

AFRICAN HISTORIES AND MODERNITIES

BLACK NATIONALIST THOUGHT IN SOUTH AFRICA

The Persistence of an Idea of Liberation

Hashi Kenneth Tafira



African Histories and Modernities

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Hashi Kenneth Tafira

Black Nationalist Thought in South Africa

The Persistence of an Idea of Liberation

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This work is dedicated to my late mother ... you are living and you are watching Ma Ndlovu.

To Azanian youth trapped in the township struggles and trying to make a meaning of it...hold up.

To Grandpas, Mavimbela Christian Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Va Chimusoro Kenneth, this is for you; your wishes are fulfilled.

To the Great Spirit that dwells in water, Nzuzu, I am eternally grateful for the gift and the honour.

FOREWORD

ALUTA CONTINUA! (THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES!)

What does freedom mean to black people whose very being (humanity) was questioned? What does blackness on a world scale mean? What does decolonization mean in a modern world in which the very modern world system remains impervious to decolonization and the global order is resistant to deimperialization? These foundational and fundamental questions have received very weak answers. In South Africa, in particular, freedom and liberation have been reduced to democracy and human rights. The negotiated dismantling of juridical apartheid has been hailed as signifying arrival. Those who spent all their time fighting for freedom and liberation, they eventually got democracy and human rights as fruits of their sacrifices. Are liberation and freedom translatable to democracy and human rights? Did Stephen Bantu Biko, Solomon Mahlangu and Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe die fighting for democracy and human rights? Why is the legacy of Biko and Sobukwe continuing to haunt postapartheid South Africa?

To respond to these questions, we must go back to the foundational question of dismemberment of black people. This foundational dismemberment took the form of questioning the very humanity of black people. It entailed pushing black people out of the human family. Once pushed out of the framework of the human family, black people have since the earliest times of colonial encounters, been existing (as opposed to living) in what Frantz Fanon termed the 'zone of non-being.' What divides the 'zone of non-being' from the 'zone of being,' is what the Portuguese decolonial theorist Boaventura de Sousa Santos described as 'abyssal thinking' that

separates human species into two zones. The abyssal thinking produced what the black American decolonial theorist William E.B. Du Bois termed ‘the colour line.’ In short, we need to fully understand the birth and fossilization of racial hierarchization and social classification of human species in accordance with assumed differential ontological densities as the foundational modernist/imperial/colonial sin. The very idea of ‘black’ and ‘white’ people cascades from this politics of paradigm of difference to borrow a term from the work of Valentin Y. Mudimbe.

The paradigm of difference is not innocent. It is an enabling paradigm—enabling enslavement, colonization and apartheid. Because of imperial/colonial logic informing the paradigm of difference, black people could easily be commoditized. Genocides, epistemicides and linguicides were enabled by the paradigm of difference. The paradigm of difference is not only backed up by scientific racism but also by the paradigm of war. The paradigm of war is justified in Western thought through ideas of *homo polemos* that naturalizes and routinizes war. The slave trade, imperialism, colonialism and apartheid were all underpinned by a paradigm of difference and war.

South Africa as a named geo-political and social entity is a construction of imperial global designs. Its genealogy is traceable to the activities of Bartholomew Diaz and Vasco da Gama. This makes the birth of South Africa to be coterminous with that of the East Indies and the Americas. Jan van Riebeeck’s 1652 landing at the Cape inaugurated enslavement of black people and colonization of space. Colonization of space could not happen without battling the indigenous people and land dispossession. The question of stolen land legitimately occupies a central place in black liberation thought, which is detailed in this book. Stolen land and inferiorization of black people provoked the rise of black consciousness movements of which Biko is known as its most able articulator in South Africa. But genealogically speaking, black consciousness is traceable to the Diaspora. Those black people who were forcibly captured and transported to the Americas as cargo suffered linguicides as part of dehumanization. This was not surprising because coloniality was inscribed through mapping, naming and owning.

The leading African decolonial theorist and novelist Ngugi wa Thiong’o spoke of dismemberment of African personhood into continental and Diaspora Africans. This was followed by The Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, that further dismembered Africa, first into various European spheres of influence and later into full-fledged colonies. The Dutch and

the British were actively involved in the making of South Africa into a colony. The Dutch had metamorphosed into Afrikaners, and they represented a colonial impulse. The English pushed forward the imperial logic of anglicization. Both colonial and imperial imperatives converged on dispossession of black people and their reduction into colonial subjects available as sources of cheap labour.

Black people have a long history of resistance and thinking about how to extricate themselves from coloniality. The African struggles for liberation date as far back as the time of colonial encounters and enslavement. This is why the birth of Haiti as a black republic occupies a special place of pride in African liberation thought. Black fighters such as Marcus Garvey occupy an important place in black liberation thought. But in South Africa specifically, the San and the Khoi Khoi became the first indigenous people to confront and resist dispossession and colonization. The Xhosa-speaking people offered stiff resistance to Dutch encroachment. The Zulu, Ndebele, Sotho and Tswana fought to retain their land and autonomy. The Battle of Isandlwana of 1879 in which Zulu forces engaged and defeated the British forces is still work of celebration in the genealogy of black struggles for liberation. The Bambatha Uprising of 1906 demonstrated the undying spirit of resistance.

Kenneth Tafira's book is focused on black liberation thought. I. B. Tabata, Biko and Sobukwe, rather than Nelson Mandela, are privileged in black liberation thought. Biko, in particular, has come to represent a black spirit that continues to inspire resistance and pan-Africanist re-imaginings of South Africa. It is resonant among the disfranchised, unemployed, disempowered and frustrated township youth in such locales as Soweto. These township youth are engaged in a struggle to find meaning for their lives within a neo-apartheid society that continues to be hailed and celebrated as a model of democracy. The black township youth are entangled in a postcolonial malady born out of protracted anti-apartheid struggle and problematic negotiations. These youth find themselves poor in a rich country, and this has awoken them to the reality of the myth of liberation, if not outright betrayal by a African leaders who allied with white liberals and communists to produce a neo-apartheid rather than postapartheid democracy. Black consciousness, in this thesis, articulated as a spirit and an emotion, 'finds a new meaning with each generation.'

The book excavates the genealogies of the black thought and crystallization of black consciousness in South Africa. Tafira is not shy in engaging the highly contentious "race and class" debates and how the leading

liberation movements responded to it and made sense of its realities in the 1960s and 1970s. Sobukwe's Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and Biko's black consciousness movement were bold enough to name racism as the main problem in South Africa, setting itself apart from such other political formations as South African Communist Party (SACP) and the African National Congress (ANC). Perhaps, the inclusivist ideas on non-racialism, as represented by the ANC, were hijacked by white liberals and white communists culminating in the downplaying of the reality of a black people who were 'Othered' racially, dispossessed as race and colonized as a race.

The current re-incarnation of black consciousness within the "post-apartheid" era, as represented by such youth movement as the Blackwash, indicates that black people still feel oppressed as a race, not class. To an extent, the continued resonance of black consciousness ideas challenges the ideas of triumphalism of ANC's non-racialism and the death of radical Africanism.

This is an important book that directly challenges the ideology of non-racialism and rainbowism. The core conundrums of liberation haunting not only South Africa but also "postcolonial" Africa are well handled in this book. The conundrums range from the very questions of decolonization and liberation, the subject of liberation and the question of betrayal of Africans.

It would seem to me South Africa has entered its "Fanonian" moment characterized by the "return" of the decolonization question. The "Rhodes Must Fall Movement" is a typical decolonial movement that has enabled students to even challenge epistemology and curriculum in such celebrated universities as the University of Cape Town (UCT). This makes Tafira's book even more relevant, as the decolonial movements draw from African archives and black thought to push down colonial statues/monuments while at the same time calling for genuine decolonization of South Africa. The liberal moment that enabled the compromise settlement of 1994 is fast losing national appeal. Madiba magic that kept South Africa together is also losing its appeal. New political formations such as the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) led by Julius Malema are pushing for the return of stolen land. The struggle for decolonization seems to be gaining new impetus. Black liberation thought is gaining relevance in a neo-apartheid situation.

Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni
Pretoria, South Africa

PREFACE

The transition of South Africa to democracy in 1994 was a euphoric event. There are manifold reasons for the celebratory mood that gripped the country. The post-1994 South Africa came about at a great cost and expenditure of black life. The institution of apartheid was repugnant. For apartheid architects, architectures and maintainers, black life was cheap; in other words, blacks were non-human who could be dispensed with in the most brutal and cruel manner without compunction. Those subjected to inhuman treatment, where race and racism are the overriding factors, don't always remain cowed in silence and fear. In time, they adopt "we got nothing to lose" attitude. In any case, their lives are a tug-of-war, with the constancy of death. Racism designs that the Other dies before they grow. Locations and spaces where the Other inhabits are death zones. In Fanonian terms, these are the native towns where all sorts of malady and vice are abound. Given South Africa's violent history of war, conquest, rape and genocide, spaces occupied by black people bear that scar, and fester with black on black violence, emasculation and feminization of men, that rise from their powerlessness, and other maladies produced by colonialism. In both colonial and postcolonial, there is a concerted effort to wage war, murder and rape, and inflict pain and suffering against those considered outside of humanity. In the postcolonial, there are negligible changes: they become mundane occurrences. During the BPC-SASO trial, in explaining why townships fester with black on black violence that makes it a miracle for one to survive to adulthood, Biko reasons:

This refers to the degree of violence that one gets in townships, which tends to introduce a certain measure of uncertainty about what tomorrow will bring...when you are in a township it is dangerous to cross often from one street to the next, and yet as you grow up it is essential that kids must be sent on errands in and around the township. They meet up with these problems: rape and murder are very very common aspects of our life in townships.

War, violence and genocide know no interregnum. Rather, these have been a conspicuous feature of black life for 500 years. For Biko, violence among victims of colonial depredations and their self-abnegation are unacceptable, but one can just die without cause or explanation.

The alterity and exteriority of blackness, where race and power relations define subjectivities and effect miseries, have been consistent with South African modernity. Blackness in South Africa is constructed from the doubt of humanity of indigenous people, a fact that facilitated genocide and land dispossession. This subjection has been indeed a very long-drawn affair. Since the arrival of Jan Van Riebeeck in 1652, blacks have always fought against attempts to proscribe them outside the human zone. Resistance has always been ongoing. This is the reason why 1994 was celebrated. Seemingly, the celebration were precocious, as black South Africans would soon discover that there have been negligible changes in their lives except pulling down of Jim Crow signs and movement into formerly racially segregated areas, the expansion of a small middle class and the ascendancy into political power of black faces. For the majority caught in the miseries of the ghettos and rural locations, they still haven't arrived, or awaiting for arrival, which looks like a perennial affair, or they will never arrive at all. That sounds pessimistic, but these are the facts of post-1994 neo-apartheid.

For some, years leading to 1994 became an endgame, with neither an outright winner nor a loser. Those of the radical bent have refused to be convinced by this assertion. Indeed, by 1994, South Africa was on a precipice. A revolution was ripe, a revolution that was averted by leaders under the pretext of avoiding a racial bloodbath and racial civil war. But what is regarded as an apocalyptic racial war, is in fact the revolution, where the anger of the masses had swelled to proportions consistent with a revolution. The dismay that some have on this non-event have led them to term the post-1994 a "sell-out" arrangement. Blacks did acquire political power and whites retained control of the economy. Currently, South Africa, a naturally wealthy country, is the most unequal society in the world where race remains a determinant.

Struggles against apartheid have always been fought by the youth who confronted heavily armed fascist police and soldiers with tenacity and reso-

lute ambition. They are in their middle to late ages now. Contemporary youth have taken the baton and continued. The reason for persistence of ideas of liberation is the grim and dim prospects offered by post-1994. South Africa's black political tradition has been a disputed affair. Black Nationalism and multiracialism have been at odds, and the latter aided by neo-liberal triumphalism has assumed hegemonic ascendancy while obfuscating the former despite its huge contribution to the South African liberation struggle. It is the youth subscribing to Black Nationalist tradition that is the subject of this book. The youth get steeled with a new consciousness at each historical phase. This consciousness is accompanied by bravery and courage and the desire to do the impossible. They are inspired by preceding generations, whose memory is not obliterated, but kept alive and burning. Stories are passed on and the new generation always realizes that freedom is a possibility. Steve Biko and Robert Sobukwe, icons of Azanian Black Nationalist thought, return and continue to illuminate the post-apartheid social order. As for Biko, his contestation by various claimants for different reasons shows his continuing and lasting legacy. However, he finds a special niche among a disenfranchised and frustrated township youth who are trapped in township struggles, where they attempt to derive meaning. More important is why these youth who neither saw nor participated in the struggle against apartheid are turning to an age-old idea like Black Nationalism in a context of the pervasive influence of non-racialism, rainbowism and triumphalism of neo-liberalism? The realization is that a human-centred society with a human face, which black radical practitioners advocated and strove for, is yet to be accomplished. This shows the anomalies and maladies of a postcolonial dispensation, where ideals, principles and teleology of the liberation struggle are yet to be consummated. Thus, Black Nationalism as a node in a long thread of black political thought in the country, and as a spirit, will always be both an emotion and a motion that find a new meaning with each generation.

This book is based on material collected while doing my doctoral research at the University of the Witwatersrand. My heartfelt gratitude to Prof. Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Prof. David Coplan, Prof. Shahid Vawda, Sabar, the scintillating man, Zandi Radebe, Tebogo Radebe, Marechera wa Ndata and Blackwash massive, with whom I shared moments of intellectual depth, all love; to Nicolas Dieltiens and Caroline Tagny, many thanks.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACU	African Christians Union
AME	African Methodist Episcopal
ANC	African National Congress
ANCYL	African National Congress Youth League
APDUSA	African Peoples Democratic Union of South Africa
APC	African People's Congress
APLA	Azanian Peoples Liberation Army
ARV	Anti-Retroviral
AWB	Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging Webblad
AZANYU	Azanian National Youth Union
AZAPO	Azanian Peoples Organisation
AZAYO	Azanian Youth Organisation
BCP	Black Communities Programmes
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
BHM	Black History Month
BPC	Black Peoples Convention
CBM	Consultative Business Movement
CCB	Civil Cooperation Bureau
CE	Critical Ethnography
COD	Congress of Democrats
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COP	Congress of the People
COSATU	Confederation of South African Trade Unions
CPC	Coloured Peoples Council
CPSA	Communist Party of South Africa
CST	Colonisation of a Special Type
CYL	Congress Youth League

DA	Democratic Alliance
DBE	Department of Basic Education
DLF	Democratic Left Front
DP	Democratic Party
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
FET	Further Education and Training
FNB	First National Bank
HPCSA	Health Professions Council of South Africa
HRC	Human Rights Commission
ICD	Independent Complaints Directorate
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPID	Independent Police Investigations Directorate
JMC	Joint Management Committee
JSE	Johannesburg Stock Exchange
KZN	KwaZulu – Natal
LP	Labour Party
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MKWVA	Umkhonto we Sizwe War Veterans Association
MMR	Maternal Mortality Rate
NACTU	National Council of Trade Unions
NDR	National Democratic Revolution
NEDLAC	National Economic Development and Labour Council
NFT	New Frank Talk
NGK	Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk
NHI	National Health Insurance
NIC	Natal Indian Congress
NIA	National Intelligence Agency
NP	Nationalist Party
NPC	National Planning Commission
NUMSA	National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa
NUSAS	National Union of South African Students
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress of Azania
PASMA	Pan African Students Movement of Azania
POPCRU	Police and Prisons Civil Rights Unions
PYA	Progressive Youth Alliance
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SAB	South African Breweries
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADF	South African Defence Force
SADTU	South African Democratic Teachers Union
SAIC	South African Indian Congress

SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SAIRR	South African Institute of Race Relations
SANCO	South African National Civic Organisations
SAP	South African Police
SASCO	South African Students Congress
SASM	South African Students Movement
SASO	South African Student Organisation
SASS	South African State Security
SAYRO	Socialist Azanian Youth Revolutionary Organisation
SBF	Steve Biko Foundation
SOE	State-Owned Enterprises
SOPA	Socialist Party of Azania
SNI	September National Imbizo
SSRC	South Africa Students Representative Council
SRC	Students Representative Council
StatsSA	Statistics South Africa
SYP	Siyaphambili Youth Pioneers
TBVC	Transkei Bophuthatswana Venda Ciskei
TCE	Transvaal College of Education
TEC	Transitional Executive Council
TIC	Transvaal Indian Congress
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UDF	United Democratic Front
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UP	United Party
WHAM	Win Hearts and Minds
WHO	World Health Organisation
YCL	Young Communist League
YWCA	Young Women's Christian Association
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African Peoples Union
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

Introduction

South African colonial modernity, which spans 500 years, is a long gory story covered in blood, sweat, tears and suffering of those who have been subjected to its insidious machinations. Generations of white population have immensely and fabulously got wealthy and still enjoy ill-gotten gains necessitated by colonization. On the contrary, black people are the case of working hard like a slave and never being able to live like a king. South African modernity is founded on, and etched in, blood. It stands on the cadavers of indigenous people, whose extermination and subjugation necessitated the ground on which South Africa is constructed. Colonial modernity and coloniality of power and their equally sinister accessories, war, murder, rape and genocide, have had a lasting impact on those unfortunate enough to receive such ghastly visitations. Colonial modernity and all constitutive of it were acts of unprovoked war; in any case, war and violence necessitated colonial modernity. Maldonado-Torres views war, conquest and genocide as fundamental to coloniality and imputed by the misanthropic scepticism of the humanity of indigenous people who were deemed inferior not only in skin colour but also in religion (Christianity), culture and civilization, which corresponded with death, violence and genocide.¹ For Maldonado-Torres, the non-human Other is “rapeable” and “killable,” notions that are inscribed in colonial bodies.² The colonial encounter itself is brutal. It uses terror, which facilitates establishment of hegemony—a terror which is not only a physiological act but also a social fact—and a cultural construction, which serves as a mediator for colonial

hegemony.³ It leads to cultures of terror whose violence is based on and nourished by silence, thus a cultural construction of evil.⁴

Coloniality is indeed insidious and wholly devilish, given its history of bloodshed, unparalleled cruelty and blood-curdling adventures anywhere in the world where contact has been made with indigenous populations. In South Africa, like the Americas, coloniality wasn't only the arrival of an economic system of labour and capital and extraction of surplus value, but it was also a hotchpotch power structure that included the cultural, spiritual, religious and cosmological aspects. Thus, we see a colonial power matrix that is multidimensional, multitudinous and latitudinal, with race being the primary criterion for structuration and individuation. Before the expansion of South African modernity into the hinterland, the Cape economy was slave-based. The coerced physical labour was assigned to those deemed inferior and black, and its alienation has been dominant in South African colonial modes of production. Under South African colonial modernity, there is an entanglement of labour, slavery, serfdom, Othering and production of commodities for the world market.

Colonial ontological difference and exteriority of the Other as racially marked, as different, as scum of the earth, as the wretched who is imbricated in the hegemonic epistemic and structures of domination, is a very prominent feature of South African colonial modernity. Race is primary, which marks the difference between conquerors and conquered, where inferiority is naturalized through biologically and phenotypically based codifications.⁵ In the Americas, coloniality of power emerged from the poser whether Indians had souls or not.⁶ In South Africa, it was whether the Khoi and the San, and later the "Bantu"-speaking peoples were human or not. Even though groups like the San are lighter skinned, it couldn't exempt them from a white supremacist racial gaze that privileges fair hue. Thus, global coloniality and indeed global white supremacy begin from the logic of hue of colour and its lightness, which guarantees full humanity.

This book maintains that South Africa, despite the official end of apartheid in 1994, remains steeped in the interstices of coloniality. We propose that there is a distinction between colonialism and coloniality, although colonialism is constitutive of coloniality. According to Maldonado-Torres:

Coloniality is different from colonialism. Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such nation an empire. Coloniality, instead, refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged

as a result of colonialism, but define culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production beyond strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus coloniality survives colonialism.⁷

We are, however, cognizant of the so-called exceptional or unique South African colonial experience, which has been sometimes called Colonisation of a Special Type, given the presence of Afrikaner domination, which had long-lost connection with The Netherlands and geographies of social origin, and the imperial nature of the British. The fact that both the British and the Afrikaners were internal settlers doesn't preclude the colonial nature of South Africa, which is similar to any classical colonial situations. South African colonial modernity, just like the Americas, emerges at a particular socio-historical setting. It is not lost to us that both Diaz and Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape within a decade of Columbus' "discovery" of the Americas, and that Diaz and Columbus were at one point companions on a ship to the West Coast of Africa in 1482 to establish a slave fort. In 1481, Diaz had also accompanied Diogo d'Azambuja in exploration of the formerly Gold Coast. That area became important in trans-Atlantic slave commerce. During the same era, Columbus also sailed in search of a route to India but got lost and ended up in the western hemisphere. Our conjecture is if he had got his bearings right and parked at the Cape, he would have prosecuted the same genocide he did in the Americas, and South Africa would have given rise to the modern European capitalist system and indeed Western modernity.

The year 1488 is the landmark year in South African historiography. Unlike the arrival of Jan Van Riebeeck in 1652, the "discovery" of the Cape in 1488 by Portuguese explorer Bartholomew Diaz laid the foundations of South Africa's colonial modernity. We propose that South African colonial modernity begins in 1488 when Bartholomew Diaz circumnavigated the Cape. We argue that what makes 1488 significant is the fact that it is a year that marks the beginning of South Africa's insertion into the capitalist world-system. While it is true that the "discovery" of the Americas by Columbus within the same decade gave rise to Western modernity and, subsequently, its prosperity, the sojourns of Diaz not only exposed the southern part of Africa to later colonization but also opened important trade routes to India and the Asian subcontinent.

We stretch this point further and say South African colonial modernity is marked by six major interregnums. The first is the period between 1488 and 1652, in which routes to Asia were established and Jan Van Riebeeck

arrived at the Cape with the intention of colonising it. The second is the period between 1652 and 1795, which marks the eruption of initial major wars and confrontations, genocide of indigenous populations, the establishment of the Dutch Cape colony that was juxtaposed with slave-based economy and forced labour, the appearance of the British, Afrikanerization, Anglicization, proselytization and beginning of accumulation at a major scale. The third is the period between 1795 and 1910, which marks the presence of the British Cape colony, further encroachment into the interior by both the Afrikaners and the British, conflicts among the colonizers, a subsequent period of mass black proletarianization, urbanization and industrialization as a result of discovery of precious metals in Kimberly and Witwatersrand and formation of South Africa as white man's nation when the 1910 Union of South Africa was instituted. The fourth is the period between 1910 and 1948, which saw the consolidation of white imperial capital and the contemporary phase of African resistance to colonial rule. The fifth period is between 1948 and 1994, which marks the institutionalization of racist white supremacist ideas in the form of apartheid, which is a node in the thread of South African modernity; these ideas had been existent since, at least, 1488. The sixth period is after 1994; it is a continuum of global coloniality, the difference with earlier phases being that local white and global capital in tandem with black *nouveau riche* elite entangle in a mixture of "old" money and "new" money, which is mixed up in a hotchpotch constellation of accumulation and consumption. However, we don't see South Africa's colonial modernity as linear, not even marked by continuities and discontinuities, rather by eruptions and disruptions. This book sketches mainly a theoretical schema of this subject, taking the themes of decolonial ethics, decolonization, coloniality and modernity as a departure point. Nonetheless, we combine these with the traditions of black radical thought, as they have been spelt out in South African political historiography.

We counterpoise the notion that South African modernity begins with the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1887 or even the Kimberly diamond rush two decades earlier. We concur that it is true these events precipitated modern forms of extractive relations of productions in South Africa. However, the country's colonial modernity should be traced to Diaz's sojourns and "discovery" of the Cape in 1488 and the arrival of Van Riebeeck in 1652.

South African indigenous peoples have a long history of resistance to encroachment of, and ill-treatment by, foreigners, and this dates back to

the time of Diaz. There were also clashes with Antonio de Saldanha in 1503 and Francis de Almeida in 1510. The latter was killed together with 67 of his men at Table Bay. Subsequent sojourns to the East Indies by the Portuguese carefully avoided the area. In 1488, Diaz encountered the Khoi at Mossel Bay, and bartered trinkets with cattle and sheep, but a skirmish broke out. Diaz shot dead one of the Khoi with a crossbow. Quarrels with the Khoi were usually caused by the ill-mannerisms of Diaz and da Gama, including fetching water without permission from the Khoi. Earlier on, in 1497, da Gama clashed with the Khoi. Da Gama's barbarous cruelty and sadistic treatment to those he encountered elsewhere in East Africa and India is well known.

Within 4 years of Van Riebeeck's arrival, the first Khoi-Dutch war broke out, the primary cause being appropriation of Khoi's prime land by the Dutch. These conflicts including the so-called Kaffir wars continued right up to the Bambatha rebellion of 1906.

Azanian Black Nationalist thought, in all its forms and shapes, is a historical idea rooted in the colonial encounter between Africans and colonizers. It is a consummation of a long tradition steeped in the desire of colonized Africans to liberate themselves. It is a strand, a node in a long thread woven through different historical epochs in Azanian resistance struggles. It is my intention to trace this idea. More important is the question why certain ideas persist throughout history, refusing to be buried, and like a spectre or ghost of the past return to haunt the present.

This book seeks to answer the question why should philosophies like Black Consciousness (BC) and Pan-Africanism persist through history, even when they are pronounced "deceased." Interestingly, some of the contemporary Black Nationalist-oriented youth neither saw nor participated in the struggle against apartheid. This book traces the development of political lineage of Black Nationalism in Azania from early African nationalism of the mission-educated elite, Ethiopianism, Garveyism to BC in its contemporary forms. I also argue that ideas travel; that while Africans were transported as human cargo into the New World, they came back into the continent in the form of an idea—Pan-Africanism. It is from these ideas that the political subjectivity of black South Africans was firmly entrenched. Developments in the USA in the 1960s and 1970s and anti-colonial movements in the Third World are also important and were intricately connected, especially with BC in Azania. Black Nationalism resurgence in postapartheid South Africa can also be compared with the revival of Black Nationalism in the USA in the early 1990s. Here,

the hagiography of black icons (especially Malcolm X) and rap culture is important; similarly, the mythologizing of Steve Biko and his contestation by various sectors of the black Azanian community makes a rich basis for comparison.

The development of African forms of political protest and resistance in Azanian history is replete with black resistance to white conquest and domination. Of course, settler colonialism is based on oppression, which, in turn, creates antagonisms between the colonizer and the colonized, the oppressor and the oppressed and the dominator and the dominated. It is proper to locate the rise of African political consciousness and resistance, which begins after the colonial encounter seen on the arrival of Bartholomew Diaz in the Cape in 1488, numerous European sailors and their skirmishes with indigenous people and the presence of Jan Van Riebeeck in 1652, the British in 1798 and thereafter. These early resistances have been documented elsewhere.⁸ It is the memory of these that would provide an inspiration and serve as political fodder for later struggles.

The first African newspapers, albeit mission-controlled, were John Tengo Jabavu's *Imvo Yabantsundu* (Native Opinion) formed in 1884; Alan Kirkland Soga and Walter Rabusana's *Izwi Labantu* (Voice of the People) in 1898 and FZS Peregrino's *South African Spectator*, which reported struggles of black people throughout the world, especially in the USA.⁹ The first African political organizations were *Imbumba Yama Nyama* (Union of Africans) formed at the same time as the Afrikaner Bond in the early 1880s; the South African Native Congress (1898) and the African Peoples' Organization whose membership was mainly 'coloured' (1902).¹⁰ With the hope of British victory in the Anglo-Boer war, many Africans hoped that the Cape's non-racial electoral system would be extended to the larger South African society. Instead, there was white settler political accommodation rather than extension of political rights to Africans. The Cape liberal idea became a basis for black protest and political mobilization.¹¹ The South African National Native Congress (SANNC) was formed in 1912 by mission-educated African elite and petty bourgeoisie who did not commit to Ethiopianist's "Africa for Africans," despite its all-African membership. Instead, its official goal was a common democratic society where Africans, whites, coloureds and Indians would be equal and sought "liberation from prejudice and discrimination through non-confrontational means: publicising of black grievances, lobbying or petitioning of public authorities and legislative bodies and support

of legal challenges to discriminatory laws and policies.”¹² The SANNC, however, changed its name to pan-African sounding African National Congress (ANC)¹³ in 1923, but didn’t wholly embrace Garveyism, which was current during that period. Nonetheless, some ANC members like Josiah Gumede in the Transvaal subscribed to Garveyism. James Thaele in the Western Cape, who himself had been educated in the USA where he fell under the influence of du Bois and Garvey’s ideas, was known to be an ardent supporter of Garveyism.¹⁴ Thaele also published the *African World* modelled on Garvey’s *Negro World*; Clements Kadalie’s populist Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) was also a supporter of Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) and the ICU’s newspaper, *The Black Man* and its successor *The Workers Herald*, featured Garveyism.

The Garveyism “Africa for Africans” movement, which can be historically linked to Ethiopianism, was in many ways conjoined with black Americans.¹⁵ Garveyism played a crucial role in the historical consciousness of resistance, which was manifest in Lembede’s Congress Youth League (CYL) in the 1940s. In the post–First World War years, Garvey’s ideas were gaining currency in the country and developing into a full, mass nationalist movement whose adherents adopted the slogans “*Amelika Ayeza!*” (Black Americans are coming!), “*Afrika Mayibuye!*” (Let Africa be restored to us!) and “Africa for Africans!”, meaning that they saw Garvey and his supporters coming to liberate oppressed black South Africans.¹⁶ Garveyism was actually a form of BC, which had long been a part of the African response to colonialism. Although Black Nationalism wasn’t exclusive to a particular social class, it was nurtured by a growing common racial identity and historical experience of subjugation and citizenship denial.¹⁷

These ideas were to find firm footing in the 1940s, especially in the writings of Anton Lembede who initiated the ANC’s CYL in 1944. In fact, Lembede is considered the first to construct the philosophy of African nationalism in Azania.¹⁸ The CYL’s manifesto, co-authored by Lembede, A.P. Mda and Jordan Ngubane, was to rethink Black Nationalist theory and practice. It advocated an African consciousness and upliftment, a belief in African spirituality, self-discovery, shedding of inferiority, self-reliance and cultural uniqueness as a basis for opposition to white supremacy.¹⁹ Lembede believed that Africans were not bound by language, colour, geographical location or nationalism, but by a spiritual force called “Africanism,” which is a higher self-realization and self-expression of the African spirit.²⁰ His African nationalism was based on

the following: “Africa is a black man’s country; Africans are one; African leaders must come out of Africans; cooperation with whites may only happen if separate²¹; destiny of Africans is in national freedom; national progress and advancement; socialism after national freedom and our motto is: Freedom in our Lifetime.”²² Lembede believed that before waging the struggle against white domination, Africans had to turn inward and make self-discovery, shed inferiority, improve their self-image, rely on their own resources and write and mobilize as a national group around their own leaders. Finally, he called for closing of ranks, unity and standing together of Africans.²³

The Youth Leaguers (i.e., Lembede, Ngubane, A.P. Mda, Zeph Mothopeng and others) also opposed the ANC old guard’s conservatism and trusteeship.²⁴ Theirs was a confrontational and direct approach. The CYL was calling for action and mass organization. Indeed, the Alexandra bus boycott of 1940 and 1945, the Soweto homeless’ movement of 1944–1947 led by Sofasonke Mpanza and the 1946 workers strike, all amidst the increased frustration of urban working class as a result of widespread poverty, were conditions that demanded a mass movement.²⁵ As a result, the ANC adopted a Programme of Action in 1949 calling for civil disobedience, strikes, boycotts and stay-at-home. By also clamouring for national freedom, political independence and self-determination, the Congress began to assume a new spirit of militancy and aggressiveness.²⁶ This culminated in the defiance campaign in 1950s, signalling ANC’s new approach to struggle.

Lembede’s ideas were propelled onwards by his Youth League comrades following his demise in 1947. A.P. Mda who succeeded him as CYL President, and others like P.K. Leballo and Robert Sobukwe formed the Bureau of African Nationalism (BAN), which monitored the Defiance Campaign, to ensure that non-Africans would not divert the goals and methods of the Programme of Action. Leballo and his associates were in opposition to the alliance policy, which they saw as collaborationist and advocating non-racialism. They called themselves as the Africanist Central Committee (CenCom), and published a journal in 1954, called *The Africanist*, which became a focal point for African nationalism and criticism of the ANC’s policy of multi-racialism. Since the first issue of *The Africanist* in November 1954 to the founding of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) in 1958, and to beyond the Sharpeville massacre, multiracial political cooperation was to be one of the most divisive

issues in South African black politics.²⁷ The Africanists argued that white liberals and white radicals shared the same underlying attitude toward African political initiatives—that neither was willing to allow Africans to chart their course for fear that Africans would see all whites as enemies.²⁸ The Africanists maintained that all whites, including liberals and radicals, desired to maintain the status quo because they were beneficiaries of an exploitative social system. White radicals, they said, saw Black Nationalism as anti-white, black supremacist, and equal to Afrikaner racism, which, however, was premised on perpetuating subjugation. African nationalism, Africanists claimed, was a liberation ideology. Indeed, Africanism and Marxism were at polar opposites—the former emphasized race consciousness, while the latter, a class analysis. The Africanist position seemed to be vindicated by the uniqueness of the historical experience of black people as the downtrodden.

By 1958, the Africanists broke away, denouncing the ANC's adoption of the Freedom Charter,²⁹ which defied the principles of African nationalism embodied in the 1949 Programme of Action. In April of 1959, on Van Riebeeck Day, the Africanists formally became the PAC at a conference held at Orlando Community Hall in Soweto. Slogans like "Africa for Africans; Cape to Cairo; Morocco to Madagascar; imperialists quit Africa and *Izwe Lethu iAfrika* (Afrika is our land), Azania we will take with a bazooka"³⁰ were heard. The formation of the PAC coincided with Ghana's independence in 1959, and the breakaway party drew heavily on Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist ethos.

In 1960, the PAC launched the Anti-Pass Campaign, which led to the Sharpeville massacre in which 69 African protesters were killed by apartheid police and 100 injured; in Cape Town, 30,000 people led by Philip Kgosana marched against pass laws. Thereafter, PAC launched an armed wing, POQO (in Xhosa, meaning 'We Africans stand-alone'); modelling itself on Kenya's Mau Mau, 250 men with *pangas* went on a rampage in the Eastern Cape, attacking a police station and killing two whites. However, it was PAC's P.K. Leballo's political naivety at a Maseru press conference that led to a raid of the party's offices, confiscation of membership lists and rounding up and arrest of hundreds of PAC supporters and sympathizers. The ANC for its own armed struggle launched *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK—Spear of the Nation), and both POQO and MK had distinct approaches and different ideological inclinations. While POQO wanted to maximize white civilian death in a terror campaign, MK used sabotage with an aim

of limited loss of life; in 1963, MK cadres were arrested in a suburb of Johannesburg, leading to the Rivonia trial where they were sent to prison for life. This effectively marked the end of African political protest, creating a political vacuum until the emergence of the South African Student Organization (SASO)³¹ and Steve Biko's Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) in the late 1960s.³²

This thought persists into the postapartheid as purveyed by township youth. Chapter 2 looks at the Black Nationalist movement as both a politico-ideological thought and a philosophy. Connections are made with erstwhile black radical thought in a political lineage linking the New World and the country. Chapter 3 traces the fortunes of BC after the 1976 uprising and how that affected BC ideological thought and at the same time contributing to its marginalization in mainstream politics. Chapter 4 examines the genesis of BC postapartheid, especially through Blackwash, a BC youth movement based in Soweto who are the primary focus of this book. It analyses BC politico-ideological thought as propagated by youth who are both within and without the movement. Chapter 5 analyses contractions that beset a youth movement, outlines reasons and causes and proposes a few considerations. Since Blackwash is a youth movement and indeed much of contemporary Black Nationalist thought is propagated by the young, Chap. 6 interrogates the concept "black youth" and the reasons why this youth comes to subjectivity and what spurs their agency. Chapter 7 traces a historical construction of blackness in Azania and elsewhere, where comparisons are made on the inherent instability of the term "blackness" itself. Chapters 8 and 9 follow debates among contemporary Black Nationalist youth on the role of the middle-class culture and history in black struggles for liberation. Chapter 10 traces the history of collaboration, complicity and "selling-out" in South African historiography. The impetus comes from allegations by contemporary Black Nationalist youth that the postapartheid order is a "sell-out" arrangement. The chapter proposes that rather than selling-out, the betrayals of liberation may better be understood as stemming from the process of decolonization itself. Chapter 12 examines "The Nation" as it was, and is propagated by different black protagonists. "Azania" is used interchangeably with "South Africa" throughout this book, the former as an appellation used by Black Nationalist proponents to refer to the latter. Chapter 13, similar in many respects to the last, views symbols, symbolization and symbolism in the postcolony as integral in a normative vision of the nation and how it had to be imagined.

This book holistically examines black political thought and themes around it. It is a totality that seeks congruence of different strands of thought that are bound together in different chapters. One particular issue may appear in one chapter and in another, albeit in a different form, depending on the theme addressed in that context. Thus, the reader is implored to read all the chapters if they are to realize a complete and fulfilling perception of the issues pertaining to this book.

NOTES

1. Maldonado-Torres, Nelson. 2007. On the Coloniality of Being. *Cultural Studies*. 21 (2) pp. 240–270.
2. Ibid.:255.
3. Taussig, Michael. 1987. *Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
4. Ibid.
5. Quijano, Anibal. 2007. Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality. *Cultural Studies* 21 (2) pp. 168–78.
6. Maldonado-Torres, op cit.
7. Ibid.: 243.
8. Trotter, Henry M. 2001. Sailors as Scribes: Travel Writings and the (Con) Textualisation of the KhoiKhoi at the Cape of Good Hope, 1649–90. *Journal of African Travel-Writing* 8 & 9 pp. 30–44; Jaffe, Hosea. 1952. Three Hundred Years. *Unity Movement History Series*. APDUSA. Cumberwood.
9. Fredrickson, George M. 1995. *Black Liberation. A Comparative History of Black Ideologies in the United States and South Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press; Walshe, Peter. 1970 [1987]. *The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa*. Johannesburg: A.D. Donker.
10. Odendaal, Andre. 1984. *Vukani Bantu! The Beginnings of Black Protest Politics in South Africa to 1912*. Cape Town: David Philip; Halisi, CRD. 1999. *Black Political Thought in the Making of South African Democracy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
11. Walshe, op cit.; Hill, Robert A and Pirió, Gregory A. 1987. “Africa for the Africans”: The Garvey Movement in South Africa, 1920–1940. In Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, eds. *The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa*. Essex: Long Group UK Ltd.
12. Fredrickson, op cit.: 125.
13. ANC’s alliance with the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), which was formed in 1921 was an adoption of working towards an independent native republic and then a workers and peasant republic; that South Africa

was a colonial situation and socialism would be achieved through two stages: (a) a national democratic revolution and (b) a socialist revolution. This was to inform CPSA and even ANC policy for a long time in the future (Callinicos 1988; Lodge 1990).

14. Hill and Pirio, op cit.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Kuper, Leo. 1969. African Nationalism in South Africa. In Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson, eds. *The Oxford History of South Africa*, Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Halisi, op cit.
18. Edgar, Robert R and Msumza, Luyanda, eds. 1996. *Freedom in Our Lifetime. The Collected Writings of Anton Muziwakhe Lembede*. Ohio: Ohio University Press; Karis, Thomas and Carter, Gwendolen M. 1963. *Five African States*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
19. Fatton, Robert Jnr. 1986. *Black Consciousness in South Africa. The Dialectics of Ideological Resistance to White Supremacy*. New York: State University of New York Press.
20. Edgar and Msumza, op cit.
21. Lembede associated Marxism with the white SA Communist Party, which he saw as perpetuating white paternalism, and he rejected communism as conflicting with nationalism. He believed Europeans could only be invited after freedom and inter-racial cooperation was only be possible when Africans had reached self-confidence and unity/cohesion.
22. Edgar and Msumza, 1996: 21.
23. Ibid.
24. Gerhart, Gail M. 1978. Black Power in South Africa. The Evolution of an Ideology. Perspectives on South Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press.
25. Lodge, Tom. 1990. *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press; Posel, Deborah. 1991. *The Making of Apartheid 1948–1961. Conflict and Compromise*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
26. Gerhart, Gail, op cit.
27. Ibid.: 151.
28. Ibid.; Halisi, op cit.
29. The Freedom Charter drafted on 26 June 1955, where ANC, SA Indian Congress (SAIC), SA Coloured Peoples' Organisation (SACPO) and Congress of Democrats formed an alliance. The Charter espoused non-racialism, and its goal wasn't socialism but class collaboration and alliances. Following the Charter, ideological conflict emerged leading to the break-away PAC in 1959 (Fatton 1986).
30. These words have translated into an emotive liberation song, which I have heard sung on many occasions by social movements.

31. SASO broke away from the mainly white NUSAS in 1968, and was officially inaugurated in 1969.
32. Mngxitama, Andile, Alexander, Amanda and Gibson Nigel C, eds. 2008. *Biko Lives! Contesting the Legacies of Steve Biko*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

The Black Nationalist Movement in Azania

Black Nationalism in Azania is just a node in a long thread of black radical thought beginning with resistance to colonial conquest. It is intricately tied and connected to black struggles on the African continent and the New World. At the turn of the twentieth century, Henry Sylvester Williams, a Trinidadian lawyer and Pan-Africanist, was practising in South Africa; the 1919 Pan-Africanist conference and the 1945 Manchester conference also had immense influence on the country's Pan-African thought. Black Nationalism in Azania was inspired by the Ethiopian religious movements, African religious-political thought and prophecy, the Pan-Africanism of Marcus Garvey, Kwame Nkrumah, Du Bois, George Padmore, among others, the writings of Negritude proponents like Leopold Senghor and Aime Cesaire, and anti-colonial literature by Albert Memmi and Frantz Fanon, among them. The Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), in particular, borrowed from anti-colonial struggles in Africa, as well as the Black Power Movement in the USA, which gave oppressed blacks a new meaning, especially the militancy of Eldridge Cleaver, Stokely Carmichael [Kwame Ture] and Paulo Freire.¹ BC emerged in the mid-1960s to fill the political vacuum left as a result of the banning of the PAC and ANC, whose leaders had been detained, sentenced to lengthy jail terms while others went underground and into exile. BC introduced new dimensions to the struggle by openly defying the system and the new black activists, like their 1940s and 1950s predecessors sought to displace the white left from black politics.² The seeds of BC began to grow with black students

who were the most educated of the oppressed blacks, who were part of National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), which contained white critics of white supremacy. At the NUSAS conference in 1968, Steve Biko and other black students identified both white leftists and liberals as part of the very system when they experienced what they considered to be white liberal paternalism and *baaskap* (white supremacy), thus leading to a decision that blacks should be at the forefront of their own struggles. Through the University Christian Movement (UCM), they read Paolo Freire, Liberation Theology and African communal life.³ The result was that SASO was formed at Marianhill and was officially inaugurated at Turfloop (now the University of Limpopo) in 1969. SASO would provide a blueprint for an incipient philosophy of BC. The SASO resolution 42 of 1971 states that:

SASO is a Black student organisation working for the liberation of the Black man, first from psychological oppression by liberating himself from inferiority complex and secondly from the physical one accruing from living in a white racist society.

There are strong resonances here with the PAC of the late 1950s. Announcing the Status Campaign in 1959, Mangaliso Robert Sobukwe called for mental revolution to reverse the inculcation of inferiority in the African psyche by which the white, foreign ruling minority “has educated the African to accept the status quo of white supremacy and black inferiority as normal.” The task of the Africanists, according to Sobukwe, was to exorcise the slave mentality and infuse into him a sense of self-reliance and desire for more “self-government [than] the good government preferred by the ANC.” He added that Africans must assert their personality and not beg the oppressor to treat them courteously. The people must be reminded that they are men and women and must resist and resent being called “kwedini,” “mfana” or “moshemane.”⁴ Acceptance of indignity, insult and humiliation was unfathomable. Freeing the mind would free the body, and “once white supremacy has become mentally untenable to our people, it will become physically untenable too and will go.” Sobukwe went on to say that those who criticized Africanists’ concern with status and not with the African economic plight assumed that the African is an economic animal and not a human being: “Those who have been ‘herrenvolkenised’ by their Herrenvolk environment expect us to be lick-spittles in order to get more crumbs from the oppressor.”

The SASO policy manifesto defined BC as an attitude of the mind, a way of life. The black man was implored to reject all value systems that alienated him from his birth right and reduced his human dignity. The concept of BC implies awareness by black people of the power they wield as a group, both economically and politically, and hence group cohesion and solidarity are important facets of BC. Therefore, BC is an inward-looking process meant “to look at ourselves and see ourselves, not in terms of what we have been taught through the absolute values of white society but with new eyes. It is a call upon us to see the innate value in us, in our institutions, in our traditional outlook to life and in our worth as people.”⁵

SASO rejected white liberal ideology and white liberal multiculturalism and formed an independent political ideology to liberate blacks from mental submissiveness. They critiqued white liberalism; espoused black solidarity and recognized that blacks were an exploited group. This was to lay the basis of the BCM principle of self-organizing and exclusiveness. Of course, there are precedents that can be traced to early Pan-Africanism, Garveyism, Lembede’s brand of African nationalism, the PAC and Black Nationalism in the USA. Carmichael [Ture] and Hamilton had advocated that black people must lead and run their own organizations and must come together and do things for themselves to achieve self-identity and self-determination.⁶ “Black Man, You are On Your Own!”, a popular BC cry, was a riposte to white liberalism, which BC saw as an obstacle to independent black initiative.⁷ During the Black People’s Convention (BPC)-SASO Trial, Biko explained that some students in the campus were sceptical of whites’ attachment to non-racialism; black students felt whites were satisfied with the status quo and were not going to assist completely in moving away from this situation to one of non-racialism. Seemingly, this position had been espoused earlier by the African Nationalism of the PAC, which originated in the CYL in the 1940s, which rejected collaboration and alliances with whites. It promoted African cultural identity, autonomy and independence in charting the way forward for the struggle. As a result, it was an ideological assertion of defiance.⁸ BC vehemently opposed white liberals’ proposal of integration, which they saw as assimilation; Biko rejected integration and called for separation, as this was practically the only means to achieve freedom. The belief in inferiority of blacks led even white liberals to believe that blacks can’t formulate opposition to apartheid alone without “white guidance and trusteeship.”⁹ It was for this reason that the BCM rejected collaboration with whites, including liberals and radicals. Biko never made a distinction between the white liberal

establishment and white radicals, which, to him, were the same thing.¹⁰ Biko questioned the sincerity of white left and/or liberals and their propensity to lead blacks, which is compounded by blacks' own inferiority complex:

Thus adopting the line of a non-racial approach, the liberals are playing their old game. They are claiming a 'monopoly on intelligence and moral judgement' and setting the pattern for the realisation of the black man's aspirations ... white liberals stand with either foot on each side and are not wholly committed to black man's cause. They vacillate between the two worlds, verbalising all the complaints of the blacks beautifully while skilfully extracting what suits them from the exclusive pool of white privilege.¹¹

Biko further indicted white liberals in these words:

We are concerned with that curious bunch of nonconformists who explain their participation in negative terms: that bunch of do-gooders that goes under all sorts of names—liberals, leftists etc. These are people who argue that they are not responsible for white racism and the country's 'inhumanity to blacks'. These are people who claim that they too feel the oppression just as acutely as the blacks and therefore should be jointly involved in the black-man's struggle for a place under the sun. In short these are the people who say that they have black souls wrapped up in white skins ... the integration so achieved is a one-way course, with the whites doing all the talking and the blacks the listening ... The biggest mistake the black world ever made was to assume that whoever opposed apartheid was an ally.¹²

Note here the similarities with the PAC-aligned Potlako Leballo's article in *The Africanist* of December 1957, where the Africanists were decrying Congress' multiracial alliances:

The Congress leadership, because it interprets the struggle as one for democracy and therefore a political struggle, designed to remove legal restrictions, recognises the foe as the present Nationalist government and accepts and treats everybody opposed to the Nationalist government whatever his motives as an ally.

Leballo criticized the ANC for making a "catastrophic blunder by accepting foreign leadership by the whites" and sarcastically asked, "How can we have leaders who are also led?" Apparently, this was in response to the

elevation of Joe Slovo in 1954 to chairmanship of the ANC's Commission of Inquiry into disputes involving ANC policies. PAC meetings¹³ also denounced multi-racialism for blinding one from facing the enemy. PAC adherents argued that white liberals who hung out with Africans were of the same ilk as Verwoerd,¹⁴ although they acted as a "good white man—*umlungu osithandayo*." Mangaliso Robert Sobukwe, while answering a question in *The Africanist* of January 1959 with regard to all whites as oppressors, said:

We regard them all as shareholders in the South African Oppressors Company (Pty) Ltd. There are whites, of course, who are intellectually converted to our cause, but because of their position materially, they cannot fully identify themselves with the struggle of African people. They want safeguards and check-points all along the way, with the result that the struggle of the people is blunted, stultified and crushed.

Biko's and the BCM's assertion that race is at the core of apartheid South Africa has been, however, contentious in the struggle against apartheid. Regardless, the argument by BC has been that whites overwhelmingly voted for the Nationalist Party government in almost every successive election and helped the racist government to retain power, the same government that maintained repressive legislation that facilitated black oppression, poverty, deprivation and self-alienation. During the SASO Trial, Biko explained:

Some may vote one way, some another, but all of them belong to an electoral college, if one may speak in those terms, of the whole society, which is jointly responsible for the government that does all these things, or that makes all these provisions applying to Black people. And in this sense therefore they lose the natural right to speak as co-planners with us in our way of determining the future ... they define themselves in other words as the enemy ... therefore we believe that in all matters relating to the struggle towards realising our aspirations, whites must be excluded.

Biko further stated:

There are those whites who will completely disclaim responsibility for this country's inhumanity to the Black man. These are the people who are governed by the logic for four and a half years but by fear at election time. The NP has perhaps many more English votes than one imagines. All whites

collectively recognise in it a strong bastion against highly played up ‘swaart gevaar’. One must not underestimate the deeply embedded fear of the Blackman so prevalent in white society.

Biko asserted that whites knew well that their actions towards blacks incited anger, but their insecurity didn’t outweigh their greed for power and wealth; therefore, they responded to black rage through an interaction between fear and reaction. This is what made meaningful coalitions between black and white totally impossible, and “also this is what makes whites act as a group and hence become culpable as a group!”¹⁵

A similar thought is seen in Malcolm X who opposed integration, which he saw as a smokescreen that confused the truer wants of a black man.¹⁶ It is probable that BC adherents were familiar with US Black Nationalist literature, which was supposed to be banned and censored. Note similarities here with Malcolm X’s opinion that Black Nationalist organizations should be all black because whites wanted to join to salve their consciences by “visibly hovering near us, they are ‘proving’ that they are ‘with us.’”¹⁷ Sincere white people wanting to “prove” themselves should do it not among black victims but in their own home communities where their white counterparts practised racism. For Malcolm X, white membership renders black organization less effective: “[E]ven the best white members will slow down the Negroes’ discovery of what they need to do, and particularly of what they can do—for themselves, working by themselves, among their own kind, in their own communities.”¹⁸ Malcolm further observed that whites, because of their money and resources, will end up controlling the organization even if they put black faces up front. This view was taken up by the Black Power Movement and articulated by Stokely Carmichael (Kwame Ture) and Charles Hamilton who, writing of white American liberals, state:

For black people to adopt their methods of relieving our oppression is ludicrous. We blacks must respond in our own way, on our own terms, in a manner which fits our temperaments. The definitions of ourselves, the roles we pursue, and the goals we seek are our responsibility.¹⁹

Ture and Hamilton saw Black Power as part of a new consciousness in countering racism. It called for black people to unite, to build a sense of community, to define their own goals, to lead and run their own organizations, which will enable them to convey the revolutionary idea and do

things for themselves. This helped create in the community an awakened stream of BC that would provide the basis for political strength. In rejecting racist institutions and values of white American society, the fundamental premise of Black Power was that “before a group can enter open society, it must first close its ranks” (note the similarities with Lembede’s formulation earlier and Azanian BC).²⁰ Ture and Hamilton further pointed out that black solidarity was necessary in bargaining from a position of strength in a pluralistic society:

The point is obvious: Black people must lead and run their own organisations. Only black people can convey the revolutionary idea—and black people are able to do things for themselves ... in the past, white allies have often furthered white supremacy without the whites involved realising it, or even wanting to do so. Black people must come together and do things for themselves. They must achieve self-identity and self-determination in order to have their daily needs met.²¹

They argued that because of the fundamentally racist nature of American society, the concept of group strength for black people must be articulated, not to mention, defended. No other group would submit to being led by others: “Italians do not lead the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith. Irish do not chair Christopher Columbus societies. Yet when Black people call for black run and all-black organisations, they are immediately classed in a category with the Ku Klux Klan.”²²

Since its inception, BC was a programme for cultural and psychological emancipation from white hegemony, espousing a black philosophy of pride, embodying ideals of Negritude and Christian liberation theology.²³ Initially while cultural, it transcended to the material conditions of black life, class struggle and abolition of oppressive racial structures, and following Lembede, revolution would happen if black people removed from their intellect the mental and cultural inferiority imposed by colonialism. Mental liberation, therefore, served as a weapon for the oppressed in challenging white supremacist ideas and asserting self-humanity, making it a philosophy of praxis. For Mabogo More:

BC was a response to a white consciousness that sought to appropriate and dominate the consciousness and thus the freedom of black people. It was and still is a struggle for a new consciousness, a reawakening of self-consciousness, re-appropriation of Black self-consciousness from the clutches of an appropriative and dominating white consciousness, a rediscovery of a

black self which lay buried beneath white consciousness imposed on blacks by cultural, political, economic, linguistic and religious domination.²⁴

The BPC, formed in June 1972, served as a political extension of BC. It meant to unite, solidify and strengthen black resistance and black people with a view to liberating them from both psychological and physical oppressions. It also considered those blacks who were not students or those who would outlive their membership of SASO, which was basically a student movement. In this way, it aimed at expanding the BCM work beyond student and youth activities.²⁵ The BPC policies were the ideological bases for the BCM. Membership applied to blacks who subscribed to its principles, aims, policies, goals and philosophy.

EXISTENTIALISM AND HUMANISM IN BC PHILOSOPHY

BC was a response to white consciousness that sought to appropriate and dominate the consciousness and freedom of black people.²⁶ The BCM which Biko founded was powerful because it established self-consciousness as a force for revolution.²⁷ For this reason, BC has been widely recognized as an existential, humanist and even phenomenological philosophy outlining that individuals and communities choose either freedom or enslavement, and that to overcome fear the oppressed have to confront their oppressors.²⁸ James Cone, the black theologian, sees BC as the black community focusing on its blackness in order that black people may know not only why they are oppressed, but also what they must do about that oppression.²⁹

Presently, I will look at the idea and political lineage of BC as espoused by Fanon and Biko and Cabral. The impact Fanon had on the development of BC ideas is acknowledged,³⁰ and it is important to place some of his ideas here, while Cabral lends a theoretical and practical appendage to the existential, lived experience and response of the black oppressed to oppression.

Frantz Fanon

The structure of colonial society, which Fanon sees in Manichaeian terms, makes it possible for “Negroes” to both have an inferiority complex and ensure its perpetuation. Colonial society makes life difficult for the black man because of the colour of his skin, which acts as a measure to torment

and deride him. Under conditions of exploitation, the oppressed do not need to read or analyse Marxist dialectics, but their conditions of existence are enough to give them no choice but to fight. Fanon proposes that consciousness be infused into them because the foundation of one's freedom is derived from one's self, cajoling them into a position where they have to make two choices, namely, passivity or action directed towards the source of that inferiority complex, which serves as the colonial social structures. In colonial ontology, in the white man's eyes, the "Negro" has no ontological existence. Since the violence of colonization dehumanized the colonized, these conditions are enough to irritate him, and one can imagine his fury.³¹ Fanon recognizes and shows that colonial violence is not only violence but also re-creation of "humanity".³²

The white world puts barriers on the Negro's involvement and participation in society as an equal and as a full citizen, leaving him with no choice but to shake off his inferiority and take action. In Hegelian terms, it is this failure of the colonialist to recognize the colonized that requires the latter to make efforts to make themselves known and recognized:

What! When it was I who had every reason to hate, to despise, I was rejected? When I should have been hugged, implored, I was denied the slightest recognition? I resolved, since it was impossible for me to get away from an *inborn complex*, to assert myself as a BLACK MAN. Since the other hesitated to recognise me, there remained only one solution: to make myself known.³³

The tragedy is that the oppressed allows his being to be determined by others, which is contradictory to his inner self/being. In Fanon's existentialism, a failure to act against the white man is a feeling of non-existence; black existence is achieved through an actional consciousness that propels oppressed blacks to realize their humanity through struggle. One sees the Hegelian–Marxist–Engels axis in Fanon's conception. Departing from Hegelian idealism, though his (Hegel) conception of history was dialectical, it was still idealistic; the materialist conception of history explains man's consciousness by his being instead of his being by his consciousness.³⁴ In Hegelian dialectics, a being has to be recognized by another being for them to realize their human worth. There should be absolute reciprocity, and prevention of that reciprocity means depriving the other of their being. To accomplish that recognition means to acknowledge their human reality and this cannot be one-sided but mutually reinforcing. When this is not fulfilled, conflict is inevitable until reciprocal recognition

is realized. Although Fanon deepened the Hegelian concept of self-consciousness, he criticized Hegel's "reciprocity" because there can be no reciprocal relationship between slave and master.³⁵ By representing colonialism and nationalism in their Manichaeic contest, Fanon made this the foundation of revolutionary action.³⁶

In Fanon's humanism, man should affirm and acquiesce to love, life and generosity; say no to degradation, scorn of man and exploitation and say yes to freedom.³⁷ Fanon's humanism, differing from Freud, Marx and Nietzsche, is about real humanism by which "national consciousness transform[s] into social and political needs."³⁸ Apparently, Fanon had read Lukacs who shows that the effects of capitalism are fragmentation, reification and dehumanization.³⁹ Tony Martin also notes that Fanon accepted Marx's analysis of society, which he elaborated to suit his geographical and historical context.⁴⁰ For Fanon, reification and dehumanization of colonization could be overcome when the colonized adopt self-consciousness and form a common bond to foster self-liberation. Actually colonialism doesn't entirely succeed in dehumanizing the oppressed; there is still a semblance of some humanity in him that allows him to assert himself.⁴¹ This revolutionary self-activity, if necessary, has to be eked out with a certain measure of violence, which is not violence for its own sake but a re-creation of human hood.⁴² It becomes, therefore, a duty to end colonialism, and Fanon insists that we must all strive to liberate humankind from imperialism and that we must all write our histories and cultures.⁴³ Thus, in the conclusion of the *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon calls for a new humanism, a creation of a whole and new man who colonialism had dehumanized.

Steve Biko

Biko saw apartheid as oppressive and evil, intertwined with white supremacy and capitalist exploitation, the concomitant results being deprivation and the hindrance of black emancipation through spiritual decay.⁴⁴ The purpose of white domination, according to Biko, is to make blacks subservient, largely through the education system. This is a process of dehumanization where the black man loses his very humanity. To remedy this, there is need for revitalization, giving life to the black man's "empty shell," to infuse him with pride, self-realization and dignity and "pump back life in his empty shell, reminding him of his complicity in the crime of allowing himself to be misused and letting evil reign supreme in the country of

his birth.”⁴⁵ For Biko, consciousness is an inward-looking process, which defines the idea of BC. During the BPC-SASO trial, Biko explained that BC refers to the black man and to his existential situation. What he said during that trial has an enduring importance that rings true even in contemporary society.⁴⁶

By adopting the slogan “Black is Beautiful,” the aim was to instil humanity into the black man, who has to look at himself as adequate, as a human being and challenge the negation of the black. BC, therefore, was about bringing a black man to the realization of a being and “at the end of it all, he can’t tolerate attempts by anybody to dwarf the significance of his manhood.”⁴⁷ Through BC, consciousness of the self means removal of all notions that imprison the mind. From this surmise, Biko declares that “at the heart of this kind of thinking is the realisation by the blacks that the most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed.”⁴⁸

BC conscientizes black people with reference to the conditions in which they live so that they can grapple with their problems; with a mental and a physical awareness of their situation to find solutions they can provide for themselves. During the BPC-SASO Trial, Biko noted:

I think the central theme about Black society is that it has got elements of a defeated society. People often look like they have given up the struggle. Like the man who was telling me that he now lives to work, he has given himself to the idea. Now, this sense of defeat is basically what we are fighting against; people must not just give in to the hardship of life. People must develop hope. People must develop some form of security to be together to look at their problems and people must in this way build up their humanity. This is the point about conscientisation and Black Consciousness.

Here, one can observe the similarities with Sartre’s existentialism:

For it is necessary to reverse the common opinion and acknowledge that it is not the harshness of a situation or the sufferings it imposes that lead people to conceive of another state of affairs in which things would be better for everybody. It is on the day that we are able to conceive of another state of affairs, that a new light is cast on our trouble and our suffering and we decide that they are unbearable.⁴⁹

Real black people are those who refuse to submit to the white man. For this reason, blacks begin to realize the need to rally around the cause of their suffering, which is their black skin. Their poverty is directly related

to their blackness and “because of tradition forced onto the country, the poor shall always be black people.”⁵⁰ Biko agrees that the colour question was originally based on economic reasons. The economic privileges, comfort and security that whites enjoyed for generations made all of them believe in the inferiority of blacks. While the race problem started from the economic consideration, it transformed to become an issue of its own. Biko firmly believed that what made apartheid South Africa a racist society were the racist attitudes and beliefs that viewed black as inferior, thus reinforcing the institutionalized anti-black racism.

Amilcar Cabral

In the aftermath of colonial armed conquest, there was complete destruction of economic and social structure of African societies. These developments were tied to racial discrimination, and contempt of Africans, who were forced to labour for little or nothing and were treated like chattel.⁵¹ Colonialism usurps fundamental rights, essential freedoms and human dignity and leads to other social malaise. Internal conditions and daily realities of people’s lives are enough to cause them to aspire for national liberation and to seek liquidation of colonialism. The struggle is both part of a larger undertaking whose teleology is the abolition of colonial rule in the whole of Africa and dismantling of capitalist colonialism and imperialism. The fight for liberation has, in the end, positive results, as it raises political awareness, national consciousness, political thought and action of the masses. It also intensifies a sense of unity of all Africans, thereby erasing differences fostered and cultivated by colonialists.

The principle of the struggle is of and for the people themselves who must wage and own it and reap its rewards. The basis of the struggle is the realization of their dreams and aspirations, and of justice and progress as a whole, not of a few groups and individuals. Ultimately, the liberation struggle enables sub-human beings engendered by colonialism to be fully human.

BLACK LIBERATION THEOLOGY

By the mid-nineteenth century, new forms of modern political consciousness were arising in the church. In church, or precisely the black church, divinity, religiosity and spirituality are inseparable from black struggles for liberation. I have noted that liberation songs in Azania have the same

emotive spiritual intonation as church hymns or “Negro spirituals.” The struggle for racial freedom in the country has always and often taken a religious form.⁵² We can say early Pan-African discourse on liberation emanates from the mission-educated elite, who themselves were avid Christians. The origins of African political consciousness in Azania can be traced to the first half of the nineteenth century.⁵³ At the same time (in the 1880s), there was large-scale secession from mission churches that led to a proliferation of African Independent Churches (AIC). Black congregants decried preponderant discrimination, racism and condescending paternalism that infected the missionary establishment.⁵⁴ The first African mass movement was a religious one called Ethiopianism.⁵⁵ Nehemiah Tile is seen as the pioneer. After a dispute with white missionaries (Wesleyans), he resigned and formed the Tembu National Church, thereby setting precedence for a slew of breakaway churches that followed. Reverend Mokone Mangena broke away from the Wesleyans in 1892 to form the Ethiopian Church, which later combined with the African Methodist Episcopal (AME). A majority of these churches preached an Africanized version of Christianity, and these are the roots of Christian Pan-Negroism, or Ethiopianism, which rose from religious separatism.⁵⁶

Another significant influence was a Christian tendency in the USA, arising from the antebellum black experience, whose modes, rituals and manner of worship and interpretation of biblical text were independent from conventional white churches.⁵⁷ This laid the foundation of black American cultural nationalism.⁵⁸ These pioneer black nationalists inspired black American emigrationist preachers, Pan-Africanists and the “Ethiopian” movement among black Christians in Azania. The Ethiopian prophecy was the religious and spiritual motivation for US independent black churches of the late nineteenth century in working towards redemption of Africa.

The relationship between the Black church and Black Nationalism is well articulated by Essien-Udom in his book *Black Nationalism. A Search for an Identity in America*.⁵⁹

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, black American churches sponsored approximately 76 missionaries to Africa. Bishop Henry. M Turner of the AME and an advocate of radical black separatism and emigration to Africa made connections between black American and Azanian Christianity. In particular, a visit by a US singing group, Virginia Jubilee Singers, to South Africa in 1890 helped to link Ethiopianism and US African Methodism. Turner himself visited the country in 1898, and, as a result, AME etched itself into the country’s black religious landscape. As

the South African Native Affairs Commission report of 1905 shows, the AME and AIC were being treated with suspicion by whites.⁶⁰ The new religious movements were met with scorn, especially the African Christian Union (ACU) of the 1890s, which Jabavu's *Imvo* denounced for its racial exclusiveness. The ACU, founded by Joseph Booth, a black American, had in its manifesto calls to unite African Christians; establishment of skills and industrial missions; a demand that Africans be accorded the same rights and privileges as Europeans, and finally a declaration "to pursue steadily and unswervingly the policy AFRICA FOR THE AFRICAN, and look for and hasten by prayer and united effort the forming of the AFRICAN CHRISTIAN NATION by God's power and in His power and in His own time."⁶¹

The Ethiopian church and its clergy were indeed involved in protest organization between 1902 and the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 and were also active in the foundation of the South African National Native Congress in 1912. After the 1920s, the Ethiopian churches didn't exactly decline with the proliferation of churches like the Zionist and Pentecostal churches that eschewed political activity and concentrated on healing and religious ecstasy.⁶² Ethiopianism contributed immensely to black politics and the liberation movement; it contained seeds of a radical Africanism that emerged in later decades, which echoed that Azania belonged to the black man and is not a multiracial country.

Historically, religion or the church has been central in black struggles for liberation. Black theology (BT) like Ethiopianism, which originated with the African Diaspora, struck a deep chord in Azanian politics of liberation. For instance, BC ideologue Steve Biko used BT to appraise the uxorious relationship between apartheid and Christianity and the "moral" support the *Nederlandse Gereformeerde Kerk* (NGK) gave to the institutionalization and maintenance of apartheid. Biko also critiqued the English-speaking churches for opposing apartheid while discriminating against blacks and privileging whites in their own structures and liturgy. In fact, mainstream denominations have a history of supporting structures and instruments of conquest and enslavement. Preaching submissiveness, respect and deference for authority—obedience not liberation—they distorted Christ's teachings and linked Him with the oppressor.⁶³ BT as a spiritual dimension of the BCM decried the spiritual enslavement of black people.⁶⁴ It endeavoured to free Christianity from its oppressive role, and sought to make it a theology of the oppressed and a theology of liberation. BT contended that black people, who believe in the wholeness of life, are

essentially religious, such that no distinction need be made between “secular”, “church” and “world”—blacks look at life in its totality and wholeness.⁶⁵ Western religion categorized black religion as heathen, oblivious to the fact that the “religion of [the] black man was an everyday affair, intimately integrated with the cultural patterns of the societies concerned.”⁶⁶ It encouraged mutual respect and believed in the good nature of man. Christian missionaries then came with a religion that threatened one with doom or salvation. With the aid of the Bible, “the black man was framed, then blackmailed.”⁶⁷ Whilst he was still confused, they stole the land right from under his nose and “the missionaries were certainly thorough in their job. Full marks to them!”⁶⁸ As a result, the black man lost his self-respect, self-confidence and respect for his culture and “he became ashamed of himself for ever having been a pagan”; whilst believing in the Christian “stronger God” he didn’t realize that he was entrapped. By welcoming the ‘new’ religion he was submitting himself to subjugation: economically, politically, religiously and socially, and “for the first time he was introduced to the concept of slavery. [The] brainwashing had been a major victory for the imperialists. And for the black man he paid dearly for it.”⁶⁹

BT also negated the white Christian view that ancestor worship is a superstition; in fact, Christianity must adapt to peoples’ cultural situation.⁷⁰ BT sought to remove the spiritual poverty in black people, since preachers always urged blacks to find fault in themselves. BT identified Jesus on the side of the oppressed and made Him relevant to human liberation, particularly black liberation. Christ was/is a man with a message for the oppressed and Himself was a liberator and an existentialist. BT pioneer James Cone has forcefully argued that the Christian gospel is a gospel of liberation. BC and BT are conjoined on terms that the biblical God is involved in human liberation and the liberation of the oppressed and God is a fighter for justice.⁷¹ A well-meaning God cannot allow His people to continually suffer. The task, therefore, was to give the biblical message a new meaning and direction that makes it relevant to the people. Contrary to the view that all authority is by divine predestination, Biko insisted that it is a sin to allow oneself to be oppressed. The BCM recognized BT as a liberation theology steeped in material and existential circumstances suffered by blacks. Thus, BT is a genus of BC and “is part and parcel of the BC family as a deliberate response to the continuing oppression and exploitation in our country.”⁷² For Cone, BT articulates and acknowledges the significance of the black presence in a hostile white world.⁷³ It is a reflection of black experience and seeks to redefine the relevance of the

Christian gospel in their lives. As Fatton notes, BT's moral and political ethic stemmed not only from African religious tradition but from material and cultural roots of black people as well.⁷⁴ Therefore, the revolutionary agency of BT lies in the fact that black people will be liberated, not by the goodwill of white people but through their own self-activity and self-initiation.⁷⁵

By the late 1980s, although BT was alive and developed, it hadn't become a political weapon and property of the struggling masses. Apparently, unable to break with imperialist Christian values and using the same models and principles of articulation as white theology, which has led to the reproduction of dominant ideological forms, "BT has become an opiate of the masses."⁷⁶ For having a non-ideological stance and being removed from the material realities of the masses, it lost its material force. In contemporary society, there is a proliferation of "prosperity gospel" stripped of radical content, which emphasizes "good life" on Earth, tithing, and that conditions of black people are due to the Devil's antics. It remains to be seen whether BT will re-emerge as a force in black struggles.⁷⁷ This is against a backdrop of an escalating increase of both Islam and prosperity gospel in black communities, a scenario conjoined with trenchant poverty. Interestingly, while churches in Europe struggle to attract congregants in Africa, Western religiosity is expanding in leaps and bounds.

RACE AND CLASS

The beginnings of the modern industrial economy in South Africa are traced back to the discovery of diamonds and gold in the nineteenth century, which changed social and economic relations. It also led to large-scale proletarianization, urbanization and unequal incorporation of different sections of the population into capitalist relations of production. From the beginning, the gold mining industry was characterized by a division of labour on the basis of skills, which coincided along racial lines. Copious literature on this subject exists.

In an interview with Gail Gerhart in 1972, Steve Biko argued that white liberals and white leftists were the same because of their adherence to the white value system. They adopted a class analysis and eschewed issues concerning race:

A number of whites in this country adopt the class analysis, primarily because they want to detach us from anything relating to race. In case it has a rebound effect on them because they are white. This is the problem. So a lot of them adopt the class analysis as a defence mechanism and are persuaded of it because they find it more comfortable. And of course a number of them are terribly puritanical, dogmatic and very, very arrogant. They don't quite know to what extent they have to give up a part of themselves in order to be a true Marxist.⁷⁸

The BC critique prompted new theorizations and analyses. Later writings attempted to relink race and class to the capitalist economic system and white domination.⁷⁹ In the 1970s, Marxist literature in South Africa argued that racism was beneficial to the development of capitalism. Alexander reiterated that the colonial history of the country is one of institutional racism and its relation to class exploitation.⁸⁰ Racism, Marxists held fast, could only end with the dismantling of capitalism.

