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Gerhard Kümmel
Bastian Giegerich *Editors*

The Armed Forces: Towards a Post- Interventionist Era?



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The Armed Forces: Towards a Post- Interventionist Era?

Editors

Dr. Gerhard Kümmler

Dr. Bastian Giegerich

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Welcome Address by the Director of the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences

Ernst-Christoph Meier

Meine Damen und Herren, Ladies and Gentlemen,

let me give you a warm welcome to this conference at the Julius-Leber-Kaserne in Berlin. It is a great pleasure to see so many distinguished guests participating in the SOWI.Summit2012.

Some of you may wonder about the location, the Julius-Leber-Kaserne. Well, the reason is quite simple: The Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences is located in Strausberg. This is a small city, about 50 kilometers away from here, and it is a fantastic place to do research, without being disturbed, while watching rabbits and deer jumping around. But the nearby capital often provides a better setting to have meetings with government officials or to hold conferences. So we appreciate the opportunity to gather at this place and to benefit from the excellent local infrastructure and support and from the proximity of this venue to the airport.

You might also be wondering why we call this conference a summit. It may appear a little exaggerated. Well, not quite. Let me put it this way: It is regrettable that in Germany military sociology is still far away from being at the center of university research and teaching, to say the least. In fact, the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences is still the only institutionalized place for systematic military-related social science in Germany. By attaching the label 'summit' to this conference and, of course, by having panelists and participants of outstanding reputation we want to draw attention to a research field that is of great relevance not only to the scientific community, but to political and military decision-makers as well.

As a government research agency it is always the ambition of the SOWI Institute to not only provide ad hoc scientific expertise for ministerial decision-making, but also to reflect on and address future challenges and developments affecting our armed forces. From different perspectives it seems worthwhile to discuss the notion of post-interventionism and its implications for our security and defense policy. Military missions and operations cost a lot of money and all members of the transatlantic community face the challenge of austerity budgets for their defense spending. Owing to demographic changes most countries experience enormous challenges as to personnel recruitment and many of them have been profoundly affected by the suspension of compulsory military service. The success of recent military interventions has been mixed at best and raises questions as to the costs and casualties each

country has to bear. One result of this is very often limited public support for international missions.

At the same time the strategic context and the security environment have continued to change dramatically with new actors, a plethora of new risks, but also with advanced technologies and comprehensive civilian-military crisis management approaches. Also new forms of defense cooperation between partners are being discussed and implemented. What does this all mean for the future of military interventions? Are we entering a post-interventionist era? How will military interventions in the future look like? What are the consequences for our armed forces? What does it mean for collective action?

The strategic uncertainty of our security environment currently matches the uncertainty of the future of military intervention. It is my hope and expectation that this workshop will help to provide a little more certainty as to both issues. We have structured the conference in thematic sessions on International Relations, Operations and Missions, Technology, Soldiers and so on. This will permit a differentiated exchange of views. Tomorrow evening we will have the honor to welcome former Minister of Defense, Dr. Peter Struck, for a dinner speech. On Thursday we will close the conference with summaries of the panels and a concluding roundtable with excellent participants.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to stop here. Many of you have just arrived after a long journey. We will now have a coffee break and will continue at 4.45 with the speech of a brilliant researcher from King's College in London, Prof. Christopher Dandeker. We are more than grateful that he is has agreed to open this conference with an introductory speech on the prospects of Western military intervention.

Again, thank you for coming. I wish all of you inspiring talks and discussions and an exciting time in our capital. Thank you very much for your attention.

“The End of the World as We Know it”!? On Interventionist Overstretch, Post-Interventionism and Neo-Interventionism: An Essayist Introduction

Bastian Giegerich & Gerhard Kümmel

1 Introduction

“It’s the end of the world as we know it” is the title sequence from the lyrics of one major hit single of the U.S. rockband R.E.M. from their 1987 album *Document*. The song takes up and plays with notions of the apocalypse and the end of time, but is in no way fatalistic or overly pessimistic. As a matter of fact, the sequence goes on with “and I feel fine”! This is perhaps a good starting point for this introduction, because the world of international military interventions seems to have reached a turning point as well and one may well ask whether we will feel fine after this turning point.

This book stems from the perception of a widespread and manifest uneasiness concerning the business of military intervention in our times. The envisaged withdrawal of ISAF troops from Afghanistan is tantamount to the end of a long-lasting international military mission that was performed by a multinational force led by the U.S. In the meantime, the Arab Spring has persuaded Western countries into another military intervention in Libya. And, currently, the pros and cons of a military intervention in Syria are being discussed. Sudan is another case in point as are several others. It would be misleading, however, to view this in the categories of ‘business as usual’. Nothing would be farther from the truth. Indeed, the West is for quite some time engaged in a deep introspection about his military intervention policies in the years to come and reflects about this.

This introspection is not constrained to certain groups in the West, be they journalists, parliamentarians/politicians, soldiers, the elderly or the youth. This introspection driven by self-doubt is, indeed, an all-encompassing one. Western military intervention policies are debated by society at large, they are discussed by the media, by politics, and, by the military itself. So it is not confined to some segments, it is a broad discussion which in turn legitimizes the notion of a ceasure we are currently in. What will Western military intervention policies look like in the future; what kind of military intervention policies is wanted and what kind of military intervention policies is financially, politically and socio-culturally possible and militarily feasible?

The hypothesis pursued here states that, in the foreseeable future, we will most likely see a different kind of military intervention policy and intervention posture of the West that will lead to different military interventions. It

may be argued that we are witnessing the dawn of a new era, the era of military post-interventionism.

2 Interventionist Overstretch

The mission in Afghanistan may well be the high water mark of Western intervention policies after the end of the East-West-conflict. It has turned into an encompassing and ambitious peace- and statebuilding mission, a kind of mission which we may not be witness to again very soon. This upgrading in objectives covers a large part of why Afghanistan is seen as a formidable failure in public discourse.

Sure, schools and water supply have been built, policemen and soldiers have been trained, political structures have been shaped and civil society developments, precarious though, have been initiated and furthered. That is by no means nothing, but it is too little to frame the mission in Afghanistan as a success and as a victory. The Taleban have not been defeated; their return to power cannot be ruled out; the political future of the country after the ISAF troops will have left is insecure – perhaps Afghanistan may become a failing state – and the drug threat to Western youth has become even bigger within the last decade rather than smaller.

Seen in the right light, the West would have to stay much longer in Afghanistan, perhaps as long as the Western allies have stayed in Germany after the Second World War. But the West is tired and exhausted: Tired and exhausted is the leading Western power, the United States, with the Obama Administration eager to close the chapter on Afghanistan rather earlier than later. Tired and exhausted are America's partners who increasingly face problems in politically legitimizing the mission in Afghanistan to themselves and to others. Tired and exhausted are the Western armed forces, engaged in a modern complex counterinsurgency mission with high risk and small success. Tired and exhausted are the Western societies, which are preoccupied with their internal problems at home. Tired and exhausted are the purses of the West given that the West is amidst a substantial and thorough financial crisis that is far from being overcome soon. Tired and exhausted, last but not least, are the soldiers in the Afghan mission who hoped to achieve more than they did and who therefore critically view their mission. Taken together, this turns future military interventions of the West into an enterprise that is much more complex and difficult than in the past.

3 The Post-Interventionist Era

Given this interventionist overstretch, the result may well be military post-interventionism. To be sure, post-interventionism does not mean non-interventionism. In our globalized, internationalized and transnationalized world military interventions will stay with us and will be around. So we will still have military interventions in the future, but these will be different from those of the past and the present. Western military intervention policies and Western military intervention posture will be of another character and of much more modesty, or realism:

- (1) Western military interventions will be even more selective than those of the past. The criterion for selection will be the respective national interest. Participation in interventions will follow the national interests of a potential intervenor much blunter than in the past – to the detriment of world society, cosmopolitan or human rights considerations.
- (2) Western military interventions will be less ambitious than in the past. The inclination to pretentious and comprehensive state-, nation- and peacebuilding missions will become less accentuated. In times of austerity, the objectives of military intervention will be limited as will be the expectations.
- (3) Western military interventions will be more difficult to sell to the critical Western publics. The self-referential, even egoistic attitude of Western societies will increase in times of crises. Political pressure to use the existing resources for domestic problems will increase simultaneously.
- (4) Western military interventions will become even more high-tech interventions. The development of unmanned aerial vehicles, of drones, will receive a boost in order to prevent ‘boots on the ground’ and to keep one’s own losses as small as possible to circumvent problems of legitimation and acceptance.¹
- (5) Even if Western powers are intervention-ready, these interventions may not come about due to the lack of American engagement and support. The centrifugal tendencies within the Western alliance have been becoming stronger: The United States have been shifting their geopolitical and strategic priorities to the Pacific and will demand more initiative and engagement from their partners and allies.

1 While some argue that this may lead to some kind of neo-interventionism with military interventions proliferating rather than to post-interventionism, this may not necessarily be the case. Even surgical warfare ushers in casualties which will need framing and legitimizing in Western societies.

Paradoxically, military post-interventionism does not imply that the profile of the armed forces and the soldiers will become less demanding. The hybrid soldier and the hybrid military, capable of meeting the classical challenges of defense, deterrence, and, somewhat less accentuated, attack, as well as meeting non-traditional challenges from peacekeeping to peace-, state- and nation-building, will still be needed. That is imperative given the security-political challenges of the present world risk society.

This implies that the transformation of the armed forces will be an ongoing process, superseding the goals, plans, objectives and ambitions of the present. Issues like the further reduction of military personnel, the concentration of particular capabilities, the division of labor, particularly within Europe, will become even more salient. The Europeans will meet the challenges of the coming post-interventionist era only, if they will be able to surmount their narrow national interest and generate a European interest. This requires political entrepreneurship. Welcome to the brave new world!

4 Debating Post-Interventionism

Thoughts and reflections like those just sketched have been the source of our efforts to organize a large international experts conference on these very issues. This conference, the SOWI.Summit2012, eventually took place in Berlin in June 2012. The present book is a direct product of this conference as it entails the revised and updated versions of the presentations held in Berlin. The perspectives presented and the opinions raised in this book differ quite a lot. So we really had a controversial debate on the issues of post-interventionism and this is to the advantage of the reader who will find this book rich in ideas and inspiration.

We are very grateful that the authors to this book invested their expertise, their time and their energy to contribute to this book. Also, we would like to thank the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences, the SOWI, and its Director, Dr. Ernst-Christoph Meier, for the generous financial and logistical support to make the SOWI.Summit2012 and this book come true. Further thanks go to the conference team, Jana Teetz, Bastian Krause and Gregory Parsons, who enthusiastically and diligently supported the project. The same applies to Cordula Röper and Edgar Naumann who put this book in perfect shape. All this is very much appreciated!

I Macro-Level Perspectives

Post-Interventionist *Zeitgeist*: The Ambiguity of Security Policy

Florian P. Kühn

1 Liberal Interventionism, Security and Social Transformation

Over the last two decades, international security has turned into a playing field for experiments in social engineering of all sorts. Under the guise of globalized risks, the states of the Western security community (Deutsch et al. 1957; Etzioni 1965; Adler/Barnett 1998) have attempted to shape social rules and institutionalized mechanisms of state domination elsewhere, more precisely the control and monopolization of violence. To this end, military units were deployed under sometimes contradictory mandates to support political transitions or create the conditions necessary for such transitions to occur (Richmond 2005; Chandler 2009; Kühn 2010; Hameiri 2011; Dodge 2012).

The practice of intervention, however, has produced mixed results at best. While resilient social figurations have resisted, subverted, or transformed the political projects, the agents of the intervening countries have themselves undergone significant changes in organization, outlook, or political salience (Heathershaw 2009; Bonacker et al. 2010; Richmond 2011; Bliesemann de Guevara 2012b). This contribution explores the mutual effects of political adaptation and the social repercussions these political transformations have in the countries sending and receiving intervention forces. Analyzing intervention as policy tightly connected to a liberal understanding of the world and of societies, it scrutinizes interventionist policy as a technique to reshape social relations in Western countries and non-Western countries alike. It will do so putting at its center the concept of ambiguity, which helps to understand current policy making. In this light, what may look like entering a post-interventionist age might in itself be ambiguous in that interventionist practices continue unabated, but are framed differently.

2 Externalizing Costs: The Political Economy of Interventionism

From a political economy point of view, external interventions triggered by security considerations have been legitimized with the horrendous costs in terms of human suffering, refugee migration and also associated security risks to Western societies like weapons and drugs trade, organized crime,

terrorism and the spread of disease. To counter or deter security risks, Western states have over centuries developed costly and specialized apparatuses, consisting of coercive organizations like militaries, epistemic support services such as strategic think tanks, and material supply of the means of violence, such as arms industries. At the same time, the costs of social adjustment, prescribed by a liberal idea of the state as the exclusive source of legitimate violence, has been burdened onto those societies deemed not fit to control populations. The question whose security gains interventions are directed at, thus, remains unanswered: Is it the populations in so-called weak, failing, or failed states whose everyday lives need protection, or is it the populations of the rich West who need to be protected from threats to their way of life emanating from those ‘risky’ areas outside the security community? (Pugh/Cooper/Turner 2008; Clapton 2009; Hameiri/Kühn 2011; Kühn 2011, 2012a)

That these areas are seen as risky is a development which followed the East-West ideological confrontation, when threats with their clearly determined origin and known and anticipated tactics and intentions disappeared. The void was filled by perceptions of risk, which is significant for its diffuseness, its unknown intentions and potential (Daase 2002: 14–16; Daase/Kessler 2007). While everyday notions of risk bear a more or less balanced relation between opportunity and danger, in this new security paradigm of risk, the latter has increasingly been overemphasized at the expense of the former.¹ For example, the Arab spring was immediately seen as risky in the way that fundamentalist governments might take over states earlier dominated by autocratic and gerontocratic regimes with outrageous human rights records – and not by many as an opportunity for democratic and, eventually, economic development.² This is because the whole idea of liberal peace and security is based on notions of order (Richmond 2002: 31–35) – a conservative approach contradicting liberal economic reasoning with its explorative spirit of entrepreneurship. “Maintaining order”, as Richmond (2002) calls his book, in this sense comes down to preserving or re-installing state institutions, which are viewed to be containers of social relations of all sorts (Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn 2010: 20–36). Within a risk paradigm, essentially, non-state social relations themselves are treated as being risky, and ever more intrusive

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- 1 See Hameiri/Kühn (2011: 275–277) for a discussion of the ontological and epistemological differences of the very notion of risk as emblematic in the works of Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens on ‘reflexive modernization’ vice versa Mary Anderson’s view that risks are socially constructed or, third, technologies of government, as Michel Foucault would have it.
 - 2 There may be other reasons to be skeptical about Middle Eastern chances for sustainable transitions, such as continuous rent dependencies (see Beck 2009).

interventions seen as laudable as long as they are expected to solve the problems of instability and disorder (Clapton 2009).

What has been clear is that the social costs of security related interventions were burdened on non-Western societies, with ambitious reform projects aiming at security sectors, but generally also at modes of economic reproduction and, not least, cultural re-adjustments along liberal guiding norms (Sovacool/Halfon 2007; Bhatia/Sedra 2008: 36, 181–183; Dodge 2012; Kühn 2012b). Part of the individualization of security is that people in Western societies empathize with victims of violence, be it in countries like Syria/Libya or victims of terrorist attacks in Western capitals (Rasmussen 2003: 171). The result is a change in political pressure to address these problems in ways exceeding older paradigms of security. While those were based on deterrence and international (state) order, states have become instrumental rather than constitutive for risk deflection and management techniques (Kühn 2011).

One of the results of this development is that interventions have become depoliticized, apparently neutral exercises, creating a huge conceptual misunderstanding between recipient societies and political constituencies in deploying countries: Whereas Western societies see themselves as providing assistance towards a better, i.e. liberal, future, local communities view themselves as being subjected to transformations they did not call for and never meant to exercise (Pugh 2012). Local communities, in effect, seem to have a much better grasp of the violence and forced transformations than intervening parties who are tightly trapped in self-referential discourses and political necessities (such as budgetary restrictions, alliance politics, or tensions between ethics of conviction and ethics of responsibility) (Richmond 2011: 205–211).

Contrasting this logic is the assumption that states which are ruled democratically are a necessary condition for the peaceful conduct of international relations. Economically, democratic states are associated with markets and capitalism – however, it is surprising that democratic peace theory has assumed such salience in the academic discipline of International Relations. Thinking along the lines of democratic peace theory has in itself contradictions and ambiguities, which Müller (2002) calls “antinomies”. He points, among other problems, to the fact that democratic peace theory’s basic assumption that states are exclusive political actors on the international stage is no longer (if it ever was) valid: Over the last decades, globalization and other denationalizing effects have taken away most areas of social regulation from the state or transformed it into modes of transnational governance (Müller

2002: 47).³ From a security perspective, to be sure, it looks different for France to elect François Hollande or the United Kingdom David Cameron compared to Egypt or Iran being ruled by Islamist parties and actors. This points to the mechanisms of perceiving risks in the first place: The states that have formed the so-called Western Security Community communicate comparably more intensely with each other than with those on the outside. This may be understood also as a Security Epistemic Community, bearing distinct ways of framing security as well as being subject to certain dynamics of the *Zeitgeist* (on the ambiguity of peace as a policy and a practice see Kühn 2012b). The obsession with terrorism which streamlined international security policy of the last decade may serve as an illustration.

3 Can Costs be Externalized at all?

Political responsibility is, for the time being, tightly bound to state mechanisms to formulate and put into practice political decisions. This has led to the narrowing down of interventionist policy to the national level, where parliamentary oversight has rolled back leverage for governments in making decisions about interventions.⁴ However, once decisions to take action have been taken, international bodies are quickly mandated to do the implementing. Thus, international policy has become denationalized, located in international bodies such as NATO or EU, in effect working to deflect responsibility for fiscal and policy decisions (Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn 2010: 192–195). However, in political discourse, this may work as long as things go according to plan; after all, legitimacy of interventions is seen to be higher when many international actors are involved.⁵ Once soldiers or humanitarian

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- 3 This extends to generating meaning for militaries which, despite significant cooperative structures in the Western context (but also including other states' militaries), rely on nationality and national states to generate meaning for what they do – their existence is contingent upon the legitimating narratives of states. Where missions are undertaken in the name of a Western, or European alliance, this legitimacy is being undermined. In other words: Are soldiers prepared to die for the European Union or the continuous existence of NATO rather than their countries?
 - 4 Notwithstanding differences in the political systems of Western states, where French presidents have different political repertoires of action at hand as, for example, a German Chancellor or a British Prime Minister. It is here where the study of domestic politics interlinks with the study of international relations.
 - 5 Interestingly, for the time after 2014 in Afghanistan, the political discourse circles around which kind and depth a mandate by the UN would require while the Afghan side is disregarded wholly.

workers die, once radicalism spreads, indicating ample discontent in the countries of intervention, once mission creep sets in, putting into question efforts in terms of time and money, then parliamentarians and policy makers at all levels of administrations need to address the resulting political pressures.

However, leverage to correct wrongs in policy is limited due to internationalized decision-making procedures and due to international loyalty to alliances which is sometimes regarded higher than concrete policy. This leads to a tendency to act according to the idea of ‘more of the same’, as could be observed in Afghanistan (Suhrke 2011: 219–228).⁶ Following the optimist decade of the 1990s, when liberal ardor directed policy, and the half *angst*-driven, half radical policy of the so-called ‘War on Terror’ during the 2000s, there is growing sentiment now that not all which may be desirable can also be achieved, and that which can be achieved needs to be paid for. The temporal sequence of events means that Iraq and Afghanistan informed subsequent cases of security concerns such as the intervention in Libya or Syria (Pelham 2012).

The striking discrepancy between plans and outcomes, especially in the politics of statebuilding but not limited to it, is part of another ambiguity: Plans are directed at communities and collectives, which may have group identities and practice delineation, assuming that people of all kinds conform to individualist notions of liberalism. In this thinking the individual is the only source of political authority, the indivisible component of a sovereign and a political (and economically) rational actor. The irresolvable ambiguity of the individual and how it is being viewed when acting in accord with collectives makes directing interventionist policies so difficult (Kühn 2010: 102–111). However, because local actors are seldom taken as being on par with Western agents, interventions still unfold according to prefabricated Western concepts, simply because political resistance is limited at first: Either, ‘partners’ are being installed by the intervening powers, or paid for their ‘cooperation’, or politically organized voice against interventionist policy lacks the means of efficiently organizing such political programs. As may be observed in Afghanistan, Iraq, but also in Libya, political resistance against

6 The case of withdrawing troops, as could be observed in Afghanistan where Canada and the Netherlands withdrew combat forces before an official end of the mission even was in sight is illustrative of how exaggerated political concerns about what would happen once solidarity between members of the alliance ended; at the same time, one might argue that it demonstrates the lack of cohesive power of NATO that states can stand by a common mission without consequence.

an implemented order develops in synchronicity with military resistance (Pelham 2012).

For the armed forces, mandated and tasked to keep the order, this means that a more target-oriented structure is required – one that needs to address the discrepancy of collective action, which is often viewed as risky for the intervention and its aims, and individuals, often seen as passive recipients of developments both political and economic. At the same time, the so-called ‘War on Terror’ led to a misguided orientation of security policy, overestimating the unlikely at the cost of strategic orientation. To level strategic planning and military practice, which is essentially social, organizational adaptation is required at both tactical and planning levels, bearing significant consequences for both national apparatuses and security organizations such as NATO. As Theo Sommer has explained, the existing security structures need to adapt to newly recognized realities: That NATO is strongest where it works as a potential rather than where its troops are deployed, where it fosters policy making between member and associated states rather than being in charge of policy implementation (Sommer 2012).

Within the Western security community, the ambiguity of security worked well to legitimize interventions (Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn 2011). While it remained unclear whose security was pursued, either the local populations’ one or the Western societies’ one, it was easier to claim that constructing states elsewhere was in the security interest of Western tax payers who essentially finance such policies: “The ethics of the Other have enabled the past problems to be rewritten as ones of non-Western state-governing capacity at the same time as denying accountability for present policy strictures. Paradoxically, the attempt to deny power and accountability has driven the extension of external mechanisms of regulation.” (Chandler 2006: 95) Between Chandler’s assertion and today, many more such mechanisms have been innovatively drafted, including advances in drone technology to manage – rather than address – violence.

Notwithstanding that cost factors are more closely scrutinized in times of fiscal and financial crises, two conditions are necessary for legitimizing interventions in this ambiguous way to work. First, the security of Western states and societies needs to be perceived as less problematic than without an intervention and, second, some sort of – even cosmetic – progress needs to be visible in the countries under intervention. Where human rights violations continue under international trusteeship, for example, interventions cannot claim to have solved the problem. What might be called post-interventionist policies could be a complete withdrawal of political involvement – leaving local populations (if there ever was a clearly distinguishable ‘local’ in a spa-

tial or social sense) to their own devices but under control of surveillance and occasional remote action.

4 Social and Societal Effects of Interventionism

Abounding social effects of interventionism are widely ignored in the political debate. On the one hand, numbers of soldiers and civilian workers encountering serious mental health problems are rising, while on the other, social transformations produce pathologies in societies where interventions take place. Among these phenomena is a transformation of political elites, which turn into coalitions of distribution rather than focusing and processing political demands of a tax-paying electorate (Suhre 2011). Instead, in many cases, the latter turn to state institutions for employment, patronage, and opportunities of co-optation (Kühn 2010: 241–254). Despite the best efforts of the intervening parties, and contingent upon general levels of economic development, dependency structures are likely to develop during interventions and to persist well after the main phase of an intervention ends, and indeed, the main funding streams run dry. The political economy of interventions has very transformative, and in this way conflictive, effects. They are, however, seldom analyzed as many of the effects of interventionist political economy on the surface serve other means (capacity building, budget support, development of institutional structures etc.); this allows Western observers to view political-economic pathologies as secondary effects, unintended in their creation but nevertheless unavoidable ‘bads’ in the quest to achieve (greater) goods.

5 Interventionism Rebound: The Legacy of the Liberal World Project

In the liberal mind-set, interventions seek to create or stabilize an international order, comprised by states, which are seen as prerequisites for security and development. This understanding puts the state at the center of all social relations and tries to establish this ‘state of the state’ where it does not yet exist. While post-interventionism may be brought about by the politics of the purse, that is a lack of funds to conduct costly endeavors such as interventions in Afghanistan or Iraq, the basic understanding of the world as one to be shaped by human reason in pursuit of generalized norms is not likely to change. In this light, it merits discussion what ‘post-interventionism’ actually means; is it a change of practices or a significant transformation of the underlying ontological basics – e.g., a pluralism towards multiple forms of economic repro-

duction, social norms and forms of life? Although awareness of the political costs of interventions – for example full-scale military involvement in ending atrocities in Syria – may differ over time, leading to a low willingness to take the risks of intervention, interventionist policy as a concept is by no means discredited. The quest to right the pitfalls of interventionist practice still seems to be ongoing.

For several reasons, mainly because the interlacing discourses of development and security are defining how we understand international relations, it seems unlikely that interventionism has already reached its ‘post’- age. Rather, in the spirit of liberal invention, new forms of intervention and social re-adjustment are likely to be found. The constant reminder of the importance of resilience of local populations, but also of personnel of intervening agencies, is an indication that liberal ideas are likely to prevail. By shaping international policy in such terms, Western agencies provide a mind-set which serves as preconditions to understand reality.

It is in this spirit that strategies of resilience are being applied to Western societies alike. Elsewhere, I have argued that there is a class struggle underway from above which aims to transform traditional functions of social exchange by fostering a sense of threat within Western communities (Kühn 2012b). Mark Duffield (2011) explains how strengthening societies against threats impossible to define and to locate in space and time leads to an all-encompassing security problem being put in the center of security. He argues that a total mobilization of resources and people’s complicity is necessary to enhance preparedness against threats that can no longer be predicted. Resilience as a concept and anti-climax in strategic planning calls for individual preparations and adaptation to changing circumstances (Duffield 2011: 13). Putting the burden of security on individuals, however, fails to foster a retreat of social technology. Instead, making Western societies resilient cascades into continued interventionist practices in non-Western society to become resilient against social but also increasingly environmental, economic, demographic and other risks of modernity.

6 Conclusions: Re-Conceptualizing International Relations and Security

To precisely analyze international relations and security, it might be important to re-conceptualize Western understandings of the world. Much of the canonized knowledge taught in universities and colleges still dates back to the overarching mould of the Cold War; while globalization and problems such as climate change or non-state violent actors have triggered debates on changing structures, the ontological base layers of international relations have

remained remarkably stable. To evaluate the changes in the security environment, four points seem to merit closer scrutiny:

- (1) It would be high time to unfold a conceptual approach which takes into account the dynamics of social figurations beyond the state as well as power structures which cannot be denied despite the formal equality of states in the international legal system. Yet, while dominant Western states are struggling to preserve their defining features in the face of seriously structure-damaging economic challenges, analyzing international relations in terms of imperial approaches seems not to be sufficient either: Rather, looking at structures of domination, tightly connected to capital relations while transcending national borders and modes of political regulation, ought to be at the center of analytical approaches of interventions.
- (2) What is portrayed in the political parlance of international institutions, the commonality of world politics, is lacking the distinct fora of political deliberation: The UN is as state-centric as world society and lacks the means for information exchange on a meaningful scale. What we can observe is a plethora of distinct, often mutually exclusive discourses about legitimacy, policy, and norms. Uproar in the Muslim world against denigration of the Prophet as well as outcries for freedom of expression: Both address home audiences or peer groups rather than being exchanges in a discourse. The same occurs on the practical level of ongoing interventions, where the merits and political calculations are debated systematically excluding the intentions of those concerned. The gap between audiences in Afghanistan, to name but one example, and Western states involved in intervention there may be impossible to bridge.
- (3) For Western actors, the increasing internationalization of missions bears the political advantage of broad-based mandates and increases the intervening regime's weight; over time, however, this might turn into a disadvantage because it becomes an impenetrable network in which responsibilities for what is actually happening on the ground are unclear. Political constituencies as well as policy makers are increasingly becoming uneasy with supporting political practices that they have no say in shaping. The direct link between those paying for the results of decisions and decision making seems to be broken.
- (4) Finally, a professionalization of aid workers as well as of military units engaged with what could be broadly defined as community work has taken place within the last two decades. Their practical experience gives them an epistemological advantage in shaping understanding of what is being done and how it is (or is not) working. In other words: Those involved in interventions have a prerogative in defining problems – how an

intervention is seen in the first place – and solutions – including the instruments to rectify faulty developments. With definitions of problems and the provision of the means to solve them in one hand, it becomes difficult to politically engage in discussions about their value. After all, it is impossible to distinguish which argument or practice is motivated by problems on the ground and which stem from the intrinsic interests of those propagating it. The call for more money and more time on aid agencies' side, but also the call for better equipment, more 'boots on the ground' are, in this regard, the same side of the coin.

In this sense, the age of interventions may just have begun, even though military interventions to establish political orders may be in decline. Economic commodification of land and resources (and subsequent legal regulation), people (as productive forces) and public assets may become a capitalism-driven international mode of social interaction. Short of direct coercion, interventionist practices seem to be headed for a restructuring of the epistemology of security and towards education of individuals to be self-serving and resilient. Whether this includes violent practices or leaves the transformation to the non-Western, not-yet-liberalized Other, remains to be seen. A post-interventionist paradigm, if it exists, may turn out to be a mere change of sequence, as political institutionalization may in the future follow the consolidation of economic structures rather than vice versa.

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Soldiers Drawn into Politics? Civil-Military Relations, Hybrid Military Spaces and the Future of Interventions

Chiara Ruffa, Christopher Dandeker & Pascal Vennesson

1 Introduction

In January 2012, a video depicting U.S. soldiers urinating on Afghan dead bodies was released. Mr George Little, a Pentagon spokesman, declared that the footage was “utterly deplorable”, and this was followed by similar statements by other high-ranking U.S. government officials (Bowley/Rosenberg 2012). The behavior of these soldiers had dramatic political consequences for the reputation of U.S. soldiers abroad and for their credibility and legitimacy in respect to military operations in Afghanistan. In addition, it had a negative impact on the diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and the Afghan government as well as on the reputation of the U.S. in international politics. Leaving aside the deviant behavior of soldiers in operations – often made public by the media, such as, among many examples, Abu Ghraib (2004–2006), or the tortures perpetrated by Italian soldiers against Somali civilians (1992–1994) or the above-mentioned episode (2012), soldiers take tactical or operational decisions that can have wide political consequences. For instance, when they decide to coordinate with other actors deployed in the field, when they launch (or do not) joint projects with humanitarian actors, when they decide where to patrol.¹

Does soldiers’ behavior on the tactical level have greater political consequences now than in the past? Has anything significant happened in the behavior of soldiers, structure of command, or simply in the types of interventions that makes these decisions so political? Is it the kind of decisions taken that have changed or the consequences of these tactical and operational actions that have become bigger and more political? This chapter asks what it means to argue that soldiers are increasingly ‘drawn into politics’: it investigates elements of continuity and change in the relation of soldiers to politics in recent interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan) in comparison with the past. Ideally, with this objective in mind, one should systematically analyze and compare patterns of interventions in old and new operations and infer from these whether soldiers are more ‘drawn into politics’ than in the past. But this chapter has a more modest objective: it provides a preliminary assessment of

1 By political decision we mean a decision that has consequence for or related to the government or the public affairs of a country and we see it as opposed to strategic, operational or tactical.

such a phenomenon mainly to envision potential scenarios of likely future military interventions. This chapter starts from a small tactical event that has major consequences for the foreign policy of a country and is an investigation of this what has been referred to as the compression in the levels of war and the extent to which it is a novel phenomenon (Dandeker 2006: 225).

We argue that five patterns have accentuated this phenomenon of soldiers being ‘drawn into politics’. Two patterns are conceptual and refer to: on the one hand, an ongoing stretching of what we mean by soldiers ‘drawn into politics’; on the other hand, a profound disconnect between the literature on domestic civil-military relations and the literature on soldiers’ interaction with other actors in operations. The other three patterns have to do with the characteristics of current operations: first, the military space has become more hybrid; second, existing operations have specific new objectives; third, soldiers have increasingly more room for maneuver.

We structure our discussion in five steps. In a first step, we conceptualize and think through what intermingling between soldiers and politics means. In the second, third and fourth, steps we investigate the practical sides this phenomenon: we ask whether a pure military space exists, how specific characteristics of recent operations have contributed to the blurring of roles and we analyze what dispersion of military authority has implied operationally regarding effectiveness and mission accomplishment. In a fifth step, we advocate for greater synthesis in the literature and speculate what the consequences may be should that take place; finally, we draw some conclusions for the practice and the future of interventions.

2 Conceptualizing ‘Soldiers Drawn into Politics’: The Strategic Corporal 2.0

The phenomenon whereby soldiers in operations are increasingly intertwined with politics can take different forms and is not new:

- (1) Soldiers in operations take decisions that are intrinsically political, meaning that they affect the functioning of local politics. For instance, in United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), peacekeepers had to decide with which mouchtar to cooperate or whether to deliver aid to a church or a mosque. These were decisions directly affecting local politics.
- (2) Soldiers in operations may take tactical or operational decisions that may have political repercussions. These refer to day-to-day activities and they comprise s probably the majority of actions we are looking at. This parallels the idea of the strategic corporal.

- (3) Soldiers in operations may behave in a deviant way, and in breach of *ius in bello* Just War principles (tortures, urinating, burning the Quran): If information is leaked to the media, their behavior can have diplomatic consequences.
- (4) The actions of soldiers in operations can have political consequences as they have always done. As Clausewitz wrote: “Policy, of course, will not extend its influence to operational details. Political considerations do not determine the posting of guards or the employment of patrols. But they are more influential in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even of the battle.” (Clausewitz 1976: 606) This means that policy may not or should not determine posting of guards but posting of guards can have political consequences.

Our perspective parallels but does not coincide with the concept of the strategic corporal. Partly a product of the changes in the media, the strategic corporal is not new since it has been noted since at least the first Iraq war (1990/1991) and the Bosnian conflict (1992–1995). While we think this has been amplified by recent phenomena (media, new kinds of operations), we do not know how systematic the ‘politicization’ of soldiers is and whether it is going to endure. Still, scandals “like those perpetrated at Abu Ghraib and Camp Breadbasket therefore became of disproportionate importance to civil-military relations” (Strachan 2006: 74). It is thus important to explore the root causes and what they mean for domestic civil-military relations. In particular, it is important to note that we are discussing situations in which soldiers are, allegedly, more involved in politics abroad, in their theaters of operations. By contrast, the bulk of the civil-military relations literature is about the involvement of soldiers in politics at home (in domestic politics).

The debate about the relative importance of the strategic corporal as against the tactical colonel reflects this increasing intermingling of soldiers in politics. This is the result of a combination of two constituent elements, of what has been called a “dialectic of control”, dispersion and micromanagement (Dandeker 2006). Dispersion occurs when the military authority is dispersed across levels of command; while micromanagement refers to a growing tendency of centralizing control (Dandeker 2006: 239f.). Dispersion and micromanagement lead to a compression of the three levels of war, namely strategic, operational and tactical (Dandeker 2006: 240). While these two elements may seem at odd with each other, they are in fact connected. Micromanagement matters as much as dispersion. The tensions between micromanagement – which refers to a centralized control and a top-down process – and diffusion (and what Dandeker calls the dialectic of control) lead to inconsistencies between orders given from the top (without in-depth knowledge of the context) and diffusion of the level of command. While potentially effective

tive for operational activities, micro-management risks being potentially very frustrating when soldiers have to carry out activities that range from humanitarian tasks to building bridges because they need to assess on the ground where this is needed.

The idea of the strategic corporal was introduced by an officer who, at the time, was commander of the U.S. Marine Corps. His main point was to describe a scenario in which a junior officer was caught in a “three block war” in which a soldiers or a unit could be delivering aid, keeping conflict parties apart, returning of fire to an attack (Krulak 1999: 18). Since the junior officer decisions were likely to have dramatic consequences he advocated better training for junior officers. Relaunching the debate, King thinks that a tactical colonel rather than a strategic corporal would have the appropriate degree of expertise. According to him, in order to have soldiers with an appropriate degree of preparation, it would be best to position colonel in tactical position than the contrary (King 2003: 22).

3 An Increasingly Hybrid Military Space

In recent years, soldiers have become more involved in politics while in operations. In the field, soldiers have often to take political decisions or at least decisions with direct political consequences. For Samuel Huntington, the core problem of civil-military relations is to adjust and balance two imperatives: On the one hand, the functional imperative, i.e. providing military security against threats; and, on the other, the societal imperative, i.e. making sure that military institutions reflect or at least do not undermine social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society (Huntington 1957: 2f.). His preferred way to ensure civilian control is “objective control” (Huntington 1957: 83–85) which means maximizing the professionalism of the military. The military should not get involved in institutional, class and constitutional politics. Huntington’s idea was that the military should preserve their professional autonomy and keep separate from civilian values. “Huntington’s account is rooted in the idea of what might be termed a ‘pure military space’ occupied by a military profession using legitimate violence to achieve victory.” (Dandeker 2010: 19)

But the idea of a pure military space was challenged already by Janowitz. In his critique of Huntington, Janowitz anticipated that the idea of a pure military space was redundant. Military personnel had to be sensitive to a political context as in his classical example on the military under the Nazis in Germany: “Was the German general staff ‘professional’ when it blindly followed orders which had little or no military purpose?” (Janowitz 1960: 6) The blurring of a civilian and a military space had already been made clear

by Janowitz. But this interconnectedness has become more evident with new kinds of operations and at junior levels of command – a consequence of the compression of the levels of war. New kinds of operations (such as the ‘three block war’ portrayed by Krulak) put greater responsibilities on the shoulders of junior officers that had to take decisions on the spot often with dramatic diplomatic consequences.

Contemporary operations present characteristics that diverge considerably from what Huntington had predicted: That politics is a civilian sphere that was tasked with the ‘art of war’ – the world of the ends or value objectives of war – and that the military strictly focused on the ‘science of war’ – providing the military means to achieve these objectives (Dandeker 2010: 19). But in contemporary operations many elements are at odds with Huntington’s idea of professional autonomy: Soldiers are tasked with activities that are often not strictly military; in their areas of operations they are tasked with interacting with local communities and taking decisions that matters for local politics.

4 New, Different, More Complex Operations and the Lost Meaning of Victory

In the past 20 years, the number of out-of-area operations has increased all over the world. These operations have become more diverse, ranging from peacekeeping to counterinsurgency, and more complex with a wide array of actors ranging from private to public, from military to humanitarian, such as NGOs, Private Security Companies, governmental agencies and conventional armies and the media. Also, operations have on average lasted longer: most Western countries involved in the NATO mission in Afghanistan have had soldiers deployed for more than 10 years (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2012). Similarly, in operations such as Kosovo, Bosnia, the Democratic Republic of Congo or Liberia, soldiers have been involved since the mid-1990s and battalions of various sizes are still involved there. Also, it has become apparent that operations are easier to launch than to draw to an end (possibly with a successful outcome). Governments in an age of austerity have become more cautious about being involved in interventions and “stability operations have dropped off the radar for many analysts and commentators” (Baumann 2012: 33). And one can reasonably ask whether a mission, such as the one in Afghanistan, has or will have been [after 2014] s worth the effort (Ruffa 2012a).

Soldiers have had to interact more closely with other actors, namely civilian actors, other militaries as well as with international headquarters. The operational environments have changed profoundly. During conventional

operations – namely inter-state wars such as the Gulf war or the Falklands war – armies had a specific objective – victory – and their military means targeted that objective. In comparison to current operations, even traditional peacekeeping missions were well defined in terms of means and objective – maintaining a truce or supervising a cease-fire between two or more parties. During current operations – often labeled as ‘complex humanitarian emergencies’ – the increasing operational complexity has made those distinctions of roles more blurred (Dandeker/Gow 1997: 327). Soldiers have several different objectives to achieve – ranging from building bridges to patrolling to targeting hostile parties –, different partners to interact with – the local government, other coalition members, NGOs –, often in the same mission phase. This new operational environment has made it impossible for soldiers to prevent that their actions may have political consequences. And this has consequences for the range of outcomes that an operation can ostensibly achieve. Recent literature has agreed on “a shift away from the idea of the pursuit of victory to that of success” (Dandeker 2010: 17) in specific at ‘establishing security condition’ rather than ‘winning the war’ (Smith 2005).

But does the blurring of boundaries in operations between what is civilian and what is military influence soldiers’ effectiveness in complex operations? Referring to conventional inter-state wars, Huntington (1957) argued that violating the professional autonomy of the military through unwarranted political interference in their operational jurisdiction could undermine their effectiveness. Yet, in contemporary operations if soldiers maintain their professional autonomy too strictly, they risk undermining their effectiveness. This is because contemporary operations require a wide range of skills from military to political to achieve a set of objectives that are at the same time military, humanitarian, diplomatic and genuinely political.

5 Exploring the Causes: Implications of Dispersion for Operational Effectiveness: Soldiers’ Margins of Maneuver

Another feature of contemporary operations is the “process of dispersion of military authority to lower levels of the command chain” (Dandeker 2006: 239). Dispersion of military authority combines coercive and hierarchical elements typical of a military organization with ‘group consensus’ and persuasive forms of authority (Dandeker 2006) and it has led to the emergence of different leadership styles (Ruffa 2012b).

While sometimes combined with micro-management, dispersion has led to greater autonomy for soldiers in the field and to reduced control. Operations are exceptional environments where decisions often have to be taken without direct orders (Resteigne/Soeters 2009). And this becomes particular-

ly difficult when soldiers have wider margins of maneuver. Our approach parallels Strachan's, who focuses on how civil-military relations changed after the U.S.-led coalition of the willing in Iraq (Strachan 2006). Strachan shows the disconnect between policy and the operational-tactical level in the U.S. and the UK while planning and implementing the war in Iraq. Among other points, he contends that "the military, which wages war in rogue states or failed states to build new states, is shaping and even formulating policy as it fights" (Strachan 2006: 72). While Strachan was rather referring to combat interventions, this holds even more true in humanitarian, peacekeeping or peace support operations where soldiers have even greater room for maneuver because non purely military tasks requires decisions to be taken on the tactical level. Soldiers take decisions that are likely to have political consequences and 'formulate policy' as they fight. "Politics have the potential to permeate all military action, but in conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan war and policy are even more deeply intertwined." (Strachan 2006: 72) We agree with that, but is it what we meant above? Why is that? Strachan seems to refer specifically to war with complex objectives in a media age – and objectives that are not really existential concerning Afghanistan. These are wars of contested choice. Obviously, all wars involve choice, even existential ones, but some are more wars of existential necessity than others (Porter 2012). To complicate things even more, politicians get involved during the mission, they sometimes change the political objectives during the mission or they have a value view of the political objective to be achieved. Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that these elements together may influence different kinds of civil-military relations.

6 Need for a Synthesis across Generations of Studies in Civil-Military Relations

The existing literature on civil-military relations has rarely looked at how soldiers' behavior in out-of-area operations is influenced by and in turn shapes domestic civil-military relations (with the exception of Strachan 2006, see below). Indeed, these are two interrelated, but partly separate questions. It is important to treat them together because traditionally the literature has focused on one specific aspect. We understand civil-military relations as a constant process of renegotiation of respective roles in and out of operations.

A classical way of framing different studies of civil-military relations has been through the concept of generations of studies on civil-military relations (Cottey/Edmunds/Forster 2002: 6). While each of these 'generations' provides interesting insights, the lack of cross-fertilization across generations has led to a certain scholarly confusion about what civil-military relations actual-

ly mean. The first and second generation of classical studies on civil-military relations had a similar focus of analysis: the armed forces' relationship to the state (Rosen 2010: 3). The debate of the first generation developed "from the paradox of the state setting up an organization that had the capacity to take over the state itself" (Rosen 2010: 29). The first generation focused on the conditions under which the military could set up coups d'état. The second generation looked at agency oversight and transparency mainly in the new democracies in central and Eastern Europe following the fall of the Berlin Wall.

In the 1990s, a new discussion evolved from the increasing number of peace operations launched and requiring a multiple array of skills, ranging from purely military to purely civilian (Slim 1996). It has been referred to by some authors as 'third generation' civil-military relations, even if it was disconnected from the debate about the soldier and the state. It studied under what conditions military and civilian actors could cooperate. A more recent debate, building on the third generation of civil-military relations, has questioned the distinction between the civilian and military 'categories'. While the interactions between civil and military actors in international operations have become more common and more diffuse, "as military organizations leave for missions, their identities as a distinct branch with a particular form of mission have until recently remained relatively stable in the political discourse" (Rosen 2010: 30). Some authors have implicitly assumed that the generation debate about civil and military actors domestically could be translated with no adjustment to the debate about civil and military actors in the field. Others either focus on domestic civil-military relations or on civil-military coordination.

Recently, some have taken categories from the domestic context and applied them to the field of operations. Rosen (2010: 31) contends, for instance, that "the Blue Helmets and PRT concept can be classified, respectively, as first and second generation civil-military relations" in which what is civil and what is military is conceptually distinct. For him, the third generation of civil-military relations presents an increasingly blurred distinction between military and civilian actors, such as the Focused District Development in Afghanistan from 2010. Yet, the domain of civil-military relations of agencies in operations (between soldiers and NGOs, for instance) and domestically (between the soldiers and the state) are distinct matters. At the same time, domestic interactions between the soldiers and the state and interactions between civil and military actors in operations are related. Two issues deserve further research: (1) The way soldiers interact with civilian actors in operations is influenced by specific, national? Traditions of civil-military relations; (2) patterns of civil-military coordination together with other elements that

require soldiers to ‘perform politically’ are likely to influence the way in which domestic civil-military relations will look like in the future. But overall, Rosen extends a longer-term process that dates back to Janowitz’s intuition that a pure military space does not exist.

7 Conclusions

In this chapter, we identified conceptual and practical elements of continuity and change in the way soldiers have been drawn into politics in contemporary operations. While we still need more systematic empirical data, there seems to be an ongoing trend towards an increased politicization of soldiers’ roles as confirmed in the role of General Dannatt in the public debate in the UK and outspoken memoirs of others such as Stuart Tootal, a colonel of the British paratroops (Tootal 2010). Overall, it seems that professional frustration on operations has led to a more outspoken professional military at home. Conceptually, the disconnect between the first two generations of domestic civil-military relations and the literature on civil-military coordination in operation has led to a certain degree of confusion. We advocate for a better synthesis between these two strands of literature and we pointed at the different meanings of the term ‘soldiers drawn into politics’.

However, the increasing role of soldiers in politics is not a completely new phenomenon but contemporary operations have accentuated specific elements that we have highlighted. The hybrid nature of the military space in contemporary interventions as well as the dispersion of levels of command (both positive and negative) contribute to the current situation in which soldiers take decisions that are intrinsically political in their effects. Since the autonomy of the military in their ‘science of war’ is not an empirical reality, soldiers need to learn better how to manage their hybrid role (Haltiner/Kümmel 2008), how to contain the reputational damage of deviant behavior and how to capitalize on their strengths. Training is the obvious response. But forming soldiers with high human capital (Lyall/Wilson 2009) at a time in which governments are becoming more cautious at intervening may neither be seen to be political viable nor cost-effective. But one can conjecture that the proliferation of strategic corporals or strategic private soldiers may have short- and long-term consequences for domestic civil-military relations? Are soldiers likely to play a much more active role domestically in the future as a result of their more politicized role in operations, for example in debates about the costs and benefits of an operation, whether such interventions should be mounted again, which lessons can be learned from the last ones and whether service veterans are cared for and remembered. Soldiers often have to deal with politicians who have a pre-defined value view of what the

political objective of a specific mission is or – even worse – who change their minds during the operation and expect the military to adjust and adapt (for instance change equipment, force design or rules of engagement). Should soldiers resist these pressures of what might be called ‘mission creep’ or do they have to get used to the idea that political decisions can be volatile and adapt to this as part of their default settings? And is adaptation sufficient for soldiers to tailor tactical, operational and strategic goals to achieve political objectives with a strong value view component and that change over time? Probably not. Given the amount of soldiers deployed and the importance of intervention for international stability as well as for international peace and security, it is important to explore the dynamics that lead soldiers to be more involved in politics.

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Searching for Minimalist Humanitarian Intervention Strategies in Global Security Policy

Wilfried von Bredow

1 Introduction

In July 2006, after the usual complex process of international and national decision-making, 780 German soldiers were deployed to the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo Kinshasa and to Libreville in Gabon. They were part of EUFOR RD Congo which consisted of 2,400 soldiers from the armed forces of several EU countries. Their mission was to monitor the democratic general elections in the capital and to prevent violent clashes between rival groups. Surprisingly, the elections on 31 July 2006 turned out to be mostly peaceful. EUFOR RD Congo stayed for additional four months in order to prevent any violence in the aftermath of the elections. The mission ended on 30 November 2006. The soldiers of EUFOR RD Congo returned home, just in time for Christmas (Chiari/Pahl 2010: 109–120).

A considerable number of the new and non-traditional missions of the armed forces are neither intense nor long-term missions.¹ Their mandate is precise; the number of soldiers is limited. They are not really problematic with respect to manpower, material costs, or military operations. Other missions are, however, more problematic and more severely disputed. These ones are the dramatic long-term military interventions by multinational coalitions which are motivated by humanitarian goals and/or the intention to contain and pacify violent conflicts and civil wars and to implement post-conflict reconstruction measures.

A short survey of these interventions does not provide much cause for optimism. The withdrawal of ISAF from Afghanistan between 2012 and 2014 is a case in point. While Western politicians – when in office – are still trying to depict the intervention in Afghanistan as a success story, many experts, perhaps even a great majority, paint a much darker picture (Rashid 2009; Brummer/Fröhlich 2011). Public support of the intervention has dropped over the years, both in the West and in Afghanistan. The complex history of the Western failure in Afghanistan is a prime example of the gap between good intentions, high expectations, and an all-inclusive political

1 EUFOR RD Congo was more a logistical than a military challenge for the Western contingents. It should be noted, however, that the comparatively peaceful course of the Congolese general elections in 2006 was all but self-evident. Many observers expected turmoil and escalating violence.

rhetoric on the one side and cultural misunderstandings, mismanagement, and the erosion of comprehensive projects for the country's reconstruction on the other. Even the Western exit strategy from Afghanistan seems to be fraught with peril (Sedra/Burt/Lawrence 2011).

Military interventions by Western states in the conflicts and wars in global trouble spots are different in terms of scope and intensity. They are motivated by a mixture of moral, political, and economic interests with a domestic and an international dimension. After the experiences of two decades, we have to conclude that ambitious long-term interventions are not very successful and are too expensive. Yet, faced with local violence and civil war in certain parts of the world along with the potential of massive disruption to all sorts of global exchange, non-intervention is not an option. Therefore, we must seek new and less expensive intervention schemes and strategies.

The following considerations do not claim to deliver such new schemes and strategies. Instead, they discuss, as a first step, some of the political aspects of interventions and their consequences for the armed forces. They are organized in four sections, including a preliminary outlook. The first section is a brief exposition of the problem as I see it. The second section gives a short account of the experiences with post-traditional missions of the military under the auspices of humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, and security stabilization. Section three looks into the reasons for the decline of optimistic interventionism which was dominant in the governmental and public discourses of the 1990s and up to about 2005. Ironically, the most important international document which calls for humanitarian interventions (under certain conditions) was only officially recognized by the General Assembly of the United Nations at the end of this 'optimist' period. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine became an integral part of the Outcome Document of the World Summit 2005. The *fourth section* is devoted to the difficulties of applying the R2P doctrine in complex conflict situations. Two of the current conflicts in the Middle East, Libya and Syria, serve as an illustration of these difficulties of external actors to take the adequate decisions without too many unintended consequences. *Section five* deals with the balancing of civil-military cooperation in interventions and peace missions. My cautious *conclusion* appears to be logical and yet ambivalent: Yes, there will have to be interventions with military and non-military means in the future. No, they have to be far less comprehensive and ambitious as in the last decades. Therefore, the search for minimalist intervention strategies is now imperative. A typical problem with long-term is that they tend to become more ambitious and expansive when in action.

2 Interventions Fail – Non-Intervention is not an Option

For more than two decades now, military strategic thinking in Western democracies has not been primarily concerned with territorial defense against an enemy state or with those nuclear war scenarios that captured the strategic imagination during the East-West conflict. The international security landscape has gone through deep structural changes. For states and non-state actors alike the world of today is not really a safer place. Due to globalization, tensions and violent conflicts in areas with a less developed governmentability, i.e. in fragile or failed states, have a considerable spill-over potential. Terrorism, mass atrocities and crimes against humanity, hunger catastrophes, international organized crime, the proliferation of light and heavy weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, and the consequences of mass migration amount to serious security challenges.

The break-down of political order and security in other parts of the world has a moral as well as a political dimension. In any case, we are always dealing with a humanitarian disaster, but also (some observers would say: in the first place) with a potential threat to the international system and to the security of states which rely on the functioning of the international order (Kathman 2011). In politics, the political dimension demands priority; yet, in the modern world, moral considerations often motivate powerful political impulses. Still, the relationship between these two dimensions is characterized by tensions, contradictions, and artfully constructed double standards.

Consequently, Western democracies have worked out security strategies with new accents. The common feature of these strategies is an extended concept of security. The conventional divisions between internal and external security and between civil and military aspects of security have become, for the most part, obsolete. A more comprehensive approach has blended peace issues with developmental issues. Overcoming collective violence and restoring security are now usually regarded as a complex civil-military mission.

Assuming this is an adequate perception, the conditions of globalization hardly allow Western democratic governments to simply abstain from any sort of interceptive action when a severe security problem or a humanitarian disaster occurs. They are bound to act in some way or another. Their interventions, usually internationally coordinated (e.g. by the United Nations) range from verbal reprimand to economic and other sanctions² and, when deemed necessary, to military intervention. Generally, Western governments are not keen on deploying their armed forces due to the remarkable material

2 The theory and practice of sanctions in international politics have been considerably refined in the last decades (see Werthes 2003).

and human costs, which are a burden for their budgets and which, when prolonged, become rather unpopular among their electorate. Military interventions usually need a strong emotionally charged environment (e.g., by means of media coverage) along with humanitarian legitimation and/or a mandate by the Security Council.

The general experience of Western governments with humanitarian interventions, peace missions, security stabilization, and organized assistance in the conflict-ridden zones of failing or failed states is not encouraging. Every single case has, of course, a special historical and political profile ('path dependency'), which makes it difficult to formulate 'lessons learned' (Münkler/Malowitz 2008a; Münkler 2008b).

There are, to put it mildly, not many cases of successful military intervention by external governments. Neither are civil organizations, governmental and non-governmental organizations alike, always instruments of a peaceful reconstruction. This bleak picture has consequences for all external actors. The question is: Is there a 'third way' between humanitarian interventions doomed to fail and a *laissez faire*-attitude of looking away?

With the predominantly negative experiences of the last two decades, it is evident that there is a need for new intervention strategies with civil and military means. The search for such strategies is complicated because they have to be based not only on national, but on multinational consent, both in abstract terms and with regard to concrete decisions and operations. Governments of democratic states must convince their public of the moral, political, and economic long-term benefits of their participation in military interventions.

3 Post-Traditional Missions of Western Militaries

Two cautionary remarks are necessary before we enter the somewhat obscure labyrinth of conceptual labels for the post-traditional missions of the armed forces. *First*, the term post-traditional does not imply that this kind of missions did not occur before the end of the East-West conflict. In the course of history, armed forces were used in many ways, the conquest and/or the defense of a territory being only one method, albeit the most common among them. *Secondly*, non-Western armed forces also perform non-traditional missions. For them, the process of transformation requires different plans and steps.

In the modern world, i.e. the world of nation states, the most legitimized mission of the armed forces became the defense of the homeland. Support of the alliance was another major mission during the decades after 1945. These

missions are usually regarded now as the traditional missions of the armed forces (Moskos 2000: 15).

Post-traditional missions are categorically neither conquest nor territorial (national) defense missions. They demand a whole range of military capacities. They became salient after the demise of the bipolar East-West conflict. The bipolarity of the international system between the end of World War II and the break-down of the 'socialist camp' and later the Soviet Union was a defective bipolarity with many international conflicts which originated outside of the bipolar scheme. The nuclear arms race, however, propelled the U.S. and the USSR into the role of so-called 'superpowers'. They were strong enough to deeply influence the course of the decolonization process and the following third world conflicts, both in military and ideological terms.

As of 1989/1990, we can consider the bipolar division of the international system as a thing of the past. The loosening of the iron brackets of bipolarity set many local and regional conflicts free. Multinational political entities like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia underwent a decomposition process. Ethnic and religious (more general: cultural) tensions became more intense and tended to erupt. The dynamics of globalization in terms of (mostly asymmetric) economic interdependence and borderless communication weakened the authority of governments. Weak states became a source of local turmoil, regional insecurity, and international alarm. Some authors like Horsman & Marshall (1995) or Martin van Creveld (1999) even predicted the end of the nation state as the cornerstone institution of the international systems. The order of the post-East-West conflict world was becoming, indeed, more fragile. The eruption of violence and civil wars in certain regions of the globe were not only perceived as morally intolerable, but also as a potential threat to the international order.

The former superpowers dealt with such violence under the auspices of their competing ideologies and their national interests (sometimes a rather strange mixture of motives and modes of behavior). When there were no more 'superpowers'³, the euphemistically so-called 'international community' were forced to deal with such violence. Consequently, a plethora of new missions like peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention increasingly

3 I have always wondered why, after 1990, the rhetoric of the American governments about their country being 'the only remaining superpower' and about the 'unipolar moment' could have been taken seriously by the American political elite and by political experts elsewhere. The diminishing marginal utility of the enormous military power of the U.S. was clearly visible from the early 1990s on (Iraq, Somalia, etc.).

gained in importance. These missions are called post-traditional here (see also Kümmel 2011).

They forced the military organizations to undergo various structural reforms or transformations in order to achieve the capacity to respond to the new challenges. The keyword for these changes would be *constabularization* of the military. The range of a soldier's professional skills had to be enlarged in order to improve the armed forces' performance in post-traditional missions. The necessary military skills for post-traditional missions were never intended to *replace* the military skills for traditional missions, but to *complement* them. Armed forces exist because collective actors, like states, perceive the need to use organized violence. Soldiers are trained to fight. This did not change in the course of contemporary history, and it will not change in the future.

The essence of the new missions is captured in the terms protect, help, save. For a time, the American military used the less than romantic term of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). NATO was the first to make use of the term Peace Support Operation (PSO) and later the term Crisis Response Operation (CRO) for the post-traditional missions of the armed forces (von Bredow 2007: 173f.; Schmidseider 2003: 25–30). These missions are very different in scope and substance, and they take place under very different geographical and climatic conditions. The social, political, and cultural environment in which the soldiers in these missions are operating varies considerably. Conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peaceenforcement, peacebuilding, humanitarian and protective operations – it is the polished labels for these missions that frequently hide the different and often crude reality as it is experienced by the soldiers in the field. They are monitoring and securing armistice agreements between fighting groups, they have to be at the same time mediators, constables, and consultants in local affairs, they function as border police, are used for special anti-crime operations, they hunt war criminals, support local attempts to rebuild the infrastructure (schools, roads, wells, etc.). They help civil organizations distribute necessary food supplies, medicine and clothing. They protect suppressed ethnic or otherwise defined minorities and provide shelter for refugees (Kümmel 2012: 120). Soldiers de-activate landmines, supervise general elections, and act as tutors for security sector reforms in post-dictatorial political systems (Edmunds 2003). In the 1990s, some authors described soldiers in their non-traditional roles as “global social workers with arms” acting in the name of and being motivated by a kind of global humanitarianism (von Bredow 1997).

Here, again, we should return to the observation above that these non-traditional roles of the soldiers in Western (and other) armed forces were *not*

substitutes for their traditional roles and professional skills, but complemented them. This was, however, sufficient to change the essence of the military profession. This was due to the fact that now the new missions exist alongside the traditional ones which clearly belong to the realm of fighting and war. Over the past two decades there has been a mingling of traditional and non-traditional roles as well as of skills and functions of soldiers and the armed forces. Peace soldiers remain war soldiers. Warriors are not functional without the 'soft skills' that are characteristic for soldiers in non-traditional missions.

This observation corresponds with contentions about the emergence of new forms of organized violence or "new wars" (Münkler 2005). The amalgamation of traditional military and non-traditional skills is the most important development of the profession of arms which will probably have a lasting effect on the self-perception of the soldiers, on their formation and training, and civil-military relations in democratic countries.

4 The Decline of Optimistic Interventionism

The discourse on (direct or indirect) intervention, sanctions, intervention with military means and humanitarian intervention keeps chroniclers and analysts of international relations busy. It is, against any superficial impression, not a new discourse. But recently, that is after the end of the East-West conflict and in the context of a dynamic globalization, this discourse has gained renewed relevance. Especially humanitarian intervention became a prominent term in the debates of political practitioners and in the textbook of IR theorists. Humanitarian intervention appears to be a genuinely positive and optimistic concept. Its goal is the protection of suppressed individuals or groups in conflict-ridden countries. Humanitarian interventions are intended to bring relief to these individuals and groups and possibly also to punish their perpetrators. It is not an expression of the national interests of the intervening actors, but an action of altruism and solidarity. In this view, humanitarian intervention is ethically clean. Jonathan Moore (2007: 169) defines humanitarian intervention as follows: Humanitarian intervention means action by international actors across national boundaries including the use of military force, taken with the objective of relieving severe and widespread human suffering and violations of human rights within states where local authorities are unwilling or unable to do so.

