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Agnieszka Weinar
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Migrant Integration Between Homeland and Host Society Volume 1

Where does the country of origin fit?

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Foreword

In every immigrant, there is always also an emigrant. This truth, which lies at the core of Algerian-French Abdelmalek Sayad's sociology, inspired INTERACT, a project conducted, 2011–2015, by the Migration Policy Centre of the European University Institute. INTERACT focussed on the integration of first-generation migrants from outside the European Union (EU) and looked, too, at their numerous links with their country of origin. The project's backdrop was the protracted economic downturn that started in 2008 and that affected economies and societies in the EU, as well as in countries of origin.

When the project started, there was the idea in migration studies that immigration from third countries would slow down in response to the employment crisis. A return movement to the origin countries would soon begin, and intra-EU mobility would dominate. The reality, however, proved to be rather different. Immigration kept growing. Between 2009 and 2013 in the aggregate EU28, the overall stock of those born outside their country of residence rose by 4.4 million, from 47.0 million to 51.4 million, comprising a 1.6 million increase in intra-EU migration (from 15.8 to 17.4 million) and a 2.7 million increase in the migrant stock from outside the EU (from 31.3 to 34.0 million). Contrary to expectations, a crisis-ridden Europe still attracts migrants. But does Europe manage to integrate these newcomers?

To integrate migrants ideally means providing them with rights and duties, opportunities and responsibilities comparable to those of natives. Put in other terms, newcomers become fully fledged members of the host society. When migrants are many and the host society is in (economic) crisis, integration is not a straightforward process, however. In the aggregate EU, migrant labour-market integration has worsened during the crisis. Between 2007 and 2013, rates of unemployment rose from 6.7 to 10.1% amongst nonmigrants, from 7.2 to 13.3% amongst intra-EU migrants and from 11.1 to 20.4% amongst migrants from outside the EU. In some EU member states, such as the United Kingdom and Belgium, changes in non-EU migrants' rate of unemployment were not dramatic (from 8.2 to 9.8% in the former and from 15.2 to 19.7% in the latter). In most states, however, the fall off was severe, with the worst cases being Italy (from 7.9 to 17.2%), Spain (from 12.1 to 38.1%) and Greece (from 7.6 to 39.2%).

Social conditions worsened in several member states, too. In the same period (2009–2013), the at-risk-of-poverty rate increased only slightly for natives: from 14.5 to 14.8% at EU28 aggregate level. This was also true of non-EU migrants, though at a much higher level than natives: from 28.3% in 2009 to 29.6% in 2013. But in some states, an acute and sudden deterioration has been observed. It was nowhere as impressive as in Greece, where the proportion of migrants from third countries at risk of poverty jumped, in just 4 years, from an already impressive 32.9% to a record 54.3%. The above figures suggest that the tension between immigration and integration, between managing new flows of migrants and accommodating old ones, has become more dangerous than in the "good old" precrisis times.

Then, integration is not, we must remember, only about labour market and economic conditions. It is also about the fabric of a given society. Did the crisis affect non-European migrants' social, cultural and civil integration? We have no quantitative evidence, but many clues that anti-immigration sentiment and xenophobia are on the rise in every EU member state and across the political spectrum. Intolerance is no longer confined to extremist parties. Some state leaders do not hesitate to declare that multiculturalism has failed and others that immigration endangers the Christian identity of Europe. Finally, there is the alarming rise of home-grown Islamic terrorism. Immigration is commonly blamed for attacks conducted by European citizens born in Europe and for the part played by young Europeans of both sexes in global Jihadism. What is at stake, however, is not immigration as much as the failed integration of disadvantaged, and often discriminated against, segments of European populations with a migrant background.

Integration is, then, extremely topical. Migration studies usually treat integration as a two-way process of mutual accommodation (or the failure to accommodate) by immigrants and natives. Instead, we postulate that integration should rather be looked at as a three-way process. The third player comprises all the actors, both physical and virtual, in the origin country, who play a part, consciously or not, in migrant integration in the destination country.

Origin states, first, developed "diaspora policies" to foster ties with their expatriate nationals. Looking at migrants as resources, they have established specific institutions for facilitating transnational contacts. Economic links with diasporas have been a goal for governments of major migrant-sending countries in the developing world since the 1980s. There have been attempts to attract migrant money, to mobilise migrant skills and to tap migrant business networks. Cultural links followed with attempts to revive a sense of belonging to the homeland amongst émigrés. Political links are, finally, now being strengthened: expatriates are often granted voting and sometimes eligibility rights, and their sons and daughters, though born abroad, are given dual citizenship. New terms are coined such as "citizens abroad", "NRIs" (non-resident Indians) and "PIOs" (persons of Indian origin), "Algériens de l'étranger", etc.

A number of new non-state connectors bridge diasporas and societies of origin: cheap or no-cost communication allows regular or continuous individual links between relatives and friends separated by geography; conventional and new social media, as well as a multitude of transnational organisations, foster collective links

with the migrant's homeland, and keep migrants exposed, in real time, to developments in the home country. Whether dual identities are competing or complementing each other has become the crucial question.

Migrant integration is a complex process that can be looked at from a number of points of view. It can mean having opportunities and outcomes comparable to those of natives in the labour market. It can also mean living in the same neighbourhoods as locals; sharing their language; making friends with natives; finding a place in one's religious community, which may or may not be that of mainstream society; taking part in local civic or political life; etc. To what extent do different dimensions work independently, or negatively or positively, as migrants integrate into their new society? Practising the language of the origin country can, for example, turn into either a handicap or an asset in migrant integration, according to how other factors play out.

Through immigration, languages that were barely spoken in Europe have become established there: the EU has five million native Arabic speakers; three million Turkish speakers; one million Chinese and Russian speakers; etc. Some of these new languages are in use across the entire EU. In that sense, they have become European languages. But, at the same time, they are minority languages. They are spoken in families and in circles of friends sharing a common origin: but they are rarely shared beyond this. Moreover, they are often viewed as a handicap at school and seldom taught. For example, in France in 2014, 2,111 foreign language posts were created: 2,092 teachers for EU languages (mostly English); 15 for Chinese; 2 for Russian; 2 for Arabic; and none for Turkish.

In many cases, speaking these languages is perceived negatively not only by schools but by society as a whole: they are seen as markers of low integration, and they can become a source of shame for migrants. But the handicap can be turned into an asset. The host society benefits if a language is used to extend business activities to foreign markets (Arab States, Turkey, China, etc.); to enhance security (intelligence, phone tapping, etc.); to enrich cultural production; etc. It can also be an asset for individual students. Indeed PISA surveys of performances at 15 years of age have shown that children of multilingual families fare better than others, once social background has been controlled for.

INTERACT developed an original three-step methodology. The first step consisted in identifying topics: the "dimensions" of integration. Nine dimensions were selected and framed through a literature review focusing on transnational processes and actors in the origin countries. The second step was dedicated to measuring integration, at the level of subpopulations, defined by common origins rather than at the individual level. Integration was assumed to be a function of three sets of variables: dimension, country of origin and country of destination. A matrix was constructed combining the nine dimensions, 54 countries of origin (all those with an aggregate number of first-generation migrants greater than 100,000 at EU28 level) and 28 countries of destination (all the EU members states). This large (13,608 cells) and, therefore, unreadable matrix was then reduced through statistical techniques into an intelligible set of indicators. In this way it was possible to compare corridors, as well as dimensions.

The third step aimed at explaining variations in both quantitative and qualitative terms: why, say, does corridor A fare better than corridor B regarding a given dimension C, and why is it that scores in dimension C differ from scores in dimension D for corridor A? State policies can make the difference. Country reports were prepared to analyse integration and diaspora policies in selected origin and destination countries. Diaspora policies differ greatly according to states and, in the same state they may also differ between categories of émigrés, according to the perceived utility of a group of migrants for their country of origin. NGO practices can also explain differences in migrant integration. In order to document this issue, INTERACT conducted a survey of migrant NGOs in close to 80 countries of origin and destination. How do migrant NGOs view the integration of their community and their role in the process?

This volume gathers the most significant findings produced in the framework of the INTERACT project, and I would like to express my deep gratitude to all the contributors. I have no doubt, however, that the wealth of data collected by the project has not yet been exhausted. Rather, there will be further insights into a phenomenon that, after all, lies at the core of the reproduction of societies, in terms both of change and continuity.

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Chapter 1
Introduction: Integration as a Three-Way Process

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Introduction

Around 25 million persons born in a third country are currently living in the European Union (EU), representing 5% of its total population. Integrating migrants, i.e. allowing them to participate in the country of destination's society at the same level as natives, is an active rather than passive process that involves two parties, the country of destination and the migrants, working together to build a cohesive society.

Much high-quality research on migrant integration has been produced. It has examined in detail individual and group processes of integration on one hand, and the actions of the countries of destination and their societies on the other. If the integration of migrants was first defined as a one-way process of assimilation into the majority group within the country of destination, further migration studies have re-conceptualised it as a two-way process. And the story seems to have stopped there.

In the INTERACT project (2012–2014),[1] we decided to examine the role of the sending states and societies in integration processes. This "three-way approach" to integration, alluded to by the European Commission in its communication of 2011, considers immigrants to the countries of the European Union to be members of two

[1] "Integration as a three-way process: the role of countries of origin in migrant integration" was a 2-year research project co-funded by the European Integration Fund 2011.

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communities: subjects of both integration policies at the receiving end, and of diaspora and emigration policies at origin. This interest was a direct result of the firm view of migrants adopted at the European level as subjects not only of interior policies – i.e. (im)migrants in the destination country – but also of foreign policy – i.e. (e)migrants from a foreign country. Such a view resulted in the growing externalisation of the European migration policy, with increased links and cooperation on migration with partner countries at the EU borders and beyond. Policy areas, previously guarded as sovereign domains, or in other words, internal business, became forums of international cooperation and negotiation (e.g. on asylum policy or the circulation of temporary workers). Naturally then, issues of integration became seen as possible candidates for further examination through this new lens.

Building on existing research, we investigated various levels of influence of over 50 origin countries worldwide on the integration of migrants in the EU countries of destination (see Di Bartolomeo et al. volume 2). The focus of INTERACT is mainly on the first generation of legally staying migrants, that is to say people born in third countries and currently living in the EU-28. We also consider migrant children in the specific context of educational outcomes. Although the first generation is not expected to be fully immersed in mainstream society and culture, there is an expectation, both in the academic literature and public policy, that the first generation severs its ties with the country of origin. Some scholars acknowledge the salience of "transnational ties" for the first generation but predict that they rapidly decline among this generation's children (Alba and Nee 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). The object of this volume is thus to review the existing academic literature on migrant integration at destination and the impact of the countries of origin on this process.

Does Country of Origin Matter?

There is a long tradition of research on integration, but so far it has not seriously studied the various ways that a country of origin can influence the integration processes. The "classic assimilation theories" (Safi 2011) in the 1960s, that is to say the First School of Chicago, viewed the "assimilation" of migrants to the receiving country as a natural process of inclusion. This process was an individual one (Park 1928), based on a linear cycle of migrant incorporation into the "mainstream" over time (Park and Burgess 1921; Warner and Srole 1945; Thomas and Znaniecki 1958). Integration was thus seen as a one-way process.

In 1964, Gordon conceptualised assimilation and highlighted different "types or stages" of assimilation: acculturation, structural assimilation, marital assimilation, identificational assimilation, attitude receptional assimilation, behaviour receptional assimilation and civic assimilation. The first type, acculturation, is defined as the "cultural or behavioural assimilation" towards the "core culture"[2] in contact with

[2] Gordon is here referring to Fishman's definition of "core society" and "core culture" (Fishman 1961).

new migrants, i.e. towards the white middle-class culture of Protestant and Anglo-Saxon origin (WASP). It can operate alone, without other dimensions of assimilation occurring. According to Gordon, structural assimilation is the "keystone" of the assimilation process (Gordon 1964, 81). "Once structural assimilation has occurred, either simultaneously with or subsequent to acculturation, all of the other types of assimilation will naturally follow" (Ibid.). Structural assimilation, that is to say "large-scale entrance into cliques, clubs, and institutions of the host society, on a primary group level", is followed by marital assimilation, which is seen as an "inevitable by-product of structural assimilation" (Ibid., 80). With the intermarriage between members of majority and minority groups, the latter "lose [their] ethnic identity" and identificational assimilation takes place. Identificational assimilation is defined as the "development of a sense of peoplehood based exclusively on the host society" (Ibid., 71). As it is no longer possible to distinguish groups from each other, prejudice (attitude receptional assimilation) and discrimination (behaviour receptional assimilation) fade. Similarly, if acculturation is complete, the civic conflict of values between groups will no longer take place, leading to civic assimilation.

Gordon conceived of integration as a multidimensional process. His second contribution from *Assimilation in American Life* highlighted the role of structural assimilation within the whole migrant integration process. Both Gordon and classical assimilation theorists from the First School of Chicago were critiqued by other scholars. Safi (2011) classifies these critiques into three different categories: the culturalist critique, the structuralist critique and segmented assimilation theory. The first questioned the existence of a uniform mainstream into which migrants should assimilate, thus seeing assimilation as a one-way process, and highlighting the fact that different ethnic groups could be in the same society.[3] The second demonstrated the importance of structural inequalities (direct and indirect discrimination within the housing and labour market for instance) which could slow down, or even stop the integration process of migrants (Massey 1985; Shibutani and Kwan 1965). And segmented assimilation theory, developed by Portes and his colleagues, highlighted the plurality of integration processes depending on collective actors and contextual factors. These collective actors are: the state of the country of destination and particularly its migration and integration policies; public opinion about migrants; and ethnic communities in the country of destination (Portes 1995). Depending on how the actions of these actors would articulate with contextual factors such as the economic situation and individual characteristics, three different types of integration were highlighted: an "upward assimilation", a "downward assimilation" and an economic assimilation without acculturation (Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Following this approach, it is worth taking into account civil society organisations and the state in the analysis of the individual integration of migrants in their new country of residence.

But if this conception of integration highlights the importance of supra-individual institutions, two types of actors have been overlooked. First, only state policies towards immigrants in the countries of destination are taken into account; there is

[3] See for example (Glazer and Moynihan 1970).

no analysis of the impact of state policies towards emigrants in the country of origin. Second, the strength of the ethnic community is measured solely through its size, and "occupational structure" (i.e. the social background of its members) (Portes 1995, 26). Institutions such as associations, schools and churches in either the country of destination or the country of origin are not mentioned.

In the 1990s, Alba and Nee (1997) suggested a new approach to assimilation. While they rooted their concept of integration in classical assimilation theory, they also broadened it to take into account the different critiques and research that had been implemented since then. Based on these critiques, they show some "gaps" in Gordon's typology. Economic assimilation and school performance are overlooked, while the concept of structural assimilation is too broad, given that both dimensions of integration were (and still are) studied in migration studies.[4] School performance and labour market integration are seen as essential in contemporary migration studies since they deeply influence several other dimensions of integration in a country: social interactions with natives/migrants, access to nationality and housing. And this leads us to Alba and Nee's second point: Gordon did not include spatial assimilation in his typology. Following Massey and Denton (1988), they consider "entry into relatively advantaged suburban communities that contain many whites [as] a key stage in the process" of assimilation (Alba and Nee 1997, 837). This disentanglement of integration processes into various sub-fields was crucial to the development of complex research approaches to measuring (e.g. MIPEX) and studying integration in Europe.

European empirical research on migration started a few decades after this kind of research was undertaken in the US. As a result, European researchers used the American theoretical framework regarding migrant integration. While taking into account the particularity of the American context in which this kind of theoretical framework was built, European research tested whether it was relevant in the European context (see e.g. European Forum for Migration Studies 2001; Esser 2003; Martiniello and Rath 2010; Penninx et al. 2006). European research (Schrödter and Kalter 2008; Berrington 1996; Safi 2011 e.g. regarding mixed marriages) as well as American research (e.g. Warner and Srole 1945; Rumbaut 2004) consider integration to be a process; time is thus a key to understanding this phenomenon. Accordingly, age, life-course and generation also have to be taken into account when studying migrant integration.

Integration, a Three-Way and Three-Level Process

Past theories on migrant integration focused on the destination country. But, as research on "transnationalism" has highlighted (i.e. Basch et al. 1994; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003) – and Sayad (1999) before transnational research – some

[4] See for example Van Tubergen 2004; Levels et al. 2008; Tribalat 1996; Alba et al. 2003; Cheung and Heath 2007.

migrants live in a "transnational space", meaning that they have connections in both their country of origin and destination. The literature on transnationalism also looks at the connections migrants develop across different countries of destination.

While integration takes place in the destination country, migrants maintain a variety of ties with the country of origin. Moreover, the ways that migrants interact with their country of origin have been transformed by: new means of communication, which facilitate contact between migrants and their country of origin; globalisation, which brings greater cultural diversity to countries of destination; and nation-building in the source countries, which see expatriate nationals as a strategic resource. Governments and non-governmental actors in origin countries, including the media, play an important role in making transnational ties a reality, and have developed tools that operate in the following ways: economically, to boost financial transfers and investments; culturally, to maintain or revive cultural heritage; politically, to expand their constituencies; and legally, to support migrant rights. We thus conceive of integration as a three-way process. How do these ties influence the integration of the migrant in the country of destination? To what extent do policies pursued by the receiving states to integrate immigrants, and the policies pursued by governments and non-state actors in origin countries regarding expatriates, complement or contradict each other? What effective contribution do they make to the successful integration of migrants and what obstacles do they put in their way?

To analyse the integration of migrants in their country of residence, different indicators of integration and ties between countries of origin and destination have to be taken into account on various levels. To this end, the INTERACT project aims to analyse the multilateral, bilateral, and mono-directional ties between countries of origin and countries of destination on different levels, taking into account the states, civil society organisations and migrants.

That said, we do not pretend that actors act in a void: the discursive context of their actions is important. Integration processes are always interpreted as a relation between a core group and an outsider group. In our view the core into which the immigrants are supposed to integrate, as well as the core that emigrants should feel attached to, is a socially-constructed phenomenon (as in the classical work of Anderson (2006). Therefore, we believe it is necessary to take into account the various discourses that shape these phenomena in a given context.

Avoiding "methodological nationalism," we addressed how "deterritorialised nation-states" (Basch et al. 1994; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003) influence migrant integration. Thus, states are conceived as actors implementing policies beyond their geographical borders, for instance through bilateral agreements and state representatives abroad (Smith 2003; Levitt and De La Dehesa 2003). Even researchers who question "transnational" state practices recognise that states are the main actors with respect to migration, since they define citizenship for example (Gerdes and Faist 2010). In addition, countries of destination and of origin can also influence migrant integration through non-state actors, such as firms, political parties, the media or associations.

It is a cliché to say that the most entrepreneurial individuals possessing relatively high human capital tend to migrate more. This basic truth has been widely

researched. We know now that there is a selectivity effect in migration processes: the people who move out of the country of origin and people who stay there are not randomly selected. Thus we know a considerable amount about individual agency (migration decisions) but our knowledge of the contexts shaping these decisions is patchier. What is the role of the country of origin's state and non-state actors in this selection process? How do existing migrant networks, and intermediaries in the migration process influence the type of people who are emigrating? How do state policies such as pre-departure training programmes, bilateral agreements between states of origin and destination affect who migrates and who does not?

The same can be said about secondary movements: there are immigrants who decide to return to their countries of origin or migrate further, and there are the ones who stay in the country of destination. This process is also not random, but we still do not know much about its determinants. The reason of return could be a consequence of both downward and upward integration in the country of destination. Is the level of integration an important determinant of this selection process? Can we identify the impact of the country of origin, its policies and civil society organisation actions as a factor in migrating, staying or moving? Do these actors and the networks among them influence migrants to integrate either in their country of destination and/or in their country of origin? For example, do ethnic networks opening ethnic markets allow for integration in the country of destination, or do they trap migrants in low-skilled jobs? Do pre-departure state policies directed towards specific market sectors (e.g. domestic services, care) facilitate entry to the job market or limit options within it?

Influence of State and Non-state Actions on the Individual Integration of Emigrants

INTERACT is situated within the field of integration studies, but due to its focus on links with the countries of origin, it touches upon two important strands of migration studies: transnationalism and diaspora studies. In this section we will describe our conceptual choices in relation to these two broad analytical frameworks.

Thanks to the transnational research, we know that contemporary migrants tend to live in (at least) two places: the origin and destination, a special position which both benefits them (allowing them to tap resources in both countries) and potentially slows down the integration processes (by using other points of reference). Migrant-focused research postulates that the "transmigrant" has ties in both countries and exists in-between both countries, living in a "transnational space", in a context of decreased nation-state power.[5] But is transnationalism always an individual choice? Is the decision to let go of the country of origin always dependent only on the transmigrant? Or is the country of origin also successful at "enclosing" the transmigrant

[5] Glick Schiller and Levitt's answer (2006) to Waldinger and Fitzgerald's (2004) criticisms of transnationalism still focuses on the migrants, and not on States and civil society organisations.

within the new country? What are the conditions that make this enclosing an integration success? Is it possible?

Individual integration failure or success is also shaped both by the country of destination and country of origin. Policies, approaches and the actions both of states and civil society organisations all influence the life of a migrant. Governments, civil society and communities in the countries of destination and origin elaborate outreach policies, and develop international cooperation where migrants are present. In our view, the role of the countries of origin has been under-researched and we put focus more on its role than on the receiving country's.

The state is defined by its power over a territory and over specific people. However, the capacity of the state to reach beyond its borders to shape the life of a population that it perceives to be part of its own "people" has not been widely acknowledged. A strand in diaspora and citizenship studies has discussed phenomena such as "polity-building" or "nation-building" beyond actual state borders (Gamlen 2008, Faist 2008, Bauböck 2009, but see the critique of Ragazzi 2009). In our view, the range of state actions to influence its "people", wherever they are, are much larger and more complex than traditional political instruments (such as citizenship, voting, socio-economic rights, etc.). In a way, a transnational migrant is always accompanied by what we call a "transborder state."

The transborder state is in fact a complex constellation of rules and actors, laws and practices, state and non-state institutions, and communities that influence migrants' integration in the different dimensions mentioned above (see Table 1.1). Its influence can range from minimal (e.g. limited to facilitating the flow of remittances) to fully-fledged engagement in structuring the lives of migrants abroad (e.g. through engaging in bilateral agreements on an international level and funding grass-roots activities abroad). The transborder state can also focus on a migration and development agenda (e.g. Mexico), an equal rights agenda (e.g. EU Member states) or control mechanisms (authoritarian states). Its influence can be constructive or disruptive. Our goal therefore is to identify the plethora of actions the transborder state can undertake and to classify them.

The Impact of Diaspora, Emigration and Immigration Policies

The idea of introducing the variable of state policy when looking at migration did not occur to economists and sociologists until the late 1970s. The postulate of "bringing the state back in" (Brettell and Hollifield 2000) evolved into a lively field of study and brought to light several pertinent questions on the nature of migration policy development and its impact on macro level migration trends and micro level individual choices. However, the field developed with an internal fault. It created definitions, concepts and frameworks of analysis adjusted to its main subject of analysis: a receiving Western liberal democracy (Joppke 1999; Mau et al. 2012). This machinery was later applied sporadically to other countries of the world, thereby establishing a hegemonic discourse on "migration policy". Since the focus of scholars

Table 1.1 Identifying state and civil society organisation actions that might affect the individual integration of migrants

	State	Civil society organisations	Individual
Economic integration			
Actors	Governmental institutions and bodies	Specific trade unions	Migrants
		Companies policies	
Actions	Elaboration of laws, public policies & specific regulations on the labour market	Social discourses; media discourses	Establishing individual position in the labour market
	Policy discourse		
Education			
Actors	Governmental institutions and bodies	Public schools and others which follow the national curricula	Individual migrant
Actions	Elaborating laws, public policies & specific regulations concerning national curricula	Teaching following (or not) the national curricula (in associations and churches for instance)	School performance
	Policy discourse	Social discourses; media discourses	
Access to nationality			
Actors	Governmental institutions and bodies	Associations	Individual migrant
Actions	Elaborating laws & public policies on nationality	Defending migrants' rights to nationality or counselling	Choosing own nationality
	Policy discourse	Social discourses; media discourses	
Civic and political participation			
Actors	Governmental institutions and bodies	Associations, political parties & other political institutions	Individual migrant
Actions	Elaborating laws & public policies on foreign associations, political parties and other political institutions as well as on migrant participation in associations of natives	Involving migrants in their activities	Participation in associations, political parties & other political institutions
		Social discourses; media discourses	Non-formal political engagement
	Policy discourse		
Religion			
Actors	Governmental institutions and bodies	Religious organisations	Individual migrant

(continued)

Table 1.1 (continued)

	State	Civil society organisations	Individual
Actions	Elaborating laws & public policies on religious organisations	Involving migrants in their activities	Individual practices
		Social discourses; media discourses	
Language			
Actors	Governmental institutions and bodies	Associations & churches that teaching the destination language(s)	Individual migrant
Actions	Elaborating laws & public policies on language	Involving migrants in organisation's activities	Improving level of competence in destination language(s)
	Policy discourse	Teaching the destination language; offering language support	
Social interaction			
Actors	Governmental institutions and bodies	Associations defending individual rights or favouring social interactions	Individual migrant
Actions	Elaborating laws and public policies on mixed marriages and other mixed social interactions	Social discourses; media discourses	Individual interactions (friends, intermarriage, neighbourhood, mixing in the workplace)
	Policy discourse		
Spatial integration			
Actors	Governmental institutions and bodies	Social Housing, Private housing actors (housing agencies, private housing owners, banks, etc.)	Individual migrant
Actions	Elaborating laws & public policies on housing	Involving migrants in organisation's activities	Choosing own place of residence (in/out of the ghetto)
	Policy discourse	Social discourses; media discourses	

contributing to the field has been almost exclusively on immigration to Western liberal democracies (Brettell and Hollifield 2000; Zolberg 1999) instead of on migration – which is defined more broadly as movement across borders (internal or international) – a wide array of issues has potentially been under-theorised or left out altogether, such as return migration, emigration, and diaspora policies and politics.

Only recently have policies towards the diaspora and emigrants gained prominence in the context of the migration and development agenda. Currently they are predominantly dealt with within an overarching category of "diaspora policies"

(Gamlen 2008). In fact, there is no clear conceptual division between "emigration policies" and "diaspora policies" in the literature; the former is essentially missing from academic discourse. It seems that scholars tend to focus more on the effects of emigration on developing countries (e.g. on remittances, Ratha 2005), and their policies (see Agunias 2009; Délano 2009). The notion of the diaspora is overwhelmingly employed to denote emigrants who are targets of possible policies and actions, even though such an approach is problematic.

The classical definition of "Diaspora" (with a capital letter) includes notions of violence, traumatic collective experience, sentimental and emotional links to the country of origin and a strong sense of belonging (Safran 1991; Cohen 1995) – in other words, all the extreme cases of forced dispersion. Most importantly, it denotes populations dispersed between two or more countries of destination. Sheffer (1986), for example, proposed a definition of Diaspora based on three criteria: the dispersed group must hold a distinctive collective identity across international locations; the group must have some form of internal organisation; and although dispersed, the group must keep up ties with the country of origin, be they symbolic or real.

However, during the late 1990s the traditional view of diaspora as a people of one nationality/ethnicity who fled a single country of origin has changed, as emigrant groups from the same nation-state have more and more often been from different ethnic origins. The reality of migration has undermined classical definitions and pushed scholars to search for new conceptual boundaries. As a result, definitions began to focus less on ethno-national unity and more on people who maintained strong collective identities. As Vertovec and Cohen observe, the notion of diaspora has come to denote any deterritorialised or transnational group which resides outside of its country of origin and that maintains social, economic and political networks across borders and across the globe (Vertovec and Cohen 1999, xvi).

As more recent studies show, the concept of diaspora has been used in many different senses in the policy realm, especially since it began to be included in emigration and development discourse (Weinar 2010). It is still not clear who exactly is a member of a diaspora. In the specific policy context, international and governmental actors tend to apply a very broad version of the definition, being as inclusive as possible, and in general keeping only three important conditions: a broadly understood ethnic/national origin, and a capability – and readiness – to contribute to the development of the country of origin. However, each policy actor puts their emphasis on different conditions. Thus different states and different organisations have different views of their own diaspora. The actual use of the term "diaspora" in the policy context is based on several indicators – such as legal status, citizenship, belonging to an organisation, duration of stay, documentation, skills, and employment status – that help distinguish diasporas from other communities and promote them as policy agents.

The concept of the diaspora is thus unclear, as it is constructed by actors, depending on their experience or need. Consequently, diaspora policies are not well defined either. They can focus on recent emigrants or on long-established descendants of emigrants abroad. Gamlen (2006) distinguishes between traditional diaspora policies (such as consular protection) and policies that aim at keeping the ties between

the populations outside the country and those in the country of origin. In the latter case, the country's ultimate goal would be to widen the community and build a nation beyond its own territory.

INTERACT's contribution is threefold. First, we introduce a clear conceptual division between emigration and diaspora policies, even though the two policy frameworks tend to overlap if emigrants settle abroad and do not return. Second, we further nuance the category of diaspora policies, based on actual practices of actors engaged in their development and implementation. Third, we acknowledge that countries of origin may play a role in the integration of individual migrants through their emigration and diaspora policies. Our objective is to examine and understand these (Table 1.2).

We define emigration policies as all policies that regulate (either facilitate or limit) outward migration, mobility across countries and possible return. These can be bilateral agreements on sending workers abroad, agreements on the recognition of qualifications or portability of rights, and pre-departure trainings, but also agreements on facilitated cross-border mobility (e.g. visa facilitation agreements). They can concern individuals (e.g. visa facilitation) or groups (e.g. sending a group of pre-trained shipbuilders abroad). What is important to note is that emigration policies *per se* do not necessarily focus on permanent settlement (with some rare exceptions). However, permanent settlement can be their unintended consequence and such policies could have further impacts on integration as well.

On the other hand, diaspora policies are the policies that engage emigrants and members of diaspora communities (both organised groups and individuals) with the countries of origin, building a sense of belonging and strengthening ties. We do not impose a definition of diaspora here. We instead derive it for each country of origin from the policy framework and actors' practices: from both state and non-state actors. Therefore, our definition is actor-driven. We focus on diaspora policies only in so far as they affect our target group. It is important to note that in our view these policies and practices have two dimensions, building two types of ties: collective and individual. In the first case the target would be the organised emigrant population and their descendants (e.g. policies focusing on associations, community schools abroad) while in the second – individual migrants (e.g. access to nationality, electoral law). This approach helps us to operationalise integration as a three-way and three-level process.

Country of Origin Effect and Impact

In order to operationalise the influence of the country of origin on migrant integration, we decided to employ two distinctive types of influence: effect and impact.

The EFFECT of the country of origin is discernible on two levels: endogenous, i.e. migrants' levels of human capital in the country, language competencies, education, and political and cultural systems – all of which can facilitate or hamper integration abroad; and exogenous, i.e. the "country label" or the set of beliefs about

Table 1.2 Examples of emigration and diaspora policies

Emigration policies	
Examples of outward mobility policies	Bilateral agreements on one-off labour migration (services, temporary employment, work & travel programmes);
	Arrangements for recognition of qualifications of own nationals abroad when sent under specific agreements;
	Agreements on the portability of social rights of migrant workers sent under a specific agreement;
	Facilitation of re-insertion of temporary emigrants;
	Exit policy (regulation of outward mobility);
	Retention schemes.
Examples of circular and temporary mobility policies	Bilateral agreements on cyclical labour migration;
	Arrangements for recognition of qualifications of own nationals abroad when sent under specific agreements;
	Agreements on portability of social rights of migrant workers sent under a specific agreement;
	Facilitation of re-insertion of circular migrants;
	Pre-departure measures.
Diaspora policies	
Examples of policies on political ties	Provisions for special IDs/visas;
	Permitting dual nationality;
	External voting rights;
	Military duty;
	Specific actions by political parties addressing expatriates;
	Participating in local elections;
	Reciprocity of political rights.
Examples of policies on socio-economic ties	Providing pre-departure services;
	Bilateral agreements on labour migration (including social rights and portability of social rights);
	Customs/import incentives;
	Protection of social and labour rights of citizens abroad (by the state or other actors);
	Providing healthcare abroad;
	Special economic zones;
	Investment services;
	Tax policies (incentives, special levies);
	Facilitating remittances;
	Welfare and education services support;
	Financial products addressed to emigrants;
	Property rights (full or restricted);
	Matching fund programmes (such as 1 + 1 in Mexico).

(continued)

Table 1.2 (continued)

Examples of policies on cultural ties	Providing national curriculum based education;
	Providing education in the national language;
	Sponsored teaching of the national language abroad;
	Honouring expatriates with awards;
	Convening diaspora/migrant community congresses (by authorities of the state of origin);
	Convening diaspora/migrant community congresses (by migrant organisations);
	Providing media services (broadcast) abroad (by the state of origin or private actors);
	Cultural diplomacy strategy focusing on migrant communities and diasporas.
Special arrangements in an institutional framework	Expanded consular units;
	Bureaucratic unit, or dedicated ministry, focusing on emigrants, migrant communities abroad, returnees;
	Special legislative representation;
	Consultative expatriate councils or advisory bodies.

Source: Adapted from Gamlen (2008)

the country and the immigrants coming from that country, and the discourses built on these beliefs. Effects of the country of origin are thus indirect, they come from the beliefs that are embedded in the given social system into which emigrants and their descendants arrive. Through this interaction, the effects of the country of origin (which are both endogenous and exogenous to the individual) are felt by the migrants and their descendants either directly (e.g. language difficulties on an individual level) or indirectly (e.g. general job market discrimination against a given group). These effects play an important role in integration and are sometimes taken into consideration by countries of origin when designing relevant diaspora and emigration policies. One example is Turkey, which has taken an active role as an advocate of Muslim populations in Europe, and has been engaged in supporting cultural dialogue projects (Bilgili and Siegel 2013). Another example is Mexico, with its policy supporting the integration of vulnerable Mexican migrants in the US (Délano 2009).

The IMPACT of the country of origin can be defined as the tangible results of certain policies employed by the state of origin targeting nationals and their descendants. Here we can distinguish two types discussed in the section above: emigration and diaspora policies. When a state engages in policymaking, it is a very direct way of making an impact. Direct impact on integration is straightforward and can be measured on the individual as well as on the group level. Countries of origin that support language classes for individuals before their departure (as the Philippines does) or agree to multilateral coordination of social security for all migrant workers (as countries in the EU have done), are clear examples of emigration policy impacting integration outcomes.

Of course, the policy results can be different from what is intended, and yes, policies usually have many unintended consequences. But the intended impact of policy

is clear. At the same time, state policies from other fields can also have an impact on emigration and diasporas: for example, the US FACTA act on taxation addressing funds held abroad had the greatest impact on US citizens who were members of the diaspora, usually with modest and unhidden incomes; or the requirement in Canadian provinces that individuals must have a certain period of residency to be eligible for the provincial health care scheme, in effect discriminating against returning emigrants, who in the interim do not have access to health insurance from another province (of origin) like domestic migrants do.

Thus both effects and impacts can be clearly felt on the individual level, either facilitating or obstructing integration. Contributions in this volume will further untangle these concepts.

The Goals of This Volume

Taking into account the existing approaches and evident gaps in the existing research, we targeted two goals in INTERACT. First, we abandoned the dominant focus on the state in the country of destination and engaged with the available literature to examine the role of institutions and communities of origin in shaping the integration outcomes of emigrants. Second, we inventoried existing knowledge on this aspect of migration across different dimensions of integration. In this volume, we also include initial discussions about the validity of the "three-way process" claim in these dimensions, as well as consider the global policy interactions on migration governance.

To this end, the volume focuses on the following questions:

1. Is "integration as a three-way process" a plausible concept that can be applied to integration processes across nine dimensions of integration?
2. In cases in which the country of origin does play a role in integration outcomes, is it an effect or an impact?
3. Do diaspora and emigration policies influence integration at destination?
4. What are the policy impacts of our findings and how can they be used by policy-makers?

These questions are tackled in the nine chapters of this volume, which look at various areas where integration occurs. We chose these areas as best fit to policymaking. In these concrete fields the policy-makers can really make a difference by designing evidence-based responses.

In the chapter on the labour market, Alessandra Venturini offers an analysis of economic literature to understand whether and how it takes into account the role played by origin countries in the process of immigrants' integration in the destination countries' labour markets. She concludes that this subject is not tackled explicitly, as economists tend to only look indirectly at the possible role of the origin country in the selection mechanisms of migrants. Many variables used by researchers – i.e. education and experience – are in fact strongly tied to the policies of the

origin country. However, a specific effect has not been isolated, and indeed, is difficult to isolate, mainly due to data shortcomings.

Educational attainment is commonly perceived as key to the labour market, which is also the case for migrants and their descendants. According to Dirk Jacobs and Anne Unterreiner, the scientific literature has only given limited space to the potential role played by countries of origin with regard to education. The country of origin effect and impact on education are extremely complex to identify using a systematic methodology due to the complex intertwinement of a multiplicity of factors. In this chapter, the authors review the existing literature to trace the potential effects and impacts of the country of origin on migrant education. Although not acknowledged as such, as in the case of labour market integration, a country of origin effect seems to exist, for instance in terms of internationalisation of enrolment in the higher education and the different "capitals" (social, financial) at disposal for migrant families. In parallel, the country of origin impacts the education of its diaspora through its diaspora policies on language and culture and by issuing diplomas that are recognised at destination.

When discussing language acquisition, Alexandra Filhon examines how the initiatives of countries of emigration are supporting (or failing to support) the maintenance of migrants' native languages in Europe. To that end, she identifies the links between European languages and languages of origin, noting the obvious country of origin effects. Most importantly, not all languages are equal: a social hierarchy exists depending on the context of elocution, and not all forms of bilingualism are considered to be a resource. The learning of a language depends partly on its social value in both the destination and origin country, which is based for example on whether the oral or written form of the language was learned and whether it was taught in a religious or international context.

Language skills have also become a precondition of access to citizenship at destination in many countries. In their chapter, Maarten Vink and Jaap Dronkers argue that access to citizenship can be viewed as an important factor in immigrants' integration process in the destination country. The role of actors in origin countries is crucial only in one respect: by allowing dual citizenship, countries of origin take away a major constraint for immigrants in the naturalisation process. Research shows that naturalisation rates at destination are positively impacted by tolerant policies towards dual citizenship at origin. The chapter discusses the state-of-the-art on immigrants' propensity to naturalise, as well as on the relationship between citizenship and integration.

When it comes to active citizenship, political and civic participation are the most important areas of integration. Migration studies have generally focused on immigrants' political participation within destination countries or in origin countries. The chapter by Ricardo Zapata, Lorenzo Gabrielli and Sonia Gsir sets an interpretative framework for the study of this topic. Following a thorough literature review they identify the gaps in the existing literature on the political and civic participation of immigrants and integration. In combination, they review a micro level analysis, focusing on individual factors of immigrants' political participation in the destination countries; a macro-level analysis, concentrating on diaspora policies and trans-

national politics; and a meso-level analysis, studying immigrants' civic participation in different types of organisations. Based on this review, they outline the main elements of a new research agenda that incorporates the effects and impacts of origin countries on immigrants' political and civic participation.

Ghettoisation is usually the most discussed issue when talking about integration of immigrants on the city level. Ben Gidley, Maria Caputo and Sona Kalantaryan debate the possible ways in which countries of origin can have an impact on integration outcomes. Taking us through the history of research on residential integration, they demonstrate that migrants' degree of residential integration is influenced by a large set of factors. These include the migrant's individual characteristics (endogenous factors), attitude of the host society towards migration (extraneous factors), but also macro variables such as housing market conditions in the destination, integration policies and bilateral agreements. They suggest a theoretical framework that could be useful for analysing three levels of residential integration: micro, meso and macro.

Sonia Gsir's account of socio-cultural integration in multicultural European societies looks at different kinds of social interactions between migrants and the host society, namely: intermarriage, interethnic friendship, interethnic relations in the workplace, and encounters in the neighbourhood. According to Gsir, the role of countries of origin is more difficult to assess considering that there is little research that has dealt directly with the issue. However, certain non-state actors such as family members and some state actors may have an influence on the socio-cultural integration of emigrants abroad, even though this influence can be indirect. The chapter assumes the existence of a transborder state with an underlying country-of-origin effect on socio-cultural integration and a more diffuse country-of-origin impact.

The socio-cultural integration of migrants can also occur through their inclusion within specific religious communities. Using the theoretical framework of transnational studies and the sociology of religion, Jocelyne Cesari identifies the most significant factors that influence the religious dimensions of emigration countries: the majority or minority status of the migrant group in the receiving countries as well as the pre-existing level of politicisation of religion in the countries of origin. She concludes that the states of origin have an effect on the type and intensity of religiosity but also on the level of acceptance of religious communities in the destination country.

The integration of migrants at destination is thus both multidimensional and complex since its dimensions are interconnected. In the past decade, the governance of immigrant integration has consequently gained increasing attention within the policy agenda in Europe, OECD countries and beyond. The scope of actions and the range of actors involved have constantly broadened to engage not only governments but also civil society. Moreover, countries of origin have started to conceive of supporting integration as part of a broader diaspora engagement strategy. In the final chapter, Maria Vincenza Desiderio, Cameron Thibos and Agnieszka Weinar examine how policies on integration can be enhanced through the engagement of the country of origin.

The volume is also a prelude to the review of empirical research results presented in the second volume of this publication, edited by Anna Di Bartolomeo, Sona Kalantaryan and Justyna Salamonska. We hope that it will stir further academic debate and provide empirical evidence for policymaking worldwide.

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Chapter 2
Immigrant Assimilation in the Labour Market: What Is Missing in Economic Literature

Alessandra Venturini

Introduction

Understanding the integration of immigrants has become a crucial issue for an aging Europe, which has seen its elderly population increase. The old age dependency ratio (the ratio of individuals 65 years and older to those aged 20–64) grew from 20% in 1990, to 25% in 2010 and to 35% in 2030. Not only will the composition of the native population change but its size will change as well. The total stock of the European population will decrease at a rate of 9.5% every 10 years if migration inflows are equal to zero, and to 4.5% if immigration inflows continue as in the past (Fargues 2011). Thus Europe clearly needs immigrants and, in particular, it needs future citizens.

The limited success of the policies implemented in destination countries to support migrants' integration in the labour market and in society at large demonstrates their complexity. Disentangling the many levels of interventions in the destination country – European, national, regional and local – has not helped us to understand and solve the many differences in integration that have been documented between different national groups (Gilardoni et al. 2015).

A broader reflection on integration policies is needed. Yes, the immigrant, the immigrant's family and the institutions of the destination country play a role in successful integration. But so too does the origin country. It can play an indirect role for instance by affecting the human capital and the employability of a future migrant (endogenous country of origin effect), and a direct role through targeted policies such as international agreements that create job matching in the destination labour market (country of origin impact).

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This chapter presents the economic approaches to the labour market assimilation of immigrants and the many actors which affect its success. It starts by covering the economic approach to labour market integration at destination and then points to its limitations and attempts to bring the often hidden role of the country of origin into view.

What Economists Mean by Economic Assimilation

The word "integration" is rarely used in economic research. Economists prefer the word "assimilation", which has a clearer operational meaning. We do not intend to enter here into the long-standing European debate between the German model of "integration by separation" and the French model of "integration by assimilation", which can be respectively summarised as having different languages at school and less involvement in the society of the destination country vs. having strong linguistic and cultural involvement in the host society. We happily leave this important and rich debate to sociologists. A relevant literature review is presented elsewhere in the present volume (Unterreiner and Weinar, this volume), but also in Garces-Mascarenas and Penninx (2016) in the IMISCOE series. Economics researchers have not taken any position in the debates on integration models, and frequently the two words, integration and assimilation, are used interchangeably with the same connotation.

In economic research and even in textbooks (Borjas 2008), the economics concept of "assimilation" has been adopted from Alba and Nee (2003) definition of assimilation: an immigrant group assimilates if there is a "reduction of differences between similar groups over time". Economists thus use assimilation with native citizens and workers as a model for analysis.

They, mainly, focus upon assimilation in the labour market: differences between the participation rate, the employment rate and the unemployment rates, their duration and immigrant wages are compared to those of a similar native (e.g. Borjas 1985; Chiswick 1991; Dustmann 1994; Venturini and Villosio 2008). Additional topics covered by economic research are for instance: the over-education of immigrants (are immigrants too educated for the job they perform?) (Boeri et al. 2013); assimilation in the welfare state (do immigrants use welfare benefits more than natives? Are they likely to exit from welfare dependency at the same rate as equivalent natives?) (Barrett and Maitre 2013); housing and property use (do they rent and buy houses like natives do? Do they buy a house earlier than natives? Are their properties smaller or larger than natives?) (Gonzalez and Ortega 2013); saving habits, etc. All these topics represent important indicators of economic integration in both the destination and origin country.

However, as we stressed before, labour market assimilation is also a political priority. If an immigrant has a job and thus an income, their social integration starts off with a positive asset. For this reason, economic research is concentrated on integration within the labour market. Indeed, analyses generally compare the

employment or wage profile of an immigrant with that of native workers with the same characteristics. The analyses of wage assimilation are probably the most diffused and the most helpful piece of integration research because the remuneration that the immigrant worker receives can be considered an aggregate index of his or her labour market integration. It, after all, captures an individual's initial human capital as well as the value of the skills they have acquired through their participation in the labour market.

How Do Economists Measure Labour Market Assimilation

The use of longitudinal data is the most appropriate method for assessing the labour market assimilation of foreign workers because it allows researchers to follow an individual throughout their life and to also compare two individuals who enter the labour market at the same time with the same age and seniority. Longitudinal data are often not available and therefore repeated cross-sections such as those derived from labour force surveys are used instead. Naturally, in such cases more attention is required to find a control group that either entered the labour market in the same period as the foreign worker in question (and was thus included in the same economic cycle), or which represents the worker in another survey, taking the cohort effect into account (Borjas 1985; LaLonde and Topel 1992).

In economics, assimilation refers to immigrants who at the moment they enter the destination labour market are not receiving the same wage as a native with similar characteristics (see Fig. 2.1), but who catch up little by little, and at the end of a reasonable period achieve the native wage profile (Scenario 1 in Fig. 2.1). More frequently – and this would be unsuccessful assimilation – immigrants begin with a wage that is lower than that of a native with similar characteristics and remain permanently below the native's wage level (Scenario 2 in Fig. 2.1). In another scenario,



Fig. 2.1 Wage assimilation of immigrants (*Blue*: native wage profile; *red*: migrants that assimilate; *continuous line* and *dotted lines* in *green* and *red*: migrants who do not assimilate) (Colour figure online)

immigrants enter the labour market with similar-to-native wages but their opportunities for career advancement do not grow at the same speed, and thus their wage differentials increase as time goes by (Scenario 3 in Fig. 2.1).

The first empirical research on these matters was based on North American data (Chiswick 1978; Borjas 1985, 1994, 1999; Borjas et al. 1992; Card 1990; Dustmann 1994; Borjas and Tienda 1987). These studies look at ways that the integration process can best be understood: 'assimilation refers to a process whereby immigrants acquire skills, including English proficiency and knowledge about the US labour market and other social institutions, which ultimately will enhance their socio-economic success and their earnings in particular'. This definition is a good example of the economic approach that uses human capital theory (Mincer 1974) as its natural point of departure. The most frequent finding by North American research is the under-assimilation of immigrants, which is a result of low human capital and also of discrimination. Later, the research was extended to the European countries, where again the prevailing result is under-assimilation (for instance in the UK, Dustmann 1994, Clark and Drinkwater 2008; in Spain Amuedo-Dorantes and De La Rica 2007; in Italy, Venturini and Villosio 2008, Strøm et al. 2013; in Norway, Longva and Raaum 2003; in the UK, Hatton and Leigh 2011).

The model that researchers use is a wage or employment equation in which the change in the wage is explained by individual variables that control for particular characteristics and by additional variables at a higher level of aggregation: for instance, the unemployment rate of the area where the worker works or lives, and other non-individual variables.

This approach is part of the human capital theory which interprets wage growth (the probability of being employed or unemployed and the duration of employment) as the return on human capital embodied or acquired by the worker on the job or outside of the workplace.

An example of a wage equation derived from Strøm et al. (2013) is included below. Here the dependent variable is the individual log weekly wage [$\mathbf{Y_{it}}$]. The equation depends on individual time-invariant variables [$\boldsymbol{\alpha_i}$], individual time-variant human capital variables [$\mathbf{x_{it}}$] and a worker's job characteristics [$\mathbf{z_{it}}$]. In addition, one can find controls for different macro-economic conditions [$\mathbf{m_{rst}}$] that affect both the region [$\boldsymbol{r}$] and sector [$\boldsymbol{s}$] where the workers are employed and the size of the immigrant's ethnic community [$\boldsymbol{c}$] in the destination area [$\mathbf{k_{crt}}$]. Individual fixed effects replace the individual time invariant-variable in a panel analyses

$$Y_{it} = f\left(x_{it}, z_{it}, m_{rst}, k_{crt}; a_i\right) + \eta_{it} \tag{2.1}$$

where f(.) is a function of the variables and the effects mentioned above and η_{it} is normally distributed with zero mean and is independent from the variables and effects inside f(.).

The statistical methods used, without going into great detail, range from fixed effect, difference in differences, to the OAXACA (1973) decomposition technique. In the last case, the differential between the two groups is first subdivided into

differentials due to different characteristics (older or younger, less educated or more educated, female etc.) and second, is attributed to the differential of the coefficients that the characteristics hold in regression results. This second component shows the differential in terms of the rewards (the price) that the market gives to different characteristics, depending on whether they are held by foreign nationals or natives. This is best illustrated by an example: the effect of tertiary education on the final wages of workers can differ if they are natives or immigrants. Let us imagine that the first effect is greater for a native than for a non-native. If, instead, an immigrant's coefficient is higher than a native's, it reduces the differential.

The differential in the coefficients is occasionally interpreted as a discrimination indicator. This interpretation is inappropriate, however, because it refers only to the wage or employment differential not explained by the characteristics covered by the variables in the regression. The differential can also reflect the different qualities of human capital and other differences such as knowledge of the destination country language(s), which may not be measured correctly in the regression.

Which Are the Variables Used?

The variables used in the empirical analyses made by economists depend upon the characteristics of the dataset, but among the *individual variables* we typically find:

- personal information: age, gender, marital status, number of children, year since migration or duration of stay, knowledge of the destination country language;
- professional information: level of education (in the country of origin, in the country of destination), occupation (employed or not), type of occupation, sector of occupation, experience on the job, etc.

Among the more *aggregate variables*, we can find the dimensions of the immigrant's ethnic community, the characteristics of the diaspora as well as macroeconomic variables (see Strøm et al. 2013) Table 2.1.

The *individual variables* are interpreted with a human capital approach. Thus the older and more educated immigrants are, the higher their wages will be. The higher their duration of stay in the destination country and the greater any experience on the job, the higher their immigrant integration will be (Edin et al. 2000). This is so because the variables in question measure the increase in human and professional knowledge, which favours both employment and its remuneration (Dustmann 1994). The knowledge of the language of the country of destination, for instance, plays a positive and important role, especially in cases of emigration for non-manual jobs (Dustmann and Fabbri 2003).

Migrant males also frequently enjoy easier integration. Being married with children encourages integration for men, but frequently has a negative effect on female migrants' labour market participation (Gevrek 2009).

High education levels increase access to non-manual jobs. But over-education is also a serious problem. In reality, not having higher education increases the

Table 2.1 Variables used in the analyses of the assimilation of immigrants

Variables	Effects	Links
Individual variables		
Age	(+)	
Gender		
Education	(+)	*Country of origin*
Language	(+)	*Country of origin*
Experience	(+)	
Occupation	(+)	*Country of origin*
Duration of stay	(+/−)	*Country of origin*
Selection of the return	(+/−)	*Country of origin*
Aggregate variables		
Ethnic community	(+/−)	*Country of origin*
Role of diaspora	(+/−)	*Country of origin*

Adapted from Strøm et al. 2013

likelihood of having a good job match. In addition, the years of education in the country of destination always have a positive effect because the human capital produced in the destination country is better aligned with the demand of the labour market. This variable in fact proves a better signal of worker productivity (Izquierdo et al. 2009). Also, some sectors offer better opportunities for advancement while construction, agriculture and housekeeping offer far fewer (Strøm et al. 2013).

To focus on a specific example, in the UK, Clark and Drinkwater (2008) show a large differential in the probability of employment between immigrant ethnic groups and natives (ranging from 0.25 to 0.03). But after controlling for age, education, marital status, children, religion and health, the differential in the average is decomposed into two parts due to the different characteristics held by the two groups (the immigrants versus the natives) and the different effects that their characteristics have on their probability of getting a job. For some groups such as Sub-Saharan Africans and Pakistanis, the differential due to different characteristics is very small and the total effect is due to the slight return on these characteristics. For the Chinese community, it is the opposite: the total differential between Chinese immigrants and the natives is very small and their characteristics play a positive role on wage differentials.

In general, there are two types of *aggregate variables,* related either to the immigrant community or to the labour market. Controlling the labour market cycle becomes more and more relevant given the different types of development that different sectors and regions experience. Immigrants suffer from lower wages and higher unemployment rates because they are employed in declining sectors which offer very few career options.

The immigrant community can play either a positive or a negative role. If the community is measured in terms of employees, a competitive effect prevails and the

larger the number of employed, the greater the competition and the more negative the effects on wages (Strøm et al. 2013). If instead, we consider all those with a job as well as those without, we frequently find evidence that the community supports immigrants in their integration, by helping them to find a house and a job, taking care of the children etc. The community also frequently has a positive effect on economic integration, as shown by empirical research recently carried out in the UK, which demonstrates the beneficial impact that social networks developed within the community have on the first stages of integration in the destination country (Phillimore et al. 2014).

Nevertheless, the enlarged ethnic community can also reduce the positive effect on the human capital characteristics of the immigrant worker. Cutler and Glaeser (1997), for instance, found that blacks in more segregated areas have significantly lower outcomes than blacks American in less segregated areas. Past research has indeed showed that large communities reduce contacts with other communities and with the native population, thus reducing the possibility of learning the native language and of widening professional contacts, which are both crucial parts of long-term socio-economic integration (Di Palo et al. 2006). However, Edin et al. (2003) found that living in an enclave improves labour market outcomes for less-skilled immigrants in Sweden. The role of the ethnic community is thus not clear cut, and it changes according to the specific cases analysed.

Very few studies analyse the role of the integration of the community in the individual integration of its members. Hatton et al. (2011), for instance, finds a strong positive correlation between the economic upgrading of a community and individual assimilation in the destination labour market. And Kindler (2014) reaches the same conclusion with a less formal model.

The lack of data affects the modelling of an empirical test. In addition, in order to use richer datasets, the empirical analysis is almost always limited to the country level. Many interesting and innovative papers have been based upon individual longitudinal datasets such as the German Socio-Economic Panel, or Social Security national data, which are limited to specific country or national labour force surveys with retrospective modules (Algan et al. 2010 in Germany, France and the UK; Dustmann et al. 2010 in Germany and the UK; Shields and Price 2002, Gevrek 2009, Bijwaard 2010 in the Netherlands; Amuedo-Dorentes et al. 2007, Izquierdo et al. 2009 in Spain; Venturini et al. 2008, Strøm et al. 2013 in Italy; Finnas and Saarela 2006, Lundborg 2007 in Sweden; Kangasniemi and Kauhanen 2013 in Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK; Longva and Raaum 2003 in Norway; Sarvimati and Hamalainen 2010 in Finland; Drydakis 2011 in Greece; Bevelander and Nielsen 2001 in Denmark; Cabral and Duarte 2013 in Portugal). These datasets include information on the status and characteristics of immigrants in the destination country and occasionally questions answered by the respondent on the origin country. While the first category offers hard information, the second depends upon the reliability of the respondent.

Limitations of the Traditional Destination-Country Approach

If too little comparative research is problematic, the concentration of research on national case studies gets around an important limitation of this approach. I refer to the fact that labour market functioning, the welfare system, integration policies and the implementation of migration policies, all of which strongly affect the integration of all workers and particularly of immigrant workers, are not included in the empirical model. Figure 2.2 tries to illustrate the relationship between the different components of the integration path.

The migration policy defines the conditions of access to the destination country for workers, family members or refugees and thus determines the type and the number of migrants that have the right to enter a country and its labour market. Different migration policies and different implementations and enforcements produce different expectations and attract different types of immigrants, who are generally easier to integrate into the labour market (Guzi et al. 2014a). The presence of (repeated) regularisations, for instance, creates the expectation of an easy back door entry (Borjas 1999) and reduces the ability of the country to enforce criteria that favour the employability of the immigrant.

As Lemaitre (2015) points out, the different channels of entry for immigrants – family member, labour, refugee, student etc. – has a strong effect on their employability. By using the 2008 EULFS, which includes the reason (channel) for entry, his research shows that the integration of immigrants entering for family reunification and humanitarian reasons is much lower than for those entering as labour immigrants. The latter group, however, represents only 30% of the total foreign population, while family members comprise 50% and refugees, the remaining 20% (Lemaître 2014). The large and frequently exclusive attention devoted to entry rules for "labour" immigrants and their link to the integration of immigrants at large arguably offers a distorted vision of the issue. By looking only at this aspect we do not efficiently analyse the causal effects of the limited integration and employability of immigrants.



Fig. 2.2 Steps in integration in the destination country

In Sweden, in an attempt to understand the lower labour market participation of refugees, Edin et al. 2000 studied the policy of redistribution to small groups around the country and its effect on the integration of refugee-immigrants. The point of this strategy was to avoid the creation of an ethnic community, which had been blamed in the past for segregation. The strategy did not work in integration terms. The dispersion of refugees actually made integration more difficult and increased their need for support. The strategy was therefore abandoned.

Other policies such as those which define the criteria of eligibility for a permanent residency permit (i.e. 3–5 years of work) or citizenship of the country of destination (i.e. 5–10 years) also affect the type of migration flows that the country of destination receives. Citizenship acquisition favours settlement, but also stronger integration. Citizenship acquisition also favours models of circular migration between destination and origin countries and the possibility of searching for a job outside of one's home country.

In parallel, different labour market structures and functioning also condition immigrant assimilation. The high unemployment rates or the availability of only low-skilled jobs reduce the assimilation of foreign workers. The analyses of the wage differential between natives and foreign nationals in Italy (Strøm et al. 2013) clearly shows that the main reason for the under-assimilation of foreign workers is that they tend to enter employment in sectors that lack career prospects. Natives who enter employment in "immigrant jobs" also have very little chance of leaving that type of employment. Figure 2.3 shows the increasing wage differentials of similar workers (with the same individual characteristics) who enter the labour market in the same period and who are employed in different sectors. The sectors in which immigrants represent more than 20% of the workers are defined as "immigrant sectors." Natives and foreign nationals employed in these sectors have the same



Fig. 2.3 Wage profiles of similar individuals: male, entering employment at 18, in Northern Italy, in the Manufacturing sector (Source: Strøm et al. 2013, data Italian Social Security data)

wage profile. Thus it is the entry job that determines the future employment trajectory of the worker. If the economy of the destination country has only these jobs available, there is no other option.