Marxism, Robinson contends, is a Western construction, that conceptualizes the human development and experience of European people.⁸¹ In claiming a world historical view, Marxists have mistaken its universality, and applied it to non-Western social formations and Third World liberation struggles. Oliver Cox critiqued Marx and Engels for their partial conceptualization of capitalism, which didn't fully acknowledge the historical forces that had created black objectification.⁸² Although the radical black intelligentsia in the New World perceived the effects of imperialism and capitalism, they nonetheless saw the solution as lying in class struggle. This conception was insufficient. The insistence on class struggle risked falling into the same racist schema that saw non-Western people as "a people without a history."⁸³ For Cabral, those who say the motive force of history is class struggle have to re-examine this assertion in view of the characteristics of colonized people under imperialist domination. The question is whether history begins only with the appearance of classes, and whether agrarian and pastoral societies are factored out of this "history."

White radicals maintained that racism is an epiphenomenon of class oppression, that colour discrimination is only another aspect of working class exploitation, that the capitalist system is the common enemy of white and black workers alike and that the struggle should involve the working class as a whole.⁸⁴ The colour line is subsumed into class, and it is assumed that strategies designed for a white proletariat can be a blueprint for blacks. Sivanandan argues that it is difficult to accept class analysis per se in South

Africa.⁸⁵ An abstract class analysis not only liquidates the national question but also ignores critical differences in the exploitation of black and white workers, which are due specifically to racism. White Marxists are critiqued for their failure to understand that Africans suffered compound exploitation, first under slavery, and secondly under colonialism. Their experience of suffering was, therefore, total and devastating, making a mockery of white workers' exploitation.⁸⁶ According to Sartre, Marxists failed to see how imperialism had perverted white working class consciousness.⁸⁷ Nationalist aspirations of the colonized are not an epiphenomenon of capitalist development and can't be wished away with slogans like "black and white unite and overthrow capitalism."⁸⁸ However, class analyses can't be rejected in favour of race, as this would misunderstand the history of racism and how "it came to be constituted as an objective reality."⁸⁹

The *Communist Manifesto*, Eurocentric in its approach to analysing class struggles in European history, outlines the emergence of the modern bourgeois society from the ruins of feudal society, which then established "new classes; new conditions of oppression; new forms of struggles in place of the old ones." Society was, thus, split into two antagonistic classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.⁹⁰ Marx and Engels further argue that, "of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of modern industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product."⁹¹ But who is the proletariat? Engels gives a more concerted definition:

[The proletariat] is that class in society which lives entirely from the sale of its labour and does not profit from any kind of capital; whose weal and woe, whose life and death, whose whole existence depends on the demand for labour, hence on the changing state of business, on the vagaries of unbridled competition. The proletariat, or the class of proletarians, is, in a word, the working class of the nineteenth century.⁹²

Engels argues that it was only Marx who showed the historical interconnection of the capitalist mode of production and its determination of a specific historical period where its essential character, which had been hidden before, is laid bare.⁹³ This was done through the discovery of surplus value—the appropriation of unpaid labour is the basic form of capitalist production and exploitation. Even if the capitalist buys the labour power of his worker at the full value it possesses as a commodity on the market,

he must still extract more value from the worker than he pays in wages. This surplus value accumulates in the hands of the possessing class. Engels argues that with the Marxist discovery of the materialist conception of history and the revelation of the secret of capitalist production through surplus value, socialism became a science. The materialist conception of history starts with the principle that production and exchange of things produced is the basis of every social order; that in every society, the distribution of wealth and the division of society into classes are dependent on things produced, how they are produced and how they are exchanged. Therefore, the causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought “not in the philosophy, but in the economics of each particular epoch.” When the capitalist mode of production transforms a great majority into proletarians, it creates a force that leads to its own destruction. In this way, “the proletariat seizes state power and to begin with transforms the means of production into state property”. It then ends itself as a proletariat, and therefore ends all class differences.

While the state is a representative of the dominating class, “as soon as class domination and the struggle for individual existence based on the anarchy of production existing up to now are eliminated together with the collisions and excesses arising from them, there is nothing more to repress, nothing necessitating a special repressive force, a state.”⁹⁴ In a “free people’s state,” the state isn’t abolished—it withers away: “[I]n proportion as the anarchy of social production vanishes, the political authority of the state dies away. Men at last become masters of their own mode of social organisation, consequently at the same time masters of nature, masters of themselves”.⁹⁵ The proletarian revolution solves the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production through seizure of public power and with this power transforms the social means of production. It frees the means of production from their previous character as capital and gives them a social character, and the different social classes become anachronistic. Socialism isn’t an accidental discovery by a certain intellect or genius but is the necessary outcome of the struggle between two classes produced by history—the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Engels concludes that the task of scientific socialism is the accomplishment of the historical mission of the proletariat; the historical conditions, the nature, the conditions and character of the proletariat emancipatory act come from the consciousness of this class that is “destined to act.” I have quoted/discussed Engels at length here to serve as a backdrop to AZAPO’s “scientific socialism,” which I discuss later in this chapter and in subsequent chapters.

Gramsci, in revising Marx, argues that mechanical conception of historical materialism assumes that every political act is determined by economic structures, and therefore is real and permanent.⁹⁶ Economism (in the classical Marxist sense) reads economic foundations of society as the only determining structure of that society. This approach tends to see all other dimensions of the social formation as having no other determining or structuring force of their own right. The approach, to put it simply, reduces everything in a social formation to the economic level and conceptualizes all other social relations as directly and immediately “corresponding” to the economy.⁹⁷ Stuart Hall follows this up.⁹⁸ He makes a distinction between the economic and the sociological: the former refers to economic structures and processes that determine the structures of social formations; the latter reads race/ethnicity as social and cultural features of these social formations. However, Hall argues that race relations are, of course, directly linked to economic processes starting with colonialism, conquest and mercantile domination.⁹⁹ However, there are factors outside the economic sphere that reproduce such social formations. Although it is partially true those racial terms correspond with the processes that turned dark people into coerced labour, “any reductive ace of racial categorisation and subjugation should be rejected.”¹⁰⁰ For West, racial definition and discourse have always followed a set of independent logics related to, and intersecting with, economic, political, legal and cultural considerations. Nevertheless, Hall doesn’t wholly dismiss the economic deterministic approach because it gives us a theoretical point of departure.

Although the Marxist theory of class formation posits that wage earners would in the long run be able to develop a common class consciousness that transcends racial and ethnic lines, in South Africa the workforce had been fragmented by racial and ethnic affinities, thereby proving to be an enduring and durable source of division and antagonism.¹⁰¹ Afrikaner nationalist ideology, for example, propounded that labour being a divine will of God, the relationship between the worker and the capitalist had to be harmonious.¹⁰² The emergence of ethnic and racial groups and antagonistic consciousness are products of structural relations of inequality that inscribe the experience of everyday life.¹⁰³ Marxist theory posits a structure that is too rigid and cannot account for how dominant political groups not only reflect economic interests but also are carriers of prevailing cultural conditions as well, and are guardians of racial and ethnic identifications. The unity of the working class as a social movement is incapable of unitary, collective behaviour and action.¹⁰⁴ Decades ago, Wolpe had written that

racial divisions amount to nothing more than the fractionalization of the working class, common to all capitalist modes of production.¹⁰⁵

In South Africa, “white labourers are quite as racist as the employers and managers, and very often a good deal more.”¹⁰⁶ Marxists of the Communist Party, according to I.B. Tabata, denied the agrarian and the national problem by arguing that the liberation of South Africa (being a highly industrialized country) lay along the road of other industrialized countries, and that the task of the militant was to organize the working class to lead a proletarian revolution.¹⁰⁷ This policy of the Communist Party, Tabata argues, was an attempt to bring non-white labour under its control, leading to reformism and Economism. It didn’t account for the political and economic realities of the South African situation, and communists failed to note that “the white workers in South Africa bear the same relation to the disenfranchised black workers as the Roman proletariat bears to the Roman slaves.”¹⁰⁸

Wolpe, an avowed Marxist, did critique the Marxist insistence on race as an epiphenomenon of class.¹⁰⁹ Economic reductionism sees capital and labour as unitary and classes as homogeneous, and the relation between them as an undifferentiated relation of exploitation, that is, the division between those who own the means of production and those who don’t. This view then sees all relations as homologous and that there are objective class interests that govern all social relations. Wolpe proposes the rejection of the opposition between race and class and advances the view that race, under determinate conditions, may be interiorized in class struggles at both political and economic levels. In this regard, the perception that racism is always functional to capitalism has to be appraised. The Marxist analysis is hinged on the concept of capital accumulation and relations between capital and labour. However, class analysis excludes non-economic relations. The problem with this consideration, according to Wolpe, is that politics, culture, religion and so on, which are non-economic in form and nature, do really influence or give rise to racism. Instead, racism is so interwoven in the fabric of society that its survival doesn’t merely depend on capitalist social relations of production per se.¹¹⁰ Although exploitation and domination had racial dimensions that cannot be explained in capitalistic terms, race was rather a means of mobilization to defend white privilege and supremacy.¹¹¹ Capitalism not only reduced blacks to objects of exploitation in relations of production, but also generated a white ethos that says blacks are culturally and morally inferior as well.¹¹² As a result, racism is important to white hegemony, and racial

practices codify an inherent privilege of white South Africans. The latter assertion was explicitly pronounced pre-1994, but the nature of race and racism has drastically changed since then. Looking at recent social formations, racism has re-organized and re-articulated with new relations of production, a subject matter I will return to in subsequent chapters.¹¹³

CONCLUSION

Developments in postapartheid South Africa have had ramifications on race and class. As the country began opening up to the world, accelerating the globalized movement of commodities and information, the migration of black African immigrants increased. This has exacerbated competition for employment between the locals and the new arrivals, who employers exploit at the point of production as cheap labour, taking advantage of their undocumented status. This is compounded by COSATU's apparent inability to unionize immigrant workers. This situation has identified immigrant workers with specific socio-economic functions, namely, in the performance of undesirable jobs vacated by indigenous workers in the transitional reorganization of production.¹¹⁴ Immigrant workers thereby come to constitute a "lower stratum" of the working class, which becomes fragmented. Conflicts between immigrant and domestic working classes take the form of anti-immigrant racism and rioting and the kind of pogroms seen in May 2008.¹¹⁵ Nonetheless, the black working class remains central to the country's economy; early morning and evening trains are packed with black workers, and South African capitalism has always benefited from that labour. The mining and other major industries continue to be characterized by migrant labour as revealed by the 34 black workers murdered in Marikana on 16 August 2012.

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BC and Its Fortunes After 1976

The lasting impact BC had on the political and revolutionary struggle cannot be understated. It confronted white supremacy by raising a consciousness of resistance, whose spark was the 1976 Soweto uprising. BC, however, was seen as counter-conscious, having a tendency to psychologism, or as a counter-ideology inclined to provoke moral anger.¹ The same criticism was made by Sartre on Negritude in his essay “Black Orpheus,” where he viewed Negritude as retrograde, regressive and an anti-racist racism.² Fanon’s riposte was that BC is immanent, necessitated by the white man’s injustice. He criticized Sartre for denigrating the Negro’s being and repudiating his blackness. Similarly, Senghor, like Cesaire, defended Negritude, opining that it is neither racialism nor self-negation, rather it is an affirmation of one’s being, the African personality.³ Both Fanon and Biko applaud Negritude because it enables blacks to find meaning and self-worth in an anti-black world.⁴ Negritude and Pan-Africanism, therefore, aid in reconstituting blacks’ subjective integrity.⁵ Likewise, Ture and Hamilton argue that the racial and cultural personality of blacks, their integrity and pride, must be preserved in the face of an anti-black assault.⁶ Richard Wright stresses that it is not the prerogative of black intellectuals to surrender the cultural heritage of their people, which is the emergent revolutionary consciousness of Black Nationalism.⁷ Issues emerging in this chapter follow up on those raised in the latter part of the last chapter. Here, I extrapolate these as regards to the BCM of the 1980s.

The emergence of BC posed a threat to white intellectuals, who faced a prospect of irrelevance in the struggle.⁸ Thus, the white left had to protect their intellectual and political identity. BC's politics of race was directly polar opposite to the Marxist class analysis, which avoided all talk of race. White radicals then challenged BC by reducing race to an "epiphenomenon of class struggle" and viewing it as a "false consciousness," with the same ideological resonance as white racism.⁹ Race was, therefore, deliberately suppressed in the debates of the white left because, as Ally observes, of the racial composition of the intellectuals (who were white). The denial of race by the left is seen by Hassim and Walker as "dangerously self-serving for whites."¹⁰ In the end, Ally argues, white intellectuals reflected power rather than rejecting it. Their insistence on proletarian agency as a class could not explain the revolutionary consciousness that had formed in the process of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist and nationalist struggles, whose resistance had beginnings remote from Marxian theories of revolution.¹¹ Further, aspects of BC were unaccounted for in the Marxist explication of the historical social formations of the modern world. BC, as a lofty form of expression of outrage, is "most certainly informed by the Africanity of consciousness—some epistemological measure culturally embedded in our minds which deemed that the racial capitalism we have been witness to was an unacceptable standard of human conduct."¹²

Robinson argues then that "the idiom of revolutionary consciousness has been historical and cultural rather than the 'mirror of production.'"¹³ For Richard Wright, Marxism was profoundly theoretically limited, having failed to come to terms with nationalism, consciousness, racism, Western civilization and industrialization in black history, and it was susceptible to abuses for narrow political interests.¹⁴ Black Nationalism is then a product of both capitalist development and accumulation and its system of exploitation.¹⁵ In criticizing Marxism, Robinson reviews Wright's critique:

As a theory of society, he found it dissatisfying, indeed, reductionist. By itself it was insufficiently prescient of the several levels of collective consciousness. As an ideology, he recognised that it had never transcended its origins. It remained an ideology for the working classes rather an ideology of the working classes. However as a method of social analyses he found it compelling. He had not abandoned the conception of the relations of production as a basis for critique of capitalist society nor the importance of class relations of production. Still, critique of capitalism was only the beginning of the struggle for liberation.¹⁶

The debate of race and class is not only confined to South African social formations, but is reflected elsewhere as well. The American Communist Party saw the absence of class consciousness and the presence of racial consciousness among blacks as both an ideological backwardness and a potential threat to the integrity of the socialist movement itself.¹⁷ Blacks with nationalist ideology were characterized as bourgeois reactionaries. Marxists argued that “American racism did not justify the programme of Black Nationalism. European immigrants with other than Anglo-Saxon origins were also targets of racist abuses and discriminations. Racism, then, was merely an element of ruling class ideology, white ‘chauvinism’ its political position. Thus, the social context of Blacks was adapted by ideologues in the socialist movement to the social experience of European immigrant workers.”¹⁸

For Nolutshungu, white Marxists didn’t concede that BC was structurally determined and in that context was appropriate.¹⁹ BC was an important development in Azanian politics because it questioned the nature of the country’s oppositional politics, its relation to South African society and its capability for protest and rebellion. After all, racial consciousness has been part of the country’s political terrain and is integral to the relations of domination and the division of labour.

Following the Soweto uprising of 1976, and the subsequent murder of Steve Biko, BC organizations were banned. With most of the leadership and adherents arrested and jailed, thousands of youth fled the country into exile and swelled the ranks of the ANC, thus changing the latter’s fortunes, militarily and politically.²⁰ From the late 1970s onward, BC was being influenced by Marxism, and the idea that the South African social formation was one characterized by “racial capitalism” became the dominant analysis. In 1978, BC supporters formed the Azanian Peoples’ Organization (AZAPO), an offshoot of the Soweto Action Council, which had been formed at a meeting in Chiawelo 5 days after the October 1977 crackdown. AZAPO incorporated class analysis without departing from a BC framework, arguing that race was a “class determinant” in so far as white racism had relegated all blacks to the lowest social class. The aim was to establish a “non-racial” and socialist workers republic, involving the black working class and a leaning towards anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism.²¹ In this analysis, all blacks were workers, regardless of their origins or occupation, and all whites were the exploiting class.²² Seemingly, the change in focus may have had its roots in 1976. A speech by Diliza Mji in July 1976 at the SASO General Students Council in Hammanskraal

indicated that the struggle should be seen in class terms and not in colour only. He argued that skin colour had become a class criterion, and for BC to survive as a viable philosophy and continue to articulate the aspirations of the people, it had to start interpreting the situation from an economic point of view. The BCM recognized that racism and apartheid were sustained by capitalism and that the liberation of black people, therefore, implied abolition of capitalism itself. Similarly, Callinicos observes that since the development of industrial capitalism led to racial domination, national liberation should be a socialist revolution led by the black working class to uproot apartheid.²³

BC adopted a materialist conception of history and began to analyse the South African problem in class and economic terms, rather than merely in cultural and racial terms. For example, Lukacs contends that economic factors are not concealed behind consciousness, but are present in consciousness itself; economic factors are, thus, decisive in workers' struggles.²⁴ Because they are a vital component of the class struggle, the consciousness of the proletariat will determine its actions, and when capitalism gets into crisis, "the fate of the revolution [and with it the fate of mankind] will depend on the ideological maturity of the proletariat, that is, on its class consciousness."²⁵ However, Lukacs opines that while there may be a division between economic and political struggle, it is in the nature of the economic struggle to develop into a political one, and vice versa.

By the end of the 1980s, the BCM used less of race and more of class in their analyses, while white radicals put the Marxian theories into practice and succeeded in setting up the grassroots trade union movement.²⁶ Gibson argues that during the 1980s, BC should have returned to its humanist roots instead of attempting to broaden its ideology with a fusion of scientific socialism, racial capitalism²⁷ and class analysis, phraseology that were now commonplace and fashionable.²⁸ After Biko, activists didn't take black radical thought and its ideology seriously and instead sprinkled it with some class analysis in deference to Marxism; consequently, they failed to attract militants to the workers' movement where the situation needed a deeper understanding of the mind of the oppressed to recapture Marx's humanism.²⁹ Thus, they couldn't take note of Fanon's injunction that BC was an absolute rather than a "passing stage." This analysis was inept because by taking on board the narrow concepts of scientific socialism, it could not work out the ambivalence, ambiguity and incompatibility of these with BC. In the 1980s and following AZAPO's Marxist-Leninist tendencies, black became "the substance rather than subject of revolution"

and just a “phenomenon of material conditions.”³⁰ One is led to recall Robinson’s observation regarding black radicalism and the need to formulate its own independent trajectory:

The experimentation with western inventories of change, specifically nationalism [that is bourgeois nationalism]³¹ and class struggle is coming to a close. Black radicalism is transcending those traditions in order to adhere to its own authority.³²

Although BC began to apply a Marxian analysis and saw race as a class determinant, it remained weak organizationally and failed to make contact and impact among the workers and could not do mass mobilization.³³ The BC-influenced youth and workers couldn’t find confluence and a common strategy for emancipation, and this affected the potential of the Soweto uprising and later struggles from becoming a revolution.³⁴ Furthermore, white intellectuals who had been left out by BC used their intellectual bases and influence in colleges, universities, trade unions and publication boards to financially support and strengthen non-racial groups opposed to BC. The BCM, thus, became stifled by white radicals who wielded financial power; even international agencies including the communist bloc didn’t support movements that emphasized the significance of colour.³⁵ Movements associated with BC and their kindred, the Africanists, complained of bias by the anti-apartheid movements towards the Congress alliance. The Australian Bureau of Southern African Affairs (ABOSA) was criticized for determining who should be supported in Azanian struggle.³⁶

There is a belief that the liberation movement took a liberal multiracial course and less of an independent workers’ one because the African National Congress (ANC) had been manipulated and controlled by the South African Communist Party (SACP).³⁷ A similar observation is made by Wilderson who describes a Tripartite Alliance gathering chaired by Ronnie Kasrils in Johannesburg in June 1992, where out of a 100 or so delegates, five to ten were white or Indian.³⁸ Wilderson noted Charterist and white dominance in these terms: “faces contorted by smiling teeth and knitted brow, solidarity and anxiety; faces pulled by opposing needs; the need to bring the state to heel and the need to manage the Blacks, and it was this need which was looking unmanageable.”³⁹ According to Wilderson, despite a huge presence of blacks, the black body was especially absent. For many, it was difficult to separate the worker and the black—for Marxists and Charterists, black suffering was predicated on economic

exploitation and not on anti-blackness: “As a Marxist, Ronnie Kasrils could not imagine a fundamental difference between the worker and the Black. Kasrils could think historically, politically and economically, but not ontologically. Or maybe he did know the difference, as we knew it intuitively and was compelled all the more to manage it.”⁴⁰ Wilderson goes on: “It may seem sacrilegious to accuse white anti-apartheid Charterists of anti-Blackness” and “... to imbue them, or the structure of feeling through which they conducted their political life, with the same anti-Blackness that they fought against appears, at first blush, to impose upon them an injudicious form of double jeopardy. The record, however, indicates that anti-Blackness cannot be disentangled from the story of their political ascent.”⁴¹ The aftermath of that meeting was Kasrils leading the ill-fated march in Bhisho that ended in massacre. Many consequently doubted the “Leipzig option” as a struggle method, and therefore the massacre hurried the impetus to the negotiating table.

By the 1980s, there was a proliferation of organizations sympathetic to the ANC and the Freedom Charter, especially those falling under the United Democratic Front (UDF) who inflected new ideas and strategies, displacing BC as a result. In the beginning of the 1980s, “Charterism” was generally understood to endorse multiracial struggle, in addition to alliances across social groups and classes, in which whites could join as participants and even as leaders.⁴² In this period, the ANC–SACP Marxism represented a brand of revolutionary multiracialism; the ANC and their allies recruited BC-oriented youths and BC leaders into their ranks⁴³ and the ideology in black politics leaned towards a non-racial direction.⁴⁴ For Gibson, “it is shocking to reflect how many founding leaders of BC⁴⁵ [as well as, of course the UDF, COSATU and the ANC] have ‘sold-out’ their principles for power, privilege and money.”⁴⁶ Gibson further avers, “Today these betrayals make even clearer the need to focus on the dialectic of ideas and objective conditions and on the relationship of intellectuals to mass movements—of cognition and material life—rather than the psychobiography of individual personalities. I think that the larger issue at stake in my analysis of BC from 1977 to 1987, therefore, was the problematic of comprehending the degeneration of BC not only as a betrayal of principle but in terms of the logic of that betrayal.”⁴⁷

Although AZAPO tried to enjoin revolutionary Marxism with Black Nationalist thought, it could not compete with the ANC and its allies. Marxist, liberal and left critics who believed in the superiority of revolutionary Marxism espoused a coherent alternative to BC and managed to win former black nationalists to their side.⁴⁸ Maphai argues that ideologi-

cal coherence isn't always necessary for political support, as was the case with AZAPO who “since its adoption of scientific socialism seem[ed] to spend more time making sense of this ideological position than fighting apartheid ... Grass-roots support is likely to go to organisations that are active, and this has been the major strength of the UDF.”⁴⁹

By emphasizing “psychologism,” which implied that it is through conscientious proselytizing that black people would be liberated, BC was seen as a transitory movement seriously lacking strategies on analysing class, race and the economy.⁵⁰ However, there is a contention that BC cannot be a “passing stage,” but is an absolute steeped in the lived experience and existential world of black oppression.⁵¹

Neither could BC formulate a revolutionary programme with a sustained analysis of the political economy and capitalist relations of production, nor could Black Communalism offer ideas of social transformation that were not reformist.⁵² Alexander has been sharp in his critique of BC and raised a number of points: by glorifying the ghetto, BC reinforced the established order of racial oppression and exploitation; it is not the white man but the system that oppresses blacks—even black people like Bantustan leaders also defend the system; BC assumes that all liberals are white without acknowledging the existence of black liberals; it fails to recognize, by pushing the “Buy Black” campaign that is meant for private gain, that black people can also be exploitative. And finally, Alexander contends, imperialism in Vietnam, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola was defeated through joint efforts of black and white people. The BCM has also been criticized for retrogression and an inability to see racism in class context: while Biko’s analysis stopped at Hegel’s thesis–antithesis, his historical analysis lacked the depth and force of Marx’s historical materialism.⁵³ Nonetheless, it is trite to dismiss BC as lacking praxis: it had a pervasive ideological impact and was a revolutionary consciousness tool.⁵⁴ This is being cognizant of the importance of ideological diffusion, which disarticulates and displaces hegemonic and racist structures, replacing them with new revolutionary awareness: “The making of a revolution requires not only organisation but also a process of ideological diffusion whereby the hegemony of the dominant classes is disarticulated and ultimately displaced by a new philosophy of emancipation.”⁵⁵ BC provided an ethico-political position through active participation towards demise of a racist, capitalist society. From 1976, it provided a platform for an erosion of white supremacist ideas à la Gramsci’s war of position.⁵⁶

After all, a revolution worth its name has to begin with a revolutionary consciousness. Wilderson vigorously defends BC and argues that:

Steve Biko and BC weren't victims of contradictions internal to the logic of their discourse, my critique notwithstanding. BC didn't peter out, it was drummed out. Biko wasn't a victim of his thinking, he was a murder victim. And given the conditions under which BC was elaborated—between cross-hairs and without sanctuary—it's remarkable that it survived for as long as it did and that its message was potent enough to spark the 1976 uprising, replenish the rank and file of the ANC and stiffen the ANC's resolve to fight as it had never before. An ANC that would betray the mandate it might have never re-secured were it not for Biko and BC.⁵⁷

CONCLUSION

Ideas are spirit. They have an enduring capacity to withstand history and a refusal to die once they are etched in the psyche of the people throughout changing political and socio-historical epochs. The relationship between political and ideological thought and history are like Siamese twins. They find resonance with each generation at each socio-historical conjuncture, where they are passed on; as each generation recedes, another succeeds and carries on a particular political and ideological tradition. These are the issues I raise in the next chapter. Let us talk of tradition here, which I think is best to understand this phenomenon. Tradition can be understood as the persistence or continuation over time of a particular way of doing things, manner of thinking, speaking and writing about something or other.⁵⁸ Tradition, in the political sense, as accepted rules of a group of people or ways in which they come to learn their activities and express their emotions, is indeed carried over time by each generation. It means determinate, enduring existence, the concrete living out of history. There are also symbiotic expressions that derive inspiration from both history and the present, including symbols, signs, gestures, words and gesticulations. All form an intellectual and political identity; forms of thought and content of ideas are patterned out in the present. Since tradition is explicated in the mould of history, one's analysis would be inadequate if it doesn't delve therein:

History is more than the record of how man became what he is; it is involved in man's present conception of what he is; it is the largest element in his self-knowledge.⁵⁹

Revolutions and social change, according to Berki, can be seen as part of the tradition of a community; radical changes and innovations are always defined in terms of an existing tradition and “revolutions, however fanatical, never really demand the subversion or alteration of a whole tradition.”⁶⁰ The next chapter then examines the continuation of a political idea that has played an important role in the Azanian liberation struggle, albeit in its postapartheid manifestation.

NOTES

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33. Hirschmann, op cit.
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Black Consciousness in the Postapartheid Era

From 2007 onwards, there has been a resurgence of BC in Azania, mainly purveyed by township youth in the form of Blackwash, a BC youth movement. It is more intriguing that older BC formations like AZAPO and their ideological kindred PAC and the Socialist Party of Azania (SOPA) have been carrying on the black radical tradition. Why is there a need for movements like Blackwash? Indeed, many commentators have written off BC as irrelevant politically and culturally, and as having dearth in social ideology mainly because of the triumphalism of the ANC's non-racialism and the poor parliamentary showing of AZAPO and PAC in the post-1994 elections. For example, in the 1999 elections, AZAPO got 17,436 votes (0.18 %), while in 2004 it garnered 0.1 % of the vote. SOPA, in the 1999 elections, got 5780 votes (0.06 %) when it contested from three provinces: Free State, Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). SOPA's national publicity secretary Ashraf Jooma said the party did not participate in the elections for results but it did so to build their profile and "put socialism back on the agenda." Like AZAPO, they have blamed the lack of resources, which parties like the ANC and Democratic Alliance have. Both raise funds from like-minded parties overseas and from membership. An AZAPO veteran told me that they boycotted the 1994 elections but participated in 1999 where they had a budget of R1 million while the ANC had R100 million.¹

Although "racial nationalism" has, in postapartheid South Africa, been eclipsed by the ANC's liberalism, it continues to enjoy popular appeal

despite black republicanism and multiracialism polarizing black political thought in the country.² Even though AZAPO and PAC have fared poorly in postapartheid polls and even now face oblivion and irrelevance, BC is too integral a part of South African black political thought and heritage to be summarily dismissed by scholars.³ Issues concerning Africa's liberation struggle, the national question, teleology of liberation, the ownership of resources and the production of public knowledge have still to be revisited.⁴ The resurgence of black radical thought is etched in the historical context and is embedded in black liberation thought. Instead of dismissing these as "fake ideologies," Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Parry (who calls for two cheers for nativism) argue that there's a need for proper historicization and conceptualization of the emancipatory nationalist agenda carried over from the liberation struggle.⁵ These critical voices, however, seem to be swallowed by the triumphalism of neo-liberalism and the ethos of bourgeois liberal democracy and globalization. A further complication is the postapartheid non-racial approach where talk of blackness and BC is subjected to liberal assault and intolerance. The subaltern epistemic knowledge tells us of the unfinished business of liberation from colonization, neocolonialism and hegemonic imperialism.⁶ For Kunnie, the reason why BCM is never mentioned by many critics of the country's reality despite its historic role in the black struggle is because BC is black-led and uncompromisingly socialist in orientation.⁷ Many accept the view that BC is marginal in the Azanian struggle and "is engaged in regressive, reactionary politics because it is realistic in its objectives and is essentialist in outlook."⁸ Kunnie argues that this shows the depth of racist ideology and triumphalism of the imperialist world in determining who represents the legitimate aspirations of black people in Azania, and "then dictating the contents of liberation so that they are considered both 'realistic and pragmatic.'⁹

In the new South Africa, there's an ongoing controversy between non-racialism and race consciousness as strategies for liberation.¹⁰ Biko and his associates played a crucial role in reshaping Azanian society by pursuing strategies of struggle based on republican traditions of African resistance. In this respect, back in 1999, Halisi projected that the legacy of Biko and BC thought would continue to influence the evolution of postapartheid South Africa. At the dawn of postapartheid in 1993, Adam and Moodley wrote that, supported by a number of influential opinion makers, clerics, trade unionists and universities, BC endures as an alternative vision than as an active political movement.¹¹ They predicted that:

Although the activities of the ANC continue to dominate press coverage of events in South Africa, the ideals of BC and Africanism, represented by PAC and AZAPO, respectively, may well develop into the prevailing black outlook in post-apartheid South Africa, as they had been in early 1960s and again during the Soweto upheavals in 1976. At present PAC and AZAPO have only minority support, but their non-compromising stance may force the ANC into policy positions which it might not take in the absence of a serious challenge from a left Africanist flank.¹²

According to Zeleza, among many scholars, especially in the North, and some in the South, nationalism is derided or distrusted for its alleged primordial pathologies and no attempt is made to distinguish the problematic and projects of nationalism; between repressive nationalism of imperialism and the progressive nationalism of anti-colonial resistance; and between the nationalisms that have led to colonial conquest and genocide and those that have sought decolonization and emancipation for oppressed nations and communities.¹³ Again, no distinction is made between struggles for domination and liberation, between the reactionary, reformist or revolutionary goals of different nationalisms. Zeleza further defends (Black) Nationalism against critics who argue that it was an elitist project as if subalterns didn't have material aspirations of their own. It is true that the nationalists were concerned about their specific societies as they were about Pan-Africanism and other internationalist movements. This is unsurprising since imperialism was experienced at local, regional and international levels. In this regard, Black Nationalism in Azania or elsewhere is confronted with the enuresis of globalization. It may be opportune to talk of Black (Inter) Nationalism where local struggles by black people have to be interlinked with international ones where blacks have undergone similar experiences. It is true that Black Nationalism in its different manifestations has arisen from, and continues to germinate within, this context. Contemporary BC adherents have, indeed, focused their attention not only on the local but also on the global machinations of capitalist imperialism that have significant influence on the South African political economy as well as interlinking with resistances on the continent and the Diaspora. Pan-Africanists face a dilemma, however, in that Pan-Africanism demands an African consciousness and an African loyalty, while each Pan-Africanist must concern himself with the freedom and development of his own nation.¹⁴ An important achievement of the black radical tradition, of course, is internationalization in the form of Pan-Africanism,

which is, Black Internationalism or Transnationalism.¹⁵ All forms of Pan-Africanism are rooted in nationalism, but its nationalism is an international nationalism.

Coming back to globalization, the struggles are cultural, as much as they are political and economic. Nabudere contends that globalization is first a cultural project, and then a political and economic one.¹⁶ There is a general agreement from a wide spectrum of protagonists, from the left, the nationalists of the South and the neo-Marxists, that there is nothing new about globalization: It is still the same age-old world capitalist system, “with its insatiable capacity for conquest, domination, exploitation, and the production of inequalities, disorder and crises.”¹⁷ In these neo-liberal times, globalization, they aver, is merely a polite way of saying imperialism, or the world capitalist system or Western modernization. Contemporary globalization might be different in manifestation, but it is the same in its fundamental structures: “in my view, the term globalisation is best understood as the expansion of global capitalism that is subject to age-old processes and patterns of capitalist accumulation with all their social and spatial inequities and divisions of labour.”¹⁸ African postcolonial states have, in conjunction with multilateral institutions, adopted economic policies, which are against the interests of their people, and “like their colonial counterparts, African postcolonial states continue to play the role of postcolonial governors over their populations in the interests of international financial capital and those of a small comprador local component whose interests coincide with those of the global financial oligarchy.”¹⁹ According to Nabudere, the process of economic globalization is leading to new forms of cultural and ethnic confrontations where the local and Western cultural and civilizational hegemony is being challenged by those cultures and traditions it sought to suppress. This confrontation takes the form of cultural and ethnic revivalism and consciousness, “which is a form of cultural and political identity against a failed national development.”²⁰ The emergence of new forms of knowledge that have been subalternized in the past five centuries requires building strong macro-narratives that are not world or universal perspectives, but are a radical departure from global designs inclined towards a different logic told from multiple local histories.²¹

With globalization and the similarities in the black experience in Africa and the New World where Africans and people of African descent share a common destiny, we see a single black collective, even in its multiplicity, that smothers nationalisms: “Harboured in the African diaspora there is a

single historical identity which is in opposition to the systematic privations of racial capitalism. Ideologically it cements pain to purpose, experience to expectation, and consciousness to collective action. It deepens with each disappointment at false mediation and reconciliation, and is crystallised into ever increasing cores by betrayal and repression.”²² Because racism is part of the superstructure of white capitalist world in colonies and abroad, the black found himself in the same predicament with all Africans “at home and abroad.”²³ All forms of blackness including Pan-Africanism are not simply a unity of colour but of a common condition. It is always valid and relevant because the international power structure continues to define human beings in racist terms. Black radicalism is a negation of Western civilization that is woven into the interstices of European episteme. Thus, black radicalism is an African response to oppression and human exploitation. Rooted in Africa’s historical experience, “the [black radical] tradition will provide for no compromise between liberation and annihilation.”²⁴ Actions of the maroons who disengaged from white power and their reconstitution of free communities in the mountains were important precedents for independent black thought. Escaped slaves who succeeded in establishing free black communities gave moral strength to those remained in slavery and captivity. Blacks also resisted by using so-called weapons of the weak like arson and destruction of work tools, *obeah*, voodoo, Islam and Black Christianity.²⁵ These gave strength and endurance, and imbued the young with beliefs, myths and messianic visions, which would allow them, someday, to attempt the impossible.²⁶ A similar view is shared by Dyson whose observation of the African-American situation shows that the black radical tradition has a cultural and racial precedent rooted in African-American heroic traditions where, during slavery, heroes were those who resisted racial dominance through insurrections, rebellions and by running away.²⁷ In this way, they acquired mythical status, and ever since, these heroes have helped preserve the collective memory of black culture against selective memory, which urges reconciliation, depoliticization and amnesia, and consequently keeps blacks outside the mainstream consciousness. The black radical tradition persists in responding to continued threats posed to African people in a modern world system and is buttressed by imperatives of broader collectivism where “particular languages, cultures and social sensibilities have evolved into world-historical consciousness.”²⁸

The “motion of motions,” that is, the movement of ideas, which is the foundation of the black radical tradition, will continue to illuminate and enliven Biko’s ideas in the postapartheid South Africa.²⁹ Taking a cue

from the Gramscian formulation that ideas “have a centre of formation, of irradiation, of dissemination, of persuasion,” ideas are structural and epistemological; they are not transformed or changed by replacing one or a whole conception of the world with another, but a mode of thought is internally reworked and transformed.³⁰ For Gramsci, old alignments are dismantled and new ones affected; thus, there is always an articulation and dis-articulation of ideas.

Ideas and theories do travel in whatever language they are dressed in.³¹ The task of local participants is to force the arrived theory to adapt, or to propose resistance, revolution and radical social transformation.³² Thus, while Africans were captured and taken to the New World against their will as human cargo, they did return to the continent and establish a metaphysical presence through an idea: Pan-Africanism and black radical thought (one may think of Marcus Garvey, du Bois, Henry Sylvester Williams, Holy Johnson, Edward Wilmot Blyden, among others) would inspire anti-colonial struggles in Africa. African-Americans, in particular, provided Africans with a means of thinking through the diverse meanings of blackness.³³ It is little wonder then that groups with a BC persuasion like Blackwash should appear on the political scene, albeit on the other side of the Atlantic.

Old BC adherents like AZAPO and its breakaway offshoot SOPA and their ideological kindred, the PAC, have all fared badly in the postapartheid parliamentary elections. If the popularity of an idea or even ideals is to be measured by the electorate’s inclinations to vote for an organization that embodies that particular idea, then we can say with high confidence that BC has passed its sell-by date. Or, we may, to be blunter, say BC has been carried in a casket, and gravediggers have dug a pit six-feet deep and then buried it there with an ominous sign, “REST IN PEACE.” Such a conclusion would be false and perfunctory, because BC is a spirit, an idea that continues to live on. To be succinct, an idea as a spirit cannot be killed; an idea can be resurrected and propelled forward by township youths, many of whom never saw or experienced apartheid. This is seen in the form of Blackwash and other youth formations that subscribe to Black Nationalist ideals.

If Azanian black youth are returning to the “buried” ideas of BC in a postapartheid social order, young American blacks, since the early 1990s, have been increasingly incorporating ideas by black struggle icons like Malcolm X into their daily consciousness.³⁴ The emergence of strong Black Nationalist sentiments among young blacks shows a disavowal of

the idea of “fitting in.”³⁵ Black Nationalism, in all its varieties, rests on the fact that white America has persistently refused to accept the humanity of blacks. The early 1990s saw the resurgence of Malcolm X, and his cultural rebirth. His ideas on Black Nationalism appealed to many blacks who, when he lived, either ignored or despised him.³⁶ His appeal is strongest among black youth of ages 15–24 years who find him a figure of epic racial achievement.³⁷ There is also rap culture that has elevated him as a cultural hero, with many seeing him as the original MC.³⁸ The hip-hop culture, either the politically conscious or hard-core gangsta, espouses the same rage and social conditions that Malcolm X spoke of, and his voice is sampled in numerous rap songs. Again, it shows the resilience of rap music, a black art form:

The obstacles that rap has overcome in establishing itself as a mainstay of American popular culture connected primarily to its style of expression and its themes provide a natural link between Malcolm’s radical social vocation and aspects of black youth culture. The similarity between aspects of hip-hop culture and Malcolm’s public career [for example, charges of violence, the problems associated with expressing black rage and experience in the ghetto, the celebration of black pride and historical memory] prods rappers to take the lead in asserting Malcolm’s heroism for contemporary black America.³⁹

Dyson further observes that “Malcolm is the rap revolution’s rhetorician of choice, his words forming the ideological framework for authentic black consciousness.”⁴⁰ Dyson’s perception is important, and thus needs more liberal quoting:

Malcolm’s phrase: ‘no sell-out, no sell-out, no sell-out,’ remains useful in this contemporary consciousness ... Malcolm’s defiant expression of black rage has won him a new hearing among a generation of black youth whose embattled social status due to a brutally resurgent racism makes them sympathetic to his fiery, often angry rhetoric. Malcolm’s take no prisoners approach to racial crisis appeals to young blacks disaffected from white society and alienated from older generations whose contained style of revolt owes more to Martin Luther King Jr’s non-violent philosophy than to Malcolm’s advocacy of self-defence.⁴¹

Like Steve Biko is in Azania, Malcolm’s style of publicly saying what other blacks fear to say and only do in private, in addition to his combative asser-

tiveness, endears him to black youth finding ways to articulate anger at the permanence of American and South African racism. Biko's philosophical praxis that he lived is shown in the findings of the inquest into his death, which determined that he was involved in a scuffle with the security police and it took several big men to subdue him. One incident recounted by Donald Woods during a police search on Biko's house, which needs extensive quoting, relates Biko's encounter with the security police:

Once he admitted them to his house—several of them, led by the notorious Warrant Officer Gerhardus Hattingh—and when they were inside the house, Warrant Officer Hattingh made the mistake of producing a revolver. In a flash Steve gave the firearm a karate-type chop while, with the other hand, wrenching the weapon from Hattingh's hand. "No guns in this house!" he said, handing it back to a shaken Hattingh. Somehow he got away with it—on that occasion. Once during one of his spells in detention, he was put in an interrogation room, in a chair in the middle of the room, with seven Security policemen standing along the walls all around him. Hattingh entered the room, walked straight to where Steve was sitting, and slapped him hard across the face.

'What happened then?' I (Donald Woods) asked.

'I hit him right against the wall,' Steve replied. 'Bust his false teeth.'

'Then what?'

'He went straight out of the room. I had the feeling that he didn't know what to do, or how to react, so he just went out—presumably for further instructions from his superiors.'

On a later occasion, the same Hattingh tried to assault Biko in detention, and Biko held him at arm's length, saying, "Stop this, Hattingh! I don't want to hit an older man." Hattingh apologized, "Sorry, Steve. I lost my temper."⁴²

Malcolm X critiqued the non-violence of civil rights movement associated with King; he advocated self-defence in the face of violent racist assault and denounced black liberal bourgeois protest, which encouraged white cooperation to secure feeble civil and political gains. He famously said, "Be peaceful, be courteous, obey the law, respect everyone but if someone puts his hand on you, send him to the cemetery."⁴³

Malcolm's undying magnetism is that there is a pervasive feeling in black communities that "we have not overcome"; for ghetto kids who have not been touched by the minimal postcivil rights gains, it's like we

are still “where we were.” Malcolm’s legacy, like Biko, is his passion for black history and cultural and racial consciousness.

BLACKWASH

Blackwash emerged in 2008. It is a blacks-only youth movement based in the Johannesburg township of Soweto. An article by Lindy Mtongana, which appears in the RNW’s Africa Desk on 19 April 2011,⁴⁴ says:

In South Africa, a radical black youth movement is gaining ground. Blackwash addresses the ruling ANC’s failure to improve the conditions of black people in South Africa, ‘Coz 1994 changed fokol!’

In an interview, Lubabalo Mgwili said, “For me the biggest problem was them (ANC) accepting the 1994 settlement and the constitution that came with it. There’s nothing to celebrate in the post 1994.” Ncebakazi Manzi explains, “Our assessment is that black people have accepted that this is a white country. They have accepted that they must live in filth and squalor (for example Alexandra) and yet if they walk just 10 minutes they will arrive in Sandton, the richest suburb on the continent. Blackwash is about the historical advantage that white people have accrued for themselves through violence. And how, in protecting the interests of white people, the ANC allows for this quiet violence to continue.” Mgwili added, “Blackwash is a blacks-only movement. We are not interested in organising with whites. They should organise themselves. White peoples’ suffering, whether it is homophobia or whatever, calls for a crisis, but the suffering of black people has been normalised and that is why black people have to organise on their own. The one thing that black people share, that white people can never have, is their black skin, which has become a cause for their oppression.” The article continues to say that Blackwash aims to achieve a dictatorship of the masses in which people make decisions through processes of direct democracy, and in which wealth is transferred to the people. Lucy Holborn of the South African Institute of Race Relations is quoted in the article as saying, although Blackwash is exploiting the frustrations of black youths, racial ideology is “just as dangerous as extreme right wing sentiment and it is based on racial stereotypes that are becoming increasingly irrelevant as racial integration and mixing increases around the world.”

Blackwash outlines its mission as:

Blackwash is a blacks-only movement. We stand for liberation of black people who want to be liberated. We will fight for this dream by any means necessary. We understand that the main force we are pitted against is white supremacy. We carry the spirit of Haiti's slave revolt of 1804. We shall walk as we talk. We shall make our own mistakes, learn and improve on our practice. We stand, ultimately, for the love of black people and the end of our suffering. (**Vuka Darkie Coz 1994 CHANGED FOKOL!**)

One Blackwash pamphlet reiterates:

Blackwash is a youth radical Black Consciousness formation for Blacks ONLY! We believe that Black people are still suffering under a black government. We hope to educate one another so we could put an end to our suffering! We are currently based in Soweto and wish to upgrade and spread radical Black Consciousness to black youth from all parts of the country. (**VUKA DARKIE COZ 1994 CHANGED FOKOL!**)

The movement also lays down what they call six minimum points, which are as follows: against patriarchy/sexism/misogyny; against white supremacy and capitalism; rejection of tribalism and narrow tribal identities; rejection of African colonial border; that all settler colonialists must be vanquished (including Arab settlers) and rejection of cultures and religions of subjugation, rather embracing both culture and religion that include resistance/liberation/black theology.

Blackwash has as its compass a document containing a set of guiding principles and a foundational ideological exposition called "The Blackwash Dream—We Fight For It Now".

According to the document, white supremacy, whose foundation is capitalist domination, oppresses and generates suboppressions in the black community. If black people fail to fight these oppressions, including at an interpersonal level, they are complicit in the white supremacist project. Blackwash defines the Black Condition (I will extrapolate more on this in subsequent chapters) as a situation whereby black South Africans are pushed into marginality, squalor and substandard education inherited from the apartheid Bantu Education system. For this reason, the youth are disillusioned with the post-1994 government. The Blackwash Dream describes the Black Condition as "a disaster zone." The Black Condition is neither predetermined nor a natural affair. Its arrival here is caused by a historical

situation and systematic brutalization of indigenous people in the process of creation of South Africa's white modernity. South Africa's 'modernization' or development has been necessitated by violence against blacks and is sustained by the same logic and practice. This particular violence has become normalized, naturalized and has become a way of life. South Africa's contradiction is seen in the squalor of Johannesburg's Alexandra Township where blacks live, and the splendour of Sandton, the richest suburb on the continent. Thus, black poverty lies side by side with white wealth, created from exclusion and impoverishment of blacks. Blacks wishing to escape the Condition adopt a white attitude and become half-white. The narrative of meritocracy and hard work is a myth to blind the excluded from the truth of how exploitation and exclusion lie at the heart of success under the anti-black capitalist reality of contemporary South Africa.

Although the anti-colonial struggles are inspirational, black people find very little to celebrate in the postcolonial dispensation. Africa remains in bondage, and its leaders have themselves become black colonisers, in the process betraying struggle luminaries like Thomas Sankara, Patrice Lumumba, Steve Biko and Robert Sobukwe. The implication is that anti-colonial struggles have to be started all over again. This is in realization of the dire objective conditions black people still find themselves in even with the celebrated "democracy."

The postcolonial condition in Azania and its schemes to delude the black masses, according to Blackwash, are seen in their chimerical attempts to "whitewash" history and thereby absolve age-old "sins" and atrocities committed against black people by "relying on our chosen group amnesia to the truth" and "the power lies in South Africa's ability to choose to forget that, at best, this land remains dis-indigenous to black people." The ideological weapons at the disposal of the postcolonial state are trained on the erotic imagination of the masses. This, amidst crass inequalities, involves *kwaito* music and entertainment to divert anger and stunt the growth of consciousness of the masses.

Despite a couple years of existence, Blackwash remains embryonic, without a fully developed theoretical and ideological position, except the BC philosophy and Biko as its compass. This largely is because of a myriad of complex problems besetting the movement, which are discussed later in the text. Some programmes that they embarked on were suspended because of intra-organizational differences and contractions. When I began this project, I expected to see and report on the progress the movement is making in the communities. However, infighting

and squabbling, arguments and disagreements were threatening the very survival of the movement. In the following sections are some of the programmes the movement embarked on before relations among the members deteriorated.

POLITICAL EDUCATION

Political education classes, public lectures mainly by Andile Mngxitama and monthly workshops were held in Soweto as part of a broader objective of conscientization. For some two years, political education classes were held fortnightly at Soweto's Moletsane High School. The school has a history of resistance, and in the 1970s was a hotbed for BC activism and hugely contributed in the 1976 Soweto Uprising. I attended two such classes, which dealt with classical black radical texts like Frantz Fanon's "Pitfalls of National Consciousness," Amilcar Cabral and C.L.R. James, among others. Common themes that were covered include service delivery protests and if they indicate potentiality for revolution, understanding power (inspired by C.L.R. James' texts) and ideology and the ruling class (mainly from Althusser). The classes followed a year-long curriculum designed to insert various themes related to liberatory and radical black theory. Each class attracted up to 50 exuberant youths, with some as young as 10 years; others included those in primary or high school, tertiary students and young adults. A Blackwash facilitator would lead and set the motion for discussion of the texts that participants would be expected to have read beforehand. The participants would then be divided into smaller groups, with instructions to discuss certain themes related to the texts. After a while, the groups would reconvene, and a general discussion would be held. It was at one of these political education classes that I first heard the term "sell-out" (ostensibly with reference to Fanon's "Pitfalls of National Consciousness"), where there is a serious indictment of the postcolonial dispensation that betrays the ideals of the anti-colonial liberation struggles. What struck me most was the high level of intellectual engagement by the youth who exhibited lofty awareness of current affairs and their own objective conditions. Although Blackwash considered reviving the classes to run concurrently in all national provinces, developing a national curriculum, training of facilitators, especially university students, and the appraisal of medium of facilitation and translation was stalled, as I indicated earlier, by contestations within the movement.

FILM SCREENINGS

Film screenings of “Thomas Sankara: The Upright Man,” amongst others, were held mainly at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) where Blackwash had a base, consisting largely of Wits students. These were always followed by a discussion on the themes these films raised. One pamphlet, for example, dated 15 October 2010, advertising the screening at the university, gave the following background:

As more and more South Africans realise that our politicians care very little about the Black majority, we look at the life and ideals of the late Thomas Sankara, former president of Burkina Faso. While in power, he carried out revolutionary programmes including reducing salaries of state ministers to the equivalent of teachers’ pay and also ensuring that they drive the cheapest cars on the market. Because of his commitment to liberation, Sankara was assassinated on 15 October 1984. Join us as we celebrate his life and draw inspiration from him for our own country.

Ostensibly, the September National Imbizo (SNI), which I discuss later in the text, derives its inspiration from the Sankarist project.

Bua Blackwash Bua

Bua Blackwash Bua was a Blackwash radical counter-cultural mass conscientization publication for “blackwashing the masses through written word.” It follows the realization that the ideological content of a publication is fundamental for its success as much as its presentation and the strength of the movement itself.⁴⁵ The publication, again like other projects, was stalled because of, among other things, prohibitive production costs. The last edition was sometime in 2010. The publication offered a space and a political platform for young black radicals to engage with ideas, themes and issues affecting black people in general. At one time, there was talk of setting up an editorial collective and resuscitating the publication. However, Mngxitama objected to the idea saying, “... I suggest we finalise the huge political and ideological problems Blackwash is faced with. Can you imagine a person with anti-Blackwash *mala-mogudu* BC⁴⁶ sitting on the editorial committee of Bua Blackwash?”⁴⁷

The “soul” of the project, however, was captured in the editorial of the edition of August 2010:

When they tell you are free and still live in shacks—Bua!
 When they say it's a new dawn and you still have no land—Bua!
 When they say better life for all yet you still have *fokol*—Bua Blackwash!
 When they promise you land and give you *nada*—Bua!
 When they preach reconciliation, rainbow nation but not justice—Bua!
 When they twin tower shower you fabricated notions of equality, unity in
 diversity *ke maka*—Bua Blackwash Bua!
 When they free your children only to enslave them again—Bua!
 Black kids caged in factories of slavery we call schools—Bua!
 Feeding young minds with historical lies from their deliberative amnesia—
 Bua Blackwash Bua!
 Bua in trains. Bua in buses. Bua in villages and townships Bua.
 Bua until parliament trembles. Stop only when true freedom comes.
 Bua Blackwash Bua!

BLACK SOCIALISM

If revolutionaries are critical of the hitherto existing material and objective conditions and the socio-political and socio-economic ordering of present society, it is always an outstanding habit that they propose a postrevolutionary alternative. Black Socialism is a phrase I have heard discussed, peremptorily in Blackwash, although no theoretical exposition on this important theme in black radical thought was fully elaborated. In 2011, I attended a debate organized by, and between the Young Communist League (YCL) and Blackwash Wits, at the University of the Witwatersrand, entitled “Is Communism a Viable Strategy for Distribution of Wealth in South Africa?” A Blackwash representative, quoting Frank Wilderson, talked of the inadequacy of class analysis and that a white person can't be part of the black struggle because of the privilege of their skin. The subjective experiences of black and white workers are different. Although the Marxist application may be correct, he said, it is inadequate. BC adherents talk of BC while communists hanker on worker consciousness based on the wage and work. BC isn't inclined to work, but to own the whole chain of production, the aim being collective ownership and collective redistribution of wealth. Still citing Wilderson, he said the suffering of blacks has no analogy. Blackness occupies a symbolic field and whiteness another, and a white hobo is more important than blacks. Black people are still oppressed, he said, because wealth still

benefits whites. He explained that Blackwash is anti-capitalist; it advocates for redistribution of wealth and stands for Black Socialism.

Let me detour and compare the speaker's input with what Lorenzo Kom'boa has said about the USA.⁴⁸ He argues that the use of dogmatic definitions of "scientific socialism" or "revolutionary communism" is based on Eurocentrism. Blacks are then expected to embrace the "socialist" values of the settler/conqueror culture rather than "socialist" values rooted in daily and cultural black realities. Kom'boa calls leftists in the USA "Marxist missionaries" coming into black neighbourhoods preaching the gospel of Marx, while the main enemy is the racist authoritarian state and its supporters. At the workplace, blacks are "last hired, first fired." White co-workers are generally afraid of blacks mainly because they are scared of competition. On the contrary, unions are soft on racism. This makes sense, as unions in the USA are running dogs of capitalism and apologists for management despite their militant rhetoric. Many white workers are supportive of racist politicians who promise to protect their jobs. Kom'boa gets harsher in his criticism:

[T]he wannabe rulers of the Marxist/Leninist white left 'vanguards' who only see the fascists as competition in their struggle to see which set of 'empire builders' will lord over us; the 'good' whites who regulate us to the amerikkkan left plantation of 'the glorious workers state', or the 'bad' whites who work us as slaves until half-dead and then laugh at us as our worn out carcasses are thrown into ovens, cut up for 'scientific purposes' or hung from the lamp posts and trees. You people have yet to show me the qualitative difference(s) between a Klan/Nazi style white supremacist dictatorship and your concept of a 'dictatorship' of the proletariat' in the context of this particular country and its notorious history.⁴⁹

He goes on to say the "dictatorship of the proletariat" doesn't guarantee equality to blacks:

Give us one good reason to believe that you people will be any different from these previous and current 'benevolent' leaders and political institutions if by some fluke or miracle you folks stumble into state power:⁵⁰

Kom'boa is afraid that judging by the general attitudes and theories expressed by "your members and leadership, we can rest assured that it is virtually guaranteed that the spirit of 'Jim Crow' can and will flourish within a white-led Marxist-Leninist 'proletarian dictatorship in the

US.”⁵¹ The danger of a working class revolution in the USA is the continued domination of non-white people by white “revolutionary leaders” and a “left wing [white supremacist] government”. Ultimately, there may be two choices, either continued repression of non-white people or grassroots-based revolution rooted in anti-authoritarian political ideas that are culturally relevant to each ethnicity of the poor and working class population.

A similar view is shared by an anarchist online article.⁵² The historical argument that the factory will create a revolutionary proletariat or a source of social mobilization has proved to be false. It asks, “how can workers alone, in tightly managed workplaces and offered only the choice of alienated labour or enforced leisure, ever be capable of carrying through a libertarian revolution?” Industrial development has simply led to managerialism, technological control of the workplace—managing the unmanageable—and to social compulsion or catastrophe. Although it remains true that the social revolution can’t be won outside the struggle at the point of production and the seizure of the means of production, struggles in other areas can’t be relegated to a secondary role because all struggles within capitalism are intertwined; thus, creation of a “libertarian front” is essential. Urbanization continues to institute a vast, displaced, hungry, dispossessed and desperate underclass across the globe. The underclass and the youth, rather than workers themselves, have become increasingly important as drivers of change, as seen by the Arab Spring and the London riots in 2011. The article also adds that socio-political ruptures are being led without a revolutionary left, which duplicates ruling class values in their authoritarianism, high degree of centralization, worship of hierarchy and the “sheep-like submission of the rank and file to an omnipotent and all-wise *leadership*.”

Coming back to the individual from Blackwash, he argued that the primary responsibility of every revolutionary is to liberate black people, the end of that liberation process being Black Socialism. Critiquing the Tripartite alliance in the same forum, Mngxitama said on the brink of the revolution in the early 1990s, Mandela told people to lay down arms, and both the ANC and SACP voluntarily chose to maintain a racist status quo and were at the forefront of theorising compromises. They sat at the negotiation table and “sold out fundamental economic issues and were bent on deracialising capitalism.” SACP secretary general Blade Nzimande and other communists are in a capitalist government defending white capitalist interests, and that should be rejected. Communists cannot *toyi-toyi*⁵³

for free education because the SACP is in power and has influence on policy decisions. He further said that there are two South Africas: one that is complicit with the white bourgeoisie and the other that is the poor black majority. The YCL representative said in South Africa it is mainly black workers who are producers of wealth, who operate machines at the point of production and whose surplus value is appropriated by the capitalists. On the question why black people are still oppressed, she said it is because of the capitalist drive to exploit people in the quest for profit. Again, workers are equally exploited, irrespective of colour. In South Africa, blacks are not oppressed because they are black but because they are workers, and workers all over are exploited in a similar manner. Black capitalists are seen to be as exploitative as their white counterparts, so capitalism is colour-blind. She gave the historical example of consumer boycotts in the country, which the black petty bourgeoisie saw as a way to enrich themselves by charging exorbitant prices, and that they were indeed incorporated into the system. She said the myth of African Socialism was long exposed: there is only one solution and that is the one proposed by Marx.

Black Socialism expresses an old idea theorized by early Pan-Africanists. Among the first to propagate the idea of African Socialism was Edward Wilmot Blyden. According to Blyden, the family is the basic unit of African socialist society, which is then linked to the extended family, clan, community and the society at large. Land and water are accessible to all. In this society, nobody is in want of work, food or clothing. The native laws and institutions prohibit cooperation with anyone intent on appropriating anything for their own use and benefit from profits accruing from joint efforts. Laws and justice are known to all members and administered by chiefs in the presence of a whole people, who are jointly and severally the guardians and preservers of peace. Social life is communistic or cooperative: "All work for each, each works for all."⁵⁴ Blyden applied an organic hermeneutic approach in analysing the African society. The cooperative principle, he averred, the African learns from the animal kingdom, especially insects, and particularly termites, which construct elaborate termite mounds or "bug-a-bug hills." Blyden explains and clarifies this concept in more detail:

It is from this object we gather that the industrial system of the African is derived. It is cooperative not egotistic or individualistic. We, and not I, are the law of African life. Indeed the word civilisation, invented by the Romans, has its root in this idea. They adopted the maxim of Marcus Aurelius who

said, ‘That which is not in the interest of the whole swarm is not for the interest of a single bee.’ The word civilisation derived from two Latin words cum and eo, means together or going together. This is the idea that underlies the efforts of the better class of socialists in Europe—a socialism which says—not all yours are mine, as a dominating and exclusive principle, but all mine are yours.⁵⁵

Through their socialistic and cooperative way in all material things, the African system avoids such European social ills like starvation, neglect, prostitution and so on. The main aim of tribes and families cooperating is to provide sufficient food, clothing, shelter and all conditions for a reasonably comfortable life for all. This is a result of collective ownership of all land and water, and equal accessibility to these natural objects for man, woman or child. Blyden adds, “When the full meaning to the life of the African of the two conditions we have mentioned above, as regards land and water, is understood, then it will be realised why the African everywhere fights for his land when he will hesitate to fight about anything else.”⁵⁶

The communistic order in Africa is not by accident, Blyden argues. It is borne out of centuries of experience steeped in philosophy and logic, as expressed by striking proverbs that chastise individualism and meanness. Blyden concludes that the individualistic system is antagonistic to the African because in Africa there’s neither proletariat nor exploiters; it is why the native is seen by the unimaginative European as “lazy.”

This early theorising by Blyden was taken up decades later by thinkers of the Negritude movement, especially Leopold Senghor and Aime Cesaire, Anton Lembede, W.E.B. Du Bois, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and the BCM in Azania. Lembede recognizes that African society is fundamentally socialistic where there is no individual ownership of land or landlords and land was understood as collectively owned. He goes on to say, “Socialism then is our valuable legacy from our ancestors. Our task is to develop this socialism by the infusion of new and modern socialistic ideas.”⁵⁷ Du Bois, in an article entitled “A Nature for Pan-Africa, Freedom, Peace, Socialism” in the *National Guardian*, lays the theoretical underpinnings of African Socialism:

Pan-African socialism seeks the welfare state in Black Africa. It will refuse to be exploited by people of other continents for their own benefit and not the benefit of the peoples of Africa. It will no longer consent to

permitting the African majority of any African country to be governed against its will by a minority of invaders who claim racial superiority or the right to get rich at African expense. It will seek not only to raise but to process its raw material and to trade freely with the entire world on just and equal terms and prices.

In a speech delivered by his wife Shirley to the All-African Peoples Conference in Accra on 22 December 1958, Du Bois wrote:

But what is socialism? It is a disciplined economic and political organisation to which the first duty of a citizen is to serve the state; and the state is not a selected aristocracy, or a group of self-seeking oligarchs who have seized wealth and power. No! The mass of workers with hand and brain are the ones whose collective destiny is the chief object of all effort.

The speech went on to say that while the West is governed by corporations, individual capitalists and trade union leaders, “on the other hand, the African tribe, whence all of us are sprung, was communistic in its very beginnings. No tribesman was ‘free’. All were servants of the tribe of whom the chief was father and voice.”

Nyerere attempted to put into practice the idea of African Socialism through *Ujamaa*. Nyerere argues that socialism involves building on the foundation of the past and building the present to our own design. Modern Africans are not divorced from their ancestors in socio-economic organization and religious facets of society:

We have deliberately decided to grow, as a society, out of our own roots, but in a particular direction and towards a particular kind of objective. We are doing this by emphasising certain characteristics of our traditional organisation, and extending them so that they can embrace the possibilities of modern technology and enable us to meet the challenge of life in the twentieth century.⁵⁸

Ujamaa is an African word, which emphasizes African-ness of the policies intended to be followed. It also means family hood. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 defines the basic principles of *Ujamaa*: love (respect); property (i.e., all basic goods held in common and shared among all members of the unit). No one could go hungry while others hoarded food; none could be without shelter when there is space; the economic proportion of one could not exceed that of others; although economic

inequalities existed, they were mitigated by family or social responsibility and could never become gross and offensive to the social equality, which was the basis of social life and finally, the obligation to work—only by the universal acceptance of this principle could the aforementioned factors be possible.

The main purpose of a socialist society is the furtherance of human development, with a strong emphasis on the human. A society isn't socialist if in its organization or practice it discriminates or allows discrimination because of parentage, place of birth, appearance, religious belief and so on. In such a society, there cannot be existence of racialism, tribalism or religious intolerance. Under socialism, there can be no exploitation of one man by another, "there will be no 'masters' who sit in idleness while others labour on 'their' farms or in 'their' factories."⁵⁹ Society has a duty and a right to prevent exploitation arising from individual ownership of the means of productive forces and exchange; the tools of production and mechanisms of exchange are firmly under control of the people with public ownership of the key points of the economy. Public ownership is through the instrument of elected central or local government, or cooperatives: "the essential point is that no individual or group of individuals will be able to hold to ransom either the society as a whole, or other individuals, by means of their exclusive control of an instrument which is necessary to the increased well-being of the community."⁶⁰

Work and commitment to work are central in such society: "A socialist society therefore will consist of workers—only of workers. Every member will contribute, by his work, to the total of wealth and welfare produced by the society, and he will receive a return in proportion to his efforts and his contribution to the well-being of the community." Work and duty to society are an obligation; thus, under socialism, there could not be a group of "permanently unemployed," so everyone has to be a worker, implying a worker is anyone who works.

Nyerere further observed the international character of socialism but must relate to the Tanzanian social context, geography and history. The universality of socialism doesn't mean a single, worldwide uniformity of social institutions, social habits or language, but differences between societies reflect the manner of their development and their historical traditions. In arguing that socialism had to be tailored in lieu of the level of productive forces of a given context, Nyerere critiqued traditional socialists, especially those from the West:

There is, however a tendency, an apparent tendency among certain socialists to try and establish a new religion—a religion of socialism itself. This is usually called “scientific socialism” and the works Marx and Lenin are regarded as the holy writ, in the light of which all other thoughts and actions of socialists have to be judged,⁶¹ and these proponents, “talk and act in the same manner as the most rigid of theologians ... indeed we are fast getting to the stage where quarrels between different Christian sects about the precise meaning of the bible fade into insignificance when compared with quarrels of those who claim to be the interpreters of Marxism–Leninism!”⁶²

However, the works of Marx and Lenin are useful because they thought of the objective conditions of their time and we can learn of their methods of analysis and their ideas, but “it is of no part of the job of the socialist in 1968 to worry about whether or not his actions or proposals are in accordance with what Marx or Lenin write, and it is a waste of time and energy to spend hours—if not months and years—trying to prove that what you have decided is objectively necessary is really in accordance with their teachings.”⁶³ African problems cannot be solved according to what priests of this “new theology” of Marxism contend because Africa’s conditions are very different from those of the Europe in which Marx and Lenin wrote and worked. To talk as if Marx invented socialism is to reject both the humanity of Africa and the universality of socialism. Marx did contribute a great deal to socialist thought, but socialism did not begin with him nor can it end in constant reinterpretations of his writings. Traditional Tanzanian society, Nyerere argued, had many socialist characteristics, and this provided a basis on which modern socialism can be built. To reject this base is to accept the idea that Africa has nothing to contribute; it is to argue that the only way progress can be achieved in Africa is if we reject our own past and impose on ourselves the doctrines of some other society. Nyerere further argued that if “scientific socialism” meant anything, it is that the objectives are socialist and one applies scientific methods of study in working out the appropriate policies. If the phrase does not mean that, then it is simply a trap to lure the unwary into a denunciation of their own nature, and therefore into a new form of oppression. A real scientific socialist would begin his analysis of the problem of a particular society from the standpoint of that society. As for Tanzania, he would have to note the existence of socialist values as part of his material analysis; he would have to study the effect of colonialism on social organization and “he could well

finish up with Arusha Declaration and the policies of Ujamaa!”⁶⁴ Walter Rodney concurs.⁶⁵ The insistence on an African identity is a worthwhile corrective not only to bourgeois cultural imperialism but also to dogmatic expositions by self-styled Marxists and scientific socialists. Identification with the particularity in Africa is as essential as appreciating the universality of scientific method. Rodney argues that when the doctrine of *Ujamaa* postulates an African path to socialism, it affirms the validity of scientific socialism, despite the lack of any declaration to this effect by Tanzanian leadership and despite deliberate efforts to distort both *Ujamaa* and scientific socialism so as to present them as fundamentally contradictory.

It is not my intention here to analyse the successes or failures of African Socialism, but I am interested in the idea as a concept, as a philosophy and as a political thought. It’s worthwhile, however, to repeat Rodney’s view that the error of most authors is failure to differentiate between form and substance, and “the substance of *Ujamaa* is its stand against imperialism, against racism and against exploitation of all kinds; and (to put it affirmatively) it stands for the emancipation of the working population of Africa and for the remodelling of the society along lines of socialist equality and socialist democracy.”⁶⁶

The BCM of the 1970s followed this thought, albeit through the concept of Black Communalism. Since most of what they said is very similar to that mentioned earlier, it is not necessary to repeat it all, except briefly. They argued that BC stifles the individualistic tendency inculcated by the legalized racism and the capitalist system. An undated 1970s BC article called “The Repugnant Elements in the Western Culture” notes:

Capitalism by its very nature hoards the wealth of a country in a few limited hands. In order to maximise profits and minimise outlay, the capitalist harnesses the poor people and euphemistically calls them workers when they are in fact slaves. Remuneration of these slaves is nothing more than a pittance that is calculated to keep only the body and soul together in order that the slave can return to work the following morning.

It adds:

We further regard communism, socialism and other related economic systems as the results of a white man’s frustrations in his capitalism and therefore just as unacceptable as capitalism that has given birth to them. Black people must have an economic system which is an answer to the ills of capitalism and that is communalistic economic system.

The communalistic system of yore ensured welfare for all. Traditional, indigenous values show that extreme richness and poverty were unknown, and “sharing was at the heart of our culture. A system that tends to exploit many and favour a few is as foreign to us as hair which is not kinky or a skin which is not dark.”⁶⁷ A black man as an individual “belongs,” he doesn’t exist in isolation; “he does not speak in terms of ‘my’ but in terms of ‘our’; he says, ‘yikithi laphaya’ (that is our home) and not ‘that is my home.’”⁶⁸ The basic structure of society is the family, the extended family, the tribe, the nation and society, and “it is evident that in such a philosophy every man is your bother and cannot be used for private gain of another; on the contrary everyone and society itself is under obligation to ensure that every member shall be provided for.”⁶⁹ The Mafikeng Manifesto adopted Black Communalism as BPC’s economic policy.⁷⁰ It explained Black Communalism as a modified version of the traditional African economic lifestyle, which is geared to meet the demands of a highly industrialized and modern economy. It advocates sharing of property, wealth, services and labour and that land be owned by all the people, with the state entrusted with its control. During the BPC-SASO trial, Biko elaborated this position:

In African society we did not believe in apportioning land for part ownership by individuals. The land belonged to the tribe, and was held in for the tribe in trust by the chief ... now we are advocating Black Communalism, which is in many ways similar to African Socialism. We are expropriating an essential tribal background to accommodate what is in fact an expounded economic concept now.