This definition is generally accepted by both the supporters and the critics of this concept (Münkler/Malowitz 2008: 8). The concept is, indeed, much contested, mainly because the gap between theory (principles, moral perspectives) and political practice has been dramatically highlighted over

the past two decades. Such gaps are quite normal in the realm of politics where the pursuit of individual or collective interests is often enough to produce clashes between actors. Furthermore, political actions often secretly or openly deviate from values, norms and rules which are officially binding.

Iraq 1991, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia 1993, the non-intervention in Rwanda 1994, Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001, Darfur 2003 – these are the most prominent cases where the concept of humanitarian intervention revealed its flaws. The list with examples of successful humanitarian interventions is unfortunately much shorter. Hinsch & Janssen (2006: 186–201) present only one ‘positive’ case – the Australian intervention of the Solomon Islands in 2003.

There are more than just a few ambiguities in the rhetorically clear and unequivocal concept of humanitarian intervention. First of all, the identification of a case of ‘severe and widespread human suffering and violations of human rights’ is not so much an empirical act, but basically a political decision. Public corruption, state crimes, violation of human rights, social injustice – bound together by Johan Galtung (1969) and called ‘structural violence’ – are not uncommon features of many political systems on the globe. The most important document on humanitarian intervention is the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Responsibility to Protect*, published in December 2001. Its two basic principles are:

- A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.
- B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect. (ICISS 2001: XI)

Military intervention is the ultimate test of R2P. ICISS builds up a high threshold for a legitimate military intervention: Military intervention for human protection purposes an exceptional and extraordinary measure. To be warranted, there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur, of the following kind:

- A. Large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or
- B. large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape. (ICISS 2001: XII)

The primary motive of intervening actors must be to halt or avert human suffering. There must be proof that non-military options will not succeed. Military interventions should be limited. There must be reasonable chance of success of military interventions. Military interventions ought to be authorized by the United Nations Security Council. It is preferable if military interventions are multinational operations and are clearly supported by regional opinion including the victims concerned. ICISS enumerates six operational principles for military interventions:

- A. Clear objectives; clear and unambiguous mandate at all times; and resources to match.
- B. Common military approach among involved partners; unity of command; clear and unequivocal communications and chain of command.
- C. Acceptance of limitations, incrementalism and gradualism in the application of force, the objective being protection of a population, not defeat of a state.
- D. Rules of engagement which fit the operational concept; are precise; reflect the principle of proportionality; and involve total adherence to international humanitarian law.
- E. Acceptance that force protection cannot become the principle objective.
- F. Maximum possible coordination with humanitarian organizations. (ICISS 2001: XIII)

One of the main problems of this superficially unequivocal set of conditions, which allows for or/and demands a military intervention, is hidden in the adjectives: What is 'serious' harm in comparison to not-so-serious harm? What is (in Moore's definition) 'severe and widespread human suffering' in relation to human suffering that is not or only partially severe and not so widely spread? There are no criteria which are able to deliver objective and generally acceptable distinctions. It is impossible to formulate such criteria, because the perception of political events and processes and the decision on how to respond to them are basically political. Common sense phrases like 'I recognize serious harm and severe and widespread human suffering when I see it' are not really helpful for what I see has already been filtered by certain cultural patterns of perceptions.

It is therefore not a surprise to learn that the history of military humanitarian interventions after 1990 is characterized by all kinds of diplomatic compromises, voluntary or involuntary misperceptions, political linkages and illusionary time-tables for the reconstruction period of the war-torn countries. This argument does not include those mechanically paranoid criticisms for which the ultimate motivator of humanitarian interventions, military and un-

military alike, can only be a kind of imperialism in disguise: Oil and other resources, military bases, etc. Conor Foley (2008: 221f.) has convincingly repelled such criticism.

We lack a “viable template or doctrine (...) for good decision making” (Moore 2007: 187). We do not even dispose of a reliable method to evaluate humanitarian interventions. Is a short-term success like the halting of civil violence and war also a success in a middle-range or long-range perspective? Are there unintended collateral consequences of the intervention? Moore also points to the fact that (not only) in democratic countries it is often the case that the politicians making the decision to intervene do not stay in power long enough to see this decision through. “The stamina of the political will and the delivery of funding pledged is not guaranteed.” (Moore 2007: 188) Military action in support of humanitarian goals “should not be approved unless there is a commitment to carry through and provide subsequent support for the reconstruction and nation-building that is integrally connected to the action” (Moore 2007: 196).

This is a sound idea, but it can hardly be put into political practice. Western governments have learnt the hard way that state-building, not to mention nation-building or the emergence of democratic values, attitudes and institutions are not ‘natural’ consequences of humanitarian interventions. They also had to learn that despite the world-wide ratification of documents like the Charter of the United Nations and several human rights pacts many governments on other continents nourish doubts about what they perceive as ‘Western values’.

The essence of the ICISS report of 2001 was embraced by the General Assembly 2005 as paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome Document of the World Summit in 2005. Paragraph 138 reads as follows: Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability (United Nations, General Assembly 2005).

If all member states of the United Nations or the ‘international community’⁴ would stick to this commitment, the world would soon look a lot different. In fact, they often cannot stick to it because of the lack of resources and the enormous difficulty of the task. Some observers contend that preventive action and early warning systems could make this task easier, keep the costs of intervention at bay and thus help to preserve peace before it is seriously endangered. This concept has gained some popularity with some governments, notably the German government which produced an action plan with the title *Civil Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and Peace Consolidation* in May 2004. The optimism and zeal which motivates the politicians and diplomats working within this conceptual framework cannot, however, do away with the fact that within the realm of politics reliable crisis prevention is not feasible.

5 Current Cases: Libya and Syria

The ‘Arab Spring’ and ‘Arabellion’ are names for several political protest movements against autocratic governments in North African countries like Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, or Yemen. They quickly spilled over to many other countries in the region. The initial protests started in Tunisia in December 2010. The opposition is composed of various social groups – young people protesting against the bleak professional expectations offered by the governments, groups of exiled politicians, religious (Islamic) groups, some moderate, some extremist, in some countries clans with political ambitions, to mention just these few. The opposition groups in Egypt succeeded in overthrowing the Mubarak regime with a minimum of violence. In other cases the clashes were less peaceful and escalated into open civil war.

5.1 Libya

The Gaddafi regime in Libya reacted with brutal threats and acts of violence to the anti-regime demonstrations which started in February 2011. On 17 March 2011 the United Nations Security Council adopted⁵ Resolution 1973, which decreed a no-fly zone over Libya and called for *all necessary*

4 This term has a certain weight and tradition in the jargon of international law. However, this does not mean that there is a general concordance of norms and values in the behavior of states. Their governments are free to opt out of that community whenever they find it convenient.

5 10 out of 15 members of the Security Council voted for the resolution, five members abstained (Brazil, China, India, Russia – and Germany).

means to protect civilians against the armed forces and police of the regime. In the terminology of UN resolutions, the term ‘all necessary means’ includes military means. Two days later, a multi-state coalition started military operations, among them a naval blockade of Libya’s shores and air strikes against the armed forces of the Libyan Armed Forces. Soon NATO played an important role in coordinating the national contingents. The fighting continued until late October 2011. The Security Council ended the mandate for the military intervention on 31 October. The death toll of the civil war amounts to about 30,000 people killed. 50,000 people were wounded, nearly half of them with serious injuries.⁶ The intervention in the Libyan civil war is hailed as an important signal for the future of international conflict management and especially for the implementation of the responsibility to protect. UN-Resolution 1973 was so important “because it is the first time that the Security Council has authorized the use of military force for human protection purposes against the wishes of a functioning state” (Bellamy 2011: 263).

For Bellamy, the case of Libya stands for a broad transformation in international conflict management policies when the issue is mass atrocities. “Debates about preventing and responding to mass atrocities are no longer primarily about *whether* to act, but about *how* to act.” (Bellamy 2011: 265)

Thomas G. Weiss, one of the authors of the R2P report in 2001, argues that the case of Libya demonstrates the necessity of visible and strong military elements in R2P practice. “But until the international military action against Libya in March 2011, the sharp end of the R2P stick – the use of military force – had been replaced by evasiveness and skittishness from diplomats, scholars, and policy analysts.” (Weiss 2011: 287) For him, the intervention in Libya 2011 demonstrates that the world can say “no more Holocausts, Cambodias, and Rwandas – and occasionally mean it” (Weiss 2011: 291).

The adverb of this half-triumphant, half sceptical outlook points to the problematic side of military humanitarian intervention. R2P postulates a perception, a norm, and a handful of principles for action. Governments of different states do not only pursue different national interests, they do so on the basis of different perceptions. Their behavior and decisions in international bodies like the Security Council depends on their own political perspective which may or may not converge with the political outlook of other governments. After a more or less thorough and careful consideration of their direct and indirect interests and of the political and economic costs of an intervention with military means, governments usually have more than only one option. And when they decide to intervene (together with other states), they are

6 It is, of course, difficult to verify these figures. They are only educated estimates.

often less driven by normative motives and the principle of R2P, but by other goals like regime change or the protection of certain economic interests.

More background information is necessary to seriously analyze the motives and intentions of the intervening coalition in Libya. However, critics of the intervention have a point when they underline the coalition's intention to overthrow the Gaddafi regime. This intention may or may not be politically sound, but it is only partially compatible with R2P. It should also be noted that the great military success of the coalition and especially of NATO, which eventually ousted Gaddafi, has left the country in political disarray. Furthermore, nobody can predict which new political structures will emerge out of the current situation.

5.2 *Syria*

Since 1963 Syria has been ruled by the Ba'ath Party. It is a secular regime; the governing families are mostly Alawites, a minority among the Muslim population. The police and other security agencies of the Syrian autocracy are commonly regarded as extraordinarily brutal with an elaborated system of supervising the population and using torture against dissidents. Martin van Creveld (2009: 285–297) describes the notorious 1982 massacre of Hama by the troops of President Hafis al-Assad, the father of the current President Bashar al-Assad, as an extremely unscrupulous operation against the internal opposition. The demonstrative massive violence and deadly cruelty guaranteed, according to van Creveld, the success of this counterinsurgency operation. This 'success' may be one of the reasons for the renewed brutal stubbornness of the regime in its attempts to wipe out all regime-critical tendencies in the country.

These tendencies have been supported by the general atmosphere of the Arab Spring since January 2011. In fact, the opposition against Bashar al-Assad and his government has become even more popular since, despite violent attacks on civilian protesters by the army. In terms of the responsibility to protect, the case of Syria is not fundamentally different from the case of Libya. Meanwhile, the regime has killed approximately 15,000 of its own citizens. The opposition groups have been joined by defectors from the army who were unwilling to shoot their compatriots. The regional and the global context of this conflict have prevented, until now, a military intervention by other states. The list of verbal condemnations of the Bashar al-Assad regime is long; most Western governments have put some economic sanctions in practice. In the region, the Shia-dominated Muslim states like Iran and Iraq support the regime, while Sunni-dominated Muslim states, like Saudi Arabia

or Qatar including Turkey, strongly criticize it. As of now, observer missions and peace plans have failed.

At the beginning of the rebellion, “a ‘pacted transition’ (...) as in Egypt and Tunisia, might have been possible; even later the ‘hurting stalemate’ (...) might still have enabled a negotiated transition. However, the hard-liners within both regime and opposition were empowered by the rising violence (...). Moreover, international encouragement, of the opposition by the West and of the regime by Russia and China, deterred both from moves towards compromise (...). The chance was missed and, as both sides started to feel they were waging a life-or-death struggle (...) protracted conflict, descending into a Libya-like scenario of civil war, seemed increasingly likely.” (Hinnebusch 2012: 112)

The internal and external political dimensions of the conflict and the anticipation of a Sunni revolution after the fall of the Ba’ath party have neutralized, until now, the moral principle which inspires the R2P obligation.

5.3 *Occasionally Firm*

The comparison between Libya and Syria reveals the ambivalence of interventionism as moral policy. My intention here is neither to hail nor to criticize the military intervention in Libya and the (until now) defaulted military intervention in Syria. It is extremely difficult to make reasonable estimates about the future of Libya and about the outcome of the civil war in Syria. Short-term agreements and developments may fall apart and turn around. Local, macro-regional and global actors and factors are keen to keep their political influence. Linkages and compromises, but also unintended consequences of decisions and actions will play a role in the internal and external conflict management, sometimes escalating the conflict, sometimes deescalating it, and sometimes generating new (and hopefully less violent) conflicts. The proponents of R2P have formulated a list of criteria for a military intervention against regimes which violate the human rights of their citizens with extreme brutality. The 2001 ICISS report lists four ‘precautionary principles’ which are to guide decisions on military interventions and, of course, are also valid during the operation itself:

- (1) *Right intention*: No partial interest of the participating governments other than the protection of the people;
- (2) *Last resort*: The use armed forces is only allowed after all non-violent means of protection are exhausted;
- (3) *Proportional means*: Minimum military means in order to secure the humanitarian objectives; and

- (4) *Reasonable prospects*: The consequences of action are not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.

The consideration of these principles is self-evident – not only for military humanitarian interventions, but for all political actions. It is, however, no less self-evident that the political and military practice has often deviated from these principles, partly because of double standards (who can distinguish *right* from other intentions?), partly because it is hardly possible to balance the consequences of action and of inaction beforehand. The authors of the ICISS report understood R2P certainly not as a panacea for all cases of violation of human rights and crimes against humanity. They were aware of the problems which are connected with and sometimes even created by military humanitarian intervention. That is the motive behind their attempts at formulating these principles of military restraint.

As the two cases of Libya and Syria suggest, the ‘right intention’-principle is likely to become only one among many other motives which lay the ground for the decision to act or to remain inactive. Even if some actors are trying hard to respect these principles, other actors stick to the prioritization of other intentions. They can easily point to the ‘reasonable prospects’-principle which allows for honest or not so honest predictions about the fate of a projected military intervention. Thus, Weiss (2011: 291) scepticism is clearly an expression of political realism: “Libya suggests that we can say no more Holocausts, Cambodias, and Rwandas – and occasionally mean it.”

6 Uneasy Civil-Military Cooperation

When discussing the non-traditional missions of the armed forces most experts endorse the concept of close civil-military cooperation as being a constitutive element of these missions. Civil and military aspects of these missions overlap, which requires a better organized cooperation between soldiers and civilians. The 2006 White Paper on German security policy and the Bundeswehr propagates a close civil-military cooperation for international missions.

In the future, national preventive security measures will be premised on even closer integration of political, military, development policy, economic, humanitarian, policing and intelligence instruments for conflict prevention and crisis management. Operations at the international level will require a comprehensive, networked approach that effectively combines civilian and military instruments (White Paper 2006: 11).

In the words of the British General Rupert Smith (2007: 411): To mount security operations we can identify certain constants: they will be expedition-

ary, they will be multinational to some degree and involve non-military agencies, and they will last long time.

The involvement of non-military agencies takes place on various levels. First, in most cases the soldiers arrive at the trouble spots only after civil relief organizations are already there. Some of these NGOs regard the cooperation with the military with mixed feelings, some even demonstratively reject it. So this kind of civil-military cooperation is often accompanied by feelings of uneasiness on both sides.

Secondly, the contingents of the participating countries are often not only military contingents, but include civilians with special missions of their own. When humanitarian interventions do not end with a cease-fire between the fighting indigenous groups, but instead are prolonged in order to assist internal stabilization processes and help with certain infrastructural reconstruction (as in Kosovo and Afghanistan), civilian experts like policemen, experts in administration, agrarian experts or engineers are sought after. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan are an example of this kind of government-led civil-military cooperation.

Thirdly, the troops of the intervening countries are, according to their mandate and certainly also in their self-perception, not occupying the country in which they operate. Thus it is imperative for them not to lose the acceptance of the population whose protection is at the heart of their mission. Instead, they are to stay in close and harmonious contact with the people.

Fourthly, however, the insurgents are by definition not regular soldiers, but are often militant civilians. The distinction between enemy fighters and civilians (always labelled by a popular cliché as ‘innocent civilians’) is hardly possible as the German Colonel Klein had to learn during and after the notorious Kunduz incident on 4 September 2009 (von Bredow 2011).

The soldiers in missions abroad have to be aware of the chances and problems of their different encounters with civilians. In a way, their profession has become de-militarized, albeit only to a certain degree. Soldiers in such missions should have a thorough training in forms and substance of civil-military cooperation which provides them with competence for such cooperation – often under strange and stressful conditions. This competence is necessary if the often quoted ‘comprehensive, networked approach’ can be made operational for such missions.

Until now, the CIMIC concepts of Western militaries are no more than some cautious steps in the right direction. Not all non-traditional missions and humanitarian interventions require sophisticated competence in civil-military cooperation, but certainly the long-term interventions with a strong element of reconstruction measures do indeed. Some critical observers, evidently those with a close relationship to sceptical NGOs and civil relief orga-

nizations, cast some doubts on this perspective, especially the confluence of security and development policies. In his study of PRTs in Afghanistan, Ryerson Christie (2012: 67) comes to the conclusion that PRTs are contributing to an environment where the humanitarian mission becomes militarized, a transformation he deplors. His argumentation may be somewhat stretched, but he is certainly right in pointing to the dialectic of partial de-militarized soldiering and partial militarizing of development.

7 Conclusions

The end of the East-West conflict and the dynamic processes of asymmetric globalization did not create an 'international community' or a 'global civil society' (Kaldor 2003) with common values, norms, political interests. The world has not turned into a peaceful world. Instead, local and regional political, economic and especially cultural conflicts became sharper and – because of potential spill-over effects – more dangerous for the maintenance of international order. There are many fragile, failing and failed states in today's world, and very often seemingly firm (autocratic) state structures crumble in the face of public dissidence and unrest.

The international security landscape is characterized by a whole range of risks, dangers and threats. This situation is not satisfying from a political point of view, and it is, at some places, unbearable from a moral point of view. As globalization continues to link markets, societies, and people and creates a nearly universal information society, it is only logical to attempt to prevent disrupting violent conflicts and to contain them in case they have already surfaced. Conflict prevention is a pretentious program, and I am generally sceptical as to the possibilities to proactively tame violent conflicts before they erupt. Conflict containment and crisis management are, however, a political and also a moral duty of the world powers which demands high priority. In politics, moral duties can be neglected until a group or organization of interested people is strong enough to change the moral issue into a political one. This transformation from the moral to the political realm happens meanwhile quite often. The R2P doctrine is a good example for this process.

In a globalizing world, the responsibility for security, both 'human security' and the security of political, economic and other threatened institutions, cannot be divided into territorial responsibilities, but has also become global. The export of instability is easy and the destructive power of small groups (militias, criminal gangs, pirates, terror networks) has a high potential. The protection against them is a great burden. This implies that stability missions with different scopes, interventions with non-military and in some cases

also with military means will remain a standard procedure of international politics in the years ahead. And it may well be that, as some observers have noted, the role of the military element in stability missions and humanitarian intervention is gaining new weight. “[W]e may now be witnessing a rebirth of more conventional guerrilla movements, whose operational density is often far greater and whose ultimate consequences in humanitarian terms are far more serious than sporadic attacks, which, although spectacular and abhorrent, cause far fewer victims. As every time period adds a further layer of conflicts of varying degrees of violence to those in preceding periods, we may well be at the dawn of a new era of numerous armed conflicts.” (Blin 2011: 309)

Containing and pacifying such armed conflicts in Africa, Latin America or Asia will be a demanding task. As the military budgets in many Western states will probably not grow in the future, the cost/effectiveness balance of military interventions will become more important. The deployment of military contingents will have to be calculated for shorter time spans. Missions like UNPROFOR, IFOR, SFOR, EUFOR Althea (Bosnia-Herzegovina, since 1995), KFOR (Kosovo, since 1999) or ISAF (Afghanistan, since 2002, probably until 2014) will have to remain the exceptions to the rule that the presence of multinational military contingents must be limited to shorter periods. For purposes of post-conflict reconstruction, the presence of armed forces is only necessary in cases where, like in Afghanistan, the conflict has not really been ended.⁷ Otherwise, police forces and gendarmeries should substitute the armed forces. The hiring of private military corporations does not seem to be a working alternative (or only in few cases), for these actors are difficult to control (see Jäger/Kümmel 2007).

The tendency to project the R2P doctrine onto conflict scenarios which remain below the level of ‘most atrocious crimes’ (genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, crimes against humanity) should be stopped. In civil wars, war crimes are often committed on both sides of the front line. This deplorable observation makes it difficult for external actors to intervene on the basis of R2P. Often, as in the case of Libya, R2P motives mingle with the intention to overthrow the regime. Regime change is a highly ambivalent goal. The ‘negative’ part of regime change is difficult enough, but feasible with the help of military operations. However, the ‘positive’ part, that is the installation of a better regime which is both stable and democratic, is much more complicated and requires (as in the cases of Japan and Germany after the

7 Future analyses of the case of Afghanistan might come to the irritating conclusion that the conflict with the Taliban was re-ignited after 2004/2005 because of serious flaws of the reconstruction program and its management.

Second World War) special conditions – and pure political luck. In this vein recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan are not encouraging.

Western governments will continuously be challenged by violence and civil war in areas of fragile statehood. As they are facing a resource problem with respect to their armed forces, they will encounter the problem of two strong, but contradicting political currents. The proponents of more civil and military interventions will provide strong arguments and convincing pictures. The critics of such interventions point to the meager outcomes in recent years. As strict non-intervention is not an option, the search for detailed minimalist intervention strategies is imperative.

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The West's Last War? Neo-Interventionism, Strategic Surprise, and the Waning Appetite for Playing the Away Game

Christian Leuprecht

1 Introduction

Why maintain armed forces? The question is as fundamental as the answer unambiguous: Because democracies have national and common interests to defend. One current of thought contends that the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan are setting the tone for the sort of future interventions that await the Western military alliance. The logic that follows is that we need to learn from them to prepare ourselves for what is to come. This chapter begs to differ on two basic grounds. First, politicians and electorates have neither the stomach nor the fortitude for lengthy campaigns that result in soldiers coming home in body bags, consume exorbitant amounts of resources, but where short-term payoff seems elusive. Second, the challenge of strategic surprise endures: We have an extraordinarily poor track record at predicting the location, nature and characteristics of interventions. If we concentrate on any one type, we risk falling into the platitude that tends to bedevil militaries: Generals always prepared for the last war – especially if they won it! As Hegel poignantly opined: ‘Those who marry the spirit of their age are bound to end up a widow in the next.’

Based on these two propositions this chapter posits the concept of neo-interventionism: While interventionism per se is not necessarily on the wane, the Western military alliance is now more unlikely than ever to engage in long-term open-ended interventions. Whatever intervention proves unavoidable will be short-term with minimal and well-defined objectives. The chapter marshals evidence as follows to argue for conceptual differentiation of interventionism. In fiscally austere times, it turns out that there is merit in experimenting with more optimal ways to spend money and direct the economies of effort than the conventional form of interventionism to which the West has grown accustomed. The chapter concludes that even in a post-interventionist era, foreign policy remains inextricably linked to armed forces. Foregoing armed forces means foregoing one's ability to make or shape international stability and security. Given the challenges that loom in the 21st century (Leuprecht 2012a), the consequences of Western democracies' inability to assert their interests would be deleterious. Still, fiscal austerity and changing structural constraints are precipitating innovation in the use of resources to advance national interests.

2 The Limits of Intervention

Inside the main entrance of the Mackenzie Building at the Royal Military College of Canada are plaques and pictures of all cadets who have fallen in the line of duty. The earliest died in the late 19th century in the same places they are dying today: On the Hindukush and in sub-Saharan Africa. Military historians remind us that expeditionary adventures to conquer and pacify Afghanistan are rife with frustration, be it the British in the 19th century or the Russians in the 1980s. Ten years of American troops in Iraq and US\$1 trillion later, Iraq's government is as dysfunctional as it is ridden by sectarian strife and violence. Years after the Dayton Accord was supposedly meant to have settled disputes in the Balkans, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo remain deeply troubled and divided.

The West is reaping what it sowed: Unapologetically attempting to implement a Westphalian nation-state model in places whose ethno-cultural, linguistic and religious diversity made that an improbable proposition from the outset. How exactly is more intervention supposed to fix the unintended consequences of historically short-sighted interventions that got the West into the unenviable situation in which it finds itself?

Can the Afghan expedition really be taken as representative? Or is Afghanistan an anomaly? Afghanistan differs significantly from earlier interventions because now, for the first time, we actually have a somewhat transparent account of the human and financial toll of expeditionary adventurism. Confronted with the bill and death toll, politicians and electorates alike are showing little enthusiasm for a repeat of an Afghanistan-like mission anytime soon. Fiscal austerity and recruiting challenges are imposing long-term political and institutional constraints that would make it difficult to sustain a similar deployment (Leuprecht 2012b). Western participants in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo or Libya financed those operations on credit: At best, they had balanced budgets and could have used the money to pay down their national debt; at worst – and that is the case for the vast majority of Western democracies – they bankrolled these missions by running up the tab further. Following the compound effect of the economic downturn of 2008 and its aftermath, that meant that, for the first time in decades, the Western military alliance ran up against hard fiscal constraints: It was forced to cut back.

3 Reining in the Expeditionary Mindset

In most countries, that has resulted in smaller, leaner, professional armed forces. These are the result of a combination of structural changes, including the New Security Environment (NSE) of the post-Cold War era as well as

technological change that inaugurated a whole new generation of warfare (Moskos 1999). Supposedly the NSE is responsible for the shift towards lightly armored rapid reaction expeditionary forces (King 2011) and analogous types of military transformation. Measured against manpower, finance, and future capital commitments, however, expeditionary forces are actually far less prominent than their profile within the armed forces would suggest. Far from being the ‘only game in town’, they verge on the marginal in terms of total defense effort.

‘Rapid reaction force’ is a contradiction in terms (as President Carter had poignantly observed): They cannot react, they are not rapid and they are hardly a force. And for an allegedly ‘rapid reaction force’, they have a rather large footprint! That is because, unlike FedEx, democracies do not ‘absolutely, positively’ have to be there overnight (and for times when they do, they maintain covert special forces, not rapid reaction forces). To the contrary, democracies want their own people and the world to know that they are ‘reacting’; so, their electorates and the world are put on notice, and the nature of the way democracies operate means that they tend to take their time to do so. The real issue up for democratic debate is whether (or which) European countries want to retain this *Pax Americana* ‘interventionist’ model that is premised on ‘boots on the ground’ that occupy, control and impose political will; and which are happy to content themselves with a more benign ‘influence-and-defend’ model (Last 2011). The former comprises ‘rapid reaction forces’, the latter acknowledges that ‘rapid reaction forces’ are both empirically and normatively controversial. Are they really the force of choice; or the force of last resort?

The elite status and concomitant special treatment they receive, along with their ‘warrior ethos’ supposedly make them the spearhead of future interventions, possibly even in a limited confrontation with China or Russia. But most of the Western allies bank on the ‘home game’ over the ‘away game’. If aid to civil authority and aid to civil power will gain in importance over the longer term, the oscillation between domestic and international focus in military effort may offer a more fruitful line of investigation. The sampling bias in favor of interventionism wrongly biases the expeditionary mindset as well as misguided inferences and conclusions that follow.

The imaginaries of an international confrontation with China or Russia, propagated by narcissistic military planners and a military-industrial complex continuously looking to justify massive public investments in military technology and procurement, run a serious risk of becoming the self-fulfilling prophesies of strategic planners who continue to be wedded to the big war paradigm that has defined U.S.-style Mahanian-type overwhelming-force doctrine for much of the last century. These strategic pipedreams contrast

starkly with the array of *actual* systemic threats to international stability in the 21st century emanating from the reverberations of domestic instability driven by climate change, resource scarcity, crony capitalism and democratic authoritarianism. In countries thus afflicted, elite warriors are hardly the solution; they are actually a significant source of the local problem. Having European major powers deploy their ‘warriors’ is likely to exacerbate an already volatile situation. Major powers – realistically any country – maintain ‘warriors’ to defend their strategic interests. In other words, their interventions are perceived to have ulterior motives of which local populations are wary and which risk drawing in adversaries, thus making precisely the sort of major-power confrontation a self-fulfilling prophecy which the experience of the first half of the 20th century suggests military planners had better stand on guard to avoid.

4 The Limits of Integration

Western allies whose ‘warriors’ are reticent to exercise their trade kinetically, notably much of the armed forces of continental Europe, get a bad reputation in an Anglosphere – the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia – long marked by an expeditionary culture. But might the elusion of ‘strategic success’ in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Kosovo perhaps offer some vindication for the more reserved approach to the conduct and operations of foreign ‘warriors’ on other countries’ sovereign territory? The Anglosphere, led by the United States, likes to set its kinetic expeditionary expectations as the benchmark to which the rest of the allies, in their view, ought to aspire. Within the Anglosphere, one cannot fail to notice a touch of British hubris longing for the grandeur of the *Pax Britannica* of a long-gone Victorian era. On military posture and integration, non-Anglo allies – which amounts to much of the rest of Europe (save France) – should supposedly be looking to the one European country that has long hindered greater defense integration across Europe: Britain? As it turns out, the collaborative interventionist experience of the 2000’s has actually generated a feedback loop of nationalist retrenchment in reaction to greater cooperation.

Militaries, especially those of smaller countries, have good reason to be enthusiastic about greater integration as a means to enhancing their institution’s functional imperative, international stature and military professionalism. By contrast, politicians and civilian bureaucrats are likely to be apprehensive as they look to limit their political (even partisan) and financial liabilities while maximizing national effect. Unlike the institution itself, they have a vested interest in the institution’s social function. That partially accounts for the perennial tensions between military and civilian authorities.

Countries maintain and deploy militaries to defend national and collective security interests, to be sure, but they also do so to reap international and domestic payoffs, notably to score points with their allies and electorates. As European countries seek to minimize defense expenditures while maximizing payoffs, that sort of cost-benefit calculation is likely to become deterministic of the way European countries and coalitions generate and deploy forces. That they will necessarily default to the U.S. ‘interventionist’ model – from which the U.S. itself appears to be retreating – using these new force structures rather than a more modest ‘influence-and-defend’ approach along with its less direct application of force is hardly self-evident.

Confronted with exorbitant financial and human costs, politicians and electorates alike are showing little enthusiasm for a repeat of an Afghanistan-like mission anytime soon. The nature and pace of military transformation is being forced by fiscal, human-resource and materiel realities of overstretched public finances. The three big-ticket items in any democracy are health, education and national defense. The situation is even bleaker in federations where national defense often makes up more than 20 percent of actual federal program spending (once transfer payments are factored out). It is impossible for a democracy to get its fiscal house in order without cutting defense expenditures. Absent a concrete menace that might threaten their existence, given the choice many electorates – especially the rapidly aging kind that pervades most post-industrial democracies – will sacrifice defense spending before health and education. That makes good sense: Health and education are services they use – or, at least, know people who benefit immediately – whereas they are increasingly distant and removed from their armed forces. The move to eliminate mandatory military service in favor of professional all-volunteer armed forces is bound to hasten societies’ alienation from their armed forces (Szvirczsev Tresch/Leuprecht 2011). Downsizing and transforming the military is thus having second-order effects on civil-military relations with lasting implications: Aloof from their armed forces, and not perceiving immediate threats to their livelihood, electorates will be less likely than ever to invest in them. Armed forces who are hedging that the way democratic societies are divesting themselves of their militaries is merely a phase should think again. To the contrary, it is likely to precipitate a spiral of mutually reinforcing alienation and divestment.

5 Aligning Means with Ends

Cuts to defense spending notwithstanding, the recent U.S. strategy statement suggests that NATO allies (and adversaries) continue to bank on airpower, tactical and strategic blue-water naval assets to secure their international-

stability interests (U.S. Department of Defense 2012). Libya, not Afghanistan, appears the more probable model for future missions – insofar as they materialize at all: Short-term, with limited objectives, a clear exit strategy, little risk of mission creep, and, notably, no ‘boots on the ground’. Tepid uptake of the Libya mission among many allies intimates that even for such a limited mandate sufficient support is proving difficult to galvanize, especially when foisted upon modest allies by great powers looking to advance their self-interest, the same great powers that are responsible for creating precisely those conditions that are driving much of the international instability that pervades the 21st century.

The well-defined limited mandate in Libya with a clear exit strategy contrasts with the expansive mission creep to which the mission in Afghanistan succumbed. To this end, Afghanistan is emblematic of an epic failure in civil-military relations. Instead of adhering strictly to the original stated purpose of ensuring that Afghanistan would no longer serve as a staging ground for international terrorism, ferocious lobbying by ‘enlightened’ cosmopolitan constructivists – the bulk of whom are disinclined towards the armed forces and to signing up for military service themselves – ended up imposing upon the armed forces a civilizing mission consisting of the transfer and imposition of liberal-democratic norms on an atavistic host society. Laudable as these moral imperatives may be, they were as sociologically unrealistic as they were internally contradictory: The same constituency that is fiercely protective of national ‘values’ and sovereignty of their own country is quite happy to intervene elsewhere to advance its idiosyncratic worldview. The neo-colonial aspect of deploying armed forces to this end appears to have been lost on them, as does the fact that this is hardly a functional specialization of armed forces to begin with. That the results of such mission creep were bound to disappoint was painfully obvious.

Why, then, maintain armed forces at all? Not to make the world a safer place. The premise that the West has an obligation to act on humanitarian grounds, let alone to stick around in an attempt to build flourishing democracies in societies to which freedom, equality, justice and equality of opportunity are an anathema, is highly problematic: For want of agreement on consistent principles to justify intervention (why Kosovo and not Darfur, for instance?), the emerging post-Kosovo, post-Afghanistan, post-Iraq, post-Libya consensus seems to be a recognition that one may be better off to abstain altogether. Countries maintain and deploy armed forces to assert foreign-policy, national and collective-security interests. For most Western allies, these are easy to define: Open trade routes and the requisite international stability to secure their economic, social and political well-being. But democracies also maintain armed forces to reap domestic and international payoffs,

notably to score points with electorates and allies alike. The strategic behavior of politicians is constrained by maintaining a seat at the table with the allies that makes it possible for them to try to overcome collective-action problems in an effort to shape international-security policy. NATO Needs Americans to Operate; but it persists because it continues to serve collective security interests. Those infamously used to be to: Keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down. With the end of the Cold War, collective interests became more diffuse; but they are not about to vanish. The transatlantic relationship and the American security umbrella (let alone the dividend that flows from outsourcing to the United States instead of having to bear the real costs of international security themselves) remains as important as ever for the bulk of allies, such as the fear of Russia that pervades NATO's Eastern and Central European allies.

In democracies, politicians have a strong incentive to do so since their job security is a function of a four-year electoral horizon (at best). As a result, interventionism may be waning, but is not about to become extinct. Where national interest is at stake and/or points can be scored with allies (notably the United States as the guarantor of the *Pax Americana*), intervention is still a possibility. That explains why democracies are not about to divest themselves of their armed forces altogether: Militaries remain pivotal to a democracy's toolkit. Yet, democratic politicians are quickly learning that it is not in their electoral interest to invest any more in the armed forces than they absolutely have to, to optimize the payoff matrix with their domestic and international constituencies. A ready explanation as to why that investment has been dwindling is that, with the end of the Cold War, a growing number of allies find themselves in the enviable position of having the luxury of deciding when, where and how to deploy abroad. That does not preclude another Afghanistan-style intervention outright; but it does suggest that Afghanistan is likely to turn out to have been the high-water mark of Western interventionism.

6 Conclusions: Alternatives to Conventional Forms of Kinetic Intervention

The aforementioned spate of structural factors from demographic and climate change to ethno-cultural strife and resource depletion juxtaposes a growing need for heavy lifting with waning money, kit and troops. That cleavage need not necessarily be deleterious. On the one hand, it breaks the security curse in which much of the West, and the Americans foremost, have been trapped: The more security you have, the more security you want. A rationalization of the armed forces may thus have the effect of optimizing expenditure relative

to expected returns, instead of the diminishing returns that would necessarily have flowed from ever-mounting investment in the armed forces. On the other hand, a rift between the interests of the traditional great powers and more modest – often continental European – allies may impose a welcome check on the former’s expeditionary culture. Much of Europe and the Anglosphere spent the first 50 years of the 20th century pushing the Germans back to their borders and the next 50 years keeping them there; much to their consternation, that experience has curbed Germany’s interventionist ambitions! In light of path-dependency, no surprise then that in German political culture, the legitimization of expeditionary deployment is not solely the prerogative of the political executive, but requires authorization from the legislative branch. The proliferation of institutional veto players to conventional forms of intervention has resulted in a substitution effect of soft over kinetic influence where national interests are at stake, but conventional interventionism would be as impractical as it would be ineffective. To analogize Andrew Bacevich (2011): It is always easier to go to war with someone else’s soldiers. It is a bit hasty to write off either continental Europe or European military sociology. To the contrary, the changing constraints confronting European allies are forcing them to introduce innovation and diversity into the hitherto ossified Westphalian market of interventionist realism. One size no longer fits all. The *frontières extérieures* (FRONTEX) initiative to secure the community through the extensive sharing of personal data among member states and the *European Neighborhood Policy* are two prominent innovations of a post-interventionist era, at least a post-kinetic one. Why default to kinetic intervention when it runs a needless risk of provoking resentment among locals and confrontation among great powers?

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Post-Interventionist or Newly Responsible? Europe as a Security Provider

Sven Biscop

1 Introduction

The reigning mood in Europe certainly appeared to be ‘post-interventionist’. With the end of a long drawn-out and inconclusive deployment to Afghanistan finally in sight and with defense budgets under heavy pressure everywhere, the appetite for new operations seemed to be at an all-time low. And then came Libya. This goes to show that ultimately ‘events, dear boy, events’ drive decision-making on intervention. The pendulum does swing back and forth between voluntarism and the belief that intervention can change things for the better (as in the early 1990s after the unblocking of the Security Council), and prudence, usually the result of disappointment (as after the failures in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia). But when a crisis occurs and essential interests or values or both are assessed to be at stake, governments will deploy the military and the public, if it is convinced of the same, will support it, regardless of the prevailing mood hitherto. Whether the intervention in Libya (March to October 2011) denotes a new swing of the pendulum is therefore an interesting but perhaps not such an important question. The much more fundamental question is linked to the fact that the Libya campaign was initiated by Europeans: It is an indication of Europe assuming more responsibilities, in a more autonomous manner, as a security provider?

2 Libya: American Intervention in a European Guise

That Europeans initiated action on a security problem in their neighborhood appears perfectly logical – except that in the last two decades *collectively* Europeans have been anything but decisive in dealing with their volatile periphery. But how European was the intervention really? Militarily, the campaign highlighted that for lack of strategic enablers, even in its neighborhood Europe cannot wage a modern campaign without massive American support. Politically, Europeans strongly disagreed about the intervention. While Britain and France took the lead and convinced (indeed *had* to convince) the U.S. to support them, Germany abstained from the Security Council vote on the mandate. Because of this divide, action under the political aegis of the EU was impossible. When the debate subsequently shifted to NATO, once the U.S. made it clear it would not take the lead, the same Europeans inevitably

replayed the same debate, remaining as divided as before. Just a few allies took part in combat operations over Libya, of which a NATO headquarters several days after the start of the operations eventually assumed command. But absent a consensus of EU or NATO members, the political center of gravity remained with the ad-hoc coalition led by Britain and France.

The conclusion is that Europeans lack any collective view on the scope of their responsibilities as a security provider. That does not prevent coalitions of the able and willing from acting, but it does jeopardize the effectiveness of crisis management, even when action in an EU or NATO framework does prove possible. It is, of course, in the nature of crisis situations that decision-making is to some extent ad hoc, but that should not be synonymous with improvisation. Without an agreed strategic framework on geographic and functional priorities to guide decision-makers, that is precisely what it risks to become. Without it, furthermore, there is no guidance for intelligence-gathering and contingency planning, rendering anticipatory action or rapid reaction (the supposed strengths of the EU, according to the EU Council's [2003] *European Security Strategy*) very difficult. And without it, the comprehensive approach cannot be implemented, for there is no basis on which to coordinate with the other (EU) instruments of external action. Europeans are now forced to think about their role, however, because if the Libya campaign was very much an American intervention under a European veil, it is likely to be the last such instance.

3 Autonomy under Pressure

If Libya thus demonstrated that in defense matters there still is not enough Europe, neither politically nor militarily, it was also an indication that in the future there is likely to be less America in European security. As a decade of 'war on terror' is being wound up, the U.S. is shifting its strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific. Consequently, as the U.S. have now repeatedly made clear (in particular in Defense Secretary Robert Gates' [2011] Brussels farewell speech of 10 June 2011 and in the Department of Defense's [2011] *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* of January 2012), they expect Europeans to take charge of crises in their own neighborhood on their own. True burden-sharing would see Europeans acquire their own enablers, allowing U.S. capacity to be diverted elsewhere. Therefore, the prerequisite for the American pivot is European strategic autonomy, at least regionally. Rather than a threat, this strategic shift is a desire, which is partly dependent on Europe's ability to defend itself. If Europe were seriously threatened, the U.S. would have no choice but to intervene because of its own vital interests. In that sense, the U.S. remains a European power. European

capitals, all too well aware of this, ignore at their peril, however, that the U.S. might decide to make the point by withholding its military support for a crisis management operation of importance to Europeans without threatening vital interests – like Libya.

The consequences for European defense are fundamental. First of all, Europeans will obviously have to invest in the capabilities which the autonomy that is forced upon them requires. Today, no single European country is capable of generating significant new capabilities on its own though, particularly not strategic enablers. The only feasible solution, whether through CSDP or NATO, is a collective European one, which underlines the urgency of obtaining results through Pooling & Sharing/Smart Defense. But in order to make collective capability decisions, Europeans need to define a level of ambition for their autonomous role as security provider. The future capability mix (as well as intelligence and planning) ought to be determined by agreed priorities (geographic and functional) for the most likely deployments, under any flag, in function of Europe's common interests and its common foreign policy, of which the military is but an instrument. In other words, collective European capability decisions require collective European strategy (Biscop 2012: 3).

4 Strategic Indications

The first strategic choice is to define the regions and issues for which Europeans as a priority ought to assume responsibility. That choice should be determined by Europe's collective vital interests: defense against any military threat to EU territory; open lines of communication and trade; a secure supply of energy and other natural resources; a sustainable environment; manageable migration; the maintenance of international law and universally agreed rights; the autonomy of decision-making of the EU and its Member States.

Starting from these interests, the most important priority area undoubtedly is the Neighborhood: Any crisis in the area from the Baltic to Gibraltar will have immediate spill-over effects on the EU, in terms of political and economic disruption, refugees, and possibly even violence. Lines of communication and energy supply are obviously at stake; migration is also an issue, especially but not exclusively in the Southern Neighborhood. In this region, the EU itself is the most powerful actor, hence it should take the lead in safeguarding peace and security, which is, not without coincidence, what our most important ally, the U.S., expects from us:

- (1) The Eastern Neighborhood (the Baltic to the Black Sea): With the persistence of the ‘frozen conflicts’, which as the Russian-Georgian War of 2008 showed, can easily be sparked into open war, the region remains fundamentally unstable. The priority is to step up conflict prevention and stabilization efforts, but crisis management may be required, as in 2008. In view of Russian aspirations to maintain a sphere of influence, any operation or mission will be highly sensitive. Nevertheless, crisis management, including extricating EU citizens or civilians deployed on a CSDP mission, must be planned for in addition to preventive measures and peacekeeping.
- (2) The Southern Neighborhood (the Dardanelles to Gibraltar): The everlasting Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but also disputes between Southern States, and the inherent instability of authoritarian regimes and their unpredictable succession all contain serious potential for conflict. While we rejoice at the Arab Spring, it does not automatically solve any of these issues and might complicate some of them even more. Here too, any intervention would be highly sensitive and ideally would take place with political, and preferably military, support from the region. Besides stepping up prevention, crisis management, evacuation and humanitarian operations must be planned for, as well as peacekeeping, notably in the event of a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Three regions immediately adjacent to the Neighborhood also merit our particular attention. The Gulf and Central Asia are of obvious importance for energy supply, and the former also for trade routes; furthermore, crisis in either region risks generating important spill-over effects. In security terms, both regions probably form part of the EU’s ‘broader Neighborhood’. In Sub-Saharan Africa vital interests are less directly at stake, but Europe does have essential interests there as well as a continued responsibility, in view of its historic legacy, to assist the African Union in maintaining peace and security:

- (1) The Gulf: The emphasis has rightly been on preventive diplomacy, notably in the Iranian nuclear dossier, but the fact that some actors might see a *casus belli* here, even if the EU does not, should inform prudent planning. Like in the Southern Neighborhood, inherently unstable authoritarian regimes are a potential source of conflict. While our leverage is more limited, notably as compared to the U.S., and operations at the higher end of the scale less likely, various scenarios may demand some contribution to crisis management. The EU could build on coordination between British and French pre-deployed assets.

- (2) Central Asia: The region is somewhat off the radar screen, but the same instability that comes with authoritarianism applies. While high-end operations are unlikely, other operations and missions might be called for.
- (3) Sub-Saharan Africa: There is as yet no end to the security problems from which Africa itself suffers first and foremost. The EU can support the African Union and local actors with operations and missions across the spectrum, but would probably have more impact if it concentrated its efforts on a limited set of priorities rather than contributing piecemeal. In the long term the key is of course development.

Finally, two less region-specific issues also demand to be prioritized. The security of shipping lanes worldwide is vital to Europe as a trade power; migration and trafficking are issues too. Because maintaining international law is a vital interest, the EU must contribute to its enforcement by the UN when it is violated:

- (1) Maritime Security: Except to the East, the EU has maritime borders, but planning ought to have a global focus, notably on the crucial zone from 'Suez to Shanghai', and increasingly on the Arctic. The EU should build a presence and contribute actively to the patrolling of key maritime routes in order to prevent other powers, or conflict between them, from dominating or disrupting them. Supporting operations and missions on land is another key task.
- (2) Collective Security: The collective security system of the UN can only work if it addresses everyone's security. In view of its vital interests as well as its values, the EU must shoulder its share of the burden, but cannot of course contribute to each and every operation. The *Responsibility to Protect* (ICISS 2001) can guide setting priorities.

5 Obstacles to European Strategy

In an EU context, proposing a strategic reflection in these terms is often met with raised eyebrows, however. Three factors explain Europe's reluctance, erroneously, to think in strategic terms about priority regions:

- (1) First, strategy is too much identified with the military. The aim is not to delineate a sphere of influence in which gunboat diplomacy will uphold Europe's interests. Rather the idea is to identify regions where our vital interests are most likely to be challenged in order to provide a focus for a long-term strategy of prevention, which in a holistic and multilateral manner puts to use all instruments of external action, in partnership with local and regional actors, to create long-term stability. But we must be

aware that, as a last resort, precisely because these are priority regions for our vital interests, we might be required to take military action if no other means can work, and must do our permanent military planning accordingly.

- (2) Second, the military option is too narrowly identified with EU-only military action. In fact, in crises demanding military action, depending on which partners want to support us, it can be implemented through NATO, CSDP, the UN, or an ad hoc coalition, whichever is more likely to be effective in the case at hand. But the framework for the command and control of the military operations is but a technical matter. Regardless of the option chosen, as far as Europe is concerned the foreign policy actor directing the operation at the strategic level will always be the EU, for it is through the EU that we make our long-term policies towards these priority regions. In Kosovo European troops are deployed under NATO command; in Lebanon, under UN command; but in both cases Europe's comprehensive long-term political strategy for the country is defined through the EU. So it ought to have been for Libya: Up to the EU, not to a coalition of the willing, to assume strategic control and political direction of all actions, even though the military operations are under NATO command, for eventually we will review the Neighborhood Policy and our specific Libya policy at the EU level as well.
- (3) Third, military action is wrongly identified with automatic participation by all Member States. In fact, as the record of CSDP proves, exactly the opposite is true. There is no expectation in the EU that all Member States take part in all operations. But there is a justified expectation that those not seeking to participate in a particular operation under discussion do not block, but provide political support to those proposing it, if it serves the vital interests of the EU and all its Members. Thus in the case of Libya, especially as the EU did adopt strong language calling for Gaddafi to leave, it could also have decided on implementing UNSC 1973 under the political aegis of the EU, even when using a NATO HQ, without obliging all 27 to take part.

The conclusion can only be that if the problem is European, so is the solution.

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The Democratic Civil-Military Relations of Austerity: Thoughts about the Past and the Present

Donald Abenheim

1 Introduction

How do defense institutions adjust to reductions in budgets amid an epoch of upheaval? This process of demobilization and retrenchment takes place amid the intensification of partisan politics in Western democracies made more toxic by an economic crisis all too similar to the 1930s. For young U.S. officers this situation burst forth without precedent. It is a shock for them unlike any in the decade prior of hard service. This article regards such a shock as a point of departure for deeper reflections about the theme of austerity and military professionalism in the past and present.

There are many examples in the past for this syndrome of shrinking treasure and proliferating military roles and missions amid political upheaval that have receded into forgetfulness in contemporary debates about security and defense policy. The following, firstly, interprets these cases in overview; secondly, generalizes about what unifies these episodes in their political, institutional and professional character, and, thirdly, joins this analysis to some thoughts about the present and future of the mutual aid and self-help of smart defense in the further evolution of NATO and the armed forces of Western democracies in general.

An exploration of these cases of strategy, politics and defense budgets – offered without the customary polemics and gored oxen of political fights about budgets – provides a point of departure for any reflection about best practices and the most efficacious means to surmount such issues today and tomorrow. This interpretation draws some tentative conclusions as to the character and essence of this issue in its context of democratic civil military relations and to do so in a way that might diverge from the norm of customary defense management and strategic studies.

The following introduces ideas of how to address austerity in defense in its essence, with an analysis that aspires to be empty of overheated rhetoric, polemics and propaganda that always surround the issue of the making of strategy and the evolution of defense and military institutions in times of scarcity.

2 Precedents

The civil-military record of the maritime democracies (the United Kingdom and the United States of America), whose strategic and political culture are intertwined in the foundation and character of NATO, suggests that the fight over money in peacetime and economic trial generally takes place as a *fight over strategy*. That is, while the core issue remains the share of national treasure in the underfunded and abused army or navy budget, this debate masquerades as strategic idealism of one form of strategy as superior to another – Hew Strachan's (1997: 119–162) point in his seminal *Politics of the British Army*. These fights loom central to democratic civil-military relations; they are ingrained in the collective memory of soldiers and defense organizations; they have a glorious past almost like decisive battles, and the past surely suggests that such a fight is at hand amid the strategic character of the present.

2.1 *Fundamentals, Constitutions and Geography*

In the first instance, these altercations arise from mixture of Anglo Saxon constitutions and geography within strategic culture. Here the interplay of checks and balances of the power of the purse in parliament with the supreme command of maritime powers (with land forces) erupt in crisis during epochs of budgetary scarcity. Such eruptions are called by partisans a failure of preparedness and a woeful neglect of national defense. The guilty in such legends and myths are usually makers of policy and sometimes colonel blimps in general staffs. This process deeply shapes the military profession and the collective memory that underlines military policy and doctrine.

This historical memory of austerity and the martyrdom of the military profession is often generalized in the U.S. forces as the legend of *Task Force Smith*, an outnumbered augmented battalion of the U.S. Army in June 1950, that was overwhelmed by the North Koreans in the first days of the Korean War (Flint 1986).¹

The sacrifice of this troop unit became the symbol of American negligence to arm properly in the Cold War and, in reality, is a canard about the defense budget under Harry Truman. Such rhetoric and myth making of lack of preparedness has been especially evident since 11 September 2001, but is much, much older. Such legend making as a tool in the mass persuasion about budgets in a democracy is a natural part of the soldier and austerity.

1 On the Truman administration, defense policy and war, see Leffler (1992); Hogan (1998).

2.2 *The 19th Century*

This phenomenon of soldiers betrayed by politicians obsessed with thrift extends backward from 1950 well into the 19th century in both the U.S. and British forces. In the wake of the U.S. Civil War, the ‘dark ages’ of the U.S. Army, when it returned to its constabulary, that is, frontier police role in the Indian wars (1865–1890), the world economic boom that followed the railroads and industrialization collapsed into a depression that began in Vienna in 1873 and lasted more or less for two decades. The president and the Congress embraced the pacifism of the business community and stripped the army of its order of battle. Those who had enjoyed flag rank in the war were reduced to their permanent company grade ranks with little prospect of promotion. For much of the year 1877, the U.S. Army received no pay at all, and its handful of officers in frontier garrisons was reduced to living on loans (Weigley 1983: 271). This humiliation infected the military writings of this generation of officers, who formed the vanguard of the modern American professional soldier and American military thought in the 20th century. Outstanding was Emory Upton, whose brilliance as a soldier was matched by his energy as a scholar (Weigley 1962: 100–126; Upton 1968). His experience of war time command, juxtaposed to peacetime austerity and limited horizons on the closing U.S. frontier, imagined that the U.S. Army should duplicate the general staff and order of battle of the recently victorious German army, despite the fact that the U.S. in the early 1880s faced no strategic situation similar to that of Germany. Upton’s writings from his era imparted to his and following generations this resentment of starvation budget and thrift as civilian mismanagement of armies inherent in parliaments, which he saw as inferior to general staffs.

In the late 19th century, the problem of austerity and strategy emerged on a global scale for the British in the climatic epoch of imperialism, navalism and militarism of the 1880s and the 1890s in the form of over extension amid rising challengers on the imperial stage. The Union Jack spread in Africa and Asia in the face of French and Russian competition without anything like the defense programming, planning and budgeting system of the 1960s and later decades with which we are well familiar. Nonetheless, these imperial forays received ample scrutiny from parliament and the public as to their excessive cost and usefulness as national interest. The result was that soldiers and sailors on distant service in turn felt betrayed at home. Despite the relative wealth of Britain (which was under pressure from the German Reich and the U.S.), these fights about treasure and conquest were simultaneously struggles about maritime strategy versus land forces (Strachan 1997: 63ff.; Hamer 1970). These struggles about the cost of empire unfolded amid the periods of

financial chaos that took place from the 1870s until 1890s, and again in the first decade of the new century. The over commitment to worldwide positions placed a further drain on budgets in the UK as the naval build up raced with its stratospheric costs and fear of loss of naval supremacy prior to the world war.

2.3 *The Interwar Years, Austerity and Strategy*

Austerity in its more extreme form became the dominant experience of the post-1919 epoch in both the U.S. and the UK, where the ill effects of total war repulsed the electorates. Policy in both nations restricted the strength of armed forces amid the rapid technological change of strategy and operations. A generalized pacifism and faith in a liberal world order ushered in a new, even darker, dark age for soldiers and budgets than in the generation from 1870 until 1900 (Strachan 1997: 144–162; Kennedy 1983: 87–108). This austerity led to fights about such budgets as strategy in the air and at sea. In the Royal Navy, for instance, the guideline for strategic planning in the 1920s was the infamous Ten Year Rule, in which, in addition to the collective security clauses of the Covenant of the League as well as the arms limitations of the Washington Naval Treaty, to say nothing of the various liberal pacts that had outlawed war altogether, construction of new ships was halted or curtailed amid a public disgust with war. This phenomenon of austerity and arms was made worse by the enduring problems in the international economy by weight of the peace (reparations) especially for the British. The collapse of the boom into depression in 1929 then poisoned relations among the victors as well as encouraged the defeated of 1918 to rearm.

This new dark age of austerity and military professionalism and the making of strategy in the U.S. were especially bleak in the U.S. Army and its air corps in the 1920s. This fight about the budget was an existential fight about the efficacy of aviation as the decisive form of strategy, and mechanization generally. In the case of armor in the U.S. Army in the 1920s and 1930s, where parochialism and strategic blindness led into a dead end of motorization and operational forces much in contrast to the Germans and the Soviets. The penury of the budget on the national level in the Republican era of the 1920s was matched by the blinkered conservatism of senior military leaders who did a great deal to extinguish necessary adaptation of air and mechanized forces to the altered face of war.

Noteworthy in this instance is Billy Mitchell as the martyr of air power, a military personality whose skillful use of mass persuasion to politicize soldiers in league with the press and public opinion (Mitchell 1925; Sherry 1987). Austerity and sparse budgets led to the creation of military personali-

ties in political culture in the era of total war who acted as propagandists for their particular strategic ideal within democratic civil military relations. Not without merit is the case of the first German Republic, where austerity linked with the deliberate national evasion of the Versailles Treaty caused both a radicalization of younger soldiers as well as a noteworthy institutional impetus to doctrinal innovation in the shadow of defeat. One might generalize from the interwar experience that such austerity can well be the parent of military innovation, but such an insight stands subordinate the truth that austerity politicizes further soldiers and enflames strategic fights in state and society. Such was the case in the wake of the Second World War.

2.4 *Cold War and Post-Cold War: Continuities*

The problems of austerity and strategy of the interwar period reemerged in the U.S. and the UK in a new and more intense form in the pivotal years after 1945. One makes an error to overlook this process whereby the cold war became a feature in the military posture of the Western democracies in the era 1946–1950 (and in which NATO was born), in which the leading allies stood burdened with the debt of the recent war as well as the imperative to rebuild under the Marshall Plan in 1947. A ceiling on U.S. defense spending prior to June 1950 as well as the need by the British to wrap up their empire while bearing the encumbrances of the Cold War meant a new era of austerity reigned, even as the atomic age propelled further change in the character and size of armed forces. Nuclear weapons appeared to strategists and treasurers as the cheaper, more efficient mode of weapon, but austerity meant no consensus about the posture of forces to use them. The demobilization austerities of the Truman presidency witnessed the creation of the Defense Department and the unification of the armed services as a lesson of Pearl Harbor, which was, in fact, scarcely a unification at all. The reform joined with the unfolding of the atomic era unleashed a bitter fight among the brass and their civilian partisans over the atomic role of general-purpose forces within an austere budget in the years 1947 through 1950. This epoch is essentially forgotten or unknown today, but its legacy endures as it was repeated in turn later in the 1950s, in the 1970s and again in the 1990s.

The political fight in the creation of the Defense Department in 1947 as a rationalization, efficiency, and revolution in management caused an open breach between the Department of the Navy and the Truman administration in 1949 in a fight over the B-36 bomber and the cancellation of the heavy aircraft carrier. At the same time, the Washington Treaty as the basis of the Atlantic alliance emerged not the least out of the need to pool and share armed forces under the heading of mutual aid and self-help for collective

defense. The authors of the treaty were led by the insight that no single nation alone could defend itself without such mutual aid in order to avoid national bankruptcy in the age of nuclear war. The creation of the Organization in NATO under Articles III, IV, V, and IX of the treaty in the years 1949–1954 was guided by the principle of thrift and the equitable sharing of the burden under Article III in which strictures of economy and savings reigned uppermost even in the attempt to create a NATO battle line for forward collective defense. The Korean War in June 1950 led to a temporary loosening of U.S. defense budgets, as well as the Lisbon force goals by NATO, made however moot by the end of the war in 1953 and the advent of tactical nuclear weapons as well as the thermonuclear bomb. These weapons appeared to render most cost-and-benefit analyses of policy, war and alliance orders of battle to be obsolete and add energy to the ongoing fight about strategy and treasure.

Such a determinant of policy was powerful in the British armed forces of the latter half of the 1950s, especially after the Suez debacle in 1956. The retreat from imperial garrisons amid conflict, which early on, in the face of the weakness of the British economy, led the UK to cut back its forces and to emphasize nuclear striking power even before this idea became central to U.S. statecraft and defense budgets in the New Look of 1953/1954 in the Dwight Eisenhower presidency (Snyder 1962; Freedman 1989: 76–90). The New Look era of austerity, retrenchment and massive retaliation with thermonuclear weapons arose from Eisenhower's determination to avoid profligacy in the face of the unending cold war. The new policy downgraded the army and gave rise to the same inter-service fights as a decade before. Such episodes as the bomber gap and, after Sputnik in 1957, the missile gap showed again with new ferocity that budget fights manifest themselves as strategy conflicts in civil-military relations. The missile gap saw propagandists and mass persuaders in the U.S. Army, the Democratic Party, and the defense industry make Eisenhower's second term into a nightmare of budgets, strategy, topped off by a recession in 1958 and the crisis over Berlin.

The dictates of thrift and an enduring weak economy in Britain in the era from the 1950s until the 1970s meant in the 1960s that even further defense cuts were made one cabinet after the other (Baylis 1989; Grove 1987; Neustadt 1999). Noteworthy here was the east of Suez withdrawal begun under the Labor government in the late 1960s, in which garrison after garrison from Hong Kong to the Persian Gulf were rolled up in a process of more or less unilateral cuts that led to bitter disputes between the services in Britain. Beginning with the Duncan Sandys White Paper of 1957, in the wake of the Suez debacle the year prior, in which conscription was abandoned, and the size of conventional forces cut back, the years until the early 1970s saw the cancellation of strategic weapons (Bluestreak IRBM); the crisis with the U.S.

over McNamara's cancellation of the *Skybolt* cruise missile that endangered the force of V bombers; the cancellation of a second generation tactical bomber (TSR-2) and the scrapping of existing blue water aircraft carriers and the refusal to build new ones. The decision in the late 1960s to focus more or less on the NATO role spelt the end of the British forces as a global force, with the culminating point of the Falklands War in 1982 to underscore the extraordinary shrinkage of British forces in the two decades prior.