The firm dimension, the sector composition of the demand for labour and the differing roles of trade unions also play an important role in shaping the employment trajectory of the immigrant. In their review of the existing literature concerning the effects of institutional arrangements on migrants' labour market integration, Guzi et al. (2014b) point out that strong trade unions have the potential to influence migration outcomes either directly, by targeting the migrant population, or indirectly, through more general institutional measures. The different types of bargaining systems also seem to be associated with the different sizes and characteristics of migrant inflows. For instance, there is a positive relationship between higher collective-agreement coverage rates and immigrants' labour market integration. Fragmented bargaining systems are associated with more precarious work.

Last but not least there is welfare legislation, which defines the unemployment benefits that workers who lose jobs can receive and for how long. The country case analysis covers all of this, but the lessons derived from one case are rarely exportable elsewhere because the structural differences are so very large.

Lastly there are the integration policies, which are mainly provided at the regional level. These help immigrants train for labour demand, learn the language of the destination country, and so forth. The success of integration policies (and the need for them) of course depends upon migration policies, which determine who can enter the country and how the labour market will function, thus defining the jobs that are available to migrants. The success of these policies strongly depends upon the structure of the country.

The only comparative research that takes the different types of welfare systems into account is very recent: Guzi et al. (2015). Their research uses the EU Labour Force Survey and the Oaxaca–Blinder methodology to define the native-immigrant differential in labour force participation, unemployment, low-skilled employment and temporary employment. They also studied the role of institutional variables on the explained differentials by immigrant/native characteristics as well as on the unexplained ones. They use four dummy variables to distinguish different types of capitalism: CME – Coordinated Market Economies (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden); LME – Liberal Market Economies (Ireland and the United Kingdom); MME – Mixed Market Economies; and EME – Emerging Market Economies (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia). They also employ the Employment Protection Legislation Index (EPL), which captures labour market rigidities, unionization density and collective bargaining coverage, as well as openness to international trade and the importance of different sectors: agriculture, manufacturing and services.

All these variables are significant in explaining both the explained and the unexplained differentials between natives and migrants in employment, unemployment, low-skilled jobs and temporary jobs.

To proxy the role of the country of origin the authors also introduce five aggregate dummy variables to capture the origin area of the immigrants. The results are

impressive because the majority of the variables are significant and explain approximately 0.9–0.75% of the residuals. This implies that, taking into account the structure of the economies of destination and the different human capital characteristics of the immigrants, the differential in employment participation is very small.

At the national level, analyses are easier because the main differences are controlled for. However, at the local level, integration policies are defined according to the needs of the local environment and thus their effects vary according to the peculiarity of the area. For this reason, controls at the local level are needed for differential interventions. In addition, immigrants of similar nationalities or areas of origin may be concentrated in the same local area in the destination country, but it is impossible to consider them as a single group. This is, first, because they have different average characteristics; but, second, because the country of origin influences the performance of the worker in many ways.

The role of the country of origin is not purely theoretical: the country of origin shapes individual human capital and its reception at destination; policies implemented by the country of origin are in fact embedded in many variables that affect the integration of immigrants.

The Role of the Country of Origin

The effect of migration in the country of origin is dealt with extensively in research analyses on the effect of emigration (Boeri et al. 2013). These point to: the positive (or negative) effect of the reduction of the population in search of jobs, which frees up resources for the remaining population; the positive (or negative) effects of monetary remittances, which finance consumption and production; the effect of social remittances on political participation and fertility (Spilimbergo 2009; Fargues 2007); and the risk of brain drain or of brain gain with the outflow of highly skilled emigrants (Boeri et al. 2013 and Fargues, Venturini eds. 2015).

This is not a complete list of research by any means, but it includes some of the most important points. The analysis also covers the policies implemented by origin country governments to favour the return of emigrants. An example here might be the United Nations programme TOKTEN (for more, see Fakhoury 2015). This programme temporarily attracts professional migrants back home to train native workers and students and offers a variety of incentives to attract both migrants' human and physical capital for the development of the origin country.

No systematic research explicitly covers the role that the origin country plays in favouring immigrant integration, directly or indirectly.

Empirical analyses of immigrant integration frequently specify an immigrant's country of origin. But the country-fixed effect on immigrant wages is derived from one of the few pieces of research which considers different destinations and different countries of origin: Algar et al. (2010) combines different cultures, religions, natural abilities and, last but not least, actions by relatives and interventions by governments or associations that support immigrant integration. The research controls only for

education, gender, first-generation or second-generation migrants and thus the country-of-origin fixed effect can be a little inflated by the missing variables. However, the results show that, in France, the country-of-origin's fixed effect is significant – and negative – only for Turkish, African and Maghreb male immigrants. It is not significant for males from Northern and Southern Europe, Eastern Europe or Asia. This result implies that immigrants coming from Europe or Asia are not statistically different from natives. Female immigrants from Eastern European countries show a disadvantage in terms of remuneration. In Germany and in the UK, a similar picture emerges. All areas of origin show a disadvantage in wage terms. In Germany the main disadvantaged groups are Italian and Greek male immigrants as well as Turkish women and ethnic German immigrants. This result should be taken as a general indication of a country-fixed effect but it should be verified with more controls. For instance, the duration of stay could produce different results and reduce the size of the coefficient or even reduce its significance, showing that there is something left unexplained. Zorlu and Hartog (2012) also found that the introduction of the country of origin made the education variable irrelevant in the employment assimilation of immigrants in the Netherlands.

The Actions of the Actors of the Country of Origin Are Already Included in Many Explicative Variables

If we look at the variables used in assimilation regressions, many of them are explicitly part of the policy that actors from the country of origin implement to help or hinder the integration of immigrants. The tuition of the language spoken in the country of destination is part of an educational policy undertaken by the country of origin that can support international mobility. The duration of stay is again strongly linked to the policy that the country of origin implements to support settlement in the destination country, circular migration or returns home. A government that accepts double citizenship favours an immigrant's move from one country to the other; governments that force citizens to give up their citizenship upon acquiring one from another country, on the other hand, encourage the foreign national to make a more permanent move and a more total form of integration.

Explicit Inclusion of the Country-of-Origin Link

The only explicit way in which economic research has taken into account the origin country has been two-fold: by modelling the decision to remain in the destination country; and by looking at how this decision changes immigrant quality (in economic terms) for the better or for the worse. This approach is crucial for quality composition analyses of the immigrant groups who choose to remain, and of their progress towards integration. If the best performing groups leave the country of destination of course,

the results will be the under-assimilation of the group. If, instead, the worst move you will find over-assimilation, induced by immigrant quality selection. The father of this strand of research is Dustmann (2003) who tried to explain the decisions of foreign workers to remain or leave a country of destination. In this respect the country of origin plays a very important role by favouring return, keeping links with immigrants and attracting them back. Family members if they are still located in the country of origin, can also play a vital role. Several scholars use different instruments according to information available in the dataset at disposal. Some use family members at home, mainly children and partners, while other authors use variables that are better linked to labour market trends, for instance job positions in the destination country and the creation of jobs and wage growth in the origin country (Dustmann 2003; Constant and Massey 2003; Strøm et al. 2013; De Haas and Fokkema 2011; Dustmann and Weiss 2007; Dustmann et al. 2007).

To control selectivity, a two-step analysis is done. In a first regression the return decision is modelled and estimated. Then in the assimilation equation, a control for the probability of return is added (IV instruments). Research has documented both results. A negative selection, namely that the immigrants with worse performance remain, has been found for instance in Germany (Constant and Massey 2003) and in Italy (Strøm et al. 2013) by using different datasets and variables to model the origin country's attraction.

In this way, we find some direct effects by actors in the country of origin, namely government, associations and family members, that favour return, but rarely a more precise indication of the specific adopted policies that affect a return to the origin country or permanent settlement. No experiments have been carried out to see whether the introduction of, say, a more open migration policy would encourage circular migration or support both return and settlement.

The inclusion, in the assimilation equation, of the control for selective return is very important. It changes our approach to assimilation by breaking down immigrant moves into various phases, and by showing that an immigrant's decision to stay or go is not necessarily permanent. It is well known that migration is not always a permanent move, and according to the OECD report (2008) between 20% and 50% of immigrants return home or at least leave to a third country. Some countries have better records of keeping up immigrant inflows and transforming them into permanent settlers: for instance, the US, Canada and New Zealand. This is related to the more impressive job options available in these labour markets, but also to the bilateral relationships which link countries of origin with these destinations.

The Impact of the Country-of-Origin Actors

As Fig. 2.4 points out, there are different types of country-of-origin actors who can play different roles.

Country-of-origin governments can affect the migration policy of destination countries by negotiating specific migrant group compositions by type of immigrant,



Fig. 2.4 The actors and instruments of integration

such as labour, family member, student; by pushing for special quota conditions and terms of stay for their citizens through bilateral agreements; by accepting or declining double nationality conditions; by defining double taxation rules; and by establishing portability of pension rights etc. (First arrow in Fig. 2.4). If they are part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), governments can even intervene inside the ENP to influence policies that take country actions into account and favour the development of participating countries and increases in human capital.

Associations can affect the migration policies of destination countries as well, for instance by lobbying for changes to destination legislation: this might be on matters concerning labour entry and family reunification. They operate by mobilising the diaspora abroad, but the initial push is based in the origin country.

In addition, government institutions can support the employment of potential immigrants (second arrow in Fig. 2.4) through the public organization of job search services. They can negotiate and organise international recruitment, as ANAPEC does in Morocco. Failing this they can, at minimum, direct individual job searches. Governments in countries such as the Philippines also organise voluntary or compulsory pre-departure training, which helps integration in the destination country by providing information on language, habits, the legal system and necessary skills. Or they might organise training after the job offer is defined as part of international labour agreements, as is done in Colombia (see Martin and Makaryan 2015).

Finally, origin institutions can support increases in human capital through educational policies, thereby improving the knowledge of the destination country language and also the employability of immigrants.

In this same area, associations can provide support for job searches and worker skills-matching. They can also organise specific training courses for potential immigrants. There are different types of organizations that run these types of programmes. Some of them are linked to ethnicity, others to the religion of the immigrants. Some

have antennae in destination countries, others in origin countries. All, however, try in different ways to support the moves of migrants and their integration in the national community of the destination country, or at best in the destination country more generally. The Filipino community offers a good example of support: it organises job placement services; training on the legal setting of the destination country; language training; money transfers (it also lends money); and also supports those who do not have an active family network. A similar role is taken up by the family or the extended family that is connected with the diaspora abroad.

State support of actors by origin country (governments, associations and families) is very important before as well as during an immigrant's move to the destination country. This helps to ensure the best possible settlement of immigrants inside the country of destination and also favours job matching.

All these actions are very difficult to measure. But if the observable characteristics of immigrants are the same and a large differential exists between the integration of immigrant workers, a great deal can be imputed to the actions implemented by origin-country actors.

This analysis becomes even more important in light of social research which stresses the transnationalism of those immigrants who remain in between two countries: that is, they are part of two different social contexts with friends and relatives on both sides of the world (see Vertovec 2009). From an economic standpoint, an immigrant's move is implicitly permanent. The immigrant is permanently in the destination country and can be compared to a native worker who was born there and who has remained there. Only a correction for the probability of return introduces some flexibility and reality. Both these hypotheses are questionable, however: immigrants do not necessarily remain in the destination country permanently and, in any case, native workers move abroad. Thus assimilation can also come about through many temporary stays, even if their sequence is broken.

In addition, it is important to stress that many countries of origin have changed their attitude towards immigrants and the narrative around migration. In the past they may have considered immigrants to be "traitors" or just temporarily outside the country and origin remittances (e.g. Morocco). More recently some of them, for example Turkey and Morocco, have become proactive in supporting immigrant integration in the destination country. The reasons that have pushed these changes in attitude have been various: the possibility of integration, after return, is becoming increasingly difficult; few jobs are available in the homeland; and a better integrated community abroad can support increased foreign investment in the homeland, higher levels of remittances (as with the Philippines) and more job options abroad for nationals, making immigrants "ambassadors" of the origin country.

The narrative of migration is very important as well, because it shapes the attitude of both the immigrant and the immigrant community versus the origin country, and induces virtuous behaviour. How can we control the concrete actions of the country of origin to further integration? This is difficult to operationalise even if there have been significant discourses on the subject.

Phases and Functions Which Contribute to Integration

In this section we try to understand the impact of the country of origin in supporting the integration of immigrants. Martin and Makarayan, in the project MisMes (2015), try to understand the policies carried out by different actors in the country of origin. They distinguish three phases: before, during and after migration. We would like instead to distinguish the different functions that the country-of-origin interventions play in the economic integration of the immigrant at destination. These can be developed before or even after migration and the match but they, nevertheless, further integration.

Box 2.1 Functional Breakdown of Action Which Support the Employability of the Immigrant

a-Creation of labour-, human- or social-capital suited for a better match and increase in technical productivity

- a-1 Education
- a-2 Professional training, general or specific ex-ante or ex-post match
- a-3 Specific legal training in the type of legislation immigrants will face in destination labour market training in the destination language

b-Creation of general and social human capital

- b-1 General training in the destination language
- b-2 Training in the social habits prevailing in destination countries

c-Affecting the migration legislation of the destination country

- c-1 Legislation which defines access to the country and its implementation
- c-2 Legislation and implementation which defines the stay in the country: namely different types of residence permits, their duration etc.
- c-3 Citizenship legislation acquisition and related rights

d-Favouring the Match

- d-1 Supporting action which favour the entrance of natives
- d-2 Helping immigrants in favouring their match by job search projects

e-Favouring upgrades

- e-1 The narrative of migration in the country of origin should be positive "ambassadors"
- e-2 Supporting the community with consular offices and association: lending money for investment.

Actions that lead to the creation of human capital (Group **a** Box 2.1) include school education or special technical courses; destination country language courses; and courses on labour contracts and the legal system. These actions support the employability of the potential immigrant abroad and are usually organised by the government, although some associations also support these activities in the country of origin before departure. Occasionally, under special agreements, these activities are organised in collaboration with destination institutions.

The second group (**b** in Box 2.1) includes all actions that increase human and social capital: namely language tuition and the provision of introductory information about the destination society. These types of trainings are frequently extended to reunified family members who do not receive professional information on how to conduct job searches. These trainings increase the employability of a given immigrant although they are not specifically geared toward this goal, unlike the first group. The courses are generally provided by governmental institutions or associations in the country of origin, and only occasionally through joint projects which also involve the country of destination.

We have already discussed actions that can be carried out by the government of the country of origin and by associations (**c** Box 2.1) to make origin country legislation more immigrant friendly, for example fixing preferential quotas, providing preferential access, and so forth. In this group we can also include actions target the lack of education degree recognition, which is frequently said to be at the root of immigrant discrimination. The subject is very complex and this is not the place to examine it, but the recognition of the level and quality of an immigrant's education depends on formal agreements between origin and destination countries.

Country-of-origin actors can also provide job matching support. All family relatives in destination and origin countries, as well as associations and the government itself can support an immigrant's efforts to find a job and in particular, the most appropriate job based on skills honed in the origin country (**d** Box 2.1). This is a very important step in the integration process, especially in terms of potential future career advancement (**e** Box 2.1). As we showed above, finding a first job that does not lead to any career opportunities is one of the main reasons for the under-assimilation of immigrants. Origin-country actors can also play an important role in protecting the labour and social rights of immigrants in the destination country, by fighting against worker exploitation and pushing for better social and political rights for immigrants. The community itself can also act democratically in the destination country through local elections, interventions in newspapers and local protests to defend immigrant rights. There is no question that support from associations and the origin country government strengthen a community's impact.

An interesting example of a country which takes great care of its citizens abroad is the Philippines. The Philippine government targets low-skilled jobs in the care and family services sector in many destination areas in Europe, the US and the Gulf countries. To this end, it provides relevant training for its future immigrant workers through language tuition, legal courses on the rights and legislation of the country of destination and courses that provide the professional skills demanded by the targeted jobs. All of this is possible because the immigrant is obliged to receive

government authorization for legal migration, and moving legally is much less costly than moving illegally. After departure, immigrant associations and the family play an important role in facilitating job matching and job allocation and in providing support to the immigrant worker during their stay. The association acts as a placement agency, tracking destination labour demands and finding appropriate workers. Associations do not feel responsible for each individual worker; instead they tend to try to maximise the total output for the community. In this way the result of their activities is more efficient. But while the Filipino community has one of the higher employment rates among immigrant communities abroad, the care and family service sector do not offer professional advancement opportunities. The narrative of the migration process has not changed in many years. The objective of the government is to create the "super maid", meaning that its targeted jobs remain limited to low-skilled workers. It seems a successful story, at least for the first generation, but given the professional reproduction of the community – children continue in the same sector – it is questionable in the long run.

Chinese migration is low skilled because Chinese students tend to return back home, where there are interesting job options. But they also return because their move abroad was always conceived by actors in the country of origin as an acquisition of human capital, not as a step towards permanent migration.

The Moroccan Government has changed its narrative of the migration of its citizens. Even the acquisition of a foreign citizenship does not imply the loss of the Moroccan citizenship; Moroccan citizens remain Moroccan all their lives. The Government also has a labour placement agency, ANAPEC, which helps prospective immigrants find jobs abroad. In some periods it has been more active and efficient, and in others less so. Tunisia also negotiated a quota of immigrants with Italy in order to bolster Tunisian emigration but the quota was rarely filled.[1] It is too early to determine the effect of the just-signed partnership agreement between Italy and Egypt: it remains to be seen whether it will play a role in the integration of Egyptian workers, who frequently use tourist visas to enter Italy for seasonal work.

Conclusion

In this paper we have stressed that policy makers need a comprehensive approach to immigrant integration, in which the roles of all actors are taken into account and all possible actions undertaken by them before, during and after migration are controlled for.

The integration of immigrants depends on more than just integration policies, which are often organised locally. Labour market functioning and job selection upon entry into the destination country are crucial for understanding whether "integratable" immigrants are let in or not. In this process, the role of the country of origin with its institutions, associations and extended family is very important. The

[1] See different CARIM countries reports at www.migrationpolicycentre.eu

indirect role of policies to provide education and training increase immigrants' human capital, which is an asset for migration and integration. In addition, the country of origin can take more specific policy actions that have a direct effect on the employability of immigrants. This role has generally been neglected in order to focus instead on integration policies, which act in an environment created by the labour market, migration policies in a broad sense and country-of-origin actors. In addition, the role played by the diaspora in the destination countries can be as important as that of the community at home.

It has become crucial to develop a comprehensive approach to migrant integration policies that starts from the country of origin. This was the objective of the INTERACT project, which analysed a larger set of policy options for countries of origin. These might include: bilateral agreements; investment in training and education in origin countries before migration; and job placement agencies. Organising these types of interventions after arrival and after difficult phases of integration are much more costly and much less efficient for immigrants and for destination countries, which in fact have ties to country of origin actors. So it is in the interest first of the migrant, then of the community in the country of origin and last, but probably most importantly, of the society of the destination country to collaborate on an early integration project with the institutions in the country of origin.

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Chapter 3
Country of Origin Effects and Impacts on Educational Attainment of Pupils with Migrant Backgrounds. Towards a New Research Agenda

Dirk Jacobs and Anne Unterreiner

Introduction

Education is at the heart of the integration of migrants and their descendants. The level of education is indeed the cornerstone of upward (or downward) social mobility. It impacts migrants' access to and position within the labour market, and their potential income level, which in turn impacts their housing.

However, in most European countries migrants have lower educational attainment levels than natives. Access to education for migrant children is almost universally guaranteed in the EU but this does not automatically equate to access to education that is adapted to their specific needs, which are linked to socio-economic disadvantages and linguistic challenges. Furthermore, according to several scholars, social and ethnic school segregation constitutes a serious barrier towards access to good education for migrant children. Country of destination policies clearly play a crucial role for educational attainment levels of migrant children. This explains why country of origin effects, defined here as the impact of cultural predispositions, and the impact of policies of origin countries have received little attention. This contribution proposes a research agenda to investigate country of origin effects and impacts based on the existing literature on migrant education. Following this book's theoretical framework, the country of origin can influence the integration of migrants indirectly, through the set of beliefs that it is entangled in globally (i.e. discrimination at destination) and its general social structure: the country of origin effects. It can also voluntarily implement specific policies targeting its emigrants, returnees or the diaspora more generally. These are the country of origin impacts.

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The issue of access to education that has been adapted to migrants and migrant descendants and the role played by destination country actors in this process have rarely been studied in a direct manner. Most focus has been on the educational attainment levels of migrants and their descendants and reasons for the existence of a performance gap between them and native pupils.

There are a number of (mainly) descriptive case studies on transnationalism, diaspora and education in which partially some interest is given to the impact of actors of societies of origin but most of the time only at the margins, as an anecdotal evidence and without any proper scholarly work to build on. We equally found a number of articles in economics simulating country of origin effects in their models, without, however, using actual data (for instance Bertoli and Brücker 2011). It seems safe to conclude that there is currently no encompassing study that systematically addresses country of origin effects/impacts, tackling the issue from the perspective of country of origin actors' mobilization around education.

Analytically we can distinguish efforts by actors from the country of origin on actors at destination to put into place inclusive educational systems for migrants and their descendants on the one hand and efforts by actors from the country of origin to themselves provide educational support to migrants and their descendants in the diaspora. It should be borne in mind that these efforts in and of themselves do not tell us anything about the effectiveness in actually enhancing educational outcomes of children with migrant backgrounds.

In order to shed light on potential country of origin effects/impacts on the education of the migrants and their descendants, this chapter begins with two case studies highlighting the dominance of the country of destination in research on migrant education. This first descriptive analysis allows us to see the multiplicity of determinants that comprise the educational attainment of people with migrant backgrounds. We then, in a second step, review the potential country of origin effects and impacts on education in the existing literature, before concluding the paper with recommendations for future research on this issue.

From the Dominance of the Country of Destination Perspective…

Regarding the education of children with migrant backgrounds, different issues can be tackled, including their access to education and school performance. Through the study of MIPEX and PISA findings, we will be able to see the multiplicity of factors influencing the educational attainment of migrants and their descendants at destination.

Comparing Migrant Access to Education Policies Across Countries: The MIPEX

For the particular question of access to education, overview studies such as the "Migrant Integration Policy Index" (MIPEX) (Huddleston and Niessen 2011) do not allow us to investigate impact of actors of the societies of origin.

The MIPEX was built in order to compare the policy framework regarding migrant integration in the EU (and a few additional countries).[1] Education is one of the eight policy areas under study, with several different dimensions under consideration: access to education, targeting the specific needs of the first and second generations; offering new opportunities; and intercultural education.

The MIPEX study does give a good overview of the situation with regard to access to education for children with migrant backgrounds across Europe. Making use of a set of indicators (based on expert judgements), it allows to rank countries with regard to the degree of openness of the educational system towards migrant pupils. The Table 3.1 gives a synthetic overview for the situation in 2014.

Generally speaking, we see a continuum of countries when we examine education policies. At one end of the continuum, with rather a favourable policy framework, we find traditional countries of immigration and Northern European countries, while on the other end, with less favourable educational policies are Eastern and Southern European countries. However, this does not tell us much about the impact/effect of the countries of origin.

Indeed, MIPEX only provides indicators on countries of destination, not on countries of origin. To our knowledge there is no comparable database available trying to monitor efforts of countries of origin to influence educational outcomes, and more precisely the access to education for their diasporas' children.

Table 3.1 Ranking on MIPEX education policy area (2014)

2014 ranking	Countries
Favourable	None
Slightly favourable	Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Canada, Portugal, Belgium, Finland, USA
Halfway favourable	Estonia, United Kingdom, South Korea, Netherlands, Denmark, Luxembourg, Austria, Germany, Switzerland
Slightly unfavourable	Czech Republic, Spain, Greece, France, Italy, Ireland, Cyprus, Slovenia, Slovakia, Iceland, Japan
Unfavourable	Romania, Poland, Malta, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia, Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria
Critically unfavourable	None

Source: Adapted from MIPEX (http://www.mipex.eu/education, accessed on 4 July, 2016)

[1] Full details on indicators, methodology and results for 2014 can be found on the MIPEX website: www.mipex.eu where maps and data can be easily downloaded. The dataset provides invaluable information for researchers interested in making comparative analyses.

If the issue of the influence of the country of origin on access to education for people with migrant backgrounds remains unaddressed, a few hints can be found in the literature regarding their school performance.

Comparing School Performance in the OECD: The PISA Studies

In the OECD, the "Programme for International Student Assessment" (PISA) studies for instance, children with a migrant background (defined as pupils of which at least one of the parents was born abroad) have a lower level of educational attainment than children without a migrant background in most EU countries (OECD 2010). PISA is an international survey of student competences, applied every 3 years. It tests 15-year-old students in the fields of reading, writing and maths. In 2015, 70 countries worldwide participated in the assessment. This data partly allows to identify the influence of societies of origin on educational attainment but the research was not specifically designed to be able to do so. One main conclusion of the research performed using this dataset is that migrants from the same origin countries do not achieve the same educational outcomes in different destination countries. This can be illustrated by focussing on achievement levels by Turkish and Russian origin pupils in different countries highlighted in the latest PISA studies (PISA 2009) (Fig. 3.1).



Fig. 3.1 (**a** and **b**) Comparison of student performance in PISA (Source: PISA 2009, originally published in OECD 2010, p. 80)

The empirical results show persistent differences once we control for socio-economic status of migrant groups and the country of destination. Comparing students from Turkey and from Russia, we first notice that the students with a Russian background, living in Finland, Israel and Germany, have better scores than the Turkish students in the six countries of residence under consideration. In addition, Turkish students' reading scores are more influenced by their socio-economic backgrounds at destination than that of their Russian counterparts. These data show the complexity of assessing the impact/effect of the country of origin. First, an important selectivity effect can lead migrants from the same country of origin to migrate to one country of destination, while others move to another one. We indeed cannot automatically assume that students from the same country of origin share the same characteristics from one country of destination to another. Patterns of migration (for instance chain migration due to social networks, linked to particular demographic characteristics) might be different for particular groups in the country of origin (e.g. Russian immigrants vs Russian asylum seekers of Chechen origins), and they might prefer different countries of destination.

Second, selectivity of migration policies in countries of destination might be different – the obvious example is a preferential integration policy for ethnic Germans in place in Germany until recently (see Weinar and Schneider 2015). This specific policy framework targeting "ethnic Germans" and offering language courses to recent *Aussiedlers* for instance could explain the better reading scores of students from Russian backgrounds compared to their Turkish counterparts.

Third, some authors have highlighted country of origin and community effects on attainment levels (see Levels and Dronkers 2008; Levels et al. 2008). These studies are not only laudable but also extremely complicated and methodologically sophisticated and run the risk of overstretching what is possible with the PISA-data set. We should be careful with sweeping statements on this issue, especially as they can have important political consequences. Doing multi-level analysis on large scale international research (such as PISA) to disentangle country of origin, country of destination and community effects have "high potential" but are also subject to "high risk". A number of methodological caveats should be noted: one can only include countries with suitable data, there are not really enough upper level cases for multi-level analysis and we are confronted with an underestimation of standard errors by not using an iterative procedure for plausible values. Taking this into account, some of the noteworthy – but sometimes counterintuitive – conclusions of Levels and Dronkers (2008) are that there is a negative impact of the level of economic development of origin countries, that migrants from politically more stable countries obtain better results and that relative community size matters.

A substantial part of the differences between "migrant" and "non-migrant" pupils is related to socio-economic status and language spoken at home (Hanushek and Wössmann 2011; Jacobs and Rea 2011; Schneeweis 2011; Entorf and Lauk 2008; Rangvid 2007; Ammermüller 2007; Cobb-Clark et al. 2012). Above and beyond this pattern on the individual level, there seem to be school related and educational system related factors such as the presence or absence of early tracking and the level of academic or socio-economic segregation playing a role (Hanushek and

Wössmann, 2006; Jacobs and Rea 2011; Cobb-Clark et al. 2012). As access to education for migrant children is almost universally guaranteed in the EU, the issue at stake is whether they have (equal) access to education taking into account their individual and collective needs. Research consistently suggests school segregation is one of the major obstacles to equal educational opportunities. Jacobs and Batista (2012) have for instance shown that social and ethnic segregation on the school level pushes performance levels of migrant students down. Research based on PISA thus shows the complexity of determinants of school performance for pupils with migrant backgrounds. It is indeed very challenging to disentangle destination, origin country effects and the individual characteristics impacting the educational attainment of the migrants and their descendants using large-scale datasets.

The Complexity of Determinants of Educational Attainment

The level of education of migrants and their descendants is determined by a multiplicity of factors.

As said above, socio-economic characteristics are major factors explaining the educational attainment of people with migrant backgrounds. Since social classes tend to "reproduce" (Bourdieu and Passeron 1970) from one generation to the next, a poorer social background (in terms of migrant families' occupations, professions and education) is the main determinant of migrant children's lower school performance (see Portes and Zhou 1993; Brinbaum and Cebolla-Boado 2007, for instance). In parallel to its effects on the various types of "capital" available to pupils (Bourdieu 1979), socio-economic background also affects housing and schooling conditions. In addition to the individual "primary effects" of social class on education, previous research has shown that for both natives, migrants and their descendants, a gender gap favouring girls exists (see Brinbaum and Primon 2013 in France). Depending on the study under consideration, these factors may or may not be taken into account in the study of migrant school performance, and may thus lead to opposite conclusions. If we look at the second generation's education using descriptive statistics for instance, we would conclude that they perform poorly compared to the natives. Whereas if we use models controlling for the social background of migrants' descendants, we would conclude the contrary. Let us take one example based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP):

As we can see in Table 3.2, the share of persons without a migrant background holding a postsecondary degree is higher than the other groups, and less often they hold either no diploma or a professional degree (*Hauptschulabschluss*) without professional training. But, once we control for the respondents' social background, gender, age and current place of residence, the story is slightly different (see Table 3.3). All things being equal, the descendants of migrants have a significantly greater chance of holding a postsecondary degree or at least a high school degree compared to the natives.

Table 3.2 Degree obtained by out of school persons (aged 17 to 50) living in Germany (% in row)

	Maximum *Hauptschule* without professional training or equivalent (%)	*Hauptschule* with professional training or equivalent, or *Realschule* or equivalent (%)	High school degree (%)	Postsecondary degree (%)	Unweighted sample
Persons without a migrant background	6.9	55.4	15	22.7	2433
Mixed children with one parent born in Germany	13.8	53.6	15.9	16.7	153
Migrant descendants	17	55	10.8	17.2	220
Migrants	25.7	55.2	6.5	12.5	190
Total	9.5	55.3	14.1	21.1	2996

Source: GSOEP, DIW, wave 2009, weighted data, originally published in Unterreiner (2012)

Table 3.3 Influence of individual and family characteristics on the diploma of unschooled persons living in Germany (binomial logits)

	Probability of unschooled respondents to…		
	Model 1:	Model 2:	Model 3:
	…a postsecondary degree	…at least a highschool degree	…maximum *Hauptschulabschluss* without professional training or equivalent
Persons without a migrant background	Reference	Reference	Reference
Mixed children born or who arrived in Germany before the age of 6, with one parent born in Germany	−0.184	−0.023	0.744***
Migrant descendants	0.675***	0.631***	0.215
Migrants	0.205	0.09	0.942***

Source: GSOEP, DIW, wave 2009, weighted data, originally published in Unterreiner (2012)
*** Significant coefficient of at least 0.01
Control variables: migrant characteristics; gender; age; parental occupation, profession, education (ESeC and CASMIN); current place of residence

This analysis also reveals that it is essential to distinguish among individuals with migrant backgrounds according to their own migration path (if any). Previous research has indeed shown important differences between the "generations" (Warner and Srole 1945), which includes the generations of migrants now called "first"

(adult migrants), "1.5" (young migrants), "second" (descendants of two migrants), "2.5" ("mixed" children that is descendants of a migrant and a non-migrant), and "third" (descendants of migrant grandparents). In France for instance, while Vallet (1996) showed a gap between first and second generation migrants, Unterreiner (2012) highlighted major differences regarding diplomas between descendants of migrants and mixed children. All things being equal, second generation Algerians perform better than French natives while French-Algerians perform worse (Unterreiner 2012).

Past research explained the gap between generations through two sets of factors. First, the longer a pupil spent time abroad, the more difficult his/her adaptation to the school system at destination. Language proficiencies are key to understanding the school performance of recent newcomers. The issue raised here is not multilingualism, but the lack of knowledge of the language spoken in the country of residence (Vallet 1996). Another factor is the understanding of the school system and its selection process. In the French case for instance, children of migrant backgrounds choose, *ceteris paribus*, to enter the elitist "*Grandes Ecoles*" post-secondary system less often than pupils without a migrant background (Lainé and Okba 2005), knowing that such a choice has major consequences on their future position in the labour market. What is called "secondary effects" in the literature is also visible if we compare the school performance of second generation migrants living in countries with a comprehensive school system versus those in systems with early school orientation, such as the German one (Tucci 2008). The more comprehensive the system, the better the educational attainment of descendants of migrants.

In parallel to the migration path and to the adaptation of migrant families to the educational system at destination, families' own aspirations are essential to understanding the school performances of their children. Based on Ogbu's (1987) seminal work, multiple research efforts have shown the importance of family mobilisation to the education of pupils with migrant backgrounds. For parents who view their settlement in the destination country as long-term, having children become successful pupils is key to upward family mobility (Becker 2010). Treating children's education as a family project has a huge impact on the school performance of the descendants of migrants, resulting in better performances, all things being equal, compared to both descendants of natives and mixed children, for whom upward mobility through education is less of a life model (Unterreiner 2011).

Research on the school performance of migrants and their descendants also highlights the importance of "ethnic communities" at destination. The research conducted by Portes and Rumbaut (2001: 283) in the United States showed that among the working-class, "strong co-ethnic communities" in the first generation led to "selective acculturation" and "middle-class status through education" in the second, and to "full acculturation" in the third, while "weak co-ethnic communities" meant "dissonant acculturation and low educational achievement" for migrants' children and "downward assimilation" for their grandchildren. What is meant here by "strong community" is the "density of ties" among its members, that is to say a group of people with a deep sense of solidarity to one other, who share their respective social capital and who reinforce migrant-family upward mobility through an education

model (Portes et al. 2005). Waters et al. (2010) refined this hypothesis while analysing the school performance of second generation Chinese living in New York. They showed that "it is not the overall level of ties to the ethnic group or selective acculturation at the individual level that leads to better outcomes. Rather it is maintaining ethnic ties within those groups which have significant numbers of middle class, educated members that help children of poor immigrants. Ethnic embeddedness and social capital are helpful when they connect people to those with significant resources. They are of far less use for groups that are more uniformly poor."

Finally, past research shows important gaps between migrant groups according to their country of origin. In the French case for instance, while second generation Portuguese have until recently chosen to pursue vocational degrees, the second generation from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia preferred general high school diplomas (Brinbaum and Kieffer 2009).[2] Even when these findings were consistent over many years, however, no author considered it as a "country of origin effect" or a "country of origin impact", as such.

… To the Awareness of the Existence of Country of Origin Effects and Impacts

Although past research focused on a destination country perspective, a systematic literature review on the education of migrants (and their descendants) demonstrates the existence of both country of origin effects and impacts.

Country of Origin Effects

In most of the literature (see Levels and Dronkers 2008; Kanas and van Tubergen 2009; Levels et al. 2008), the main focus is to make a country of origin effect visible in educational attainment of migrants and their descendants, which means that when all other factors are held constant (country of destination, individual characteristics) there are still significant differences to be observed depending on what country a migrant originates from. Furthermore, the potential impact of a number of country characteristics are examined (GDP, growth, MIPEX-score, political stability, democracy, etc.). In these studies, there is no direct examination of what meso-actors, such as non-governmental organisations, or micro-actors, such as individual teachers, might play a role in determining these macro-level country of origin effects, i.e. detectable on the broad societal level. In indirect ways some of this literature does, however, raise some points pertaining to the role played by actors from the countries of origin and having consequences for educational attainment levels.

[2] These analyses were made controlling for the social background and the school performance at the time of orientation of the pupils.

Past research has raised the question of "capital" acquired abroad and its impact on integration at destination. Some attention has been given to the effect of country of origin of pupils on their educational attainment (Levels and Dronkers 2008; Levels et al. 2008). It presupposes that pupils come with a set of cultural predispositions and attitudes towards education which might hinder or enhance their inclusion in the educational system of the country of destination. This is a relatively new approach because, as we have seen above, most research has been focusing on assessing migrant educational achievement and explaining outcome differences with the non-migrant population in countries of destination, with little importance given to origin country effects. The specific culture of the migrant families could also be influenced by the schooling experiences of the parents. Education increases levels of cultural capital and enhances possibilities for the socio-economic integration of migrants and their descendants. Van Tubergen and van de Werfhorst (2007) point out that in many studies insufficient distinction is made between pre-migration and post-migration schooling. However, as shown by Ichou (2014), the educational attainment of parents at origin influences the school performance of their children through the "intergenerational transmission of cultural resources". Following Becker (2011), we can then distinguish between two types of capital: what she calls "specific capital", that is to say capital that the migrant can only use at origin, and "general capital", which "is useful in various types of contexts and can be easily transferred between societies without losing its value" (Ibid.: 5). While specific school degrees seem to fall into the first category, part of the knowledge acquired at origin falls into the second.

In parallel, the country of origin can indirectly influence education outcomes of migrants and their descendants as it impacts others' perceptions at destination. Depending on which country they originate from, migrants and their descendants might be more or less discriminated against in the labour market. Research has shown that people with a higher probability of being discriminated against in the labour market tend to remain at school in order to ease their entry to the labour market and avoid a difficult job search. Leslie and Drinkwater (1999) found for instance that in the UK, ethnic minorities with a higher probability of unemployment are encouraged to stay at school after completing their compulsory education. Cheung and Heath (2007) also explain the higher share of students among some ethnic minorities due to this phenomenon.

Another possible effect of the country of origin on an individual level is the internationalisation of higher education, in India or China for instance (see Unterreiner in Vol. 2 of this book). According to Waters (2005) 'overseas education' is a "key manifestation of symbolic or cultural capital assumed to embody significant international *value* in both business and professional spheres". Waters stresses that for Chinese students an overseas educational experience is "believed to indicate (in its bearer) fluency in the English language as well as less obvious qualities, such as confidence, sociability, cosmopolitanism and possession of valuable social capital" (Waters 2005: 363). As such educational strategies become embedded in the creation

and maintenance of transnational social networks which are seen as additional instruments to secure social mobility. As Bourdieu stated: 'The "interest" that an agent (or class of agents) brings to her "studies" […] depends not only on her current or anticipated academic success (by anticipated is meant her chances of success given her cultural capital), but also on the degree to which her social success depends upon her academic success' (Bourdieu 1996: 276). Waters (2005) emphasizes this explains the important success of overseas education for Chinese middle-class students, as a means to try and escape the fierce local competition and gain an additional advantage by pursuing education abroad. He also highlights that for some Chinese middle-class families it actually is cheaper to invest in a migratory project in order to invest in the future of their children and profit from educational facilities of receiving societies instead of trying to enroll their children in international schools and universities with high tuition fees and at high cost. Waters (2005) in this context highlights two particular profiles enacting transnational strategies: 'lone satellite children' (children or youngsters living alone abroad for schooling purposes) and 'astronaut families' (families abroad with one of the parents, often the man, returning to Asia to work and provide for the family after experiencing difficulty of socio-economic integration as migrants). Such migration strategies are deeply connected to the country of origin school system and lead to short-term residence at destination. Recent Chinese migrants living in the UK in the 2010s, for instance, currently have an average length of stay of 2 years. It is therefore difficult to see them becoming long-term migrants who will eventually integrate at destination (Unterreiner 2017).

Thus, country of origin effects are not presented as such in the literature. This can be explained by the interlacement of country of origin effects with individual characteristics, and by the huge impact of the destination society (meaning its institutions, policies and values) on the school performance of people with migrant backgrounds. However, we can still find some indirect mentions of this notion within the academic research on migrant education, which is also the case for direct impacts of country of origin policies.

The Impact of the Country of Origin

In the field of education, the countries of origin can impact their emigrants through the recognition of their foreign qualification at destination and through their diaspora policies enhancing the culture and language of the country of origin.

As Kanas and van Tubergen (2009) point out many immigrants in Europe come from developing countries and are often less educated than natives. The skills or degrees immigrants have acquired in their countries of origin are often less valued than skills or degrees obtained in the country of destination because they would be "of lower quality, difficult to transfer, or employers are more uncertain about these skills" (Kanas and van Tubergen 2009: 893). The recognition of qualifications acquired abroad has thus become a focus of attention for both the policy makers at destination and origin, and for researchers.

In order to assure better inclusion of adult emigrants in their countries of destination, origin countries might invest in equivalence (and recognition) of their scholarly programmes with international standards. On the European level the Bologna process is supposed to create this alignment within the EU. The Process gathers now 52 European and Central Asian countries committed to a common agenda for higher education.[3] Obviously the issue of readability and transferability of degrees is also a topic with a wider international relevance. Usually countries negotiate bilateral agreements on diploma equivalency and set in place processes for individuals to achieve them. Also, big immigrants countries, like the US, Canada and Australia rely on services of specialized agencies that process diplomas and certificates of incoming immigrants to assure their inclusion on the labour market or further education. Countries of origin have an interest in being able to attract their co-nationals who pursued further education abroad to come back to their country of origin, send remittances or invest in it through other means. They can adapt their educational systems to international standards to facilitate recognition of degrees and skills abroad – if only in terms of accountability and possibilities of evaluation -, but this does also entail some risk of facilitating brain drain. High level migration can, however, also bring benefits to origin societies, for instance through the importance of remittances. Countries of destination on their part have an interest in attracting a migrant population that has an added value in solving shortages on the labour market without having to invest too much in additional training. However, the qualifications acquired abroad are not easily converted at destination. As shown in the Immigrant Citizens Survey (Jacobs and Callier 2012) carried in a number of European cities[4] that migrants are often overqualified for the jobs they do and would benefit from recognition of foreign degrees and skills: quite some migrant talent is not used in an optimal manner. Even when foreign qualifications are officially recognised at destination, migrants experience difficulties with their value in the labour market (i.e. the case of *Aussiedler* in Germany, Konietzka and Kreyenfeld 2001). When acquired abroad, the qualifications carry less weight in the labour market than those obtained in the country of residence. Given this general conclusion, a country of origin effect seems to exist. First, depending on the bilateral agreements at stake, the qualifications of migrants from country of origin A are officially recognised, while this is not the case for migrants from country of origin B. Second, the similarity of school systems and historical ties can mean that some migrants' qualifications are more easily transferable. This was shown in the Dutch case for instance: migrants from the former Dutch colonies benefited more from the country of origin schooling than those coming from Turkey and Morocco (Kanas and van Tubergen 2009).

In some countries the presence of pupils with migrant backgrounds and their residential concentration has led to specific educational efforts targeted towards

[3] For more information, see: http://www.ehea.info/ Accessed 5 July 2016.

[4] This survey was conducted in Belgium (Antwerp, Liège and Brussels), France (Lyon and Paris), Germany (Berlin and Stuttgart), Hungary (Budapest), Italy (Milan and Naples), Portugal (Faro, Lisbon and Setubal) and Spain (Barcelona and Madrid). For more information: http://www.immigrantsurvey.org/index.html. Accessed 5 July 2016.

these children. According to the EURYDICE report (2009) around twenty European countries have issued regulations or recommendations on school-based provision for mother tongue tuition for immigrant pupils. Sweden and Netherlands were among the pioneering countries. As explained by Cabau-Lampa (2000) Sweden introduced programs of teaching in the 'own language and culture' of migrant children in 1977, partly in continuity of diversity policies oriented towards the Sami and Finnish minority groups. In 2000 it concerns about 12% of the student population, but with important variation between municipalities. The most taught languages are Arabic, Finnish, Serbian, Spanish and Iranian. In the early nineties the program underwent important budgetary cuts. In the Netherlands there were programs for 'onderwijs in eigen taal en cultuur' (OETC) (education in own language and culture), in 1995 transformed into 'onderwijs in allochtone levende talen' (OALT) (education in allochtonous living languages). Since 2000, the OALT system has gradually been cut down by local governments who are responsible for implementation and has in 2004 been almost completely abolished by the central government.

As highlighted in the EURYDICE (2009) report, in Latvia, minority language programs, including the option to attend schools where the mother tongue is the language of instruction, developed for national ethnic minorities (Estonian, Lithuanian, Polish, Belorussian, Jewish, Romany and Russian) also apply to immigrant groups. The situation is similar in Lithuania, with Polish, Belorussian and Russian being the most important languages for which there is a program in place for ethnic minorities which can also be beneficial to immigrant pupils.

Development of this special education in the 'language and culture of the country of origin' has often also been done in cooperation with origin countries. A number of countries have arranged for provision of tuition of immigrant pupils under bilateral agreements concluded between the country of destination and the countries from which the main immigrant communities present in the country originate (EURYDICE 2009: 21). As the EURYDICE report states, in Poland, Slovenia and Liechtenstein mother tongue classes for immigrant pupils are financed by embassies, consuls or cultural associations of the country of origin of pupils. According to the same report, in France, Germany, Luxembourg, the French and Flemish communities of Belgium and in Spain, activities covering language and culture of origin teaching at the pre-primary level are organized under bilateral agreements. The comprehensive EURYDICE report gives a good overview of bilateral agreements. The French Community of Belgium has a bilateral agreement on mother tongue tuition for immigrant pupils with Greece, Italy, Morocco, Portugal and Turkey. The Flemish Community of Belgium has agreements with Greece, Italy, Morocco, Spain and Turkey. Germany has bilateral agreements with Croatia, Greece, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Spain and Turkey. Spain has bilateral agreements with Morocco and Portugal. France has bilateral agreements with Algeria, Croatia, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Serbia, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey. Luxembourg has a bilateral agreement with Portugal. Slovenia has bilateral agreements with Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Germany, Montenegro, Russia and Serbia.

Such bilateral agreements are of tremendous importance to the countries of origin actively trying to enhance a national sense of belonging among their diaspora.

On an official Turkish website[5] for instance, we can read the following statement about education and Turkish mother tongue courses:

> In order to ensure active participation, it is of vital importance to provide equal opportunity for the immigrants' children to learn their mother-tongue as well as culture and history.

In this context, the opportunity for the Turkish community to learn their mother tongue is an issue closely followed by Turkish Government. Turkish citizens who are bilingual and have the opportunity to preserve their own identity would be a more equipped individual in today's globalized world and would contribute to further bilateral relations between Turkey and the host countries.

To this end, Turkey has been appointing, in cooperation with host countries, teachers for Turkish language and culture. Currently 1.618 Turkish language teachers, 112 Turkish language lecturers are posted to the countries where the members of the Turkish community live. Our missions are working in close cooperation with the parents' associations with a view to increase the number of teachers, to enable locally employed teachers of Turkish origin to participate in in-service trainings in Turkey and to increase the number of teachers of Turkish origin at pre-schools".

Obviously, social and ethnic school segregation at destination is something actors from origin countries have little impact on. However, in parallel with the official recognition of country of origin qualifications and the teaching of the language and culture of origin within schools run by the destination countries, the countries of origin may focus on alternative strategies if they feel that the educational opportunities offered in the society of destination are insufficient. One of these can be to create or subsidize diaspora schools. There has been only limited scholarly attempts to investigate to what extent governments of origin countries or non-governmental actors from origin countries monitor the educational achievement of their diaspora abroad and what kind of strategies they develop to counter problems. A case in point is the creation of diaspora schools in Western-European countries as the Netherlands and Belgium by a part of the Turkish community inspired by the teachings of Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen, known as the *Hizmet* ("Service") movement. A transnational alliance of businessmen and intellectuals, sharing a similar set of societal and religious convictions in accordance with the *Hizmet* philosophy (Agai 2002), have had the explicit aim to create and finance (elite type) schools for Turkish origin children whom they consider not being well catered for by the receiving societies (Polat 2012; Aydin and Lafer 2012; Mehmeti 2012). The *Hizmet* movement, which created a string of educational institutions throughout homeland Turkey and Central Asia, also developed a number of charter schools in the US. These charter schools, in contrast to the situation in Europe, do not really cater to a Turkish student population, but rather seem to function as gateway to the United States for Turkish teachers. While at first, the *Hizmet* movement was an ally of the AK-party of current Turkish president Erdogan, it has in 2015 fallen from grace and is being actively prosecuted by the Turkish government in

[5] http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-expatriate-turkish-citizens.en.mfa. Accessed 2 November 2013.

2016. It will hence remain to be seen whether they will be able to maintain their educational agenda both inside Turkey as abroad.

All these topics have to our knowledge until now received limited scholarly attention. It could be claimed this is not totally surprising as the country of origin effect and the impact of policies of origin countries on the educational attainment of migrants and their descendants is not only difficult to study, but also is far less important as an explanatory factor than educational policies of countries of destination or socio-demographic profiles of migrant groups. This being said, it is obviously not illegitimate to systematically study the effects and impacts of country of origin for the educational attainment of migrants and their descendants.

Conclusions or the Way Forward

Migrants in the EU in general have lower educational attainment levels than natives. Most research for legitimate reasons focus on socio-demographic factors, segregation patterns and other school system characteristics to explain this attainment gap. The focus in this kind of research is hence clearly on the country of destination. One can, in addition, also study country of origin effects/impacts. This is a relatively new approach, as most research has been focusing on assessing migrant educational achievement and explaining outcome differences with the non-migrant population in countries of destination, with little importance given to country of origin.

Access to education is as good as universally guaranteed for migrant children across the European Union, the real issue at stake is whether people of migrant backgrounds have access to good education catering for their specific needs. One of the main challenges is that social and ethnic school segregation often limits this access to good education in which sufficient opportunities are given to them to discover and develop their talents.

This does not mean there is no transnational dimension to the educational integration of migrants and their descendants. The countries of origin can have some stakes and input in the process. As seen above, several countries have bilateral agreements on teaching in the language and culture of origin of migrants and on the recognition of their foreign qualifications. If these policies have a direct impact on the level of education and knowledge of the diaspora, the countries of origin also influence their emigrants and their descendants indirectly. Both of these country of origin impacts and effects need to be at the heart of future research on migrant education. One should, however, surely take care that a shift of focus to potential country of origin effects/impacts does not lead to a culturalist bias in interpreting the performance gap between migrant and non-migrant children which is to be observed in several countries. Furthermore, there is the risk that country of origin effects/impacts might be used as an excuse for not taking at heart the challenge in destination countries to cater for migrant pupils. In the worst case scenario, it could even boil down to ‘blaming the victims’ of an incapacity of the educational systems of destination societies to fully take the responsibility of their minority (migrant origin) pupils.

That said, all the above issues when studied must keep track of four important distinctions in the research design. We should first of all distinguish whether we are focussing on adult migrants or on migrant children. Migrant children will attend a significant proportion of their educational trajectory in the destination country and either have acquired some schooling in the country of origin or did all their formal schooling in the country of destination. In the case of migrant children, we should hence also take into account generation and age of migration. Some children will not have undertaken a migration during their life course themselves but are highly influenced by the migrant status of their parents in their quest for integration in their society. Children that did undertake a migration themselves, did so in the framework of family reunification or as a family member – with the exception of unaccompanied minors – and here the age of migration (and the number of years of schooling in origin and destination countries) is of particular importance.

A second analytical distinction to be made concerns the scope of transnational actions. A transnational analytical framework, as Erel (2012) describes it, "makes a case for researching migrants as participants in two societies, within a globalizing system, focusing on migrants' social relationships and positionings as 'fluid and dynamic' (Glick Schiller et al. 1992)". Actors from origin countries may opt to try and influence destination countries actors to put into place inclusive educational systems for migrant children. In such a case the final responsibility remains in the hands of actors at destination. This kind of action is not really transnational in scope. Or they might attempt to provide themselves educational support to people of migrant backgrounds in the diaspora. In this case we can speak about a transnational educational network. With regard to origin country actors trying to promote themselves access to education adapted to the needs of the diaspora, we should distinguish high level international mobility of expats (and the creation of international schools) on the one hand and diaspora efforts of creating their own educational infrastructure in destination countries with help of country of origin actors on the other hand. Indeed, there is quite a difference between the possibilities to providing access to good education for richer expat children, by means of (often) expensive and good quality international (private) schools or private tutoring, and the possibilities to assure better educational inclusion for migrant children in less socio-economically privileged positions. Diaspora groups may wish to organize their own schools, either to ensure specific cultural or religious education (i.e. Jewish schools), keep links with the host society or because migrant (sub)groups wish to strengthen their human capital and are disappointed by the 'regular' offer (i.e. Turkish schools of *Hizmet* movement).

A third analytical distinction to be made concerns the type of mobilising actor: state or non-state. Different kinds of actors can be analytically distinguished in which we can move gradually from the micro to the macro level: family members, transnational social networks, religious, political or socio-cultural organisations, government actors and international political venues. With regard to country of origin actors trying to influence destination country actors we should foremost distinguish diplomatic and state centred endeavours (bilateral talks, international agreements, etc.) on the one hand and non-state actors (NGOs, religious communities, media) trying to

influence actors in other countries on the other hand. An important aspect for state centered endeavours is the existence of the European Council Convention on the protection of regional and national languages (1995), even though in the European context it does not always have consequences for people of third country national background. It should focus on initiatives by state actors in states at origin and investigate their prevalence. However, one should not exclude non-state actors a priori, especially as NGOs and religious organizations can play an important role in setting up, financing and organizing diaspora schools, thus creating a transnational educational field. This kind of study has been done within the INTERACT project, through its survey of non-state actors (see volume of Di Bartolomeo et al. 2017). The pilot study showed a limited engagement of the non-state actors in the development of actual education curricula at destination. However, considering the limitations of the survey conducted (Salamońska and Unterreiner 2017), a survey with a narrower focus could reveal more nuanced picture.

A fourth analytical distinction to be made is to what extent migration was undertaken for the deliberate purpose of enhancing educational capital of individuals (or not?). A special case is the international market for (higher) education (Sze Yin Ho and Sok Foon 2012), where children and youngsters of the elite of developing countries are sent away to pursue top (higher) education abroad. It should be noted in this context that the increased interest by Asian – notably Chinese – students for western education – seen as an instrument to secure access to 'top jobs' (Waters 2005) – and the need to have some benchmarks for decision making, has contributed to the international ranking systems for higher education institutions (Dehon et al. 2009). All in all, we see this emerging research agenda on migrant education as a fruitful undertaking that needs to be treated with care.

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Chapter 4
Language Acquisition and Cultural Integration

Alexandra Filhon

Introduction

The traditional model of integration advocates an ethnocentric universalism whereby the behaviour of migrants is seen as lacking (Sayad 1999). While migrants do not renounce the cultural appurtenances of their country of origin, they no longer live on the margins of society, locked in an imagined culture. Although largely used at scientific level, the concept of integration is often related to political ideologies that mask the complexity of social interactions. This vision of cultural unity is above all a political ambition. The idea that a dominant cultural model exists in Europe and prevails over all others results from a form of cultural imperialism (Hajjat 2005). Linguistic imperialism (Phillipson 1992) in particular refers to the propagation of a language such as English or French in the old colonised countries and more recently in many European countries, where the language in question (mainly English) has become obligatory in academia.

Our objective here is to question the upholding of the languages of migrants in a context other than the origin country. The "native" or "first" languages of people having experienced international mobility will be distinguished from languages known as "European". The first group relates to the dialects in which individuals were socialised before migration, while the seconds refers to the official languages of the destination countries.

Migrants are part of several social and cultural universes, to which they refer, belong and identify. Their country of birth and their native language(s) constitute their "reference group" (an expression introduced by Hyman), meaning that their

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childhood learning and primary socialisation contribute to shaping their perception of social reality. How does this link evolve after migration? According to Avanza and Laferté (2005), belonging to a community involves participating in the activities of the country. In the case of migrants, does it entail identification with the origin country or a real belonging? In this chapter we show to what extent the origin language fosters the link with the country left behind, and the initiatives implemented by countries to favour the continued use of the mother tongue. Do origin countries seek to maintain control over migrants through economic and social support measures in host countries? In that case, can we talk about a trans-border state? We also seek to determine whether these countries prepare their populations for migration by facilitating the learning of European languages. Are the linguistic policies implemented having a positive impact?

Meanwhile, the host country represents the "participation group" (Bastide 1970). The maintaining of several cultural universes is not necessarily a source of conflict in European countries, but it is not always valued. The key here is understanding which linguistic "baggage" helps migrants to integrate. All migrants are not equal, depending on their origin country, and neither are their native languages. What kind of impact or effect does the origin country have on the relationship to languages? Migrants manage these forms of belonging in line with the origin and destination country, their degree of social participation and, in particular, the pressures and constraints weighing on them. In this respect, it is important to examine whether the actions taken in the departure and arrival countries are convergent or, often, contradictory. Continuing to use one or more languages other than the language of the destination country is not a disavowal of the country, while transmitting this cultural baggage from one generation to the next serves to sustain the connection with the origin country.

When focusing on the acculturation of migrants in the host country and the place made for their native language, the political integration model should be taken into account. The three most prevalent models are assimilation, multiculturalism and communitarianism. Although reality is largely multicultural in most big cities in Europe, cultural diversity is often denied and it is frequently forgotten that integration is not simply about incorporating migrants into a fossilised, static nation failing to benefit from these migratory currents. In this sense, integration is not a one-way but a two-way process. A society cannot be referred to as integrated according to the degree to which a group has been included by being melted in a mould. It is by adopting this way of thinking that many European institutions have transformed the "right" to integration into an "obligation" or "will" to integrate.

As such, when examining the linguistic abilities of migrants and how those abilities are likely to influence their process of integration in the new society, we will not adopt a linear point of view. It is rather a question of understanding the comings and goings between native languages and European languages learned by people born outside the European Union. The main objective is to determine the players and actions from the origin country that support, or fail to support, the integration of these migrants outside their country of birth. We also analyse the possible tensions between origin and destination countries. What is the place of the language of the destination country in the origin country? How is this language perceived in the country of birth and how is the native language perceived in the host country? In

which contexts are these languages practiced? And how can native languages gain more social value?

The main difficulty of our subject matter stems from the diversity of possible configurations owing to the plurality of the origin and destination countries and also to the scope of the languages concerned. Consequently, our aim here is not to exhaustively address all the possible situations but to present a few typical situations.