As shown in Chaps. 1 and 2, by the 1980s, BCM shifted from this position and adopted scientific socialism as a mode of analysis. Rodney writes that Marxism is relevant to non-Western societies because they have been incorporated into the world capitalist system of production.⁷¹ Therefore, African people in the Third World have a vested interest in scientific socialism, which needs to be adapted to context though, because it offers them a weapon of theory, tools and ideas to dismantle the capitalist system and the imperialist structure. Rodney critiques Nkrumah and Padmore, who, in finding an alternative to scientific socialism, that is, through Pan-African Socialism, inevitably turned out to be another branch of bourgeois thought. When I talked to Sadique Variava, a founding member of AZAPO, he told me South Africa has all the features of an advanced,

industrialized capitalist formation, which necessitates application of scientific socialism. Mafika Gwala's appraisal of BC is that the scope of the liberation struggle had to be widened beyond social and cultural identity towards a firmer base.⁷² BC could not remain static; it had to outgrow its cultural overtones and embrace pressing issues—it would follow a “path leading to National Consciousness with class identity as alternative to the flippant middle class oriented separatist line” and there had to be a natural development towards class identity within the struggle.⁷³ For Gwala, African Socialism was half-baked and unscientific in today's world of advanced technology and planned economies: “to me African Socialism had to the pattern I was then watching in Natal, that of a tribal chauvinism being moulded in the name of black cultural identity and self-reliance.”⁷⁴ It is for this reason that the BCM adopted scientific socialism, and AZAPO has not since departed from that position. As for Blackwash, it remains to be seen how they intend to develop the idea of Black Socialism.

CONTRADICTIONS, CONTRACTIONS AND CONTESTATIONS AMONG BC YOUTH

As I mentioned earlier in the text, when I embarked on this project, I had high hopes of reporting on the progress Blackwash was making in the black communities. These hopes were heightened by the excitement I saw among township youth who attended political education classes and public lectures. The movement didn't and couldn't put their ideas into practicality and instead expended most of its energies and time on internal wrangling. My treatment of the movement then is more about narrating and analysing these disputes.

The decision to form the SNI in 2010 (which I discuss later in the text) precipitated widespread dissension and dissatisfaction and further deepened and sharpened the divisions. Many questioned the rationale to form another movement when Blackwash itself was embryonic and trying to find its feet. Yet, there are also other grievances, which I will discuss later. Matters came to a head at the SNI gathering in Durban in 2011. Participants were divided into commissions to discuss various themes. Among them was an open commission. It is here that many who were grieving about formation of SNI congealed their disdain and expressed their frustrations. Interestingly, there were attempts to censor and occlude this commission by “senior” and more intellectual activists who were

strong advocates for SNI. Many reasoned that this conversation was important because it was useful in sorting out issues that divide the movement. There were also concerns regarding age, between the “senior,” who are older and the younger members. Some felt there was now a generation gap because Blackwash was primarily a youth movement. There was now a tendency by the older generation to impose their will on the aspirations of the younger. Seemingly, only a few people exerted dominance, while the rest were silent. However, some comrades felt that the age factor alienated older people.

According to those in the open commission, most people in the townships were familiar with Blackwash as a contemporary movement expressing the age—old BC idea that came to its zenith with Biko and others. Of course, BC has never departed from the psyche of the people, so when Blackwash emerged onto the scene, it elicited fervent excitement. Ironically, many people were surprised that gradually Blackwash receded into silence when it was important that a political base be established in the communities. Establishing a political base goes beyond “talk,” which should be congealed into praxis; as someone put it, “otherwise talking and talking without putting that talk into practice will make people think we are looking down at them.” There was widespread concern with a “culture of talking” in the movement without establishing a physical presence in communities. The conscientization programme couldn’t be complete unless “we go to the community and identify with its needs.” Grassroots issues had to be addressed and considered as of practical importance. This includes establishing community development projects. When activists do things on the ground, it’s a way of spreading consciousness. In this process, the people take ownership and make decisions for and by themselves. With education and right ideas, people will get increasingly attracted to the movement; for this reason, activists have to do a lot of field work. After all, for ideology to be effective, it had to be manifest in practicality. Furthermore, to do any programme, event or project, it must be clear to the people that it is theirs, even though it is a movement’s initiative.

Participants noted that Blackwash was behind the formation of the SNI. Initially, the idea was to make SNI an annual event, and would remain such. At that time, there was, on one hand, confusion about the relationship between the former and the latter. Secondly, energies had been split between the two. The reasoning behind formation of SNI was that it would act as a “magnet” to attract those blacks “intimidated” by Blackwash’s radical left politics, but this complicated the former’s politics

because liberal blacks wormed their way into it. Many familiar with the matter sensed dishonesty and betrayal when neither the link between SNI and Blackwash was denied, nor that it was an initiative of the latter, and claimed an “information gap” regarding the matter. Instead, it was argued that Blackwash was only asked and agreed to host this initiative, which was started by people who were not members of Blackwash. Mngxitama said the history of SNI dates back to April 2010 when he started it as a *Facebook* conversation, and it was suggested that it be held in September. The present feeling, according to Mngxitama (who was the prominent individual in movement and a public personality), is that some thought SNI owned Blackwash and Blackwash had no right to “come here and disturb the programme of SNI, a totally independent and autonomous movement and that no political and non-political formation can stake a claim to SNI.” Some opinions were that the division enabled external forces to enter, and there was need to clarify that SNI is not a movement. After all, if there were two organizations, how could comrades’ multi-task and maintain that relationship, and where did their allegiances lie? The implications of SNI being a movement meant lack of commitment to Blackwash, and as a result the movement suffered, its growth stunted, its cohesion dissipated and its very survival endangered. At the time of the first SNI in Soweto in 2010, Blackwash had suggested a couple of propositions meant to strengthen the movement. Now at a time when the movement was trying to find its feet and learn from its mistakes, of which it didn’t have adequate time to do, SNI came along and it seemed another organization was being created. One comrade, a foundation member of Blackwash, said that originally the decision was to have SNI as a platform for black people to air their views, but it seemed SNI had stolen the eye of Blackwash and she didn’t “know what’s happening.” It had been made clear at the inaugural SNI meeting in Soweto 2010 that SNI would remain just an event. She didn’t, however, decry SNI and its politics because the only politics that are relevant to black people is politics of revolution. She further said revolutionaries shouldn’t compromise that much just because certain politics seem to be “black, radical and conscious.” Some comrades felt this should be the last conference of SNI because if it continued to be dominated by middle-class tendencies, it would derail attempts at mobilizing at community level. There was concern that most ideas propagated revealed the dominance of a few people while the rest were silent; thus, the need for urgency to go back to the roots and wean out an elitist approach. The discomfiture seemed to emanate from a perceived dominance of the

SNI by the middle class, who had compassed it towards “liberal reformist politics.” Quoting and preaching black radical literature couched in obscurantist language was self-defeating. The challenge was “how to bring Fanon to the level people can understand.” However, before embarking on community mobilization, activists had to do deep soul searching and self-introspection. References were made to the BC in the 1970s, whose adherents invested a lot of time on political education among themselves before going out to the people. It seemed SNI had become a forum for hangers-on who were now “compromising our revolutionary programme,” and a platform for people who didn’t have revolutionary commitment. The proposition earlier on about SNI contesting elections was amazing and surprising to many people. This opinion stemmed from the proposed SNI mobilization of 10,000 people to march to parliament in September 2012.

The conversation veered to the need to resuscitate Blackwash as a matter of paramount importance. This is because it seemed SNI had hijacked Blackwash and from now on, “we need to go back to the Blackwash direction,” and let people know about the identity and ideology of the organization and its principles. This means an inalienable need to go back to the source, as one activist elaborated:

What does it mean to be Blackwash? It means adopting radical politics meaning while you were brainwashed now you are blackwashed. When you are blackwashed it means you are steeped in black radical politics rooted in the people, not just going around in a t/shirt.⁷⁵

Some felt the politics should be taken to the poor working blacks because “after all the middle class doesn’t need conscientization because they don’t have many problems to worry about.” The issue may have emanated from the “flat structure” of Blackwash, which said, “we don’t want anyone to lead us”; therefore, certain individuals quietly labelled themselves leaders. Others felt an alliance between Blackwash and SNI couldn’t be tenable because it would be an uneasy reminiscent of strange bedfellows like the ANC/COSATU/SACP Tripartite alliance. The consequence would be abundance of misunderstanding and friction in the relationship.

When most people got attracted to and joined Blackwash, it was a radical organization, and by forming SNI, the intention was not to abort Blackwash; however, it seemed to be the case now. Questions rankled in

most peoples' minds. If SNI was an initiative of Blackwash, when did this split occur and why? If it wasn't a split why there wasn't enough honesty to tell the people that this was a platform formed by Blackwash? Most people didn't know that it was a Blackwash baby informed by the movement's politics, and currently Blackwash was now taking a back seat. Even on SNI T-shirts, which some were wearing, there was neither Blackwash name nor insignia. Someone emphasized this point and said:

It is not like Blackwash is a first born child feeling disgruntled when a second child is born and is no longer getting attention from the mother.

Another mistake was that Blackwash became an intellectual base for SNI, and the confusion was furthered when even some Blackwashers thought SNI was a movement on its own; the overlap in affiliation to both organizations was also fuzzy and misty, as some Blackwashers were also active in the SNI. Initially, it was agreed that only three Blackwash representatives, not all Blackwashers, would be involved in the SNI; apparently Blackwash people were the SNI people and active in it. In this regard, clarification would be needed on the role of Blackwashers in the SNI, that is, when does one belong to both organizations and how do they account to the other? Those who were new learnt of Blackwash on the Internet but couldn't connect Blackwash to SNI. On the misty relationship between the two, someone said:

I am a victim of propaganda from both Blackwash and SNI. I thought this conference would be radical now it seems like a tea conference.

Every movement needs funding to sustain itself and its programmes. There were deliberations on the need for resources, but there were varying opinions on how to obtain them. Many thought about how to get the movement forward in terms of resources, and that it's fatalistic to get support from capitalists. This was in response to someone who talked of empowering people economically through establishing cooperatives, initiating companies and getting money from the government. The general agreement was that the movement should be self-funded because, "the revolution is our responsibility—politically, financially, ideologically and thus the need to take ownership of the revolution."

At the end of the *Imbizo*, SNI properly formalized itself into coherent structures, with a National Coordinating Committee, and had a succinct direction moving forward, while comrades who had been together in

Blackwash emerged from the gathering with deeper fractures. Disgruntled Blackwashers formed a caucus before leaving Durban and deliberated on resuscitating and revitalising the movement and agreed on a meeting in Mangaung, Free State, in October 2011.

The Mangaung meeting was meant to clarify the role of Blackwash vis-à-vis the SNI and the contention that had grown after SNI Durban. The meeting also sought to probe ways to tighten Blackwash ideologically, politically and organizationally. Blackwash Free State had convened a prior meeting and took a position that since SNI had become autonomous, Blackwash must also be independent, although, as a matter of principle, it may support any other social movement with similar goals, including the SNI. They had realized that Blackwash didn't have any qualms in supporting the black cause, but the movement wouldn't be accountable to SNI. Nevertheless, some needed clarity as to the purpose, and an in-depth understanding of SNI. Mngxitama elaborated that Blackwash was formed in 2008 by four women as a counter-cultural movement, for example, disrupting messages like *amakhipkip*.⁷⁶ After a year, there was an agreement that there was need for expansion, since it was based in the Johannesburg CBD. He said that the SNI started as a *Facebook* discussion on his *Facebook* wall. The idea was then brought to Blackwash, and since Blackwash's radical politics had to permeate society, the SNI was the right platform because it could attract those blacks who would find Blackwash politics unpalatable. At this point, it was mentioned that using SNI to recruit people is cowardice in disguise and Blackwash politics had to be taken to the people in their pure and raw form. Mngxitama reiterated that Blackwash and SNI had, and were always, de-linked. He attacked the organizers of this meeting because they were preoccupied with promoting factions and organizing meetings and caucuses behind other people's backs and were responsible for disrupting the SNI Durban. This was in reference to the SNI Durban's last day where a meeting was caucused aligned on the basis of those who support Blackwash and SNI. On this concern, someone opined that the reason the Durban caucus was held was to extricate Blackwash from the confusion that had ensued as a result of SNI. Some Blackwashers had been reluctant to participate in SNI activities, which was an indicator of the level of dissatisfaction. The major grievance was that Blackwash had been neglected in favour of SNI. Those who advocated expending more energy on reviving Blackwash were called "plotters" and "agents" by Mngxitama. The severity of disagreements and deterioration of personal relations included former comrades no longer

sharing same residences. It was mentioned that it is vital as comrades to have trust and love and that an independent opinion should not be called plotting. For those present, it was inconceivable that as brothers and sisters in struggle they could label one another “plotter,” “agent” or “reactionary.” It showed there was a limited space of engagement, leading to the conclusion that one is a plotter, if their view strays from the norm. It also indicated that, for a while, not all were walking in the same direction.

Some said they were openly against the SNI from the very beginning because of its inability to propagate Blackwash politics while at the same time Blackwash’s growth was being stunted. SNI’s campaign that politicians must use public amenities was mere “cheap politicking.” The “broad church appeal” and open door policy of SNI left it susceptible to hijacking, in addition to making it a reactionary and counter-revolutionary process. The concern was that SNI would be open to forces that didn’t have interests of blacks at heart, since those people lacked the necessary political education and were not committed to radical politics like Blackwash’s, which desired a radical revolution against white supremacy. The result would be that Blackwash would expend time and energy dealing with these instead of building the movement. The feeling was to call for an agreement to bar Blackwash from involvement in the SNI until the former had become operational; otherwise, efforts would be spent on SNI when it would be opportune to be identified as Blackwash, though not necessarily SNI. In this sense, there would be need to establish where one’s loyalties lay---Blackwash or SNI. Since Mngxitama was adamant that the two were separate organizations, it was suggested that a memorandum of understanding be drafted spelling out how the two will relate to each other.

As a revolutionary movement championing the cause of the people, it was proposed that Blackwash establish a physical presence and a firm community base. The Free State Blackwash, for example, had solely existed in tertiary institutions where continuity could not be guaranteed once the students graduated and moved into middle class echelons. Blackwash Wits remained an academic, intellectual kind of BC, which hadn’t been able to link itself with broader community struggles. It was only later that it finally involved in the Wits workers’ (cleaners and grounds-persons) concerns, who, for a while, had been subjected to racist maltreatment on campus,⁷⁷ struggles Blackwash had hitherto not been involved in. As regards to Johannesburg, concentration and focus had been shifted to an academic institution, where all Blackwash meetings were held, neglecting Soweto

where the masses were showing “hunger” for black radical thought but were discouraged by a lack of organization. The significance of a political base could not be underemphasized. The movement needed to extend beyond itself. One lesson was that people are not swayed by talk. While continuous talking is important as a political process, talking and doing had to run concurrently. Township peoples’ attitudes, it was noted, is that they listen and then that would be it. They had to feel affined and bound to the movement through the work it does for them. One critique was that the movement had been labelled a talk shop. The activists themselves were looked down upon by the people because they were seen as best at talking and least on action. Political education that had been going on had to be augmented with practical conscientization that goes hand in hand with projects whose importance needed heavy emphasis. The proponent of this idea elaborated thus:

For example when we buy school shoes for a child, we tell them why they don’t have shoes; when they are worn out we tell them why they can’t have another pair. This is not reactionary-projects and politics have to run together.

A reference was made of the SNI-organized “Alex to Sandton” march on 16 June 2011, which attracted less than a 100 people, most of whom were outsiders. It indicated lack of Blackwash presence in the communities. One way would be community projects (projects, programmes of action and activities) to help the communities identify with the movement. By doing projects, activists would be educating the people to shed a dependency culture and making them believe in doing things for themselves. There are similarities here with what Malcolm X said about self-reliance. The black man can never become independent and recognized as a human being who is truly equal with other human beings until he has what they have and do for himself what others are doing for themselves.⁷⁸ BC activists in the 1970s stressed building and encouraging secondary institutions in the community run by the people themselves, covering all fields of black community’s social life—education, social, economic, religious and so on.⁷⁹ The idea of self-reliance and community development has always been part of Black Nationalism. In the 1970s, BC gave community development a new focus as a strategy for development.⁸⁰ The inspiration of course came from Nyerere’s self-reliance and *Ujamaa* as a development philosophy, using traditional structures of “economy of affection,”

which stresses support, communication and interaction by people connected through blood, kinship and community.⁸¹ In the Azanian context, it was compatible with the concept of *Ubuntu*, which was central to black social relations. Ubuntu, an African Humanist ethos awareness into social relations, BCP were meant to break dependency on hand-outs from privileged whites and translate into programmes of awareness and liberation, emphasizing self-reliance, projects initiated, development directed and implemented by blacks themselves. BCP projects, which included health, education, leadership training, publications, home industries, and child care, were symbols of hope, which would empower the people to liberate themselves. However, like Nyerere's *Ujamaa*, BC activists took for granted that the community was willing to cooperate for common good without regarding internal differentiation within them and a propensity by blacks to exploit each other.⁸²

The meeting encouraged activists to identify issues/problems in their respective communities and work towards solving them. The proponent of this motion emphasized that this was not new; it had been done before by past movements and has been part of the BC tradition. University students, for example, could help tutor high school students or mentor post-matriculants. Each street and family could be asked to contribute some amount to help matriculants and students in need. Other activities would include a membership drive even in high schools; if they go to college and graduate, they would have to be compelled to come serve the movement and the community. Since many blacks are church-goers, the potential of that institution had to be exploited, where Christ should be seen as a radical. As there are many black professionals, a community database of skills had to be drawn up.

However, some like Mngxitama opposed the idea, saying BCP and Black Panther community projects in the 1970s had failed, and activists should study how and why these could not become a reality. Again, the concern is that these pander to capitalist whims and tendencies inimical to a revolutionary programme.

Blackwash used to have a working committee, whose flat structure, however, debilitated functions of the movement. It was proposed that an internal organizational reworking had to be deliberated. Firstly, active participation in the community, with the aim of getting numbers into the movement, required binding people into the Blackwash idea. This could be facilitated through membership forms followed by creation of a database of members who could contribute financially. Hitherto, Blackwash

had operated without any clear criteria of binding members, and without a set of policies or guidelines for code of conduct. As a result, high turnover ensued, some brilliant minds coming and then getting lost to the movement. The move for internal organization would help reinforce discipline. A code of conduct, which would be articulated succinctly and clearly on the membership form, would also ensure censure, allegiance and reprimand of those who fail to execute their duties.

At the close of the meeting, it was agreed to have a central national and provincial administration. A National Working Committee, consisting of provincial representatives, was appointed. Finally, the movement would have a form of a structure that would tread carefully between hierarchy and flatness.

Subsequently, there was a realization that the movement was taking a new direction and no one could claim to be a figurehead. The cult around one or a few persons had debilitated the movement and occluded independent and creative thinking; therefore, the movement was, for a while, moving in an awkward direction, and youthful township activists felt they were being misled. One issue of dissatisfaction, in particular, was the clout the “middle-class” leadership had not only on the movement but also on others affiliated to it. At one meeting I attended in Soweto, someone expressed disdain at “middle-class” sensibilities of a “middle-class” Blackwasher, a university student, who had barred a fellow activist from the township from visiting her home because she was concerned with what her mother would think of that activist. Apparently, she regarded this activist as not presentable in terms of accoutrement, refinement and civility.

A follow-up meeting was held in Soweto in December 2011 to concretize and put into practice the issues raised in Mangaung. This included drafting of a constitution. For the first time, the movement formalized itself. Plans for structures like home cells, regions, a Provincial Working Committee, a National Working Committee and a National Disciplinary Committee were set up, with the ultimate policy and decision-making body being the Annual National General Meeting (ANGM). A constitution was also drafted. The proceedings of the meeting adopted a statement, which has been called the “Soweto Manifesto,” outlining and addressing the openly strained relationship between Blackwash and SNI. It’s worthwhile to quote it at length:

In accordance to the resolutions taken in last year’s SNI regarding the nature of the relation between both organizations, Blackwash accepts the

understanding that it ‘initiated and gave rise to SNI but the former is autonomous from the latter.’ What the policy-meeting sought to make clear and implement, both on a constitutional and a policy level, was the organizational implication this autonomy held on Blackwash in particular. And so the following areas were recognized as aspects needing attention in the quest to finally bring conclusion and clarity to the issue. We accept that Blackwash and SNI are two autonomous organizations and for reasons to be expressed in later points, joint membership in both organizations shall translate as a transgression in accordance to point—of the code of conduct and section—of the constitution.

1. Blackwash sympathizes with SNI as it does with any other black social movement. SNI expresses the same ideology as we do and further identifies itself as an organization orientated in nothing but the emancipation of the black masses. On this ideological front, Blackwash recognizes and appreciates a unity between the two organizations.
2. However, said that, Blackwash sees a fundamental difference between the movements on an organizational level. We find the implementation and the directed energy of the ideology differing insofar as Blackwash sees the revolution built primarily on a grass-root level, completely rooted in the communities and organizing that space as our core political base. Blackwash believes itself to be in tune with the peoples’ pulse, and to lose sense of this pulse is a ready forfeit of revolutionary struggle. This pulse requires that you organize your way and means of struggle to fit its call and its rhythm. A staggering majority of our people in the deep of struggle are located in many township and rural settlements, festering scars of colonial conquest in our homeland. Must revolutionary movements not position themselves in these spaces where there is an obvious abundance of us? And should our struggle be based there, we need to be careful not to dance in tune with the rhythm of our people.

While the Blackwashers were treating the resuscitation of their movement with urgency, the aforementioned statements led to even further contractions and ructions, with some Blackwashers not recognizing the meeting, which reached a zenith at the ANGM in Welkom in April 2012. At that point, the movement had clearly coalesced into two camps. I

deduced that this had to do with ideological and political differences between those who favour an elitist middle-class approach and those who support grassroots organising. Of course, there is a personality factor, which added to these constraints. I will return to these matters later. Before the Welkom meeting which I could not attend because of unforeseen circumstances, I met one Blackwasher, who told me the “founder” members were attending the ANGM with the intent of disrupting it and reclaiming the movement because they felt it was now being misrepresented. One should note that some Blackwashers in the Free State also belong to Pan-African Student Movement of Azania (PASMA), a student movement affiliated to the PAC. One such Blackwasher posted on *Facebook* that he would not be attending the Welkom meeting because, “I have already been told by Andile Mngxitama to leave Blackwash and focus my backward politics on PASMA and PAC. So I do not want to drag Blackwash down, its owners and copyright holders. I won’t be compelled into disrespecting PAC or PASMA just to impress people renowned for killing movements. So I can’t be there as a matter of principle unless Blackwash gives a clear position with regard to us backward cadres of PAC.” He added, “Lastly it has been hugely insinuated that I joined PASMA NEC to achieve a certain Blackwash ideological objective, a claim that has endangered my life and those of PASMA cadres who are in Blackwash. I can’t deal and operate in such an environment. Did Blackwash deploy me to PASMA?”

The “founders” regarded the “Soweto Manifesto” as a “reactionary” document drafted by “reactionary” elements and demanded an apology be made to the SNI. Such contrition was, however, refused because there were no grounds soliciting such atonement. One word that subsequently emanated from this debate is the intention of “founders” to “purify” the movement. I am not sure what “purify” means, but metaphorically it had the same resonances as Stalinist *gulags* where undesired elements were purged *en masse* or Nazi Germany where some were subjected to a night of the long knives.

The aftermath of Welkom deepened the divisions yet further. Acrimonious conversations and vituperative exchanges on *Facebook* revealed fissures that bordered on hatred, which ran short of murder. The grassroots camp was labelled “reactionaries, agents, bloody *askaris*, and counter-revolutionaries”⁸³ Earlier on, Mngxitama wrote on *Facebook*⁸⁴ that he had started political education classes in Soweto, but Blackwash comrades couldn’t understand how capitalism works in the oppression

of blacks; therefore, he decided to start online political education classes. Later on,⁸⁵ he wrote with a tinge of cynicism that he had failed Blackwash comrades.

Clearly, the “middle-class” and “grassroots” camps were at loggerheads. The former mystified its accusations on the latter through terminology that shrouded the underpinning ideological and political differences. The other camp charged that their elitism made them indifferent to the need to go back to the roots and be with the poor blacks. They responded by critiquing the grassroots camp for promoting “*mala-mogudu* BC.” It is not succinctly clear what this means, but considering the nature of this discourse, it refers to disdain and contempt for poor township blacks who are avid consumers of *mala-mogudu*, who Mngxitama calls “ghetto reactionaries.” Another issue is that the other camp was seen as being faithful to social media where a huge amount of conversation takes place, while neglecting grassroots organizing and mobilizing. The grassroots camp, as a result, began to increasingly question the effectiveness of *Facebook* organizing as a medium, insinuating that it is negative as far as grassroots mobilization is concerned. The other had been for a long time speaking of *Facebook* and the cell phone as the “new AK 47,” of course, as a result of the Arab Spring. Ironically, both Blackwash and SNI have been on *Facebook* for a couple of years. One Blackwasher questioned this, and observed that old comrades used to fill halls with multitudes of people at a time when social media was non-existent. They managed to do so because they were in the community as part of the community, and the community was the actual movement not the revolutionary organization.⁸⁶ The same individual was concerned with the apotheosis of certain black revolutionaries to god status, whose opinions were regarded as carrying divine ordinances.

There were further accusations of nameless Blackwash *Facebook* page administrators blocking certain Blackwashers. Mngxitama’s riposte was to scream, “fucking *askaris* and agents!” Another *Facebook* page, Blackwash 2012, was started by the other camp. When I met Mngxitama a year after the SNI debacle, he told me the original idea was to make Blackwash a student wing and SNI a parent body, just like SASO-BPC. I found this extraordinary because this was totally not the intention for setting up those movements, according to my impression and that of others well acquainted with this history.

Apparently, the fissions between the two camps, which were based on irreconcilable and hardening politico-ideological differences that pat-

terned themselves between two diverting approaches, couldn't be easily reconciled. Since the Welkom meeting, the "grassroots" camp coalesced into Blackwash Movement, with an ideological impetus based on "Black Power Pan-Afrikanism" that marries BC and Pan-Africanism. Participants subscribing to this ideological perspective reason that "you cannot be BC if you are not Pan-Afrikanist and vice-versa." They add that "while BC is yin, Pan-Afrikanism is the yang that breathes from the same lung." They opined that while BC speaks to the distinctiveness of the black problematic, Pan-Africanism focuses on the comprehensive aspect of the problematic. As part of reorganization they are making calls for lost members to reconcile with this new ideological approach.

THE SEPTEMBER NATIONAL IMBIZO

We have made several references to the SNI, which has been the cause for much discontent and disgruntlement in Blackwash, in the process threatening to drag the movement down. On the last weekend of September 2010, a 3-day gathering, which was called September National Imbizo or SNI, was held at a community hall in the Soweto Township.⁸⁷ Its banner showed the "three patriarchs of Azanian struggle," Biko, Sobukwe and Tambo, whose vision and ideals had been betrayed in the postapartheid era. I was struck with amazement why Tambo, associated with BC bitter opponents the ANC, and often accused by BC and Pan-African activists of ordering their elimination in the 1980s, would be venerated by the SNI. Convened and organized by Blackwash (to my understanding then), it brought together individuals, organizations and groups from all over the country who subscribe to or sympathize with the BC philosophy. On the second day of the *Imbizo*,⁸⁸ I noticed about four white participants, although Blackwash and other groups are intent on blacks-only membership and participation. The facilitator on the day announced that after lunch, the participants would be divided into various commissions, with different themes/topics to ponder on. The white participants were requested to form their own commission and discuss how "white people should recompense or pay restitution to the wealth they had taken from blacks over the years."

After lunch, only one white participant was left. He attempted to join a commission that was overwhelmingly black. His intention was met with resistance, and a debate whether he should be allowed to join ensued. In the end, it prevailed that the majority of the participants objected to

his presence. Ultimately, he left the gathering altogether and never came back again for the rest of the *Imbizo*. The following day, which was the last, after rigorous debate, among the resolutions was that whites should not and were not welcome to participate in the SNI activities, as it was a blacks-only gathering.

The gathering deliberated on themes like economic justice, the state and democracy, contemporary struggles and participation in voting, and presented itself as an “anti-politics political movement.” I am not sure what this means, though. I suspect it’s about critiquing the traditional mode of operation of political parties. Subsequently, while Blackwash was stagnating, the SNI was making remarkable progress: formalizing itself through well-defined structures, setting up a *Facebook page*, a vibrant web address and an email newsletter; doing fund-raising activities; having a media team and pamphleteering in a number of events and launching a publication called “Vuka Darkie.”

There is one important thing I would like to point out about the SNI. It seems to me it has taken an ahistorical stance and has gotten obsessed with the “mis-rule” of the ANC, neglecting the historical demands of the masses. The condition the black masses have found themselves in is not only a mirror of the postapartheid period, rather they are an apartheid condition. Thus, an analysis that focuses largely on the postapartheid government risks ignoring the enduring effects of apartheid in the postapartheid era or even the hand of white supremacy itself in engendering these.

The SNI’s position has been that nearly two decades into the so-called democracy, there are problems bedeviling black communities, namely, crumbling healthcare, a dysfunctional educational system, police brutality against blacks, an enduring institutionalized racism and ANC government’s failure to return land to black people. Not even nationalization could solve national problems because according to SNI, nationalization would serve the interests of the political elite, given the pervasive venality and rapacity of the black elite. State-owned enterprises haven’t ameliorated the plight of the people either and are infested with endemic corruption. Driven by BC philosophy, SNI proposed as a panacea, a set of actions it called “The Peoples Manifesto.” The document contains guiding principles of the movement and is invoked regularly by its adherents. The spirit of the manifesto is outlined as thus:

The Manifesto is a key document to unify our people to raise their critical consciousness and sense of ownership of the country. It’s only when our

people see politicians as servants who must serve us that they will demand accountability from public servants and politicians. The campaign will also build a new movement for a peoples' democracy towards true liberation. In short, the manifesto says what is good for President Zuma and Premier Zille is good for the ordinary persons. The Manifesto is a tool to build this movement of a people to foster a new culture of accountability, dignity and equality. The SNI manifesto is inspired by Thomas Sankara and undertaken in the memory of Andries Tatane!⁸⁹

Some BC adherents critiqued the document and the campaign as reformist, that narrows the historical demands of the masses and that activists can't be reformist with the system. SNI's argument was that the Manifesto was like a movement that challenged the ANC. It was not an end, but a means to a revolution because it gave people a much larger sense of entitlement and raised their level of demands. The question of parliamentary participation was contentious. Some thought the parliament and contesting elections was no option because communities should be centres of power. Secondly, the decision would be inimical to the historical BC stance of non-participation and non-collaboration in institutions that oppress people, and that the postapartheid parliament and institutions do not work in the interests of the people either. The other view in support of SNI's stance was the successes of the Venezuelan and Bolivian models where leftist governments made huge strides in improving the lives of their people. It also invoked the Bolsheviks. Let us examine it. Lenin, in responding to the Rosa Luxembourgeois school that stated "parliamentarism is obsolete," argued that participation in bourgeois parliamentary elections took into account the existing conditions and examination of how far the masses were prepared (ideologically, politically and practically) to accept the soviet system and to dispense with bourgeois democratic parliament.⁹⁰ The Bolsheviks did participate in the Russian bourgeois parliament, the Constituent Assembly elections in September and November 1917, which, as a question of tactics, proved to yield invaluable political results. Lenin argues that participation a few weeks before the Soviet Republic did not harm the revolutionary proletariat but actually helped it to prove to the backward masses why such parliaments deserve to be dispensed with, helps their successful disposal and helps make bourgeois parliamentarism "politically obsolete."⁹¹ The debate between Eduardo Bernstein and Luxembourgeois posed the question: reform or revolution? Reformists believe a conquest by a social democratic majority in parliament leads

directly to the gradual “socialization” of society. Bernstein’s opinion is that capitalism is unlikely to decline because it has shown a greater capacity for adaptation as capitalist production becomes more and more varied. Luxembourgh argues that Bernstein’s position is both utopian and reactionary and the socialist movement is not bound to bourgeois democracy; on the contrary, the fate of democracy is bound with the socialist movement.⁹² Reformists, instead of looking for establishment of a new society, stand for modification of the old society and favour the method of legislative reform rather than conquest of political power and social revolution. Thus, “our programme becomes not the realisation of socialism, but the reform of capitalism; not the suppression of the system of wage labour, but the diminution of exploitation, that is, suppression of abuses of capitalism instead of the suppression of capitalism itself.”⁹³ However, Bernstein may be vindicated because since the inception of capitalism, socialist revolutions can be counted on fingers.

The success of the Bolshevik approach will, however, depend on the revolutionary conditions hitherto pertaining. It remains to be seen to what extent Azanian masses’ consciousness can provide an impetus for radical social change.

The SNI launched “The Politicians and Public Servants Use Public Services Campaign,” which was supposed to culminate in a march by 10,000 people to parliament in Cape Town in September 2012. It would demand that the National Assembly enact into law the demands of the campaign that all politicians and public servants use public amenities. Discussions I had with some activists reveal a naivety of this approach, because the masses can only march to parliament under determinate conditions, with an intention of “storming parliament and taking over.” Such an event occurs on the eve of a revolution or announces a revolutionary scenario, whereby the masses are in a position of “no retreat, no surrender.” One participant told me SNI’s biggest “success will be its failure.” Contestations were also abounding in the movement. There were ructions in the SNI as a result of sexual misdemeanours by some leading male figures with female colleagues. The decision by some members to drag SNI into the newly formed Malema’s political party Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) led to further contractions.

The SNI proposed a people-centred democracy where every single person can have meaningful participation in the affairs of the country: “For example in a country like ours where more than 70 % of people have cell phones, we must use SMSes to vote on important matters such as

healthcare, education, appointment of important persons such as the chief justice, land expropriation, nationalisations, awarding of mining rights and tenders beyond a certain amount.” SNI found fault in the current system where 400 people represent 50 million people who have to wait 5 years to vote in or vote out a representative. For SNI, voting has to be a daily occurrence.

Lack of grassroots mobilization is reflected in the marches the SNI has so far participated in: “Welcome to Hell, South African Townships march” annually held in Cape Town and organized by black theologian, Pastor Xola Skosana. It always attracted barely 200 people; in 2012, there were approximately 50 people. The SNI organized “Alex to Sandton-Hell to Heaven” march, which was also met with apathy; the majority of participants were from outside Alexandra despite the depressing social conditions there, which would be a natural catapult for mass action. This indicated the movement’s lack of organizational presence and community absence.

HAGIOGRAPHY AND BIKO’S CONTESTED LEGACY

Many people call themselves Biko, a popular *Facebook* moniker for many young blacks, or evoke his name, something that makes him an icon and shows his relevance and powerful legacy, even if he is not owned by one individual or group. The name of Biko as a “master-signifier” is put to strategic use by various diverse interest groups.⁹⁴ This means his legacy is alive, though contested, and has become a part of the popular imagery of youth culture.

Biko’s name has also been appropriated internationally in popular songs, research institutions, as logo of apparel and so on. Biko is valorized in rap songs of US artistes like Dead Prez and Reks. There are similarities with icons in the USA like Malcolm X and Martin Luther King. The increasing iconization of both Biko and Malcolm X, for instance, has captured global imagination. Their historiographical representation is a contested terrain by different sections of the black communities, both in the USA and Azania.⁹⁵ There has been increased marketing of both Malcolm and Biko in business endeavours, branded in baseball caps (in the case of Malcolm X), T-shirts and popular culture.

Mngxitama, Alexander and Gibson identify at least three points of contestation in regards to Biko’s hagiographical representation: first, black business class, who have made a claim to white wealth, usually through BEE. The corporate BEE also talks of “Corporate BC,” and

now it seems his memory is mobilized to support it.⁹⁶ There are some BC-oriented sections whose commitment to capitalism contradicts leftist BC approach. These claim blacks are mired in poverty because economic opportunities are closed to them because of their colour. Therefore, to redress this, blacks should be players in the economy and are entitled to partake in, and share fruits and benefits of capitalism itself. Secondly, the invocation of Biko's memory by state-linked political and bureaucratic classes who share a lot with the business class, where in a sense, "Biko's thought has been reduced to slogans on T/Shirts weaned of all radical content as a philosophy of black liberation, and images of Biko have come to adorn glossy magazines and fashion houses."⁹⁷ Biko's name has been made fashionable including in upmarket places like the Zone in Rosebank where expensive T/Shirts with his face are sold.⁹⁸ The increasing interest in Biko and Fanon, especially in academic institutions, is, according to Mngxitama, to "decaffeinate" them, making them appear less radical.⁹⁹ At Universities of Cape Town and Rhodes, there are Steve Biko Students Union and Steve Biko Lawns. At Wits, there is a Steve Biko Centre for Bioethics. I attended the launch of the centre at Constitution Hill in 2008; 90 % of attendants were white, in tailored and designer suits; I was the only one who looked odd, "scruffy" in jeans and T-shirts and unkempt hair. Invocation of his name in these institutions may not mean there are a radicalized student and academic cohort. Veriava and Naidoo are poignant in this analysis:

Biko is "big" in Rosebank. So "big," in fact, that one can't help but be reminded of Walter Benjamin's warning, "not even the dead will be safe if the enemy wins. And the enemy has not ceased to be victorious."¹⁰⁰

Veriava and Naidoo argue that the struggle is to reclaim Biko from those who want to use his name for neo-liberal purposes, "a Biko reduced to a footnote in the speech of the magnum leader and profoundly worn by the kids of the rich."¹⁰¹ Biko may be an icon of today's black middle-class who don't understand his thesis on the struggle and experience of oppression. The irony is they mimic white society, which Biko counter-poised.

If there are claims that Biko and his legacy has been commercialized, the Steve Biko Foundation (SBF) may be deemed complicit. The SBF was founded in the late 1998 by Biko's son Nkosinathi, following a speech by Nelson Mandela at the erection of Biko's monument,

a national project, in the Eastern Cape. Although I could not make a conversation with Nkosingithi, the foundation's communications officer told me the idea to sustain Biko's legacy was because neither his vision was being fulfilled nor his ideas commemorated. To preserve the history of Biko's ideas, memory and heritage, projects like Steve Biko Centre, which is a memory and heritage bank, were initiated. The SBF has branched to international dialogue series, public lectures, the annual Steve Biko memorial lecture, seminars, radio talk shows on Yfm and the journal Frank Talk, which is published as a periodical. The latter is meant to serve as a platform for discussion and debate for not only professionals but also for laymen. The SBF hosts talks all over the country on themes like education, black theology, youth and state of the nation, and works closely with the Robert Sobukwe Memorial Trust and international organizations like the Steve Biko Cultural Institute in Brazil. In the Eastern Cape schools, they have programmes on history, which they do in conjunction with the Cape Town's Baxter Theatre. The arts and culture programme hosts the annual Ginsberg (Biko's home town) Easter festival and heritage trail, through poetry, fine art, storytelling, dance and popular music to "resurrect the spirit of Africanness, *Ubuntu*." Ironically, the SBF has departed from the revolutionary agency of BC. When I went to the SBF offices, the walls of the boardroom were littered with framed certificates of awards like the Vodacom 2006 Journalist of the Year, which was awarded to Biko at the national awards ceremony in the category lifetime achiever, 29 October 2006. Below the certificate were sponsors like Southern Sun, Johannesburg Stock Exchange and South African Airways. Another one shows a lifetime achievement award for Community Builder of the Year, sponsored by the Sowetan newspaper, Old Mutual and SABC. The SBF official explained that the foundation is more liberal and realized it has to work with the system of the day. When I asked on the concern that Biko is now being commercialized, she said the SBF has to finance its programmes and projects, and therefore it has to work with the systems available. Although it receives funds from donors and corporates, it remains an independent organization and doesn't allow funding politics to compromise its work, the officer declared. The foundation is not preoccupied with criticizing the government; instead, it is there "to build the consciousness of the people." The official said SBF's stance is "what can we do to keep Biko's memory alive; it doesn't take the government alone to do it so we need to hold hands with all sectors."¹⁰²

There are similarities with icons in the USA like Malcolm X and Martin Luther King.

In 1970, the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations donated \$15 million to “moderate” black organizations, giving people grants, fellowships, scholarships and seed money for black-owned business.¹⁰³ In the 1960s, the corporates were diffusing the black civil rights movement and successfully transformed Black Power into black capitalism. According to Roy, the foundations and corporates “worked hard to remodel his (King) legacy to fit a market friendly format.” The Martin Luther King Jnr Centre for Non-Violent Social Change got an operational grant of \$2 million from Ford Motor Company, General Motors, Mobil, Western Electric, Proctor and Gamble and US Steel and Monsanto. The King Library and Archives of the civil rights movement and some of its projects are working closely with the US Department of Defence, the Armed Forces Chaplains Board and so on. The corporates have also co-sponsored the Martin Luther King Jnr Lecture Series called “The Free Enterprise System: An Agent for Non-Violent Social Change.” On the Martin Luther King weekend, there is increased marketing and advertising. Recently, JP Morgan Chase partnered with the King Centre in Atlanta and launched a website with an aim of, “preserving the inspiration and sharing the passion of Martin Luther King Jnr.”¹⁰⁴

The fourth aspect is, according to Mngxitama, the living Biko finds meaning in everyday struggles by the black majority who haven’t seen significant changes in the postapartheid era. First, there is the radicalism of movements like Blackwash, discussed earlier. Secondly, although the death of Biko is signalled in every Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) deal, in every jingle using “black soul” to sell the latest commodities and in every T-shirt. Veriava and Naidoo believe it’s not all gloom and doom because, “Black is also alive—in every refusal to pay for water or electricity, in every land occupation, in every march and everyday act of resistance against today’s logic of neo—liberalism and the rule of the market; is alive in the spirit of resistance and refusal, the spirit of rebellion against that which we are taught to believe is natural and unchangeable.”¹⁰⁵

Mngxitama¹⁰⁶ has also added a fifth one, which is represented by old BC parties like AZAPO, which he calls a party of commemorations. AZAPO outlines the Black Condition as:

Despite the fact that we are indigenous and the vast majority in this country of our fore bearers, we are at the bottom of the pile in every sphere of

life. We are indeed in bad shape and some of the statistics below testify to that: blacks own less than 13 % of the land; blacks control only 2 % of the economy; less than 1 % of all chartered accountants are black; only about 1000 out of 26 000 medical doctors are black; 13 % of all lawyers in this country are black; 15 million of us are jobless; 7 million Blacks are homeless; 80 % Blacks have no tap water in their homes; 60 % of us have no access to electricity; over 75 % of black families live below the poverty datum line, and finally Blacks are synonymous with negative things like *mikhukhu*,¹⁰⁷ street kids, carjacking etc.¹⁰⁸

It adds

when you see a shack, you know a Black person lives in it. You do not have to ask. We know that when people call for the death penalty for criminals, they are in fact saying: hang these Blacks. We know when it's said matric results are bad; it means Blacks are failing matric ... we are our direct inheritance from colonialism and racist oppression.

AZAPO has programmes like “Stretch the Rand Campaign,” which is only a synonym for “Buy Black.” The campaign calls for blacks to keep money in black hands through mutual support and increased economic solidarity. The party says the campaign is “a huge psychological and material step to launch us on to the road to progress and collective dignity.” Recently, there has been intimation on starting community projects, which the BCM did in the 1970s.

Nonetheless, support for AZAPO, their offshoot SOPA and their ideological kindred PAC has been parlous. On 16 June 2012 commemoration at Regina Mundi Church in Soweto, there were suggestions of unity, but deep ideological differences among the three may hinder such an effort. All three have blamed marginalization and limited resources for their degeneration, but organizational incapacity may well be the cause.

Maphai, writing nearly two decades ago, may have been right after all in saying: “... in the near future it is unlikely that ideological considerations will play a major role in the nature and size of support which an organisation can draw” and that people will support an organization for different reasons.¹⁰⁹ From the 1980s through to the postapartheid, internally and externally, ANC has monopolized the struggle and BC has since stood little chance of surviving postapartheid South Africa in any organizational form. Charterist organizations had by then and pres-

ently dwarfed AZAPO, taking all the initiative, enjoying larger support and virtually reducing it to an organizational disaster. Maphai was a little optimistic though, asserting that BC will survive, but AZAPO as an organization is beyond its usefulness, “people need concrete political and economic power, not some nebulous psychological liberation.”¹¹⁰ Seemingly, AZAPO hasn’t consummated their ideological postulations in any coherent organizational form. The old BC parties are subjected to derision by contemporary young BC adherents who regard both PAC and AZAPO as moribund, struggling on “a deathbed,” are in a “comatose”¹¹¹ and are incapable of igniting change for black people, with PAC now a “support group.”¹¹² Others think AZAPO just like ANC and DA, doesn’t have the interests of black people at heart; that the present AZAPO should completely distance itself from the legacy of Biko.¹¹³ Mngxitama also wrote, “AZAPO is the cultural desk of the ANC! The ANC uses the ‘struggle’; AZAPO uses ‘Biko’, the DA uses, ‘clean audits’. They all believe in the same thing. I won’t be voting AZAPO *ek is nie maal nie*. Those who vote ANC and DA know that their hands are covered in blood. Their parties shoot to kill and have given blacks ‘cabriolet toilets’, that’s how much they care.”¹¹⁴ Mngxitama also detests AZAPO for its “quasi-Marxist” tendencies. Some conversations called for dissolution of PAC and AZAPO who should put their efforts in building a united Azanian Front, while others opined that these parties should move with the times, while they were relevant, then they need to repackage their offering (philosophies, policies, solutions) so as to appeal to the common person. However, one individual defended the party: BC for AZAPO is a value and a value that needs to be protected by all forms of manifestations, and BC has its own practice under AZAPO.¹¹⁵ This sentiment is echoed by someone who observed that AZAPO defended the BC philosophy; if it wasn’t AZAPO, Biko would have been forgotten.¹¹⁶

Contemporary youthful BC adherents may have to be wary of the acerbity of their critique of AZAPO, SOPA and PAC because these are naturally their potential strategic allies, which they may call upon at a future occasion. Alienating them would be a signal of political naivety and immaturity.

CONCLUSION

The fate and fortune of BC formations in their different manifestations isn't predicated on the inadequacy of the idea, which is potent and responds forcefully to the historical and contemporary conditions of black people; rather, there are different factors, which I have highlighted in this chapter, that hinder the consummation of the idea into praxis. Politics, of course, is concerned with disagreements.¹¹⁷ It's about ways to deal with these: dissolution, arbitration or renouncing politics altogether. BC formations have to make a choice. Ultimately, it's about self-introspection and deep soul searching. Berki makes an important point. It's worthwhile to quote him at length:

We could indeed—if I may be permitted the use of a few somewhat quixotic analogies—see the study of the history of political thought as an experience resembling that of a middle aged individual who has decided to turn the pages of his diary written some twenty years before. He will read these notes with mixed feelings. He will venture an indulgent smile here and there, will feel ashamed at certain points, angry and frustrated at others, wistful at the passing of his youthful innocence and fantasies, and yet at the end, as likely as not, he will still take heart from the fact that he is at least able to read his diary, and that not every ambition he had in the past has ended in complete failure. In some little way at least he will probably be a “changed” man: his problems will not have disappeared and his personality will remain basically the same, but he might very well be able to bring fresh energies and resources to deal with situations as they arise thenceforward.¹¹⁸

NOTES

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 18. Ibid.:14.
 19. Ibid.:41.
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 23. Rodney, Walter. 1981. The Africa Revolution. A Talk at the University of Michigan March 31 1972. *Urgent Tasks* 12 pp. 5–13.
 24. Robinson, op cit.:452.
 25. Ibid.
 26. Ibid.:444.
 27. Dyson, Michael Eric. 1995. *Making Malcolm. The Myth and Meaning of Malcolm X*. New York: Oxford University Press.
 28. Robinson, op cit.:451.
 29. See, for example, Bogues, op cit.

30. Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. *Selections from Prison Notebooks*. Translated and edited by Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
31. Mignolo, op cit.; Said, Edward W. 1993. *Culture and Imperialism*. London: Vintage.
32. Said, op cit.
33. Magubane, Zine. 2004. *Bringing the Empire Home. Race, Class and Gender in Britain and Colonial South Africa*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
34. Dyson, op cit.
35. West, Cornel. 1994. *Race Matters*. New York: Vintage Books.
36. Dyson, op cit.
37. Ibid.
38. MC or Master of Ceremonies is synonymous with rap culture.
39. Ibid.:82–3.
40. Ibid.:85.
41. Ibid.:87.
42. Woods, 1978:106–7.
43. Malcolm X, Message to the Grassroots.
44. “Coz 1994 Changed Fokol, Black Movement Aims for Dictatorship of the Masses”. <http://rnw.nl/africa/article/black-movement-aims-dictatorship-masses>.
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46. Mngxitama has constantly referred to a grassroots BC approach as “mala-mogudu BC.” *Mala-mogudu* (tripe) is a popular township meal associated with being black and poor. I will analyse these contestations later in the chapter.
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59. Ibid.:96; see also Arusha Declaration.
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63. Ibid.:15.
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74. Ibid.:235.
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76. *Amakikip* is a youth fashion label.
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79. “Understanding SASO.” Discussion Document by Steve Biko for SASO Formation School, Pietermaritzburg, 5–7 December 1971.
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81. Hyden cited in Ramphela, op cit.

82. Ramphele, op cit.
83. These are some terms used by Mngxitama on *Facebook*.
84. On 10 March 2012.
85. Posted on *Facebook* on 12 April 2012.
86. This message was posted on Facebook on 14 May 2012.
87. Soweto (South West Townships) is a sprawling Johannesburg ghetto.
88. An *imbizo* is a Nguni word for a gathering where issues are discussed.
89. For an in-depth analysis of Thomas Sankara's career in Burkina Faso, see an article by Amber Murrey: "A Reflection of Sankara's Speech, 25 Years Later." (<http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/83074>).
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101. Ibid.
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114. Posted on Facebook, 18 May 2011.
115. Posted on Facebook, 15 February 2012.
116. Posted on Facebook, 15 February 2012.
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Some Considerations in a Youth Political Movement

This chapter follows the last, where we observed contractions and contradictions in a youthful political movement. Frictions, fissures and disagreements, at any given time, threaten the survival of embryonic movement. After a careful study of the factors at play in a movement, one can offer an analysis rather than a panacea. Below are some considerations that sadly have affected the abilities and capabilities of many Black Nationalist movements and have rendered them ineffective in fighting white supremacy and reversing the status quo.

Here are a couple of reflections:

LOVE

These four letters look simple and innocent, or even trivial. The word is laden with an enduring power that can change society and establish firm social and personal relationships, while cleansing them of colonially engendered trappings of self-hatred, disunity and selfishness. As Cornel West points out, since nihilism in the black community may be difficult to eradicate, it can be cured by self-love and love for others, which are “both modes towards increased self-evaluation and encouraging political resistance in one’s community.”¹ Love, which should be firm love, has to form the very foundation, and the basis, of any revolutionary activity. Let me add that no revolutionary can prosecute and execute a revolution without being driven and inspired by love—love for humanity. Even extremes of

revolutionary activity that include violence are a lofty expression of love. A love for the love of humankind, that is. One sees bitter hatred seeping into a movement, where comrades who are supposed to be brothers and sisters turn into incorrigible verbal and physical sparring partners. The reason is those protagonists may not have an ounce of love in and unto *themselves*. To expect them to love others is too much a request. They may only be preoccupied with narcissistic and futile pursuit, that is, the business of loving themselves and only themselves. Consequently, they can't love humanity, and whatever talk they exercise regarding human problems may risk descending into hypocrisy. The movement not only gradually recedes into oblivion and death but certain individuals also show utter contempt for poor working blacks who are in need of proper theoretical, political and ideological guidance. It's not very hard to tell that, hatred, coupled with middle-class comfort, may make one completely lose agency. This sentiment is captured by an old BC adherent, Mafika Pascal Gwala, who, back in the early 1980s, observed a certain trend in BC:

I have seen many a young man walking up the escalator of BC; their life-style—snobbery; their practice—collecting jazz and dashikis for boasts; their goal—bourgeois status; their sentiment—black identity, and some, ‘individuals and groups in the name of BC were riding on.’²

In the early 1970s, the BC adherents realized that BC, though emanating from students, ran the risk of remaining elitist if it wasn't rooted in the community. Even if it were students who were driving it, it had to find popular grassroots support.³ Temba Sono, SASO president at the time, said these important words, which are relevant to contemporary BC activists: “The strength of SASO doesn't lie in campuses where intellectual ideas come under academic titration but in the community.”⁴In fact, SASO's approach was a departure from the impersonal, bureaucratic and bourgeois type inherited from Western-based student organizations. The realization was that BC is a way of life that must permeate through society and be adopted by all. BC activists of the 1970s understood that for the theory of BC and Black Power to be successful and effective, it had to be adopted by a larger population. BC then understood the deleterious effects of education among activists, which would alienate them from their people. To solve this, “the black intellectual must review all the factors which alienate him from the black community, i.e. must readjust himself, totally integrate his whole personality to the accepted values, norms,

beliefs and prejudice of his community. He must get off the high pedestal from which he addresses the community and get to work at and among the people, rather than pull them or drag behind them.”⁵ In addition, “he must always be aware that in ‘taking the message to the people’, he is not telling them anything new—something they neither know nor understand. But he is merely articulating their everyday feelings and aspirations.”⁶ The black intellectual and his message should not be passed to another intellectual but must be taken to the man in the street. The neglect of grassroots by contemporary BC led one activist to say, “It’s now about cappuccino sipping meetings with no action.” Following his troubles with Nation of Islam, Malcolm X knew where his constituency was:

I knew that the great lack of most of the big named ‘Negro leaders’ was their lack of any true rapport with the ghetto Negroes. How could they have rapport when they spent most of their time ‘integrating’ with white people? I knew that the ghetto people knew that I never left the ghetto in spirit and never left it physically more than I had to. I had a ghetto instinct; for instance, I could feel if tension was beyond normal in a ghetto audience. And I could speak and understand the ghetto language. There was an example of this that always flew to my mind every time I heard some of the ‘big name’ Negro ‘leaders’ declaring they ‘spoke for the ghetto black people.’⁷

Love goes with empathy. After 400 years of slavery, colonialism, dispossession, nihilism and psychological incineration, black victims of such perpetration are visible in the townships, farms and rural areas. Any engagement with them has to factor in these concerns. Love is also accompanied by unity. The old adage, “united we stand tall, divided we fall,” remains more relevant than ever. There have been suggestions for unity in the movement, a proposition denounced by some who argued that there can be no “unity for unity’s sake.” One observes that Black Nationalists are the most disorganized and disunited and have leadership that has an erotic lust for power. This is a question that has always thrown one into a quandary. Black Nationalists are expected to be the most advanced and more conscious sector of the black community; they are expected to know the inner workings of white supremacy and the intricacies of black oppression. Apparently, they seem to be the “hardest hit” victims of colonialism and white supremacy despite their pretensions. Thorough self-cleansing and self-introspection seem appropriate. Contemporary activists who shun lessons from history have to go back and learn. The PAC spent most of

its revolutionary life on character assassination, squabbling, fighting one another and eliminating each other, resulting in the struggle suffering. It was only with the release of John Nyati Pokela in the early 1980s that a semblance of sanity prevailed. By then, the PAC had lost ground in the struggle to the ANC and Charterists. History cannot forgive the authoritarian and power-obsessed earlier leadership; time lost in that endeavour has never been redeemable, and PAC has never fully recovered.

DON'T AGONIZE, ORGANIZE!

Nearly a century ago, Marcus Garvey gave this injunction: "Don't agonize, organize!"⁸ The movement has to have the capacity to organize in the communities. However, it is inconceivable for such an undertaking to realize fruition if an unorganized movement attempts to organize unorganized masses. The first step has to begin in the movement itself, which has to internally tighten itself theoretically, organizationally, politically and ideologically. Some people are attracted to the organization for a number of reasons. Are its policies clear, succinct and coherent? Does its vision, mission and objectives resonate with would be followers? What are its values and does everyone abide with them? Is it embarking on *tangible* and practical actions, because people like to see the actual work the movement is doing. Does it have mechanisms for discipline? Let me add that the system is much organized, that's why it manages to survive and reinvent itself. A revolutionary movement has to be better organized if it is to successfully execute social change. One perceives, for example, that social movements' meetings start 2 hours or more behind schedule. In contrast, capitalists start their meetings right on time. It seems for the former, there's no urgency at all. Another matter of concern is the need to survive, so many activists have to go to work rather than pursue the revolutionary vocation full-time, who Gramsci calls the 'occasionally revolutionary' as opposed to permanently revolutionary.⁹ Revolutionaries have to treat the exercise of struggle as a *business*, implying that they are in a business of revolution, whose success or failure depends on amount of time, dedication, commitment and discipline invested therein. Talking of discipline, in a bourgeois society, it is central and it endeavours to keep it together.¹⁰ While this society is authoritarian and mechanical, socialist discipline is autonomous and spontaneous. Bourgeois discipline on citizens makes them subjects; the discipline of a Socialist Party makes the subject a citizen. Since bourgeois society's main characteristic is discipline, then discipline must be met with discipline. Gramsci elaborates:

And whoever is a socialist or wants to become one does not obey; he commands himself, he imposes a rule of life on his impulses, on his disorderly aspirations.¹¹

Let me add that in bourgeois society, discipline and organization are fundamental, the main reason why this society is highly organized. A revolutionary movement would be sleeping off a heavy dream if it fathoms tackling a capitalist system if the movement itself is not better organized.

PRACTICE OF REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY

Amílcar Cabral's assessment of the revolutionary organization remains one of the most poignant and outstanding. In a movement, we see that some individuals are indifferent to, and brook no, criticism. This leads to a political *cul-de-sac*. They cannot delineate between constructive and destructive criticisms; they are full of self-importance, and they feel they own the revolution. This also goes with reluctance to appreciate differing opinion (s). Such individuals' response is to attack those who disagree with them, bawling out politically unpalatable names like "reactionaries" or "agents." A spirit of fear ensues; the younger comrades cannot independently express their opinion, and they have this awe of the "leader (s)." Cabral says:

Develop the spirit of *criticism* between militants and responsible workers. Give everyone at every level the opportunity to criticize, to give his opinion about the work and the behaviour or action of others. Accept criticism, wherever it comes from, as a contribution to improving the work of the Party, as a demonstration of active interest in the internal life of our organisation.¹²

Cabral further notes that criticism must be followed by self-criticism. Self-criticism helps one in analysing one's work, faults, weaknesses and strengths. While it is not penance, self-criticism "is an act of frankness, courage, comradeship and awareness of our responsibilities, a proof of our will to accomplish and to accomplish properly, a demonstration of our determination to improve constantly and to make a better contribution to the progress of our Party."¹³

Practice of revolutionary democracy is an indispensable element of a movement, for it also allows different opinions to be debated upon, agreed on or disagreed without compromising the integrity of the movement. For Cabral revolutionary democracy,

Demand that we should combat opportunism, tolerance towards errors, unfounded excuses, friendships and comradeship on the basis of interests opposed to those of the Party and the people and the obsession that one or other responsible worker is irreplaceable in his post. Practice and defend the truth and always the truth in front of militants, responsible workers, the people, whatever the difficulties knowledge of the truth might cause. Revolutionary democracy demands that the militant should not be afraid of the responsible worker, that the responsible worker should have no dread of the militant, nor fear of the mass of the people. It demands that the responsible worker live in the midst of the people, in front of the people and behind the people.¹⁴

Under revolutionary democracy, power comes from the people, that is, the majority, and no one is afraid of losing it. The leader must “be a faithful interpreter of the will and aspirations of revolutionary majority and not lord of power, the absolute master who uses the Party and does not serve the Party. In the framework of revolutionary democracy, we must avoid demagoguery, promises we cannot keep, exploitation of the people’s feelings and the ambitions of opportunists ... we must constantly increase the strength of the people, advance bravely for the conquest of power by the people, for the radical transformation (at the base) of the life of our people, for a stage in which the weapons and means of defence will be entirely in the hands of the people. Do not be afraid of the people and persuade the people to take part in all decisions which concern them—this the basic condition of revolutionary democracy.”¹⁵

Cabral argues that the best among the people should lead the organization, “step by step we have to purge the unworthy elements from our Party, the opportunists, the demagogues (deceivers of the people), the dishonest, those who fail in their duty.”¹⁶ However, there is a danger in this assertion. When a movement is wrecked by infighting, this would lead to self-righteousness, which could be used by different factions to eliminate their opponents.

When a movement degenerates, it is indicative of a crisis in leadership. Even though it professes an anarchist flat structure with no pronounced leadership structures, we see an individual or individuals who implicitly wield all the power. There have been allegations that these personalities influence decisions and surround themselves with loyalists who they keep pleased through a client–patronage network. In most instances, such

personalities claim the foundation of the movement, which they treat as a private company in which they are the majority shareholders. One *Facebook* user put it:

We must never privatise BC. The problem is there are people who think no one can speak on BC or mention Biko or Fanon. That's dangerous! They think they have the birth right to BC.¹⁷

They are indispensable or as Cabral calls them, the "Irreplaceables."¹⁸ They have a sense of entitlement, inflated egos and are consumed by paranoia because their minds tell them, "I started this thing." They are afraid of losing power that comes from being "the founder." One serious handicap of these self-anointed and self-righteous "leaders" is they blare their horns in middle-class spaces; their primary audience is not the poor black masses but whites, where they put a political grand posturing in a language shrouded with populism. They regard themselves as the intellectual revolutionary vanguard of the movement, something not very divorced from the pretensions of white liberal left towards the BCM itself. They are in contempt of poor blacks trapped in townships and informal settlements; they are reluctant to go and organize and mobilize there. If they understand revolutionary democracy, they distort it to suit their narrow and selfish interests.

By engaging philosophically with the masses, there is a constant reminder to remain in contact with the "simple" and "only by this contact does a philosophy become 'historical', purify itself of intellectualistic elements of an individual character and become a 'life.'"¹⁹ In other words, there must be a philosophy of praxis, which, though polemical and critical in its guise, finds roots in the masses, and socio-political activity, thought and action are reciprocally determined. Let me add also the following quote:

With its clear understanding of hierarchical society, the concept of self-organised society and authoritarianism, the revolutionary organisation is well placed to resist 'revolutionary' parties based on authoritarian notions of power and elitism. It will be a struggle at the grass-roots, a war of ideas and tactics against authority and bureaucracy, using revolutionary anarchist theory and practice.²⁰

COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP

More important is the concept of collective leadership, which Cabral defines as leadership by a group of persons, and not by one person alone or by some persons. Questions are asked jointly, decisions arrived at as a collective, each has an opportunity to think and act, each has responsibilities and each has a capacity to take initiative. Cabral calls for combating the spirit of the “big man” who is like a traditional chief, boss or foreman, and at the same time regarding others as vassals and subjects. In the township there is a conveyor belt of talent, of articulate, thoughtful and well-spoken young activists, who have to be nurtured for leadership positions and empowered to take initiative rather than responsibility being a burden of college or the university trained. In Gramscian sense, all men are philosophers and potential intellectuals by virtue of having an intellect and using it, even if they are not intellectuals by social function; therefore, all are leaders.

Critiquing Kautsky’s treatise on social democracy, Gramsci derides its tendency to see the relationship between workers and intellectuals in mechanistic terms, with intellectuals providing theory and ideology and often leadership for a mass base of “non-intellectuals.”²¹ But non-intellectuals don’t exist. Since each man is a carrier of intellectual activity, they are philosophers: organic intellectuals. Nonetheless, the level of consciousness and capacity for leadership among the masses varies. The task of a movement is to work incessantly to raise the intellectual level of the populace, “giving a personality to the amorphous mass element.”²² This includes cultivating intellectuals from the masses. In order for the masses to challenge the existing order, they should not depend on intellectuals emanating from the middle class; they must create organic intellectuals of their own, because dependency on the middle class for leadership has, as a historical fact, led to struggles and revolutions being aborted. The activist, who re (lives) the demands of the masses should be a collective thinker and must elaborate a collective doctrine in the most relevant manner. But this mass creation can’t happen arbitrarily, “mass adhesion and non-adhesion to an ideology is the real critical test of the rationality and historicity of modes of thinking.”²³ Intellectuals in the traditional sense happen to lead a movement and exercise social and political hegemony. The others in the organization give consent, because they don’t believe either in their own organic intellectualism and capacities or in the prestige these intellectuals enjoy by virtue of their level of educational achievement, class status, thorough articulation

and/or even fame. Such a situation is untenable though. The rank and file don't always remain passive, and their capacity to critique leadership increases at particular times and they desire to direct a movement towards a certain political, theoretical and ideological pedestal. Sometimes, certain social classes (who have hitherto been providing leadership) get detached from the rank and file when these particular men, the charismatic "men of destiny" who constitute, represent and lead them, are no longer recognized.²⁴ Here, a "crisis of authority" ensues, which consists of the old dying and the new failing to be born; thus, a variety of morbid symptoms appear.²⁵ At this juncture, important questions that concern the movement are its capacity to, in Gramscian words, "react against the force of habit, against the tendency to become mummified and anachronistic" and whether it can adapt itself to new tasks and a new direction.²⁶ But the rank and file, which happen to be under-resourced, may be dismissed and derided and could be seen by the intellectuals as intellectually incapable of interpreting neither canonical texts nor the hitherto pertaining socio-political conditions.

A similar situation is pertaining in Black America. Cornel West questions why Black America hasn't produced leaders of quality and calibre of past black leaders.²⁷ The answer may be the emergence of a new black middle class, with "its content and character, aspirations and anxieties, orientations and opportunities."²⁸ Despite the increase in number of this class, there has been a dearth of quality, and it's the opposite of their predecessors. This contemporary middle-class leadership "is more deficient and, to put it more strongly, more decadent."²⁹ This class came of age in the late 1960s, whereby the civil rights movement led to black Americans benefiting from the economic boom, who got "a small, yet juicy piece of the expanding American pie."³⁰ This achieving class entered into a culture of consumption and made "status an obsession and addiction to stimulation a way of life."³¹ The wane in leadership is because of lack of a vibrant tradition of resistance passed on to new generations, which means there's no nurturing of a collective critical consciousness, while today's black middle class is a matter of professional consciousness, personal accomplishment and cautious adjustment.³² The post-civil rights era shows the politicians lack of authentic anger and genuine humility. The anger of Malcolm X et al. in their tone and speech fuelled their boldness and defiance. West says, "In stark contrast, most present day black political leaders appear too hungry for status to be angry, too eager for acceptance to be bold, too self-invested in advancement to be defiant."³³ West goes on to conclude that in front of black audiences, their

bold rhetoric is “more performance than personal, more play-acting than heartfelt.”³⁴ A similar observation is made by Reed who observes that this originates from a black elite, with a “highborn sense of duty” and a responsibility to guide the rank and file; these middle class “race leaders” who were prepared to accept the burden of speaking for the mute masses, “thus the old quip that any black person with a clean suit and five dollars in his pocket imagined himself a Negro leader.”³⁵

CONCLUSION

A revolutionary or anyone who professes to this august vocation must always be doing self-appraisal, and must always be honest with themselves. Sometimes lack of well-tuned theoretical perspectives is the undoing of movements. Activists fail to connect with the masses and be identified with them. Contradictions in a movement stall its progression. Disagreements and quarrels lead it to descend; it becomes the opposite of what its founding mandates was—it becomes a regression. However, corrections are made, and reflection is paramount for a praxis that begins to see the world in fresh terms and all to see with one eye. These are the lessons of the struggle.

NOTES

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Youth Politics, Agency and Subjectivity

INTRODUCTION

The question whether youth formations like Blackwash were merely practising precocious youth politics or were seriously revolutionary, begs the need to explore the concept “youth.” Since the majority of these youth formations’ membership and affiliation are those categorized as youth, I have in this chapter closely examined the concept “youth,” more importantly “black youth.” Since its inception, BC has been synonymous with the young. That tradition has persisted. I seek to understand factors that propel youth agency and subjectivity and the strengths and limitations of confining agency to a single age category. Indeed Azanian youth are the most betrayed given their role in bringing apartheid to an end, while their older comrades arrogated themselves leadership positions in politics and the economy. This youth has been termed the “lost” generation and later on “kwaito” generation. In the contemporary era, many are talking of “m-xit,” “amakipkip,” “skinny jeans” generation and “izikhotane” who are said to be preoccupied with diversions and are in pursuit of hedonistic pleasures. This view, I contend, is fallacious and is a misconception because there are spaces that give rise to a conscious township youth that reads voraciously, is abreast with current affairs and is in possession of radical literature and material. It is this youth that is a purveyor of Black Nationalist ideas.

“Youth” as a social construction linked to age originates from relationships of economic production, legal relations and cultural particularities.¹ In the immediate postapartheid period, youth included diverse classes of freedom fighters, students, workers and even delinquents, and “in this story, it is true, not all young blacks are youth. But all youth are black and male.”² Thus, we see a construction and stereotyping of a “black youth,” which, seen as a “lost generation,” is regarded as a menace. Its exclusion from mainstream society guarantees its poor future prospects.³ Azanian youth are trapped in deprivation, lack of opportunity and skills and are caught in a kernel of frustration. Although young people constitute the majority of the population, they are always at the margins of society and political, socio-economic and cultural spheres.⁴ Comaroff and Comaroff use the term “alien-nation” to describe marginalization of youth from the normative world of work and wages.⁵ The best word to describe them is underclass, a continuation from apartheid to postapartheid where social and economic conditions created a disadvantaged class of black youth.⁶ For the Comaroffs, youth is a collective term denoting “a faceless mass of persons who were underclass, unruly, male, challengingly out of place—and at once physically powerful and morally immature, always liable to seize the initiative from their elders and betters.”⁷ The underclass, seen in behavioural terms, is “a set of pathological social attitudes, actions and activities,” of which the outward visibility is race.⁸ It has come to signify not only the unemployed but also the permanently unemployed and the unemployable. It describes a state of mind and a way of life, and is as much cultural as it is an economic condition. It is linked to a poverty of culture rather than a culture of poverty, where the social conditions of the poor are blamed on themselves. In racist schema, idleness, laziness and sloth is a central idea of representation, be it on the street, by the police, in the media, at school and other institutions. These conditions lead to the rise of counter-cultures, which may take overt resistance or ideological forms and are oppositional in stance to dominant values and institutions.⁹ These counter-cultures induce “moral panic” in moral guardians of culture, including parents, marking a “crisis of authority” and youth are viewed as the symptom. Therefore, they become a scapegoat. The Comaroffs see the youth as a “counter-nation,” with its own illegal economics.