While the U.S. forces waged war in Indo-China in the era 1964–1975, this Asia First strategy led to a neglect of U.S. commands committed to NATO, which had been downgraded and subjected to a preemptive austerity even in wartime that then became generalized on a worldwide basis after 1975. The latter half of the 1970s witnessed how U.S. forces became holloed out in the retrenchment after the U.S. debacle in Indo-China, and the advent of stagflation connected with the two oil crises of the 1970s (Bacevich 2005: 34–68; Bailey 2009). This problem particularly affected U. S. conventional and naval forces at a time in which the face of combat changed in the 1973 Middle Eastern war, the order of battle of the Warsaw Pact grew rapidly and much of the vessels of the U.S. Navy built in the Second World War came to the end of their operational lives. Also in this era of austerity of the later half of the 1970s, NATO undertook fitfully to increase defense spending (3% goal), as well as to rearm with new nuclear weapons (neutron bomb, and *Intermediate Nuclear Forces*) that provoked something other than orderly consensus among the allies, as the Cold War reappeared after 1979.

The austerity of the 1970s reemerged in the era after 1989 as the peace dividend, the entirely normal political expectation that the end of the cold war meant that defense budgets would return to a 'peacetime level'. This hope collided with the revival of war in the international system and the problems of reducing the U.S. forces despite enduring worldwide commitments. The decade of the 1990s, which began in a recession connected with the 1990/1991 Gulf War, was a time of relative austerity, and it, too, saw fights within the U.S. government and defense department over the shape of budget, strategy, and alliance statecraft in the years leading up to 11 September 2001, the end of this chronicle. The economic straits of the late 1970s and the early 1990s made the fights over budgets-as-strategy more intense, and more tangled again in the rhetoric of strategic idealism. Seen from today's nadir of treasure and policy, the problems of money and strategy of these now distant epochs frankly pale in comparison to the present economic situation with its similarities to the 1930s.

3 Legacy of Austerity as Source of Strategic Discord

As a preliminary conclusion, the legacies, traditions, legends and myths of austerity as a weapon in democratic civil-military relations require those who will grapple with this phenomenon to consider the following:

- (1) Austerity has been a constant feature of the lives of cabinets, treasuries and general staffs – especially in the leading NATO nations – for a very long time in their democratic civil-military relations. It is hardly the exception, but more the norm. Such austerity often stands at the foundation of military doctrine, which, in turn, forms a vital part of the making of strategy often in a negative sense. The altercation that surrounds us in the years to come of scarcity and the formulation of strategy has this rich tradition. But this tradition is a conflicted one, to be sure, for what the parliamentarian and the treasurer see as economy, the soldier sees as austerity and a breach of civil-military faith in the preference for butter over guns.
- (2) The maker of policy must be able to extract myth and legend from conflicts over strategy that are, in fact, fights over budget. The latter are natural, normal and necessary features of form of government in the elite-mass relations in war and peace. Fights over strategy in epochs of austerity are linked to domestic politics, to the tradition of the state, and to the mechanisms of mass persuasion in formation of strategy. They are further linked to the ideals of military professionalism and citizenship as we have seen these since the late 19th century. The biographies of such figures as Duncan Sandys, Robert McNamara or Donald Rumsfeld embody a warning as to the imperative to de-mystify myth and legend of arms and austerity. The factors of military honor, esprit de corps, the timeless principles of war as well as partisan politics signify normal features of these fights. There exists no technocratic, technological, or otherwise magical management process to extract, that is, politically neutralize or depoliticize – in the sense of Carl Schmitt – a single piece of the triad of strategy, politics, and defense budgets. This issue cannot easily be made neutral through some management science artifice or rationalization of defense structure borrowed from multinational corporations or the most recent fad in schools of business. For instance, the mixed fortune of the Revolution in Military Affairs of the Donald Rumsfeld epoch suggests the truth of this generalization. The case of Eisenhower's New Look in its time is but another, earlier example of this dilemma.
- (3) As a result of the above, those charged in defense ministries, general staffs and elsewhere with leadership in this question are enjoined to understand this dynamic of money and politics in its essence and character

within the history, tradition, and character of military and civilian institutions. One must be master, and not its slave. Such an injunction especially applies in the maelstrom of mass persuasion that usually attends these strategy/budget fights. The practices and habits of healthy democratic civil-military relations, as NATO allies have long advocated in these more than two decades, represent a fundamental for the successful formulation of policy and strategy in the face of diminished treasure.

4 Conclusions: Smart Defense, Austerity, the Need for Statecraft, Policy and Strategy

This article has tried to identify the best practices in the making of policy and strategy and their realization in the face of severe economic and political weakness. Its main goal has been to underscore realism in the making of strategy, without a retreat into fantasy, illusion and buzzwords. The latter has become a more or less constant feature of the making of strategy of the last 20 years, as if an army or a military campaign, in reality, is nothing more than a revamped product from a multinational corporation or an application for a smart phone. The central point has been the making of strategy in an era of austerity has its own metaphysics, its own culture, and its own magic. The comments and insights are guided by Clausewitz as to how we might think about this problem in its historical-political dimension, that is, in its most fundamental and efficacious way.

Smart Defense as outlined by the NATO Secretary General at the Chicago Summit this year plainly indicates the way ahead in the face of diminished treasure and the need to employ mutual aid and self-help for the ends of the Alliance. The willy-nilly renationalization of defense without consideration given to the impact on the whole is a familiar problem in NATO, and has existed in one form or the other since 1949. The obvious task ahead is to forestall a panicked and disjointed renationalization of defense at the same time that the international system of states lurches around in crisis of its fundamentals of state, economy and society.

The pooling and sharing of security, defense, military forces and weapons symbolizes a plainly urgent and eminently sensible policy. It is the only real way for the future. But this ideal cannot be sold to a skeptical public as a neutralization or detoxification of domestic politics and strategy. NATO undertook to achieve these ends of mutual aid and self-help for collective defense in its formative years, and has pushed intermittently in its more than 60 years of history. However such a noteworthy and laudable initiative as Smart Defense will cleave more or less to the dynamics of strategy, politics,

and defense budgets as outlined above (without making pretense of seeing the future as an oracle).

These policy imperatives of efficiency and economy in order to generate strength collided then as they do now with civil-military phenomena that will hardly vanish, and, if anything are intensifying in an alarming way. The sources of friction in the political and economic realm are obvious: The mixed fortunes of multinational and supranational institutions and cooperation in a time of crisis, the revival of nationalism, populism amid the fatigue of the European ideal, the putative U.S. shift of strategy to Asia (despite the bond to Europe as the basis of world power) and potential for mischief in the process of demobilization of forces and combat veterans and the proliferation of threats and security issues. The size of armed forces will shrink under the reign of the new triad of Special Forces, drones and computer warfare, a subject I shall not explore. The capacity to mount customary military operations of various kinds will diminish in a way that is alarming and quite dangerous, since the need for such operations will scarcely disappear even if fatigue with Iraq and Afghanistan is powerful today. The pace of strategic change in connection with new forms of strategy and weapons as they have emerged from the past decade and more of conflict might offer the prospect of more bang for the buck, but such forces and weapons will likely be inappropriate for a further crisis that will unfold six months or three years from now that will make nonsense out of strategic doctrine that looks forward by looking backward.

These dangers of disintegration in the face of austerity and the making of strategy should make the Western nations redouble their efforts to treat the matters at hand for the questions of war and peace, of life and death that they always have been and will remain. Another crisis will emerge presently, or is already here and has yet to become a defense and military problem. Such a crisis will challenge NATO as has happened with regularity in the past. As a point of departure, an understanding of the essential elements and dynamics of past episodes likely provides a better tool for policy than some management school fad or manifestation of mass persuasion in the 21st century ignorant of the truths of governments and arms. The chronicle offered here teaches no lessons to the present and the future in the form of timeless verities, but should equip the virtues of judgment, character and intellect in those who bear the burden of responsibility in war and peace and must do so with less treasure and forces than has been done in the recent past.

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Factual Knowledge and Public Support for German Military Operations: The Case of the German ISAF Mission in Afghanistan

Rüdiger Fiebig

1 The Germans and their Armed Forces

Ever since the German Bundeswehr was formed, the relationship between the German population and its armed forces has been very complex. Starting back in the days of the debates about German rearmament, Germany has developed a peculiar attitude towards the Bundeswehr and its tasks, which is distinctly different from the civil-military relationship prevailing in other Western states (cf. Rattinger 1985; Bulmahn et al. 2008; Biehl/Fiebig 2011). What started in 1990 with a stronger German contribution to international military operations and got the German Bundeswehr, as part of the ISAF mission, involved in a complex counterinsurgency operation claiming – for the first time ever – the lives of Bundeswehr personnel in combat, has stirred up both the public and political debate on the identity of the Bundeswehr and the adequate attitude of the Germans towards their armed forces and their soldiers serving on operations abroad. This attitude has come to be described as “cordial indifference” (*freundliches Desinteresse*), a term coined in 2007 by the then Federal President, Horst Köhler. The term tried to melt the two seemingly contradictory opinions taken by the German population towards its armed forces. On the one hand, the German people’s relationship with the armed forces has been characterized for years by a stable favorable general attitude towards the Bundeswehr and a high level of trust. On the other hand, the Germans’ interest for their armed forces has stagnated, as has their knowledge about security and defense policy issues (cf. Fiebig/Pietsch 2009). Due to the lack of factual knowledge, the potential impact of media coverage on the populations’ attitudes could increase, and with often negative news coverage on the Bundeswehr, this could contribute to a further erosion of the public’s acceptance of the missions.

Since the emergence of the concept of cordial indifference, the Germans’ relationship with the Bundeswehr has become a subject of even more intense discussion. In Afghanistan, the Bundeswehr has seen itself confronted with its most difficult mission yet. Since 2008, the security situation within the ISAF Regional Command North, which is under German command, has markedly deteriorated and the nature of the mission has been turning from a ‘stabilization mission’ into a ‘counterinsurgency’ operation. More and more, success is also expressed in territorial gains vis-à-vis the insurgents, which

actually is a striking novelty for the Federal Republic of Germany and the Bundeswehr.

As the character of the mission became increasingly military, the public's approval of the German participation in the ISAF mission fell. Between 2008 and 2010, the support steadily decreased. This tendency was amplified further by the fatal air strike on two fuel tankers near Kunduz in September 2009, which was carried out on German orders and in which numerous civilians lost their lives. In view of the soaring level of mission intensity, the German population's approval of the mission dwindled. This phenomenon went hand in hand with an increasingly sceptical assessment among the population as to the mission's chances of success. Although the basic attitude of the Germans towards their armed forces remained steadily positive throughout this whole period, the most important Bundeswehr mission abroad was not only put into question by the population, but, for the first time, outright rejected by a majority. Against this backdrop, the following issues and questions suggest themselves for discussion in this paper:

- In a first step, a descriptive review will be carried out on the German population's knowledge about the ISAF mission as well as the Germans' support for it, on the basis of current survey data.
- In a second step, the connection between the population's state of knowledge, the perception of the mission as a success and the approval or rejection of the mission will be examined in further detail. In this context, special focus will be on the following questions: What impact do different kinds of media use have? Which factors have the most important influence on the population? Which parameters can be identified as determinants for either approval or rejection of the mission?

The analysis will be based on the results of the public opinion surveys which have been conducted annually since 1996 by the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences (Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, SOWI) on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Defense. Thematic priorities of the surveys are the population's position on security and defense policy, its attitudes towards the Bundeswehr, its opinions on Bundeswehr missions abroad as well as the public's opinions on conscription and the Bundeswehr as an employer. The sample of the surveys is composed of all German-speaking citizens of 16 years of age or older. The Public Opinion Survey of 2010 was carried out in October and November 2010 in two modules – face-to-face interviews (CAPI) and a telephone survey (CATI). In total, 3,000 citizens were questioned.

2 An Empirical Investigation of Security Policy Attitudes: The State of the Art

Public opinion on political issues (in the sense of specific political attitudes) is hard to grasp empirically as political attitudes by definition are not simple views on topical political issues, but rather need to rest upon a certain foundation. Attitudes have an affective, a cognitive and an action-oriented component. In order to be able to trigger action of different grades of intensity, the first two components must be developed to a sufficient extent. The affective and cognitive component may, for instance, be developed by dealing with a certain topic in more depth or also via media reception (cf. Allport 1935; Converse 1964). As, in principle, the interest of the general public in political issues is generally limited, the mass media play a pivotal role in the shaping of political attitudes. “The question as to whether citizens are able to acquire knowledge about political structures, political players, essential political issues as well as the understanding of the contexts necessary to form an opinion, to cognitively underpin their political preferences and thus to take informed decisions depends not least on the quality of the [mass media’s] coverage.” (Maier 2009: 393, my translation)

When it comes to political attitudes on foreign policy and security policy issues, this dependency is even more marked, for most people rarely can relate to these topics at a personal level. In contrast to, for example, welfare and education policy issues, for the majority of the population, foreign and security policy-related questions are at the periphery of both attention and interest. In this context, it must be understood that measuring the individual interest of people in foreign and security policy as an indicator of well-founded political attitudes on these topics is problematic, because this does not necessarily reflect the actual degree of political involvement. “[I]t must be remembered that experience shows that people will claim interest in anything, unless they are forced to set priorities – just as any political problem is at least ‘important’ to many people” (Rattinger 1985: 114). When looking for an indicator which allows inferences on actual political involvement, it is therefore more useful to ask questions relating to fact-based knowledge on certain topics. This approach has already been widely employed in research on political knowledge (cf. Maier 2009). As a consequence, for further analysis, the question arises if the population is at all capable of forming substantiated and consistent attitudes on security and defense policy issues like the ISAF mission. Over the course of its history, research on political attitudes has found very different answers to this question.

In the 1950s in the U.S., for instance, the prevailing opinion was that statements made by the public on foreign and security policy-related topics

be classified as ‘non-attitudes’ at best, on the grounds that these statements were – due to a lack of both interest in and knowledge of the underlying issues – inconsistent, volatile and therefore irrelevant for the formation of political will (cf. Almond 1950). From the 1980s onwards, in research, this so-called ‘Almond-Lippman-Consensus’ (cf. Rattinger 2007) was increasingly replaced by the assumption of a ‘Rational Public’, originally by Page & Shapiro (1992). They found out that the foreign and security policy attitudes in the U.S., at least on the aggregate level, were characterized by high stability and consistency. Changes in public opinion could be plausibly explained by specific events in foreign policy (e.g. the Vietnam War).

Since 1980, the structures of attitudes towards foreign policy at the individual level moved into focus. Of particular importance here was the realization that attitudes towards foreign and security policy are placed along different underlying dimensions, which, for example, can be described as the fundamental position on a more military or more pacifist foreign policy, that is, a multilateral or unilateral style of politics (cf. Wittkopf 1990; Ziegler 1987). Hurwitz & Peffley (1987) put forth the theory that attitudes towards foreign and security political issues are of a strictly hierarchical structure, that specific positions, for example, on military missions are hence based on certain fundamental beliefs and core values. Thus a specific position on a certain military mission can be ascribed to a person’s pacifistic or more militaristic stance.

Different approaches have been pursued in the research on political attitudes to define the determining elements that shape attitudes towards security policy matters. During the time of the Almond-Lippman consensus, stable attitudes such as party affinity, core values or social variables played a major role. Cognitive mobilization, that is, the capability of transferring political events and developments from the abstract to the individual level, has also been cited as an element in the formation of foreign policy attitudes (cf. Janssen 1996). In recent years, indicators of an increasingly more specific nature such as the awareness of military losses (‘casualty awareness’) and of success or failure of the mission have gained dominance (see Kümmel/Leonhard 2005). Trust in the military as a public institution is given as a determining element for the support of military missions abroad (cf. Bulmahn et al. 2011). Taken together, the different research approaches suggest that in Germany, attitudes towards the participation of the Bundeswehr in the ISAF mission are also rooted in a complex interplay of interest, knowledge, use of the media and acceptance. The following analysis should help explain these contexts and identify the elements determining the level of knowledge about the ISAF mission and its approval among the German public.

3 What the German Population Really Knows about the ISAF Mission

Table 1: Level of Awareness of Selected Bundeswehr Missions Abroad

Question: "Have you ever heard or read about the following Bundeswehr missions abroad?" (Figures given in percent)				
	Strong interest in the mission, know all essential facts	Have heard about the mission, know some facts	Have heard or read about the mission, but know nothing concrete	Never heard or read about the mission
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF)	8	49	40	3
Anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia (ATALANTA)	6	32	44	18
NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR)	4	33	54	9
Peacekeeping force of the European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR)	4	30	52	14
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	3	16	46	35

Data Base: Public Opinion Survey by the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences conducted in 2010.

Many Germans state that they know little about the current Bundeswehr missions abroad. Their self-reported level of knowledge is between 19 percent – those who know some or all relevant facts about the UNIFIL mission – and 57 percent – those with the same knowledge about the ISAF mission. This shows that the attention given by the media to the ISAF mission markedly influences how much the public knows about this subject. The other Bundeswehr missions clearly fall behind the figures stated above. It should be noted, however, that the majority of Germans say that they know very little about the Bundeswehr missions abroad; many have never heard about some of the missions.

Table 2: Questions Concerning the Knowledge about the Mission in Afghanistan
(in percent)

	Correct answer	Wrong answer	Don't know/no response
1. Here you see a map of the world. Where approximately is Afghanistan located?	29 (Pointed to location on the map)*	55	17
2. Where is the Bundeswehr deployed in Afghanistan?	55 (In the north/Kabul)*	10	35
3. Approximately how many Bundeswehr soldiers are on deployment in Afghanistan?	20 (4,000–5,000)*	40	40
4. Since when has the Bundeswehr been on deployment in Afghanistan?	18 (2001/2002)*	52	30
5. Which international organization is in command of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan?	26 (NATO)*	25	49
6. Which country has the most soldiers deployed in Afghanistan?	70 (USA)*	6	24
7. How many Bundeswehr soldiers have to date been killed in action in Afghanistan?	11 (20–30)*	56	33


Note: *The figures in brackets represent the correct answers in the survey.
Data Base: Public Opinion Survey by the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences conducted in 2010.

To measure the actual level of knowledge about the ISAF mission beyond mere self-perception, those surveyed were asked seven questions about the ISAF mission in Afghanistan in the form of a test covering geographic, political and military aspects of the mission. The questions asked were open questions, and correct answers could therefore not have been coincidental. Table 2 shows the shares of correct answers in relation to the respective knowledge questions.

The question which nation has deployed the most troops in Afghanistan also received the most correct answers. 70 percent of those surveyed named the U.S. More than half of those surveyed (55%) know that the Bundeswehr is deployed in the northern area of Afghanistan and, in part, in the capital Kabul. Less than one third of those surveyed, however, is capable of correctly locating Afghanistan on a blank political map of the world. 55 percent pointed to the wrong country, of which around 20 percent pointed out at least

a country bordering on Afghanistan. Still fewer of those surveyed gave correct answers to the other questions.

Figure 1: Percentage of Respondents Who Answered a Certain Number of Knowledge Questions Correctly



Data Base: Public Opinion Survey by the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences conducted in 2010.

To illustrate the knowledge distribution across all subgroups of the public, an index was compiled from the number of correctly answered knowledge questions. Figure 1 shows that the share of those surveyed, who answered a certain number of knowledge questions correctly, is not distributed evenly, instead it is clearly shifted to the left. Nearly 60 percent of those surveyed were able to answer only two of the knowledge questions correctly, 18 percent answered none of the questions correctly. Fewer than 25 percent of those surveyed answered more than four questions correctly. None of those surveyed was able to answer all seven questions correctly.

To allow for further analysis, the index used was condensed to four levels, so as to indicate extensive, average, little or non-existing knowledge about the ISAF mission. Table 3 shows the distribution of knowledge across several socio-cultural subgroups. The knowledge displayed by men is markedly higher than that displayed by women: 25 percent of women cannot answer correctly any of the knowledge questions concerning the mission in Afghanistan, while the figure is 10 percent for men. Those surveyed in the 17 to 29 age group, too, have relatively little knowledge about the mission in Afghanistan: 24 percent of this group are not capable of answering any of the questions. Knowledge about the mission increases in the higher age groups and decreases again among the elderly, with those surveyed in the 70-plus age group showing a level of knowledge similar to that of the youngest surveyed.

Both the level of education and the income of those surveyed are clearly linked to the level of knowledge about the missions. 25 percent of those surveyed with a secondary school education at the most are not capable of answering any of the questions concerning the missions, while the figure is only eight percent among those with university entrance qualification. There is also a similar link as regards the income of those surveyed: 25 percent of those surveyed with a low income are not capable of correctly answering the questions concerning the mission, while the figure of those surveyed from the group of high earners with a monthly net income of more than EUR 3.000 is only eight percent.

Table 3: Knowledge Index Based on Subgroups

Condensed knowledge index based on subgroups ¹ (in percent)				
	0	1	2	3
Total	18	41	31	10
Gender***				
Male	10	37	37	15
Female	25		26	6
Age**				
Between 16 and 29 years	24	42	25	9
Between 30 and 49 years	15	45	29	11
Between 50 and 69 years	14	37	36	12
70 years and older	22	38	35	5
Educational background***				
University or technical college entrance qualification	8	35	43	14
Intermediate secondary school education	16	44	31	9
Secondary school education or no school leaving certificate	25	41	25	9
Monthly net income***				
EUR 3.000 and higher	8	34	44	14
Between EUR 1.500 and below EUR 3.000	15	42	30	13
Below EUR 1.500	25	45	24	6
Political party preference**				
Christian Democrat Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU)	13	36	36	16
German Social Democratic Party (SPD)	17	37	36	9
Free Democratic Party (FDP)	17	41	31	12
Alliance 90/The Greens	10	47	32	12
The Left	8	48	33	12

Condensed knowledge index based on subgroups ¹ (in percent) (continued)				
	0	1	2	3
Region*				
Northern Germany (Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Bremen, Lower Saxony)	18	34	37	11
East Germany (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Brandenburg, Berlin, Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony, Thuringia)	15	45	32	9
Southern Germany (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria)	19	41	33	7
West Germany (North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Hesse, Saarland)	18	41	25	15
Support of the Bundeswehr ISAF mission				
Fully approve/largely approve	11	35	35	19
Rather approve	18	42	30	10
Rather oppose	17	43	32	7
Fully oppose/largely oppose	15	45	32	8

Note: 1) Condensed knowledge index 0 = no question answered correctly; 1 = 1 to 2 questions; 2 = 3 to 4 questions; 3 = 5 to 6 questions; *: significance $\leq .05$, **: significance $\leq .01$; ***: significance (Chi square) = .000.

Data Base: Public Opinion Survey by the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences conducted in 2010.

Knowledge about the mission in Afghanistan also varies distinctly at the regional, that is, at the Federal State level. Those surveyed in northern and southern Germany know the most about ISAF, while the knowledge of those from the Western and Eastern Federal States is below average. Party preference is also linked to the level of knowledge. Those surveyed whose preference is with the CDU/CSU are capable of answering an above-average number of questions; the average results for the supporters of the other parties are close to those of the general public.

Table 4: Perceived and Actual Level of Knowledge

Actual knowledge after personal self-assessment (in percent)				
	0	1	2	3
Never heard or read about the mission	29	47	19	5
Have heard or read about the mission, but know nothing concrete	29	48	20	3
Have heard about the mission, know some facts	10	38	38	15
Interested in the mission, know all essential facts	1	23	56	20

Note: Condensed knowledge index 0 = no question answered correctly; 1 = 1 to 2 questions; 2 = 3 to 4 questions; 3 = 5 to 6 questions.

Data Base: Public Opinion Survey by the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences conducted in 2010.

Finally, clarification is needed as to whether the actual knowledge of those surveyed is linked to how they assess their own knowledge, that is, if those surveyed who indicated to know all relevant facts about the mission, do actually know them. Table 4 shows those surveyed listed in the order of personally perceived knowledge and their share in the respective actual knowledge index. This clearly shows that the self-assessment largely approximates the actual knowledge, but also that many of those surveyed overestimate their knowledge or exaggerate it in tune with social desirability. Ten percent of those surveyed who profess that they know some facts about the mission, are not capable of answering any of the actual knowledge questions. Only 20 percent of those who believe they know all essential facts about the mission also reach a relatively high level with their answers to the factual knowledge questions about ISAF. This confirms that interest in or continued perception of a particular issue with a perceived high level of knowledge is not necessarily an indication of actual knowledge among the public.

4 Support for the Bundeswehr's ISAF Mission

Table 5: Attitude of the General Public towards Bundeswehr Missions Abroad

Item: "Please tell me if you approve of a participation of the Bundeswehr in the following missions or if you disapprove of it." (Figures given in percent)							
Participation of the Bundeswehr in the ...	Completely approve	Predominantly approve	Somewhat approve	Somewhat disapprove	Mainly disapprove	Completely disapprove	Neither approve nor disapprove
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF)	6	14	24	25	11	15	5
Anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia (ATALANTA)	17	21	26	16	5	8	7
NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR)	8	21	32	17	6	9	7
EU peacekeeping force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR)	7	20	34	16	6	9	8
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	4	10	25	25	7	12	17

Data Base: Public Opinion Survey by the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences in 2010.

In late 2010, the majority of the German population disapproved of the Bundeswehr participating in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. 20 percent of the German general public completely or predominantly approved of the ISAF mission, 24 percent somewhat approved. A total of 51 percent disapproved of the mission in varying degrees. Therefore, the approval rate for ISAF is quite low compared to the other Bundeswehr missions. The anti-piracy operation ATALANTA in the Indian Ocean receives the highest level of approval, followed by the KFOR and EUFOR missions in the Balkans.

Table 6: Approval for Bundeswehr Missions Abroad, 2005–2010

Item: "Please tell me if you approve of a participation of the Bundeswehr in the following missions or if you disapprove of it." (Proportion of approval ¹ , figures given in percent)						
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF)	64	49	60	64	50	44
NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR)	75	62	70	70	66	61
EU peacekeeping force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR)	68	63	70	70	64	61

Note: Shares "completely agree", "mainly agree", "somewhat agree", aggregated.
 Data Base: Public Opinion Surveys by Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences 2005–2010.

In the past, approval among the German public with regard to the Bundeswehr ISAF mission was significantly higher. While the approval rate for the ISAF mission was at a solid 64 percent in 2005, the following year saw a considerable decline, which coincided with the publication by a German tabloid paper of photographs of Bundeswehr soldiers presenting skulls as trophies. This incident demonstrates how short-lived media events can potentially impact the general public opinion.

The remarkable decline of the approval rate from 2008 to 2009 is also partly attributable to the impact of short-lived media attention: In this case, the survey was conducted only a few weeks after the fatal airstrike in Kunduz in September 2009. The further decline of the approval rate in 2010, however, cannot be blamed on the effects of critical media coverage. Instead, it suggests that the broad acceptance for the ISAF mission is about to erode due to more complex causes. To find out what aspects played a role in this process, we will now conduct an analysis of the determinants for approval of the ISAF mission.

5 Determinants for Support of the ISAF Mission

Table 7: Approval of the Bundeswehr ISAF mission by subgroups

	Agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Disagree
Total				
Gender**				
Male	25	25	24	26
Female	18	25	28	29
Age***				
16 to 29	25	29	22	23
30 to 49	25	28	25	22
50 to 69	19	21	31	29
70 and up	12	21	25	42
Level of Education***				
Qualification for admission to universities or universities of applied sciences	26	26	24	24
Intermediate School-Leaving Certificate	22	25	28	25
Lower secondary school leaving certificate or no completion of secondary school	18	25	26	31
Net household income per month***				
More than 3.000 Euro	26	27	23	23
1.500 to 3.000 Euro	23	27	26	25
Less than 1.500 Euro	17	25	25	34
Party Inclination*				
CDU/CSU	28	29	26	18
SPD	24	28	27	21
FDP	30	25	27	18
Alliance 90/The Greens	20	31	23	26
The Left	14	18	29	40
Region				
North	23	28	24	25
East	19	24	25	32
West	20	22	28	29
South	23	28	27	23

Note: Figures given in percent. * Significance $\leq ,05$; ** Significance $\leq ,01$;


***: Significance (Chi Square) = ,000.

Data Base: Public Opinion Survey by the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences in 2010.

To analyze the potential causes for shrinking support, we will first take a closer look at the approval rate of individual subgroups. As Table 7 shows, some of these figures vary greatly. The data shows particularly clear links between the approval rate and age, formal education, income and party identification of the people surveyed. While 25 percent of those aged 50 and below approve of the mission, the age group 70 and higher strongly disapproves. Respondents who obtained a higher education tend to approve of the mission, just like those with relatively high incomes. This is not surprising from a public opinion research perspective, confirming that primarily young people, the better educated and the well-to-do are able to differentiate between their personal situation and the potential value of a commitment abroad, even if it does not affect them personally.

For further analysis of the determinants regarding approval for the Bundeswehr ISAF mission, we turned to multiple regression analysis, which allows us to relate the effects of individual aspects to one another and compare them. In this way, we are able to establish an approval model of the ISAF mission by taking multiple independent variables into account and comparing their effects.

Figure 2: Multiple Regression Analysis: Determinants of Approval Regarding the Bundeswehr ISAF Mission



Note: Figure shows the standardized Beta coefficients for significant relations. Non-significant relations are indicated with dotted arrows. Combined percentage of total variance explained in the model: corr. $R^2=0,488$.

As for the determinants regarding approval of and knowledge about the ISAF mission among the general public, multivariate regression analysis reveals a relatively clear picture: Knowledge about the ISAF mission largely depends on the use of media. However, different types of media also have different effects. While the use of local media, public broadcasting and nation-wide quality media have a significant impact on the degree of knowledge about ISAF (Beta = 0.230 or 0.215), this is not the case for tabloid media. The use of media, in turn, is heavily influenced by the formal level of education.

The public's approval of the ISAF mission largely depends on whether they perceive the mission as successful and whether they can see specific positive effects in certain areas as a result of the mission. The direct effect of the trust placed in the Bundeswehr as a public institution on the approval rate, which in the past was often cited as a central aspect for the support of Bundeswehr missions abroad, is negligible. Instead, trust that has already been well established, serves as a catalyst bringing out additional positive effects for perceiving a deployment mission as successful. There are only limited linear connections between knowledge about the ISAF mission and its approval rate. Therefore, a solid level of understanding does not always lead to a broader acceptance of the mission. On the contrary, the negative aspects of the mission may be revealed more clearly.

6 Foreign Military Engagement: Not an End in Itself

Support for the Bundeswehr ISAF mission among the general public has significantly declined in the past years. Only a small minority currently advocates that Germany should continue its military commitment in Afghanistan. Despite the fact that the ISAF mission is not of primary interest to the German public and therefore detailed knowledge about the mission is limited, general acceptance of ISAF is not based on a 'gut feeling', but on plausible and rational considerations. The analysis has shown that the general public approves (or disapproves) of the mission, depending on the perceived chances of success. In this context, trust in the armed forces does not manifest itself through approval based on 'blind faith'. Instead, it is made subject to the likelihood of a successful outcome of the mission. This means that the German public evaluates the missions of their armed forces in accordance with sober and rational considerations. Moreover – despite the 'cordial indifference' they are often accused of – they see themselves as perfectly capable of assessing the mission's chances for success.

The media is a key player in forming public opinion on the ISAF mission: They are decisively involved in shaping the public understanding of the mission. Although the use of media does not have a measurable linear effect

on the approval rate for the ISAF mission, it can be assumed that knowledge about the mission – both positive and negative – does have an impact on the perception of the mission as successful or not.

In general, the public focuses on the successful outcome of a mission and its positive effects. Thus, the seemingly ‘cordial indifference’ of interest displayed by the general public in Germany must not conceal the fact that the Germans have legitimate reason to approve or disapprove of the ISAF mission. They do not see the mission as an end itself. Instead, the mission must produce clear and tangible results in order to enjoy the support by the general public. Hence, it does not suffice to call for sympathy, concern and support for Bundeswehr missions abroad among the general public. Politicians are well advised to communicate the concrete outcome of military missions abroad to maintain a certain level of general acceptance.

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The Future of Liberal Interventionism in UK Foreign Policy

Tim Oliver

1 Introduction

The end of Tony Blair's premiership in 2007 might have been expected to herald the end of a strongly liberal interventionist phase in British foreign policy. Blair had come to be defined by a foreign policy that showed a willingness to back military intervention to prevent human rights violations inside a sovereign member state of the United Nations. While his approach was never universally popular, some of the earlier interventions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and initially Afghanistan did command a strong degree of public and political support. This was not to last. Failings in British military capabilities, the mounting cost of operations and continuing problems in places such as Kosovo and the drawn-out conflict in Afghanistan played their parts. But it was the Iraq War of 2003 that seemed to signal a reappraisal of Britain's interventionist tendencies. Whilst arguments for liberal intervention had not been to the fore in justifying the Iraq War the disaster that unfolded damaged Blair's and Britain's foreign policy reputations, in turn badly tainting the idea of liberal intervention. It might have been expected then that Iraq would herald a reversal in British approaches to liberal intervention. Instead, as this chapter argues, liberal intervention is now a more accepted part of British foreign policy debates than before Blair arrived. This chapter draws on the ideas of Jason Ralph (2012) that Blair continued a shift in British political debate on liberal intervention that led all three of the UK's main political parties to a position where today they are more willing to sanction liberal intervention than they were before. While authorization from the United Nations Security Council is still required, this need not be a 'restrictionist' unequivocal authorization considered necessary in the 1990s to handle the situation in the former Yugoslavia. Instead, as Ralph has argued, British politicians have shown a willingness to use 'implicit' or 'revived' authority in UN resolutions to justify the use of force, most recently in the intervention in Libya.

Britain's political leadership is today then more accepting of the idea that military force should be used for liberal ends and that this can be authorized without clear UN authorization. However, the ability of the UK to project military power has been limited by cuts to the armed forces, wider austerity measures reigning in state spending, a series of military failings tarnishing the reputation of the British military, a growing dependence on allies who are not as willing to sanction the use of force and a British public who has grown

increasingly weary with military deployments. To explore these issues further the chapter considers three questions. First, how has liberal intervention been viewed and pursued in UK foreign policy, particularly since the end of the Cold War? Second, what do the three main British political parties think about liberal intervention, particularly with regard to the intervention in Libya? Third, what are the arguments for and against liberal intervention continuing to play a part in UK foreign policy? The paper provides a brief overview to the many issues these questions raise. While this paper is focused on the debate in the UK it will also discuss in passing the wider international debates about the future of liberal intervention.

2 How Has Liberal Intervention Been Viewed and Pursued in UK Foreign Policy, particularly since the End of the Cold War?

There has long been a tension in British foreign policy between pursuing national interests and liberal ideals. Indeed, there have also been long standing questions about the sincerity of political leaders given the discrepancies between talk of ethical foreign policies and the unethical policies that are often implemented (Curtis 2004). In the Victorian era the liberalism of prime ministers such as William Gladstone found itself up against, and sometimes mixed with, the needs of the British Empire. What was sometimes termed ‘gunboat diplomacy’ could sometimes be about opening up new markets while at other times used to tackle slavery. In the 20th century a commitment to the ideals of the United Nations and international law over the use of force eventually found a place in all of the main political parties’ manifestos and worldviews. However, any idealism about what this could achieve was tempered by the realpolitik Cold War needs of containing the Soviet Union. Commitments to international law and the primacy of the UN Security Council in authorizing the use of force were also, at times, overridden by the needs of the British Empire and British power, most clearly and disastrously seen in the Suez War of 1956. Nevertheless, the pursuit of human rights in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) from the early 1970s onwards had been largely a bipartisan affair, while it had been the Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher which had negotiated Zimbabwean independence in 1980 (at the time this had seemed like a blow for freedom and democracy). The Gulf War of 1990 had been backed by all three main parties thanks to a combination of national interest and a desire to uphold the UN’s will to restore the sovereignty of a member state. British foreign policy then has long contained some commitment to liberal ideals, but crucially it

has lacked an explicit commitment to intervening in the internal affairs of another state because of concerns for a humanitarian crisis or to enforce liberal ideals. It was not until the end of the Cold War that such a clear commitment began to materialize.

It was the arrival of Tony Blair and New Labour in 1997 that brought about the most profound changes. In presenting the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's new 'Mission Statement' the newly appointed New Labour Foreign Secretary Robin Cook called for an 'ethical dimension' to UK foreign policy (Guardian 1997). This higher profile given to such matters by Cook and the Labour Party reflected Labour's own long-standing concerns about ethics in foreign policy, something we return to below. New Labour had also benefitted from being able to paint the previous Conservative government as Machiavellian, steeped in myopic realism and therefore fixated on the amoral pursuit of the national interest. The Conservative government's failings over the conflict in the former Yugoslavia had opened it up to such charges. John Major's government was regularly accused of failing to adopt a more robust approach to solving the humanitarian disaster because it could see no direct national interest at stake. Instead it seemed to hide behind the limitations of a United Nations struggling to provide the leadership or authorization for dealing with a civil war involving numerous humanitarian crises. The Conservative government had stuck to a restrictionist interpretation on the use of force arguing that military action could only be taken if there was a clear UN mandate to do so from the UN Security Council.

That the Conservative government was being criticized for not taking a stronger approach pointed to a movement in British politics on when it was permissible to use force. Proponents of a more forceful approach included a large group of Labour backbenchers, including Clare Short, the future Secretary of State for International Development (Daddow 2009: 550). The Liberal Democrat party's adoption of an equally robust approach to calls for military action had led to their leader Paddy Ashdown being labeled a 'warmonger' and 'Member of Parliament for Sarajevo' by supporters of the government's position. Short's and Ashdown's arguments that the UN process was failing, that Britain had an obligation to the people of the former Yugoslavia and as such should consider going further formed part of this wider move in British politics for the UK's foreign policy to view ethical and humanitarian concerns as of direct national interest. Cook's 'ethical dimension' tried to encapsulate this in policy. While questions soon revealed the limitations to what quickly became known as New Labour's 'ethical foreign policy' (see Little/Wickham-Jones 2000), the decision to emphasize such an approach was not a complete surprise.

2.1 *Kosovo and the Doctrine of the International Community*

New Labour's approach was most clearly tested by the war in Kosovo. The military action launched by NATO against Serbia over allegations the latter was causing a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo lacked the unequivocal backing of a UN Security Council resolution because of the threat of a Russian veto. Nevertheless, the possibility that in Kosovo the world would see a repeat of the experiences of the rest of the former Yugoslavia drove NATO, New Labour, Blair and Cook to back military action. While the degree to which the UK played a part in bringing about an eventual Serbian withdrawal can be debated, the language and ideas employed by the UK, and in particular by Blair, appeared to signal a powerful change in both British and international thinking. At the height of the conflict Blair (1999) delivered a speech in Chicago entitled *The Doctrine of the International Community*. In it he said: "The most pressing foreign policy problem we face is to identify the circumstances in which we should get actively involved in other people's conflicts. Non-interference has long been considered an important principle of international order. And it is not one we would want to jettison too readily. One state should not feel it has the right to change the political system of another or foment subversion or seize pieces of territory to which it feels it should have some claim. But the principle of non-interference must be qualified in important respects. Acts of genocide can never be a purely internal matter. When oppression produces massive flows of refugees which unsettle neighboring countries then they can properly be described as 'threats to international peace and security'." (Blair 1999: 6f.)

He went on to argue that the decision on *when* and *whether* to intervene depended on the answer to five key questions: (1) Are we sure of our case? (2) Have all diplomatic options been exhausted? (3) Can military operations be sensibly and prudently undertaken? (4) Is there a will to hold out for the long term? (5) Do we have national interests involved? (Blair 1999). For Blair the key to justifying action could not depend solely on a UN Security Council resolution if the Security Council, backed by wider international society, was prevented from taking action by the threat of a veto by one of the permanent members. Such a situation would merely repeat previous mistakes where humanitarian disasters were allowed to unfold while politically driven use of procedures in international institutions and the intricacies of international law delayed or stopped necessary action.

Whoever had been prime minister in 1999 would have faced a wider movement within the Labour Party, in other political parties (such as the Liberal Democrats who backed the war in Kosovo) and from overseas for a stronger approach to liberal intervention. Indeed, Blair's ideas tried to articu-

late what he and others had been struggling to articulate over the previous few years as part of a wider debate in international relations about the related concepts of sovereignty, rights and justice. Blair's own outlook also drew heavily on his own strongly held religious beliefs. His approach was also the product of his position within government where, because of the powerful position of his Chancellor Gordon Brown, Blair felt most free and able to articulate new ideas in international relations. With *The Doctrine of the International Community* Blair was setting out some of his rationale for when British military force would be used for liberal and humanitarian ideals. "Blair's War's" (Kampfner 2003), as they became known, would see British military forces also deployed to East Timor, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Iraq and contributions to other smaller missions to places such as DR Congo. Under Blair British foreign policy had acquired an explicit commitment to liberal intervention.

Blair's *Doctrine of the International Community* was not without its critics. As Andrew Linklater (see Ralph 2012) pointed out: Who constituted the 'we' in Blair's five questions? Was it Blair? The British Cabinet? The U.S.-UK relationship? NATO, the EU, the West? The UN Security Council? Or was it a wider but undefined sense of the international community beyond the UN Security Council? Over Kosovo it seemed that the wide support in the international community and a majority of the Security Council were the 'we' meaning any veto was undermining the efforts of the UN and international community to resolve the issue. For Labour and the British government, defining 'we' as being more than the wider UN Security Council and crucially the approval of all five permanent members, was a fundamental change to previous policy and commitments. This did not mean abandoning the UN route, the UN itself forming a central part of Blair's *Doctrine of the International Community*. As Ralph (2012) points out, the British government argued that legal authority for war was also implicit in previous resolutions the Security Council had passed and so in taking action NATO was acting both legally and enforcing the will of the wider international community.

The events of 11 September 2001 did not undermine Blair's approach. In his speech to the Labour party conference following the attacks Blair felt the compulsion of change: "This is a moment to seize. The kaleidoscope has been shaken. The pieces are in flux. Soon they will settle again. Before they do, let us reorder the world around us." (Blair 2001) The interventions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and East Timor had largely been on human rights grounds; in Afghanistan and then Iraq security was to the fore, but security that depended on successful advancement of liberal ideas in those states. The events of 11 September also brought out the importance of the U.S. in both

Blair's and Britain's foreign policy thinking. For Blair the UK's role as a 'bridge' between the U.S. and Europe was essential not only to ensure the continued commitment of the U.S. to British security. It was essential if the Atlantic alliance was to remain the fundamental axis for the preservation and advancement of a liberal world order (Seldon 2004: 407). Blair had long worried that U.S. isolationism would risk not simply the security of the UK, but also the advancement of liberal internationalist ideas. His approach of sticking close to the U.S. was driven by his desire to ensure Washington remained committed to these ideals and institutions such as the UN. This became very clear with the Iraq War.

2.2 *Iraq*

Whether the Iraq War was an example of liberal intervention is disputed. Given the UK's long-running benefit from a U.S. security guarantee it could be seen to have been about Britain paying the blood price for this security in addition to earning access to U.S. decision-making. The war has also been presented as being about tackling weapons of mass destruction, bringing about democratic change in the Middle East or enforcing the will of the international community. While the idea of preventing a humanitarian catastrophe was not clearly employed, it is likely that arguments for liberal intervention played a central role in convincing Labour MPs to support the conflict even if at heart it was not a liberal intervention (Hardy/Denselow 2011: 23).

For Blair, the threat came from the character of the regime of Saddam Hussein, the removal of which would be a positive advancement for liberal internationalist causes as well as bringing about a more stable security environment. But in achieving this, from Blair's perspective, the UN Security Council was once again being blocked by the threat of vetoes. When attempts to secure a second resolution authorizing military action failed, the British government drew on the approach taken over Kosovo by basing the war on a 'counter-restrictionist' argument that existing Resolutions 1154 and 1205 (both issued in 1998) "implicitly revived the authorization to use force given in Resolution 678 (1990)" (Ralph 2012). As with Kosovo, the British government was arguing that the necessary authority could be revived from previous resolutions. Furthermore, implicit in these revived resolutions would be the authority to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein. Such an approach was not one endorsed by the government's own lawyers, including the Attorney General Lord Goldsmith. Nevertheless, as Ralph (2012) argues, the central point here is that a counter-restrictionist argument was a preconceived strategy. As such it fitted into an already established approach to justifying and thinking about military interventions. Blair, however, failed to see that,

as Robin Cook made clear in his speech resigning from the government over the Iraq War, unlike over Kosovo the UK now found itself in a minority. Blair's 'we' of the UK and the rest of the U.S.-led coalition of the willing was now a minority opposed by a majority in the UN Security Council, the wider international community, not to mention large swathes of the British public.

The costly disasters of the Iraq War and the damage it did to both Blair and British foreign policy can blind us to what Blair had been arguing for. As Oliver Daddow (2009) argues, there was a time before Iraq when Blair was genuinely set on building a consensus around liberal intervention. As we saw earlier, a wider movement to support humanitarian intervention was already underway when Blair entered Downing Street. In time Blair became the most enthusiastic supporter for this cause. Nevertheless, Blair's successor Gordon Brown took steps to distance himself from Blair's agenda. His decision to commission the UK's first cross-government National Security Strategy (Cabinet Office 2008) was in part meant as a break from the more personalized approach of Blair. Further distancing might have been expected with the arrival of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government in 2010. While the Conservatives had supported the Iraq war they had slowly distanced themselves from it accusing the Labour government of issuing misleading statements and allowing idealism to gain the upper hand over sound strategic decision-making. For the Liberal Democrats opposition to the Iraq War was never as clear cut as some might think (see Jones/Oliver 2011). But their public stance and the strong public backing they received may have led some to conclude that the party was anti-war and therefore unlikely to pursue such an agenda once in government (Astle 2011). As we discuss below, a context of a financial crisis along with cuts to military spending only added to the idea that the new coalition government would avoid further military interventions, not least when there was no clear national interest involved.

Yet, when tested by the conflict in Libya both parties were found willing to pursue liberal intervention. As we discuss further below, the intervention fitted Cameron's ideas about 'liberal conservatism'. The Liberal Democrats were returning to arguments they had made since the 1990s in favor of liberal intervention. The leadership of the Labour party also backed the intervention, ignoring the few dissenting voices from the Labour backbenches. Furthermore, all three parties now appeared to be comfortable with rejecting a restrictionist view of liberal intervention with its insistence on an unequivocal Security Council mandate. Over Libya, Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 had made clear military action was for the protection of civilians. The resolutions did not explicitly authorize the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime. However, as Ralph (2012) argues, for the UK and its allies, implicit

within this mandate was that the regime itself was a threat to civilians and so regime change was consistent with the mandate. Protection of civilians was taken to have an elastic meaning, something that caused a degree of international unease to which we return later. To understand why there was no unease and instead a degree of alignment between the UK's three main parties we need to briefly examine them in more depth.

3 How Have the Three Main British Political Parties Thought about Liberal Intervention, particularly with regard to the Intervention in Libya?

3.1 The Conservative Party

In outlining his ideas about liberal intervention Blair often contrasted himself with a 'Tory' approach that placed national interests above and separate from any humanitarian needs. As discussed earlier, this may be somewhat unfair given the Conservative Party's past support for freedom movements in Eastern Europe and later in the 1990s when under the government of John Major human rights had begun to appear more clearly in the work of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Nevertheless, the Conservative Party has often adopted a more pragmatic worldview distrustful of ideological schemes, focusing instead on trade and security. In short, it lacked any explicit ideological basis for its foreign policy (Honeyman 2012: 130–133).

David Cameron, elected Conservative leader in 2004, brought a degree of change to this approach. Speaking to the *British-American Project* on 11 September 2006 he outlined his idea of 'liberal conservatism' stating: "I am a liberal conservative, rather than a neo-conservative. Liberal – because I support the aim of spreading freedom and democracy, and support humanitarian intervention. Conservative – because I recognise the complexities of human nature, and am sceptical of grand schemes to remake the world. A liberal conservative approach to foreign policy today is based on five propositions. First, that we should understand fully the threat we face. Second, that democracy cannot quickly be imposed from outside. Third, that our strategy needs to go far beyond military action. Fourth, that we need a new multilateralism to tackle the new global challenges we face. And fifth, that we must strive to act with moral authority." (Cameron 2006)

This agenda was complemented by other moves such as a stronger interest in environmental issues, a tougher stance opposing infringements on civil liberties, a cooling of relations with the U.S. and a commitment to protecting overseas aid spending so the UK would meet its commitment to spending

0.7 percent of GNP on overseas aid. Such positions were not universally popular within the Conservative party (see Birrell 2011). Critics outside the party accused Cameron of adopting such policies as a means of remarketing the party away from the ‘nasty party’ image it had acquired.

Beyond any attempts by Cameron to market the Conservative’s in a new way, his approach was a product of many influences, not least of which was Blair’s foreign policy legacy. It was also pushed by some neo-conservative thinking, particularly thanks to the Henry Jackson Society (Dodds/Elden 2008). To a certain extent liberal conservatism is “very similar to New Labour’s doctrine of international community” (Beech 2011: 349). However, Cameron maintained a degree of pragmatism that has long been present in Conservative thinking on foreign affairs. On some aspects Cameron was prepared to go further than Blair arguing that if the international community was unwilling to act then coalitions of the willing could take action without justifying their actions through any implicit or revived authority. Furthermore, in setting out the new government’s foreign policy priorities the new foreign secretary William Hague (2010a) was at pains to state that both ethics and national interests such as increased trade mattered. A focus on the national interest, in particular trade, was understandable given the economic situation the new government faced (see Hague 2010b), although some termed the approach “neo-mercantilism” (Hardy/Denselow 2011: 39). For Hague (2010a) these came together: “What I like to call our enlightened national interest is no narrow affair; it involves being a force for good in the world as well as seeking the best for our own citizens and society.”

That Cameron’s Conservative party backed military intervention in Libya was not thanks to narrow economic interests. It was in line with Hague’s ‘enlightened national interest’ to view the protection of civilians and support for the spread of democracy in the Arab Spring as being a long-term benefit to the UK. But the intervention also highlighted a more circumspect approach that fitted Cameron’s ideas of liberal conservatism. As Honeyman (2012: 140) points out, the coalition government was keen to encourage democracy in Libya and support those demanding it, but this was not the same as introducing it. As Cameron (2006) himself had argued, “democracy cannot quickly be imposed from outside”. Military action was also circumscribed by the lessons of overstretch from Iraq and Afghanistan (something both the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats had accused Labour of causing) as well as the limitations of a military struggling with recently imposed defense cuts. Cameron also placed great emphasis on how the UK’s position was not a minority one, the multilateral approach drawing on wide support in the international community with particular support from the Arab League. Libya then highlighted how the Conservative party had acquired an approach to

foreign policy which, though one that still displayed pragmatism and a focus on the national interest also now saw value in humanitarianism, democracy and human rights.

3.2 *The Liberal Democrats*

The foreign policy agenda of the Liberal Democrats draws on the merged ideas of the Liberal party founded in the 18th century and the Social Democrat Party that broke away from Labour in the early 1980s. These merged ideas (the parties merged in 1988) embrace liberal internationalism (Grayson 2001; Jones/Oliver 2011). This has manifested itself in a commitment to international law and multilateral cooperation, especially through the UN and EU, underpinned by a belief that trade and closer relations between states and peoples can bind them together. The use of force in international relations was to be managed through international law and institutions such as the UN Security Council. Unilateral power, nationalism, imperialism and isolationism were incompatible with such a worldview. As with any party this worldview contains a number of conflicting tensions. Furthermore, this is a worldview that has been formulated over decades of policy-making in opposition. Until recently the party had regularly been subjected to criticism that it had not had to deal with the reality of government, instead being able to fall back on idealism born from a permanent state of opposition.

The party's approach to liberal intervention has been one area to cause tensions. The party has at times been vociferous in calling for military action beyond that strictly permitted by international institutions. This runs up against not only a small but vocal pacifist tradition in the party, but also a commitment to the UN that can take a strongly restrictionist interpretation over the use of force. Nevertheless, under the leadership of former Royal Marine officer and Special Boat Service commando Paddy Ashdown the party had led the way in calls for stronger military action to deal with the situation in Bosnia and later supported military intervention in Kosovo. The party's position over Kosovo was made easier by the multilateral approach taken by NATO and also by a belief that the conflict was morally and arguably legally the right thing to do (Keohane 2003: 44). The party supported the use of force in Afghanistan, although as Liberal Democrat shadow Foreign Secretary Ming Campbell MP made clear in the House of Commons debate on 14 September 2001, in supporting the U.S. the UK should not give "a blank cheque" and that "any response should be based on clear and unequivocal intelligence, that it must not be disproportionate and that it must be consistent with the principles of international law". Over Iraq the party's opposition was not straightforward. Some within the party, including Ming Campbell, wor-

ried the party would be labeled “anti-American” and appeasers of Saddam Hussein’s regime (see Jones/Oliver 2011). A small number of members such as Paddy Ashdown, by then out of British politics and working in the Balkans, privately supported the intervention. The crux of Liberal Democrat opposition rested on fears the Blair government’s approach was isolating the UK in most multilateral institutions where its support for military action was not backed by the rest of the international community. While Kosovo had lacked a legal mandate from the UN, it had at least commanded widespread support amongst the international community and a majority of the UN Security Council. For the Liberal Democrats, the UK was now the state being unreasonable in its expectations of the international system, moving it dangerously towards vigilantism.

Opposition to the Iraq War did not, however, reverse Liberal Democrat support for the idea of liberal intervention as seen over Libya. Speaking in Mexico City in March 2011 as British and other allied military forces intervened in the conflict in Libya, Deputy Prime Minister and Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg (2011) made clear: “The lesson of Iraq is not that intervention in support of liberal aims is always wrong. The lesson of Iraq is that any such action must only – and must always – be multilaterally sanctioned and driven by humanitarian concerns. Liberal vigilantism is dead. Law-abiding liberal interventionism is not.”

For the Liberal Democrats this was an intervention that met several of the party’s long standing conditions for action: A UN mandate, with widespread international support that included a degree of European cooperation. In addition, support was made easier by the more circumspect approach taken by the Obama administration to wielding U.S. power and the absence of the moralizing tone found during the Blair premiership. Critics of the Liberal Democrats might argue the party’s ability to influence the direction of UK government policy over Libya was limited by Conservative ministers dominating foreign and defense policy. Furthermore, given the Liberal Democrats had suffered low opinion poll ratings since entering into coalition with the Conservatives the last thing the party needed was for the coalition to collapse over an issue where public opinion was not strongly motivated to back them. However, this overlooks the party’s strong internationalist thinking that in the 1990s had made them the first major party to back liberal intervention.

3.3 *The Labour Party*

The Labour Party has long held reservations about the use of force and insisted on the primacy of the United Nations in deciding when force can be used (Phythian 2007: 5, Vickers 2003: 5–9). This unease can be traced back to the

First World War and the party's later support for the ideas of U.S. President Wilson and the League of Nations. Post-1945 the party has strongly backed the United Nations, a commitment clear during the wars in Korea, Suez, the Falklands and the Gulf. For Labour, the UN process allowed a pause for diplomacy to be tried and if this failed force could then be authorized as a last resort. The UN route also carried the added benefit of setting boundaries on those powers wishing to act on behalf of the international community, for example during the Gulf War the UN mandate limited what the U.S. could do. For Labour, a commitment to multilateral processes and forums for deliberation such as the UN Security Council allowed a common good to prevail, preventing acts of imperialism and vigilantism by the major powers. The party has also held long standing beliefs about promoting democracy and human rights. But as Ralph (2012) argues: "It was committed to the defense and spread of democracy but within a framework of international law and organization." As with the Liberal Democrats, with whom historically the Labour party has shared many ideas and concerns about international relations, the party's outlook has posed a series of tensions. Balancing the need for authorization from the UN Security Council has meant accepting that deliberations in that forum might not always represent the common good given the power of the permanent members. As we saw above, frustrations over this were already evident within Labour before Tony Blair entered Downing Street. A 2011 report (Hardy/Denselow 2011: 6) on the future of Labour's foreign policy by Progress, an organization within the Labour Party, noted of the many senior members who they interviewed that "[e]ven after Iraq, the majority of interviewees were still committed to liberal intervention, supporting the Libyan campaign and underlining the need for the Labour Party to remake the progressive case for intervention while endorsing the need for a Labour-led review of the criteria for 'how and when' to intervene".

Labour leader Ed Miliband might have declared the Iraq War to be a mistake, but he still backed the intervention in Libya. As Ralph (2012) argues, that Labour supported the intervention and did so while not raising questions about the legal authority for the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime means a Blairite tendency to stretch legal mandates to achieve liberal ends continues to inform center-left foreign policy despite Iraq. However, other discussions about the future direction of Labour's foreign policy have offered critiques of this approach. David Clark, former special adviser to Robin Cook, has argued for Labour to talk about "humanitarian intervention", disposing altogether of the phrase "liberal intervention" (Hardy/Denselow 2011: 40). As Hardy and Denselow go on to note Clark has been keen to see stricter parameters put in place to ensure humanitarian intervention is not used as a justification for regime change. For Clark this would help to re-emphasize the original mean-

ing of Tony Blair's Chicago speech which was about intervening to protect people, not enforce new forms of governance on them. Nevertheless, for Labour the idea of liberal or humanitarian intervention in some form remains an accepted one.

4 What Are the Arguments for and against Liberal Intervention Continuing to Play a Part in UK Foreign Policy?

As we have seen, the UK's three main political parties have moved to positions where they are more prepared than before to sanction the use of force in ways that go beyond any restrictionist approach dependent on clear UN authorization. Government policy has followed this lead. The 1998 Strategic Defense Review (Ministry of Defence 1998) commissioned by the New Labour government, configured the UK military towards expeditionary warfare so it could play a lead part in making Britain what the report termed a 'force for good in the world'. The more recent 2010 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defense and Security Review (Cabinet Office 2010) continued this trend, albeit in a more circumspect way. While a commitment to intervening on humanitarian grounds was made, it was not central to the review. Instead the focus was on threats from terrorism, cyber security, major accidents and natural hazards or maintaining open sea lanes such as in the Gulf. However, in dealing with these and other threats the review did foresee a world in which stabilization and intervention missions would remain an important task of the armed forces. As a result the UK retains a military capability predisposed to expeditionary and interventionist operations. This capability is set to develop further with the single largest demonstration being two new aircraft carriers. A prime minister from whichever party now have at their disposal a military designed to travel to trouble spots around the world; a powerful tool which prime ministers may find difficult to resist the temptation to deploy. At the same time the armed forces themselves will want to prove their worth, both in a professional sense and in defense of their budgets, an allegation made of the British Army's approach to operations in Afghanistan (Cowper-Coles 2011: 176).

Policy and bureaucratic considerations aside, the UK may find itself faced by events and demands that will require it to partake in liberal interventions. Most recently, events such as the Arab Spring brought about widespread calls for the UK to assist the spread of liberal values and prevent humanitarian disasters. The growing merger of national interest and values in UK foreign policy means any similar events in future will be seen as having a

direct bearing on UK security. Given the UK's close relationship and dependence with the U.S. and other European states the UK could find itself under pressure to contribute to operations led by these states in areas such as Mali or the DR Congo, places the UK's allies feel have clear security or humanitarian implications. That the British government itself continues to think of itself as a major world power (and one that has at some point played a part in many ongoing conflicts) means it will continue to feel it has a responsibility to act, with a capability to deploy military force being something the UK continues to view as a key attribute for remaining a major world player. This could be exacerbated by any further development of ideas such as Responsibility to Protect requiring Britain to uphold its own pretensions to global leadership. Even if the UK finds it difficult to deliver any expected military contributions, something it has experienced over the past ten years, the desire to play a global role means it will continue to strive to deploy military force. To opt for another route might seem like an abdication of global power and the opportunities this is seen to offer.

The type of interventions undertaken by the UK will also vary. After the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan any UK military intervention is unlikely to be in the form of large-scale ground interventions. More likely, air power with some limited special forces operations will be the preferred means to create safe areas or to assist friendly forces on the ground. It is also worth recalling that liberal intervention is not simply about military action. The 2010 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defense and Security Review committed the UK to focusing a proportion of overseas aid on conflict prevention. At the 2010 general election all three of the UK's main parties committed themselves to meeting the international agreement for OECD countries to spend 0.7 percent of their GNP on overseas aid. While some quibble with the extent to which the current government is meeting this commitment (and critics, especially within sections of the Conservative party question it altogether), the decision to at least in public commit to ring-fencing the development budget means the Department for International Development has become an established and powerful player in Whitehall pursuing an ambitious humanitarian agenda. The UK is therefore set to maintain a substantial capacity to be involved in humanitarian aid operations. As such British governments will find themselves closely involved in international discussions about how to respond to international humanitarian crises.

It may well be that the UK will soon find it easier, perhaps more effective and, crucially, cheaper to provide humanitarian aid rather than engage in any military led liberal interventionism. While all three of the UK's main political parties are prepared to argue for liberal intervention, Libya may have been a conclusion to a period of British foreign policy rather than a harbinger

of more to come. Institutional changes put in place by Gordon Brown and David Cameron such as the National Security Council and granting the House of Commons a stronger role in authorizing war make the ambitious foreign policy agenda of the Blair era less likely. If coalition government becomes the norm then the power of the executive to wage war could be constrained further. The British political elite may also begin to take note of the British peoples growing weariness of military interventions (Chatham House 2011: 101).