Demo-Linguistic Data Thin on the Ground

National quantitative data mentioning the languages spoken by individuals are rare, and where they do exist are sometimes censured because they are considered to be too politically sensitive. In Belgium for example, such data resulting from the population census have been prohibited since 1961 so as to not create tensions between linguistic communities. Looking beyond this political dimension, describing the linguistic landscape of each country is difficult because measurement is complicated. The ideal thing would be to define the contours of a language, but this is not an easy task. In countries where linguistic data exist (including in Switzerland, England and Austria), they concern either the languages spoken at home or the languages written, and sometimes merely the official languages, which complicates the possible comparisons thereafter. Data, then, are seldom available, and when they are, they provide only a vague focus. For example, a national survey carried out in France in 1999 parallel to the population census revealed nearly 400 different language varieties on the territory (Héran et al. 2002).

In addition to this quantitative information, the analysis presented in this text results primarily from sociolinguistic research based on discussions with institutional players (teachers, institution heads, administrative staff), parents and children, as well as on ethnographic observations (of classes for example) and on official language policy texts. We also drew on national and international reports sent to the Council of Europe as well as to the European Parliament. Lastly, we referred to legal texts, circulars in particular, and once again both national and European.

As a result, this text mainly concerns second-hand information. However, while this research relates to a broad range of countries, a case study resulting from research based on interviews conducted by the author in the early 2000s with Arabic-speaking and Berber-speaking migrants will be presented in the last part.

World Linguistic Landscape: Monolingualism vs. Multilingualism

There are 6000–7000 languages in the world. All of them are continuously evolving, some disappearing and others appearing. They are unevenly distributed, most of them being used by a very small portion of the population and some of them

being spoken by the large majority of the world population. These last include Mandarin, English, Spanish, Arabic and Hindi, which are international languages. This hegemony leads to a hierarchy of languages based on but not limited to the number of speakers. Further criteria are at play, contributing to the value of each language, one of them being the context, i.e., the place of enunciation. Let it be noted from the start, then, that all languages are not socially equal.

In Europe, and more particularly in Western Europe, monolingualism has been advocated since the seventeenth century, the idea being that the use of a common language is the only means of generating a feeling of nationhood and that the nation is upheld through the virtue of a single language. State monolingualism reigns in almost all the countries of Europe, with a single national language supplanting all others. It is in this geopolitical space that the monolingual ideal is the most developed and where it "tends to associate a same territory, only one politico-administrative organisation and a single language. The French State is the concretisation of this ideal of State-Nation" (Boyer 2010, p. 71). The rapid implementation of this ideal was illustrated recently in the countries of ex-Yugoslavia.

But monolingualism is far from being in a majority. Thousands of languages exist worldwide, some of them existing in hundreds of varieties in the same country, as is the case in Cameroon, for example. There is less such diversity in Europe, which is estimated to account for just 3% of world language variety. Nearly one-third of the world's 6000 spoken languages are spoken in Africa and Asia, and more than 15% of all dialects are located in America and Oceania (Juaristi et al. 2008).

Regional languages and the languages of immigration have, however, been firmly rooted in Europe for a long time. The situation recently led to the introduction of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (Woehrling 2005), aimed at the institutional recognition of the languages that have long been present in European countries. While the sense of nationhood in most European countries is conveyed by the legitimate language associated with that feeling, and consequently the indivisibility of the nation is expressed by the use of a single and socially developed language, State monolingualism does not mean that only a single language is spoken on the territory.

Plurilingualism, a Socially Marked Practice

The Social Hierarchy of Languages

To understand the trend in languages of immigration in Europe, to determine whether their continued use supports or fails to support integration, and to identify the main players involved, we first need to clarify how the dialects are positioned relevant to each other.

First of all, the concepts of "language", "dialect" and "patois" are terms defined by linguists and sociolinguists that do not always have the same meaning in the

common language. One would tend to rank them in descending order from "language" to "dialect" to "patois", but objectively speaking that is not the case. The distinction between a standardized "official language" and other "dialects" and "patois" is not about value. For example, the rise of State monolingualism in European countries involved a devaluing of the other "languages", i.e. "dialects" and "patois" (Lodge 1993, p. 5). Yet these last are also "languages" through their status as an exclusive instrument of communication. Rather than referring to a specific community of individuals who refer to them exclusively, the choice is determined mainly by social use, hinging on membership to a group, the situation of the interaction and issues of dominance (Fishman 1965).

Consequently, "languages" can be said to differ mainly according to the space they occupy, their social and political status. Each language has a value on the "linguistic market" and so all languages other than the national language are not equal. "The construction of a linguistic market creates conditions of an objective competition in and by which legitimate competence can function like linguistic capital producing, at the time of each social exchange, a distinctive advantage…" (Bourdieu 1991, p. 54).

This is why, within various geopolitical spaces, languages stand as strategic instruments making it possible to establish a hierarchy among the speakers. Such an approach denotes an essentialisation of the language that results in a denial of the "constitutive heterogeneity" of the language and the compartmentalisation of societies and cultures along determinist lines (Canut and Duchêne 2011, p. 6). In Ce que parler veut dire (Bourdieu 1982) (translated as Language and Symbolic Power), Bourdieu showed how "communication reports […] are reports of symbolic power where the power struggles between the speakers or their respective groups are updated" (Bourdieu 1991, p. 14). The origin country thus has a clear effect on the construction of relationships of dominance between speakers. This exogenous effect is related, as explained by Sayad (2014), to the diachronic aspect of societies, namely their cultural, economic, political and social history. To that can be added a synchronic dimension relating to political and cultural actions and the resulting effects in terms of individual skills, such as one's level of education, ability to read and write several languages, openness to the media, and capacity for international dialogue. Knowledge of the national language is a major asset in many spheres of public life. For some families, learning that language and using it in the family sphere constitute an investment aimed at social mobility.

Legitimate Language: An Advantage for Migrants?

The work of economists (Grin 1996; Grenier 2000; Chiswick 1992; Borjas 1999) in the United States and Canada based on population censuses has served to assess the language knowledge of respondents by asking them questions on their language skills. Socio-economic analysis based on these data has established that language can be regarded as a form of human capital. In this respect, knowledge of a language

(but not just any language) can prove profitable on the job market. Borjas (1999), for example, explains that it is an economic advantage for immigrants to have English skills because it brings them access to employment within their membership group and also outside of that group. Bilingual immigrants are revealed to have better salaries than those who are not bilingual. The author deplores that in 1990 a full 37% of the immigrants having lived in the United States for ten years said they did not have "very good" control of English. He also wonders about the meagre investment in English language learning on the part of some immigrants given the "profit" of such an investment. Gilles Grenier (2000) partly confirms these results in his study conducted in Quebec and Ontario. He also notes that men speaking a language other than English or French in a family have lower incomes, while the language spoken in the household by women does not seem to have an incidence on their incomes.

These economic analyses shed light on the benefit offered by proficiency in the destination country language on the job market and in particular the possibilities it offers to widen opportunities of gaining employment and obtaining a higher income. In this respect, language policies implemented by origin countries in favour of plurilingualism can have a positive impact on the economic integration of migrants.

However, an individual's professional situation and linguistic practice are not to be considered unilaterally, as the second determines the first. The spoken language and professional activity are in interaction (Filhon 2009). By learning the language of the host country, a person will be more likely to take up a job, but conversely, it is by taking up a job that a person can learn how to speak or better speak that language. Considering the learning of a language as a simple personal "investment" is to deny the crucial role of interactions and see bilingualism solely as the result of individual will.

Whatever the language in question, a person conversing in two mutually incomprehensible linguistic forms is considered as bilingual. "Active" bilingualism, which consists in speaking two languages, is distinguished from "passive" bilingualism, where the practice of one of the two languages is not effective and limited to comprehension. Generally speaking, the practice and/or comprehension of at least two linguistic varieties is called multilingualism. For example, in many Turkish migrant families in Germany, parents spontaneously address their children in Turkish or Kurdish. The children understand this language but answer in German, the language in which they are socialised outside the family sphere. Thus, parents and children do not use the same speech but understand the language of the other as they are accustomed to hearing it. This process of the progressive comprehension then activation of bilingualism is clearly a sign of integration.

On this point, the work of Cummins (2000) reveals that it is advantageous for the child or adult migrant to improve the mastery of their native language in order to then facilitate the learning of the language of the host country. He makes a distinction between additive bilingualism, in which a second language is learned while developing and improving the first, and subtractive bilingualism, in which the national language is learned to the detriment of the native language. In previous research, Cummins (1994) already demonstrated that learners in a context of additive bilingualism succeed more than those whose language and culture is undermined by

school or society in general. The difficulty of learning a second language also depends on the individual's mother tongue. The relative easiness or difficulty of learning the second language is affected by the geographical distance between the departure and arrival countries and by the closeness of the graphic and grammatical systems of the two languages:

> In terms of motivation, the Q-value of L1, i.e. the native language, and the geographical distance between the origin and receiving contexts are of particular importance; in the context of access to the second language, both previous contact to the L2 in the country of origin, including media contact and language instruction in L2, and, in view of transnational mobility, geographical distance, which hampers L1 access, play an important role. The linguistic distance between L1 and L2 and the cultural distance between the contexts affect the efficiency of language learning and also the costs of L2 acquisition. (Esser 2006, p. 36).

There is no doubt that teaching a second language in the origin country has positive consequences on the social integration of migrants in the destination country. Based on several investigations made at different times in Australia, the USA, Israel, Canada and Germany, Halmut Esser showed that in each of these countries the acquisition of an official language depended above all on the duration of settlement and the degree of education, rather than on the age at migration or the territorial concentration of migrant populations. Here once again we see the endogenous effect of the origin country in terms of the level of education, even though this aspect in itself is not sufficient to understand the relationship with the departure and arrival languages of migrants.

Ultimately, bilingualism or multilingualism is an asset in the process of social integration from the standpoint of identity and economics. But countries do not necessarily perceive this capital as a social resource.

Bilingualism, a Social Resource?

State monolingualism, then, exists in the great majority of the European countries. But recently these countries have encouraged a certain degree of multilingualism with the increasingly early learning of several foreign languages at school and the need to speak international languages such as German, English or Spanish at work. Only five countries in Europe have more than one official national language: Belgium, Finland, Switzerland, Ireland and Luxembourg. In these last three, official multilingualism reflects the intention to promote undervalued languages, respectively Romansh, Gaelic and Luxemburgish, which symbolise the national identity of the countries. But on an unofficial basis, daily practice remains monolingual, with English having largely supplanted Gaelic in Ireland and Finnish now being spoken much more than Swedish in Finland (Baggioni 1997). Even in Belgium and Switzerland there is a territorialised monolingualism which is often a source of conflicts between linguistic communities.

While some multilingual practices constitute a resource to be developed socially, the tradition of integration in several European countries expressly invites migrants to give up their native languages for the exclusive use of the legitimate language. In these cases, the multilingualism of migrants is perceived as a threat to national unity. In his analysis, Haque (2011) says that the conflict between immigrant and official language policies takes three forms: a flagrant conflict, as in France or Germany, where the official language dominates at all levels; a latent conflict, as in Sweden, Norway or Finland, where immigrant languages are recognized by some institutions; and a minimal conflict, where the home languages are not considered as a threat. These three forms of conflict are often associated with contradictory language policies between the origin and destination countries. In the first case, then, cultural assimilation hinges on linguistic assimilation, i.e. by renouncing one's native language.

Examining the acquisition of the German language by migrants, Hartmut Esser (2006) draws a direct link between "the mechanisms, social conditions and consequences of the acquisition of the host society's language and the retention or loss of the language of origin. (…) Acquisition and language retention are understood here as the outcome of the interaction of 'immigrant' activities or learning, on the one hand, and certain social conditions, on the other. Learning of a new language depends on four basic factors: motivation (e.g. the prospect of increased income), access (e.g., opportunities for contact or availability of courses), skills (e.g., general intelligence or particular ability to learn languages) and the costs associated with learning (e.g., time involved, pressure to assimilate)." (p. 3).

Bilingualism related to immigration is thus not necessarily perceived as an asset. It is even sometimes regarded as an additional "source of difficulties" (Roselli 1997, p. 12), in particular for the most socially deprived populations. The social utility of languages of origin is not recognised right from the start in the home country, as demonstrated by the Bénisti pre-report drafted in France in 2004 by the Prevention Committee of the Parliamentary Task Force on Internal Security in which the multilingualism of foreign parents is considered as pathogenic and a source of cognitive disorders. A connection is even made between this multilingualism and the delinquency of the children. In much the same sense, a recent investigation showed that "the conception of the bi/multilingual pupil is positive only if the languages are taught/offered by the school (seldom if they are practiced outside, in the family for example) and if the pupil has good academic performances" (Auger 2009, p. 45). The maintenance of a source language appears to be seen as a hindrance to learning the language of the home country. Sociolinguists however have showed that bilingualism facilitates the acquisition of a new language and increases memory capacities.

There is no single form of bilingual education in Europe. In some countries and regions bilingualism is seen as a transition, implying that the native language of migrants is bound gradually to disappear. In others, an emphasis is placed on maintaining this bilingualism, either by making sure that there is no loss and that the language continues to be spoken in the family, or by seeking to improve the skill (Baker 2011).

In their project on the place of minority languages in Europe, Guus Extra and Durk Gorter (2001) showed that most European countries favour regional languages over immigration languages, particularly at school. Generally speaking, two main approaches are adopted depending on the country: either a multicultural perspective, which involves national policies advocating all kinds of multilingualism as a resource (and not necessarily economic) to be developed; or conversely, an assimilationist perspective, which supposes that the languages of immigration are a handicap because they potentially harm learning, the use of the European language and the acceptance of a new cultural identity nurtured partly by the language. Such variations in linguistic policy are found not only between countries but also within the same country, as in Germany for example, where approaches vary according to Länder.

Given the language ideologies used in Europe to promote the use of a single common language – a symbol of social cohesion – the multilingualism of migrants remains little accepted in most countries. Effective multilingual policies need to be understood and supported by social players, and in particular by teachers. Today only a few languages are promoted by the educational system. The languages used by immigrants at home are generally not considered as academic skills, i.e. as having worth in the school system or the job market. They are not legitimate at school because there are considered as a part of private culture (Smet 2011). In Western European countries, schools also have a certain amount of autonomy, and so social players negotiate language policies but do not necessarily apply them to the letter (Pulinx and Van Avermaet 2014).

> By marking specific home languages as illegitimate, entire groups of families are no longer considered as settings where legitimate linguistic competences can be acquired. Secondly, in the context of monolingual education ideologies, proficiency in the legitimate language is considered a condition for participation in education. This means that the legitimate linguistic capital has to be obtained before entering the field education. As a result, the same group of students and parents is excluded from education as a setting where valuable linguistic capital can be obtained. (Pulinx and Van Avermaet 2014, p. 12)

These ambiguous approaches to multilingualism are also at play in origin countries. Some languages may constitute considerable advantages for countries in terms of opening up to the outside world and participating in the global economy, standing as important resources for individuals on the job market. But the development of multilingualism remains complex in young nations in Africa and Eastern Europe that are still in the process of formation and now seeking to affirm their national identity while promoting above all a single official language.

Ultimately, bilingualism and bi-literacy are more often a means than an end in itself, used for assimilating migrants in the society; unifying a multilingual society; favouring the communication of a country with the outside world; entering the job market and allowing social mobility; safeguarding the religious and cultural identities of migrants; bringing linguistic and political communities closer together; fostering the use of a colonial language; and preserving the favoured position of an elite or, on the contrary, giving an equivalent legal status to two languages that in reality do not enjoy the same social recognition. Lastly, they are used to gain a deeper understanding and knowledge of a language and a culture.

Language Policies

Progressive Recognition of Multilingualism by the Council of Europe

Multilingualism has increasingly gained ground in Europe since the end of the twentieth century, but the languages of immigration are still little recognised and many negative perceptions persist. "The challenge to recognise multilingualism resulting from immigration as a wealth in itself and not as an obstacle or at best as a temporary means of integration, exists fully within the societies where speakers of languages of origin are second class citizens – when they are likely to be it – and excluded more or less permanently from the places of power." (Mc Andrew and Ciceri 2003, p. 191).

The gradual recognition of multilingualism was helped along in particular by two initiatives from the Council of Europe (Beacco and Cherkaoui Messin 2010):

– The proposal in the early 1990s of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages for signature by each European State. Taking into account the diversity of national configurations, the Charter comprises 98 articles, of which signatory countries must adopt at least 35.
– Following this partial recognition of undervalued languages, the Council of Europe's Language Policy Unit fostered the use of the word "multilingualism", particularly through the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages, set up in 2001 to develop and diversify the linguistic repository of each individual.

But looking beyond this political will, the primary texts (before translation) submitted by the European Commission (the principal generator of texts of all the institutions) provide an eloquent indicator of the real-life evolution of the approach to languages in Europe. In 1986, 58% of the texts were written in French, 26% in English, and 11% in German. In 1999, 35% were in French, 52% in English and 5% in German (Truchot 2001). It is reasonably safe to assume that the same trend was still strong at the beginning of twenty-first century. Despite an aspiration to develop multilingual practices, English is gradually gaining dominance, including in the institutions of the European Union.

Recent National Language Policies

The language policies rolled out in Europe have for decades been aimed at promoting economic development and cultural influence. These authoritative policies have often diverged considerably from social practices.

State monolingualism was imposed gradually through language policies corresponding to two levels of intervention in the management of languages (Boyer

2010). The first relates to the language itself and its standardisation for example; the second concerns the languages involved and their respective status. These policies may serve to protect certain languages, ousting other dialects or usage standards.

Three main approaches to the management of the co-presence of languages can be identified (Boyer 2008):

– A liberal approach that consists in accepting the domination of some languages over others, with thus the idea of a competition between languages and linguistic communities. State intervention here is not considered appropriate.
– The second approach promotes intervention but not only at national level. The aim of this political management of languages is "linguistic ecology" at all levels, from local to international.
– The third approach, also interventionist, is identity-based, promoting linguistic nationalism. It is particularly visible in the maintenance of the Catalan language in Spain, Hebrew in Israel and French in Quebec.

This last type of management emerges in particular during the constitution of a State. Regarding our focus here, i.e. to understand links with the origin countries of migrants, the countries in question are frequently former colonies that, when assuming independence, sought to dissociate themselves from colonising countries by imposing another national language while at the same time adopting the monolingualism model of European countries and applying it as brutally as in Europe. This linguistic imposition was implemented in Algeria, Guinea and India, for example. Meanwhile, some African countries chose to maintain the language of the coloniser as the official language. Such was the case in Angola, where Portuguese was considered as a "war trophy". When Angola, as well as Mozambique and Cap Vert, proclaimed independence, the new governments decided pragmatically that Portuguese would be favoured as the lingua franca and language of teaching. Contrary to other forms of nationalism, which took care to eradicate the language of the former colonists, these countries regarded this European language as a conquered language that had become their own. In Algeria for example, given the linguistic dispossession and imposition of French during colonization, the return to Arabic corresponded to a desire to break with cultural imperialism and forge a new national identity. In the 1970s this policy led to the closing of French high schools to Algerians. The population also hoped that the policy of Arabization would restore equal opportunities. Understanding the relationship with the languages of migrants hinges on this ambiguity, one that is extremely present in numerous countries of emigration and based on the desire to break with the colonial language, which at the same time remains the language of social advancement as used in upper-class and prestigious schools. The relationship with French in a number of French-speaking African countries remains complex to this day, and the French language, considered as elitist and difficult to access, is increasingly being abandoned in favour of English.

As mentioned earlier, language policies have recently been developed in a large number of European countries to strengthen the learning of the official language. In parallel, proficiency in the legitimate language of the host country has sometimes become a condition for entering the country or obtaining nationality. The relative

newness of these language policies can be attributed in part to the fact that for many years the governments in question were counting on the return of migrants to their origin country, and incentive policies were introduced to that end (Weil 2005). Similarly, and as explained by P. Weil, the fear both in France and the origin countries is that the elimination of illiteracy increases the political conscience of the population and thus their democratic claims.

Several European countries have in recent years deplored the scant knowledge on the part of migrants of the national language. As demonstrated by Nikola Tietze (2005), this is the case in Germany, where the migrant integration policy attaches great significance to the learning of German. Contrary to the 1970s and 1980s, when foreigners could not become nationals, the new laws on immigration in Germany and the 2000 code of nationality associate nationality more with citizenship and consider, more than before, a territorial definition of nationality based mainly on the right of the land. Thus, language in Germany is no longer solely considered as a cultural marker. It is also a social marker and German dialect should support equal opportunity.

Against this backdrop, the division of language policies of the Council of Europe has sought to measure national expectations regarding legitimate language proficiency. In 2007 and 2009, it conducted a survey to compare trends in linguistic national policies. The delegates of the European Committee for Migration, representing 44 Member States, responded to a questionnaire on the linguistic abilities expected in three situations: for entering the country (A), for residing permanently in the country (B) and for obtaining nationality (C). To review the language policies implemented in the countries, the survey included questions on the courses suggested, their content and duration, tests, and any penalties in the event of failure. Twenty-seven countries responded to the questionnaire in 2008 and 31 in 2010.

The initial findings (Extramiana and Van Avermaet 2010) reveal that the expectations of European countries as regards language knowledge vary according to the three situations suggested. In 2010 one European country in four required proficiency in the official language to enter the territory and more than seven out of ten required proficiency for the granting of permanent residence, while for more than nine out of ten language was a criterion for obtaining nationality (Table 4.1). The second significant result reveals that for each situation the expectations of the countries increased between the two dates, accompanied by an increase in the language training offer, from 62% in 2008 (training obligatory in six out of 13 countries) to 82% in 2010 (8 out of 19 countries).

Immigration is now subject to certain conditions, especially in Western Europe. Significant differences exist between the expectations of Western European countries and Eastern European countries. In Western Europe, more than four out of ten countries require knowledge of the language of the host country on the part of migrants entering the territory, compared with practically none in Eastern Europe. Western European countries are also more than twice as numerous to deliver a permanent residence permit on the basis of linguistic abilities. However, the acquisition of nationality is largely based on proficiency in the national language in Eastern and Western Europe alike.

Table 4.1 Countries which impose or do not impose knowledge of the language of the host country

Language knowledge compulsory in 23 states	Language knowledge not compulsory in 8 states (**=optional language classes)
1. Germany A, B, C	1. Belgium/Wallonia**
2. Armenia C	2. Cyprus
3. Austria B, C	3. Spain
4. Denmark A, B, C	4. Hungary**
5. Estonia B, C	5. Ireland**
6. Finland A (Russian Ingrians), B	6. Malta
7. France A, B, C	7. Serbia**
8. Greece B, C	8. Sweden**
9. Italy B, C??	
10. Lithuania B, C	
11. Liechtenstein A, B, C	
12. Luxembourg A, B, C	
13. Norway B, C	
14. Netherlands A, B, C	
15. Poland C (repatriation)	
16. Czech Republic B, C	
17. Slovak Republic C	
18. United Kingdom A, B, C	
19. San Marino	
20. Slovenia B, C	
21. Switzerland (cantons) C	
22. Turkey C	
23. Ukraine C	

Source: Extramiana and Van Avermaet (2010, p.11.)

As political discourses on immigration have toughened up and more demanding integration policies have been introduced in the last few years, language policies have been introduced, notably including tests of proficiency in the language of the host country.

In this respect, emphasis has been placed on the migration of students, which is strictly controlled by bodies such as Campus France. For origin countries, this selection process is often accepted and encouraged as it serves to train an elite and may limit the unemployment of young graduates. Where a transnational policy if favoured, both in the departure and arrival country, this form of migration is also seen as a way of growing their political and cultural influence. Some countries, including China, have substantially structured this cross-border policy by facilitating the entry and exit of their nationals while reminding them of the importance of "coming home to serve their country". Professional and student organizations have based themselves in countries of immigration and the number of Confucius institutes is on the rise in a number of countries (even though the underlying ideology is

sometimes criticized), fostering the learning of Mandarin and the Chinese culture (Liu 1998; Mazella 2014).

Linguistic Education

This recent trend is encouraging many European countries to implement language training courses, the duration of which varies sharply from one country to the next, as its compulsory nature, content and non-paying access. The training is often closely linked to a community project and thus relates to a special learner profile. Some migrant-related criteria are taken into account in the organization of the courses (though these are limited and so the courses are not particularly diversified):

– Taking account of academic baggage (including in Germany and Denmark)
– Increasing literacy or not (France, Luxembourg)
– Time spent in country (the Netherlands)
– The learning speed of the participants (the United Kingdom), which can lead to financial penalties.

But these criteria mainly address the length of the training courses, while educational approaches remain little varied.

One of the key questions involved in determining the place of the origin country in the maintenance of native languages as well as in the learning of European languages is to know which institutions play a significant role and what their potential actions are.

Linguistic Training for Potential Migrants in the Origin Country

In origin countries, the main institution is the school. School is indeed the main place where European languages are learned. It is also a decisive body insofar as the higher the level of studies, the easier it is for migrants to learn the language of the host country, even if they have not had the opportunity to receive an academic education in the host country. Moreover, the status-related value of language is partly related to the social image of the speakers and the label of the country. As a result, the higher the number of graduate migrants arriving in the destination country, the more their native language increases in the hierarchy of languages. This further supports the idea that the linguistic integration of migrants should be seen in the light of effects that are both endogenous and exogenous to the origin country.

In some countries of emigration, educational establishments do not yet have the sufficient backing to set up reforms to improve their structural capacity and the content of

the training (Adami 2007). Some territories also lack financial means. In formerly colonized countries, the language used in teaching is still an issue, with the language in question not that spoken by the majority of pupils. While the share of graduate migrants keeps increasing, the illiteracy rate in some countries of emigration remains relatively high, which makes learning a second language much more complicated. Indeed, it initially seems preferable to continue the learning of the first language, an educational process that in real life is seldom implemented after migration.

For students with secondary or higher education, the learning of a second language remains despite everything very partial. In particular, there is a big gap between linguistic expectations at primary and secondary level and expectations at higher level. For example, in Morocco the language used to communicate at university is mainly French, but most students are not adequately prepared to do so (except for a minority from the most favoured classes likely to speak French in the family sphere and to be enrolled in French schools). Pupils do take French courses starting from the third year of primary school, for a total of around 8 h a week, and continue to learn French in middle school and then at high school, with gradually fewer hours. But despite this substantial training, a major difference exists between university expectations and the benefits of secondary education (Belhaj and Lepez 2009).

The educational reforms under way in many countries have the disadvantage in Europe and elsewhere of not considering language teaching in terms of continuity. Moreover, an ineffective hourly over-investment can be observed, calling for a re-examination of teaching practices. Many sociolinguists now advocate communicative and action approaches based on real life experience. This approach involves developing language as an instrument of communication, thereby abandoning learning based on the translation of texts or the reading of traditional literary works. Several international resources to that end have been proposed since the end of 1990s, allowing for remote access. This is the case of the Cultura project (http://cultura.mit.edu), which makes it possible to learn a foreign language via intercultural exchanges and multi-media supports.

The actions implemented in Europe mainly concern the linguistic training of migrant adults, migrant children or the children of migrants.

The Training of Children in the Country of Arrival

A number of actors from origin countries also play a significant role in the process. The ELCO language and culture teaching programme is one such initiative, though the courses it offers are not dispensed in all European countries (Eurydice 2009). Most host countries have recommendations or regulations favouring teaching in the language of origin of the children. But some countries, including the UK and Portugal, consider that these courses should be conducted through private initiatives and not by the State. In contrast, in some rare countries such as Latvia or Lithuania, immigrant pupils can continue their schooling in their first language. Thus pupils coming from Poland, Estonia, Belarus and Russia can be provided education in one

of these languages. These language policies were implemented following the end of the Soviet empire, and while entirely bilingual lessons are proposed in primary education in Latvia, the final objective of the Latvian government is to gradually achieve linguistic assimilation and the exclusive use of Latvian.

The teaching of the parental language was also established with the objective of a possible return to the country of origin and in order to maintain contact with the members of that country, thereby helping people to not forget their origins. Today, in Europe as in the countries of emigration, the authorities are aware that the settling of these populations is final. Some countries favour above all the learning of the national language while others consider the native language as a potential transnational resource. Countries of departure do not always desire the return of migrants as these families represent a significant source of income from abroad. What is essential for these original homelands is that migrant populations do not lose sight of their origins and continue to visit and send funds to it.

Depending on the links established between the countries and the language policy of the host territory, language teaching is conducted either on the basis of bilateral agreements or with the host country taking full responsibility (Eurydice 2009). In the first case, the initiative often comes from the origin country, where the teachers come from and where they were trained. Teachers who give ELCO courses in these countries are selected by the national authorities even if they are then supervised by the authorities of the host country. These teachers, on temporary assignment, do not receive specific training on teaching migrant children or the children of migrants and some of them have found it difficult to find their place in the host education system. They are often isolated and insufficiently integrated in the teaching teams.

However, this assumption of responsibility by the consulates can lead to the perpetuation of discriminations, particularly with respect to populations that are disregarded and even discriminated against before their departure, such as Kurdish migrants. It is generally the national language that is proposed and financed in bilateral agreements, which complicates the bond between language and country of origin, the result being that the recognition of certain languages remains highly problematic in the context of migration.

ELCO training can be organized during school hours and thus replace other lessons. It can also be organized after class, in which case, depending on the country, the courses are given in school buildings or at an external facility. In the first case, the problem is that pupils do not benefit from the same lessons as their friends, and parents fear that the academic success of their children is at stake. The pupils may also be distanced from their peer group and consequently labelled as immigrant pupils or the pupils of migrants. In addition, ELCO courses take place during early learning, activities that are widely appreciated by pupils, which diminishes the appeal of ELCO classes. The problem in the second case is an increase in study time, leading to high rates of absenteeism. Moreover, according to a report on the integration of immigrants in Europe through schools and multilingual teaching, drafted in 2005 by Miguel Portas, courses given outside the school framework are a source of stigmatisation, a harmful consequence already outlined in the first case.

In several European countries, in addition to the objective of returning to the origin country, ELCO lessons were envisaged to remedy the learning difficulties of migrant children and the children of migrants. Gradually, however, many countries recognized the importance of empowering this teaching and making it possible for children to learn not only the official language of the country of departure but rather the native language of their parents. In the Netherlands, in addition to this teaching, one can also learn the language and culture of the country of origin thanks to religious schools, although these remain rare in the territory.

The expectations of the players involved are shifting in several European countries. Parents want their origins to be transmitted to their children, especially religious values. Schools and teaching teams often do not know much about ELCO teachers and their culture. Above all, they consider ELCO staff as mediators between the school and want them to be able to explain to families how the school system works, which requires that ELCO teachers to have full knowledge of this last. Lastly, ELCO teachers seek above all to initiate pupils in their culture(s) of origin without addressing religious dimensions. They are considerably isolated from the rest of the teaching team, in particular because they often work in several schools and have extensive administrative tasks. Their low recognition or their low involvement is also due to the fact that in most countries they do not receive the same remuneration as their colleagues (Obdeijn and de Ruiter 1998).

Ultimately, it appears that the place granted to languages of immigration and to players from the countries of departure is not always correlated with the proportion of migrants on the territory. Countries such as Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, which have long been territories of immigration, do not adopt the same strategies (Eurydice 2009). The first four countries have favoured bilateral agreements and today are trying to establish links between the teaching of languages of origin and foreign languages at school. In the Netherlands, languages of origin are now no longer taught, to the exclusive benefit of foreign languages taught to all pupils. The UK has never proposed ELCO teaching but is currently thinking about diversifying foreign language courses. Obviously, the diversification of migratory flows in these countries complicates the implementation of these courses. Are only international languages to be taught? Or those grouping a significant migrant community?

In addition to school learning, private initiatives are taken by embassies, diplomatic missions and other players, which cannot be considered here because they are too scattered and heterogeneous. Community schools are independent structures connected to origin countries that develop the native language to a greater extent and provide “immersive” teaching for the intensive – and sometimes practically exclusive – learning of the origin language. There are also institutes that combine linguistic teaching and the teaching of religious values. Indeed, in many countries, places of worship provide an opportunity to learn the native language. For example, in France, the Al-Ghazali Institute trains imams and teaches Arabic (http://www.institut-al-ghazali.fr/). It largely relies on course books imported from countries of origin and distributed by consulates.

The Training of Adults in Europe

The language of the host country unquestionably has a strong social value and is often necessary for entering the job market. But the connection between language learning and job access precludes a part of the population, particularly mothers, who do not have vocational plans and either do not know that they can benefit from linguistic training or are not motivated to do so. Indeed, when a linguistic community is largely established in a district or a city, migrants can easily find intermediaries and organizations who can help them in, for example, their administrative approaches, which lessens the need to learn the national language. Here the linguistic community and the community constitute "protective enclaves" which can become "captive spaces over the years" (Simon 1998, p. 438). In contrast, for more isolated women, their weak network and ignorance of the host country makes them unaware of organizations and linguistic training. It is important to encourage these women to learn, and as early on as possible, so that they can benefit from training as soon as they arrive, irrespective of their plans. Following up on their children's schooling is an important source of motivation in this respect, as the involvement of parents in the academic success of their children takes the form of regular discussions between teachers and families, which can initially require interpreters or the translation of rules of procedure. A majority of countries offer this opportunity. Helping children with their homework and forging bonds with the educational establishment strongly encourage mothers in particular to begin or continue learning the language of the host country.

Obviously, people exposed to the language of the country of arrival before migrating are more comfortable speaking the language and find it easier to continue learning it (Leconte 1997).

Migration towards Europe is diverse, so migrant adults have diverse needs. They fall into one of three main cases:

- Migrants who have been in Europe for some time, often elderly women from former European colonies, whose low level of education in their origin country makes it difficult for them to write, though they do have a certain oral knowledge of the language of the host country.
- More recent migrants, often male and female university graduates from Asia, who are well educated and thus read and write, having perfect command over writing of their language of origin but no knowledge of the language of the host country.
- Migrants who can hardly read or write or not at all and who do not know the language of the immigration country.

To these a fourth profile can be added that is increasingly coveted by host countries: migrants with high-level further education who require no language training. With international language mobility in English and to a lesser extent French, these candidates are becoming the standard in countries such as Canada.

This diversity of profiles poses a problem in the host countries in the type of training to be proposed and the educational approach to be adopted, as we saw ear-

lier. The diversity of languages poses a further problem. Teachers require some knowledge of the language of the migrant, which is not always possible. This often leads to the denial of the linguistic identity of the trainee, affecting the learning process and demotivating the migrant, who is not recognized socially. In this respect, starting in the 1970s Quebec supported the use of native languages in literacy-building courses proposed to migrants (Gsir et al. 2008).

To fill this void, some countries have developed a portfolio of languages[1] as an additional learning tool aimed at reinforcing intercultural competences and the autonomy of learners and which relies on the various experiences of each migrant.

Mother Tongue: A Strong Link with the Origin Country

Migrants maintain their mother tongue more easily if strong links are kept with the origin country. To better understand how migrants relate to language, I conducted research in Metropolitan France with families from North Africa (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). I was able to understand their motivation for learning French, as well as the degree of their desire to pass on their native language, Arabic or Berber, to their children (Filhon 2009).

The maintenance of Arabic and Berber languages to the next generation is explained first of all by the French language skills of the parents. Where they manage the French language easily, it becomes difficult for them not to use it with their children. Moreover, when one of the partners is not a native of Algeria, Morocco or Tunisia and was not socialized in Arabic or Berber, it is increasingly likely that the other partner will pass on these languages, with more than half of them saying that they use French exclusively when speaking with their sons and daughters. Also, while transmission is clearly about the person passing the language on, the process cannot be fully grasped without taking account of the receiver, namely the child. The use of Arabic or Berber by their parents always does not enable children socialized exclusively in French to activate this asset, in particular when it is transmitted in partnership with the French language. The majority of the children in question understand the parental language but do not speak it. This "passive" bilingualism can however evolve over time, depending on how often they return to the country of their parents, their close friends or the origins of their future partner.

The use of Arabic and Berber languages in the family sphere does not arise from a rational decision taken at a given moment by the parents to pass on or not pass on this asset. The issue is more a question of practice than strategy. But at various points in their lives (when their children start school, when they visit their origin country, and in discussions with colleagues), parents are often required to justify their linguistic practices.

The reasons for transmitting the parental language can be related to anticipations of the future of the children but above all they reflect an attachment to the past and

[1] http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/elp/default_fr.asp

the concern of keeping the family memory alive by maintaining the parental language along with other cultural practices and religious values. The Arabic language was sometimes described as a resource that can be used to professional ends by children and more broadly as an additional source of "wealth" that can be used when travelling. Again looking to the future, parents spoke Arabic or Berber with their children because they soon planned to leave France, believing they were temporarily settled there. Without necessarily considering a final return, seasonal visits allow the parents and the children to forge strong bonds with the rest of the family and constitute a motivation to transmit their native language. The family, then, plays a key role in maintaining the language of origin, particularly if it is a cross-border family. These regular returns during the summer give children the chance to absorb the Arabic or Berber language for a month or two. Communication between parents and children are the main source of initiation to the parental language, but extended presence in the country of origin of the parents is undoubtedly the second most important transmission channel. It serves to activate knowledge of the language, as the children find themselves in the presence of people who do not speak French and have to succeed in communicating with them. The frequency of these return visits is a significant factor in support of this learning. Identification with the origin country takes on a real sense of belonging if the individuals in question take the nationality of the country or are able to vote there – processes that are facilitated by some cross-border countries.

In the countries where they have settled, language is often used as a substitute for the territory and the loved ones left behind. Maintaining the native language, as well as other cultural aspects, is seen by migrants as a certain "linguistic loyalty" (Weinreich 1970, p. 65). That honesty is not necessarily a nationalist act but above all a duty to remember and a desire to not forget the place they come from. Obviously, the safeguarding of origins varies according to the country of emigration, the bonds preserved with it, and the existing past between the birth country and the host country.

Conclusion

The place, status and social recognition of languages in departure and arrival countries are related to national histories and understood relative to the room made for immigrants in each host country. The impact of policy varies in line with the measures proposed. It appears difficult here to determine a prevalent model (effect or impact) but endogenous and exogenous effects have undoubtedly been revealed. It is important that the schooling of young girls and boys continues in the countries of emigration because it is a decisive factor in supporting transnational mobility. It is also vital that host countries develop knowledge of migrants and their trajectories, helping them to become an integral and lasting part of the new country. Social recognition is without any doubt a crucial factor for integrating parents and children in society.

Through state transnationalism the integration of migrants can be envisioned with a sense of continuity, in which moving from one country to another is not nec-

essarily to be seen as a disruption. Different forms of transnationalism exist, however, some of them aimed at the return of origin-country citizens at some point and others in which the origin country seeks to safeguard links in a looser fashion and with a view to fostering international dialogue.

How to Increase the Positive Perception of Languages of Immigration?

Several suggestions can be made to further develop the languages of immigration. First of all, it is advisable not to limit the learning of these languages to migrants or the children of migrants from the countries in question. Regardless of the language of immigration, it should be proposed to all without distinction. This would limit the hierarchical structure between languages, some being regarded as minority or even useless compared with others, principally English. To propose the learning of all languages of immigration is to fully take into account the intercultural aspect, recognizing their socio-professional benefit and accepting that they all constitute sources of personal enrichment. These languages continue to be widely perceived as useless in Europe today because they are only taught to the children of immigration (Gsir 2006). In this respect, it is important that the diversity often seen in elementary schools continue at secondary and higher level. This is seldom the case in Europe, where minority languages are sometimes developed at the start of schooling but quickly replaced by "major" international languages starting in secondary school.

In some countries, including Canada, languages of immigration appear to be less socially devalued compared with most European countries. This difference is partly due to the fact that migrants are "selected" before their entry on the territory and thus socio-economic partitions between migrants and non-migrants are weak. My intention here is not to advocate customized immigration but to insist on the need to continue making education available to men and women in origin countries and the need in Europe to foster the social mobility of these migrants by improving access to training, including continuing education and evening courses in companies.

Which Multilingual Training?

The development of multilingualism learning, and at as young an age as possible, would be advisable in countries of origin. Before and after migration, action should be taken to improve teacher training and the quality of course books. The training of adults in migratory situations would be improved by taking account of their diverse profiles and projects. One way not to de-legitimize the origin language is to learn a new one, which once again requires further skills from teachers.

The teaching of origin languages also appears to be problematic where the younger generations are concerned. Rather than isolating populations by accentuating their differences, they should all, irrespective of their origin, be able to access multilingualism learning. But this is not necessarily what origin countries want, as it takes away their control over their nationals and their children. Countries of emigration could be called on to develop exchanges between school children and between countries. Twin town and sister city arrangements and language exchanges are currently limited to Europe, mainly for financial reasons. But looking beyond physical trips, such exchanges could be enhanced through the use of new remote communication technology. Cooperation projects in this area, as suggested by Miguel Siguan (2007), would make it possible to develop certain languages and cultures of immigration and would also strengthen the knowledge of European languages in origin countries, particularly in their communicative dimension. They would also be an opportunity to design international educational approaches to ensure more consistency between the departure and arrival countries.

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Chapter 5
Political and Civic Participation of Immigrants in Host Countries. An Interpretative Framework from the Perspective of the Origin Countries and Societies

Lorenzo Gabrielli, Sonia Gsir, and Ricard Zapata-Barrero

Introduction: The Role of Countries of Origin in Political and Civic Participation of Immigrants

The focus of this chapter is the role of origin countries in influencing immigrants' political and civic participation in their host societies. It is our aim to understand how these processes can affect immigrant integration in destination countries. More specifically, our objective is to explore the following questions: first, whether and how emigration countries can influence immigrants' political and civic participation in destination countries; and second, whether links between origin countries, civil societies and migrants have an impact on the political and civic participation of the latter in the receiving countries. We also propose to analyse origin countries' possible influence on political and civic participation through a very specific approach based on the identification of different actors intervening in these processes. In this framework, we distinguish between state and non-state (or civil society) actors and we look at how they can play a role in the political and civic participation of immigrants at destination. The rationale behind this differentiation is that these two categories of actors do not generally use the same tools, and often they may not share the same goals (Gabrielli and Zapata-Barrero 2015).

Following the main framework of this volume, the present chapter contributes to a deeper understanding of immigrants' political and civic participation by considering not only the host country framework but also that of the origin countries. We consider the political participation of migrants in a broad sense, which includes civic participa-

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tion. As both forms of participation constitute important dimensions of integration, they have to be considered jointly for several reasons which are outlined below.

The frontier between political and civic participation is, in conceptual terms, blurred, even if both political and civic participation have been distinguished by some scholars (e.g. Ekman and Amnå 2009). Moreover, analysing the existing definitions of political participation, Martiniello (2009) proposed a typology based on the agency of immigrants and their descendants, in which he clearly distinguished between participation in state politics and participation in non-state politics. Accordingly, *state political participation* includes electoral policy, parliamentary policy and consultative policy while *non-state political participation* embraces political party involvement, union politics, other pressure groups, ethnic and communitarian mobilisations, etc. This distinction is analytically useful even if sometimes state and non-state politics can and do overlap.

The political integration of immigrants has been assessed in terms of their ability to use a repertoire of political actions that can allow them to influence decision-making (Morales 2011). However, they can meet many obstacles when they wish to participate in conventional forms of political life in the destination countries, such as voting or running for elections, voting on referenda, becoming members of political parties, sitting on advisory councils or contributing to other arenas of political dialogue. Therefore, we consider it necessary not to restrict the analysis solely to these *conventional forms* of political participation. It seems necessary to also take into consideration the *non-conventional and extra-parliamentary forms* of migrants' political participation, such as protests, demonstrations, sit-ins, political strikes, hunger strikes, civil disobedience and boycotts.

Rather than engaging directly in the politics of the new country of residence, migrants can be involved in civic matters without even realizing that they are taking part in politics, for instance when they are active in parent-teacher associations (DeSipio 2011). It is therefore necessary to also consider immigrants' civic participation – in terms of their involvement in informal politics such as pressure groups and NGOs, and in organising lobbying activities – in the same framework. As Ekman and Amnå (2009: 291) explain, "[c]ivic engagement refers to activities by ordinary citizens that are intended to influence circumstances in society that are of relevance to others, outside their own family and circle of close friends". Here we address civic participation in the active dimension and more precisely, in the collective and public dimension. Civic participation concerns the way immigrants act as citizens, even though they may not have the nationality or citizenship of their new residence country and consequently cannot participate in formal politics (Ekman and Amnå 2009). Civic participation is considered the first form of politics among immigrants, and is also an opportunity for integration because immigrants can participate regardless of their status (DeSipio 2011). It concerns the inclusion of immigrants in the civic institutions of the receiving country and the way in which foreign citizens become an accepted part of society in civic terms. Civic integration thus means becoming a citizen of the receiving society, but not necessarily a full citizen with nationality and full political rights, which in turn leads to political integration.

What is important in our framework is that immigrants' participation at the political and civic level depends not only on the country of destination, and on the specific

characteristics of the migrant, but also on the country of origin. Currently it is widely recognised that immigrants' participation in politics or society depends to some extent on the context of the country of destination, immigration policy (borders and the accommodation of diversity) and the integration framework. In other words, the political participation of immigrants depends on changes in the political opportunity structure that arise from a specific host society. As Morales and Giugni (2011) point out, it is not only the political but also the discursive opportunity structure in receiving countries that is a decisive factor which permits the political inclusion of immigrants. More specifically, these authors refer to local policies towards immigrant associations, the openness of public authorities and formal institutions, the configuration of local power, general policies towards immigrants and the prevailing discourse on immigration and immigrants. With regard to destination, access to naturalisation gives foreigners the opportunity to vote and to stand for election, giving the same legal protection and political rights to immigrants as to nationals. Citizenship has been repeatedly identified as the primary measure of immigrants' integration in democratic societies. Once naturalised, citizens can further their political incorporation through voting. The vote is the pathway through which immigrant groups become political communities who can alter the political system through their elected representatives (Fennema and Tillie 1999). In fact, some authors point out that the vote is a better indicator of political incorporation than naturalisation (Simpson Bueker 2005). The idea that political participation is a clear indicator of integration can be applied to both 'conventional' and 'non-conventional' political participation.

Within the already existing literature on political and civic participation, the novelty of the interpretative framework that we propose here is its focus on the country of origin, and on the role it plays in fostering the "active immigrant" (Zapata-Barrero and Gropas 2012; see also Vogel 2007). We understand active immigrants to be immigrants who are not passive individuals, workers, or merely receivers of social services, but rather agents who can participate as citizens in the societies of both destination and origin countries.

In order to understand the role of origin countries, we identify the main driving factors behind the choices made by immigrants about whether and how to participate in the political and civic life of a country. And we use three concepts to grasp their influence. First, the **country-of-origin effect** refers to the political and civic capital that migrants have acquired in the country of origin, such as political and civic education and culture, but also refers to language, in which case the effect is endogenous. But the effect can be also exogenous when it refers to a set of beliefs about the political system of the country of origin, or in other words, the "country label". For instance, a migrant coming from a country labelled as a dictatorship could be perceived as lacking of democratic experience. Whether the migrant left a democratic system or a dictatorship may also influence the political and civic participation in the new residence country through both an **endogenous effect** (his/her agency as citizen) and an **exogenous effect** (the way the migrant is perceived). Secondly, through emigration and diaspora policies, countries of origin may also influence the civic and political participation of migrants in the host country. We call this factor the **country impact**; it assesses the influence of the country-of-origin

policies that target nationals abroad. Given the effects and impact of the country's actions beyond its physical borders, the country of origin can be conceptualized as a **trans-border state**. This state has three main characteristics: first, it has policies in place that are effectively building the nation (and a sense of belonging) beyond its physical borders (i.e. across them); second, it supports emigrants beyond its physical borders; and finally, it is represented by at least two levels of governance: the government and a civil society, both of which work across borders.

To analyse the 'country-of-origin effect', we consider the main methodological approaches to researching political participation at the micro level – where the term is used, even if only in a marginal way. These approaches allow us to identify the extent to which the countries and societies of origin influence migrants' political and civic capital.

To understand the 'country impact', which is a new concept in the field, we are obliged to enlarge the focus of our literature review and to consider other fields of the literature on migrants' political participation vis-a-vis origin countries, namely diaspora policies and transnational politics, as well as immigrant and civic participation in mainstream, migrant and bi-national organisations.

An analysis of these specific fields of literature, which concern trans-border linkages more than migrants' characteristics and capital, can also help us to develop our actor-based approach, allowing us to map the state and non-state actors implicated in the countries of origin, their strategies, and their actions. We also specifically consider state actors' strategies and interactions with migrants, in terms of both conventional and unconventional forms of political participation. Subsequently, we look at non-state actors and their strategies to influence migrants' political participation, which can be directed at both destination and origin countries.

Thus, we analyse the relation between political and civic participation and integration, which is a key element in the field of immigration research as it allows to consider immigrants' multiple loyalties and country-of-origin perceptions of this issue in the integration debate. Finally, based on the findings (and shortcomings) of our research, we propose a new research agenda in order to develop a deeper understanding of the influence of origin countries and civil society actors on immigrants' political and civic participation.

The State of the Art: The Standpoints of the Literature on Migrants' Political and Civic Participation

In this section we review the existing literature in order to identify the different elements that origin countries and societies can use to influence the political and civic participation of migrants. We also consider the more 'classical' literature on the political participation of immigrants in destination countries, and the links between these issues and the integration debate. However, immigrants' political participation

is oriented not only towards the destination countries; it also takes place between migrants and their home countries.

Then, in a second part of this section, we focus on other research fields that explore the transnational political linkages and activities between home countries and societies on the one hand, and migrants on the other. We refer to studies which are focused on 'diaspora policies' and 'diaspora engagement policies' as well as on 'transnational political practices'. Finally, in a third part, we focus more specifically on additional inputs coming from the literature on the civic participation of migrants. It has to be underlined that generally the literature on political participation in destination countries concentrates on the *micro level,* analysing the main factors influencing political behaviour, while the bibliography on diaspora policies and transnational political ties and interactions focuses more on the *macro level*, and is comprised of actors, strategies and tools. A review of both approaches, complemented by an examination of the literature on immigrant civic participation, is a necessary starting point in the analysis of the possible roles of origin countries and civil society in influencing the political and civic participation of immigrants.

A Micro Level Analysis: Individual Factors of Political Participation of Immigrants in the Host Countries

The key-question guiding the literature in the field of immigrant political participation is: is there a relationship between an effective political participation of immigrants and the integration process and if yes: what is it? The immigrants' political integration has to do with, first, self-identification with the political system and if they feel represented by it; second, active political participation, through voting or participation in public sphere; and third, with perception of being heard by authorities (Kaldur et al. 2012). The general literature identifies a number of factors explaining various types of political participation, some of them general, others specific to immigrants. Through their action, origin states and societies can affect some of those elements and intervene then on the political participation of their expatriates. The main question we consider here is: which elements explaining political participation of immigrants at destination can be influenced by the action or origin states and societies?

On the one hand, more 'traditional' factors are useful to explain general political participation (valid for all population), independently from a previous migration experience or from the origin of the subject (i.e.: see Lipset 1960; Almond and Verba 1963; Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba et al. 1995). More specifically, we must consider such factors as age/generational cohort, gender, beliefs and values, level of education, linguistic skills, place of residence, social capital, and socio-economic status. In the specific field of migration studies, socio-economic theories confirm also that to participate or not depends on issues such as incomes or education (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Smith

and Edmonston 1997), or demographic characteristics (Yang 1994). For one of those 'traditional' factors, namely gender, the framework is more complex, in the sense that it seems to be more connected to immigrants' origin, and the literature on those specific issue is particularly limited (Wu and Wang 2007; Gidengil and Stolle 2009).

On the other hand, other explaining factors of political participation are 'immigrant-specific'. Martiniello (2005), points out that the rational choice or the self-identification with or the feeling of belonging in host countries are the main reasons for immigrant political participation. Other researches underline the importance of the knowledge of the political system, the political socialisation and re-socialisation, previous involvement in politics, social capital and density of social networks (Jones-Correa 1998; Adamson 2007; White et al. 2008; Li and Jones 2011; De Rooij 2012; Prokic-Breuer et al. 2012). Some authors identified language competencies and access to reliable information as additional factors (Zapata-Barrero and Gropas 2012), while other scholars emphasise particularly the type and the causes of migration, the length of stay and the "structural" (or socio-economic) position in the receiving country (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001; Portes 1999). These three last elements are connected, more or less directly, with the origin of the immigrants.

If we look at countries and societies of origin, the 'mode of migration' is also linked to existing emigration policies and bilateral agreements on workers recruitment, and on familiar and home-societal strategies of migration. Referring to the 'structural position', this is linked also to homeland socio-economic conditions prior to departure, as well as to the mode of migration. Moreover, the length of stay can also depend on homeland situation, on return policy of home country, and on family and societal strategies.

Among all the factors influencing immigrants' political participation, just some of them have a relation with origin country's political and socio-economic framework, and also with eventual labour emigration policies and regulations. However, the majority of the latter relates specifically to migrants' situation in the homeland before their departure. In some cases they may be targeted by origin countries and society only with large and general political measures, not directly linked with emigration, as in the case for the level of education, the socioeconomic status previous to migration or the political socialisation and the previous involvement in politics, particularly of women. Another part of those factors is independent from the action that origin countries' and societies' may develop towards emigrants already out of the country. Then, we have to consider the majority of all the micro-level factors explaining political participation as independent from the origin countries' and societies' action towards migrants after they leave their origin country.

Some scholars focused specifically on the existence of a source country effect which would explain differences in immigrants' political participation depending on the country of origin. Following Simpson Bueker (2005), this source country effect is constituted on several hypotheses. The first one is the reversibility hypothesis: political participation of an immigrant is inversely related to the ease with which one can reverse his or her migratory course and return home. The clearest

examples are the case of migrants installed in the US from China, former Soviet Union, Cuba, the countries of the South-East Asia, Philippines and India; following this hypothesis, the opposite trend is predictable in the case of immigrants in the US from Mexico, Canada, Great Britain, and Italy. The second is the translation/transferability hypothesis: political participation of an immigrant is directly related to the ability to apply prior political knowledge to a new political environment. This hypothesis is strictly connected with the political re-socialization of immigrants happening in the country of destination. The third is the mobilisation hypothesis: political participation of an immigrant is directly related to the level of mobilisation of the reference group or community. Following this hypothesis, the initial reception of immigrants, in terms of financial aid and assistance, would have implications for the following political incorporation in the country. The example is the case of Cuban community in the US. Settlement patterns seems to be also significant in this process, considering that immigrants' concentration would help integrating the latest arrivals in the political and economic systems, and also increase the 'voting bloc' effect, pushing the interest of major political parties. The fourth is the gender hypothesis: the place of women in the social and political life of the immigrants' countries of origin of immigrants can determine a different political incorporation processes.

We consider that those elements underlined by the source country effect constitute some valuable inspiration to analyse origin countries and societies role at the micro level of the political behaviour of immigrants.

At this point, a key question is whether those main methodological approaches in researching immigrants' political participation allow us to identify the influence of the countries and societies of origin in this process. The existing literature on political participation of migrants in host countries permits only a limited identification of the influences that countries and societies of origin can have in this field. Consequently we need to enlarge the scope of the review and consider literature considering a large framework allowing the identification of actors, strategies and tools developing and sustaining trans-border ties with migrants in their destination countries.

A Macro-level Analysis: Diaspora Policies and Transnational Politics

Contemporary migrants, and their predecessors, have maintained, and still maintain, a variety of links with their origin countries; while at the same time, they are incorporated into the countries in which they are settled. Migration has never been a one-way process, but rather one in which migrants interact simultaneously in different spheres where they live. Most aspects of their lives occur and take place, frequently, across borders (Levitt and Jaworski 2007). The new sphere where the political activities occurred faces with the challenges of the currently nation-state,

both supra-national and regional dimension, and with the large flows caused by migration (Basch et al. 1994). Political and civic participation develop then at multiples sovereignty levels, as well as at transnational level (Bauböck and Faist 2010; Faist 1998).

In order to understand the transnational political and civic linkages between the societies and the countries of origin with their emigrants and state-actors influence on political participation, it is crucial to consider emigration policy of origin countries and their 'diaspora policies'. The latter constitute a particularly new field of research that draws attention to state actors' influence on emigrants' political activities. Following Scheffer (2003: 9–10), an ethno-national diaspora can be defined as "a social-political formation, created as a result of either voluntary or forced migration, whose members regard themselves as of the same ethno-national origin and who permanently reside as minorities in one or several host countries". Gamlen (2008) identifies two broad frameworks of action through which the country of origin remains connected and interacts with his citizens abroad. The first mechanism is a diaspora building, addressed to recognise pre-existing diaspora communities or cultivate new ones. The second mechanism, called diaspora integration, looks for pull emigrants into a "web of rights and obligations" (Gamlen 2008: 842). The diaspora building mechanism is filled with capacity building policies that "aimed at discursively producing a state-centric transnational national society, and developing a set of corresponding state institutions" (Gamlen 2006: 5–6). The diaspora integration mechanism is composed by two different dimensions: the first one is aimed to extending rights to the diaspora, and then to build a legitimate transnational sovereignty; the second one is addressed to "extract obligations" from the diaspora, considering citizens abroad owe loyalty to this legitimate home country (ibid.).

The diaspora policies literature enlightens almost exclusively top down transnational political activities, namely those carried out by states and institutional actors, in connection with emigrants and diasporas. One of our goals is to understand how those non-state actors build up those linkages, which tools they use, which actions they carry on, and what motivations and interests drive those transnational activities in the political field. For understanding the role of non-state, or civil society actors we will need to focus also on bottom-up transnational dynamics, and transnational networks. For that purpose, it is necessary to consider the literature more specifically focused on transnational political practices.

Literature on immigrant integration and political participation aims, first of all, at understanding the conditions of integration from the perspective of the receiving country. And, in studies on immigrant transnationalism, the key factors are transnational practices and the conditions of emergence rather than consequences on integration, even though this issue is not completely absent (Snel et al. 2006; Délano 2010). But the transnational perspective seems to offer a relevant theoretical approach should we wish to grasp what occurs when immigration and emigration countries are simultaneously taken into account.

Some scholars concentrate their attention on the implications of transnational political practices at the international relation's level. Koslowsky (2004), for example, details several kinds of emigrant political activity and its recent expansion through increased migrations and defines those activities as 'the globalization of

domestic politics'. He also underlines how the democratization processes of home countries are linked with the participation of the emigrants, increasing their possibilities to influence the homeland politics (ibid.). Scheffer (2003) focuses his analysis specifically on diaspora groups that possibly are different from migrants group, due to their stronger structure and their more homogenous group identity. Østergaard-Nielsen (2003: 21), for example, underlines that for some authors, diaspora politics is a subset of transnational politics concerning groups "that are barred from direct political participation in the political system of their homeland – or who do not even have a homeland political regime to support/oppose", and is closer to the less common concept of émigré politics (Cohen 1997). Nevertheless, we think that some of his considerations on political activities of the diasporas, their objectives, their strategies and their tools represent a key feature for a broad understanding of the role that origin countries can play towards their emigrants' political participation.