The problems of youth and issues associated with it are worldwide phenomena, although race continues to be a factor. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) warns of a “scarred generation” of youth facing a “dangerous mix of high unemployment, increased inactivity and pre-

carious work” in developed countries, and persistent high poverty in the developing countries.¹⁰ In 2012, approximately 75 million young people were out of work, of which 40 % of jobless were the youth.¹¹ In Britain, the older British are seen as the gilded generation who saw a life of rising prosperity, abundant welfare and soaring house prices. In contrast, today’s youth scour the streets for non-existent jobs and are called the “jinxed generation who will be poorer than those born in the 1950s and 1960s.”¹² Some argue the bigger problem is in regards to equity or absence of it; the tension is intra- rather than inter-generational, where the inequalities are within the rising generation. Lately, in Azania, there have been debates about a youth wage subsidy, precipitated by high levels of youth unemployment, which culminated in a Democratic Alliance (DA) march on 14 May 2012, demanding that government implement the policy, which, it says, will create more than four hundred thousand jobs. However, Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)’s Vavi believes the subsidy will lead to old workers being retrenched and increased exploitation of workers.¹³ BC adherents and Africanists condemn the youth wage subsidy as, “a sly manoeuvre and auction to pay local and multinational exploiters to further exploit Azanian Black youth in particular.”¹⁴

Youth and student activism has always been prominent in Azanian struggles. The youth constituted not only a generational but also a political category.¹⁵ In the 1980s, high school students exerted their energies towards mass campaigns, political structures, participation in direct action and street combat. Although the youth had intensity, energy and creativity, they lacked the experience and sophistication. The youth tended to triumphalism and anticipation of imminent victory, with little patience or strategic reality.¹⁶ Nonetheless, the youth represent a regenerative force and are vanguard of social change.¹⁷ Others see the youth as “makers” of society through their contributions to structures, norms, rituals and directions of society; they make society a political force through resistance and resilience.¹⁸ In Azanian struggles, there has always been inter-generational conflict between the “youth” and the “elders.” These tensions have largely been conspicuously reflected in political movements. To comprehend this, one has to know the working of African lineage systems, which promote an unequal relationship between a minority of elders and majority of youth, meaning only a few of the latter reached positions of social control when the elders leave the scene.¹⁹ In some societies, the “open” or “relative” seniority means younger members will eventually be promoted to positions of seniority. The “closed” or “absolute” seniority means the

younger generation is permanently denied seniority except through individual achievement, secession or manipulation of genealogy.²⁰ The old, the “elders,” the ancestors and those with knowledge occupy a central place in Africa.²¹ In moments of conflict, domination is maintained through threats of evoking the power of ancestors to punish the disobedient since contact with ancestors is a preserve of the elders. Therefore, relations between generations should correspond with the ancestors.²² In the colonial and postcolonial eras, some of these inherited principles are maintained. It is through transmission of knowledge and laws by memory that links elderliness with power. Elderliness and ancestry are closely tied and mutually reinforce each other.²³

In Azanian context, lineage/unilineal descent groups have an apical ancestor that can be traced, although they differ in generational depth and geographical dispersion.²⁴ All Southern African groups are patrilineal and governed by patrilineal descent; they worship ancestors mainly through the male line, so the emphasis is on male authority, which is stratified into kinship and political hierarchies. These govern all social life with a strong dominance pattern: agnation, ranking and generation are fundamental and inscribed into the moral code. The most fundamental moral principle is to show respect (*ukublonipha/inhlonipho*) to lineage seniors and to all members of the senior generation. This is incubated in early childhood. Children are taught absolute obedience to parents; they must always use formal modes of address to them, may not interrupt while grown-ups are talking and neither shout at them nor call across to them. Among the Xhosa, parents whose children fail to behave well are said to feel shame (*intloni*).²⁵ Sanctions become supernatural; misfortune will befall him who “plays the fool with the old people.”²⁶ Emphasis on respect runs through all kinship and descent groups, and from family to clan.

Inter-generational conflict in the Azanian context begins with the encroachment of colonial, wage and migrant labour, which transformed inter-generational hierarchies.²⁷ Young men who were workers increasingly defied their own patriarchs and colonial laws, breaking filial obligations and customary prohibitions. In Natal, the Native Code turned chiefs into “eyes and ears” of the government, which made Africans “easy to govern” by promoting dependence and obedience.²⁸ The chiefs collected taxes and fines for the colony and helped in enrolment of young men into government public works brigades called *isibalo*. Wage labour made elders and fathers lose power to the young men, who could now pay *lobola* without the formers’ assistance. In 1900, one male elder

complained: “at public meetings of natives some young men get up and speak in English when there is no necessity for doing so, it is due to a species of pride and sense of importance.”²⁹ He saw the rift as “because the country now belongs to the new generation—*abatsha* who ‘jeer at me saying we are equal now.” In politics especially, deference for elders is derided by the youth. Hitherto existing conditions radically alter these relationships. The youth no longer see it helpful to consult elders, who are compelled to “shift their ground, adapt themselves to the new situation.”³⁰ The Bambatha Rebellion 1906 is the first instance in the country’s modern political agency that the youth came into conflict with the elders. The elders lost control as young men from the anti-poll tax movement organized by Bambatha, himself a young man, hunted and killed *amambuka* (male African elders seen as traitors for their loyalty to the colonial government).

“Generational consciousness,” that is, differential experience between generations specific to age best explains a succession of generations.³¹ In other words, as an older generation (in this case the youth of 1970s and 1980s) progresses to middle and senior adulthood, a new generation continues the struggle, albeit in a different experience, a shared social situation, social conditions and development of attitudes and responses by particular close-knit “concrete groups.”³² In their similarly located contemporaneous experience, the youth form a common identity and affinity, which is shaped by common experience, that is shared experience (of a generational unit), which crystallizes into generational style different from that of the older or immediately preceding generation.³³ How young people see and analyse their predicament and form a political identity depends contextually.³⁴ Youth agency is a zone of powerlessness, so to study youth politics is to study politics “from below,” that is, studying the politics of the powerless.

Contemporary BC youth are just a node in a long thread of youth activism in the country. In the 1970s, the BPC youth programmes outlined the role of youth as thus:

Young people are the bearers and perpetrators of what we hold dear: our survival as a group and our identity. In them we recognise the manifestations of our aspirations. They will be the ones who will be on the front lines of the liberation struggle. It is therefore of utmost necessity that our youth should be made the cornerstone of our programme of liberation. They are the people who are able to give our struggle its dynamism and lifeblood.³⁵

There is always generational revival: 1960s, USA and Europe; 1970s, BC and 2000s, Arab and Azanian youth formalizing themselves and actively protesting. This can be seen as a historical process that involves generational renewal, ideological renaissance and continuity and development of new ideas, where political stagnancy seems to stifle any forms of youth agency.³⁶ Let us consider two cases of two people who were/are youth during two different historical moments. One is a BCM founder Sadique Variava, and the other is a contemporary youth. Let us call him B:

1. Sadique Variava

Most BC founding members were born between 1945 and 1949. Incidentally, the Nationalist Party came to power during this period. Thus, they grew up in a world of apartheid. When the ANC and PAC were banned, they were in their teens, making them generational heirs to the incipient political vacuum. At that time there was a culture of fear—a pervasive informer network and every aspect of black social life dominated by security police. Sadique, who sees himself a liberationist/revolutionary, can be considered “Indian” if ethnic categorizations are used, says in political thought there is usually a continuation but in this case there was a cut-off. However, most of these youth had an idea of history of resistance, either through schooling from parents or through kin who were politically active in the years before; the youth, thus, used to hear the names of Mandela and Sobukwe mentioned indiscriminately. Sadique’s family also has a long history of BC involvement. His brother Yusuf (Joe), now with Wits school of medicine, was also prominent in the BCM. Other sites of political education were sporting events, especially those associated with the Unity Movement, which has provided most of the vocabulary BC uses. The impetus was derived from resistance to banning of non-racial sport. At school, they were forced to celebrate Afrikaner holidays like the Republic Day, associated with subjugation of indigenous people. Sadique and other youth used to derive an inspiration from Unity Movement tradition; they used to boycott these holidays and distribute pamphlets whose message was political in tone, denouncing these enactments. When a decision was taken to give the department of Indian Affairs powers to take over schooling for “Indian” children (Sadique was 14 years old at that time), they used to organize marches and boycotts. Earlier on, the ANC had formed alliance with Indian and Coloured Congresses, which were all ethnic-based; Sadique and others did not subscribe to that. There was

no influence of a major political movement, however. The influence was from the New Left and Black Power movements, especially in France for the former and the USA for the latter. After high school, Sadique went to the Transvaal College of Education College (TCE) to train as a teacher. All campuses were controlled by the Broederbond and the liberal NUSAS. Early BC proponents considered NUSAS as subversive and racist because it “poisoned minds of young blacks.” They desecrated its multiracialism: many of their white colleagues were privileged and were children of big capitalists who were oppressing them, thus making the partnership fraught with contradictions and untenable. Sadique felt he belonged to blackness. TCE itself was pro NUSAS before SASO established its niche there. At NUSAS conferences, many blacks were afraid to talk or contribute because of an inferiority complex instilled in a racist society, where to be white was equated with being human; hence, they could not come up with their own programmes. When Sadique went to college, his reputation of leading protests had preceded him. In his first year, he was elected into the Student Representative Council (SRC); this was a turning point in his life because he could now attend conferences where he could assert some political influence. In fact, TCE was the first SASO affiliate, the TCE’s SRC constitution was thrown away, the SASO one was now the guide and in short all campuses now identified with the nascent black movement. He realized that black Africans, Indians and coloureds shared the same objective experience. At campuses, everyone began to talk of their experiences. They began to question why collectively they were referred to as non-white and whether it was an aspiration to whiteness, so the question was “who are we”? To answer this, Biko organized formation schools where leaders of all black campuses were involved and spent weekends addressing these questions. The result was if you remove white from non-white, you are left with *non*: meaning a non-person, a non-being. On the contrary, white society, despite its diverse ethnic/cultural groups, was defined as a single white unit (even the Lebanese and Japanese were considered “honorary whites”). Another question to ponder was why were they rigidly divided by the system through giving some a few privileges. They argued that they couldn’t be partially oppressed, that would be like saying “you are partially pregnant.” Then you have to be wholly so or not at all. The government encouraged white immigration to bolster white numbers, and Sadique says, “for whites the country was heaven, it was like the

advertisement back then ‘sunny skies, braai vleis and Chevrolet’, this was the white experience.”

The early BC started identifying with black radical thinkers and got hold of, and devoured, the writings of Fanon, Cesaire (especially ‘Return to My Native Land’), Carmichael (Ture), Hamilton, Mao and Freire, who were all big influences. This literature they discovered on their own endeavours, because under apartheid laws, such reading was banned and outlawed. They overcame the dearth of available literature by “when one picks up a book, they would distribute it to one another after reading.” They began relating and translating these readings to their own experience, and started to find an anti-thesis to whiteness, which was Black Solidarity, which implied describing people beyond ethnicity, thus creating a new people. BC adherents in those days listened to reggae, which was part of cultural movement inspiring anti-colonial struggles, while the ANC people listened to classical music, a point that made us chuckle during our conversation.

Speaking about contemporary youth, Sadique says BC adherents are now more youthful; the elders’ task is to inculcate a work ethic into the young because today’s BC major handicap is “laziness.”

B

B was born in Soweto in the years when apartheid was in turmoil. He comes from a deprived home. He was raised by his aunt, who struggled to provide for the household. He persevered to attend college. He went to Morris Isaacson High School in Soweto, which is symbolically associated with June 16 1976 uprisings. Morris Isaacson High School is central in Sowetan politics. A majority of Blackwashers in Soweto attended the school, which has a tradition not only of excellence in academic, sporting and other extramural activities but also politically as well. He told me that he later converted to Islam. The reason may have been spurred by material rather than spiritual deprivation. Like all contemporary religions, there are overtures and proselytizing in townships by religious crusaders of all persuasions who promise converts improved life circumstances on earth just as enhanced entry opportunity into heavenhood. B was in the faith for a while until for some reason “his eyes were opened.” There are two explanations to this. One is the fact of a “rampant, unchecked, unparalleled and sometimes invisible racism in Islam.” Although there is a preaching with underlying positive teaching about equality of all God’s human creation,

“the level of hypocrisy was alarming.” B discovered “unacceptable” differences between black and Arab Muslims. The former are always poor, in want and are servants of their Arab counterparts who live in opulence and privilege. B says he began reading history of Islamization and Arabization in Africa and stumbled on “some disturbing facts” where Islam is implicated in slave trade, slavery of blacks and paving the way for European slavery, imperialism and colonialism. He then decided to renounce the faith. This seems validated by Mngxitama who has consistently labelled Arabs “the first enslavers and colonisers of black people and countries in north Africa don’t consider themselves African but part of the Arab world.”³⁷ Secondly, a former schoolmate of his, who was now involved in Blackwash politics, had a major political influence on him. He recruited him to the movement and tutored him in major black radical thought.

Today’s youth are reading Biko. Biko and BC itself is “hip” and “chic,” is charismatic and an “in thing.” There is a subculture associated with BC and Biko. Biko T-shirts and other inscribed paraphernalia can be seen on any given day worn by youth in unkempt and kinky hair. The contradictions are that BC somehow appeals to them even if they don’t understand the underlying radical and potentially subversive message inherent in that erstwhile thought. Some youths do totally comprehend the message though and can relate it to own lived experience. B and other Blackwashers relate the “immense” interest schoolchildren have in Biko’s ideas when they host presentations there. Sadique Variava also confirmed that when he was invited to deliver a talk at his nephew’s school project on resistance poetry, “the kids enjoyed the talk on BC and I went on for three hours.”

Young people are always encouraged to be rebels, to subscribe to non-conformity and to be anti-establishment “to the core” and should always protest.³⁸ The realization is the youth have a historical responsibility; they should be eternal students of history, not imitators, because history “tells you why you are disenfranchised.”³⁹ This thought is similar to 1970s BC: SASO urged students (the youth) “be creators of history and not history to create you.”⁴⁰ Being creators of history means mastery of one’s circumstances and one’s attitude to the black community. The admonishment is “if you betray your history you will be ashes but you will be the fertiliser is the future rebels.”⁴¹ BC youth are recognizable by their ghetto argot, unkempt and kinky hair, which some twist into dreadlocks, their apparel is jeans and T-shirts and their manner of walking, ranging from street swagger, swash-buckling to a step that is confident yet militant. They have a firm belief that as young black people “we should take initiative, do it

for ourselves because our elders are not doing it ... we will create our own history and we will not accept what our elders say.”⁴² Thus, they are inspired by Fanon’s injunction that every generation has a historical mission and task, either to fulfil it or betray it. They reckon young people are forthright, even though they sometimes are impulsive; their stores of energy are, as one participant explained, “like a spring that never dries up but always flows” and are always poised for fearlessness and are “pissed off with talking instead of action (he coiled his fingers into a fist as he emphasised that point).” He stressed the need to eradicate the attitude that “things will happen by themselves” without doing anything. In contrast, elders are hesitant and cautious, they have everything to lose while the youth have none and they are a hindrance and constraint to youth agency. The struggle is always fought by the youth, but it is the older people who sell-out, in addition to having a penchant for lying. The friction also happens among an age-cohort group that involves older and younger youth. One participant told me, “I have a fourteen year old nephew who I caught smoking and I admonished him. His riposte was *nawe uyabhema* (but you also smoke).” This made his moralizing Pharisaic. Township BC youth are not only politically aware but also socially conscious. I attended a birthday party for the nephew of one BC youth. An intoxicated man was molesting a young woman. One BC youth said the man had to be stopped; if he wants a woman, he has to adhere to proper courting decorum, otherwise “if we just look and leave him behaving that way he would rape that young woman.” The BC youth approached that man and admonished him. One should note that the man was in his mid- to late thirties, and the youth was in his early twenties. Most BC youth are smokers, but during various events involving a cohort of children and underaged participants, they do so out of sight.

One youth believes rebellion has to start in the home because the home is a microcosm of oppression and injustice. It is in the home that a youth can hone his/her agential skill and capabilities because “if you can disobey the parents, flout all the rules imposed in the home, you can rebel against the system.” The participant decried that one youth (who is part of the BC collective) as “still being looked after and cared for by his mother, they should move beyond that.” The family, according to their definition, is those “brothers and sisters in the struggle,” in other words, the ideological family. There used to be a talk in Blackwash about them being an ideological family. However, some youth have come to believe that the family has to be an admixture of both the ideological and the biological.

Most BC youth don't come from political homes or homes with a political tradition. All they know about BC is gleaned from their peers, as one participant told me: "all I know I learned from the street." Here, exchanges in literature, audiovisual material and ideas happen. Contemporary BC youth are in possession of radical material, most of us in academy don't possess. I could not establish how they came to possess it. They are avid readers of black radical texts like Fanon, Chinweizu, Cabral, Nkrumah, Frank Wilderson III, C.L.R. James, George Jackson, Khalid Muhammad, Biko, Malcolm X, Assata Shakur and du Bois. Their music is mainly conscious hip-hop by US artistes like Dead Prez, KRS ONE, Talib Kweli, Common, The Roots, Immortal Technique, Ill Bill, Diabolic, Vinnie Paz, Poor Righteous Teachers, Cashless Society, among others. They are also fascinated by the non-conformity of Nigerian singer Fela Kuti and his son Femi. They find inspiration from black revolutionaries like Robert Mugabe (because he doesn't give a fuck about the white man, someone told me, and that he returned the land to black people; the Blackwash Movement has made exchange visits with ZANU PF and the New Black Panther Party), Thomas Sankara, Assata Shakur, Mangaliso Robert Sobukwe, the Zimbabwean maverick Dambudzo Marechera, long time death row US political prisoner Mumia Abu-Jamal and the executed Troy Davis who was a cause celebre. Poqo and the Black Panthers also provide a militant impetus to their struggles. All of the aforementioned are frequently evoked, and are pervasively part of *Facebook* chatter and moniker.

Increased importance of the market, hegemony of mass media on consumption patterns and growth of youth-oriented leisure industry and arrival of mass communication, mass entertainment, mass art and mass culture create a new youth category—the teenage consumer.⁴³ In South African townships, there has been a new trend called *ukukhothana* (licking each other just how snakes do). These youths (*izikhotane*) compete in destruction of material objects, including burning of currency. The *izikhotane* who wear the latest fashion trends that are procured at a cost don't shy away from exhibiting a conspicuous consumption even if they originate from desperately poor households. These youths are said to brook no admonishment because they will say *bhek'ndaba zakho* (mind your own business). The hysteria around consumption habits of black ghetto youth might be a result of an inability to possess the status symbols associated with whiteness, where whiteness, consumerism and identity become linked.⁴⁴ Current discussions among both the youth and the old tend to see the postapartheid youth as apolitical, and who are neither

conscious nor politically aware. However, to insinuate that the youth is caught in *jouissance*, consumption and hedonistic pursuits like *uku-khobhana* might be a misdiagnosis. Revolts by youth in the Arab world and Tottenham riots in the UK, where experiences are not qualitatively different from Azanian youth, were because of unrest in the respective countries. According to StatsSA in South Africa, 3.3 million youth aged 15–24 years were unemployed and had neither attended school nor tertiary institution.⁴⁵ All factors point towards frustration by this cohort. Azanian young people are, therefore, the most dangerous because apart from their large population, they are the “the most betrayed people.”⁴⁶ Let us look at the Tottenham riots. From a right-wing perceptive, the disturbances were caused by a moral and social decline since the 1950s, multiculturalism, soft policing, family breakdown, liberal teaching, welfare dependency and immigration.⁴⁷ On the contrary, the causes are an alienated youth, police harassment, unemployment, poverty, tuition fee increases and a neo-liberal economy “which allows bankers to earn bonuses usually described as ‘obscene.’”⁴⁸ The killing of Mark Duggan, a black youth, by police, was considered a racist act and sparked the upheaval, where 10 years earlier, the MacPherson inquiry reported on institutionalized racism in the police. The youth went on rampage and burned down their own neighbourhood, a manifestation that young people have no stake in the neighbourhood they live in and even in wider society.⁴⁹ The motto of most young black men who have given up all hope of attainment in a white man’s world is “it’s about the money!” Their problems are passed from generation to generation; they refer to themselves as nigga, telling the world that they were offspring of the “field negro,” not the trained “house negro” from slavery days. The “field negro’s” sole intent is “to escape, and maybe to cause a little damage to the master and his property.”⁵⁰

SIYAPHAMBILI YOUTH PIONEERS

Siyaphambili Youth Pioneers (SYP) who subscribes to BC is a youth initiative by Sowetan youth whose primary aim is to “conscientise, empower and teach kids to fish.” SYP has a project on technology and engineering in collaboration with Formula One (F1) in which nine million children worldwide are participating. The F1 has partnered with SYP on a national level. Presently, there is an F1 school at Jabulani Technical. In 2008, learners from Jabulani went to Malaysia for an international competition, where they were the only

black team. So far, only five black teams have participated at international events. There are also corporate sponsors like Ferrari and Anglo-Platinum. However, this inclination has precipitated critiques from other BC adherents who regard SYP as pandering to capitalism and its ethics, given its partnership and consort with “capitalist exploiters like Anglo-Gold and Anglo-Platinum.”

Sowetan schools like Morris Isaacson, Sekano Ntoana, Naledi and Orlando High Schools have a long history of emphasis on extramural cultural and sporting activities, including debating societies. By late 1960s, some BC-oriented teachers like Tom Manthata, Jack Tsotetsi, Onkopontse Tiro and Curtis Nkondo infused debate meetings with political and social themes, and as the 1970s wore on, debating was extremely popular in Soweto.⁵¹ In 1968, the African Student Movement (later SASM) emerged from school-based societies and YWCA youth groups. The debating tradition in Soweto schools has persisted. Currently, debate and public speaking meetings are hosted and organized monthly by SYP, in which a range of topics and themes affecting contemporary society are a staple. Participating schools include Morris Isaacson, Jabulani Technical High School, Aurora Girls, Moletsane, among others. Themes range from Black History Month, human rights, youth, freedom and so on. Most coincide with topics associated with national holidays. The debaters/speakers are awarded with certificates of acknowledgement that contain an SYP logo. Normally the topics, as one BC participant observes, are “tough which fail even older people.” The students and the contents of their speeches show a level of intellectual advancement. Names of struggle icons like Biko, Miriam Makeba, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King and even Mandela are indiscriminately mentioned. I have heard phrases like, “every existence is an act of liberation,” “let’s change the mentality of black suffering,” “brothers and sisters of Azania ... they can’t control our minds,” “for a man to conquer the world he has to conquer himself first,” “people fought for freedom but are we free when our people are poor and there is a jobless youth, can we decolonise ourselves?” “Are we free as a black nation, as a black child?” “If there was freedom why are people protesting and still living in shacks?” “we have to take charge because the nation is ours,” “whites turned South Africa into a country of failures, made it separate from the African continent,” “we have to ask do we know our history?” “Freedom is still a pipe dream for most black South Africans” and “freedom given ain’t freedom at all.”

One can delineate two strands of thought in the students’ speeches: Congress and BC influence. Some mention that there is now equality

in the country as a result of peoples' struggles to realize a democratic society. The new day begins when Mandela was freed from prison, some students intimate, so we should relish this freedom and this non-racial society where, if the past and the present are compared, today a black child can go to the same school as whites and "we are now taught in the same manner." They say the government is "providing us with free stationery but we don't want to learn, we burn them, we are lazy, we want to be spoon-fed." The other strand evokes Biko and his ideals. One participant says, "What happens to the dream when the dreamer dies? We have to live the dream of our heroes." They note that schools are decrepit; the homes are so poor they cannot provide adequate meals, which hinders black children's capacity to acquire skills, inhibits their chances to succeed and they end up trapped in cycle of poverty. They observe an increasing inequality whereby to obtain something worthwhile, one has to invest a lot of struggle and pain. Nonetheless, the students showed a lack of historical and thematic perception when, at one meeting, they were asked to distinguish between apartheid and white supremacy. None of those present could do so.

One persistent theme is the role of education in the lives of black children. Even if everybody talks of education as a precursor to success, education is not innocent because it can be a "poison" used to enhance a particular hegemonic view.⁵² Education can also be used to address man and his existence holistically and can be a vehicle for social change. Education and freedom are sides of the same coin: "the definer designs a hellish environment and in turn tells you what to learn and tells black people that psychologically their minds are dysfunctional because of their environment."⁵³

BC youth, some of whom were former debaters at school where there have been generations and generations who have been produced by that system, say it is realized debates are crucial, but it is a matter of changing their orientation and content. For example, instead of one team opposing or supporting a topic like "Freedom and Education," they can just express what comes into their thought because most times a team may just oppose and say things that are contrary to their belief, conviction and conscience. Nonetheless, BC adherents believe that youth associated with SYP are an important base.

BLAQ AESTHETICS

Back in the old days, BC used to enact performances at birthdays, funerals, parties and wherever black people congregated, to spread consciousness, inspire people and infuse hope into their lives. According to BC performer Diniso Gamakhulu, that's what contemporary BC adherents should be doing because black people have "been lulled by the postapartheid liberalism."⁵⁴ Blaq Aesthetics is a BC-influenced formulation started in 2008 in Soweto as arts collective to provide a space for township masses to engage "in arts that will stimulate them." They run a weekly Book Club at Jabavu and Pimville libraries where they review a range of different texts. Their aim is to "take the library to the people," and inculcate a literary tradition among the poor, which doesn't have to be a preserve of the privileged. The challenge is people don't favour the pastime of reading, but the reason is "maybe there's nothing to read." Thus, they solicit books from writers associations and other sources. They organize and host regular reading and spelling sessions at Jabavu library for parents and Soweto primary school learners who are aged 10–14 years. The children are asked to name an alphabet letter and spell a word in a language of their choice, but mainly it is English, Sesotho, Setswana and isiZulu. Then there is a reading competition, where the learners have to read a paragraph in 30 seconds. A third aspect is more like a quiz. At one session I attended, I observed that the children were given three simplified texts provided by the government, compiled by Chris van Wyk, on Robert Sobukwe, Chris Hani and Steve Biko, which fall under "Learning African History-Freedom Fighters Series." This part of the session is called "Battle of the Books," where a judge asks the schools' representative (that is the learners) questions from those texts. Afterwards the learners question each other. This is meant to test reading speed, accuracy and competency. The sessions often assume a competitive edge; a panel of judges processes the children through elimination rounds. Winners are rewarded with books.

Blaq Aesthetics also runs a "revolutionary bioscope" for educating and entertaining the masses. Film screenings like "Afrika YiKas'lam Film Festival," held in November, are a regular event. Featured film titles include Phakathi, Soweto's Middling Class, Maafa, Apartheid Did Not Die, 500 Years Later, Good Hair, Roots, Sankofa, The Great and The Mighty Walk. The screenings are followed by a discussion around themes they raise. Attendance, however, tends to be apathetic. One participant explained that sometimes it's the nature of the masses not to take an active

interest in educational films that are devoid of the “hu ha” associated with action movies. Poetry sessions are also held weekly, mostly at Credo Mutwa village. Arts performances called “TrainSpotSation” are regularly enacted in the last coach of trains that run from Naledi to Johannesburg. Apart from spreading consciousness, these are meant to counter “tame and lame” messages of Christian preachers who are ever present in each and every coach.

They regularly host an arts event called “Loxion Connexion” that has an array of poetry, music and other performances. There are also literature and theatre programmes and workshops. Blaq Aesthetics intends to participate in the National Arts Festival in Grahamstown in 2013.

CONCLUSION

Azanian youth are among the most disenfranchised and frustrated section of the population. The view that the postapartheid youth is apolitical and stagnant might soon be a passing phase. More youth trapped in the struggle of townships and rural areas will attempt to derive a meaning therein, which will give an impetus to a sustained agency. Already there are indicators like incessant service delivery protests where youth play a prominent, albeit a violent, role. Unless socio-economic conditions assume a cyclical turn tending to improvement, the authorities may ignore youth agency at their own peril. Azanian youth are a time bomb. They soon may be going on a power trip. History attests to that.

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The Social Construction of Blackness in Azania

INTRODUCTION

This chapter argues that since blackness is a historical phenomenon, it can only be thoroughly understood by analysing its historical roots. My engagement with this question hinges on how black South Africans have been brought into racial subjectivity and objectification and how this question persists even with the formal abolition of apartheid. I make four major postulations: firstly, blackness is a white creation through white anti-black racism; secondly, in the process of construction of blackness, whiteness was also created; thirdly, I look at social suffering and the black body in the making of blackness; fourthly, I analyse how black people are responsible for bringing themselves into subjectivity through large swathes of resistance, in other words blackness as agency. The latter explains the persistence of blackness and ideas consistent with it. Further, I look at the evolution and instability of the political, racial and cultural usage and categorization of the term blackness, which reached its zenith with the inception of BC movement. Of course, blackness has not only been employed by a racist state in its social engineering but also by black people themselves as a reference point for political mobilization and as a rallying point for resistance. In addition, I examine blackness in the post-1994 society and how it is enunciated. This I intend to achieve by engaging with the changing nature and “invisibility” of race and racism, which has been egged by the “death” of Jim Crow, as seen by the incipient post-1994

society. I also make comparative analyses with political and epistemological uses of blackness in the “postracial” USA since the 1960s to the present and Britain in the 1970s and 1980s.

THE BLACK BODY AND SOCIAL SUFFERING

According to Sartre, the first dimension of being is existence as in the body; second, the body is utilized and known by others; third, when one is for others, the other is revealed, meaning the ontological dimension of one’s body is existing as a body known by others.¹ Relations with others arise from relations of one’s body to others’ body. These are not unilateral, but reciprocal and moving, relations. The objectification of the black body is seen in the racist gaze, which regards the “Other” as a non-being.² From this gaze, “he feels the weight of his melanin.”³ A black subject not only has a feeling of inferiority but also of non-existence. The black man’s being is experienced through others; his blackness is in relation to whiteness and its gaze, and the black body becomes a curse, attacked severally, thus giving way to an epidermal racial schema.⁴ The black subject is determined from without, appraised from his very appearance. In white man’s eyes, he has no ontological existence; his customs and the sources in which they were based were wiped on assumptions of a “superior civilization” which imposed itself on him. The gaze and the over-determination induce power, and power arouses fear, which becomes part of the black’s constitution. If fear pervades the black, Fanon asks “but of what is he afraid?” He answers, “Of himself.” Ultimately, the black may have to resign himself to his fate or more so to his colour. Fanon is vehemently opposed to this proposition: “I feel in myself a soul as immense as the world, truly a soul as deep as the deepest of rivers; my chest has the power to expand without limit. I am a master and I am advised to adopt the humility of a cripple.”⁵ The internal tug-of-war is intense, smothering his optimism; silence becomes his companion and he resigns to weeping.

The first encounter between whites and the African was characterized by the physiological difference of the latter, where whiteness was the direct opposite of blackness.⁶ Blackness itself wasn’t enough cause for debasement; there was also the peculiarity of his language, gestures, eating habits and dress. The fact that one is black implies that he is an animal, is bad, mean, ugly and can entice fear in anyone he comes into sight and contact with.⁷ The black man then, becomes a victim of objectification, “a slave not to the idea others have of me, but to my appearance.”⁸ Sin is

synonymous with the Negro as virtue is with whiteness and the Negro interiorizes that, which results in “epidermalization” of inferiority.⁹

The English, for example, were so fascinated and impressed by the African’s “deviant” behaviour that they used powerful metaphors to describe him: “brutish” or “bestial” or “beastly.”¹⁰ They were also compared to “orang-outang” (chimpanzee), which Africa happened to be home to and which closely resembles man.¹¹ Apes were seen to be venereal and lustful as the natives. This sexual link would lead to blacks being regarded as lewd, lascivious and wanton. In the New World, blacks were not only subjugated in the plantations but stringently barred from sexual relations with white women; Jordan observes, “White men extended their dominion over their Negroes to the bed, where the sex act itself served as ritualistic re-enactment of the daily pattern of social dominance.”¹² However, white men had open access to black women who were seen to be lascivious. Having originated from tropical climes, they were associated with sexual activity. Thus, white men could not be blamed if they succumbed to their temptations. If the black woman had warm body temperature, the black male was virile and lusty. But white women were off-limits to black men. Racial jealousy, fear and feelings of sexual inadequacy kept white men insecure. There is, therefore, little wonder regarding castration and lynching as punishment on black males, and “it illustrated dramatically the ease with which white men slipped over into treating their Negroes like their bulls and stallions whose ‘spirit’ could be subdued by emasculation.”¹³ This I think is at the heart of violent racism meted on the black subject ... throughout history. It is impossible to talk of racism without talking about sex: “White supremacist ideology is based first and foremost on the degradation of black bodies in order to control them”, and white fear of black sexuality is a basic ingredient of white racism.¹⁴ For Fanon, everything happens at the genital level.¹⁵ In his analysis of Negrophobia, the myth of a black male’s big penis and thus tremendous sexual powers, which begets fears in white men, is the basis of genital racism. The archetypal figure of the threatening super sensual dark villain or black beast is old in societies of Western civilizations, and the threat of a dark villain to the white goddess features prominently in Greek mythology.¹⁶ Transcending to the medieval Christian theology, the devil is depicted as a super sensual and lascivious black male with a large penis capable of super masculine exertion. This villain is not only darker or black but also dirtier, hairier, ugly, dishevelled, threatening and immoral. Thus, the conflict between the hero, who defends the white goddess, and

the dark villain, becomes a struggle between understandings of manhood: human versus animal, white versus black, spiritual versus canal, higher versus lower and noble versus base.¹⁷

Fanon observes that in all cruelties, tortures and beatings, there are conspicuous elements of sexuality.¹⁸ He notes that the viewing of the Negro as a penis symbol and his lynching is a sexual revenge. In Lacanian terms, this is symbolic castration—the phallus is a signifier not simply an organ of insemination, but symbolizes power, and just like other objects and insignia it enables the subject who acquires them into position of exercising power.¹⁹ The penis, which is synonymous with power, under these relations, is all what the black male has. In the 1930s and 1940s, there was a linking of race, libido and death in colonialist discourses, in complicity with medical and social sciences.²⁰ This was compounded by the syphilis scare, which viewed African men as voracious sexual predators, and such themes would remain a staple of the racist imagination. In addition, there was the *swart gevaar* (black peril), which was similar to fear of black men ravishing white women in the deep American South. In fact, apartheid was propelled to power by *swart gevaar* of which sex was central. Thus, in the American South and Nazi Germany, the fear of sexual pollution or violation by the allegedly subhuman race is close to the heart of murderous or genocidal racism.²¹ In Nazi Germany, Jewish males, like blacks, in the racist imagination, were seen as potential seducers and violent sexual predators. The notion of the male Jew as a cunning seducer and violent rapist was the staple for Nazi propaganda, and his relationship with a German woman would pollute and contaminate the racial purity that Nazis were endeavouring to preserve.²² However, Fanon, argues that whilst the black was feared for his perceived large penis and posed a biological danger, the Jew was an intellectual danger, resented because of his potential for acquisitiveness and deemed to control everything including wealth and positions of power.²³

The missionaries did play an invaluable role in recreation of personhood and the black body, something akin to Lacanian imago, the “mirror-stage” fixation where both the missionary and the native cooperated to create a public representation of the self as a Christian convert.²⁴ Centuries earlier, construction of the Khoi and the San as nomads and vagrants, “who were poor, close to criminal classes and carrying disease” set precedence to the later work of missionaries.²⁵ The colonized were seen as savage, a term to describe their “nature”—animal, brute, Neanderthal, bestial associated with heartlessness, unfeeling, unresponsiveness, inhumaneness,

bloodthirstiness, cannibalism.²⁶ The “savage” had to be tamed, domesticated and civilized. Exploitation and oppression based on race required constituting the African not only as the “Other” but as species of animal. The history of formation of missionary societies coincides with British expansion overseas. One of the myths created by missionary societies is a false belief that imperialism represents the will of God to convert and save the heathens from moral depravity.²⁷ By 1889, American missionary societies had become established in South Africa, in Natal, Cape Colony and Transvaal. John Comaroff critiques Foucauldian and postmodern/poststructuralist/post-Marxist analysis of colonial governance for insinuating that the capillary power of colonial regimes was based on inculcation of a self-regulating, self-controlled, self-motivated, legally constituted and socially individuated person.²⁸ He argues this was not the task of the state alone but also if evangelists. The body, the physical object becomes a social subject, so those who seek to forge empires or to remake existing worlds will start by working on the bodies of would-be subjects.²⁹ The evangelists had an interest in the corporeality of blacks: grooming, dress and comportment were crucial modes of colonial production. To domesticate the black body, they interfered with their cooking, hygiene, sexuality and work, thus creating “free” individuals to consume and be consumed by European commodities.³⁰ This individuation was accompanied by commodification and modernization, which went with construction of boundaries around the body. In South Africa, missionaries sought to create bounded and inward-looking persons, “physically enclosed disciples who would also be colonial subjects.”³¹ The dialectical relationship between body and space leads to embodying of the structures of the world; production of a “new man” in the process of “deculturation” and “reculturation” manifested through dress, beauty, physical and verbal manners.³² The imprint of pedagogy on the body makes the body to serve as memory, the mnemonic, bearing the content of culture. Central to this is *habitus* that engenders thoughts, perceptions, expressions and actions, which are historically and socially situated conditions of its production.

In the 1970s, the BCM adopted the slogan “Black is Beautiful” as an attempt to restore humanity to dehumanized blacks. It challenged at the very deep roots the black man’s belief about himself and what makes him negate himself; that he doesn’t have to run away from his nature, which is perfect, thus needing no modifications. Martin Luther King, in a 1967 speech, talked at length about the association of blackness with base, evil

and ugliness, a fact repeated semantically in education and dictionaries. To counter this, Negro must say to himself and the world:

I am somebody. I am a person. I am with dignity and honour. I have a rich and noble history. How painful and exploited that history has been. Yes. I was a slave through my fore parents and I am not ashamed of that. I am ashamed of the people who were so sinful to make me a slave ... we must stand up and say 'I'm Black and I'm Beautiful.'³³

Because of denigration and feelings of inferiority about their bodies and beauty whose aesthetic value was used in determining one's place in the racial hierarchy, black people start using lightening creams, straightening devices for their hair and so on. Skin bleaching, for example, is often described as a manifestation of "colo-mentality"³⁴ or what Fela Kuti refers to as "Yellow Fever."³⁵ Malcolm X, who in his early life had conked hair, which he later viewed as a big step to self-denigration, had joined multitudes of blacks brainwashed into believing that black people are "inferior" and white people "superior":

I'm speaking from personal experience when I say of any black man who conks today, or any white—wiggged black woman, that if they gave their brains in their heads just half as much attention as they do their hair, they would be a one thousand times better off.³⁶

In Azania, the poetry of James Matthews, for example, condemns blacks who attempt to escape their blackness by imitating the style of whites, as alienation and opportunism:

My sister has become a schemer and a scene-stealer her free swinging breasts strangled by a bra face smeared with astra cream skin paled for white man's society songs of the village traded in for tin pan alley "black is beautiful" has become as artificial as the wig she wears.³⁷

The constraints posed by the black body are an anathema, which is the major reason for laboratories designed to produce chemicals for "denigrefication" for the Negro "to whiten himself and thus throw off the burden of that corporeal malediction."³⁸ Fanon declares that the black man who strives to whiten his race is as wretched as the one who preaches hatred of the white man. The black, a slave of the white man, a victim of white civilization, in turn, enslaves himself and aspires to whiteness in

every possible manner: “out of the blackest part of my soul ... surges up this desire to be suddenly white. I want to be recognised not as black but as white.”³⁹ After all, he has to escape that burden that comes with being black and reach the pinnacle of humanity, which is symbolically encapsulated in whiteness. It becomes necessary to help the black man suffering from inferiority complex, to liberate himself and to liberate from him this unconscious desire that Fanon sees as a malady. In some sense one feels pity rather than choler for him because he lives in a society that enables this condition, produces and maintains it and has a pervasive belief that one race is superior over the other. For Fanon, the black man should no longer be faced with the dilemma “whiten or perish,” but must be aware of his existential position, and if society makes it difficult for him because of the colour of his skin, he has to choose action (or passivity). As a result, Fanon is preoccupied with the question of how to end suffering and the emergence of a “new man” who is fully human is his concern.

The body, of course, is important to Fanon’s thesis. When Sartre in “Black Orpheus” critiqued Negritude where Césaire advanced the notion that the idea of the “barbaric Negro” is a European invention that Negritude has to overthrow, Fanon felt insulted because Sartre reminds him that his blackness is just but a minor term: “Jean-Paul Sartre had forgotten that the Negro suffers in his body quite differentially from the white man. Between the white man and me the connexion was irrevocably that of transcendence.”⁴⁰ However, whilst colonization apologists claim that it sought to civilize, it instead decivilizes and degrades the colonized.⁴¹ But colonization also dehumanizes the colonizer, “who in order to ease his conscience gets into the habit of seeing the other man as an animal, accustoms himself to treating him like an animal and tends objectively to transform himself into an animal.”⁴²

The black body was intrinsically connected to social science, knowledge production and capital accumulation. The view on black bodies enabled by racism extended the space in which capital accumulation, growth of productive forces, and massive generation and redeployment of surplus value could take place. Goldberg writes of the human body:

It is directly experienced; its deficiencies are immediately felt; and it’s the receptacle of pleasures and pains, desires and needs. The bodies of others are observable, confronted and engaged. In other words, the body is central to ordinary experience. It offers a unique paradigm: it is a symbol of a ‘bounded system’ whose parts and functions are related in a complex

structure, and whose substance is confined by boundaries and limits that are fragile, vulnerable and threatened. By extension, the body may be found to stand for the body politic, to symbolise society.⁴³

Under these circumstances, the human body is classified, ordered, valorized and devalued. Because of their difference, blacks are forced to labour, alienated from their labour product, disenfranchised or restricted in their right to social entry and mobility. Concern with purity, impurity, disease, cleanliness, acceptability, inclusion and exclusion are all central to this racist imagination. The “Other” and their being are thus denied personhood, and are excluded from social benefits and social wages.

The colonial encounter itself is brutal. It uses terror which facilitates establishment of hegemony; terror which is not only a physiological act but also a social fact and a cultural construction, which serves as a mediator for colonial hegemony. It leads to cultures of terror whose violence is based on and nourished by silence, thus a cultural construction of evil.⁴⁴ In Azania, for example, Cecil John Rhodes is an important character in laying the foundation on the construction of blackness and the violence meted against it. As prime minister in Cape colony in 1890, he introduced the Strop Bill, which permitted lashes to be inflicted on black servants for most trivial offences. The black, regarded in beastly terms, would then be immune to bodily pain or would endure it nonchalantly like a beast. The *sjambok* has ever since become synonymous with violence and brutality against the black body. This is the heart of all the inhumanity ever done to blacks. All these point towards suffering. Suffering is a social experience.⁴⁵ Suffering is when individuals and groups undergo and bear certain burdens, troubles and serious wounds to the body and spirit. It is characterized by human conditions like chronic illness and death, experience of deprivation, exploitation, degradation, oppression and survivorship. Social suffering results from what political, economic and institutions of power do to people.⁴⁶ Racism, itself one of the many forms of oppression, is sustained by an ancient moral concept—the dualism of good and evil.⁴⁷ Oppressors justify their actions by a belief they have more of a moral worth than those they oppress. The violence meted out to the racialized “Other” wasn’t surprising: for more than a millennium the history of Europe is fraught with fratricidal warfare and its celebration, no wonder the indiscriminate violence, cruelty and brutality witnessed at the onset of the European contact with the rest of the non-Western societies.⁴⁸ In any way oppression causes suffering and threatens human survival; it requires

creation and maintenance of violence and mechanisms to keep people oppressed including murder and torture, psychological and economic deprivation and imprisonment. Relative deprivation reduces the economic well-being of the oppressed and restricts their means to self-fulfilment. For that reason, suffering is wrong, and its wrongness is derived from our reactions to pain and “pain is something we would rather do without.”⁴⁹ In a country where blackness has always been associated with poverty, “to be a poor man is hard, but to be a poor race in a land of dollars [Rands] is the very bottom of hardships.”⁵⁰ Blacks have experienced collective suffering, and there continues to be a market for suffering and commodification of victim-hood.⁵¹ Mortality and morbidity continue to characterize blackness: poverty, disease, hunger, malnutrition and other social malaise. These are all historical constructions. However, Kleinman and Kleinman caution against privileging suffering; it can indeed inform resistance and response through grief, rage, humiliation but also endurance, aspiration, humour, irony.⁵² Importantly, suffering can be a major cause for mobilization and agential combativeness of those subjected to it.

BLACKNESS AS LABOUR

Imperialism and invention of race were fundamental aspects of Western industrial modernity.⁵³ Slavery and colonialism associated black bodies with labour, and popular attitudes saw this in symbiotic relationship.⁵⁴ The value of black labour in South Africa and elsewhere made the economic foundation of the so-called Negro problem, and the role of forced labour reinforced black inferiority. The role of forced labour (*corvee* in French colonies), *isibalo* in Azania or *chibharo* in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), whose semantic meaning has connotations of rape, is important in this analysis. Since labour is fundamentally degrading, it had to be the burden for inferior people; the white man became a symbol of capital and the black subject that of labour.⁵⁵ Colonial contact, which is marked by “forced labour, intimidation, pressure, the police, taxation, theft, rape, compulsory crops, contempt, mistrust, arrogance, self-complacency, swinishness, brainless elites, degraded masses,” means no human contact at all, but alienation.⁵⁶ Alienation included a social distance from themselves and their fellow human beings, and regarding themselves as commodities and being regarded by the colonizers as “pure” labour.⁵⁷ These are relations of domination and submission, which turn the colonizing man into a “classroom monitor, an army sergeant, a prison guard, a slave driver and

the indigenous man into an instrument of production.”⁵⁸ So colonization is akin to “thingification.”⁵⁹ When the British conquered Azania, they imposed a capitalist system, grabbed the land, cattle and stock and turned natives into reserves, others into farm labour and labour in capital investments in commerce and industry.⁶⁰ In the formative colonial years, Anne McClintock narrates this genesis: in Natal, the British (numbering in ratio, 1:25) pondered how to force the Zulu from their lands and compel them to wage labour against their will. It is from this riddle that the degenerate “idleness” of blacks arose, which, “of all the stigmata of degeneration invented by the settlers to mark themselves from Africans was idleness: the same stigma of racial unworth that Haggard saw as marking the Kukuana’s degeneration and loss of title to the diamonds.”⁶¹ In fact, almost all travel accounts, memoirs and ethnographic documents indicated the “sloth, idleness, indolence or torpor of natives, who the colonists claimed, preferred scheming and fighting, lazing and wanton lasciviousness to industry.”⁶² The partnership between the British and the Dutch meant a joint exploitation of blacks. The black person ceased to be just a person who is black but became a vital tool in a hoarding and acquisition race associated with colonial capitalism.⁶³ While white settlers had exterminated indigenous people in Australasia and elsewhere, the contradiction is that in South Africa, black labour was indispensable, and that no white person could do without a black servant.⁶⁴

The idea of Englishness and Anglo-Saxon racial purity became entrenched with the advent of settler colonialism and imperialism. Cecil John Rhodes’ ideas and activities are crucial in understanding the type of state that evolved after 1910. Young African men would be compelled to labour to enable them to pay tax. Rhodes said:

By the gentle stimulant of the labour tax to remove from them the life of sloth and laziness; you will thus teach them the dignity of labour ... It must be brought home to them that in the future nine—tenth of them will have to spend their lives in daily labour—in physical work, in manual labour ... my idea is that natives should be kept in these native reserves and not mixed with white men at all.⁶⁵

In the aftermath of armed conquest, there was complete destruction of economic and social structures of African society, tied with racial discrimination and contempt of Africans who were treated as chattel and forced to labour for low wages.⁶⁶ White civilization, according to Kadalie, a popular

leader in the 1920s, is built on the assumption of the natives forming, to “all eternity,” a huge labouring class, satisfied to live like an animal and with little opportunities for education or advancement, and of the white men forming the aristocracy of the country, wielding all legislative power in their hands and doing nothing but skilled work, of which the natives were assumed to be incapable.⁶⁷ The economic policy was to squeeze as much labour as possible at little expense.⁶⁸ Pauperization of Africans, destruction of their society, confinement to labour reserves meant social death, and it was necessary that the African people be nothing except a labour force that could be bought for next to nothing.⁶⁹ The African is reduced to an object, classified as “idle,” “undesirable,” “detrimental to maintenance of peace and order” and as a servant to the white man; his labour is canalized and is largely reduced to the level of a commodity.⁷⁰ There are also occupational hazards, especially in mines. Black workers continue to face hazard, disease and death in South African mines. History does continue.

It is difficult to separate the worker and the black. Biko observes, “The term Black worker is a bit misleading because I think 90 % of Blacks are workers. When you are talking about blacks you are talking about workers.”⁷¹ For Marxists and Charterists, black suffering was predicated on economic exploitation, and not on anti-blackness.⁷² Following Orlando Patterson’s work, mere exploitation and alienation are not essential to suffering; blackness and African-ness are constituent to slavery and racism. The black man is a victim because he is a black, and since he is oppressed within the confines of his race and because of it, he must first become conscious of his race.⁷³ However, Magubane’s Marxist inspired position is that Africans weren’t enslaved because they were black but because they could provide labour, although racism derived directly from the lucrative slave trade.

BLACKNESS AS AGENCY

The question of race and racism has been central in the fight for liberation. As indicated in the last chapters, there has always been a heavy presence of Black Nationalist ideas in the country, a la Pan-Africanism of du Bois, Henry Sylvester Williams, Marcus Garvey, among others. Even in ANC, Black Nationalism has always been part of the movement. For example, Z.R. Mahabane departs from his ANC colleagues, as seen in these words:

For reasons of self-preservation, self-protection and self-aggrandisement, the white man has elected to treat the Bantu peoples of Africa as an “inferior”, or as Earl Buxton, in his presidential address at the annual meeting of the African Society in London on the 15th of March last year, described our people as the “child races” of the empire. They have carried this to a logical conclusion by denying us the right, privileges and responsibilities of manhood. And thus as children we have no voice in the affairs of the country.⁷⁴

Mahabane further added that according to “Bantu” custom, only males who haven’t undergone the ritual of circumcision are called “amankwenkwe” or “maqai” and therefore treated as youth no matter their age. The black man in South Africa was treated in the same manner: “He is a political child, a political *nkwenkwe* or *maqai* ... the poor black man is consequently reduced to a position of utter voicelessness and votelessness, defencelessness, homelessness, landlessness, a condition of deepest humiliation and absolute dependency.” Mahabane ended the speech by calling for a “full and free cooperation of the white and black races of the land and all classes and conditions of men.”

Clements Kadalie observed that white civilization in Africa was built on the assumption that the black man is inherently inferior to the white man, and that this alleged inferiority gave the white man the right to exploit the black economically and oppress him politically and socially.⁷⁵

Pixley ka Isaka Seme was one of the many with different opinions in the Congress. He used to passionately talk of the need for “Race Pride” and decried the detribalized educated African who gets detached from his uneducated tribal kin. “Race Pride” was necessary in the country, as it was for the US blacks where even the coloured ones regard themselves as Negroes.⁷⁶

In the 1930s, racial consciousness was growing, as expressed in articles written at the time, like this 1935 editorial:

The hour of African freedom has struck. That for which Toussaint L’Overture suffered and died, that for which Menelik, Shaka, Makana, Lewanika, Lobengula, Langa libalele and other great sons of Africa, lived, suffered and died for (this would be repeated by later generations immediately starting with Lembede). The complete liberty of Africans to shape their own destiny in their own way, has come ... the dreams and prophecies of Marcus Garvey, the solidarity of Africans throughout the world is becoming a fact. And but for a few TRAITORS, Africans had reached the land of Promise—liberty, equality, opportunity and justice.⁷⁷

The editorial urged Africans to free themselves from “manifestations of inferiority complex,” which debarred them from unity and solidarity; that the African Liberator taught them self-reliance and self-help. Progress could not be realized if Africans ape Europeans who,

Tell us that they represent the best in the race, for any ordinarily trained monkey would do the same. The slave mentality still holds our people in chains and they firmly believe that they can only exist through the good graces of their ‘masters.’ Before doing anything worthwhile, they must have the stamp of approval from some Europeans, otherwise they have no confidence in their work, thoughts and ideas. It is this spirit of ‘defeatism and boyishness’ secured as ‘good servants’ rather than as independents, which makes our men who represent their coats, suffer from lack of initiative, inferiority complexed, lying, backbiting, envious, backstairs -creepers and abject cringers’ fight to death any and all independent ideas and actions calculated to uplift Africans without consulting the ‘good master.

Anticipating the PAC and BCM decades later the same editorial accused these blacks of being “good boys” who are “spineless creatures” who live by deceit but “will not forever remain deceiving Africans and therefore cannot permanently impede African progress towards unity, liberty, justice and freedom.” At the same time there was a call to a “Buy Black Campaign” as “our reply to war, oppressive legislation, discrimination, injustice, pauperisation, unemployment and oppression.” Therefore, “all African money must circulate through African friends” coupled with economic boycott against unjust and tyrannical employers, persistent struggle for more wages and shorter working conditions. DDT Jabavu also urged a patriotic spirit of African Nationalism by supporting “our own traders.”⁷⁸ For him, nationalism of Race-Pride is steeped in business and commerce, trades Africans should venture into. He makes reference to the US “Negroes,” where they say “keep your money within the colour.”

At the same time, a litany of discriminatory legislation from the 1930s was passed: Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 amended in 1937, Native Laws Amendment Act 1937, Industrial Conciliation Act 1937, Master and Servant Act, Native Labour Registration Act, 1913, redefined in 1942, the Factories Act 1941, the Gestapo Act (Unlawful Organisations Act) meant to silent opponents of apartheid, the Ghetto Act (Group Areas Act) meant to create overcrowded ghettos for Africans, Indians and coloureds where “ghetto life will make it impossible for the Non-European to make

any economic progress whatsoever. Severe unemployment and disgraceful slums will be the order of the day.”⁷⁹ Pamphlets and political speeches of the day cajoled Africans with phrases like “Tsoga MaAfrica!” (Wake up African!) The effects of discrimination, which coloureds and Indians also felt, spurred a need for a non-white unity. There was a common awareness among all non-whites that they had a common enemy, the white oppressor.⁸⁰ Since the legal mechanism was integral to the racist machination, protest has always also been directed at these. Schemes deployed by racist legal mechanisms made the life of a non-European⁸¹ very cheap; count not as people but assets and therefore the unity of all oppressed groups, Africans, coloureds and Indians, was indispensable.⁸² I discuss this later, as concerns the BCM.

For the PAC, mental revolution was central to liberation. Sobukwe and the PAC sought to exorcise the African from slave mentality and teach the people of their “African personality.” The concept apparently has a long history, beginning with early Pan-Africanists like Mojola Agbebi, Holy Johnson and Edward Wilmot Blyden who used the term at a lecture on the Young Men’s Literary Association of Sierra Leone on 27 May 1893.⁸³ The term then never meant quite the same thing as it did to later African Nationalists with who it has been associated.⁸⁴ Initially, it had cultural connotations. African customs and institutions, not offensive to humanity, should be adopted rather than abandoned, as majority of educated Africans tended to do. For Blyden, African personality meant that Africans must preserve the purity of the Negro race and its characteristics. He expressed the view that Africans weren’t biologically inferior to other races, as achievements of numerous Africans attest. He saw an African with a willingness and joy “to endure hardship, habit of thrift, and self-denial, self-control and physical strength,” which enabled him to be self-reliant and self-governing, live long, have the urge for power and force of association with others to cooperate communally, is very religious, has moral fibre to resist evil and has a high standard of sexual morality.⁸⁵ It was these virtues Johnson wished to see preserved. Johnson also emphasized the physiognomy of the African. He led an anti-liquor crusade, after seeing the effects of liquor on Africans. Gin bartered in West Africa in the nineteenth century was “especially a vile concoction which neither the manufacturers nor European sojourners would taste.”⁸⁶ In contrast, African beer had no deleterious effects, never intoxicating, no matter the quantity taken, and didn’t cause chaos in society. He also considered that the white man and his civilization undermined the African personality “at a time when

extremely Anglicised Africans were contending that not only Africans must be ashamed of their past and culture but they must be ashamed of their colour as well.”⁸⁷ For Nkrumah, African personality is a political philosophy that exorcises from Africa all forms of neo-colonialism and imperialism. For others like Senghor, it’s mainly psychological and emotional, discerned in abstract philosophy, songs and poetry. The Azanian Africanists argued that man is a social being, not an economic animal. Thus, he must recognize the primacy of the material and spiritual interests of his fellow humans and must not uphold his own interests at the expense of a fellow man and “it is only from this set-up that the human personality can be developed and that respect for it can be developed.”⁸⁸ The year 1958 was declared a “Status Year,” a battle for political, economic and social status. The PAC announced “A Status Campaign” whose first stage targeted businesses and whites who addressed Africans as “native,” “kafir,” “boy,” “girl,” “Jane,” or “John.” They asserted: “we will no longer have “Jack,” “George,” “Nancy” etc. as handy labels to be attached to any black man or woman by any white man or white woman, white boy or white girl.”⁸⁹ It called for boycott of all those shops, European or African, that didn’t comply, and ended by declaring: “Ma-Afrika is the meaning of our struggle! Mayibuye!”

The Unity Movement regarded Herrenvolk ideology as infused into white people from childhood, by school, church and state: “from cradle to grave, every phase of life is consciously regulated and moulded in order to preserve and perpetuate the division of the people of South Africa in to the European—the Herrenvolk and the Non-European—the slave, divinely ordained to minister to all his needs.”⁹⁰ Racial superiority is then infused into every aspect of life in South Africa that “it has reached the very vitals, and no single phase of public or private life remains untainted by it” including liberals in the Labour Party and Trade Unions. The Unity Movement provided similarities with Nazi Germany, where while the “Jew had to distinguish himself as an outcast by wearing a yellow patch, in South Africa a brown or black face makes the patch unnecessary.”

Africans were associated with a badge of slavery, the *dom pass*, which “is extended from the African male dog to the African female bitch”⁹¹ and a main symbol of domination. Passes for the African woman, who, in the eyes of the white man, “are potential prostitute, an undesirable element—not a woman, mind you, or a mother ... she is not a woman, just as her husband is not a man. If the dog, the man, carries a dog—collar in the form of a reference book, why not the bitch?”⁹² In fact, the myth of racial

superiority was encapsulated in the *dompas*, so the fight against the pass involved reversing the mentality that the African was synonymous with the pass: “In fact an African does not feel himself if he doesn’t feel the weight of the *dompas* in his pocket.”⁹³ In the postapartheid, the pass has assumed a new social life. It is a basis for exclusion and inclusion in the new nation, a factor in police harassment and profiling of darker blacks who are suspected to be immigrants. In short, it contains the philosophical and racial trappings of apartheid.

Agency involves resistance to colonialism, colonialist ideologies and other colonial legacies.⁹⁴ Identity is both an affirmation and negation. Black becomes relevant to an African when he comes to contradiction with whiteness and is sharpened by continued white domination. In this regard, black or African identity becomes a weapon for emancipation.⁹⁵ For Rodney, African revolution shows that what once was a badge of servility becomes a bond of unity and a liberation tool. Garvey had contended that the black man was universally oppressed on racial grounds, so any programme of emancipation must be organized around race first, and race became a political entity.⁹⁶ Garvey was displeased by black people who didn’t think in racial terms, the “Uncle Tom Negroes,” “a yes boss negro,” “a hoardi massa Negro,” “a yes massa Charlie Negro.”⁹⁷

Blackness as agency has been a response and a reaction. Interpellation for me is an integral part of that reaction. Language is a terrain of power and domination, compounded by hierarchical relations, which also have an influence on speech.⁹⁸ Apparently, writing from a Marxist influenced position, Magubane argues that all relations including economic are expressed or have to be expressed in thought and “all economic relations have an ideological dimension, and issues of language and meaning aren’t simply ephemeral or secondary.”⁹⁹ By mid-nineteenth century, both the British and Afrikaners referred to blacks as *kaffirs*, although the term native seems to have been used interchangeably with *kaffir*.¹⁰⁰ The words “Bantu” and “Bantu race” were also used in this period. The Bantu is defined by linguistic criteria and by use of the root “ntu” for human being.¹⁰¹ They are divided into ethnic units, with social organization and religious system resembling each other, and phenotypical characteristics ranging from black to yellowish-brown, but the prevalent colour is chocolate brown and the hair is woolly and short.¹⁰² In South Africa, the Bantu are AmaXhosa, AmaThembu, AmaMpondo, AmaMpondomisi, AmaZulu, AmaSwazi, Bathonga, BaSotho and BaTswana.¹⁰³ Pheko argues that Bantu is a modern application, which originated when Dr. Bleek,

a scholar of Azanian languages, used it as a comprehensive term for all dialects of the inhabitants of Southern Africa.¹⁰⁴ Just like native, “Bantu” was used by both colonial rulers and Africans themselves, the former as racial naming, the latter as self-identification and self-referential. Editorials and articles in J.T. Jabavu’s *Imvo Zabantsundu* refer to Africans as natives and the “Aboriginal population.” Even early organized African movement had the word in them—South African Native Congress (formed in 1903), South African National Native Congress (later the ANC). However, the *South African Spectator* (29 June 1901) favoured the word black because it “applies to some millions of people who count among them some of the best men the world ever produced.” Apparently, it is tendentious by both colonists and early African activists to see humanity as races, probably because of the influence of polygenism.

At the AAC conference in 1936, one delegate was dissatisfied with calling Africans “non-European,” when according to him they formed the indigenous population of the African continent. He urged the convention to use the term “non-Africans” to refer to all Europeans as distinct from Africans because here they lived in Africa and not Europe where the term “non-European” was used, which was conceivable and tolerable to strangers to Europe. This “sign of an awakening of race-consciousness may well be discussed next year in December,” quipped the chairperson.

The Africanists insisted that black people were Africans, not Bantu, as the government was inclined to use, and they promoted this interpellation as part of psychological liberation:

there are some people who believe that nothing is better unless it is brought about by a white man. These people will be slaves for good. You are Africans. You are not Bantu.¹⁰⁵

At the same meeting, S.T. Ngendane added, “You should be proud of being an African. This word Bantu means everybody. We are not non-European. We are not Natives. We are Africans.” Leading Africanists like Sobukwe also asked, “How long shall we be called Bantu, Native, and Non-European, non-white or black stinking kaffir in our fatherland? When shall we be called sir, Mr., Mrs., Miss, ladies and gentlemen? And continue to live in squalor in townships and ‘emaplangeni’ (houses made of planks), starving, without rights, vote or voice.”¹⁰⁶ He reiterated that their energies be directed against a myth that went by racial superiority: Herrenvolkism, white leadership or white supremacy. For Magubane, the

words “native” and “kaffir” are the most demeaning in the vocabulary of colonialism, and at one time “native” meant one born in bondage.¹⁰⁷

In mid-1960s, coloureds were being urged to join the Africanists. According to Barney Desai, formerly of the Coloured Peoples’ Congress, since the Khoi-Khoi (Hottentots) and Batwa (Bushmen) tribes are forebears of the Cape’s coloured people, coloureds should recognize themselves as Africans.¹⁰⁸ He also called on Indians and coloureds numbering 2.5 million “enslaved people” to join the PAC and “for all time bury their racial tags.” All those who would continue with sectional and racist activity would be regarded as “enemies and traitors to the cause of our liberation.”

In the New World, the term Negro, which is borrowed from Hispanic languages, comes from human complexion.¹⁰⁹ To justify the view that whites had a right to live off the labour of darker people, science, religion, government and industry were mobilized and the word “Negro” was used for the first time in world’s history to tie colour to race and blackness to slavery and degradation.¹¹⁰ While the colonists referred to Indians as savages (reflecting their view of Indians as uncivilized) or pagans (which explicitly had a missionary urge), the colonists referred to Africans as Negroes and by eighteenth century to blacks and Africans, “but almost never to Negro heathens or pagans or savages.”¹¹¹ For themselves, the English used Christian, then English, and free, after 1680. Taking the colonies as a whole, they used the term white, showing gradual mutation of the religious element to a secular nationality. Laws prohibiting miscegenation in the seventeenth century and migration of non-English Europeans spurred the use of “white” and “English,” while a dark complexion became an independent rationale for enslavement. In the USA, there were problems caused by mulatto children. Since they had a taint of Negro blood, they were seen as Negroes, with the Virginia Assembly in 1705 defining a mulatto as “the child, grand child or great grandchild of a Negro.”¹¹² In South Africa, in contrast, offspring of mixed blood were and are referred to as “coloureds.” In the black America of the 1960s, there was a growing resentment of the word Negro because the term is an invention of the oppressor.¹¹³ In the early 1960s, there was no agreement on the use of the word “Negro,” some preferring “Afro-Americans,” “Aframericans,” “Africans Abroad,” “Persons of African Descent,” “Asiatics” or “Black people.”¹¹⁴ The Abyssinian movement in Chicago in the 1920s, a semi-religious and nationalistic group, referred to themselves as Ethiopians and not Negroes, and didn’t want to be associated with the inferior connotations of the term. In 1959, the New York-based

neo-Garveyite Carlos A. Cooks, founder of African Nationalist Pioneer Movement, called for a complete abrogation of the word Negro, because it is closely connected to “nigger,” which is derogatory, vulgar and offensive; it defines no man, land of origin or heritage, and therefore “we demand to be called, when dealing with colour, Black men and women and when dealing with race, land and heritage, Africans.”¹¹⁵ The movement said anyone who fits into the following categories is a Negro: caste-men—coloured people; integrationist Negroes; hand-picked house niggers; would-be black; people not organized; brainwashed Negroes; Uncle Tom niggers; handkerchief head Negroes; conked head Negroes; other people niggers—stool pigeons. The creation of the Negro, a beast of burden only fit for slavery, was closely associated with economic, technical and financial requirements of Western development from the sixteenth century onwards. As an ideological construct, it suggested no situatedness in time, history, space or ethno-politico-geography, civilization, culture, religion and finally “no humanity which might command consideration.”¹¹⁶ Many blacks began to call themselves African-American, Afro-Americans or black because “that is the image of ourselves.”¹¹⁷ The argument is that the black community has to have a positive image of itself, which it creates, meaning “we will no longer call ourselves lazy, apathetic, dumb, good-timers, shiftless etc.” because these are the words used by white America to describe blacks.¹¹⁸ If blacks accept this, then they will see themselves in a negative way, precisely the way white America “wants us to see ourselves.”¹¹⁹ Upon this realization, “we shall view ourselves as African-American and as black people who are in fact energetic, determined, intelligent, beautiful and peace-loving.”¹²⁰ Having defined themselves as black, they regard each other as brother/sister, “soul-brother” and “soul sister” and it shows a growing sense of community; that blacks have a common bond not only among themselves but with their African brethren. Contemporary black youths have appropriated the historically racially offensive “nigger,” enunciated “nigga” as a self-referential term of endearment. This appropriation has happened in black American ghettos, and is an expression of street life and has been popularized by rap music where the term has been effectively recoded in its social meaning, whereas in the public discourse it is taboo.¹²¹ When used in black vernacular culture, the reversal of meaning makes the term function as a source of pride rather than denigration besides being a term of defiance. The transnational commodification and global appeal of hip-hop culture has enabled the introduction of “nigga” into a global context. Azanian black youth use it among themselves indiscriminately.

The word “darkie” is mentioned in the writings of du Bois and it corresponded with the religious doctrine.¹²² It also frequently features in speeches of early black American leaders from the eighteenth century. Malcolm X recounts that when he was growing up, white kids called them “nigger,” “darkie” and “Rastus.”¹²³ “Darkie” is a common parlance among Azanian BC-oriented youth. It might have been inserted into the local linguistic repertoire from historical encounters with black Americans. It is also sometimes translated into vernacular, *manyamane*, a reference to blackness, “in and out.”¹²⁴ There is also frequent emphasis of the phrase “Tsoga Darkie,” an extension of the old Africanist, “Tsoga MoAfrika.”

In the French colonies and among French colonized, the struggle against alienation gave birth to Negritude “because Antilleans were ashamed of being Negroes, they searched for all sorts of euphemisms for Negro: they would say a man of colour, a dark complexioned man, and other idiocies like that.”¹²⁵ So they adopted the word *negre* as a term for defiance, “to some extent it was a reaction of enraged youth. Since there was shame about the word *negre*, we chose the word *negre*.” Asked whether the concept Negritude was formed on the basis of shared ideological and political beliefs, Césaire says it was a matter of feeling, “you either felt black or did not feel black. Secondly there was the political aspect—Negritude was part of the left and liberation placed us on the left, but both of us (Senghor and him) refused to see the black question as simply a social question.” Although some people think the black question will disappear with change in economic conditions, Césaire believes that although the economic question is important, it isn’t the only thing, because blacks were doubly proletarianized and alienated—as workers and also as black. Depestre quips: “Certainly, because the relationship between consciousness and reality are extremely complex. That’s why it is equally necessary to decolonise our minds, our inner life at the same time that we decolonise society.”

The inception of the BCM in the late 1960s and early 1970s saw a redefinition of the meaning of blackness. The term black emerged from mass struggles against racism; therefore, it assumed its own self-identity.¹²⁶ Of course, there were problems of Indians and coloureds identifying themselves as black, which served as a political category more than a racial one. Writing of coloureds, Alexander says they were in a sense *amper baas*, almost white, not quite non-white; any threat to downgrade them to status of African peasant would be met with stiff resistance.¹²⁷ This ambivalence made them realize that their destiny lay with the rest of the oppressed—the

Africans and Indians. In the postapartheid, there are debates in the BC youth on this matter, given that the Chinese successfully lobbied in the courts to be considered black, ostensibly on economic imperative (they will be eligible for BEE deals). Discussions fluctuate between “symbolic” blackness and the culturally and racially defined blackness. Others reckon that in the Indian community, for example, whiteness is central in determining privilege; darker skinned Indians are the poorest, and the closer one is to whiteness, the better off one is likely to be. This opinion states that whiteness thrives on skin colour. The issue of coloureds reflects a divide and rule tactic, the light skinned versus the dark skinned. All the same, coloureds suffer from violent rejection of whiteness and should be seen as “just another tribe within blackness.”¹²⁸ Coming back to the fictive kinship of black Africans, Indians and coloureds, similar developments were happening in the UK. Immigrants and descendants of immigrants of many nationalities from the Caribbean, East Africa and the Asian subcontinent (Pakistan, Bangladesh and India) called themselves black, a racial category, which Sivanandan characterizes as a “political colour” of the oppressed.¹²⁹ The reasoning was that although they had different skin colour, the social and political system victimized them regardless. Despite that they came from different geographical areas, this formed the basis for unity. Since they looked the same, they had to identify themselves as black, and “anti-racism in the 1970s was only fought and only resisted in the community, in the localities, behind the slogan of a Black politics and Black experience.”¹³⁰ Black identity in Britain became a matter of cultural politics and was important in the anti-racist struggles.¹³¹ Since the early 1980s, initiatives at building a pan-black identity and the transition from black, like in postapartheid South Africa, among British oppressed have been stalled because of ethnic particularisms and internal cultural segmentation.¹³² There is also a splintering of socio-economic experience among and between these groups. This has led to erection of boundaries and oppositions between both Britain’s and South African, African, Caribbean, Asian and coloured communities. In Britain, these are called “frontlines,” which suggest not only a move towards fragmentation but also mutual competition and antagonism.¹³³ Currently, all these groups have been partitioned as objects of opposed and irreconcilable versions of cultural differences, something similar to “difference-as-colour versus difference-as-culture.”¹³⁴ The fragmentation of black as a political and discursive category means a retreat to naturalized and essentialized marginal identities, which privilege notions of racial and ethnicity authenticity and belonging over historical and social processes.¹³⁵

Because of this breakdown, the question is: is this a question of trying to build resistance based on the “illusion” of “political colour”; is ethnic particularism a more historic if not more “relative” identity bound to outlast an invented tradition of blackness; or is it because of subversion for opportunism by ethnic leaders?¹³⁶ The term black, although lingering in political circles and campaigns, has been dropped, including in the academy where a neo-anthropological reference to ethnicity, cultural difference and marginality is fashionable.¹³⁷ These shifts have implications for theorization of race and ethnicity in Britain.¹³⁸

In Jamaica, 98 % of population in the 1950s was either black or coloured.¹³⁹ At that time, Hall never heard anybody call themselves black, although there were inferences to shades of colour. He asks why, despite huge presence of blacks,: “Black is not a matter of pigmentation. The Black I am talking about is a historical category. In our language, at certain historical moments, we have to use the signifier. We have to create equivalence between how people look and what their histories are. Their histories are in the past, inscribed in their skins. But it is not because of their skins that they are black in their heads.”¹⁴⁰ Hall testifies that he heard black for the first time in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement, decolonization and nationalist struggles. Black was created as a political category in a certain historical moment, as a result of certain symbolic and ideological struggles. The reasoning was that for centuries, symbolically black was a negative term, so the feeling was “I want that term, that negative one, that’s the one I want. I want a piece of that action. I want to take it of the way in which it has been articulated in religious discourse, in ethnographic discourse, in literary discourse, in visual discourse—I want to pluck it out of its articulation and rearticulate it in a new way.”¹⁴¹ During the process, there is a change of consciousness, self-recognition and there is a new process of identification and the “emergence into visibility of a new subject: a subject that was always there, but emerging, historically.”¹⁴² In Jamaica, in the 1970s, black people recognized themselves as black. This was a profound cultural revolution in the Caribbean, greater than any political revolution, Hall avers.