Any growing weariness with liberal interventions by the British public or political class may be down to the sheer cost in blood and treasure. While the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defense and Security Review reiterated long-standing commitments for the UK to remain a military power with global reach, the clear overriding priority of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government has been deficit reduction and the protection of such things as the UK's AAA credit rating. As such the financial crisis faced by the UK means it may no longer be able to afford the capabilities it had previously been able to deploy. This, however, overlooks long-running financial problems faced by the Ministry of Defense. The 2010 spending cuts announced to the UK's defense budget were not entirely a result of the recent financial crisis. The UK's defense budget had been in a state of crisis for over a decade with spending commitments leading to the MOD facing an estimated £ 38 billion black hole of future commitments not budgeted for in the yearly allowance granted to it by HM Treasury (Blitz 2011). Even when the economy was growing with the UK boasting robust national finances the Ministry of Defense had been over-spending. For critics this was a clear example of allowing political demands and morals to get the better of sound strategy. The defense budget would almost certainly have still faced a period of retrenchment had the British economy not entered recession. This raises questions about the ability of the British government to balance ambitions and capabilities in its foreign and defense policies; British defense planning has been described as being in a crisis (Cornish/Dorman 2009). The successful staging of the 2012 London Olympics and the withdrawal of British forces from Afghanistan mean spending on security and defense is likely to reduce even further.

The UK's recent decision to cut defense spending to the point where it comes close to dropping below NATO's suggestion of two percent of GDP also means the UK will struggle to set an example to other NATO allies who it has in the past chided for failing to live up to their NATO defense spending obligations. The U.S. also expressed concerns about the UK's ability to lead (Barker/Parker 2010). The UK, then, is set to become more dependent on its allies to pursue any form of military intervention. The prospects do not look

good. Libya might have highlighted cross-party agreement in the UK on going to war, but the operation exposed divisions within NATO (Germany's refusal to participate being the most obvious example) and was largely dependent on U.S. support, something then U.S. Secretary of State for Defense Robert Gates pointed out in his stinging criticisms of European defense weaknesses (Charlemagne 2011). It seemed as if Europe had not made any progress since its failures in the Balkans almost 20 years earlier. Britain's ability to undertake liberal intervention will increasingly be held in check by European weaknesses in defense and a dependence on a U.S. that in both Libya, as with Kosovo, showed a distinct unwillingness to engage. Britain could find it increasingly difficult to motivate NATO to engage in liberal intervention when because of widespread defense cuts the organization is now facing a choice as to whether to continue its global policing role or to focus more on its traditional role of defense of Europe and the North Atlantic. The U.S. focus on Asian security matters could also deprive the UK of any mainstay of military intervention in Europe's near-abroad.

It is not just a decline in UK military power that could limit the UK's willingness to engage in future liberal interventions. The relative decline of the West as power is diffused to a range of new powers around the world means the UK along with allies such as the U.S. may increasingly lack the economic and financial power necessary to underpin any interventions. They may also find themselves struggling to protect the liberal international institutions they have built. The intervention in Libya itself demonstrated the dangers of pushing liberal intervention too far, states such as China or South Africa uneasy with how protection of civilians became regime change. As Ralph (2012) argues, the unease intervention in Libya generated around the rest of the world should give progressive foreign policy thinkers cause for reflection. Counter-restrictionist arguments might have enabled the UK to be more responsive to humanitarian emergencies without abandoning a commitment to multilateral dialogue and international law. But if these arguments are delegitimized through being used to advance ideas other states are not yet ready to adopt then such an approach could threaten the viability of institutions such as the UN Security Council. A future check on liberal interventions then looks set to be the struggle to balance a need to take action with the skeptical opinions of emerging powers.

5 Conclusions

For a long time British governments have been more willing than most other states to consider using military force to achieve foreign policy goals. Such goals have often either contained an element of liberal ideas or at least been

masked with liberal intentions. Since the end of the Cold War liberal ideas and the national interest have increasingly merged in British foreign policy. This began in the 1990s thanks to the failures to intervene in the former Yugoslavia which helped drive forward Tony Blair's early thinking on liberal intervention as part of a wider willingness to back military action in places such as Kosovo. The disaster of Iraq did not stop this move; the UK's political class – evident in all three main parties – remains more comfortable with liberal intervention than before. A more explicit commitment to liberal intervention is today a more accepted norm in British politics. The British military has also spent the past ten years improving its doctrine, equipment and planning for liberal interventions such that its tools and capabilities for intervention have improved. But its utility has been tarnished by some of the political decisions surrounding the wars it has fought along with the mistakes the British military has made in learning those lessons. While some of this tarnish has been removed and the political willingness advanced, the British government today finds itself limited by financial constraints, differing opinions from allies and a changing balance of power in the international system that, if not managed correctly, could see new powers become hostile to liberal intervention. The UK, then, is politically more willing to engage in liberal interventions and the military is increasingly configured to undertake such operations. The UK will therefore continue to support liberal interventions. However, thanks to spending cuts, the legacy of the Iraq War and growing external constraints any future interventions will be more circumspect than in the past.

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A Note on Military Intervention in an Era of Globalization

Manas Chatterji

The objective of this brief note is to survey the literature and discuss the nature and effect of military intervention particularly by developed countries and its prospect in the future. The study of such intervention is important since it involves destruction, the deaths of soldiers, the depletion of resources and has an impact on the future of societies as well as of political leaders. Military interventions by external powers in the affairs of other countries have a long history, but the objectives, the nature of intervention and its effects seem to have changed over time. So what do we know of interventions?

- (1) The causes of military intervention can be many: Among them we find territorial gain, control over resources, increasing the political power of the initiator in the region and damaging the economic might of the target country. In addition, we witness interventions for humanitarian and crisis management reasons which have been defined by the U.S. Pentagon (Odom 2001) as OOTW (Operations Other Than War). Last, interventions may be ventured for domestic political reasons of those intervening.
- (2) If we look at the history of all the conflicts for the last 50 years, we will find it is generally the lack of governance that is responsible for conflict.
- (3) Military intervention cannot achieve its goals at a low cost. Quite to the contrary, intervention can be a very costly endeavor and sometimes it is not as successful as the initiator thought. There are lots of uncertainties and complexities in interventions. Nevertheless, they are initiated because the costs of non-intervention might be even higher.
- (4) Increasingly, military interventions are conducted by a coalition of actors. This was the case in the Kosovo War (Dunn 2009) and, more recently, in Libya (see also Morelli/Belkin 2009).
- (5) The 'business' of military interventions is not affected by the type of domestic political structure of the intervening party.
- (6) It is often said that internal war often necessitates military intervention, but this phenomenon occurs less frequently than often expected.
- (7) Most of the military interventions by the U.S. and Western powers have been targeted toward developing countries.
- (8) There is a pattern when it comes to the question whether the military intervention is by a Western power or a developing country (Levine et al. 1992). It involved superpowers and regional parties, incumbent re-

gime and insurgents, democracies and non-democracies, distant or neighboring countries.

- (9) There are many similarities in the process of military intervention. The amount of time the operation stays active depends upon the 'success' of the intervention, domestic responses, costs and the availability of alternatives.
- (10) In a historical perspective, only a small percentage of interventions involved troops. The remaining interventions used diplomatic means, included the sending of advisors and financial help and the delivery of arms, and were even conducted through subversive techniques.
- (11) But in an era of globalization, economic power may be the most important intervention instrument even compared to military power. Yet, some scholars believe that sanctions have no effect and are of mere symbolic importance. The objective is to isolate the target state and incur some economic costs to achieve political goals. (Hufbauer et al. 1990). But the major powers are reluctant to get involved in any war. To protect their economic and political interests (like anti-terrorism) they use sanctions. Sometimes the rationale of the sanctions is unclear. It may be to achieve multiple goals not all related to target states. The goals of the imposing country may be public or hidden and sometimes even unclear to the imposer itself. Besides inflicting a punishment there may be other motives like (1) setting the rules of acceptable behavior of a state; (2) impressing other states about the justification of the step; (3) responding to domestic politics or influencing public opinion; (4) as an alternative to costly military intervention; (5) use sanctions as a bargaining chip; and (6) reacting to the strategic advantage of an adversary. The basic question is whether the objectives of a sanction are ever achieved because they are a double-edged sword. In most developing countries, the interests of the leaders and decision-makers are not the same as those of the people. So a sanction intended to punish a country may lead to the punishment of the people rather than its leaders and decision-makers. The hypothesis that if people suffer, they will protest and affect the decision process is also not valid in most cases. Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott (1990) give a list of economic sanctions adopted for the foreign policy goals during 1914–1990. There were instances of successful sanctions when the situation was favorable, say (1) the UK against the former USSR (1931); (2) the USSR against Finland (1958); (3) the Soviet Union against Lithuania (1990), etc. There were sanctions which did not succeed despite the situation was favorable. Some examples are (1) the League of Nations against Italy (1935); (2) the U.S., the UK and others against Japan (1939–1941); (3) the USSR and

Eastern bloc countries against former Yugoslavia (1948–1953); (4) the U.S. against Cuba (1960); and (5) the UN against Rhodesia (1966). It is not clear whether sanctions against Iraq were a failure or success. In the end, we follow Makio Miyagawa (1992) who lists the following conditions for a successful economic sanction both from the point of view of the target and imposing countries: (1) Dependence on trade; (2) size of the economy; (3) availability of substitutes; (4) trade partners; (5) foreign exchange resources; (6) monitoring; and (7) economic systems. Factors limiting the efficacy listed by him are: (1) no leakage, other countries are not eager to help the target; (2) direct and indirect cost for the imposer; (3) internal pressure groups; (4) legal limitations; (5) fear of war; (6) shifting the power blocks; and (7) may strengthen the target through political/social integration rather than disintegration.

There are also many methodological issues of sanctions (Hufbauer/Schott/Elliott 1990). Although sanctions may succeed in the short run, in the long run they can be counterproductive.

The globalization of business, high technology and drastic changes in manufacturing processes are bringing people together. On the other hand, the demise of bipolarity and the growth of nationalism are tearing the fabric of nation-states apart and opening up the old wound. The unfortunate examples in Yugoslavia, Somalia, etc. have shown us how uglily violent the world is we live in. The international community faces the challenge of transferring the system of nations as we knew it to a new framework without violence. This process of transformation is interlinked with such factors such as democratic principles, environmental security, free trade, demographic balance, technology transfer, a new financial and monetary system, human rights, settlements of refugees and a host of other factors.

This does not only require a worldwide body like the UN to keep peace and make peace, using force if necessary, but also a new type of development policy fully funded by the developed countries. Controlling the arms production in the developing countries and arms shipments from the developing countries is urgently needed. What is equally needed is a development aid policy to eradicate worldwide poverty. This will serve as the carrot and sanctions linking development assistance to military spending can be used as the stick. For that, we need a strong, financially viable United Nations with military power. The first and foremost task is to reduce conflict. For this purpose, I suggest the establishment of an International Training Center of Conflict Prevention and Management. In this institution, civil servants, politicians, leaders and other decision-makers in the national and international arena can be trained how to communicate, mediate, compromise, make peace and keep peace. Very often, this lack of training prevents them from starting or stop-

ping the conflict even if they want to avoid conflict. I hope such an institute will be established in the future.

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II Meso-Level Perspectives

Military Strategic Trends since 9/11

Ben Barry

1 Two Decades of War

After the end of the Cold War Operation 'Desert Storm' succeeded. Although the UN struggled in Bosnia, combined UN/NATO air and artillery strikes helped end that war. The military provisions of the Dayton Agreement were successfully enforced by the deployment of 60,000 NATO troops. A U.S.-led NATO air campaign successfully forced Milosevic to withdraw Serb troops from Kosovo. Security was then enforced by a NATO ground force. Outside Europe, the UK unilaterally intervened in Sierra Leone and Australia led a multinational force to stabilize East Timor.

All these interventions succeeded with few Western casualties and were broadly supported by the politicians, public and media of the countries providing troops. But the Bosnian factions, Serb forces, Sierra Leonean rebels and the militias in East Timor were all easily overmatched by Western forces' modern capabilities and superior training.

The exception was Somalia in 1993, where after a successful intervention to protect humanitarian aid, the U.S.-led UN force sought to capture General Aideed, a Somali warlord. As vividly depicted in the book and movie *Black-hawk Down*, the Somali militias' willingness to fight and die overmatched the Delta Force and the Rangers, prompting U.S. withdrawal.

So in September 2001, most Western forces and defence ministries were confident that they could conduct peace support operations. Many Western forces, defence manufacturers and military theorists thought that military power was undergoing a 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA), claiming improved surveillance, C2 and precision weapons would allow a modernized networked force to defeat a less modernized one.

The first war after 9/11, the successful removal of the Afghan Taliban government, saw considerable precision strikes. But regime change depended on the ground forces of the Northern Alliance, supported by special forces directing air strikes. A similar effect was achieved in Libya in 2011, where rebel forces became increasingly well-coordinated with NATO attacks.

The Coalition attack on Iraq in 2003 saw successful precision attack and rapid manoeuvre by well-equipped and trained land and air forces. But too few troops were allocated to provide security after regime change. The early failure of the Coalition to have a positive impact on Iraqi citizens rapidly created the conditions for insurgents and militias. So what had been seen as

Balkan-style stabilization became war in a broken country against enemies who, unlike the Balkan factions, fought and died.

For much of the Iraq war the insurgents and militias had the initiative. They quickly organized themselves and used the internet to rapidly learn roadside bomb technology. They used 21st century propaganda methods. The environment was extremely complex with the strategic, operational and tactical levels overlapping, and a political dimension to operations. So understanding the situation and the myriad local actors became as important as the narrower understanding of orders of battle and military hardware that had sufficed before 9/11.

U.S. and UK forces struggled to adapt. Initially, the RMA seemed to offer little to the hard pressed Coalition forces grappling with irregulars who blended into the civilian population. Indeed by creating a false confidence in U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and others that Iraq and Afghanistan could be stabilized with insufficient forces, RMA advocates contributed to strategic miscalculation.

The principal factors in the U.S. forces' eventual, but limited, success were rediscovery of the classic principles of counterinsurgency, concentrating sufficient troops to provide security, embracing Sunnis willing to fight Al Qaida and building the capability of the new Iraqi Security Forces. Without the U.S. forces' ability to adjust to the war that neither they nor Rumsfeld had planned to fight, Bush's decision to surge and Petraeus' leadership, the U.S. and her Coalition allies would have been defeated in Iraq. This illustrates the importance of leaders and forces being able to innovate and adapt. Although technology can assist with this, Iraq and Afghanistan show that key enablers and barriers to adaptation are leadership, cultural, mental and organizational agility.

In Afghanistan, the initial defeat of the Taliban was followed by efforts now seen as inadequate. It was only in 2010 that adequate U.S. and NATO force levels were achieved and that sufficient effort was allocated to building the capability of the Afghan forces. This allowed a COIN campaign to be mounted, applying relevant lessons from Iraq. But Afghanistan is a much less developed country than Iraq and the challenges are even greater.

Other wars have confirmed there is no substitute for well trained and led forces with a credible plan. This was shown in the Georgia war of 2008 where the rapid execution of an adequate Russian land/air/sea plan rapidly unhinged the Georgian defenses.

In 2006 Israel fought Hezbollah, a hybrid opponent that displayed a mixture of irregular and regular capabilities. Israeli forces had a number of shocks arising from unrealistic expectations of what networks and precision weapons could achieve, exacerbated by insufficient training in conventional

war. The hard lessons appear to have been applied to their attack on Hamas in Gaza.

2 Some Strategic Lessons

These wars showed that strategy and strategic leadership mattered. Clausewitz (1989: 88) proposed that the strategic leadership must from the outset “establish (...) the kind of war on which they are embarking”. For example, if strategy is the national alignment of ends, ways and means to achieve strategic objectives, Israeli strategy against Hezbollah in 2006 failed. The subsequent investigation by the independent Winograd commission judged that the formulation of strategy and the leadership, direction and management of the war by the Israeli Prime Minister, Defense Minister and Chief of Defense Staff was inadequate.

I make a similar judgement about the U.S. and British direction of the Iraq war, up to President Bush’s decision in late 2006, against the majority of advice, to surge. And both the U.S. and UK governments struggled to fully integrate their military operations with the rest of their strategic tools, particularly diplomacy and development.

Many of Clausewitz’s other enduring propositions were also validated by the last decade’s wars. Other important strategic lessons of the Iraq and Afghan wars can be summarized as follows:

- Wars are not predictable.
- The enemy has a vote and may fight to the death to cast it.
- Political factors are paramount.
- Do you go with the political grain?
- Or use force to change the political situation?
- Starting a second war before winning the first is risky.

Often characterized as ‘nationbuilding under fire’, Iraq and Afghanistan confirmed that the classic principles of insurgency and counterinsurgency still applied. This includes the primacy of politics, addressing the root causes of the insurgency, improving governance and development, popular support, legitimacy and operating within the law and the value of propaganda to the insurgents and ‘information operations’ to the counterinsurgents.

The wars also confirmed that numbers count. Not only numbers of troops on the ground, but also training, mentoring and integrating with indigenous armies, militias and police. Success at all levels required integrating not only traditional fire and manoeuvre, but also a wide variety of other effects and agencies including reconstruction, development and information operations.

Previously supporting capabilities such as language and cultural awareness, become as important as more traditional military capabilities.

3 The Utility of Force

These wars remind us that fighting is the core military capability. Many Western forces achieved results in the Balkans simply by 'being there'. The Shia uprising in Iraq in 2004 made it clear that against opponents determined to fight, armed forces who were unable to fight, or whose governments would not allow them to fight, were worse than useless. And in Afghanistan there was considerable tension within NATO concerning national contingents whose restrictive rules of engagement and national political caveats greatly reduced their utility.

These wars also provide a useful test of the propositions made by General Sir Rupert Smith (2005) in his book *The Utility of Force*. Based on experience in Northern Ireland and the Balkans, his analysis was that there 'industrial war' had been overtaken by a new paradigm; 'war amongst the people'. This comprised six trends:

- (1) Military objectives are changing from forcing a political outcome, to creating the conditions that allow the political outcome to be decided.
- (2) Fighting is amongst the people, not on the battlefield.
- (3) Conflicts tend to be timeless, even unending.
- (4) Armed forces now fight to preserve the force, rather than risking it all to gain the objective.
- (5) New uses are found for old weapons and organizations.
- (6) The sides are mostly non-state, comprising some form of multinational grouping against some non-state party or parties.

The majority of these trends were validated by the wars since 9/11. But the final trend did not apply to the U.S. campaign against the Afghan Taliban government in 2001, the initial destruction of Saddam Hussein's forces in 2003 or to 2008 Russia/Georgia war. And in the Middle East and Asia Pacific there are plenty of flashpoints that could result in state on state war.

4 Pointers to the Future?

Firstly, in the Afghan and Iraq wars armies and air forces adapted some of the tools of the RMA as components of the counterinsurgency operation. This included unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), precision weapons and high ca-

capacity C2 networks. But these were being used as an integral part of the operation, not leading it in the way many of the RMA's advocates had urged.

U.S. and NATO forces made great efforts to reduce their own casualties. So protection and protective equipment became a much higher priority than had been envisaged before these wars. Second only to reducing their own casualties was the imperative to reduce civilian casualties and collateral damage, not only for their own sake, but also to minimize handing propaganda opportunities to their opponents. So precision became increasingly important. This was complemented by fielding of weapons with smaller warheads.

There were remarkable improvements in intelligence collection and analysis. Precision weapons needed to be complemented by adequate command and control networks, as well as professional targeting staff, all working within much more restrictive rules of engagement than previously. But these trends in land and air warfare have not been wholly matched by Western naval forces.

Secondly, it is ironic that they offer greatly improved military tools at a time the utility of the military instrument has been so tarnished by the apparent intractability and difficulty of the Iraq and Afghan wars. We have seen this before. Forty years ago the U.S. failure in Vietnam had similar effect on U.S. attitudes, but had paradoxically, in precision bombs, created a tool that made the military instrument more useable.

Finally, just as important as Western views are the perspectives of those who would confront Western forces or seek to counter the 'western way of war'. Their perspective needs understanding.

The Libya war is an interesting example. Whilst the U.S., UK, France and NATO celebrate their military success military planners in Caracas, Damascus, Tehran, or Pyongyang may deduce that they need to improve their internal security capabilities (such as well equipped, highly trained, politically loyal elite forces) to halt protests before they develop. They could seek to prevent the Security Council passing a similarly broad resolution as UNSCR 1973 and undermine the formation of any coalition against them. They might also target enemy infrastructure and homelands with conventional, unconventional and cyber capabilities, and employ 'anti-access' and 'area denial' systems. Finally, they probably think Gadhafi foolish to have voluntarily surrendered his WMD capability.

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A British Perspective on Future Contingency Operations

John Henderson

1 Introduction

To remind ourselves of discussions of the ‘peace dividend’, so prevalent at the end of the Cold War, is to provoke wry smiles on the faces of soldiers and politicians alike. The present generation of soldiers, sailors and airmen has more operational experience than anybody under the age of 90, and arguably a broader experience of the spectrum of conflict than anybody alive. As NATO nations prepare for the end of the Afghanistan mission, the hope in ministries of defense across Europe, and more widely, is for a return to some form of normality. But what will that normality look like? This paper will briefly analyze the factors that might influence future operations and make some predictions and recommendations, the only one of which can be guaranteed to be correct is that all of the others will be wrong. The hope is that they will be less wrong than they might otherwise have been without analysis.

2 Political Will

When asked in retirement what had most influenced his premiership, Harold Macmillan is reputed to have said, ‘Events, dear boy. Events’. Those of us who were serving around the Millennium will remember planning for a return to contingency, by which we mean forces training for operations but not deploying, once we got the Balkans operations down to a manageable level. The events of 9/11 changed everything, and there is no guarantee that there will not be another strategic shock of this type in the future. That said, the political landscape has changed, and the present generation of politicians look at their predecessors and what participation in unpopular wars did for their re-election chances. It is my contention that the bar has been raised for military responses to crises, and I would cite the stand-off response to Libya, and the reluctance to get involved in Syria as examples of this trend.

It is a common theme inside ministries of defense that, in the battle between the services for funds, navies and air forces often cite their ability to conduct short, ‘surgical’ wars in which there is no need to commit troops as ‘boots on the ground’; in other words, more politically attractive operations. This modern version of ‘gunboat diplomacy’, or put more politely, the strategic raid, did not really work during Victorian times, and experience from recent past is that such operations as in Sierra Leone are usually followed by

a lengthy commitment on the ground. Although the Royal Navy delight in telling us that 70 percent of the world's surface is covered by water, the vast majority of the people live on land, and it is the people that matter in modern operations. Even in Libya, where the National Transition Council formed the ground forces, there were Western advisors and mentors with the 'brigades' teaching them how to incorporate air power, and helping them with tactics.

General Sir Rupert Smith has a useful model of confrontation that can develop into conflict and return to confrontation again. It is often suggested that a preventative deployment of foreign forces during a confrontation will prevent it developing into a conflict. This is laudable, but ignores the *modus operandi* of the world's international organizations, and the functioning of democracies, both of which take time to make decisions, and invariably do not do so until the line has been crossed into conflict.

So, in summary, I believe that the bar has been raised in terms of political will, but that Western democracies will continue to get involved in expeditionary operations, just at a later time. The consequence of the bar being raised is that the operation is more likely to be conflict resolution than conflict prevention.

3 Enemy Lessons Learned

Before looking at the lessons that our forces have learned from operations, we must look at what our enemies, and potential enemies, have learned. In simple terms they are:

- Do not let the U.S. or NATO nations prepare for operations from a secure base such as Kuwait or Macedonia.
- Do not take the U.S. or NATO on in a conventional fight. Find a simple set of tactics and techniques that can be adapted and changed as they find countermeasures.
- Where possible, concentrate on denying them freedom of movement, and when you have bottled them up in heavily protected bases, exert influence over the population.
- Play the long game. Democracies have a finite attention span, related to their election cycle, and if you can cost them enough in 'blood and treasure' over a long enough period, they will negotiate on your terms. Use this factor in your influence campaign with the population; the foreigners will go home, but we will still be here.
- Ensure that your information campaign is quicker than theirs. They have to take time to confirm facts and agree lines. You do not – you just have to get your version out more quickly.

4 Friendly Forces Lessons Learned

Having noted that our enemies have changed since the days of Group Soviet Forces Germany, we should also be grateful that our own forces have learned huge lessons from recent operations. From my own perspective, the British Army is unrecognizable from the organization into which I was commissioned in 1982. I would propose the following lessons as the more important:

- NATO nations have optimized their forces for expeditionary high-intensity combat operations, but the role that they undertake in theater is invariably internal security of some form, a role that they do not practice at home. These operations involve prolonged contact with the population, and an understanding of culture and language that cannot be grasped during a short per-deployment training package. Nations will need to develop pools of expertise for likely regions in order that they can be used to 'train the trainer' when an event rises. This is not a cheap option, as, even with first-rate analysis, the majority of these personnel will never use their skills in the field.
- In the arena of Security Sector Reform (SSR), fixing the police is always more difficult than fixing the armed forces. They tend to have lower levels of discipline, live amongst the community that they police, and have greater opportunities for corruption through their daily contact with the population. Yet, few Western democracies have specific units in their armed forces that are optimized for reforming police forces, and our own police forces do not have an expeditionary mind-set. Some, like the British and American police, are deliberately structured and focused on local communities, making national command and control more difficult. This is a capability gap that some nations such as Norway have addressed successfully by setting targets for their police in terms of international deployments. If we are serious about this issue, more needs to be done.
- Indigenous forces will always be more effective in terms of their human intelligence and situational awareness than foreign forces. Therefore, effort and resources invested in training them will always have greater return than the same effort made in training foreign forces. They are also very likely to be more acceptable to the local population.
- Heavy armor and conventional war-fighting equipment is only useful if you can get it to the theater of operations on time and can support it when it is there. Every defense review aims to improve the 'tooth to tail' ratio, by trimming support organizations and budgets. While laudable, a balance must be struck, and perhaps NATO's Smart Defense initiative could help here. It is currently focused on such areas as Intelligence, Surveil-

lance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), which is excellent, but it does not help NATO in getting more nations' forces into the fight, and earlier. If they are serious about getting more nations onto operations at an earlier stage, which is always a challenge in NATO Force Generation, they must look carefully at enabling capabilities such as strategic transport aircraft, roll-on/roll-off shipping, hospitals, infrastructure for camps and airfields, and logistics provision of food, water and fuel.

- Training and mentoring are tasks that are here to stay if we are to address SSR adequately. Related to the first point on developing specific regional expertise, there are more general skills that armies, in particular, can develop to prepare themselves for future operations:
 - The trend towards professionalizing armed forces is the right one; modern operations require fewer, better-trained soldiers than the industrial war that preceded it. Those soldiers need to be trained as instructors, with the ability to teach both military and technical skills to others. This is not a trivial task, and will result in smaller, older, more intelligent, and therefore higher-ranked structures than those that they replace.
 - Longer tours will be required from all personnel if they are to establish confidence with indigenous forces. This will require a new way of thinking about operational tours, both for the soldiers and their families back at home.
 - Previous SSR experience suggests that more effort is given to training and mentoring the combat forces than the support units. It is a truism that you can only fight the battle than you can sustain, and the experience of the Afghan Army in 1992 is a salutary lesson. The Soviets did not train the Afghan logistic units, preferring to supply them from Uzbekistan with a 600 vehicle weekly convoy carrying everything from ammunition to bread. The convoys stopped in November 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unable to deploy outside their garrison areas, the Afghan Army lost its freedom of movement, its influence over the population, and was ultimately defeated less than 6 months later in April 1992.

5 The Shape of Things to Come

In this brief analysis, it is clear that we came expect more of the same. As General Sir David Richards states, 'Afghanistan may not be a template for future operations, but it is surely a signpost'. The summary of recommendations is:

- Present and future politicians will be less willing to get involved than their predecessors, but will probably have no choice in the end. The chances are that the trigger point will be later, resulting in future operations that are more conflict resolution than conflict prevention.
- Potential enemies will use asymmetry and avoid direct confrontation with NATO forces. They will also play it long, and employ effective information campaigns both internally and internationally. We need to understand that and adapt accordingly.
- Although there will be a role for the strategic raid, armed forces must prepare for the enduring land operation, supported from sea and air, which almost always follows.
- Forces:
 - Train and maintain regional expertise pools.
 - Train for SSR.
 - Train regularly with police.
 - Think expeditionary and maintain balance in the forces.
 - Do not forget the support elements in SSR.
- NATO Smart Defense. It must look at enabling capabilities as well as ISTAR and the more attractive combat capabilities.

In summary, it has been a truism of recent military experience that forces retained for contingencies rarely remain in their barracks for long. This situation is unlikely to change in the coming decade, and it is therefore incumbent on those of us responsible for designing, preparing and supporting our forces to get it right in advance of the deployment date. This is not a trivial undertaking, but as the old sergeant told me during parachute training in the 1980s, “If this was easy, anybody could do it.”

The Price of Disengagement: Past Trends and Prospects for Portuguese Participation in International Military Missions

Helena Carreiras

1 Introduction

In Portugal, democracy did not come about from a pact between elites. It was the direct result of a military coup which overthrew, in 1974, a 48 year-long authoritarian regime and ended a 13 year-long colonial war in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. In spite of the crucial role performed by the Portuguese Armed Forces in this process, its progressive withdrawal from the political scene and the normalization of civil-military relations under a consolidated democracy after 1982,¹ was followed by a process of objective and subjective marginalization of the military, which has continued until the present. A decreasing legitimacy of conscription during the 1980's and 1990's, strong personnel reduction, shrinking budgets, and material obsolescence were some visible features of this tendency.

However, during the past three decades, various modernization processes were also set in motion, which have strongly shaped the organization in both structural and cultural terms. The recruitment of women, from the beginning of the 1990's, the end of conscription in 2004 and the increasing participation in international peace support operations, from the mid-1990's onwards, have changed the human landscape and the organizational outlook of the military in unprecedented ways, with a visible impact on the relationship between the armed forces and Portuguese society. While the participation in international peace support operations has become a central task for the armed forces during the past two decades, there are now signs of a challenge to the prevalence of this centrality, namely the scarcity of financial resources and an apparent, even if still unclear, reorientation of military missions for domestic purposes.

This paper addresses the involvement of the Portuguese armed forces in international peace support operations and the prospects that might be drawn from this analysis in the face of a probable disengagement in the near future. After reviewing basic facts and figures about the Portuguese armed forces, it moves on to examine the pattern of Portuguese participation in international peace support operations, providing a brief description of its evolution during the past 20 years as well as a summary of the present situation. In a third section, the question of the relevance and meaning of such involvement will be

1 Date of the dismissal of the Council of the Revolution, the last military structure among the governing bodies of the state.

scrutinized at different analytical levels: The political-strategic level of national defense policy and discourse, the organizational level of the armed forces, the societal level of public opinion and the interactional level of soldiers' attitudes and their professional identities. Finally, the last and concluding section of the paper consists of a short prospective exercise looking at possible implications of a disengagement from international missions.


2 The Portuguese Armed Forces: Some Basic Facts and Figures

During the past three decades and following a generalized tendency in most of the Western world, the Portuguese armed forces carried out a deep restructuring of their organizational format, accelerating the trend away from the mass-army towards a more technically-based volunteer force. Three major changes have taken place in this respect: personnel reduction, end of conscription and recruitment of women.

Following the end of the colonial wars in Africa, the re-dimensioning of the institution was urgent and dramatic. Between 1974 and 1991 there was a reduction from around 120,000 to 61,800 in the total number of active duty personnel. Between 1991 and 2011, a further reduction of 62 percent of the total military force effectively occurred, corresponding to a new total strength of 38,384 (Figure 1). This occurred for two main reasons: the reduction in the number of conscripts and a parallel reduction of the personnel in the permanent structure (Carrilho 1994: 121–127).²

2 By the end of the war, the hierarchic pyramid was almost inverted, with excessive personnel in the upper ranks and a clear deficit in the non-commissioned officers' positions. Since the group of colonels was the most affected by this legislation (many of them forced into early retirement), it came to be known as the 'colonels' law'.

Figure 1: Active Duty Military Personnel in the Portuguese Armed Forces (1981–2011)




Source: MDN (2001a ff.), Anuário Estatístico da Defesa Nacional.

Particularly significant was also the transition from conscription to an exclusively voluntary force in peacetime. The constitutional reference to compulsory military service was eliminated during the constitutional revision of 1997 and, two years later, a new law on military service (Law 174–99) was established that called for the ‘professionalization’ of the armed forces and the creation of an exclusively volunteer force in peacetime to be completed in 2004 after a 4-year transition period.

Another important aspect of the overall transformation, particularly relevant from the point of view of civil-military relations, has been the inclusion of women with explicit military status. Female recruitment unfolded from the end of the 1980’s and, in a very short time, women’s representation and gender integration in the Portuguese Armed Forces had reached relatively high levels if compared to those of other militaries in advanced democracies, many of which had started to recruit women long before (Carreiras 2006). Numbers increased regularly during the past two decades which, together with the reduction of military personnel, fostered an increase in female representation: While in 1994 the 1,310 Portuguese women soldiers still represented a residual percentage, in 2012 there were around 5,000 female soldiers, constituting 14 percent of the total force (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Number of Women in the Portuguese Armed Forces, by Service (1994–2009)



Source: MDN, Annual reports to the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces/ Committee on gender perspectives.

The general pattern of women’s representation in the Portuguese armed forces has followed a tendency towards the elimination of formal restrictions of access to military functions and a sustained growth of representation levels; the reverse side of the medal is that even if formal/legal integration has been accomplished, real social integration did not follow at the same pace. Portuguese military women are still under-represented in higher hierarchical levels and in operational areas related to the core functions of the armed forces. In any case, however instrumental the reasons for female recruitment, however unequal their status and occupationally segregated they might still be, women are no longer peripheral to the organization. Their access to military positions has at least the potential to promote a ‘controlling presence’ over conditions of choice (Jonasdottir 1990), both inside the military institution and in the state arenas where decisions concerning the use of military force are made.


Finally, the involvement in international operations has meant a crucial transformation both in terms of the military’s operational roles and the image and identity of the military profession. While, as in many other countries, the Portuguese Armed Forces experienced sharp budget cuts and organizational restructuring, their missions have been reoriented, with priority shifting from national territorial defense to multinational interventions aimed at supporting peace and stability at a more global scale (Dandeker 1998: 84). This has become an increasingly important area for military action, as the following sections will detail.

3 Portuguese Military Participation in International Peace Missions: A Statistical Portrait

Although Portuguese troops already had a modest presence in United Nations operations, especially in Angola and Mozambique,³ it was the Portuguese contingent in Bosnia in 1996 that signaled a real inflection of policy in this domain. In this year, the so-called *new missions* represented nearly half of the military's operational expenses (46%) and approximately 12 percent of the defense budget. On the other hand, the Bosnian experience revealed a growth in public, military and political awareness and support to the participation of the Portuguese military in multinational operations and peacekeeping (Vasconcelos 1999; Sousa 1999; Carreiras 1999), and initiated a permanent presence of the Portuguese military in international missions.

Evolution in numbers of deployed soldiers (always on a volunteer basis) shows a variation between a few hundreds and nearly 2,000 soldiers yearly, with two peaks: 1996 (1,521), coinciding with the IFOR mission in Bosnia and UNAVEM in Angola, and 2001 (1,736), with the simultaneous presence of military contingents in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor.

Figure 3: Portuguese Military Personnel Deployed to International Peace-Support Operations (1989–2009)




Source: UAL 2005; Teixeira 2009.

3 Portuguese military observers had joined various UN missions, but in a limited way: UNOGIL in Lebanon in 1958, in Namibia in 1989; ONOMUZ in Mozambique, UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III and MONUA in Angola.

From a geographical point of view, international missions have taken place mostly in Europe (Balkans), but also in the Middle East, Africa (mainly Angola and Mozambique) and East Timor. In 2001, for instance, the Portuguese Armed Forces mobilized 1,736 soldiers in peace-related operations conducted under the auspices of NATO in Bosnia (SFOR), Kosovo (KFOR), Macedonia (FYROM) and Afghanistan (ISAF), and of the UN in East Timor (UNTAET/UNMISET).⁴ In June 2012, 455 soldiers were involved in three main theaters: Lebanon (UNIFIL – 136); Kosovo (KFOR – 162) and Afghanistan (ISAF – 157). Although absolute numbers are modest, the presence of Portuguese troops has been constant and highly significant: During the past two decades, Portugal has been among the 15 larger contributors and one of the major European contributors to UN operations (Viana 2002; Branco et al. 2009).

If compared to other forces in the field, casualties have been limited. For instance, between 1992 and 2002, ten soldiers were killed, and this happened mainly in traffic accidents. For some analysts, this relatively low level of casualties and their context might explain the perceived success of the missions among large sectors of the Portuguese society. Costs have followed the rhythm of missions and their requirements.

Figure 4: Costs of International Missions (National Deployed Forces) 1994–2009
(in mio. Euro)



Source: MDN (2001a ff.), *Anuário Estatístico da Defesa Nacional*.

4 Information available in the *Anuário Estatístico da Defesa Nacional* (MDN 2002).

In 2012, the withdrawal from Lebanon was announced and funds for missions were reduced from 75 mio. Euro (2011) to 50 mio. Euro, nearly half of the amount spent in 2001. Simultaneously, the Minister of Defense underlined on several occasions the need to reinforce the armed forces' role in support to domestic relief missions, namely fire-fighting. Considering the dramatic scenario of the global economic crisis which led to the country's bail out in 2011, and the need to commit to strict economic and financial measures imposed by creditors, participation in international missions will probably be substantially reduced. If confirmed, such disengagement is likely to have important consequences in the overall strategic definition, purpose and identity of the Portuguese military. In order to argue for the plausibility of this claim, it is important to examine the meaning and place conferred to international missions at four different analytical levels: (a) the national defense policy and discourse; (b) the armed forces as an organization; (c) public opinion; and (d) soldiers and their professional identity.

4 The Place of International Missions and the Legitimacy of the Armed Forces

At the strategic political level, international military missions have become a core element of the Portuguese national defense policy. To a certain extent, they have been used to fulfill what some have called a strategic vacuum in Portuguese defense policy (Santos 2001, 2012), becoming one very significant instrument of Portuguese foreign policy and international projection. Political discourse and legal instruments alike reflect this centrality. Although critical voices have been heard regarding the absence of clear and sound defense policies, signaling the broad scope of military missions, the ad-hoc character of decision-making concerning the use of the armed forces (Santos 2001: 185) or the inadequacy of legal frameworks (Pinto 2002: 185), international missions became an increasingly important area for military action and foreign policy. The need to have a force able to fulfill Portuguese commitments in NATO and the European Union, as well as ensuring Portuguese participation in multinational peacekeeping missions, had already been identified as a goal in the 1994 strategic national defense concept (Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional).

As noted above, the participation of Portugal in IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996 was crucial in consolidating this strategic orientation. This was the first time that the Portuguese Armed Forces intervened in European territory after the First World War. Until then, even while strongly supporting EU economic and monetary policies, Portuguese authorities had been very cautious regarding progress in terms of a European defense policy.

In various elite sectors a traditional ‘atlanticist’ vision of national interests and alliance policy was dominant. Likewise, an attitude of a certain isolationism and neutrality deeply rooted in the country’s political culture was still visible, as could be seen during the Gulf War in 1991 when the government used the concept of ‘non-belligerent state’ to justify refraining from a more direct involvement in the conflict. However, at this moment positions started to change, moving towards a clearer will to participate in post-Cold War military missions.

In 2001, the white book on national defense (*Livro Branco da Defesa Nacional*), underlined the importance of the new missions, putting them at the same level of the constitutionally defined mission of territorial defense and that of collective security: “Cumulatively, (the system of forces) will have to guarantee the availability of forces and the means necessary for the performance in the new scenarios of state conflict, in peace support, crisis management and humanitarian missions.” (MDN 2001b: 23)

The 2003 revision of the strategic national defense concept also prompted, and in a much clearer way, Portuguese military participation in international missions, an aspect which has continued to be emphasized by political leaders. During an important media interview in 2005, the Minister of Defense (and later Foreign Minister), Luís Amado, highlighted the fact that the key missions of the Portuguese Armed Forces were those related to international commitments and the support of foreign policy within the framework of NATO and the European Union. According to his perspective, the ability to strengthen the political identity of Portugal as a sovereign state would occur through participation “in the new frontiers where the security of the country regarding regional security is decided (...). For this, we need to move from a vision that exists in certain sectors of the armed forces, which is still very state-centered and territorial, to one which privileges a dynamic and flexible configuration, of rapid response and force projection, of interoperability and joint action.” (Interview in the weekly newspaper *Expresso*, 4 June 2005)

Five years later, a strategic document issued by the Minister of Defense (MDN 2010) confirmed this perspective: “Portugal will keep participating in missions that embody the principle that national security is not only pursued in areas close to the territorial borders of the country. Our contribution to global security must be based on an international effort where Portugal must have a role. The national participation within this wide concept of security, with National Deployed Forces, in a context of adversity and in the presence of insecure populations, has largely contributed to the country’s prestige, and credibility.” (MDN 2010: 23152) Hence, it is not surprising that political

orientations and decision-making in this respect developed in the frame of a wide political consensus.⁵

At the organizational level, the growing relevance of international peace support operations entailed significant organizational adjustments in terms of human resources, equipment and training. Since 1996, all military academies and schools have included in their curricula modules related to training and conduct of international peace support operations. Moreover, international missions have been mobilizing most of the armed forces' resources and became a source of prestige and legitimacy to the organization. Official documents as well as survey and interview data show that military leaders have been willing to participate internationally and usually consider these missions as a locus for professional fulfillment. Already in 1989, a survey conducted among a representative sample of officers from the three branches of the armed forces showed that officers were willing to participate internationally, namely in the framework of UN and NATO operations (Carrilho 1994:153f.).

Likewise, participation in peacekeeping missions has generally been welcomed by the Portuguese population. Although fluctuations in opinion were observed during the first half of the decade, in 1996 almost two thirds of the Portuguese supported the country's involvement in international missions, especially those taking place in the former colonies (Angola, Moçambique, East-Timor). While at that point in time only 45 percent supported participation in the IFOR mission, 68.8 percent considered that the presence of Portuguese soldiers in this mission increased the international prestige of the country (Carrilho 1998: 23–31). After deployment, the media started to give much more attention to the situation in Bosnia. Between January and August of 1996, 25 newspaper, radio and television channels kept 150 permanent reporters in Bosnia. During the first months, soldiers had many reasons to complain and their complaints were immediately reported. The absence of previous experience in this type of mission and, above all, the bad weather conditions (previous participation had always taken place in Africa) resulted in various difficulties of installation and inadequate equipment. More than other national contingents, the Portuguese troops had to adapt to the new European scenario. The novelty of the whole experience resulted in an unprecedented attention given to the armed forces and the military's *new missions*.

Another public opinion survey, conducted in 1999 showed that positive attitudes prevailed, with over two thirds of respondents considering that in-

5 However, old policy dilemmas re-emerged during the Kosovo crisis, when the national capacity to maintain troops simultaneously in more than one operation was severely tested.

ternational missions raised the country's prestige and the effectiveness of the armed forces themselves. This correlation was more obvious among men with low qualifications and from lower social strata (Matos/Bacalhau 2001: 119–126).

The sequence of opinion polls available during the 1990s was abruptly interrupted during the following decade. It was only ten years after, in 2009, that another survey was conducted on defense and the armed forces which included the topic of international missions (Carreiras 2009). Results still confirmed the same general trend in public attitudes: After over a decade of permanent international military participation and in the absence of significant casualties among soldiers, the Portuguese kept showing their support to these missions. On a scale ranging from 1 to 10 with 10 indicating maximum agreement, the average answer to the question “Do you agree with the participation of the Portuguese Armed Forces in international peace missions?” was 7.8. In this case, there were no significant statistical correlations with sex, age or education, which suggest a growing public consensus over the issue.

What about the soldiers themselves? How did they react to these new tasks and to what extent did they incorporate an international, expeditionary mindset? The sociological literature on peacekeeping, which emerged mostly from the American experience, has highlighted an ambivalent pattern regarding soldier's attitudes and perceptions about this type of mission. These studies have underlined a fundamental distinction between the traditional definition of military missions and the one that characterizes the new social and operational contexts of peacekeeping. In this latter frame it seemed to be much more difficult to clearly identify both the sense that soldiers attached to their participation and possible consequences in terms of the organizational ideology of the military (Miller/Moskos 1995). Besides their ambiguity, empirical results have also been paradoxical. While surveys conducted among American soldiers during the last 20 years have revealed the existence of serious difficulties in the adaptation of soldiers to the new missions – leading to questions such as “do soldiers hate peacekeeping?” (Miller 1997), in other countries, for example in Italy (Isernia/Lanzieri 1999: 188) and Portugal, we find the opposite pattern. Although scarce, sociological data from various surveys conducted among Portuguese peacekeepers since the mid-1990s is a good source of information concerning attitudes towards international missions (Carreiras 2010).

The first survey was conducted among participants in the IFOR and SFOR missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁶ One of its main conclusions was that, notwithstanding the existence of problems and difficulties (namely distance from and communication with families and bad equipment) the participation in the mission had been an extremely gratifying experience for Portuguese soldiers. Not only did they positively evaluate various dimensions of their presence in Bosnia, but recognized the legitimacy of the governmental decision to get involved. Satisfaction levels were generally very high, independent of rank, both in the personal (91.3%) and professional dimensions (82.9%). When questioned about the usefulness of the mission for the population of Bosnia, 93.6 percent of the respondents considered that it was useful or very useful; more than 90 percent declared they would like to participate in future international missions and identified the opportunity to be involved in peacekeeping missions as one of the most pleasant features of military life. Moreover, international peace support missions were identified as equally relevant to the armed forces as the more traditional constitutional mission of territorial defense or other humanitarian/disaster relief tasks.

The increased public visibility of the military, together with an enhanced social recognition of their role, seemed to produce a similar increase in self-esteem and professional satisfaction among these soldiers. Remarkably, this aspect – the international promotion and visibility of the Portuguese military – was even perceived by most soldiers as one of the goals of the Portuguese participation. A variety of other indicators, emerging from the military institutional assessment of different contingents in international missions, globally confirm this overall positive evaluation, even when various organizational dilemmas were identified (Carreiras 2010).

A second major sociological survey was carried out in 2009 in the framework of a case study of a Portuguese battalion deployed to KFOR. Here again, results of a survey run after the mission, sent to the whole battalion,

6 This survey was directed by Helena Carreiras in the framework of a research project of the *Institute for International and Strategic Studies* (IEEI), an independent Portuguese research institute and think-tank. It was run between October 1997 and January 1998 and addressed to all Portuguese soldiers who, until that moment, had been involved in the IFOR and SFOR missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1,039). The survey took place after their return to Portugal. With some minor changes, the questionnaire used in the Portuguese case was similar to the one developed by a team supervised by F. Batistelli in a study of the Italian IFOR contingent in the beginning of 1997 (see Ammendola 1999). The majority of the soldiers came from operational units of the Army (500 from a mechanized infantry battalion and 517 from an airmobile brigade); the remaining 22 belonged to the Air Force Operational Command.

showed that over 80 percent of the deployed personnel were satisfied or very satisfied with the mission and considered that it had been useful to the population in Kosovo. Likewise, a high percentage (78%), even if lower than that of the IFOR/SFOR sample in 1996, would like to participate in future international missions, with 51.9 percent irrespective of the location and 22 percent preferring Africa. Qualitative data from three dozen in-depth interviews carried out in the frame of this study, during fieldwork in Kosovo, also shed light on a pattern that has been described as *ground-floor cosmopolitanism* (Silva 2000; 2006; Carreiras 2012), a concept closely related to the notion of *expeditionary mindset*, involving tenets such as humanitarian and cosmopolitan conduct of military operations, cultural interoperability, empathy, negotiation skills, or ability to adapt to changing operational environments (Fürst/Kümmel 2011; Shields 2011).

Finally, an on-line survey to officers and NCOs conducted in 2010, replicated similar conclusions as far as willingness to participate in international missions and their legitimacy was concerned. Participation in the production of security at a global scale was clearly understood as a defining characteristic and necessary feature of the armed forces (Carreiras 2011).

In sum, all attitudinal data indicate that, more than mere additional experiences, international missions have come to occupy a core function in the construction of military identity and professionalism. The perception of the purpose of the armed forces and the military profession now seems to require an explicit reference to international military missions, namely peace support operations.

5 Conclusions: The Price of Disengagement

If the above interpretation of the meaning of international military missions is plausible – and empirical data seems to support it – its almost certain decrease will have implications at all the four levels scrutinized above. What follows is a necessarily short prospective exercise, based on present trends and available data.

At the political-strategic level, the national defense policy orientation towards the production of international security will probably retrench, if not at the discursive level, certainly in practice, in number of missions, material means and financial and human resources mobilized for these tasks. Independently of the appeal of the EU's *Pooling and Sharing* or NATO's *Smart Defense* concepts, when a severe economic crisis and extreme austerity measures are in place, it is virtually impossible to have but a very modest contribution to the pool. At a moment when a new strategic concept of national defense is being discussed, this situation will entail a real challenge to

the ability of strategic thinkers to balance normative and pragmatic considerations in the definition of military options. Whether the centrality of international military missions in the national defense policy discourse will be replaced by a more conservative orientation towards traditional missions and increased use of armed forces for domestic purposes, is still unclear; if this last hypothesis prevails, new rationales will have to be found to support policy options. In any case, material constraints, more than sound political choices, seem to be the leading force framing national defense policy in the near future.

At the organizational level, the armed forces will have to face the question of how to cope with both structural arrangements set in place to prepare the organization and soldiers alike to deploy internationally and with the rather strong expeditionary mindset that has come to characterize the Portuguese military. If there is a shift in mission priority, the efforts directed to education and training of military personnel oriented towards participation in international missions will most probably have to be reviewed. Moreover, if international missions have indeed delivered additional social recognition to the armed forces, its decrease would make the institution lose an important source of prestige and legitimacy with consequences in terms of international credibility and public visibility.

As far as public opinion and relations between society and the armed forces are concerned, an eclipse of the so-called *new missions* from the public view could increase civil-military distance, deepening what has been described as a 'without me attitude' (Manigart 1996; van der Meulen 2003). There are, however, other intervening variables that might affect public opinion. If domestic missions become more relevant, the visibility of the armed forces could possibly increase, but so could conflicts between the military and other agencies previously in charge of those tasks, affected by the country's overall economic situation and high unemployment rate.

Finally, the adjustment needed in the identity and professional culture of soldiers themselves would be anything but a painless process. As described above, soldiers' attachment to international missions has been a source of identity and meaning; if discontinued, institutional affiliation could also be affected.

In the context of limited resources and an apparent lack of adequate alternative routes, there is thus a price to pay for disengagement. In other words, if engagement is too expensive, disengagement also entails costs. Awareness of the possible costs involved, however, is a crucial factor to face the challenge and prepare the Portuguese armed forces for the future.

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Expeditionary Capabilities and the Use of Force in a Post-Interventionist Era: The Case of Sweden

Franz Kernic

1 Introduction

Over the past few years, Sweden's security and defense policy has changed dramatically, and its focus has clearly shifted from national territorial defense to international operations abroad. Thus, the country has started to develop new military capabilities that can meet future challenges and requirements, including an engagement in robust military operations and combat. Consequently, the armed forces are currently undergoing a process of radical change. Conscription was abolished a few years ago and the overall direction was set out by the Swedish government toward establishing an all-volunteer force that is "usable, accessible and flexible" (Regerungskansliet 2010: 1).

This essay intends to shed light on the current restructuring process of the Swedish Armed Forces and discuss some of its major societal and political implications. Its main focus is on the idea of creating a new 'expeditionary force' that can be deployed anywhere in the world and that would allow Sweden to use military force outside its own territory. This new direction in Sweden's defense policy has raised a number of questions for both the Swedish Armed Forces and society. One central question is, of course, how much public support and democratic legitimacy this new political orientation and policy goal will find in a long-term perspective. There can be no doubt that radical changes in the country's security and defense policy have been put in motion during the last five years. These changes have also radically challenged our prevailing notions and concepts of a 'post-interventionist era' according to which particularly smaller European armed forces would limit themselves to homeland defense, humanitarian aid and small-scale joint military operations for the purpose of crisis and conflict management in international politics.

The article is structured in the following way: First, I will review the 'Defence Bill 2008/09' and other recently adopted key documents for Sweden's new defense policy and discuss their political goals and consequences. Second, I will shed light on the development of a new analytical concept of the Swedish Armed Forces that has been labelled 'expeditionary capability'. I will also analyze a few key aspects of the current restructuring process of the Swedish Armed Forces, particularly with respect to the transition from a military force based on conscription to an all-volunteer force. Finally, I will discuss important political and societal implications of today's comprehensive

defense reform and link my analysis to the question of whether it is true or not that we at present live in or are entering into a post-interventionist era in global politics. In this respect, I will focus exclusively on the Swedish case study and therefore only provide a limited answer to the guiding question of this book. The main question of this essay can be phrased as follows: Can we interpret the current restructuring process of the Swedish Armed Forces as an adjustment to a newly emerging structure of a global post-interventionist era and/or as one country's specific attempt to contribute to the creation of such a post-interventionist global order?

2 Sweden's New Defense Policy: Toward Establishing a Flexible and Usable Military Force

Sweden's defense policy has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. Its traditional military policy throughout the entire 20th century had rested heavily on the idea of a strong national territorial defense embracing the entire Swedish population and based on the universal conscription of male citizens. Major changes to this traditional system occurred in the mid-1990s, particularly in the context of the two reform phases of the so-called 'Defence Resolution for 1997–2001'. An important milestone of this development was the 'Defence Bill 1999/2000'. This bill launched a comprehensive reform and modernization process of the Swedish Armed Forces aiming at the creation of a "modern, flexible and versatile defence on the basis of national service (...) capable of being utilized for both defence in Sweden and participation in international operations" (Regeringskansliet 2000: 3). A few years later, the 'Defence Bill 2004' outlined the new organizational structure of the armed forces and the new goals of the Swedish defense policy for the years 2005–2007.

In 2008, an even more radical and comprehensive reform of Sweden's entire defense system was launched. This happened two years after a new coalition government under the leadership of Fredrik Reinfeldt had been installed in Sweden, thus putting an end to a relatively long era of social-democratic political leadership in the country. Respectively, the 'Defence Bill 2008/09' needs to be seen as the most important political document with respect to today's reorientation of Sweden's security and defense policy. This bill opened the door for a comprehensive restructuring process of the entire Swedish defense force and for creating a new mission-based armed force with smaller, flexible, stronger and more focused units that can be deployed anywhere in the world. 'Functional defense' became the new guiding principle and catchword, aiming at the creation of military force that could easily be used for different societal tasks and functions, at home as well as abroad.

In addition to the existing traditional defense units (territorial component), a small but strong and modern military force for expeditionary purposes should be established and manned with well-equipped and well-trained professional soldiers. It was planned that the new operational organization would be in place by 2014. According to these plans, the new Swedish defense organization will comprise a total of approximately 53,500 people (28,000 personnel in the mission-based organization, 22,000 personnel in the territorial national defense, and 3,500 civilian personnel) which results in a significant reduction of the number of manpower in Sweden's defense (see Table 1).

Table 1: Number of Personnel in Mission-Based Organization and Territorial Defense 2006–2011

Branch	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Army	18,000	21,000	17,500	16,300	16,900	15,100
Navy	5,000	5,000	4,600	3,800	3,600	3,100
Air Force	10,000	8,000	3,000	3,200	3,200	3,400
Command	32,000	7,500	6,900	5,300	5,100	5,300
Logistics	--	5,500	5,000	5,400	5,200	5,700
Home Guard	41,000	41,000	38,000	38,000	38,000	22,000
Total (no of people)	106,000	88,000	75,000	72,000	72,000	54,600

Source: Swedish Armed Forces 2009, 2011.

According to the 'Defence Bill 2008/09', the battalion combat groups that will form the core of the Army's forces will be more mobile and flexible than at present, and will have high operational effectiveness. Like our naval and air defence forces, they can be rapidly deployed for missions in Sweden, the immediate region and beyond (Regeringskansliet 2010: 5).

The document also emphasizes the importance of the defense force's ability to "switch between different tasks, environments, conflict levels and cooperation partners" and of having "sufficient advanced capability to engage in warfare on any scale, from low- to high-intensive levels of conflict" (Regeringskansliet 2010: 4f.). This organizational reform had to be implemented together with the transformation from a recruitment system based on universal conscription to an all-volunteer force. At the same time, new ideas about a future comprehensive 'military professionalization' in Sweden were created and promoted, particularly within the armed forces. The Swedish Parliament proposed to assign the following main tasks to the Swedish armed forces:

“Defend Sweden and assure our security via missions in Swedish territory, within and beyond the surrounding area, detect and counter violations of Swedish territory and in accordance with international law, protect sovereign rights and national interests beyond this. Armed Forces capabilities and resources are also to be put at the disposal of the community and other authorities in time of need.” (Swedish Armed Forces 2009: 5)

In addition, the following new “mission statement” was published: “Through its armed combat capability the Swedish Armed Forces are Sweden’s ultimate security policy instrument. As such, the Swedish Armed Forces are on constant standby to undertake international missions and assert Sweden’s national integrity and to support Swedish society in the event of major crises. To ensure that Sweden can retain its security policy freedom of action, the Swedish Armed Forces continuously further develops its capabilities to meet future needs.” (Swedish Armed Forces 2009: 6)

The *Pocket Guide to the Swedish Armed Forces 2009* phrased the new direction of its so-called ‘mission-based defense’ with the following slogan (in the document printed with big capital letters): “Always at the ready, anywhere anytime.” (Swedish Armed Forces 2009: 10)

In recent years, several consequences of this shift and new direction in military affairs have become visible. Sweden has participated in a number of international military operations including missions in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Libya. In this context, the deployment of JAS 39 Gripen in Libya (Operation ‘Unified Protector’) must be seen as the beginning of a new era in Sweden’s military engagement in international coalition operations. Today, the country – despite its military non-alignment policy – clearly signals its readiness to engage militarily even in robust military operations around the globe. It must also be mentioned that Sweden became the lead-nation of the EU Nordic Battle Group (NBG); most recently last year when the NBG was on stand-by for potential EU military operations. Sweden contributed about 1,600 troops to the NBG 2011. Today, a new recruitment system gradually leads to the creation of a new type of Swedish soldier. This type is linked far more to images and ideas of a ‘professional soldier’ who is employed by the armed forces not primarily for the purpose of national or territorial defense, but rather to contribute to the success of any kind of military mission, including combat and war-fighting, than to traditional images of a homeland defender, peacekeeper or citizen in uniform. This change will have a major impact on the self-image and corporate identity of the Swedish officer corps in the next decades.

3 Sweden's New Expeditionary Capabilities' Concept

The 'Defence Bill 2008/09' also stimulated a number of new military concepts and doctrines that would help to re-design the armed forces and create the desired mission-based organization. The Swedish Armed Forces started to develop a new conceptual framework for their future military operations abroad by adopting a new 'military-strategic doctrine' and by developing a new analytical concept of 'expeditionary capability'. Both activities need to be viewed as important steps regarding the implementation of the 'Defence Bill 2008/09' and the current transformation of the Swedish military, their participation in international coalitions and their readiness to use force in such operations.

The 'Military-Strategic Doctrine 2012' (militärstrategiskdoktrin med doktrinärgrunder, MSD 12; Försvarsmakten 2011) avoids using the term 'intervention', but quite openly speaks about the armed forces' 'capability to conduct war' (krigföringsförmåga). A few pages of the doctrine focus explicitly on key aspects of Sweden's expeditionary capability (Försvarsmakten 2011: 137–140). The need to increase this specific capability is stressed, although the level of ambition in this respect remains vague depending on external factors such as the overall political direction, economic conditions and access to resources. However, it is made clear that a smaller part of the military organization is designed to conduct 'robust expeditionary' operations. This also implies that the recently initiated professionalization of the Swedish Armed Forces has to contribute to the creation of a general 'expeditionary mindset' among its personnel. This doctrine is linked to an Operative Doctrine of the Swedish Armed Forces which provides the general guideline for a number of tactical manuals. The document itself also stresses the harmonization of its guiding principles and goals with other multinational doctrines, primarily NATO's Allied Joint Doctrine (AJP-01) as well as other NATO and EU doctrines (Försvarsmakten 2011: 14).

Another important document for Sweden's defense policy is the annual 'letter of regulation' (regleringsbrev) of the Swedish government which outlines specific policy goals for the armed forces and provides budget information for the upcoming year. According to the letter of regulation for the budget year 2012 (Regleringsbrev 2012), the Swedish Armed Forces are tasked with developing the following operational capabilities within the next few years: To ensure the permanent availability of 2,000 personnel for national and international military operations and to allow for a permanent participation of military troops in up to four operations of which at least one can be of the size of a battalion (Regeringen/Försvarsdepartementet 2011: 4). Reviewing the government's plans with respect to the development and pur-

chase of new arms systems (armament), military equipment and material in the years to come, it becomes very clear that the goal of creating a modern and well-equipped 'expeditionary force' is increasingly gaining importance.