Otherwise, some authors also bring their attention more specifically to transnational political practices. Østergaard-Nielsen (2001: 2–3), for example, notes that the 'proliferation of political ties, networks, and practices across borders', is a phenomenon strictly linked with "the sending countries' particular politico-economic incentives to mobilise their citizens and former citizens abroad", between others factors. About the definitions of the concept of transnational political practices, significant differences emerge regarding its range, varying from a narrow definition, considering only the actual membership of parties or hometown associations, up to a wide one, including all the political consequences of transnational ties between migrants and their countries of origin, and also the migration, as 'unintentional political action' affecting national and international level. Other scholars emphasise the identification of more durable patterns as a continuum of different practices. Itzigsohn (2000: 1130) gives the following definition of immigrants' political transnational field: "recurrent and institutionalized interactions and exchanges between, on the one hand, immigrants and their social and political organizations and, on the other hand, the political institutions and the state apparatus of the country of origin".

Østergaard-Nielsen concentrates on intentional transnational political practices, and focuses, as a main unit of her analysis, on the transnational political networks (2001: 5). She distinguishes different types of transnational political practices, depending on whether the political activities are directed towards host or home countries. She defines as immigrant politics the political action undertaken by immigrants and refugees to improve their situation in the host country. Some examples are the activities carried out to obtain more political, social and economic rights, or to fight discrimination. When the home country supports emigrants' activities, the immigrant politics becomes transnational. Otherwise, when political actions of immigrants and refugees are addresses to the domestic policy of their homeland, or to the foreign policy of the latter, they are defined as homeland politics. In this framework, activities of immigrants and refugees may take the form of opposition or support to the current political regime in the origin country or to its foreign policy.

External voting of migrants in another research field linked to transnational political and civic practices that can add useful elements to our analysis on the role that origin countries and societies can play in the political participation practices of migrants (Baubock 2007; Jaulin 2015; Lafleur 2013). External voting can be defined as "the active and passive voting rights of qualified individuals, independently of their professional status, to take part from outside the national territory in referenda or in supranational, national, subnational, or primary elections held in an country of which they hold citizenship but where they permanently of temporarily do not reside" (Lafleur 2013: 31).

A Meso-level Analysis: Immigrants and Civic Participation in Mainstream, Migrant and Bi-national Organizations

The integration process is gradual and civic integration is also an important part of it. It takes place at various levels and the question is through which channels it can be observed and furthermore the role of the origin country and of transnational links in this process. As mentioned above, temporary absence of citizenship or the limitations on political rights do not prevent migrants from engaging civically in the host country. One of collective forms of civic participation is to join or create an association. Migrants can engage in various types of associations such as migrant organizations, hometown associations, but also mainstream organizations namely non-migrant associations, consultative bodies or even bi-national associations. Even though other forms of civic participation exist, we focus on the involvement of migrants in organizations. They indeed offer a significant form of civic participation, with a collective dimension and with the potential empowerment dimension for all migrants, whatever their status.

Mainstream Organizations

Migrants can get involved in *local politics* over mainstream issues or neighbourhood issues such as housing, education, urban space, etc. issues that are not specific to migrants. Even though immigrant participation in mainstream organizations can be of the utmost importance for integration, in particular in countries with a strong civil society tradition, literature and case-studies are quite scarce on this, particularly in the case of Europe.[1]

Mainstream organizations primarily serve the native population or more broadly the population without distinction of ethnicity (Ramakrishnan and Viramontes 2006). This participation is sometimes also called by some researchers "civic and community involvement" and can take a lot's of forms from volunteerism to mem-

[1] See a comparative case-study is the INVOLVE project of involvement of third-country nationals as a means of integration (CEV 2006).

bership in different kinds of groups or associations in the community (Ready et al. 2006). Mainstream organizations are sometimes embedded in the receiving societies, e.g. civic clubs, or at a more local level, neighbourhoods or homeowners associations.

Participating in mainstream organizations favours interaction with natives (Ahokas 2010) even though these organizations do not have integration as an aim (Ramakrishnan and Viramontes 2006). Volunteering in mainstream organizations is thus a way for immigrants to engage in the civic affairs of the new country of residence. Nevertheless, it relies a great deal on the openness of mainstream organizations to immigrants (Ahokas 2010) and in some cases, even though they have joined these organizations, immigrants prefer to leave and to create their own associations in particular when they cannot take part in leadership (Ramakrishnan and Viramontes 2006).

The possibilities for origin countries' actors to directly influence civic participation through mainstream organization seem to be very limited. Meanwhile, association and participative culture in origin country can affect migrant involvement in organizations. This can be identified as country of origin effect endogenous first, but also exogenous as mainstream organizations gather both migrants and native population.

Migrant Organizations

Migrants set up all kinds of migrant associations, though these associations are not easy to define (Moya 2005). Migrant organizations are, indeed, very diverse: ethnic, cultural, regional, social, professional, religious, charitable organizations, sports (Brettel 2005). De Haas (2006: 7) considered a migrant organization as "any kind of organization consisting mainly of migrants and their descendants, irrespective of the specific activities of such organizations." Migrants associations are also called "ethnic" associations and are oriented towards issues linked to the country of residence (Portes et al. 2008). Among the various migrant organizations, scholars distinguished diaspora organizations, which are also called (civic) hometown associations or even transnational organizations (Ramakrishnana and Viramontes 2006). Hometown associations are "organizations that allow immigrants from the same city or region to maintain ties with and materially support their places of origin" (Orozco and Rouse 2007). Hometown associations can also contribute to the integration of immigrants in the host countries as they are "organized points of contact and coordination between immigrants, the host governments, and other institutions" (Somerville et al. 2008: 2).

Migrant associations are considered as the locus of transnational political activities (Morales and Jorba 2010). Transnational political activities are the activities "conducted by migrants of the same national origin but residing in different destination countries or when the state authorities of the sending country interfere with their emigrants' activities in the country of residence" (Martiniello and Lafleur 2008: 653). "Civil society actors – and, in particular, migrants' organizations […]

provide the networks and the infrastructure to facilitate and sustain various forms of transnational engagement by individuals and communities (…), most notably civic and political transnationalism" (Morales and Jorba 2010: 181). It is then necessary to focus also on literature specifically consecrated to civic participation through different types of organizations.

Migrant organizations are an important place for affirming attachment to the country of origin (Brettell 2005). They are considered as a means for gathering and creating links with immigrants from the same country of origin and also for promoting the culture and the language of the home country (ibid.). Their agenda is not necessarily focused on one society, but it can target both the homeland issues and the integration problems in the host society (Cordero-Guzmán 2005; Portes et al. 2008). If migrant associations can thus be orientated toward the country of origin like transnational associations or toward immigrant integration in the country of immigration, some of those also gradually present a mixed agenda (Faist et al. 2013).

Migrant organizations emerge often spontaneously as informal social networks but progressively they organise in more formal organizations with several objectives. Migrant associations are not exclusively initiated by migrants. Countries of origin can encourage their creation (Xiang 2003; Délano 2010; Ramakrishnan and Viramontes 2006). In this case, we can then talk about country impact. Receiving countries or regional authorities can also foment migrant organizations especially in the framework of co-development policies (Østergaard-Nielsen 2009). Furthermore, migrant organizations can differ from one country or even from one city to another because "political or institutional opportunities in the host and sending societies strongly influence immigrant organizations" (Schrover and Vermeulen 2005: 828).

Bi-national and Multi-national Organizations

Some authors found that some associations are bi-national and serve as bridges between natives and migrants (Brettel 2005). In some cases, organizations with mainstream origin become rather hybrid organizations because if initially mainstream their membership diversified ethnically to a significant extent (Ramakrishnan and Veramontes 2006). Another kind of civic body characterized by bi or even multi-ethnic membership including migrants and natives are the local consultative councils for foreign residents. Some would argue that consultative bodies refer rather to formal political participation (Martiniello 2009), but they can also be seen as a place of civic participation as they, in some cases, were developed before allowing foreign residents to vote. Local consultative bodies for foreign residents are often set up by local authorities in the residing country and they bring together foreign residents and local elected representatives (Gsir and Martiniello 2004). These councils pursue two main objectives: first, integrating and encouraging the participation of foreign residents in local public life and second, improving or harmonising relations between foreign residents and other sectors of the community (authorities, administrative bodies, nationals) (ibid.). They, thus, represent a privileged place of civic participation.

According to Ramakrishnan and Viramontes (2006: 88), "[h]ybrid and ethnic civic organizations display a mode of assimilation characterized by a strong desire to integrate into the mainstream while maintaining allegiance to ethnic-specific issues and concerns."

Following this analysis, we can state that migrant organizations and specifically hometowns associations but also bi-national organizations may be considered as places of civic participation where country of origin actors can have an impact.

The Focus: The Role of Actors in the Country of Origin and Their Strategies

As seen above, combining the findings of the literature produced in different fields (political participation of immigrants, diaspora and diaspora engagement policies, transnational political practices, external voting and civic participation) allows us to identify the different origin-country actors, and to better understand their specific interests, as well as the actions and tools they use to influence migrants' political and civic participation. In this way, we are able to identify the different actors who are interacting with migrants in order to influence their political and civic participation, both in the homeland and the destination country. In a broad framework, the actors involved in migrants' political participation belong to three main categories: the host-country actors, the migrants and the home-country actors. We focus on the state and non-state actors in the home countries in order to understand the interests that guide the way they operate, and the different tools they use to influence the political and civic participation of migrants.

Emigration countries' interest in their nationals abroad is not new. In addition to emigration policies, countries of origin have developed diaspora engagement policies (Gamlen 2006). The emigration policies include the exit rules of the country and can vary from forbidding emigration to permitting free emigration (Weiner 1985). Diaspora policies are aimed at engaging the diaspora abroad, and at keeping links with emigrants living in a new country of residence. In various ways, "[…] emigration states attempt to maintain the umbilical cord between the homeland and emigrants" (Lafleur 2013: 7). Although they have accepted and even promoted emigration, emigration states view emigrants as resources that can be useful for the country's interests. As noted by several scholars, countries of origin are mainly motivated by the potential for attracting emigrant remittances, opening markets and having a representation (and defence) of national interests in the host country (Portes 1999; Bauböck 2003; de Haas 2007). Diaspora policies consist of an array of measures such as ministerial or consular reforms; investment policies to attract remittances; the extension of political rights (dual citizenship, right to vote from abroad); the extension of state protection or services; and symbolic policies to reinforce a sense of belonging (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003). These policies address emigrants in the receiving country but can also address them when they come back

"home" by offering them specific provisions: for example, advantageous conditions of investment or protection against rackets.

Diaspora policies also depend on how emigrants are perceived by the country of origin. Are they considered traitors who fled their homelands or on the contrary, are they celebrated and perceived as heroes? In several countries, maintaining links with emigrant workers in anticipation of their eventual (and permanent) return home has been progressively replaced by simply maintaining links with all emigrants and their descendants abroad. This strategy takes into account possible pendular travels between the country of emigration and immigration (Portes 1999; de Haas 2007). Several studies have demonstrated how countries of origin such as Morocco, Mexico and China, among others, have shifted from an approach of controlling emigrants abroad to one of courting them (DeSipio 2002; Xiang 2003; de Haas 2007; Délano 2010; Gamlen 2012). Furthermore, emigrants do not constitute a homogeneous group, even if they come from the same country or region of origin; some may be in opposition to the regime or ruling authorities of the country of origin. Therefore, the government of the country of origin adopts actions depending on the different components of the diaspora. For example, the Turkish government may target Kurdish emigrants differently than other members of the Turkish diaspora (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003).

State Actors in Home Countries: Their Strategies and Actions Towards Political Participation

Origin countries can have multiple state actors developing political activities towards emigrants. As Gamlen (2006) clearly explains, "diaspora engagement policies are more a 'constellation' of different institutional and legislative initiatives implemented at different times, at different state levels, and for different reasons, than a unitary and coordinated state strategy". Based on a study of institutions in 30 developing countries, Agunias (2009) has mapped state actors that engage diasporas, distinguishing "government institutions at home", "consular networks" and "quasi-government diaspora institutions".

Fitzgerald (2006: 260) also argues that emigration policies "are best understood by a 'neopluralist' approach, disaggregating 'the state' into a multilevel organisation of distinct component units in which state incumbents and other political actors compete for their interests". This author criticises the realist interpretation of the state as a unitary actor pursuing 'national interests' and competing with other states. He suggests that this description of states does not capture the internal, multilevel struggles to determine those interests, not only in the economic sense, but also in political and ideological terms (Fitzgerald 2006). Considering all these scholars' remarks above, we can take into account whether initiatives carried out by origin countries are specific and *ad hoc*, or if they are part of an overarching strategic orientation.

In view of the multiplicity of state actors, it is also difficult to define 'the interests' of each country. Consequently, it is also challenging to define whether the interests of sending and receiving countries are diverging or converging. At the core of the question is the issue of migrants' "loyalty" towards the origin and destination countries. The question at stake is whether double or multiple loyalties are possible, and whether or not migrants' political participation is a zero-sum game. In some cases, as Scheffer (2003) clearly points out, host countries try to take advantage of emigrants' opposition viewpoints towards the destination countries' governments. On these occasions, destination countries can support migrants' criticisms of the political regimes in their homeland, and at times even encourage migrant activities against their homeland governments, with the risk of creating a political confrontation between origin and destination countries. The activities of the Cuban diaspora in the US against their homeland is one of the clearest examples of this situation.

Gamlen (2006: 5–6) says that states, in the framework of their 'capacity-building policies', try to create a transnational 'relationship of communication', based upon the idea of the nation, which he defines as "a system of symbols and signs within which states can immerse the exercise of power". A second step is the creation of the state's "objective capacities for the realisation of power relations" (ibid.), namely the building of specific diaspora institutions. A third step of this transnational exercise of state power consists of what he calls the finalised activities, or specific effects: a kind of transnationalised citizenship (see also Vink, Chap. 9 in this volume) which is simultaneously comprised of the extension of rights to emigrants and the extraction of obligations from them.

As he explains, symbolic nation-building policies are used to create "a homogeneous national 'diaspora', with close ties of allegiance to the home state" (Gamlen 2006: 6), through initiatives that increase migrants' sense of belonging to a transnational community and enhance the place of the state within the community. More specifically, Gamlen (2006) notes several initiatives that are encompassed in this group of policies: rhetorical or symbolic gestures celebrating emigrants as national heroes[2]; paternalistic claims that expatriates are an "offshore part" of the national population or an extra administrative district of the state's territory[3]; programmes to teach the national language and history; national celebrations and cultural events within expatriate communities; expatriate-targeted media, communications and public relations, meant to "align" emigrants or to mobilise diasporas; and the organisation of large conferences and conventions, designed to show the home country's "listening attitude", gather diaspora 'representatives' and eventually establish a patronage relationship with them or convey the state's position on various issues.

[2] As in the cases of Mexico, Morocco and China, among others, this stance very often represents an important shift for a state that previously denounced emigrants as deserters.

[3] The idea of emigrant communities as off-shore districts of the state is reflected in some specific electoral systems, as in the case of Ecuador and Italy, where external electoral constituencies are given special representation. Some other examples of these actions, but which have a more paternalistic approach, can be found in Mexico, Haiti and Ireland.

As the same author clearly explains, these policies share the states' interest in producing "a communal mentality amongst non-residents; a sense of common belonging to the home-state that renders expatriates governable" (Gamlen 2006: 7). This kind of state-actor activity towards emigrants is meant to (re)establish loyalty toward home countries among the citizens abroad. In this regard, Brubaker (2010: 77) talks about "new forms of external membership" that constitute forms of "trans-border nationalism". He also uses the concept of "external politics of belonging", which concerns those "who are long-term residents (and perhaps citizens) of other states, yet who can be represented as belonging, in some sense, to a "homeland" or "kin" state, or to "its" eponymous nation".

A further step in state actors' activities towards emigrants is what Gamlen (2006, 2008) defines as 'institution-building policies', which create bureaucratic instruments and systems that give home countries the capacity to promote their political and economic interests to emigrants. The most common initiatives highlighted in this field are:

– the implementation of surveillance, through the foreign service or the migration bureaucracy, to collect statistics on which to base strategic orientations towards emigrants and the strategic selection of emigrant actors with whom long-term relationships can be established;
– the creation by the home state of its own transnational migrant organisations, often acting as consultative institutions, in order to avoid existing political tensions and to eventually contain possible future conflicts with emigrants;
– the creation of specific government offices, sometimes at the ministerial level, when a critical mass of governmental activities addressing emigrants is reached and requires coordination.

In this regard, Itzigsohn (2000) suggests that home countries' engagement of emigrants is based on two main interests: on the one hand, politically containing emigrants, namely by controlling the impact of emigrants' political activities on homeland politics; and on the other hand, mobilising emigrants to be lobbyists in the destination countries. As Scheffer (2003) explains, when emigrant communities are better-organised and more affluent, they engage in advocacy activities intended to increase acceptance of the general diaspora phenomenon and tolerance of specific diasporas and their respective homelands at the political level.

In this sense, Argentina is a very interesting case. At the time of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands crisis in 2012, the government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner sent letters to influential emigrants asking them to support the official state's position on that issue in their destination countries, as well at the international level. More specifically, leading expatriates received two letters, the first one inviting Argentineans abroad to mobilise and attend informational meetings at the embassies (including a briefing on the latest news about the issue, and the distribution of multimedia materials). The second letter was sent by the embassy and invited influential figures of the emigrant community to sign a statement and to send it to the UN's Special Committee of Decolonisation, as members of the "*Grupo de Apoyo a la Cuestión Malvinas*" *(Support group on the Malvinas issue)*. This case represents

a clear example of the "selective mobilisation" of emigrants to create public opinion abroad and to push origin states' interests at the international level.

In Turkey, we find another clear example of a state action aiming to mobilise citizens abroad to provide political support and lobbying assistance. Turkey tried to engage influential expatriates and emigrant associations in Europe, in order to push forward the state's agenda on the issue of EU membership (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). The state also sponsored academic exchanges and academic chairs as tools for promoting pro-Turkish ideologies abroad, having first screened the candidates for their views on the Armenian massacres (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001).

Looking at examples of state-actors at origin who co-opted influential expatriates by encouraging them to stand for elections in external constituencies, we can cite the cases of Ecuador and of Dora Aguirre, founder and former president of the Spanish-Ecuadorian association "Rumiñahui", one of the most important migrant associations in Spain. In Ecuador's 2009 legislative elections, Dora Aguirre ran as a candidate from the external constituency for the ruling party, namely the *Alianza PAIS* (*Patria Altiva y Soberana*), the same party as the president Rafael Correa. She was finally elected as one of the representatives of Ecuadorians abroad in the Parliament and re-elected in 2013. During her electoral campaign abroad for the 2013 elections, the main points of Dora Aguirre's programme were linked to the conditions of Ecuadorian emigrants and the protection of their rights.

In the case of Mexico, some scholars (Gamlen 2006) suggest that the Mexican state is seeking to extend its governance of Mexican nationals through urban and community-scale organisations, containing and co-opting migrant political activity by inserting state representatives into civic associations.

Another important issue which allows citizens abroad to push forward their home country's interests is the promotion of cooperation between host and home countries and the liberalisation of tariffs and commercial flows. Finally, lobbying by emigrants can also be used to end economic boycotts and limitations on exportation and importation to and from origin countries (Scheffer 2003). One of the clearest examples in this sense is the action by the Jewish diaspora in the US, who lobbied for the end of the economic boycott of South Africa during apartheid in order to help the Jewish diaspora (a position which generated tensions not only within the diaspora, but also with communities lobbying for the boycott, such as African-Americans). A similar case is that of the Chinese diaspora lobbying in the US for more open political and economic approaches to China (Scheffer 2003).

In contrast, emigrants can also engage in lobbying activities to impose boycotts and sanctions on their home countries, and to gain more political influence on the international relations front, as in the case of certain groups in the Cuban and Iranian diasporas in the US, as well as the Iraqi diaspora in Europe, which mobilised against the regime of Saddam Hussein (Scheffer 2003).

Nevertheless, home countries' efforts to co-opt emigrants as lobbyists or influential spokespeople are oriented not only towards host countries, but also towards transnational or international actors, namely public institutions and private companies. According to Gamlen (2006), origin countries thus seek to influence capitalist

elites for the purpose of concluding new strategic alliances and attracting foreign direct investments and technology transfers.

Lastly, home countries have a major impact on emigrants' formal political participation at destination by granting permission for double citizenship, as this action indirectly allows emigrants to acquire the citizenship of destination countries and participate in elections there.

Non-state Actors in the Sending Societies and Their Strategies

The role of origin countries cannot be reduced simply to state actors. Different kinds of non-state actors try to engage or maintain links with emigrants abroad. They come from the political sphere but also from the civil sphere. Establishing a complete and full-inclusive list of non-state actors in origin countries is complex. Nevertheless, it is possible to underline some of the main actors: political parties (specifically, opposition parties in the case of authoritarian regimes, and 'separatist' parties or ethnic-minority parties in multi-ethnic countries); trade unions; NGOs; different civil society groups and associations; churches and religious groups; media; etc. To assess the influence of these actors on the civic participation of emigrants abroad, it is necessary to examine their purpose and agenda. State and non-state actors do not necessarily have the same interests and the same agendas regarding diaspora members' civic participation in the host country, especially in the case of conflicts or contested political situations in the country of origin.

Regarding the non-state actors in origin countries and their interests, it is clear that voting and standing for election are the most obvious ways in which emigrants can influence policy in both their origin and destination countries. But other emigrant activities, fostered by sending societies, can also have impacts in the political arena. Koslowsky (2004: 14) suggests that "a less visible, but perhaps more influential, way may be through campaign contributions and other support for contending political parties". He points out the importance of the difference in the values of external currencies compared to home-country currencies during the election process. He suggests that in the first free election in the East European countries, for example, a 50 dollar donation coming from a Polish resident in the US equalled a third of the monthly wage of resident of Poland.[4] Another example in this sense is the one of Franjo Tudjiman, leader of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), who started to raise funds from emigrants in the US and Canada even before non-communist parties were legalised in Yugoslavia. Apparently, around 80% of the

[4]Assuming a monthly average wage of 1,770,000 zloty in 1991 (http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/5840_1630_ENG_HTML.htm), that is, around 160 dollars (at the exchange rate at this time: 11,100 Polish zloty/1 dollar [http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/18/world/abortion-ban-sought-by-church-is-rejected-by-polish-parliament.html?pagewanted=2]. Koslowsky (2004: 14) gives different figures, equating 50 dollars with a Polish monthly salary.

expenses of Croatian political parties in the 1990 election were covered with funds coming from Croatian emigrants and their descendants (Koslowsky 2004).

Another clear way to influence home-country politics is for emigrants to be appointed as ministers, and particularly as foreign affairs ministers, in newly democratised countries, as in the case of Armenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (ibid.).

Following the agenda of specific non-state actors in origin countries and supporting identity-groups' alternatives to the dominant actors is another way to influence homeland politics. Emigrants can inspire economic backing by leading movements which project national visions that transcend existing state boundaries and revive 'dormant' sub-national identities (ibid.). The challenges that these kinds of emigrant actions pose to multinational origin countries are evident. Furthermore, as Østergaard-Nielsen (2001) suggests, political organisations in the homeland can coordinate their campaigns with sister organisations elsewhere, pooling financial resources and drawing on their expertise and manpower, or with political counterparts in other countries, producing joint informational material or organising and coordinating confrontational activities (demonstrations/mass meetings).

The case of the Kurdish diaspora is particularly relevant: part of this diaspora has been a key actor in internationalising the politics of Kurdish separatism and bringing Turkey's treatment of the Kurdish minority to the attention of European countries through different activities (hunger strikes, protest marches and a terrorist bombing in Germany) (Koslowsky 2004). Again, the case of Croatian emigrants is particularly relevant to the issue of reviving 'dormant' sub-national identities. They played a key role as a lobbying group in the case of Germany's diplomatic recognition of their independence and contributed to mobilising the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) and to establishing back-channel contacts between Franjo Tudjman and the government of Helmut Kohl before Croatia declared its independence (ibid.).

A very fashionable debate since the 'Arab spring' is the role of diasporas in the democratisation process of their origin countries. The case of the Arab Spring countries suggests that the actions of home societies in the field of political participation have a greater impact when non-state actors at home have diverging interests vis-à-vis state institutions. Also, when there are fewer opportunities (or more difficulties) for emigrant communities to participate at home, it is possible that they will be more politically active outside the country to change the situation at home. It is important to underline that these activities are not exclusive of the Arab countries; for example, Chinese citizens abroad have supported movements for political change in their homeland.

In this sense, two types of actions can help non-state actors in home societies to push forward their agendas, allowing emigrant groups to express criticism of their home government or transmit demands concerning the expected behaviour of the latter. The first is the use of global institutional structures to facilitate transnational political practices. In particular, international organisations, under the umbrella of human rights, can provide an essential framework for negotiations between transnational political networks and home countries. As Østergaard-Nielsen (2001: 15) has pointed out, "transnational political networks who oppose a state that has strong

allies in their host-states or is simply too powerful for other states to meddle with, may turn to international organisations such as the UN, OSCE, European Council, and the like". In this framework, the role of NGOs in 'trans-state advocacy' can be very useful to facilitating contacts between those transnational political networks and a level of policymaking that would probably otherwise be unreachable for emigrant groups (ibid.). An example of this strategy is the case of the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organisation), which has long been lobbying for Palestine to be recognised as a member state of the UN. Similarly, the Tibetan diaspora has engaged in international advocacy to build support for Tibetan independence and to promote respect for human rights in the Tibet.

New technologies are another option for non-state actors who are using transnational political activities to involve the diaspora and push their agendas forward. Internet connections especially, as well as satellite broadcasting and new electronic media, are of utmost importance for diaspora activities (Scheffer 2003). These changes substantially transform the nature and size of interactions between diaspora groups and both governmental and non-governmental organisations in origin and destination countries (ibid.). Scheffer (2003) underlines that the low cost, the reach and the interactivity of the internet has increased the range, quality and impact of several kinds of diaspora activities, as well as the mobilisation and transfer of economic, cultural and political resources, and the creation of trans-state political communities. Thus technological changes and the large diffusion of this new means of communication give more and more emigrant groups access to public opinion and policymakers, regardless of their economic and political resources, and irrespective of their locations.

It appears particularly important to consider the centrality of new communication technologies in the case of interactions between emigrants and home societies where the government or a majority or dominant social group is unfriendly or unsympathetic to the specific group of emigrants (Scheffer 2003). Links can easily be made between ethno-linguistic minority groups in the home country and their specific diaspora, and between emigrant activities and opposition groups in the homeland, against totalitarian or authoritarian regimes in the origin countries.

Participating Here and There: The Issue of Multiple Loyalties and the Integration Debate

Maintaining active civic ties with one place (emigration country), while residing and developing civic links with another (immigration country) raises the question of multiple membership and allegiance as regards political ties. There is an emergent literature on the role of migrants' transnational ties in their integration into the receiving country (Levitt 1999; Pantoja 2005; Snel et al. 2006; Portes et al. 2008; Morales and Morariu 2011).

At destination countries, not all the actors are comfortable with the political participation of immigrants on host societies, with their relationship with origin communities or with maintaining double political link or affiliation. In European receiving countries, states seems to not welcome particularly transnational political practices of immigrants, independently from their exclusive or inclusive political systems (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001). Even if this situation is progressively changing, as underlined by the growing admittance to double or multiple citizenship (Kivisto and Faist 2010), the issue of "double loyalty" linked to immigrants' political participation in both host and home-countries is still at the centre of the debate.

The political and academic debates consider whether immigrants' political relations with their origin countries, and their persistence over time, could be or not a facilitating factor for the integration of immigrants at destination. In the early years of the century, the academic literature explores whether this link with the countries of origin is an obstacle to the integration of immigrants (Nieswand 2011; Snel et al. 2006); if the relationship between integration and transnational relations is positive or negative (Guarnizo et al. 2003, Portes 2003); or if the positive or negative relation depends, for example, on which social class migrants belong to (Levitt 2003; Morawska 2003b). Although there is a relationship between transnationalism and integration of immigrants in the host countries, the mainstream discourses have been kept separate.

At the core of research debate it is the question of which is the relation between immigrants political participation in host-countries and towards their homeland. Two positions are particularly relevant in the case of transnational politics and political activities and of the recognition of dual citizenship or nationality. When migrants engage politically in two different societies, this can raise the question of his/her loyalty to each nation-state. Moreover, the question is whether political and civic activities oriented towards the country of origin reduce the political and civic participation of the immigrant in the new residence country and thus limit integration. What is at stake is the possibility to being faithful to more than one nation-state on with, beyond this, the question of the development of civic commitment independently of the nation-state and of the citizenship acquisition.

On the one hand, some scholars argue that we would be in presence of a 'zero-sum game', in which migrants' political implication toward homelands is precluding involvement in receiving countries politics. Some suggest that maintaining links with homeland countries, particular identities and ethnic enclaves hinder a full assimilation and integration into 'mainstream' society and politics (Huntington 2004). In the first position, political participation is oriented and linked to one nation-state, namely the country of origin. Portes (1999) pointed out that in some cases diaspora policies can provoke conflicts in the migrant community because not all immigrants necessarily agree with homeland politics or with the political regime. According to him, the efforts of emigration countries can break the solidarity among immigrants, politicise their civic organisations and jeopardise integration (Portes 1999). As DeSipio (2011) underlines, critics to transnational engagement ranges from a moderate concern of this activity on immigrant adaptation to the new society, to a more extreme fear "that transnationally engaged immigrants will act as a desta-

bilizing force on the politics of the new home and act as an agent of the sending country's government". Furthermore, since 9/11, there is even more suspicion towards emigrants political activities and especially remittances to conflict areas (Kleist 2008). Transnational networks are, thus, perceived as challenging single allegiance (Kastoryano 2000) and civic activities impeding integration.

On the other hand, some other authors disagree with this 'zero-sum' interpretation of the relation between linkages and transnational practices with migrants' home countries and integration/assimilation in host countries. An extensive literature has shown that transnational practices represents more an alternative path of immigrant incorporation and adaptation than an obstacle (Basch et al. 1994; Morawska 2003a), and that also foster immigrants' engagement in receiving-country politics (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Vertovec 2003; Morales and Morariu 2011). Eva Morawska (2003a), for example, challenges the idea that transnational involvements of migrants and their children and their assimilation as concurrent processes. Following Kivisto and Faist (2010), "simultaneity" is the characteristic relationship between assimilation and transnationalism. Some scholars underlines how transnationalism provide alternative resources facilitating social mobility in the host countries, and how transnational practices create skills that migrants can transfer to their lives in destination countries (Portes 1999). Levitt (2003: 178), for example, speaks of a "false dichotomy between assimilation and transnationalism"; Morales and Morariu (2011: 143) considers that transnational practices foster political integration "when they generate transferable skills that are useful for engaging in receiving-country politics". Fibbi and D'Amato (2008) realised a study based on a quantitative methodology, comparing different immigrants groups in the same countries, and the same group in several countries, and underline fact that integration and transnational engagement are not zero-sum game.

This second position assumes the compatibility of transnational political activities oriented to the emigration country and political integration in the destination country (Portes et al. 2008). It views civic and political participation coming from the belief in democracy and democratic values and possibly developing within more than one nation-state (beyond methodological nationalism). Certainly, countries of origin intend to preserve loyalty of emigrants through their diaspora policies (Portes et al. 2007) but, "[t]ransnational practices, and in particular political transnationalism, are viewed as leading to the political incorporation of migrants because they enable them to forge political coalitions and organisations that will allow them first to engage in 'ethnic' politics and, later, to become active in receiving-country politics" (Morales and Morariu 2011). Even in the case of conflict in the country of origin, the INFOCON project – which looked at the portability of conflicts in countries of immigration – revealed that transnational civic participation increased civic participation in host societies (Perrin and Martiniello 2010). Furthermore, political participation in the country of origin (political orientation or identification) can differ according to countries of destination (Østergaard-Nielsen 2009). Turner (2008) showed that parts of the Burundian diaspora adopted political positions radically different from the country of origin, relying on the security and the distance provided by the host country. According to Portes (1999), civic activities oriented

towards the country of origin can thus be seen as a means to increase the level of migrant political awareness, and thus as a first step in a civic integration process.

The experience of hometown associations is a way for emigrants to be engaged by participating in homeland politics. They can sometimes gain power in particular in the country of origin, but they can also develop interest in becoming engaged in civic activities in their new country of residence. In some cases, transnational civic engagement creates frustration and become negative: so much so that emigrants will prefer to give up civic actions concerning the country of origin and they will focus on the receiving country, instead. The Intipucá organization was disbanded due to criticism from the country of origin (Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008). Other cases with Moroccan or Turkish associations in Europe revealed other reasons such as unsatisfactory implementation of policy or conflicting relations with local authorities in the origin country (Østergaard-Nielsen 2009). Potential conflicts between hometown associations and communities of origin can indeed deter civic participation in homeland politics when "the transnationalisation of political participation creates tensions between mobile and relatively immobile people and associations" (Faist 2007: 10).

Nevertheless, Morales and Morariu (2011) highlighted the role of transferable political skills and capital and the mobilizing capacity of transnationally–engaged emigrants in their comparative study on the impact of transnational activities of three ethnic groups in European cities on the political integration in receiving countries. Then, the expertise that migrants acquire through their political activities towards their home countries promotes their capabilities for political involvement in other political arenas (in host countries, but also at international level) at the same time.

Finally, through their activities in hometown associations (e.g. in terms of increasing numbers) and thus through transnational civic engagement, emigrants became more visible in the receiving society. And, public visibility is undoubtedly an important step for civic integration. Hometown associations can thus serve migrants and help them to be collectively represented in the public and political spheres in both origin and receiving countries. And as Brettell (2005: 878) pointed out "[i]ncorporation involves gaining some sort of public recognition". Transnational civic engagement can thus have a positive impact on civic participation in the destination country and influence political and civic integration.

Towards a New Research Agenda Incorporating Origin Countries' Influence and Impact

This chapter aimed to better understand how countries of origin can influence the political and civic participation of migrants once they are settled in a new country of residence. In particular, it questioned the effects – both endogenous and exogenous – and the impact that countries of origin can have on migrants' civic and political participation and integration.

With regard to the endogenous country-of-origin effect, literature focused on the micro level has shown that it can directly or indirectly play a role in the political and civic socialisation of emigrants, mainly with respect to 'political socialisation', the place of women in civic and political life in the country of origin, as well as the mode of migration and the possibility of return. Nevertheless, immigrants' re-socialisation in the country of destination can often change the framework of these dimensions. For instance, immigrants coming from an origin country where political and civic participation is limited by a non- or semi-democratic system may discover new avenues of political and civic participation in the destination country, through different types of associations. More indirectly, this endogenous country-of-origin effect can also play a role in other factors, such as education level and socio-economic class, that influence the political and civic participation of migrants.

As regards the endogenous country-of-origin effect, the "country label" in destination countries' perceptions can also play a role in political and civic participation, even if at a lower level than in other integration dimensions. This label can affect the acceptance of immigrants in political parties and mainstream organisations. If we consider the historical relations between countries of destination and origin to be a country label as well, the latter can play a major role in formal political participation. As underlined above, bilateral agreements on political participation and citizenship, as well as pragmatic cooperation on external voting can favour migrants' integration.

In the field of political and civic participation, the idea of the trans-border state, with two levels of governance working across borders via the government and civil society, has to be clearly considered and analysed in detail. When applied to state actors, this concept can be univocal, if we consider that different actors connected with the state administrations of origin countries share the same objectives. By contrast, if we consider country-of-origin non-state actors' influence on emigrants' political and civic participation we have to consider that at times their interests can diverge substantially from those of state actors, as well as from other non-state actors with different political orientations (Gabrielli and Zapata 2015).

The case of Turkish immigrants – in which as we mentioned before, the state co-optation of emigrants co-occurs with the Kurdish diaspora's effort to defend their rights in Turkey – is clearly representative of one of the possible materialisations of the divergence of interests between state and non-state actors at origin.

A deeper look at state-of-origin role in the political and civic participation of their emigrants reveals that sometimes the two axes of their actions, maintaining a sense of belonging to the nation across border and supporting emigrant integration in the destination country, can be conflictive. Here, as we previously underlined, the issue of multiple state loyalties is at stake; and even if some evolution occurs, in the end states may still covet the supposed monolithic and exclusive loyalty of their citizens.

Depending on which is the prevailing model in the political and civic participation of a group of immigrants, the country-of-origin effect or impact, several indications emerge from our analysis. Firstly, in the specific field of political participation, and particularly in the formal one, the main filter is clearly the country-of-origin impact. The existence of bilateral agreements between origin and destination countries concerning political participation or double citizenship clearly affects immi-

grants' possibilities for formal political participation at destination. Concerning formal political participation at origin, specific rules allowing emigrants' active and passive participation also constitute a key element. In this domain, the dominant actors are clearly the state institutions. Meanwhile, in the field of civic participation and informal political participation, the country-of-origin impact is a less limiting factor than in formal political participation. Avenues of participation are more open in these two dimensions: state actors in the country of origin have less power to control or limit participation; and sometimes they may also have more interest in curtailing emigrants and using them as a pressure group in the destination society. Moreover, civil society actors surely play a larger role in civic participation and in these less formal modes of political participation.

If we try to evaluate whether origin and destination state policies towards integration in the field of political and civic participation are complementary or contradictory, some considerations emerge from the analysis. Once more, in the field of formal political participation there are more competing interests between origin and destination state actors. These potential tensions are connected with a shared and still dominant conception that migrants should have an exclusive loyalty to one nation-state, even if this perception of emigrants is progressively changing and the acceptance of multiple loyalties is growing. In the field of civic participation these tensions are lower.

Concerning tools, bilateral agreements allowing migrants to vote in their destination countries (even if still rare) and dispositions allowing emigrants to vote externally will facilitate political participation as well as integration in this specific dimension. Also, the cooperation of destination countries in external voting procedures can facilitate the formal political participation of migrants, thereby supporting their integration. The entire process of external voting (negotiations, organisation and realisation) can give immigrants the opportunity to establish contacts with destination country institutions, thereby developing political and civic capital that can be very useful to larger integration patterns.

Thus in the field of civic and non-formal political participation, we once again see that the actions and tools of country-of-origin actors are more favourable to the development of participatory patterns, even when oriented to civic participation in the countries of origin.

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Chapter 6
Residential Integration – Towards a Sending Country Perspective

Sona Kalantaryan, Ben Gidley, and Maria Luisa Caputo

Introduction

This chapter explores the key issues relating to how housing integration might be understood and further researched from a "country of origin" perspective. Residential integration is a key and perhaps even foundational dimension of the integration of migrants and minorities. Residential integration includes two key elements: the nature and quality of the housing that minorities occupy, assessed in terms of factors such as tenure, overcrowding and disrepair; and the patterns of migrant residence in receiving societies, including clustering or its absence. Residential integration in the second sense is usually seen as opposite to residential *segregation*, although, as we shall see below, segregation itself is defined in multiple ways, in terms of uneven distribution of settlement and low chances of inter-ethnic contact, as well as concentration, centralization and clustering. "Clustering" itself is a more neutral term, referring to the propensity of specific groups to live together, rather than to their separation from other groups.

The issues of overcrowding and housing quality have been a major concern of migrant organisations and advocates as an index of the discrimination and disadvantage migrants face, while segregation and the formation of migrants enclaves and ghettos have played a central role in the public imagination of the policy field. A recent Eurobarometer qualitative snapshot of migrants' and non-migrants' attitudes

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to integration found that residential segregation, and specifically the formation of "ghettos", was seen by non-migrants as the most important barrier to successful integration (TNS Qual+ 2011).

The first part of this chapter covers the existing state of the art and methodology used in the field, in relation to both elements. It briefly introduces the main issues then explores the main methodological approaches. In the second part of the chapter, suggestions are made, drawing on the literature, for a move to a country of origin perspective on residential integration, starting with country of origin as a variable in determining residential integration outcomes, re-framing the issue in a more transnational perspective. The third part highlights the gaps in the literature, and the fourth introduces a new theoretical and methodological framing, shifting the emphasis from a static "social physics" to a processual, pathway-focused approach.

A series of key questions will be addressed: Are there transnational residential strategies of migrants? Is residential integration an indicator of integration, e.g. can owning a house be an indicator of integration? Are residential patterns in the receiving country negotiated in any way by the state or origin? And what is the role of home country institutions in assuring residential integration or separation?

The main issues in the field fall within the two elements already mentioned. In terms of the first, the nature and quality of migrant housing, this includes the following issues:

- *Tenure and ownership:* The large body of international literature on different forms of housing tenure tends to show that, even controlling for other variables, migrants are less likely to achieve home ownership, and that there is some correlation between home ownership, length of residence and civic participation, but also that there is some correlation between residential segregation (ethnic enclaves) and the achievement of home ownership.[1] As will be explored below, country of origin dynamics can play a part in this element of residential integration (Alba and Logan 1992; Papademetriou and Ray 2004).
- *Overcrowding and housing conditions:* There is also a significant body of evidence on migrant housing conditions, again pointing to gaps between migrant outcomes and those of non-migrants, with many categories of migrants often experiencing overcrowding or poor housing conditions, as well as declining rates of overcrowding following long-term residence. However, from the literature there is little likelihood that sending country dynamics play a significant role in this.

In terms of geographical residential patterning, the key issues are:

- *Segregation and clustering:* There is an extensive literature on migrant settlement patterns which focuses on the extent to which migrants are residentially concentrated in particular areas. Again, as will be discussed in this chapter,

[1] See for example, Borjas 2002, Bourassa 1994, Constant et al. 2009, Coulson 1999, Duffy 2007, Hirschman 1994, Massey 1985, Mesch and Mano 2006, Myers and Lee 1998, Painter et al. 2003, Painter and Yu 2008.

sending country dynamics might play a role in shaping this element of residential integration.

Migrants' residential integration patterns in Europe are frequently defined by historic and socio-economic factors but are also heavily influenced by the specificities of the national housing market.[2] Donner (2000) presents a detailed analysis of the housing policies in European countries, and among other things finds that the extent of state regulation may influence the intensity of ethnic segregation. With this context in mind, Kohlbacher and Reeger (2005) divided European countries into several groups. The Netherlands, Sweden and the UK are characterised by a large share of social housing, and demonstrate that intensive state intervention through social housing provisions leads to the achievement of social (and ethnic) mixing. However, Musterd and Fullando (2008) consider the peculiarities of the residential segregation of immigrants under different state regulations, focusing on the two quite different cases of Amsterdam and Barcelona. Their study claims that the generosity of the welfare state and availability of social housing do not have a significant impact on residential segregation patterns. Similarly, Bolt et al. (2006) consider ethnic segregation in Amsterdam and find that the availability of public housing in combination with modest income inequality leads to a low level of income based on residential segregation, but does not prevent ethnic segregation. The observed migrant settlement patterns are defined by the origin rather than destination effect, and the levels of integration can be influenced by the country of origin policies. For example, the Belgian-Turkish agreement concerning organised migration for Belgian mining jobs included a protocol relating to various social aspects of Turkish immigrants' lives, such as access to social housing. The 1964 bilateral agreements also included attractive conditions including the provision of adequate housing (Gsir and Meireman 2005).

As we will see below, the measurement of integration in this domain is challenging and the relationship between integration in this domain and in others is far from straightforward. Nonetheless, we suggest that residence is fundamental to a full understanding of integration, because local place is the primary site of migrants' everyday interactions with a receiving society. When Third Country Nationals arrive in EU member states, it is in specific places – most often, but not always, inner city neighbourhoods – that they arrive. Place matters, and the nature of the place of settlement makes a fundamental difference to the different stages of the integration process.

[2] Kohlbacher and Reeger (2005) "There are nation-specific factors determining patterns of socio-spatial segregation in the urban context even making it difficult to compare segregation for example in the two neighboring and German speaking countries Austria and Germany."

Understanding Residential Integration

Historically, the study of integration in general and of residential integration in particular has been bound up with the study of the city. The emergence of modern social science was in part a response to the formation of the modern city; the mass migration from country to town in the wake of the industrial revolution generated new forms of behaviour and social problems calling for scientific attention. The study of integration has its roots in this moment, and in particular in Durkheim's work *La division social du travail* (1893). Durkheim interpreted integration as the degree of sharing of common rules and values. He spoke of "moral density", the "moral rapprochement" produced by the reduction of spatial distance between individuals.

In the 1900s, Georg Simmel re-elaborated Durkheim's analysis in the terms of social psychology. Simmel describes the process of "de-socialisation", such as the loosening of the link between the individual and his community. He believed that the oldest form of social groups is that of a strongly cohesive community. In this kind of group, the individual has limited autonomy and liberty of movement. This kind of community is presumed to grow in the urban context numerically, spatially and culturally; its internal unity and its boundaries become less strong because of the exchanges and the connections; the individual obtains more liberty of movement. Thus despite physical proximity, social distance between individuals is maintained; the characteristic figure of the city, therefore, is the "stranger". In the modern city, Simmel argued, the stranger comes today but stays tomorrow.

The American Literature: Ghetto as Peculiar Institution

Our scholarly literature on residential segregation emerged in the United States early in the twentieth century. The first serious scientific study to address the issue was *The Philadelphia Negro* (1901), written by the pioneering African-American sociologist WEB DuBois, which drew on household interviews and census data to portray the city's black community to explore The urban "ghetto" – as spatial concentration of a subaltern minority emerging in the metropoles of the American North in the period of the post-slavery "Great Migration" from the rural South – became the paradigmatic space for the scholarly discussion of segregation, and indeed of race and ethnicity more generally.

Following DuBois, a sociology of urban settlement patterns emerged in America. The reflection of the German sociologist Georg Simmel strongly influenced the Sociological School formed in Chicago from 1916 and its perspective of "human ecology": the analysis of human relations, social and ethnic communities, and their development in the city. The city was represented by human ecology as a habitat which naturally sorted and sifted its social groups into a mosaic of "natural areas":

within these segregated areas, the community forms a cultural independent unit, with its own cultural and social models.

With Chicago as their laboratory, Robert Park and his colleagues explored its Little Sicily and its Chinatown as instances of this ecological tendency; the ghetto was their exemplary image of immigrant clustering. Park (1925) theorised that physical distance (of the ghetto's inhabitants to the mainstream world) generated social distance, and thus that patterns of assimilation in other spheres of life could be mapped on to urban settlement patterns. New contours of urban settlement in the 1970s/80s saw the emergence of migration-focused literature, such as the work of Massey and Denton on migrant-origin Asian and Hispanic segregation, seen as differently patterned than that of black Americans (.e.g. Denton and Massey 1989; Yu and Myers 2007; Li 1998).

The European Literature: Beyond Ethnic Framing, Towards Migration Framing

As European societies became sites of immigration, the theme of residential integration returned here. The European literature historically took the US literature as its model, but rapidly moved beyond the American ethnic framing, and towards migration framing (Bergamaschi and Ponzo 2011). In "older" migration countries, such as the UK, attempts were made to use similar methodologies to understand distinct patterns – a question framed by Peach as "Does Britain have ghettoes?" Peach argued that whereas New York, for instance, is a city *of* immigrants and minorities, London is a city *with* immigrants and minorities (1996). In the "British model" that Peach identified, "culture" (i.e. the specific cultural practices of particular ethno-cultural groups) rather than "race" was the fundamental divide. Whereas American cities experienced suburbanisation as "white flight", European cities saw declining population in the mid-twentieth century period *before* large-scale in-migration, leaving affordable urban space which migrants accessed.

Consequently, the weight of the research showed that European cities have far lower levels of spatial concentration by ethnicity than their American counterparts, a finding confirmed, for example, in the Netherlands (e.g. Musterd and Ostendorf 1998, 2007), Sweden (e.g. Andersson 2007). European cities do include sites of migrant residential concentration, but migrant populations as a whole are less intensely clustered.

One significant factor which shapes the housing dynamic in older migration countries in Europe is the huge role of public housing in the urban residential market, which dramatically shapes housing outcomes for many migrant groups. Thus different sorts of housing policies and welfare entitlements across Europe play a much more significant role in the literature here than in the US (Fortuijn et al. 1998).

Despite the low levels of enclaving in Europe compared to the US, there has nonetheless been a powerful policy discourse around "parallel societies"

(*Parallelgesellschaften*) in several different European countries, especially older migration contexts such as Germany, the Netherlands, France and the UK, sometimes linked to spectacular incidences of urban unrest, as with the French *banlieue* uprisings of 2005 (Schönwälder 2007).

Comparative Research Across Europe

Comparative research has been a strong feature of the European literature, with comparisons conducted at a number of levels, from the national to the regional to the city and even neighbourhood. Throughout the 1990s, immigration scholars in Europe focused on the nation state as the key level for understanding immigrant integration comparatively (Brubaker 1992; Heckmann and Schnapper 2003; Schnapper 1992; Soysal 1994; Zincone 1991). The importance of the different *national* integration models or philosophies of integration posited by scholars such as Favell (2001) and Joppke (1998) and the different immigration policies and migration histories features prominently in the research. Different national models – such as the Dutch "multicultural", the British "race relations" model, the French "assimilationist" model and the German "differentialist" model (Koopmans and Statham 2000) – embodied in varying regulatory frameworks, policies and practices, shape variations in the possibility of residential integration from country to country. The turn against methodological nationalism has shifted comparative analysis to the city level (Penninx et al. 2005). An underdeveloped field of *cross-city* comparisons has been more prominent in the last decade (Zincone and Caponio 2005). There have been important attempts to map and typologise different sorts of "contact zones" (e.g. Hickman et al. 2012, Wallman 2011).

Most recently, a critique of "methodological city-ism" has emerged with an insistence that the neighbourhood, as integration's "ground zero", is the most appropriate scale for comparative analysis of the real processes of integration (Pastore and Ponzo 2013). This turn to city and neighbourhood approaches in the comparative literature is thus able to draw on the insights of the urban sociological literature noted above, as well as the growing new body of comparative urbanism (e.g. McFarlane and Robinson 2012; Nijman 2007). Schiller and Çağlar (2009) call for a "rescaling" of migration studies to better calibrate it to the challenges of understanding these place-specific processes. Such a re-scaling would require migration studies to enter into closer dialogue with geography, urban studies, and other more spatially attuned disciplines. Wei Li's analysis of the emerging Chinese "ethnoburb" in the American metropolis of the 1990s gives us some indications: "global and national conditions manifest themselves at the local level, and are overlaid onto the place-specific situations. The interplay of changing geopolitical, economic and social dynamics at different levels and their spatial expressions form new opportunities for an ethnoburb to be created at certain localities" (1998).

Drivers of Residential Integration and Segregation

All of these literatures, American and European, have yielded valuable hypotheses on the drivers of residential integration. These include "dysfunctional processes" that prevent integration and "benign processes" that produce areas of different ethnic compositions (Simpson et al. 2007). We can identify four main sets of drivers of residential integration and segregation: discrimination, ethnic majority revanchism, housing market factors, and social factors.

A massive literature, both activist and scholarly, has focused on areas of **discrimination** faced by migrants and minorities, including the housing market. This includes both formal mechanisms and informal mechanisms, ranging from the prejudices of landlords and lenders to institutional racism among public housing providers. In addition to direct forms of discrimination, indirect discrimination may result from lack of information about housing (for instance advice about public housing entitlements or about access to cheap finance) or from language barriers which block new migrants' access to information.

"Revanchist Urbanism" a term used in critical geography, refers to the processes by which majority populations attempt to withdraw themselves from the diversity of the city. This includes the creation of exclusive gated communities and processes of "white flight", as majorities remove themselves from areas perceived to be multicultural.

Housing Market Factors are fundamentally important. As with non-migrants, the socio-economic characteristics of the migrant household are key determinants of tenure, conditions and residential location. Household financial resources are especially important in determining choices about what is affordable, and these in turn rest on access to credit.

These household level factors are mediated by immigration status and the rights and entitlements associated with these, including the right of residence and access to public housing or rent support. In different welfare systems, housing need (which is often demonstrable among refugee families, for instance) might facilitate access to public housing, while in other welfare systems length on the waiting list or residence in a municipality will help determine this (thus disadvantaging recent migrants).

Some of the key concepts in the literature around residential integration relate to the **pull factors** in residential clustering. These include the locational, contextual and personal characteristics which drive clustering (e.g. Glavac and Waldorf 1998). For many migrants with curtailed financial and social capital in a receiving society, residential clustering also enables strong ties (bonding capital) that support their livelihood strategies while leaving them "encapsulated" in "truncated" networks (Portes 1998; Granovetter 1983; Ryan 2011).

There are also different spatial and temporal orders of clustering discussed in the literature, such as the existence of primary and secondary clusters and the divergence between initial residential choice on migration and subsequent moves which

have the effect of relatively weakening or strengthening primary or secondary clusters or of driving deconcentration (e.g. Glavac and Waldorf 1998).

The role of chain migration and migrant networks (to which we will return below as we focus on a transnational approach to residential integration) is key here, with chain migration producing clustering effects, which in turn encourages more migration: the formation of ethnic enclaves or at least a critical mass of co-ethnics in a city or neighbourhood makes settlement more attractive, while those who settle first take on key intermediary and networking roles in facilitating future migration (see e.g. Gardner 2002 on Bangladeshis in London).

Is Residential Integration an Indicator of Integration?

A related key set of questions is around the measurement of residential integration, and the extent to which it can be measured as an indicator of integration more broadly. Media and policy discourses around parallel lives and segregation suggest that migrant spatial concentration is a key indicator of integration as understood publicly.

The academic consensus is that residential integration is indeed an indicator of integration in general (Peach 1975), More recently, for example, in Ted Cantle's work (2001) on community cohesion, as in many other accounts, social interaction is closely related to the places where people are housed, schooled and employed. There is evidence elsewhere in Europe of some correlation between residential integration and integration in the labour market – as in Italy, where Moroccan migrants have a longer presence than Romanian migrants but are less residentially integrated in a way that correlates to their relative exclusion from the Italian labour market (Ponzo 2009) – and education integration – as the school choice and residential choice of migrants and non-migrants are clearly related.

However, as this "dissimilarist" approach has built up increasingly complex and contradictory evidence, the picture has become more complicated. There has been a growing recognition of the relative autonomy of the different domains of integration. Thus an increasing weight of evidence pushes against the original thesis and suggests that migrants benefit in several ways from living near people of the same background, and that this can be a factor for successful integration in a number of domains, including the labour market (Murdie and Borgegård 1996). Ager and Strang (2008) cite the evidence of Hale (2000) and the extensive review of evidence by Duke et al. (1999), which show that connections with fellow migrants reinforced by residential proximity strengthen social capital, especially "bonding" capital. Hence, in developing indicators of refugee integration, Ager and Strang initially proposed a suite of indicators to do with housing which included "measures of the physical size, quality and facilities of housing, along with the financial security of tenancies and, where appropriate, ownership". But they found in their fieldwork with refugees that these aspects of housing were considered unimportant; what was considered important were the sense of being settled and at home in an area (2008) –

the aspects of housing that point beyond the socio-economic towards identity and belonging.

Finally, underlying all the processes of integration is the regulatory regime which enables or prevents migrants from equally participating in the various domains; this web of legal rights and responsibilities form a foundation for integration. In the domain of residential integration, most relevant would be laws and rules relating to the long-term settlement of migrants with different legal status, but also laws and rules relating to their entitlements to some welfare benefits including housing assistance and, crucially, access to public housing.

Measures of Residential Integration and Segregation

Quantitative Methodologies

Understanding such factors has required the development of methodologies for measuring integration and segregation. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, residential tenure and conditions have been used as key indicators of integration, along with features related to segregation. Variables relating to tenure and conditions are relatively straightforward in their measurement.

Issues relating to segregation are more complex and contested. In their analysis of segregation's dimensions, Denton and Massey (1988) considered residential segregation as a multidimensional phenomenon varying along five distinct axes of measurement: ***evenness*** (uniformity of distribution), ***exposure*** (chance of being in contact), ***concentration, centralization***, and ***clustering***. Reardon and O'Sullivan (2004) discussed Denton and Massey's paper in their distinction between spatial and a-spatial traits of residential segregation. They reduced the study of residential segregation to two main dimensions: *spatial exposure or spatial isolation* (the extent that members of one group encounter members of another group or their own group, in the case of spatial isolation in their local environments) and *spatial evenness or clustering* (the extent to which groups are similarly distributed in residential space).

Evenness is a relative measure and refers to the differential distribution of two social groups among areal units in a city. It is maximized when all units have the same relative number of the two group members as the city as a whole and minimized if a group is distributed in an elevated heterogeneous way over areal units. Therefore, the evenness indices express the degree of distributional heterogeneity between two populations. They reflect the degree of heterogeneity in the composition of the population, which are considered as both divided sub-groups and independently from how these sub-groups are distributed. In this sense they are a-spatial.

The most widely used measures of residential evenness are the *Dissimilarity Index*, the *Gini coefficient* and the *Entropy index*. The Dissimilarity Index assesses the evenness with which two groups are distributed across the component geographic

areas that compose a larger area. The critics of the Dissimilarity Index were concerned with its correlation to the number of sub-areas and their conformation. In the 1990s, an alternative formula was proposed that took in account the spatial characteristics of the sub-areas (Morrill 1991; Wong 1993). The Gini Index is closely related to the index of dissimilarity and represents the mean difference between minority proportions weighted across areal units, expressed as a proportion of the maximum weighted mean difference. The Entropy index measures the distance from evenness by assessing each unit's difference from the entropy of the whole city. A city's entropy is the extent of its diversity.

Residential **exposure** refers to the degree of potential contact or the possibility of interaction between two groups. Indices of exposure measure the degree of confrontation by virtue of sharing a common residential area. Although indices of exposure and evenness tend to be correlated empirically, they are conceptually distinct because the evenness indices depend on the relative size of the groups, while the exposure indices do not.

The two fundamental measures of residential exposure are the *interaction* and the *isolation* index. The interaction index measures the extent to which members of one group are exposed to members of the other one. It is the minority-weighted average of each spatial unit's majority proportion. The isolation index, similar to the previous index, measures the extent to which minority members are exposed only to one other, rather than to majority members, and is computed as the minority-weighted average of each unit's minority proportion.

Concentration refers to the amount of physical space occupied by a group. A group is said to be residentially concentrated if it occupies a small segment of the total area in a city. The index of spatial concentration is interpreted as the share of group's members that would have to move to achieve a uniform density over all units.

Finally, **clustering** is the spatial dimension of segregation and refers to the extent to which areal units inhabited by minority members adjoin one another in the urban space. Clustering is strictly connected to the "checkerboard problem", an important issue in measuring segregation that refers notably to the contiguity between areal units.

All of these indices of residential segregation compare the administrative units (e.g. census tracts) into which the geographical area is divided. From the equivalence between administrative units and neighbourhoods arises two issues: the *checkerboard problem* and the *comparability problem*. The checkerboard problem refers to the impossibility of the a-spatial measures of segregation to distinguish between normal widely-distributed settlement areas (like a checkerboard) and a checkerboard where all the black squares are together on one side and the white ones on the other side.