Biko notes that the term black originates from various areas where dark-skinned people were regarded as inferior: socially, intellectually and otherwise.¹⁴³ It became popularized in the USA, through the Black Power movement, adopted as a way to inculcate a sense of pride in black people.¹⁴⁴ There is a political and descriptive concept of black, which relates to blacks who are politically, psychologically and socially oppressed and who

also identify as a unit in the struggle towards realization of their aspirations. The descriptive definition is one that is based on external observations, mainly phenotypical.

According to Biko, putting the term black in its right context is a “re-christening,” and “we are merely refusing to be regarded as non-persons and claim the right to be called positively”:

Adopting a collective, positive outlook leads to the creation of the broader base which may be useful in time. It helps to recognise the fact that blacks have one common enemy and defines their aspirations in fairly uniform terms. The entrenched division in the country made blacks not to work as a unit and the unity of the oppressed groups is to form a black umbrella. The BCM defined Black as those legally, politically, economically and socially discriminated against as a group.¹⁴⁵

Biko exhorted them:

By all means be proud of your Indian heritage or your African culture but make sure that in looking around for somebody to kick at, choose a fellow who is sitting on your neck. He may not be as easily accessible as your black brother but he is the source of your discomfort.¹⁴⁶

Blacks realized that the cause of their suffering is their black skin, and relatedly their poverty. The harsh experience of black people is precipitated by their blackness and it inhibited realization of a full humanity. The drive was to make black masses aware of their “value as God created human beings—not just ‘black things’ but black people.”¹⁴⁷ Blacks had to rid themselves of all negative connotations associated with blackness, that is, sinful, inferior, gloomy and unattractive, and build up a consciousness of pride and dignity. The urgent task was to liberate blacks from psychological oppression, inferiority complex and physical oppression as a result of living in a white racist society.¹⁴⁸ BC sought to produce “real black people” who don’t regard themselves as appendages of the system, but could hold their heads high in defiance and are not willing to surrender.¹⁴⁹ The term black wasn’t necessarily all inclusive, that is, the fact that all were not white didn’t mean all are black; non-whites existed including those working the machinery of oppression, those with aspirations to whiteness but inhibited by their pigmentation, those who don’t identify with the black struggle and its attainment of total goals and those who call a white man

“baas” are non-white and don’t qualify to be called black.¹⁵⁰ BC believed that anyone who is not white is black, but “those people whose soul is an appendage of Wonderbloom, Lower Houghton, Berea or Brighton Beach are black skinned white souled lost brothers. These have sold their black souls for the ‘meagre dubious returns of baaskap.’”¹⁵¹

Negation and nothingness had defined black subjectivity. Non-white means their basic constitution lies in the notion of non-being, so these definitions were degrading and denigrating and blacks complied with them.¹⁵² The acceptance of an inferior category is a result of historical imbibing of the value system meant to deprive blacks of their being. The oppression and subhuman condition is because “we are not white ... we have never denied that we are NOT white, but we have always (at least some of us) denied that we are non-whites.”¹⁵³ The Rand Daily Mail became the first paper to switch from using the word “non-white” to “black” in 1972,¹⁵⁴ a move followed by several publications of the liberal Institute of Race Relations. The Mail, in its editorial of 15 July, stated that while it accepted the term black, it “dissociated itself from Black Power racialism.” The Institute noted, though, that not all coloureds and Asians and even Africans wished to be referred to as black, but the consensus opinion appeared to be that this term was preferable to non-white. By 1974, the Afrikaans press and the NP had abandoned “Bantu” in favour of “black,” as seen in apartheid state’s statutes.¹⁵⁵ In the 1980s, the contestation between BC and multiracial movements brought the meaning of black back into contention. The NACTU congress of 6–7 August 1988 replaced the term black in its constitution with “African,” the reason being that black was associated with BC and therefore racist because of its exclusion of whites. However, de-emphasizing black has the same compromising effect as the use of non-white and non-European.¹⁵⁶ Apparently, “non-white,” considered offensive by BCM, has been intermittently creeping back into popular usage and discourse in the postapartheid era.

IS POSTAPARTHEID A POST RACIAL SOCIETY?

Contemporary patterns of racial formation pit non-racialism against racial consciousness.¹⁵⁷ Race is central to imperialist relations and in the contestation with the African Nationalist agenda.¹⁵⁸ The fundamental issue to be confronted in any explanation of the Black Condition has and will always be race because it was the core of humiliation and indignities.¹⁵⁹ Coopan questions the triumph of hybrid identities over particularisms of

race and ethnicity, class and gender, nationalism and nation, taking into account contemporary world events where continued legacies of racialized inequalities and ethnic and racial identification persist.¹⁶⁰ These particularisms are far from disappearing, since the formerly colonized parts of the world remain bound by constructs of race, nation and class. Coopan is sceptical on the end of racialism and the ensuing of hybridity in the form of the rainbow nation in the postapartheid.¹⁶¹ Under the ethos of rainbowism, race and racism recede to the background, become subterranean or like a snake with its head in the grass makes sibilant hisses, raising it occasionally to strike. In that event, some are taken by surprise or dismiss it as isolated incidents. In the meanwhile, the snake reclines its head down and strikes again; the same response is elucidated, and the pattern goes on. Race and racism also become like a chameleon, changing colours to suit its purposes and environment.¹⁶² Those of us who have witnessed a chameleon change its colours would testify to a pleasurable sight that keeps one engaged and diverted. As the colours change, we are struck with wonder and amazement, but still the creature has neither ceased to be a chameleon nor lost its capability to elongate its long poisonous tongue and strike its prey. Here, I am stressing the extent to which race and racism are denied in the postapartheid. The resultant effects of race denialism are sixfold: race and racism have become invisible; discussion on racism and inequality disappears from the research agenda and debate; to speak of race in the postapartheid is now tantamount to evoking old apartheid classifications,¹⁶³ implying it becomes criminal to talk of racism; race and racism becomes a taboo subject, and those who talk of it are seen to be committing a sacrilegious act, are vilified, get a stamp of outcast stuck on their foreheads, are leprous like Lazarus and no one wants to associate with them; silence on race absolves whites from culpability and historical complicity in black subjection and their guilt is saved by the misdemeanours of a ruling black government and finally we now live in a society where there is racism without racists. By not speaking of race or even ethnicity, some argue, is to elide the apartheid legacies and committing the error of prematurely announcing the end of domination and non-acknowledgement of its contemporary traces.¹⁶⁴ We see an enduring age-old accusation against those blacks who discourse on racial inequalities and racism as attempting, as one apartheid judge put it, “to create and foster feelings of racial hatred, hostility and antipathy by the blacks toward the white population group of the Republic.”¹⁶⁵

The reluctance to mention and deny race runs deep in the country's historiography: from the apartheid state, the liberation movements and academic analysts to activists. All analyses didn't engage the question of race and racism, and "the unspoken omniscience of race, being everywhere visible but nowhere analysed" shows the depth of intellectual production in South Africa.¹⁶⁶ The reason why race was marginalized and suppressed reflected the dominant position of whites within the academia "who were uneasy engaging with a discourse and materiality in which they themselves were profoundly implicated."¹⁶⁷ As a result, there was an emphasis on non-racialism expressed by the dominant liberation movement, and its rejection of racism and racial discourses associated with the state and the discourse of non-racialism associated with the ANC had, by the 1980s, acquired hegemonic domination, while PAC and BCM had counter-discourses, which were often sources of bloody township clashes.¹⁶⁸

The Pan-Africanists' view has always been that the oppressed associated their oppression with both the system and the oppressor perpetuating it. On being asked if the Pan-Africanists were anti-white, Sobukwe said the oppressed hate "these groups because they associate them with their own oppression! Remove the association and you remove the hatred. In South Africa once white domination has been overthrown and the white man is no longer 'white-man boss' but an individual member of society, there will be no reason to hate him."¹⁶⁹ He added that they didn't hate the European because he is white but because he is an oppressor, and "it is plain dishonesty to say I hate the *sjambok* and not the one who wields it." Some black writers like Appiah think that Black Nationalists by responding to their experience of racial discrimination accept the racialism it presupposes which makes them intrinsic racists.¹⁷⁰ Colour blindness has become the "in thing," and any declaration by blacks of racial identity becomes a racist act. Black experience of racism make blacks not to fully trust non-blacks in fighting racism, where historically the social bond among blacks has been a source of strength and hope and effective in mobilization for social justice. Although there are biologically based characteristics (phenotypes), these features are used for purposes of racial signification, which is always and necessarily a social and historical process, and "a racial project can be defined as racist if and only if it creates or reproduces structures of domination based on essentialist categories of race."¹⁷¹ BC groups, including, have been accused of racism, but BC riposte has always been "blacks can't be racist."¹⁷² This has been the Black Nationalist credo borrowed from the USA especially. In Azania, in the 1970s and earlier, similar

charges were made at blacks only organizing that excludes white liberal tutorship. The BC in 1970s responded:

Some people who should know better do not know that powerlessness is never commensurate with racism. Without power black people can never be racists, let alone practice it.¹⁷³

It added that while blacks are not fundamentally racist,¹⁷⁴ all whites are racists, directly or indirectly. Those who don't perpetrate it, support it by voting for the white perpetrators of racism. On the contrary, no black man or government has ever legislated second-class status to whites based on the colour of their skin. Black Nationalism is an attempt by black people to assert themselves and declare their worth and willingness to participate in affairs affecting them. The purpose of racists is to subjugate and maintain subjugation and keep black people at the bottom, but the goal of Black Nationalism is full participation in decision-making processes affecting black people.¹⁷⁵ BC cannot be racism in reverse or anti-white; instead, like other forms of Black Nationalism, it doesn't preach hatred, but love. The BC tradition has always delineated between preaching BC and preaching "hatred of whites": "telling people to hate whites is an outward and reactionary type of preaching which though understandable is undesirable and self-destructive."¹⁷⁶ The goal is not domination, exclusion or exploitation of other groups, but an equal share of power in society and colour shouldn't be a determinant to position or privilege.¹⁷⁷ Black Nationalism is not racist because it will not manipulate laws and institutions for subjugation or maintaining of subjugation of other races or groups. After all, black people "have not lynched whites, bombed their churches, murdered their children ... white racists have."¹⁷⁸ Challenging the permanence of racism in South Africa is not premised on revenge, but on a quest for humanity, dignity and respect that have been undermined because of the colour black. The concept sees races cooperating for the general good of all, but those who see it as racism envisage conflict because "it challenges the very basis of their standpoint which is of seeing humanity in terms of digress and material achievement."¹⁷⁹ The postapartheid hasn't fulfilled the historical ideological position of BC, which remains relevant:—the struggle against white racism in the country should be seen as a totality involving political, economic, psychological, educational and socio-cultural.¹⁸⁰

Writers like Chipkin argue that in the postapartheid, blackness no longer denotes a social position (in the racial capitalist relations of produc-

tion) or a physical condition.¹⁸¹ Rather, it designates an authentic national subject that is loyal to the state simply because that state is controlled by other blacks. However, the postapartheid gives an illusion that the historically enforced racial inequalities that defined blackness have been superseded. Although there have been, to some extent, attempts to deracialize society and include blacks into economic affairs, most black people remain trapped in spaces designed for them apartheid. These are the people made poor and kept poor by racism. There has been a gross assumption that the end of apartheid has meant the end of racism. In a global political and cultural economy, race hasn't receded; instead, its vitality and volatility have intensified.¹⁸² Despite its uneven development, racism is characterized by an international hierarchy where wealth and power are associated with whiteness or "honorary whiteness." Owing to racism's persistence and ability to reinvent itself in new postcolonial and postmodern forms, including those that disguise its continued existence, some scholars feel compelled to assert the rather pessimistic view that racism is permanent notwithstanding whether "races" exist or not, are ideologically marked or not.¹⁸³ Racism assumes more subtle and elusive forms in the contemporary world. It is being reconfigured, without "race" as a classificatory device for demarcating difference. All the same, racism is unvarying in nature; it is essentially the same attitude expressed in differing social conditions, "that racist discourse is more chameleonic in its nature, in some ways more subtle in its mode of expression."¹⁸⁴ In the past, Goldberg aver, there had been a misconception that racism is "an ahistorical, unchanging social condition always presupposing claims about biological nature and inherent superiority or ability."¹⁸⁵ This has led to reductionist approaches. Still racism has persisted, its forms altered and its rationale and rationalizations transformed. In the USA and in South Africa, because of pressure of the civil rights movement and anti-apartheid struggles, formal barriers and symbolic manifestations for subordination like "whites only" disappeared from the public sphere but respected "the acceptance of the rhetoric of formal equality, signalling the demise of white supremacy rhetoric as expressed by the nation's normative vision. In other words, it could no longer be said that blacks were not included as equals in the nation's political vision."¹⁸⁶ Although there were significant gains as a result of legal reforms "racial hierarchy cannot be cured by the move to facial race-neutrality in the laws that structure the economic, political, and social lives of black people. White race-consciousness, in a new but nonetheless virulent form, plays an important, perhaps crucial role on the new

regime that has legitimated the deteriorating day-to-day material conditions of the majority of blacks.”¹⁸⁷ The end of Jim Crow in both the USA and South Africa has been seemingly accompanied by the end of white supremacy, but “the white norm, however, has not disappeared; it has only been submerged in popular consciousness.”¹⁸⁸ Except for vestigial pockets of historical racism, any possible connection between past racial subordination and the present situation has been severed by the formal repudiation of the old race-conscious policies. There is a thinking that race now matters less than it once did or that it is a thing of the past.¹⁸⁹ Manifestations of racism, however, remain completely articulated, deeply embedded and subtly intertwined with seemingly neutral and innocent phenomena. Essed and Goldberg argue that calls for colour-blindness or race neutrality cover the invisible hidden forms of established racist expressions and exclusions. Martin Luther King’s dream of one day Americans “not judged by the colour of their skin but by the content of their character” means the vision of a colour-blind society blurs realization of an equitable one.¹⁹⁰ Since the Reagan’s and Mandela’s era, colour-blindness and rainbowism have become an official racial ideology of both USA and South African neo-liberalism, and with Obama’s and Mandela’s election, the USA and South Africa are seen as postracial societies. In this context, “race no longer matters” because it has ceased to be an explicit and stark criterion for regulating social relations. Any attempt to talk of race and racism is seen as being recklessly and carelessly divisive and fostering racial antagonisms.

The existential and material condition of Azanian blacks, the Black Condition (which also is in the parlance of Blackwash), has provided a powerful fodder for racist imagination of black people.¹⁹¹ Note similarities with the US black experience: the enslavement and brutalization of Africans in the New World; the subsequent exclusion from mainstream American civic, economic and social life and the peculiar content of anti-black racist ideology with its images of blacks as lazy, stupid, incompetent, hyper-sexual and disposed to gratuitous acts of violence have combined to give anti-black race prejudice a distinctive character among American forms of racism.¹⁹² There are also severe social problems, namely, joblessness, high rates of incarceration, poverty, failing schools and a violent drug trade, which plague black communities. The black angst resembles a kind of collective clinical depression, derived from black existentialism, lived experience and “ontological wounds and emotional scars inflicted by white supremacist beliefs,” which has endured in different historical

epochs.¹⁹³ There is also a view that has underlined racist representation of blacks in a “postracial society”: that the underclass black are economically and socially disadvantaged because they haven’t adopted values of hard work and discipline, attained skills and marketable education and learned to make sacrifices necessary for success. In this contemporary society, racial inferiority is re-employed to assume cultural inferiority rather than the old white supremacist notion of genetics; thus culture, not race, now accounts for this Otherness.¹⁹⁴ The racist view also characterizes underclass blacks as a “problem,” victims of self-imposed ignorance, lack of direction and poor work attitudes.¹⁹⁵ This discussion doesn’t note the flaws historically embedded in a society structured through inequalities and cultural stereotypes where race is a decisive factor. White race-consciousness and white norm couched in reference to black cultural inferiority only furthers black subordination and reinforces the myth of equal opportunity, and justifies the view that both the USA and South Africa are meritocratic where nothing hinders no one to climb up the social ladder. Claims that race is less salient than before in determining “life chances,” a non-racist or colour-blind idea is increasingly challenged. This has also been mystified by the existence of a small, but steadily expanding, black middle class. Thus, black social misery and social suffering have been rendered invisible.

An important element of both American and South African racist schema is white privilege, itself a historical accrual. According to Robert Jensen, himself a white man, the primary force that keeps white supremacy firmly in place is the material and psychological gains that come to white people, which are bolstered by an ideological support system.¹⁹⁶ As apartheid ended, the ANC had to face and confront the legacy of vast social dysfunction and anger while the NP handed political power precisely at a time when political power had become a burden.¹⁹⁷ In contrast, white South Africans were relieved as a group of both guilt and direct responsibility of these problems: “From whatever perspective, whether it is that of business, of liberal values, or that of defence of ‘cultural rights’ which had become the rallying cry of many Afrikaners, they can take now a critical and demanding attitude to the [new] government.”¹⁹⁸ Ironically, those who made the mess could now criticize those who have to try or fail to try to clean it up. The postapartheid white supremacy, Achille Mbembe¹⁹⁹ reckons, works on: self-absolution where white racism no longer is considered the cause of black suffering; nostalgia, with some people saying apartheid after all wasn’t that bad and there is no need to be ashamed of its horrific past; the ANC has decapitated the moral capital amassed during the struggle, thereby absolving white guilt; the Damascus moment, where certain

sections of whites suddenly became radical democrats condemning the current government, but the question is how and why people who yesterday fervently believed in, and were apostles of racism, have turned activist today and finally reverse victim-hood, where apology of racial inequality is now couched in the language of rights.

Currently, there is concern for welfare and love of animals more than for black people; a scenario given impetus by rhino poaching. While most of us do indeed love animals and strive to preserve natural resources and the environment, it seems animals are dearer, more loved and more cared for than blacks. We see also another trend in racism—white flight. As upwardly mobile blacks leave historically segregated spaces into formerly white-only ones, white people “flee.” They start by going to more expensive suburbs in the hope that blacks can’t afford them; however, some blacks follow them there. White people leave for much more expensive ones until they shut themselves in exclusive pockets called “gated communities” or, in the extreme, Orania,²⁰⁰ or emigrate to countries like Australia on the pretext that South Africa is crime-infested. Interestingly, Australia’s history is chequered with the genocide of indigenous people, and its contemporary society is no less racist. The flight also applies to other institutions like schools. All these indicate the extent, depth, breadth and length to which white supremacy has mutated. Then there is the role of emotion in bolstering white arrogance, “a kind of irrational self-confidence based on being white in a white supremacist society.”²⁰¹ Arrogance serves to keep white people from critical self-reflection. Guilt and fear also help to keep white supremacy in place. Guilt means responsibility, and they don’t want to own it while fear keeps them from confronting themselves and the system. Given the general norms prohibiting explicit discrimination and out-group derogation, white-group members usually do not want to be seen as “racists.” Van Dijk says of race denials:

They have a socio-political function. Denials challenge the very legitimacy of anti-racist analysis and thus are part of the politics of ethnic management: as long as a problem is being denied in the first place, the critics are vindicated, marginalised or delegitimised: denials debilitate resistance. As long as racism is denied, there is no need for official measures against it, for stricter laws, regulations or institutions to combat discrimination, or moral campaigns to change biased attitudes of whites.²⁰²

Van Dijk’s words are true to South Africa and are a big intervention in the furore caused by Samantha Vice’s writings on white South Africans’

guilt.²⁰³ Secondly, instead of facing the fact that whatever they have is unearned, what they have is the product of the work of others, which is unevenly distributed, they rather fear losing it. The obfuscation of the idea of race and racism is seen in the Brett Murray's "spear" painting of President Jacob Zuma. The painting is a plain case of racism and objectification of the black phallus. Murray is vindicated because of his "struggle credentials" and claims of his satirical work in the 1980s. In contrast, images of black security guards manhandling a black man who defaced the painting and "gentlemanly" escorting his white counterpart out of the gallery were widely screened.

Incipient racisms have characterized the postapartheid social formation, which is heightened by the presence of black African immigrant identities.²⁰⁴ The result has been black on black racism whose pivot is not only use of debasing racist language but violent pogroms and lynching synonymous with, and ironically at the heart of white anti-black racism. In societies previously structured in racial dominance,²⁰⁵ like South Africa, the formerly racially oppressed imbibe the racist traits of their racist oppressors, which they mete out to those who share a similar colour. Here, we are talking of transferred or delegated racism. I find striking similarities between apartheid notions of the nation, ethnicity, race and discrimination and their replication in the postapartheid. There is a paucity of research on this matter though, which will further enlighten us on this phenomenon. Many elect to deny it, but there certainly are a reconfiguration of race and racism in the postapartheid, very similar to apartheid's, yet with illusory changes. The apartheid project was built on race denial; rather, they found it opportune to talk of culture and *ethnos*. We see the culturalism of the new racism after 1994. Then there is the connection between racism and nationalism, a concern with purity of the nation and its "children" in order to maintain its true identity.²⁰⁶ It must, therefore, isolate the "exogenous," "interbred," "cosmopolitan" elements within, then eliminate and expel them. The result is "racialization" of populations and social groups whose collective features are deemed impure. Violent racism is transported onto intra-black populations, in the process absolving white South Africans of racism. The latter becomes covert, invisible and masked; the former is overt and visible because it is tangible, like when a "foreigner" is thrown off the train or burnt.

CONCLUSION

Despite the ethos of non-racialism that dispenses with race or races, black identity hasn't disappeared because "as long as that society remains in its economic, political, cultural and social relations in a racist way, to the variety of Black and Third World peoples in the midst, and continues to do so, that struggle remains."²⁰⁷ Black Nationalist agitation for a "manifesto of identity"²⁰⁸ remains relevant in a postcolonial social order—the black awakening, which the postapartheid had lulled back to sleep; the continued degradation of the black body and his destiny as a human being, is a subjectivity that reflects the past, the present and the future. It represents a psychological and spiritual liberation of black masses from shackles of the past that, at a certain historical moment, are partially unfettered and quickly get fettered back again or have never been at all. These continue to haunt the present. The BC can only be relevant if one knows one's historical self.²⁰⁹ The present is only history in motion. Nonetheless, the black struggle has its own silences: blacks (Africans, coloureds, and Indians, like Asians in the UK) with their own particularisms as a resource for resistance, which fragments the struggle; black people who don't identify with the collective struggle; the gender aspect, that is, black masculinity over black women and finally the question whether black struggles are essentialist.

All the same, blackness as a political identity understands identity as complex and always historically constructed, never in the same place, but always positional.²¹⁰

Blackness, as agency, is always a resistance, critical and oppositional in stance. When will black and blackness cease to be black? I think when an egalitarian society is achieved, the resources of the nation equally shared among all without regard to colour and when we see a society with a human face.²¹¹ Fanon states it no better, "Yes to love. Yes to generosity. But man is also a negation. No to man's contempt. No to the indignity of man. To the exploitation of man. To the massacre of what is most human in man: freedom."²¹²

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The Black Middle Class and Black Struggles

This chapter examines the positionality and role of the black middle class (BMC) in historical and present black liberation struggles.¹ This question has thrown a succession of black radicals into a quandary and dilemma. Indeed debates on this topic have spanned generations and are as alive today as they were then. In any case it shows the truncated nature of a colonial subject who went through the process of depersonalization and assumed the mantle of leadership. Contemporary debates among Black Nationalist adherents are whether the BMC possesses revolutionary agency. One view, which intellectuals like Andile Mngxitama strongly advocate, is that the “coconut are gravediggers of white supremacy.”² Mngxitama and those of his ilk contend that the BMC is close to whiteness (at multiracial schools, universities or workplace), where they experience first-hand white anti-black racism. This, in turn, radicalizes them. This view seems to be lent credence by the fact that the BMC has led black struggles for liberation, so the argument is the middle class has to lead contemporary struggles. The other view advocates taking the struggle to the grassroots. The middle class has to commit suicide as a class³ if they are to positively identify with the masses, and in the Gramscian view, there has to be a cultivation of organic intellectuals among the poor black masses in preparation for leadership responsibilities. In this chapter, I take a standpoint and say, as a historical fact, it is true that the BMC has led black struggles and it’s also true the BMC has betrayed those struggles. I make comparisons with similar debates in the contemporary black struggles in the USA, where

the post-Civil Rights era, just like the postapartheid, has seen benefits accrued in the form of an expanding, but small, BMC, including black leaders whose social pretensions and condescension hinder total identification with the experience of those blacks trapped in the Black Condition. In my view, it is opportune to examine the BMC as a *class* and how its affinity to its class position influences the manner it undertakes, prosecutes and executes the struggle on “behalf” of other blacks. I am going to trace how the BMC has developed its agency, why it decided to fight for issues cross-cutting the spectrum of black subjectivity and interrogate whether in all instances it has acted in good faith.

Early proponents for freedom in Azania, just like everywhere else where black struggles occurred, were the educated strata of the black oppressed. The early mission-educated elite in the country initially fought for recognition by colonial masters as well as for incorporation and inclusion into the incipient colonial nation.⁴ Tension between the school people (*amagqoboka*, meaning those who have been pierced through) and red people (*amaqaba*, those who smear red ochre) is recorded.⁵ Unlike their illiterate or semi-literate brethren, they could use their education or ownership of property as conditions to acquire political privileges, adult suffrage and inclusion. This consisted of a “civilization test.”⁶ For them the vote was sacrosanct because “the vote made a person ‘white’ as much as the other way round.”⁷ This dates back to the Cape non-racial franchise introduced in 1853, outlined in the constitution made in Britain to enable “the intelligent and industrious man of colour to share with his fellow colonists of European descent in the privilege of voting for the representation of the people.”⁸ The Cape franchise was to be a benchmark for which voteless blacks pinned their struggle for liberation from white domination. However, in Natal, the British excluded Africans and Indians from the franchise. This was accepted by Boer trekkers who, in the 1856 Transvaal constitution article 9, stated: “the *volk* are not prepared to allow any equality of the non-white with white inhabitants, either in church or state.”⁹

Let us put the issues we are discussing in this chapter into context. Editorials of J.T. Jabavu’s first African-run newspaper *Imvo Zabantsundu*, for example, mentions that “natives” are the King’s subjects and appealed for their consideration into the empire, which has “a solemn obligations to protect the weaker races which for us ‘is a cardinal sin.’”¹⁰ Let us quote Jabavu at length in the inaugural edition of *Imvo* of 3 November 1884:

For over a half a century missionaries have been labouring assiduously among natives of this country, and the government has invested, and is still investing enormous sums of money with the professed object of civilising them. The result—which will ever be mentioned in these columns with gratitude—is, that a large class has been formed among the Natives which has learnt to loathe the institutions of barbarism, and to press for the better institutions of civilised life. Hitherto this newly formed class has been tossing from pillar to post, despised by its former friends of the heathen state, and misunderstood by the representatives of civilisation in this country. This uncertain drifting hither and thither of ‘school kaffirs’, as they are called, has given rise to some hateful comparisons as to whether ‘red kaffirs’ are better than ‘school kaffirs.’ The fact is, the so-called ‘school kaffirs’, or as they are sometimes called, ‘educated natives’, have had stirred up within them a desire for better things, and in their perhaps clumsy efforts to attain them, they have been misunderstood by their white friends. This is due to the fact that there is no touch between the great mass of reclaimed natives and those who are on the shores of civilisation.

Jabavu did oppose formation of the Congress in 1912 because of his deep faith in the Cape non-racial system. He didn’t like an organization that didn’t work with sympathetic whites to exert pressure within the established parliamentary system. He also considered minister of Native Affairs, J.W. Sauer, a “friend of Africans.” Incidentally, it was Sauer who proposed the Natives’ Land Act of 1913, which would deprive Africans of their land and become the main hallmark of African policy of the Union government.¹¹ This treatise indicates the nature of leadership that assumed responsibility of fighting for freedom in the country for generations.

There was a recognition by 1960 that the political crises following the Sharpeville massacre were caused by the government’s failure to recognize the emergent urban African “that is responsible, middle class, which could be used as a stabilising influence and could cooperate with the instruments of law and order and who will accept with us the responsibility of maintaining western standards in our South African community.”¹² Although the NP didn’t seriously consider this proposal at that time, they later saw its intelligence and by late 1970s, the liberals and the Afrikaner *verligte* were vigorous on it; by 1980s, it was part of Botha’s WHAM policy that consisted of co-optation and building a class of collaborators in the aspiring African middle class, African politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen to propel the machinery of their own oppression and domination. In the meantime, the policy of separate development and Bantu Authorities had

ingredients of germinating and fostering a BMC that would be complicit with the regime. The AAC and the Unity Movement foresaw these intentions as promoting “a Quisling type of African teacher and trader who will be mass produced through Bantuized schools strictly controlled by government through its Native Commissioners, policemen, intellectuals, policemen-chiefs and headmen etc.”¹³

I must make it clear here that the BMC itself is not a unitary corporate entity. There is the petty-bourgeoisie that comprised traders, business people and entrepreneurs who aspire to be a fully fledged bourgeoisie, with business as their major concern. Then there is the professional class which includes intellectuals who earn their keep from salaried occupations. I have collapsed them into one class—the BMC—despite stratification within it. They can be divided into two: the apolitical and the politicized. I am disdainful of separating them, by virtue of their shared class position. Let us now look at the politicized BMC from which black leaders emanated. By 1920s, a mature black petty-bourgeoisie had emerged, though it was caught in the contradictions of the dominant relations of production, which used race as a criterion.¹⁴ But why would these blacks look down on their own people? Educated Africans had a strong repugnance of tribal society, “a sense of cultural shame, a feeling that tribalism is a return to the past, to barbarism, to the primitive. The cultural shame derives from exposure to western civilisation and from teachings of missionaries and from formal education.”¹⁵ For this reason, the BMC has become almost white: “the more he rejects his blackness and the bush, the whiter he becomes.”¹⁶ This view is extrapolated by the BC in early 1970s that warned of the danger posed by creation of a BMC whose “blackness is only skin deep, literally.”¹⁷ These, like their mission-produced predecessors would aspire to whiteness and assimilation, in taste, food and values. According to BC tradition, these had lost their “right to blackness,” because they had become white persons in black skins”¹⁸ or what Malcolm X calls “black bodies with white heads” or “black skins white masks.”¹⁹ In Fanonian terms, there is a definite feeling of inferiority, which the BMC constantly attempts to overcome by absorbing European mannerisms and adopting a superiority complex towards their own.²⁰ In the USA, some black Americans tried seeking acceptance into white society, striving to become “white middle class,” believing and behaving as if they were exempt from white contempt of their race.²¹ Their world-view and philosophy can be regarded as naïve individualism. The road to success for them lies in trying to psychologically escape from their identity. Holy Johnson is even more disdainful of the educated BMC:

All educated Negroes suffer from a kind of slavery in many ways more subversive of the real welfare of the race than the ancient physical fetters. The slavery of the mind is far more destructive than that of the body. But such is the weakness and imperfection of human nature that many even those who bravely fought to remove the shackles from the body of the Negro transfer them to his mind.²²

The effects of education on the schooled BMC meant they approached African culture with ambivalence; they were between and betwixt, were victims of Western mores and norms and looked to Europe for their values and inspiration. In search of an identity, they would cleanse themselves of the stigma associated with African-ness. In reference to their snobbery, Johnson argues, they renounced their culture, thus denying Africa an identity, self-dignity and independence. If only the elite would study their past and understand their customs and institutions, they would discover endowments they should be proud of and discover that “their contempt for traditional African culture was due to a state of mental slavery.”²³

For a long time, the educated BMC endeavoured to maintain a distinct identity from the uneducated. The “scuse me”²⁴ people or “omaBA”²⁵ were monikers used for this petty-bourgeoisie who took concern with rules of etiquette and correct behaviour.²⁶ In other words, they were imitators of white middle-class behaviour. They had a fondness for white sympathizers, used high-flown English, their manner of dress aped the European and their relatively luxurious lifestyles maintained a differentiation with the rank and file, which is accompanied by conspicuous consumption as an index of class.²⁷ The cultural transformation of these leaders is blamed on the education value system beginning with missionaries who implant the black intellectual into a zone of alienation; his attainment and achievement provides him “refined” manners, the reason why most “educated people find it hard to communicate with fellow black people in a train, who are uneducated.”²⁸ White racism marked the landscape, the boundaries of black life, their social lives and habits, and imposed a cruel order of social and spiritual regulation, leading to deracination. Social and cultural alienation would become measures of “civility.”²⁹ Despite being educated and “civilized,” they didn’t escape the indignities and injustice others faced. They found themselves in an invidious, complex and precarious position. On one hand, they were “aspirant bourgeoisie”; on the other, they were inhibited by racist legal machinery. Although they aspired upwards, they had no option but to identify themselves downwards with the rest of the

underclass. Heightened fears and frustrations were constant reminders of the realities of oppression, which they all shared despite differences in class position. The BMC position is not envious though; it is traumatic and excruciating. They found themselves in a space of marginality trapped between imposed barriers on upward mobility and their lower ranking brethren; therefore, they experienced stronger feelings of unhappiness and suffering than their fellow Africans; of ambivalence, antagonism and hostility towards Europeans and their laws, job dissatisfaction and inferiority in the eyes of whites.³⁰ It results in what Cabral calls a “frustration complex,” which infuriates them.³¹ In a racist society, even the most accomplished Negroes cannot get recognition since colour is the most obvious manifestation of race; it has been made the criterion in which men are judged irrespective of their social or educational attainments.

Although Fanon observes the desire for colonizers’ material possessions by the colonized, he also views the colonial society in Manichean terms, as a binary antagonism between the oppressed and oppressor, good and evil. For Bhabha, it is in relation to the place of the other that colonial desire is articulated.³² In other words, the colonial subject mimics the colonizer, and there is a production of an image of identity where the subject is transformed into assuming the colonizer’s image. But there is an ironic compromise:

Colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognisable other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite. Which is to say, that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference.³³

The ambivalence of colonial positionality crosses the division of self/other, colonizer/colonized, thus departing from Hegelian master/slave dialectic. The difference is produced through enunciation and difference. Rather than being antagonistic, it is agonistic. For this reason, colonial authority undermines itself by not replicating itself properly. Colonial authority produces differentiations and individuations through discriminatory practices, leading to splitting as condition for subjection. This enables colonial subjects to be under the colonial gaze that enables effective surveillance and exercise of power. Bhabha argues that the effect of colonial power is by hybridization rather than an outright hegemonic command. In other words, the tension between demand and desire in the process of identification is a “space of splitting,” whereby colonial identi-

ties are transformed into multiplicity. Fanon does mention the change in personality, a definitive mutation explainable by an “evidence of a shift and a split.”³⁴ This identity is always constructed through ambivalence, where there is always desire and loving.³⁵ Bhabha has been critiqued for universalizing tendencies, mainly because colonial identities and power relations are analysed in semiotic and psychoanalytic terms and for misrepresenting the anti-colonial struggle by downplaying the bitter dissent between the colonizer and the colonized where there has been a search for rehabilitation of cultural identity debased by colonialism.³⁶ Nonetheless, the BMC is a misfit in the borrowed European cultural atmosphere because Europeans would never accept them as equals no matter how much “they Europeanized themselves.”³⁷ Even though a black man can elevate himself to the level of the European through Western education and culture, he is unable to escape from his race.³⁸ For me, this becomes a condition for antagonism, which is prodded by the desire of the subject to arrogate for themselves the positions currently a domain of those in hold of material wealth: who is the colonizer himself.

Despite their profound cultural transformation, they latched onto pre-existing cultural forms, coupled with daily experiences of racism and economic imperatives of a developing capitalist society, all which were important factors in early stirring of political consciousness and protest within the *amakholwa*³⁹ communities by end of nineteenth century.⁴⁰ This was aided by tools like being conversant with Western communication skills and familiarity with Western political institutions. The BMC, who culturally separated themselves from the rest, were able to develop their own unique cultural identity.

Contemporary BC debates waver between whether the BMC can lead the black struggles effectively or not. One view strongly advocated by Mngxitama (as mentioned in the Introduction) is that the “coconut⁴¹ rather than the working class is ‘a gravedigger of white supremacy’” by virtue of their closeness and contradiction to whiteness where they experience first-hand the indignities of white anti-black racism coupled with their comprehension of white culture and value system.⁴² This, in turn, radicalizes them more than the blacks of the township. As a historical fact, most leading revolutionaries were trained by imperialists, and they were brilliant revolutionaries because they acquired cultural capital from white institutions, which the poor don’t have and can’t access. Examples of such include Fanon, Cesaire, Cabral, Biko, Sobukwe and Sankara, who passed through certain periods where they were coconuts but ended up fighting

white supremacy.⁴³ However, not all coconuts become black radicals, just as the location and village black will not join the revolution against white supremacy. Mngxitama and other middle-class radicals contend that the black working class, the peasants and the poor, will not and cannot lead the revolution because they just want “an RDP house and a toilet” and their demands are limited to bare minimal existence. Squatters, for example, cannot generate consciousness except “squatter consciousness.”⁴⁴ I found this postulation strange and extraordinary, though. In contrast, coconuts’ demands are larger in scale, ambition and quantity. According to this thesis, it is the revolutionary BMC that renounces their middle-class tendencies that will infuse revolutionary consciousness into the masses and therefore lead the revolution. Opposing views say it’s hard to fathom and imagine the BMC “leaving sushi and begin burning tyres”⁴⁵ or even getting their hands dirty, and coconuts “reminds one of a house nigger during slavery days.”⁴⁶ For some, movement that doesn’t have a radical middle-class intellectual base cannot survive.⁴⁷ The counter-position is that the middle class, is full of superficial aspirations and hypocrisy. Black radicalism must distance itself from reifications of white supremacy. What is needed is to build very strong grassroots BC rather than sitting in Sandton⁴⁸ discussing revolution over cappuccino and oysters.⁴⁹

Aime Cesaire, in an interview with C.L.R. James in 1974, said he was a product of Western education (having studied and taught Latin, Greek and French literature) whose later writings seriously indicted and attacked Western civilization.⁵⁰ In “Return to My Native Land,” Cesaire writes that because he knew the system inside out, he was better poised to work out its dismantling. Of course, the intelligentsia had mastered tools of the system, especially words, which they used to construct new meanings, new alternatives, and new realities for themselves and for others.⁵¹ In the struggle against colonialism, the revolutionary petty-bourgeoisie played a leading role.⁵² They were the intellectual force of the struggle and were able to develop a general awareness of the exploitation and dominative implications of imperialism, an ability that inserted them into leadership positions. Under colonialism, racial barriers, which inhibit the development of the petty-bourgeoisie, and the undeveloped political consciousness of the masses offer an opportunity for the petty-bourgeoisie to struggle against foreign domination.⁵³ By virtue of its position in the colonial hierarchy, this class is the first to be aware of the need to rid foreign domination; in this context it might be assumed to be “revolutionary.”⁵⁴ Nabudere equates their role and rela-

tionship with the masses with that of an advocate compelling a client's case in which the advocate had an interest in the brief.⁵⁵ Clearly, there is Marxist influence here: Marx and Engels in *The Communist Manifesto* regard the petty-bourgeoisie's impulse to fight the bourgeoisie for reason of preservation of their own class interests. If by chance they happen to be revolutionary, it is because of their fear of descending down into the proletariat. However, the later proposition poses a dilemma for the petty-bourgeoisie; after all, no one likes renouncing comforts and privileges of their class. Others like Du Bois and his argumentation for the "Talented Tenth" believed the Negro race will be saved and served by its exceptional men who will guide the masses, without whom the Negro would have to accept white leadership.⁵⁶ Cabral also believed that the best sons and daughters of the land had an obligation and responsibility in both the revolutionary party and the revolution.⁵⁷ C.L.R. James would wrestle with the ideological and social ambivalence of the renegade intelligentsia, the revolutionary petit-bourgeoisie, arguing that no revolutionary cadre divorced from the masses could sustain a revolution. He adds that it was only the consciousness and activity of the revolutionary masses with its own best interests that could preserve the revolution from compromise, betrayal or the ill-considered usurpation of revolutionary authority.⁵⁸

Cobley counters the argument that the black politicized leadership was "a catalogue of failure and craven compromise."⁵⁹ Instead, he sees it as "giants" on whom communities looked upon and provided them with articulate and coherent leadership. He argues that the modern Black Nationalist struggle and much of the social and political identity of modern black communities in South Africa were built on their shoulders. As for their political role, there has always been a suspicion that they would betray the rest of the uneducated.⁶⁰ Kuper's study of the BMC reveal that the *izifundiswa* (the educated) and *amazemtiti* (the exempted, i.e., from carrying passes because of their level of education) were regarded as betrayers or likely to betray because of their association with and occupation in the white world. In the Cape, the educated were called *amakumsha*, that is, speakers of European languages, which, in the mind of the tribal person, are associated with deceit and almost synonymous with a turncoat, a cheat or a trickster.

These educated lot are to Malcolm X a modern-day Uncle Tom "who doesn't wear a handkerchief on his head but now wears a top hat...he is often the personification of culture and refinement. The twentieth cen-

tury Uncle Thomas sometimes speaks with a Yale or Harvard accent. Sometimes he is known as Professor, Doctor, Judge, and Reverend...a professional Negro.”⁶¹

This observation rings true in the postcolonial: the absorption of the formerly radical intelligentsia and BMC into the dominant colonial class has made them incapable of practically and ideologically leading the black majority.⁶² Instead of identifying themselves with those at the bottom of social hierarchy, the “evolues,” the “educated” and the “intellectuals” happily jumped onto the bandwagon of accumulation and power.⁶³ After the struggle for independence, power is entrusted into the petty-bourgeoisie hands who follow this road: to give free rein to its natural tendencies to become “bourgeois”; to transform itself into a national pseudo-bourgeoisie, that is, to deny the revolution and subject itself to imperialist capital.⁶⁴ This corresponds to the neo-colonial situation, that is, betrayal of the objectives of national liberation, and they would have special interests in a postcolonial set-up.⁶⁵ Fanon opines that the problem of decolonization lay in the native intellectual who had imbibed colonial culture and values and never intended to shake them off entirely.⁶⁶ This same group, after independence uses national resources in schemes that don’t benefit the people, but themselves.⁶⁷ The effects of these schemes are seen in dire social conditions people live under. In order not to betray the liberation objectives, Cabral suggests that the petty-bourgeoisie has to strengthen its revolutionary consciousness, repudiate temptations to become “bourgeois” and the natural pretensions of its class mentality and to identify with the aspirations of the masses. Finally, it “must be capable of committing suicide as a class.”⁶⁸ This proposition seems unpalatable and tortuous to them, though.

In the USA, the Civil Rights movement not only acted as a buffer between the white middle-class audience and angry young blacks but also claimed to speak for the black community.⁶⁹ The language of Civil Rights leaders was moderate and resulted in no significant gains for black masses; a language that propagated non-violence, fear of white backlash and misled some into believing that a minority of blacks could be co-opted into positions of power.⁷⁰ The BMC could no longer be leaders of their people because they had “arrived,” that is, gained entrance into white middle-class society.⁷¹ They cannot, however, take millions of other blacks with them. In the years of Civil Rights struggles, Malcolm X would observe a pattern of “house Negro” and “field Negro” marked by emerging class distinctions.⁷² In contrast, blacks were told that if they worked harder,

they could attain success by following the protestant ethic of thrift, hard work and achievement, like all other racial groups. For this reason, the BMC rejects and despises the masses. Ironically, they can't really be assimilated into white society, because they are confronted by what Du Bois calls "double consciousness."⁷³ In the post-Civil Rights struggles that guaranteed right to vote, to use buses, public facilities and restaurants reserved for whites in the South, equal opportunity in education, right to economic justice, King's heirs are a blossoming BMC but are increasingly behaving like their white counterparts.

As for the black struggle in both postapartheid South Africa and post-1960s' USA, the opening and expanding of a BMC seem to suggest that opportunities exist but they lead to loss of collectivism among blacks. The new opportunities as a result of removal of formal barriers means some blacks enjoy some benefits not enjoyed by others.⁷⁴ As these classes move to different spheres, the experience of being black becomes fragmented and multifaceted, and these different contexts mean experiencing racism and oppression in different ways. This obscures the problems of lower class blacks mainly because "progress" is defined in middle-class terms, further heightened by the conspicuous consumption of the BMC, who "in fact have found their identity with the white middle class."⁷⁵ Malcolm X is even acerbic: "these chosen few Negroes are more white-minded, more anti-black, than even the white man is."⁷⁶ Some call them "middle-class sell-outs."⁷⁷ Whilst they have economically, culturally, socially and geographically distanced themselves from the underclass, they are highly anxiety-ridden, insecure and willing to be co-opted into the system.⁷⁸ In contrast, the underclass gets caught up in social vices, which West calls "walking nihilism."⁷⁹ The "bonds in solidarity in chains," which previously characterized the relationship among all blacks, is no longer apparent, where the BMC once identified with struggles and aspirations of lower class blacks.⁸⁰ Loyalty to race and unquestioning allegiance have been historically constructed as primary; those who detoured from the prescribed path were labelled "sell-outs," "traitors" or "Uncle Toms," and those who deviated from forms of racial identity and cultural expression were called "Oreos" or "Incognegroes."⁸¹ While in the past, "whites only" symbols were visible targets for action, mobilization and organization, their removal and end of Jim Crow infused doubts whether there are similarities in ontological and existential experiences of different sections of blacks. The realization is that blacks are not a homogeneous or homologous cohort. A visit to the malls shows the middle- and upper-class

South Africans imitating Western culture; “they are representatives and supervisors of globalisation, it’s not by accident, middle class Africans are soldiers of imperialism.”⁸² As blacks are divided into classes, the BMC gets culturally estranged, thus posing questions of black authenticity. The following are the questions: Are they still “real” blacks or have ceased to be so? Who are the real blacks? Does blackness has to be always associated with material want and deprivation? Collective black identity is worsened and complicated by intergroup conflicts, and cultural and class differentiation.⁸³ West, however, contends that primarily blackness minimally means to be subject to white supremacy, so blackness is a political and ethical construct, a fact that black authenticity ignores.⁸⁴ The following then is question: Is there a possibility of unity between the BMC and underclass blacks? Should the BMC, given its historical role in leading and at decisive moments abandoning the black struggle, be entrusted with leadership? To answer the first, one would concur with Crenshaw and Shelby that the present predicament provides few options except crafting a distinct political thought informed by the actual conditions and needs of black people.⁸⁵ For the second, I advocate for cultivation of “organic intellectuals” to take more leadership responsibilities, at the same time harmonizing the needs of the BMC and underclass blacks trapped in depravity of townships and rural and farm areas. The reason being the permanence of South African anti-black racism would ultimately enforce a unity of colour. All blacks have vested interests in racial and economic equality regardless of their cultural identification, class, gender or age, though the agency depends on experience.⁸⁶ Caution though must be emphasized about the BMC bringing their social pretensions and condescension onto less well-to-do blacks. A unity with black capitalists, for example, is unpalatable because even though they experience a different form of racism in lieu of capitalist circles they cavort in, they possess vampirism and blood-sucking tendencies that are not qualitatively divorced from their white counterparts. They defend a system that has fed on blood, sweat and tears of blacks. Therefore, alliances with them can be limited to strategic purposes only, that is, in cases of experiential racism.⁸⁷ Another complication is the BMC who have rejected their black identity in favour of white persona and lifestyle, but Shelby argues it would be unjustified to say these people are lost to the struggle.⁸⁸ The class character of their culture makes them exhibit their cultural prejudices; just like during the liberation struggle, the BMC regarded the liberation movement as a means to eliminate colonial oppression of their own class and hence re-establish complete cul-

tural and political domination of the people.⁸⁹ Black Nationalism in the USA, for example, has been used by the BMC to attain privileges and ranks of power, while closed off to their most desperate constituency, the poor blacks.⁹⁰ Yet, according to Malcolm X, the BMC and its haughtiness convinced him that they could not be effective in achieving authentic black liberation.⁹¹ As for Azanian struggles, “black people are betrayed by black petty-bourgeoisie and the next leaders should not come from gated communities.”⁹² One Blackwasher related an incident that happened in Cape Town a few years back, after a meeting in one of the city’s townships. Like many aftermaths of such gatherings, there was a ritual of *shisa nyama*⁹³ and socializing. After a while it was proposed by the middle-class clique that they go to Long Street.⁹⁴ One may have to note this section of Cape Town’s CBD is frequented by tourists, so prices are beyond the ordinary. One also has to remember that in a movement there are the less well-to-do, the unemployed, the students and the like, who don’t earn a regular salary. The BMC entered a restaurant/bar while the township crew was smoking outside. They were approached by a security guard who demanded to know their business in the area and suspected them of intentions to break into one of the shops. After a confrontational exchange, they finally entered into the restaurant. The BMC had ordered expensive drink and refreshment. The township crew was excluded from the merriment; seemingly there was an arrangement that each had to settle their own bill. The township camp had to return back to the township. The Blackwasher said these are indicators that show the gap and rift between the BMC “radicals” and the rest. Despite its pretensions. the BMC and the rest of the blacks are, as Sabar, a scintillating BC poet, says, “we are all in different cabins on the same ship.”

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, can the BMC be trusted with the insurmountable task of leading, prosecuting and executing a revolution? It’s not guaranteed. Their revolutionary agency and urgency can be stretched to certain elasticity and is proscribed within their class interests. Personally, I am averse to the idea. The BMC can participate in the struggle and lend skills and support, but they *should not take ownership or leadership of the struggle unless they shed their pretensions*. As someone puts it, “the BMC is useful to us when they reject middle class pretensions, just as the working class is useful if it rejects middle class snobbery.”⁹⁵ While it might seem injudicious

to say they have a propensity for “betrayal,” as a historical fact, the BMC has led black struggles, at a decisive moment they have prevaricated and thus were not able to see it through to its logical conclusion. And history hasn’t ceased to repeat itself.

NOTES

1. I use Black Middle Class as an inclusive term for intellectuals, the petit-bourgeois and those of means. Normally, all these might have attained a certain level of education.
2. Coconut refers to culturally transformed black South Africans, who, like a coconut, are black/brown outside and white inside.
3. Cabral, Amilcar. 1979. *Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings*. London: Heinemann.
4. Carter, Gwendolen M, Karis, Thomas and Stultz Newell M. 1967. *South Africa's Transkei. The Politics of Domestic Colonialism*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
5. Kuper, Leo. 1965. *An African Bourgeoisie. Race, Class and Politics in South Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
6. The All-African Convention Proceedings and Resolutions of the AAC, December 15–18 1935.
7. Magubane, Bernard M. 1996. *The Making of a Racist State. British Imperialism and the Union of South Africa 1875–1910*. Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc. p11.
8. Simons, Jack, n.d.
9. Cited in Simons, Jack, n.d.
10. Cited in Karis, Thomas and Carter, Gwendolen M, eds. 1972. *From Protest to Challenge: Protest and Hope 1882–1934* Volume 1. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. p63.
11. Karis, Thomas and Carter, Gwendolen M, eds. 1972. *From Protest to Challenge: Protest and Hope 1882–1934* Volume 1. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.
12. Sir de Villiers Graaff, the opposition UP leader during House of Assembly debates, 29 March 1960.
13. W.M Tsotsi, “Presidential Address,” AAC, 14–16 December 1958.
14. Coble, Alan Gregor. 1990. *Class and Consciousness. The Black Petty Bourgeoisie in South Africa, 1924–1950*. New York: Greenwood Press.
15. Kuper, op cit.:84.
16. Fanon, Frantz. 2008. *Black Skin White Masks*. Translated by Richard Philcox. New York: Grove Press.
17. “Understanding SASO.” Discussion document by Steve Biko at the SASO Formation School, Pietermaritzburg, 5–7 December 1971.

18. Speech by Reverend Mashwabada Mayatula, First National Congress of the Black Peoples Convention, Hammanskraal, 16 December 1972.
19. Malcolm X with Haley, Alex. 1965 [2007]. *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*. London: Penguin Books. p345.
20. Fanon, Frantz. 1967. *Black Skin, White Masks*. New York: Grover Press, Inc.
21. Essien-Udom, EU. 1962. *Black Nationalism. A Search for an Identity in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
22. Cited in Lynch, Hollis R, ed. 1971. *Black Spokesman. Selected Published Writings of Edward Wilmot Blyden*. London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd. p228.
23. Johnson cited in Lynch, Hollis R, ed. 1971. *Black Spokesman. Selected Published Writings of Edward Wilmot Blyden*. London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd. p297.
24. From “excuse me,” which shows politeness.
25. Means Bachelor of Arts graduates.
26. Kuper, op cit.; Dubb, Allie A. 1974. The Impact of the City. In David Hammond-Tooke, ed. *The Bantu Speaking Peoples of Southern Africa*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
27. Kuper, op cit.; Coble, op cit.
28. “The Movement in Relation to the Black community.” Article by “Black Student Leader,” SASO Newsletter, May/June 1975.
29. Robinson, Cedric J. 1983. *Black Marxism. The Making of the Black Radical Tradition*. London: Zed Press. p257; Ranger, Terence. 1983. The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa. In Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
30. Nyquist cited in Dubb, op cit.
31. Cabral, Amilcar. 1973. *Return to Source: Selected Speeches of Amilcar Cabral*. Africa Information Service, ed. New York: Monthly Review Press.
32. Bhabha, Homi K. 1994 [2004]. *The Location of Culture*. New York: Routledge Classics.
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33. Bhabha, 1994:12.
34. Fanon, 2008:3.
35. Hall, Stuart. 2000. Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities. In Les Back and John Solomos, eds. *Theories of Race and Racism. A Reader*. London: Routledge.
36. Loomba, Ania. 1998. *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*. London: Routledge;
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- Cheers for Nativism. In Francis Barker, Peter Hulme and Margaret Iversen, eds. *Colonial Discourse/Postcolonial Theory*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
37. Holy Johnson in Lynch, op cit.:297.
 38. Fanon, op cit.
 39. Literary means believers or the faithful in the Christian sense.
 40. Carter, Karis and Stultz, op cit.; Cogley, op cit.
 41. Coconut is derision for culturally transformed blacks, who like a coconut are black/brown outside and white inside. Kopano Matlwa's book "Coconut" provides a lurid expose of the aspirations of a coconut.
 42. Facebook post by Mngxitama, 29 May 2011.
 43. Ibid.
 44. Mngxitama during a talk on "Fanon on Blackness," held at WISER, University of the Witwatersrand, May 31 2012.
 45. These are some of the debates at SNI Durban, 23–25 September 2011.
 46. Facebook post, May 29 2011.
 47. Facebook by Mngxitama, April 17 2012.
 48. Sandton is the richest suburb in South Africa and Africa.
 49. Facebook post, 17 April 2012.
 50. C.L.R. James interview with Aime Cesaire, cited in Cedric Robinson (1983: 259).
 51. Robinson, op cit.
 52. Nabudere, Dani Wadada. 1981. Imperialism and the Struggle for New Democracy Under Proletarian Leadership. *Ikhwezi* Number 18, October.
 53. Cabral, Amilcar. 1979. *Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings*. London: Heinemann.
 54. Cabral, Amilcar, op cit.:135.
 55. Nabudere, op cit.
 56. Du Bois, William Edward Burghardt. 1903. *The Souls of Black Folk*. Chicago: McClurg and Company.
 57. Cabral, op cit.
 58. Cited in Robinson, op cit.:449.
 59. Cogley, op cit.:xi.
 60. Kuper, op cit.
 61. Malcolm X with Haley, Alex. 1965 (2007). *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*. London: Penguin Books. p345.
 62. Bayart, Jean-François. 2006. *The State in Africa. The Politics of the Belly*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
 63. Ibid:182.
 64. Cabral, op cit.
 65. Chinweizu, op cit.; Fanon, Franz. 1961. *The Wretched of the Earth*. Translated by Constance Farrington. London: Penguin Books.

66. Fanon, op cit.
67. Ibid.
68. Cabral, op cit.:136.
69. Carmichael, Stokely (Kwame Ture) and Hamilton, Charles V. 1967. *Black Power. The Politics of Liberation in America*. New York: Random House.
70. Ibid.
71. Essien-Udom, op cit.
72. Malcolm X, op cit.
73. Du Bois, op cit.
74. Crenshaw, Williams Kimberle. 2000. Race, Reform and Retrenchment. Transformation and Legitimation in Anti-Discrimination Law. In Les Back and John Solomos, eds. *Theories of Race and Racism. A Reader*. London: Routledge.
75. Essien-Udom, op cit.
76. Malcolm X, op cit:378.
77. Haile Gerima, address to the SNI, Durban, 23 September 2011.
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79. West, op cit.
80. Ibid.
81. Dyson, Michael Eric. 1995. *Making Malcolm. The Myth and Meaning of Malcolm X*. New York: Oxford University Press.
82. Haile Gerima, address to the SNI, Durban, 23 September 2011.
83. Shelby, op cit.
84. West, op cit.
85. Crenshaw, op cit.; Shelby, op cit.
86. Shelby, op cit.
87. One is reminded of Jimmy Manyi's controversy resulting from comments he made about Indians and Coloureds. Attacks aimed at him took a racist and right-wing turn, and as a black man he had to be defended by blacks... only at that moment.
88. Shelby, op cit.
89. Cabral, op cit.
90. Dyson, op cit.
91. Malcolm X, op cit.; Dyson, op cit.
92. Haile Gerima, address to the SNI, Durban, 23 September 2011.
93. Barbecue.
94. The area is littered with upmarket restaurants and bars.
95. A contribution from the floor during SNI Durban, 23–25 September 2011.

Culture and History in the Black Struggles for Liberation

INTRODUCTION

There is no general agreement among contemporary BC adherents on the role of culture and history in black struggles. There are two contending positions. For purposes of expediency, let us call them “modernist” and “roots.” These are not a new aberration in contemporary BC thought, they are an age-old problematic the 1970s BC proponents grappled with and could find neither a common agreement nor a similar theoretical trajectory. Contemporary conversations are not much divorced from those of yore; thus, in this chapter, I am not looking at repeating them at length, rather I want to use more of the textual. One, which is prominent among the petit-bourgeois black radicals, says that black culture is anachronistic, is mired in atavism and that most black cultural practices are inimical to liberation because of their oppressive nature and history is inconsequential, what matters most is the present. This school believes in a “100 % modern black” and that there can only be subscription to a single culture: “a culture of liberation.” In contrast, the other view, which seems to be inspired by early advocates of Black Nationalism, contends that culture is a tool for consciousness. The realization is that in the New World, the racist schema denied Africans neither civilization nor “achievements” in science, arts or culture. African culture, therefore, was used to instil in black people a sense of pride; that black people do, indeed, have a history and have throughout history exacted numerous stupendous accomplishments. In

regards to these debates, in this chapter, I am not seeking to define what culture is, but to interrogate its role in black struggles for liberation.

For Sartre, colonization is an act of cultural genocide and dehumanization.¹

Colonial domination, which leads to poverty, oppression and inhibition of culture, is one single machine that is total and complete.² Fanon reckons through colonization, which he views as a Manichean world, the Negro loses his culture and customs, and those sources that made his being were decimated because they were seen to be in conflict with “modern civilization.” There are efforts to remind the colonized of the inferiority of his culture. In the New World, for example, slavery was justified on grounds of Negro heathenism; when he became a Christian, it was said he was different from white people. Afterwards, the Bible and science were used at the same time as anthropology to justify black inferiority due to physical characteristics.³ Through descriptions of himself, the Negro came to believe in his inherent inferiority. To attain superiority, he must become like the white man in colour, in achievement and so forth. Colonialism in perpetuating exploitation not only represses cultural life but also promotes cultural alienation through assimilation (as in cases of Lusophone and Francophone colonies), whereby colonial subjects assimilate colonizers’ mentality, see themselves as culturally superior to their people and look down on their cultural values.

THE MODERNIST VIEW

Colonization not only destroyed structures that built African society, but also distorted the history of the oppressed through a long-standing racist announcement that Africans had no history before 1652⁴ or that that they arrived in South Africa at the same time as white people.⁵ African culture was seen as barbaric, Africa itself a “dark continent” and religious practices as superstition.⁶ The colonized is “elevated” to colonizers’ culture and renounces his blackness since he now regards himself through the trope of whiteness. European culture not only strips him of his race but also induces alienation. For Biko, BC is directed to the past to rewrite black peoples’ history and elevate their heroes and see them as a people with a positive history. African culture’s most important aspect is its emphasis on man, its human centredness, the inherent goodness of man, human relationships, group intimacy, the idea of community and eschewing of individualism which marks the capitalist ethos where people use one another to progress.⁷ The prospect of rediscovering his culture gives the colonized

immense pleasure and hope.⁸ In his culture, he sees salvation, whereby when he was debilitated, he is now rehabilitated, is recognized and therefore he becomes somebody when he was nobody. National culture of the past legitimates these claims. Going back to one's culture is fundamental: it is a radical condemnation of the system's efforts to mentally enslave the people and repudiate colonial claims that Western civilization is meant to enlighten the natives and that their history is chequered with barbarism; if the settlers were to leave, they would descend into bestiality.⁹ Intellectuals begin to search for national culture that existed in the pre-colonial, and they start to shy away from Western culture. They discover that actually there is nothing to be ashamed of the past, as it was filled with dignity and glory. Cabral advocates for a "reconversion of minds," "of mental set," a "re-Africanization," a "return to the source," which can only be realized in the course of struggle, through daily contact with the popular masses "in the communion of sacrifice required by the struggle."¹⁰ It means concrete involvement with the independence struggle and total identification with the masses. For Fanon, this is the beginning of rehabilitation. The intellectual affirms the existence of African culture and adopts the concept of Negroism as a counter to white man's inhumanity. But I see Fanon's treatment of culture as an oxymoron. Sartre's essay "The Black Orpheus" critiques Negritude as a minor term, a dialectical regression. The theoretical and practical assertion of white supremacy is its thesis, Negritude is the anti-thesis and this value is a moment of negativity. Thus, Negritude has its own roots of destruction; it's a transition, not a conclusion, a means, not an ultimate end. Sartre continues and states that Negritude is an anti-racist racism. Fanon's riposte is that Sartre was denigrating his Negro being and his blackness at a time when he was trying to reclaim his Negritude; it is snatched away by the likes of Sartre. He says, "Without a Negro past, without a Negro future, it was impossible to live my Negrohood" and "black consciousness is immanent in its own eyes."¹¹ Fanon accuses Sartre of liberalism, destroying his black zeal where he (Fanon) "needed to lose myself completely in Negritude"; that he (Sartre) forgets the Negro suffers in his body differently from a white man. Fanon's heart yearns for Negritude and is proud of being a Negro: "My cry grows more violent: I am a Negro, I am a Negro, I am a Negro."¹² Following Senghor's and Césaire's writing on the beauty of African art, Fanon is inspired: "from the opposite end of the white world a magical Negro culture was hailing me. Negro sculpture! I began to flush with pride. Was this our salvation?"¹³ As a result of discovery of a glorious culture, the Negro is rehabilitated,

recognized and set on his feet again. The white man could not understand “the magic substitution,” “the secret,” which is necessitated by rummaging through the antiquity of a black man, a finding that takes Fanon’s breath away.¹⁴ Accomplishments and achievements of blacks “exhumed from the past, spread with its insides out, made it possible for me to find a valid historic place. The white man was wrong, I was not a primitive, not even a half man, I belonged to a race that had already been working in gold and silver 2000 years ago.”¹⁵ It seems to me, Fanon’s response to Sartre was for political expediency. In the last chapter of *Black Skin White Masks*, he makes an about-turn. Taking a cue from Marx that the revolution doesn’t draw from the past but from the future and that it has to “strip itself of all its superstitions concerning the past”; that revolutions of the nineteenth century have to let the dead bury the dead, Fanon seems to be steeped in existentialism and the ontological present that his analysis becomes befuddled; like a well-spoken and articulate man who all along has been pronouncing sober judgements until after a seventh beer he begins prattling. He writes: “the discovery that a black civilisation existed in the fifteenth century doesn’t earn me a certificate of humanity. Whether you like it or not, the past can in no way be my guide in the actual state of things.”¹⁶ He adds, “In no way does my basic vocation have to be drawn from the past of people of colour. In no way do I have to dedicate myself to reviving a black civilisation unjustly ignored. I will not make myself the man of any past. I do not want to sing the past to the detriment of my present and my future.”¹⁷ Fanon’s thesis is, even if discovery of feats and ingenuity of black people in the past is acknowledged, it cannot change the contemporary existential situation of the oppressed. Fanon claims, “he is not a prisoner of history,” he cannot ask today’s white man to answer for his ancestors’ excesses committed during slavery, and “am I trying to cause guilt to burgeon their souls? And grief, when they are confronted with the density of the past? I am a Blackman, and tons of chains, squalls of lashes, and rivers of spit stream over my shoulders. But I have not the right to put down roots. I have not the right to admit the slightest patch of being into my existence. I have no right to become mired by the determinations of the past. I am not a slave to slavery that dehumanised my ancestors.”¹⁸ History, therefore, will not be a determinant of his actions. Rather, his actions will be guided by his own impulses. For Fanon, the most important thing is to fight subjugation of man by man. He seems to be easing towards conciliatory politics when he says hankering on the past hinders genuine communication between the black

man and the white man. He says, "The misfortune of the man of colour is having been enslaved. The misfortune and inhumanity of the white man are having killed man somewhere."¹⁹ I find this reasoning alarming and extraordinary. What bothers one's peace is it has been used or misused by "modernists" in their approach to black history and culture, a position that remains theoretically, ideologically and politically inept.

Coming to debates in contemporary BC, the "modernist" group seems to subscribe to this view. Biko's formulation that modern culture should be "a culture of defiance, self-assertiveness and solidarity" has lent political weight to this view, although Biko himself was a "roots" person (as I indicate later in the chapter).²⁰ Biko acknowledges this culture has roots in situations and experience of oppression. It is expressed in urban sub-cultures where subjects craft new forms of cultural expressions. There is, of course, mimicry and imitation of the colonizers' culture; African culture is no longer expressed in pure forms, but as a hybrid distortion and deformation. One of the peculiarities of South African colonization is that its earlier machination sought to create a detribalized native (as seen in the effects of missionary education and emphasis on Western civilization). Later on the apartheid regime with its cultural relativism, there was retribalization where *ethnos*, culture and ethnicity were central themes in subjection, compartmentalization and nation making. In contrast, 1970s' BC didn't, in its analysis factor, probably because of its urban centredness and ostensibly its renunciation of the apartheid project that viewed African culture as static. Rather, they argued that since culture and traditions are man-made, they can be changed according to whether man continues to find value in them.²¹ Since culture is dynamic, blacks must destroy old and static customs and traditions that "have made the world a zoo and museum of human evolution ... almost all of the so-called tribal customs must be destroyed, because they cannot even do so little as to help the black man get food for the day."²² This affirms Bhabha's and Hountodji's view that all forms of culture are continually in a process of hybridity.²³ Let us quote one Vic Mafungo, who in this period, expresses a similar view:

We believe that a true set of value system for blacks can be extracted from the historical evolution of the culture of the black people and can be used in whatever innovations blacks make in modernising their culture. We reject the derogatory conception that a call for black culture implies a 'return to the bush' demand.²⁴

BC rejected the dilution and corruption of black values given that blacks were emulating whites as a result of their dominant cultural position: “whilst not rejecting all that is white, we however, condemn the escalation of the decadent subculture so common in the black urban areas as a result of economic conditions and blacks aspiring to be white.”²⁵ BC believed that authentic black culture can be successfully projected through art forms, theatre, literature, music, sculpture and so on. This view, I think, is fraught with contradictions and is yet to frame a coherent position on culture: in repudiating African customs, it risks falling into the same racist colonial schema that viewed African culture as “backward” and “barbaric.” Some of the contributions of the “modernist” camp border on ludicrous, if not simplicity. There have been attempts to call for abolition of cultural indices that mark Africans’ identity like *izithakazelo*. The reasoning is they don’t contribute anything to the betterment of black peoples’ lives. Other customs and traditions like *s’manje*, *lobola* and *ulwaluko* are seen as backward, anachronistic and oppressive. It says some of the “so-called black cultures” have to be discarded because there is nothing revolutionary about them. Only those that work for blacks must be preserved. One participant intimated that he would find it highly amusing if the “modernists” would go about telling people to discard *lobola*. The risk of declaring war on the masses and alienating them is greater and more hazardous to any political project. One cannot afford this because one always needs the people. The “modernists” also say as black people there can only be a single culture, that is, “a culture of liberation” or a “culture of resistance.” Personally, I think the “culture of liberation” has become common place, used to mask an inherent disdain of African culture. For me, there is nothing like a “culture of liberation,” there can only be a “practice of liberation” or a “practice of resistance.” The “modernist” view also rejects traditional Black Nationalist mantras like “Black and Beautiful” or “Black Pride,” which were central in formulation of blackness and its agency, because there is nothing to be proud of being black if one lives in a shack, starves or is in perpetual want, they argue. Conversations on *Facebook* and elsewhere show a binary division on the approaches to culture, customs and traditions. The “roots” camp regards views on cultural traditions by people like Andile Mngxitama as “no better than that of born again Christians and bible wielding lunatics.”²⁶ On *Facebook*, someone related an incident where he told his students that the idea of wearing black for

women when mourning started with Queen Victoria when she was grieving her husband. His students said African culture doesn't exist, what they have is just a colonial form with certain remnants of Africa's past culture. The person wrote: "you see if you are landless and oppressed, you have no culture of your own! You just mimic and are a copycat of other peoples' lifestyles. Culture and power go hand in hand. If you are powerless you only practice an oppressed culture. In Marxist terms the economic superstructure determines culture."²⁷ Clearly, there is a heady Fanonian influence on the "modernist" camp. It is not surprising. Fanon was a Frenchman, in and out. His thinking is 100 % French, which is crafted in the genealogy of French philosophy.²⁸ The same title of his book "Black Skin White Masks" may be an apt reference to him. One notes mimicry of the prevailing cultural modes, which radicals employ in their theory, ideology and political practice. They seem to be vindicated by Bhabha, who sees mimicry as a form of defence and a means to destabilize authority.²⁹ Bhabha's argument is that those who oppose the dominant power on its own terms or in its own language are usually caught in its logic, and thus perpetuate it.³⁰ That's the reason why he calls for contiguity rather than direct opposition as the most effective position to assume, and also infiltration of the dominant symbolic orders and systems rather than rejection or reversal of the dominant.³¹ This approach renders black struggles accommodationist, conformist, reformist and contradictory because tools and trope of conceptualization used to undermine the system belong to the very system. Advocates of this position are privileged black middle-class radical elite who produce a cultural discourse that denigrates African value systems, carry cultural baggage of Western culture, preserve the status quo and are not dissimilar to imperialist and racist position in regards to African culture. According to Ajayi, those blacks who consider knowledge of the past as irrelevant can only be presumed to harbour a colonialist view of the African past.³² It is improbable that these middle-class blacks can commit to a black struggle whilst they are dually suspended between Western modernity and fear of the values and customs of their people. If they cannot adjust, profess loyalties and identify with black ethos, then despite the Black Nationalist rhetoric they spew with regularity, they certainly are black people with white souls; they are colonizers with a colonial mind-set who masquerade as black revolutionaries.