In addition to the material and logistic aspects of how to equip and maintain a modern expeditionary force, so-called 'soft skills' or the moral, cultural and mental grounds of such a military endeavor are increasingly taken into consideration by military strategists and planners and systematically studied in Sweden. In the last three years, a number of research projects sponsored by the Swedish Armed Forces have aimed at studying a wide array of moral, cultural and social-psychological aspects of military operations abroad, particularly with respect to potential new expeditionary missions in the near future. A number of studies have also aimed at gaining deeper insight into the importance of certain attitudes, concepts, ideas and values with respect to mission success and issues of legitimacy and public support (Fürst/Kümmel 2011; Fürst/Flygelholm 2011). In this context, the Swedish Armed Forces have shown a particular interest in studying questions such as, for example, how an expeditionary force can manage to win 'hearts and minds' in the mission area and what kind of 'expeditionary mindset' needs to be created within Sweden and the Swedish Armed Forces in order to guarantee success in future expeditionary missions (Flygelholm/Norlander/Hansson/Sjöblom 2009).

4 Political and Social Implications of Sweden's New Defense Policy

This development and the above-described reform and restructuring processes raise the question of whether the new direction in Swedish security and defense policy is in fact built upon solid public consensus and therefore also finds enough public support in a long-term perspective. It is interesting to note that the parliamentary vote on abolishing conscription in Sweden resulted in a rather split decision with a very tiny majority in favor of the motion (votes 153:150; Swedish Parliament, 16 June 2009). Furthermore, public opinion polls indicate that a significant part of the Swedish population still favors the country's involvement in traditional peacekeeping rather than engaging in robust combat operations. It appears that the above-described shift in Sweden's defense policy and the new direction towards an expeditionary force has not sufficiently been noticed by the vast majority of the country's population.

An analysis of today's Swedish security and defense policy discourse needs to address a number of interesting puzzling features: One emphasizes solidarity in the EU and Nordic region, while maintaining a policy of military non-alignment; one avoids terms such as military intervention in public dis-

courses, while conceptualizing and materializing the creation of an expeditionary force; one signals the country's readiness to engage in robust combat operations, while maintaining and reconstructing the image of Sweden as a peace-loving nation devoted to humanitarian aid, democracy and the rule of law, the principle of non-intervention and peaceful settlement of conflicts.

Magnus Christiansson recently tried to explain this Swedish peculiarity as the outcome of a "two-dimensional game of solidarity and sovereignty" of the Swedish security policy which, according to him, is subject to a process of "conceptual stretching", i.e. established analytical concepts and notions are getting changed and gradually adapted to fit new contexts or, in other words, "the extension of meaning of a political concept in a discourse serves the function to accommodate distinctly different political interests" (Christiansson 2010: 29).

Following the idea of conceptual stretching, one could, with respect to the Swedish case, draw the conclusion that the recent changes in the country's security and defense policy and the Swedish Armed Forces current work towards establishing an expeditionary force capable of conducting war and using military force anywhere in the world is largely covered up in a public discourse that overstretches the traditional meanings of terms such as peace-keeping, humanitarian aid, stabilization mission etc. Avoiding the term 'military intervention' in public discourses does not automatically lead to the abolition of any intervention-type military action. On the contrary, the new term and concept of an 'expeditionary force' could easily turn out to be nothing else than a traditional military intervention force in new clothes.

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Democratic Soldiers as Marginal Men: The Impact of Security-Cultural Transformations on the Military in Europe

Sabine Mannitz

“It is in the mind of the marginal man – where the changes and fusions of culture are going on – that we can best study the processes of civilization and progress.” (Park 1950: 356)

1 Introduction

When the Chicago sociologist Robert Ezra Park conceptualized the “marginal man” in the 1920s (Park 1928), he focused his emerging theory of the relationship between identity and social order on the urban experiences of immigrants. Park regarded the immigrant as living in two different cultures and as struggling morally with an ambivalent division between the old and the new self. I introduce Park’s notion of the ‘marginal man’¹ here as a point of departure because it has something to contribute to contemporary research on the transformation of military institutions in post-Cold War democracies, and more particularly in the context of a “post-military society” (Shaw 1991).

Park argued that the human self is given meaning and identity by the responses we receive from others to our role and status in the social order, and more specifically to our occupation. The figure of the immigrant served – at the least at the time when Park developed his model – as a prototypical example to illustrate (and study) the influence of modern contingency and changing conditions in the social hierarchy and valuation scheme on the conceptualization of the self: Being socialized in cultures with different understandings of status, social roles, virtues and obligations, migrants typically experience an identity crisis,² according to this concept, when they realize that familiar standards are rendered obsolete in their new environments. Robert Ezra Park called this experience that of the ‘marginal man’. In my article,

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- 1 Park used the masculine reference as the general denominator, which is also quoted here. Women are, of course, included in the concept of the “marginal man”, but the feminine reference will not be added, for readability reasons. Unless otherwise stated, both men and women are included.
 - 2 Although terms like ‘crisis’ and ‘marginal’ may be interpreted as indicators for a pessimistic judgment of the migrants’ capacity to cope with change, Park did not assess the conflictive situation which he assumed to exist to be a negative circumstance. I will return to this aspect later on.

I argue that it is instructive to use Park's notion as a perception foil when studying the situation of soldiers in post-Cold War democracies, who have been affected by a number of trajectories of change for the past two decades. With this template in mind, my article reflects on the tensions that soldiers from European democracies encounter as they have to cope with competing expectations which arise from the normative concepts of soldiering in their national societies on the one hand and from the practical scope and experience of international military operations on the other.

In the following, I draw on a research project that resulted in detailed analyses of the ways in which democratic civil-military relations and the norms of soldiering are currently conceptualized in twelve European countries (Mannitz 2012b). The focus of this research concerned relationships within democratic societies and the ways in which they have changed since the end of the Cold War. In an international collaboration including three colleagues from the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt and nine external associates,³ we first of all studied the official ideal-type that professes the socialization objective of each country's military today. In a second step, we investigated how these normative concepts are actually interpreted and conveyed in military institutions. And finally, we analyzed how individual soldiers who are socialized within these institutions express their values, attitudes and professional identities⁴ in the face of the redefined status of the military in global political conflicts.

This chapter is divided into four parts. At first, I shall explain the research interests that made us address soldiering from the angle of IR democratic theory. I will then turn to the research design and present some of our major results in the third section. As will be argued in the conclusion, some of our findings touch upon the political and societal resources which soldiers are entitled to in a democratic polity, but which increasingly seem to be missing; a development, which places them more and more in the position of 'marginal men'.

3 For more information on the research team and access to our interim country reports see our project website: <http://www.hsfk.de/Das-Bild-vom-demokratischen-Soldaten-Spannungen-z.75.0.html?&L=1>.

4 We thank the Volkswagen Foundation for funding our joint research from 2006 to 2010 and the involved ministries of defense for granting access to their militaries.

2 The Contextual Construction of the ‘Democratic Soldier’

Since the end of the East-West conflict, we have observed new forms and a rise in numbers of military missions undertaken by democratic states. At the same time, however, democracies continue to differ in the ways they employ their military forces: Some participate in ‘wars of choice’ more willingly than others, some states tie their international commitment to further conditions. In the post-Cold War security environment, democratic states have called upon their armed forces to fulfill somewhat unconventional and increasingly ambiguous tasks – partly civilian, partly humanitarian, partly military in “fuzzy”, “dispersed”, “blurred” and “unpredictably fluid” conflicts (Michael/Kellen/Ben-Ari 2009: 3). And military structures have been transformed to make them suitable for these new types of deployments. Traditionally, the military assumed the role of the national defense institution; it served as nation-builder and regime defender. With the changed global conditions, the European democratic societies now appear to attribute quite different roles to their armed forces. Unconventional conflict and threat scenarios have led to new kinds of military missions such as humanitarian interventions, multinational crisis management or peacekeeping; or else the aim is to defend the values of liberalism and rules of democracy, for instance when guarding democratic elections in Congo with the help of EU troops. These shifts towards armed forces as multi-functional instruments or forces for (what the responsible decision-makers consider) ‘good’ imply various challenges and adaptation pressures for military institutions and their members. Not only have qualification demands grown. The new mission types also imply the necessity to adopt a new image and ethos of soldiering: The collective that soldiers are now expected to defend has turned into a transnational value community rather than being a national collective or territory (see Haltiner 2006; Mannitz 2006; Haltiner/Kümmel 2008).

The new arrangement of continuities and changes has driven us to ask about the mechanisms which are at work within democratic states when it comes to the task allocation and democratic control of the armed forces. The goal of our study was to see whether and how the differences which exist between democracies in terms of the way they deploy their militaries are conditioned by the way in which the normative image of the soldier is constructed and realized. This interrelation between democratic rule and a particular conceptualization of soldiering may need an explanation.

All democracies are confronted with the principal problem of having to deal with tensions between the norms of their constitutional order (prioritizing non-violent solutions to conflicts) and the means of military violence. In structural terms, the special feature of a democracy’s internal relationship

with its military is the fact that civil control of the military power apparatus takes place under the decision-making primacy of the democratically legitimated political leadership. This is generally held for the standard principle of democratic governance (Schmidt 2000: 450f.) and is emphasized as being indispensable for the process of democratization. Corresponding institutional reforms also took place during the wave of democratization which began with the collapse of the socialist world starting from 1989/1990. And yet, democratic integration and control of the armed forces requires more than mere institutional structures to steer the military power apparatus and give military operations democratic legitimacy. The qualitative particularity of democratic states is the principle that the definition of the *volonté générale* and hence also of the political tasks entrusted to the military should be developed in a process of deliberative negotiations. The actual fluidity of these processes is subject to specific elements which arise as a result of the institutional order, the history of a country, its political culture, and additional factors related to the concrete democratic development. All the basic societal, political, and historical conditions may leave their mark on the discursive construction of the conceptual ideal of the soldier, which we set out to investigate. Therefore, the most suitable way of focusing our research was via the formulation of an explicitly social constructivist hypothesis about the genesis of specific features of democratic civil-military relations. In doing this, we concentrated on social constructions which, as collectively produced systems of values and meanings, inform the societal discourse about the image of the soldier.

Following Immanuel Kant, we suggested that civil-military relations within a democratic polity are characterized by a particular quality of mutual responsibilities: The basic assumption originally put forward by the philosopher says that democracy is the most peace-inclined regime type because the interest calculations and value orientations of their citizens reduce the readiness of democracies to make use of their military forces. The people would not risk their own health, lives and commonwealth, or those of their 'own' soldiers, if there was no ultimate necessity, i.e. self-defense. This implies that distinctive features and constraints characterize civil-military relations in a democracy. Both civilians and soldiers are supposed to be stakeholders, and their relationship is construed as one of mutual responsibilities. But does this lead to greater peacefulness? Empirically, democracies are no less inclined to wage war than non-democracies, but do not fight against other democracies (see Geis 2001). This reflects the fact that democratic states are willing to cooperate and also capable of doing so. Recent research concerned with the drastic differences between democracies regarding their participation in militarized interstate disputes points to a strong influence of national political

cultures on the relationship to war and peace. The puzzle of ‘democratic peace’ and ‘democratic war’ may find an explanation in this particular factor (Müller/Wolff 2006; Geis/Müller/Schörnig forthcoming). It indicates that democratic citizenries develop a relationship to their soldiers that does differ in quality from the relationship developed by their non-democratic counterparts, but that this relationship shows path-dependent national idiosyncrasies at the same time. Admittedly, some common features can be identified, with individual exceptions. There is a general trend towards the professionalization of armies (in the meaning of contracting rather than drafting soldiers) and to reductions in manpower (see Werkner 2003; Szvircsev Tresch 2005); and cooperation in security policy has increased. These developments suggest that we need to look afresh at the consequences for mechanisms of democratic control institutionalized on a national basis. Consequently, our research combined an investigation into national specificities in the way democracies deal with their armed forces with a perspective which takes into account the rising level of international and transnational cooperation in foreign and security policy.

3 Conceptual Premises and Research Design

In order to study the ways in which democratic societies define the functions and profiles of their armed forces, we took a look at the military as a social institution that needs to manage a stock of knowledge, has to transmit the meanings of its tasks to its members, and also has to reorganize these in situations of change. In other words, the ideal of the democratic soldier is neither timeless nor universal. It is shaped in social construction processes which are historically, nationally, and culturally specific; and democratic societies re-negotiate their normative concepts against the background of the changing conditions in their security environment. In this respect, like in many others, democracies differ a lot. For some states, out-of-area military employment is not at all a novelty. Hegemonic powers like the U.S. or former colonial powers like the UK have been engaged around the globe for a long time. For other nations, such as Germany, the Czech Republic, or Lithuania the post-Cold War changes in their foreign and security policy are tremendous.

In order to make this operable for empirical research, we treated the particular national normative concept of the ideal soldier both as an indicator of and as a tool for the inculcation of democratic norms in the military. In this sense, the specific image of what constitutes a ‘good soldier’ comprises the relevant goals for military socialization; and these are supposed to correspond

to the ideas of the citizenry as represented in national parliaments. The dimensions we addressed in our case studies were accordingly:

- (1) The official normative model of the ‘good soldier’ in a given country: This refers, for example, to the levels of integration versus segregation of the military and related recruitment policies – the classical divide between the integrated citizen-soldier and the separate functionalist elite (the Huntington vs. Jannowitz debate on control modes; see Mannitz 2012a: 9–13). Is the ideal soldier a male, or a female, or is gender irrelevant? Is he or she allowed to express political opinions?
- (2) Transfer of the norms: How is the normative concept translated into practice and into an agenda of training and education in the military? Is it, for instance, regarded sufficient to make soldiers familiar with needed technical skills; or is civic education deemed necessary? What about ethics and learning contents concerning the rule of law, human rights, or intercultural competencies?
- (3) The concrete expression of the concept at the level of individual soldiers as actors: Does it work? Do the soldiers actually correspond to the socialization goals which are designed for them? Does the image of soldiering that they encounter in the military institution make any sense for them? This is of special relevance because of the particular status which the individual enjoys and because of the high priority given to autonomy and self-expression in principle in liberal democracies.

The three conceptual dimensions of the study required an interdisciplinary combination of methods. We combined non-reactive procedures in the shape of analysis of the contents of official documents and public discourse with reactive interviews and methods of ethnographic observation because our research design incorporated both material and ideational factors: (1) We analyzed the institutional set-up of the civil-military structure, the declared tasks of the armed forces and – if they were of topical significance – public or political discourses on these issues. (2) We looked into soldiers’ training and educational principles, the formal code of conduct, the contents of the military oath, documents on military role-sets and institutional culture, the definition of misbehavior and conflict, and conflict settlement proceedings. (3) In the third phase of our study, we carried out field studies with participant observations in selected military training courses (where it was possible) and conducted semi-structured interviews with soldiers, the contents of which were then analyzed according to a common set of questions.

The sample consisted of twelve cases across Europe involving old and young democracies as well as one country which qualifies as a semi-demo-

cracy at best.⁵ The cases were chosen from the different historical phases of democratization because we wanted to see if the particular path to democratic rule renders an effect on the ideal of the soldier. The systematic comparison of a range of European democracies and the developments in post-socialist Europe are especially interesting in this regard.

Since the 1990s, the former socialist states of Central, Eastern, and Southeast Europe have been faced with the task of formulating a security policy based on new principles and establishing a bond between their armed forces and their young democratic systems. Yet, the end of the Cold War also led to changes in security policy in the Western part of Europe; here too, new kinds of conflict and threat scenarios have led to the replacement of classical national defense by multinational crisis management and new mission types. Not least, alliance structures have also been subject to changed conditions. However, in spite of the envisaged increasing cooperation between European states in the field of foreign and/or security policies the countries differ considerably in terms of their national histories, political cultures and their international political profiles. The sample thus shows a variance with regard to democratic regime types, with regard to NATO and EU membership, and other features like, for instance, political neutrality, or the degree to which women are integrated into the military: The studied cases were Switzerland, the UK, Germany, Spain, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Serbia, and the Ukraine. Given the great importance of democratic control of the military during efforts to bring about system transformation, the majority of cases has been selected from the post-socialist countries. The West European states, on the other hand, represent distinctive models of the endeavor to place the armed forces in a democratic system. Furthermore, they served as contrasting cases to assess the influence of the varying levels of democratic maturity on the shaping of military institutions and on military missions.

5 The Ukraine is obviously misplaced in the democratic category. According to the Freedom House Democracy and Freedom Index and the respective Polity IV scales (Jagers/Gurr/Marshall 2009), the country does not meet the minimum standards for democracies, which the other countries do. The case was nevertheless included in the sample because of its political importance and the special challenges due to the huge stock of weapons left in the country from Soviet times, competing military structures, and a split society that is struggling for democratization.

4 Democratic Civil-Military Relations and Ideals of Soldiering: Perspectives from within

For reasons of space, I will concentrate in this chapter on a few *convergences* that we found across our cases. In a certain sense, these convergent phenomena are, as such, also the most striking finding because the studied country cases are otherwise marked by and conscious of their distinct national traditions, political cultures and social complexity (see the case studies in Mannitz 2012b).

A well-known structural commonality is that the armed forces across Europe have been reorganized and reduced in size over the past 20 years (see Kuhlmann/Callaghan 2000). The major trend regarding recruitment structures is the transformation towards all-volunteer forces (Werkner 2003; Szvircev Tresch 2005): Conscript armies are costly in relation to what they are able to achieve. Conscripts can hardly be sent into the new types of multinational missions for reasons of political justification and due to a lack of training time that would be needed to make recruits fit for most complex military operations. In brief, we observe a convergent shift towards increased (multi-) functional efficiency of the armed forces, while the democratic goal of integrating the armed forces in society by means of the draft has lost importance. This development is – at least on the normative discourse level – consequential for the definition of the soldiers' virtues and the parameters of their professional identities. In regards of the ideal personal profile in general, and of leadership norms in particular, we found, likewise convergent, the tendency that the ideal-type of the soldier across the studied countries is being promoted as combining a well-trained specialist or technician with discipline, bravery, loyalty to his or her country and/or democratic order – the cases differ in emphasis here – and with a professional respect for the subordination of the military to democratic civilian control (see Müller 2012: 285–287). At the same time, however, the conventional images of soldiering as being about national (and, in particular, meaning territorial) defense have not disappeared from the official political documents. The new aspects and dimensions have rather been added as additional layers than replaced the traditional notion of the nation's defender, or else patriotic warrior. This mixture is prone to create contradictions.

In practice, on the other hand, a diversification of soldierly role-sets is necessary and also observable as a result of the very different and hybrid new mission types. They involve considerable civilian tasks although soldiers must simultaneously also be capable of acting as warriors. From this tool kit, soldiers are expected to be able to distinguish, at times within seconds, what best suits a given situation. This requires complex cognitive capabilities, ana-

lytical and decision-making skills as well as intercultural sensitivity from soldiers in general, and from military leaders in particular (see Kümmel 2003; Tomforde 2008; Müller 2012). The multi-functional use of the military creates the need to rearrange professional images and learning contents, and it creates stress: Soldiers in missions like those of the EUFOR RD in Congo, or those involved in the NATO Operation Enduring Freedom and/or the IS-AF 'peace enforcement' activities in Afghanistan must not act throughout as if they were in a combat mission; it would undermine their soft mission goals. They are expected to be able to engage with, e.g. the civilian population in Afghanistan in a sensitive way that helps to build trust and raise support, whereas the civilians they encounter might just as well be terrorists who plan to carry out an attack.

In many programmatic documents, the consequences of these extensions of the grey zones are in fact reflected: The necessity to adapt military training and education to the new international mission environment is generally admitted; and in most cases, civilian learning contents such as the knowledge of international law, soft skills and training in intercultural competencies are also declared to be of growing importance.⁶ The military sociologist Karl Haltiner has coined this shift from military skills towards a broader educational agenda as the move from Sparta to Athens (2005, 2006: 523f.). A remarkable emphasis is, moreover, put in many official declarations on the individual soldiers' ownership in decision-making within the boundaries of commands. Key concepts such as 'mission tactics' or 'leading with values' describe this ideal of de-centralized leadership. However, while high ambitions are typically phrased in the normative rhetoric in most countries we investigated, (too) little seems to have been done as yet to provide the necessary assistance and concrete instruction to help soldiers cope with the diversity of role-sets that they are nowadays expected to master.

The Czech Republic may serve as one example to illustrate existing gaps between the glossy vision and the rocky way: The Czech volunteer army (since 2005) is constructed as an army of citizens and designed according to the concept of an 'army in democracy'. This assumes the introduction of the maximum of democratic rules and processes compatible with its functioning as an armed force that needs to rely on clear chains of command. The politi-

6 Tomforde (2008) explains the rationale behind this with reference to the German *Bundeswehr*. The fact that she is herself employed as a lecturer in ethnology/cultural anthropology for the training of military leaders gives evidence for the relevance that is meanwhile attributed to this kind of skills in the German case. Germany is comparatively advanced in respect of the institutional integration of intercultural competence into the curricula of the officer training (see also Bake/Meyer 2012).

cally informed citizen-soldier is the normative role model, and official documents explain this model to be rooted in the country's history, with special reference to the First Republic of the inter-World War period and the military reforms of that time. However, the current day training of Czech soldiers involves no political or civic education at all that would explain and promote the concept of the 'army in democracy'. It comes as no big surprise then that many of the interviewed soldiers do not understand the bigger picture of military values and democratic traditions that they are supposed to have internalized. Apparently, the Czech Ministry of Defense staff expects that the country's pre-communist democratic past and traditions will somehow automatically be absorbed with the re-introduction of democratic rule; however, it obviously does not work like that. Our research – as well as national survey data – indicates that Czech soldiers express very conventional ideas about their place in the polity: One third of our interviewees mentioned as their genuine tasks the defense of the state, of national independence and of sovereignty, and only 14 percent came to speak of peace related activities. Half of our interlocutors did not see themselves as guardians of *any* ideals. And concerning the judgment of peace operations, 60 percent of the interviewed soldiers said that they did not believe that politicians would understand the political, military or ethical circumstances of these missions (see Kříž 2009, 2010, 2012). These Czech soldiers are ready to defend their country and many even insisted on the importance of defending the sovereignty and territory of the Czech Republic, if necessary, at any cost. But this is quite a different vision from the actual, allotted tasks of the Czech armed forces. The related defense political documents explicitly declare national territorial defense to have been rendered a pointless scenario with the European integration process.

Sure, this is just one idiosyncratic example with its own specificities, and it may appear extreme. However, it is in fact rather typical in the following respects:

- Practical training resources tend to be (too) scarce when compared with the high ambitions one finds in the latest official documents on the changing culture of military operations, and the soldiers which they require in terms of horizon, ambiguity tolerance and personal faculty of judgment. In order to develop the related skills, high-quality ethical education, e.g., the Swiss dilemma training, does exist. But it has as yet remained exceptional, meaning that soldiers from different European countries enter their demanding joint missions with very different starting conditions.
- By abolishing all 'political education' – which had obviously been some kind of partisan indoctrination in their old regimes – most post-communist democracies threw the baby out with the bath water. Soldiers

will neither come to terms with the political ends of unconventional military operations nor understand the particular mutual responsibilities of democratic constituencies and armed forces if nobody explains these to them. The institutional logic of the military as such is neither democratic, nor can it be taken for granted that collective memory dates back to the early 20th century, unless it becomes revitalized. Therefore, institutionalized provisions and – naturally non-partisan – instructions on democratic civil-military relations must receive systematic attention.

- Soldiers across all the countries in our sample expressed certain disenchantment with the political leadership and with the lack of military expertise among political decision-makers. Furthermore, what was not quoted in the Czech example above but holds true for that country case also: Wider society is judged by many members of the armed forces to be too uninterested, prejudiced or at the best indifferent in issues pertaining to military affairs. The fact that the military profession required a whole range of skills from technical knowledge over managerial and diplomatic skills to military expertise proper would not be recognized in public, but soldiers were held by many of their fellow citizens for being just simple-minded daredevils.⁷

The last point is quite informative: Many of the soldiers of different rank and throughout almost all the countries in our sample either fear or have the impression to directly observe alienation in the domestic relations: Towards the politicians who decide on the deployment of troops, and towards the democratic citizenries that are in charge of controlling this decision-making through their representatives in parliament and the public media. Similar assessments were made even in countries where opinion polls regularly indicate that the military is among the most trusted state institutions. In this context also, the changes in recruitment modes were seen as giving rise to concerns: Although we found an altogether consensual set of attitudes among soldiers throughout the ranks regarding the ongoing trend of transformations towards professionalized, contracted all-volunteer forces, there is also widespread fear that these forces will not be taken care of in an adequate way. Politicians and

7 This is not to say that the absence of great debates in society does automatically indicate a disinterest, or tacit agreement with military political decisions. Biehl & Fiebig (2011) have, for instance, shown that the German citizenry is much more supportive of the *Bundeswehr* than is generally made believe with reference to the ‘friendly disinterest’ which former President Horst Köhler claimed to be characteristic. However, evidently the soldiers expect more explicit signs of trust and support; or greater alertness in matters pertaining to the democratic control of the executive when it comes to deployments.

the civilian public could more easily regard the military to be just a functional institution and lower inhibitions concerning deployment. We heard from among the more senior officers in particular that these experienced soldiers become increasingly disappointed by politicians who they judged to act irresponsibly if the decided missions are not clearly explained; and if the people who are to exert democratic control of the security sector do not know much about military affairs; or else if politicians do not differentiate clearly between civilian/humanitarian ends and military mission tasks.

Against the background of the aforementioned Democratic Peace assumptions and in spite of the characteristic democratic reluctance regarding casualties (Schörnig 2008), citizenries in democracies may, in fact, become less hesitant to deal with conflicts by military means if an all-volunteer force is available and is provided with up-to-date equipment. Quite understandably, the idea that soldiering could in such a way be regarded (merely) an ordinary profession meets with considerable uneasiness on the part of many soldiers. It leaves the bitter taste of being the ones who are sent out to do the dirty work – namely possibly the killing – for the community. One conclusion that emanates from this constellation is that it is the military that has the strongest interest in most scrupulous democratic control of the armed forces, and in transparent criteria concerning out-of-area and out-of-classical-defense deployments (see Müller/Fey/Mannitz/Schörnig 2010).

The potential overstretch of soldierly role-models in fuzzy missions adds further to the identity stress factors with which military institutions and individual soldiers have increasingly had to cope following the end of the Cold War changes in the international security constellations. And, paradoxically enough, in spite of the notable increase in military deployments in the post-Cold War era and their vast coverage in all types of media – from TV over newspapers to the internet, the military institution itself “exists ever more on the margins of post-military society. (...) [The armed forces] constitute a smaller and often more isolated section of societies to which they belong.” (Shaw 1991: 134f.; see also Booth/Kestnbaum/Segal 2001: 337) This marginalization has normative as well as practical consequences.

Deployments abroad under EU, UN or NATO command have become ‘normal’ to most countries in our sample. The respective constituencies accept their forces being sent into highly complex, high-risk international missions, but do not care too much about how their fellow citizens in uniform manage to bridge the gap between the national expectations or factually existing bonds of loyalty and the challenging international mission realities. Nevertheless, under certain conditions peacekeeping or the monitoring of post-conflict reconstruction processes become resources of soldierly self-assurance: For one, whether peace support or combat missions, they must not

appear as imprudent hazards, but the goals must be clear and plausible. The latter implies that competent decision-making bodies account for their considerations and produce a convincing narrative. Furthermore, the adoption of unconventional, seemingly ‘unmilitary’ tasks in soldiers’ professional identities appears to be easier in those societies where public contestations have been recasting the concepts of masculinity over the past decades. Although stereotypical images of masculinity have always had a strong backing in military institutions – and may continue to find proportionally more adherents there than on average scale in wider society – the late modern discourses on gender roles as being social constructions have left their marks. This becomes evident in many soldiers’ assessments of job satisfaction, and ‘doing a good job’ in missions ‘other than war’ when it is exactly the underlying humane vision and their partly civilian and partly post-national character that made these employments meaningful. Only a very small number of soldiers commented on such missions as placing soldiers in unmanly roles. At the same time, however, a huge number of soldiers we talked to still quote national or ‘homeland’ defense as the ultimate personal motivation for the readiness to enter the genuine risks of the military profession.

Hence, the ongoing and contradictory transformations in soldierly role conceptions seem to be less and less inspired by a normative consensus which the democratic polity defines and contests in public, but to develop within military life-worlds as a result of the involved personnel’s international mission experiences, and as a result of the sheer necessity of coping with the loss of former certainties. In other words, the critical moments of ambivalence have become ‘normal’ for the military as well, just as the coping strategies have become heterogeneous – which ultimately meets with Park’s observations of the implications of marginality (see Park 1950: 356).⁸

8 One should note that scholars from migration studies and postcolonial studies, in particular, have long been arguing for the thesis that Park’s concept is no longer valid because of the overall social changes and the general fluidity which marks biographical options in late modernity. Stuart Hall, for instance, noted with irony that the experience of the marginal migrant has meanwhile become a universal living condition: “Thinking about my own sense of identity, I realize that it has always depended on the fact of being a migrant, on the difference from the rest of you (...). Now that, in the postmodern age, you all feel so dispersed, I become centred. What I’ve thought of as dispersed and fragmented comes (...) to be the representation of postmodern experience! Welcome to migranthood!” (Hall 1987: 63) Although this may be true, at least to some extent, the role of the military in modern democracy nevertheless has traditionally been defined by the institutional representation of the citizens’ right of and duty to defense. This continued to imply greater role clarity, relatively speaking, till the 1990s than in many other societal sub-systems.

5 Conclusions

The diversity of contemporary missions, most of which combine military combat readiness with soft goals like the establishment of trust in peace consolidation processes, makes it more difficult to prepare soldiers in advance for their duties than has been the case in times of classical warfare. Hybrid operations like a ‘robust peace support’ mission raise the level of the required cognitive abilities and call for situational flexibility. Professional efficiency is expected from the individual soldier in the role of the warrior as well as in the role of the proverbial ‘armed social worker’. Among soldiers who have experienced this in practice, a hybridization of their professional self-conceptions is one answer to these ambiguities; but it remains to be accompanied by considerable feelings of uneasiness: Most of our interlocutors long for a clarity of roles and structures that is no longer available and also unrealistic to regain. They have been experiencing simultaneous transformations in the international system and the defense alliance, in life-worlds, recruitment systems, military technology, mission types, and – in post-communist countries – also in the political system.

All this implies the loss of orientation marks such as tradition, clear enemies, role certainties, clear identities and (taken for granted) bonds with their parent societies (see Mannitz 2006; Müller 2012). Our empirical research shows clearly that many soldiers feel left alone in the face of such multi-dimensional challenges (see the country cases in Mannitz 2012b). Soldiers have to redefine their professional identities and adjust to the new demands which unfold in the gap between the national norms of defense and the ambiguous realities of international missions, while this gap is not made an issue in much of the public representation of contemporary military operations: “[T]he military is becoming less salient in the thoughts and minds of Western citizens. (...) Much more likely [than global war, S.M.] is the chance of military involvement in constabulary affairs, which, while hardly being innocuous for the personnel involved, does not capture public attention to the degree that large-scale conflicts can.” (Booth/Kestnbaum/Segal 2001: 337)

In terms of the implications for the democratic governance of the security sector, our comparative research thus prompts us to conclude that the so-called “second generation problematic” (Cottey/Edmunds/Forster 2002), i.e. the effective engagement of civil society in the governance and control of the defense and security policy, is not only a problem of the relatively young post-communist democracies, but a more general deficit. Critical observers like Martin Shaw forecast the possible increase of armed conflicts early after the implosion of the Soviet Empire and pointed to the societal and political responsibilities in democratic states to use the opportunities for peace which

the course of history has granted: “Military force will inevitably have a role in the creation of a more peaceful world order – even the most perfect global institutions would, in the foreseeable future, require a considerable policing or peace-keeping capacity. But the transition to a peaceful world depends on the progressive weakening of military institutions in favour of political mechanisms for international disputes. This will not occur simply as a result of developments between nation-states themselves: it requires the active intervention of the members of society, as individuals and in organized groups. (...) Just as the citizen formerly owed a military duty to the state, the active side of post-military citizenship can be defined in terms of the citizens’ duty towards peace.” (Shaw 1991: 186f.)

Soldiers in democratic systems are entitled to sound reasons for being deployed; not last in order to be able to cope with the personal risks involved. Finally, democratic constituencies are accountable for engaging their collective means of violence in foreign policy. This is especially the case when legitimizing extraterritorial military activities as serving the agenda and humane values of the Enlightenment, because arguments for “militarized humanitarianism” (Chandler 2001), or “wars of conscience” (Dandeker 1998: 35) leave even more space for arbitrary forms of interpretation than classical defense scenarios. It seems that these consequences have not yet been realized sufficiently in the public arenas of the advanced democracies. They are, however, understood immediately by soldiers who are expected to be prepared to kill and risk their own life and limb in remote parts of the world without always being given substantial justifications for the choice of military means to settle a given crisis. Likewise in this respect, our soldiers have come to be ‘marginal men’ in the meaning of Robert Park who argued that the distance of marginality provides a special vantage point from which to comprehend and critique what tends to be taken for granted by the mainstream.

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The Quest for ‘Evidence-Based Soldiering’

Joseph Soeters

“Perhaps our (...) military experts would benefit from following such a tactic- and arrive at happier outcomes.”¹

1 Introduction

Now as the closure of the large-scale operations in Afghanistan approaches, few people are convinced that these operations have been successful. A certain disillusionment seems to prevail as so often happens when wars come to an end. Has it been worth all these lives (dead or disabled), this destruction, these efforts, all this money? The enthusiasm with which the operations started seem to be as large as the disappointment afterwards. One even talks about the coming era of post-interventionism: We won’t do this again, not this way, not so comprehensively, not so ambitiously, not at the expense of so much.

But, perhaps, this conclusion is too quick. One does not necessarily need to be pessimistic about what the military – whether or not in collaboration with other organizations, such as aid agencies – can achieve. Instead, one must perhaps take a more distant view and have a look at what may have worked, and what did not in those operations in Afghanistan. Which aspect of the soldiering – here to be perceived as the whole military effort, not the behavior of individual soldiers only – did work properly, and what was not effective? This is a plea for pragmatism as well as an argument to bring in more evidence-based thinking into military practice.

Evidence-based thinking has emerged in medicine (Sackett et al. 1996), but when it comes to social sciences it has also been advocated in education, policing (Sherman 2002) and, more recently, in management (Rousseau 2006; Rousseau/McCarthy 2007). This way of thinking attempts to combine the best available external evidence from systematic research with individual expertise and experience of medical doctors, police officers, managers or indeed military commanders. This approach is neither an old hat nor is it a dangerous innovation, but it may be controversial for some people nonetheless. That is because evidence-based soldiering will not accept what has long been taken for granted nor will it follow certain ‘truths’ simply because some important person or institution ‘said so’.

1 This quote is the last sentence from Segre (2012: 29). This is a piece in a volume advocating the use of scientific concepts to improve one’s thinking (and acting for that matter).

2 Evidence-Based Medicine, Policing and Management

Evidence-based medicine, for sure, is nothing new (Sackett et al. 1996). Its origins date back at least 100 years or more. But its ‘utilitarian turn’, concentrating on what is useful and what works, has gained more attention recently. That is because patients want treatments and drugs that make them better, nothing else. On the same level, insurance companies only want to compensate those treatments that are based on scientific evidence demonstrating that these therapies are in fact effective. This is not an isolated, cost-driven ambition. Particularly with respect to the pharmaceutical industry, serious doubts about the effectiveness of new drugs have been raised over the last couple of years (Mintzberg 2006; Light/Lexchin 2012). Evidence-based medicine – including psychiatry and psychotherapy – therefore strives to integrate empirical, scientific evidence derived from clinical trials, double-blind placebo-controlled experiments and meta-analyses with individual expertise and experience. For that reason it is important to have medical training, education, treatments, practices and financial compensation based on scientific evidence. Possibly, this may go as far as implementing ‘no cure, no pay’-policies.

The step towards evidence-based thinking in the social sciences is more recent (Young et al. 2002). It is increasingly applied in the field of public administration. More than before, today’s governments want their policies to work, and hence they want to select those measures and regulations that they know will work towards the achievement of their goals. In policing, evidence-based thinking has gained some ground in community policing (Sherman 2002). Police officers are trained to treat their suspects politely because it has been demonstrated that doing so reduces repeat offenses. Psychological evidence with respect to behavior in crisis and stress has resulted in training programs on how to deal with people who threaten to commit suicide or engage in violent behavior towards others, such as hostage taking. Earlier on, in the 1980s, it had been discovered that visibility of the police and the mandate to go after petty crimes such as graffiti, littering and other nuisance helped to bring down the general level of crime in a neighborhood. An orderly environment was discovered to serve as a reminder that police and residents are dedicated to keeping the peace on the street and showing who is in charge (Wilson/Kelling 1982; Pinker 2011: 123).

In management there are numerous insights and evidence that indicate what to do and what not to do when trying to run companies and public organizations successfully and decently (Rousseau 2006; Rousseau/McCarthy 2007: 86). Unfortunately, the available information to gain, and be aware of, evidence is not always used (Pfeffer/Sutton 2006). The assumption that

workers continuously want to compete with co-workers is incorrect as a general idea. It has been the founding myth of many reward systems over the last two decades, nonetheless. The idea that international mergers provide easy gains has been proven to be incorrect many times; yet, managers often decide to engage in such mergers or acquisitions without giving it much thought, let alone having many doubts. Decisions in organizations are often, too often, made on the basis of hope and fear, on the thoughtlessly copying of others' practices, on following what people believe has worked in the past, on dearly held ideologies and culture-related opinions, and on overconfidence. Many managerial decisions are made on the basis of lots of things other than facts (Pfeffer/Sutton 2006: 5), as it frequently is the case in the military world as well (Johnson et al. 2006).

3 Suggestions to Find Evidence in Military Practice – Afghanistan as a Case-Study

This brings us back to Afghanistan and the disappointment that seems to come along with the end of the large-scale operations in that country. The operations have been conducted by various national military contingents who – at least a number of them – had distinct areas of operations, often in an existing province in the country. Because governments and the societies they represent want to know if the military efforts work, large-scale systems have been developed to make inventories of the effects and results that have been achieved.

There is even a NATO-doctrine in this connection, the Effects-Based Approach to Operations – EBAO (e.g., O'Hanlon/Sherjan 2010; Rietjens et al. 2010; Davids et al. 2011). Those measurements of results are based on internal military reports (on casualties, attacks, IEDs), but they increasingly also make use of large-scale polls among the population and reviews of local experts concerning the development the region or country is going through. Granted, one should not take the reliability, credibility and validity of such measures for granted (e.g., Rietjens et al. 2010) and indeed one should scrutinize the use of such information in everyday military practice. Yet, the development to bring more standardized and comparable information into the process of judging the impact of military operations must be seen as a giant leap forward.

Unfortunately, even though there is ample information on input (number of soldiers, vehicles, aircraft) as well as a growing knowledge of the mission's context and increasing information on results or effects, there is hardly any information on the *process* that leads to the *results*. This is an important neglect. For instance, the number of casualties and attacks in a region is al-

ways perceived to be a manifestation of the danger and hostility in that particular area, for instance Helmand being more dangerous than Uruzgan (e.g., Bogers et al. 2012). However, no relation is made with what the various militaries in those areas are in fact doing on the ground. It is simply taken for granted that more attacks and casualties are an indication of the region's hostility, not of the military's own performance (Soeters 2013). Process and result are not connected. Hence, the idea that hostilities may be provoked does not even come to many military minds, despite academic evidence indicating that violence is related to another actor's actions, leading to vicious circles of violence, contra-violence, contra-contra-violence etc. (e.g., Nowak 2011).

Combining the two aspects (process and results), four situations may emerge (Weggeman et al. 2007):

- (1) Process and result are both good (which everyone wants);
- (2) process and result are both not good (which everyone tries to avoid);
- (3) process is good, but result is not (the operation was good, but the patient died; this is unlikely, but it happens); and
- (4) process is bad, but result is good (*catenaccio* football bringing the victory; this is unlikely, but it happens).

It would be interesting to see which military operations may be recognized in the four different situations. I leave this to others. My main point here is that one needs to know more about the process characteristics of military operations and about the connection between process characteristics and results or effects. Without this information, evidence-based soldiering will be impossible. Given the fact that national military contingents have been conducting their own operations in their own areas of operations with their own national styles of operation (showing large and/or subtle differences within a general NATO framework, see Soeters/Tresch 2010), it would have been a good idea to study all these variances with respect to effects and process characteristics. Even in retrospect, it may still be possible to do so. It will provide information for many lessons to learn in order to strive for future evidence-based soldiering.

Process elements that could play a role in such analysis are: The frequency and type of attacks and hostile engagements (defensive and offensive), the time intervals between them, the amount of ammunition used, the size of the collateral damage, the number of the various types of patrols, the amount of money spent on projects, the number, dispersion and distribution of soldiers – standardized for population density and/or per square kilometer –, but particularly also seemingly trivial issues such as: The number and performance of local language experts, the demeanor of soldiers on the streets (body language, use/show of weaponry, cultural sensitivity, general attitude and im-

pression), and the selection of (the numbers of) local partners and contractors. Three examples may be illustrative here.

4 Three Suggestions to Explore

Firstly, organizations tend to prefer working with only one or a small number of partners (e.g., suppliers of goods and services). That is because they think this is more efficient (less contracts, less controls) and more comfortable because one is familiar with the partner's reputation, personnel etc. In the same manner, many military organizations tend to pursue this practice in the area of operations, resonating the 'divide-et-impera' tradition that was so prevalent in colonial times. Sarah Chayes (2006: 182f.), a U.S. citizen living in Kandahar, has described how the American military in various provinces in Southern Afghanistan preferred to work with only one regional, political, tribal leader who also happened to be in the business of construction, security matters and other local services such as language mediation. The consequence was that in granting contracts one partner was given preference all the time making him wealthy and powerful, at the expense of potential partners – from other tribes – who felt increasingly deprived relative to the favorite tribe. In the words of Chayes (2006: 183), this "built a growing feeling of resentment against the U.S. troops". It created hostilities in the form of attacks, IEDs etc. that had nothing to do with Al Qaeda or the Taliban. They were the consequence of ordinary Afghans becoming frustrated by the experience of being neglected. In general, distributing power and resources among several partners will render cooperation more effective, enhance the cooperation's legitimacy, and contribute to the quality of the partnership's direction-setting and implementation processes. This is evidence from organization theory that the military still needs to put into practice (Bollen/Soeters 2010), because they still rely on traditional and easy practices whose usefulness are simply taken for granted.

Second, at the SOWI Summit on post-interventionism in Berlin it was mentioned that Afghan soldiers who are trained by NATO military occasionally sell their uniforms to militants. Using the disguise of the uniform of the Afghan military, those insurgents try to enter the base and attack NATO personnel as well as their compatriots, regularly leading to fatalities and injuries. The militants' behavior is easy to understand, but the selling of the uniforms by one's own 'students' is not. The conclusion – generally accepted and taken for granted – was that Afghans are not to be trusted, not even the ones that are trained to cooperate with the Western militaries. It simply did not occur for a single moment that other interpretations based on cultural evidence may provide a totally different interpretation. This cultural evidence refers to the

importance of honor, ‘keeping face’ and politeness in the communication and interaction style in Afghan society (Hoedemaekers/Soeters 2009). If people in honor cultures lose their face, if they feel insulted and derogated, the offender(s) will evolve to be vulnerable to revenge and violence (Pinker 2011). It is not difficult to imagine that in military training situations between Western servicemen and Afghan ‘students’ such negative interaction may easily occur. Yet again, process and results are not connected.

Third, the structuring of organization activities – the division of labor if you wish – generally has a large impact on the organization’s effectiveness. Questions pertaining to centralization or decentralization of command, the concentrating or dispersing of resources, and the composition of units are pivotal issues in organization studies (e.g., Mintzberg 1979). In Afghanistan commanders of the various nationalities have pursued their own insights with respect to these questions – sometimes even differing among the brigades or task forces that took over each other’s work. There did not seem to be a lot of consistency among the troops that were deployed sequentially nor among the troops of the various nations in the various provinces. Some commanders preferred to decentralize and disperse their troops geographically to get closer to the ‘enemy’, i.e. more within fighting distance (King 2010). The advantage of such an approach may be that local communities are better protected (Sinno 2008), because de-concentrated troops are more easily capable of reaching out to far away locations. The other side of the coin is that troops become more vulnerable to hostile attacks. Others (e.g., Rodriguez 2011) preferred to secure and develop key terrains only, assuming that the absence of troops in far away regions would not attract the enemy to these places, hence bringing down the general degree of hostilities in those areas. Also the composition of units – only consisting of combat troops or being combined units of action including ‘talking people’ – plays a role in containing the violence and solving the conflicts. Discussions about such questions looks like feverish debates among believers. The truth is that one can study such effects (even in retrospect), if one would only commit oneself to doing so, staying cool, searching painfully for details and paying a lot of attention to facts and statistics.

A lot of such information may seem unimportant at first sight, but it has been discovered in the world of sports, that details and subtle incidents may cause the difference between success or failure (Seely Brown/Duguid 1991). It is surprising to see how much attention is devoted to recording all actions of players and athletes in important games and matches, such as the finals in the soccer World Cup or the finals of Olympic Games. From all thinkable angles and perspectives, cameras register all movements and events in the field, enabling an in-depth, detailed scrutiny of everyone’s performance and

the course of events. In the field of military operations such post-hoc scrutinizing is only about to begin, with an exception for military pilots whose actions, firing for instance, are recorded as a standard procedure to make intensive post-flight reviews possible (Ron/Lipshitz/Popper 2006). But even then, the reviews are directed towards the improvement of the actions themselves, not towards the question how these actions may contribute to the overall mission goals. The pilots and their commanders examine and discuss how an object has been targeted, not how this targeting may have contributed to solving the conflict at large.

Sociologists are likely to recognize here the distinction between functional rationality focusing on means to ends (=operations rationality) versus substantial rationality that matters in the context of larger values (e.g., Ritzer 1998: 16–34). One can safely assume that in technical matters, such as in military engineering or aerial bombing, evidence-based thinking is much better developed than in the judgment of large-scale operations. In operations the goals to achieve are broader, more abstract, more ideological by nature, more fuzzy and generally more difficult to comprehend because of the many, long chains of causes-and-effects. Therefore it does not come as a surprise that evidence-based soldiering meets with resistance.

5 Why not? Then Why?

Why are military people hesitant to strive for and implement evidence-based soldiering? There are at least two types of rebuttals.

First, commanders – like medical doctors or managers – may feel threatened by the idea of becoming accountable for their decisions (Rousseau/McCarthy 2007: 94). Sometimes, people may prefer not to know the truth because they only want to hear and convey good news (Pfeffer/Sutton 2006: 32), and sometimes they are more interested in symbolic problem solving because that will ensure future resources flowing into the organization's direction (Seibel 1996). Resistance from commanders may also stem from taken-for-granted demands and views relating to professional autonomy. Many commanders prefer to run the operations as they see fit. Conducting military operations is seen as an 'art' that simply cannot be studied – let alone with metrics! It is an art that must be experienced and practiced on the basis of commanders' intuition and talent, the 'military genius'. Most of all, it is an 'art' that cannot be judged by outsiders or people lower in the organizational hierarchy.² Often there is a reference in this respect to von Clausewitz's fa-

2 In fact, reliance on facts and evidence is a great leveler of hierarchy, as Pfeffer & Sutton (2006: 31) have stated.

mous ‘fog of war’-concept (e.g., Vego 2010). Such thinking underlines the ‘romance of leadership’ (Rousseau 2006) that flourishes in an atmosphere of ‘romantic militarism’ (Pinker 2011), and it stresses the admiration for, and the self-admiration of the big men. A well-known example has been the U.S. Joint Forces Commander General John Mattis who vehemently opposed the EBAO-doctrine, indicating that no one – let alone an information system – could tell him what to do. Obviously, this is the battle about the autonomy of the (military) professional. His arguments led to a fierce debate indicating that not everyone in the U.S. military agreed with his position (Mattis 2008; Ruby 2008).

Another rebuttal seems more content-related. Striving for evidence-based soldiering implies the use of scientific evidence, which is often based on collecting metrics and comparing situations (diachronically and/or cross-sectional) in order to know more about patterns and cause-and-effects relations. Indeed, there are potential methodological problems with both points. As referred to earlier, metrics can be ill-treated and ill-interpreted in many ways (with respect to EBAO, see Rietjens et al. 2010). Comparing violent conflict situations in different points in time or in different areas may be problematic because of the complexity of the situations at hand, rendering every such situation unique, at least to a certain degree. That is the reason why in social sciences, such as military studies, general knowledge should always be interpreted and used in a contextualized manner. This is also the reason why one can never have real, but only *quasi*-experiments in military operational studies. Therefore, in striving for evidence-based soldiering one should not be too simplistic, assuming that A will inevitably lead to B. Instead, one should take the context, i.e. the variance of the situations, into account. One needs to accept that evidence always is only temporarily and conditionally true, i.e. true in its particular context. The forms of evidence that one searches for should therefore be as broad as possible (Learmonth, 2009).

Being aware that situations are unique to a certain extent one must not surrender for this complexity. One must not stop trying to bring elementary relations between process and results in the (various types of) conflicts to the surface. One must no longer take the vision and preconceived ideas of great leaders for granted, nor should one simply accept the exemplary significance of historical events that are ‘sold’ as particularly successful such as in Malaya and Northern Ireland (Ledwidge 2011). Instead, carefully comparing current experiences in a number of situations may lead to a sort of meta-conversation, meta-narrative and meta-knowledge (Robichaud/Giroux/Taylor 2004) that will make evidence-based soldiering possible. Doing without is morally and cost-wise unacceptable. Too many lives, and yes also too much money, are at stake. That is why.

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A Premium on Organizational and Technological Efficiency: Making the Comprehensive Approach Work

Ralph Thiele

1 Prevention is Better

The rules of the global order are changing. Growing competition for global influence and power within the international system can be observed. Globalization, privatization, and outsourcing constitute revolutionary developments encompassing governmental and non-governmental organizations today. The influence of the United States is shrinking, at least in relative terms. The European Union is going through a profound crisis while the security of its societies is defined by a fragile network of values, connections, and infrastructure.

Today it is not possible anymore to clearly classify security risks and it is very difficult to limit them – both in terms of quality and geography. Risks threaten completely different areas like health, the ecological balance, or the peaceful co-existence of social groups. Still, central security challenges can be identified. They comprise, in particular, the threats following from weapons of mass destruction and their increasing proliferation as well as international terrorism, regional conflicts, migration, and the danger of pandemics. In addition, there are the shortage of resources and the vulnerability of critical infrastructures, which can lead to acute crises on short notice.

The events of the Arab Spring, the confrontation over Iran's nuclear arsenal and the possibility of an Israeli attack, the lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, they all indicate: Within the new security environment, prevention and responsiveness are of particular importance – in every respect. Crises and conflicts can occur at any time, on short notice and without prior warning and may require a rapid response over large distances. The coming decades are likely to see a decline in state sovereignty, a power shift from states to international or non-state networks, and an increase in the lethal power of these non-state actors. Scarcity of resources and migration, cross-border conflicts and terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international criminality – all these are global problems which can only be solved jointly. Because of the potential damage that may be caused in future conflicts and possible consequences for people, including economic and social development, authorities will increasingly find themselves in a position, where they cannot afford to wait and see what damage is caused before reacting. In many cases priority must be given to preventive

action. Moreover, a policy aimed at prevention will encourage economic development and reduce the overall costs. Prevention is better than cure!

The majority of people in Western-style democracies nowadays recognize that their freedom depends on the freedom of others. With societies becoming more closely interwoven and with increasing globalization, people can only live their own lives in dignity in solidarity with others. Against this background, the focus of security policy is not on strong states any longer, but rather on weak or even disintegrating states out of which strong non-state actors are operating. The challenge of our times is to establish a dynamic stable international order within the framework of cooperative multipolarity. The use of power in such a globally connected arena is inherently complex. It requires a broad array of diplomatic, political, economic and military tools. It also requires sophisticated concepts to successfully deal with security challenges and anticipate costs when applying given tools.

2 Available Security Instruments

Armed forces are not the only – often not even the most important – security instrument available to the state. In the past, society was mobilized in order to support the military in case of attack. Today, it is the other way round: The armed forces are part of the forces a community uses to react to attacks. In the field of internal security and hazard prevention, it is the police, the fire brigade, disaster control and other *first responders* that are mainly required. There is no doubt, however, that the manifold capabilities armed forces have at hand – partly as the only organization with these capabilities – should become part of a comprehensive *security system*. This system must integrate all authorities responsible for public security, including the state and police, medical services, fire brigades, intelligence services etc.

Military organizations at all levels must be able to conduct integrated military-civil missions requiring well-balanced organizational interfaces. To do so, pre-established information sharing, comprehensive planning methods, role integration and ultimately operational support are needed. While private contractors have been increasingly supporting military missions, military support to civil agencies can be extensive as well. Generally, it requires resources, including vehicles, shelter, communications, security, supplies, etc. in excess of the kit required by the military unit alone.

In consolidation missions, where the military and civilians will integrate closely, the challenge is in particular to:

- Provide a secure environment for the conduct of civilian stability operations;

- protect the victims of conflict as much as seeking to neutralize perpetrators of unlawful violence;
- provide both physical security and logistical support to deployed civilians; and
- conduct humanitarian or reconstruction operations.

Once consolidation becomes the primary mission, military commands must determine the *military* resources necessary to achieve initial stability and the return of essential services in the immediate wake of military operations. These are assets such as military police, CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation), construction engineers and military medical personnel. These forces have the mission to move into areas in the wake of conflict and work with combat forces that are still securing the area. They must provide public security, temporary governance and basic services. These forces must be culturally aware and accustomed to working with both traumatized populations and civilian actors, including NGOs that may already be in the conflict area.

All available instruments must be able to participate in a coordinated, integrated, sometimes even synchronized manner in multinational coalition operations. This requires establishing policies, technologies, and procedures to enable synergies among the very different actors. Joint pre-mission exercises and training are of particular importance to ensuring common understanding of the different organizations' approaches, cultures and objectives.

Military missions have expanded with the developing challenges to security – an ever-growing array of tasks arises by adding new to traditional missions: nationbuilding, stabilizing fragile states, counterinsurgency, and strengthening the security capacities of other countries. The capabilities of civilian agencies have not kept pace, which has caused an imbalance in the tools of statecraft and a resulting inability to meet strategic objectives. For example, despite the European Union's claim to approach security comprehensively, it has until now primarily built military institutions, improved military planning, and generated military capabilities with the civilian institutional counterparts lagging behind and with relatively little attention devoted to civilian personnel and equipment. It has taken more than a decade since the launch of European Security and Defense Policy to recognize that this lopsided situation needs to be remedied (Drient 2011: 5–7).

3 A Hub of Security Partnerships

NATO, the European Union and their respective member nations need to be much better connected – internally, with each other, but equally important to global civilian and military, public and private partners; with security stake-

holders such as the United Nations; with numerous non-governmental organizations. All these actors need the principal ability to operate their available civilian and military, governmental and non-governmental security instruments.

NATO's new Strategic Concept (NATO 2010), adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, underlines that effective crisis management calls for such a comprehensive approach. "The comprehensive approach not only makes sense – it is necessary", NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated in his October 2010 speech at the German Marshall Funds of the United States in Brussels to add that the comprehensive approach builds on enhanced cooperation with external actors. "NATO needs to work more closely with our civilian partners on the ground, and at a political level – especially the European Union and the United Nations." (Rasmussen 2010a)

In fact, NATO has reached out to strengthen its ability to work with partner countries, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and local authorities. In particular, NATO has been building closer partnerships with civilian actors that have experience and skills in areas such as institution-building, development, governance, judiciary and police. Already in February 2010, at the 46th Munich Security Conference, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Speech pointed out that the Alliance should become "the hub of a network of security partnerships" (Rasmussen 2010b). In the subsequent discussions he highlighted, that just like spokes at the hub of a wheel, countries and organizations should be able to connect with NATO to act jointly and in a synergetic fashion if required.

To this end, the Secretary General's hub indeed has enormous potential as it not only provides a plausible vision of what needs to be achieved, but also delivers an operational principle for the design of NATO's organizational processes and structures as well as the selection of available – i.e. information and communication – technologies. Consequently, the *hub* should not merely be understood as a symbol. It should rather serve as a blueprint for focused change management that needs to drive the implementation of a comprehensive approach, where all actors contribute in a concerted effort, based on a shared sense of responsibility, openness and determination, taking into account their respective strengths, mandates and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy. The challenge is now to make the comprehensive approach work.

4 Comprehensive Avenues

Efficient decision-making relies on close integration of political, military, economic, humanitarian, policing and intelligence instruments. This integration is the core of a comprehensive answer to the issue of effective structures for cooperation between the public sector and other parts of society – at the national level and, in particular, across borders. A three-pronged approach will be required, with measures aimed at prevention, protection of critical infrastructures and improved performance of security forces. Building up structures that reflect the tasks is of special importance. This also includes, for example, setting up clear-cut responsibilities, exchange of information and common planning processes. Of particular importance is the development of a *culture of cooperation* among civilian and military actors and between highly different authorities and organizations.

Here, the private sector must be included as well, as the vast majority of the critical infrastructure belongs to or is operated by this sector. The same applies to various non-governmental organizations, as it is not only governmental organizations that have great expertise. Very often, they are in a crisis area even before an intervention occurs and are perfectly familiar with the local situation. This knowledge is of particular value when it comes to planning measures and effects, evaluation methods and evaluation of results as they can help to enhance continuity during transitional phases.

The comprehensive approach as the principal vision of NATO, the European Union and their member states for managing a global landscape in transition is supposed to enable the collaborative engagement of all requisite civil and military elements of international power to prevent crises, to manage them well, to terminate hostilities, restore order, commence reconstruction, and begin to address the conflict's root causes. To work closely on a comprehensive approach NATO and the European Union have principally four instruments of power available:

- *Military* instruments refer to the application of military power, including the threat or use of lethal and non-lethal force, to coerce, deter, contain or defeat an adversary, including the disruption and destruction of its critical military and non-military capabilities. Of course military instruments can also make a contribution to reconstruction and stability building.
- *Political* instruments refer to the use of political power, in particular cooperating with various actors in the diplomatic arena, to influence an adversary or to create advantageous conditions.
- *Economic* instruments generally refer to initiatives and sanctions designed to affect the flow of goods and services, as well as financial support to state and non-state actors involved in a crisis.

- *Civil* instruments refer to the use of powers contained within such areas as judiciary, constabulary, education, public information and civilian administration and support infrastructure, which can lead to access to medical care, food, power and water. They also include the administrative capacities of international, governmental and non-governmental organizations.

Focusing on the military and civilian capabilities of both of these distinct but related asset pools is indispensable to achieve effective civil-military teamwork:

- Military forces will have two essential tasks in the future: One is to win a given conflict militarily in a rapid and decisive manner – even from a distance. The other is to consolidate the military success on the ground. Both tasks support the political purpose. There is no imperative sequence for them, so the focus of action between decision and consolidation can always shift in the course of an operation. Besides a small number of major nations, there will be few states left capable of waging an interstate war with any prospect of success. This is in stark contrast to the emergence of more and more non-governmental protagonists prepared to wage war. The rationale of warfare will differ: While modern industrial states are interested in preventing war out of self-interest, there are states and non-governmental protagonists which use war as an economic or ideological factor leading to another cost-benefit calculation. Furthermore, cyber warfare offers the possibility to considerably affect especially those protagonists who depend on command and control systems and employ them hierarchically.
- Civilian capabilities come mostly from national assets. These include capabilities such as interagency departments of member governments. Contractor support has also become a large factor. If this is indeed to be the primary and most dependable source for the comprehensive approach, there is reason to establish a modest capacity to coordinate national contributions and planning efforts. Beyond governmental task forces of the nations involved, civilian support comes from a host of international organizations, both non-governmental and multinational, many with specialized and highly desirable skills. Key organizational partners are the UN, OSCE, regional organizations or major NGOs such as the Red Cross.

Civilian and military capabilities need to be embedded into an *overall package* of governmental or international measures. The civilian and military actors involved in such operations need to agree on the political end-state, on a politico-strategic guidance to develop a coherent plan involving military and

non-military elements of governments and NGOs and then engage in the joint planning, training, execution and evaluation of operations in complex, civil-military environments in order to achieve the stated objectives. A sustainable organizational framework has to provide the proper structure for effects-based operations synchronizing all actors involved within an environment called engagement space. Understanding the engagement space requires a comprehensive view of all systems relevant to the crisis, particularly six domains which are political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information. Through systems analysis of the goals, strengths, weaknesses and interdependencies of the main actors within these domains, knowledge is developed about the behavior of the main actors within the engagement space. The challenge is to gain a thorough understanding of the behavior and capabilities of different actors and their interactions in order to determine how they might be best influenced by available instruments of power. That knowledge serves decision-making at all levels.