Indicators of Residential Integration

Most discussions of indicators of integration have articulated an aspiration to include residential integration among key indicators. For example, in the mid-1990s, the Council of Europe's initiative to build a cross-European consensus on measuring integration included residential factors in its recommended indicators: "concentration and segregation in districts, quality of housing/overcrowding" and "proportions in public, rented, and self-owned housing" (1996).

However, the disparities between housing markets, forms of tenure, and available data in different countries have been a barrier to developing common indicators in this area; as most of the housing market is private and since there is little requirement on landlords and home owners to provide standard information to states, national governments tend not to hold extensive data.

The OECD uses three residence-related indicators among its suite of indicators of migrant integration: tenure status, physical description of the dwelling, and cost of housing. On the first of these, for example, 53% of migrants in OECD countries are owner-occupiers, compared to 71% among the native-born. At an EU level, the indicators of integration proposed at the Zaragoza ministerial conference of 2010 (Zaragoza 2010), which put in place a framework for measuring integration across the EU, included "ratio of property owners to non-property owners among immigrants and the total population" (as measured in the EU-SILC database) as one of the core indicators for "social inclusion".[3] This variable is available for the foreign-born in all EU-27 countries except Romania, for Third Country Nationals in all 27 EU countries except Romania and Slovakia, (Migration Policy Group 2012).

In developing the indicators, the Migration Policy Group has stated in a Discussion Paper states that at the European level, the members of the foreign-born population are three times less likely to own property compared to the general population. This indicator compares the ratio of property owners to non-property owners of foreign born and foreigners in the age group 20–64. While people born in another EU Member State are less likely to own property compared to native-born immigrants, they are still more likely to own property than non-EU immigrants. The situation is slightly more positive for the age group 55–64. The relevance of this indicator is debatable from a social inclusion perspective, for which housing quality and access may be more relevant. Indeed, many recent or temporary migrants have little reason to buy property (ibid.).

OECD research suggests that newer immigration countries such as Ireland, Finland, Greece or Italy tend to have bigger gaps with this indicator than older immigration countries such as Germany (2012). At a national level, some integration monitors have taken up these indicators. The Irish national integration monitor, for instance, shows a dramatic gap in the proportion of households that are property

[3] See *Presidency conference conclusions on indicators and monitoring of the outcome of integration policies*, Annex to Ministerial Declaration, Zaragoza 2010. NOTE: In August 2013, new indicators were proposed by MPG to augment these Zaragoza indicators: Housing Cost Overburden (EU-SILC), and Overcrowding (EU-SILC).

owners, between 77.9% among Irish nationals and 28% among non-nationals (McGinnity et al. 2013: Table A3 p. 9, Table 4.5 p. 46). Other monitors use indicators of concentration or of social housing, either instead of or in addition to home ownership. For example, the Dutch national integration monitor includes the indicator "Proportion of individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood" as one of the measures of "social contacts". The Danish integration monitor, for example, examines segregation and social housing, disaggregated by gender, 'non-Western immigrants' and particular ethnic groups.

The PROMINSTAT project has provided more detail in its country studies of available variables in each country, which range from tenure to amenities and type of property, to satisfaction with neighbourhood or landlord, to reasons for moving to current residence (e.g. Singleton et al. 2010). Few national monitors, however, disaggregate by country of birth, making analysis from a sending country perspective less easy; exceptions are Austria, Norway and Sweden.

Towards a Country of Origin Perspective

Contrasting Outcomes by Country of Origin

The types of methodologies introduced in the previous section have been applied to the ways in which different groups within an urban system experience residential concentration differently, with several comparative studies positing both convergences and contrasts between different groups' outcomes. Following the hegemonic role of ethnicity in the American literature, much of this scholarship has focused on differences between ethnic groups. However, there has also been considerable work on explaining differences and similarities between different country of origin groups. This line of inquiry takes us towards the possibility of a sending country perspective on segregation.

For example, in the UK, detailed analysis of housing rental in the Labour Force Survey, although sample sizes are small for migrant groups, reveals significant differences by country of origin, as summarised by Kofman et al. (2009). So, while only 5% of migrants coming from Australia, France and the USA live in local authority or housing association housing, this figure exceeds 40% for those coming from Bangladesh and Turkey and reaches 80% Somalians. Conversely, UK research focusing on ownership shows that different ethnic groups have dramatically different rates, with South Asian households considerably *more* likely than the national average and Black Caribbean and especially Black African households considerably *less* likely to be homeowners.

In a third example, the Irish national integration monitor shows that the differences among migrants between country of origin groups are as significant as those between migrants and non-migrants, with just 3.3% of EU12 nationals owning homes compared to 73.15 of A8 nationals. In a more geographically focused study,

Cristaldi (2002) has measured the segregation of migrants from China, France, Morocco, Peru, Poland, Spain, and Sri Lanka in Rome, showing different degrees of concentration for different country of origin groups.

This type of research agenda has pushed some scholars towards a discussion of different housing integration models for different migrant groups in the same receiving contexts. For example, Peach (1996) has developed the idea of an "Irish" versus a "Jewish" model of spatial integration or Verdugo discussed "region of origin" settlement pattern. However, these types of research questions are limited by seeing country of origin as a *predictor* of integration outcomes in the receiving context, rather than seeing migrants as actors in their own right.

Residential Integration in a Transnational Perspective?

The "transnational turn" in migration studies in the last two decades has opened up a new set of research agendas (e.g. Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Schiller 1999; Vertovec 1999). This turn has not had a significant impact on the literature on residential segregation, but it nonetheless opens up new ways of conceiving of migrant settlement as part of a larger transnational view of the migration journey, with neighbourhood choice being shaped by a whole web of factors. In particular, the transnational perspective breaks down the traditional divide in migration studies between immigration questions and integration questions, allowing us to relate integration outcomes back to other elements of the migrant journey. Few studies have systematically analysed the relationship between cross-border activities and integration, but those that do suggest that strong transnational links are no barrier to integration in a receiving society and may in some cases facilitate it.

One particularly fruitful area of the transnational approach that is relevant to residential integration is work done on various types of **intermediaries** in the migration process, which can help us to identify some of the key actors in a transnational residential trajectory. For example, considerable research has been done on various types of agents facilitating regular and irregular migration – see, for example, Peixoto (2008) on the "contact people" in Portugal who promise irregular migrants from Brazil or Eastern Europe access to housing as part of a "migration package", with the housing provided often rented from members of the same informal networks. Other types of intermediaries may be located in the formal rather than informal economy, such as the "ethnic estate agents".

A second fruitful area of the transnational approach is the concept of the "**migratory career**", as developed by Martiniello (2008) and others. The migratory career is defined by Cvajner and Sciortino (2009). as "a sequence of steps, each marked by events that are defined as significant within the structure of the actors' narratives and publicly recognised as such by various audiences".

And a third fruitful area emphasised in the transnational literature is the **economic flows** between sending and destination countries. Gilani et al. (1981) found that Pakistani migrant workers spent a majority of their receiving country income

on sending country household consumption, with the largest share, 22% of income, going into real estate. Recent work has continued to explore this. For instance, from his research on Moroccan emigrants, Hein de Haas has written about the significance of international migrants' households leading real estate investment and construction activity in the Todra valley. Summarising much of this literature, the OECD notes that even "when families can afford a suitable accommodation, they may choose to give priority to other aspects of their lives (children's education, proximity to cultural services, etc). This is notably the case for migrants contemplating a return to their country of origin and to an even greater extent for those aspiring to property ownership there." (2012).

More **ethnographic** research has teased out the affective texture of these processes. For example, Katy Gardner's research with Sylheti Bangladeshis (e.g. 2002) showed the interrelationship between migration pathways and settlement patterns, with chain migration building up a critical mass of co-ethnics in particular neighbourhoods (specifically Tower Hamlets in London) that in turn encouraged further migration, to the extent that settlement patterns in the receiving country affected migration decisions in the sending country.

Other recent work, drawing on Douglas Massey's work with Mexican migrants in the US (1986), has explored the relationship between **transnationalism and integration**, although this remains an under-researched topic. For instance, de Haas and Fokkema (2011) have explored the relationship between integration and return migration, based on a on a dataset of four African immigrant groups in Spain and Italy, and found that owning a home in the destination did not affect the likelihood of returning to the sending country, whereas other forms of economic integration in the sending country do reduce the likelihood of return. Valentina Mazzucato (2008) has researched similar questions in relation to Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands, with a detailed analysis of how these migrants spend money, including on property in the receiving and sending context. Spending on home ownership in the Netherlands and in Ghana are not inversely related, with many migrants spending on both, showing how transnational commitment and local rooting are not necessarily in opposition.

Cultural dimensions which vary by country of origin feature in some discussions of residential integration. Fereshteh Ahmadi Lewin (2001), for example, shows how the varying meanings of "home" among migrants affect settlement patterns. A rare example of an analysis which from a transnational perspective which focuses on residence is Sutama Ghosh's work on Indian Bengalis and Bangladeshis in Toronto (2007). Ghosh attempts to show that strong transnational ties make a difference to settlement pathways, and the relative density of these among Bangladeshis compared to Indian Bengalis makes a difference to outcomes. Cultural dimensions are highlighted, such as fictive kinship of co-nationals in migration or the sense of obligation (dharma) motivating the provision of shelter to co-nationals. These strong ties are reflected in higher reported satisfaction from Bangladeshis with their first residence in Toronto. However, Ghosh found that these processes did not facilitate home ownership or the move from first accommodation to first permanent residence,

as obligations and debts (including contracts with immigration agencies) could keep many Bangladeshis in temporary accommodation longer.

Housing Pathways

In some ways mirroring the paradigm shift in migration studies, housing studies have also seen a transition from the more positivist "social physics" of the earlier period to focus instead on how housing choice and constraint are socially constructed (e.g. Payne and Payne 1977; Clapham 2002).

The concept of housing pathways, building on earlier "housing career" approaches, emphasises that choice and constraint operate in different ways in different significant life moments, structured by larger social forces but also including residents' agency. Family formation, life-course moments, and work-related and other formal and informal economic resources and opportunities all play a role, but in the context of particularly shaped housing markets. Clapham (2002) defines housing pathways as "patterns of interaction (practices) concerning house and home, over time and space" (p. 63). "The pathway of a household is the continually changing set of relationships and interactions which it experiences over time in its consumption of housing. This includes changes in social relations as well as changes in the physical housing situation" (Clapham 2003).

A pathways approach means a turn from statistical models which present a (however sophisticated) static *snapshot* of residential concentration, to a more diachronic or *processual* analysis, as time and the life-cycle play a key role in thinking about pathways. The approach was also based on a critique of an earlier "constrained choice" model, which undervalued the role of migrant agency in forging housing careers. A pathways approach foregrounds relationships and interactions, thus showing both migrant agency and capitalist structure.

The role of networks and intermediaries, as highlighted in the transnational literature, also emerges occasionally, with "informal support provided by kith and kin, chance encounters with key actors – or gatekeepers – sympathetic to an individual's plight and willing and able to assist [and] third-party advocates able to draw on professional expertise and standing to challenge the decision making of housing agencies such as social landlords" all identified as helping to shift intentions post-migration or otherwise contribute to changing housing pathways. (76) For example, evidence of "a local Pakistani 'accommodation circuit' also emerged, with respondents revealing their disengagement from formal access routes into housing and their reliance on informal alternatives."

Gaps in Knowledge

Key gaps in knowledge, which can potentially be addressed while accounting for the country of origin importance are the following ones:

- *The extent to which cultural expectations* of migrants *from different sending contexts affect residential patterns*. For example, if there is a "culture" of home ownership, of self-build, or of social housing in the sending context (i.e. a habituated body of practices embedded in the common life of the specific sending context), will this influence housing choice in the receiving context? Inevitably, the extent to which migrants see themselves as permanent or temporary makes a fundamental difference to all the domains of integration, as has been recognised at least as far back as 1976, when Joan Nelson described a continuum between "sojourners" and "new urbanites", who relate differently to the city of settlement depending on their expectations of return. Drawing on Nelson's observation that the urban conditions in the city of settlement (including the availability of adequate housing or land, discrimination in the rental market, etc.) are a key determining factor in the decision to remain or return, multi-sited research would enable a better grasp of the relative weight of factors at different stages of the migratory career.
- *The extent to which cultural and material resources that migrants bring from different sending contexts give them differing market power or access to finance, which structures their housing choices*. For example, culturally embedded sources of credit (accessed through kin, religious or hometown networks, for example) might open up opportunities in the housing market otherwise denied when these are absent. The ethnographic literature on transnationalism gives us glimpses of these sorts of issues, but there has been no systematic analysis across country of origin groups.
- *The extent to which migrants' residential strategies are already formed pre-migration and the extent to which these strategies are maintained or adapted in receiving contexts.* We know that factors already emerging in the sending context make a fundamental difference to residential strategies post-migration, including decisions on where to live, who to live amongst, whether to rent or buy, and the proportion of income to be spent on housing in the receiving context as well as housing-related remittances to the sending country. And we know that intentions can change after migration. However, a proper understanding of the extent to which pre-migration factors do or don't continue to make a difference post-migration remains unclear and would require in-depth (including qualitative) research with migrants, and in particular longitudinal study, to develop a better picture.
- *The extent to which sending context actors intervene directly in the residential choices of migrants.* The academic literature contains almost no examples of case studies of sending context actors directly intervening in residential choices. In terms of flows of financial and other forms of capital, the overwhelming weight of attention in the transnational literature has been on remittances from

receiving contexts to sending contexts. Far less attention has been paid to ways in which sending governments invest in the infrastructure of their expatriates and diasporas. In 2005, Moya noted that there have been instances when "local governments [in sending countries] have become sources, rather than recipients, of financial support. Monetary injections from the lately empowered regional governments of Spain and Italy are keeping alive what appeared to be moribund regional and hometown associations in South America and Canada" (2005) – although this trend has lapsed somewhat since the economic crisis. Again, understanding this requires focused, in-depth qualitative case study research, and in particular multi-sited research to fully explore the motivations and actions of sending context actors. Specific research questions would include: do some states of origin favour residential concentration in the country of destination through Diaspora policies, e.g. by funding associations, cultural centres etc. in specific districts? Or signing bilateral agreements regarding rights of the Diaspora in specific regions/towns? By buying land for constructions?

- *The extent to which strong or weak transnational ties facilitate or block residential integration.* The limited evidence on the relationship between transnational ties and integration (and in particular residential integration) is inconclusive and needs to be developed. It is clear that strong transnational ties do not hinder integration in most socio-economic domains, but it is unclear in other domains. We know that economic integration in the sending context reduces the likelihood of return, but we don't know the extent to which investments in residence and property in the sending country affect migration strategies or integration pathways in the receiving context.

Towards a Country of Origin Perspective on Housing Pathways and Migrant Strategies

As is clear from the above, the literature on residential integration has to date neglected country of origin dynamics beyond approaches which simply see country of origin as a variable. However, we can get glimpses in the literature of some of the key elements of a potential field:

What Are the Actors Involved?

The actors central to an analysis of residential integration are migrants themselves, best analysed in relation to residential pathways in terms of migrant households, rather than as individuals. However, they are operating as part of complex transnational social fields that include a range of state and non-state actors. These social fields:

- mediate choices migrants make in shaping particular housing pathways, for instance facilitating or blocking access to particular forms of housing; and
- mediate flows of housing-related capital both from sending contexts to reception contexts (e.g. in the form of capital for investment in initial or subsequent home rental or ownership) or vice versa (e.g. as remittances or investment in real estate back home).

Non-state actors can be classified too in terms of their place in the formal or informal sector, and in terms of their location and focus of attention (in reception or exit contexts or both). The diagram below schematically sets out some of the key actors involved. In attending to state receiving actors, we also take into account the vital impact of policy on processes of residential integration (see, e.g. Musterd and Fullaondo 2008; Bolt et al. 2006).

In all of these categories, some actors are located purely in the receiving or in the sending context or operate across borders. As Portes (2003) has argued, not all immigrants are transnationals, and thus we would not expect to see individual migrants directly engaging with actors across this diagram; many individual migrants would interact with a limited range of actors in one or another corner of it. However, it *is* the case that all migrants dwell within a transnational social field, as Faist argues when he notes that "transnational webs include relatively immobile persons and collectives" (2000). The three types of transnational social spaces Faist describes – transnational kinship groups, transnational circuits, and transnational communities – are all in play in this field (Table 6.1).

How Can Their Actions Be Classified?

As the diagram above shows, the actions of these actors – whether forms of reciprocity within kinship collectives, forms of exchange in transnational circuits, or forms of solidarity within communities, or regulatory activities by sending and receiving states – can be classified into *direct* and *indirect* influences on housing pathways and related flows of capital. Direct influences include the provision of housing and finance, for example. Indirect influences are very varied, including for instance the clustering of employment opportunities or associational activities that might inform settlement choices in migration, as well as the wider social networks that might influence a return migration decision.

In addition to the *spatial* dimension (where actors' activities are focused: in the reception or exit context), the temporal dimension is important in classifying their actions, i.e. whether they have an effect pre- or during migration, at point of first arrival, or on an on-going basis.

A more detailed mapping of actions in this field (following Guarnizo's heuristic typology of transnational economic activities 2003) might identify the beneficiaries of each action (individual migrants, their families and wider social networks, their sending communities, the institutions and agents which capitalise on or take

Table 6.1 Actors in residential integration processes

Actors/focus of activity	Reception context only	Reception context primarily	Cross-border	Sending context primarily	Sending context only
State actors	Public housing market actors (e.g. public housing authorities, public housing advice officials)	Settlement/reception programmes and agencies (e.g. refugee integration programmes)			Public housing market actors in sending context
Directly engaged in housing pathways					
Directly engaged in housing-related flows of finance	Public agencies providing housing-related welfare benefits				Financial regulatory agencies (e.g. revenue agencies)
Indirectly engaged in processes of residential integration	Other institutions of the local and national state in receiving context		Sending country embassies, language schools, and cultural centres		Other institutions of the local and national state in sending context
			Formal diaspora engagement programmes		

(continued)

Table 6.1 (continued)

Actors/focus of activity	Reception context only	Reception context primarily	Cross-border	Sending context primarily	Sending context only
Non-state actors	Private housing market actors (e.g. private landlords, real estate agents)		Intermediaries (e.g. people smugglers)	Household members left behind residing in property owned or rented by emigrants;	Sending country private housing market actors
Directly engaged in housing pathways				Sending country landlords receiving rent from emigrants; sending country tenants paying rent to emigrants	
				Partners or others involved in home country property investment	
Directly engaged in housing-related flows of finance	Banks, informal lenders, credit unions	Formal and informal intra-community credit sources (mutual aid societies, lenders within social networks)	Formal and informal remittance agents (e.g. money transfer agents, hawala agents)	Family members left behind and others in receipt of remittances	
Indirectly engaged in processes of residential integration	Employers, customers, trading partners, etc., whose locations impact on residential choices	Wider migrant community associations, faith organisations, NGOs and networks whose locations impact on residential choices	Cross-border and transnational institutions whose actions impact on settlement choices	Wider home context communities and networks whose locations impact on decisions on return	

Source: Own analysis

commissions on investments, etc). And it might further identify indicators by which each action could be measured at the micro level of the individual migrant household (proportion of remittances spent on housing, proportion of shelter costs funded from remittances, etc) and at the macro levels of the sending and receiving countries (total flow of finance for housing investment coming from emigrants, proportion of housing stock partly funded by emigrants, etc).

What Can Actors in the Sending Country Do to Overcome the Identified Difficulties?

As we can see from the right-hand side of the diagram above, home country actors can play a number of roles in sustaining or depleting the resources with which migrants take advantage of opportunity structures in the receiving context. Family and hometown based associations and networks, as well as other transnational associations (e.g. faith-based), can be key to migrant livelihood strategies. However, the academic literature provides little evidence of how this might play a role in residential strategies specifically.

What Are the Diverging/Converging Interests of the Sending and Receiving Countries? What Are the Strategies of the Sending Societies to Push Their Interests?

There is some evidence that migrants are able to invest in residence in the receiving context while still making significant remittances to the home country, but the weight of evidence (e.g. Massey et al. 2002) suggests that over time greater financial commitment, including to housing, in the country of settlement depletes the possible resources that can be sent home and diminishes the likelihood of return. This is a key potential divergence of interests between sending and receiving contexts.

Sending countries, at a national level, are increasingly engaged with their expatriate populations, seeing them as key actors in economic and other forms of development. Encouragement to invest in real estate (which provides considerable labour opportunities to non-migrants – see Haas 2006) has been a major strategy for sending countries. However, in the literature, there are no discussions of ways in which institutions in sending countries actively intervene in residential strategies in receiving contexts.

A New Theoretical Framework

The research agenda opened by the transnational perspective and the methodologies used in the housing pathways literature can help us to profoundly re-orient the approach to residential integration. Both perspectives share an emphasis on *process*

rather than pattern: a move away from a static mapping and measurement of a given situation (Simpson 2005).

In such a framework, residential integration would be seen as a process occurring in one of a number of mutually related but relatively autonomous domains of integration. The process of residential integration is conceptualised as a dimension both of a migratory career and a housing pathway as they interact over time. The migratory career and housing pathway are in turn seen as shaped by the relationship between structures of opportunity – constrained by forms of discrimination, regulatory frameworks, and the housing market – and the agency of the migrant household in deploying their own resources – financial, social, emotional and cultural – to make choices. Finally, in understanding migration career, integration pathways, and housing pathways as processes or journeys, we highlight the dimension of time, including historical conjuncture, length of stay, and life-course stage, but also collective features of a specific migrant community's trajectory.

In conceptualising these processes as part of transnational strategies, we recognise that aspirations, values, experiences, and resources brought from a sending context are relevant, and that the integration pathway is part of a migratory career that begins long before settlement. It is also recognises that structures of opportunity in the receiving context are also affected at times by actors in the sending country who can intervene. In addition, seeing these processes as part of transnational strategies foregrounds the roles of networks and mediators who connect the sending and receiving context.

Drawing on the typology of actors identified above, a research programme focused on the transnational nature of these strategies would focus on contexts in which countries of origin appear as actors in the integration process. This theoretical framework would point to the following research strategy:

- At the *micro level of analysis*, research would explore individual migrant households' migratory careers, housing pathways, and integration pathways, seen as intertwining with each other as well as shaped both by structures of opportunity (including the legal foundations and policy preconditions which facilitate or block integration as well as the socio-economic context including the housing market) and migrants' individual and collective mobilisation of resources (including resources – finance, cultural orientation, social networks – brought from the sending context).
- At a *meso level of analysis*, research would have to attend to both the patterns characterising country of origin migrant groups in different spatial contexts *and* the multiple migrant and non-migrant groups who share space in residential neighbourhoods, in order to understand the constitutive role of both country of origin factors and of settlement sites. At this level, we move from housing pathways and migration careers to settlement patterns, including processes of segregation and clustering. Here, the issues identified by Thomas Faist (2000) – social and symbolic ties, and the exchange of social capital through transnational social spaces – are crucial.

- At the *macro level of analysis*, rigorous comparison across countries of origin and countries of settlement is required to understand the extent to which country of origin variables (economic development, cultural factors, etc.) and country of settlement factors (policy and regulatory frameworks, integration models, etc.) are significant in shaping residential integration. Analysis at this level will identify correlations whose causes can be explored qualitatively at the micro and meso levels.

Such a turn to a more dynamic, process-oriented approach, placing residential integration within a framework of housing pathways which link sending and receiving situations, can raise a series of possible research questions. In this perspective, we can see the extent to which migrants' housing strategies are part of migration strategies. In addition to questions raised earlier about cultural expectations and cultural and material resources shaped in sending contexts, other research questions might include the following.

- Do differing housing tenure, land ownership, household structure models, and finance traditions in sending contexts have an impact on migrant housing pathways?
- What is the role of formal and informal networks and mediators in facilitating migrant access to housing?
- How are home-based actors and political networks (as well as transnational – e.g. family- or hometown-based political networks) mobilised to support migrant residential strategies, including in conflictual contexts such as struggles over access to social housing?
- How do the legal regimes in sending countries – e.g. around currency transfer, foreign investment – have an impact on migrants' housing pathways?

Provisional Hypotheses on the Impact of Country of Origin Actors in the Residential Integration Process

Drawing on all of the above, we can identify four provisional hypotheses for our research questions.

1. Hypothesis: Integration in the residential domain loosens transnational ties

   Does integration in the receiving society loosen ties with the sending context? Ethnographic evidence adds some weight to this suggestion, which seems intuitive at first glance. For example, Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2013), reflecting on long-term work with Dominicans in Boston, note that "While in the early days of migration, people lived near one another, the challenges of Boston's geography and of finding affordable housing mean that community members now often live quite far apart from each other. While they remain committed to helping their community, time is more precious and valuable" (2013). However, as Levitt and Lamba-Nieves also suggest, this may not be straightforwardly the case; ties

with the homeland may be articulated differently in less time-intensive, more efficient ways, for example.

This hypothesis could be tested by observing the correlation between residential integration and remittances to the receiving country or active engagement with hometown associations, with a negative correlation supporting the hypothesis. However, such an analysis would need to be attentive to the importance of harder-to-measure "social remittances" (Levitt 2001; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011) alongside flows of money.

2. Hypothesis: Sending country actors perceive that integration in the residential domain loosens transnational ties

   Whether or not the previous hypothesis is confirmed by the evidence, it is also intuitively likely that sending country actors – sending states, but also associations based in or focused on the sending context – might perceive it to be true. This would be best tested through interviews with sending country actors, although analysis of relevant documents (e.g. formal strategies for engaging diasporas, speeches of sending politicians aimed at expatriates) might also provide insight.

3. Hypothesis: sending country actors with an interest in stronger transnational ties act to promote residential integration

   If the previous hypothesis is true, it would intuitively follow that those sending country states and other sending country actors that are most concerned with strengthening ties with their emigrant population – e.g. those most dependent on remittances – would act most vigorously to maintain residential integration, if the resources are available. Case study research on examples of sending country actors' interventions could test this hypothesis.

4. Hypothesis: The specific (local) opportunity structure in the receiving context shapes the possibilities for transnational engagement in residential integration

   The preceding hypotheses provide a framework for investigating the motivations of sending country actors to intervene in residential integration processes in receiving contexts. But it is also vital to see how the features of particular places in the receiving context can change the possibilities of integration. Schiller and Çağlar (2009) illustrate this across several domains of integration when arguing that where a municipality stands in the larger cartography of trans-urban systems is a fundamental determinant of the potential for inclusion across a range of integration or incorporation domains. This is particularly the case in relation to residential integration, which is heavily constrained and enabled by structural and contingent features relating to place, and in particular by the housing market. Understanding how this works requires a rigorously comparative approach that investigates the opportunity structures in place and the spatial dynamics in play in a range of receiving contexts.

5. Hypothesis: The engagement of sending country actors in residential integration hhas macro-social consequences in receiving contexts

   Schiller and Çağlar argue that the existence and density of particular pathways of incorporation in a municipality in turn impact the municipality itself and its political and economic potential (2009). This is just one example of the thesis

articulated by Portes (2003) that, in the aggregate, migrants' transnational activities add up to significant effects in both receiving and sending contexts. In the residential domain, this most obviously means effects on the housing markets in both contexts (measurable, for example, by land/house prices and rents and on rates of specific tenure forms), but also on local economies, (the efficacy of) migrant political mobilisations, and forms of bridging and bonding social capital based on migrant associational and cultural life. Quantitatively measuring and attributing causality to such effects would be an extremely challenging task, however, and focused extended case study approaches might be more useful.

Methodological Approaches

In conclusion, four different methodological approaches are appropriate in addressing this research agenda, and a combination of these would provide a robust account of residential integration as part of transnational migration.

1. Multivariate analysis and indicators of integration

   The disaggregation of data on migrant integration, including its relation to residential integration, by country of origin, and a multivariate analysis of key variables remains a key task for integration scholars interested in how country of origin dynamics shape integration. Key data sources are set out in the *PROMINSTAT thematic report on housing conditions* and national datasets (such as Census data). However, such synchronic methodologies tend to provide a static picture, good for describing the state of integration at a specific moment but poor at explaining integration as a lived process unfolding over time in real place and thus best complemented by longitudinal and more focused qualitative accounts.
2. Large-scale Longitudinal tracking

   On moving to a process-focused transnational approach to residential integration, one key potential resource would be the use of longitudinal data on migrant trajectories to analyse the factors that shape migrant residential pathways and better understand the role of sending country actors in those. Such data would include material from small-scale qualitative longitudinal studies, large-scale quantitative longitudinal datasets, and the tracking of individual trajectories through linked administrative datasets. (the Enquête Longitudinale sur l'Intégration des Primo-Arrivants (ELIPA) project in France, the STATIV database for Sweden).
3. Housing career interviews

   Longitudinal data of a different sort can also be collected retrospectively through biographical recall techniques during interviews, on the model of life history interviews. Similar techniques have been used in transnational migration studies contexts, but here the focus would be on residential history, including decisions about tenure or ownership.

4. Neighbourhood case studies

   Neighbourhood case studies, ideally including both fine-grained quantitative data collection as well as ethnographic attention to the everyday lived experience of integration, can also help us go beyond the social physics of synchronic methodologies. Where research can explore households from multiple country of origin groups that share space in the same housing markets, a far richer account can be generated of the ways in which specific migratory careers and residential strategies are shaped through local opportunity structures and resource mobilisation. Such a research agenda might enable us to develop more sophisticated accounts of the country and region of origin models already in the literature, and test our hypotheses. It would also generate policy recommendations, in particular given the recent policy neglect of housing as a key element of integration.

Conclusion

Successful residential integration is an important element of the overall well-being of a migrant in the country of destination. Becoming part of the host community is necessarily shaped by the housing conditions of an individual migrant or a family that has to integrate into the new reality of the destination country, and first and foremost, into a village, city or neighbourhood. As demonstrated in this chapter through an extensive literature review in the field, migrants' degrees of residential integration are influenced by a large set of factors which include the individual characteristics of a migrant (such as education, labour market status, financial resources, family size, etc.), the attitude towards their migration (welcoming or discriminatory), but also by macro variables such as the condition of the housing market in the destination (rental market regulation, availability of social housing and migrants' rights to it) and integration policies or bilateral agreements (such as the Belgian-Turkish agreement of 1964).

The impact of these elements has been extensively discussed by the academic community. However, there is growing evidence of the importance of the country of origin in defining residential integration outcomes in the destination country. The rapidly increasing diversity of the European population in terms of origin and observed heterogeneity of migrants' settlement patterns has introduced a new dimension to the European research agenda. It has pushed some scholars towards a discussion of different housing integration models for different migrant groups in the same receiving contexts. There has also been considerable work on explaining differences and similarities between different country of origin groups, which has led to scholars acknowledging the possibility of looking at residential integration from a sending country perspective. However, the existing knowledge regarding the channels through which the country of origin may impact the integration outcome of migrants abroad is scarce and limited to case studies which are hardly generalisable.

Taking this into account, the chapter discusses the key gaps in knowledge which can potentially be addressed while accounting for the importance of the country of origin: (i) the extent to which cultural expectations of migrants from different sending contexts affect residential patterns; (ii) the extent to which the cultural and material resources that migrants bring from different sending contexts give them differing market power or access to finance – which in turn structures their housing choices; (iii) the extent to which migrants' residential strategies are already formed pre-migration and the extent to which these strategies are maintained or adapted in receiving contexts; (iv) the extent to which sending-context actors intervene directly in the residential choices of migrants; and (v) the extent to which sending-context actors (state and non-state) intervene directly in the residential choices of a migrant. These knowledge gaps led us to propose a new theoretical framework which could potentially answer the questions above. The proposed research strategy includes a micro, meso and macro level analysis which would test the set of provisional hypotheses regarding the potential impact of country-of-origin policies on residential integration in the destination country. At the micro level of analysis, research will explore individual migrant households' migratory careers, housing pathways and integration pathways, which are seen as intertwined, as well as shaped both by structures of opportunity and migrants' individual and collective mobilisation of resources. At a meso level of analysis, research will have to attend to both the patterns characterising country-of-origin migrant groups in different spatial contexts and the multiple migrant and non-migrant groups who share space in residential neighbourhoods, in order to understand the constitutive role of both country-of-origin factors and settlement sites. At the macro level of analysis, rigorous comparison across countries of origin and countries of settlement is required to understand the extent to which country-of-origin variables and country-of-settlement factors are significant in shaping residential integration. Analysis at this level will identify correlations whose causes can be explored qualitatively at the micro and meso levels.

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Chapter 7
Do Countries of Origin Contribute to Socio-cultural Integration of Migrants Abroad?

Sonia Gsir

Introduction

This chapter aims at understanding how countries of origin may influence the social ties of their emigrants abroad – and thus the socio-cultural dimension of integration – when they settle in their new country of residence. "Socio-cultural integration is concerned with the question of whether ethnic minority groups become part of the receiving society or whether these groups remain distinct from the host country" (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2007). The contacts migrants develop with the host society, their knowledge of the host society language, the attitudes of the host society, and the sense of belonging to the host society are several aspects of socio-cultural integration which have been studied in great detail (Ehrkamp 2005; Snel et al. 2006; Gijsberts and Dagevos 2007; Vancluysen et al. 2009; etc.). Here, socio-cultural integration is examined through the lenses of social interactions between migrants and natives in different social contexts: intermarriages, interethnic friendships, interethnic relations at workplace and, finally, encounters in the neighbourhood.

Whereas the literature has generally focused on the role that transnational bonds play in the society of origin, here it is rather their role in the receiving society which is explored. The purpose is to explore how links with the country of origin can influence social interactions in multicultural European societies, and to assess their impact on socio-cultural integration in the host society. Social interactions between the host society and first-generation migrants who are legally in Europe are discussed in the literature on second generation integration (Portes and Zhou 1993; Ellis and Almgren 2009; and others).

In order to better identify the role of the country of origin on social-cultural integration, three leading concepts are mobilized. Firstly, the country effect refers to the role of the country in the migration process. There are two kinds of country effects,

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both of which can be particularly relevant in socio-cultural integration as they constitute a kind of background or a socle for the development of new social ties in the destination country. On the one hand, the endogenous country effect refers to the level of emigrants' human capital. In other words, newcomers already have specific capital that has been constructed in the country of origin and relies on the cultural and political system there. For instance, several authors have noted that proficiency in the host country language is an element of migrants' social integration (Jacobs et al. 2004; Chiswick and Miller 2007). Only very basic social interactions can take place without a common language; it is obvious that proficiency in the language of the receiving country is a powerful tool that allows migrants to actively communicate and interact with members of the receiving society. If migrants have had the opportunity to learn the language of the destination country in their country of origin, then there is obviously an endogenous country effect on socio-cultural integration. On the other hand, members of the host society have certain perceptions and beliefs about the country of origin of new immigrants. This "country label" is the exogenous country effect. We assume that it shapes the attitudes of the host population but it can be difficult to assess due to its heterogeneity. The exogenous country effect can vary according to ethnic groups and generations. This effect is certainly highly dependent on the historical links between emigration and immigration countries and on their political relations. We can also formulate a hypothesis that the country of origin influences socio-cultural integration through emigration and diaspora policies. This country impact would be difficult to evaluate, however, in some cases countries of origin are actively mobilizing their own culture in order to foster links with emigrants (Gsir and Mescoli 2015). Finally, if we consider the effects and impacts of the country of origin, the concept of a trans-border state can be mobilized to describe a state which has three distinct characteristics: it builds the nation beyond its physical borders; it supports the insertion of emigrants into the economic and social fabric of the migrants' new country of residence; and it is represented by at least two levels of governance, comprised of state and non-state actors.

The first part of the chapter draws broadly on the global context of social interaction in Europe. It argues for the use of the term "co-integration" in order to better describe the process at stake between the various stakeholders, and it introduces the concept of social interactions. The second part of the chapter addresses four kinds of social interactions, highlighting their role in socio-cultural integration. For each one, a non-exhaustive review of the specific literature underscores the main factors which explain these social interactions. The role of links with the country of origin is also explored. Finally, some questions and hypotheses are put forward. The conclusion aims to assess the role of the country of origin in social integration and whether there is a prevailing model (effect or impact). It also tries to understand how policies of the country of origin match (or do not match) the integration policies of the European countries and how they can contribute effectively to socio-cultural integration in destination countries.

Social Interactions in a Diversified Europe

The European Union has created a continent of immigration with de facto multicultural societies with diverse ethnic and religious populations. The elements characterizing integration, in the EU help to give more depth to the analysis and recall the important role played by the receiving country and by the host society in the process of co-integration. Migration contributed to the diversification of Europe and continues to do so with the arrival and settlement of new migrants (Fargues 2011). But the diversification of Europe is not only related to migration; other factors contribute too to diversity (Martiniello 2011). Vertovec (2007b) introduced the notion of super-diversity in order to adopt a multifactorial perspective rather than an exclusive focus on the ethnic factor. Indeed, on the basis of the super-diversification of society, he proposed to take into account other factors often considered separately such as "differential immigration statuses and their concomitant entitlements and restrictions of rights, divergent labour market experiences, discrete gender and age profiles, patterns of spatial distribution, and mixed local area responses by service providers and residents" (Vertovec 2007b). He meant by super-diversity precisely "the interplay of these factors" (ibid.). This multidimensional diversification must undoubtedly be taken into account in the analysis of social interactions in complex societies. For example, even though, the following concerns social interactions between migrants and natives, the fact is that among the latter some have a migration background which may impact on social interactions. Or as Song (2010) noted in her study about intermarriages and "mixed" children in Britain "[w]hat we mean by integration, and assumptions about the social distance between ethnic and racial groups, will need far more fine tuning, with the growing multiple pathways and outcomes experienced by monoracial and multiracial people within multi-ethnic Western societies." Diversity at different levels is thus a specific structural element of European societies and it has to be taken into account when studying social interactions between different ethnic groups.

Integration has progressively become synonymous with the efforts undertaken by immigrants to integrate their new residence society and they are indeed viewed in political discourses and public opinion as the main proof of their "good" integration. Nevertheless integration, and specifically socio-cultural integration, happens not only through immigrant endeavours but rather in interaction with the host society. The premise of this statement is to look at identities as multiple and, above all, not fixed but changing throughout life. I Social ties and more precisely socio-cultural interactions are a locus for identities formation. Identities cannot be essentialized and reduced to language, culture or religion. Furthermore, other sources of identity formation have to be taken into account such as "experiences of gender, age, education, class and consumption, which are shared with other groups and cut across ethnic lines" (Amin 2002). Faist and his colleagues argued that "focusing on interaction allow to move from the integration of immigrants to the co-integration of residents" (Faist et al. 2013). In order to better account for this reciprocity between immigrants and the host society members, co-integration should be used instead of

integration. Co-integration, indeed, better reflects integration as a "two-way process" (Joppke 2007).

Co-integration is, thus, a process involving all members of the destination country society, including those who are full members and fully included and including new members even though they do not yet necessarily enjoy full rights linked to citizenship. It relies on the place the host society and the receiving country grant or allow to immigrants in "the process of becoming an accepted part of society" (Penninx 2004). This highlights precisely what is at stake: the place that the society assigns to the migrant and how social ties are shaped. The point, in this chapter is that through social ties between established members of the society and newcomers, one can observe and measure steps and degrees of the co-integration process and the dynamics of a changing society. This chapter also adheres to the ideas of contact theory stating that prejudice can be reduced by interpersonal contacts between different social groups (Allport 1954). Blau and his colleagues have also showed that "[m]ultigroup affiliations further the integration of the diverse segments of complex society in two ways: by fostering crisscrossing conflicts, which mitigate the chances of deep cleavages and sustain democracy, as political sociologists have pointed out (e.g., Lipset), and by promoting marriages as well as friendships between members of different groups […]" (Blau et al. 1984).

In order to understand the socio-cultural dimension of co-integration between immigrants and natives, one can focus on social interactions that occur in immigrants' everyday life in the host country (Goffman 1967). Social interactions can be very diverse. They can be ephemeral or long-lasting, positive or negative, private or public, ethnic or non-ethnic, etc. They can emerge in the frameworks of more or less strong social ties. As Alioua (2008) noted, strong ties imply a high level of reciprocity and long-term relations, and they concern relations with relatives, friends or even regular associates. Whereas, weak ties are more occasional, and they do not imply reciprocity and regular contacts (ibid.). The nature of social interactions reveals the array of relations that can emerge between individuals or groups: distance, separation, segregation, cooperation, coalition, patterns of friendship, conflicts, tensions, accommodation, etc. (Vertovec 2007a). Observing and analysing social interactions can highlight the social structures framing individuals when they enter into relations (Goffman 1967). In this chapter, social interactions occurring between migrants and natives are the dependent variable and refer to socio-cultural integration. Thus the question is how countries of origin have an effect or an impact on social interactions in the countries of destination.

One of the prominent characteristic of these social interactions here is that they occur between members of different ethnic groups: immigrant minorities and the majority group or natives. Therefore, here social interactions also refer to interethnic relations and can be considered as such and, in particular, as part of the questioning of integration and integration conditions in the new society. De Rudder et al. (2000) defined interethnic relations as "relations that build and unite social groups defined by their origin, real or perceived, and their culture, claimed or alleged. Interethnic relations are not reducible to what is sometimes called 'intercultural relations'. In interethnic relations, cultural facts are actually 'captured' by a

description and categorization system. This system selects, falsifies or invents cultural traits including them in a more or less unequal and hierarchical social organization." In multicultural societies shaped by immigration history, the population is diverse with different groups: immigrants (new immigrants, naturalized), natives with more or less recent immigration backgrounds and native with no immigrant background. These groups are also labelled ethnic minorities and the majority is referred to as the natives. Interethnic relations occur between immigrants and natives but also between immigrants from different ethnic backgrounds. In some neighbourhoods with a high percentage of immigrants or with many residents from an immigrant background, the balance between ethnic minorities and the majority group can be inverted leading to another kind of social interactions where natives feel themselves to be a minority. There is a wide array of social interactions among all these groups but the focus here is mostly on social interactions between first-generation immigrants and natives without a recent immigration background.

The local contexts where emerge social interactions between immigrants and the receiving society range from multiple institutions of the host society such as local governments administrations and other public services, schools, companies, hospitals, and, associations (Vertovec 2007a) to public spaces with squares, public transportation, shops, housing complexes. However, they also include the private sphere (family relations, marriages, friendships). Social interactions contribute to the migrant social network. For the purposes of clarity, interactions in private context are distinguished from those in public context even though it is obvious that both contexts are not impervious. The private context is the place for strong bonds of a family type, for friendship or even professional relations. Here the focus is put on marriages and friendship between immigrants and native population. It is in the public context that the weakest links between immigrants and host society can emerge. This might be the case in formal and institutional public frameworks such as the workplace, churches or other religious organizations, recreational groups or volunteering associations. These weak links arise in a more informal way in the public space such as the neighbourhood understood as an open public space, but also within reduced public spaces such as specific squares, parking areas, etc.

A large array of relationships can weave between migrants and the majority group. I use the term "relationships" purposely to take into account both interactions and representations. Even though the focus is here on social interactions, it is important to bear in mind how mutual perceptions about the other can shape and influence attitudes and interactions (Pastore and Ponzo 2013). In some studies, scholars measure socio-cultural integration by observing social contacts together ("contacts with indigenous people in leisure time and visits of indigenous friends or neighbours"), language proficiency and stereotypical attitudes (e.g. Gijsberts and Dagevos 2007). In the neighbourhood for instance, immigrants can be seen as a social or a territorial threat, being discriminated against or on the contrary accepted as neighbours. Migrants as natives have mutual beliefs, stereotypes and prejudices.

Relying principally on different bodies of existing literature on immigrant integration, on transnationalism and on emigration and diaspora policies, this chapter explores how countries of origin influence social ties at destination; even though

this question is not necessarily tackled directly by these bodies of literature. Literature on immigrant integration aims first of all at understanding the conditions of integration from the perspective of the receiving country. And, in studies on immigrant transnationalism the dependent variables are transnational practices and the conditions of the emergence of these practices. Their consequences for integration are of lesser importance – even though this issue is not completely absent (Snel et al. 2006; Vertovec 2007a; Délano 2010). In the Netherlands, social interactions in terms of informal contact with native residents are not related to transnational activities or transnational identification and it is, rather, the length of stay in the new residence country that influences the number of native Dutch in migrants social networks (Snel et al. 2006). Migrants involved in transnational economic activities, who identified themselves with the members of their diaspora living in other countries, tend to identify more with the natives (ibid.). Thus "migrants appear to be quite able to live in two different worlds" and that the links migrants keep with the country of origin do not impede social integration in the host country (ibid.). Finally, the literature on emigration and diaspora policies is still limited. Therefore, information about the object is relatively new. Certainly, data about the impact of emigration countries on integration and specifically social interactions in immigration countries are scattered through the literature.

Social Interactions: Towards an Emigration Countries Perspective

In order to give a perspective including different types of contexts of social interactions between immigrants and host country population, several kinds of social interactions are reviewed from intimate ones such as immigrant-native marriages in a private space to more mundane encounters in the public space like the neighbourhood. Each section aims to define a specific social interaction, to identify the factors explaining it and also to assess the links with integration. One crucial question would be to identify in the literature the role that countries of origin can play on intermarriages, interethnic friendship, and interethnic relations in the workplace and in the neighbourhood. Finally, in order to try to answer this issue new hypotheses are put forward.

Intermarriages

"One of the most commonly used indicators of social interaction between immigrant communities and mainstream society is intermarriage" (Muttarak 2013). Intermarriages take place when two persons of two groups considered as ethnically different marry and the word refers to a form of cultural exogamy (Safi 2008).

Moreover, "[i]nterethnic marriage, defined as a marital union between a foreign-born and a native-born individuals, is considered to have important social implications for both immigrants and their host countries" (Kantarevic 2004). A great deal of research in sociology and in demography has been focussed on binational marriages or intermarriages. These works examine the patterns of exogamy, they provide intermarriage statistics, describe interethnic marriages and focus on their causes, and their formation (Filhon and Varro 2005; Collet and Regnard 2008; Lucassen and Laarman 2009; Hamel et al. 2010; Le Gall and Meintel 2011). Some studies have showed that the number of intermarriages have grown in some European countries (Collet and Regnard 2008; Lucassen and Laarman 2009; Muttarak 2013). Among the factors that influence intermarriages, authors pointed to the age and marital status at migration, the level of education, the generation, and the length of residence in the host country (Filhon and Varro 2005; Kalmijn 2010). Another important factor is group norms (Muttarak 2013). They might discourage intermarriage or acquaintance out of the group for preserving some cultural values or traditions such as Muslim Pakistanis in Britain who favoured endogamous arranged marriages (ibid.). The interethnic friendship network increases the probability of marrying interethnic partners (Van Zantvliet and Kalmijn 2013). Finally, Safi (2008) recalls what others have also highlighted, namely the importance of demographic balance between groups, residential segregation, and the size of the group: when migrants were fewer it was more likely that they would meet and marry natives. There are thus individual and structural factors explaining intermarriages (Safi 2008).

Other research also tried to understand the impact that intermarriages may have had on integration (Blau et al. 1984; Lucassen and Laarman 2009; Safi 2008), on the economic assimilation of immigrants (Kantarevic 2004), and on the social integration of the children of these interethnic marriages (Filhon and Varro 2005; Kalmijn 2010; Song 2010; Le Gall and Meintel 2011). Intermarriages are often viewed as a measure of integration in the receiving society (Safi 2008). "High rates of intermarriage are considered to be indicative of social integration, because they reveal that intimate and profound relations between members of different groups and strata are-more or less-socially acceptable" (Blau et al. 1984). Intermarriage is a principle of assimilation theory on integration (Safi 2008). After all, the more that migrants are assimilated, the more they get closer to natives and, thus marry them, have children, blurring boundaries between groups. Consequently intermarriages rate as an indicator of assimilation (ibid.). Even though this theory worked for describing European migrant assimilation in the USA at the beginning of twentieth century, it was contradicted by other examples such as the low intermarriage rate between "Black" and "White", Irish or Jewish and others in the USA (ibid.). In her case-study on intermarriages among migrants in France, Safi (2008) has shown that the classical assimilation theory is relevant for European migrants, the Portuguese excepted. Therefore, she concludes, social integration through intermarriage depends on good integration on the labour market. But, she observed an inclination to endogamy for other groups such as Asians and the Portuguese, who are well integrated in the labour market but who maintain strong community bounds. There

was, meanwhile, a proclivity to exogamy for other groups that are less integrated economically in particular Tunisians but also other North Africans (ibid.). Her findings allowed her to nuance the correlation between intermarriages and integration and to underline that other factors were crucial: individual, structural and contextual factors explaining intermarriages, not to mention the particular migration history of each immigration (ibid.). Furthermore intermarriages generally contribute to the integration of children. In his case-study on Senegambian-Spanish couples in Catalonia, Rodriguez García (2006) noted that "[s]ocial class seems a more important factor than cultural origins in determining patterns of endogamy and exogamy, not to mention the dynamics of living together and the raising of mixed-union children". She warned about the risk of essentialism when focusing on cultural arguments to explain mixed unions and their consequences (ibid.). Kalmijn (2010) also stressed that intermarriages also affect society as a whole by reducing frontiers between groups and between the generations.

The impact intermarriages have on the links with country of origin is progressively studied in particular in the context of transnational studies. When a migrant decides to get married with a spouse from the host country, this can lead to conflict or even rupture with the family in the country of origin. In their case-study on intermarriages between migrants and Quebecois, Le Gall and Meintel (2011) indicated that social interactions with the family of origin of the migrant was sometimes stronger than with the Quebecois family, notwithstanding that this family was geographically closer. It seems that there is a real endeavour on the part of migrants and even their spouses to maintain strong and regular links with the family abroad and consequently, they invest more in these interactions (ibid.). Regular contacts with family in the country of origin is seen by the parents as a means to initiate their own children into country of origin culture and part of their identity (ibid.). In their research on binational marriages between the French and migrants, Filhon and Varro (2005) looked for the impact of marriage on the migrant's desire to return to the country of origin and found differences according to the origin and the sex of immigrants. Portuguese and Moroccan men married to a French spouse were keener to return than women from the same countries, however, globally, migrants involved in binational marriages tended to return less to the country of origin than migrants married with a co-ethnic spouse (ibid.).

But rather than the question of impact on the links with country of origin, here the issue is on the the role of the country of origin on intermarriages. In some specific cases, agencies in the country of origin advertise and promote intermarriages by advertising brides from an emigration country (Kofman 2004; Zabyelina 2009). However, the issue of "mail-order brides" seems to fall outside the scope of this chapter in the sense that it concerns women candidates for emigration rather than emigrants already settled in the host country. The literature apparently offers little on the influence on institutional actors from the country of origin on intermarriages of migrants in the host country. In order to investigate this question, one can hypothesize that different kinds of actors in the country of origin may have an impact on cultural exogamy. Without assessing the importance of this "country of origin" factor, the hypothesis is that it can, indeed, be relevant to complete the array of local

factors already identified – local referring to the individual and structural factors, which are specific to immigrants in the new residence country.

On the one hand, non-state actors, third parties such as families, friends, religious groups affect immigrant spouse choice. Families staying in the emigration country can try and encourage or discourage from afar the son or the daughter (namely the migrant) to get married with a native from the immigration country. They can on each occasion promote arranged endogamous marriages. Arranged marriages with immigrants can be a way to organize new emigration. Mbah-Fongkimeh and her colleagues (2012) showed how Turkish arranged marriages with even second generation migrants residing in Belgium, and through the family reunification right, encourage new emigration. Third parties in the country of origin can thus affect intermarriages according group norms and interests. It is thus important to understand what is the norm regarding intermarriages and how the latter are perceived in the country of origin. As mentioned above group norms are a crucial factor of intermarriages formation. One can consider them as an endogenous effect as they are part of the human capital of migrants. Nevertheless, they can be also part of the exogenous effect as members of the host country may have some believes regarding marriages in the considered country of origin.

On the other hand, authorities in the country of origin may also affect intermarriages according to their laws and policies and have an impact. Firstly, apart from the broad question regarding the diaspora policy and the measures related to intermarriages, countries of origin may by law recognize or not intermarriages. Furthermore, marriages recognized by the country of destination could be prohibited by the country of origin (e.g. gay marriages). Secondly, state actors may also influence maybe more indirectly the union of emigrants abroad according to access to documents requested to contract marriages abroad (e.g. such as birth certificate). In this case, the role of consulates can be prominent because they may facilitate or impede the access to documents. Finally, once migrants are married, countries of origin may still play a role. Before all when they give or not access to their territory to the migrant spouse. They may also grant or not specific rights to the foreign spouse and the children in the country of origin (social, economic, political rights and access to citizenship). These rights may be important for a lasting intermarriage.

Interethnic Friendship

Before even getting married, another type of social interaction happens when some migrants and members of the host society develop close ties and trust, and become simply friends. Friendship with the majority population can benefit immigrants in terms of socio-cultural integration even though friendship relations are not as formal as intermarriages (Muttarak 2013). Interethnic friendship gives opportunities for better reciprocal knowledge and brings migrants and natives closer allowing the exchanges of socio-cultural codes, practices, languages, etc. It can also reduce

mutual prejudice (intergroup contact theory), as mentioned above with the work of Allport (1954) and followers such as Savelkoul et al. (2011): these demonstrated that social contacts between different groups have a favourable effect on mutual perceptions and reduce negative attitudes. They can enlarge the social networks of both migrants and host society. They can also have a positive effect on employment and on finding a job (Battu et al. 2011). "[I]nter-ethnic friendships not only reflect voluntary and intimate social relations between individuals, but also indicate to what extent members of different ethnic groups accept each other for such relations" (Schlueter 2012).

A rich literature on interethnic friendship both in the USA and European countries suggests that interethnic friendship is a process shaped by individual preference, opportunity structure and also integration (Muttarak 2013). In her theoretical review, Muttarak (2013) pointed out the factors influencing interethnic contacts and friendship such as the principle of "homophily": homophily meaning that people tend to associate with similar others in terms of characteristics (language, nationality, culture, tradition, religion, etc.) directing social relations in general. "Individuals with similar social status (e.g. education and occupation) and beliefs (e.g. religion and political orientation) are more likely to be in the same physical space at the same time" (Muttarak 2013). A second factor is the influence of third parties (family or group members), which can be against interethnic friendship (ibid.). Encounter opportunities are another crucial factor conditioning friendship and finally integration is also a relevant element in the sense that second generation migrants, who are already included in different spheres of society, have a greater chance to have interethnic friends than their parents when they migrated (ibid.). Works such as the case-study of Schlueter (2012) on immigrants in the German city of Duisburg demonstrate that friendship with natives is more frequent when immigrants are born in the host country and when they speak the host country language and have a high education.

Part of the literature often examines patterns of friendship or the interethnic unions of immigrants children (Verkuyten and Kinket 2000; Van Zantvliet and Kalmijn 2013) rather than focusing on adults (Muttarak 2013). As in this chapter, first generation migrants is targeted, the literature focusing on adult friendship is privileged. Muttarak (2013) examined interethnic friendships of minority ethnic groups in Britain and found that generation was an important factor or, in other words, that interethnic friendship was more frequent in second generation migrants than in the first one. She found, too, that migrants from one ethnic group tended to develop friendships with migrants from other ethnic groups and less with the "white British" (ibid.). And finally, she highlighted the fact that if ethno-religious identity could shape interethnic friendships, economic integration weakened this factor (ibid).

The characteristics of the residing environment are another important factor. Regarding the influence of residence on interethnic friendship, two positions have been established (Schlueter 2012). The first one states that living in an ethnic enclave where ethnic minorities were the main inhabitants limits social relations with the host society and interethnic friendship; whereas the second position argued that segregation was not a relevant factor because of the high level of mobility and

modern communication technology in current societies (ibid.) Taking into account the role of socio-economic resources on social integration, Schlueter (2012) examined how residence and educational attainment play a role on interethnic friendship patterns between Turks and German in a German city. He found, as others have showed before him, that there was a correlation between residing in an ethnic segregated neighbourhood and friendship with host-society members. But he also demonstrated that when the education level was low there was even smaller chance of getting friends within the host society (ibid.).

Finally, the literature on interethnic friendship does not particularly highlight the role actors in the country of origin could play in this specific social interaction. Nevertheless, to go one step further, some factors influencing interethnic friendship could be questioned from the country of origin perspective. In this last paragraph, the question is whether actors in the country of origin and links with the country of origin may affect the conditions of interethnic friendship. The degree of influence could be looked for within four factors: homophily, third parties, opportunities of encounters and residence. Firstly and broadly, the narratives of actors of the emigration country regarding the destination country with respect to the socio-cultural dimension of the receiving country should be investigated in order to understand if the stress is put on socio-cultural differences or on socio-cultural similarities between both countries societies. Secondly, and at a rather micro level, when transnational contacts are maintained with members of the families back in the country of origin, one could ask to what extent these members favour or discourage interethnic friendship. And for instance if emigrants are in a way allowed to travel back home with friends from the host country and what are the attitudes of family or friends in the country of origin regarding interethnic friendship. Thirdly, the cultural diplomacy of the country of origin may be relevant to initiate interethnic friendship in particular if the country of origin promote, in the receiving countries, opportunities of encounters (through, for example, some events or some specific places) between emigrants and the host society. These opportunities can be offered through the support of intercultural events but also in some specific places such as cultural centres established in the destination countries by the authorities of the countries of origin. Apart from cultural policy of the country of origin, the immigration policy may also be relevant in order to understand whether origin country authorities issue visas for visiting friends and more generally what is there visa policy regarding citizens from the destination country. At the end, it is more difficult to address how the country of origin may influence the place where the emigrants will reside abroad, knowing that interethnic friendship relies also on the place of residence. Nevertheless, in some bilateral agreements between the emigration and immigration countries, there can be specific housing measures which can favour or on the contrary prevent residence segregation.

Interethnic Relations in the Workplace

Some business, firms, companies, private and even public services in Europe are places of diversity. Working in ethnically diverse settings raises the issues of cultural diversity management but also, the question of social interactions between colleagues from different ethnic backgrounds. For us the most important question is the matter of social interactions between migrant workers or entrepreneurs and people from the host society when they meet in the workplace and more precisely the effect and impact of the country of origin on these interactions. There is a vast literature on immigrants' integration on the labour market. And some scholars have studied the role of the country of origin human-capital on migrant employment and in particular self-employment in the destination country (Kanas et al. 2009). No studies focus precisely on the impact of countries of origin on interethnic relations in the workplace, however, some migration studies address ethnic business and entrepreneurship, and transnational entrepreneurs (Portes et al. 2002; Kloosterman and Rath 2001).

The workplace is a space in-between the private and the public spaces. Unlike the wide public space, the workplace can be defined as "micro-publics" in terms of interaction or as "the sites for coming to terms with ethnic difference are the 'micro-publics' where dialogue and 'prosaic negotiations' are compulsory, in sites such as the workplace, schools, colleges, youth centres, sports clubs and other spaces of association" (Amin 2002). Then social interactions between interethnic groups are circumscribed to a specific environment, the workplace, and develop accordingly. Thus, the workplace offers an opportunity for encounters and for creating stronger bonds (Wise et al. 2010).