CULTURE AND HISTORY

All racially subjugated people have had to struggle with the dilemma of constructing a positive, valorizing identity to offset the negative representation projected by racism. Black people have had to deal with an ideological assault that has historically represented them as the anti-thesis of civilization, intelligence and advancement, factors claimed as constituent elements of whiteness.³³ The racial world-view and culture of racism suppress the self-esteem and distort forms of consciousness of the racial others.³⁴ In the USA, for example, history and the relationship between then and now reveals how African-Americans (re) construct the past through cultural politics of memory.³⁵ The sacred and profane dimensions of memory are seen as the key to identity, including the contestation by African-Americans of the Euro-American claims to superior history. This is an integral part of the struggle against racism. The dark and savage Africa is redeemed through achievements of ancient Egypt's Africanity and blackness, a place where Europeans have "recognised, admired, and appropriated as the roots of their own."³⁶ The argument is the "Negro" had a glorious past.³⁷ For Ture and Hamilton, it is absolutely essential that black people know their history, "that they know their roots, that they develop an awareness of their cultural heritage."³⁸ This thought places black people on the mantle of important contributions to civilization—invention of smelting iron; Ethiopia (the land of the sunburnt faces as mentioned by Greek writers) was the highest seat of civilization; Axum, Kanem, Zazzau, Zimbabwe and Sudan were also great centres of civilization; Ghana, Mali and Songhai contained schools and centres of learning and the university of Sankore at Timbuktu were famous.³⁹ Let us quote du Bois:

What in our civilisation is distinctly British or American? Nothing. Science was built in Africa and religion in Asia. Was there no other way for advance of mankind? Were there no other cultural patterns, ways of action, goals of progress, which might and may lead man to something finer and higher? Africa saw the stars of God; Asia saw the soul of man; Europe saw and sees only man's body, which it feeds and polishes until it is fat, gross and cruel.⁴⁰

Africans on the continent and in the Diaspora have always acknowledged the importance of black history in black struggles. Black History Month⁴¹ (BHM), for example, which was started in 1926 by Carter G. Woodson (a Howard University professor), as Negro History Week, showed a growing

realization that blacks had a history and thus a permanent place and inalienable right to US citizenship.⁴² Levine argues that all modern history is black history because of Africa's and Africans' central, even if it's a still subaltern, role in the history of the modern world. Articles in the *Journal of Negro History* (founded by Woodson), not only taught blacks about the commonality of their cultural DNA but also forced them to confront the violence that is at the core of that shared history. There is a reminder that "black people were not just indigenous to another continent (Africa); their passage to the Americas constituted the foundation—and along with the genocide of indigenous Americans—the original sin of modernity, from which the world, and particularly Africa, have yet to recover."⁴³ Levine adds, "our common history, whether 100,000 or 1000 years ago, is rooted in or passes through Africa." Black history becomes a hagiography that celebrates achievements of blacks (the racial firsts) who showed that blacks are fully human and who are not inferior. The danger with this position, though, is it becomes a positive racial uplift favoured by conservatives including affluent BMC. BHM in the USA has become contested, one version being the corporatist that suppresses radical voices and radical visions of black people by promulgating a colour-blind society. The other counters the colour-blind theory and contends little has changed in the lives of blacks. Rather than celebrating black progress, it points out the continuity of white supremacy, state violence, exploitation and disenfranchisement of black Americans.⁴⁴ This version is more confrontational, more collectively oriented and concerned with political urgency of the present and asks the following question:

How could there still be more black men in prison than in college; if Obama marks the end of racism? How could the days of plantations and ghettos be over when, according to the Pew Research Centre, the average white family today possesses twenty times the wealth of the average black family?⁴⁵

Raiford and Cohen conclude that BHM needs to retain its faith in a future beyond white supremacy, and its emphasis on promoting African-American racial pride remains as important as ever. But it also needs to stay true to Dr. Woodson's larger project of educating all Americans about the truth of the country's past—a truth including the history of slavery and sexual violence, convict leasing and lynching and segregation and hyper-incarceration. For du Bois, Pan-Africa seeks to preserve its history, write

the present account and erase the lies and distortions about black folk.⁴⁶ Edward Wilmot Blyden before him had indicted colonial and slave history:

A people with a passion for taking away the countries of others and dignifying the robbery as conquests; and whose systematic cruelty has been shown for ages, in chaining, buying and selling another ... that the part of the man-stealer and man-seller is far more contemptible than the part of the man stolen and sold ... history absolves the Negro being as 'a despised race' because his hands are free from the blood of other men. He has not in any way oppressed other races.⁴⁷

The return to history is paramount, that is, to a history of populations long thought to be people without a past but whose past is now very much of the present.⁴⁸

Recurring question is as follows: Is black history merely a sad prelude to the present or an on-going nightmare of discrimination and violence?⁴⁹ The answer is that the study of the past is not only soothing and a fountain of inspiration but also a source of black rage. Du Bois recounts an incident he had with an editor when offering an article, which began with a reference to the experience of the past century: "Oh", he (editor) said, "leave out the history and come to the present."⁵⁰ Du Bois says he felt like going to him over a 1000 miles and taking him by the lapels: "Dear, dear jack-ass! Don't you understand that the past is the present; that without what was, nothing is? Those of the infinite dead, the living are but unimportant bits?"⁵¹ In the new African renaissance, according to Nkrumah, there is need to place great emphasis on history that mirrors African society, capture its experience so as to guide and direct African action and "can thus become a pointer at the ideology which should guide and direct African reconstruction."⁵² In other words, there should be a connection between an ideological standpoint and writing of history.

In the 1950s and 1960s, it was realized that anti-colonial nationalism had its roots deep in the African past and that it was only a product of a continuous process of resistance, which took diverse forms, that is, armed struggle, African Independent Churches, welfare associations, strikes and so forth.⁵³ In the New World, black radicals were impelled to read about Africa to challenge white mythologies and racist representations of Africa's past, which have been used not only to justify slavery but also to maintain segregation and oppression. American blacks, in particular, found themselves driven to make the most serious study of the African past.⁵⁴ Malcolm X has put it more succinctly:

The social philosophy of Black Nationalism involves emphasis upon the culture of the black man, which will be designed for us to connect with our cultural roots, to restore the racial dignity necessary for us to love our own kind and strike at the evils and vices that are at the centre of the moral fibre of our own community and our own society. The social philosophy of Black Nationalism encourages the black man to elevate his own society instead of trying to force himself into the unwanted presence of white society.⁵⁵

National culture is attached to the realities of the people and is not divorced from the struggle for freedom. The fight for liberation ensures existence of culture, and the struggle itself is a cultural undertaking.⁵⁶ The common bond of all African cultures is the fight against colonial domination. This culture must be a popular culture that takes into cognizance diversity of levels of cultures, thus making it a national culture with a national dimension.⁵⁷ It is around peoples' struggles that African/Negro culture takes substance, and not only through songs, poetry, folklore and so on.⁵⁸ This is predicated by the need to create necessary conditions for the existence of that culture which is the liberation of the whole African continent. The value of culture in resisting colonial domination is decisive because colonialism thrives not only on material domination but also on permanent cultural impairment.⁵⁹ Culture is an element of resistance because domination is a manifestation of physical, social and ideological realities of a dominated society. Cabral's argument is that national liberation involves formulation by people of their history, which colonialism usurped. National liberation takes place when national productive forces are freed of colonial domination, and this frees prospects of cultural assertion and cultural development. Cabral, like Fanon, emphasizes that national liberation is an act of culture.

THE ROOTS VIEW

Let us look at the "roots" view. Culture has been central in the liberation movement. An article in the SASO newsletter, for example, says SASO, through its cultural committee (CULCOM), "aims at reawakening the people to the beauty of their past kingdoms so that they will be able to deal with this turbulent present and an even more unpredictable future."⁶⁰ It also decries blacks reading their "history" written by other people who don't know how it is like to be black. Note that Biko had recognized that African cultural values were dissipated by Christianity, missionary education

and Anglo-Boer culture, which taught the black man to be submissive.⁶¹ The role of BC was to eradicate this. To aid the black man's consciousness, there is a need to go back and rewrite the distorted history and reproduce "our heroes who offered resistance to the white man."⁶² There are similarities here with Garvey, who encouraged the "Negro" to forget and cast behind him hero worship and adoration of other races and to start to create and emulate his own: "we must canonize our own saints, create our own martyrs and elevate to positions of fame and honour black men and women who have made their distinct contributions to our racial history."⁶³ Biko argues for the return to the past. He writes, "Our culture must be defined in concrete terms. We must relate the past to the present and demonstrate a historical evolution of the modern black man."⁶⁴ My understanding is that while black people are caught and trapped in modernism, the past, unlike the position of Biko's contemporaries, still forms a cohesive part in stimulating the consciousness, subjectivity and agency of black people. Biko observes that although the colonizer "devoured our culture" and bastardized it, basic tenets of African culture have withstood this bastardization because "we are a man centred society whose sacred tradition is that of sharing."⁶⁵ Note similarities with Cabral who observes that despite betrayal by African indigenous elite, superiority of imperial forces, organized repression and cultural destruction, African culture and cultural resistance survived through generations.⁶⁶ This is exhibited through freedom struggles for liberation. Black culture has the power for innovation, which enables it to be responsive to new problems and challenges as seen in the inherent creativity of black theatre, drama and music. The "roots" view realizes the totality of the past, the present and the future; drawing from culture, the present generation should be makers of history.⁶⁷ It calls for a reappraisal of a language that reproduces white supremacist vocabulary and psychological mind-set, partnered with a critical evaluation of accoutrement and fashion that is promoted by global images, coupled with "watching television instead of reading about our heroes; preoccupation with television has meant we have become a sick society."⁶⁸ This culture endeavours to make people forget their pain; it, therefore, cannot be regarded as useful in the project of emancipation.

The cultural bases of Haitian revolution were steeped in the nocturnal rituals of possession done in the forests and forest spaces that cultivated a culture of freedom that enabled slaves to cope with hells of slavery and facilitated a foundation for common devotion and solidarity.⁶⁹ Voodoo played an invaluable role where the enslaved enacted rituals that allowed

their bodies to be possessed by their ancestors and their gods, thereby becoming gods, kings and queens, sovereigns and free people at night. At midnight celebration of voodoo, slaves danced and sang:

Eh! E! Bomba! Heu! Heu!

Canga, Moune de le!

Canga, do ki la! Canga!

[Translation: we swear to destroy the whites and all that they possess; let us die rather than fail to keep this vow.]⁷⁰ Although slave-owners tried to stamp this song and voodoo, it was futile and quixotic because for over 200 years the slaves sang it at their meetings. One such ritual was conducted by a voodoo priestess (*mambo*) and a priest (*oungan*) of the snake cult. The rituals required oaths, sanctioned with the will of God, encoded the virtue of silence and “sometimes a vase, containing the still warm blood of a goat, will seal on the lips of the participants the promise to suffer death rather than reveal anything, and even to administer death to whomsoever may forget that he had solemnly bound himself to the oath.”⁷¹ Further, the rituals shaped and engendered a radical anti-slavery ethos in the agency of the enslaved and a culture of respect, discipline, cohesion, trust, community, security and viability that became an organizational basis of the Haitian revolution.⁷² Invocations were also made to the patron God of the revolution, Mbumba (*Nzambi Mpungu*), urging him to destroy white oppressors (*mundele*) and their black supporters (*bafioti*), and these became the invocations and chants of the revolution. The *bafioti* were regarded as mentally enslaved, their physical person zombified. Those who sided with Napoleon’s counter-revolution were “black skin white heart,” “Uncle Toms” whose mental enslavement was a category of blackness.⁷³ For Rene Depestre, the Haitian revolution was a confirmation and a demonstration of the concept of Negritude and quips, “our national history is Negritude in action.”⁷⁴

In reference to the role of ancestors in Zimbabwean war of liberation, Nabudere observes that concepts of analysis such as Marxist categories must take into account real traditional and spiritual forces existing in a community.⁷⁵ Many young guerrillas came from Christian homes or urban areas; some received political education in the socialist bloc and would have hardly likely to be sympathetic to spirit mediums playing a role in the

struggle.⁷⁶ But guerrilla commanders were pragmatic and they planned to lay a durable foundation of long-term cooperation with the peasantry; certainly they knew the role of mediums in the 1896 First Chimurenga, of Nehanda, Chaminuka and Kaguvi,⁷⁷ who all formed part of the Second Chimurenga's⁷⁸ spiritual guidance. Mediums wielded power and authority and helped in recruitment; guerrillas offered land, to be returned to its original and rightful owners, which struck a shared vision and aims between the former and the latter. There were, of course, rituals, lore and spiritual guardianship guerrillas were compelled to observe, which ensured their survival and success. Some "modernists" may view this as superstition, but this was the pragmatic reality of the Zimbabwean struggle, which is a legend even today. Activities of the guerrillas show that old set of categories survived not as a blunted relic of the past but as an attempt to make the world new.⁷⁹ Taking the Zimbabwean example into account, Nabudere calls for the need for a hermeneutic dialogue between tradition and modernity and between the past and the present. It is improbable zanu/zanla/zapu/zipra guerrillas could have succeeded if they had blindly adopted Marx's faith in the future communist society and "banished the past" in their practice by disregarding the role of ancestors. Lan further queries the "modernist" view:

If to be revolutionary means to make a complete break with the past then it cannot ... nor can it elsewhere. A total break must always be perceived as chaos. Without guidance from the past, how can we know what changed, what has stayed the same?⁸⁰

This doesn't deny the fact that concrete realities must be factored in. It happens that some beliefs and superstitions may hinder progress of the struggle. The struggle as a process does "process" all caught in it. Gradually, beliefs and convictions naturally change; some may even recede into oblivion, not by compulsion, but by a natural synthetic progress. For example, Cabral relates, "... many of us believed that we should not install ourselves in certain bush areas because they belonged to *iram* spirit. But today thanks to many *iram* spirits of our land, our folk understood, and even the *iram* understood, that the bush belongs to man and no-one is afraid of the bush any more. We are even well established in the Cobiana bush, the more so because that *iram* spirit is a nationalist. It 'said' openly that the Portuguese had to go away, had no right to be in our land."⁸¹

The devastating historical experience, which African people have gone through under colonialism, shows the continued preservation and use of their cultural heritage to resist, survive and withstand the ravages of Western imperialism and postcolonial neo-colonialism.⁸² Even though colonialists used some aspects of African customs and traditions to enforce colonial rule, this didn't subdue the people entirely or destroy African traditions and customs completely. They used those resources of their spirituality and culture to adapt, modify practices and resist negative colonial impositions. Used in this way, tradition and culture proved to be a revolutionary resource that enabled African people to reassert their humanity, integrity and dignity. Nabudere argues that the use of culture and tradition was part and parcel of the human struggle for self-preservation, self-identity, self-representation, liberation and freedom.⁸³

CONCLUSION

One's conception of the world is derived from the present and historical reality.⁸⁴ Just like philosophy cannot be separated from history of philosophy, nor can culture from the history of culture. Gramsci argues one cannot have a critical and coherent conception of the world without having a consciousness of its historicity. This is a fact that contemporary BC adherents have to acknowledge. They need to craft all their programmes, political, theoretical and ideological positions on the basis of "pulse of the people." They need to constantly feel what that pulse is like on each and every day. Rather than imposing prescriptions on the people, they have to engage hermeneutically with them, understand them, dialogue with them and learn from their practices. That is the hallmark of an authentic and true revolutionary.

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Collaboration, Complicity and “Selling-Out” in South African Historiography

Present discourses among BC adherents infer to the postapartheid South African social order as a “sell-out.” In this chapter I trace the etymological, ideological and political roots of the term “sell-out.” I argue that this is a complex, multidimensional term, whose usage and meaning is contingent to prevailing socio-political conditions of any given time. In its universality, it transcends space and time but finds acute expression in South African political historiography. Since collaboration and “selling-out” have defined South African liberation politics, I find it opportune to ask and seek answers to these questions: Who is and what are the dimensions of a “sell-out?” What is that they sell? What is the morality behind the allegations? Why are black people penchant on “selling-out” their own kindred? Why do people engage in “selling-out,” collaboration and complicity? Who has the power to label another a “sell-out”? Hopefully, at the end of this presentation, some light would be shed on these theoretical dilemmas. This chapter is not meant to be a historical narrative per se; rather, it attempts to show the historical development of a character called “sell-out” as it insinuates itself in South African black political history. I haven’t separated “sell-out,” complicity and collaboration. I will show how all these are sometimes difficult to study as distinct, “standing alone,” but rather intersect, interlock and converge in different historical epochs. Complicity refers to yet another form of collaboration by post-colonial native elite where colonial economic, cultural and political structures framed by colonial masters remain. Therefore, I seek to interrogate

this concept and how it has defined contemporary postcolonial relations. I would make a large claim and declare that in history there is always a “sell-out.” As a historical phenomenon, this character is also universal, appearing in different socio-political and socio-economic contexts, contingent to hitherto existing conditions. In South Africa, as I will show, selling out and collaboration have been complex, contested and debated. My methodology in preparing this presentation relies on a substantial amount of archival research. I have dug deep into history, where seemingly yellowing and rusty pages presented voices that speak from the nether world. The ageing pages, I found to my confounding astonishment, were actually breathing with life; voices that I found speaking from the past, not forgotten and buried, but implications for the present. I have also benefited from numerous conversations with a cross-section of participants:—the youth, the middle-aged and old “war horses” who were in the thick of struggle against apartheid.

COLLABORATION AND COMPLICITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY

According to Edward Roux’s account, during the eighth Xhosa War of Resistance (1850–1853), which was the longest and bloodiest, the Xhosa faced threats to their land, independence and an impending doom from the colonists.¹ Only a “miracle” could save them from this apocalypse. Given this state of affairs, where the “Bantu,” beaten by guns, horsemen and superior fire-power of the Europeans, turned to the spiritual world for help.² On a particular day in 1856, in an area inhabited by the Xhosa, a young girl called Nonqawuse was coming from drawing water from Gxara, a small river east of the Kei. According to legend, she met the spirits of the dead, who happened to be the mortal enemies of the white men, who had come from the sea to aid the Xhosa in driving the English from the land.³ Her uncle, Mhlakaza, delivered the prophetic message to the paramount chief, Sarili. The spiritual orders required that all cattle were to be killed and eaten. In addition, no one was to cultivate the land. The reward for observance of these strict injunctions was a punitive measure by the gods; the sky would fall and crush the white people and all the blacks who had not obeyed the spirits.

The aftermath of this “prophecy” was that of 150,000 Xhosas, 25,000–30,000 perished as a result of cattle killing and resultant famine. A mass

exodus ensued; thousands reached the Cape colony and offered themselves as labour where they were given food, shelter and work. According to Roux, Nonqawuse and Mhlakaza had effectively solved the labour problem of the colonists.⁴ The military might of the Xhosa was broken, and it would be a generation before they would be able to fight again. While Mhlakaza is believed to have died of starvation, Sarili and Nonqawuse fled to Bashie. While no attempt was made to arrest Sarili, Nonqawuse was sought by a group of Africans and handed over to the authorities. She was, however, released shortly afterwards, changed her name to Victoria Regina and retired somewhere near present-day Port Elizabeth. The story of Nonqawuse is subject to controversy and debate. On one hand, she is likened to Joan of Arc, and is seen as a prophet of Xhosa nationalism; on the other, she may have colluded with the British. The latter claim is lent credence by the fact that the Cape governor, Sir George Grey, whose earlier career had taken him to Australasia and had studied the "superstitious" mind of the native, could have used Nonqawuse to solve the debilitating labour woes the early colonists faced.

Collaboration and "selling-out" has a long, unique and peculiar thread in South African history, immediately beginning with colonial contact. According to Hosea Jaffe, the first "traitor" to Africans was Krotoa (Eva), who was an intermediary between her uncle, Autchumao (Herry), and Jan Van Riebeeck, for whom she worked as a translator.⁵ Eva acted as a go-between in peace negotiations, which followed the KhoiKhoi wars and persuaded them to part with their cattle for the sake of "peace." She also tried to prevent the KhoiKhoi from joining and receiving rebellious and runaway slaves. Eva became a factor in Van Riebeeck's divide-and-rule strategy, and reliably she became an instrument of the Dutch East India Company. She later married a Dutchman, Pieter Van Meerhof, in 1664, in a glittering ceremony complete with pomp and entertainment. After the couple's death, her children were taken to Mauritius to be brought up as "Europeans." Eva is said to have lived and died despised by both the Khoi and the Dutch. She is said to be the first African "quisling" because she was Van Riebeeck's "eyes and ears."⁶

During the intervening years, there is evidence of African chiefs who collaborated with the invading European armies leading to large-scale loss of land. But for the purposes of this chapter, I will fast track the history to mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Missionary activity, which worked in tandem with the colonizing forces, had by nineteenth century succeeded in establishing churches and schools

in many parts of South Africa. It is from the latter that the first African educated elite emerged. These elite are historically important because they were the first to challenge the colonial status quo.

In this history, one important and prominent figure I would like to make reference to is John Tengo Jabavu. Jabavu, who was behind the Native Electoral Association in 1884, would for the next 30 years lead progressive Africans in the Cape. In 1887, Jabavu led an unsuccessful opposition to the Parliamentary Voters Registration Bill, which denied Africans the vote by defining qualifications for the franchise. Thus, throughout the history of African protests, the question of the franchise would assume a central role.⁷ The likes of Jabavu were not radical; instead, they preached loyalty and subordination to superiors. He published these postulations with rigour and vigour in his newspaper *Imvo Zabantsundu*. Simons and Simons observe that although men like Jabavu and Dr. Abdurrahman⁸ were great among their people; they faced racial discrimination in their endeavours.⁹ Though unwilling, and perhaps unable to alienate themselves from the poor and oppressed, they didn't escape from compromises that are forced on leaders without power who seek to reform but never overthrow an evil social order. Although the Cape liberalism declined and racial discrimination spread, leaders like Tengo Jabavu still maintained faith in white patronage, a belief that proved futile. Tengo Jabavu opposed the forming of South African Native Congress (later ANC) in 1912 because of his deep faith in the Cape non-racial system. He also didn't like an organization that didn't centre on working with sympathetic whites to exert pressure within the established parliamentary system, and so he formed the South African Races Congress. In 1913, the new minister of Native Affairs, J.W. Sauer, proposed the Natives' Land Act of 1913, building on proposals outlined by his predecessor J.B.M. Hertzog. The law would become the main hallmark of African policy of the Union government.¹⁰ Ironically, Jabavu in his newspaper's editorial, considered Sauer a "friend of the Africans," and on his death he gave him a glowing eulogy. Jabavu's actions in supporting the white government, defending the 1913 Land Act and later supporting the Native Affairs Bill in 1920 were some of classic acts of complicity. When he stood against the incumbent Walter Rubusana in the election for Tembuland provincial council, the African votes were split. The election was won by a white candidate, A. Payne (1004 votes to Rubusana's 852 and Jabavu's 294). This betrayal ended his political career, and as a result, Africans would not again have their own representative. Simons and Simons observe that although there was

a streak of Uncle Tom in Tengo Jabavu, he wasn't a white man's lackey.¹¹ However, looking at the man's career, one can detect the roots of complicity, which would be a recurrent feature in South African black politics.

On 25 November 1925, Hertzog made a speech in the Orange Free State town of Smithfield where he outlined the "solution" for the "Native Question": removal of all Africans from the common voters roll, white representation of "Natives" in parliament, delimitation of land within the framework of Native Land Act and establishment of a partly nominated, partly elected "Native Councils." The Hertzog Native Bills, first formulated in 1926 and referred to a Select Committee in 1927, sought to abolish the Cape African vote completely. To "compensate" that, a second Bill would promise "Natives" a certain measure of representation by white senators; the third Bill would be an amendment of the Natives' Land Act of 1913, called the Native Land and Trust Bill, which proposed to set up a board of trustees in which "natives" with money could have access to a total of 12 % of the land.

These preceding developments culminated in the formation of the Non-European Conference on 23 June 1927, which assembled in the City Hall in Kimberley calling for a closer cooperation among non-Europeans and between Europeans and non-Europeans and opposition to Hertzog's proposals. In January 1930, Mveli Skota, ANC's Secretary General, moved a motion for an All-African Convention to fight for rights and liberties of Africans. African political organizations throughout the country agreed to work together and convened an All-African National Convention (AAC) whose inaugural meeting was held on 16 December 1935 at Bloemfontein. While more than 400 delegates assembled, there was, according to those participants, "only one outstanding traitor": the Reverend John Dube, who publicly declared himself in favour of the Bills. But who cared for Dube, some delegates asked? He was known to be a "government man."¹² While the radicals and communists rejected the Bills and called for militant action, their efforts were rebuffed by conference leading heads, who were moderates and were inclined for negotiation. Despite protests, the Hertzog Bills were, nonetheless, passed into law in April 1936, at a joint session of both houses of parliament, by 169 votes to 11. A Native Representative Council (NRC) was also to be created with 12 elected Africans, four Africans chosen by the government and white Native Commissioners under the chairmanship of the secretary for Native Affairs.

The AAC again met in June 1936 to deliberate on unity by African organizations in opposing the Native Representative Act. It was yet to be

seen whether the Convention would have nothing to do with the new law or use the NRC as a platform to demand an extension to the franchise and a vote for all South Africans, black or white. The AAC sought a policy of “political identity” and “full partnership” devoid of dominance by one racial group over another. The Africans, though, were ready to accept a “civilization test”¹³ as a qualification for the franchise. At the meeting, ANC’s Dr. A.B. Xuma (who would later on become ANC president) was optimistic the “Bantu” would reach a higher stage of civilization and begin to behave with proper decorum. This prompts De Kock to state:

In view of the rapacious political thievery South African blacks were subjected to, such sentiments do indeed sound quaint. Here we see a paradox typical of early African Nationalism: the response to segregationist pressure is seemingly dressed in a language of complicity with colonial, “civilising discourse.”¹⁴

De Kock further notes:

On the surface we have an emergent African nationalist discourse framing its ideals in what post-colonial theory would regard as language of complicity. Here is a genuinely representative post-colonial ethos, not driven by self-serving elitist of bourgeois sell-outs that seemingly ask to be measured by the standards of imperial “civilisation.”¹⁵

One contentious question was whether the African organizations would participate in the elections of members of the new NRC. Despite rejection of the Bills by many in the AAC, including in the discussions of the United Transkeian Territories General Council (the Bunga), most AAC members acquiesced to Professor D.D.T. Jabavu’s call to use whatever means and platforms to air their grievances. The Convention agreed on participation, and many Africans associated with the AAC, including the ANC, members of the Left and the Communist Party, leaders of Location Advisory Boards and the Transkei Bunga, in June 1937, ran for NRC elections, and later on became councillors. While the AAC gathering in 1935 rejected the Hertzog Native Bills, the 1936 conference steered by leaders bent on assuming leadership and directing the movement along innocuous lines led to a “compromise” where the leadership, without reference to the people who sent them, agreed to the Bills on the liberal premise that “half a loaf is better than nothing.”¹⁶ One major weakness was that the masses

entrusted their allegiance to intellectuals as their spokesmen and leaders on the basis of their personality and prestige. Indeed, the highest political honour for African leaders in the late 1930s and 1940s, according to Tabata, was to be labelled an "NRC." Therefore, in the absence of principle, there were no checks and balances that gave leeway to opportunism. As a result, the spirit and resistance on the part of the African people, which had manifested itself in the first AAC conference, now gave way to compromise and collaboration.

The AAC, which since its inception had allowed all non-whites to be members, became dominated by coloured and black African radicals in the Cape. On 16 December 1941, I.B. Tabata, while addressing the AAC conference, criticized the ANC for not wanting to be part of the AAC, which would unite all political organizations and therefore become an African parliament. Tabata blamed the leadership for failing the masses. The masses had now realized that they had to rely on themselves because the firm intentions of the white rulers were to keep them under perpetual servitude. It was imperative that all factional divisions and differences be wiped out in an effort for unity against a common enemy. Taking an audit of the AAC's six years of existence, Tabata observed:

we can see two distinct traits in the Convention: knavish submission to the ruling class and fear for their own people. In order to retain the goodwill of the authorities the leaders must see to it that the people do nothing that will really improve their lot, or challenge the status quo. For it is their political task to bring conciliation between the oppressed and the oppressor, not conflict. It's their task to bring about the acceptance of oppression, not the determination to overthrow it.

Tabata critiqued the leaders for trying to make the AAC innocuous by engaging in negotiations with the prime minister. He saw parliamentary representation as a "fraud," and the Convention was obliged to tell the people that they had nothing to expect from this sham representation because it wouldn't change their material conditions "whether they elect these three members or the other three, they will not get higher wages or land or houses or education, but they will remain slaves as long as they accept and submit to this slavery legislation." He criticized the NRC and white liberals, like Ballinger and Molteno:

I maintain that one has to be in the skin of the oppressed to feel and suffer as an African does, if he wants to represent him. This representation therefore is a farce. Even if there were, not three white representatives of six and half million Africans, but thirty, it would still be sham representation.

Tabata went on to say that while “parliamentary representation is a sham, the NRC is worse. It is a complete dud. It is neither native, nor representative nor council ... and besides it presents such a sorry spectacle, that it is today the most humiliating insult for the Africans. They robbed us of our land and of our rights. They shouldn’t mock us by forcing twelve men to play the role of jesters who kiss the whip that is lashing us.” As a farce, it was only “providing many jokes for the oppressors: the Pondo chief asking for an aeroplane ride ... or A. M. Jabavu showing his appreciation at sitting in Pretoria City Hall where no native has ever put his foot.”

Some coloureds in the Cape had, early in 1943, rigorously opposed the establishment of the Coloured Affairs Department (CAD). As a result, they formed the Anti-CAD linked with the AAC into a federal body called the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM), which condemned all forms of participation in segregated forms of representation. The AAC, therefore, proposed for a federal body including groups like coloureds (under Anti-CAD) and Indians (under the South African Indian Congress [SAIC]), which would unify all non-European people in the struggle against segregation. The Convention then decided against trusteeship and segregation; the struggle by oppressed groups in South Africa, the black Africans, the coloureds and the Indians was identical in aim and methods. By December 1943, the AAC and the National Anti-CAD had coalesced into the Unity Movement, which adopted non-collaboration and boycott as a basis for struggle. Of course, boycott and non-collaboration would inform the methods of struggle until the 1980s. NEUM leaders didn’t advance traditional working class methods of struggle but adopted “non-collaboration” as their slogan. They rejected “dummy bodies” like NRC, CAC, native representatives, township advisory boards, the Bungas and any other body set up to “advise” on events in the Reserves. Any person who cooperated with these institutions was a “quisling” who faced the ignominy of personal boycotted. Boycott as a struggle weapon has been borrowed by generations of activists, the word itself originating from Captain Boycott who oppressed and exploited peasants in Ireland. Ultimately, he was completely isolated and ostracized, and eventually forced to capitulate. Boycott, which has been employed for three centuries, was used by

the country's activists to describe non-cooperation.¹⁷ This came against a background of a litany of discriminatory laws in the 1930s: the Native Urban Areas Act, 1923, amended in 1937; Native Laws Amendment Act, 1937; Industrial Conciliation Act, 1937; Master and Servants Act, Native Labour Regulation Act, 1913, redefined in 1942; the Factories Act, 1941 and the effects of discrimination, which black Africans, coloureds and Indians felt spurred a need for a non-white unity. The CAD, which Prime Minister Jan Smuts set up in 1943 to perform advisory functions with 20 coloureds appointed by government, galvanized coloured leaders opposed to this racially discriminatory institution, which they saw as similar to the Native Affairs Department (NAD). Thus, there was a common awareness among all non-whites that they had a common enemy, the white oppressor.

On 26 August 1943, a manifesto was adopted by the AAC declaring that:

For eight years we have been developing on our own lines. For eight years we have been fooling around with dummies, with meaningless mock elections and mock councils. And have we got more land today, more jobs for thousands of our young men? Are we better off? Appeals to rulers have not worked, they are fruitless and only give the impression that African grievances are being voiced and they are being represented, more importantly, they 'lull us to sleep'. In this light it is no use appealing to the government because it's not an African government but a white man's government, as is the parliament, the law courts and other institutions.

African representation in the NRC was seen as a 'farce and a mockery' where three whites represented eight million Africans, while two million whites were represented by one hundred and fifty.¹⁸ In this regard, the representation was sham because it ensured that the interests of white "aristocracy" were served without interruption or opposition from African representatives; it fooled Africans to believe that they were being represented while living in the unattainable hope for justice:

African representatives "have been sent to parliament not to see justice, but to make laws to suit the mine-owners and big farmers, to force the Africans to the mines and the farms as cheap labour."¹⁹

In the meantime, in 1947, Prime Minister Smuts met with some NRC members to deliberate the earlier adjournment of the NRC in protest to

lack of consideration of their resolutions.²⁰ Smuts' proposals included giving a measure of responsibility and authority to the NRC and strengthening it, including devolution so that "leaders of our Native people would get proper training in the management of their own affairs." Secondly, he proposed to make the NRC an all-African body, with own organization and own staff. Thirdly, with the flocking of Africans to urban areas, Smuts reported on establishment of Local Advisory Boards and Native Advisory Boards in townships and locations. In response, Prof Z.K. Mathews expressed the need for cooperation between the government and the people, which can be done "by giving us a greater measure of recognition in the various councils of the state." Chief Poto added: "The African people I like to think are like the English people—they believe in loyalty to their government and to their chiefs ... in course of time the white people realised that they could not effectively govern the Native people except by making use of their Native Chiefs." He wended up this speech by encouraging the government to give more responsibility, powers and authority to the chiefs in their areas of jurisdiction. While the Nationalist Party initially didn't follow Smuts' policies, they formed the letter, spirit and content of apartheid ideology.

In response to Smuts' proposals, ANC's A.B. Xuma observed that while these seemed generous, they, in actual fact, meant Africans had to "administer their own domination, discrimination and oppression under a cloak of giving Africans responsibility and participation in the administration of their own affairs." Xuma further remarked that "this is a false position created because there is no such thing as Native Affairs apart from South African national affairs."

I.B. Tabata's letter to CYL's Nelson Mandela in 1948 reveals the contradictory nature of CYL and Congress politics. For Tabata, a political organization needed to stick to its principles and should seek to unite oppressed people by following a course of non-collaboration with the government: "I am totally opposed to any organisation whose policy is to collaborate with the government and disunite the people." Tabata detailed conditions necessitating the formation of the AAC, which was needed to unite all African people. However, the ruling class sought to destroy that unity by "finding a willing stooge in the person of the late Dr. Dube ... he was the first to break away from the Convention, and with him practically the whole of Natal. The white press acclaimed him as a great statesman, a moderate, a practical politician and in fact an epitome of all virtues. They crowned him with a halo of greatness and conferred a doctorate on

him. It was Dr. Dube that led the Zulus back to tribalism where they still stagnate today." Tabata continued by saying others in the Congress, like Thema and Xuma, followed suit, breaking the Congress away from the Convention: "the white press picked him up (Xuma), built him up as a great leader, a great champion of the cause of African people." Disunity in African politics, fostered by the oppressors, threw Africans back to the pre-AAC era of sectional, factional and fratricidal strife. The policy of the Convention was to reject the superiority of the white race over the black, denouncing trusteeship and all its implications like segregation, sectionalism and tribalism, and "this policy the Convention follows without any 'concessions, compromises or deviations.'" In contrast, the Congress did all the opposite, Tabata averred. Her policy has been to fall in the hands of the government, either by siding directly with the government against the people or by sowing confusion among the people.²¹ Tabata, in the letter, was dissatisfied with CYL's political posturing, who, on one hand, spoke the language of modern, progressive, independent intellectuals that reject inferiority, while, on the other, as members of the ANC, they accepted inferiority and trusteeship with all its political manifestations, that is, segregated institutions like NRC, Advisory Boards, and the Bunga. For this reason, the CYL became "political Januses," with two heads facing in two different directions at one and the same time. Finally, Tabata warned Mandela that a young man entering politics must "establish the habit of basing his actions on principles. He must be ready if necessary to swim against the stream. Thus armed, he is protected against the temptation of seeking popularity and ephemeral success."

In the following two years, efforts were made to foster unity, especially by the AAC and the Congress. Given the deterioration in African life, deprivation of political rights and education, restriction of movement and lack of employment, frustration had been running high among Africans and "has undermined any confidence Africans might have had in the justice of most white men."²² Therefore, there was need for unified action by Africans, the first step being the unification of the main African political organizations—the ANC and the AAC—into an All-African National Congress, with a common programme and common principles. On 16–17 December, 116 delegates representing the ANC, 30 the AAC and 50 unattached descended on Bloemfontein to moot this idea of unity. AAC's Tabata placed the conditions for which the AAC would agree to unity, including the acceptance of AAC/NEUM ten-point programme, federal structure of the Convention, the principle of unity of all non-Europeans

and most importantly the policy of “non-collaboration with the oppressor.” The latter reference was made specifically on bodies like the Bunga and the NRC. Tabata ended by saying: “we must say we do not want separate institutions. We want to go to the only councils recognised in the land-parliament, provincial and municipal councils.” After long and rigorous debate on what constituted similarities and differences between the two organizations, CYL’s A.P. Mda said: “non-collaboration with the oppressors was the principle to base the national struggle. The Ballingers and the rest of them must have no place in our midst.” S. Saiyiya from AAC Cape Town announced that if ANC people who were members of government’s institutions were sincere, they should resign immediately. Of course, such an action would not be possible. In the follow-up meeting of the National Executive Committees of the ANC and AAC on 17–18 April 1949, Tabata once again reiterated that as a basis for unity, they should reject inferiority and institutions created for an “inferior” race, and demanded full democratic rights and only those institutions recognized in a democratic government. By non-collaboration, Tabata, meant “unwillingness on our part to work with those institutions which were created for our own oppression. A collaborator was one who voluntarily supported and worked with political institutions created for the oppression of the black man. We should support the freely created organisations of the people. That was what we meant by non-collaboration.” A vigorous discussion followed these postulations. J.B. Marks felt it would be wrong to stigmatize as collaborators those who didn’t agree with non-collaboration at this stage. Selope Thema, supported by Marks, was sceptical of the Convention’s position on boycotting government institutions. He asked the delegates whether they believed they could tell Transkei people to abolish the Bunga, for which there was a resounding, yes! Some believed they could fight through this institution, that’s why the government was afraid of the NRC! Selope Thema further argued that the Bunga had done a lot for the people, including giving bursaries and planting trees. If he was to go to his own area, Pietersburg, and tell the people not to have anything to do with the Bunga, they would take him for a madman: “If we sit in our own homes and cry ‘don’t collaborate!’ the people still accept these things.” R.M. Canca, in explaining the meaning of collaboration, said the laws weren’t enough—institutions had to be created to foster a mental attitude of acceptance of the laws and these were the NRC, the Bunga and Advisory Boards: “A collaborator was one who contested in one of the above institutions. He was one engaged in a mental swindle.

He knew participation in these institutions could not free the African, yet he pretended it could." Tabata added that people were suspicious of government institutions, but it was the intellectuals who went to them to seek for votes; therefore, the intellectuals must agree on non-collaboration: "we must create such an attitude of mind as will make these institutions stink in the nostrils of the people. The people will follow if the leadership gives expression to the aspirations of the people." Dr. G.H. Gool from NEUM supported these sentiments, saying the government would always find quislings to sell the people and, therefore, those who participated in those institutions should be nailed as traitors. The question on non-collaboration would defeat any attempts on the proposed All-African National Congress unity. Some felt the ANC was inimical to that idea for fear of being exposed as collaborators, meaning "at the same time they would be committing themselves if they accepted non-collaboration and they didn't want to commit themselves."²³

Following the NP victory in 1948 elections, the Unity Movement's definition of a collaborator shifted, which was in sync with the racist "Herrenvolk" policies of divide and rule. The Unity Movement called these characters "quislings (mainly from the activities of Norwegian Vidkun Quisling during World War Two), misleaders and cranks," whose work was synonymous with that of "gaolers, chaining their people but in indirect ways which the people don't see." Although their work was similar to gaolers, it was different because of its subtlety and indirectness, but all the same synonymous because they fastened chains on the people. These people were always those in prominent positions who played "tried and tested leaders who work themselves to the bone in the service of the people. They prosper and profit on misery and oppression of the people with some 'making it their only profession, while some work it as a sideline.'"²⁴ These worked the machinery of oppression, that is, the NRC, the CAD, the Asiatic Advisory Boards, the Bungas and the Advisory Boards: "Now the name by which these persons are known throughout the world is—QUISLINGS."²⁵ The destructive capability of quislings couldn't be underestimated because they had a devastating agency that caused confusion, hindered progress and was deleterious to building of unity and the nation. The main preoccupation of "quislings, misleaders and cranks" was to preserve the status quo. The question of status quo had high political significance because: "is it to be based on the principle of complete freedom from all national oppression and on demands for full and equal democratic rights, or is it to be based on bargaining for the amelioration

of conditions, on bargaining for some concessions and crumbs?”²⁶ The quislings in the D.F. Malan’s machinery were seen as ready to sell Non-Europeans for a few promises and a few crumbs: “Let them realise that all the shouting for the status quo, for the two-thirds majority to change the constitution and for round table conferences is the forerunner to coming betrayals and sell-outs.”²⁷

The formation of the CYL signalled a new era in African nationalist politics. These were young men whose patience was running out because of old timers’ faith in trusteeship and the *hamba kable* (go slow) approach to the struggle, leaders who were ready to compromise after they had been “flattered by taking tea with the rulers.” This new generation of Youth Leaguers (i.e., Lembede, Ngubane, A.P. Mda, Zeph Mothopeng) also opposed the ANC’s old guard’s conservatism and moderation.²⁸ This was a confrontational and direct approach. The CYL was calling for action and mass organization. Indeed, the Alexandra bus boycott of 1940 and 1945, the Johannesburg squatters’ movement of 1944 to 1947, the 1946 workers’ strike and increased frustration of urban working class as a result of widespread poverty were conditions that demanded a mass movement.²⁹ As a result, the ANC was compelled to adopt a Programme of Action in 1949, calling for civil disobedience, strikes, boycotts and stay at home. By also clamouring for national freedom, political independence and self-determination, the Congress began to assume a new spirit of militancy and aggressiveness.³⁰ This culminated in the 1950s defiance campaign signalling ANC’s new approach to struggle.

The period 1950–1952 saw the ANC adopting a militant approach and abandoning moderation, encapsulated in the Defiance Campaign.³¹ The Congress had a long history of multiracial cooperation beginning at least with the Communist Party in 1920s. In the 1950s, there was alliance with the SAIC, white and coloured groups. This sowed discontent in the movement, especially with the Africanist who was wary of whites and communist influence. This played a role in the split leading to the formation of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC). An editorial in the journal, the *Africanist* of December 1955, criticized the ANC for serving the interests other than those of Africans, calling them “lackeys, flunkeys and functionaries of non-African minorities, stooges and careerists.” For the Africanists, the ANC should be rid of foreign domination because African nationalism was the sole ideological basis of African liberation. The Africanists argued that “we have consistently condemned collaborators who postpone our day of liberation by supporting dummy institutions—Advisory Boards, Bungas,

Verwoerd School Boards and etc."³² Thus, national oppression couldn't be challenged unless African people obtained the self-confidence and subjective liberation espoused by African Nationalism. Sobukwe would stress that Africanists differed with others on the term "cooperation," which for them was only possible among equals, "there can be no cooperation between oppressors and oppressed, dominating and dominated. That is collaboration, not cooperation and we cannot collaborate in our own oppression."³³ He criticized the ANC leadership for lacking clear ideological and political direction by regarding collaboration and cooperation as synonymous.

HOMELANDS AND COLLABORATION

Immediately after coming to power, the NP government passed a number of discriminatory legislation.³⁴ In 1951, the NP government passed the Bantu Authorities Act, which abolished the NRC and set up a hierarchical system of tribal authorities composed of government-approved chiefs and advisers. A letter written to the "secretary" of the ANC in response to an earlier letter to the prime minister by Z.K. Matthews regarding threats for defiance and civil disobedience, dated 29 January 1952 and signed by M. Aucamp, private secretary to the prime minister, stated that peace and goodwill lay in the acceptance of separate population groups with opportunities for self-development in service of its people. The Bantu Authorities Act was designed to "give the Bantu people the opportunity for enlightened administration of their own affairs in accordance with their own heritage and institutions, adapted to modern conditions." The letter further stated that while the government was not prepared to grant the Bantu political equality within the European community, it was only too willing to encourage Bantu initiative, Bantu service and Bantu administration within the Bantu community, thus allowing the Bantu full scope for all his potentialities. It also said, "The prime minister has instructed me to urge you to let wise council to prevail and to devote your energies to constructive programme of development for the Bantu people. This can be done by using the opportunities offered by the government for building up local Bantu government and administration." In 1955, the Transkei central representative body, the Bunga, accepted the Bantu Authorities system, designed by Pretoria to bolster the conservative position of government-paid chiefs.

In October 1958, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd said "clear contact with chiefs" was the NAD's official reasoning. He had brought the

Transkei chiefs (Botha Sigcau, Victor Poto, Wabana Makaula, Sabata Mtirara, Kaizer Matanzima, Sandy Majele and George Moshesh) to Pretoria to tell them of the plans to do away with Native Representatives in parliament, and how, in future, chiefs, along with their tribal headmen, would act as mouthpieces of African people as well as oiling the wheels of the Bantu Authorities system.³⁵ This was the main item on the agenda; another was Verwoerd's advice to chiefs to deal with "agitators." Earlier in January 1958, among the Bafurutse, three pro government *indunas* and the sister of the local puppet chief were killed and several houses "including the chief's house and his 'posh' American car were set alight."³⁶ The peoples' anger was a result of deportation of their chief and issuing of passes to women. The local chief said the root of the problem was "agitators" who came from Johannesburg to incite the people. Verwoerd and the Transkei chiefs were treated to red carpet entertainment with "a programme fit for important visiting statesmen. Luxury buses took them on sightseeing trips to African townships, and the chiefs were housed in the posh residency specially built in Vlakkfontein for visiting chiefs."³⁷ The Transkei chiefs were the first to be called to Pretoria because they had accepted the Bantu Authorities Act. In January 1959, Verwoerd announced that it was time for "natives" to be placed towards self-governance in their own areas—the Bantustans, which were provided under the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959³⁸ (which was an extension of Bantu Authorities Act). The Act recognized eight Bantu "national units," based on ethnicity in which tribal representatives (ambassadors) would be links between a national unit and its members working in urban areas.³⁹ The policy of homelands was aimed to reinforce divisive tribal identities and make them the basis for a system of patronage easily manipulated by the government.⁴⁰ In the Bantustans, the government offered jobs or cash to Africans who performed useful roles in the coercive state apparatus, and this spread after 1961. The policy ran parallel with training of black university students, aimed at producing a black middle class that could be co-opted into the government's machinery of domination, employed as teachers, clerks and Bantustan bureaucrats, of which this domination would be manned by blacks themselves. After 1976 and Steve Biko's death in 1977, the government, despite its emphasis on increased repression, also considered co-opting an expanding black middle class, which would, however, be subordinate to Afrikaner domination. The government, nagged by white liberals and the Afrikaner *verligtes* (the enlightened), was attempting to build a class of black collaborators in the

aspiring black middle class, politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen to prop up the homelands and urban councils. This would be a buffer class linked to separate institutions in the South African polity. This strategy was, however, not new, although the NP government had, over the years, not been explicitly inclined to it. During parliamentary debates in 1960, the opposition United and Progressive parties had noted that an African middle class could be used as a safety valve, only if urban Africans were given outlets to channel their views. Sir de Villiers-Graaff, a United Party leader, opined that the current crisis (as a result of Sharpeville massacre) was caused by government's failure to recognize the emergent urban native, that is, a responsible middle class that could serve as a stabilizing force and cooperate with the instruments of law and order. For de Villiers-Graaff, this class could own their own property and "will accept with us the responsibility of maintaining western standards in our South African community."⁴¹ Indeed, many black people would be incorporated into the echelons of Bantustan programme. A number of commercial institutions were set up: the Black Bank, Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC), Xhosa Development Corporation (XDC), National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC) and so on. This class would, of course, align itself with imperialist interests.⁴²

After the Rivonia trial and the impending African political lull, Africans were faced with the question whether or not to participate in the state institutions and be seen as "collaborators." Some saw working within the system of homelands as a way of undermining the system from within and used that as a stepping stone towards liberation. In early 1962, Tabata⁴³ observed that Verwoerd's attempt to create Bantustans was to mould "Tshombes" and "Kasavubus,"⁴⁴ who would be used against black masses. Just like elsewhere in Africa, colonial rulers didn't have to employ military force as such, but make use of collaborators—chiefs, headmen and elders who were brought into the neo-traditions of subordination, and "this collaboration was in essence a very practical affair of exchanged benefits."⁴⁵ In contrast, imperialism used intellectuals who were after "crumbs" and wanted to attach themselves to liberals, and, for Tabata, the liberals were creating the "exempted native." In the early 1970s, there were debates in the BCM whether to work with people like Chief Gatsha Buthelezi. Though he looked like the best of the homeland leaders, the BCM rejected him and those of his ilk. In December 1973, while on a visit to Dar es Salaam, Buthelezi was jeered by Tanzanian students who beat the roof of his departing car.⁴⁶ In May 1976, on his arrival to accept an honor-

ary degree at University of Zululand, students stoned his car and shouted “Sell-Out! Sell-Out!”⁴⁷ At the funeral of PAC leader Robert Sobukwe in the Eastern Cape in March 1978, he was heckled by groups of youth who called him a stooge and a sell-out. In early 1974, the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted a declaration describing homeland leaders as “puppets” and rejected the so-called independent homelands. BC denounced the homelands as “tribal cocoons.” O.R. Tiro in his graduation speech at University of the North on 29 April 1972 was even more scathing, referring to blacks in the administration committees as “white black men” and “our so-called leaders have become the bolts of the same machine which is crushing us as a nation,” while the South African Students Movement’s newsletter of April 1973 quipped: “there’s an illusion that Buthelezi will free black people, with his ‘tricks’ he manages to confuse black people.” The BPC observed that since the jailing of true leaders in the early 1960s, “we have been the sad, silent witnesses of the greatest selling-out by persons chosen by the white racist system to be our ‘leaders’. The actions of our ‘so-called leaders’ made it easier for the white government to control and manipulate us.”⁴⁸ The posturing of homeland leaders like Buthelezi, of course, showed the depth of imperialist influence on South African politics. The apartheid government sent Bantustan leaders to the West to “cheat” and sell apartheid to the outside world. In a speech in the late 1980s, AZAPO’s Nkosi Molala said:

When the regime’s intransigence repelled such (imperialists) efforts, imperialism shifted its influence to black politics and here it unearthed Gatsha Buthelezi whose qualities matched its requirements. He was black, fluent, politically astute, and influential, his rhetoric was anti-government and he had a modicum of support. Imperialism set out to deliberately increase his stature and with it, his influence and support. Gatsha’s Zulu *impis* are today an intractable and murderous machine.⁴⁹

The criticism of Buthelezi was sharp and poignant. Mapetla Mohapi, a 1970s BC adherent, spared no kind words:

Most of these so-called leaders deceive a lot of people especially outside South Africa by their fraudulent behaviour. People like Gatsha Buthelezi for example are very dishonest and deceitful. Chief Gatsha is a man who has accepted to be called a Zulu leader by the racist system ... he is a person who doesn’t believe in BC yet often uses Black Power fist during moments

of excitement when he addresses people as he did at the Umtata summit meeting of these Bantustan leaders.⁵⁰

Mohapi further called Buthelezi a government stooge, a big fraud, a tool for division and a reactionary who was misleading black people with "false hopes and vague promises."⁵¹

The BC tradition was an extension of the 1930s Unity Movement and AAC policy on non-collaboration in the structures of black peoples' domination. Although the inception of the CYL pushed the old guard from politics of negotiation, adding a new militancy, the PAC pushed ahead with that combativeness; it was the BCM that added a new political complexion by saying one cannot talk liberation with the master.⁵² The BCM, as a policy, stated: "we shall operate outside the white government created systems, structures and/or institutions and shall not seek elections in these."⁵³ Section 3 of BPC constitution barred members from seeking election into government-created institutions and system-created platforms. It stated that:

The miserable rule of all the Bantustans, the CPRC and the SAIC are in fact a bluff as they can never have any political and economic viability. The real power in these reservoirs of black cheap labour is in the hands of well trained and experienced officials of the department of Bantu Administration and Development, Coloured and Indian Affairs Departments ... non-white Chief ministers and CEOs or so-called prime ministers are Quislings and sell-outs ... the non-white national leaders of the Stans, some of them highly learned chiefs, have been turned into puppets of officialdom. They have become employed by supporters of the old imperialist maxim of divide and rule.

The Bantustan governments were powerless because they could be unquestionably vetoed by one white cabinet minister of Bantu Affairs Department. The main objective of Bantustan philosophy was to trap all blacks into a network of migratory labour and oppressive pass laws. The BPC saw government-created platforms as products of white racists, fostering divisions among blacks, diverting the aims of the struggle, trenchantly tribalist, meant to bolster the white regime that created them and were, "designed to cheat the black man into participating in his own oppression because of built in safeguards that make it impossible for any black person using them to liberate himself," and "they are designed such

that those black people who participate in them are the ones who soil their hands by doing dirty work designed and planned by white racists.”

The BC definition of a sell-out/collaborate became ingrained in the meaning and construction of blackness; those collaborating with the system renounced their blackness, and therefore, they became not blacks but non-white. During the BPC-SASO trial, Biko elaborated this. In 1970, Biko wrote of “Judases” and urged activists “never to ignore the Judases for they are an extension of the enemy into your ranks.”⁵⁴ It was also Faustian in that those personages lost their black soul by making deals with an evil system.

There remained a problem of permanently urbanized Africans, despite government’s notion that they would return to their “ancestral” lands. Though there were forced removals, it was infeasible, and so the government devised a compromise solution: construction of a local government system linking all urbanized Africans with their designated homelands overseen by collaborationist “councillors.” Like in the homelands, the government was to create an overt apparatus of control in urban areas using black surrogates to minimize potential opposition. After the NP came into power, the older township Advisory Boards⁵⁵ created in 1922 were gradually replaced by elected Urban Bantu Councils (UBC) under African chairmen.⁵⁶ The first UBC in the country resumed work on 1 September 1961 in Daveyton. Its task was removal of people not lawfully resident of the area, regulation of entry into an area, maintenance of good order, control and management of community guard and management and control of the “Bantu Town.”⁵⁷ In Soweto, the Soweto Advisory Board was replaced by the UBC in 1968, elected on an ethnic basis. In time, this would be counter-productive because these would be popular targets of reprisals by their own communities. There was widespread contempt towards the UBC councillors; in the Orange Free State they were called “castrated Boers,” and elsewhere were called “Useless Boys Clubs.”⁵⁸

When the 1976 riots broke out, youth anger became directed at symbols of apartheid: systems of Bantu Education; the government’s Regional Administration Boards and black collaborators in the UBC and homelands governments. By 1976, the ineffectual UBC was highly unpopular; their powers were only advisory and their advice largely ignored by the government. When in April 1977, the West Rand Administration Board (WRAB) hiked rents in Soweto, the Soweto Students Representative Council (SSRC), which had replaced the South African Students Movement,

renewed its campaign against collaborators; this fight was intertwined with issues of rents and evictions, which the UBC were suspected of fermenting. Fliers distributed by the SSRC⁵⁹ in the wake of Soweto uprising warned people of "false leaders who always run in the dark to sell-out ... they are tools and stooges of the oppressive system." A press release by Khotso Seathlolo on 29 October 1976⁶⁰ rejected the Transkei "independence" on 26 October and regarded Matanzima⁶¹ "a betrayer of black people's political aspirations by selling-out our birth right to the white minority government." In its vituperative tone, the statement further criticized all homeland leaders and described them as "political cowards, stooges and puppets who could not hold their own fight and defend their birth right. They are sell-outs that were just too ready to capitulate to the oppressor and collaborate with the exploitative, oppressive and suppressive system. They shall go down into the annals of black history as Judas Iscariot who sold the black nation down a political drain."

On 11 June 1977, police broke down a meeting of the SSRC and detained the attendants under Section 6 of Terrorism Act. It gave rise to suspicions that the movement might have been infiltrated and "it was an open secret that the police had since the previous June been anxious to get, hook or crook, knowledgeable people especially among students themselves, to work for them."⁶²

Reform initiatives were laid out after 1976 to legitimate apartheid. The 1979 Riekert Commission recommended that permanent African urban residents be recognized and that the Verwoerdian approach of grand apartheid was anachronistic. The commission recommended that government planners put forward a set of legislation based on selective incorporation. In the 1980s, Prime Minister P.W. Botha's government outlined a plan to "Win Hearts and Minds" (WHAM) as part of a total strategy of reforms and repression. Many activists were identified and there were mass detentions. The government also used covert operations including "dirty" tricks encompassing a hidden war against opponents. This included planting of informers in opposition movements.

Constitutional proposals were made in 1981 in a referendum for a constitution that would create a tri-cameral parliament to include coloureds and Indians, in which elections were held in August 1984. The dilemma for blacks was whether to accept second-class forms of political representation created for them or boycott these dummy institutions. Under the same proposals were the Koornhof Bills: the Black Local Authorities Act (1982) intended to confer increased powers to township commu-

nity councils to manage electricity, water, garbage removal and health services. Since the state was parsimonious and wasn't obliged to finance black areas and local municipalities, the black authorities hiked rents, leading to widespread anger.⁶³ The Vaal uprising, which erupted on 3 September 1984, the day the tri-cameral parliament opened, was caused by rent hikes and general hardship and suffering. The area (Sebokeng, Sharpeville, Boipatong, Bophelong and Zamdela) was under a black local council, Lekoa municipality. Most public buildings, shops and homes of councillors were burnt; several perceived collaborators, including the deputy head of the Lekoa council, were murdered. The Vaal uprisings sparked protests against collaborationist councils elsewhere including stay-away by workers in Soweto and KwaThema demanding that black councillors resign.⁶⁴ Attacks on perceived collaborators and boycott of their shops subsequently led to hundreds of councillors to resign.

In the late 1980s, one could see that the old strategy of non-collaboration and boycott was being implemented as one of the bases for struggle. Many, including the United Democratic Front (UDF) formed in early 1980s in response to Koornhof Bills, regarded participation in the municipal elections of October 1988 as "giving puppet structures a new lease of life."⁶⁵ Therefore, boycott of dummy structures was a "strategy geared to building a united opposition and a move towards one person one vote." The Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference flyer of July 1988 noted that the Bantu Administration Boards were unpopular and rejected because they didn't have real power to change things, there was increased hardship for residents through rent hikes and evictions, they couldn't do anything without government approval and they were used by corrupt councillors for personal gain. The elections were seen as a modified form of apartheid, and the church regarded apartheid as a sin, and so "we as Christians have to avoid sin or collaboration with sin."⁶⁶

The BCM had campaigns, which were part of the cultural boycott against artists performing in South Africa. Black Americans, in particular, were severely admonished. Those who were oblivious of the unity and solidarity in boycotting apartheid South Africa were portrayed as opportunists and collaborators with the oppressors.⁶⁷ Thus, while Percy Sledge, known for his *dashiki* and Afro, who came to the country and performed in segregated white audiences was subjected to severe criticism, Nina Simone, who declined to play in the country was, venerated. The spirit of this criticism is expressed in James Matthews' poem.⁶⁸

CATEGORIES OF A SELL-OUT/COLLABORATOR

Impimpi/Mthengesi/Mdayisi

Mthengesi/Mdayisi are Nguni words associated with selling. The term *impimpi* has a long history in South African black politics. Its origin varies, though. Some think it comes from Zulu/Xhosa *impempe* (whistle) and that it might have its origins in the mines. The *baas-boy/induna* employed by gold mine management was an African tasked with blowing a whistle to gather workers or for announcement of important mine communication. Once a whistle was blown, there would be commotion and haste as all employees scrambled to their positions. The *baas-boy* was also a link between workers' social life and management, and was also tasked with monitoring and control, and ensuring loyalty and discipline. So *impimpi*, from *impempe* resonates with the effect the whistle has in every aspect of peoples' social lives. An act of spying and informing is synonymous with the whistle because it leads to discomfiture and unease in a given populace.

One opinion is the word might have originated in prison. Joseph Silver, an early Johannesburg bandit at the turn of the twentieth century, was, among many of his criminal career, a pimp. *Impimpi* might be an English misnomer for pimp, associated with people who snitched on Silver, who at the time of his arrest was one of Johannesburg's most wanted men. Gang activity has long been part of South African prison life. Another name for *impimpi* is "Big Five," a prison number gang responsible for maintaining order and observance of prison rules. The "Big Five" also collaborate with prison authorities in ensuring adherence of this decorum.

In the wake of political upheavals of the late 1950s and early 1960s, Security Police became ubiquitous, and fear became pervasive: "discussing politics even among close friends became a high risk activity. Informers were everywhere."⁶⁹ Police had intelligence on all people going into exile, their families and political prisoners released from prison were closely monitored. By mid-1960s, security police were using bullying tactics to arrest and harass opponents, inducing widespread anger and fear. There emerged a pervasive presence of police informers on university campuses, in welfare and religious organizations and in township shebeens. In African homes, politics became a taboo subject as parents tried to protect their children. Apparently, the government had no difficulty in recruiting informers, and the popular presumption that spies were everywhere pervaded the atmosphere. Some of those arrested would be asked to become

informers or they would do so as a result of being tortured. Increased repression demanded a change of tactics; opposing movements could no longer hold public meetings, rallies and conferences, and leaders could no longer be publicly elected or openly hold office. Secrecy and discipline became imperative. Government informers, hitherto not significantly a problem, though a nuisance, now became a real threat, endangering the success of all Africa political initiative and security of leaders and their followers. It's also possible that the liberation movements were infiltrated from the very top. The South African security establishment had information on operations beforehand, which compromised the lives of those undertaking them and may also be one of the reasons why the liberation movement could not inflict a military defeat on the apartheid government. A report by "General Tobetsa" on an unsuccessful Umkhonto We Sizwe⁷⁰ mission in the late 1980s shows that when the group was captured, the security police told them: "your commanders outside the country are working for us, they are getting money from us; they have big stomachs because they are eating money; some of them are members of Special Branch." The report also says the Boers had more than 10,000 photos of comrades outside the country, with correct information on where they were: "they once asked me who I think Chris Hani is working for. I said for the people. They laughed. They then asked me about Bra A. I said something to answer. They said his name is Lombard (Lambert) Moloi, he is working for us, *maan* and he is giving the money to his wife in Lesotho." The police also possessed knowledge of different structures of MK, ANC and other political structures, their heads, deputies, secretaries and so on.

The sin of selling-out was as dark as wolf's mouth. Labels like *impimpi/mthengesi/mdayisi* had negative connotations, because the general feeling among the oppressed masses would be, "you pretend to be one of us, then like Nicodemus in the dark you go to collaborate with the enemy; you are using us, you come to our meetings, steal our documents and documentary evidence and record our talk and then sell us."⁷¹ In Cervantes' *Don Quixote*, Cara was the nickname for Count Julian's daughter, who, having been ravished by King Roderigo, helped bring the Moors into Spain. Her true name was Florinda, but because she is blamed for Spain's betrayal to the Moors, the name isn't given to girl children but "bitches."

There's evidence of attacks on perceived collaborators from the late 1950s. The Pondoland Revolt against Bantu Authorities in 1960s showed

mass popular anger against those who collaborated with the government: "The Pondos found that news of their meetings was reaching the magistrate's ear and that their new found unity was being undermined from within by government agents. Drastic action was taken against these informers; their huts were fired, and many were forced to flee from the area. Between March and June, 27 kraals were reported to have been burnt down."⁷²

In the early 1960s, Poqo,⁷³ a PAC armed offshoot, which was determined to smash white rule, targeted African collaborators and informers for death. The group was also incriminated in the murder of chiefs and headmen in Transkei during 1962–1963 and also attempted to assassinate Kaiser Matanzima.⁷⁴

In Transkei, Spiegel reported that the police maintained an extensive network of village-based informers who used this resource now and then during local level political struggles.⁷⁵ In Matatiele, the informer network was so dense that in the early 1980s one in four hundred could be an informer. Informers were feared because of their ability to bring misery and make life unbearable to those who crossed their paths. Other informers thought they could use their office as a prerogative to intervene in other peoples' domestic squabbles, which Spiegel calls "informer terrorism." However, in urban areas like Soweto, the office of an informer demanded absolute secrecy because of a volatile political environment, coupled with pervasive police brutality, repression and disappearances. Informers, thus, were virulently hated, detested and loathed, and most often they met a violent and miserable death. By the 1980s, people's alternative forms of justice were prevalent; prosecution and exacting of judgement on perceived informers was the office of "comrades" (*amabutho*⁷⁶) who executed informers by necklacing.⁷⁷ However, the brutal method of necklacing was descried by the Pan-Africanists who argued it fulfilled the enemy's divide-and-rule tactics and it engendered black on black violence.⁷⁸ PASO identified with PAC's slogan, "war against the enemy-Peace amongst Africans. The necklace has proved a successful onslaught against our people whilst there is yet to be found even one 'necklace' victim amongst the ranks of the oppressors." It's probable most innocent people became victims of the label "sell-out," a very subjective accusation that may not be proved, one that results from personal conflicts.

In the 1970s, SASO drew up a set of measures to counter informer pervasiveness: "work shopping" of spies, a thorough investigation of suspects and use of suspects' associates to ferret out informers; using incriminating

evidence as a bait; establishing a screening committee at all levels to reduce “informer consciousness” from peoples’ minds and avoiding one becoming “informer conscious,” roughing them up until they confessed and exposing infiltrators to the public.

Once one was labelled a “sell-out,” it was a Sisyphean task to exonerate one’s name, and was equivalent to witchcraft accusation. Just like in witchcraft where criminality is illuminated, people who behave unacceptably are seen as inhuman and animals; those who turn against their kin are dogs and those who are cunning, dishonest and untrustworthy are called snakes.⁷⁹ Witches are seen to lack “maitshwaro” (calculated conduct); they succumb to their desires, in this case greed, and totally dominated by cravings for food, sex, money and revenge. In witchcraft, there’s pervasive fear and widespread suspicion, largely the occupation of bewitching others is just like the office of an *impimpi*. There is latent power crafted around secrecy and the capacity to ruin, wreck and bring misery to other peoples’ lives. Witches and *impimpis* bring pollution, pollution beliefs reinforce cultural and social structure in a given social order and transgressors are punished by attacks, sanctions and so on.⁸⁰ The community is imagined to share a common culture, and so it presses for conformity to norms and values. In “tribal” societies, for example, certain classes of people are liable to be classified polluters. In some societies, elite possessors of esoteric knowledge are charged with knowing too much and misapplying it for their selfish ends.⁸¹ Therefore, sorcerers’ lore is seen as destructive as the science of military, business or chemical weapons. In some societies, paupers and second-class citizens can be accused of pollution and are excluded from benefits and privileges of the community. The difference with informers is that they do materially benefit from their trade and can as a result prosper. Integral to the whole business is gossip, allegation and accusation.⁸² Niehaus argues that evils of sexuality and sexuality of evil associated with witchcraft in the Lowveld were part of the general moral system, where “gossip, repressive sanctions and violent forms of punishment unified these moral beliefs and mobilised popular sentiment against both sexual transgressors and assumed witches.”⁸³ All these happen in a context of domination, subordination and power. Gossip itself is facilitated by long residency, as Ashforth’s study on witchcraft in Soweto shows, where there’s a “meddling of individual fates into the life of a community that creates dense networks of suspicion animated by memories of past suffering.”⁸⁴ Knowledge of who was a witch filters through generations, making it difficult to understand how they came to know. Niehaus’ study in the

Lowveld reveals that population removals by apartheid regime, combined with migrant labour system that generated inequality, which, in turn, bred feelings of envy and resentment, increased tensions among neighbours and escalated witchcraft accusations.⁸⁵ During the anti-apartheid struggle, witchcraft accusations got political overtones, with comrades at the forefront of witch-hunting. In the Green Valley, during 1986 and 1987, comrades killed 36 suspected witches in the wider Mapulaneng area.⁸⁶ This was a quest for political legitimacy, and, through witch-hunting, comrades sought to eliminate evil and prevent future occurrence of misfortune.

During the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, those who worked for the state or in farms were branded. Attacks on sell-outs who betrayed the armed combatants, the comrades and the long established fear and hatred of witches were bound together.⁸⁷ Again, the guerrillas aligned with lion spirit mediums, the *mhondoro*, who in Shona cosmology typify the ideology of descent; those who opposed the guerrillas, the representatives of *mhondoro*, and allied themselves with the white government were seen as traitors to their own people, their own *rudzi* (means kind, type or blood).⁸⁸ In effect, "they would have taken sides against the *mhondoro* and the only person who would do such a thing is a witch."⁸⁹ Those identified as witches were people believed to be politically untrustworthy or treacherous, acting against the interests of the people as a whole. As a result, sell-outs were called witches, showing the extent the guerrillas and nationalist leaders had identified with *mhondoro*. Anyone who opposed the benevolent and altruistic *mhondoro* and their protégé for selfish and individual reasons was placed in the category in which ancestors are opposed to, which is the witch.⁹⁰

Askari

The term *Askari* originates from East and Central Africa. It refers to black policemen/soldiers in the employ of colonial governments. The King's African Rifles were called the Askaris. The West Indian Regiment used by the British during the Second World War had Indians and Africans, with Irish and British as officers, and was also used to protect British interests in the West African coast. Rodney reports that the West African Frontier Force was in 1894 joined by the West African Regiment to suppress the Hut Tax war in Sierra Leone.

In South Africa, *Askari* refers to black policemen and "turned" guerrillas captured in combat. The police used torture and harsh interroga-

tion techniques, which aided in coercing some guerrillas to cooperate, to defect or to be “turned.”⁹¹ During the TRC deliberations, Joe Mamasela, a notorious black policeman in the 1980s, who was once an activist in SASM, became a police informant in 1979 while in jail awaiting trial for housebreaking and theft. Mamasela’s story is littered with inconsistencies; it’s difficult to coherently thread it. He claims he was persuaded by a security policeman to “combat terrorism.” He infiltrated the ANC in Botswana, although he claims to have joined the ANC in Botswana in 1977 where he received training in intelligence. In 1981, he was arrested by security police, and after assault he turned: “so I had to break and I merely confirmed what the police knew. Just like my president Mandela. He confessed in court during Rivonia Trial but because he was a leader it is fine; when Mamasela does the same thing under duress it’s called selling-out. It’s double standards!”⁹² Mamasela was recruited by Major Kruger to become an *askari*. They didn’t recruit just anyone—one had to have special qualities needed, a particular knowledge and intelligence. The first recorded case of a “turned” activist is that of Bruno Mtolo, who, during the Rivonia trial, emerged as a leading state witness, ready to implicate people, even those suspected by police, and to volunteer huge amounts of information. Mtolo had been part of an early MK sabotage squad, and apparently had become disillusioned with his comrades. Leonard Nkosi, part of MK’s Wankie Campaign, was captured in 1967, and he told the police everything they needed to know, gave evidence in trials, joined the police and was the first to be killed by the ANC. In fact, one of the major MK operations was attacks on collaborators, including black policemen, homeland and council officials.⁹³ By the late 1980s and early 1990s, hit squads going by the names of Joint Management Committees (JMCs), *Askaris*, Zebra Force, Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) were composed of personnel including active and non-active members of SADF, deserters from the liberation movement and former members of security forces in Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia.⁹⁴

Amagundwane (Rats)

Amagundwane (rats) are overt sell-outs who usually are strike breakers. These are mainly associated with the trade unions. They are called *amagundwane* because, just like rats, they either operate at night and their actions are both visible and invisible, or like rats, they blow breath where they bite. Apparently, this character gets insinuated into the South African

political scene after trade unions were allowed to operate from 1979. In the 1980s, they became prominent, either as strike breakers or snitching at shop-floor. Most *amagundwane* became victims of necklacing punishment or sound beating from both “comrades” and its *oSiyayinyova*.⁹⁵ They are intensely detested because during mass stay-aways they would go to work, therefore breaking the spirit of unity, while benefiting from whatever little gains a strike action brings.