5 Change Management

Implementing such a *Comprehensive Approach* begins with a vision and a plan. It ends – in the best case – with a culture of active collaboration and transparency among those involved. In the past decade, the volatile environments in which civilian and military security forces operated has allowed senior leaders to ignore such requirements. Fearing reactions of constituencies, strategic communities, public opinion and not least of employees has kept them from successfully implementing the comprehensive approach. In the meantime, change has become indispensable. Traditional toolboxes of states have fallen short of delivering sufficient impact to respond effectively and with adequate agility to the existing multifaceted challenges to security. In all developed industrialized states and beyond, intensifying globalization leads to ever higher innovation frequencies. This means that former success is no guarantee for continued prosperity or security. This in turn eventually means that new products and capabilities are being developed in ever shorter periods of time. Successful organizations and enterprises, societies and states depend on their own courage to change their traditional behavior patterns, i.e. from the currently prevailing incremental innovation to structural innovation. Any change management is supposed to address people and their mindsets, organization – i.e. processes and architecture – and last but not least technology. Good communication is the biggest carrier of any proposed change.

5.1 Organization

With regard to organization it is of key importance that sustainable efficient and effective organizational structures and business processes underpin newly developed capabilities. Organizational design needs to define the structure, roles, skills and job descriptions of the instruments of the comprehensive approach. The process of design must be complementary with the objectives as organizational systems exist for only one purpose – to deliver the power of the organization’s vision. Every element needs to be examined and designed to make sure that it is *fit for purpose* – to deliver the vision of the comprehensive approach. Structures and processes need to be shaped to enhance interoperability and to facilitate interaction and synergies in complex engagement spaces among very different organizations.

- Structure, as shown on organization charts, needs to define the boundaries of authority and decision-making and to identify the key personnel responsible. Once vision and strategy, core work processes, and key roles have been identified, the structure should be reviewed and, if necessary, re-designed to provide the required support. Within the comprehensive approach the organizational design of civil-military components needs to support:
 - Command and control: Interconnected system of command and control, communications and information collection and processing as well as intelligence (C4ISR) at the disposal of the political, civilian and military leaders as well as an adequate, comprehensive logistical set-up for all task elements.
 - Rapid deployment: Small modular task units with a high command and control capability with emphasis on covert special operations, surveillance, intelligence and cyber warfare, including the necessary situational awareness, access to land-, air- and sea-based active options as well as strategic-operational mobility. Reaction and adaptable forces – as recently has been reported (Sengupta 2012) with regard to structural reforms in the British Army – will enable to respond in an emergency while also preparing for longer-term deployment.
 - Force multipliers and stand-off capabilities: land-, air- and sea-based active systems which ensure that decisions can be brought about in a stand-off manner with or without the support of the forward-based task elements.
 - Consolidation capabilities: militarily organized and armed police or similar units with components for nation-building, economic and so-

cial intervention as well as for countering international criminality/terrorism. These include experts from the areas of administration, social affairs, infrastructure, judiciary, civil defense etc. as well as possibly support from and cooperation with non-governmental organizations.

- Work processes need to describe how work gets accomplished within the organizations enabling a comprehensive approach to security. These would range from a few high-level cross-functional integrated core processes down to detailed processes and procedures in units, teams or even for individuals. To this end, the Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) (Simon/Duzenli 2009), dated 25 February 2010 constitutes an important milestone. It covers in detail planning principles, doctrine and processes. It is the repository of planning knowledge and therefore details and explains each step of operations planning at the military strategic and operational levels of command in Allied Command Operations. It brings together, in one place, theory and practice, process and products.

The COPD already has been shaping NATO's operational planning as an approach in which

- systems in the operations environment are analyzed i.e. through systems analysis;
- knowledge about the different political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information domains of the strategic environment will be developed in order to understand the behavior and capabilities of key actors, their interaction within the operations environment and to make informed decisions that are specific to each of the stages of the planning process.

Within the COPD planning process situational awareness has gained an indispensable function in developing and maintaining a level of understanding to support operational assessments, the provision of operational level advice, and decision making during the planning for and conduct of operations. Its products include

- commander's requests for information;
- key judgements about the situation in the area (risks and threats);
- conditions, trends and tendencies in the area;
- assessment of indicators and warnings.

5.2 Technology

Technology has always played a major role in shaping an organization's structure and processes, as well as being one of the major catalysts for organizational change. Until recently, innovation has been relatively slow and the need to adopt new technologies not particularly pressing. Thus, organizations could adopt it incrementally and find ways for it to complement organizational structures and processes by trial and error. In the meantime, challenges in the area of security policy have changed considerably, as have technical possibilities for both attack and defense. Actors, who do not have well-developed military capabilities at their disposal have increasingly shifted conflicts into *difficult* terrain like cities and the information space. Scientific and technological progress as well as growing networks, globalization and the vulnerability of modern industrialized societies have increased their chances of success. States have to find new answers.

The revolution in the field of information and communication technologies has become part of a greater structural transformation process: High-performance networks and network connections, together with the data streams involved, form the basic infrastructure for a functionally linked global system. This revolution is also an essential factor for the competitiveness and productivity of countries, regions and enterprises all over the world as it introduces a new way of international work sharing. With the creation of a *global village*, a new communication reality is emerging where messages can be centralized and reception of these messages decentralized. Connection to the global communication system gives those who are participating increased importance. Non-participants are being marginalized.

The information revolution has also exacerbated the vulnerability of modern industrial states to asymmetric attacks. The enormous multiplier effects that are connected to the different uses of information make the state and society extremely dependent on such potentials, which are mostly interconnected. Even the smallest faults within the critical 'information-oriented' infrastructure can have serious consequences. The functional capability of postmodern industrial states depends not least on well-protected databases and other facilities of the information infrastructure. Telecommunication systems in particular, which are often also used by the military, need to operate without interferences. However, malfunctions can also affect other sensitive areas like energy and water supply, traffic, public administration, industry, commerce, banks, insurances, the police, security and rescue services as well as political and military command and control on all levels. There are many ways to deliberately cause damage or turmoil with relatively little effort. Even individuals can seriously damage the critical infrastructure of a modern

industrial state through deliberate attacks. Preparation and conduct of such attacks can hardly be detected. In information warfare, there are no warning times or advantages for the defender. Countermeasures have to be developed on the basis of anticipations; that is why they are, naturally, full of uncertainties.

As technological innovation in the engagement spaces of security has accelerated, organizations cannot afford to adopt new technology by trial and error or to learn gradually how to make new technology complement the rest of the organization. They must learn fast and the complementarity achieved through the introduction of new technology must be superior to what existed before for the organization to succeed. Technology needs to help accomplish comprehensive missions more efficiently and effectively than in the past, and enable comprehensive avenues that were previously unthinkable. To this end, the accelerating rate of technological change in information technology, biotechnology, nanotechnology, robotics, alternatives to hydro-carbons, and socio-cognitive research requires close monitoring. The ongoing *info-bio-nano-robo-hydro-cogno* developments will seriously impact chances and risks with regard to making the comprehensive approach work. Obviously situational awareness will have a key role.

6 Situational Awareness as Prerequisite

The comprehensive approach builds on a holistic analysis of the challenges to be addressed. To get there, a system of systems analysis is required, taking account of the knowledge requirements of all stakeholders. To many in the strategic community – academics, political and military decision-makers alike – these arguments sound rather theoretical and far off reality. The contrary is true.

For example IBM's vision of a *Smart City* (Dirks/Gurdgiev/Keeling 2010) has become a viable concept in Moscow, Amsterdam, Dubai and many other places in the world with tremendous dynamics. As an increasingly *instrumented, inter-connected, and intelligent urban system*, it has been focusing on positive impacts of Information Communication Technologies on the efficiency and effectiveness of healthcare and security, power and transport, and the practice of commerce and work. The *Smart City* is viewed as a 'system of systems' with the city realizing benefits through integration and coherence amongst its systems. It is addressing urban performance as a function of the complex interplay between systems composed of infrastructures, capital, assets, behaviors, and cultures, addressing the economic, social, technological, political, and environmental spheres. Especially situational awareness is important for a *Smart City* as the addressed potentials can only be mobi-

lized, if inhabitants, companies or the administration are aware of the cities' position, knowing the city from the inside, but also being aware of the surroundings – including global networks – and the system of cities the city is located in.

The challenge in the security and crisis prevention/management context is very similar. Key actors need to be analyzed and understood from various perspectives, with particular attention paid to political, military, economic and social, information and infrastructure aspects. Consequently holistic approaches addressing issues like border security, maritime domain security, the protection of critical infrastructure or disaster relief operations as the Haiti earthquake (Hedlund 2010) in 2010 with its catastrophic magnitude – all of these concepts build on system of systems analysis and situational awareness as core functions to manage complex, dynamic and time critical challenges, i.e. in Brazil (Reuters 2011), in Qatar, in Saudi Arabia and Singapore.

These observations have a clear message: *Situational awareness* is the prerequisite of *comprehensive security*. The purpose of *situational awareness* is to generate actionable knowledge. Knowledge is the decisive resource of all social processes and social organizations. As society turns into a knowledge society, access to knowledge and the exchange of information are becoming more and more universal: For individuals, social groups, politically and economically relevant actors, states, and alliances. It is also in the fight against security challenges that knowledge becomes more and more important. Rapid changes and spreading biotechnology, for example, also enhance the ability of opposing actors to use biological weapons. Thus, knowledge diffusion and proliferation has become a core problem. Space is a perfect example of this. Because of knowledge proliferation nowadays, smaller states, non-governmental actors or individuals are already able to use space at relatively low costs.

For an inter-agency approach to work it must draw together the strengths of the relevant organizations involved in addressing security issues. Much expertise is resident within NGOs. Numerous governmental, military and business organizations already possess valuable data, information and knowledge as inputs into shared situational awareness. These are particularly valuable resources when it comes to design action and effects, methods for assessments, and interpreting results. Often civilian agencies have a presence in crisis regions prior to military engagement. They provide continuity during transitions and are focused on long-term solutions. However, no one source captures all of the information needed or currently available. In better use of limited resources to address the omnipresent, multi-national security challenges the output would be most valuable for governments, international organizations and the commercial sector as well. The information exchange

between these actors, in particular, sharing common databases, is the real power behind *situational awareness*. (Allied Command Transformation 2012)

Situational awareness will be generated via platforms, sensors, links, data and sensor fusion, change detection, decision support tools, open source intelligence, knowledge development and C4ISTAR facilities. The quantity and depth of information collected from these various sources need to be fused to enrich a *common relevant operational picture* that can be – role-based – distributed among relevant users. Lessons learned from many contingencies suggest that some capabilities for each of these missions have much in common, particularly with respect to interoperability and information sharing. Some capabilities for comprehensive approach situations can be developed quickly. Building these capabilities might cost much less than expected by many, partly because of the vast development of commercial capabilities that can be leveraged.

The utility of the common knowledge base depends upon the ability to practically share data in a timely manner – based on a network of governmental and non-governmental expert knowledge and instruments. Information sharing needs to be pre-established. It requires comprehensive planning methods, role integration and ultimately operational support in order to project all available instruments at an early stage and in an integrated fashion in order to achieve a maximum outcome. A role-based approach, rules and workflow modeling structures enable situational awareness environments to push information to stakeholders within and across organizations while ensuring the security of the information. The role-based approach ensures that stakeholders are able to communicate through a variety of means and maintain role-focused situation awareness throughout the organization and among organizations – many are looking at different situational pictures, but all look into the same situation with a common shared situational awareness.

Shared situational awareness means less to integrate established, proven systems into a single new one, but rather to consolidate comprehensive data and information from sources and inventories of the acting decision-makers and related personnel. An information turntable provides the information from multiple sources, inventories and databases. A particular challenge is the collection, fusion and dissemination of enormous quantities of data drawn from military and civilian government agencies, international coalition partners and forces, and commercial entities.

Situational awareness also benefits private industry. A multinational situational awareness program – preferably within the context of NATO and the EU – would allow for a variety of national and international security, research and business initiatives to emerge and would foster broad participation

of large, medium-sized and even small-sized companies in a transatlantic collaborative approach. As it focuses on optimization at the systems level versus the platform level, it does not favor any particular technology or platform. It enables trades of risk, cost and capability, and it opens competition at multiple work levels, giving small and large companies from around the world equal opportunity to compete. In doing so, it encourages, indeed demands, *best of industry* solutions and innovation.

In fact, two recent important initiatives in NATO have been driving situational awareness in that very direction.

- By the end of 2012 NATO will be provided for *the first time in the Alliance's history* with a NATO Common Operational Picture providing NATO commanders and operational staffs with essential and reliable information that enables their understanding of comprehensive security environments in order to improve situational awareness and support rapid decision-making.
- The NATO Common Operational Picture is supported by the Afghan Mission Network. *For the first time in the Alliance's history* a common C4ISR network has been established for all ISAF forces and operations consisting of the ISAF-secret network as the core with *national extensions*. In times of austerity cuts these national extensions have an enormous impact on national C4ISR structures. Consequently, NATO is planning to expand this approach to build a Future Mission Network.

On a global scale, both developments have served as best practice examples for security forces and security business. Consequently they have shaped both, requirements and markets.

7 Dealing with Austerity

The financial crisis hit Europe at a time when all countries have undergone major reductions in their force structures. The fact that the post-cold war threat was significantly lower already had led to a continuous reduction in funds over the last two decades. Today, most European states are either in the midst or in the early stages of transforming their armed forces with the primary goal to increase the proportion of capable and sustainable forces that can be deployed in international operations. The financial crisis now has put public budgets under additional pressure. Public spending has been cut. Defense budgets have been cut again. At the same time the crisis has led to the withdrawal of those resources that have enabled ministries to conceal inefficiencies in the security sector. It appears that this situation will continue.

Now, as new security challenges broaden and resources shrink, the requirement for synergy-led partnerships both between states and across non-governmental organizations will grow. Over the next decade, the transformational dimensions of *network-enabled capabilities*, the *effects-based approach to operations* and the *comprehensive approach to security* will drive developments. Addressing new challenges such as cyber war, ballistic missile defense, and space will require allocation of additional resources for security and defense. All these initiatives will have to be found within the given financial framework and will gradually consume a greater proportion of ever more scarce resources. On top comes the requirement to build civilian consolidation capacity.

Julian Lindley French has stated rightfully in a recent blog: “Over a decade of attending such conferences I have often felt like Bill Murray in Groundhog Day; forced to attend the same conference over and over, albeit with different people ‘discovering’ the same revealed truth and coming to the same ‘solutions’ (...).” (Lindley-French 2012) Implementing significant change is one of the most challenging endeavors organizations and governments face. Political, industrial, civilian and military leaders need to act together. It is high time to boost efforts and to reach out to critical partners to systematically search for best practices across the safety, security, and defense communities. It is high time to manage the process of change to successfully implement the comprehensive approach via a defined process to guide the change, an assigned Change Leadership Team and an extensive communication process.

Situational awareness could be instrumental in providing valid orientation to this process as it is at the very core of dealing smartly with globally connected security issues. Building *situational awareness* would constitute a systemic, networked response to symmetric and asymmetric, traditional and networked security challenges. It would support partners and allies working effectively together in a *plug to operate* approach. It would bring together different types and generations of people, organizations and equipment through a common connector. Architecture, processes, and tools would provide for informed, responsive decisions in an interagency and international security environment that includes the services of government actors and private business. Focusing on situational awareness would be very instrumental particularly towards integrating European and U.S. toolboxes.

Certainly, it may prove difficult to find incentives for organizations, departments and bureaus to adopt flexible and sometimes counterintuitive approaches to policy-making and implementation in an era of budget cuts and resource constraints. At the same time, the imperative to use power more effectively and allocate resources more efficiently has never been higher. It is

exactly the recognition of stringent economic realities that has driven the discussions over a ‘smarter’ use of diplomatic, information, military and economic tools. The current crisis could well be used to push for new solutions rather than letting it curtail options. Even in times of financial austerity we need do go through the exercise. The result may enable the comprehensive approach to become both, effective and affordable.

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Unmanned Warfare: Towards a Neo-Interventionist Era?

Niklas Schörnig

1 Introduction¹

Over the last decade or so drones have become the single most important asset in Western warfare. While older generations were only capable of timely reconnaissance, the latest models in Western inventories have been armed, enabling both the military as well as intelligence agencies like the CIA to conduct precise strikes against insurgents and terrorists. Drones are, however, only the frontrunner of a more fundamental change in military affairs, i.e. the robotization of the military. In the not so distant future, military robots will dominate the air, the ground and the seas. But where does this dynamic come from? This article argues that the robotization of the military is to a large extent a reaction of Western governments to the experiences of casualties amongst their own soldiers in what has been termed the ‘wars of choice’ of the Post-Cold-War-Era. Robotization seems to be a perfect reaction to the demands of casualty averse publics in almost all Western democracies, enabling the military to engage in military missions which would be out of the question without robots on the frontline. The article therefore continues to argue that military interventions might go up rather than down in the future, leading to a ‘neo-interventionist era’, but that these interventions will look rather different from the interventions of the last two decades. The article concludes, however, with a cautioning note on whether robots can really fulfill the hopes and expectations of the proponents of a robotization of the military.

2 Experiences of War and Peace: Two Sides of Asymmetry and the End of Intervention-Euphoria

Since the end of the Cold War, Western states have made rather mixed experiences when it comes to the use of military force. Thanks to their heavy investment into high-tech military equipment – with the United States in the driving seat of this development – ‘traditional’ interstate wars against opponents with less sophisticated weaponry can be won quickly, decisively and with only minimal losses on their own sides. The starting point for this high-tech warfare dates back to the last phase of the Cold War where Western ar-

1 Some of the arguments presented in this text have been taken from earlier works (Schörnig 2010; Sauer/Schörnig 2012).

mies planned to counter the quantitative superiority of the Warsaw Pact with qualitatively superior technology. However, even after the Cold War had ended, many of the related programs were not discontinued in order to gain a peace dividend, but kept running to „keep the technological edge” (Carter/White 2001) in an age of uncertain threats, leading to what has been labeled a ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) or the transformation of the American military (Shimko 2010). Key technological elements of this ‘revolution’ entail, for example, stealth technology (i.e. making one’s own systems less prone to radar-detection), better surveillance by satellite or drones and an increase in the precision of weapon systems by either laser or GPS guidance. The main element of the RMA is, however, the IT based interconnectedness of all relevant assets into one ‘system of systems’ with a permanent exchange of data resulting in an unprecedented situational awareness enabling attacks of high-value targets with pinpoint precision. The wars against Iraq (1991), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2003) were increasingly based on these RMA assets and turned out to be less bloody for the West than many military exercises held by NATO during the Cold War both in relative as well as absolute terms. It is safe to say that the deliberate effort to invest into high-tech weaponry has created an asymmetrical situation for classical interstate war scenarios where less sophisticated armies have hardly any chance of inflicting significant damage to Western armies in war when fighting a strictly conventional war without resorting to weapons of mass destruction.

Despite their technological sophistication, however, Western armies could not prevent significant losses to their personnel in the post-war phases which were supposed to be non-violent and peaceful, but turned out to be bloody “small wars” (Daase 1999) against insurgents and guerillas. Looking back, this could have been expected, but it was not. While the use of precision guided munitions, satellite and UAV-based surveillance, stealth technology and networked systems gave Western armies an asymmetrical advantage over their opponents in the traditional scenario, troops on the ground faced new and unexpected threats in the post-war phase, bringing on a new asymmetry against them. Improvised explosive devices (so called IEDs), suicide bombers and guerilla warfare have led to a constant blood-drain where the superior technology (which had proven itself so useful before) seemed to fall short. In sum, while Western armies won the war, they could not win the peace. A look at the sheer numbers of Western casualties in the Afghanistan war is a striking case in point: According to the reputable website icasualties.org 3,157 soldiers of the coalition have died in Afghanistan in total (as of 27 August 2012). During the first three months of the war – i.e. the first bombing of Kabul on 7 October 2001 and the fall of Tora Bora in December – only 12 allied soldiers had died. Only since then casualty rates

have increased, peaking in 2010 with 711 coalition military fatalities reported in that year alone. This drain of blood has caused political fallout in almost all troop-contributing countries, putting the political decision-makers under an ever increasing pressure, leading to early pull-outs of many Western contingents. This development has led at least some observers to speculate about a post-interventionist era, i.e. an era where especially Western countries would shy away from military engagement. As, for example, the German political scientist Herfried Münkler (2012: 11; my translation) concludes: “The era of a euphoric interventionism is over.”

3 Casualty Aversion of Western Countries: The Key Determinant of Western Military Engagement

From a theoretical point of view this is hardly surprising: For quite some time academics as well as military experts have argued that Western states have entered a “post-heroic”-phase which is characterized by an increasing aversion against losses on their own side (Luttwak 1995; Münkler 2002). This casualty aversion, it is argued, is especially high when the military engagement is understood to be a ‘war of choice’ rather than a ‘war of necessity’ (Freedman 2006/2007). While the latter is fought for national security or shows at least a clear reference towards the national interest, the former usually refers to humanitarian or state-building missions or missions to enforce international law. At least from the perspective of European publics, most wars fought since the end of the Cold War have been understood to be wars of choice rather than wars of necessity, despite efforts by the political elites to frame at least some missions as being related to the national interest. In consequence, political leaders face a dilemma: While Western publics are emotionally affected by humanitarian crises (especially when the media picks up the issue – the so-called CNN-effect) and demand that ‘something has to be done’, the public is increasingly less willing to risk the lives of their own soldiers. In addition, public opinion reacts even stronger to casualties when it is perceived that their own soldiers died in vain, i.e. when no progress towards the declared goal of the mission is visible (Gelpi et al. 2006) – as it was the case in Iraq and is the case in Afghanistan. So, in addition to being casualty averse in general, when it comes to ‘wars of choice’, Western publics have become ‘loss-averse’ in regard to the outcome of a military engagement. In the extreme, this might lead to what can be called a ‘casualty trap’, a stalemate situation where military operations are ceased to avoid additional casualties, thereby forestalling mission accomplishment (Schörnig 2009). So even if public opinion supports military engagement in the begin-

ning, the responsible political elite has to fear a sudden reversal of the public mood when one's own losses increase.

The military as well as the political leadership has reacted to this dilemma with several new strategies to prevent being caught between the rock of public opinion and the hard place of mission accomplishment: One way to avoid casualties amongst their own ranks is to rely on airpower and leave the fighting on the ground to local groups, supporting the fraction which seems most in line with the Western interest. One might describe this approach as a 'division of labor' between local and Western troops. The first phase of the Afghanistan mission is a good example here: While the U.S. bombarded the Taliban with their air assets, the fighting was (mainly) left to the Northern Alliance with additional support from a small Special Forces contingent. The same strategy was implemented during the Libya War in 2011 where NATO troops – except for some special forces on the ground – were mainly enforcing no-flight-zones and providing air cover for rebel forces to level the odds. However, this approach has downsides. Local rebels and insurgents usually do have an agenda of their own which might or might not overlap with Western interests. It is hard to take control of their actions and they might not be as reliable as one would prefer, especially when it comes to the laws of war: Take for example the unclear circumstances of the death of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi which might had been avoided, if he had been captured by Western troops as in the case of Saddam Hussein.

A second way to solve the Western dilemma described above is to rely on private military contractors. Analysis has shown that Western publics do not react towards killed contractors nearly as strong as they would towards fallen soldiers (Schooner 2008). This approach has been labeled 'outsourcing' in the literature (Singer 2005). The use of contractors, however, has its own drawbacks as well. Experience has shown that when it comes to actual fighting, contractors might not be as reliable as regular units, that it is harder to integrate their actions into the overall military operation and that overseeing their actions is more difficult than it is with regular troops. In addition, due to several scandals either involving civilian death or fraud of public funding, public awareness as well as the lawmakers awareness (at least in the U.S.-case) has zoomed in on contractors (Harwood 2008). At the moment at least, contractors are hardly used for actual fighting missions but rather to provide support, ranging from non-military tasks like catering or doing the laundry to guarding duties or providing personal security detail. Despite the fact that several hundred contractors were killed in Afghanistan and Iraq in the course of these conflicts, one might doubt that adding these losses to military casualties would have led to a significant change of the public mood.

4 The Robotic Answer to Casualty Aversion

From the perspective of political and military leaders alike the most promising way to solve the problem of casualty aversion in the future is, again, a technological one, the reliance on robotic systems. They seem to square the circle of contradicting claims the political elite as well as the military is facing when it comes to wars of choice, especially in so-called D3-scenarios, i.e. the military's dirty, dull or dangerous jobs. Machines can operate in hazardous environments and they do not mind getting dirty or contaminated. They do not need training and can be sent from the factory straight to the frontline. In contrast to humans robots do not get tired, but keep focused on the task almost indefinitely. Finally, by using unmanned systems in dangerous situations such as forward reconnaissance, bomb disposal or the suppression of enemy air defenses, human soldiers are given the best possible force protection – namely not having to expose themselves to the enemy in the first place. In other words, using a robot enables the soldier to distance himself from the danger-zone, minimizes exposure to potential harm and minimizes unwanted casualties – a very prominent topos when justifying the procurement of military robots.

From this perspective, the robotization of the armed forces is the latest and probably most effective and most consequential step in one of the overarching themes of military innovation, namely to distance the warfighter from the zone of battle. Only in this case, the warfighter will not show up in battle at all, but has a robotic surrogate taking his or her place. One has to admit, however, that the idea of military robots replacing human soldiers on the battle fields of the future has a strong feeling of science fiction to it and arouses Hollywood-images of *Terminator* or *Battlestar Galactica*. While the reality of armed humanoid robots patrolling the battlefields of the future might indeed be some decades away, the basic trend nevertheless points into a direction which many people might indeed wrongly associate with pure fiction rather than understanding it as a likely real-world development. The exponential use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is the most striking example here. Used as reconnaissance assets a decade ago with the ability to provide real-time data (usually live video-feed), their armed successors with those terrifying names like *Predator* or *Reaper* have evolved to be the Obama Administration's weapon of choice in the 'War against Terror'. Being flown from bases within the U.S. thousands of miles away from the theater of war, drone pilots do not face any danger whatsoever, but enable the U.S. to engage virtually everywhere with pinpoint precision – at least in theory. Given greatly extended loitering times compared to manned fighter jets, UAVs can wait for the best moment to engage with relatively small munitions, transmitting a

high-resolution image of the target not only while attacking, but afterwards as well for immediate damage assessment. From the perspective of the troops on the ground, the value of real-time intelligence cannot be underestimated, especially when facing an ambush or other forms of engagements with insurgents and significantly enhances the protection of the soldiers in theater. Already today it is almost impossible to imagine most military missions by Western armies without the support of military robots. Even pure peacekeeping missions cannot take place without extensive robotic support, e.g. the reconnaissance provided by drones or other robotic assets (Piesing 2012), to minimize the chance of unwanted developments which might lead to the unexpected loss of lives as it – for example – happened to American rangers in Somalia in 1993. While most of the current UAVs still are unarmed and provide intelligence only, there is a clear trend towards arming drones. Since the first strike by an armed *Predator* reconnaissance drone in 2001, the American military as well as the CIA have increasingly used armed drones, especially for targeted killings of either Taliban insurgents or alleged terrorists. These targeted killings have stirred an intense debate whether or not targeted strikes are covered by international law. At the moment, there seems to be a consensus that targeted attacks are legal under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as long as they are part of either an armed international conflict or an armed non-international conflict, e.g. the current conflict in Afghanistan.

There is disagreement, however, whether the American-led ‘War against Terror’ qualifies as an armed non-international conflict, and especially non-American scholars have doubts whether the American drone-strikes in Pakistan, Somalia or Yemen against alleged terrorists are legal in terms of international humanitarian law, especially when conducted by the CIA rather than the military (Schaller 2011; for an American critic see O’Connell 2012). Notwithstanding these legal issues, it is obvious that armed drones offer an added value to their non-armed variants from the military’s perspective: While a reconnaissance drone can provide intelligence and helps to lift the ‘fog of war’, they cannot engage targets on the ground when friendly troops are under fire. An armed drone, however, can provide additional fire support, and they are usually more precise than, for example, supporting artillery from up to 40 Kilometers away. It is safe to say that they offer an additional layer of protection to ground troops engaging in hostilities. In addition they might attack what the military calls ‘high-value targets’ like commanders or critical infrastructure without endangering a human pilot or a commando unit. It is no wonder that many Western countries like Britain, France, Italy or Germany have started thinking about procuring armed drones and are likely to integrate these into their armed forces in the near future. The current generation of drones, however, is a far cry from being the robots one has seen in Holly-

wood blockbusters. At the moment most drones are remotely controlled with a relative low grade of automated behavior. But it is likely that that is going to change in the immediate future. Current Predator drones or their direct successors, the *Predator B* (called *Reaper*) can only be used in uncontested airspace as they are relatively slow and prone to conventional air defense. i.e. surface-to-air missiles or air-to-air combat. In short, they are no match to current manned fighter jets and offer only a limited spectrum of capabilities. The next generation of drones, however, is supposed to overcome these restrictions. Current demonstrators like the Navy's X-47B prototype are supposed to be able to outperform their current predecessors by orders of magnitude. Not only will the next generation of drones be able to perform sophisticated maneuvers like landing on a flight carrier's deck (one of the hardest maneuvers for a military pilot) without human interference, but they will be able to perform air-to-air combat to defend themselves in contested airspace. This, however, necessitates a much higher degree of autonomous behavior. When controlling a drone remotely one has to take into account the up to two seconds delay the signal needs to travel from the control station to the drone via satellite. While this delay is usually unproblematic when attacking relatively stationary targets on the ground, it might mean the kill of the drone in a dogfight situation. In order to engage enemy fighter jets the drone has to perform maneuvers where split seconds count. It is therefore inevitable that drones need to behave more autonomously in the future, reducing human interference. In the parlance of the military the development will be from 'man in the loop' (i.e. remote control) to 'the man on the loop' or even 'man out of the loop'.

While the current focus lies on drones, i.e. unmanned *aerial* vehicles, the development of robotic land- or naval-systems is continuing as well. From an engineering point of view, the technical problems drones face are comparatively easy to solve when it comes to autonomous behavior. The drone cannot get 'stuck' in the air, there are relatively few obstacles and evasive maneuvers can be flown in all three dimensions. It is true that most robots on the ground are remotely controlled as well, especially in the realm of bomb disposal. However, ground robots are catching up fast and some (armed) systems are already being deployed for guard or patrol duty (<http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4425689.stm>). It is at least not farfetched to imagine semi-autonomous military robots armed with precision rifles to support troops on the ground in actual combat situations within the next decade or so.

5 Towards a ‘More Humane’ Warfare Thanks to Military Robots?

Proponents of an intensified robotic armament hope that reliance on robot warriors might enable Western states to engage militarily in conflicts where casualty aversion lets them shy away at the moment, usually humanitarian or state-building missions. For instance, international law expert Claus Kreß, was quoted in the German weekly *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung* with the rhetorical question of whether the use of military robots in humanitarian disasters such as Kosovo and Darfur might not “create possibilities to launch a rescue operation that one might otherwise refrain from due to fear of losses to one’s own side?” (as quoted in Kantara 2010: 52, my translation). And an American military officer strongly argued in favor of the robotization of Western militaries in the same fashion when referring in a personal conversation with the author to the possibility to prevent another ‘Ruanda’ just by relying on drone warfare. From this perspective, it is likely that the pressure to engage militarily in civil wars or other humanitarian disasters will increase, potentially leading to a *neo-interventionist era* based on robotic rather than human assets. For proponents of robotic warfare, the current developments described above are only the first step in a process which might lead to a totally new kind of warfare. As Ron Arkin, professor for robotics at Georgia Tech puts it, “intelligent robots can behave *more* ethically in the battlefield *than humans* currently can” (as quoted in Dean 2008: D1) thereby transforming warfare as we know it. The basic argument is straight forward: In contrast to humans which might overreact under stress or ignore rules of engagement an autonomous or ‘intelligent’ robot has not to fear its own destruction and can act according to the rules given by international humanitarian law under any circumstance (Arkin 2009).

While we are only at the beginning of this development and the technology needed for such an approach is still more science fiction than reality, there is first evidence for the general development implicated in the technological development: The intervention without – or minimal – human exposure. Current events seem to support the notion that robotic-warfare is one of the preferred options Western states have. Look again at the example of the Western intervention into the Libyan civil war to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1973: The U.S. lost both a fighter aircraft as well as a reconnaissance helicopter over Libya. However, while special forces had to be flown in to bring home the two downed F-15E pilots (http://www.usaf.aib.law.af.mil/ExecSum2011/F-15E_Libya_21%20Mar%2011.pdf), the MQ-8 *Fire Scout* helicopter was unmanned (<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13858200>), not demanding a dangerous search and rescue (SAR) mis-

sion. From this perspective, it is not hard to imagine that military robots are seen as the silver bullet of Western warfare, solving the Western ‘moral dilemma’ of having to risk their own lives in order to save others (Gross 2010: ch. 9). Given the American technological advantage, the U.S. is again the trend-setter in the development, leading to what has been called the “Obama Doctrine” (Sanger 2012), i.e. warfare based on special forces, cyberwarfare and – drones. This begs the question whether military engagement which is based primarily or even solely on computers and robots will be understood as war in the future. While legal scholars argue that it is the effect which matters, i.e. destruction of an adversary’s physical infrastructure, the political elite might have a different opinion.

According to news articles the White House argued during the air-war over Libya that with regard to the American engagement “the limited American role did not oblige the administration to ask for authorization under the War Powers Resolution” (Savage/Landler 2011: A16). But how could one describe the American role as limited? According to Harold Koh, the State Department’s legal adviser, and Robert Bauer, White House counsel, U.S. forces were at little risk because there were no troops on the ground and Libyan forces were unable to exchange fire with them in an effective way (see Savage/Landler 2011: A16). In consequence both officials argued: “We are saying the limited nature of this particular mission is not the kind of ‘hostilities’ envisioned by the War Powers Resolution.” (as quoted in Savage/Landler 2011: A16) This understanding, however, leads to a totally new understanding of the term war: If war were defined by the number of soldiers exposed to risks rather than the effect caused by the weapon systems employed, no military engagement based on robotic warfare would qualify as a war in the classical sense. This would have tremendous consequences not only for the parliamentary control of the armed forces, but the general awareness whether a nation is in a state of war. Only recently the well-repudiated blog *Dangerroom* released a feature about ‘America’s Secret Drone War in Africa’, qualifying the report as “in part conjecture, albeit *informed* conjecture” (italics in original) due to the clandestine nature of the ongoing shadow war (Axe 2012). The author argues that “the absence *so far* of popular backlash against America’s shadowy robot campaign in Africa should be encouraging news for U.S. policymakers” (Axe 2012, italics in original) and concludes that “America is entering a new era of warfare, one in which *most* U.S. conflicts could be waged in the shadows by intelligence agents, commandos and high-tech robotic aircraft” (Axe 2012, italics in original). Given this background it seems plausible that the neo-interventionist era differs fundamentally from the interventions of the recent past, i.e. interventions with massive

ground troops and ‘boots on the ground’, but will rather be characterized by smaller, more focused and more clandestine interventions in the future.

6 The Great ‘If’: The Downside of Drone Warfare

It is, however, not yet clear whether things work out as they should, especially when it comes to drone warfare. Firstly, currently Obama’s approach of using drones to conduct targeted killings is facing tremendous criticism, especially in Europe as the latest *Pew Global Attitudes Project Report* published in June 2012 has revealed (<http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/13/global-opinion-of-obama-slips-international-policies-faulted/>). Except for the U.S. there is strong opposition to the use of drones as a new means of warfare in almost all other countries under scrutiny.² One of the important issues here is that despite the promise of pin-point precision and surgical strikes drone attacks still cause significant civilian casualties and the media is picking up on them. While one might argue that the numbers of civilian casualties are low compared to what would be expected using ‘traditional’ means like unguided bombing or artillery shelling, they are high compared to what one would expect from ‘surgical strikes’ or – in the words of White House counterterrorism adviser John Brennan – “laser-like” precision (as quoted in Isikoff 2012). In addition, the question of who is a legitimate target in the first place is far from solved. Most legal scholar would agree that only direct participation in hostilities makes a person liable to attack. Some would argue that a civilian who poses an imminent threat is a legitimate target as well. But who is posing an imminent threat? Are all able-bodied males in proximity of a known militant legitimate targets, as a former senior CIA official suggests in an interview with *Esquire* (Junod 2012)? It seems that very different definitions of what constitutes a civilian and what constitutes a legitimate target are applied when one compares the data on civilian casualties presented by, for example, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (474–881 civilians killed between 2004 and 2012; <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/>) with John Brennan’s claim that civilian deaths are “exceedingly rare” (as quoted in Bennett/Cloud 2012). Finally, even if a drone strike hits only the person targeted, it is far from clear that the ‘correct’ person was

2 In 17 out of 20 countries under scrutiny, the disapproval rate is higher than 50 percent with only the United States being the exception with an approval rate higher than 50 percent. In Great Britain disapproval (47%) is higher than approval (44%), but below 50 percent. In India, finally, the approval rate (32%) is higher than the disapproval rate (21%), but with almost half of the population undecided (47%).

killed. There is at least one example known where faulty intelligence led to wrongful attacks against an innocent individual who was mixed up with someone else (Clark 2011).

In this context it seems plausible that the current debate about Western missions in Afghanistan and Iraq have not only raised awareness regarding one's own losses, but regarding civilian losses as well, making public outcry over civilian losses inflicted by one's own troops more likely. While many scholars argue that there is a norm hierarchy placing one's own losses above losses amongst the civilian population, the relative relevance of civilian losses has risen in the shadow of the increasing aversion of casualties. A new study by James Walsh on the American attitude towards drone strikes even suggests that civilian casualties are even more important to the public than losses of American servicemen or – women (Walsh 2012). Walsh qualifies his findings, however, as his survey was not based on a random sample. Still, civilian casualties – either due to lack of precision, a too broad definition or faulty intelligence – might have become an important factor to be taken into account. It is remarkable, however, that almost no Western country officially criticizes the targeted killings by the U.S. armed forces or the CIA. One can only speculate about this difference, but it seems that even those countries which would not engage in targeted killings with drones themselves appreciate the ends (the killing of alleged terrorists) over the means – at least as long as someone else is doing the killing.

Secondly, it is doubtful whether future generations of robots can fulfill the high hopes of their constructors and proponents described above. International law is, to a large extent, a matter of discretion, especially when it comes to the application of force. At least from today's perspective it seems doubtful whether a robot can be programmed to act according to the 'principle of proportionality'. How would a robot be able to decide what use of force is 'proportional' in a certain context when seasoned servicemen find it hard to come up with a clear answer in concrete circumstances?

Whether a robot can distinguish between a combatant and a civilian in a small-war scenario – an issue where even seasoned soldiers have to rely on their gut feeling from time to time – is heavily debated amongst robotic scientists as well (Sharkey 2009). Imagine, for example, that a robot has been programmed to interpret the raising of both arms as 'surrender', prohibiting the use of force against the surrendering individual. How would such a robot react to someone who is too injured or simply too tired to raise his arms? In short, is it really possible to transform 'soft' international law into the binary logic of computer algorithms? Some computer scientists even argue that sheer logic dictates that certain problems remain where a computer as we know it is simply unable to determine the correct answer to a given scenario.

Where humans have the option to fall back to their gut feeling, the computer simply gets stuck with an unsolvable problem.

Finally, questions remain about the ethical ramifications of increasing autonomy. At the moment military officers as well as political decision makers insist that there will always be a 'man in the loop' when it comes to the use of lethal force. From today's perspective this seems highly plausible as military as well as political leaders have grave reservations when it comes to hand over responsibility for a particular action into someone else's hand. But as described above, sheer military necessity might dictate to give military robots more autonomous decision-making power than currently wanted. Legal issues notwithstanding, that begs the question „whom we should hold responsible when an autonomous weapon system is involved in an atrocity of the sort that would normally be described as a war crime” (Sparrow 2007: 62). At least at the moment it seems not plausible to hold the robot responsible as it is doubtful that even prospective systems will develop some form of consciousness in a human fashion. But could we hold the programmer responsible? Only as long as we assume that the robot had to follow pre-programmed behavior and was programmed in a 'wrong' way. It is, however, the nature of true autonomy “that an autonomous system will make choices other than those predicted and encouraged by its programmers” (Sparrow 2007: 70). It might also be possible that the system is used in a scenario that the programmer did not anticipate or which he explicitly ruled out as 'safe'. Does that mean that the commanding officer has to take responsibility? This might be the case if the human in charge had sufficient knowledge that unintended consequences might occur. But again, if the robot made a decision on its own which was beyond what a knowledgeable commander could expect it hardly seems fair to let him or her shoulder the burden of responsibility (Sparrow 2007: 70f.).

While these ethical questions remain unanswered, the technological development rushes on. As Werner Dahm, the Chief Scientist of the U.S. Air Force, puts it: “Although humans will retain control over strike decisions for the foreseeable future, far greater levels of autonomy will become possible by advanced technologies.” And he argues that “[i]n the near- to mid-term, developing methods for establishing ‘certifiable trust in autonomous systems’ is the single greatest technical barrier that must be overcome to obtain the capability advantages that are achievable by increasing use of autonomous systems” and he is optimistic that “technologies will be developed over the next decade that can enable reliable V&V [verification and validation; NSg.] and certification methods to provide ‘trust’ in even highly adaptable autonomous systems.” It remains unclear, however, whether and how such methods of reliable verification and validation will keep a human decision-maker in or

on the loop or whether they solely rely on computing as well. It seems plausible that if the outcome of a military engagement hinges on decisions made in a split second, there might not be enough time to keep the man in or on the loop. In addition, reliable verification and validation is per definition a time-consuming process. Even for a highly advanced computer, double checking the facts takes more time than to do without. But even with no human interfering, this minimal delay of action might be too much. Dahm warns: “Note that potential adversaries may be willing to field highly autonomous systems without any demand for prior certifiable V&V. In so doing they may gain potential capability advantages that we deny ourselves by requiring a high level of V&V” (all quotations: United States Air Force Chief Scientist [AF/ST] 2010: 60).

7 Conclusions

Most observers agree that the fundamental decision for the robotization of Western militaries has already been made and is irreversible. The short-term gains are too tempting to be sacrificed for potential future problems and risks. This development, however, has a high potential to alter the way war is fought and thought about. If it is possible to wage a “bloodless war” (Mandel 2004) with robots or computer viruses at least for one’s own side, the military option might become the preferred solution, leading to a new age of neo-interventionism. These interventions, however, will be very different from the ones we have seen in the recent past. They will be more focused, more lethal and more clandestine than before. They will be disruptive rather than constructive. As the Afghanistan example has shown, it takes boots on the ground to rebuild a country; it takes humans to win the proverbial hearts and minds. And this means to take risks. But at the moment the most important risk one takes when investing in military robots is that someday the decision to intervene will not be his own anymore but made by a machine. It is time to have a sober debate about where military robotization will lead. Otherwise the proponents of military robotics will end up like Goethe’s ‘sorcerer’s apprentice’ – who cannot get rid of the spirits that he called.

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The Legacy of Military Heterogeneity in a Post-Interventionist Era: Diversity as a Challenge to the Military Ideal of Homogeneity

Heiko Biehl

1 The Pluralization of Western Armed Forces: Strategic and Societal Drivers

The most recent era of multinational military interventions following the end of the East-West conflict is drawing to a close. This is suggested by the, at best, mixed results of the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans as well as by the increasing disillusionment among the political and military leaders in the troop-contributing nations. Western societies have always kept some distance to the multinational commitment of their armed forces, a distance that has been greater, the more these missions have been limited in their legitimacy and chances of success, the longer they have gone on and the heavier their toll of lives and resources has been.

On account of these developments in security and under the influence of trends in society, Western armed forces have undergone fundamental changes during the last two decades. They have become smaller and more mobile and, with a few exceptions, been turned into all-volunteer armies. Not least, armed forces have opened up to segments of society previously not admitted to them: women, homosexuals and ethnic minorities. Today's armed forces are much more heterogeneous than the armies of the Cold War era.

Today's military has been described as "postmodern" (Moskos et al. 2000). Charles Moskos (2000), in particular, established a detailed catalogue of criteria to distinguish them from the modern and pre-modern armies of past eras. However, a look at Moskos' book itself may already be sufficient to perceive a remarkable difference. The cover of the U.S. edition shows a very heterogeneous group of soldiers: male and female soldiers, members of different ethnic groups as well as soldiers from all the arms and services with their different uniforms and appearances. This plurality contrasts with the idea of uniformity that is usually associated with armed forces and that has been communicated by them internally and externally for a long time.

The developments illustrated by Moskos highlight how the military ideal of homogeneity, which broad parts of the armed forces and society still adhere to, seems increasingly out-of-date and is coming under pressure. Nevertheless – or perhaps for this very reason – many people still regard the army as an embodiment of the de-individualized, the collective, the homogenous and the uniform. The aim of this article is to take a critical look at the mili-

tary ideal of homogeneity and confront it with the latest (military-)sociological research findings. For this purpose, first, the military ideal of homogeneity will be briefly introduced and discussed. Second, the relevant contributions of military sociology are presented and, third, the critique of the functions and prerequisites of military homogeneity is discussed. The fact that the ideal of military homogeneity has been persistently maintained both within and outside the armed forces despite these findings can only be appreciated if, in a fourth step, attention to interest and identity policies is paid. The article ends with a discussion of the chances of a further pluralization of the armed forces in the emerging post-interventionist era.

2 The Military Ideal of Homogeneity and the Socio-Cultural Pluralization of the Armed Forces

Uniformity has been considered an essential characteristic of armed forces in the era of the nation state.¹ This is most evidently reflected in the appearance of soldiers. On the one hand, uniforms and the standardized dress that goes with them demonstrate the soldiers' uniformity, jointness and affiliation to the armed forces. On the other, the rank insignia draw attention to the hierarchical internal structure of the military establishment, which is deliberately made visible. Furthermore, uniforms illustrate the internal heterogeneity of armed forces with collar colors and unit crests. At the same time, the way soldiers adorn their uniforms with badges, medals, marksmanship lanyards and decorations may be interpreted as an attempt to acquire an individual profile within an organization that is characterized by pressure to maintain uniformity and homogeneity (Stölting 2010: 23).

The idea of military homogeneity, however, is not limited to outward appearance. The question of who is eligible to serve in the armed forces is also associated with corresponding ideas. Until just a few decades ago, soldiers in many Western armed forces normally had to be white, male, heterosexual nationals. This restriction, which can have a significant impact on civil-military relations and the social position of the groups concerned, was always explained by referring to functional military requirements. However, the long-prevailing 'ideal' has crumbled during the last few decades, and this has resulted in the socio-cultural pluralization of the Western armed forces which reflects developments in both society and security.

1 I would like to thank Dr. Thorsten Loch (MGFA) for providing valuable information and advice.

Due to changes in the social, security and military environments, segments of society formerly excluded from joining the army have been granted access to the armed forces. The first groups to be mentioned in this respect are women and homosexuals; they have meanwhile been integrated into most Western armed forces on an equal footing. The changes in the security environment since 1989–1991 and the subsequent transformation of many Western armed forces from defense to intervention armies have likewise led to changes in the composition of armed forces. Compulsory military service came under permanent pressure and has meanwhile been suspended or abolished in most European states – including Germany. The multinational military operations in war and crisis zones have given rise to the question of why access to the armed forces should be linked to nationality at all. Hand in hand with the ethnic pluralization of the German population, this has led to increasing ethnic diversity in the Western armed forces. In Germany, nationality continues to be a *conditio sine qua non* for military service. Other nations, such as Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain, have gone further and opened up their armed forces to foreign citizens. Irrespective of these national differences, a similar trend can be observed in all Western-style armies. The personnel composition of the armed forces shows a greater socio-cultural variety, the backgrounds and experiences of soldiers are more diverse, in short: The armed forces have become “more colorful” (Kümmel 2012). The reality in today’s armed forces therefore increasingly collides with the idea of military homogeneity which is still widely prevalent both in the armed forces themselves and in large parts of society. Military sociology has contributed considerably to the consolidation and legitimation of this idea, as the next section will show.

3 Military Sociology and the Military Ideal of Homogeneity

Military sociology in no way established the ideal of military homogeneity and the exclusion of certain groups from the armed forces, but it helped justify and stabilize this practice (and partly still does). U.S. studies from the Second World War are of central importance in this context. The work done by a research team headed by Samuel Stouffer (1949) as well as the groundbreaking paper by Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz (1948) unanimously stress the effectiveness of social cohesion. In their second volume, entitled *The American Soldier. Combat and Its Aftermath*, Stouffer et al. (1949) devote their attention to the fighting spirit of American soldiers. Their conclusion is that “‘a sense of group obligation’, ‘a sense of justice or fairness’, and ‘the institutionalized role of the soldier’” are more important for fighting spirit than “‘overrideological considerations’ and ‘sheer self-interest’” (Schwartz/Marsh 1999: 27). Accordingly, a soldier’s motivation depends pri-

marily on his military environment (Stouffer et al. 1949: vol. 2, chap. 3). In their study on the Wehrmacht, Shils and Janowitz point out that socio-cultural similarities are central prerequisites for social cohesion, which, in turn, was the basis of the German soldiers' will to fight in the Second World War: "[T]he army was to a great extent carefully protected from disintegrating influences of heterogeneity of ethnic and national origin." Conversely, they state that socio-cultural heterogeneity causes dysfunctions: "In the Wehrmacht, desertions and surrenders were most frequent in groups of heterogeneous ethnic composition in which Austrians, Czechs, and Poles were randomly intermixed with each other." And: "It was clear that groups so diverse in age composition and background, and especially so mixed in their reactions to becoming infantrymen, could not very quickly become effective fighting units." (Shils/Janowitz 1948: 286, 285, 288).

Whether that was the intention or not, the studies thus provided justification for the exclusion of certain social groups from the armed forces. Henceforth, there was scientific or, more precisely, military-sociological evidence supporting the personnel policy which armies organized around nation-state principles pursued anyway: To admit only compatriots and to exclude women and homosexuals. The view that such a personnel policy is necessary to ensure social cohesion and therefore military effectiveness persists to this day in the armed forces – and in parts of the scientific community and the general public. Two examples illustrating the current situation should suffice: In a survey conducted in 2005 among members of the Bundeswehr, half of the male respondents were of the opinion that the integration of women had caused it to take a turn for the worse and about a third assumed that this would lead to a loss of combat power. A negative influence of female soldiers on social cohesion was stated as a cause of this (Kümmel 2008: 21, 86, 98ff.).

The 2nd Military Affairs Division of the Federal Administrative Court even set forth a more pointed argument in the early 1990s, when it dealt with the question of the extent to which homosexuals could serve as soldiers and superiors in the Bundeswehr and assume responsibility for subordinate soldiers: "In the close male community of the Bundeswehr, homosexual relationships must not be tolerated under any circumstances, because they would lead to isolation and group formation, jealousy and mutual distrust and thus break up the military community."² In another judgment, the same court stated: "Troop cohesion would be severely disrupted if homosexual relationships with all their emotional implications were tolerated."³

2 Quoted from: *Neue Zeitschrift für Wehrrecht*, No. 2, Vol. 33, 1991: 79.

3 Quoted from: *Neue Zeitschrift für Wehrrecht*, No. 1, Vol. 34, 1992: 35.

This argumentation is no longer in line with the official policy of the Bundeswehr. The ‘Kujat Directive’ of 2000 and the current Joint Service Regulation 14/3 (Military Disciplinary Code and Military Complaints Regulations) cancel all restrictions on homosexual soldiers, consider the sexual orientation of soldiers to be a private matter and establish rules for partnership relations between military personnel. Since there are no recent empirical studies on the situation and acceptance of homosexual soldiers, the author cannot say how their situation in the armed forces has de facto developed. However, in view of the considerable increase in social recognition for homosexuals, it can be assumed that – despite the reservations that still exist (Uhlmann/Scheel 2012; Thiel 2012) – their acceptance in Germany is greater than in many other countries. The furore and immense social and political mobilization that this question has caused in the United States (Moradi/Miller 2010) cannot be observed either in the Germany case. This is certainly in part due to the fact that, so far, no evidence exists that would point to the integration of homosexual soldiers having any negative effects on social cohesion in the armed forces. The judgments of the Military Affairs Division were based on the assumption that such negative effects would occur. Today, however, this position is no longer supported by military-sociological research, as the following sections will show in detail.

4 Social Science-Based Relativization of Military Homogeneity and Social Cohesion

The findings of Stouffer et al. and of Shils & Janowitz have been confirmed in some follow-up studies on mission motivation (Little 1964; Marshall 1966 [1947]; Wong et al. 2003). However, the current knowledge-base of military sociology is more differentiated, and recent studies have qualified and corrected earlier findings. This applies both to the importance of social cohesion for mission motivation and to the question of whether socio-cultural homogeneity is necessary to achieve social cohesion. The criticism and objections raised are based on more recent results as well as on a re-reading of older studies (Basham 2009):

Misunderstanding of the classical studies from the Second World War

Over time, the works of Shils and Janowitz and of Stouffer et al. have established themselves as standard references in military sociological literature. However, as the number of quotations has grown, the abundance and subtlety of the original findings have successively disappeared. Instead, the studies have often been accepted as providing unquestionable evidence for the cen-

tral importance of social cohesion and socio-cultural homogeneity as its prerequisite. It is in particular thanks to David Segal & Meyer Kestnbaum (2002) that the re-reading of the classical studies has corrected this distorted impression. The authors prove that the works from the Second World War have been perceived and interpreted with some bias. They state that Stouffer et al. are “remembered as showing that cohesion (fighting for one’s buddies) was the primary factor that sustained soldiers in combat”. The problem is that cohesion is only “one of the most important factors sustaining men in combat. However, it was not the most important”. The authors also state that the actual findings of these studies are obscured by a “romantic mythology” (Segal/Kestnbaum 2002: 446, 445). The re-reading of the original Second World War studies thus underlines the importance of motivation-relevant factors beyond social cohesion, which is generally substantiated by recent research.

Empirical relevance of other factors influencing mission motivation

The studies on mission motivation continue to emphasize that comradeship is an essential prerequisite for mission motivation. Carsten Pietsch (2012: 113, 115), for example, proves in a recent analysis that comradeship is a key reason for Bundeswehr soldiers’ participation in missions. Military cohesion is therefore a necessary element of mission motivation, but is not enough in itself. Comradeship alone is not sufficient to motivate soldiers; other factors are required.

Over the decades, researchers have identified an extremely wide range of motivational elements and they can differ in relevance, depending on the context, the conflict and the army concerned. Task cohesion is of central importance in this context. Thus, it is not social cohesion, but the commitment among members of a group to achieving a shared goal which is decisive for the behavior of soldiers in a mission or war (MacCoun 1993). Soldiers with different backgrounds are integrated by the task which they undertake jointly: “Social cohesion, in other words, refers to whether group members like each other, while task cohesion refers to whether they share the same goal.” (MacCoun et al. 2006: 647) Meanwhile, there are a number of studies which analyze the respective influence of social cohesion and task cohesion on the motivation of soldiers. However, researchers have also identified other elements that are essential for the motivation of soldiers, especially the influence of military families has been emphasized (Albano 1994). In the survey they conducted with two battalions stationed in South Korea, David Segal et al. (1999: 162) come to the conclusion that a successful family-army arrangement has a motivating effect, especially on younger soldiers. In a frequently cited paper, Mady Wechsler Segal (1986) described the military and the

family as “greedy institutions”, both of which, in their own manner and in their own right, have an influence on soldiers and make demands on them in terms of commitment, energy and, not least, time. Especially when deployed on a mission, soldiers cannot, of course, meet their family commitments due to their being away. So it is hardly surprising that the soldiers’ motivation depends considerably on how they and their families come to terms with their being apart. The influence of the family on the motivation of soldiers is largely undisputed today; such findings can already be found in the first publications from the Second World War. Shils & Janowitz (1948: 289–291), for instance, discuss attempts made by the Wehrmacht to minimize the strains caused by the soldiers being away from their families and homes, because such strains can have a negative effect on comradeship.

Other pieces of work investigate the impact of further military parameters, such as training, equipment, medical care, boredom, etc. (Keegan 1978; Harris/Segal 1985). All in all, these works provide a subtle and broad picture of the motivating factors. For a long time, social cohesion was considered to be the decisive parameter for dispatching soldiers on missions and getting them to fight, but the relevance of other factors has meanwhile also been recognized. Monocausal explanations of mission motivation have been replaced by multidimensional models which put the importance of social cohesion in perspective.

Methodological objections: What is the value of personally disclosed information on mission motivation?

The studies in which social cohesion is considered to be central to the motivation of soldiers are often based on information disclosed personally by the people surveyed. The soldiers are directly asked what their decisive drive to fight or to go on a mission was. On the basis of their own assessments, the respondents report on their motivation and their reasons for it. The difficulties involved in pursuing such an approach are illustrated by a recent controversy in *Armed Forces & Society*, the world’s leading journal on military sociology. The study by Wong et al. (2003), in which U.S. and Iraqi soldiers involved in the Iraq war were interviewed, once again emphasizes the central importance of social cohesion. The study is based on information from soldiers about their motivation. This approach as well as some disparaging remarks dismissing the distinction between social cohesion and task cohesion as academic artefact which was not applicable to the hard reality of armed conflicts evoked a resolute reaction from Robert MacCoun et al. (2006). The advocates of social cohesion are accused of encouraging a romanticized view of military cohesion. MacCoun et al. (2006: 647ff.) argue that talk of emotional relationships between soldiers caters for the internal military discus-

sion, but such a concept is of little use as a social science analytical category or explanation. The authors state that the study reveals a methodological deficiency in qualitative interviews, when the soldiers are directly asked about their motivation and the reasons for it. They say that soldiers use explanation patterns which they have been taught in their training and reproduce them in the interviews. They argue that from the point of view of methodological critique, this leads to a response behavior that complies with the criteria of military desirability (MacCoun et al. 2006: 649ff.). They add that the actual reasons for the motivation of soldiers can hardly be determined by using such a method of study. They conclude that task cohesion continues to play a central role and that the study by Wong et al. (2003) also includes some evidence of its relevance, but Wong et al. did not interpret it correctly.

The criticism levelled at Wong et al. refers to methodological weaknesses which are also ascribed to the studies on the Second World War. In particular Omer Bartov (2001 [1992]) has critically discussed the findings of Shils and Janowitz on social cohesion among German soldiers in his book *Hitler's Wehrmacht*. Bartov rejects the methodological approach taken by the American sociologists, arguing that the statements of German prisoners of war were an extremely problematical source of data. After all, one could easily understand that those soldiers preferred to say that the cooperation they practiced with fellow-soldiers was an essential element of their fighting spirit rather than their own fanatic belief in National Socialism (Bartov 2001: 56). Bartov concluded that the personal disclosures of captured Wehrmacht soldiers could hardly serve as evidence for the relevance of social cohesion. The methodological objections are not only aimed at the central importance of social cohesion. Its prerequisites have meanwhile also become a topic of critical discussion.

Socio-cultural homogeneity is not a prerequisite for social cohesion

Current researchers in military sociology are at least sceptical about the assumption that socio-cultural homogeneity is conducive to social cohesion. A number of authors assume that military cohesion can also develop between soldiers who have no socio-cultural similarities. However, researchers have not yet definitively determined whether mixed units function in a different way than homogeneous units. For example, the integration of women, which has meanwhile been realized in almost all Western armed forces, continues to be disputed. Despite numerous historical examples of female fighters, there is still debate in the armed forces, the scientific community and the media as to whether mixed-gender units can attain adequate military cohesion (cf. the contributions in Carreiras/Kümmel 2008). Quite a few people assume that female soldiers permanently disturb the military social fabric and ultimately

jeopardize operational capability. Similar arguments were and still are used to justify the discrimination of homosexual soldiers in the armed forces (Herek/Belkin 2006: 125).

The occasional fury of the debate can only be understood if the integration of women and homosexuals is viewed as a threat to classical constructions of military identity (Basham 2009). At present, the stereotypes of the inability to integrate 'people who are different' are being increasingly observed in multinational cooperation. Attention is drawn to a number of supposedly incompatible features, such as a lack of language proficiency, different procedures, rules, levels of training and divergent military cultures. However, there are also people who query whether military cohesion between soldiers from different nations is possible at all. In any case, the analyses conducted so far, which are limited to relatively calm peace stability operations, suggest that soldiers show confidence in superiors and fellow soldiers regardless of the national armed forces they come from (Moelker/vom Hagen/Soeters 2007; Biehl 2008). Rather, the extent to which such differences are perceived depends on personal dispositions and constellations. A similar line of argumentation is found in the report of a multi-disciplinary research team that is investigating the cohesion and motivation of Israeli soldiers during the al-Asqa Intifada (Ben-Ari et al. 2005). On the basis of a qualitative ethnological field study on combat units – supplemented by in-depth and focus-group interviews – the authors demonstrate how units formed for a specific task can be successful. Focussing on a common goal facilitates cohesion between soldiers who have not worked together before and who are highly divergent not only in terms of their military backgrounds. As such a situation is by no means an exception, particularly in a combat environment, standardization and de-individualization are the aims of many military initiatives concerning structures, processes, equipment, training etc. This corresponds to the functional logic of military organizations, which is strongly influenced by the logic of the interchangeability of individuals. The objective is to make the individual soldier replaceable in order to maintain the armed forces' functional capability and capacity for action regardless of the fluctuation in personnel. Social cohesion as a result of soldiers having the same social and cultural characteristics and long-term cooperation would be diametrically opposed to the functional logic. Instead, armies are geared to promoting integration among soldiers with heterogeneous experiences, backgrounds and characteristics by getting them to quickly focus on a task. From this perspective, task cohesion as a prerequisite for mission motivation and fighting spirit is 'more desirable' for the military organization than social cohesion.