Few studies have focused specifically on interethnic relations in the workplace (Schaafsma 2008). And they are often studied so as to assess diversity in the organizations and to improve its management (Jackson et al. 2003). In her review of studies focused on interethnic relations and diversity in the workplace, Schaafsma (2008) gave elements illustrating the range of relations between workers from ethnic minority groups and workers from the majority: difficulties in establishing positive relations or in maintaining personal relations. Here we see relations becoming conflicted, trends of avoiding ethnic contact, discriminatory acts, language problems and cultural differences causing misunderstanding and irritation and also less identification with the organization and the work team for the ethnic minorities (Schaafsma 2008). She also pointed out that the perception of negative relationships differed from one group to another, and for example "that majority members are less sensitive to negative ethnicity-related events than minority members" (ibid.).

Studying daily interethnic relations between employees and managers in fifteen organizations in the Netherlands, Schaafsma (2008) found that the relations were generally perceived as positive or neutral because the goals to be reached at work took precedence over ethnic differences, which seemed to be more likely to be taken into account during informal contacts at work rather than during working time. She also found similar interethnic barriers at work highlighted in previous studies:

"communication problems because of language barriers or cultural differences in social norms […], tensions because ethnic minority members spoke in their native tongue prejudice, ethnic clique formation, ethnic jokes and discriminatory remarks, and the preferential treatment of ethnic minority or majority workers by managers. To a lesser extent, […] problems because of cultural habits interfering with the work process […] and because of differences in work norms" (ibid.). Furthermore, she isolated three factors affecting interethnic relations at work: "the sense of achievement" (threatening work process or goals), "the sense of belonging" like the unity of the group and the "sense of equality", such as unequal norms and preferential treatment (ibid.).

The organizational setting is also important. Some studies on former guest workers pointed to the importance of the work position and of the distance existing between ethnic minority workers and workers from the majority group, furthermore in low-skill settings ethnic boundaries were more visible (ibid.). Contact theory suggests that better conditions for contacts include equal status between the ones involved in the social interactions, so the question of the position at workplace between immigrants and natives is crucial (Hashim et al. 2012). The position in the workplace allows us to gain an insight into social interactions. It is already obvious that if immigrants are employees, they are not in the same position as the self-employed. And, some migrants, because of difficulties in accessing the labour market, turned to self-employment and created their own businesses (Kloosterman and Rath 2001). Developing their affairs, immigrant entrepreneurs may employ some workers. They are often, at the beginning, members of the family or co-ethnics; in this case, relations are intra-ethnic.

Nevertheless, interethnic interactions can take place with the clientele following the type of market concerned by the business of ethnic entrepreneurs. Interethnic social interactions will be hard to observe in "ethnic markets" or in "niche markets" where in both cases clients are co-ethnics (Rušinovic 2006). It is rather in "middle-markets" and in "mainstream markets" that opportunities for social contacts with natives will be more important. The first type is markets where "ethnic products are sold to a general public" (ibid.). In "mainstream markets", meanwhile, non-ethnic products and services are sold to a wide clientele. Interethnic contacts can occur in both markets lead by immigrant entrepreneurs or in mainstream workplaces. Nevertheless, no study has yet focused on these contacts. The literature on transnational entrepreneurship aims rather at explaining how transnational entrepreneurs cross borders for their business activities and at examining transnational economic activities from an economic point of view (Portes et al. 2002).

After all, studies on interethnic relations at work or on ethnic entrepreneurship do not give an insight into the specific role that actors in the country of origin play but this role can be approached in studies focusing on diaspora policies. Délano (2010) questioned the role of the Mexican state, regarding the integration of emigrants in the United States. First of all, she highlighted that integration was rather an unstated objective in the diaspora policy, rather than a stated one. The Institute of Mexicans Abroad approach was to collaborate with US institutions (Délano 2010). The education programmes Plaza Communitarias "do in fact provide the tools for a

more successful interaction with [the] United States" (ibid.). They consist in adult courses held in Spanish on "Spanish literacy and writing, elementary and middle school education, computer literacy, and English as a Second Language" (Laglagaron 2010). These binational programmes are organized inside U.S. institutions (like schools, community centres, health clinics, etc.) and according to Délano's findings, these location help migrants to know these institutions and to become familiar with them (ibid.). They thus offer opportunities to develop social interactions with the American society, especially as some coordinators of these programmes were Americans (ibid.). This case offers an example of diaspora policy measure aimed at socio-cultural integration broadly but the effect on integration in the workplace is thus rather indirect.

Finally, in the case of emigration policies, bilateral agreements on temporary labour migration have provided some specific elements regarding the workplace. Countries of origin may thus influence social interactions at workplace in the immigration countries if they negociate migrant positions at work but also their living conditions such as housing and residence. Through diaspora policies the possible impact on the workplace environment of emigrants abroad is different. It seems that the influence of country of origin actors is located upstream by, for example, empowering multicultural skills of emigrant workers. It would be necessary to explore whether country of origin actors initiated or developed some programme to help migrants to work in a multicultural environment. Another point to explore would be the diversity policy of the country of origin and in particular at the workplace. These two points related to the endogenous country effect as the capacity to work in multicultural settings can be part of migrant human capital. Another strand of research might concern the role of migrants' transnational activities on social interactions in the workplace in the host society. For instance whether transnational entrepreneurs encourage interethnic relations in the workplace and whether there are any binational entrepreneurship or binational business associations.

Daily Encounters in the Neighbourhood

A great number of social interactions between migrants and host society happen in the context of daily life in the neighbourhood. These range from the most informal and mundane interactions like meetings in the street or sharing a space in, say, a square, a green area or public transportation, to more formal interactions such as neighbourhood relations, attending neighbourhood events or being part of a neighbourhood association. The last look more like the "micro-publics" mentioned above. Lots of authors have studied ethnic cohabitation at the neighbourhood level (Taboada-Leonetti 1989; Simon 1997; Germain and Blanc 1998; Ehrkamp 2005; Gsir and Mandin 2012) and some examined the evolution of social distance between ethnic minority and the majority group (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2007; Schaafsma et al. 2010).

Local context and in particular sub-national spaces are of major importance for understanding migrant integration (Ellis and Almgren 2009). Focusing on the "micro-cultures of place" allows migrants "to privilege everyday enactment as the central site of identity and attitude formation" (Amin 2002). Neighbourhoods are spaces of sociability, functional spaces with a specific socio-cultural history and they are also symbolic spaces (Grafmeyer 1994). Space of life within the city, specifically interconnected in the urban space, each neighbourhood has its own social dynamic. Moreover, integration policies, even if they are defined at the national level, are implemented at the local level. Furthermore, considering the neighbourhood is critical in this case because the presence of migrants become more visible at the neighbourhood level. Even though migrants do not constitute the majority of the population, they symbolically mark the neighbourhood, which can even be labelled accordingly, as for example, the Turkish or migrant neighbourhood (Taboada-Leonetti 1989). Consequently, some neighbourhoods are perceived as "ethnic enclaves" and some of them are truly enclaves (Logan et al. 2002).

There are, indeed, different kinds of neighbourhoods identified according to the distribution of populations. When ethnic minorities represent more than half of the population, they are considered as "ethnic enclaves". Germain and Blanc (1998) called multi-ethnic neighbourhoods, those with more than 30% of ethnic minorities and with an important diversity among ethnic minorities. Mixed neighbourhoods, unlike homogeneous neighbourhoods, are considered as such because they have a mixed population in terms of income (Blokland and Van Eijk 2010) and ethnicity (Bolt et al. 2010). Some neighbourhoods are defined as "super-diverse neighbourhoods" (Wessendorf 2013). From another perspective, Amin (2002) reminded us that research in UK on areas characterized by racism has distinguished two types of neighbourhoods which one can observe without difficulty in many other European cities. The first type is impoverished neighbourhoods where the native working class lived and where successive waves of migrants settled; with progressive socio-economic and cultural decline (Amin 2002). In these areas where clashes between populations may happen, natives long for the neighbourhood as it looked in the past while migrants express a right of place (ibid.). The second types are "'White flight' suburbs and estates dominated by an aspirant working class or an inward-looking middle class repelled by what it sees as the replacement of a homely White nation by another land of foreign cultural contamination and ethnic mixture" (ibid.).

Furthermore, if neighbourhoods differ in terms of population distribution and composition and migration history, they also provide their own public services, institutional infrastructures, schools, hospitals, green and pedestrian areas. All these elements contribute to the coexistence of residents and frame social interactions. Unlike the workplace, social interactions in the neighbourhood are not compulsory. In the workplace, all workers are engaged in shared working activities and pursue common working goals. This allows them to interact together despite ethnic differences and stereotypes. Work has a kind of mediating effect much as other types of activities (learning in at schools, playing sports, volunteering in association, etc.). It forces the encounter and interactions between immigrants and natives. These spaces which can be located in the neighbourhood represent what Lofland (1989) – quoted

by Wessendorf (2013) – called a "parochial realm" or a space "characterized by more communal relations among neighbours, with colleagues in the workplace, or acquaintances through associations or schools" (Wessendorf 2013). Wood and Landry (2007) pointed out that social cooperation is often easier in "zones of encounter", where deeper and more enduring interactions between people engaging in shared activities and common goals can take place. Such places are, for instance, associations, schools, youth centres, sport clubs, etc. (Pastore and Ponzo 2013). Assuming that interactions are different in the neighbourhood itself, some authors find it useful to make a distinction between: cohabitation in residential space (buildings, residential area) where people tend to stay; and public spaces such as parks, streets, shops, pubs, public transportation, etc. where people tend to circulate or where they stay briefly in order to assess the different modes of sociability between populations (Germain and Blanc 1998).

Social interactions in the neighbourhood happen more or less fortuitously. They are not necessarily sought after as in friendship or intermarriage where individual choice is critical. "Specifically, inter-ethnic contacts such as everyday encounters between immigrants and host-society members in the neighbourhood, at the workplace, in a sports club or within the family may, but need not be, based on voluntary preferences for enduring and beneficial social interaction the sine qua non for identifying friendships generally" (Schlueter 2012). They can, thus, be almost inexistent even though one can acknowledge that even when two outsiders cross anonymously in the street without even greeting each other, there is a kind of social interaction. Daily social interactions give an insight into the quality of relations between populations groups living in the neighbourhood and in this case, those relations between migrants and host country population. They can also give them the opportunity for renegotiating interethnic differences (Amin 2002). In multi-ethnic neighbourhoods of Montreal, observed that in public spaces, ties emerged rather between people from the same ethnic group (Germain and Blanc 1998). Regarding interethnic interactions a pacific cohabitation and a kind of distance as a way of sharing a densely populated space characterized the occupation of urban spaces (ibid.).

From the literature, one can distinguish two major sets of factors influencing social interactions in the neighbourhood and therefore socio-cultural integration and more largely co-integration. On the one hand, the neighbourhood specificities like residential segregation and its evolution over time in the city are important. On the other hand, interethnic relations depend also on the characteristics of the various population groups. Moreover, Bolt et al. (2010), who discussed the correlation between residential segregation and integration, found that integration relied not only on migrants' characteristics but also on institutions and the populations of the receiving society; in other words, their argument was that segregated cities were created by the host society (Bolt et al. 2010). In particular, they pointed out the location of the neighbourhoods in the city (ibid.). Some neighbourhoods, even ethnically segregated ones, may have links with other neighbourhoods due to their geographical situation or because of public transportation. Their ethnic population can, therefore, be exposed to natives and can interact with them (ibid.).

Within the set of factors linked to the neighbourhood, one which is seen as critical by many scholars is ethnic concentration or segregation. It is considered as an obstacle for social interactions with natives because migrants, as they live mainly among co-ethnics favour contacts with them (LaanBouma-Doff 2007). An interesting question came up in Gijsberts and Dagevos' study (2007) on the relations between ethnic concentration in the neighbourhoods and the socio-cultural integration of ethnic minorities in Dutch society. There the authors asked whether in a less ethnically concentrated neighbourhood there were necessarily more social contacts between minorities and the majority group because migrants would more likely meet natives. They found that ethnic concentration was related to a mechanism of ethnic competition; immigrants were seen as a threat by the natives who adopted defensive behaviour (ibid.). But when ethnic minorities were a majority in the neighbourhood, Dutch natives had more opportunities to meet them and thus to have social contact to a certain pointbecause if there were more than 50% ethnic minorities from non-Western origin, Dutch natives tended to have less contact (ibid.). Therefore, they concluded that a degree of mixing could favour interethnic contacts and had a positive effect on mutual acceptance between migrants and natives and on migrant language proficiency, an element recognized as critical for socio-cultural integration (ibid.). Another element which may influence significantly interethnic relations in the neighbourhood is the pace of the influx of migrants there (ibid.). The way the diversification of the neighbourhood happened in terms of population has a negative impact on how the natives perceived migrants and this is particularly true when there is a quick inflow of newcomers and especially non-Western migrants (ibid.). Another critical element is the migration trajectory of immigrants living in these neighbourhoods because first generation migrants have less contact with the natives (ibid).

Moreover, urbanists put forward the propinquity effect or the objective physical distance between the groups at stake. In other words, "individuals will tend to associate most with those closest to them in physical space" (Hipp and Perrin 2009). The issue of housing distribution and access to housing is crucial from this point of view. Whereas, sociologists pointed out social distance between individuals – according to their demographic characteristics such as age, gender race/ethnicity, religion, economic resource, life course stage and social background – which is also fundamental for understanding the complexity of social interactions (ibid.).

Finally, other characteristics of the neighbourhoods in terms of geographical location and interconnection with other parts of the city, in terms of socio-economic infrastructures and public services on offer are also significant (Vertovec 2007a; Amin 2002). In the comparative research on integration and conflict in European neighbourhoods Concordia Discors, it is observed of one of the Nuremberg neighbourhood that "the increasing number of shops and restaurants are regarded by interviewees to have fostered a trend away from mutual ignorance towards greater harmony and cooperation among residents: everyday interactions, such as shopping, leisure time activities, involvement in associations, local district committee, neighbourhood centres (e.g. Zentrum Aktiver Bürger) as well as courtyard festivals are considered crucial in fostering encounters between migrants and natives"

(Pastore and Ponzo 2013). The socio-economic structure of the neighbourhood shapes also social interactions.

Other factors are related to the characteristics of the population living in the neighbourhood. A first crucial element highlighted by many authors is income or socio-economic position and also education level. Social deprivation exacerbated ethnic difference (Amin 2002). According to Gijsberts and Dagevos (2007), the less privileged in the population socio-economically or with a low level of education had more negative attitudes because of ethnic competition theory. A high education level and a good position in the labour market allowed more contacts, and structural and social integration are articulated (integration in the labour market and education producing social integration) (ibid.). Racism has also a dramatic influence on inter-ethnic relations in neighbourhoods and could persist despite housing policy of ethnic mixing to increase neighbourhood social cohesion (Amin 2002). Cultural isolation is usually seen as the problem and ethnic mixing the key, but the underlying assumption leading to this policy solution is a vision of the different groups identities as fixed and culturally homogeneous (ibid.). "Inter-ethnic understanding, therefore, is not guaranteed by everyday cultural hybridisation. It requires the removal of fear and intolerance associated with racial and ethnic difference, living with or coming to terms with ethnic difference, and, ultimately, an acceptance that cultural pluralism (ethnic, racial, sexual, generational) is the mark of a vibrant and evolving society" (Amin 2002). Comparing interethnic relations between Turks and Dutch in Tilburg and Rotterdam, Leeflang (2002) found that it was the level of acceptance of Turks as neighbours, colleagues, friends that determined the tolerance and not the reverse. Both communities have their own perspectives for evaluating relationships and the concepts they use to describe their relationship, therefore, "[a] majority, which determines what level of cultural diversity is allowed, is related to a minority, which strives for a respectful relationship with the majority" (ibid.). Finally, another study on neighbourhoods, in a Belgian city this time, revealed that even though natives, in their discourses, expressed racism towards immigrants living with them in the neighbourhood, they could simultaneously and paradoxically create ties and interact with them in a way that demonstrated acceptance (Gsir and Mandin 2012). It is thus crucial to observe social interactions in locus and not only to rely on discourses about interethnic relations in the neighbourhood.

The literature on social interactions in neighbourhoods reveals various factors in interethnic relations. The role of the country or the society of origin is rarely put forward even though as for other social ties, there is an underlying country effect, would it be endogenous or exogenous. Apart from studies such as Ehrkamp's (2005), the literature does not really explain the country impact. A possible hypothesis is that actors in the country of origin become interested in what happens in the neighbourhood when there is ethnic concentration of emigrants and when problems or conflicts with the native population are reported in the media. The country of origin is, indeed, concerned as to how emigrants are perceived and reported in host countries. Furthermore, "[e]xposure to the culture of a country through its diaspora may serve as a portal through which people in a host country develop broader interest in the diaspora's homeland – including its political and economic circumstances.

Country-of-origin governments often promote culture as a way of raising the profile and burnishing the reputation of their country" (Newland 2010). The authorities of the country of origin can, then, try to promote better intercultural understanding, particularly within "zones of encounters" in the neighbourhood that can favour cooperation and peaceful relations between natives and migrants. The country of origin can be present or represented through institutions such as consular networks, cultural centres, schools, hometown associations or migrant associations located in specific neighbourhoods. Actors in the country of origin may try to empower emigrants in terms of social integration (language courses, information about group norms and codes, information about the local institutions) in the country of destination. If actors in the country of origin may support the creation of mixed place of encounters in the neighbourhoods such as cultural centres or religious or leisure places, they also may organize or co-organize events with intercultural dimension such as festivals, cultural events, fairs, sport events, … On the other side when events such as municipality initiatives, intercultural networks, public fora and events, city twining, intercultural exchanges, and sponsorship are organized by the receiving country, the country of origin and some actors may take also part in and influence interethnic encounters.

Conclusion

This chapter set out to clarify how country-of-origin actors influence the socio-cultural integration of emigrants in the destination country; or put differently, the objective was to identify the effect and impact of the country of origin on social interactions between emigrants and members of the host country society. Literature on the issue is scarce and therefore, hypotheses and research guidelines rather than answers have been offered here. From the four cases (intermarriages, interethnic friendships, and interethnic contact at the workplace and in the neighbourhood), we can conclude the following:

First, the different social interactions depend on a multiplicity of contextual factors related to the destination country (such as residential segregation, degree of racism and acceptance, opportunities for encounters and neighbourhood effects) and individual factors related to migrants (demographic characteristics, migration trajectory and length of residence). The latter are indeed linked to the country of origin. They can be considered the endogenous effect of the country of origin on socio-cultural integration. Indeed, social interactions rely on the human, cultural, economic and even political capital of the migrants, part of which has been gained in the country of origin. Human capital is of crucial importance with regard to intermarriages and interethnic friendships, due the principle of homophily. On the other hand, social interactions imply the participation of non-migrants or members of the destination society. In the case of encounters in the neighbourhood, the beliefs and knowledge about the migrants' countries, the exogenous effect of the country of origin, is crucial. The effect of the country of origin varies according to the kind of

social ties. One could assume that the endogenous effect is stronger in intermarriages and interethnic friendships and lower in encounters in the neighbourhood. Whereas the exogenous effect is more important when social ties are weaker, for instance in public contexts such as the workplace and neighbourhood.

Second, the impact of the country of origin also varies depending on types of social ties. In this case, the impact is represented by the government through its policies, as well as by civil society and non-state actors. Regarding interethnic relations in private spaces, it seems that non-state actors from the country of origin are the ones who may have a critical impact. Their influence can be particularly relevant for the formation of interethnic unions. However, state actors may also play a critical role by giving migrants access to documents required to register an intermarriage abroad. Finally, actors in the country of origin may indirectly influence the socio-cultural integration of emigrants abroad by creating opportunities for encounters with natives or by offering emigrants in the neighbourhoods certain practical tools for socio-cultural integration (such as language courses).

Third, through "diaspora engagement policies", states of origin work at diaspora building by cultivating or recognizing diaspora identity. They also carry out diaspora integration, or rather re-integration in homeland politics, by extending emigrant rights abroad and in the origin country (for instance, the right to retain citizenship (Gamlen 2006)). A third mechanism for engaging diaspora (Gamlen 2008) is the empowerment of the diaspora in the host country. The country of origin can strive to sustain and facilitate emigrants' socio-cultural integration in the receiving country. However, even diaspora-engagement policies do not aim to shape social interactions and integration in the host country. Their implementation can only influence social interactions by providing conditions (such as dual citizenship) to develop them or by offering migrants tools and services to more easily interact with the host society. Sustaining migrant integration in the host country can be a strategy for other policy areas (tourism, bilateral agreements, economic policies, etc.). States of origin want their emigrants to succeed in host countries in order to get indirect benefits: a positive country image, remittances, opportunities and development. Socio-cultural integration is undoubtedly part of the recipe for success. However, as Délano (2010) remarked in the case of Mexican diaspora policy, immigrant integration is often part of an "unstated objective" of the country of origin due to the concern about potential intrusion into the country of destination's affairs and potential allegiance confusion. Finally, for the society of origin, the idea that their government is more active for emigrants abroad than for the population within the country could serve local political actors.

As mentioned above, countries of origin have both an effect and an impact on socio-cultural integration. One could ask what the prevailing model is. In the country-of-origin effect model, what is particularly at stake is, on the one hand, endogenous factors such as levels of human capital and the cultural system of emigrants acquired in the country of origin, which play a role in socio-cultural integration; and on the other hand, exogenous factors such as beliefs regarding emigrants' origins, (i.e. the country label). In the latter example, these factors rely largely on the members of the destination society. In the country-of-origin impact model,

emigration and diaspora policies play a role and are crucial factors to explain socio-cultural integration at destination. In the case of social interactions, it is the country-of-origin effect model which is more powerful because it has been demonstrated that endogenous and exogenous effects shape all kinds of social interactions. The country effect underlies socio-cultural integration. The impact of diaspora policies, even when they lead to the implementation of programmes empowering emigrants abroad, is less obvious although it can also be combined with other factors shaping social interactions. Countries of origin pursue relatively unstated or indirect objectives regarding socio-cultural integration in the destination countries. Finally, this chapter has shown that all social interactions are shaped by a group of factors (individual, structural and contextual). The influence of the country of origin can be part of this multifactorial approach and can be conceptualized as a trans-border state with an underlying endogenous and exogenous country effect, and a more diffuse country impact.

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Chapter 8
Religion and Diasporas: Challenges of the Emigration Countries

Jocelyne Cesari

Introduction

According to a 2011 survey conducted in the 27 member countries of the European Union, all immigrant groups tend to be more religious than the native born population of the host country. Religiosity was measured as the sum of three factors: frequency of prayer, attendance of religious services and self-declaration as religious. Based on the subjective religiosity, the difference between immigrants and native population is small. Overall, immigrants pray more (30.02%) than native populations (21.86%) and attend religious services at least once in a week in the receiving countries.[1] Interestingly, the religiosity of the same immigrant group varies from one receiving country to another. For example; certain destination countries such as Greece, Poland, Portugal, and the UK demonstrate high levels of immigrant religiosity, however, Scandinavian and Eastern European countries (except Poland) tend to show lower levels of religiosity for immigrants as compared to other countries based on their "religious attendance and praying. There are also certain countries (like Cyprus, Greece, and Ukraine[2]) whose native born population is more religious than the immigrant population.

Unemployment and low levels of income do not increase immigrants' religiosity. On the other hand, the level of education and the length of time spent in the host

[1] The religiosity was measured by three questions: frequency of prayer, attendance of religious services and self declaration as religious. Based on the subjective religiosity, the difference between immigrants and native population is small.

[2] Although Ukraine is not a member of the EU, it was included in the aforementioned survey.

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country tend to diminish the level of religiosity. Finally, Muslim immigrants are more religious on the three accounts (prayer, religious attendance, and self-declaration) than other religious immigrants.

Regretfully, this survey is one of a kind. Undoubtedly, studies on the religiosity of immigrants have increased in the last 15 years. But most of them are focused on Muslim immigrants in Western Europe. They have the inconvenience of being nationally defined and for the most part qualitative and therefore difficult to use in any comparative work.[3] There are also surveys on the policy of receiving countries for religious recognition or fight against religious discrimination as well as on Muslim organizations and their relationships with the state of the receiving countries (Laurence 2012, Fetzer and Soper 2004). Through this angle, it is possible to get sparse information on the strategies of some sending countries to take advantage of this situation.

Moreover, there has been very little work done on the religious dimension of political actors from the sending countries, *when they interact with migrants*. There is no work at all on the dialectical interactions between migrants, countries of origin and countries of residence.

Considering the above, I will show that the effect of the sending countries is **endogenous**, i.e. education and cultural references create a specific religious identity which either facilitates or hampers integration abroad. Because of the status of religion in most countries of origin, immigrants expect a religious experience that is not limited to the place of worship but also appears in the social and public spaces of the receiving countries.

At the same time, the impact of the country of origin is visible in its diaspora policies (which maintain a connection with emigrants and their descendants through cultural and religious ties). This action on the diaspora often competes with the influence of religious transnational networks that target the same population. For this reason, the analysis for this chapter is situated within transnational studies and the sociology of religion, which allow a broadening of the role of religion beyond state actors by looking into the actions of groups and individuals in both the sending and receiving countries.

Religious Dimensions of Transnational Networks

We usually understand migrations as flows of people from one nation-state to another; in the migration scholarship these flows are thought to indicate different sets of policies on the parts of net-immigrant and net-emigrant countries. The classical emigration/immigration distinction thus refers to the notion of a definitive transfer from one country to another. In this shrinking world, however, it seems that

[3] For a systematic review of the existing surveys on Muslims across European countries over the last two decades, see Jocelyne Cesari (2013), *Why the West Fears Islam: Exploring Muslims in Liberal Democracies*, New York, Palgrave MacMillan.

no one leaves a country "forever." The possibilities for remaining in touch with the homeland are diverse and in the age of social media, increasingly efficient. In these conditions, people identify themselves with different nations and cultures, and manage trans-frontier activities and loyalties, without particular conflicts or tensions. These transnational identities are by no means new, but they tend to have greater political and economic impact due the increase in intensity and technological progress. However, transnational networks do not signify the end of the state power over its nationals. We will see that in some situations, the state can actually instrumentalize these networks for its political advantage, either domestic or international.

In these conditions, the religious and cultural condition of migrants can be defined by three principal dimensions: the awareness of a religious identity, the existence of communal organizations, and the persistence of relationships (even imaginary ones) with the homeland. These three dimensions usually define the diaspora condition.

For this reason, religion cannot be apprehended exclusively as faith or belief. Additionally, while surveys analyzed below show that migrants appear to be more religious than their fellow citizens in receiving countries, we should be aware that such feature does not translate automatically in greater religious practices. Sociological work has highlighted an increasing disjunction between believing, behaving, and belonging among followers of all denominations. These three dimensions have historically been systematically linked or associated in the definition of a person's religiosity. In other words, a person's religiosity has long been defined by the inextricable connection of believing, behaving, and belonging. However, sociological analyses shed light on the disjunction of these three dimensions and apprehend this disjunction as modern forms of religiosity. Thus, a person can believe without automatically behaving and belonging; can belong without believing or behaving; or can behave without believing or belonging. For example, surveys have shown that many Christians maintain private, individual religious beliefs but do not practice on a regular basis (i.e., believing without behaving), or in some cases, Christian identity has taken on more cultural than spiritual meanings.

The studies discussed in the following sections, show that belonging is more relevant than believing to understand the political dimension of religion. In fact, belonging is often strongly asserted even when migrants lack belief. The belonging identity is strengthened when religion is embedded within the national identity of the sending country (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Poland). A difference emerges between being a "practicing Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox" and just "being Muslim, Catholic or Orthodox." So when people say that they are very much Muslims, it does not mean that they are pious. This loose cultural identity can become an asset for the sending country.

In order to capture the religious dimension of the different state and non-state actors, this chapter will analyze the interactions between receiving countries and sending countries in the religious domain. From the existing literature, it is possible to distinguish three situations that influence the actions of sending/receiving countries as well as of migrants: the minority condition, the minority within the minority

and the majority situation. The religious minority situation refers to cases where the religion of the migrant groups is a minority within the receiving country. Muslim immigrants in Christian western countries are a paradigmatic example of this situation. There is also the condition of the religious minority within the minority migrant group, like Alevis within the Turkish Sunni migrants in Western Europe. Finally, there are circumstances where the religion of the migrant group is similar to the religion of the receiving country. In these cases, the majority situation is not evaluated in numbers but in terms of proximity or familiarity with the migrants' religion. For example, even if Germany or the UK are Protestant countries, we have included Catholic migrants to these countries in the majority/majority situation, because they share a Christian background and because there are already Catholic groups in the receiving countries.

I will first present the features common to all migratory situations, i.e. disconnection between national and religious identities, cultural discrepancy between the clerics of the sending countries and the religious communities in the receiving countries, and influence of transnational religious groups. I will then address the specifics of the minority condition, as well as of the majority condition. I will conclude by discussing the positive or negative role of religion on the integration of migrants in the receiving countries.

Influence of Religion on Migrants

An analytical review of the existing literature highlights three major aspects of religious influence on immigrants: disconnection of religious and national identities, the gap between clerics and religious communities in the receiving countries, and the influence of transnational religious movements on the religious condition of migrants.

The Disconnection Between Religion and National Identities

Immigration creates new conditions of identification where personal attachment to the religion prevails over belonging to the national community of the sending country. In this regard, sociological surveys show that Muslims in Europe tend to redefine their attachment to Islam in their new countries of residence through personal belonging to the religion more than through collective belonging to an Islamic or national group.[4] Attachment to Islam becomes disconnected from attachment to the national community of origin (unlike the first generation of immigrants).

[4] For a comprehensive analysis of these surveys across Western and Eastern Europe, see Jocelyne Cesari (ed), *Handbook of Islam in Europe*, Oxford University Press, Cesari 2015a, b, c).

This disconnection between religion and national identity appears also vis-à-vis the country of residence. According to a report prepared by about the Muslims in Marseilles, only 30% of the city's population introduced their identity as Muslim. Similarly, 2011 IFOP polling shows that Muslims separate their religious values from their French national identity.

In some surveys, the disconnect is expressed in cultural terms. For example, in a 2009 survey, Turks who are born in Germany (32%) and those who are immigrants to Germany (52%) declared that they don't feel attached to the German national identity when it comes to the education of children and gender relations, while only 9% of Germans thought the same way. Interestingly, the study showed that the perception of Germany of German Turks is similar to their counterparts in Turkey rather than their fellow citizens in Germany. Similarly, according to a 2012 study by the Federal Ministry of Interior about integration and Muslims in Germany, a significant minority is particularly skeptical about integration: Only 52% of non-German Muslims favored integration, while 48% refuse to integrate, and prefer to live in separation from the German mainstream. These figures change slightly when taking into account German Muslims: While, then, 78% of Muslim favor integration, 22% prefers a more separatist approach. Overall, about 24% of non-German Muslims reject integration and question Western values.

This disconnect with the dominant cultural values of the national community has to be distinguished from loyalty to the political institutions of the receiving countries. Usually quantitative surveys of Muslims across Europe show an attachment to the national institutions of the country of residence, although results can be contradictory and vary from one European country to another (Nyirir 2007).

A 2009 survey of Muslim youth in the UK compared to their counterparts in various European countries show that the former feel more integrated within their national community of residence. For example, Asian origin youth in Britain feel more British in schools than Muslims born or raised in Germany and France. Similarly, the second generation Pakistani and Indian Muslim immigrants in the UK, feel more integrated than their Moroccan or Algerian Muslim youth in France. Also, youth population of Turks and former Yugoslavs in Germany feel less integrated than Muslims in the UK.

According to a survey by the British think tank, British Muslims have a greater national identity attachment to the UK than the average British citizen. In other words, for them, being British is something they are proud of and they would like to contribute for the future of the UK. Furthermore, the 2000 survey suggested that 83% of Muslims were happier than the national average among British citizens of 79%. This research refuted the myth that Britain Muslims get their identity primarily from their religious identity. Rather, they were mostly satisfied by living in the UK and they were proud to be British citizens. The same trend is identifiable across Europe. On the other hand, other surveys attest to frustration and discontent vis-à-vis the receiving countries. For example, a 18 month-long study conducted in 2007 in England, Scotland and Wales found that young Muslims express frustration about the way they are depicted in the media and they do not feel that British society

conforms to Muslim "ideals." They also define themselves as patriotic and aspire to serve British national ideals.

Besides media treatment and negative political discourses, the assertive religiosity of young Muslims is another reason for the gap with their "non-Muslim" co-citizens. According to the 2011 census, 1 out of 10 youths younger than 25 in the UK describes themselves as Muslim. While the population of immigrant Christians such as Catholics from Poland and other denominations from different countries such as Nigeria are dramatically increasing in the UK, the population of British-born Christians has decreased about 15% from 2001 to 2011. According to a 2007 survey, young British Muslims' religiosity is growing. As a result, they feel challenged to relate with non-Muslim British youth. These young British Muslims' religious identity is expressed in their strong preference for Islamic schools and sharia law, which set them apart from the "lifestyle" of mainstream society.

According to the 2011 IFOP mentioned above, 41% of the respondents define themselves as both observant and believing, 34% of them define themselves as only believers, 22% defined themselves as only Muslim origin, and 3% said they didn't have any religion. These numbers, confirmed by previous surveys of the same kind, put them at odds with their fellow French citizens that do not express the same levels of religious attachment or practices.

The same disconnect appears for immigrants who share the religion of the receiving country. Additionally, centralized religious institutions like the Catholic Church can reinforce the gap and lead to the isolation of immigrant religious communities. Based on a 2007 survey conducted among children and adolescents in Germany, Catholics who come from immigrant families are more observant than "autochthones" young Catholics. According to the same survey, migrants are taught through parishes about values such as "trust, solidarity, and help", in ways that strengthen the migrant group. Anthropologist Georg Elwert qualifies this process as inner integration. Usually parishes do not facilitate interactions between immigrants and local Catholics. As a result, migrant Catholics do not have opportunities to be exposed to Catholicism from the German point of view.

Several studies have emphasized that local more than national community is a strong identifier among Muslims across Europe. According to research on the Muslim community of Waltham Forest, one of the London's 2012 Olympic boroughs, the respondents express a strong attachment to their neighborhood in contrast to their attachment to Britain, while the non-Muslims in the same neighborhood show a greater attachment to Britain over their neighborhood.[5]

The consequences on the attachment to the sending countries of these emerging Muslim identities in Europe have not been systematically studied. We know that being a Muslim in France or Germany is increasingly disconnected from national attachment to Algeria or Turkey. But this does not mean that religious interactions with the countries of origin have stopped: they usually happen through family, business or social networks, and are more influential when they materialize outside the

[5] *New Publication: Muslims in Paris* (2012, August 3). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam. Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2012/08/03/new-publication-muslims-in-paris/

institutional channels of the sending state (Ministry of Religious Affairs, embassies, etc.). As explained above, religious identity is more and more shaped within transnational semantic spaces in which national frameworks are included but not exclusive anymore. For example, the fluid and multi-layered religious and national identities of the German-Turkish youth were reflected in a research conducted by Selcuk Sirin among 1400 participants who were 18–25 years old. It shows that these young peoples' collective identity cannot be classified as Islamists vs. secularists. Instead, Turkish youth have multiple identities, with dimensions of belonging to secular movement (Ataturkism) and Islamic identity that shape their political identity. They don't define themselves according to Ataturk's ideals or Islamic ideals, but they say "I like Atatürk and I also feel like a Muslim.".[6]

In sum, the disconnect between religious belonging and the dominant culture of the receiving country does not lead to lack of loyalties but to multiple allegiances that are not seen as conflicting or contradictory. Nor does it translate in an exclusive link with the sending country, which is not seen as an ideal place for the fulfillment of migrants' personal values, especially for the second or third generation. The country of origin still triggers sentimental attachment through family links, but it is not the place to definitively return to. In fact, recent research shows that the conflict between Islam and European political identities is the consequence of a type of Islamic belonging to an abstract Ummah. In other words, being attached to a local Islamic group (through mosque or ethnic organization) has actually a positive influence on the perception of the receiving country. On the other hand, identification to the Ummah as an idealized community of believers, leads some believers to separate and withdraw from the main stream environment. Additionally, young people attracted to radical groups like Al Qaida and ISIS are characterized by a similar identification to a global deterritoralized Ummah (Roy 2006).

This cultural gap is also reflected in the tensions that often occur between clerics from the countries of origin and religious immigrant communities. The influence of transnational religious groups is another challenge for the clerics of the sending countries.

Influence of Transnational Religious Groups on Religious Immigrant Communities

The proliferation of religious authorities and the shrinking realm of their authority is by no means a new phenomenon, and it has been the subject of many studies. Both mass education and new forms of communication have contributed to the increase of actors who claim the right to talk on behalf of any religious tradition in both authoritative and normative ways. Therefore, established religious figures,

[6] *Interview with Selçuk Şirin: "Turkish Youths Have Multiple Identities.* (2009, September 1). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2009/09/01/interview-with-selcuk-sirin-turkish-youths-have-multiple-identities/

such as the sheikhs of Al-Azhar or Medina, are increasingly challenged by the engineer, the student, the businessman, and the autodidact, who mobilize the masses and speak for Islam in sports stadiums, in the blogosphere, and over airwaves worldwide. This trend predates the Internet and is related to public education programs and the increased availability of new technological communicative mediums such as magazines, cassette tapes, and CDs.[7] However, the internet has added a new element to this proliferation of religious voices: the greater influence of globalized authority figures that have an audience beyond their particular cultural background. This trans-nationalization of religious voices can be defined as neo pan-Islamism. There are multiple forms of this contemporary pan-Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood being the one that has been the most studied.

Interestingly, the Muslim Brothers at least in their majority tend to foster national allegiance to the receiving country rather than to the sending country or the global *ummah*. For this reason, they stand on the same side as the sending and receiving countries, in the competition against global Salafism.[8] The same logic is at work for religious movements like Evangelicals, who challenge the established religious institutions of both sending and receiving countries.

Today, the conditions for communication and the circulation of people and ideas make the *ummah* (the community of Muslim believers) all the more effective as a concept, especially considering the fact that nationalist ideologies have been waning. The imagined *ummah* has a variety of forms, the most influential of which emphasizes direct access to the Qur'an and Muslim unity that transcends national and cultural diversity. In this sense, those extolling this modern trend can be called pan-Islamists even though the restoration of the caliphate is no longer their priority.[9] It is worth noting that not all these movements are reactionary or defensive. For this reason, a distinction must be drawn between the Wahhabi/Salafi and Tablighi s on one hand and the Muslim Brotherhood on the other hand. Both trends dominate global interpretations of Islam across Europe but have very different positions vis-à-vis modernity. The Muslim Brothers heirs of the Salafiyya, reformist movement of the eighteenth century, privileges a direct interpretation of the canonic sources (Quran

[7] Traditionally, authority was conferred according to one's theological knowledge and mastery of the methodologies used to interpret this knowledge. Only those who possessed knowledge that had been passed down through a chain of authorities or a line of recognized masters could claim legitimacy as religious leaders. Though formal education was an important component throughout much of the Muslim world, the transmission of knowledge did not always rely on formal education, especially if the knowledge being passed down was esoteric in nature (as was the case of the Sufi masters).

[8] Salafism is a multifaceted revivalist movement within Islam (the name being a reference to *as-salaf as-salah*, or the pious ancestors) that advocates for a literalist interpretation of the Qur'an and a rejection of the Sunni schools of jurisprudence (Madahib).

[9] The Hizb ut-Tahrir party is one of the most significant contemporary pan-Islamist movements that advocates for the restoration of the Caliphate, way before ISIS did. The difference is that Hiz At-Tahrir does not advocate for the use of violence. Founded in Jerusalem in 1953, it claims branches in the Muslim world as well as Europe and the United States. In Great Britain, the party is known under the name Muhajirrun, and has been active in the public sphere, until having been banned after the 7/7 bombings (see. Taji-Farouki 1996).

and Hadith) that remains contextualized and historicized. They also engage in civic and civil actions in the different receiving countries and promotes political participation.

Wahhabism is characterized by a rejection of traditional modes of interpretation of the Quran and Hadith. Mystical approaches and historical interpretations alike are held in contempt. Although, wahabi, advocate a direct relation to the revealed Sources (Qur'an and *hadith*), in contrast to the Muslim Brothers, they reject the recourse to the historical contributions of the various juridical schools (*madhahib*).

According to their literalist interpretation, nothing must come between the believer and the text: customs, culture, and Sufism must all be done away with. The heirs of this rigorist and puritanical line of thought are the existing Saudi religious establishment, also known as Salafi. Adherents of Wahhabism have rejected all ideas and concepts that are deemed Western, maintaining a strictly revivalist agenda. As a stringently revivalist movement, Wahhabism seeks the "Islamization of societies," which entails formulating contemporary ways of life in relation to the conditions of seventh century Arabia by "returning to the sources" whose "true meaning," Wahhabis argue, was lost over the centuries following the Prophet Muhammad's death.

The significant difference between the global Salafi Islam of today and the original Wahhabi period is a difference in audience: in other words, Salafi decisions and interpretations are no longer limited to the Saudi kingdom but are now followed by Muslims around the world. The fatwas of Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ibn Baaz (d. 1999), Grand Mufti of the Saudi Kingdom, and of Sheikh Al-Albani (d. 1999) are the common points of reference for their followers in Europe and the United States, and more generally throughout the Muslim world. The movement has succeeded in imposing its beliefs not as one interpretation among many but as the global orthodox doctrine of Sunni Islam.

The considerable financial resources of the Saudi state have also certainly helped create this situation of religious monopoly. In the 1970s, Saudi Arabia began investing internationally in a number of organizations that "widely distributed Wahhabi literature in all the major languages of the world, gave out awards and grants, and provided funding for a massive network of publishers, schools, mosques, organizations, and individuals.

In the West, this *dawa* (proselytization) resulted in the building of new Islamic centers in Malaga, Madrid, Milan, Mantes-la-Jolie, Edinburgh, Brussels, Lisbon, Zagreb, Washington, Chicago, and Toronto to name just a few; the financing of Islamic Studies chairs in American universities; and the multiplication of multilingual Internet sites. In March 2002, the official Saudi magazine *Ain al-Yaqin* estimated that the Saudi royal family has "wholly or partly financed" approximately 210 Islamic centers, 1500 mosques, 202 colleges, and 2000 Islamic schools in Muslim-minority countries. It is important to note that these estimates do not include the number of institutions funded by the Saudi Government in its entirety or other sources within Saudi Arabia that finance Wahhabi proselytizing. According to

some estimates, the Saudi Kingdom spent over $80 billion on various Islam-related causes in Muslim-minority countries between 1973 and 2002.

The construction of mosques, schools, and other Islamic institutions is only one Saudi strategy to circulate the Wahhabi ideology. They also rely heavily on media to promote and spread their message, whether through the circulation of handouts, the creation of websites, or the airing of satellite television shows. For example, in 1984, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia opened the King Fahd Complex for Printing the Holy Qur'an in Medina. According the website of the now-deceased King Fahd bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, the Complex produces between 10 and 30 million copies of the Qur'an each year. Copies of the Qur'an also are available in Braille, as are video and audio recordings of Qur'anic recitations.

It is extremely difficult to gauge the precise influence exerted by Wahhabism on Muslim religious practice. In the case of European Muslims, the influence cannot simply be measured by statistics. In a minority culture lacking both institutions for religious education and the means by which to produce new forms of knowledge, the easy access to theology that Salafism offers is one of the main reasons for its popularity. The widespread diffusion of Salafi teachings means that even non-Salafi Muslims evaluate their Islamic practice by Wahhabite standards. In other words, even if most Muslims do not follow Wahhabite dress codes—white tunic, head covering, beard for men, *niqab*[10] for women—the Salafi norm often becomes the standard image of what a good Muslim ought to be.[11] Despite the strong presence of many different interpretations at the grassroots level,[12] the Salafi revivalist interpretation of Islam dominates the Internet *dawa*. Salafis oppose all forms of nationalized Islam either in the receiving or sending countries, at least rhetorically. For this reason, tensions between national religious authorities and Salafis are reported everywhere. The identification to the trend of Islam advocated by salafi groups is also associated with radical forms of global Islam like the ones propagated by Al Quaida and ISIS. To be clear, most of salafis are apolitical but it happens that the theological core of radical groups are salafis, which is why most global jihadis today are salafis (Coolsaet 2011).

The appeal of transnational movements and their challenges for established religious groups are also reflected in the growing influence of evangelical movements in Europe.The EEA's (European Evangelical Association) Brussels office represents 15 million European evangelicals from 35 countries to the European Union.[13] Compared

[10] A cloth covering the face according to Wahhabi law.

[11] Another group, albeit with much less financial resources, that takes a traditionalist and legalistic approach to Islam is the Tabligh, sometimes referred to as the Jehovah's Witnesses of Islam. The Tabligh is usually described as a pious and proselytizing movement whose primary aim is to promote Islamic education. The essential principle of this sect within the Deobandi movement—founded in 1927 in India—is that every Muslim is responsible for spreading the values and practices of Islam. In the last two decades, this movement has gained a wide following, especially in Europe and the United States. In these conditions, competition rages in the West between Tablighis and Salafis, and anathemas rain down on both sides.

[12] There are Muslim Brotherhood groups that are very active at the grassroots level and in creating Muslim organizations to cooperate with political institutions.

[13] *The European Evangelical Alliance.* (n.d.). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Europeanea: http://www.europeanea.org/

to Latin America or Africa, the diffusion of evangelical Christianity in Europe remains small. Evangelicals represent less than two percent of the European population (Bryant 2006). Some 4.5 million of the UK's foreign-born population claim to have a religious affiliation. Of these, around a quarter are Muslim, while more than half are Christian – with Polish Catholics and African Pentecostals among the fastest-growing groups.

While traditional churchgoing is on the decline in the UK over the past decade, the latest immigrants mean Christianity is becoming more charismatic and fundamentalist. The most significant change has been the growth of Pentecostal and charismatic Christianity within migrants from Africa and Latin America. In Lewisham, there are 65 Pentecostal churches serving the Nigerian community, and others serving the Congolese. Ghanaian and Ivorian Professor Mike Kenny of IPPR said: "The research shows that recent waves of inward migration have given a boost to some of the UK's established faith communities at a time when Britain's society and culture are generally more secular, and smaller numbers of the indigenous population are regularly attending churches.".[14]

Recent migration trends are altering the faith map of the UK. Their biggest impact is being felt in the largest cities: London above all, where a rich mosaic of different faith communities has come into being. Evangelical Christianity may be heavily African-influenced, but it is also spreading among British natives (West 2009).

France has witnessed an eight-fold increase in Evangelical Christians during the past half century, from roughly 50,000 to 400,000.

Evangelical movements have also made significant in-roads in the Eastern parts of Europe, especially in the 1990s after the collapse of communism, although their influence has stalled since the early 2000s. The stagnation has been explained by a greater resistance of the traditional churches than in Latin America, as well as a greater suspicion towards movements seen as foreign and Western.

Overall, we are missing localized studies on the influence of these transnational movements on the religious landscape of the sending countries. Most surveys on Salafis focus on their doctrine and practices in different local contexts but do not systematically investigate the connection with their counterparts in countries of emigration.

When it comes to the situation of religious minorities, the focus of studies has mostly been on the sociology of clerics as well as on Islamic organizations, much less on the role of religion in the personal integration of immigrants.

[14] Ibid.

When the Religion of the Sending Country Is in Minority in the Receiving Country

The minority/majority divide has usually favored the sending countries' interests vis-à-vis the receiving countries', especially when there is no strong dominant religious institution in the sending countries. For example, in the initial phase of Muslim immigration to the West in the 1970 and 1980s, the religious institutions of the sending state had a monopoly on the representation of the religious interests of its nationals, especially vis-à-vis the political institutions of the receiving countries.

In the case of Catholic immigration, the state is supplanted by the Church, which sometimes has divergent interests, as we shall see below in the case of Spanish immigration in Germany. The state's or church's monopoly is usually challenged and weakened by the rise of "autochthone" religious authorities in the receiving countries and by the competition of transnational religious networks. However, since 9/11, the securitization of immigration policies and the war against terrorism have created new "religious opportunities" for sending countries, especially Muslim ones.

The decline of the religious legitimacy of clerics from the sending countries has been a major focus of study as well as of political concern. The quick depreciation among emigrants of the religious leadership from the country of origin has deprived sending states of an important resource of political influence. This situation has been extensively studied in the case of Muslim minorities in Western Europe.

This depreciation is caused by the social, cultural and linguistic gap between the clerics from the countries of origin and the Muslim communities in the West. Islamic religious authorities in Western Europe are often more conservative than Muslims at large, and less well-integrated into society. A significant body of academic work has focused on this problem, including research by this work concerns the sociological background of clerics, the political instrumentalization of religion by sending countries, and the training of clerics in the receiving countries.

The Background of Imams and Priests

On average, imams are foreign born, do not master the language of their host countries, are older than the immigrant population, and are characterized by very low religious skills. At the same time, they have become instrumental in the policies of the host countries, because they are seen first, as important actors in the social integration of Muslim immigrants and second, as possible partners in the fight against radicalization, especially since 9/11. For both reasons, actors from the sending states try to maintain influence among their former nationals and face increasing competition from migrants themselves, from transnational religious leaders and even from the receiving states.

When addressing the case of the Netherlands, Imoet Boender and Meryem Kanma give a neat summary of the political challenge faced by European countries: "Can imams function as intermediaries between European and Islamic societies… to what extent to the countries of origin exert a political and ideological influence on Muslims in the host countries through these 'key figures'; how can these men function in the host society if they do not speak Dutch; how do they interpret the norms and values of their host societies; should they not receive their education in the their host country rather than in their country of origin?" A primary concern is that the enduring influence of imams who are under-integrated into their host societies creates a sociocultural, political, and linguistic gap between clerics and the communities they have authority over. These questions can also be interpreted in relation to the cases of many European countries and immigrant Muslim leaders.

Politicians across Europe repeatedly express suspicion toward imams. In 2013, in an effort to counter radicalization, the Belgian foreign minister, Didier Reynders, announced different measures to control imams' discourses in mosques as well as their training.[15] According to Le Monde, data collected by the Interior Ministry indicate that France expelled 166 Islamists, including 31 imams, from September 2001 until the end of 2011. In 2012, the Swedish state television (SVT) revealed that 6 out of 10 mosques in the country provide counseling in contradiction with Swedish laws on issues of the face veil, polygamous marriages, domestic violence and nonconsensual marital sex.[16]

Imams are also suspected of politicizing religion. For example, in 2009 in Milan, the collective prayer of Muslims to express protest against the situation in Gaza was presented by media and politicians as a bad example of political use of religion inciting hatred. In other words, the Italian politicians interpreted the imams' use of prayer as a political weapon that ran contrary to the Italian political culture.[17]

At the same time, Muslim populations across Europe are in dire need of religious leaders to fulfill their basic religious requirements, a situation that cannot be ignored by European countries. For example, a 2011 internal document of the Dutch Ministry of Justice states a sharp increase of Muslim chaplains from 37 to 42, while the overall number of chaplains has been diminished from 177 to 160.[18]

Religious leaders can have a positive influence on social or political integration. Imams in Scotland have cooperated with law enforcement officers to diminish gang

[15] *Belgian Foreign Minister wants to monitor Imams.* (2013, March 19). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2013/03/19/belgian-foreign-minister-wants-to-monitor-imams/

[16] *Gender Issues and the Hijab/Burqa, Muslim Advocacy Organizations, Public Opinion and Islam in the Media, Scandinavia.* (2012, May 21). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/category/news-by-issue/gender_issues_and_the_hijab/

[17] *Colosseum prayers during a rally in Milan raise critique of the use of religion for political purposes, calls for sermons in Italian (Conflict in Gaza).* (2009, January 21). Retrieved July19,2013,fromEuro-Islam.Info:http://www.euro-islam.info/2009/01/21/colosseum-prayers-during-a-rally-in-milan-raise-critique-of-the-use-of-religion-for-political-purposes-calls-for-sermons-in-italian/

[18] *Netherlands to Increase Muslim Clerics as Prison Chaplains.* (2011, January 30). Retrieved July19,2013,fromEuro-Islam.Info:http://www.euro-islam.info/2011/01/30/netherlands-to-increase-muslim-clerics-as-prison-chaplains/

activities among the youth. These imams, mostly Scottish born, didn't use the means of preaching, but performed community service by working with the Youth Counseling Agency (YCSA) and Glasgow Community and Safety Services.[19] In the same vein, it was reported that several imams called on young French Muslims to use their right to vote during the presidential elections on April 22 and May 6, 2013.[20]

The same goal of fostering positive integration through Islam has justified the organization of representative bodies of Islam under the auspices of the state in Belgium, France and Spain (Sooper and Laurence). These new institutions were perceived at first as a fatal blow to the influence of the countries of origin. However, it appears that state actors have redefined their strategy of influence by working within these new institutions to maintain connections with their nationals or former nationals.

After 9/11, and even more so after t the Charlie Hebdo attacks, imams and religious institutions in general have been seen as major actors in the fight against radicalization. While umbrella Muslim organizations assert general principles, the groundwork of fighting against terrorism is usually conducted at the local level by mosques or imams cooperating with the police, which also allows for informal influence by state and non-state actors from the sending countries. For example, in order to foster a peaceful society, British born imams led citizenship classes to differentiate British Islam from the "al-Qaida version" of Islam, to inspire young Muslims and encourage them to feel part of British society.[21]

These different initiatives and somewhat contradictory perceptions about imams have drawn attention to the external influence from the sending countries.

Political Instrumentalization of Religious Authorities by the Sending Countries

The external origin of most European imams has raised questions on the political influence of the sending countries. According to a study of the French Ministry of Higher Education and Research in 2013, 1800 imams are educated in their countries of origin even though these imams are assigned to represent the second and third generation of Muslim immigrants. One of the main challenges for imam training is funding. That is why Algeria, Turkey, and Morocco are the primary countries that have been sending imams to France. For example, in 2010, the Algerian Minister of Religious Affairs sent 52 Algerian imams to France with the aim of promoting

[19] *Scotland: Imams to help police in bid to keep young Muslims away from gang culture.* (2009, February 15). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2009/02/15/scotland-imams-to-help-police-in-bid-to-keep-young-muslims-away-from-gang-culture/

[20] *French imams urge Muslims to vote.* (2012, April 30). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2012/04/30/french-imams-urge-muslims-to-vote/

[21] *Imams could lead citizenship lessons.* (2008, June 12). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2008/06/12/imams-could-lead-citizenship-lessons/

Algeria's ideas among the immigrant Muslim community in France, as well as its stance against the extreme/radical notion of Islam.[22] In the following year, 180 Moroccan imams came to France for the fast of the month of Ramadan in order to enhance Muslim immigrants' spiritual experiences.[23]

In 2012, the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs, represented in Europe by DITIB, decided to open a training center in Strasbourg and intended to start training courses for at least 30 French students by 2013. The cost of the project, approximately 2 million Euros, is covered by the Turkish state, which means that the evaluation of the training will not be performed by French institutions.[24]

Germany accepts imams posted by the Turkish government's Presidency of Religious Affairs, who often have a poor knowledge of German and German culture.[25] 90% of the imams in Germany are from Turkish origin and the rest are from Morocco and Iran.[26] According to a research report by the Chester University, 8% of imams in British mosques are native born, and 6% of them speak English as their native language.[27]

With Islamist governments in power in Turkey and Tunisia, the perception of Islam as a positive link with the country of origin is even stronger. Interestingly, these new authorities do not express it as an exclusive allegiance, like it was during the strong nationalist phase under authoritarian regimes. For example, in 2009, the Fetullah Gullen movement cooperated with the AKP government in Turkey to launch the "Alliance for Peace and Fairness", which aims to unite Turkish Muslim communities with other Muslim groups in Germany. The leaders of this initiative have also called for all Muslims in Germany to use their political rights as citizens of Germany—as voting makes them contribute to the political representation of Germany. In these circumstances, Prime Minister Erdogan has expressed his support for the creation of a Turkish Muslim community without assimilation and discrimination in Germany as well as being in touch with the other Muslim communities in Germany.[28] As another sign of this acceptance of multiple allegiances, in July 2013 the Turkish government has decided to stop judicial pursuits against Turkish citizens abroad who have not fulfilled their military obligations. In the same vein, the Islamist

[22] *52 Algerian Imams Arrive in France.* (2010, May 26). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2010/05/26/52-algerian-imams-arrive-in-france/

[23] *180 Moroccan Imams sent to France for Ramadan.* (2011, August 30). Retrieved July 2013, 19, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2011/08/30/180-moroccan-imams-sent-to-france-for-ramadan/

[24] *Turkey to open an Imam Center in Paris.* (2012, September 11). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2012/09/11/turkey-to-open-imam-training-centre-in-paris/

[25] Paul Hockenos (2015) "Educating Imams for Germany," *The Atlantic Times*, http://www.the-atlantic-times.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=331%3Aeducating-imams-for-germany&catid=50%3Apolitics&Itemid=65

[26] *Muslims in Germany seek clarity on religious law.* (2009, January 18). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-islam.info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2009/01/18/muslims-in-germany-seek-clarity-on-religious-law/

[27] *Ban foreign language imams.* (2007, July 6). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2007/07/06/ban-foreign-language-imams-peer/

[28] *Fethullah got his hands on Germany.* (2009, August 30). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2009/08/30/fethullah-got-his-hands-on-germany/

regime post-Ben Ali in Tunisia has institutionalized the role of the diaspora, granting it eight seats in the Constituent Assembly in the October 2011 elections.

This implicit or explicit recognition of the multiple allegiances of Muslim immigrants by their former country of origin goes hand in hand with the growing trend among Muslims in Europe of valorization of multiple identities. In contradiction with the 1980s discourse on conflictual identities among the second and third generation of immigrants, research actually shows that people identify themselves with different nations and cultures, and manage trans-frontier activities and loyalties, without particular conflicts or tensions.

For this reason, Russia's revival in world affairs in the 2000s has led to an explicit use of religion through increasing cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MF) and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). In the 2000s the Putin administration issued a National Security Concept that aimed to stabilize all Russians' "spiritual and moral welfare" (reference?) and ensure that foreign religious organization and missionaries will be prevented from "destabilizing" Russian people outside Russia. In the 1990s, the leaders of the ROC were afraid that Russia was losing its Orthodox identity and sought the state's help to fight against the influence of other religious groups or sects inside and outside the country. Non-orthodox religious groups were depicted as foreign intelligence workers conspiring against "Russian policies and strategic activities". Therefore, the Russian Orthodox Church became a tool for the defense of the national and spiritual identity of Russians. "Spiritual security" became synonymous with the defense of religious freedom. The 2007 Act of Canonical Communion between ROCOR (The Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia) and the Moscow Patriarchate was a new step in the Russian government's efforts to instrumentalize religion for international reasons. The unification of the ROC, the ROCO and the Russian President led to a sort of Russian "super-church". ROC congregations in different countries were used as foreign intelligence centers in 1970s. It was speculated that the Russian government could use the ROC congregation today in the same way for its geopolitical aims. The 2007 reunification has been seen as the most important and largest overture to the Russian diaspora by the Putin administration and the ROC. The ROC and the RFM aim to protect Russian citizens' rights and liberties when living in foreign countries. In addition, the foreign minister supports the spiritual needs of the Russian diaspora. This includes building new churches and transferring lost properties back to Russian ownership. The re-appropriation of churches built in Western Europe prior to the communist period is part of this strategy: they are considered to be a tool for the unification of Russian people. There is a debate over the true owners of these properties, the Russian state or the Russian Orthodox Church. Up to now, which entity can supersede the other to influence Russians outside Russia is not clear. In fact, both entities are strengthened by this "alliance". In sum, by fighting against the militant secularism and Protestantism that permeates European culture, the ROC serves the Russian state's international strategy.