The Vigilantes

The urban vigilantes, which arose after 1985 state of emergency, employed killings, arson, stoning and other forms of violence. This coincided with the army’s occupation of townships since vigilante groups received money and equipment from the JMC that had been set up by the securocrats.⁹⁶ The leadership of most vigilante groups consisted of municipal councillors, black policemen and traders as well as members of their families. They included *Amasolomzi* (Ashton near Pietermaritzburg), *Amadoda* (Cape Town) and *Phakathis* (Welkom in the Orange Free State).⁹⁷ The vigilantes had a patron–client relationship between leaders and followers and had a strong antipathy towards the youth who called themselves comrades. In the Vaal, Krog reports, based on evidence of the TRC, of existence of the A-Team who were anti-UDF and worked with police who, at night, would deliver alcohol to their houses.⁹⁸ The team wore their names on their chests and carried hammers, *pangas* and guns. In KZN, the *amabutho* wore balaclavas and colourful overalls, used knobkerries, spears and axes and worked with Inkatha and SADF. Krog reports that their rituals were steeped in tradition; before going for their victims they drank and splashed on war potions to make themselves invincible and didn’t talk of killing but of “removing obstacles” or “purifying the fields.”⁹⁹ They would remove body parts of victims to brew a concoction to cleanse themselves of murder. Their operational tactics resembled Vlaakplas¹⁰⁰—drinking, choosing a victim, arming themselves and getting together as they make a big kill. In Crossroads, Cape Town, men associated with Johnson “Nobs” Ngxobongwana identified themselves as Witdoeke, which means white cloth because the vigilantes were identified by white head clothes or *bandanas*. This wasn’t new in Cape Town; migrants wore them during the conflict between hostel dwellers and township youths in 1976.¹⁰¹ Ngxobongwana, their leader from 1986, recruited an army of “elders.” The older people, the “fathers,” sought to instil discipline in the area and

get rid of comrades. They acted as a “third force” always with the explicit and overt support of the police; they attacked known opponents, activists and those who participated in stay-aways and strikes. Most vigilante groups were the *amagoduka*¹⁰²; migrant labourers argued that they were in the city to work and support their families back in the rural areas, and therefore politics was not their priority. Of course, there was friction, tension and conflict between them and township residents because the former always collaborated with the brute police force. Many recent arrivals had with them material and ideological linkages with rural areas; the new consciousness was infused with old notions and beliefs where neo-traditional structures served to perpetuate these.¹⁰³ Steve Jacobs’ short story, “A Day in the Life,” in Staffrider of 1987 details out the activities of the *Witdoeke* who burned people’s homes as told by the character Gibson:

The *Witdoeke* are like Judas, betraying their own people. The government gives them guns and money to attack their brothers and burn down their houses. But we will have revenge.

Witdoeke operating in Crossroads in May and June 1986 forcibly removed 70,000 people from surrounding squatter settlements and had the support of SAP and SADF; they curtailed the support bases of UDF-affiliated organizations in the area, thus returning political control to local state.¹⁰⁴ Crossroads, once a symbol of defiance against apartheid removal strategies, now became a symbol of right-wing vigilante and black on black violence. According to Lodge and Nasson, the vigilantes were powerful allies of the South African state and could cripple or root out radical opposition groups more effectively than could the police.¹⁰⁵

A new task force created by SAP, the special constables (nicknamed *kitskonstabels* by residents), was a new devolution of SAP to ensure maintenance of law and order. The new recruits consisted of former *witdoeke* and comrades; they were legally armed with sjambok and guns and were mandated to deal with trouble makers in townships. However, they came under attack from residents and comrades and “placed alongside community councillors as sell-outs and symbols of black oppression.”¹⁰⁶ Cole adds, “The tragedy is that most of them, like the ‘witdoeke’ are merely pawns in a game whose ground rules are ultimately controlled by the South African state.”

WHY DO PEOPLE SELL-OUT?

First, there is the economic imperative. At a time when black people were politically and economically disenfranchised, the occupation of informing or snitching was lucrative. It's probable that many black people earned a living selling-out even if it entitled unpalatable consequences to those they informed on. In the 1970s, the BC had observed the deleterious effects of informers:

When we tried to effect change in our society for good of all, we have 'faceless informers' who should have been part of us but because of the divisive nature of white power, these villains earn their living selling their brothers and sisters to the very enemy we want to destroy/remove.¹⁰⁷

However, there are contradictions as reported by Harry Mashabela, who was a Star reporter during the 1976 Uprising. During the upheaval, students led by Tsietsi Mashinini burned policemen's homes in Soweto. Harry Mashabela reports: "They singled out security police sergeants Caswell Mokgoro, Benjamin Letlake and a CID policeman known as Hlubi. Their homes were set alight with petrol after family members had been cleared out."¹⁰⁸ Police put a price on Mashinini's head offering a reward of R500: "However R500 might have become a magic wand in a society wallowing in poverty and teeming with informers. Wouldn't some residents who knew have been tempted to tell the cops?"¹⁰⁹ Mashabela's analysis is that the events seemingly had knitted Soweto together; a solid spirit of unity had filtered into the community and Mashinini's comrades ridiculed police and their reward. In Zimbabwe, the Rhodesian state used to issue powerful propaganda and offered huge rewards of up to \$5000 for information leading to capture or death of a "senior terrorist leader."¹¹⁰ Despite these temptations, authority and claims of loyalty to the community were powerful counters against treachery.

The office of a sell-out involved a deal, Faustian, one might say. The sell-out would be obliged to provide correct information, which was nonetheless verified, they spied on people and stole documentary evidence including minutes of meetings. Since the performance of Judas two millennia ago, can one then suggest that human beings are venal? Under revolutionary conditions where everybody would be expected to at least participate in some way, why do we find counter-revolutionaries?

Secondly, the process of colonization did a large-scale mental damage to black people. Those who collaborated with the system or sold-out were victims of psychological and mental colonization; they were people who didn't have faith in black agency and self-rule and pandered to white colonizing ethos. Certainly, they didn't buy into the idea of revolution or black majority rule. Writing of Uncle Tom, Oliver C. Cox describes him as a passive figure; he is so thoroughly inured to his condition of subordination that he has become tame and obsequious.¹¹¹ In Richard Wright's story "Fire and Cloud," the Reverend Taylor suspects Deacon Smith to be an informer in his church:

He reached the bottom of the slope, turned into a cinder path, and approached the huts. N Lawd, when Ah do try and do something mah own folks won't stan by me, won't stick wid me. There's old Deacon Smith a-schemin n a-plottin, just a-watchin me lika hawk, just a-waiting for me t Tak mah eyes off the groan sos he kin trip me up, sos he kin run t the white folks n tell em Ah doin something wrong! A black snake in the grass! A black Judas! Thas he is! Lawd, the Devils sho busy in this world.¹¹²

In such situations, there is always the good "nigger" who is seen to be responsible for "order" in the black community, ensuring all black people know their "nigger place."

Thirdly, some of those who were labelled could, in all probability, have been innocent people who were victims of personal squabbles and political differences. Under tense revolutionary conditions, it was easy to label anyone one doesn't like a sell-out. A major factor would be the element of doubt, implying trust would no longer be attaining. Or when comrades disagree on a tactic or strategy, such an environment would breed suspicions of "selling-out." The 1980s conflict between UDF and AZAPO, which was based on ideological and political differences, often assumed an element of opponents being unfortunate to be caught by their adversaries and being sentenced to necklacing on the premise of being sell-outs. Political opponents across the ANC/PAC divide and later on those sympathetic to BCM labelled each other "agents, informers and traitors." This was purely political mudslinging precipitated by differences in political opinion. This has been a trend in black politics ever since. The hardening of contesting political opinions, of course, has a long history in the country, frequently with different camps brooking no criticism. While NEUM preached non-collaboration as a struggle tactic, it descended into dogmatic frivolity, which generations of activists adopted and dragged with them into a political *cul-de-sac* and

thereby, instead of uniting the masses into action, it became divisive and sectarian within the liberation movement.¹¹³ Consequently, some would be expelled from an organization if fortunate enough to escape necklacing or for pandering to “tribalism, regionalism and factionalism and for endangering party security by being enemy agents.”¹¹⁴

CONCLUSION

The term “sell-out” has undergone ramifications in the postapartheid with the changing socio-political dispensation, except for snitches who point out criminals. However, there is a large presence of social movements in the country, and it might be possible that spies are planted there by state security. Currently, it is common to hear in political circles words like “reactionary,” “ultra-left,” “whistle-blower,” “counter-revolutionaries” or “agents,” which no longer cause physical harm to the addressee (except whistle-blowers in corruption cases who get assassinated) but have the same philosophical and political underpinnings as the old. This chapter has attempted to show the historical development of a collaborator/sell-out. Non-collaboration has, in particular, been an important component of the country’s politics, whose origins rose from the experience of the European anti-fascist resistance to Nazi rule. Non-collaboration taught how important collaborators were to the enemy and “how the war against them had to be as hard and unremitting as the war against the Nazis and their Gestapo; how Vidkun Quisling contributed the name in South Africa.”¹¹⁵ The character “sell-out” has many dimensions and complexities that are contingent on existing socio-economic and political conditions. Collaboration and selling-out, I would like to argue, happens in a multiplicity of sites and insinuates itself in different times though holding a common thread. I would further say that collaborators and sell-outs have many characteristics and habits; some are small-scale local level snitches, while others are big-time collaborators earning huge rewards for their efforts. What all have in common is one trait—selling-out.

NOTES

1. Roux, Edward. 1948. *Time Longer Than Rope. A History of Black Man’s Struggle for Freedom in South Africa*. London: Victor Gollancz Limited.
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3. Ibid.; see also Peires, Jeff. 1989. *The Dead will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Cattle Killing Movement*. Bloomington: Indian University Press.

4. Roux, op cit.
5. Jaffe, Hosea. 1952. Three Hundred Years. *Unity Movement History Series. APDUSA*. Cumberwood.
6. Ibid.
7. Karis, Thomas and Carter, Gwendolen M, eds. 1972. *From Protest to Challenge: Protest and Hope 1882–1934* Volume 1. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.
8. Dr. Abdurrahman was the leader of the African Peoples Organization.
9. Simons, Jack and Simons, Ray Esther. 1983. *Class and Colour in South Africa 1850–1950*. International and Aid for Southern Africa. p116.
10. Karis and Carter, op cit.
11. Simons and Simons, op cit.
12. Roux, op cit.:296.
13. The “civilisation test” consisted of “educational or property or wage qualification, as a condition for the acquirement of political privileges” (Prof D.D.T. Jabavu cited in De Kock. 2004. South Africa in the Global Imaginary: An Introduction. In De Kock, Leon, Bethlehem, Louise and Laden, Sonja, eds. *South Africa in the Global Imaginary*. Pretoria: UNISA Press.).
14. De Kock, Leon 2004, p122. Sitting for the Civilisation Test: The Making(s) of a Civil Imaginary in Colonial South Africa. In De Kock, Leon, Bethlehem, Louise and Laden, Sonja, eds. *South Africa in the Global Imaginary*. Pretoria: UNISA Press. pp 117–136.
15. Ibid.:123.
16. W.M. Tsotsi, Presidential Address at Conference of the AAC held at Queenstown, 17–20 December 1956.
17. Duma Nokwe, “Next Stage in the Struggle for Power.” *New Age*, 9 November 1961.
18. IB Tabatha, “The Agrarian Problem”, Address to Society of Young Africa, May 1954.
19. Ibid.
20. Present at the meeting were Chief Mshiyeni ka Dinizulu (Natal); Chief Victor Poto (Transkei); Chief Maseramule (Transvaal and OFS); R.V. Selope Thema (Transvaal and OFS); Paul Mosaka (Transvaal and OFS) and Z.K. Mathews (Cape).
21. Many Congress leading members were part of government’s institutions like the NRC and Location Advisory Boards.
22. “A Call for African Unity,” Statement signed by Xuma, Jabavu, Moroka, Matthews, Bokwe, Godlo, Mosaka, Baloyi, Champion, Selope Thema, Ntlabati and Mahabane, all Congress leading members, 3 October 1948.
23. Review of the AAC/ANC National Executive committee meeting, in the minutes of the Annual Conference of the AAC, December 1949.

24. Z.R. Mahabane and G.H. Gool: "A Declaration to the People of South Africa", 1951.
25. "A Declaration to the People of South Africa from the NEUM", Statement by the NEUM, April 1951.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Gerhart, Gail M. 1978. *Black Power in South Africa. The Evolution of an Ideology. Perspectives on South Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
29. Lodge, Tom. 1990. *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press; Posel, Deborah. 1991. *The Making of Apartheid 1948–1961. Conflict and Compromise*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
30. Gerhart, op cit.
31. Karis, Thomas. 1973. *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa 1882–1964: Hope and Challenge 1935–1952* Volume 2. Stanford: Hoover Institution.
32. "The Future of the Africanist Movement," questions and answers by R.M. Sobukwe in *The Africanist*, January 1959.
33. "The Future of the Africanist Movement," Questions and Answers by R.M. Sobukwe in *The Africanist*, January 1959.
34. Among the legislation introduced was the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act (1945), which tightened control of Africans, regulation of contracts, regulation of influx and conditions of residence, prohibition of African acquisition of land except from other Africans; Population Registration Act (1949) to control access and flow of labour, it also defined and classified racial categories; the Native Abolition of Passes and Coordination Act (1949), which mandated Africans to carry a reference book, establishment of labour bureaus to direct Africans to white employment; the Group Areas Act (1950), which promulgated residential segregation and forced sale of property by one designated racial group to another at deflated or inflated rates and this created conditions of poverty and overcrowding; the Urban Areas Act (1952), which subjected urban areas to influx control.
35. 'Verwoerd Tells Transkei Chiefs: Native Reps Will Go. Secret Talks on New Machinery of Consultation,' New Age, 16 October 1958.
36. "New Zeerust Clashes: Four Killed, People Determined Not To Accept Passes," New Age. 2 January 1958.
37. Ibid.
38. The Act also removed representatives of African in parliament, a provision of 1936.
39. Karis, Thomas and Gerhart, Gail M. 1997. *From Protest to Challenge. Nadir and Resurgence, 1964–1979* Volume 5. Pretoria: UNISA Press.

40. Ibid.
41. House of Assembly debates, 29 March 1960.
42. Speech by Diliza Mji, President to General Students Council of SASO, Hammanskraal, July 1976.
43. IB Tabata “The National Question” at National Conference of the Unity Movement of South Africa, January 1962.
44. These were Congolese leaders who collaborated with Belgian imperialism.
45. Ranger, Terence. 1983. *The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa*. In Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p229.
46. East African Standard, 15 December 1973.
47. Sunday Express, 9 May 1976.
48. Black Peoples Convention, n.d.
49. Nkosi Molala, “The State of the Nation”, Presidential Address to the Ninth Annual Congress, Harare Consultation of the BCM (A), 19–21 May 1990.
50. Mapetla Mohapi, n.d.
51. “Group Accuses Chief”, *Daily News Reporter*, 14 April 1975.
52. Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu, “Black Consciousness Movement of South Africa.” Speech given to the Assembly of the IUEF held in Geneva, 22 November 1976.
53. Speech by Rev. Mashwabada Mayatula, First National Congress of the Black Peoples’ Convention, Hammanskraal, 16 December 1972.
54. Steve Biko “Who is Black?” SASO Newsletter, September 1970.
55. These were created by the Stallard Commission tasked in solving the urban migration of Africans.
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57. “First Urban Bantu Council for Daveyton-Advisory Board Assists at its own Funeral!” *New Age*. 10 August 1961.
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59. To All Residents of Soweto, Hostels, Reef and Pretoria”, Flyer in English and Zulu by Soweto Students Representative Council, 7 September 1976.
60. Press Release by Khotso Seathlolo, Chairman of SSRC, 29 October 1976.
61. Transkei leader.
62. Mashabela, op cit.:129.

63. Gerhart, Gail M and Glaser, Clive L. 2010. *From Protest to Challenge. A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa 1882–1990 Challenge and Victory 1980–1990* Volume 6. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
64. Ibid.
65. "Municipal Elections," Paper by Titus Mofolo, June 1988.
66. "Municipal Elections," Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference Flyer, July 1988.
67. Shava, Piniel Viriri. 1989. *A Peoples' Voice. Black South African Writing in the Twentieth Century*. London: Zed Books.
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69. Karis and Gerhart, 1997:17.
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81. Ibid.
82. Ashforth, Adam. 2005. *Witchcraft, Violence, and Democracy in South Africa*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
83. Niehaus, op cit.:274.
84. Ashforth, op cit.:64.
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87. Lan, David. 1985. *Guns and Rain. Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe*. London: James Currey Limited.
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91. Karis and Gerhart, op cit.
92. Cited in Krog, Antjie. 1998. *Country of My Skull*. Johannesburg: Random House.
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94. Azania Combat, (Official Organ of APLA), Issue 2 Number 11 1990.
95. o*Siyayinyova* didn't have any particular political allegiance as such; they were township lumpen proletariat who would join any commotion and cause destruction. o*Siyayinyova* has many interpretations but may mean to "kick ass".
96. Lodge, Tom and Nasson, Bill. 1991. All Here, and Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s. *South Africa Update Series, Ford Foundation Foreign Policy Association*.
97. Ibid.
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99. Ibid.:46.
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102. Means those who will return back to where they came from, that is the rural hinterland.
103. Cole, op cit.
104. Ibid.
105. Lodge and Nasson, op cit.
106. Cole, op cit.:154.
107. STM Magagula, "Black Power" (n.d.).
108. Mashabela, op cit.:100.
109. Ibid.

110. Lan, op cit.:165.
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113. Alexander, Neville. 1989. Non-Collaboration in the Western Cape, 1943–1963. In Wilmot J. James and Mary Simons, eds. *The Angry Divide. Social and Economic History of the Western Cape*. Cape Town: David Philip.
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115. Alexander, op cit.

Transference and Re(De)Placement and the Edge Towards a Postcolonial Conundrum

This chapter is a follow-up to the previous one. Here, my analyses of the postapartheid South African are done through lenses of extended colonialism. Here, we refer to continued tentacles of colonialism despite the end of juridical and administrative colonialism. The “postcolonial” is a condition that is still mired and connected to colonial machinations; it is presently caught up in the vortex of the regressions of excesses of colonial rule and its attendant matrix of power, reification, a persisting racism, and exploitative and extractive relations of oppression. Colonial Africa is much more like postcolonial Africa, and its dynamics have continued to shape the contemporary societies. It is only when this message has been digested that we can establish what the real peculiarities of postcolonial Africa are.¹ Like elsewhere, in Africa, end of official colonialism didn’t mean colonialism ceased to exist. Instead, it remained; its structures and values, the entanglements of global and local colonial power matrix have been persistent, if not enduring.

I argue that whatever “ills” that have befallen the post-1994 social order are rooted in, according to Cabral and Fanon, the process of decolonization itself and the paucity of ideological thrust by the dominant liberation movement. More importantly, it shows the character of the leadership and its lack of an ideological base in envisioning a postcolonial society and reveals the weakness, rather than strength, of the liberation movement. Less surprisingly, this leadership has been trapped into venality. Erstwhile revolutionaries have turned comprador bourgeoisie complicit with both

local white capital and the international financial system. Consequently, the majority of blacks are caught in, what youthful contemporary BC activists term “the Black Condition,” a situation of depravity, poverty and nihilism while a few members of the black elite have managed to reap the fruits of the postcolony at the expense of the black majority.

THE POSTCOLONIAL MALADY

The decadent postcolony can be equated to a malady. Here, I mean the diseased condition that fails to fulfil the aspirations and dreams of the black majority who get increasingly frustrated. Ndebele finds it incredulous how leaders gave up long-held convictions and ideals overnight, renouncing them; at the same time, their people felt betrayed, confused and anguished.² He asks: “How do you turn around this way and retain credibility, of being thought to have betrayed their people, to have cowardly lost their nerve and become weak at a crucial moment.”³

The postapartheid can be seen as a replica of the apartheid, albeit with certain permutations. An image refers to two different things. There is the plain relationship that produces the likeness of an original, not necessarily its faithful copy, but simply what suffices to stand in for it. And “there is the interplay of operations that produces what we call art: or precisely an alteration of resemblance.”⁴ Ranciere goes on to argue that the image is never a simple reality, like cinematic images, which are primarily operations and “relations between the sayable and the visible, ways of playing with the before and the after, cause and effect.”⁵ One might insinuate that the postapartheid reflects both the former and the latter. Whilst the apartheid social formation may not be exactly reproduced in the postapartheid, it does appear with some alterations and modifications, which, however, are not poor and cheap imitations, but are excellent copies, showing brilliant artistry and craftsmanship. But the image is not merely a double, Ranciere argues. It is a triple. There is a different resemblance: the one that rejects the mirror in favour of the immediate relationship between progenitor and the engendered. This he calls hyper-resemblance. The reflection, the image, contains the fine features of the original. One might say, this imitation looks like a pirated porn DVD: the sound and image quality are near to the original, and some of us are not perturbed by its slight defects because our senses are piqued by erotic arousal. The image is not merely a postcolonial spectre; it has its roots in the liberation struggle, in the liberation movement itself and in the nature of its leadership. During the

talks preceding 1994, the ANC had to present a certain image, that is, it wasn't inclined to annihilate whites. It had to assuage white fears, that although there was widespread anger among blacks, this would only lock the country in to the past and hinder progress forward.⁶ Waldmeir writes:

So in New York and Soweto, Lusaka and Dakar, South Africans met to lay the human foundations and erect the emotional buttresses for a lasting peace. In less than a decade the ANC had pulled off a monumental feat of seduction–conversion of the Afrikaner nation, liberation of the white tribe of Africa from irrational fears of centuries.⁷

The ANC strategy conference of 1985 sought to win as many whites as possible to its side instead of overthrowing the government.⁸ The strategies involved courting businessmen, Afrikaner intellectuals and black homeland leaders and convince them to turn against Pretoria. For this to succeed, the ANC had to present itself in a particular light. Part of the image included the leadership, many of them aspirant bourgeoisie and culturally transformed individuals with acute tastes for everything Western. Despite Pretoria's image of them as "terrorists," they were quite gentlemen to the core, urbane, with refined mannerisms and used it to suggest a cultivated reserve inconsistent with white stereotypes of "primitive" Africans. They also projected themselves as human beings, moderate ones, that is, not fanatic ideologues. Many of the talks had "cordiality, attractive and congenial without aggression, animosity or hostility and were almost like a 'reunion.'"⁹ Inside the country Mandela's prison meetings with Afrikaners showed he was a man of moderation and flexibility, not a communist. He, therefore, assuaged white property owners. Although South Africans had spent years fighting and talking about political power, the subtext of the negotiated revolution was always economic.¹⁰

Though the dismantling of colonialism in the twentieth century was significant, the far-reaching consequences and implications have continued spread of imperialism, and postcolonial societies are still subject to subtle neo-colonial domination.¹¹ For Ashcroft et al., postcolonial doesn't mean "postindependence" or "after-colonialism" because this would insinuate that colonialism ended.

Eliminating the legal underpinnings of apartheid wasn't enough. The failure to overhaul and restructure the state machinery, apartheid apparatus in civil service, and the judiciary and security forces¹² means the post-apartheid arrangement looks the same as the system it replaced where

economic power was left in the hands of the white propertied oligarchy. White racism no longer exists as a formalized structure, but white power still remains in commerce, industry and higher education where it has mutated and assumed a colour of change.¹³ White supremacy lingers on despite blacks being incorporated into a colour-blind political framework and “those who agreed at Kempton Park were too happy to be the new managers of a system they didn’t create, just like all managers they are now called upon to make it work.”¹⁴ Others like Kunnie opine that a neo-colonial situation is existing in the postapartheid where an indigenous bourgeoisie has assumed political governance while servicing the interests of local and Western capital and imperialism, with the ANC acting as the “bodyguard of white supremacy”¹⁵ who have “inherited the language, mind-set and vocabulary of white supremacy and these are servants of imperialism.”¹⁶ In this analysis, ANC is seen as the key problem, and one has to “deal with it if we want to deal with white supremacy.”¹⁷ BC analysis of the postapartheid is “there is always slave-catchers, so we deal with them as we deal with the masters. There are always *askaris* who do the dirty job of whiteness. Whiteness just needs a little bit of melanin to reproduce itself.”¹⁸ Adam, van Zyl Slabbert and Moodley have argued that multiracial capitalism can be sold more effectively to impoverished masses than the racial monopoly of white ownership; “the ANC as the guardian and beneficiary of the system that it once denounced as irreformable represents the real miracle of the transition.”¹⁹ In fact, the plan was for whites to remain in the engine room of power even if the skipper was black.²⁰ This does nothing to either erode the deeply embedded structural inequalities or remove the inherited social and economic conditions. Murray asks, “Is apartheid really dead, or will it continue to survive, tragically metamorphosed in a ghastly new guise?”²¹ The 1994 deal, property rights and the sacrosanct values of the free market have become the dominant narrative.

Since the nationalist leaders are afraid that national liberation would lead to colonial bourgeoisie withdrawing their capital, Fanon calls this “the curse of independence.”²²

Whites would only be too happy to be part of the “political miracle” as long as they kept their economic power and wealth. Besides, there was never direct confrontation with racism and inequality. The demand was replacement of white faces with black ones; capitalism is the system the masses knew in the modern era, what they were fighting for was that it should be in their hands.²³ Transference of independence is mimicry of colonial dependence, and independence is only a mockery.²⁴ In Lacanian

terms, mimicry is like camouflage, not a harmonization of repression of difference, but a form of resemblance.²⁵ Fanon had warned of the desire and envy of the colonized that make him fantasize the master's place.²⁶ In the 1970s, Steve Biko foresaw a situation where:

At worst Blacks envy white society for the comfort it has usurped and at the centre of this envy is the wish—nay, the secret determination—in the innermost minds of most Blacks who think like this, to kick whites off those comfortable garden chairs that one sees as he rides in a bus, out of town, and claim them for themselves.²⁷

As for the leadership, “they were not against capitalism; they simply wanted its fruits and saw independence as the means to that end” and were concerned with Africanization of the capitalist economy of colonialists and knew no other alternative.²⁸ Indeed, independence would grant them individual wealth; they wanted what whites had for themselves and the opulence that came with it. The elite that would rise to power refused to radicalize the popular masses against colonialism; the reason is that they reached an understanding with colonial forces who previously political and economic power. These black leaders would become staunch defenders of capitalism, use positions of power for private gain and their office and seniority to get capital and become capitalists. In the postcolonial, there is increased wealth of a few who show off “African-owned large cars and luxurious houses, and so on, as evidence of growing prosperity and of their own devotion to the cause of national independence.”²⁹ The mental conditioning and consumption habits of these elite have affinity with the Western bourgeoisie.³⁰ Their common bond is liberalism, an office they prosecute with enthusiasm. Chinweizu contends that Africa's greatest problem today and its most formidable obstacle to her final liberation is the character of her elite, who Haile Gerima calls “snake oil sellers.”³¹ Chinweizu avers that there is a strong quisling quality in the African elite, a tendency that is calamitous to the welfare of Africans. One should ask if they are primarily African nationalists or modern black slavers “serving the west just as the slaving elites did centuries ago” with strong similarities in role and actions, a connection that is reprehensible.³² Their policies preserve an extended colonialism, their class interests are tied to their imperialist masters and “they readily abandon the interests of their people to protect those of their class.”³³ The change in lives of people is negligible; instead, “there has been a change of masters, but like new leeches, the new

ruling classes are often greedier than the old.”³⁴ For Fanon, the native elite are pacifists and reformists. For me, they are pacifists–apologists. This is a negation of the teleology of the liberation struggle:

Obviously a peoples’ struggle is effectively theirs if the reason for that struggle is based on the aspirations, the dreams, the desire for justice and progress of the people themselves and not on the aspirations, dreams or ambitions of a half a dozen persons, or a group of persons who are in contradiction with the actual interests of their people.³⁵

National liberation of a people denotes regaining of their historical personality, a return to history through destruction of imperialist domination that they were subjected to.³⁶ In the postcolonial, this is yet to, or not realized and fulfilled at all. National liberation exists only when the national productive forces are completely freed from all and any kind of domination.³⁷ Since imperialism usurps the historical development of the people through violence, national liberation has to grant the right of the people to have their own history. Any liberation movement that doesn’t consider this is certainly not struggling for national liberation because the principal aspect of national liberation is the struggle against neo-colonialism.³⁸ If this involves freeing of productive forces, then national liberation necessarily corresponds to a revolution, and “national liberation struggle is a revolution.”³⁹ Fanon believes that the settler never ceases to be “the enemy, opponent, the foe that must be overthrown,” because he has always been part of a process of domination and exploitation.⁴⁰ If the revolution is not realized, then national liberation continues because it “is not over at the moment when the flag is hoisted and the national anthem is played.”⁴¹

In most African countries, campaigns were against colonialism and foreign domination, not capitalism. The contradictions in the struggle are that some sections of capital may shed racism to guarantee continuation of capitalism, which puts the national liberation struggle into quandary: “the struggle for national liberation and against white domination is not necessarily a struggle for socialism.”⁴² Nyerere, Cabral and Fanon all argue that this stems from a lack of ideological content during the liberation struggles.⁴³ Ideological deficiency and total lack of ideology in the national liberation movements, which is explained by ignorance of historical reality that these movements aspire to transform, constitute the greatest weakness in the struggle against imperialism and “nobody has yet successfully practised revolution without revolutionary theory.”⁴⁴ In an interview, BC proponent Strini Moodley captured this sentiment:

The ANC's got no ideology. What ideology has the ANC got? You can see it happening today. No, it always has been like that. The Freedom Charter is a sell-out document, it's a liberal document. It doesn't take care of the interests of the majority of the people...ANC leaders tried to convince me that 'your place is with the ANC and with the SACP' and I told them, I'm with the BCM, and this is our policy document and I sent it to them. In it I said, 'as far as we are concerned, NUSAS, the Liberal Party, Alan Paton, and all those white people are enemies of black people.' They wrote back to me and said, 'the enemy of the NUSAS, and enemy of the Liberal Party and Alan Paton is an enemy of the ANC,' and that's when we realised these guys are going to sell us out. And the big sell-out came in 1990...the consequence of the release—Kempton Park was the biggest sell-out.⁴⁵

The postcolonial is an illusion, reinforced and spurred by native elements controlling political or state power. The illusion arises from the fact that this class is subjected to the whims, caprices and impulses of imperialists.⁴⁶ This pseudo-bourgeoisie, however strongly nationalist, cannot fulfil a historical function, "it cannot freely guide the development of productive forces, and in short cannot be a national bourgeoisie."⁴⁷ Werbner calls most African countries' sovereignty "political fiction"; in Fanonian terms, it's a "masquerade" based on concessions and minimal control of economic means.⁴⁸

Extended colonialism is shaped by operations of capitalism, by ways in which global capitalism draws in local cultures and economies into its vortex.⁴⁹ In the postcolonial, we see those who once were activists, radicals, leftists, communists, trade unionists and all sorts of that motley becoming "changed men."⁵⁰ Of these, Neville Alexander says:

All I wish to stress here is that any blanket statement about 'sell-out' and 'betrayal' could only be made at the most general and abstract level against the background of the avowed previous ideological and programmatic positions of the individuals or groups of people concerned.⁵¹

These men, including Mbeki's tenure in presidency, are complicit with the West's globalization agenda, when global apartheid and economic globalization "simply doesn't work for South Africa or Africa."⁵² It shows the depth of the embourgeoisement of the liberation movement with former activists and unionists, now well-endowed and well-resourced tycoons. The ANC, COSATU and its affiliates, SANCO, MKWVA⁵³ and SACP, have set up investment arms, and their former leading activists have

become wealthy beyond imagination⁵⁴ and have successfully made capitalism work for themselves.⁵⁵ Mngxitama has critiqued the ANC and her allies (COSATU and SACP) as being anti-black and anti-workers because they have the means and stature to galvanize society towards black socialism, but are not willing.⁵⁶ The post-1994 regime is also accused of “talking left and walking right” when “black people got a raw deal and continue to languish in squalor.”⁵⁷ These are effects of Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma compromising a lot, BC youth allege. Someone posted on *Facebook*: “South Africa is not run by the ANC as some ignorantly claim. Britain owns and runs South Africa. Thanks to Rupert and Oppenheimer, what we deem ‘black diamonds’ or wealth is crumbs used to reward submissive blacks. Zimbabwe was once a power house, the moment they threatened imperialist interests you know what happened...you wonder why our neighbours are skeletons and we are the only ‘healthy’ country in the SADC region?”⁵⁸

As for the SACP, it is accused of having sold out or having been co-opted into giving an exploitative order a humanitarian veneer, thereby strengthening capitalism rather than overthrowing it.⁵⁹ Former union leaders like Cyril Ramaphosa have become overnight multimillionaires. In 2012, Ramaphosa lost out on a prized buffalo, which fetched a record R20 million at an auction, to a Free State businessman.⁶⁰ He bid R19 million for a rare buffalo cow with a horn spread of 109 cm. Ramaphosa, who owns a game farm near Bela-Bela, spent more than R15 million on other game at the auction, including R12.5 million on two pregnant buffalo cows. Ramaphosa, who is deemed to have been complicit in the 2012 Marikana massacre where 34 mine workers were shot dead by the police, is now South Africa deputy president and is in line to assume presidency when Zuma’s term expires. Despite left rhetoric, the new regime has ideologically shifted towards neo-liberal market policies, revealing the dictates of imperialist capital and the hold of some powerful players who the government submit to. The ANC immediately after 1994 renounced the left leaning RDP, adopted Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) and a Thatcherite approach of fiscal discipline and Mbeki announced, “just call me a Thatcherite.”⁶¹ Adoption of GEAR in 1996 implied reorganization of the state through measures like labour market flexibility, tight fiscal policy, trade liberalization, exchange control liberalization, independence of the Reserve Bank, privatization and restructuring of state assets and limiting the extent the state can provide essential social services.⁶² The ANC has defended GEAR as “a tactical detour,” which “we followed by design,”⁶³ necessitated by objective (high public debt and deficit, low

growth, etc.) and subjective conditions (distrust by private capital of the new dispensation).⁶⁴ These shifts “are deplored by the left-wing as a sell-out to the global neo-liberal agenda and praised by economic conservatives as the only sensible policy of liberation movement in government.”⁶⁵ These reflect two positions: there’s no alternative to neo-liberalism, and it confirms the petit-bourgeois character of the ANC leadership.

The character of South African capital has all the features of imperialism that extends its tentacles onto the continent. South African capital that has penetrated into Africa includes state enterprises like South African Airways and Transnet. AngloGold has majority stake in Ashanti and has become AngloGold Ashanti. Mobile Telecommunication Network (MTN) has operations in Africa, Middle East and Iran. In Iran, the company was once embroiled in a legal and criminal lawsuit for its dishonesty and unethical association with the authoritarian Iranian regime, which is implicated in gross human rights violations.⁶⁶ What is unpalatable is that MTN has been providing the Iranian government confidential details of its subscribers. De Beers, SAB, FNB, Standard Bank, Nedbank and Shoprite all are present in 17 African countries. This new imperialism, which is not qualitatively divorced from rapacious and deleterious Western imperialism, is actively encouraged by the ANC. The party’s “Second Transition” document captures this:

... if Africa is set to be the new investment frontier of the world, South Africa has to position itself more strategically to take full advantage of the changing balance of economic forces and shifts in global production, answering such questions as: How much is Africa on our radar screen? How many patriotic entrepreneurs are pathfinders in the unexplored and under-served African markets? How many state-owned enterprises have made the continent their investment frontier?⁶⁷

The state has been intimating adopting the Asian developmental model to “guide national economic development through fiscal redistribution, mobilisation of domestic and foreign capital and other social partners, utilisation of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), industrial, policy and regulation.”⁶⁸ The “development,” as used here, is meant or supposed to mean improving the conditions of the poor.⁶⁹ In the postapartheid, development and modernization of the formal market economy are seen as the way to social advance. The contradiction is there is permission of international capital flows and technological advances linked to global economics, with the state assisting in supporting markets to produce developmental

goods and services.⁷⁰ The developmental model is based on the centrality of markets as constituted under capitalist relations of production and consumption. Reliance on markets means developmental goods and services must be converted into commodities and markets operate on “effective demand” catering for those willing to pay and those with resources.⁷¹ The model has support of major captains of industry like First Rand’s Sizwe Nxasana, who believes the state should play a bigger role in the economy to spur growth and stimulate the economy.⁷² Nxasana supports the developmental state mentioned by Zuma in his 8 January 2012 statement marking ANC’s 100th anniversary and argues that the country needs a mixed economy in which the private sector can flourish, with the state actively participating in several sectors like mining and banking. Nxasana doesn’t support full nationalization though. SACP’s Blade Nzimande also supports ANC’s policy thrust that calls for increased state involvement in the economy and the placement of policies into practicality and radical social transformation. He observes that the first decade of freedom benefited capitalists, the second must benefit the masses and the party is concerned about “our inheritance of an apartheid economic order.”⁷³

The ANC’s “Second Transition” debate acknowledges that having “concluded our first transition with its focus on democratisation over the last eighteen years, we need a vision for a second transition that must focus on the social and economic transformation of South Africa over the next 30 to 50 years”⁷⁴ and “concern about the lack of commensurate progress in liberation from socio-economic bondage.” The focus has been to address the triple challenges of “unemployment, inequality and poverty,” which all require a radical shift in the hitherto existing approach. Leading topics include nationalization and land reform, themes that the government is inclined to tread on with caution because they strike at the heart of South Africa’s capital and social formation. The ANC has been always been at pain to assure international investors that nationalization is not on the party and government policy radar.⁷⁵ The ANC still commits itself to a mixed economy and “de-racialisation of ownership and control of wealth.” Analysing the transition documents, scholars like Mbembe, for example, note that the “Second Transition” is an attempt to puncture the 1994 stalemate, which saw no outright winner or loser whose settlement suspended the revolution.⁷⁶ In his keynote address to the “Second Transition” conference, Zuma argued that the breakthrough at CODESA, which made compromises possible, was absolutely necessary because economic compromises were meant to stabilize the economy. He,

however, reckoned that the economy remains in male white hands; the structures of apartheid are still in place and have not allowed empowerment. Zuma, nonetheless, remains committed to increasing partnerships with business and insinuated that “the policy conference should be a platform for networking; I have seen deals clinched here.”⁷⁷ The widespread feeling, though, is that apartheid is not over, as blacks continue to be treated as second-class citizens and trapped in a permanent present, where they find it hard to make it from today to tomorrow.⁷⁸ Mbembe adds that it seems the country is going in many different directions and is wobbling in an entanglement.

The UNDP Millennium Development Goals Country Report of 2010 shows that the racial distribution of poverty in South Africa remains high. Black South Africans in 2006 constituted 79.4% of population, and 76.8% of households earned 41.2% of the R747.6 billion income, whereas 45.3% of that income was earned by whites who constituted 9.25% of the population. The Commission for Employment Equity report shows a slow pace on employment equity at senior levels, with blacks at top management unchanged since 2006: 3.9% are African, 4.8% are coloured, 7.5% Indian and 65.4% are white.⁷⁹ The income gap has come under scrutiny. Bobby Godsell, chairman of Business Leadership SA, called for a commission on high pay to be set up in the country, similar to UK’s High Pay Commission. At a presentation in parliament entitled “Addressing Income Inequality,” he said a large part of our society hadn’t benefited from any postapartheid dividend and that is due to high levels of inequality.⁸⁰ At the same meeting, COSATU’s Zwelinzima Vavi said income inequality and excessive remuneration were long-term threats to the country’s stability. In July 2011, South Africa surpassed Brazil as the most unequal society in the world. Between the second and third quarters of 2011, official unemployment level was pegged at 25%⁸¹ although the UNDP puts the national average at approximately 43%, a total of 4.4 million people are unemployed and more than 3 million (6.8%) have been unemployed for a period of 1 year or more and 60.2% of job seekers don’t have matric.

The Trevor Manuel’s chaired National Planning Commission’s (NPC) vision for 2030 seeks to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality, change the life chances of the people, “that remain stunted by our apartheid history.”⁸² NPC’s Diagnostic Report released in June 2011 highlights the country’s shortcomings and achievements since 1994: adoption of the constitution, establishment of institutions of democracy and building of a non-racial and non-sexist new nation. The UNDP reports that

South Africa has halved the population living below the poverty line of \$1 a day, the decline being 11.3% in 2000 and 2.5% in 2006. President Zuma has also hailed the country's progress in the past 17 years, while other African nations have "deteriorated after independence."⁸³ At an election rally in KwaMashu (KZN), he, however, said "we cannot solve the problem caused by apartheid in 17 years, it's not possible."⁸⁴ The NPC identifies challenges as a politicized public service, rampant corruption, an ailing healthcare system, substandard education for black children and continued divisions in society. It reckons that to eliminate poverty and inequality over the next two decades will require active participation and efforts of all South Africans in their own development, redressing the injustices of the past effectively, faster economic growth and higher investment and employment, rising standards of education, a healthy population and effective social protection,⁸⁵ an effective and capable government and collaboration between public and private sectors.

THE BLACK CONDITION

The end of colonization brought great anticipation and high hopes, namely, good life and control of political, economic and cultural destiny; these were, however, short-lived because immediately a neo-colonial social order ensued.⁸⁶ The liberation struggle fought at a cost, and expended countless souls brought with it depressed material conditions, racism, misery, suffering, poverty, corruption, tribulation and violence. All these become accepted norms⁸⁷; black suffering become normalized. Private property ownership and unequal distribution of wealth became legitimate. Many young blacks in the country feel "it's not yet *Uburu*, the postapartheid is a twilight zone between freedom and oppression."⁸⁸ BC youth feel black people died in the struggle for continued "white man's ownership of our resources." Conditions for blacks haven't qualitatively changed in 20 years; thus, there is a "need to start afresh the black revolution which was betrayed."⁸⁹ Contemporary BC youths view current problems as a black concern; whites, even so-called poor whites don't count as a factor; in other words, there is an absence of whiteness in the condition of blackness. In an anti-black world, the fundamental point is to change and end it, BC proponents say. Mngxitama proposes a radical option: since we are living in a plantation, the only way out is burning it down.⁹⁰ Although colonialism brought non-Western societies like South Africa into the vortex of modernity, BC youth say blacks are constructed outside modernity;

modernity is synonymous with humanity, and humanity equates to whiteness. Thus, to be human is to be white. Black, therefore, have to strive for humanity by apish endeavours and mimicry of whiteness through all means possible. In Fanonian terms, this condition is pathological, implying a need for urgent cure.

Let us now look at the morbid symptoms of the postapartheid social order: In the Johannesburg's Alexandra Township, an old woman wept while telling former Human Settlements Minister Tokyo Sexwale, former Gauteng Premier Nomvula Mokonyane and former ANCYL President Julius Malema how it hurts to be loyal to the ANC while living in a shack on the Juskei River, perpetually afraid of being swept away.⁹¹ The RDP houses, which Mngxitama calls "improved shacks" and "hokkies," are badly constructed and pose a hazard to occupants; they are insulting to black people, worse than the four-room 'matchbox' houses apartheid built for black people.⁹² These conditions are captured by this *Facebook* post:

The single most important contribution of the ANC in the past 17 years is its success in making blacks accept animal level existence as a right. We want an RDP house and a toilet. If I was white I would laugh at the kaffir government.⁹³

These are symptoms of colonialism and apartheid that engendered a culture of inferiority complex among blacks in a "democratic" environment, who accept inferior and substandard services, are unbelievably tolerant and are "bewitched" by democracy, and the task of contemporary BC is to raise the level of desire for real services in order to realize freedom beyond a toilet and an ugly RDP house, and that is the main objective of conscientization.⁹⁴ The Black Condition suggests that black people are human waste and are just appendages of society and are subhuman beings politicians don't lose sleep about. The reason is blackness is considered marginal. That is why, BC adherents observe, it is considered racist if black people congregate among themselves to deliberate issues affecting them. The situation is compounded by an increasing black on black violence so rampant in townships, whose roots are steeped in colonial and white supremacist violence, because "to be human as black requires violence that includes killing each other."⁹⁵ The intermittent poverty, lack, deprivation and conditions of want produce a kernel of despair, create a subhuman and manufacture a different class of human beings. Townships are considered an epitome of the Black Condition. According to Black Theologian

Pastor Skosana, “townships are nothing but glorified refugee camps, rat infested hell-holes that must be exposed for what they really are. They exist as readily available hubs of cheap labour to keep labour intensive industries going for the benefit of a few.”⁹⁶

The resultant effects are decay in the black moral world, social malaise, resorting to alcohol by blacks as a means of forgetting and escaping their problems and engaging in criminal activities. The irony is that hunger is abounding in a land of plentitude. References are made of Cape Town, which BC youth call “Kakstad,” which they say represents the South African reality—white opulence alongside black poverty and penury. The ruling party, the ANC, the rapacity and venality of its leadership and rank and file gets indicted. BC proponents opine: “We say we don’t want white minority rule again. We also don’t want black minority rulers who come to us in the name of liberation. These people have privatised the struggle... black people have to free themselves from domination. We should roll out a programme of mass mobilisation and civil disobedience.”⁹⁷

EDUCATION

Many BC proponents believe education for black children is a disaster zone. We will come back to that. The NPC has argued that there have been strides made since 1994. In 2007, a total of 80.9% of 5-year-olds were enrolled in early childhood development institutions; approximately 99% of children complete grades 1–9; since 1996, the number of schools without water has decreased from 9000 to 1700; the number without electricity decreased from 15,000 to 2800; school funding policies have been pro-poor, resulting in 60% of all schools being designated “no-fee” schools; the national school nutrition programme feeds approximately 6 million children in 18,000 schools nationwide; in historically white schools, approximately 56% of learners are black; the race profile of higher education institutions has changed, 32% of all students in 1990 were African, by 2009 this had increased to two-third. The General Household Survey (2002–2009) shows that 15–20-year-olds who are not functionally literate have decreased from 13% in 2002 to less than 10% in 2009; completion rates of primary school and higher for those aged 15 years increased from 59.6% in 2002 to 93.85% in 2009; literacy rate among 15–24-year-olds has steadily increased in the past 8 years from 29.1% in 2002 to 88% in 2009.

The NPC acknowledges that South African children grow up lacking food and nutrition; mortality rates in 0–4 age group are high; intolerable levels of stunting, neglect and exposure to violence; the legacy of low-quality education; lack of enough public institutions providing learning opportunities and the success rate of FET colleges is too low.

The Department of Basic Education (DBE) figures of 2011 show there are 25,000 public schools in the country, 3544 (14%) have no electricity; 2402 (10%) have no water supply; 23,562 (93%) don't have stocked or functioning libraries. The DBE Annual Assessment results of June 2011 show grade 3 learners' national average performance to be 35% in literacy and 28% in numeracy; among grade 6, language was 28.5% and mathematics 30%. Despite the economic crises in Zimbabwe, it has the highest literacy rate in Africa. The Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality's 2007 report shows Zimbabwean grade 6 students scored higher than South African in both maths and literacy: 507.7 in literacy and 519.8 in maths against 494.9 and 494.8, respectively. Comparing the two systems, Martin Prear argues that after independence, Zimbabwe focused on building new schools, providing textbooks, recruiting more teachers, treating them with respect and expanding teacher training colleges, while South Africa reduced its teachers, closed all teacher colleges and training moved to universities; unions like SADTU have more influence in the running of the educational system, to the detriment of learners.⁹⁸

Half of South African blacks of school-going age live in former homelands, which are suffering from a crippling education meltdown. Rural areas bear the brunt of poverty, joblessness and gross inequality, where one-third of the country still live. The department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation 2012 mid-term review for the priorities of government said schools in former homelands are more likely to be without books, administrators and underqualified teachers. Some schools, especially in Limpopo, have gone half the year without textbooks. Books have been reportedly dumped or wrong ones sent to schools.

HEALTH

According to the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA), more than 37,300 doctors are registered and almost 12,300 of them are specialists.⁹⁹ But it's not known how many of them practice in the country; it seems more than half are practising in South Africa, a disturbing fact in a country with 50 million people. In the USA, there are 901 nurses and 247 doctors per 100,000 people. South Africa has 393 nurses and 74 doctors per 100,000 people. A total of 11,332 (30%) doctors work in the public sector, the rest in private, that is, for 16% of a population that can afford private medical insurance or private healthcare. Almost 35% doctor and 40.3% nurse positions were vacant in 2008; the country needs an additional 46,000 nurses and 12,500 doctors to treat state patients. Universities produce more than 1200 doctors annually, where 2400 would suffice.

Health workers are also affected by poor working conditions, which expose them to risk of contracting disease. Poor vaccination practices have been putting nurses at high risk of liver disease for over 10 years, according to a study by universities of the Witwatersrand and Cape Town. Healthcare workers who work regularly with blood are exposed to Hepatitis B virus. At Charlotte Maxeke Academic hospital, only about half (52.4%) of staff and student nurses are protected; those not vaccinated said, they "were not aware of the danger of hepatitis as an occupational exposure" or didn't know a vaccine was available.¹⁰⁰ The tuberculosis rate among health workers in public facilities is said to be up to three times higher than of the general population, according to Stellenbosch University's Desmond Tutu TB Centre.¹⁰¹ Patient waiting areas remain overcrowded and poorly ventilated, and doctors and nurses are rarely provided with masks (respirators and N95 masks). The risk of infection has also contributed to brain drain in the sector.

The Human Rights Watch report of 2011 states that 625 of every 100,000 South African women die while pregnant or within 42 days after termination of pregnancy, compared to 14 deaths per 100,000 in developed countries. The National Committee for the confidential inquiries into maternal deaths report shows that 38.4% of maternal deaths in the country are avoidable. The World Health Organization (WHO) Statistics of 2009 says South Africa is one of only six African countries that has made no progress in reducing maternal deaths by 2008. The Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) is high and increasing: it was 150 per

100,000 live births, according to the 1998 South African Demographic and Health Survey; the 2003 one was not available. The country should attain an MMR of 38 per 100,000 live births by 2015 if it wants to meet the internationally set target (UNDP MDG Country Report 2010). The situation is compounded by the fact that mothers face abuse from nurses, which put them and their new born at high risk of deaths or injury. Socio-economic conditions continue to be significant in the health status of the population. Data from StatsSA of November 2010 show that heart disease, for example, is often linked to unhealthy lifestyles associated with middle- and upper-class living standards, whereas intestinal infectious diseases, such as contaminated drinking water, are typically associated with poor living conditions. The leading cause of death among Africans is tuberculosis, followed by influenza, pneumonia and cholera.¹⁰²

The government has unveiled plans to introduce a universal healthcare scheme, the National Health Insurance (NHI), whose success remains to be seen in alleviating the chronic problems associated with access to healthcare for the poor.

POLICE BRUTALITY

The Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD)¹⁰³ was established in April 1997 (renamed the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) from April 2012), and immediately started reporting a high rate of deaths in police custody and as a result of police action. In its first year, April 1997 to March 1998, a total of 737 people died in police hands; in March 1999, there were 756 deaths. During the 7 years of IPID, there have been 4688 deaths, an average of 56 a month.

In 2010–2011, the IPID received 5869 complaints, of which 797 were deaths, 102 domestic violence, 2493 allegations of criminal offences and 2477 misconduct cases. In 2011, the IPID recognized that the South African police was at its most violent in more than 10 years. Between April 2009 and March 2010, the police assaulted 1667 people, an increase from 1578 in 2008–2009 and from 1380 in 2007–2008. In 1998, the number was 224, in 1999, 380. Former Police Commissioner Bheki Cele defended the police actions, arguing that “the police should not be painted with the same brush” when “isolated incidents” of police brutality are mentioned.¹⁰⁴ Cele was a strong advocate of maximum use of force and violence by police, calling the force to “arrest them (criminals), use the tools

we gave you” and instructed them to “shoot to kill.”¹⁰⁵ The problem has been exacerbated by the remilitarization of police under Cele’s tenure. It means the police operate under a command system where members have to comply with orders and commands even if the actions are against their moral conscience.¹⁰⁶ The Tactical Response Team (TRT), known as “amabherete” (from the berets they wear), set up during Cele’s tenure, has become infamous in townships for its brutality.

The majority of victims of police brutality remain poor blacks.¹⁰⁷ The Cato Manor Serious and Violent Crimes Unit in northern KwaZulu-Natal, which has since been disbanded, under the command of Major-General Johan Booysen, is allegedly to have operated as a hit squad that “executed” suspects.¹⁰⁸ They would then hold alcohol-fuelled parties, intimidate victims’ families and cover up evidence. The front page of Sunday Times of 26 February 2012 shows a picture of three policemen celebrating while at their side is Makhosazana Biyela, the widow of slain Bongani Biyela, weeping. The IPID has been probing 51 suspicious deaths caused by the activities of the unit.

There is a general feeling that the country has been slowly becoming a police state and entrenching a security mind-set. In 2012, the Intelligence General Laws Amendment Bill, which seeks to create a single intelligence body, the State Security Agency (SSA), by amalgamating NIA and SASS, was proposed and gives legal recognition to the National Communications Centre, which houses interception facilities that provide for bulk monitoring, to intercept communications with little legal restraint.¹⁰⁹ The agency would have enhanced ability to counter those seen as “enemies of the state” and weakening of civil society. The eavesdropping centre and the government have the capacity to access one’s text messages, hear one’s cell phone conversations, pinpoint one’s location through one’s cell phone, access personal calls and landline records and read one’s emails.¹¹⁰ Over a 4-year period leading to 2010, the centre had legally carried out 3 million interceptions—phone calls, text messages and emails.¹¹¹

CONCLUSION

At the time of Mandela’s release, the aspiration was ownership of the economy by the blacks after liberation. Yet, four years later, Mandela took office armed with an economic policy indistinguishable from that of any other liberal democratic leader: nationalization was out, privatization in and capitalism encouraged and nurtured. Thus, with barely minimal changes

in the economic spheres, 1994 wasn't a revolution at all.¹¹² In Gramscian sense, this was a passive revolution, "a revolution without a revolution" where a social group comes to power without rupturing the social fabric but rather adapting it and gradually modifying it.¹¹³ This continues to fracture race relations in the postapartheid and haunt those who sat in the pre-1994 negotiations. Looking at the transmogrification of apartheid and totality of white power in every social, political and economic spheres, Kunnie in his book "Is Apartheid Really Dead?" asks, "Are we Black South Africans a defeated people?" and Ndebele sarcastically observes, "one is compelled to ponder: we are either tragically naïve or profoundly wise."¹¹⁴

There is need for an integrated African economy oriented not to the whims of the economies of the West but to the needs of Africa as politically defined by African people.¹¹⁵ Anything short of that will be incompatible to their aspirations for political and cultural autonomy. This is because the colonial economies were not intended to respond to the national and historical needs of African people. Some propose a radical political economy, which examines structures of dependency and dominance in the world economy.¹¹⁶ It says the problems are caused by inequalities between and within nations, leading to dependency, stagnation, underdevelopment and marginalization. This approach is guided by the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles.

The BC tradition has always been that there can never be a situation where a master and slave can negotiate a change in the status of the slave.¹¹⁷ If so, then the slave would do it in a position of powerlessness. Such a negotiation would be from unequal positions, which result in co-option and collaboration. At the negotiations, the leaders' will is "softened," and they are calmed by ethics of forgiveness.¹¹⁸ The BC position has been that it doesn't negotiate with anyone and doesn't expect to receive liberation on a silver platter. As Nkrumah puts it, "A revolutionary, as opposed to a reformist, is not called for amelioration here and there of social inequalities, but for a total rejection of the idea of social inequality."¹¹⁹ The victory of the ruling class as a result of negotiations is that the black masses were weakened and their historical demands defeated, which didn't find their way into the constitution.¹²⁰ The question then is: Can a liberation movement enter into compromises? Lenin's analysis is useful here.¹²¹ He argues that compromises determined by objective conditions (e.g., in proletarian bargaining, lack of strike funds, lack of support and exhaustion) may necessitate compromises. This compromise doesn't diminish the revolutionary potential, devotion or readiness for further struggle. Then there

is “a compromise by traitors who try to ascribe to outside causes their own selfishness, cowardice, desire to toady to the capitalists, and readiness to yield to intimidation, sometimes to persuasion, sometimes to sops and sometimes to flattery on the part of the capitalists.”¹²² So there is a legitimate “compromise” and a treacherous “compromise.” For Lenin, it would be absurd to formulate a recipe or general rule “No compromises!” to serve all cases. All is determined by practical questions of a political nature that happen in a separate or specific historical moment, which denote whether a compromise is an impermissible, treacherous or opportunistic and therefore fatal to the revolutionary class. The latter seems to be agreed to by many critics who have analysed the postapartheid conundrum.

NOTES

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3. Ibid:219.
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7. Ibid:64–5.
8. The visiting South African delegation consisted of Gavin Relly (Anglo-American), Zach de Beer (Anglo-American), Tony Bloom (Premier Group), Tertius Myburgh (Editor, Sunday Times), Harold Pakendorf (Editor, Die Vaderland), J.de L. Peter Sordor (Director, SA Foundation), Hugh Murray (Editor, Leadership SA), while the ANC delegation consisted of Oliver Tambo, Pallo Jordan, Mac Maharaj, Chris Hani, Thabo Mbeki and James Stuart.
9. Waldmeir, op cit.:197.
10. Ibid:252.
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17. Andile Mngxitama, "Fanon on Blackness." WISER, University of the Witwatersrand, 31 May 2012.
18. Andile Mngxitama, "Fanon on Blackness." WISER, University of the Witwatersrand, 31 May 2012.
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51. Neville Alexander, “South Africa—An Unfinished Revolution?” Address at the 4th Strini Moodley Annual Memorial Lecture, 13 May 2010, University of KwaZulu-Natal.
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The Idea of Nation in South Africa, 1940 to Post-1994: Conceptualizations from the Black Liberation Movement

My major tangents in this chapter hinge on how the idea of the nation was articulated not only by white rulers but also by black activists in different epochs and historical circumstances. Among blacks there have been polarizations and contestations on what a nation is. The national question, that is, who and what constitutes a nation, is yet to be resolved despite efforts by the ANC to steer all towards rainbowism. This is sharply expressed by the friction between Congress' multi-racialism and BC/Africanists' brand of Black Nationalism. The Congress vision of the nation which has culminated into a post 1994 social order continues to be contested by BC adherents and Pan-Africanists. Those in Africanist/BC camp have and still decry ANC's steerage of the nation towards multiculturalism, a euphemism for the much-vaunted rainbow nation, where sins of whites and racial brutalities perpetrated against blacks have been remitted and where majority of blacks are still trapped in the Black Condition characterized by depredations of coloniality, poverty and material and spiritual want. Indeed, a lack of proper theorization of the nation was a lacuna in the major movement, the ANC, and shows a serious lack of liberation and ideological principles. The idea of the nation could not be separated from these.

Quoting Cabral, Nabudere has asserted that ideological deficiency and/or lack of it by national liberation movements is explained by ignorance of historical reality, which these movements aspire to transform, and this constitutes one of the greatest weaknesses in the liberation struggle.¹ Thus, the

struggle (both scientific theory and national liberation), Nabudere adds, is concerned with proper identification of national goals and national motive forces. This struggle also has to consider machinations of extended colonialism and its perseverance in the “postcolony,” which, of necessity, has to be dismantled to facilitate the path to a society organized around ethos of Pan-African socialist democracy and socialist economy.

To put this discussion into context, post-1910 Union saw black people as analogous to factor of production, the ideological explanation being whites were of superior civilization and therefore were destined to rule.² From 1948 and beyond, in the aftermath of an electoral victory, the Afrikaner-dominated Nationalist Party (NP) adopted as its theoretical and political position the idea of nationalities, which obfuscated “race,” and shifted the racial into ethnic/tribal of which culture was the planetary discourse. In fact, apartheid architects, apologists and executioners were race denialists who conflated race into culture, which was in sync with apartheid’s cultural relativism. Of course, such reasoning masked underlying racist schemes and social engineering. The nation was not only an ideological phenomenon but also intricately related to economic and political relations. After the 1961 creation of the Republic of South Africa, the main focus was the white nation and the black nation. The black nation would compose of ten “nationalities,” a euphemism for ethnic groups. Obviously, this was part of colonial codification that created tribes, following the racial thinking common in German colonial administration inspired especially by Fichteian and neo-Kuyperian notion of a nation. The most far-reaching effect of European-invented traditions was the belief that African age-old custom had to be respected—that every African belonged to a “tribe” just as every European belonged to a nation.³ Post-First World War anthropology preferred “tribal” than the derogatory “savage,” so “tribes” were seen as cultural units possessing a common language, a single social system and an established common law based on kinship and heredity.⁴ Mamdani has argued that just like colonial systems of indirect rule elsewhere, the NP borrowed and upgraded indirect rule, fracturing the racially oppressed South Africans along ethnic and rural–urban lines.⁵ Having taken this cue from British imperialism, “framers of apartheid were the last, not the first, and certainly not the only ones”⁶ to execute such colonial policy of which the whole dogma of white supremacist rule hinged. It is not the intention of this chapter to examine creation of the “white nation,” or how South Africa became a white man’s country, rather I would like to look at “nation” from the

perspective of black protagonists. This I intend to achieve through tracing political and genealogical lineage of the question, of which the interregnums 1940–1959, 1969–1994 and the post-1994 are crucial because black activists were engaged in articulating a political and ideological calculation of how the nation was interlinked to the broader objectives of liberation. More important has been the equation of nation with race, because the most characteristic feature of the colonial situation is racism, which underpins all relations between the colonizer and colonized.⁷ In this chapter there is, therefore, an insistent inference to race.

The first and earlier major influence on black South African political agency has been Ethiopianism. Ethiopianism, a crystallization of religious and political notions associated with Ethiopia, the only truly independent country in Africa, with its millenarian preoccupations, though not directly a political expression, infused a sense of indigeneity to the African oppressed.⁸ Hayford identified Africa with Ethiopia, which became a symbol of African independence, a bastion of prestige and hope to Africans at home and in the Diaspora who suffered the insult of inferiority. The romanticism and myth shrouding Ethiopianism was fostered by an array of emotionalism—frustration, hope, dreams, resignation—and was more escapist than real.⁹ Ugonna argues that it's no wonder why it developed in societies with more crass racism and invidious racial animosity like the West Indies, the USA, South Africa and East Africa. In its religious conceptualization (including use of Psalm 68 verse 31 whose message gave hope to a metaphysical black heaven), freed African slaves dreamed of going back home to Africa, to Ethiopia, to displace all foreign races and claim an “Africa for Africans.” Hayford believed that to achieve greatness, Africa must attain mature nationhood.¹⁰ Thus, the question of access to land conjoined with nation remained the central motif of all black political organizations. Ethiopianism has a solid history in South Africa, beginning with break-away African Independent Churches, which, dissatisfied with racism inherent in white missionary establishments, morphed into millenarian movements that sought a black redemption. Influences from emigrationist black American churches whose eminent personalities visited the country in the latter parts of the nineteenth century inspired the vision for a redeemed Africa across the Atlantic. Although Ethiopianism didn't directly become a fully fledged political movement, it provided a consciousness for later black agency, which has been consistent throughout modern black South African history of resistance.

1940–1959

1. Views from The NEUM

The “Native Question” remained a thorn in white rulers’ vision of the nation in the post-1910 Union. On 25 November 1925, Prime Minister Hertzog made a speech in the Orange Free State town of Smithfields where he outlined the “solution” for the “Native Question” through a raft of proposals known as Hertzog Bills: removal of all Africans from the common voters roll, white representation of Natives in parliament, delimitation of land within the framework of Native Land Act and establishment of a partly nominated, partly elected “Native Councils.” Between 1925 and 1936, black Africans organized themselves into organizations opposed to Hertzog Bills, which scrapped African voting rights enshrined in the Cape franchise. The All-African Convention (AAC), established to fight for rights and liberties of Africans, would be a product of these deliberations. Despite protests, the Hertzog Bills were, nonetheless, passed into law in April 1936. An NRC was created with twelve elected Africans, four Africans chosen by the government and white Native Commissioners under the chairmanship of the secretary for Native Affairs. One contentious question was whether Africans should participate and collaborate in the NRC. Nonetheless, in the end, members of the Left, the ANC, the Communist Party, the Transkei Bunga and leaders of Location Advisory Boards ran for NRC elections and became councillors. Indeed, the NRC encapsulated segregationist philosophy and was that a node in racial doctrine that would be consummated in the form of apartheid after 1948.

The coloureds had, early in 1943, at a time when the ANC CYL was formed, impatient with the old timers’ moderation and trusteeship, rigorously opposed the establishment of the CAD, which was consistent with South African philosophy of segregation. As a result, they formed the anti-CAD linked with the AAC into a federal body called the NEUM, which condemned all forms of participation in segregated forms of representation. The AAC, therefore, proposed a federal body including such groups like coloureds (under Anti-CAD) and Indians (under the South African Indian Congress), which would unify all non-European people in the struggle against segregation. The Convention then decided against trusteeship and segregation. By December 1943, the AAC and the National Anti-CAD had coalesced into the Unity Movement, which adopted non-collaboration and boycott as a basis for struggle. Of course, boycott

and non-collaboration would inform the methods of struggle until the 1980s.

The prognosis by the Unity Movement was *Herrenvolk* ideology infused from childhood into white people by school, church and state: “from cradle to grave, every phase of life is consciously regulated and moulded in order to preserve and perpetuate the division of the people of South Africa into the European—the *Herrenvolk* and the Non-European—the slave, divinely ordained to minister to all his needs.”¹¹ Racial superiority is then infused into every aspect of life in South Africa that “it has reached the very vitals, and no single phase of public or private life remains untainted by it,” including liberals in the Labour Party and Trade Unions. The Unity Movement provided similarities with Nazi Germany where while the “Jew had to distinguish himself as an outcast by wearing a yellow patch, in South Africa a brown or black face makes the patch unnecessary.”

The Unity Movement and the AAC saw it imperative for the oppressed non-Europeans to wipe away factional divisions and differences and unite against a common oppressor.¹² Their position tethered on the premise that the struggle by oppressed groups in South Africa (Africans, coloureds and Indians) was identical in aim and methods.¹³ The effects of discrimination, which coloureds and Indians also felt, spurred a need for a non-white unity. There was a common awareness among all non-whites that they had a common enemy, the white oppressor.¹⁴ Since the legal mechanism was integral to the racist machination, protest has always also been directed at these. The binary distinction deployed by the racist legal mechanism made the life of a non-European very cheap; count not as people but assets and therefore the unity of all oppressed groups—Africans, coloureds and Indians was indispensable.¹⁵ The Unity Movement envisioned an organic unity that would lead to development of a national movement, the ultimate goal being nationalism, an antithesis to sectionalism and racialism.¹⁶ In a country like South Africa with multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual populations, all should have equal right to citizenship of the country. The *Herrenvolk*, they averred, usurped for themselves all political, economic and judicial rights, grabbed by force all the land and proclaimed they were sole owners, sole rulers, and sole citizens and arrogated to themselves the nation.¹⁷ Against this background, the indigenous people of the nation had been constructed as outcasts, people with neither a nation nor nationhood. The NEUM declared that the success of *Herrenvolk* had been the policy of divide and rule, “splitting the people, playing one section off against the other and fomenting jealousy and enmity by intrigues and by seeming to vary the

degree to which the screw of oppression is being applied.”¹⁸ The policy of segregation, which saw a binary of white and non-white, was fundamental to the master-race creed of dividing non-Europeans into many sections and groups, which hindered their unity as a nation. The main task of the Unity Movement, therefore, was one of breaking the mental rather than physical barriers of segregation.¹⁹ Ultimately, building a nation was crucial, whereby “our thinking from now on must be from the point of view of the nation ... when we think in terms of the nation we think in terms of the population as a whole.”²⁰ Tabata reckoned that whilst it is true that non-Europeans were oppressed as nationalities, in the struggle between the oppressed non-Europeans and white oppressors, there was also class exploitation, which is a fundamental form of oppression: “whilst we consider the last, we find that in the final analysis the conflict is not basically that of colour ... ”.²¹

2. The ANC and the PAC

The formation of the ANC in 1912 as a supra-tribal and national movement aimed at uniting various ethnic groups into a nation ushered yet in another era of resistance that had ended with the suppression of Bambatha Rebellion in 1906. One of the founders Pixley ka Isaka Seme called for a single African identity. He advocated for a “Native Union,” which unites all the natives; the “demon” dividing Natives along tribal lines had to be buried and forgotten.²² Seme’s stance is a little surprising. He had been educated abroad where he fell under the influence of ideas of du Bois and other pan-Africanists. He called for a regeneration of Africa, the basic factor being an awakened race consciousness. He expressed his Africanism with phrases like, “I am an African, and I set my pride in my race against a hostile public opinion,” “the conflicts and strife are disappearing before the fusing force of this enlightened perception of the true inter-tribal relation, which relation should subsist among a people with common destiny.”²³ However, in the early Congress, there was no common approach to what a nation is, as observed by Reverend Mahabane:

affiliation to the nation should be based on locality of birth that all who claim South Africa as the country of their birth should be eligible for membership of the nation.²⁴

Contrary to Seme’s Africanist perspective, ostensibly, Mahabane’s view has ever since been Congress’ attitude towards the concept of a nation, while one of ANC’s early presidents S.M. Makgatho was decisively uncompromising on

the ideal of an ultimately non-racial society.²⁵ Mahabane does express Africanist sentiments when he says of the Native Affairs Act (1920): “a final exclusion of the black man, the original inhabitant of the land, from participation in the government of the affairs of this country of his birth.”²⁶ He objected to the policy of segregation or separation of “the African or black races from European or white races” and noted “The Europeans came to Africa, robbed the African of his God—given land and then deprived the African of all rights of citizenship in a country originally intended by Providence to be his home.”²⁷

The roots of contestation in the Congress may have begun in the ANC’s 1943 Bill of Rights, which the Africanist youth found neither representing mainstream black political thought nor realities of oppressed blacks. The permanent urbanization and proletarianization of black workers who filled the gap left by whites and who went to fight in the Second World War; their subjection to similar working conditions created favourable conditions for rise of African Nationalism, and the Africanist ideology was more representative than liberalism.²⁸ It is a little surprising then that the CYL would emerge within these interstices. The CYL promoted Africanism, whereby Africans “should strive for progress, development and national liberation.”²⁹ The manifesto recognized that the white race arrogated itself ownership of land through conquest, and although the African was defeated he refused to accept his oppression. It stipulated that since whites saw the country’s problems through racial lens, “it is imperative for the African to view his problems and those of his country through the perspective of race.”³⁰ For Anton Lembede, it was only African Nationalism or Africanism that could save the African people because it was an antidote against foreign rule and modern imperialism. It declared that: Africa is a Blackman’s country because Africans are natives of Africa who have inhabited the continent since time immemorial; Africans are one, who out of heterogeneous tribes must make a homogeneous nation; tribalism was recognized as “a mortal foe of African Nationalism”³¹; the basis of national unity being the “the feeling of nationalism within Africans, the feeling that we are Africans irrespective of tribe, economic status, class or education.”³² Lembede’s lieutenants followed this exposition. The basis of unity, for Africanists, must be African Nationalism—the liberation of Africans as a race from European domination. They argued Africans are a conquered race, their oppression was a racial oppression and “in other words they do not suffer class oppression.”³³ Instead, they were oppressed by virtue of their skin colour, as a group, as a nation, “in other words they are suffering national oppression.”³⁴ The Africanists argued they didn’t hate white people, harboured no racial hatred but detested white

oppression and domination and recognized that all racial groups were here to stay.³⁵ Thus, when national freedom is realized, a “Peoples’ Democracy” would be established where all men shall have rights and freedoms merely because they are men.