Thus, research provides sufficient evidence to confirm that cohesion can also develop in mixed military units. The fact that a message to the contrary

continues to be sent out in some parts of the armed forces and of the scientific community probably goes towards making the integration of 'people who are different' harder instead of easier. Reservations against socio-cultural heterogeneity can thus become a "self-fulfilling prophecy" (Moradi/Miller 2010: 406).

Military peculiarities increasingly require legitimization due to developments in society and security

In addition to the arguments that originate in the closer context of research in the field of military sociology, there are developments in society and security that conflict with the concept of socio-cultural homogeneity among armed forces. In this context, it should be borne in mind that military peculiarities mostly have to be defended against the political authorities and society by referring to functional necessities. This insight has been succinctly summarized by Bernard Boëne (1990) in the question: "How unique should the military be?" In the discussion on this subject, normative, empirical and functional aspects – which are based on the logic that there are some differences between military life and civilian life for functional reasons – have always co-existed and interacted, and still do. The military function has always been clearly defined as the ability to fight and the willingness to kill and die. Military peculiarities could be explained and justified by referring to this functional imperative, as it was characterized by Huntington (1957: 13). Thus, armed forces opposed certain social changes – much longer than most other sectors. Only such a concept rendered it possible for women and homosexuals to be still denied membership in the armed forces when they had already demanded and attained their right to participate in politics, business and society. For some time now – and for at least two reasons – it has become more difficult to defend military peculiarities against social demands by referring to the function of the military.

Firstly, it must be said that the function of the military itself has become unclear. Whereas in the days of the East-West conflict it consisted in the capability to mount a national and collective defense, the tasks have now become at least more diverse and partly vaguer and woollier. Timothy Edmunds (2006: 1075) writes: "A consequence of this fluid organizational milieu has been the emergence of a number of functionally diverse, organizationally fragmented and sometimes contradictory roles for European armed forces. In the absence of an uncontested functional imperative, socio-political influences have been the most important factors in determining the nature and balance between these emergent new roles."

What the marginalization of the military, which is so often mentioned today, is perhaps most likely attributable to is not the supposed indifference of

the people or the alleged lack of support from the political authorities and society, but the fact that the armed forces are increasingly less successful in asserting military peculiarities against social demands and norms by referring to functional necessities. Instead, there is increasing pressure for the armed forces to get more in line with developments in society and adapt to civilian standards. This applies in particular to the willingness of the armed forces to become accessible for all social and cultural groups.

Secondly, it is evident that socio-cultural homogeneity in the armed forces is more of an obstacle to the accomplishment of the new security and military tasks than an advantage. Due to the ongoing operations, the tasks demanded from the armed forces have become more diverse. During the days of the East-West conflict, the main tasks were participation in genuine combat action and engaging in battle, whereas today military requirements and military capabilities are diversifying. Karl Haltiner and Gerhard Kümmel (2009) speak in this context of the hybridization of the military. These different tasks require a range of capabilities and experience which an individual soldier cannot all have. It will therefore be all the more important to keep a wide range of experience, capabilities and skills available within the armed forces and to a certain extent within small units. This is best ensured by armed forces that are composed of people with diverse backgrounds and characteristics. From this point of view, socio-cultural homogeneity becomes counterproductive and socio-cultural heterogeneity functionally necessary.

This view can be illustrated by a very plausible example: Particularly during operations in countries with more traditional gender and family relations, female soldiers can establish contacts and communicate with local women in a way which would not be possible for male soldiers. Comparable services can be provided by soldiers with a migration background who have a cultural connection to the country in which forces are deployed or speak the local language. The ongoing missions therefore require military functionalities which are easier to provide with a socio-culturally mixed army. The old logic of the studies from the Second World War has thus been turned upside down, so to speak: Socio-cultural homogeneity is no longer functional because it facilitates social cohesion, which in turn is a prerequisite for fighting spirit; instead socio-cultural heterogeneity gives the armed forces the broad range of capabilities, experience and perspectives without which the ongoing missions could not be accomplished. The traditional ideal of homogeneity is therefore not only under pressure from a military sociology perspective, but its military relevance is also on the decline. However, the fact that people still support this ideal to this day makes it necessary to take a look at the interests that are associated with it.

5 Findings of Military Sociology, the Military Ideal and Interest-Driven Politics

Considering the diverse and partly serious objections raised to the central importance of social cohesion and socio-cultural homogeneity, the question arises as to why these concepts can persist so long in large parts of the armed forces, the public and the scientific community. This can only be explained by taking a look at the interests behind them. These interests refer to at least three aspects:

Exclusion by personnel policy

The great importance attached to social cohesion and socio-cultural homogeneity – which was supported by scientific studies – allowed the implementation of a military personnel policy that denied some social groups access to the armed forces. Women, homosexuals and certain minority groups were excluded from the armed forces until very recently – this was explained not least by referring to their dysfunctional influence (Basham 2009). Especially in times when the armed forces had a central position in society, they reflected and consolidated the gender order in society, including the idea of heteronormative masculinity. The exclusion of certain groups was part of an identity policy which linked the image of the soldier closely to certain ideas of gender, sexuality and nationality. At the same time, it reduced the number of people who were eligible to have the attractive and prestigious job of doing military service. Identity policies and socioeconomic interests thus complement each other. As recent studies also emphasize, reservations against the integration of women into the armed forces are partly due to the prospect of increasing competition among military personnel (Kümmel/Biehl 2001: 87ff.). The smaller the number of people who are eligible to do military service, the greater the career prospects of each soldier. Therefore, the exclusion of certain groups from the armed forces was always also attributable to vested interests.

Romanticization and mystification of social cohesion

Armed forces are structured to allow personnel to be replaced, to be exchanged and to fluctuate. The military therefore has created a number of institutions whose aim is to provide opportunities for soldiers to quickly get to know one another and establish themselves as a group. Examples are the obligatory icebreakers or seminar evenings, which are held at the beginning of every training course, no matter how short it may be. Soldiers are required to show a high degree of adaptability and “professionalism in cooperation” (von Bredow 2005) – especially when working together with soldiers they did not

know before. In the afore-mentioned study on the way the Israeli armed forces operated during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, Ben-Ari et al. (2005) examined the interaction in so-called instant units, i.e. units established for specific tasks. The authors describe ways in which the soldiers quickly gear themselves to the task at hand and work with soldiers they do not know. Since the current tasks often require different potentials and organizational elements to be combined for a specific task at short notice, sometimes even including the integration of armed forces from other countries, these capabilities are indispensable from a functional point of view. In this situation, it would be counterproductive to base the establishment of cohesion on long-held knowledge and experience.

Against the background of these organizational necessities and functional requirements, the longing of many soldiers for social cohesion and their idealization or romanticization of it can be seen as an attempt to resist the functional imperatives of an organization that is geared to the replaceability of individuals. This makes it easier for the soldiers to moderate the contradiction between the rhetoric of comradeship and what they experience as 'cold' organizational logic and functional requirements.

Historical exculpation

Thomas Kühne (2006: 13) rightly argues that in the German context, the scientific approach to comradeship and primary groups is highly judgemental. This is due to the debate on how far Wehrmacht personnel were involved in and responsible for Nazi crimes. The answer to the question of whether the German soldiers who fought in the Second World War were primarily motivated by concern for their fellow soldiers and their primary groups or by ideological, i.e. National Socialist, beliefs is important for the normative evaluation of their actions. The political relevance of the study by Shils and Janowitz was and still is based on this question, since one of their central findings is this: "This extraordinary tenacity of the German Army has frequently been attributed to the strong National Socialist political convictions of the German soldier. It is the main hypothesis of this paper, however, that the unity of the German Army was in fact sustained only to a very slight extent by the National Socialist convictions of its members." (Shils/Janowitz 1948: 281) Although they probably did not intend to, the authors thus provided an explanation and exculpation pattern which many Wehrmacht soldiers were able to use to explain and, to a certain degree, legitimize or excuse what they had done and experienced. In conjunction with Eisenhower's and Adenauer's statements of honor for the German soldiers in the early 1950s, this paved the way for the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany and the integration of former Wehrmacht personnel into the new armed forces that had been

established. Thomas Kühne (2006: 278) used this background to show how the myth of comradeship dominated the collective West German memory of the Second World War until well into the 1970s. Since the mid-1990s, the debate on the involvement of the Wehrmacht and its members in National Socialist crimes has received increased and widespread attention. The question as to what prompted the German soldiers to go on fighting and what was the cause of the generally confirmed remarkable sustainability of many Wehrmacht units again plays an important part. In the scientific discussion, the position of Shils and Janowitz is opposed by Omer Bartov, who raises conceptual and empirical objections, in addition to expressing doubts about the method used, as has been already discussed. For example, Bartov demonstrates that, due to immense casualty levels and personnel rotations, ‘matured units’ and long-standing comradeship relations were by no means normal for the units on the Eastern front. Rather, the identification with the system was constitutive of the fighting spirit of the soldiers, who were also fighting “for National Socialism and for everything it stood for” (Bartov 2001: 272). Bartov’s study and the debate on guilt and the involvement of the Wehrmacht and many Germans, which can be exemplified by the Goldhagen debate and the exhibition on crimes of the Wehrmacht, as well as the unabated research interest of historians (Müller 2007; Kunz 2007; Zimmermann 2009; Neitzel/Welzer 2011) show that the subjects of fighting spirit and social cohesion are of a great social relevance in Germany that goes far beyond the scientific context.

6 Conclusions

6.1 The Normativity of Military Sociological Research ...

The preceding sections have shown how closely organizational policy – primarily personnel policy – can be linked to social science research. Even though some studies attempt to give the impression that they steer clear of the normative debates on armed forces and the use of military force – not least by their being reduced to statistical evaluations, quantitative analyses as well as data and figures –, it becomes very clear: Military sociology cannot be unbiased. Hardly any strand of research is better suited to prove and illustrate this thesis than the analysis of fighting spirit, mission motivation and social cohesion.

6.2 ... and: Back to the Roots? The Legacy of Military Pluralism in a Post-Interventionist Era

The emerging post-interventionist era will come with considerable changes and challenges for the Western armed forces. What is needed first and foremost is a new legitimacy: During the East-West conflict, the armies stood for the readiness of the Western world to defend itself. In the past 20 years, they have been regarded as instruments for countering conflicts and crises, enforcing national interests and projecting stability on a global level. It has not yet been finally determined what their future role will be and how it can be sustainably legitimized. The political and social pressure to accept further troop reductions and budget cuts will therefore be high. This trend could be reinforced by developments in technology, which can be exemplified by keywords such as drones and cyberspace. The calls for reductions and cuts could fall on fertile ground in the era of austerity. When political decisions are dominated by austerity measures, when familiar social benefits are abolished, and when the public sector is reduced in many countries, the armed forces and their resources can also expect to be up for debate. The Western armies could therefore be put under increasing external pressure in the foreseeable future.

In view of this, there is a risk that tendencies towards separation and isolation within the military may be reinforced. In Huntington's sense, the armed forces would withdraw into themselves. In the course of such a development, supposed traditions and antiquated military rituals could be revived and social homogeneity could be rediscovered as a military desire. Such a retreat, however, would marginalize the armed forces socially and politically and be detrimental to them in the long run. The future of the armed forces must be more colorful than their past. The developments in both society and security suggest this. In the future, armies will have to distinguish themselves by heterogeneity, differences and pluralization, since this will be the only way for them to keep up with functional and social trends and necessities. The armed forces cannot go back to the imagined good old days either.

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Expectations: An Underestimated Factor in International Crisis Management

Walter Feichtinger

1 Introduction

May be the topic is a little bit surprising, but nonetheless the importance of expectations – especially unmet expectations – should not be underestimated. Generally speaking, expectations are a positive factor while motivating and introducing positive attitudes. In contrast to this we can often notice that expectations are exaggerated and in the long run, they are leading to disappointment, frustration and in extreme situations to hostility. To illustrate this thesis let me cite three short examples:

- (1) When the former president of Yugoslavia, Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, did not give in during the negotiations with NATO in 1999, most of the observers expected him to do so after a few days of ‘selective’ bombardment. On the other hand analysts argued that Milosevic did not expect NATO to intervene militarily at all. In the end we witnessed an extended air campaign which lasted for more than 70 days – as a result of miscalculations and wrong expectations on both sides.
- (2) When the international community started to engage in Afghanistan militarily in 2001 only 5,000 troops were sent to Kabul in order to assist Afghan Security Forces in providing security. After having invested plenty of resources during 11 years of crisis management and peacebuilding it is evident that the whole engagement did not meet the expectations at all – neither those of the international community nor those of most Afghans.
- (3) Looking at the most recent example of Syria it is evident that not only the suffering population there but also people from outside ask the same question: Why does the international community not intervene to stop bloodshed and to avoid further atrocities? Why did intervention happen in Libya in 2011, why not in Syria now? Are lives in Syria not of the same value as they were in Libya just one year before?

As we know from our personal experience it is very common to take something for granted what in reality is not certain or, even worse, what can not be achieved or afforded. Related to international crisis management and peace operations many politicians, observers, mass media and ordinary people tend to demand action very soon. By doing so a general opinion and an ‘obligation to act’ in the sense of resolving a security problem is evolving. But even persons who are in charge of peace operations or missions are sometimes voic-

ing expectations which are far from reality. The disparity between expectations towards international engagements and the actual on-scene results is becoming visible more and more. This creates serious problems.

2 Some Structure for a Coherent Assessment

For a more structured approach to this phenomenon it is useful to follow three tracks. Track one is content-, or purpose-, based and asks: What is international crisis management expected to achieve? Track two is focusing on timelines and raises the questions: How fast does international crisis management react to develop security concerns and for how long is the engagement planned? Track three is related to local actors in war-torn countries and their compliance with international programs and activities. In other words it tackles the question: Do the local parties really want to achieve the same goals as the intervening actors?

2.1 Three Drivers to be Identified

Let us look at track one in detail: What are the expectations towards international crisis management? According to recent documents and doctrines mainly developed by UN-bodies there are three clear messages: (1) There is an international obligation to act in cases where people are in danger of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity and their states are failing in protecting them – this is called the ‘Responsibility to Protect’. (2) Protection of civilians has to be an integral part of peacekeeping missions; and (3) Statebuilding is of highest priority.

Although every single track is strongly legitimized and can be underpinned, one has to keep in mind, that there is no consensus on this within the so-called international community. As we witness now in Syria there is a strong restraint on the Russian and Chinese side to exert influential pressure on President Bashar al-Asad via the Security Council. Although it is evident that crimes against humanity are executed and that state authorities are responsible for them, there is no unanimous understanding and assessment of the situation and how the international community should act in order to protect innocent people. After the experience of Kosovo 1999 and of Libya 2011, where NATO has intervened, there has been a general expectation to repeat humanitarian intervention in similar cases. But can it really be done? Of course, the situation of endangered and suffering people is comparable, but nothing else. So is it helpful to let expectations towards military interventions evolve when there is no guarantee at all that the ‘responsibility to protect’ indeed leads to substantial action? Or is it to be seen as a step on a long

way to turn this into a standard of international law? Similar to these issues is the challenge of protecting civilians in peacekeeping operations. There is little argument that UN military forces can and should be used to protect civilians under attack or imminent threat. But as Alan Doss, currently Senior Political Advisor at the Kofi Annan Foundation, points out: “In planning, managing, and monitoring missions with protection responsibilities, it is vital that the limits as well as the imperatives of protection are explained and understood in the Security Council and beyond. Public opinion, locally and internationally, must be made aware of just how far a peacekeeping mission can go in protecting people. Failure to do so opens up the danger that great expectations will end in great disappointments.” (Doss 2011: 42)

From a realistic perspective there is no doubt that states are an indispensable pillar of international security. State-building, therefore, is an obligation in cases where states are failing, have failed or are recovering. But to be honest – is it feasible to build states from the very scratch? What can be done from outside and what kind of ‘state’ do we mean? Do we have the same expectations towards Kosovo, Afghanistan and South Sudan or even Somalia to be or become a state?

2.2 Speed and Duration of an Engagement

This leads to the second track – how fast does international crisis management work in cases of security concerns and for how long is the engagement planned. Generally speaking, international crisis management is not a speedy enterprise. Conflict prevention is widely perceived as being of highest importance, but in day to day engagement hard to achieve. In principle, international crisis management is reactive and in most cases there is some indefinable threshold that has to be overcome before acting. It still takes approximately half a year to set up a UN peacekeeping mission. Even monitoring missions require 1 to 2 months before being fully active. Sanctions also do not have an immediate effect – it may take years until their influence may be felt, provided that they work at all. Concerning the duration of missions most troop contributing states have a strong desire for a clearly defined end-date-engagement instead of end-state-orientation. Seen positively it can be considered as a lesson learned namely that an overextended stay prevents the resolution of the underlying root causes of a conflict and contradicts the principle of local ownership. Seen less optimistically one could argue that states and/or international organizations are not patient enough and ignore the fact that political and structural changes take time – at least one generation. One of the underlying problems is that previous crisis management and peace operations were too unrealistic – in other words, expectations were too high! Not only

on the side of the external actors, but also on the side of local authorities and societies, mainly driven by messages of foreigners.

2.3 Compliance or Contradiction?

Track three is closely linked to the last point. Given the case that there is some accordance of expectations on both sides on immediate issues – does it mean that local actors and authorities really have to agree on long-term goals developed and shaped mainly by external actors? Do we, as part of the international community, really expect them to fully comply with our understanding of running a state, societies, economies, etc.? Or do we underestimate the fact that there is a different or traditional understanding of order, checks and balances and inclusive politics? In this context Denis M. Tull points out the danger of misperceptions. He stresses that external actors can not expect local political elites to share problem assessments and interests with them. Quite to the contrary, local parties can exert heavy pressure in order to counter external reform strategies, if they do not meet their interests (Tull 2011: 249). In addition he emphasizes that an overextended engagement is sometimes seen negatively, because it could damage the image of a country or government as being unable to solve its problems (Tull 2011: 252).

3 General Statements

Having in mind the experience of more than two decades and looking forward one can identify three phases: Firstly, the optimistic, or ‘yes we can’-phase assuming that the international community can stop atrocities, can build states, can do regime change and that all can be done predominantly from outside. This general attitude led to rising expectations regarding international crisis and conflict management. It started in 1995 after ending the war in Bosnia and ended in approximately 2006 when it became clear that Iraq and Afghanistan would not be a story of success only. It was followed by Phase 2 – one could call it the ‘eye-opener phase’. It was characterized by realities on the ground, for example in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Haiti or even Bosnia-Herzegovina. All external but also domestic actors had to realize the multiple limits international engagements are confronted with. Of course, the achievements sometimes were in sharp contrast to the concepts, plans and expectations. But it was a necessary and inevitable period for future adaptations.

4. Three Concluding Remarks

- (1) Related to international crisis management there is a clear message: ‘Hope for the best, but prepare for the worst’. And don’t forget to tell the people what really can be achieved and what the dangers, perils and obstacles before and during an engagement are. In addition, don’t send soldiers to hot conflicts only to stop killing – its all about political problems. A military intervention is not a solution in itself – the use of force can be decisive, but it cannot be a substitute for politics!
- (2) International crisis management is not about immediate solutions or quick impact projects enabling external politicians to have nice photos for winning elections back home. International crisis management requires comprehensive long-term strategies and lasting engagement – if needed for generations.
- (3) The possible impact of external engagement must be seen cautiously – it is often very little and poor. The decisive element for the definite result is the acceptance of external assistance, the absorption capacity and, most important, the will for change on the local side. One should not underestimate obstructive factors or resistance in these fields. Wrong assessments or wishful thinking can be very counterproductive in this context.

All these remarks are not at all new – but are they evident in the public and politics in our states? Or more important, are they implemented as lessons learned in our strategies and public communication? We can often recognize that these simple findings are ignored or have been forgotten. But it can be deadly for a mission or engagement not to keep these basic principles in mind and not to make them public in order to avoid exaggerated expectations. Tell the people what realistically can be expected and achieved and they will understand this message. Otherwise the risk for disappointment and for the failure of an engagement will increase substantially. ‘Expectation management’, therefore, is one of the overwhelming challenges in international crisis management – it is not exaggerated to see it as a core requirement to succeed.

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III Micro-Level Perspectives

Militaries and the Multiple Negotiations of Intervention

Eyal Ben-Ari*

1 Introduction

This book is based on the contention that in the wake of the many interventions that the industrialized democracies have undertaken since the end of the Cold War, things are slowly but steadily changing. In these countries there is much less enthusiasm for stability and support operations, counterinsurgency, humanitarian missions, or 'small' wars than during the past two decades and a greater selectiveness in sending armed forces abroad. Indeed, those impelled to intervene are confronted with confusing, ever-shifting normative, political and financial environments which are made more complex by the nature of conflicts and the proliferation of actors seeking to intervene with a myriad of instruments and imperatives (Ramuhala 2010: 11). Accordingly, many of the articles in this volume focus on the macro-level of strategy and civil-military relations to explain what has led to these changes.

I offer a model for analyzing how military interventions are negotiated by a variety of actors in an array of arenas, not only at the macro-level of elites and institutions. The model is based on the conceptual and theoretical insights that I have developed with Edna Lomsky-Feder (Lomsky-Feder/Gazit/Ben-Ari 2004; Lomsky-Feder/Ben-Ari 2011, 2013) and on the work of Forster (2012) and Levy (2012) and focuses on three levels of interchange and bargaining:

- (1) At the macro-sociological level transactions and bargaining occurs between senior commanders and political leaders representing an undifferentiated society and result in *social covenants*.
- (2) At the micro-level exchanges and negotiations transpire between individual soldiers and their families and specific units (for instance in regard to postings in expeditionary forces) and result in 'psychological' or *individual contracts*.
- (3) In between them at the mezzo-sociological level within the armed forces specific groups (like reservists or ethnic minorities) give-and-take with the military and the outcome are specific *group compacts*.

* I would like to thank Edna Lomsky-Feder with whom I developed many of the ideas at base of this article, Amichai Cohen for discussions about it and the participants at the SOWI Conference on Postinterventionism, June 2012.

Each level is characterized by its own dynamic, involves different resources and expectations and diverse forms of emergent agreements. In addition, the three kinds of negotiated agreements interact with each other and provide limiting and enabling conditions for the others.

A word of caution: To be sure, negotiated agreements also take place within military interventions themselves between the armed forces and a variety of other actors such as other military units, locals, NGOs or the police forces, but given the limits of the article I only focus on what happens at 'home'. I suggest that the same kind of theoretical insights based on exchange and negotiations can be applied to cases in the 'field' as well.

2 A Conceptual Model

Forster's (2006, 2012) analysis of the military covenant promulgated in the United Kingdom offers an excellent starting point for theorizing. As he explains, this covenant refers to the terms of the 'contractual' relationship between armed forces personnel and their host society. I use 'contractual' in inverted commas to denote the fact that while not legally binding this agreement nevertheless is seen by a variety of groups to be obligatory in terms of mutual expectations and the moral force behind their implementation. The idea of the covenant has roots in social philosophy where 'social contract' refers to the understanding between a state and its citizens regarding the rights and responsibilities of both sides. But the military covenant is more specific in the stipulations it lays out. Put simply, the covenant focuses on the willingness of military personnel to make personal sacrifices (including death), forgo some rights enjoyed by those outside the armed forces and in return expect recognition of their important social role, fair treatment for them and their families and commensurate terms and conditions of service. While the British covenant comprises an actual document, a written text, I argue that such a social covenant exists in unwritten – but equally strong – forms in all of the industrial democracies.

In the case of Britain, the promulgation of the covenant was seen as an antidote to the civilianization of the military and to challenges to its autonomy, namely, its ability to determine for itself its culture and values and police the boundaries of its expertise (in organized violence), jurisdiction and legitimacy (Forster 2012: 274). Like the formulation of various codes of ethics by any large organization when it encounters problems in recruiting resources and is no longer taken-for-granted, the promulgation of the covenant should be seen as an active defensive move by the elites of armed forces, a protective effort to redefine a space for new expectations of the military and of the missions it must carry out. The most significant challenge has been the right

of the army to be different from the society from which it came and maintain its combat effectiveness (collective over individual rights, separate legal system of military discipline, hierarchical structure based on rank and a chain of command) (Forster 2012: 276).

Forster's model is based on a number of assumptions about external and internal organizational exchanges and the dynamics of organizational politics that I develop. At the root of Forster's explanation is the contention that the social covenant is based on an exchange relationship between the military and (an undifferentiated) society in which resources are negotiated and traded between parties. This kind of conceptualization has been developed most forcefully by Yagil Levy (2003, 2008, 2010), who for example, distinguishes between subject militarism and contractual militarism to underscore the appearance over the past years of a new kind of relationship between the armed forces and social groups outside of it. These exchanges go on between elites representing the military and society, and are based on the perceived interests of each party and changing social conditions.

The model of exchange is bolstered by a political perspective giving pride of place to how the constant (implicit) bargaining and (sometimes explicit) contestations between the parties relate to the resources each party can employ and the coalitions it can create. Forster's formulation is echoed by other analyses that emphasize the permeable boundaries between the military and civilian sectors as zones of negotiation and friction that take place within changing social and political conditions. Forster (2012: 274) suggests that the British covenant involves three types of relationships: between soldiers and the army, the armed forces and government and the army and society. I suggest a different typology that explicitly differentiates the social covenant from two other kinds of related accords – group compacts and individual contracts. This move allows me to underscore the particular character of each type of negotiated agreement, the resources brought into play at each level, and the importance of the political environment within which the accords emerge. In addition, my analysis allows me to integrate three hitherto separate kinds of scholarly literature into one combined formulation.

3 Social Covenants

As explained, the social covenant (Forster 2006) is an accord that emerges between the armed forces and civilian groups in the name of an undifferentiated society. This agreement that in most countries is implicit governs such issues as the conditions for using the military in a legitimate manner for security and defense considerations, waging warfare in moral ways, a promise of citizen rights and care for combatants, and (possibly) a guarantee of social

mobility for them. In the industrial democracies the covenant centers on the potential of the armed forces to wage organized violence and particularly on public expectations that the military be used in a rightful manner and that soldiers' lives are taken into account as a central consideration.

In countries such as Switzerland, Israel or Finland (and not in current-day France or the United States, for instance) this social accord also governs the notion of citizen-soldiers as conscripts or reservists. Accordingly, the move to an all-volunteer force would constitute a gross violation of the macro-social covenant in such countries (see Tresch 2011). Indeed, because the citizen-soldier in the guise of the conscript has been so central to the covenant in the countries maintaining a compulsory draft, Haltiner/Tresch (2009) argue that (among other factors) external military interventions have led to the end of conscription: In the eyes of European publics conscripted citizens are classic defenders of their nation or allied territories and thus states cannot compel conscripts to participate in out-of-area missions. It follows that the operational capability of a country's armed forces to participate in out-of-area peace missions depends solely on the number of available volunteers.

The end of conscription has not spelt the disappearance of the social covenant, far from it. Rather, during the past two decades, a social covenant centered on volunteer forces has emerged in many countries, but in an altered form from the one governing conscripts. Like the latter, at its core the new covenant involves maintaining the uniqueness of the military as an organization and the particular ethos of the warrior. But the covenants of the industrial democracies have now come to include other topics such as expectations that the military operates like business organizations in terms of efficiency, placing women in all military roles as part of the move to gender equality, being ecologically aware and protecting the environment, and introducing multiculturalism (or some kind of representativeness of the wider population). And indeed, when the terms of the covenant – now much more civilianized than in the past – is violated there are a host of actors (social movements, NGOs and international bodies) that may initiate political action (witness the activities of feminist and ecological movements).

More pertinent to my analysis is the question of the new covenant's terms for acceptable military intervention. Calhoun (2004, 2008) traces the rise of what he calls the 'emergency imaginary' in which the term 'complex humanitarian emergency' is central. First appearing at the end of the 1980s it refers to sudden, unpredictable crises that are seen as being outside of normal circumstances. These emergencies – that ironically appear rather regularly – are often viewed by publics in industrial democracies as justifying military intervention. Thus, the civilianization of the military in which the military is expected to share the values civil society holds in high esteem is now ex-

pected to prosecute armed interventions – such as wars – in ways that reflect civility and compassion – in a word military humanitarianism (Coker 2002: 93). Like the spread of human rights, which shares much of the same intellectual ancestry, the spread of humanitarianism is often celebrated as an indication of the growing cosmopolitanism of conscience. Indeed, the title of one of Ignatieff's (1998) books aptly attests to the changed terms of the social covenant in that it indicates that military missions abroad for 'good' purposes have become part of The Warrior's Honor.

The activities of such public intellectuals as Ignatieff himself – he is an entrepreneur in this sense – in changing the stipulations of the social covenant should be seen against a wider backdrop. Collective security and collective intervention for military humanitarianism has been negotiated into the covenant by a loose but powerful coalition of actors (media representatives, policy and decision-makers, researchers and academics, pundits and publicists, security experts, human rights advocates and humanitarian activists) (Chandler 2001). What we have witnessed in the last 20 years is the development of new international norms that define what is legitimately accepted by state actors and their publics. Certain actors or norm entrepreneurs – domestic and external, state and NGO-based, and often supported by the media – have steadily been pushing to expand the role of humanitarian interventions. Embedded within combinations of intellectuals, informed publics, human rights and humanitarian movements, and national and transnational judicial bodies such norms have contributed to a global discourse on human rights and rules and expectations regarding the proper initiation and use of force (Colonosmos 2006; Ignatieff 1998, 2004; Warren 2000: 228). The new global norms are constantly refracted through domestic and international pressure and have become part of the social covenant. Crucially, they strongly resonate with assumptions about the responsibility of key countries for conflicts in the Third World and the need to alleviate suffering and poverty among civilians in them. These themes are so ethically and emotionally evocative for they touch, as Ignatieff (1998) observes, on the bases of Western self-perceptions which stress good, responsible, and moral behavior. As Calhoun (2008) argues, responding to and intervening in emergencies through delivering humanitarian assistance has become one of the modalities of globalization – a central engagement for global NGOs and other bodies.

It is not surprising then, that the German Supreme Court decided that there was a need for the Bundestag to decide about the country's expeditionary missions because it touched upon the social covenant as embodied in the constitution (Amichai Cohen personal communication). The decision was taken because issues involving the social covenant usually appear at the level of constitutional law (or its equivalents) while those of the mezzo group

compacts are under administrative law. The level of constitutional law is something that the courts are uncomfortable with since the idea is that social forces (or their representatives in parliament) should decide on the essential issues.

The social covenant is also closely related to the process of the juridification of the military (Rubin 2002). In theater, as Forster (2006) argues, both the prescriptive rules of engagement and the fact that the Royal Military Police have been over-zealous in Iraq, requiring soldiers to prove they operated within the rules of engagement have had a detrimental effect on morale. Hence, Dandeker/Freedman (2002) worried that the blame and compensation culture that is already affecting other public services like health and police would cause leaders to be more defensive; all of which may hinder the military becoming an effective force. The media tends to intensify both the process of juridification and the need for military humanitarianism (Robinson 2000).

4 Individual Contracts

At the micro-level within specific units, *individual contracts* are negotiated and agreed upon between commander and an individual soldier and his or her family. In organization studies this accord has been called the implicit or 'psychological contract' involving the perceptions of employees and employers of the mutual obligations to each other. More specifically, this kind of informal contract is based on a "[b]elief that some form of promise has been made and that the terms are accepted by all involved. The psychological contract really is an unwritten set of expectations between everyone in an organization and, unlike the written contract, is continually changing. By nature it is a highly flexible and undefined set of terms which are extremely interpretive by the individual" (Odysseyzone 2006).

Within this unofficial pact, troops expect that their time will be used efficiently, they will receive proper training, be deployed in justified missions, provided with minimum life conditions and that their families are taken care of. The military for its part expects proper and professional performance, discipline and acceptance of hierarchical authority, commitment to the military and the unit, high motivation, care of one's body, and a willingness to make sacrifices.

As Lomsky-Feder/Ben-Ari (2012) argue, in practical terms this exchange is rooted in interpersonal dynamics and in the local organizational conditions of the unit where individuals serve. My hypothesis is that the most significant difference would be between combat and support soldiers and to a slightly lesser extent between deployable and non-deployable troops. The difference

can be seen in that individual contracts may be transactional or relational (Odysseyzone 2006). In business organizations and by extension support units, transactional terms are usually short-term performance related and frequently involve material exchanges. In the military they are related to the occupational category of Moskos' Input-Output Model (1986) (I/O model), and are exemplified through the arrival of a technician to work with an organic unit for a period of a few days. Similarly, the civilian 'pilots' of drones may have the same kind of exchange tie with the armed forces employing them. In such cases, an expectation about the development of skills is negligible and a specific period of 'employment' is agreed upon. The unit for its part can award or withhold all sorts of seemingly insignificant material conditions for proper performance of the role (such as proper sleeping quarters or food). Relational contracts are based on emotional involvement as well as material benefits and are typically more long-term as evinced in Moskos' institutional category. The key to such individual pacts is significant investment on the part of both sides as often epitomized in combat units. This situation is not surprising since the more dangerous and critical the mission, the less leeway a commander has for negotiations with troops about material conditions of service and the more he or she will make an effort to 'compensate' soldiers with symbolic goods (like recognition or cultivation).

In many countries the terms of the contract and its contents have slowly changed. Tomforde (2005; see also Mannitz 2009: 691, 2011; Tripodi 2006) for instance explains that since the early 2000s the self-images of troops in Germany – and by extension other countries such as The Netherlands and the Nordic countries – began to be based on peacekeeping and soldiers began to define themselves and expect roles that involve care and protection of life. In contrast, soldiers in the British, Italian, French or American armies still defined themselves as combat soldiers and valued symbols of power and masculinity. Mannitz (2011) quoting surveys of German soldiers since 2000 says that there is a diversification of role concepts combining competing competences required to tailor to the various missions like armed mechanics or global street workers. My guess, then, is that the terms of the individual contracts these troops negotiate have slowly changed. And in fact militaries around the world have been keenly aware of the changed expectations centering on individual contracts with soldiers (Williams 2006: 25f.); Belgian's military instituted new and more flexible procedures; Spain established a new hotline for soldiers' complaints; Germany relaxed its regulations regarding the wearing of jewelry; the French force created new career paths and promotions for people with special expertise without taking direct command; and several countries are improving family benefits such as housing family support, child-care centers or assistance in searching for schools.

That such contracts are significant as determinants of organizational behavior is evident when individuals perceive that they have been violated and take action that has long lasting effects. Current problems with retention in the military are a good example. As Müller (2012) has it, the soldiers of industrial democracies are facing an acute period of stress following numerous changes that their societies and armed forces are undergoing. In fact the problems of overstretch and morale due to multiple deployments and greater flexibility demanded of the military can be found in many countries (Dandeker/Freedman 2002). While overstretch for some younger troops can be exciting and rewarding, in general it leads to increased problems of retention. In fact, even before the Iraq War military leaders of the armed forces of industrial democracies complained about the strain imposed on personnel by frequent deployments to stressful missions around the world (Williams 2006: 9). It is not surprising then that there are reports about soldiers' negotiating with commanders about deployments or that the U.S. Navy set up an on-line auction directing bonuses to volunteers for unpopular tours (Williams 2006: 25f.).

Here we find a curious reverberation between the macro and mezzo-levels. At the macro-level, the process of juridification of military action (Rubin 2002) has obvious expressions such as the growing centrality of legal mandates for action by international bodies. Here, however, we find that while never a legal document, the military covenant in Britain has provided a reference for judicial rulings (Forster 2010: 281): Coroners' courts have been central in raising the covenant as a benchmark for obligations of the armed forces for their service personnel and especially their families. The types of issues dealt with include forms of discrimination, employment practices, health and safety conditions or protection of the environment. But from the perspective of our analysis, this process – and the relative plasticity of the social covenant (Forster 2012) – has provided families of fallen soldiers with the resources and avenues to contest the military. Hence, at the macro-level this situation leaves senior commanders as 'weakened gatekeepers' and the army no longer amenable to traditional forms of regulation. Moreover, at the more micro-level we find that families of fallen soldiers or soldiers who died during training increasingly turn to judicial treatment (Forster 2006).

Allied with the power of the human rights discourse, the process of juridification has increasingly impinged on the autonomy of the armed forces. The power of the covenant as related to individual contracts is most explicitly evident in the fact that the British military – as do all of the militaries of industrial democracies – finds increasing difficulties in controlling a professional space because it is increasingly penetrated by legal interventions and individual and societal demands (Forster 2006). At the individual level the

increasing formalization of relations between troops and militaries may lead to a growing lack of trust and to much more limited sets of motivations.

5 Group Compacts

The third kind of agreement, what I call the *group compact*, lies at the mezo-sociological level between the macro-covenant and the micro-contract. It is negotiated between the military as an agent of the state and different social groups. If we understand the permeable boundaries between the military and civilian sectors as zones of negotiation, friction and fluidity, then it becomes clear how different groups bargain collectively with the military based on their access to various symbolic, social, political, and economic resources. For example, since marriage has become a norm in military life, especially with the end of conscription, families have, ironically, emerged as a powerful lobby to engage with the armed forces (Coker 2002: 98). Forster (2012) states that in Britain since 2006 the covenant has provided an important reference point for demands towards the army and government: For better equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan and for better treatment of casualties. Among others, these claims have been voiced by families of soldiers organized jointly and allied politically with groups within the military and the media. Similarly, as Dandeker and his colleagues (2006) explain, in the United Kingdom and elsewhere policies towards veterans are based on negotiations with veterans' interest groups.

More generally, these examples indicate another kind of reverberation between the levels of accords. It is not coincidental that the ethics of care in the international arena and the underlying humanitarianism and humanitarian missions – perhaps epitomized in the human security paradigm or NATO's comprehensive approach – are but part of a wider move towards the ethics of care with regards to groups and individuals and the kinds of agreements that they have with the military. Other examples of negotiated accords include social groups – based on ethnicity or national affiliation (think of the Foreign Legion) – that organize to bargain with the military. Indeed, in 2007, Commonwealth soldiers serving in the British forces formed a union because they were dissatisfied with racism, welfare support and promotion prospects (BBC News, 7 March 2007). And the Ghurkha Welfare Society has been partially successful in its negotiations with the British government for a rise in pension schemes for veterans (BBC News, 21 July 2010). Such collective action is certainly in part the outcome of experiences in military interventions. In other countries such as Norway or Portugal where only a small minority of the population is interested in the armed forces, it is limited, if powerful, groups that negotiated with the military.

Negotiations and emergent agreements between representatives of military reserves and the military exemplify a very important group in current day missions. In fact, in many countries such as Belgium or Germany reserve officers are organized in unions and form interest groups and lobbies that negotiate with the armed forces. In Sweden the reserve officers' union is not only formally institutionalized (it has its own newspaper, functionaries and rules), but is also a pressure group negotiating with headquarters. Compared to reservists there is much less leeway for conscripts and regulars as groups to negotiate specific compacts and where lobbies promoting their interests have been created, this has been done by external actors (such as parents, wives, or pensioners), located outside the military hierarchy.

In previous work with colleagues on Israeli reserves (Lomsky-Feder/Gazit/Ben-Ari 2004; Lomsky-Feder/Ben-Ari 2011) we suggested that a fruitful way to understand the conditional attitude on the part of troops towards reserve service is the degree to which the military holds up its part of the unwritten group compact with them. Accordingly, when the demands or the expectations of reservists are not met they can leave service, voice their concerns, organize in pressure groups, or turn to the media. This situation becomes especially acute in regard to deployments in wars of choice: Smith/Jans (2011), e.g., suggest that when multiple employments along the life-course have become common-place, it seems only normal for reservists to bargain with the military in and around the terms and meanings of their service. Indeed, that such group compacts are significant as determinants of organizational behavior are evident when reservists perceive that they have been infringed and take action having long lasting effects. Consequently, accords with reservists as Griffith (2011) and Dandeker (2011) make clear have implications for retention and readiness: In the U.S. military, e.g., reservists who joined the military for educational reasons and were called up for service during the last decade tend to disproportionately not enlist again; or those with soldier-warrior orientations have the greatest concerns about lack of training and possibly a greater propensity for post-traumatic stress symptoms. Conversely, strong consensus on group compacts strengthens individual contracts.

6 Conclusions

In this article, I have analyzed armed military interventions by industrial democracies as being negotiated on multiple levels. By integrating in one conceptual framework scholarly analyses of three kinds of emergent agreements between the military and other actors, I suggested a way to understand not only the diverse interchanges, but also the relations between them. My wider

view is based on looking at how the military – like any organization – is characterized by an array of consultations, parleys and bargaining that underlie emergent structures and patterns of behavior. As a consequence we realize that just as the covenant has come to mean different things to different groups (individuals, military charities, political parties, and different arms of the state) (Forster 2012: 283), so group compacts and individual contracts are open to negotiation and contestation.

Along the lines I have been arguing, we need to realize that people use terms related to the three agreements – expectations, exchange, rights and duties, violations – as mediums for talking about, or evoking images of their country, their military or themselves. By discussing specific issues, people constantly advance or denigrate certain visions of what their country and its military is like and what it should be like. Mannitz (2009) contends that with the increased Europeanization of security and military policy as part of normative changes to the soldierly role, we may well witness more discussion about military matters beyond national publics. Accordingly, while none has emerged so far, there may be a space opening up for a pan-European social covenant.

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Generation ISAF – Operational Realities, Self-Image and Organization¹

Anja Seiffert & Julius Hess

1 Introduction

In one of his first interviews in his role as Federal Minister of Defense, Thomas de Maizière said something quite remarkable: “Normally, *Innere Führung*, or leadership development and civic education, and the concept of soldiers as citizens in uniform are taken for granted and not put to the test – not so in times of crisis or during operations.” (Kompass 2011: 9) Discussions of Bundeswehr operations abroad are generally limited to issues of legitimacy, strategy and tactics. What is far less often addressed is how soldiers perceive the context and reality of an international intervention or crisis management operation, how they deal with often confusing conflict scenarios and rapidly changing security situations in theaters of operations, how they experience dealing with military force and what the results are for their self-image and for the overall organization of the Bundeswehr. This paper addresses these issues and outlines them in seven hypotheses. The approach will be based on examples, with a strong focus on Bundeswehr operations in Afghanistan. The statements are based on the findings of field research conducted during Bundeswehr operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan (Seiffert 2005, 2012).² Furthermore, the results of a survey carried out by the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences among Bundeswehr soldiers deployed to the German-led Regional Command North of ISAF in Afghanistan between March and October 2010 have also been incorporated. These soldiers formed the 22nd ISAF contingent of the Bundeswehr.

1 The present article is an extended version of Seiffert (2012).

2 The research team of the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences to Afghanistan consisted of Dr. Anja Seiffert, Dr. Phil C. Langer, Carsten Pietsch and Bastian Krause. The field research in the Balkans was conducted by Dr. Anja Seiffert.

2 Hypothesis 1

*The transformation of the Bundeswehr into an operational army has not only a structural, but also a cultural component. It includes modified military organizational practices and changes in the organizational culture, as well as a reorientation of the soldiers.*³

The Bundeswehr is under pressure to adjust. There is talk of a radical turning point and of the most extensive reform since the establishment of the Bundeswehr. With the suspension of compulsory military service, the reduction in the number of forces and the reorganization of the political and military command and control structures, the Bundeswehr will change substantially over the coming years.⁴ Basically, the reform measures already initiated and those that are to follow constitute a “transformation of form and function” (Seiffert 2005: 8) which is so extensive that even the Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr speaks of a “change in awareness, the magnitude of which could not be foreseen”. He goes on to say that today, “having to fight is part of the military profession” (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4 February 2011). “Be able to fight so you don’t have to fight” was a Bundeswehr *doctrine* of the Cold War period. By now, it has been overtaken by a new military *reality* for the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan that includes deaths and killings as well as injuries and disabilities. The result is a widening gap between experiences of society in the home country and of soldiers during operations. In today’s “wars of choice” (Müller et al. 2010: 17), soldiers alone bear the risk, ultimately paying the price for political decisions. But this is just one side of the issue. In contrast to conventional combat operations, military operations today predominantly take place “amongst the people” (Smith 2006: 335). In countries such as Afghanistan with an unstable security situation and a lack of state structures, the focus is on protecting the population and the interaction of civilian and military measures, especially the proportionality of military means and the adequacy of action strategies in general. This requires a willingness to cooperate with a diversified range of actors. Military-technical skills alone are not enough. Today, soldiers need to develop additional capabilities for action and cooperation. Traditional military competences must be combined with diverse stabilization skills (Seiffert 2008: 54). Soldiers need to be as competent in peacekeeping as in combat. This requires a broad, mul-

3 This thesis does not only apply to recent reform measures of the Bundeswehr. It refers to the transformation process of altogether more than ten years and is based on Seiffert (2005).

4 See also the key elements for the reorientation of the Bundeswehr from 18 May 2011 and the Defense Policy Guidelines, also from 18 May 2011.

tifunctional profile and demands tremendous social, intellectual and psychological capacities (Müller et al. 2010: 14).

In a complex operational environment – which in Afghanistan varies between counterinsurgency and state-building – between combat situations, stabilization and training tasks, soldiers are confronted with comprehensive and sometimes conflicting demands on their actions and behavior. On one hand, they are under pressure to become ‘civilized’ in terms of social and cross-cultural competences.⁵ On the other hand, they must maintain their full military fighting capability. This new occupational image has nothing in common with the traditional self-perception of the soldier as a ‘warrior’ anymore. Coping with the contradictions and tensions resulting from the de facto combination of military and civilian tasks, however, is not easy (Seiffert 2005: 16). The term “split” has been used in research (Bredow/Kümmel 1999: 6) to describe soldiers required to “help people on the one hand but also be capable of fighting” (Warburg 2010: 263). It is not yet possible to foresee where this “transformation of identity” (Wiesendahl 2010: 6) will ultimately lead the Bundeswehr, but, especially with a view of the operational realities, today it is more important than ever to encourage awareness of social norms in different situations, as well as the development of a differentiated self-image among soldiers (Ebeling 2006: 62ff.).

In Germany, the perception of Bundeswehr operations in Afghanistan is usually limited to a focus on negative sensationalist news. Violence and war dominate the news that reaches us from Afghanistan. The ongoing public debate on the nature of this Bundeswehr operation which was sparked by the air strike in Kunduz in September 2009 seems to emphasize this perception even further.⁶ The beginning of 2010 marked the first time that a member of the German government, namely the then German Minister of Defense, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, expressed the opinion that the situation in Afghanistan could “colloquially be called a war” (Süddeutsche Zeitung online, 4 April 2010). Referring to the concept of war established greater clarity re-

5 Experts agree that the multidimensional crisis management operations of the Bundeswehr are mostly complex civilian-military missions that require a high level of individual professionalism. Apart from military core capabilities, these operations call for “social empathy and the ability to deal with conflicts and cross-cultural competence, as well as role distance and political judgement” (Seiffert 2005: 303). In military sociology, this is referred to as a tendency towards polyvalent capabilities (see Bredow 2005; Haltiner 2006; Mannitz 2007; Kümmel 2010).

6 In early September 2009, the then German commander of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kunduz ordered the bombardment of two hijacked tankers. More than 100 people died, many of them civilians.

garding operational reality, but, at the same time, the complexity of the task seems to be lost from sight (Ebeling 2010: 51). The media are now talking of a “brutalization” (“Verrohung”, our translation) caused by war experience (Die ZEIT online, 21 January 2011) and of the “era of professional fighters” (Die ZEIT, 19 May 2011). This is based on implicit and often unsupported assumptions about the reality of the „new wars”⁷ (Münkler: 2006) and its consequences for the organizational culture and the self-image of the Bundeswehr.

With regard to the operations of the 22nd contingent of the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan, this paper aims to discuss and to empirically substantiate how exactly operational realities differ for German soldiers in Afghanistan, what experiences they actually have with direct and indirect violence and what effects these experiences have on their attitudes and orientations.

3 Hypothesis 2

Experiences in theater differ. The operational reality of soldiers in Afghanistan is divided into different ‘realms of experience’.

The general discourse about ‘war in Afghanistan’ may adequately describe the very real perception of the risk and threat faced by many soldiers deployed to Afghanistan, but, at the same time, it easily masks the differences in individual experience and can thus quickly lead to misinterpretations and misleading conclusions. During any discussion of the consequences of operational experiences, whose experience in which operational reality is referred to must be checked. The different operational realities of soldiers in Afghanistan can be categorized. For instance, the realms of experience and the hazard-potential vary substantially depending on the place of deployment. While German soldiers in the troubled provinces of Kunduz and Baghlan in the ISAF Regional Command North were under fire almost every day and had to deal with suicide attacks as well as complex military operations by insur-

7 The nature of operations is often misunderstood. In the words of the former British General Sir Rupert Smith: “Capturing the will of the people is a very clear and basic concept, yet one that is either misunderstood or ignored by political and military establishments around the world. The politician keeps applying force to attain a condition, assuming the military will both create and maintain it. And whilst for many years the military has understood the need to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local population, this is still seen as a supporting activity for the defeat of the insurgents rather than the overall objective, and it is often under-resourced and restricted to low-level acts to ameliorate local conditions and the lot of the people.” (Smith 2006: 277f.)

gents, those on deployment in the 'Blue Box' around Camp Marmal near Mazar-e-Sharif predominantly experienced a "sort of insecure intermediate world" of no-longer open violence and an "unstable state of peace" (Wiesendahl 2010: 22), where priority was given to demonstrating presence in local settlements, establishing and maintaining contacts and securing and supporting reconstruction activities. Although conflict scenarios may change quickly at any time, as shown by the violent attack on the United Nations Assistance Mission in April 2011, the fact remains that the risks soldiers face vary depending on the area of operations.

Experiences and risks do not, however, vary depending on the location alone, but rather depending on the tasks in operations. More than a third (41%) of the members of the 22nd contingent was assigned training and protection tasks. Almost as many (40%) were assigned support tasks while one in five (19%) performed planning and command and control tasks.⁸ The spectrum of duties and activities varies greatly across ranks.⁹ Enlisted personnel were found more in task force and protection companies while junior non-commissioned officers were tasked more with support activities. Sergeants and officers were equally represented in all areas of responsibility. As one would expect, field-grade officers were tasked more with duties related to planning, command and control. However, while a fifth (20%) of command and control personnel and a third of support forces (35%) spent several months of their deployment entirely within the fenced-off world of the camp and only rarely came into contact with the country and its people, 88 percent of training and protection forces moved outside the camp for joint operations with Afghan security forces, vehicle patrols and outposts to maintain contact as part of civil-military co-operation or for the purposes of training the Afghan Army

8 The question was: "What tasks were you assigned during your deployment?" Participants could choose from a list of 17 tasks. For the purpose of data analysis, responses were re-grouped into three central task areas. The task items HQ company, national staff, combined staff and communication service were grouped under "Planning/Command & Control". Task force company, military police, OMLT, CIMIC, EOD, security forces, QRF and patrol duty were grouped under "Training/Protection". Finally, the response categories engineer forces, maintenance & repair, camp management and medical service were grouped under "Support".

9 $\chi^2=208.106$; $df=8$; $p\leq 0.001$; Cramer's $V=0.30$; $N = 1\,131$; data weighted according to rank category.

and police force.¹⁰ This applies especially to soldiers of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) of the Regional Command North, which was disbanded in 2010 and was gradually integrated into the newly established German training and protection battalion (Task Force) Mazar-e-Sharif¹¹ during the deployment of the 22nd contingent. They were often assigned to outposts or on missions in the field for several weeks at a time, often only returning to camp for a few days.¹² Thus, not only is the potential risk unequally distributed among soldiers in operations, but challenges and stress factors may also vary greatly.

German training and protection forces employed in the regions of Kunduz and Baghlan, where they operated mainly in the field, faced especially complex challenges. They had to deal with guerrilla warfare and terrorism and had to adjust to a situation of asymmetric warfare in which their opponents employed classic methods of partisan warfare (see Münkler 2006: 292ff.). This was the main area where they conducted joint operations with Afghan Security Forces against insurgents, sometimes at a high level of escalation. That is just one aspect of their task spectrum, however. In the context of ISAF's partnering-strategy, all operations are conducted jointly with Afghan Security Forces. This requires coordination with the Afghan partners, which in turn requires cooperativeness and tolerance, particularly considering that German soldiers may be confronted with values and ideas that may seem foreign or problematic. Moreover, in order to permanently retain areas that have been freed from insurgents and transfer them to Afghan security forces, training the Afghan Army, dealing with incendiaries and protecting the population from them are also central elements of their task spectrum. 'Soft' tasks are not easy either and include people-oriented tasks such as human intelligence gathering, information collection and maintaining contacts. Priorities

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- 10 Of those respondents assigned training and protection tasks, 62 percent stated they spent several weeks or days at a time outside the camp as part of their official duties. Another 26 percent had to leave the camp every day or several times a week. Yet, only 29 percent of those respondents charged with tasks of command and control and 38 percent of support forces reported doing so.
 - 11 The two German training and protection battalions Kunduz and Mazar-e-Sharif (task forces with an authorized strength of about 1,400 soldiers) were established as a result of strategic reorientation of the Afghanistan strategy towards a gradual transfer of security responsibility to the Afghan government that was decided at the international conferences in London and Kabul in 2010. In order to drive out insurgents, the number of forces operating throughout the country has been increased. Additionally, operations are planned and conducted jointly with Afghan security forces ("partnering"). Meanwhile, the withdrawal of ISAF's combat troops by 2014 has been decided.
 - 12 Of the respondents from the QRF (N=103), 90 percent indicated that they had spent several weeks at a time outside the camp as part of their official duties.

may suddenly shift from one situation to the next. Situations are never clear-cut (see Müller et al. 2010: 12).

This constitutes a challenge especially to military leaders. They must have operative combat capabilities as well as negotiating skills that are founded on political and cultural background knowledge.

Soldiers who remain inside the camp at all times and are responsible for evaluation, planning, maintenance or the smooth execution of an operation, however, need to have completely different practical and military as well as social skills. Above all, they must be able to cope with everyday routine, constant social control and lack of personal space inside the camp. That can be stressful, too, but requires entirely different ways of managing stress.

German soldiers deployed to Afghanistan thus operate in a shared context, but do not face the same demands, challenges or dangers. Soldiers also differentiate clearly between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, between those who spend most of their deployment inside the camp and those whose main tasks lie outside the camp. In doing so, they not only refer to challenges and stressful or dangerous situations, but also ascribe a cultural dimension to this differentiation, which can be an important point of reference for self-definition, establishing close bonds and solidarity between units and helping survive the difficulties and challenges of deployment.

4 Hypothesis 3

In multidimensional operations, soldiers need to have a high level of cultural sensitivity. Cross-cultural competence can be a significant aid in dealing with cross-cultural conflicts.

From the beginning, the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan has required soldiers to be able to competently operate “amongst the people” (Smith 2006: 335). The military relevance of dealing with the population in a culturally sensitive and de-escalating manner is acknowledged within the Bundeswehr. “Winning the hearts and minds of the people” through cross-cultural competence is “vital for concrete military action in the operational theater”, as noted by former German Defense Minister Jung (Willner 2007: 14 as cited in Langer 2012: 125).

But how do the soldiers of the 22nd contingent themselves perceive their deployment, and do they see it as operating ‘amongst the people’? Almost half the contingent reported having had daily or at least weekly contact with the local population outside the camp (Langer 2012: 127). But while some of the members of the contingent rarely had any contact with the Afghan civilian population over the course of their deployment, the frequency of contact was much higher among

soldiers assigned certain tasks in training or protection. Of these soldiers, 83 percent reported daily or weekly contact with the civilian population. The differentiation of realms of experience is thus reflected in the varying frequency of confrontation with a culture perceived as 'foreign'. Cross-cultural conflict situations greatly influence the realm of experience during deployment.

However, are cross-cultural issues actually relevant to mission accomplishment or self-protection? About half of the respondents described occasional or frequent verbal disputes with locals while a third experienced occasional or frequent violent clashes when dealing with the civilian population (Seiffert et al. 2011: 37ff.). The frequency of such incidents was considerably higher in some task areas such as training and protection. For the soldiers of the 22nd contingent, in general and specifically for members of certain units, cross-cultural conflict situations were a (security-)relevant part of their experience in operations.

The Bundeswehr has responded to such challenges with the development and implementation of the concept of cross-cultural competence. According to this concept, cross-cultural competence implies "the individual ability and willingness (...) to adequately deal with other cultures, religions, living environments and their distinctiveness, to acquire appropriate knowledge and skills, as well as the understanding of and sensitivity to different values, opinions, and behavior (...)" (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2010: 10). The concept of cross-cultural competence combines a range of character traits such as tolerance, empathy, role distance and sociability (see Tomforde 2010b: 269; Seiffert 2005: 303) and by definition connects them with specific capabilities and problem-solving competences. On one hand, the term is very broadly defined with regard to content. On the other hand, the asserted correlation between cross-cultural sensitivity and specific operationally-relevant capabilities has barely been empirically verified thus far. This is also true of the assumption that cross-culturally competent conduct is vital to military mission accomplishment and self-protection. Against this background, it is understandable that cross-cultural competence is occasionally referred to as a sort of buzzword (Langer 2012: 123).

Which challenges can be overcome with the help of cross-cultural competence in the reality of operations? Do the experiences of the members of the 22nd contingent attest to the alleged effectiveness of cross-cultural competence? Results of a panel analysis indicate that soldiers going on deployment with a relatively high level of cross-cultural sensitivity report fewer misunderstandings, verbal disputes and violent clashes in contact with the local population than soldiers going on deployment with a relatively low level of

cross-cultural sensitivity.¹³ Furthermore, cross-cultural sensitivity and successful handling of cross-cultural confrontation have been observed to improve in tandem. Cross-cultural competence increases self-confidence in culture-based conflict situations. As a result, cross-cultural sensitivity is reinforced at a high level throughout deployment. Moreover, soldiers who already displayed a relatively high level of cross-cultural sensitivity prior to deployment also reported a lower level of stress resulting from operating in an environment perceived as culturally ‘foreign’.

This initial evidence needs to be substantiated by further research. A thorough evaluation of the efficiency of cross-cultural competence in the context of operations remains a desideratum of research. Future research efforts should flesh out the ambiguous concept of cross-cultural competence, tie it closer to the specific challenges that soldiers face during operations and concretize the concept of cross-cultural competence. In German research, training in cross-cultural competence has been criticized as playing a less important role than training in purely military skills (see Tomforde 2010b: 272). Definite proof of the *military* necessity of cross-cultural competence could help establish a new line of reasoning.

5 Hypothesis 4

Experiences gained in operations, especially during combat, create a shared horizon of experience which can affect attitudes and opinions.

The mission in Afghanistan marks the first time since the establishment of the Bundeswehr that its soldiers have been involved in prolonged combat operations in which they face death or psychological and physical injury and have been forced to kill or injure others. Furthermore, the Bundeswehr, along with Afghan security forces, was involved in the most extensive fighting and operations against insurgents in 2010.¹⁴ Eight soldiers were killed in the battles of the 22nd

13 In the study conducted by the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences, cross-cultural competence/sensitivity was measured using the psychometric Intercultural Sensitivity Scale (Chen/Starosta 2000), which includes statements on five factors – interaction engagement, respect for cultural differences, interaction confidence, interaction enjoyment and interaction attentiveness. For a theoretical discussion of the concepts of cross-cultural competence and sensitivity, see Langer (2012: 129ff.).

14 In late September 2010 in the Baghlan province in northern Afghanistan, the Bundeswehr was involved in its most extensive battles yet, fighting near the village of Shahabuddin against about 60 insurgents over four days. Substantially involved in these battles were soldiers of the 5th QRF who have been interviewed as part of the study on the 22nd ISAF contingent conducted by the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences. For operations in this time period, see Nachtwei (2011).

contingent, several were wounded, some of them severely. While the consequences of combat operations have long been discussed in international research¹⁵, the Bundeswehr has yet to get involved in this field of study.

Soldiers in operations are affected by violence in different ways and to varying extents. While the entire contingent lived under the shadow of the asymmetric threat posed by insurgents, only some of the soldiers were so involved in combat or threatened by attacks that they experienced life-threatening danger and had to kill or injure. One in five (21%) members of the 22nd contingent actually experienced combat situations. Almost half (46%) experienced enemy fire. Almost half (47%) had to deal with injury and more than a third (37%) had to cope with the death of a fellow soldier.¹⁶ The fact that stressful events leave their mark on soldiers is evident in the high number of respondents (43%), more than a third, indicating that they had witnessed the psychological or physical breakdown of a fellow soldier.

As mentioned above, experiences of direct and indirect violence vary greatly between task areas and deployment areas (see Table 1). More than a third (42%) of respondents assigned training and protection tasks experienced combat. Only one in ten respondents with command and control or support tasks (6% and 8% respectively) reported the same. Soldiers employed in the regions of Kunduz and Baghlan are faced with direct violence almost daily. About two out of three (65%) of those soldiers stationed in outposts in Baghlan and operating in the field and almost half (48%) of the members of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Kunduz experienced combat situations. Soldiers deployed in the PRT Feyzabad, in Camp Marmal in Mazar-e-Sharif or in the Afghan capital of Kabul, on the other hand, were involved in combat much less. Six per cent of respondents in Mazar-e-Sharif and nine per cent of soldiers deployed in Kabul or Feyzabad reported combat experience.