This political instrumentalization by the sending countries, as well as the concerns about transnational religious influence, have led to multiple political initiatives to train imams in the receiving countries.

Training of Clerics in the Receiving Countries

Due to the persistent fear of international influence, receiving states have been taking initiatives to select the entry of imams on cultural grounds by controlling for their command of the language as well as for their political background. They have also initiated training programs.

Since 2007, all incoming imams to Germany are required to take integration courses (such as German language and culture) whether they will be staying in Germany permanently or temporarily.[29] At the same time, the German state has promoted Islamic Studies chairs in universities to foster a greater competence of homegrown Muslim leaders. Greater training for religious authorities is seen as a way to combat the dangers of communalism and fundamentalism that could be caused by cultural isolation. This initiative raised a lot of criticism from Muslim organizations that didn't have a say in the curriculum's definition, even if some faculties do seek advice with local mosques or national Muslim associations. In 2008, a case at the University of Münster caused a large debate: Muhammad Kalisch, Professor of Islamic Religion, publicly doubted the real existence of Prophet Mohammed, which in turn caused an outcry among Muslim associations. They called for Prof. Kalisch to step down and discouraged students to take up Islamic teacher training in Münster. Because they had no say, Kalisch still continues to teach.

For this reason, the *Wissenschaftsrat* (German Council of Science and Humanities) has proposed granting both universities and Muslim associations a say in the education. The new proposal seeks to guarantee acceptance of Islamic teachers and imams among the believers, and therefore allows associations to have more influence. Together with the universities, they may take part in decision-making on what will be taught and by whom. While it is certainly necessary to consult Islamic expertise in this matter, the question is whether the largely conservative associations would be the best partners.[30]

In 2007, the UK government addressed imam's training from the language ability perspective. As a result, foreign-born imams who didn't learn English were required to refrain from giving sermons. This ban's purpose was to increase English-speaking imams, so it would be easier to fight against radicalism among young British Muslims.[31] Sometimes the training of imams can be assigned to

[29] *Call for imams in Germany to undergo integration course.* (2007, September 20). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2007/09/20/call-for-imams-in-germany-to-undergo-integration-course/Anna Reimann, "Motors of Integration: German University Starts Seminars for Imams," *Spiegel Online*, October 7, 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/motors-of-integration-german-university-starts-seminars-for-imams-a-721818.html

[30] *German education of Islamic school teachers and imams remains source of conflict.* (2010, January 30). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2010/01/30/german-education-of-islamic-schoolteachers-and-imams-remains-source-of-conflict/

[31] *Ban foreign language imams.* (2007, July 6). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2007/07/06/ban-foreign-language-imams-peer/

other religious institutes, like the Catholic Institute of Paris in France, which in 2008 started training Muslim chaplains.[32]

In the Netherlands, in the early 2000s, state-subsidized imam-education programs were created and there was a requirement that imams recruited from Islamic countries undergo a yearlong integration course. However, less than a decade later, the only Dutch vocational training course for imams is closing, raising doubts over the fruitfulness of efforts to create a "Dutch Islam".[33] Indeed, the end of the program at Inholland University echoes more general concerns over integration and imam training: "It's one of our most expensive programmes. A large proportion of the 150 students need intensive supervision. We are having to deal with students with different cultural backgrounds."[34] The difficulty faced by this program, and others, is how Islamic education is to be standardized when faced with student diversity, differing backgrounds (cultural, religious, and otherwise) and economic concerns.

Even in country of recent Muslim immigration, the training of imams has become a political priority. For example, a 4-day seminary course initiative has been designed in Palermo for training imams in Italy, having dialogue with Muslim communities all around the Europe, and also educating the non-Muslims of Sicily about Islamic values. About 30 Muslim imams and different professionals of the Muslim community participated in these educational programs, backed up by the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO), cohosted with the Italian Religious Communities (COREIS), the Ministry of Religious Affairs of Kuwait and the Municipality of Palermo.[35]

It is clear that across Europe, a focus on imam training is seen as a way of bridging cultural divides and integrating immigrants. A common theme across many different countries is the desire to create country-specific brands of Islam - "Dutch" Islam, "German" Islam, "French" Islam, and so on. Contextualizing and domesticating Islam is meant to foster attachment to a host country. Some scholars push back on government emphasis on imams solely; for example, notes "most research shows that local imams have only minimal influence over their assemblies, with the partial exception of [a] few, notorious, extremist imams." (p.???) Regardless, governments across Europe continue to view domestic imam training as a way of strengthening the attachment of Muslims to a broader society. Because since 9/11 this goal is increasingly linked to security issues, countries of origin like Morocco and Turkey have been using this particular angle to regain religious credibility in the receiving countries, by arguing that they can efficiently counter radicalism and

[32] *France continues Muslim Imam Training.* (2008, March 2008). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2008/03/09/france-continues-muslim-imam-training/

[33] "Demise of 'polder imams' may leave Dutch mosques open to radicals," The Amsterdam Herald, February 8, 2013, http://amsterdamherald.com/index.php/rss/685-20130208-demise-polder-imams-may-leave-dutch-mosques-open-to-radicals-religion-muslims-islam-inholland-netherlands-dutch-society

[34] Ibid.

[35] *Imams Participate in Training Seminar in Palermo.* (2013, April 4). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2013/04/04/imams-participate-in-training-seminar-in-palermo/ accessed 23 March 2016.

Salafism. The rise of the Islamic caliphate and its unprecedented appeal among Muslim youth in Europe as well as the Charlie Hebdo and Copenhaguen attacks have led to renewed attempts from the receiving coutnries to foster European forms of Islam that comply with the dominant secular political cultures, this time working more closely with national Muslim groups instead of religious instances of countries of origin.

Interestingly, these challenges are much less critical in the case of the minority within the minority.

The Minority Within the Migrant Minority

In addition, to the points highlighted above, surveys on minorities within the minority, like Alevis in Germany, highlight a few more specifics of the religious interaction between sending and receiving countries. First, in the case of oppressed minorities, the migration breaks down the proclaimed religious and cultural homogeneity of the sending country by providing visibility and freedom of action. Second, this visibility can facilitate the group's religious integration, when it promotes the same values as the receiving country. Third, this visibility is often reinvested in political actions in the country of origin and beyond.

For example, the Alevi declaration in Germany[36] in 1989 states that Alevism is compatible with multiculturalism and therefore is a resource for any society in which it operates. It emphasizes the Alevi's difference from Sunni Muslims in order to bring Alevis closer to German cultural values. Brochures in German on the Sivas massacre of 1993 (where 35 Alevis were killed by an angry mob) read: "Alevis do not differ from Germans with regard to fundamental rules and values," as they, unlike fundamentalist Sunni Muslims, value democracy and the rule of law.

Because Sunni Islam in Germany is perceived negatively and associated with the oppression of women, terror, fanaticism and radicalism, Alevis have emphasized their difference to gain legitimacy as a distinct Muslim group within German society. For example, in the ongoing controversy on female teachers wearing the headscarf in public schools, Alevis have been explicitly opposed to the headscarf by declaring it religiously unnecessary. Therefore they implicitly send the message that they can integrate within German culture and society. In other words, they present Alevism as an embodiment of universal values that has its place in Germany.

Thus, Alevis don't demand their rights through religion, but through the language of rights and citizenship. While Sunni Muslims demand halal slaughtering and emphasize their specificity, Alevis inscribe their demands within the existing German law (Alevis ritual don't contradict with the German law) and the rhetoric of universal human rights.

[36] "Alevi Declaration (Alevi Bildirgesi known in Turkish) released in 1989, stated that there were about 20 million Alevis among Turkey's population of (at that time) fifty five million, i.e., that Alevis did not form a small minority.

For this reason, Alevis have gained greater institutional recognition than the Sunni groups. Alevi leaders tend to associate with various German civil and governmental institutions, notably in interfaith dialogue. They fundraise for their local events by seeking institutional cooperation with municipal institutions. They also take advantage of public funding for various projects for disadvantaged youth and information for new citizens. While Alevis application for the legal status of a "corporation under public law" has been pending since 1995, the application of Sunni Islamic organizations has immediately been rejected without consideration. This is another illustration of the political advantage of Alevis over Sunni Muslims in Germany. In the same vein, AABF, in the *Länder* of North-Rhine Westfalia, Hesse, Berlin and Bavaria has achieved recognition as a religious community in accordance with Article 7, paragraph 3 of the Basic Law, which allows them to provide religious studies as a standard subject in the *Länder* specified above.

The grounding of Alevism in German society has also strengthened its political struggle in Turkey by giving it a global visibility. For example, the Alevi Cultural center in Hamburg has helped the Alevi cause by inviting politicians from Turkey such as Arif Sag, a member of Turkish parliament who participated in the campaign against anti-Kurdish politics in Iraq. It has also facilitated the development of the religion by allowing the multiplication of places of worship and traditional teachings in Turkey. For example, the AABF assisted the construction of new Cem houses in the city of Erzincan. When the funding was very limited in Turkey, the chairman of the AABF himself helped out through different German associations. It also allows many humanitarian events such as helping out the Alevi victims of the earthquake in the city of Pulumur, Tunceli in 1967. The general elections of June 2015 in Turkey has led to an unprecedented number of M.P with an Alevi background, as the result of the electoral success of the DHP (Kurdsh Party) that will be called to rule in a coalition with the AKP. This change in the political landscape of Turkey will also in the long term influence the position of Alevis in Europe.

When the Religion of the Migrants Is the Same as the Religion of the Majority in the Host Country

Counter-intuitively, past and recent surveys show that shared religion does not lead to cultural or social integration even if it provides resources for structural integration. Political activism in the workplace, however, was and in some cases remains a powerful tool for social integration. For example a 2008 survey of Italian, Croatian and Spanish immigrants to Germany show that the immigrants and their offspring have not assimilated into the local church and disappeared into a Catholic "melting pot." Many of them still live their faith in separate migrant parishes that do not foster social integration. In creating these structures, the Church acted similarly to some German *Länder* that offered special schools for immigrant children or local foreigners' councils in the political sphere. The German unions, on the other hand,

did not establish special institutions but rather included immigrant members in their regular structures (Thranhart 2008).

At the same time, the parishes could efficiently support their members because of their resources. Offering social services, leisure activities, and linking the immigrants in dense networks, they initiated processes of structural integration.

In the same vein, since Poland joined the European Union in May 2004, it is estimated that over half a million Polish nationals have arrived in Britain (Home Office 2008). The presence of Polish migrants has significantly transformed Catholic parishes around the UK, by increasing the number of parishioners as well as service attendance. The consequence has been a growing anxiety of the autochthones priests over ethnic divides in parishes. The Archbishop of Westminster, Cardinal Murphy-O'Connor, publicly declared his fears of Poles splitting the Catholic Church in Britain, and urged them to integrate. He implied that the introduction of Polish masses hindered successful integration. The Polish clergy and community in Britain responded passionately and the deputy rector of the Polish Catholic Mission, Grażyna Sikorska, felt "spiritually raped" by the Cardinal's words. This public disagreement over appropriate pastoral care for Polish migrants and their place in the Catholic Church in Britain has unfolded differently across the UK, but most tensions arise on the parish level.

As Trzebiatowska (2010) observed, there is a difference between Polish and British approaches to Catholicism. Poles are "incapable of overcoming religion-national identity" (p. 1069), while Britons profess more universal Catholicism, not linked to any nationality or specific historical experience. As the author noted, there are tensions between British and Polish ways of practicing faith despite the overarching universalism of Catholic rites and practices. This is especially clear for Polish priests working in Britain (and coming there by EasyJet each week): "Their habitus clashes with the local religious field (of British Catholics) they have entered, partly because the religious capital they deploy is determined by the needs of the consumers – the Polish laity – who expect 'Polish', and not apparently 'universal', Catholicism." (p. 1069). This means that Polish priests need to choose between the two. The priests most often decide to serve the migrants, to keep the link with them. Polish church in the UK is the place of rites and services in Polish, and the sermons often revolve around the situation in Poland. What then happens is creation of separate congregations, exercising different types of Catholicism.

From existing surveys about the majority situation, we can draw the three following conclusions. First, the role of the religion in the integration process varies according to its status in the country of origin. According to the survey of Catholic immigrants in Germany, each of the migrant groups' parishes has a different way of understanding integration. For example, for Spanish priests, integration is undertaken through education. For Croatians, integration is about national community and finally going to back to the fatherland, as well as having individual networking. For Italians, integration is about political fragmentation. According to the 2002 Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the states in the Federal Republic of Germany, Spanish and Croatian children are more successful than Italians: 58.7% of Croatian students and 54.3% of Spanish students

accessed well-qualified schools, while that was the case for only 30.7% of Italian students. Scholars explain this difference by the fact that Spanish priests focus on education more than on religious instruction or preservation of the identity of origin. For the same reason, the percentage of inter-marriage between German and Spanish groups is higher than for Croatians or Italians. In contrast, Croatian groups tend to preserve their own identities and upward social status, and refrain from intermarriages. Compared to Croatians, Italians are more open to intermarriage, but their children are less successful in schools, probably because Italian priests do not emphasize integration but rather self-organization.

Second, there is the possibility of marginalization of the emigrants by the national religious institutions of the receiving country. A case in point is the emigrants from the Philippines to Italy, who are still perceived as "other" or different even if they share the same religion as the majority. Similarly, German Catholics have a higher social status than Catholic immigrants. According to, even though local parishes were supposed to be open to foreigners and native language counseling, immigrant Catholics became secondary church participants, because even if religion was a shared heritage, there were many differences in terms of social values.

Between 2003 and 2009, the financial and personal support of the German Bishops' conference for the integration of Catholic migrants in Germany has raised some resistance: for example, the Rottenburg-Stuttgart diocese raised concerns over divided parishes.[37]

Again, socioeconomic status, political memory and perceived social distance play a decisive role in shaping the influence of religion in the integration process as well as its political relevance for the emigration country. More generally, it seems that in this case, religion is trumped by the level of modernization of the country of origin in comparison to the immigration country.

Third, religious institutions from the sending country can act independently of the state and create connection with their counter parts in the receiving countries, thereby operating as an independent political force. In some cases, this political influence undermines the influence of the country of emigration (as with Spanish priests in immigrant parishes in Germany at the end of the Franco regime). In others, religious institutions maintain the diaspora in the cultural and political orbit of the emigration country, therefore reinforcing its influence. For example the Croatian priests in Germany at the time of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia.

[37] Winterhagen, J., & Thränhardt, D. (2012–2013). *Three Catholic transnationalisms Italian, Croat, and Spanish immigrants compared.* Retrieved 07 19, 2013, from Academia.edu: http://www.academia.edu/3442401/Three_Catholic_Transnationalism_Italian_Croat_and_Spanish_immigrants_compared

Conclusion

This chapter considered the ways in which religion intertwines with the integration of migrants and the possible roles of the countries of origin. As per the theme of the volume, I attempted to disentangle the country of origin effect and impact in the area of religion and integration.

The reviewed literature testifies to a two-fold country of origin effect. First, religion is an important part of everyday public life in many countries of origin and thus migrants expect it to have a similar presence at destination. A strict division between private and public religiosity at destination in many Western societies is a novelty that influences integration, both positively and negatively; the literature is not clear in this respect. Also, even having the same denomination (in both the country of origin and destination) does not necessarily help integration, as the rites and traditions differ between countries, resulting in different versions of the same religious rite, for example, as illustrated by the differences between Polish and British Catholicism. This situation tends to separate immigrants from mainstream society as they stick to the homegrown versions of the rite, which are provided by the preachers brought from the countries of origin. Perceptions leading to discrimination are a second important issue: for example, due to growing Islamophobia, Muslims are perceived as being more difficult to integrate, even if existing evidence shows a much more complex picture. Also, in the common Western imagination, the idea of a Muslim is equated with Middle Easterners or North Africans, regardless of their actual denomination; interestingly enough, Muslims from Albania or Bosnia are not immediately perceived as Muslims.

Migrants tend to differentiate between personal attachment to religion and belonging to a collective identity, either religious or national. This is a challenge for sending countries where religion is part of the national identity. In order to maintain their influence, they have to diversify their strategies vis-à-vis their former nationals, as well as with the receiving countries. One strategy is to cater to "religious culture", a widespread notion that overlaps with ethnic or national identities with no fixed content. It seems to override the more circumscribed definition of "being religious" which is usually measured in polls.

Adding to the challenge of fluid identities, the influence of the country of origin is increasingly contested by transnational religious movements. Consequentially, the effect of religion on the diaspora cannot be analyzed only through the dyadic relations between sending and receiving countries; it must also be examined in a broader space where different actors operate: state actors (from both sending and receiving countries), non-state actors from receiving and sending countries (religious leaders, intellectuals) and transnational actors (Salafis or Tablighis). We are in dire need of studies that will take this new landscape into account.

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Chapter 9
Access to Citizenship and the Role of Origin Countries

Maarten Peter Vink, Tijana Prokic-Breuer and Jaap Dronkers

Introduction

For foreign-born residents and their children, attaining citizenship in the host country confers membership, rights and participation opportunities, and encourages a sense of belonging (Bloemraad 2006). From a destination country perspective, natuniveruvimmigrants. In order to optimise the use of what is sometimes termed the 'citizenship premium', actors in destination countries often advocate public policies that are aimed at increasing naturalisation rates among immigrants (OECD 2011; Sumption and Flamm 2012). The acquisition of citizenship is associated with better employment probability, higher earnings and higher occupational positions (Liebig and Von Haaren 2011). Politically, in a democratic context, citizenship normally qualifies immigrants to take an active part in the electoral politics of the destination country (Pikkov 2011; De Rooij 2012).

Jaap Dronkers: This chapter is dedicated to the memory of Jaap Dronkers, a dear colleague and mentor who sadly passed away in March 2016. We will miss Jaap's curiosity and enthusiasm dearly. Parts of sections "Methodology used in research in the field" and "Proposed theoretical framework" are derived from Vink et al. (2013) and are included here with permission of John Wiley and Sons. This chapter also draws on research findings from ongoing collaboration with Gerard-Rene de Groot, Chun Luk, Floris Peters and Hans Schmeets. The authors would like to acknowledge Philippe Fargues, Anne Unterreiner and Agnieszka Weinar for their constructive input to this chapter as well as for their feedback on an earlier draft.

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Yet, immigrant naturalisation rates vary greatly across countries and between immigrant groups (Eurostat 2015). This heterogeneity first of all reflects different pay-off structures between groups, in terms of the relative added value that is offered by the acquisition of destination country citizenship vis-à-vis the citizenship of the origin country and the costs associated with acquiring a new citizenship, such as naturalisation fees, investments in language skills and other integration requirements, as well as the potential loss of the origin country citizenship. While for many immigrants the acquisition of citizenship of a member state of the European Union implies a life-changing event for the immigrants and his or her family, for others this 'investment' simply does not make sense. This pay-off structure is, to a large extent, determined by characteristics such as the levels of economic development and political stability associated with the origin country.

Aside from this well-established *endogenous origin country effect* (using the terminology of this volume), immigrant naturalisation rates are also affected by *diaspora policies* of the origin country that are aimed at maintaining ties with the emigrant community. Most notably, this relates to the phenomenon of dual citizenship, which is understood as an individual's possession of two citizenship statuses. Dual citizenship is a fact of life in a mobile world. As a result of international migration, rearrangements of the territorial scope of states and the lack of global coordination between citizenship laws, millions of people worldwide are citizens of two or more, states (Faist 2007; Faist and Kivisto 2007).[1] In Europe, where increasing gender equality provides both the father and the mother the opportunity to transmit their citizenship to their offspring, children often automatically become dual citizens at birth when their parents are also citizens of other states. They often also acquire two citizenships when they are born in a different country than their parents and their country of birth has a regime of territorial birthright (Vink and De Groot 2010). Moreover, many people acquire an additional citizenship at a later stage of life because they take up residence in country other than where they born and wish to consolidate their position in that new society by acquiring citizenship there.

Despite its ascendency as a demographic phenomenon, dual citizenship is still seen by many as a problematic phenomenon that should be avoided if possible. In line with a traditionally restrictive approach to dual citizenship in international law, a substantial number of states in Europe and beyond actively discourage multiple citizenship, by requiring candidates for naturalisation to renounce their previous citizenship prior to naturalisation or by having provisions that lead to the automatic loss of citizenship when their citizens voluntarily acquire another citizenship (Vonk 2012; Vink and De Groot 2010). However, the worldwide number of states with a restrictive approach to dual citizenship has been decreasing for the past few decades and migrants are thus increasingly less often compelled to make a decision regarding

[1] In this chapter we use the term '*dual* citizenship', but it is possible that individuals possess more than two citizenship statuses, in which case the term 'multiple citizenship' would be more appropriate.

their choice of citizenship (United Nations 2013: 113; Vink et al. 2015). The role of actors in third countries, while only one of the factors of integration that determine the adoption of citizenship, is crucial since particularly by allowing dual citizenship, countries of origin can take away a major constraint for immigrants in the naturalisation process. Research shows that naturalisation rates are positively impacted by tolerant policies towards dual citizenship (Jones-Correa 2001; Vink et al. 2013; but see Yang 1994; Dronkers and Vink 2012).

This chapter addresses the question of how immigrant integration in European destination countries, through the acquisition of citizenship, is influenced by both the economic and political characteristics of origin countries (origin country effects), as well as their policies regarding dual citizenship (origin country policies). In the remainder of the chapter, we first discuss the main methodological approaches in researching integration in this field of research, with particular attention to the influence of the countries and societies of origin. Some conceptual clarifications will be made as well. Subsequently, we outline the actors involved and identify the diverging and converging interests of the countries of origin and destination, as well as the strategies of the societies of origin to advance their interests. The chapter will then outline the theoretical framework, which is then also illustrated by case studies that show the relationships between the countries of origin and their impact on migrant communities abroad. The conclusion will reflect on the central question of the volume (tailored to this chapter): how can naturalisation policies in EU member states, in the context of 'origin country effects' and 'origin country (dual citizenship) policies', optimally facilitate access to citizenship, especially by third-country citizens, while retaining citizenship as a value good that offers a genuine premium for integration?

Methodology Used in Research in the Field

Three conceptual clarifications should be made from the start. First, an 'immigrant' is defined as a person born in a third country and residing in the European Union. While immigrants can be understood more generally as all foreign-born persons residing in a country, following the overall focus of the book the discussion in this chapter is restricted to immigrants from non-EU countries. Second, 'integration' as understood as the process by which immigrants become accepted into society, both as individuals and as groups (Penninx 2003). This definition thus views integration deliberately as a process, rather than as an endpoint and also is deliberately open as to what precisely determines the acceptance of immigrants in a society, which may –after all– vary from one receiving society to the other. Thirdly, 'citizenship' is a legal status and relation between an individual and a state that entails specific legal rights and duties (EUDO CITIZENSHIP 2013a). In some

countries, the status may be called 'nationality' rather than citizenship and the persons holding the status are referred to as nationals rather than citizens. In this chapter, the terms citizenship and nationality are conceived as interchangeably, though for the sake of clarity we systematically use the first term only.

Following these conceptual clarifications, the chapter starts out on the basis of two assumptions with regard to the role of third countries with regard to immigrant integration and access to citizenship. While these two assumptions are not intended as undisputable starting points for the following discussion, they do indicate the theoretical scope within which this chapter should be positioned. The first assumption is that the access to citizenship can be seen as indicator of integration, in the sense that it closes an important legal gap between immigrants and natives. However, although from the perspective of 'becoming accepted into society' acquiring destination country citizenship is likely an important step in the integration process, it is not seen as the endpoint of this process. Hence, in this chapter the access to citizenship is viewed as a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for full integration of immigrants in the destination country. The second assumption is that third countries cannot directly influence the acquisition of citizenship by immigrants in EU member states, which is after all a sovereign competence of the respective state (within the constraints set by international law, for example with regard to the avoidance of statelessness); however, particularly by allowing dual citizenship, countries of origin can take away a major constraint for immigrants in the naturalisation process. Hence, political actors in origin countries, such as legislators who determine the rules of dual citizenship as well as government officials linked to diplomatic representations who may reach out to the emigrant community, are expected to be able to play an important role in the process of integrating migrants in destination countries, in terms of stimulating (or not) the acquisition of citizenship. Their role, however, is necessarily one that should be understood in conjunction with the constellation of actors and rules in the destination country.

The question of immigrant naturalisation is not a new question in the migration literature. A well-developed body of research looks at the determinants of naturalisation, mostly but not exclusively in the North American context (North 1987; Portes and Curtis 1987; Yang 1994; Jones-Correa 2001; Chiswick and Miller 2008; DeVoretz and Pivnenko 2004; Bloemraad 2002; Rallu 2011; Liebig and Von Haaren 2011). Typically, these studies look at a range of individual characteristics, such as educational attainment, age at migration, years of residence, family situation and, relating to country of origin, economic development, the political situation and toleration of dual citizenship (for a recent comprehensive overview and analysis, see Chiswick and Miller 2008).

While these studies have contributed to our understanding of the determination of citizenship take-up among immigrants, their comparative scope is surprisingly limited, from the perspective of migration destination countries. Most studies focus on the North American context, with key contributions looking in particular at the case of the US (Yang 1994; Jones-Correa 2001; Chiswick and Miller 2008; see also DeVoretz and Pivnenko 2004 on Canada). Some notable exceptions exist, though at best they compare a few countries. In the context of the 'naturalisation gap' between

Canada and the US, for example, important work draws attention to the extent to which naturalisation is institutionally encouraged (Bloemraad 2002; Picot and Hou 2011). Other studies have investigated the relevance of the citizenship legislation in countries of origin, in particular in relation to toleration of dual citizenship (Jones-Correa 2001). These examples, however, are exceptions confirming the rule, as we are still a long way off from understanding the relationship between country of origin features, individual characteristics and the institutional opportunity structure in which naturalisation takes place.

In particular, in Europe, where citizenship policies differ substantially (Vink and De Groot 2010), we see large differences in citizenship take-up rates, with around 80% of the foreign-born population naturalised after at least 10 years residence in the Netherlands and Sweden, around 65% of a comparable group in the UK, 50% in France and only around 35% in Germany and Switzerland (Liebig and Von Haaren 2011: 28). The logical question is thus: are these differences in citizenship take-up rates explained by differences in the demographic composition of the immigrant population, or rather by the institutional structure made up of citizenship policies in the countries of origin *and* destination? We cannot answer this important policy-relevant question without an explicit cross-national comparison. Hence, as both the composition of immigrant populations *and* citizenship policies across Europe vary significantly, studies which take the idea of a 'citizenship constellation' (Bauböck and Faist 2010) seriously, should include a comparative design captures, in addition to the individual characteristics of migrants and aspects of the opportunity structures in destination countries, also the features of rules and practices in origin countries. While advanced methodological techniques, such as cross-classified multi-level anaysis allow capturing such complexities, their application in the field of citizenship studies so far is still the exception, rather than the rule (see e.g. Dronkers and Vink 2012; Vink et al. 2013).

In terms of the question of the 'citizenship premium', much of the recent literature has focused on the question whether citizenship acquisition actually improves labour market performance or whether immigrants who perform better on the labour market are more likely to naturalise. In other words, is there unobserved heterogeneity, for example related to ability or motivation of immigrants, which is driving the association between naturalisation and economic performance? This causality question is clearly of key importance and scholars have developed specific methodological strategies depending on the type of available data, such as using instrumental variables (Bevelander and Pendakur 2012; Rallu 2011) or a Heckman two-stage model (DeVoretz and Pivnenko 2004) for cross-sectional datasets, or individual fixed effects and longitudinal analysis with panel data (Bratsberg et al. 2002; Steinhardt 2012). The common denominator of these studies with a more refined analysis of the relation between naturalisation and economic performance is that when controlling for self-selection the citizenship premium decreases, but –crucially– remains significant (see Scott 2008, for a contrasting view).

While most studies of the relation between naturalisation and integration, have focused on policies and structural context of destination countries, particularly in Europe there is relatively little attention for the role of origin countries in the process

of naturalisation and integration of immigrants. Yet it is evident that the 'origin factor' matters significantly when assessing the question of immigrant integration. Especially, dual citizenship policies in origin countries should be taken into account as a potential facilitating or restraining factor for the process of integration of immigrants. These dual citizenship policies may be reflected in general rules in constitutions or citizenship laws on the loss of citizenship upon voluntary acquisition of another citizenship (see below), but also in more specific bilateral agreements between countries or rules that only apply to citizens from certain countries (see for example the German exception for EU citizens).

In Europe, as elsewhere, we see that many traditional emigrant countries initially develop a restrictive attitude towards the acquisition of foreign citizenship by the emigrant community, yet later often develop a more tolerant approach. A state of origin as Mexico originally have sought to exercise control over the diaspora by penalising the acquisition of foreign citizenship with the loss of the citizenship of origin, yet now recognize that 'mexicanidad' can be maintained while acquiring, for example, US citizenship. Also in Europe we see an unmistakable trend that states increasingly start to reconceptualize citizenship in a more transnational manner (Vink and De Groot 2010). This affects both European receiving countries, such as Germany, France and Italy, as European countries of origin, such as Armenia or Ukraine. In post-Soviet Armenia, for example, the approach to dual citizenship was originally largely restrictive, as a result of concerns that the Armenian naturalised abroad would be able to avoid military service at the time of the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh territory. In a more general sense, due to the sizeable diaspora, there have been strong concerns about the interference in Armenian politics and society of foreign citizens, in the case of Armenians who have acquired another citizenship (Makaryan 2013: 6). However, since 2007, dual citizenship has been fully accepted and acquiring the citizenship of another state no longer implies the automatic loss of Armenian citizenship (Makaryan 2013: 15).

Moreover, in addition to these *formal rules*, what matters equally –and has been relatively under-researched so far– is how e.g. governmental actors in origin countries *in practice* stimulate or discourage the acquisition of a foreign citizenship by the emigrant community. For example, in Ukraine, there is an overall negative attitude towards dual citizenship, as a result of concerns about the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine vis-à-vis Russia (Shevel 2010: 1). However, more recently the attitude against dual citizenship has softened and in practice allows many Ukrainian citizens who acquire a foreign citizenship to retain their citizenship of origin (Shevel 2010: 11). A similar trend can be observed in Georgia, where in 2004 a special 'dual citizenship commission' was formed to create a more liberal framework for dual citizenship, in response to demand from the sizeable Georgian diaspora (Gugushvili 2012: 9). However, in Georgia, as in Ukraine, the legal framework remains unclear as to the extent to which dual citizenship has been embraced or not and, at times, seems to be applied in a problematic manner in cases of political controversy (Gugushvili 2012: 23).

There are two reasons for why dual citizenship policies in origin countries should be taken into account, from the perspective of the integration of immigrants in

destination countries. First, being able to retain the citizenship of origin generally can be expected to increase naturalisation rates among immigrant groups. Jones-Correa (2001), for example, demonstrates that changes in citizenship policies in Latin American countries in the 1990s had a positive effect on naturalisation rates among immigrants groups in the US from countries that recently allowed dual citizenship. Vink et al. (2013) demonstrate that in 15 European countries the possibility of retaining the citizenship of origin, depending on citizenship law in destination and origin countries, positive correlates with the propensity to naturalise. In Portugal, for example, low naturalisation rates among the Ukrainian community are mainly attributed to the risk of losing Ukrainian citizenship (EUDO CITIZENSHIP 2013b: 13). This indicates that, in as far as there has been a softening of the negative attitude towards dual citizenship in Ukraine (see above), this has not yet translated into a proactive policy, for example through the diplomatic representation in Portugal, to encourage the naturalisation of Ukrainians in Portugal (but see e.g. ACIDI 2011). Mazzolari (2009: 187) also links the increased propensity to naturalise to improve integration outcomes: 'Immigrants coming from countries that have recently allowed dual citizenship are found not only to be more likely to naturalise but also to experience relative employment and earnings gains and to lower their reliance on welfare.' This relates to the benefits of naturalisation, such as increased employability, as discussed below.

Second, there is the question of how retaining the citizenship of origin influences the integration process. While there is some limited work on the relation between dual citizenship and sociocultural integration and political participation (e.g. Staton et al. 2007; Dagevos 2008; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010), there is a much more limited literature on the relation between dual citizenship status and socioeconomic integration. As a result, few studies on the relation between naturalisation and economic integration, or other integration indicators, employ explicit methodologies that allow for the identification of the influence of the origin countries. As argued by Peters and Vink (2016), the literature on citizenship and integration has developed methodologies mainly aimed at detecting *whether* destination country citizenship matters, which may not necessarily be suited to analysing the question *to whom* citizenship matters.

Discussion of the Literature: Focus on the Role of the Country of Origin

This section outlines the actors involved in the process of immigrant integration in destination countries and identify the diverging and converging interests of the countries of origin and destination, as well as the strategies of societies of origin to push their interests. We start by discussing the relation between citizenship and integration and then go into the question to what extent and how actors from origin

countries can encourage the access to citizenship of migrants in destination countries.

The relation between naturalisation and the structural integration of immigrants (i.e. their inclusion into existing social structures, such as the labour market) has received increasing scholarly attention since Chiswick's (1978) seminal study of the effects of citizenship acquisition on earnings of foreign-born men in the US. While the literature is marred by differentiated findings, depending on choice of destination country, immigrant group, dependent variable (e.g. employment status or income) and methodological design (e.g. based on cross-sectional or longitudinal data), it is fair to say that the consensus is that overall naturalisation has a strong potential to improve the economic well-being of an immigrant (see e.g. Bratsberg et al. 2002; DeVoretz and Pivnenko 2004; Mazzolari 2009; OECD 2011; Rallu 2011; Bevelander and Pendakur 2012; Steinhardt 2012).

In as far as a 'citizenship premium' is observed in the literature, the main reasons are seen as threefold: (a) *unrestricted access* to the labour market: in many countries citizenship is still a requirement for certain jobs, particularly in the public sector; (b) *better employability*: the absence of administrative costs associated with work and residence permits makes it easier to hire naturalised immigrants; and (c) citizenship acquisition as a *signalling device* of integration: naturalisation indicates a clear commitment of the immigrant to remain in the country of residence, hence lowering the uncertainty of the employer, and formal equality also decreases (though does not prevent) the risk of discrimination. On the whole, naturalised immigrants thus are generally seen as more likely to have paid employment and less likely to be unemployed, as well as more likely to have higher earnings due to better occupational status (Liebig and Von Haaren 2011).

When we look more specifically at the literature on the relation between *dual* citizenship status and immigrants integration, what strikes is that the relevance of retaining origin country citizenship is framed virtually exclusively as a naturalisation effect: 'Immigrants coming from countries that have recently allowed dual citizenship are found not only to be more likely to naturalise but also to experience relative employment and earnings gains and to lower their reliance on welfare' (Mazzolari 2009: 187). In other words, Mazzolari compares those naturalised immigrants with non-naturalised immigrants, but does not compare naturalised immigrants *with dual citizenship* with naturalised immigrants *without dual citizenship* (cf. Liebig and Von Haaren 2011: 30). One important reason for this limited analysis of dual citizenship is data availability: while national registration data and international surveys (such as the European Social Survey and the Labour Force Survey) include valuable information on destination country citizenship, they seldomly include data on retention of origin country citizenship.

The key 'citizenship' question is thus often seen as whether an immigrant has destination country citizenship or not (see e.g. OECD 2011), whereas keeping the origin citizenship is seen as relevant only in terms of the extent to which it influences the propensity to naturalise. There is some limited work, though with rather mixed findings, on the relation between dual citizenship and sociocultural integration and political participation (e.g. Staton et al. 2007; Dagevos 2008; Ersanilli and

Koopmans 2010). Yet overall, the literature on the 'citizenship premium' treats dual citizenship as largely irrelevant from the perspective of affecting the potential payoff of naturalisation, in terms of improving integration outcomes.

In other words, the default assumption seems to be that what matters for the integration of an immigrant is destination country citizenship, not origin country citizenship and in as far as the latter is relevant, it is because of the relevance for the propensity to naturalise. However, to what extent this assumption is empirically valid, is a largely unresearched question. While this is a question that often arises in political debates on dual citizenship (see e.g. Schmeets and Vink 2011, on the Netherlands), in academic studies the question has been mainly left unaddressed. From the perspective of this brief literature review, the main identifiable gap in the literature thus relates to the under-researched issue of the relevance of retaining origin country citizenship for the relation between naturalisation and immigrant integration.

In the next section we discuss two sides to this under-researched question: first, the question to what extent dual citizenship policies in origin countries affect the propensity to naturalise, for migrants in destination countries; and, second, the question to what extent the 'citizenship premium' is affected by an increased propensity to naturalise for immigrants from origin countries that allow dual citizenship.

Proposed Theoretical Framework

Citizenship is a legal status and expresses a relationship between an individual and a state that entails specific legal rights and duties. As for the rights attached to citizenship, the most important right associated with citizenship is the protection by the state and unrestricted access to the territory. Even if alternative permanent residence statuses, such as the green card in the US, may provide sufficient security of residence and strong protection against expulsion, 'naturalisation' ultimately transforms a foreigner into a citizen. Citizenship provides additional privileges, such as diplomatic protection, the right to vote, and access to public sector jobs, to name a few. This section highlights research on the impact of origin country effects and origin country policies on, first, immigrant naturalisation rates and, secondly, integration outcomes associated with naturalisation.

Citizenship of Origin and the Naturalisation Propensity

Citizenship laws vary greatly between countries and thus may well explain differences in terms of naturalisation rates between similar immigrant groups. Typically, we see important differences between immigration countries, such as Canada and the United States, and most European countries. In the North American context,

birth in the territory gives automatic access to citizenship to the second generation and naturalisation is seen as a natural part of the integration process that follows immigration. In most European countries, by contrast, citizenship acquisition has for a long time been dominated by descent-based transmission from one generation to the next and therefore was never very accessible to immigrants. However, within Europe we see a large variety of policies that regulate access to citizenship and some countries, notably Ireland, the United Kingdom and France, have stronger *ius soli* traditions, which is partly still reflected in citizenship policies of today (see for example, Bauböck et al. 2006; Brubaker 1992; Janoski 2010; Vink and De Groot 2010; Weil 2002).

Aspects of citizenship laws that influence the 'accessibility' of citizenship for immigrants are the conditions for ordinary naturalisation, such as residence requirements, dual citizenship toleration, language and integration requirements, fees, and administrative discretion. For children of immigrants and subsequent generations, ius soli birthright also matters greatly as this determines whether they are included at birth as full members of the political community.

Although the acquisition of citizenship can offer significant benefits, we know that some immigrants naturalise and other do not. Why is that? Yang (1994: 457) argues that immigrants' perceptions of the costs, benefits and meaning of naturalisation are conditioned principally by the socio-economic situation in their countries of origin: insecurity, poor economic conditions and low standards of living may deter immigrants from desiring to return to their homelands. In other words, citizenship provides security, but the utility of naturalisation is appreciated differently among immigrant groups, depending on their country of origin context (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1986: 303; Bueker 2005; Logan et al. 2012). Based on this reasoning, one would expect, certainly in developed European countries (as in North America), that the citizenship take-up rate is higher among immigrants from less developed or lower-income countries. The context of country of origin is thus, first and foremost, relevant in terms of motivating the demand for naturalisation from an immigrant's perspective.

Based on the literature, one would assume that differences still exist among immigrants in their perceptions of the chances of life improvement secured by citizenship, even within groups coming from countries of origin with relatively similar levels of development. If seen as a life-course event (Tucci 2011), citizenship take-up is likely to be influenced by expectations and ambitions related to an individual's life situation. For example, we expect that residence matters: the longer an immigrant resides in a country, the higher the expectation of legal incorporation in the host country community. Existing research has shown this to be one of the best individual-level predictors of naturalisation (e.g. Dronkers and Vink 2012: 404). Additionally, immigrants who are married and those who have children may also be more strongly motivated to acquire citizenship, as fulfillment either of their own life-course project, or that of their spouse and/or children (who may be left behind in the country of origin). Another important individual characteristic which can be assumed to positively affect the ability to qualify for citizenship is language competence. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1986: 305) observe that, for the USA, 'coming from

a country in which English is an official language facilitates naturalisation, for which knowledge of the English language is a requirement.' Yang (1994: 468) confirms these findings and factors such years of residence, being married and having children, as well as speaking the language of the host country would be expected to be included in most micro-level investigations (e.g. Yang 1994; Chiswick and Miller 2008; Dronkers and Vink 2012).

Crucial determinants, in line with the literature, are socioeconomic factors such as human capital (educational attainment, occupational status) and employment status. There are two key reasons why one would expect that higher levels of human capital would increase the propensity to naturalise (Yang 1994). First, as to human capital, as better-educated or more highly skilled persons are more likely to qualify for the type of public sector jobs for which citizenship may be a precondition, they are more likely to capitalize on this citizenship bonus and thus to invest in the naturalisation process. The same goes for employment: only those immigrants active on the labor market are likely to expect a return on their investment in the naturalisation process, for example in terms of wage increase. The second reason is related to the selectivity of the naturalisation process, which may deter immigrants who decide not to bother investing in a procedure that looks very complex and is difficult to understand. Less educated or skilled immigrants may be deterred more easily by the seeming complexity of the naturalisation process. Hence, following both arguments, one would expect that immigrants with higher levels of human capital and employed immigrants are more likely to acquire the destination country citizenship. It is often hypothesised that 'social capital' also matters, for example in terms of immigrant networks and access to information on naturalisation procedures, but the evidence there is less systematic.

However, whereas most single-destination country studies have stopped here, logically looking only at the variation in the origin country citizenship policies of the immigrant population, particularly in a European context citizenship policy in the destination context is crucial. Citizenship policies set the conditions under which immigrants can naturalise, for example the required years of residence, the requirement to renounce one's previous citizenship, language and civic integration tests and fees. In Europe, we see large differences in terms of residence requirements, varying from three to twelve or more years (until 1999 even 15 years in Germany) as well as fees, ranging from no costs whatsoever to nearly two thousand euro in Austria (Goodman 2010). Eligibility criteria such as residence requirements make the acquisition of citizenship a rather more or less realistic prospect within a foreseeable future. We expect that immigrants are more likely to acquire destination country citizenship in countries with a citizenship law that makes citizenship relatively accessible.

Aside from individual characteristics and legal requirements in the destination country, the legal framework set by the citizenship laws in the countries of origin and destination provides the opportunity structure with regard to access to citizenship. In the literature, most research has gone out to citizenship policy in the origin country, particularly with regard to the possibility of retaining one's previous citizenship when acquiring a new citizenship. Whether citizenship can be retained will

depend on the combined outcome of the citizenship legislation in both the countries of origin and destination. In order to avoid conflicting allegiance or loyalties, many countries have a rule that implies the loss of the citizenship of origin upon the voluntary acquisition of another. Some countries also require immigrants to renounce their citizenship of origin, if they do not lose it automatically. In Europe, countries such as Austria, Denmark and Norway have a strict renunciation requirement (Vink and De Groot 2010). This leads to the expectation that immigrants who can retain their citizenship of origin are more likely to acquire destination country citizenship. It should be noted, however, that the findings in the literature on this point are rather ambiguous as some studies which hypothesize a positive effect of dual citizenship toleration in the origin country, find in fact the opposite (see Jones-Correa 2001; Mazzolari 2009; but compare Yang 1994; Dronkers and Vink 2012; Logan et al. 2012). Such contradictory findings are likely related to the differences in methodological design, for example with regard to sample size and definition of immigrant population (e.g. whether or not to include the second generation).

Third, with regard to dual citizenship policies, while the option to retain dual citizenship may be expected in general to affect the decision on whether to naturalise, one may assume that the absence of the dual citizenship option in particular affects immigrants from highly developed countries. After all, not only are immigrants from less developed countries in general more motivated to naturalise, thus more willing to accept the potential cost of breaking off the legal link with the country of birth, but those from more developed countries also have more to lose, so to say, in terms of the value of citizenship. It would thus be intuitive to expect a stronger positive relation between dual citizenship tolerance and naturalisation among immigrants from highly developed countries.

Citizenship of Origin and the Naturalisation Premium

The relation between naturalisation and the economic integration of immigrants has received increasing scholarly attention since Chiswick's (1978) seminal study of the effects of citizenship acquisition on earnings of foreign-born men in the US. In as far as a 'citizenship premium' is observed in the literature, with regard labour market performance of immigrants, the main reasons are seen as threefold: (a) *unrestricted access* to the labour market: citizenship may be a requirement for certain jobs, particularly in the public sector; (b) *better employability*: the absence of administrative costs associated with work and residence permits makes it easier to hire naturalised immigrants; and (c) citizenship acquisition as a *signalling device* of integration: naturalisation indicates a clear commitment of the immigrant to remain in the country of residence, hence lowering the uncertainty of the employer, and formal equality also decreases (though does not prevent) the risk of discrimination (Liebig and Von Haaren 2011).

In addition to methodological debates already to referred to above (on disentangling causal mechanisms, what is clearly missing in this debate is the answer to the

question how the relation between naturalisation and labour market performance is affected by the retention or renunciation of the citizenship of origin. While there is some limited work on the relation between dual citizenship and sociocultural integration and political participation (e.g. Staton et al. 2007; Dagevos 2008; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010), there is virtually no literature on the relation between dual citizenship status and socioeconomic integration. Even the work by Mazzolari (2009: 187), which focuses specifically on the issue of dual citizenship and labour market performance, frames positive correlations between dual citizenship and labour market success mainly as a naturalisation effect: 'Immigrants coming from countries that have recently allowed dual citizenship are found not only to be more likely to naturalise but also to experience relative employment and earnings gains and to lower their reliance on welfare.' In other words, Mazzolari compares naturalised immigrants with non-naturalised immigrants, but does not compare naturalised immigrants *with dual citizenship* with naturalised immigrants *without dual citizenship* (cf. Liebig and Von Haaren 2011: 30). This lacuna in the literature is problematic because there are at least two contrasting views imaginable on the role of dual citizenship in the relation between naturalisation and economic integration. Since there are no well-developed systematic positions on this relation, such views at best have proto-theoretical status.

The first view, which is in fact the mainstream view in the literature on naturalisation and economic integration, is what we would term an *assimilationist perspective* on dual citizenship and naturalisation. Classically, assimilation is seen as a process by which immigrant groups fully integrate themselves into a new country, ranging from cultural assimilation to structural assimilation (Gordon 1964). Since the move to obtain citizenship indicates a commitment to stay in the destination country and requires a minimum of acculturation, this may be seen as an indicator of assimilation (White et al. 1993: 99).

From this assimilation perspective, the acquisition of citizenship of the destination country is thus an important step on the way to the civic and structural assimilation into the institutions of the host society. While naturalisation may not fully overcome the disadvantageous situation immigrants often find themselves in, caused by racial discrimination, language difficulties or cultural habits which set off immigrants against the native population, it is deemed to narrow the employment gap between immigrants and natives by making the first similar to the latter in terms of legal status. Moreover, in terms of signalling towards employers, the key 'citizenship' question is often seen as whether an immigrant has destination country citizenship or not (see e.g. OECD 2011). Keeping the origin citizenship is seen as irrelevant from this perspective as neither access to public sector jobs nor access to the territory are usually conditioned on the renunciation of another citizenship. This view also chimes with transnationalist perspectives, which endorse the idea that multiple forms of membership are a reality in a mobile world (e.g. Spiro 2007; Portes et al. 1999; Naujoks 2013). In other words, what matters for the employability of an immigrant is having destination country citizenship, not origin country citizenship.

In contrast with such a narrow perspective that only considers the relation between citizenship and integration from a destination country perspective, negative views on dual citizenship are frequently to be found among politicians and voters, especially in countries such as the Netherlands where this is a politicized issue (Schmeets and Vink 2011). In such a critical view, dual citizenship is essentially seen as a signal of the ambiguous status of an immigrant who is being caught between the contexts of the ethnic group and that of the destination country. In some ways, views that emphasise the 'disintegrative' consequence of dual citizenship, in the sense of persisting group ties that can negatively impact the integrative potential of assimilation forces such as education, work and arguably also citizenship, could be seen in line with segmented assimilation theory (Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997). More forcefully even, by holding on to their 'exit option' of a second citizenship dual citizens are viewed by opponents as those who could never be as fully 'integrated' as those who have made a conscious choice for their new country and rejected the formal link with the country of origin.

While one can see how this ambiguity of dual citizens could play out in different ways, especially as regards political participation and sociocultural integration (see e.g. Staton et al. 2007, for a critical view), such a position is difficult to hold specifically with regard to naturalisation and employment, which has been the focus of much of the 'citizenship premium' literature. After all, the retention of citizenship of origin is unlikely to affect the employability of immigrants in terms of formal requirements (with the possible exceptional cases of higher political offices that may be excluded in some countries to dual citizens). Also the argument that dual citizenship would undermine the 'signalling' effect of naturalisation is difficult to make, as then we would have to assume (a) that employers systematically have information on dual citizenship status of applicants and, if so (b) that they view this negatively; both assumptions are unrealistic from our point of view.

Does this mean we should not expect to observe a negative relation between dual citizenship and employment status? One reason to think so is that immigrants in principle can be assumed to want to retain their citizenship of origin, when they naturalise; but they may make a choice, when forced to do so because of the citizenship policies in the origin country (provisions of loss of citizenship) or the destination country (renunciation requirement). One could thus hypothesise that immigrants who naturalise despite having to renounce their citizenship of origin are 'positively selected' into naturalisation under the assumption that unless they are required to do so, immigrants would normally not renounce their origin citizenship. These immigrants can be expected to be extra motivated to naturalise and, thus, have (unobservable) characteristics related to personality and life situation that may make them perform better on the labour market. In other words, if such a 'positive selection' mechanism were to exist, one would expect to find empirically that immigrants who do naturalise, despite losing or having to give up their previous citizenship, will be those who can be associated with better integration outcomes. Crucially, however, this would not imply that dual citizenship is a barrier to integration; rather, it would mean that dual citizenship rules –in origin and destination countries- significantly

impact the payoff structure and thereby the integration outcomes associated with naturalisation.

Dual Citizenship

This section discusses two case studies that illustrate the previous methodological and theoretical discussions. The first case study discusses the impact of dual citizenship policies on immigrant naturalisation rates in destination countries, based on the results of a comparative study in 16 European countries. The second case study introduces data from a new 'global expatriate dual citizenship database' (Vink et al. 2015), which collects information on dual citizenship policies in all countries of the world since 1960. It discusses how origin countries have evolved in their citizenship policies vis-à-vis the diaspora.

Assessing the Impact of (Dual) Citizenship Policies on Immigrant Naturalisation Rates

This section summarizes the results of a recent comparative study by Vink et al. (2013) on the effects of citizenship policies in European countries on the propensity to naturalise, taking into account not only characteristics of individuals, but also their origin country features. In particular, the study looks at the relevance of destination country policies *in the context of origin country features,* such as the level of development of the origin country, as well as dual citizenship policies. The study is based on a sample of 7.489 foreign-born residents in 16 European countries, collected by the European Social Survey. The study is innovative because, in as far as any comparative research has been done on the effects of destination country policies, these have concluded that indeed 'policy matters' (Bloemraad 2002; Dronkers and Vink 2012). However, so far no research has been done on the question *to whom* citizenship policy matters more.

Vink et al. (2013) hypothesise that the inclusiveness of citizenship policy matters in particular to those immigrants who are strongly motivated to naturalise, primarily those immigrants coming from less developed countries. After all, whereas the first group has a 'valuable' citizenship to fall back on and will thus continue to have a viable return option, the latter is likely to see citizenship acquisition as part of a life course project aimed at permanent settlement in a new country. While this need not necessarily rule out the idea of return to the home country, acquiring citizenship of the destination country is likely to be perceived as a key precondition for such return to the origin country, given that citizenship guarantees continuous mobility. Hence, these immigrants will be affected more significantly by policies which make destination country citizenship either not accessible within a reasonable period after arrival

in the country due to prohibitive residency requirements or difficult or even impossible to acquire due to prohibitive and discretionary assimilation requirements.

Vink et al. (2013) find that the level of development of the country of origin is a crucial factor in understanding the relationships between on the one hand citizenship policies and on the other individual-level features and citizenship take-up rates in Europe. To arrive at this conclusion, the analysis first shows that demand for citizenship is influenced primarily by where immigrants are from. The level of human development of countries of origin accounts for the vast difference among immigrants in their propensity to naturalise. Immigrants in Europe coming from medium and under-developed countries are on average 2.5 times more likely to have citizenship than those originating from highly developed countries, including EU member states and other OECD countries. These findings are in line with the literature and can be understood in terms of the perceived payoff attached to citizenship. Acquiring destination-country citizenship has a much higher potential pay-off for immigrants originating from low-income countries than for those coming from developed and more prosperous societies. In this context, securing residence status in a country which offers a vast increase in security and life chances, is of crucial importance.

Crucially, because large differences exist between immigrants in their motivation to naturalise, Vink et al. (2013) show that the impact of citizenship policies varies for these two groups. The legal framework set by the citizenship laws in the countries of origin and destination accounts for a difference in naturalisation rates, yet only for immigrants from less developed countries. In fact, not only are these immigrants twice as likely to naturalise in countries with very open citizenship policies, but they are also the ones particularly affected by these policies. Vink et al. (2013) demonstrate the relevance of policy by introducing an indicator that captures the openness of citizenship policy in the destination countries for first generation immigrants, with regard to residency and integration requirements for naturalization (MIPEX Access to Nationality). They observe that an increase of 1 unit on the MIPEX scale leads to a 2.4% increase in the likelihood of having destination country citizenship. However, only in the case of immigrants from under-developed countries do they observe a sharp increase in citizenship take-up rates. For immigrants from highly developed countries the positive relation between citizenship policy and naturalization rates is weaker and not significant.

Second, the analysis by Vink et al. (2013) shows that this origin factor is also related to the role of individual characteristics in immigrants' decisions to naturalise. Differentiated analyses of citizenship take-up among two immigrant groups, from highly developed (incl. The EU) and from medium/under-developed countries, show that different determinants play a role for different groups. Socio-economic features such as human capital (e.g. language skills) and employment status indeed play significant roles in the take-up of citizenship, but only for immigrants from less developed countries. Historical and cultural ties between the origin country and the destination country also matter, for example in the context of former colonies.

These findings match with those of Jones-Correa (2001), for example, who demonstrates that changes in citizenship policies in Latin American countries in the

1990s had a positive effect on naturalization rates among immigrants groups in the US from countries that recently allowed dual citizenship. Peters et al. (2015) find that in the Netherlands migrants from countries that do not allow for dual citizenship status are about 24% less likely to acquire citizenship of the destination country, indicating that the renunciation requirement is considered a significant obstacle to naturalization. However, they find significant differences between how these dual citizenship policies affect various migrant origin groups and cohorts (see also Bevelander and Helgertz 2014 for some contrasting findings on the relevance of dual citizenship policies of origin countries).

Charting Dual Citizenship Policies Worldwide in the Last 50 Years

The relevance of dual citizenship thus needs to be understood in this context of differentiated naturalisation dynamics. In Europe, migration-receiving countries are increasingly unlikely to demand the renunciation of previous citizenship as a condition for naturalisation (Vink and De Groot 2010; updated in Vink and De Groot 2016). This has to do with the fact that, in a world of migration where children of mixed-nationality couples increasingly often have dual citizenship at birth, it makes increasingly less sense to require from a specific group of immigrants that they renounce their citizenship of origin, when they naturalise. By 2010, of all EU member states, Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark and Estonia are the only countries which still have an uncompromised renunciation demand in their citizenship legislation. Since the early 1990s, countries such as Italy, Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden abolished the renunciation demand altogether. Other countries, such as the Netherlands, currently allow for so many exceptions to the general rule that most naturalised citizens do not have to renounce their previous citizenship (Van Oers et al. 2006: 419). The new German naturalisation regime is also significantly more tolerant towards double citizenship than was previously the case, though still generally restrictive with regard to dual citizenship of specific categories of immigrants, as well as for the children of immigrants who can acquire German citizenship at birth but still have to make a decision between German and foreign citizenship between the age of 18 and 23 (Hailbronner 2006: 232). Spain formally has a renunciation demand but does not enforce it.

The attitudes towards dual citizenship of emigrants are perhaps most clearly manifested by the rules that exist in states with regard to the loss of citizenship after a citizen voluntary acquires the citizenship of another state. Basically, countries can be divided in three categories, depending on the type of general rule they apply (though, admittedly, bilateral agreements between countries may provide different rules for specific groups). Traditionally, in many states dual citizenship was perceived negatively and such states provide accordingly in their national legislation that citizenship is lost automatically upon the voluntary acquisition of another citi-

Table 9.1 Rules on consequences of voluntary acquisition of another citizenship for the citizenship of origin country, by world region in 1960 and 2015 (percentage of states per world region applying a specific rule)

	1960				2015			
	Automatic loss origin country citizenship	No automatic loss, but renunciation possible	No automatic loss, no renunciation possible	N	Automatic loss origin country citizenship	No automatic loss, but renunciation possible	No automatic loss, no renunciation possible	N
Africa	71,4%	14,3%	14,3%	7	35,2%	55,6%	9,3%	54
Asia	54,5%	40,9%	4,5%	22	33,3%	62,5%	4,2%	48
Europe	54,8%	41,9%	3,2%	31	27,3%	70,5%	2,3%	44
Americas	72,7%	4,5%	22,7%	22	8,6%	60,0%	31,4%	35
Oceania	66,7%	33,3%	0,0%	3	15,4%	84,6%	0,0%	13
Mean	61,2%	29,4%	9,4%	85	26,8%	63,4%	9,8%	
N	52	25	8	85	52	123	19	194

Source: Vink et al. (2015)

zenship. By contrast, in states where dual citizenship is not perceived to be problematic, no such rules on loss of citizenship exist though citizens are allowed to voluntarily renounce their citizenship. Thirdly, in a minority of states, citizenship is not automatically lost and renunciation is also not possible.