The ANC had a long history of multiracial cooperation dating back to the 1920s. In the 1950s, there was multiracial cooperation with SAIC, white and coloured groups, thus making communist influence a recurrent theme for propaganda among the Africanists, which had deeper roots in the history of black political thought.³⁶ The Africanists equated communism with apartheid as “two similarly vicious evils.”³⁷ It also contributed to the spilt by the Africanists who formed the PAC in 1958, drawing heavily on the philosophy of Lembede. Africanist members of the CYL who were inclined to exclusive African Nationalism were hostile to the role of non-Africans (which they expressed in both ideological and racial terms) in the Programme of Action, but certain sections like Tambo, Sisulu and Mandela were accepting a multiracial cooperation with the Left. Africanist elements in the CYL found that cooperation and contact between white and Indian leaders was increasing during the early stages of the Defiance Campaign and were wary of African aspirations being subordinated. For that reason, they refused “to be reduced to the level of doormats and instruments of white capitalist liberals and the Indian merchant class.”³⁸

When he returned from the USA in 1953, Z.K. Matthews saw African political activity in a lull. In his presidential address to the ANC’s Cape provincial conference on 15 August 1953, he suggested formation of a multiracial congress of the people (COP), a campaign which would be inclusive of all races and where a freedom charter for a democratic South Africa would be drawn up. The suggestion was adopted by the provincial conference and accepted by the national conference in December 1953. The freedom charter was presented at Kliptown where whites from the Congress of Democrats (COD), Indians and coloureds, who were essential in staging the congress, occupied prominent positions on the platform, behind which there was a large replica of a four-spiked wheel representing four racial groups in the Congress Alliance.³⁹ The charter outlined a liberal bourgeois democracy whose formulations were not Marxist: the nationalization proposed was state capitalism; wasn’t a revolutionary document, moderate in tone; emphasized liberties than independence and took for granted the continuance of a multinational rather than an essentially Negro-African state.⁴⁰

The freedom charter's main pillar that says "South Africa belongs to all those who live in it" encompassed Congress' vision of the nation. Incidentally, it enshrined the same NP pluralist idea of the country as composed of many nationalities, particularly the Bantustan theory. This vision could be seen in the ANC logo (the four spikes representing four national groups: white, coloured, black African and Indian). It intersected with the Communist Party's Soviet-influenced "independent native republic" and later on Communist Party's conceptual Colonisation of a Special Type (CST),⁴¹ the former recognizing the right of oppressed nations to self-determination, and the National Democratic Revolution (NDR), a two-stage conceptualization following the 1969 Morogoro conference, which promulgated national liberation as a first stage followed by socialism, has ever since consummated Congress' policy.

In an article in *Liberation* of June 1956,⁴² Mandela praised the adoption of the freedom charter; the uniqueness of the event being its multi-racial nature and that it was more than just a list of demands because "the changes it envisages cannot be won without breaking up the economic and political set-up of present South Africa." While it listed some proposed changes,

It is by no means a blueprint for a socialist state but a programme for the unification of various classes and groupings amongst the people on a democratic basis. Under socialism the workers hold state power. They and the peasants own the means of production, the land, the factories and the mills. All production is for use and not for profit. The Charter does not contemplate such profound economic and political changes. Its declaration "The People Shall Govern!" visualises the transfer of power not to any single social class but to all the people of this country be they workers, peasants, professional men or petty-bourgeoisie.

Mandela added that the nationalization of the banks, the gold mines and the land is imperative because the wealth of the country would be turned to the people. Seemingly, the people he is talking about are a black petty-bourgeoisie:

The breaking up and democratisation of these monopolies will open up fresh fields for development of a prosperous Non-European bourgeois class. For the first time in the history of this country the Non-European bourgeoisie will have the opportunity to own in their own name and right mills and factories, and trade and private enterprise will boom and flourish as ever before.

In contrast, the Africanists were staunch opponents of the “multiracial charter,” which they sarcastically called the “Kliptown charter.” The charter’s preamble “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white” would be the final bane in the already strained relations in the Congress. The Africanists saw the preamble as a claim that “the land no longer belongs to the African people, but is auctioned for sale to all who live in this country,” thereby legitimizing the dispossession of the indigenous people, whereas the Africanists’ commitment was overthrow of white domination and restoration of land to its rightful owners. The *World* of 14 December 1957 said of the charter: “The greatest sell-out of the nation, the planting of a strong but deadly schism among the Africans, thus pushing us far back from our goal, has been the so-called congress alliance.” The Africanists claimed: “Afrika for the Afrikans while the ANC claims South Africa for all.”⁴³ Mangaliso Robert Sobukwe, a prominent figure in the Africanist camp, argued against multiracialism because “it fosters, safeguards and maintains white interests: in addition to implying that there are basic insuperable differences between the various ‘national groups.’”⁴⁴ In a government run by Africanists on the basis of African Socialist Democracy, anyone who accepted majority rule would be regarded as an African, he added. There would be no minority rights because “we think in terms of individuals not groups.”⁴⁵ The Africanists argued national oppression couldn’t be challenged unless African people got the self-confidence and imbibe subjective liberation propounded by African Nationalism, thus the need to return to the teachings of Lembede. The Africanists would not tolerate “deviationists and pacifists” because “no white man has ever impressed us, liberal democrat or democratic liberal because both are hypocrites, for they cannot accept clear cut African Nationalism.”⁴⁶ Others in the Congress like Chief Luthuli and Matthews believed of “an all-inclusive African Nationalism,”⁴⁷ cooperation with other sections of the population on an equal basis and “the nationalism we express is not the narrow nationalism which seeks to exclude others from South African nationhood as we are excluded today but a broad nationalism which is all inclusive, with no position of special privilege for any group as we find is the case in this country today.”⁴⁸ Senior Congress leaders, despite tolerant to Lembede and Youth Leaguers, never adopted the view that South Africa should be politically dominated by Africans.⁴⁹ They only wanted Africans to have an equal place in a heterogeneous nation.

The official PAC policy regarded coloureds as African since their geographical origin was in Africa and shared the same black man’s experience

of dispossession and degradation, although the policy was never adhered to by PAC branches in the Western Cape.⁵⁰ Sobukwe personally favoured acceptance of poor Indians into PAC and was averse to the merchant class for its tendency to exploit Africans and its claims for cultural superiority. Sobukwe decried the Indian merchant class' Janus-faced identification with the oppressor while, at the same time, providing political leadership of Indians. Poor Indians who suffered material oppression easily identified themselves with indigenous Africans and therefore could be partners in the struggle.⁵¹ Thus, in the late 1960s, coloureds and Indians became part of the PAC.⁵²

The PAC was continental in its thinking:

Afrika is our fatherland by decree of Providence and Divine Right. We rise to give a pledge that Afrika must be freed ... therefore let us turn to the graves of Afrikan martyrs, Moshoeshoe, Sekhukhuni, Makana, Tshaka and Dingani and pray for inspiration from them and those who died for us in the cause ... if we betray the whole or part of our principles of African Nationalism the Gods will destroy us.⁵³

Although they used "Azania" as a reference to South Africa, they saw Africa as a nation, thereby not recognizing colonially imposed borders. In their commitment to Pan-Africanism, inspired by Nkrumah's United States of Africa and by Marcus Garvey and George Padmore's assertion that the destiny of Africa is one, stretching from Cape to Cairo, Morocco to Madagascar, a desire to claim every inch, a single African nation would be one where ethnic and national groups are subsumed.⁵⁴ The Africanists didn't subscribe to the idea of South African exceptionalism because South Africa is part of the indivisible whole of Africa. They adopted a slogan "Ma Afrika is the meaning of struggle! Mayibuye iAfrika!"⁵⁵ Meetings would open with phrases like "Sons and Daughters of Afrika, Sons and Daughters of the Soil."⁵⁶ At the PAC launch, words like "Cape to Cairo, Morocco to Madagascar, Azania is our land, we will take it with a bazooka" captured Pan-Africanism and its sentiment. Actually, these words have been turned into an emotive struggle song, which I have heard sung by contemporary social movements. The PAC also adopted the slogan "Izwe Lethu iAfrika" (meaning Afrika is our nation) not only as their form of gesticulation but also as an expression of nationhood. *Izwe* seems a homonym, in its various meanings and explanations; it indicates country, land and nation, altogether combined. Contemporary BC youth and activists also use *Izwe Lethu* with frequent regularity, showing a yet-to-be-achieved black nation.

For Africanists, the struggle was both nationalist and democratic, meant for restoration of the land to its rightful owners, the Africans, and for them this was a fact of history.⁵⁷ The argument was that the democratic struggle is about numbers in which the wishes of the majority are implemented, while the national struggle is about recognition of heritage dating back to Moshoeshoe, Shaka and Gcaleka who fostered nation-building by bringing in scattered tribes into one single entity.⁵⁸ The Africanists critiqued the ANC for preoccupation with the democratic struggle at the expense or total exclusion of the nationalist. The former as a political struggle was seen as “designed to remove legal restrictions, recognizes the foe as the present Nationalist government”; thus, the Congress, like the white opposition United Party (UP), only aspired for a precipitous acceptance and accommodation instead of total dismantling of the machinery on which white supremacist rule hinged. The Pan-Africanist analysis was that the struggle for African freedom should not accept compromise, apology, collaboration or servitude. The Africanists differed from the ANC in that Africans were oppressed as a subject nation, which made the struggle a national one.⁵⁹ Thus, there were conscious efforts by African people to reject “balkanization or pakistanization” of their country by apartheid rulers (at a time when homeland system was being implemented). They conceived the struggle in Manichean terms where two belligerents were identified: the oppressor/oppressed; master/slave; fight between forces of evil and righteousness; champions of oppression and champions of freedom.⁶⁰

For the PAC, mental revolution was central to liberation. Sobukwe and the PAC sought to exorcise the African from slave mentality and teach the people of their “African personality.” The concept apparently has a long history, beginning with early Pan-Africanists like Mojola Agbebi, Holy Johnson and Edward Wilmot Blyden who use the term at a lecture to the Young Men’s Literary Association of Sierra Leone on 27 May 1893.⁶¹ For Azanian Africanists, man is a social being not an economic animal; thus, he must recognize the primacy of the material and spiritual interests of his fellow human, must not uphold his own interests at the expense of a fellow man and “it is only from this set-up that the human personality can be developed and that respect for it can be developed.”⁶² The year 1958 was declared a “Status Year,” a battle for political, economic and social status. They announced “A Status Campaign” whose first stage targeted businesses and whites who addressed Africans as “native,” “kafir,” “boy,” “girl,” “Jane,” or “John” and “we will no longer have ‘Jack,’

‘George,’ ‘Nancy’ etc. as handy labels to be attached to any black man or woman by any white man or white woman, white boy or white girl.”⁶³ It called for boycott of all those shops, European or African, that didn’t comply and ended by the slogan: “Ma-Afrika is the meaning of our struggle! Mayibuye!”

1969–1994

1. Pan-Africanist and BC Positions

The Congress multiracialism, which reached its zenith in the 1955 Kliptown congress where the freedom charter was drawn, and the Pan-Africanist and BC positions have always been at ideological and theoretical variance, if not outright acerbity and abhorrent engagement. But since the nation has been also synonymous with race, racial domination and oppression of black South Africans, for many, wresting of economic and political power from white supremacist rule would result in a fruition of objectives and teleology of the liberation struggle.

The interregnum 1960 to the end of the decade has been considered a political nadir, a consequence of banning of black political movements, incarceration of their leaders and beginning of exodus into exile. The late 1960s and 1970s up to the 1980s saw a resurgence of militant activism in the form of BC and its impact on the larger black populace and indeed on ANC itself. The consensus among BC/Africanists was that black South Africans were a displaced nation, and justice would only be realized with restoration of that nation to its rightfully owners, the blacks. In contrast, Congress position oscillated from approbation of Nelson Mandela as a symbol of resistance to apartheid, his release from prison, clamour for apportioning of civil liberties and human rights; thus, the teleology of the struggle veered in a direction that reduced objectives of the struggle to a right to ballot.

In the 1970s, BCM used to talk of *sechaba*⁶⁴ (nation), *isizwe es’ mnyama* (the black nation) and *sechaba seyashwa/saphela isizwe es’ mnyama* (the black nation is perishing) and used to address all blacks as Ma/Mo’Afrika. The BPC, an “adult” wing of the SASO, also had a publication called *Inkululeko YeSizwe* (Freedom of the Nation). All these were expressions of yearning for nationhood. It acknowledged that only two groups/nations exist—the oppressor and the oppressed; the oppressor being white and the oppressed being black.⁶⁵ In the 1980s, BCM critiqued the

ANC for denying the existence of an oppressed nation and an oppressor nation. The BCM sought to foster a common black identity opposed to apartheid-imposed tribal identities. The objective of BCM was to unite all blacks as a nation in quest for both psychological and physical liberation and reclamation of their land.⁶⁶ Blacks had to form a power bloc/solid group to counter an institutionalized racism, which would facilitate a bargain based on a position of strength. The solidarity of the oppressed as expressed in Black Solidarity was inalienable. Black Solidarity meant coming together of blacks to solve their problems through using their numbers and their blackness and rejection of sectional, tribal or religious differences. The realization was that black people had one thing in common, that is oppression, which comes as a result of colour of their skin, and this was the central point of their suffering.⁶⁷ The main argument was Black Solidarity would remain much vaunted as long as blacks were politically and economically a minority, that is, whereas BC is an on-going and an all-embracing philosophy reflecting all aspects of black community life, Black Solidarity is a means to an end, relevant only in the course of working towards liberation and,

Despite the white forces having repressive machinery on their side, we have about 30 million black people on our side. No amount of manipulation and subjugation by the repressive white forces can prevent us from uniting as an oppressed people, as Blacks-Africans, Coloureds and Indians—into a common political movement.⁶⁸

Like the Unity Movement before, BCM in the 1970s saw Indians and coloureds as constitutive of the black nation despite few privileges they accrued from white rule. The entrenched division in the country deterred blacks from working as a unit; therefore, the unity of the oppressed groups would be realized by formation of a black umbrella. The BCM defined black as those legally, politically, economically and socially discriminated against as a group.⁶⁹ Steve Biko exhorted the racially oppressed with these words:

By all means be proud of your Indian heritage or your African culture but make sure that in looking around for somebody to kick at, choose a fellow who is sitting on your neck. He may not be as easily accessible as your black brother but he is the source of your discomfort.⁷⁰

BCM believed that Azania is a country in which both black and white live and shall continue to live together, but a truly open society could only be achieved by blacks by virtue of their numbers and state of oppression.⁷¹ They asserted that Azania belongs to black people, and whites who live in it have to do so on terms laid down by blacks and on condition that they respect black people.⁷² BC argued that this should not be construed as anti-whitism but “only means that in as much as black people live in Europe on terms laid down by Europeans, whites shall be subjected to the same conditions.”⁷³ The so-called non-white oppressed were seen as excluded and discriminated against as a black nation and not as a class; therefore, the response had to be some form of nationalism, not classism.⁷⁴ The many Azanian ethnic groups suffered from same oppression and landlessness, thus constituting a single black nationality. BCM, like the Africanists before, critiqued the ANC for promoting multiracialism at the expense of a black nationhood.⁷⁵ The world of the ANC was peppered with a select elite clique of writers, white universities’ academics and multiracial gatherings which were the crucible where the ANC’s policies took shape and which probably explains Congress’ many ideological and political postulations that didn’t place the black subject at the centre of the struggle.⁷⁶ Further, the South African situation, described as internal colonization, meant collective exploitation and oppression of a whole people, not classes. There is a link here with Negritude thinkers who saw colonialism as a racial experience, whose contradictions create a “community of blood,” therefore a collective personality of black people.⁷⁷ Such exploitation, Sebidi, like Magubane’s argument, doesn’t give rise to class consciousness, but to race or national consciousness that transcends tribal divisions.⁷⁸ The struggle for national liberation constitutes a new entity of all social classes, who identify with the national territory; around it develops a new consciousness reflecting all their interests.⁷⁹ A similar observation is made by Wolpe: while the black petit-bourgeoisie was small, unable to develop because of legal racial constraints, the racial and national subordination of this class led to its alignment with the national liberation movement.⁸⁰ This position gives credence to race as a unifying factor for all black classes. BC in following the Africanists before, were averse to both non-racialism and multinationalism, whether expressed by white liberals or blacks, because it serves to “preserve power in white hands, designed to create a condition of white ‘haves’ and an upper crust of black ‘haves.’”⁸¹

In the 1980s, the BCM, unlike their 1970s counterparts, conceived the struggle for national liberation in class terms, as directed against racism

and capitalism. They averred that the black working class was central in the struggle because blacks were exploited, oppressed, dispossessed, owned no land or means of production, therefore the material position in which the black man found himself in was determined in both racial and economic dimensions, in the process reducing all blacks to a class of workers, “therefore in South Africa race is a class determinant.”⁸² The BCM’s position in the 1980s was: “Black Solidarity under the hegemony of the Black working class, the dictatorship of the Black proletariat and its hegemony over all classes in the South African social formation.”⁸³

By late 1980s, BMC and their ideological kindred, the PAC, were arguing that apartheid could not be reformed, it had to be totally destroyed; liberation and self-determination for a free, non-racial socialist Azania had to be attained not on a silver platter but through struggle, the motor being the liberation movement, not the regime.⁸⁴ They argued that since apartheid was a special manifestation of colonialism, the fight therefore was against settler colonialism and capitalism.⁸⁵ The PAC would aim to rally and unite African people under one banner of African Nationalism “in order to overthrow white domination and establish a socialist order recognising the supremacy of the interests of the individual.”⁸⁶ Building a society that doesn’t see people as black or white was the goal, as Zeph Mothopeng explained:

We say there are no whites or blacks in Africa, there are only Africans and colonialists.⁸⁷

Mothopeng further observed that an African is the indigenous person of Africa and of all those who owe their allegiance to Africa and accept the democratic rule of the African majority.

Central to BC and Africanist vision for negotiations or a future Azania was “land restoration, socialist transformation of the economy, building of a national culture in which all Azanians, irrespective of race, gender or religion will participate;”⁸⁸ creation of an egalitarian society—egalitarian meaning blindness to colour, non-recognition of minorities because “this is symptomatic of using skin colour to place man in a specific special box.”⁸⁹ In this discourse, the land question is the heart of the national question⁹⁰; in other words, land and nationhood are Siamese. Land reclamation as opposed to Congress’ struggle for political rights was, therefore, the principal objective of national liberation. In final analysis, the question

would be consummated, and based on key tenets of the 1983 Azanian Manifesto, would be anti-imperialism, anti-sexism and anti-racism.

The NP's Gerrit Viljoen, the minister of Constitutional Development under De Klerk's government, during negotiations was worried about the use of "Azania" by the PAC and BCM. Let us quote him at length:

We want to change our approach completely. We want to include blacks as fellow citizens. But we would be negotiating even the name of the country ... many blacks call it Azania. They are the blacks who see no place for the white man. They are the extreme PAC. I think there's no likelihood of coming to an agreement with them ... the name Azania sounds a warning note, of completely ending South Africa and bringing a break in history. In our thinking, a complete break in history would be unacceptable. We will have to provide some continuation with the past.⁹¹

In contrast, Motsoko Pheko observes that the people of Azania whose country imperialists called South Africa through British imperialist Union of South Africa Act of 1909 mined gold and copper at Mapungubwe as early as the ninth century.⁹² He argues that Azania, like Kush, Mizraim, Egypt, Kemet and Ethiopia, means Blackman's country or continent, that is, in vernacular, *izwe labantu abamnyama/lefatsho la batho bats'o*. This view has been relayed to contemporary BC and Africanist-oriented youths who use "Azania" with deliberate intent; many have adopted it as a *Facebook* moniker and refer to South Africa as "Azania."

2. The Congress Tradition

When the ANC was formed in 1912, it emerged as a supra-tribal and national movement aimed at uniting various ethnic groups into a nation. Seemingly, its dalliance with the Communist Party from the late 1920s changed its views on the question.

The 1955's freedom charter's main pillar that states "South Africa belongs to all those who live in it" has ever since been Congress-guiding philosophy on the nation, but one that has been bitterly contested by those on the opposite political and ideological spectrum. Incidentally, it enshrined the same NP pluralist idea of the country as composed of many nationalities, particularly the Bantustan theory, as seen in the ANC logo (the four-spikes representing four national groups: white, coloured, black African and Indian). It intersected with the Communist Party's Soviet-influenced "independent native republic" and later on communist-conceptualized CST,⁹³

the former recognizing the right of oppressed nations to self-determination and the NDR, a two-stage theory that was borne at the 1969 Morogoro conference, which promulgated national liberation as a first-stage, followed by socialism. This has ever since consummated Congress' policy. A unity of Africans, progressive whites, Indians and coloureds as a single national front has been the policy of the Congress and its ally the South African Communist Party (SACP) as from the 1970s. In his ANC's New Year message of 1971, Oliver Tambo said: "Who are the blacks? They are the people known as 'kaf-firs', 'coolies' and 'hotnots.' Together with those South Africans whose total political identity with the African oppressed makes them black in all but the accident of skin colour."⁹⁴ The question has always been the following: In a country where both the oppressed and oppressors claim the same geographical entity, then who comprises a nation? Congress/SACP approach has been to overcome internal colonization and non-racialism as a principle of struggle has to be applied. The ANC's Morogoro conference of 1969 recognized that African people are "a dispossessed and racially oppressed nation."⁹⁵ This situation had to be overcome by NDR, which would destroy the existing social and economic relationships and correct historical injustices perpetrated against indigenous peoples. The struggle for national liberation had to precede socialist transformation, a position associated with the SACP, which was incorporated into the ANC's tactics and strategy. It stressed that the black working class is not only an oppressed nation but also represents the most potent force for national liberation.⁹⁶ The policy paper also noted that Indian and coloured people were discriminated and oppressed; despite certain concessions, they shared a common fate with black Africans, and their own liberation was inextricably bound with liberation of Africans. The ANC/SACP, therefore, strove for unity of "South African nationalities,"⁹⁷ their integration and fusion into a single unitary nation under headship of the working class. The creation of a new nation would involve, as a basic objective, elimination of accumulated political, social, cultural and economic privileges associated with whites.⁹⁸ However, it was not spelt out how the working class would achieve this goal. Nonetheless, national determination would be secured through a democratic institutional framework of adult suffrage and civil liberties within a non-racial state, that colonial and national question are synonymous and antagonistic "nations" can only be unified through democracy⁹⁹ and a commitment to the principle of "one country, one people, one government—a government of the people of South Africa."¹⁰⁰ For ANC, the nation is not defined by skin colour or racial designation, but by loyalty and "commitment to the country, its people and

its future.”¹⁰¹ By late 1980s and negotiations era, the Congress’ position on ending apartheid was that all people must be treated as equal citizens without regard to race, colour or ethnicity. This had to be guaranteed by a Bill of Rights that would safeguard fundamental human and individual rights. ANC’s constitutional vision was premised on the freedom charter, based on non-racialism and non-sexism, where structures and institutions of racial oppression and discrimination are dismantled and replaced with democratic ones, insertion of constitutional provisions to facilitate redistribution of wealth and opening of facilities to all and an independent, unitary, democratic and non-racial state.¹⁰² These latter suggestions were Congress’ guiding principles in the final years of the struggle; land and its return to blacks was never on the radar.

As CODESA negotiations surged on, the ANC was ecstatic because “the dream of the oppressed majority in this country ever since 1910 has been full participation as ordinary South Africans in elections and the choice of government.”¹⁰³ The Congress saw elections as part of the process of achieving independence and a signal for true citizenship, which, for nearly 100 years since its formation, was now realized.

NATION IN THE POSTAPARTHEID ERA

1. 1994 –

Smith defines a nation as “a named and self-defining human community whose members cultivate shared memories, symbols, myths, traditions and values; inhabit and are attached to historic territories or ‘homelands’, create and disseminate a distinctive public culture, and observe shared customs and standardised laws.”¹⁰⁴ This definition overlaps with that of *ethnie*, thus showing a close relationship between ethnic communities and nations. One detects a similarity with postapartheid’s brand of multiculturalism, which goes by the name of rainbow nation or non-racialism. During the Mandela era (1994–1999), a new narrative emerged to describe a new social order: nationhood, unity, racial harmony and race entered a delicate and sensitive terrain. While these were attempts to give South Africans a new language of colour-blindness, it rendered the real and often violent consequences of race and racism invisible. As a result, there was little attention to how race continues to shape relationships and identities in the postapartheid. Central to this project is the TRC¹⁰⁵ headed by Desmond Tutu, who once quipped:

Ours is a remarkable country. Let us celebrate our differences. God wants us as we are. South Africa wants and needs the Afrikaner, the English, the Coloured, the Indian and the black. We are sisters and brothers in one family—God’s family, the human family ... my appeal is ultimately directed to us all, black and white together, to close the chapter on our past and strive together for this beautiful and blessed land as the rainbow people of God.¹⁰⁶

Mandela’s inauguration speech on 10 May 1994 also echoed these sentiments:

We enter a covenant that we shall build the society in which all South Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk tall, without fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human dignity—a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world.

Mngxitama¹⁰⁷ likens Mandela to Nongqawuse’s miracle: “When Nelson Mandela walked out of a brutal 27 years of unjust imprisonment, he extended his hands to his jailers, embracing them as one does to a long lost friend. The world was agape with awe. What magnanimity! Mandela showed no bitterness and demanded no justice for himself and his people. With the help of Desmond Tutu, he built a successful forgive and forget industry that culminated in the TRC. The outcome was neither truth nor reconciliation, but a democracy which was founded on a refusal to address the historical injustices systematically inflicted upon the Black majority by a settler white minority.”

Harris et al. see the TRC as a product of a political compromise during the period of negotiations and a historical moment under Mandela’s government of national unity.¹⁰⁸ As an instrument of national unity, it served to conceal historical injustices in order to project the image of, and imagine a new nation. This necessitated expulsion of race and racism from its interrogational framework and inscription of new values of constitutionalism and citizenship of the new nation, a superficial reconciliation, which denies the racist past and “suppressed the dialogue on the persistence of racism in the new South Africa.”¹⁰⁹ Omission of race meant placing of individual blame than collective guilt and “actively fed the denial by white beneficiaries of their role in the past and removed collective [racialised] sense of responsibility for apartheid.”¹¹⁰ The BC youth blamed the constitution for denying blacks an authentic nationhood and for entrenching both black propertylessness and white existing property rights. Some call the constitution a “blueprint for neo-colonialism.”

Major government commissions continue to recognize the non-racial character of the nation. For example, the Trevor Manuel chaired NPC throws non-racialism into an admixture of ideologically incoherent statement. The vision statement of the NPC says:

Who are we? We are Africans. We are an African country. We are part of our multi-national region. We are an essential part of our continent. Being Africans, we are acutely aware of the wider world, deeply implicated in our past and present. That wider world carries some of our inheritance. We have learned a great deal from our complex past; adding continuously to our experience of being African ... our connectedness across time and distance is the central principle of our nationhood ... we have welcomed people from distant lands, who have chosen to live among us ... we are a community of multiple, overlapping identities, cosmopolitan in our nationhood. Our multiculturalism is a defining element of our indogeneity. We are, because we are many. Our many-ness is our strength-we carry it throughout our lives ... South Africa belongs to its peoples.¹¹¹

The NPC stresses on nation building and social cohesion, balancing between healing the divisions of the past, broadening economic equalities, particularly in black people, and building a sense of inclusion and common purpose among all South Africans. It says the aim is not building a melting pot where individual, religious, cultural and other differences disappear, but rather “a society with a shared South African identity, without distracting from our diverse multiple identities.” Integral in this project is the constitution and the Bill of Rights, which established a new South Africa and a new South African identity, which “enabled us to overcome our history and envisioning a new society based on equality, freedom and dignity,” where human beings are individuals and moral agents with rights and responsibilities. The document, which sounds Charterist and not very much divorced from the ANC’s policies, says unity in diversity is “the key to the country’s unity in embracing the reality that all South Africans have many identities, and yet are South African.” In its liberal postulation, the NPC observes that while the government is expected to fulfil its responsibilities, South Africans are obliged to meet theirs and play their role “as responsible and active citizens that shape society.” Incidentally, Freedom Day celebrations continue to have a conspicuous absence of white South Africans; the audiences remain largely black.¹¹² Various opinions point out that the event shows how the nation is still divided along racial lines.

Multiculturalism has become a central discourse in the struggle over issues pertaining to national identity, construction of historical memory, purpose of schooling and meaning of democracy.¹¹³ The notion of a multicultural nation is critiqued for masking a democracy that is secured through control and discipline of bodies.¹¹⁴ Thus, the idea of democratic citizenship is equated with a private, consuming citizen coupled with increasingly subalternization of the Other. What we have in postapartheid South Africa is twofold: the private, consuming citizen is part of a democratic *joissance* where the idea of freedom is an alibi for material lack and deprivation. Secondly, there are residues of apartheid notions of conservative multiculturalism, which sought to construct difference through “sameness.”¹¹⁵

In modernity, the African subject is constituted through structures of oppression and exploitation.¹¹⁶ These complex questions of complicity need to be addressed on an entirely new basis—all identities have been shaped by and continued to express structures of power and exclusion.¹¹⁷ De Kock uses a metaphor of the “seam,” which, while joining together, bears the mark of the suture. So there is an attempt at the seam to flatten out difference, which De Kock calls “politics of the seam.”¹¹⁸ These have, however, endeavoured to wean themselves from the legacy of white supremacy. In the post-1994, there have been attempts to create a common “South African” culture, which takes into cognizance cultural differences. A similar situation pertains to the post-civil rights USA. If a “common national culture” means abrasion of differences, it implies assimilation of previously racially dominated groups into the mainstream dominant framework of values. It is important to acknowledge that this has placed problems of white anti-black racism, social justice and ramifications of power off limits.¹¹⁹ It posits that anyone regardless of colour can reap economic benefits of the nation, but the precondition is for one first becoming “denuded, deracinated and culturally stripped.”¹²⁰ The divergent pole of this kind of multiculturalism is the critical and resistance multiculturalism, which argues that without a transformative political and economic agenda, multiculturalism is just another form of accommodation to the larger social order. This school doesn’t see culture as nonconflictual, harmonious and consensual; it doesn’t see diversity as a goal, but rather it must be affirmed within a politics of culturalism and a commitment to social justice. Though attentive to notion of “difference,” which, of course, is a product of history, culture, power and ideology, it interrogates the construction of difference and identity in relation to radical politics and to a testimony to pain, suffering and “walking nihilism of black people,”¹²¹ which can be traced to origins of

racism in the social, political and cultural dynamics of white supremacy.¹²² Thus, there is a need to challenge narratives of national identity, culture and ethnicity, address of systemic structural harbingers of such a social order and undoing of master narratives of racism and deconstruction of centres of colonial power.¹²³

In BC and Africanist tradition, non-racialism is synonymous with assimilation and integration and incorporation into mores of whiteness, into the larger compass of social, political and economic privilege.¹²⁴ Contemporary BC youths argue that the ANC fights for inclusion, while BC seeks destruction of the system and its values, rather than seeking entry into a multiracial society.¹²⁵ In rejecting integration, Biko's words remain true in contemporary society:

this is a white man's integration—an integration based on exploitative values. It's an integration in which black will compete with black, using each other as rungs up a step ladder leading them to white values. It is an integration in which the black man will have to prove himself in terms of these values before meriting acceptance and ultimate assimilation, in which the poor will grow poorer and the rich richer in a country where the poor have always been black. We don't want to be reminded that it is we, the indigent people, who are poor and exploited in the land of our birth. These are concepts which the Black Consciousness approach wishes to eradicate from the black man's mind before our society is driven to chaos by irresponsible people from Coca-Cola and hamburger cultural backgrounds.¹²⁶

While the struggle against the white regime was in the first instance directed against national oppression, in 1994, there was an inheritance of a system with its norms, values, rituals, structures and institutions that were meant to perpetuate oppression. BC youth intimate that freedom is defined in Western liberal terms, and people are yet to understand what freedom means. BC activists do note, however, of black South Africans, especially educated blacks' commitment to, and defence of, non-racialism and integration. Others think non-racialism is worthy, but it is not manifest in lieu of everyone being allowed to vote. It gets much more complicated to claim it as a goal; unlike during apartheid, the postapartheid state is not manifestly and overtly racist, making it not a legal problem but a social one. A bigger portion of these protagonists demur non-racialism as a mystification; anti-racist society rather is ideal where all energies should be projected toward. The historical demands commensurate with a black

nation that looks after a historically dispossessed population are yet to be realized. This opinion is at the centre of historical consciousness, which is the heart of radical traditions of black thought. On many occasions, BC youth use the phrase “not yet Uhuru” with frequency. On *Facebook*, some even juxtapose ANC’s logo and colours with the old NP’s orange, blue and white. They ground this reasoning on the fact that there has been a continuation of the apartheid nation into the “postcolony,” albeit with some ramifications.

An important question by both the black radical tradition and the radical anti-colonial political thought is, as follows: Can rights be reposed only in citizenship? Early proponents of South African struggle petitioned for granting of equal political rights to “qualified men irrespective of colour, race or creed.”¹²⁷ Although they did this within the confines of their own narrow condescending pretensions towards the rest of uneducated Africans, certainly citizenship, the vote, liberty and nation were conjoined. In the postapartheid, race and citizenship have become complex intersections of identity, conflict, nationalism, history and interpersonal relationships.¹²⁸ In its liberal formulation, citizenship means reciprocity or rights against, and duties towards, the community. As entitlements, citizenship rights establish a legitimate sphere for all individuals to pursue their actions and activities without risk of arbitrary or unjust interference.¹²⁹ The left critique is that the degree to which individuals are “free” and the nature of that “freedom” is subject to intricacies of capitalism—a citizen may enjoy “equality before the law,” but do they have the material and cultural capacities and resources to choose between different courses of action or do existing relations between races allow citizenship to become reality in practice? In the postapartheid, the constitution and its rights are used by those who lost nothing or little political power, to which they turn to for recourse.¹³⁰ The question is how rights of South African white citizens can be protected without entrenching the privileges of the old, especially in a context of continuing historical disparities in socio-economic life.

The controversy that Freedom Front Plus’s Pieter Mulder¹³¹ elicited when he said the “Bantu” who originated from East and Central Africa, arrived at the same time as Europeans and met at Kei River, and therefore had no claim to 40 % of the country has long been in the psyche of racist right-wing thought. Note the similarities with Verwoerd’s speech in the House of Assembly on 21 January 1961:

A territory which generally speaking was unpopulated became the area of settlement of two population groups at a certain stage. Whites who came from Europe and Bantu who came from Central and East Africa. These two groups established themselves in specific areas and generally speaking these specific areas did not encroach upon each other ... basically, however, we had two communities here of two different origin, who had actually settled more or less simultaneously in certain areas which did not overlap.

The claim that white settlers arrived at the Cape simultaneously as African tribes was propagated by colonial historians Theal and Cory early in the twentieth century, was common in most school history texts and vehemently propagated by serious Afrikaner scholars and “this claim was made in service of state ideology.”¹³² This claim, Goldberg asserts, was designed to substantiate the idea that whites originally laid equal claim to the land with blacks and historically acquired 87 % of South African land by way of a “just” war, “the deeper insinuation here, of course, is one of white superiority.”¹³³

The return of popularizing the freedom charter by the ANC, which reinforced the notion of different races, and ANC’s inability to sustain solidarity built up by the BCM mean that currently there has been a creation of “a backlash of tribalism, ethnicity, xenophobia, all the diseases the BCM had at least eliminated within the black community.”¹³⁴ If national leaders imagine the vision a nation should be envisioned, then friction is unavoidable. Nationhood is re-imagined by citizens as they reluctantly embrace difference, and “multiculturalism,” the “rainbow nation” and terms of similar resonance provide an argot of accommodation, even amidst bitter contestation.¹³⁵ This is best exemplified by inception of a new racism that has taken a violent form against *amakwerekwere*,¹³⁶ heightened by an increasing emergence and presence of black African identities.¹³⁷ Concern with borders and their protection escalate. Under global conditions and neoliberal capitalist economy, the state deregulates motion of wealth and regulates movement of migrants, “aliens” and other “undesirables” who work tractably, cheaply and are denied citizenship and entitlements of belonging.¹³⁸ There are internal dynamics as well, for example, ethnicity, which, during the struggle, was rejected by both Marxists as “false consciousness” and the liberation movement because ethnic particularism was used by apartheid as a tool for colonization, political division and exploitation.¹³⁹ However, ethnicity has always, and remains alive today. ANC’s commitment to universalism and common citizenship makes it struggle

with adjusting to multiple ethnicities and differences. Dubow observes that ethnicity can become a substitute for other appellations: first, where “tribes” evolve into nations; second, its function as “race” connecting with nation and culture.¹⁴⁰ This is exhibited in the so-called xenophobia, a prominent feature of postapartheid social relations. Of late, there has been concern on rising “tribalism” based on patronage like ANC’s cadre deployment policy, which gets abused for “opportunistic, factional and tribal ends.”¹⁴¹ Gumede notes of a perception that under Zuma’s rule there has been “Zulufication” just as under Mbeki’s “Xhosafication.” Ethnic nepotism is not only a black feature: white English speakers give preference to their own just as Afrikaans speaking, especially those at certain schools/universities, while coloureds feel marginalized because they are not black or white enough. At the same time, inequalities within and among the nation’s citizens have widened alarmingly. Thabo Mbeki once mystified this during his “Two-Nations Speech.” He reckoned the economic inequalities as rooted in the past, and in the present there is a nation of the poor and black and the rich and white. As a man of many ironies and contradictions and theatrical posturing, he later discarded the “two-nations” notion for a “united South Africa,” at the opening of parliament in 2001. Mbeki didn’t also realize that much of the postapartheid poverty has been exacerbated by his own neo-liberal policies propagated during his tenure.

CONCLUSION

The struggle for a nation involves people identifying themselves as an entity by drawing on historical factors as part of the claim.¹⁴² These intermingle with new objectives to constitute the present. The claim for nationhood arises out of objective facts brought about by the introduction of capitalist relations of production in the new societies.¹⁴³ Thus, the task of a democratic revolution is to eliminate foreign domination and monopoly capitalism preceding the way to a socialist revolution. Ideas and oppositional theses about the nation have always been part of South African historiographical landscape. Black protagonists on the opposite poles of ideological thought and political spectrum have their own ideas about the nation and are only heirs to those who debated and theorized in the preceding decades. In the postapartheid, the ANC continues to talk a language of universal citizenship and rights, and “has sustained its commitment to a classically European form of nationalism and nationhood.”¹⁴⁴ There is

recognition that attempts to posture the postapartheid South Africa as a colour-blind rainbow society obfuscates the violent history where blacks were subjected to racist brutalities without, in the post-1994, any recompense, while rendering race and racism invisible and at the same time criminalizing any discourse tending towards such. In the post-1994, there have been attempts to create a common “South African” culture, which takes into cognizance cultural differences. If a “common national culture” means abrasion of differences, it implies assimilation of previously racially dominated groups into the mainstream dominant framework of values. The idea of the nation will continue to be contested, especially by the BC and Pan-Africanists. In any case, this is a historical question that will reach its denouement and zenith under a different set of social conditions. More importantly, the black nation remains trapped in material inequalities despite ascendancy of a tiny proportion of the black middle class into the echelons of power in the postcolony. For that reason, the nation will always be a bitter contestation.

We may conclude by proposing that the idea of the nation in South Africa is and should be part of a future revolution, because majority of blacks remain trapped in material inequalities despite ascendancy of a tiny proportion of a black middle class into the echelons of power in the “postcolony.” Importantly, if the nation is conjoined with land, of which majority of blacks are still landless, then it’s not only about a redefinition of terms; the present generation is only heirs to political progenitors who theorized the issue decades ago. The nation will always be a bitter contestation, a friction and a proviso for oppositional political trajectories. Notwithstanding the fact that the post-1994 has a black government in power, it doesn’t imply that black South Africans own the country even though political power is in the hands of their ilk. Postapartheid South Africa still exhibits all features of coloniality and its trappings of imperialist relations, white supremacy and an enduring racism, which is masked by sometimes invisibility, denial and amnesia.

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Symbols, Symbolism and the New Social Order

In South Africa, increasing importance and an increasing use of symbols and symbolism are seen in the post apartheid social formation, both as a nation building strategy and as a reminder to the people of the hegemonic mantle the current ruling dispensation wields. This is done through apotheosis of certain leaders to demigod status, erection of monuments, memorialization of “sacrifices” of the liberation struggle, which are apportioned to one political party and a single set of leadership. The nation and its associated phenomena, nationalism, the nation state, national symbols, histories and so on are based on social engineering, which is deliberate and always innovative.¹ In this chapter, I examine the role of tradition and aesthetics of the postcolonial nation and how it obliterates the contributions of opposing ideologies like BC and Pan-- Africanism (e.g., there have been debates why PAC stalwart Robert Sobukwe is not recognized in the same way as Nelson Mandela). I have sought to understand how symbols are used to contain the “masses” into a vision of the nation the ruling elite envisages and envisions. In the process, the masses themselves acquiesce to such projects, even if there may be contradictions and contestations.

Personalizing South Africa’s successful transition by attributing it mainly to the reconciling “magic” of Mandela has become conventional global wisdom.² His apotheosis to demigod involves deliberate contrivance of Western imperialism, whereby its strategic and corporate interests had to be protected in a postapartheid dispensation. Arundhati Roy writes:

When Mandela took over as South Africa's first black president, he was canonised as a living saint, not just because he was a freedom fighter who spent 27 years in prison, but also because he deferred completely to the Washington consensus.³

Frene Ginwala, an ANC veteran, narrates that in the early 1980s, there was advice that the anti-apartheid movement needed a figurehead and a face, and Mandela's name was brought up.⁴ Consequently, streets in London, gardens at Leeds university and rooms of buildings were named after him; statues and art festivals were about his legacy and Nelson Mandela day (his birthday) celebrated in London was declared by the UN an international day in 2009. In contrast, AZAPO's Sadique Variava told me that in BC tradition, the cult of leadership was detested and curtailed by reducing leadership tenure to 1 year even though every movement needs to have some sort of figurehead. The feeling among Africanists and BC adherents is "Nelson Mandela didn't liberate us, we liberated him from prison."⁵ According to Haile Gerima, when Mandela walked out of prison, it was the most watched programme on television—"the first TV reality show."⁶ In 2012, Google sponsored a US\$1.25 million grant to create Mandela online archives that "takes the life of Mandela to the world. Our job is to take important stories to the people of the world and in those stories of the twentieth century none is more inspiring than Madiba's," explained Steve Crossan, head of Google Cultural Institute. At the launch, author Beata Lipman said the archive attempts to turn Mandela into "Jesus Christ superstar," and Naledi Pandor, minister of science and technology, said, "our country and the globe are in desperate need for role models that espouse the values and morals Mandela exhibited." In fact, while a few years ago it was sacrilegious and blasphemous to critique Mandela, contemporary BC youth are increasingly critically scrutinizing the role the man has played in the country's post-1994 conundrum. Some BC participants believe this symbolization, spurred by Mandela's head on South African currency, the so-called Randelas, is meant to be a permanent imprint on society "that will always confuse our children, their children and their children and their children until amen."

But seeing Mandela as a demigod shows the political immaturity of the electorate, which doesn't trust its own political autonomy.⁷ Adam, van Zyl Slabbert and Moodley add, "Mandela's lack of bitterness has symbolically exonerated whites from their apartheid sins. Handing power to such a magnanimous figure made the Nationalist Party defeat during constitu-

tional negotiations more tolerable.”⁸ Plastering over racial differences by Mandela, reluctance to force whites to show more contrition to their black victims of apartheid and “South African whites continue to enjoy their privileged lifestyles while the national high priest, Madiba, appears to have absolved them of their sins without a proper confession and penance” continue to trouble many.⁹

In the postcolony, the desire for reconciliation obfuscates both history and the present. The Mandela–Rhodes foundation formed in 2002, with the Rhodes Trust in Oxford contributing 10 million pounds to scholarships, child healthcare and sporting facilities for disadvantaged communities. While both Zimbabwe and Zambia removed statues of Rhodes after independence, they still litter South Africa’s landscape, and even Rhodes university remains.¹⁰ In Cape Town, there is a Mandela Rhodes building. This makes it an anomaly, because Rhodes was a crude racist whose ruthless sense of white supremacy was a precursor to apartheid and racial segregation. At the launch of the Mandela–Rhodes Foundation in February 2002, Mandela said, “combining our name with that of Cecil John Rhodes in this initiative is to signal the closing of the circle and coming together of two strands in our history.”¹¹ Maylam questions whether this is about forgetting and sanitizing the past in the “new South Africa,” and if the spirit of reconciliation entails letting off the hook villains of South Africa’s racist colonial past. An analogy is made of Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) granting amnesty to white supremacists and the posthumous amnesty of earlier architects of white supremacy, which Maylam questions whether it is historical amnesty or historical amnesia.¹² This is compounded by history as a subject losing its salience. Later generations would not know of Rhodes’ misdeeds, because his name is associated with educational excellence rather than racist brutality and colonial exploitation. Even if the pairing of Mandela and Rhodes is bizarre and incongruous, exonerating Rhodes of his crimes is within the ambit of the ANC’s neo-liberal and capital-friendly agenda. Maylam intimates that if Rhodes was alive today, he would have been given plenty of space to make monstrous profits. Fanon best explains this scenario. Let us quote him liberally: “Every time the black man fights for liberty and justice it’s always for a white liberty and a white justice. In other words, for values secreted by his masters.”¹³ On being freed, he is just like a patient suffering a relapse after being told his condition has improved, “so the news of emancipation for the slaves caused psychoses and sudden death.” He adds, “It’s not the sort of announcement you hear twice in a lifetime. The black man was merely

content to thank the white man, and plain proof of this is the impressive number of statues throughout France and the colonies representing the white figure of France caressing the frizzy hair of the docile black man whose chains have just been broken” and “on battlefield, marked out by the scores of Negroes hanged by their testicles, a monument is slowly rising that promises to be grandiose. And on top of this monument I can already see a white man and a black man hand in hand.”¹⁴ Statues, street and town names of Verwoerd and Vorster, among others, intensely hated by the masses, were left intact, standing and imposingly tall. Some in the Africanist/BC are dissatisfied that “we have a country whose landscape is littered with erstwhile racists and colonizers.”

All major companies and rabid racist individuals’ egregious history is whitewashed as they are recast in a new light in the postcolony. This is aided by their association with former liberation stalwarts. The politics of symbols are best explained by reconciliation. In the early days, ANC politicians sought to learn Afrikaans “the hated language of the oppressor.”¹⁵ Mandela called de Klerk, a representative of white supremacy, “a man of integrity.”¹⁶

This discussion points generally towards leaders, past or present, being part of a myth, the sacred—that permeate the whole society—set apart and forbidden.¹⁷ They are taboo, which involves “ritual avoidances,” and enjoy a different “ritual status” in a social system.¹⁸ Tabooed persons are respected as sacred, are objects of ritual avoidance and are recipients of tribute; in this sense, they are “abnormal” by virtue of being separated from that which is normal. They are also a totem, precisely a national totem. They are an emblem, a collective label that assumes a religious character. The force of the totem assumes a spiritual form similar to god (s), and outlives the individual and generations of today as well as of tomorrow just as it animated those of yesterday. It follows to say the totem is a symbol of outward and visible form of god and of society (clan) itself, a visible mark of society’s (clan’s) personality that distinguishes it from others. Durkheim asks: “if it is at once the symbol of god and of society, is it that not because god and society are only one?”¹⁹ This apotheosis is enabled by the effect and power it divinely has over the minds of the worshippers because a god is above all, a being individuals think is superior to themselves, whom they feel they depend on. The god is also peculiar and possesses a nature different to ourselves, so that we become its servitors even at the expense of our own convenience, privation and sacrifices. We are obliged to submit ourselves to rules of conduct, thought and deeds even if it causes discomfiture or “contrary to our most funda-

mental inclinations and instincts.”²⁰ The figure/god becomes infused as part of collective consciousness, which asserts supremacy over individual consciousness and assumes moral ascendancy over members of society. Since the leader(s) is taboo and sacred, and the symbols are meant to be beyond criticism, what happens to those individuals who fail to observe this “religious” authority? Those particular individual(s) who ignore the moral–aesthetic norms the symbols formulate, who are discordant, “are regarded not so much as evil as stupid, insensitive, unlearned, or in case of extreme dereliction, mad.”²¹ Geertz gives a case of Java where small children, simpletons, boors, the insane and the immoral are all said to be “not yet Javanese,” that is, not yet human because they are yet to observe the morality that religion supports as proper conduct, where such conduct has to be “common sense.”²² The Javanese use a term *tjotjog*, which means to fit “as a key does to a lock, as efficacious medicine does to a disease, as a solution does to an arithmetic problem, as a man does with a woman he marries (if not they will divorce).”²³ Therefore, all separate elements have to strike a chord to avoid dissonance.

Nabudere makes a distinction between neo-traditionalism used by the elites and posttraditionalism as use of culture and tradition by people to resist colonialism and neo-colonialism.²⁴ The former involves use of symbols and suitably tailored discourse such as national history. Therefore, the national phenomena cannot be adequately studied without looking at “invention of tradition.”²⁵ Hobsbawm traces the “invention of tradition” to postrevolution France, where public ceremonies were invented, especially the Bastille Day, which included festivals, fireworks and merriment, “its general tendency was to transform the heritage of the Revolution into a combined expression of state pomp and power and citizens pleasure.”²⁶ There also began mass production of monuments, which he calls “statuomania.”²⁷ Incidentally, postcolonial Africa replicates the same. The postcolonial state gets increasingly involved in the lives of the citizens—a pervasive etitisation—by manipulating an erstwhile liberation history, invocation of memory and constant reminders that the masses are always in a perpetual mode of gratitude. There is the use of what Smith calls ethno-symbolism in analysis of employment of symbolic resources, traditions, memories, values, myths, rituals and symbols that compose the accumulated cultural heritage.²⁸ These are crucial in analysing ethnicity, nations and nationalisms, which ensure the degree of social cohesion and common national consciousness. They also endow these communities with a distinctive repertoire of language, customs and institutions that demarcate social

boundaries, delineating them from “others,” a distinctiveness of identity and exclusiveness.²⁹ This is similar to endogamy, a mechanism for maintaining boundaries of groups and keeping members exclusive to prevent encroachment of undesirable elements.³⁰ In modern societies, it’s done in a subtle, unconscious manner through a disparate body of symbols fashioned on the pretext of nationhood, mass-mediated ritual excess, which produces/reproduces state power to conjure up national unity and to persuade citizens of the reality of both, feature prominently in the postcolonial society.³¹ The assurance of continuity of the past ethos of the colonial era is guaranteed by the new political dispensation through collective symbols like the flag (even if the colours change, the concept is the same) and a national anthem that includes vestiges of the old colonial one, which ironically was galvanized in the extermination of the indigenous population and national holidays.³² Such symbols, according to Smith, are important in the rites and ceremonies of public culture, as they help to create and sustain communal bonds and strike a chord with a heterogeneous population, and thus a sense of national identity. Symbolic forms are analysed to discover their symbolic functions of which is the objectification of relationships between individuals and groups; these relationships are developed and maintained by symbols and they also objectify roles and relations that help differentiate people and assist in achieving stability and continuity.

The current friction between the liberation movements (ANC, PAC and AZAPO) is based on a supposed marginalization, obliteration and exclusion of the Pan-Africanists and BCM from official memory of the country’s liberation. The question is whether the new nation is/will be the official and sole author of the official script of public memory, or whether collective memory will continue to lie elsewhere, in embodied memory, privacy of home or within spaces of violence.³³ The general observation is although memory mediates the past, the present and the future, authorized versions of the past that become public memory, which is merely selective memory, involves forgetting and remembering, inclusion and exclusion. All is premised on who wields the reins of power at that particular historical moment. Current discussions reveal that the ANC believes that all the intellectual history and liberation credentials reside with it. ANC’s spokesman Keith Khoza has affirmed: “...the ANC should be treated as part of our collective heritage as a nation.”³⁴ The debate has been precipitated by obfuscation of struggle icons like Mangaliso Robert Sobukwe and Anton Lembede from official and public memory. Rapule Tabane asks: “...has anyone heard of him (Sobukwe)? Is it correct that he

is not acknowledged in any way or not in the way other liberation heroes have been commemorated—through institution being named after them? Do they remember that Sobukwe was the only prisoner so feared by the NP regime that a special parliamentary law³⁵ was created to keep him and only him in jail without any charge?”³⁶ Although Steve Biko has been honoured in many institutions like the Steve Biko Centre for Bioethics at Wits and Steve Biko Academic Hospital in Tshwane (formerly HF Verwoerd hospital), Sobukwe has no place named after him (a small street in Sunnyside, Pretoria, named after him mocks his legacy; Jeff Masemola who spent more than 27 years in prison has a much bigger street named after him in Pretoria central). Following the screening of the documentary “Sobukwe: A Great Soul,” some comments suggested that collective memory is not only about remembering but also about collective forgetting, where Mandela has been promoted as a key collective memory of South Africa because of his support for the status quo, while the collective memory of Sobukwe would disturb the collective discourse of ANC as the sole and only force for the liberation struggle and would show there were other powerful forces outside the ANC that played a crucial part, “even much more than Mandela himself.”³⁷ To remember Sobukwe would also mean remembering his radical politics, which “would bring to the doorstep memories of Chris Hani—something the current predatory elite (one that Fanon warned would replace colonial oppressors) don’t care about. Remembering Sobukwe would prick the conscience of many in society who benefit from tenders and corruption and those who benefited from apartheid. Remembering Sobukwe would conscientise the people to rise up and reject half-baked transformation... so the ANC and its institution of collective memory have “deliberately forgotten Sobukwe.”³⁸

In 2012, the government decided to relocate Sharpeville commemorations from Sharpeville to Kliptown where the freedom charter was presented. One placard had these words inscribed, “ANC, where is your conscience? Sharpeville 21 March massacre”; one resident said, “It is a tradition that when you hold a ceremony of the ancestors it should be held at home and not at a neighbour’s yard.”³⁹ The South African flag was also burned by irate Sharpeville residents.

BCM and PAC have in history used symbolic events associated with black struggles to both fight oppression and as a basis for memorialization. For example, a 1983 AZAPO pamphlet titled “Remember June 16” says, June 16 is an expression of a determination by the oppressed masses to end their dispossession and “on June 16 we mourned and died

together.” It adds that the day should stand as a symbol for the need for Black Solidarity. Other commemorations AZAPO still observe are Black Wednesday, Biko Lives/Biko Week 6–12 September, Heroes Day 21 March, May Day and Biko Day commemorative service 12 September. The Socialist Party of Azania (SOPA) has appealed to government to declare Regina Mundi church in Soweto a heritage site because it provided a sanctuary during the struggle and became a living symbol for all the people, and to bring fallen heroes interred outside the country for burial at a heroes acre the government should create.⁴⁰ Most BC adherents believe June 16, in particular, has become trivialized and commercialized. One participant put it thus: “people are packed at Orlando stadium because of entertainment, Chomee is performing.”⁴¹ During the “Alex to Sandton–Hell to Heaven March” on 16 June 2011, one participant revealed that one youth asked him, “Which DJ is playing at the march?” He said it shows how the elite has “destroyed” young minds and reversed the moral capital amassed during the struggle. For today’s youth, there is no significance for these symbolic days because it is a day of partying and hedonism. On 16 June 2012, a photograph juxtaposing the iconic picture of a shot Hector Pieterse widely circulated on *Facebook*. It shows three very drunken youth, one carrying a passed out young man, their female colleague walking on the side, holding an alcoholic bottle. The photograph was meant to intimate both the degeneration of the country’s youth and the day.

THE MASSES

To understand the efficacy of symbols and their effect, one has to know the character of the masses for whom the symbols are intended. The question is whether the masses acquiesce to these externally driven forms. But who are the masses? The masses are the people. Who are the people? The people are those caught up in a daily drudgery trying to make the most, and meaning of their lives. They should, in all circumstances, be the vanguard of the struggle, a thing that cannot be done “in laboratories but through critical engagement.”⁴² The masses are a peculiar creature, though. Even if we reckon they are sometimes the downtrodden, exploited and oppressed of society, we don’t need always to romanticize them; they should always be challenged to critical thought so as to create a critical society that becomes a safeguard of its own interests.

Perpetuation of capitalist oppression after independence is accepted by the masses that took part and made sacrifices in the struggle.⁴³ They see this situation as a given and natural, and beam with pride because their own are now holding the reins of power.⁴⁴ The other reason is the people have learnt to trust their nationalist leaders. As BC youth put it, “historically it’s the masses that fought apartheid but they worship the leaders. We say we need a hundred thousand Bikos so if they kill one, others keep popping up.”⁴⁵ Another added, “The political animal we are dealing with has the ability to mutate and change itself. It can use political rhetoric and confuse the masses.”⁴⁶ The leadership and its corollary bloc exert hegemony through consent of the masses that support power and social authority of the dominant social order.⁴⁷ Sometimes, there is the ambivalence by the masses when they seem to participate in the state’s domination over them while ridiculing it.⁴⁸ Although people resent the state’s intrusion in their lives, they are drawn into it because it remains a channel of getting the little to be gotten.⁴⁹ Even if the power is perverted, that matters little. The leadership is able to coerce the masses to conform to its interests. Total social authority is exerted, consent and preferences are shaped and conflict is prevented or contained through *jouissance*. The masses are caught in enjoyment, a *jouissance*, which in French has direct sexual connotations similar to “orgasm.” Music and entertainment are integral. The music doesn’t necessarily have to be hedonistic; the masses listen and enjoy uplifting and revolutionary music, but it doesn’t always lead to any form of agency. It only strikes the senses, not the inner emotions. The masses may not comprehend the message contained therein at all. In Lacanian analysis, the subject doesn’t simply satisfy a desire; he enjoys desiring, and this is an essential dimension of his *jouissance*. Desire lacks an object (in biological sense) but an endless pursuit for the enjoyment (*jouissance*), an eternally unsatisfied desire; so *jouissance* sustains desire, one is kept desiring in the absence of satisfaction. However, *jouissance* moves from simply pleasure to mental and physical suffering—the existence of pleasure and pain “in a single packet.”⁵⁰ In this discourse, the Big Other is factored in as symbolic. Žizek asks whether by the Big Other Lacan means that individuals are mere epiphenomena, shadows with no real power of their own; that their self-perception as autonomous free agents is a kind of illusion blinding them to the fact that they are tools in the hands of the Big Other that hides behind the screen when he pulls the strings.⁵¹ For Lacan, the reality of human beings is constituted by three inter-tangled levels: the symbolic, the imaginary and the real. This facilitates the masses’ desire for things/

objects, which they don't possess themselves. Thus. "man's desire is the other's desire."⁵² Fundamentally, human desire is that of the other's desire in both subjective and objective terms. It means envy and resentment are constitutive of human desire, that is, envy of the other who has and enjoys what the masses don't have or enjoy. In today's society, Zizek observes that the injunction is "enjoy," but with prohibitions. One is permitted all enjoyment on condition that it's stripped of the substance that makes it "dangerous." Seemingly, the masses ape lifestyles of the Big Other who happen to be politicians, political leaders and celebrities. Party conferences, events and celebrations are a medley of conspicuous consumption and extravagance. Male leaders always have young women in tiny skirts in tow, who are referred to as "pantypreneur gold diggers in stilettos and two inch dresses that show off their underwear."⁵³ The merriment, however, cannot be complete without cars and drink for accompaniment. Party colours are strapped on car doors and windows, hooting and waving contribute to the excitement, the masses are enthralled and their emulation of leadership is orgasmic. The leadership hoist themselves in those poorly organized or disorganized spaces, momentarily, either to celebrate a party/national event or to canvass for votes; thereafter, they leave for the exclusive luxurious life of the suburbs. Performing artistes add to the splendour and glamour; "lavish musicals" elaborately crafted in detail, meticulous, produced and staged at a cost, either in celebration of selected icons or historical events narrated on a subjective plane are also integral to these theatrics. This situation is what I call *partitisation*.

This is similar to what Mbembe calls "aesthetics of vulgarity."⁵⁴ However, Quayson critiques Mbembe for his concern with "banality of power" and postcolonial African leaders' preoccupation with hedonistic fascination with the body as a means to foreground their power.⁵⁵ Quayson's critique is that Mbembe ignores the history of this development in the West and how it continues as a stereotype broadcast in the media about Africa. Nonetheless, it doesn't exonerate African leaders of this wanton obscenity that borders on criminality.

In South Africa, just like in all advanced capitalist societies, shaping and transformation of mass consciousness is aided by the rise of mass media and culture industry.⁵⁶ The resultant effect is the willing, voluntary consent and subordination of the masses under a particular social formation. The masses may also be checked through naked brutal force, involving police massacres, detention and general harassment. This scenario is epitomized by a *Facebook* post:

Suffering and smiling—Fela Kuti. I think the musician and prophet Fela wrote the song for us South Africans. We are indeed suffering and smiling.⁵⁷

The discussions centred around the view that people are essentially gullible and they prefer lies and fairy tales than logical reality of life; after being fed so much propaganda, truth ends up sounding like hallucinations.

In a scenario like this, there is a contestation of ideas and ideologies—the mental frameworks, languages, concepts, categories, imagery of thought, systems of representation—which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, define and render intelligible, the way society works.⁵⁸ The extent to which the ideas of different social groups enchant the masses will depend on both their materiality and posture. A particular social group asserts its ascendancy and domination of social thinking of the masses, thus leadership over whole society. Power and domination are at dalliance here. But there are always contradictions. The masses develop their own corporate culture, with its own forms of values and social relationships. It is within this culture that the struggle doesn't totally recede; rather, it is always kept alive and seething, waiting for a historic moment for explosion and aplomb. There exist some oppositional forces among the masses, who craft a counter ideology. A theory that explains the complexities of society, the figuring of a particular existing conundrum and a subjunctive description of a lived experience, necessitates this option. Social ideas arise, which reflect the material conditions of certain social groups, become part of a social formation informing the struggle to change society and open the path towards a socialist transformation.⁵⁹ New forms of consciousness and conceptions of the world are birthed, which move the masses into historical action against the prevailing system. The continued deterioration of conditions and mass impoverishment keep alive the flame of nationalism, awakening of consciousness on the basis of awareness of neo-colonialist frustration and a reunion by the majority of the population around the ideal of national liberation betrayed by the leadership. In Gramscian sense, ideas only become effective if they connect to a particular set of social forces. Ideological struggle, therefore, becomes part of a general struggle for mastery and leadership, that is, hegemony. This social bloc may be strengthened by its entry into "alliances," enabling a wider social character that sets the popular classes and representatives of capital and those coalesced around the state, onto a collision course. But one finds out the masses are reluctant to engage into struggles that would benefit them and radically transform their lives, socially, economically or otherwise. Although there is intimation

that the basis of a socialist revolution is created when in society the struggle results in mass consent and mass desire for change to transform society, the masses don't always desire change, not even the poorest man. The masses are, at times, apathetic and shy away from any active self-organizing, engagement and involvement in endeavours that might bring change in their objective conditions. One elderly woman put it this way: "people only get up from their bums when they hear there is free stuff being distributed and cause a stampede there."⁶⁰ She added that the masses have normalized their condition and "all they think of is the bottle (alcohol)."

The masses are slower to change their conceptions of the world or never change them at all.⁶¹ Gramsci adds that a person may suffer intellectual crises, wavering between the old and the new, may lose faith in the old and yet may not come down in favour of the new. This all happens amidst state terror against the citizens and frequent police massacres. The people's capacity for anger is insipid. Black masses expect white liberal and white liberal democrats to fight on their behalf, BC proponents allege. As human waste, they don't matter to politicians; rather, they only become important when elections are around the corner. This is the primary reason why BC youth organized "NO VOTE" debates and campaigns in 2011, with pamphlets and posters distributed at Wits University and around Johannesburg. Some T-shirts like SNI were inscribed:

Vote for ANC: Vote for Corruption and Poverty
 Vote for DA: Vote for *Baas* and Madam
 Vote for COPE: Vote for Clowns
 We are the Ones We Have Been Waiting For.⁶²

On *Facebook*, messages like this were posted:

A note to voters: as you mark your X next to the ANC please think about Andries Tatane who was murdered by the ANC government for demanding water. As you mark your X next to the DA think about the one eyed people of Hangberg and a concentration camp called Tin Town (Blikkiesdorp). It's you, the ballot and your God.⁶³

Some sections of the masses still believe in the postapartheid "miracle" and still have a "kaffir mind-set," as one BC aligned friend told me after a taxi ride to Soweto for an event. We were sitting in the back seat, conversing about the state of the nation. My friend, who is naturally voluble and loud,

was criticizing the ANC-run government when a young man joined in and said there is Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), which is benefiting the people. He said we can no longer blame whites for whatever malaise affecting the country. He added that in townships, development has been leaping in bounds as seen by the proliferation of state-of-the-art malls. My friend vigorously defended BC and intimated that the economy is still in white hands. He said, only 6% of the land has been redistributed to blacks since 1994, and that the ANC had failed to alleviate the Black Condition.

Some participants are sceptical if black people do read at all, given the levels of their gullibility. Others agree that blacks do indeed read because in the townships the *Daily Sun* (which some calls Daily Shit), the *Sowetan*, *True Love* and *Drum* are widely circulating, which all are biggest selling press editions among blacks. Participants find problems with the content, though—what is it that they read and who owns those publications? The challenge, they say, is for BC to come up with a popular media that would challenge the mainstream and identify with peoples' daily realities.

THE 2010 SOCCER WORLD CUP AND SPORTING JAMBOREES

Contradictions in the 1995 rugby and 2010 soccer World Cups is that they “united” black and white South Africans despite expressions of “driving out” *amakwerekwere* soon after the 2010 jamboree and a persisting white anti-black racism. The discovery by Mandela of rugby, a high totem of Boer nationalism, summarized the politics of symbolism. Waldmeir writes:

Rugby was a sport which apartheid architects embraced with a passion they reserved for nothing else but religion and politics. If the Dutch Reformed Church was the NP [Nationalist Party] at prayer, rugby was the NP at play. For blacks, the sport came to symbolise the arrogance of Afrikaner power, and the brutality and aggression that went with it.⁶⁴

The zenith would come at 1995 rugby World Cup where Mandela appeared in the springbok rugby jersey. The trend was followed by his successor, Thabo Mbeki, who in rugby jersey adornment, was hoisted high by a victorious springbok team in the 2007 World Cup.

Andile Mngxitama⁶⁵ sees the 2010 World Cup as a reversal of age-old racist perception that blacks are incapable. The hosting, therefore, was a

laborious endeavour to “prove something.” An analysis of this view garners a perception that the event was a subconscious attempt by blacks to overcome a supposedly innate inferiority, summed up in the mantra “yes, we can.” This coincides with the idea of nation, nationalism and a repertoire of symbols epitomized by the national soccer team. The government made a call for Bafana Bafana (South African male senior national soccer team) “to make us proud.” Bafana, however, enjoyed the ignominy of making history by being the first ever host country to be eliminated in the first round. Nationalistic sentiments were mystified through efforts by the authorities to call it an “African World Cup” despite an aggressive anti-African feeling that was pervasive in the country. The irony is that billions of Rands were spent amidst pervasive poverty and vast inequalities. Mngxitama refers to the World Cup as one of the latest miracles, “a colonial swindle” where priorities were misplaced. He bemoans the commercialization of soccer, which has lost its aesthetic and entertaining value. The people are also complicit because they didn’t question the idea of playing host to enjoyment, merriment and entertainment in a sea of deprivation (see *jouissance* above), which I see as a one big event, a one big orgasm.

Many were amazed by efficiency of services during the tournament:

The ANC is revealed as a proper anti-people servant of imperialism and an agent of neo-apartheid. They won’t build hospitals, schools or clinics. They won’t return the stolen land. They won’t protect workers. They won’t free the Black slaves on South African farms. They won’t criminalise racism. They won’t even build toilets, bring clean water and provide enough ARV’s in good time to save lives but they can build intimidating infrastructure for their world cup within a short period of six years.⁶⁶

Given the success of the World Cup, lack of service delivery is deliberate, whereby the ANC government “delivers services to its chosen constituency with frightening resolve and skill. That constituency is not the poor and voting majority but national settler white capital, global capitalism and the subordinated black capitalists of BEE.” FIFA is seen as the ultimate “scorer” benefiting handsomely from the spectacle.⁶⁷

The South African Communist Party (SACP), which had criticized a trend in the ruling alliance to *tenderpreneurship* and corruption, was silent about World Cup dispossession⁶⁸ and corruption. Mngxitama declares,

“The SACP’s anti-corruption campaign is not only consistent with capitalism, but is a mere bourgeois moralising.”

CONCLUSION

According to Cohen, any political/social order has to have a mystification of symbolism.⁶⁹ Symbols bind and make the concept of the nation coherent. There are always manifestations and exhibitions of power, which determine the official script that silences and mutes other voices. Notwithstanding, there exist spaces for consent, abidance and obedience on the one hand, and oppositional and antagonistic on the other. The nation, therefore, is a frequent motion, a constant friction.

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Concluding Remarks

Black Nationalism is not simply an idea, a philosophy. It is a spirit. Like all spirits it never dies but lives, as an emotion and a motion that finds new meaning with each generation. This book has attempted to trace this lineage and the themes, topics and ideas that are referent to it. Despite marginality in the postapartheid BC, for example, still insinuates itself in various spaces. Important in this discourse is the living embodiment of Steve Biko. Currently, he is claimed by various sections of black and white communities, for either narrow purposes or parsimonious interests. The contradiction is whether his widespread invocation is meant to be an ideological pacification and dilution of his radical and potentially subversive thought. Will it create a gap among the masses to question: Who really is Biko? What is Black Consciousness; what is its meaning? What is its relevance in their social and spatial world? So, while sometimes his valorization might be for malevolent ends, could it ultimately be a tool that aids to an increased awareness by blacks of their historical and existential conditions? Biko has returned in the postapartheid, seething with “black rage and fury” as he finds a special niche among a particular zone—a disenfranchised black and frustrated township youth who are politically, ideologically and theoretically astute. They live and imagine the ideals not only of Biko but also of other erstwhile black radical thinkers. This raises the question: Why should Black Nationalism be relevant in today’s society despite the triumphalism of non-racialism, rainbowism and neo-liberalism? The question seems to answer itself. Ideals, principles and teleology

of the liberation struggle where a society that is human-centred, which BC proponents strove for, has yet to come to fruition. There is a realization by many that apartheid never died; it only went subterranean, is well and well-fed, healthy, hale and hearty, is in robust constitution and is alive. This postcolonial anomaly and malady opens up spaces for oppositional thought and action. Black Nationalism, of course, is not a new thought but builds on the foundation patterned out by those of yore. It will continue to illuminate the postapartheid social order because, despite pronouncement of its “death knell,” it has never departed from the psyche of the people. The task of contemporary Black Nationalist adherents is to keep the thought wired, sharpen the strategy in face of a postcolonial tragedy and, most important, build a resilient grass-roots mass movement. To elaborate on the latter point, the need is to organize in zones and spaces of marginality where the black majority are still trapped in the poverty created by apartheid and sustained by the postapartheid. This, however, involves an elaborate political and ideological position that requires activists to be among, and constantly feel the pulse, of the people. As a historical fact, political upheavals and possibilities of change are cyclical and happen in phases. The two decades of democracy may be deemed a phase of lull, celebration, pacification and expectancy. But as time rolls by, postcolonial black elite, who at one time were liberation fighters, in complicity with local white and imperialist capital, their former “sworn” enemies, soon “forgot” the people. Expectancy and patience are known to wear thin unless if one is the Biblical Job. This provides spaces for discomfiture and dissatisfaction. A prognosis of the postapartheid reveals that conditions for unrest and a possible social change are there. It is probable that sooner or later Azanian masses will revolt. A disconcerting and ominous prospect is that whenever that occurs, there may be an absence of an organized, well-drilled black movement to provide leadership and politico-ideological direction. It might end up being a “revolution lost.” Nonetheless, a revolutionary is an eternal optimist.

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