Vink et al. (2015) have charted these rules for all countries in the world, since 1960. This novel dataset provides a unique overview of the development of origin country citizenship policies over the last half century. In 1960 in 61% of countries the voluntary citizenship of another country implied the automatic loss of the citizenship of origin. In 2015, however, only 27% of countries globally still applied such loss of citizenship provisions (see Table 9.1). This trend is especially strong within the American content, where by 2015 only 9% of countries still applies a rules of automatic loss of origin citizenship upon the voluntary acquisition of another citizenship.[2] These changing rules clearly reflect a different approach towards dual citizenship, an evolution that is linked to the desire of migration countries of origin to maintain the links with the emigrant community (Jones-Correa 2001; see for further analysis of these data: Vink and de Groot 2016).

Do these dual citizenship rules matter? For that question we go back to the analysis by Vink et al. (2013), who show that dual citizenship policies do matter. Immigrants who can retain their citizenship of origin are 40% more likely to acquire destination country citizenship. These results are controlled for individual factors such as gender, age, education and years of residence, as well as other origin countries (e.g. Human Development Index and whether immigrants come from former colonies or territories) and destination country features (GDP per capita and citizenship policy). However, there is no empirical support for the intuitive hypothesis that

[2] However, in more than 30% of countries in the Americas individuals are not allowed to renounce their citizenship, even if they choose to do so.

dual citizenship matters more for immigrants from highly developed countries than for those from less developed countries. The latter in general have a significantly higher propensity to naturalize, but this does not seem to be affected particularly by dual citizenship policies.

Conclusions

To conclude, immigrants coming from highly developed countries are not only less likely to naturalise, but whether or not they do so seems to depend on few factors. The strongest impact on immigrant naturalisation rates is clearly from 'origin country effects', especially in terms of relative levels of economic development, political stability and – in the case of EU member states – whether immigrants come from outside the European Union. If immigrants from highly developed countries or other EU member states naturalise at all, then years of residence play a crucial role in the process. For these immigrants, socio-economic and demographic features play only a marginal difference in their decision to naturalise, compared to the relevance of the time spent in the country of destination. In other words, not only does it matter where an immigrant is from, in terms of his or her propensity to naturalise, but it also matters significantly where an immigrant goes, in terms of the institutional context of the citizenship policy in the destination country. However, crucially, while destination country citizenship policies clearly affect naturalisation rates among immigrants, their relevance is conditioned by the kind of origin country background of the immigrants involved. Thus the question of how much where one goes matters with respect to naturalization depends significantly on where one is from.

The chapter raises two strands of issues relating to the actions and strategies of *actors* in origin countries which could affect migrant integration in destination countries.

First, dual citizenship policies, which are understood as the constellation of destination and origin country rules, affect the propensity to naturalise across the board – though within the context that the motivation to naturalise also depends on other factors related to the socioeconomic background of the origin country, as well as to individual-level factors. Thus, one could say that the impact of 'origin country policies' interacts with the impact of 'origin country effects'. From this perspective, the actors in the countries of origin who can most directly affect the integration of migrants in destination countries, with respect to the acquisition of citizenship, are the national legislators, who regulate what happens when an immigrant voluntarily acquires another citizenship – especially in the origin countries from which migrants are most interested in acquiring destination country citizenship. The summary results of a worldwide survey presented in this chapter clearly demonstrate that these actors in the origin countries increasingly accept dual citizenship as a natural phenomenon in an increasingly transnational world and thus abandon previously restrictive rules. At the same time, there are still a significant number of states in the

world, albeit a clear minority, where the phenomenon of dual citizenship is still actively countered through restrictive citizenship rules. These changing attitudes towards dual citizenship could be probed further through a survey of country of origin legislators and diaspora interest groups, in a diverse geographical, socioeconomic and legal context.

Second, following up on the previous point, the chapter highlights a major issue which has so far received relatively little attention, at least in the surveyed literature on citizenship acquisition and the socioeconomic, political and sociocultural integration of migrants in destination countries: namely, the relevance of retaining origin country citizenship to naturalisation and immigrant integration. In much of the economically oriented literature, the default assumption seems to be one of assimilationism: destination country citizenship, not origin country citizenship, supports integration. However, apart from affecting migrants' propensity to naturalise, dual citizenship rules in origin countries by definition also affect the continuing relationships of naturalised migrants after they have acquired destination country citizenship. How do these continuing ties with the origin country, whether expressed in a legal status or not, affect migrants' integration in the destination country? Apart from the occasional case studies of specific destination and origin country constellations (e.g. between Mexico and the US, see Fitzgerald 2008), there is relatively limited systematic evidence which shows how origin country citizenship affects what is often seen as a 'citizenship premium' in destination countries. Moreover, in a related manner, even if origin countries broadly accept dual citizenship through their citizenship legislation, a wide variety of diaspora politics is foreseeable in terms of efforts by government officials who are linked to diplomatic representation; they may reach out to the emigrant community to either stimulate or discourage them to naturalise in the destination country. By keeping a formal link with the origin country, citizenship policy is often seen as an important tool to maintaining ties with the economically significant diaspora. Such politics may or may not interfere in migrants' integration process in the destination country. Hence, even if legislators broadly accept dual citizenship for the pragmatic reason of keeping the emigrant community's bond with the home country alive, how do they view this continuing legal bond in terms of political, social and economic obligations, both of the country of origin and the individual migrant? And, how do individual migrants view these continuing legal ties to the origin country?

While the viewpoint that citizenship can serve as a tool for integration is increasingly accepted in academia as well as in national politics – now that citizenship policies in origin countries have become increasingly tolerant towards dual citizenship in Europe and beyond, as demonstrated in this chapter – there is a self-evident relevance to further exploring how maintaining origin-country citizenship interacts in the citizenship-integration nexus in the destination context. The role of relevant actors in countries of origin, such as legislators and diaspora group representatives, will be crucial to understanding how this interaction plays out across various constellations of countries of origin and destination.

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Chapter 10
Governance of Integration and the Role of the Countries of Origin – A Global Perspective

Agnieszka Weinar, Maria Vincenza Desiderio, and Cameron Thibos

Introduction

In the past decade the governance of immigrant integration – defined as the set of actors, structures, mechanisms and processes of cooperation that make up the framework for integration policies and practices – has gained increasing attention in the policy agenda in Europe, OECD countries and beyond (Desiderio and Weinar 2014). The scope of actions and the range of actors involved have constantly broadened to engage not only governments – at various levels and across different portfolios – but also civil society. Moreover, countries of origin have started to conceive of supporting integration as part of a broader diaspora engagement strategy – as a means of strengthening ties with the diaspora abroad and of putting its members in a position to contribute to the origin country. These policies thus support, at least in their stated goals, a functional integration (not necessarily full identification) of emigrants at destination, i.e. helping them function as productive members of the host societies. They are largely formulated by the institutions dedicated to diaspora engagement and are generally implemented with the involvement of the ministry of foreign affairs, consular networks and other offices set in receiving countries. We are now only starting to understand this integration/diaspora nexus (Délano and Gamlen 2014; Délano 2009). The need to understand their role as creating obstacles

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or support for integration has become crucial to international cooperation on migration.

In this chapter we contribute to this research field in two ways: by reviewing the challenges to cooperation between the countries of origin and destination on migrant integration; and by mapping fields of cooperation and levels of international governance that are relevant for such cooperation. Acknowledging the empirical constraints of this chapter, we focus on state actors and do not consider the roles of other stakeholders in the multilevel governance of migration.

State actors in the country of origin can influence integration in the country of destination either indirectly or directly. We talk of a "country of origin effect" when specific diaspora and emigration policies, while not aimed at integration per se, nonetheless have the potential to support integration. For example, teaching home country language can boost employability of migrant descendants in globalised economy. We talk of a "country of origin impact" for policies whose specific aim is to influence integration: for example, preparation programmes for migrant workers in their home countries. Below we enumerate some examples of both types of policies (Table 10.1).

It is important to note that we make a distinction between diaspora and emigration policies following the main concepts of the volume (Fargues, Weinar, Unterreiner this volume). As a whole, this volume seeks to understand the dynamics of cooperation on integration. It also asks about the potential complementarities and clashes between integration goals at destination and diaspora policies of the country of origin. Our core focus in this chapter regards current cooperation on the integration of migrants between origin and destination countries, and its prospects. The central questions we ask stem from the debates with the experts in the field: is cooperation on integration matters between origin and destination countries possible? Does it have value added? What are the most promising areas of cooperation?

This work is based on original research in 48 non-EU countries on four continents (Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America). We collected analytical reports for each of these countries following the same pattern of information. On this basis we created a database on diaspora policies. This information has been enriched with opinions of 24 experts interviewed in the spring and summer 2014. Our interviewees

Table 10.1 Diaspora and emigration policies potentially shaping integration outcomes (examples)

Effect (indirect)	Impact (direct)
Heritage promotion (origin language courses for diaspora)	Pre-departure measures for integration at destination
Heritage promotion (origin education for diaspora)	Post-departure orientation for integration at destination
Dual citizenship (acceptance of)	Bilateral agreements opening channels for legal labor migration (temporary, circular)
Trade policy (trade agreements)	Agreements for the mutual recognition of foreign qualifications
Foreign policy (political relations with the country of destination)	
Cultural diplomacy abroad	

were all selected from a group of university scholars, practitioners and think-tank experts in Europe, North America, Africa and Asia. Both research activities were a part of the Interact project.

The chapter is further grounded in a thorough review of the existing literature on diaspora and emigration policies, including INTERACT reports.

In the chapter we first contextualise our research with a discussion of the state of play in the integration and diaspora policy nexus. Following this, we identify several possible areas of cooperation using the international relations framework of three-level games. We conclude our analysis with observations concerning the future of this cooperation.

Cooperation Between Countries of Origin and Destination

Migration policy has historically been part and parcel of international relations (Mau et al. 2012). The recent rediscovery of the role migration plays in foreign affairs should not be misleading in this respect (Geddes 2008). In contrast, the question of how countries of origin can influence the integration of their nationals abroad through international channels is quite new. It received particular attention in the late twentieth century, due to the growing number of international interdependencies and forums to manage them.

International cooperation on integration has three levels. The first level reflects domestic politics and interests that steer the international relations agenda. The second level is the regional level, where a regional framework for cooperation is in place (what is increasingly the case on all continents). The third level is international cooperation led by global institutions and shaped by global frameworks. In reality all three tend to intertwine in what international relations theory calls "a three-level game" (Reslow 2013; Larsén 2007; Reslow and Vink 2015).

Outlining the Landscape of Cooperation

The objectives underlying migration and integration management in origin and destination countries have been commonly portrayed as mostly antithetical or, at least, diverging (Kunz et al. 2011; Lavenex 2004). On one hand, the contribution of emigrants who are well integrated in their receiving countries to the development of their countries of origin has been ambiguous: they either supported the development of the homeland or became disinterested altogether (Docquier et al. 2016; Docquier and Rapoport 2012). On the other hand, the ability of immigrants who are closely linked to their countries of origin to integrate is frequently questioned, as such groups are often assumed to disrupt the social cohesion in the countries of destination (Joppke 2009).

The scholarship focuses on "asymmetric relationships" where the countries of origin are supposed to be in a less powerful position to negotiate their interests (Martin 1998; Kunz et al. 2011). Such a view assumes that countries' interests are inherently diverging and that the ultimate model for international cooperation is the power play. Nevertheless, at least in the broad area of migration, the interests have evolved together with changing global economic, political and migratory contexts (Rosenblum 2006).

Over the last two decades, origin countries have increasingly adopted an approach supportive of the successful integration of 'their' diaspora in destination countries (Délano 2009; Desiderio and Weinar 2014; European Training Foundation 2015). This shift can be explained by important changes on all three levels of policy-making.

On the domestic level, the countries of origin have understood the benefits of successful integration of their citizens and their descendants abroad for the development of the home country. At the same time, they have acknowledged that emigration is often permanent and thus integration does not represent an obstacle to return per se. Also, researchers have pointed out that some countries of origin support integration to meet the expectations of non-migrating nationals who nevertheless have close contacts with members of growing expatriated communities (Cassarino 2014; Délano 2009). Another, more recent element relates to the fact that some of the traditional migrant-sending countries have increasingly become countries of destination in their own right. Grappling with integration-related issues at home have prompted them to re-think their approach to their own nationals overseas (Desiderio and Weinar 2014).

On the regional level, the objectives of countries of origin develop in a broad socialising context. Regionalisation of international relations has helped to build communities of practice that tend to cooperate on more issues at a time and have more intense contacts across the administrations (not only through diplomatic missions) (Cassarino 2014; Rosenblum 2004). They thus treat migration as one issue among many others (see US-Mexico-Canada relations after NAFTA (Délano 2009), EU freedom of movement or MERCOSUR approach to regional mobility). This broadening of the pool results in trust-building and a deeper understanding of each other's objectives and modus operandi, as well as increased interdependence in other areas (mainly trade and other economic relations). This has opened the door to more symmetric relationships, which can meet the expectations of all states. This may also explain why some countries of destination are now more likely to cooperate in the narrow field of integration (traditionally considered a purely domestic issue).

On the international level, the focus on the migration and development agenda (e.g. High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development or Global Forum on Migration and Development) bore two results: an increased policy dialogue between countries of origin and destination worldwide (at multilateral forums) and increased access to relevant funding. This has not only empowered international organisations (Weinar 2011; Geiger and Pecaud 2010) but has also stirred interest in pursuing specific migration and development goals (often including integration support) by national actors on both the origin and destination sides (Piper 2009; Weinar 2010).

All in all those developments seem to have improved the conditions for cooperation between origin and destination countries in the governance of immigrant integration compared to three decades ago.

Areas of Cooperation

Countries of origin indeed seem to invest more in integration measures at destination now than in the past. Our database on diaspora policies reveals solid patterns of engagement with integration-related issues (Fig. 10.1).

Still, policies that can have direct impact on integration (as opposed to an indirect effect) are less common. In our sample of countries we found 146 instances of countries going for policies with integration effect and only 74 – with integration impact.

The growing interest in the role of the country of origin indicates also that there is potential for the increased path-crossing between countries when designing policies for migrants. This leads us to conclude that we might expect cooperation in this field become more and more important, however probably only in a handful of domains. From the research so far and in alignment with the opinions of the interviewed experts (Thibos 2015) we identified three main policy areas where cooperation exists or can develop, and where policy choices have integration impact



Fig. 10.1 Share of integration-relevant policies in various policy fields across 48 non-EU countries, 2013 (Source: INTERACT database)

or effect. These are: (1) labour market integration; (2) citizenship policies; and (3) policies in the areas of education and culture.

Institutional Framework for Cooperation

As widely recognised in international experience, intergovernmental and regional organisations are best placed to promote and institute common standards and frameworks, as well as to monitor progress. They can set in place a climate and space for cooperation more generally. But, given the non-binding nature of many intergovernmental and regional initiatives, experts agreed that the single most powerful level for (formal) progress is the national level. This is where bilateral treaties are forged and real, country-specific concerns over migrant rights and protection can be hammered out. That said, many such agreements are not primarily designed to facilitate integration or to maximise the well-being of migrants, according to Michele LeVoy of the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants. On the contrary, he emphasised that many agreements – including so-called EU mobility partnerships – are pursued with other motives, such as strengthening border controls and keeping potential migrants out. As long as bilateral agreements ostensibly regarding migrants' rights and protection are used, or are perceived to be used, as mere fig leaves for exclusionary policies, they reinforce the isolation and non-integration of migrants in society. As Aiša Telalović, of the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of Refugees of Bosnia and Herzegovina, explained:

Genuine partnerships between countries of origin and countries of destination should be forged based on mutual respect, interest, benefits and planned strategic (development-related) objectives. At the moment, there is no partnership at all between countries of origin and the EU members (destination countries). … The EU keeps insisting on its own priorities, while failing to listen to [other] countries' priorities in the area of migration.

The sub-national/local and NGO levels were both perceived by our interviewed experts as crucial, as they are at the coalface of integration. This is usually where primary exchanges with natives and migrants take place to improve situations and to overcome the us/them divide, either in concert with national policies or in contradiction to them. Finally, our interview experts stressed the importance of informal networks and migrant organisations. These are crucial for orienting new migrants, providing support and comfort, as well as distributing information on the job opportunities and social services available. While inter-state cooperation at all of these levels is not necessarily possible or even desirable, all must be supported and encouraged if migrant groups and majority societies are to have the best possible chance of integrating into each other.

Our research showed clearly that all three levels of cooperation (bilateral, regional and international) are not equally important across all the areas. Indeed, it seems that almost all cooperation works best at the direct, bilateral level. "There is a logic to them," one expert said. "The number of actors are only two. They each

know what the positives of being in a better relationship are. They both see the obstacles to a deeper relationship. And if there is trust between the two governments, presumably ways will be found to start chipping away at what separates these countries." In the next three sections we will explore several areas where there is potential for the chips to fly.

Labour Market

Given that the economic value of migrant labour is one of the primary areas of interest for both countries of origin and countries of destination, it is unsurprising that the labour market is one of the most commonly cited areas of possible cooperation on all three levels. Three identified areas where cooperation is especially ripe or promising are: migrants' rights and welfare; recognition of professional and educational qualifications; and pre-departure measures.[1]

States can institutionalise migration channels, treatment, safeguards and procedures through bilateral agreements, reducing the uncertainty and risks associated with some types of migration. Experts focusing on African countries, especially the Democratic Republic of Congo, noted the need for formalising circular and seasonal migration schemes. They also suggested instituting more formal labour transfer programmes to decrease the risks and guarantee more protections to labourers. More broadly, our interlocutors repeated the need for more stringent safeguards and regulations regarding ethical recruitment and treatment of migrants, especially those working in vulnerable fields such as domestic and agricultural work. "[The EU] needs to have a policy that prevents social dumping," said Jin Sook Lee of Building and Wood Worker's International, a global union federation in the construction sector. "There has to be a policy of recognition for equal pay for equal work."

Migrants should also be better matched to their occupations, and afforded opportunities for vocational training and professional growth. It is common for migrants to be overqualified for the jobs they hold abroad. This is due to a multiplicity of factors, including labour market information bottlenecks, language problems, status issues, and difficulties in obtaining recognition for the qualifications they earned abroad. Such difficulties can be greatly reduced by cooperation between states on the mutual recognition of qualifications.

The area of labour market integration was also flagged as a sensitive site by the experts participating in our research because national interests in the area of employment can sometimes conflict (e.g. finding a balance between the need for cheap and circular labour on one hand, and the need for high and long-term remittances on the other). Below we discuss three promising areas that could bring value-added to labour market integration of migrants: labour mobility that includes migrant rights

[1] We define pre-departure measures as targeted trainings that aim at preparing a migrant for work abroad. They usually include language skills, information on legal framework, rules and procedures, sometimes also skill-adjustment training.

and welfare; recognition of qualifications; and pre-departure measures. However, it must also be noted that, if indeed the goal is successful *integration* – rather than the 'resource maximisation' of migrants – then the conversation needs to move away from assumptions focusing *only* on what states 'need' and take into account what migrants require to integrate. "One has to make immigration policy migrant-friendly, or migrant-centric, and that has not been there," said Binod Khadria of Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. "It's the countries of destination, or countries of origin, that are always the talking points for us. But nobody talks about the migrants. What is the impact of the migration policy on the migrants and the families of the migrants, in the short-run, in the medium-run, and in the long-run? That is not the discourse. The discourse is, what is good for the country of origin, and what is good for the country of destination."

Our discussion below, albeit inspired by the insights from our expert survey, is based on Interact reports and analytical notes prepared on various migrant-sending countries.

Labour Mobility

Bilateral Agreements

The potential of the bilateral level clearly dominates the policy options. Bilateral cooperation is seen as the main vehicle of cooperation on integration, albeit one that is not used to its full potential. After all, migrants move through corridors with well-known start and end points. Yet, as our research has informed us, good faith cooperation that acknowledges, *accepts*, and targets such channels is an exception rather than a norm (see also Desiderio and Weinar 2014; European Training Foundation 2015).

Providing pre-departure services, offering training and support measures at destination, and negotiating bilateral agreements that facilitate mobility or protect the social and labour rights of migrant workers are among the range of ways that origin countries seek to extend rights to their diasporas (Gamlen 2008). Agreements that exempt emigrants from double income taxation or that provide for the portability of pensions and other benefits are another widespread measure that can work for (legalised) migrant workers' protection.[2]

Many of these strategies have been pioneered by the Philippines government, which pursues a variety of approaches to prepare future emigrants for migration and to protect their rights once they are living and working abroad. According to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, 44 labour migration agreements have been negotiated to date – either Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs, which are nonbinding) or Memoranda of Agreement (MoAs, which are binding). These

[2] These are quite common between countries in Europe as well as the European Union member states and non-European countries of origin, the most notable exception being the US – the only country that taxes expatriates on their overseas earned income.

exist with 20 countries, including an agreement on labour migration management cooperation with Spain, and agreements concerning recruitment and the health sector workforce with the United Kingdom. Conventions on the recognition of Philippine seafarers' certificates have been concluded with 34 countries, including Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, and Sweden.

Labour mobility agreements are hardly limited to the Philippines. Indeed, many of the traditional origin countries concluded their first bilateral recruitment and labour migration agreements with European receiving countries during the guest-worker era. Over the past decade, some of those countries have entered into a new generation of labour migration agreements, such as those signed by Morocco with France (2001), Italy (2001), and Spain (2005) based on the principle of circular migration (Madani 2014). Furthermore, the national employment agencies of traditional origin countries cooperate closely with their counterparts in the countries of the European Union on job placement for their migrants. For example, the Tunisian National Employment and Independent Work Agency partners with the French National Agency for Employment to help match Tunisian workers to vacancies in the French labour market (Pouessel 2014).

Agreements on the portability of social security rights have also become widespread. These agreements provide migrants with significant welfare coverage, social security and health benefits. The Philippines has negotiated such agreements with Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, as well as a few non-EU countries, while India has signed similar agreements with 16 countries to date (nine have been implemented).[3] Traditional migrant-origin countries have also developed large networks of agreements by this point. Turkey's agreements with Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom allow for the portability of health benefits upon retirement, and are also applicable for dual citizens (Korfali 2014). Moldova has been especially active in negotiating and signing such agreements with numerous EU Member States (Weinar 2016).[4]

We have also seen the growth of pre- and post-departure services to migrants in recent years. The Commission on Filipinos Overseas, for example, organises compulsory pre-departure orientation and peer counselling seminars that explicitly require migrants to complete a number of training hours. Optional pre-employment orientation seminars are also offered. The government also offers post-arrival orientation seminars, a vast array of assistance services, as well as labour and social integration programmes in destination countries. These are carried out in countries

[3] The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, 'Bilateral Agreements,' accessed 24 March 2014, http://moia.gov.in/services.aspx?ID1=81&id=m4&idp=81&mainid=73

[4] It must be underlined that the fact that Moldova and EU have signed a Mobility Partnership has not had much impact on this result, as Moldova managed to sign such agreements with Member States which are both in and outside of the Partnership. It remains to be seen if the number of social security agreements will facilitate future extension of EU social security coordination mechanism to Moldova or a conclusion of EU social security agreement with this country.

with large, Filipino-origin communities through embassies and consulates, the Migrant Workers and Other Overseas Filipinos Resource Centres, and the Philippine Overseas Labour Offices.

In the past, he Colombian government established vocational training centres in Spain and the United States to support the labour market integration of their emigrants. Mexico operates similar programmes, while the Indian Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, the country's overarching institution dealing with diaspora, cooperates with the International Organisation for Migration to establish skills training and vocational qualification programmes to help workers secure employment abroad (European Training Foundation 2015) Pakistan maintains bilateral agreements on labour migration and vocational training with Asian and Gulf countries, and is currently negotiating a similar agreement with Italy (Shah 2014).

Regional and International Level Cooperation

Agreements at the regional and international levels focus on some but not all of the points laid out in the bilateral agreements. There are no binding labour mobility agreements at the regional and international levels, and to date cooperation has been limited to the facilitation of mobility through agreements on the portability of rights and migrants' welfare.

The portability of social welfare and acquired rights is more frequently found within the regions with similar systems (Hirose et al. 2011). This is why regional (and bilateral) agreements are more common than broader multilateral agreements. The functioning examples of regional arrangements as of today are: EU Coordination of Social Security Systems, CARICOM (Caribbean Community) Agreement on Social Security, the Unified Law on Insurance Protection Extension of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council), the Ibero-American Multilateral Convention on Social Security, the CIPRES (Inter-African Conference on Social Insurance) Multilateral Convention on Social Security. As already observed for other areas of cooperation, the regional dimension is most pronounced in the "special" case of the European Union – however its system of modernised social security coordination entered into force only in 2010, over 50 years after the first laws on coordination were made. The current system is very broad and includes all categories of social security benefits. The mechanism replaced a dense network of bilateral agreements between the EU Member States on the subject. Since 2011, third-country nationals can also benefit from modernised social security coordination mechanisms, albeit under many conditions, including geographical limitations.

The EU has tried to expand its regional approach to its neighbours through the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) and the Association Agreements. The EU has only recently decided to include the partner countries in its internal social security coordination mechanism as part of the Association Agreements. For the moment the proposal concerns Albania, Montenegro, San Marino and Turkey (revised 1975 agreement), i.e. the countries with social systems that can be relatively easily translatable (Communication on the External Dimension of EU Social

Security Coordination and four proposals for Council Decisions). This is the first attempt to extend this EU-level coordination programme to non-EU countries in order to improve the integration of migrant workers.

To date this has had a limited effect on EU external migration policies and its cooperation with third countries in multilateral settings. Three possible examples of this failed impact include Migration, Mobility and Employment (MME); the Rabat Process; and the Eastern Partnership (EaP). All have created a forum in which the issues of decent work, social rights of workers and recognition of qualifications can be discussed. MME is a dialogue between the EU MS and African countries on the issues facilitating better legal labour migration and mobility. These include several capacity building mechanisms, such as the Decent Work Initiative and recognition of foreign qualifications. In this way MME goes beyond solely migration issues to provide more general capacity building – it aims at building comparable social realities among which the migration of workers can take place (e.g. as regards workers' rights and protections). The Rabat Process focuses on migration from West Africa and thus is more of a usual migration dialogue, where issues of workers' rights, social welfare, and recognition of qualifications are strictly focusing on migrants. Finally, EaP is a platform for dialogue on all policy areas that traditionally cover the Eastern Neighbourhood. Issues of labour market, workers' rights and social welfare, and education and qualifications cooperation are included in 2nd and 4th EaP Platforms.

The Russian Federation has also introduced regional arrangements within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The main areas of cooperation concern Russian language tuition in the main CIS origin countries (mostly Central Asia) and the establishment in those countries of Russian educational institutions that indirectly familiarise potential migrants with the Russian culture, society and work standards. All in all, however, regional cooperation on integration is in its infancy.

International cooperation at the UN level has so far evolved almost exclusively around migrant workers' rights. However, the main forum for discussions and negotiation for both countries of origin and destination is the International Labour Organisation, which has been advancing frameworks for the protection of migrant workers since 1949. At present, ILO member states have agreed on two binding legal instruments in the area of migration: C143 Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975; and C97 Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949. In addition, the Domestic Workers Convention no. 189, adopted in June 2011, focuses on (predominantly women) domestic workers.

Welfare and social rights is an area where the cooperation is limited to the regional and bilateral levels. The only international instrument in this area is the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Developed under the ILO framework, this initiative is not legally binding and thus an international multilateral framework remains *de facto* inexistent. Indeed, this Convention is a prime example of diplomatic deadlock between countries of origin and destination, with the former proposing solutions that are *a priori* unacceptable to the majority of the latter. It was proposed by Mexico

and Morocco during the oil crisis years in a world far less interdependent than the one in which we currently live, a historical moment when the receiving states felt economically vulnerable and were possibly more prone to a compromise. The Convention was adopted in 1990, but entered into force only in 2003. All the ratifying and signatory countries are primarily countries of origin. The main countries of destination have not adhered to the Convention. EU countries of destination question the rationale of this instrument. Their primary complaint is that it also covers irregular immigrants, requiring signatories to allow equal access welfare and social protections regardless of immigration status. They also suggest that the Convention is, for regular migrants, superseded by the higher standards of protection contained in current EU law (for other reasons see Pécoud, Guchteneire 2004). Importantly, the Convention requires countries of origin to also protect their migrating nationals. This might, at the very least, compel sending countries to pursue unilateral actions and to seek agreements at the bilateral level.

The portability of social security is a complex legal area. Under most such bilateral agreements, returnees have their social rights recognised at home and emigrating workers have their rights recognised in the receiving country. One obvious problem with this approach is the diversity of existing social welfare systems, which in practice excludes any possibility of binding international legal frameworks in this area. This is why the agreements on social welfare and rights are more frequent within regions, as stated above.

A recent revival of the migration and development agenda reintroduced countries of origin as important actors, ones which are potentially able to manage diaspora relations to ensure diasporic involvement in their national development strategies. One of the most important consequences of that revival has been the creation of dedicated forums to facilitate discussions and diplomatic relations between countries of origin and destination. The most prominent is the UN Dialogue on Migration and Development and its working-level, the Global Migration and Development Forum. The latter gathers together not only governments but also civil society organisations active in the field of diaspora relations. It is, however, still unclear how these homebound initiatives could influence integration at destination.

Recognition of Qualifications

The need for more widespread recognition of foreign qualifications was one of the most cited issues in our expert survey. Improving the recognition of foreign qualifications is crucial for maximising immigrants' human capital, not only to ensure that migrants work in their fields of qualification but at the levels to which they trained. This enhances the capacity of skilled migration to contribute to host countries' economies, the development of the countries of origin, and to better living conditions for the migrants themselves.

Possible avenues to facilitate the recognition of foreign qualifications as identified in our research include:

- efficient national policies for the recognition of foreign qualifications in receiving countries;
- international cooperation for harmonisation/alignment of curricula or competency standards across countries (generally within a regionally integrated area);
- bilateral or multilateral agreements for the recognition of professional qualifications.

Obtaining recognition of foreign-acquired professional qualifications is a complex undertaking for immigrants, particularly for recent arrivals who wish to practice regulated professions and must therefore complete mandatory formal recognition procedures. One key reason for this complexity lies in the fragmentation of recognition authorities and rules within each country – with different authorities and rules applying depending on the qualifications area (e.g. medicine, architecture, engineering), and the purpose of recognition (i.e. for study or work). Such fragmentation is exacerbated in federal states, due to state/provincial competence. Indeed, it is often the case that different provinces within a single country do not have mutually recognisable qualifications. For example, Canadian provinces agreed on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications for regulated professions only with the full implementation of the Agreement on Internal Trade in 2008. Inter-state recognition of professional qualifications in the United States still varies a great deal depending on the occupation in question (Rabben 2013), while in Germany some medical qualifications are recognised at the federal level while others at the state (*Bundesland*) level.

The multiplicity of actors and regulations makes it very complicated for newcomers or prospective migrants to understand clearly how the system works and from whom they should seek recognition, to the extent that foreign-qualified professionals may be deterred from seeking recognition of their qualifications (Desiderio and Schuster 2013). It must also be noted that, even when the correct authority is found, recognition is hardly guaranteed. Depending on the country in which the qualification was earned, the language spoken by the applicant, and a plethora of other factors, many migrants with foreign-earned qualifications are fated to find themselves holding worthless pieces of paper once they reach their destination.

Mutual recognition agreements tackle this fundamental obstacle to recognition, by setting standard rules for the recognition of credentials and access to professional practice that apply to all individuals who obtained their qualifications in a country participating in the agreement. By agreeing on standard rules for the recognition of qualifications issued by the partner country or regulatory body, each country/regulatory body which enters into an MRA renounces the case-by-case assessment of qualifications issued by the partner country/authority. In other words, the same qualification issued by the same country/authority is always valued by the partner country or partner professional body in the same way. In doing so, MRAs improve transparency and consistency of recognition procedures for participating countries.

Furthermore, MRAs often include simplified procedures for the recognition of qualifications obtained in participating countries, as compared to the general rules

applying for all other foreign qualifications. General recognition procedures tend to be complex and require a significant amount of time to be fulfilled, particularly in the case of regulated professions. The extent to which MRAs simplify recognition procedures varies greatly, as it depends on whether the MRAs provide for automatic or partial/conditional recognition of qualifications among member countries. This, in turn, is often a function of the level of mutual trust among participating countries, and of the degree of similarity among their qualifications and indeed educational systems.

Such international cooperation among national governments on the recognition of foreign qualifications mostly happens at the bilateral or regional level. MRAs involving more than two countries have most often been concluded among the members of economically integrated regional areas, such as the European Union (EU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM). The reasons for this trend are twofold. First, the level of mutual trust and 'affinity' required for countries to renounce case-by-case assessment tends to be greater among countries participating in regionally integrated groupings. A good example of this is the EU's Professional Qualifications Directive, which grants full and automatic recognition of professional qualifications to qualified EU citizens in seven professions. That this works is a direct result of the high level of harmonisation of education and training systems among the Member States as well as the depth of economic and political integration involved in the European Union.

More fundamentally, in economically integrated regional areas the conclusion and implementation of MRAs serve broader economic and political objectives than that of facilitating the international portability of foreign qualifications *per se*. That is, they support the intra-regional liberalisation of services provision and, in some cases, also of workers' movements. These broader objectives offer a solid framework for the conclusion of MRAs. Indeed, the negotiation and implementation of MRAs require intense legwork and diplomacy. As discussed, neither national nor subnational government authorities control all the levers in any particular country, and professional bodies often maintain a degree of autonomy in decisions regarding the recognition of foreign-earned qualifications. Thus, national governments seeking to enter into international agreements on the recognition of foreign qualifications must frequently act as deal brokers between a plethora of actors in order to achieve their goals (Sumption et al. 2013). The negotiations of the sectoral MRAs between France and Quebec provides a prime example for when governments played this role successfully.

Comprehensive multilateral instruments regulating the recognition of professional qualification do not exist, if we exclude the WTO rules on MRAs. These basically state that all member countries are free to conclude MRAs provided that other member countries have the opportunity to enter negotiations should they wish. A few (non-binding) comprehensive frameworks exist for the recognition of academic qualifications, such as the UNESCO/OECD guidelines on "Quality provision in cross-border higher education." Regional agreements focus mainly on academic qualifications (i.e. the six regional UNESCO Conventions covering Africa, Europe, Asia and Pacific, Latin America, Arab states, and the Mediterranean Area), however

these agreements do not ensure automatic recognition. Rather, they open door for transparent accreditation procedures.

Similarly, regional qualifications frameworks exist, respectively, among European countries, ASEAN countries, and Australia and New Zealand. Such qualifications frameworks are designed as *transparency* tools to help *understand* the value of qualifications issued in a participating country. They work by comparing the qualifications of one country to the corresponding qualifications of a regional benchmark framework. As such, these tools neither lead to the recognition of foreign qualifications nor bind participating countries to facilitate the recognition process of professionals. Nonetheless, qualifications frameworks can help understand the 'value' of foreign qualifications vis-à-vis a known standard and thus facilitate the recognition process in some circumstances.

The European Qualifications Framework (EQF) was launched in 2008 as a common European reference framework. The aim was to facilitate communication and comparison between qualifications systems in Europe. Its eight reference levels are described in terms of three types of learning outcomes, namely knowledge, skills and competences. The system was designed to provide at-a-glance information on what a person with a certain qualification knows and can do, and to support lifelong learning by including outcomes of formal, informal and non-formal learning processes. The establishment and alignment of National Qualifications Frameworks (NQFs) to the EQF allows qualifications-level descriptors to work as translation tools, enabling employers, regulators, and education providers in each country to 'read' and understand the meaning of foreign-acquired qualifications and competences in comparison to the domestic qualifications.

The European Commission is currently exploring ways to establish mutual referencing mechanisms between the European Qualifications Framework and the qualifications frameworks of Australia, New Zealand and Hong Kong.[5] Indeed, establishing comparability between the EQF and external qualifications frameworks – be these at the national or regional levels – could facilitate transparency and thus the transferability of qualifications and skills from third countries. This would conceivably reduce employment mismatches and skills waste in the migration process, both in immigration and return migration. It is also with this aim that some of the countries participating in EU Mobility Partnerships have taken steps to adopt national qualification frameworks modelled after the EQF. There are not, however, any mutual referencing processes between the EQF and the NQFs of countries outside Europe at this time.

The alignment and mutual referencing of external qualifications frameworks with the EQF may contribute to improving EU employers' understanding of the value of qualifications acquired by migrants in their countries of origin by allowing for the comparison of qualification levels across aligned frameworks. This mutual referencing process may also lay the groundwork for regulators involved in designing mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) for regulated professions. However,

[5] http://www.nzqa.govt.nz/about-us/our-role/our-role-in-international-education/country-specific-recognition-arrangements/european-union/. Accessed 26 January 2015.

this potential neither offsets nor reduces the need for efficient recognition systems and procedures, as gaps in qualification standards and levels are likely to persist between EU Member States and third countries, particularly in the case of developing countries. This remains true even when the process of adopting NQFs modelled on the EQF triggers improvements in national qualification standards.

While qualifications frameworks might help to assess *equivalence* between qualifications acquired in different countries, they cannot make up for variations in education and training standards across countries, let alone for differences in scope and fields of professional practice – which often exist even among countries with similar levels of development. Bridging the *irreducible gaps* in training standards and professional practice parameters between different qualification systems is precisely the purpose of the recognition of foreign qualifications.

Pre-departure Measures

A wide array of pre-departure integration measures have been implemented over the past decade, including: open-access, often internet-based information tools; compulsory or voluntary orientation modules and language training; tailored vocational schemes and broader jobs-skills-matching support; and skills recognition.[6] Some of these initiatives focus specifically on labour market integration, while others serve more general social inclusion purposes.[7]

Two characteristics stand out. First, most existing measures are designed and implemented unilaterally by destination or – to a lesser extent – origin countries. Second, and somewhat related, a large share of these measures consists of introductory modules or services. These provide general information on the receiving country's culture, language, and labour market features as well as on their administrative requirements and services. More broadly structured initiatives holistically addressing (labour market) integration bottlenecks are rare.

The observation that, in most cases, pre-departure measures are initiated by destination countries should not come entirely as a surprise, given that integration happens *within* the receiving society. As the union worker Jin Sook Lee rightly pointed out, "In terms of integration, in terms of inclusion, in terms of social acceptance, in terms of recognising that migrant workers are an integral part of their economic development: that is the responsibility of the governments of the countries of destination." More unexpected is the finding that destination countries, and especially

[6] A global inventory of pre-departure measures has recently been compiled in the context of two projects: the HEADSTART project, co-funded by the European Union and selected Member States and carried out by the International Organisation for Migration. For more information on the project and the inventory see: http://www.headstartproject.eu/ and European Traing Foundation project MISMES http://www.etf.europa.eu/web.nsf/pages/MISMES_global_inventory

[7] Mandatory integration courses, a special form of pre-departure measures that target permanent migrants (mainly family reunification), have been recently introduced by some EU member states. (Austria, Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). They are however not within the scope of this chapter.

EU member states, generally design pre-departure integration measures without any involvement of the countries of origin, where the initiatives will ultimately be implemented. In many cases, third-country institutions do not even participate in the practical implementation of pre-departure measures. Destination countries typically resort to international organisations, non-governmental organisations, or private service providers to carry out the orientation and training modules in origin countries. There are some exceptions to this rule. A handful of origin countries also provide pre-departure seminars and information tools to emigrating populations. The Philippines have been offering such services for decades. More recently, other Asian countries (including India) as well as countries in the EU neighbourhood (including Cape Verde, Georgia and Moldova) have stepped up their efforts to prepare and protect their departing (labour) migrants.

Similarly, pre-departure measures initiated by sending countries are also often implemented unilaterally, albeit with the strong involvement of international organisations and private agencies. This generally remains true even in the rare cases where origin country pre-departure programmes are coupled with post-arrival integration support at destination. Such tandem programmes are usually provided through sending country institutions and organisations abroad, namely consular and foreign affairs networks.

Two main reasons may explain why pre-departure integration programmes have so far been largely characterised by unilateral ownership, and thus haven't fully realised their potential as tools of origin-destination country cooperation on integration issues. These are misaligned interests between destination and origin countries; and complex multilevel governance of integration and diaspora engagement policies (see also Desiderio and Hooper 2015). The first reflects the "asymmetry of power" dilemma between origin and destination, while the latter points to the institutional complexity of policymaking in the overlapping area of domestic and international policy.

Destination countries have designed pre-departure schemes with the overarching objective of preserving social cohesion and the assumed cultural values of 'the majority'. Additionally, labour market-related measures are usually aimed at maximising the economic benefits of skilled migration. In this context, migrants' transnational ties with their countries of origin, their culture, and home-country specific skills have largely been considered irrelevant if not counterproductive to integration trajectories, and thus cooperation with origin countries has been deemed unnecessary. Voluntary pre-departure measures offered to prospective labour migrants, furthermore, are often geared towards skilled or highly-skilled migrants. It is therefore unsurprising that the number of web-based information and job-matching tools that have been implemented in the past 5 years by EU Member States focus particularly on attracting middle to highly-skilled migrants and supporting their successful integration into the labour market.[8] In many cases, international job-matching pro-

[8] More generally, it has been argued that all internet tools are somewhat tailored to skilled migrants, given the difficulties that candidates lacking basic literacy and computer literacy skills may have in accessing them. See Desiderio and Schuster (2013).

grammes have focused on specific occupations – notably in the health sector – for which there may be high demand for specialised workers not only in destination but also in sending countries. In Denmark, the "Work in Denmark" web-platform and job-bank explicitly targets highly-skilled migration candidates in the STEM field.[9] Similarly, the "Make it in Germany" website and integration support initiative both cater to skilled workers, and include job matching services for migration candidates with qualifications in the STEM or medical professions, as well for experts with vocational training in shortage occupations.[10]

This selective approach adopted, more or less openly, by destination countries in the design of pre-departure measures and information tools may present a challenge for cooperation with origin countries on integration, as it may conflict or be perceived as conflicting with origin countries' development goals and brain drain concerns.[11] Aiša Telalović, of the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of Refugees of Bosnia and Herzegovina, expressed just such concerns when we interviewed her for this research. "Bosnia and Herzegovina has a huge brain drain index, particularly in the areas of medicine and technical sciences," she said. "We need assistance from developed countries to retain our current cadre and produce more, to the ultimate mutual benefit of both our country and countries of destination, [which] provide incentives for such labour force segments [as well]." Indeed, while most of the EU Member States prioritise skilled – more specifically, highly-skilled – immigration from third countries, migrant-sending countries may wish to retain their more educated populations while promoting the emigration of their lesser-skilled workers. Some countries, like Germany, take into account the need to walk a fine red line between brain-drain and brain-waste. The German development agency, GIZ, ran a successful skills matching programme that recruited engineers from Tunisia into a 6-month paid internship in Germany. At the end of their internships 65% signed employment contracts with German firms. This reduction of brain waste is all the more important since many countries already have difficulty retaining their skilled work force.

The pre-departure orientation programmes of origin countries have been traditionally designed as tools to support the deployment abroad of redundant low to middle-skilled workers, and to promote remittances. Pre-departure modules have thus focused on providing basic training – including on financial literacy and remittances – as well as information and services aimed at protecting migrants, and thus empowering and engaging them with development processes back home. Since 1983 a pre-departure orientation seminar (PDOS) has been compulsory for Filipino workers migrating under the national contract programme. The PDOS lasts 6 h and consists of seven modules providing information on: migration realities, country

[9] https://www.workindenmark.dk/. Accessed 26 January 2015.

[10] http://www.make-it-in-germany.com/en. Accessed on 26 January 2015.

[11] International recruitment and labour market integration programmes in the health sector implemented by destination countries in many cases include mechanisms for protecting origin countries from brain drain. See, section "Labour market" for examples.

profile, employment contract, health and safety, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration programmes, other government services provided at home and abroad, travel procedures, and basic financial literacy.

Apart from diverging interests regarding the labour market integration of migrants through pre-departure measures, difficulties in identifying, bringing together and coordinating the multiple actors involved represent significant challenges for stepping up cooperation in the area of pre-departure measures (Desiderio and Weinar 2014).

In many destination countries (including almost all EU member states) integration is included within the portfolio of the ministries of internal affairs. This limits the possibilities for international cooperation, a domain of foreign affairs ministries. To overcome this hurdle, some states have started experimenting with new ways of institutionalising the external dimension of integration. In most cases these have involved the establishment of liaison officers or offices in the main origin countries of migrants to provide counselling and integration support prior to departure. Also, some European states have dedicated institutions to manage international cooperation on migration. However, one has to bear in mind that pre-departure programmes are more often than not subcontracted to international organisations or NGOs (Weinar 2011; European Training Foundation 2015). Only Germany and France have built capacity to deal with such programmes within their own administrations: more specifically through the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the International Placement Service (ZAV) of the Federal Employment Agency (BA) in Germany, and the French Office for Immigration and Integration.

All in all, the multi-layered governance of immigrant integration and, to a slightly lesser extent, of diaspora engagement challenges the capacity of stakeholders on both sides to identify and convene the appropriate interlocutors for cooperation on the other side.[12]

Depending on the specific circumstances and on the particular migration corridor, misaligned interests on labour market integration and pre-departure measures, as well as institutional coordination issues stemming from multiple levels of governance, may require different degrees of effort to overcome. In most cases, however, reconciling what may be substantially differently-oriented domestic policies with respect to migration systems, education and labour markets in origin and destination countries is a demanding endeavour – let alone reaching agreement on how to equitably share the costs of joint initiatives.

[12] For a thorough discussion of the challenges and opportunities for origin/destination country cooperation on immigrant integration stemming from the complex and stratified institutional setting for the governance of immigrant integration and diaspora engagement see Desiderio, *Supporting Immigrant Integration in Europe? Developing the Governance for Diaspora Engagement*. For a specific discussion of the trend towards mainstreaming immigrant integration into general policy areas across EU Member States see Elizabeth Collett and Petrovic (2014).

Dual Nationality

This dimension was one of the most discussed in our survey, and our interlocutors agreed that paths to full citizenship are vital for improving integration. The level of openness to naturalisation sends a strong signal to migrants and natives alike regarding a society's level of acceptance and tolerance. These are prerequisite characteristics for the majority society, as migrants can only ever integrate to the degree to which they are allowed by their country of destination. If the point of integration policy is to "create a functional, diverse society that acknowledges the benefits of migration for cultural, economic and social progress … [and] provide a path to equality under the law", as Lana Velimirović Vukalović from the Croatian Office for Human Rights and Rights of National Minorities put it, then it "should also raise awareness of the need for anti-discrimination." Becoming more open to the full incorporation of migrants into the destination country is thus another way to counter xenophobic and 'othering' tendencies, which decrease integration. Furthermore, citizenship confers an additional package of political and social rights on the beneficiary. Over time, this will likely result in a step change in migrants' participation, productivity, and parity – the keys to integration according to the experts interviewed – in all spheres of the receiving country.

In our research, however, several experts warned that countries of origin must tread lightly when dealing with the citizenship of migrants abroad, lest they leave themselves open to the charge of meddling in the affairs of the countries of destination. "It requires a very soft hand on the part of the country of origin," one expert cautioned, "because if it is seen as getting too involved in the politics of the countries of destination then there will be a reaction to it." Nevertheless, they still saw room for cooperation, especially with regard to dual nationality. Many migrants are loth to give up the citizenship of their countries of birth, especially those who face uncertain futures in the countries of destination or are unsure of how long they will remain. This is especially true for forced migrants and refugees, whose relationship with their countries of origin and reasons for leaving are often extremely complex. "[The] last thing forced migrants wish to do is to denounce their nationality of origin in order to obtain nationality of the country of destination and thus get access to basic rights and freedoms," said Aiša Telalović. Allowing for dual nationality is not only another step toward fostering and open and diverse society, but it is a way of acknowledging the prerogatives, desires, and lived transnational realities of many migrants today.

The area of naturalisation and political belonging is traditionally a state prerogative, hardly subject to international cooperation. The sovereign power of a state over citizenship remains unchallenged, save for guidelines issued by relevant international bodies (e.g. Council of Europe) regarding dual citizenship or UN conventions on statelessness. Also, the legal concept of European citizenship, which gives its holders many rights equal to those of national populations, is a rare example of regional cooperation on this matter (Maas 2008).

Bilateral cooperation on citizenship and belonging is therefore rare. When it happens it concerns dual citizenship or acceptance of special status cards. The bilateral

agreements can lay down the rules that apply to specific nationalities, allowing for dual nationality or banning it. An example of the former are, collectively, the bilateral agreements between Spain and several Latin American countries concluded in the 1960s that allow for dual nationality. An example of the latter were the conventions on avoidance of dual citizenship among the communist states. These guaranteed that nationals of signatory countries would lose their original citizenship when acquiring the citizenship of another signatory country. These agreements have been mostly discontinued to date.

Some countries of origin, in reaction to restrictive citizenship policies at destination, have created categories of quasi-citizenship or 'origin status', making it easier for migrants to adopt the nationality of their countries of residence while still retaining some rights in their countries of origin. Ethiopia, for example, does not allow for dual citizenship. Instead, it issues the Ethiopian Origin ID (yellow card), which allows bearers to visit, live, and work in Ethiopia without a visa, as well as retain some rights such as access to pensions. Similarly, the Turkish 'blue card' (formerly the 'pink card') was created primarily to allow Turks residing in Germany to pursue exclusive citizenship there while retaining some rights back in Turkey.[13] These developments have been explained by the concept of "citizenship constellations" (Bauböck 2010), where one country uses bespoke laws to creatively overcomes barriers put in place by another country. These usually have to do with retaining or recreating belonging to the country of origin for emigrants who had to renounce their previous citizenship at naturalisation. But they can also serve as laws assuring migrant rights and welfare at destination, e.g. by providing identification. The Mexican government, for example, issues the *matrícula*, a consular identification card, to nationals abroad regardless of their immigration status. In the years following 2001, the Mexican authorities successfully campaigned for this card to be accepted by many banks, police forces, and other institutions in the United States. By giving nationals – even those with an irregular migration status – a way to safely identify themselves, the *matrícula* reduces many problems of access and security experienced by Mexicans residing in the United States today (O'Neil 2003).

Cooperation in Area of Culture and Education

Countries work together on cultural exchanges at all levels of cooperation. UNESCO, a part of the United Nations, is the main actor promoting cultural exchanges at the global level. However, its initiatives have very little practical impact on the integration of migrants. All regional entities (such as European Union, MERCOSUR, ASEAN etc.) promote cultural and educational exchanges between their member states, however this rarely goes as far as attempting to harmonise educational

[13] 'Blue card (old pink card) application *[Mavi kart (eski pembe kart) uygulaması]'*, Republic of Turkey Foreign Ministry, accessed: 28 Feb 2015. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mavi-kart-_eski-pembe-kart_-uygulamasi-.tr.mfa

systems and ensure their mutual transparency. A leading example here is the Erasmus programme and the Bologna Process in wider Europe. Erasmus allows nearly 270,000 students per year to study abroad at one of 4600 member institutions across the continent. In doing so, it closely supports one of the goals of the Bologna Process, namely that 20% of all European students will have studied abroad by 2020. The Bologna Process itself is a process of harmonisation of higher education in terms of transparency of diplomas and recognition of credits. Forty-nine states (not all of them strictly European) have joined since 1999, the year of its creation, and 47 actively participate. The Bologna Process has influenced educational reforms elsewhere in the world and is regarded as a template for cooperation (Vögtle and Martens 2014; Gänzle et al. 2009). Nevertheless, as our research concluded, cooperation on cultural and educational issues is best achieved at the bilateral level.

Bilateral cultural agreements are usually signed with 'people-to-people' contact in mind by institutional actors for whom migration policy is not the main responsibility (ministries of culture and education, but also sometimes municipalities, e.g. 'twin cities' programmes). As a consequence, such agreements are not intended to be migration policy tools. Agreements on cultural cooperation between countries can cover various activities (from language teaching to film festivals), but it is difficult to see their direct link to integration. When the country of destination is very active in the field of culture in the country of origin, the link is more obvious. It is less clear the other way round. For instance, Morocco and France cooperate on the implementation of the Moroccan ELCO programme (programme pour l'enseignement de la langue arabe et de la culture marocaine) for Arabic language and culture. As a result, Moroccan teachers are detached to French public schools to teach Arabic as a part of the French school curriculum (optional). Still, there have been no studies so far that would clarify the impact this programme has had on the integration of Moroccan immigrants and their children in France (Filhon this volume). What we know, however, is that the culture and mechanics of teaching differ in Morocco and France, therefore the communication gap between the teachers and the children, brought up in another reality, can detrimentally impact their learning outcomes. On the other hand, from a purely functionalist point of view, learning Arabic (or making Arabic a desired language to study) can have important effects for the future employability of these children: due to wider educational opportunities and growing international business networks. So in fact, it can have positive integration outcomes. This is also the case for teaching Russian to heritage members in many countries in the world. On one hand, it is a sign of cultural diplomacy, but it can also be of practical relevance for countries with large Russophone populations. Teachers are placed in diaspora schools that deliver language instruction in the main countries of destination, primarily Germany.

Language is a crucial aspect of the migration experience, and the facility with which a migrant wields the language of the country of destination is a strong indicator of their integration prospects. Most interlocutors stressed the need for language learning opportunities in both the destination and origin countries, and this should be considered imperative to any integration effort. As noted, creating an openness to other languages within the majority society, providing courses for 'natives' to learn

the languages of their country's main migrant groups, and facilitating the use of minority languages in public are all important methods of fostering mutual respect within a diverse society. The acceptance of a multilingual society is an important step to overcoming perceptions that migrants are foreigners, aliens, guests, or 'others', which in turn helps counter xenophobia and discrimination.

Religion is often seen as a part of cultural heritage, but it tends to be promoted by the country of origin only if it is a part of the government identity abroad, like Poland, Morocco or Turkey. Other countries seek to work with their churches to deliver services to populations, but in majority of cases the churches themselves organise this service.

Cooperation on religious issues is an ambiguous field. On one hand, religion is an important element of integration and, especially in Europe, the focus has been on shaping relations with imams to facilitate integration of Muslim migrants. On the other hand, it is widely recognised by practitioners that it is easier to establish dialogue on religious issues with migrant communities themselves than with the countries of origin (Cesari this volume). The example of imams can be instructive here: as imams sent from the countries of origin have little in common with the lifestyle of migrant communities, lack language skills, and are frequently more conservative, the governments of the countries of destination prefer to cooperate directly with immigrant communities on training and preparing imams from among their own nationals. The countries of origin can educate imams themselves, as the Turkish government does by establishing preparatory institutions abroad, without the control or support of the country of destination. There is very little evidence to argue that following a specific religion or set of teachings could have positive or detrimental effects on integration, apart from cases of fundamentalist teachings or when a particular religion is heavily stigmatised in a country of destination.

Bilateral cooperation on migrant integration also means promoting positive relations between the states at both the institutional and 'popular' levels. At a time of economic crisis, war and virulent extremism, countries of the West have seen a wave of increasing xenophobia and suspicion of other cultures crash over it in recent years. Politicians of many different stripes have cashed in on this discontent, using their amplified voices to scapegoat or vilify the very countries of origin from which many migrants hail. The politicians of countries of origin tap into similar currents of thought on their own main streets, creating two-way streams of animosity that are exponentially magnified by the internet and national medias. As Kemal Kirişci of the Brookings Institute in Washington DC said, when speaking specifically of the Turkey-European dynamic:

On both sides, there are more and more wise people discussing [cooperation], and may want to be part of larger exercises – in civil society, in governments, in bureaucracies, certainly in academia. But politics, domestic politics, in Europe and in Turkey – I'm afraid is not providing a conducive environment for this. … Right now … beating [up] the West and Europe is convenient. And in Europe, beating [up] the Muslims and the Turks is convenient. This is what brings you political brownie points. It looks like this will go on for a while.

Conclusions

In this chapter we discussed the main elements of international cooperation that could support migrant integration at destination. We started off with specific questions: is cooperation on integration matters between origin and destination countries possible? Does it have value added? What are the most promising areas of cooperation?

Our review of emerging and aligning interests in this area confirms that cooperation on integration matters is possible, albeit in quite limited areas. We identified three main areas of cooperation (labour market, citizenship cooperation on cultural and educational issues) and we discussed each of them in relation to the adopted analytical framework of three-level games: bilateral level, regional frameworks and international (global) regimes.

Our analysis shows that international cooperation in all these areas has so far been dominated by bilateral initiatives, for obvious reasons: bilateral agreements are legally binding and easier to enforce. They also reflect direct interests of the partners involved. They are the best possible vehicle for the country of origin's impact, rather than effect.

However the results are mixed. Clearly, direct engagement in agreements supporting the mobility of workers as well as the portability of their social rights and recognition of their qualifications is a sign of a direct impact of the country of origin. A bilateral agreement can improve migrant integration in the destination country providing clear legal framework. Most of all, however, this legal framework needs to be enacted. Too often bilateral agreements on labour migration, for instance, have remained only on paper (Desiderio and Hooper 2015).

As regards pre-departure measures, they are implemented usually unilaterally and as such can be hardly a golden example of cooperation between states. And yet, their existence has a direct impact on the success of the workers abroad. As regards dual nationality laws, again they are most of the time a unilateral decision, with some notable exceptions, but citizenship itself can as well be a vehicle of the country of origin effect on integration (some passports take you further on the labour market than others). Finally, cultural and educational commitments between the countries of origin and destination have a country of origin effect: they familiarise societies at destination with the culture of its immigrants, and in doing so remove some obstacles for intercultural dialogue. Also, education in terms of country of origin language training (usually provided unilaterally) can only support integration if it has a positive effect at destination (e.g. if it is regarded as useful).

Institutionally, both countries of origin and countries of destination must create and support the foundations necessary for integration to take place. One way to do this is through bilateral agreements that formalise and regularise the treatment of migrants in a wide variety of areas, including: the development of legal migration channels; bilateral labour migration agreements; taxation; access to social welfare and insurance systems; dual citizenship; as well as provision for cultural and educa-

tional support. Bilateral agreements contribute to the predictability of a given migration channel and give more space for successful integration.

Countries of origin could better prepare potential migrants for integration into their countries of destination by offering several important services, including: language training; skills training; legal training on migrants' rights and obligations abroad; current information regarding labour and housing markets, as well as available support systems, in the countries of destination. Authors elsewhere have also highlighted the need for sending countries to protect potential migrants from the predatory practices of many labour recruiters, who are often able use debt to trap migrants into exploitative labour conditions. Cooperation with countries of destination to end exploitative recruitment and employment practices at both ends of the labour supply chain would immeasurably improve the prospects for migrant integration and, more generally, migrant well-being in the countries of destination.

Regional and international cooperation is less legally advanced (with the exception of the European Union) and thus cannot be viewed as promoting country of origin impact. However indirect effects can be felt, especially with regard to such issues as education (e.g. if a country participates in a multilateral process in the area of education, it could be perceived as more trusted and solid). Yet, it is impossible for now to expect from regional organisations beyond the EU to achieve such levels of coordination on all the areas we discussed in this chapter any time soon.

One question that has not been clearly answered regards the value added of integration-related cooperation. The answers have been alluded to, but there is a need for more structured policy evaluation measurement before it can be answered in any univocal way.

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