The extent to which violence is experienced is also dependent on rank, while in terms of sheer quantity, sergeants and enlisted personnel are most often affected by direct violence (see Table 1). In relation to the overall composition of the contingent, enlisted personnel are faced with combat situations to a greatly disproportionate extent. Statistically, enlisted personnel of

15 For examples of experiences of violence in the Vietnam War and their consequences, see Frey-Wouters/Laufer (1986).

16 Different violent scenarios such as coming under fire, exchange of fire, attacks, death or injury usually do not appear in isolation, but are often experienced in a combat situation or successively over the course of deployment. The data supports this assessment, with almost all of those who actively participated in an exchange of fire also reporting coming under fire (99%) and perceiving it as a life-threatening situation (93%). Only those soldiers who were actively involved in an exchange of fire, however, are counted as having experienced combat.

the 22nd contingent have ten times the relative risk of being involved in combat compared with field-grade officers.¹⁷

Table 1: Combat Experience by Subgroup

Question: "Which of the following incidents did you personally experience during your employment?"		
Statement: "I have been actively involved in an exchange of fire" by subgroup ¹ (data shown as percentages)	YES	NO
Total	21	79
Sex**		
Male	22	78
Female	6	94
Rank category***		
Enlisted personnel	37	63
Junior NCOs	9	91
Sergeants	21	79
Officers	13	87
Field-grade officers	5	95
Area of deployment****		
Kabul	9	91
Mazar-e-Sharif	6	94
Kunduz	48	52
Feyzabad	9	91
Outposts (in the field)	65	35
Task area***		
Planning/Command & Control	6	94
Training/Protection	42	58
Support	8	92

Note: 1) *: significance $\leq .05$; **: significance $\leq .01$; ***: significance (Chi Square) = .000.
Data Base: Survey by the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences in the 22nd ISAF contingent. Aggregate dataset after deployment.

Any study of the consequences of experiences of violence must take into consideration different ways of being affected since generalizations are of no use. However, the entire contingent is affected by experiences of combat, attacks and enemy fire. This is not to say that the disparity of experiences of violence and danger is irrelevant. But the nature of an operation shapes the experience of both those directly and those indirectly affected by violence. In any case, operations such as the one in Afghanistan are fundamentally differ-

17 Odds ratio calculation: enlisted personnel/junior non-commissioned officers: OR 6.2; enlisted personnel/sergeants: OR 2.2; enlisted personnel/officers: OR 3.7; enlisted personnel/field-grade officers: 10.1.

ent from conventional combat operations. Neither can the enemy be clearly identified nor have the Afghan Security Forces become trusted partners yet. Even in seemingly civilian situations, a suicide bombing or attack could occur anytime. With attacks being possible anytime and anywhere, threats are not limited to combat situations. The soldiers' daily operational routine was thus shaped by a diffuse threat which was also felt by many who rarely or never left the camp during their deployment and who were never involved in combat. This diffuse-threat perception connects the units of the contingent and establishes a shared overarching frame of reference.

In our interviews, many soldiers described how experiences in combat with enemy fire and ambushes are formative, create a firm bond in and between units and can change people. Previous studies have also shown that soldiers have to adapt to the community on deployment as well as their units. An operation can thus work as an "agent of socialization" (Seiffert 2005: 296) and aid in the establishment of a collective identity. Sociocultural practices, patterns of behavior and identities can evolve which are markedly different from the realms of experience of those who were socialized during the Cold War or on operations in the Balkans. The different realms of experience of the 'old' and the 'new' Bundeswehr were also addressed by soldiers in our interviews when they colloquially differentiated between 'cold warriors' and the 'new warriors' who have mostly been socialized in ISAF operations.

6 Hypothesis 5

The issue of the likelihood of success and effectiveness of the operation are at the core of the motivation and identity behind the self-image of the soldiers.


In the often confusing situations during operations, soldiers often find it difficult to assess the chances of the success of their own actions. Together with Afghan Security Forces, they are tasked with keeping violence at bay and freeing areas from insurgents in order to take the initiative in key districts of the country once more and to be able to transfer security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces. Their duty is to ensure the safety of the population and create a safe and secure environment for reconstruction. Many perceive events as highly contingent, as strategic goals can only act as guidelines. In the interest of avoiding casualties amongst a population that is more and more difficult to differentiate from insurgents, soldiers are required to have a great personal willingness to take risks (Wiesendahl 2010: 23f.).

These tension-filled requirements can all easily result in an increasing shift of focus towards military operations.¹⁸ Coupled with a lack of prospects of success and unclear goals, the situation can become even more complicated. Both the strategic orientation and the effectiveness of the operation are not just minor issues for many soldiers. They expect positive results from their involvement, a ‘peace dividend’ so to speak, in the form of successful reconstruction and improved security. Soldiers who have actually been involved in combat situations and have experienced danger to life and limb have the common expectation that they do not want their deployment to have been in vain. How do they discern their deployment? How do they assess the effectiveness of their deployment and how do experiences of violence affect their views on the mission and the use of military force?

What is striking is the statistically highly significant correlation between exposure to violence in operations and approval of the use of military force. Soldiers who were actively involved in combat and who were faced with ambushes and enemy fire were significantly more likely to believe that the Bundeswehr should enforce its mission in combat action and should use armed force more often than those who were not immediately affected by violence (see Figure 1). However, soldiers with combat experience generally expressed less approval of more robust military action after returning home than they did when surveyed during their deployment, whereas the change in attitude among soldiers who did not experience direct violence during their employment was negligible.

18 In that case, the measure of success would be the kinetic effect of the operation, regardless of whether political support for the enemy among the population is increased as a result (see Hippler 2009).

Figure 1: Development of Opinions Regarding the Mission after Combat Experience



Note: Figures in percent. Only approving answers. The differences in response for all items listed are highly significant at a level $p \leq .000$ (chi-squared) in both surveys. Data Base: Survey by the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences in the 22nd ISAF contingent. Weighted data sets from intra-deployment and post-deployment interviews.

It would, however, be short-sighted to regard the development of attitudes towards the use of military force simply as an effect of exposure to violence during deployment. Rather, the data refers to a mix of influential factors, of which doubts about the operation's effectiveness are likely to play a central role. The survey results of the approval of mandate and mission appear to confirm this (see Figure 1). Accordingly, approval ratings of the decision to deploy the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan dropped considerably among combat-experienced soldiers after their return home. By contrast, approval of the political mandate dropped negligibly in the reference group of soldiers without combat experience. These findings, in turn, correlate closely with the development of approval of the military mission. A significant degree of approval

was also forfeited among combat-experienced soldiers, whereas the approval rating of the military mission among soldiers without combat experience changed only slightly.

At the same time, an above-average number of soldiers who had experienced combat, enemy fire and ambushes argued in favor of the Bundeswehr assuming a more robust course of action in Afghanistan (see Figure 1). By putting their lives on the line, they bore higher risk costs and were not able to simply avoid violent situations. It is, thus, hardly surprising that they much more often took the view that the Bundeswehr should clamp down on insurgents with armed force more often and that it should actively pursue the enforcement of its mission through combat. They formulated the requirements of effective military action against the background of their experiences.

This interpretation suggests that the high approval of military force among combat-experienced soldiers on deployment is the initial result of an acute reaction to dramatic combat experiences of death and injury that they, however, re-evaluate after returning home and then transfer into a more sober perspective. Following this interpretation, the decline in approval of mission and mandate among combat-experienced soldiers returning from deployment is not so much the result of the threats and violence they were exposed to, but rather that of a more sceptical assessment of the mission's effectiveness. Indeed, the data show a moderately strong, yet highly significant correlation ($R=.541$ and $R=.451$) between approval of the mission and the evaluation of its effectiveness.¹⁹ Multivariate regression analyses of mission approval rates using the dependent variable of *ISAF's military mission is worthwhile* support this thesis (see Table 2). In essence, approval of ISAF's military mission depends largely on whether the operation is judged to be effective and beneficial to the lives of the Afghan people (Beta =0.370/0.391). Attitudes towards the military course of action, the theater of operations and the area of deployment reached a certain, albeit moderate degree of relevance. Meanwhile, neither combat experience nor rank, sex, assignment or function during deployment had any relevant influence on the approval of the mandate.

19 Approval of mission and mandate were operationalized by using the answer categories "The ISAF contingent's military mission is worthwhile" and "Deploying the Bundeswehr to Afghanistan was the correct political decision". The answer categories "The deployment of the Bundeswehr helps the people there" and "Ultimately, operations in Afghanistan are not worthwhile since they do not significantly improve the situation there" reflect the dimension of effectiveness.

Table 2: Determinants of Mandate Approval


	Beta value	Significance ¹	Adjusted R	R increase
Task	.019	n.s.	.000	.001
Area of deployment	.091	*	.11	.059
Actively enforcing the mission with armed force	.057	*	.037	.038
More frequent use of armed force	.007	n.s.	.038	.002
Combat experience	-.003	n.s.	.042	.005
Sex	.004	n.s.	.043	.003
Rank category	.020	n.s.	.042	.005
The mission helps people in Afghanistan	.391	***	.355	.309
Operations in Afghanistan are not worthwhile since they do not significantly improve the situation there	-.370	***	.454	.099

Notes: The table shows the standardized Beta coefficient, correlation level and the explained variance with the dependant variable "ISAF's military mission is worthwhile". The following factors were considered as explaining variables: rank, sex, task, area of deployment and the items "It is worthwhile that the Bundeswehr actively enforces its mission with armed force"; "The German ISAF-contingent should clamp down on insurgents more often with armed force"; "I have actively participated in an exchange of fire" (combat experience); "The mission helps people in Afghanistan"; "Ultimately, operations in Afghanistan are not worthwhile since they do not significantly improve the situation there". 1) n.s. = not significant; * = significance $\leq .05$; ** = significance $\leq .01$; ***: significance (chi-squared) = .000.

Data base: Survey by the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences in the 22nd ISAF contingent. Aggregate dataset after deployment.

Approval of mission and mandate furthermore dropped only among a subgroup of combat-experienced soldiers. The assessment of the effectiveness of the deployment clearly varies within the group of combat-experienced soldiers after their return home (see Figure 2). While soldiers who, in the context of partnering, were involved in offensive operations along with Afghan security forces more often than not supported the military ISAF mission (58%) and asserted the opinion that deployment of the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan helps the people living there (59%), PRT soldiers voiced considerable doubts about the effectiveness of the operation. They were significantly less often supportive of ISAF's military mission (40%) than the control group and comparatively often expressed the opinion that the deployment of the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan is not worthwhile since it does not effect fundamental improvements (33%).

Figure 2: Assessment of the Mission's Effectiveness According to the Theater of Operations



Note: Figures in percent. Only approving answers. 1) significance ** $p \leq .01$; 2) significance *** $p \leq .000$ (chi-squared).

Data base: Survey by the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences in the 22nd ISAF contingent. Aggregate dataset after deployment.

Performance and approval of the mission thus correlate closely. Nevertheless, the positive evaluation of the partnering-strategy by a subgroup of soldiers merely provides a snapshot of their opinions formed shortly after their return against the background of their experiences on deployment. What effects further developments in the operation may have had on approval of the mission – for example, the deadly attack on German soldiers in February 2011 – could not be established using the present survey results.

The experience of direct violence leaves its mark and can certainly influence attitudes and positions towards the military use of force. Nevertheless, they do not necessarily lead to a higher approval of the use of force. The vast majority of affected soldiers is prepared to bear the high risks of deployment. Approval of military force is, however, rationally bound to the effectiveness of one's own actions and expectations regarding positive effects these actions might have. Yet, attitudes and orientations are not set in stone; they can re-

shape, change and transform in response to social living conditions. There are, furthermore, no simple, short-term answers to questions like those that surround the processing of dramatic experiences that will necessarily affect attitudes and values. Processes of coping take time. Attitudes shift very slowly only and effects will sometimes not manifest themselves until a few weeks after deployment. To what extent the experience of direct violence transforms the self-image of soldiers in the long term will take time to assess.

7 Hypothesis 6

The discrepancy between the two empirical worlds – that of the military command on one side and deployment soldiers on the other – provokes a generation conflict that could also successively trigger organizational shifts within the Bundeswehr.

Soldiers who lived through combat and ambush, who saw death and injury, who themselves killed and wounded others have had experiences during deployment that did not previously exist in the Bundeswehr to this extent and in this scope. These experiences are, furthermore, rarely shared by the military command. Combat experience is more prevalent among lower ranks up to the level of company commanders. This may not only cause a “generation conflict” (Tomforde 2010a: 195; Seiffert 2005: 177) between military leaders and the succeeding generations, but actually promote a rift through the entire armed forces.²⁰ Politics and society as well as the Bundeswehr are thus faced with a challenge that cannot be overcome with established routines and habits.

When affected soldiers find it difficult to communicate their experiences at home and on their home bases, the situation becomes even more complex. In our interviews, soldiers often described their reluctance to speak about their encounters with violence. “People at home”, one soldier said, “have no idea what we do here; we can hardly connect with them on the subject”. It is as if there was something between deployment soldiers, soldiers stationed at home and the wider populace that could not be expressed. It is as if these soldiers felt they could not burden others with what they experienced: mortal danger, fear and killing.

20 A ‘divide’ between the older generation with its professional experience on one side and the younger generation with its orientation towards deployment on the other already began to open during operations in the Balkans (see Seiffert 2005: 173). Maren Tomforde (2010a: 195) also describes a generational conflict “between the ‘old’ national defence army and the established succeeding generation of soldiers” that was reinforced by the “deployment subculture” that has gradually emerged over the last years.

The different realms of experience, both within the Bundeswehr and in relation to society as a whole, can contribute to the development of subcultural milieus within the organization. Studies in organizational behavior have shown that similarities and differences in an organization can exist side by side without being mutually exclusive (Luhmann 2000: 195). The culture of an organization is divided into different subcultures that, taken together, form a unity (Martin 2003: 45). Every subculture has its own socio-cultural practices and is distinct from other sub-sections of the organization. This can, however, put organizational cultures in which the younger traditionally learn from their elders under considerable pressure if “the younger generation gathers experiences that the older generation does not share” (Tomforde 2010a: 204).

After their return from deployment, German soldiers furthermore encounter a society that for the most part disapproves of their mission, and, thus, they fail to find a place for their deployment experiences. This can definitely pave the way for feelings of disappointment and resignation. The often vehement complaints of deployment soldiers that politics and society are not supportive enough of the Bundeswehr’s military commitment in Afghanistan are an expression of these feelings. A feeling of isolation and being rejected is at the core of these complaints. The demand for greater political and social backing of their mission is thus not simply reactionary rhetoric. It is much more an expression of the wish for their deployment to not only rest on the political mandate, but also on a society whose interests they were, after all, deployed to defend. Without sufficient backing, they fear the high risks that many of them bear on deployment are hardly justifiable.

8 Hypothesis 7

In the complex deployment scenarios in Afghanistan, the willingness to assume responsibility and take risks are leadership qualities that are often expected of military superiors, but that are hardly reflected in the organizational culture of the Bundeswehr, which is tied up in red tape.

While the organizational culture of the Bundeswehr is still defined by bureaucratic control and sanction management, as well as defensive communication patterns²¹, there is little room for micromanagement in the complex

21 We draw on an unpublished qualitative study by Seiffert/Ebeling/Pietsch/Fehr/Krause (2011) that describes the organizational culture of the Bundeswehr predominantly as an “over-determined system”. On the organizational culture of the Bundeswehr, see also Demmer (2011).

deployment scenarios in Afghanistan. Instead, flexibility, correct estimates of the situation even under time pressure and confidence in complicated conflict scenarios are expected, especially of superiors. To keep calm in risky situations and hold back armed force when the source of danger is unclear is no simple task. This requires self-reliance, responsibility and the ability to appropriately assess the consequences of military engagement even in difficult ethical situations (see Ebeling 2006). The following statement made by a staff sergeant during a post-deployment briefing for soldiers of the 22nd contingent illustrates this statement of facts: “Life on deployment is a wholly different world. It’s a completely different mindset. Here, everything is caught up in red tape. I have no time for bureaucracy when I am on an operation as a commander. I have to make quick decisions, and if I make the wrong decision, my men bear the consequences. I have to deal with that. I have to manage. And I can’t just shirk from my responsibilities. I always have to do the best I can.”

However, at their home base, where leadership culture is defined by formality and the adherence to rules and regulations, there is little room for the values of responsibility and independent decision-making. A controlling style of management and risk-averse decision-making easily obstruct a culture of responsibility. As a result, the realms of experience on deployment and at home may drift even further apart. In interviews, this is often described fittingly as the “problem of two worlds” (“Zweiweltenproblematik”; our translation). This also puts the Bundeswehr’s organizational culture under pressure to adapt. It is not yet clear how the experiences of this ‘Generation ISAF’ will specifically affect the organization of the Bundeswehr. However, German society and politics, just like the Bundeswehr, are faced with the difficult challenge of having to redefine their relationship.

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Auf verlorenem Posten

Marco Seliger

1 Tödlicher Irrtum

Ich habe lange überlegt, wie ich in diesen Vortrag einsteige. Vielleicht hiermit? Wieder einmal wurde an jenem Tag vor Selbstmordattentätern und Sprengstoffanschlägen mit Autos gewarnt. Gemeinsam mit afghanischen Polizisten bauen deutsche Feldjäger in der Nähe von Kundus einen Straßenkontrollpunkt auf. Sie sollen Fahrzeuge stoppen und auf Waffen und Sprengstoff durchsuchen. Dazu sperren sie die Straße auf beiden Seiten, indem sie zwei Transportfahrzeuge *Dingo* quer zur Fahrbahn stellen. Auf den Fahrzeugen gibt es ein Maschinengewehr, eines der Gewehre wird von Tobias Arndt bedient. Wenn die einheimischen Autos den *Dingo* passiert haben, dürfen sie sich der Kontrollstelle im inneren Ring nur noch in Schrittgeschwindigkeit nähern. Gegen 22 Uhr rast ein Kleinbus heran, passiert den *Dingo* von Tobias Arndt und fährt noch immer zu schnell weiter. Plötzlich wendet der Fahrer den Wagen und rast zurück, direkt auf Arndt zu. Der Oberfeldwebel kann aufgrund der Dunkelheit nicht erkennen, wer in dem Wagen sitzt. Doch er muss binnen fünf Sekunden entscheiden, ob der Kleinbus gefährlich ist. Spätestens dann hat ihn das Fahrzeug erreicht und der Fahrer könnte einen Sprengsatz zünden. Der Wagen beschleunigt, die Räder drehen durch, es staubt. Der Afghane am Steuer hört nicht die Rufe der Soldaten und Polizisten, reagiert auch nicht auf Warnschüsse. Das grelle Licht einer Leuchtrakete erhellt die Szenerie. Es ist die vorletzte Aufforderung, stehen zu bleiben. Der Fahrer reagiert immer noch nicht. Er rast weiter auf den *Dingo* zu. Tobias Arndt richtet die Waffe auf das Fahrzeug, ein Feuerstoß prasselt vor dem Kleinbus in den Boden. Keine Reaktion. Der zweite Feuerstoß sitzt höher. Fünfzehn Kugeln dringen durch die Frontscheibe in das Wageninnere. Dann stoppt das Fahrzeug.

Als sie die Türen des Kleinbusses öffnen, bietet sich den Soldaten ein grauenvoller Anblick. Über die Sitze fließt Blut. Es ist das Blut einer Frau und zweier Kinder. Die Kugeln haben sie getroffen, nicht den Fahrer. Sie sind tot, nichts mehr zu machen. In dem Kleinbus saß eine Familie, kein Selbstmörder. Tobias Arndt hat drei Unschuldige erschossen, unbeabsichtigt, versehentlich. Er hat alles richtig gemacht, der Fahrer verhielt sich höchst verdächtig. Hätte er nicht geschossen, wären möglicherweise erneut Kameraden gestorben. Der Tod von Hauptfeldwebel Mischa Meier liegt gerade einen Tag zurück. Und doch weiß Arndt nun, dass es falsch war, zu schießen. So ist das im Krieg: Die Unschuld stirbt zuerst.

Am Hergang der Ereignisse besteht in Deutschland kaum Interesse. Wichtiger scheint die Frage, wie Oberfeldwebel Arndt belangt werden kann. Es ist grotesk: Die Bundeswehr darf Gewalt anwenden, um ihren Auftrag zu erfüllen. Doch Bundesregierung und Bundestag haben es nicht für nötig gehalten, die sich daraus ergebenden rechtlichen Folgen für die Soldaten zu klären. An dem Tag, an dem Tobias Arndt in einem Kriegsgebiet außerhalb Deutschlands tötet, gelten in der Bundesrepublik Rechtsgrundsätze, als übe das Militär noch immer den Panzerkrieg in der Lüneburger Heide. Das verunsichert und frustriert die Soldaten.

Tobias Arndt hat getötet, eine Straftat begangen. Er ist nun ein Fall für die Staatsanwaltschaft. Doch für welche? Militärgerichte gab es in Deutschland zuletzt unter den Nationalsozialisten. Also muss die Staatsanwaltschaft am Wohnort des Soldaten tätig werden. Sie ermittelt wegen des Verdachts des Totschlags. Der Militärpolizist hat seinen Auftrag erfüllt, er hat gehandelt, wie es ihm befohlen worden ist. Jetzt wird er wie ein mutmaßlicher Verbrecher behandelt. Die Bundeswehr weigert sich, ihm einen Anwalt zu stellen. Eine öffentliche Institution wie das Verteidigungsministerium könne sich nicht gegen eine andere öffentliche Institution wie die Staatsanwaltschaft wenden, sagen die ministeriellen Juristen. Es gibt Spötter, die sagen, das Verteidigungsministerium werde nicht von Politikern, sondern von Advokaten geführt. Oberfeldwebel Arndt, heißt es, könne ein Darlehen bekommen, um den Anwalt zu bezahlen. Sollte er verurteilt werden, müsse er die Kosten des Rechtsstreits allerdings selbst tragen.

Einige Tage nach dem Zwischenfall an dem Checkpoint überreichen Emissäre der Bundeswehr den Hinterbliebenen der drei Getöteten 20.000 Euro. Oberfeldwebel Tobias Arndt muss neun Monate lang auf das Ergebnis der staatsanwaltschaftlichen Ermittlungen gegen ihn warten. In dieser Zeit kann er nicht befördert werden. Auf dem Gelände einer bayerischen Kaserne werden die Ereignisse jener Nacht in Anwesenheit der Staatsanwältin nachgestellt. Eine Verurteilung wegen Totschlags würde Arndt für Jahre ins Gefängnis bringen und das Ende seiner Militärlaufbahn bedeuten. Am 25. Mai 2009 wird das Ermittlungsverfahren eingestellt. Die Staatsanwältin erklärt, Arndt habe nicht vorsätzlich getötet, sondern annehmen müssen, seine Kameraden und er selbst würden angegriffen. Der Oberfeldwebel wird rehabilitiert.

Es hat niemanden in der politischen und militärischen Führung gegeben, der sich nach dem Zwischenfall bedingungslos vor den Soldaten gestellt hätte. Minister, Staatssekretäre und Generäle duckten sich weg und wagten sich erst aus der Deckung, als die Staatsanwaltschaft ihre Entscheidung verkündet hatte. In vielen Kommandos und Ämtern der Bundeswehr, in der von den Soldaten naturgemäß ganz besonders Tapferkeit gefordert wird, herrscht vor allem eines: Opportunismus, kritiklose Anpassung. Ein Offizier in Kundus

bringt das kurz nach dem Vorfall an dem Checkpoint auf den Punkt: „Ich habe noch nie so viele feige Menschen getroffen wie beim Militär!“

Diese Form des Einstiegs in den Vortrag wäre ein Beispiel für den Umgang eines Landes, einer Gesellschaft und ihrer Politiker sowie Militärführer mit den Soldaten, die in einen Krieg geschickt worden sind, der als solcher nicht bezeichnet und betrachtet wird. Weder politisch, noch juristisch. Und daher Rückschlüsse auf den Rückhalt zulässt, den die Soldaten in ihrem Land für ihre Tätigkeit in Afghanistan finden. Nämlich – trotz aller anders lautenden Bekundungen von Regierungs- und Bundestagsmitgliedern – so gut wie keinen.

2 Angriff

Dann habe ich überlegt, ich könnte auch hiermit in den Vortrag einsteigen: Am Morgen greifen die Taliban in drei Gruppen an. Sie agieren so, wie es Märtyrer tun: erst Beten, dann Sterben. Die eine Gruppe feuert von Süden auf die Deutschen, die zweite von Norden auf die Afghanen und die dritte von Osten auf die Amerikaner. Sie schleichen sich in Wäldern und Gräben an, einige sind in Häusern verschanzt, aus denen sie mit Mörsergranaten auf die Soldaten schießen. Ihre Attacken muten wie Selbstmordkommandos an. Sie sind den Verteidigern von Quatlum deutlich unterlegen. Die meisten von ihnen sterben an den folgenden vier Tagen im Feuer der 20-Millimeter-Kanonen, der Granatmaschinenwaffen und der Panzerhaubitze, die aus dem zehn Kilometer entfernten Feldlager schießt. Die Angriffe beginnen stets eine halbe Stunde nach dem Gebet. Jeden Morgen, jeden Mittag und jeden Abend dasselbe Muster.

Am Mittag des ersten Tages weist Oberleutnant Dominik Berger der Artillerie erstmals ein Ziel zu. Er liegt mit einigen Soldaten in einem Graben am Ortsrand von Quatlum. Sie nehmen den Kopf nur aus der Deckung, wenn sie schießen wollen. Aus 250 Meter Entfernung werden sie mit Panzerabwehrraketen angegriffen. Ein Geschoss schlägt zwanzig Meter vor ihnen ein und explodiert. Der Gegner liegt ebenfalls in einem Graben, der ein kleines Wäldchen durchzieht. Er ist gut geschützt, die Fallschirmjäger können ihm mit ihren Waffen nichts anhaben. Berger trägt einen Helm, in den ein Headset mit Mikrofon integriert ist. Über Funk hält er den Kontakt zum Gefechtsstand im Feldlager, in dem zwei Panzerhaubitzen stehen. Er funkt die Koordinaten an den Gefechtsstand und sagt: „Ein Schuss feuern! Kommen!“ Die Antwort erfolgt umgehend: „Ein Schuss abgefeuert!“

Die Soldaten pressen sich an den Boden und erwarten den Einschlag der 50-Kilogramm-Granate. Einschlag ist allerdings das falsche Wort. Die Zünder sind so eingestellt, dass die Granate zwölf Meter über der Erde explo-

diert. Sie wirkt dadurch in alle Richtungen. Ein kurzes Pfeifen in der Luft, dann bebt die Erde zweihundert Meter entfernt. Als Berger den Kopf aus der Deckung nimmt, ist eine Schneise durch das Wäldchen geschlagen worden. Zerhackte Bäume liegen am Boden. Doch erneut fliegt eine Panzerabwehrrakete in ihre Richtung. Der Gegner ist noch nicht vernichtet. Berger fordert vier weitere Artilleriegranaten an. Nachdem sie explodiert sind, herrscht Ruhe in dem Gefechtsabschnitt. Die Soldaten beobachten, dass Verwundete aus dem Ort geschafft werden.

Am zweiten Tag greifen die Aufständischen erneut an. Wieder befindet sich Dominik Berger in einem Schützengraben, der unter schwerem Granat- und Maschinengewehrfeuer liegt. Der Gegner hat einen Laufgraben zwischen zwei Gehöfte gezogen, aus dem er einige Minuten lang schießt und anschließend in den Gebäuden verschwindet. Berger bespricht mit dem Gefechtsstand den Einsatz der Artillerie, als ein belgischer Fliegerleitoffizier den Funkverkehr unterbricht und sagt, er habe Verbindung zu einer *F-15*. Berger kombiniert kurzerhand den Einsatz von Artillerie und Kampfflugzeug. Er funkt an die *F-15*-Besatzung: „Das Ziel ist ein Graben zwischen zwei Gehöften. Roger.“ Der Pilot erwidert: „Ich sehe die Gehöfte. Roger.“ Wieder setzt Feuer auf ihre Stellung ein. Berger funkt an den Gefechtsstand der Artillerie: „Ein Schuss feuern!“ Eine halbe Minute später schlägt die Granate am einen Ende des Grabens ein. Die Angreifer flüchten in die andere Richtung. „Clear“, funkt Berger an die *F-15*. Eine Minute später hören die Soldaten das Pfeifen der 500-Pfund-Bombe, die aus knapp drei Kilometer Höhe abgeworfen wurde. Sie explodiert im mittleren Abschnitt des Grabens, in dem die vier Angreifer gerade laufen. Nach einigen Minuten funkt der Pilot der *F-15* an den Boden: „Keine Bewegung im Umkreis der Explosionsstelle.“

Dieser Einstieg in den Vortrag wäre ein Beispiel für den Erfolg militärischen Handelns. Oder, konkreter ausgedrückt, des Kampfes.

3 **Gefallen**

Schließlich fiel mir noch eine dritte Möglichkeit für den Einstieg in den Vortrag ein. Ich habe wieder lange überlegt, ob ich das hier schildern soll. Es bedeutet Niederlage, es zeugt vom Grauen des Krieges: Als der Schützenpanzer an der Spitze des Kampfverbands um 9.54 Uhr auf die unter der Straßenoberfläche versteckte Druckplatte auffährt, zündet der Sprengsatz. Die Panzerabwehrminen detonieren und lösen die Explosion des Sprengstoffgemischs aus. Die Druckwelle erfasst den *Marder* vorn rechts auf der Höhe des Motorblocks. Sie katapultiert das 37 Tonnen schwere Fahrzeug in die Luft und zerfetzt die Front. Das Triebwerk reißt aus seiner Verankerung und zerquetscht Alexej Kobelew. Der 1987 in Russland geborene Kobelew ist der

Fahrer, dessen Sitz sich, getrennt nur durch eine wenige Zentimeter dünne Stahlplatte, direkt neben dem Triebwerksraum befindet. Der tonnenschwere Motor hat die Stahlplatte durchschlagen, als würde ein Panzer eine morsche Mauer durchbrechen. Kobelew wurde zermalmt.

Das wissen die Soldaten noch nicht, als sie sich dem Panzer nach der Explosion nähern. Das Wrack steckt wie ein Pfeil senkrecht in einem vier Meter tiefen Krater. In seiner Unterseite klafft ein quadratisches Loch, so sauber ausgestanzt, als hätte sich an der Stelle eine Metallklappe befunden. Das aus dem Panzerboden gerissene Stück Stahl finden die Soldaten dreißig Meter entfernt auf einem Feld. Ein Sanitäter läuft die Straße entlang, vorbei an Soldaten, die an Fahrzeugen stehen. Der Weg zweigt rechts ab. Fünzig Meter weiter ragt das Wrack aus dem Krater, der sich mitten auf der Straße befindet. Ein Soldat kommt dem Sanitäter entgegen. „Wo ist er?“, fragt er. „Es ist der Fahrer. Wir kommen nicht heran. Er saß vorn links, gleich neben dem Motor. Er steckt in der Erde.“ „Wisst ihr, welche Verletzungen er hat?“ „Nein, wir kommen nicht heran.“

Vor dem Loch im Unterboden des Panzers kniet ein Soldat und schaufelt mit einem Spaten Erde aus dem Wrack. „Könnt ihr irgendwas von ihm sehen“, fragt der Sanitäter. „Nein.“ „Gibt es eine Überlebenschance?“ „Schwer zu sagen.“ Der Sanitäter steigt aus dem Krater und funkt an die Helikopterbesatzung: „Der Fahrer steckt in der Spitze des Fahrzeugs. Weiß nicht, ob er noch lebt.“ Ein Bergepanzer erreicht die Stelle und zieht den *Marder* aus dem Krater. Soldaten treten an die zerstörte Front des Panzers heran. Sie blicken in ein Gewirr aus verbogenem Stahl und losen Motorteilen.

Es gibt Panzerabwehrminen, die Kette und Laufrollen zerstören und das Fahrzeug nur manövrierunfähig machen. Doch bei den hier eingesetzten Minen handelt es sich um gerichtete Ladungen. Sie haben die Panzerung des *Marder* beidseitig durchschlagen: unten rein und oben raus. Den Körper von Alexej Kobelew entdecken die Suchkräfte, als sie von der Seite in das Wrack schauen. „Ok, hier ist er“, sagt einer der Soldaten, und es klingt gelassen. Der Sanitäter tritt hinzu. „Scheiße“, sagt er und dreht sich erschrocken ab.

4 Der Brunnenbohrer wird Kämpfer

Dies sind wahre Begebenheiten. Begebenheiten des Krieges in Afghanistan. Warum schildere ich das hier so? Weil dies eben der Krieg ist, egal, ob er zwischen 2001 und ich weiß nicht wann in Afghanistan tobt, oder ob er irgendwann in der Zukunft in irgendeinem Land stattfindet. Im Krieg passieren Fehler, im Krieg verlieren Menschen ihre Unschuld. Im Krieg töten junge Menschen andere Menschen und freuen sich darüber, denn es hat den Anderen und nicht sie erwischt. Im Krieg werden junge Menschen getötet, mitun-

ter auf grauenvolle Weise. Der Tod und das Töten gehören zum Soldatenberuf, spätestens seit Afghanistan sollten das auch die deutsche Gesellschaft und ihre Politiker wieder wissen. Doch gehen sie mit diesem Wissen verantwortungsvoll um?

Die Bundeswehr ist der verlängerte Arm der Regierung und die Regierung einschließlich Bundestag ist der verlängerte Arm des Volkes. Befinden sich also die deutschen Soldaten, die sehenden Auges in einen Krieg geschickt wurden, bei ihrem Volk und ihren Politikern in guten Händen? Man kann seine Zweifel haben. Nehmen wir die Entwicklungen der vergangenen Jahre in Kundus. Sprengfallen, Hinterhalte, Selbstmordattentäter, Gefechte, Guerillataktik, Asymmetrie. Wir kennen sie alle, die Begriffe dieses Krieges. Soldaten-Handwerk, Kriegshandwerk. Deutsche Kampftruppen können damit umgehen. Das haben sie gelernt.

Das Problem liegt woanders: Afghanische Polizisten, von den Deutschen ausgebildet, die ihre Uniformen an den Gegner verkaufen. Aufständische, die aus Dörfern kommen, angreifen, und wieder in den Dörfern verschwinden, geschützt von der Bevölkerung. Provinzgouverneure, die sich ihren Posten für 200.000 Dollar in Kabul gekauft haben. Richter, die nicht Lesen und Schreiben können und deren Urteile Verhandlungssache sind. Polizeichefs, die ihre eigene marodierende Miliz haben. Warlords und Gouverneure, die das gesamte Polizei- und Geheimdienstnetz kontrollieren, nach Belieben Verbrechen verüben, morden, vergewaltigen, ohne dass sie jemand zur Verantwortung ziehen kann. Deutsche Soldaten und Polizisten, die diese in Polizeiuniformen gesteckten Leute ausbilden und damit Warlord-Schwadronen trainieren. Milizen, die für die Aufständischen gekämpft haben und bestochen werden, damit sie die Seiten wechseln und die Füße still halten. Menschen, die abwarten, wer gewinnen wird, und sich so lange mit beiden Seiten gut stellen. Ausländer, die ankündigen, wann spätestens abzuziehen sie gedenken, und Taliban, Warlords, korrupte Beamte, Verbrecher in Regierungsämtern, Drogen- und Waffenhändler, die nur darauf warten.

Glaubt ernsthaft jemand, dass diese Widersprüche von den Soldaten, die teilweise das vierte, fünfte, sechste Mal in Afghanistan eingesetzt sind, nicht durchschaut werden? Glaubt ernsthaft jemand, dass ihnen am Sinn ihres monatelangen, entbehrungsreichen Tuns trotz aller begrenzten Erfolge auf dem Gefechtsfeld nicht ernsthafte Zweifel kommen? Wer glaubt, Soldaten würden nicht verstehen, dass sie in einen Krieg geschickt wurden, für den es nicht einmal ein strategisches Ziel gibt, der will sie bewusst für dumm verkaufen. Schon früh, keine zwei Jahre nach Ankunft in diesem Land, war vielen von ihnen klar, dass sie etwas schaffen sollen, wofür ihnen die Mittel nicht zur Verfügung stehen. Sie sollten Afghanistan aufbauen – und dabei mit Hilfsorganisationen und staatlichen Stellen wie der GTZ oder dem BMI zusammen-

arbeiten, die in langwierigen Verfahren über Anträge entscheiden, als handle es sich um den Straßenbau in Deutschland. Sie sollten Sicherheit schaffen, und zwar möglichst ohne Waffen. Brunnen bohren, Schulen bauen – das erwartete die deutsche Gesellschaft von ihren Soldaten. Und nahm nicht wahr, dass der Brunnenbohrer schon bald die Schippe aus der Hand gelegt und als Kämpfer zum Gewehr gegriffen hat.

Als der Gegner stärker wurde, als er immer mehr Bomben in den Straßen vergrub, als er Nacht für Nacht Raketen auf das Feldlager schoss, als er schwere Maschinengewehre, Panzerfäuste und Hunderte Kämpfer einsetzte, reichte das Gewehr nicht mehr, um sich behaupten zu können. Andere, schwerere, durchschlagskräftigere Waffen und mehr gepanzerte, geschützte Fahrzeuge mussten her – und ließen doch Monate, ja Jahre auf sich warten.

Es sollte ein sauberer Einsatz werden, und es wurde ein schmutziger Krieg. Ob die Soldaten wollten oder nicht. Ob die Gesellschaft wollte oder nicht. Nur: Wenn die Soldaten letztlich der verlängerte Arm des Volkes sind, dann brauchen sie die Unterstützung des Volkes, um ihren Auftrag erfolgreich bewältigen zu können. Wenn sich das Volk aber größtenteils um das Geschehen in Afghanistan nicht schert, Missstände, Ungereimtheiten, Fragwürdigkeiten ignoriert, Gewalt und Leid, das Töten und Getötet werden, den Krieg an sich jedoch ablehnt, und trotzdem nicht die Kraft oder das Interesse hat, die Soldaten nach Hause zu holen, dann stehen die Soldaten auf verlorenem Posten. Dann haben sie eben bis heute keinen Kampfhubschrauber, weil der Druck, den einige wenige Afghanistanveteranen auf Politik und Militärführung ausüben, nicht ausreicht, um die Beschaffung der Kampfhubschrauber zu beschleunigen. Dann können einige wenige Politiker die Beschaffung eines gepanzerten, dringend benötigten Fahrzeugs um beinahe Jahre verzögern, nur weil es nicht in Deutschland hergestellt wird und damit deutsche Rüstungsbetriebe nicht zum Zuge kommen.

Wozu führt das? Zum Beispiel dazu, dass ein Kommandeur in Kundus im Jahr 2008 auf die Frage, was er in seiner Zeit erreicht habe, antwortet: „Ich habe ein paar Schulen eingeweiht. Das war’s.“ Und der auf die Frage: „Gibt es einen Kommandeur, der mehr erreicht hat?“ antwortet: „Ich kennen keinen.“ Oder dass ein Kommandeur in Kundus in der zweiten Hälfte seines sechsmonatigen Einsatzes nur noch daran denkt, durchzuhalten und anschließend zu Hause sagt: „Das Schlimmste war die Ohnmacht!“ Ohnmacht, nichts gegen den Raketenbeschuss des Feldlagers tun zu können. Nichts gegen die Straßenbomben. Nichts gegen die Taliban, die in eben solchen Nächten in den Dörfern vermeintliche Kollaborateure erhängten, köpften, erschossen. Und am Ende, als er auf die wiederholte Bitte um mehr Soldaten, Waffen, Fahrzeuge aus Deutschland zum wiederholten Male eine abschlägige Antwort erhalten hatte, keinen Sinn mehr in seinem Einsatz sah und resigniert

sagte: „Bloß keine Toten, das war am Ende mein Ziel.“ Denn letztlich interessierten sich Regierung und Gesellschaft nicht wirklich für sein Problem. Wozu also sollte er das Leben seiner Soldaten aufs Spiel setzen? In einem Krieg überlebt, wer zuerst und besser schießt. Die deutschen Soldaten mussten Jahre lang darauf warten, beschossen zu werden, ehe sie zurückschießen durften.

Wenn manche Bundestagsabgeordnete auf Kurzbesuch im Feldlager waren und die Fotos von den zerbombten Fahrzeugen der Soldaten sahen, schwiegen sie kurz und sprachen dann von Demokratie und fragten nach Mädchenschulen. Oder versprachen schnelle Hilfe und ließen danach nie wieder von sich hören. Ich habe kaum einen Soldaten kennengelernt, der den Krieg geliebt hätte. Es gibt Soldaten, die meinen, sie müssten das, was sie Jahre lang trainiert haben, endlich auch einmal anwenden. Denen es einen Kick verschafft, wenn sie unter Feuer liegen und spüren, wie nah Leben und Tod in einem einzigen kurzen Moment beieinander liegen. Doch das ist eine Minderheit. Es sind mitunter diejenigen gewesen, die den Kampf leichtfertig gesucht und dafür teilweise bitter bezahlt haben. Die meisten Soldaten hassen den Krieg. Sie wollen tief im Grunde ihres Herzens nur eines: überleben und gesund nach Hause zurückkehren. Die ihren Frust über das, was ihre Vorgesetzten bis hinunter auf Gruppenführerebene politisch korrekt als Einsatz bezeichnen, was aber nichts anderes ist als Krieg, ihren Frust also mit zweifelnden Sätzen zum Ausdruck bringen wie diesem: „Wir halten hier den Arsch ins Feuer, die in Deutschland aber erklären am liebsten, am Hindukusch hätten wir alles im Griff. Dabei weiß jeder Soldat, dass das eine Lüge ist. Wenn wir alles im Griff haben, warum sterben dann meine Kameraden?“ Man könnte antworten: „Weil das Sterben zum Soldatenberuf gehört.“

Damit haben die Soldaten nicht mal ein Problem. Sie wissen, dass es so ist. Sie haben aber ein Problem damit, dass die Politiker dem zweifelnden Volk zu Hause nicht erklären können, worin Sinn und Zweck des Einsatzes der Soldaten bestehen, und dass sie, und das ist noch viel schlimmer, die Auseinandersetzung mit der zweifelnden Gesellschaft darüber auch nicht wirklich suchen. Warum lassen wir Soldaten Krieg führen – diese Frage wird weggeschwiegen. Und damit werden die Soldaten verhöhnt. Und am Ende stehen Aussagen wie diese auf die Frage an einen Hauptfeldwebel nach dem Sinn des Sterbens und Tötens: „Ich mache das für meine Familie und meine Kameraden.“ Jeder Soldat weiß, dass er nicht dazu da ist, nur Familie und Kameraden zu verteidigen. Doch wozu dann?

How Military Interventions Increase the Gap between Soldiers und Politics

Jens Warburg

1 Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, military interventions have become the key deployment scenario for most NATO countries. Military interventions, however, i.e. the deployment of troops in regions and states sometimes far away from one's own territory, are currently looked upon with some unease. The two major military interventions at the beginning of the first decade of the 21st century, Afghanistan and Iraq, have basically failed. Against this backdrop, the political administrations of NATO's member states are asking themselves if and how they want their troops to intervene in other states or regions in the future. What can be said even today is that, in the foreseeable future, NATO states are unlikely to issue any deployment orders aiming at a territorial conquest of such states. After all, the mission goals in Afghanistan and Iraq which required the long-term deployment of large troops are considered as unaccomplished. It was not the defeat of enemy troops or the conquering of the countries' capitals that proved difficult; instead, it was the long-term support of the regimes installed thereafter. Even though thousands of intervening troops were killed and tens of thousands were injured, thousands of locals died¹ and resources amounting to hundreds of billions of euros were used, the respective regimes are considered unstable and the originally proclaimed aims like freedom, human rights, democracy and the rule of law are hardly being mentioned any more.

In the following, I am going to take a look at the relationship between soldiers and political decision-making. In doing so, I am first going to deal with the question of what future military operations of Western industrialized states may look like. A second issue I am going to look at is the relationship between Western civil societies rooted in democratic constitutions on the one hand and war and the military on the other. For it is the relationship between such societies and war that has essential repercussions on soldiers and their relationship to politics.

1 In 2011, "410 civilian deaths were attributed to Pro-Government Forces" (UNAMA 2012: 21), 2,332 to Anti-Government Forces. "A further 279 civilian deaths (...) could not be attributed to a particular party to the conflict" (UNAMA 2012: 2). In summary, then, in 2011 about 3,000 civilians were killed in Afghanistan.

2 Military Interventions

In the first years after the enemy troops in Afghanistan and Iraq had been defeated and the countries had been occupied by the intervening troops, there was a term always held in high esteem in the political debates. It was the concept of ‘nation-building’. The soldiers of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ in Iraq, and the NATO soldiers in Afghanistan, were supposed to secure processes during which new state structures were meant to emerge, intended as guarantors of political stability, democracy and human rights. Today, however, hardly anyone holding a political office in any of the intervening states uses this term any more with a view to those states, because the political, social and economic realities do not match the noble aspirations associated with it. Admittedly, President Obama did use the term ‘nation-building’ in June 2011, in the context of his announcement to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan; however, he did so only to emphasize that the U.S. would no longer pursue costly military interventions, as the massive economic problems of the U.S. called for a different policy. Mr. Obama (2011) said, “America, it is time to focus on nation-building here at home”. In Afghanistan, the situation is particularly discouraging, as ten years after the invasion it is still feared that right after the withdrawal of the troops a violent war will ravage the country and the Taliban will regain complete power.

In the second decade of the 21st century, expectations placed on military interventions have basically been reduced to core business. NATO troops are expected to fight opponents assessed as dangerous by political decision-makers at a military level. Unlike in previous years, no more far-reaching goals will be pursued by military operations. But how could Western states intervene militarily in other regions without deploying troops there? I am going to use two examples to illustrate the pattern of future military interventions.

2.1 *Libya*

In 2011, international military action was taken in Libya. It took place under NATO command, and the participants were mainly NATO states. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates provided airplanes, sent special forces and participated in training of the insurgents (Coker/Levinson 2011). Future military interventions are likely to be modeled on this campaign. In it, according to NATO (2011) information, more than 26,000 airborne operations, among them slightly less than 10,000 airborne attacks, were sufficient to achieve the toppling of a regime without deploying any ground forces. The target of toppling the regime could be achieved without adopting any political responsi-

bility for the present or future situation of the country. The military units loyal to Gaddafi were wiped out, Gaddafi himself was killed by locals. After that, the end of the military intervention was officially announced. In line with the UN mandate, it was left up to the local players to decide on whether democracy and human rights were to be part of Libya's future.

In Libya, an unknown number of special forces were deployed for reconnaissance, for coordination with the rebel units as well as for identifying targets to the attacking planes. The scope of logistical support and the amount of arms supplied to the rebels is unknown, just like the extent to which concealed operations were carried out to support the rebels in combat. The role of international private military and security companies is also unknown.

2.2 *Somalia*

On 24 December 2006, Ethiopia declared war on the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which back then controlled large portions of Ethiopia's neighboring country, Somalia. Ethiopia invaded Somalia with troops. According to William R. Polk, the Ethiopian government did not act solely on its own account. Instead, the attack was actually a concealed military intervention of the U.S. by which the latter tried to combat the Islamic Courts Union (Polk 2009: 303). The Bush Administration considered the ICU to be a dangerous Islamist power potentially supporting terrorist activities. Ethiopia's military intervention was supposed to dismantle the Union. The so-called transitional government, which by then was in control of just minor parts of Somalia and had been unable to build a functioning administration there, was supposed to gain control of the majority of the country's territory. However, in spite of great military success at the beginning, both targets were missed. The civil war was not ended, the Union reformed and allied with other Somali militias against the Ethiopian troops. The civil war went into a new round.²

In the following years, the transitional government, in spite of the support it received from abroad, was unable to achieve a breakthrough success against its armed opponents. Neither air raids by U.S. fighter aircraft, nor the deployment of African Union troops, nor the training and equipment of the transitional government's troops financed by the U.S. and several EU member states did much to change the situation. Only when the Ethiopian troops, which the Somali population rejected, had been withdrawn, an Islamic group was accepted into the transitional government, and the number of African

2 Another effect was the sharp rise in pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa. The number of such attacks had gone down while the Union was in control of large portions of the country (Polk 2009: 305).

Union troops was increased, did it become possible to form a somewhat more stable transitional government in 2010.³ However, the war cannot be considered over, especially since in early 2012 a new player entered the scene – Kenyan troops invading the south of Somalia. All of this happened and is still happening without drawing much attention by the media of North America or Western Europe. The military actions, whether concealed or overt, have not served to build democracy or to secure human rights. In 2011 alone, 300,000 people fled Somalia because of violence and the draught. Over the past five years, the number of refugees from Somalia totaled 700,000 (UNHCR 2012: 12).

2.3 *Stability and Security*

Alongside democracy and human rights, two other terms have been constantly used in recent years whenever there was a need to justify military interventions. These were stability and security. Maintaining global stability may well be called the key objective of Western industrialized nations' foreign policies. Preserving the existing situation is used as a synonym of security. As Dierk Spreen has shown, security is not just about 'peace'. Rather, the debate on domestic and international security is about risk management (Spreen 2008: 28). Other possible objectives of foreign and security policy, such as the enforcement of basic democratic rights, play a relatively minor role and it will become less and less plausible to pursue them in the future, because their pursuit is in contradiction to the goal of not deploying any resources or personnel locally, on a long-term basis and to an extent that is hardly quantifiable in advance. This is why risk management is mainly based on the more or less short-term calculations of power and benefit of the intervening states. The focus is on averting danger. Social and political situations are deemed stable and secure if they do not trigger any regional turbulence endangering the security of the member states of the alliance. In turn, any event that might lead to an interruption of trade routes or produce flows of refugees, thereby destabilizing the situation in neighboring countries and ultimately reducing, or even cutting off, access to natural resources is deemed unstable and therefore dangerous.⁴

3 The transitional government has its own troops, some of which receive basic training by an EU military training mission (EUTM Somalia). This mission includes members of the Bundeswehr who have been deployed to Uganda.

4 At this point an advantage of concealed military interventions becomes visible: Neither the Bush Administration nor any other Western government assumed official responsibility for the consequences of the invasion of Ethiopian troops to fight the Islamic Court Union.

So what is to be expected in the future? First, political decision-makers will try to order military operations with more limited objectives. Second, they will try not to deploy any ground forces. If the deployment of ground forces cannot be avoided, they will operate according to the hit-and-run principle. The share of concealed operations in military interventions will increase.⁵ The attempt will be made to enhance regional stability by using local players and regional military powers. Even in the past, NATO states have not been picky on choosing allies of this kind, as the military intervention in Afghanistan has shown, and they will be even less picky in the future. As in previous years, such allies will be supported by providing reconnaissance data, training aids, the provision of supplies and weapons, and even, though to a limited extent, the deployment of armed forces. All these areas have been covered in the past, not just by special forces, but also, to a growing extent, by private military companies and contractors. There is no reason to assume that this trend will be reversed.

From a U.S. perspective, the NATO alliance itself should become a regional power of this kind and should be responsible for the status quo within its zone of influence. It is unclear, however, whether this will actually happen. For how much lament has been made by the U.S. since the 1980s with a view to the alleged imbalance of burden within NATO and how often have the U.S. tried to use other member states more intensely for military interventions? The insistence shown by the U.S. is in no way new to NATO. But in the years to come, the European partner states might be faced with more marked restraint on the part of the U.S. with a view to military interventions. As a result, the partner states will face the question of how, and to what extent, they can intervene militarily in far-away regions on their own.

Whether military campaigns can always be limited in such a way as to avoid the use of ground forces and/or their long-term deployment is a matter of doubt. Limitation efforts may be thwarted by the enemy, by allies or even

5 The use of drones has contributed to this development. For ten years, U.S. armed forces and the CIA have been attacking individuals who U.S. authorities suspected to be terrorists. The attacks are mainly performed by drones used to fire missiles. Military operations of this kind have taken place in Yemen, Somalia and, above all, Pakistan. The number of killing operations performed by drones has soared during the Obama Administration. Even though they are intended to kill individuals or groups in a targeted manner, large numbers of bystanders have been killed by those operations. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, a British organization of journalists, estimates that in Pakistan alone, between 2004 and June 2012 up to 832 civilians were killed in 334 attacks (Woods/Serle 2012). The U.S. government refuses to comment on concealed operations as a matter of principle, thereby avoiding the assumption of responsibility for its decisions.

the civil society back home. The latter will be discussed below in more detail. It should be mentioned here, however, that civil societies may call for more massive interventions than originally planned by those holding political and military power. And situations may arise in which it no longer seems opportune to reject these calls.

3 How Western Democratic Civil Society Deals with War

In the past decade, the term ‘post-heroic society’ has been used time and again to characterize the way contemporary civil societies deal with war and military values. At first sight the term, sometimes written in inverted commas, seems to be an appropriate characterization of Western industrial society, as it refers to an actual problem. When returning to the barracks, their families and their civil environment after deployment, soldiers have a hard time finding recognition. Civil society does not show sufficient interest in what the soldiers have been through, what their experiences and sufferings have been. All too often, they have to struggle for help in coping with their injuries.

A more in-depth look, however, gives rise to serious objections to the theorem of the post-heroic society. These objections become particularly clear when looking at the heroic societies that actually existed in history. In the German-speaking countries, the theorem was popularized by Herfried Münkler. He uses the term *heroic societies* when referring to the nation states on the eve of the First World War. In addition, he applies the term to some ancient city republics. As Münkler (2006: 310ff.) himself points out, heroic societies have been historical exceptions. No less than 2,000 years lie between the ancient city republics and the nation states of the late 19th century. Was there a shortage of belligerent heroism in that period? Certainly not. Ultimately, the theorem is based on a deliberately construed idea on what the civil community’s attitude toward the state and its warfare should be. The societies classified as heroic were militarized societies which are said to have been more belligerent because their members had been more willing to sacrifice themselves for the community. It is certainly right to say that warfare in the First World War did not suffer from a lack of willingness to make sacrifices, nor did the Napoleonic Wars at the beginning of the 19th century. The First World War, therefore, is not uniquely remembered for the soldiers’ willingness to sacrifice themselves, but for the unscrupulous willingness of the political and military leaders of all parties to pour men and material onto the industrialized battlefields (Geyer 1998: 246). The virtue of heroically sacrificing one’s life on the battlefield was thoroughly discredited during the carnage of the First World War. Münkler holds that since the First World War

there have only been unheroic or post-heroic societies and societies which were more or less successfully made into large heroic communities by dictatorial, violent means. These were National Socialist Germany, Imperial Japan, Bolshevik USSR and, to an extent, fascist Italy (Münkler 2006: 327). With the end of the Second World War, the military had lost its nimbus, particularly in Germany and Japan, and no painstaking explanation is needed as to why in Germany, in particular, the idea of self-sacrifice no longer holds a high position in the canon of civil virtues.

But what are we supposed to do with a theorem based on societies that have been historical exceptions with but little appeal? All heroic societies have been defeated, and they have been defeated by unheroic societies. The U.S. should be mentioned first and foremost in this context, being a completely unheroic society in terms of Münkler's definition (Münkler 2006: 338ff.). Consequently, the theorem does not tell us anything about the belligerence of a society, and even less does it tell us about whether wars are won. The disastrous course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, at any rate, is not the result of a lack of self-sacrifice on the part of the GIs or American civilians.

So why is the concept of the post-heroic society still being used again and again? Maybe because it is useful in political lament and political scuffles. It implies that the problem lies in the civil society's unwillingness to make sacrifices, thereby concealing the fact that avoiding military losses has been just one out of several factors in the warfare of Western states. As Edward Luttwak, actually the first writer to use the term *post-heroic society*, explains, this factor does not play a role in cases of self-defense or in extraordinary cases (Luttwak 2003: 108).⁶ It becomes important only when the state in question pursues imperialist power politics calling for additional legitimization in the eyes of the public.

Indeed, any democratic society must insist on particularly strong reasons to be given in public debate whenever the government takes decisions requiring individuals, i.e. soldiers, to risk their life and limb, and to break a taboo which is of utmost social importance, the taboo of killing. Whenever soldiers complain about a lack of recognition for their commitment, the political class, which is more than the actual government, has obviously failed to legitimize the soldiers' mission to a sufficient extent and to create the level of societal acceptance the soldiers ask for. Bringing up the concept of the allegedly post-heroic society makes the issue of legitimization disappear in the political scuffle. Wherever there is a problem of legitimization, this concept blames a lack of self-sacrifice, lack of political principles, populism, and

6 He quotes the Second Gulf War as an example of an extraordinary case.

even cowardice. As a result, the deficit of legitimation is redefined to become an attitudinal problem of civil society. In this way, you can create morale-boosting slogans, but you will not be able to create democratic legitimation.

Up to now, however, the difficulties in legitimizing military actions abroad have hardly restricted the Western political classes' freedom of shaping their foreign and security policies, because civilians, in their everyday lives, usually do not pay much attention to the global wars. And what is more, in spite of the wars waged by Western democratic societies in the past 20 years alone, it has not only been unnecessary to mobilize the forces of society as a whole; likewise, there has been no societal militarization aligning civilians' thoughts and feelings with the requirements of war (cf. Heins/Warburg 2004: 121). All Western democracies, albeit to different extents, are similar in that war and the military do not hold a central position in their canon of standards and values. Furthermore, in Europe the fear of a war impacting the local situation immediately has been dwindling since the end of the Cold War. The war is raging out there, somewhere else. Reports on what is happening on the international scene bear witness to dangers lurking elsewhere. The citizens are not indifferent to the victims of war, but they are more concerned about the decisions taken in the domestic arena. This is why the wars waged out there, and even the danger to the country's own soldiers, seem to be detached from the local situation. This is not even changed by the repercussions of international crises and wars on the domestic situation, as they are mainly viewed as unalterable facts, just like volcanic eruptions or other natural disasters. As a result, the *other where* remains a place of danger, of exotic fascination, but above all a place of disastrous situations that you better keep your distance from.

The example of the German Federal Government shows how the deficits in legitimating the decision in favor of a military intervention had no consequence whatsoever. For ten years in a row, the German government, with approval of parliament, kept sending more and more troops to Afghanistan even though this mission never enjoyed much popular consent and has even lost public support in recent years. Whether in the U.S. or in Western Europe, public sentiment, as surveyed in opinion polls, has never had any major influence on the decision-making processes within the political administration. Only in the run-up to major elections, when a narrow outcome is to be expected and new coalitions have to be formed, topics related to foreign and security policy play a certain role in forming the government and have a

practical influence on imminent decision-making processes. As a rule, however, elections are lost and won in the domestic field.⁷

4 Notes of Discord between Policymakers and Soldiers

As a matter of principle, the relationship between policymakers and soldiers and vice versa is a difficult one. Conducting politics requires the possibility to change perceptions and decisions, and this is precisely why it can get in conflict with the existential relationship that soldiers necessarily have to their own activity in war. Soldiers risking their lives in war are not very open to political reassessments of the past and the present. They call on policymakers to give them something they cannot always give: Consistency in their decisions. This leads to discord and disappointment.

If we approach the phenomenon in a different way, we will find that soldiers and politicians decide and act against the backdrop of different time horizons. A soldier's everyday actions in war can have serious and immediate consequences on his own life and limb as well as the lives of others. This immediacy is unknown to the political decision-makers of democratic societies. Mistakes they make in their field of action may end their political career, but will not kill them.

In democratic societies, the relationship between military and politics is clearly defined. The military is supposed to be an instrument of foreign and security policy. Soldiers, therefore, are supposed to do what the political leaders tell them to do. However, as soon as a large number of soldiers is injured or killed in war, it becomes obvious that the idea of using the military just like an instrument is wrong. It is wrong because the people deployed cannot just be switched on and off like machines (cf. Warburg 2008: 40f.). More and more often, soldiers reclaim their status as subjects worthy of recognition. It must be assumed that the discord between policymakers and soldiers will be exacerbated in the future, as future military interventions are supposed to do without legitimations which in turn would necessarily involve a comprehensive deployment of resources and people. And even if such legitimations are given, the forces deployed will not suffice to actually fulfill the responsibility outlined. Apart from exceptional cases like the liberation of

7 Another exception is the transformation of a decision originally belonging to the field of foreign and security policy to an issue of domestic policy, as occurred in Western Europe in the early 1980s with the deployment of new nuclear weapons. In Germany, however, the CDU/CSU (Christian Democrats), who advocated the deployment of those weapons, won the federal elections in 1983 after campaigning on economic and social policy issues.

hostages, there will be more and more political disputes about the aims and purposes of military interventions, and the political consensus on individual missions will become fragile and brittle, as can be seen even now.

As has been stated before, military interventions requiring the deployment of troops for years are supposed to be avoided, as major mistakes have been made in the past during the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and these missions are ultimately considered to be failures.

4.1 The Will to Shape the Political Situation

At this point, however, another reason should be mentioned: The political administrations obviously do not have a strong will to shape the political situation in regions such as Afghanistan or Iraq. This can be derived from the fact that the concept of security is mainly narrowed down to the criterion of stability. The ideas on how to shape these regions spatially, socially and politically are ultimately defined in a defensive way. The situation is supposed to be stable. A democratic situation where, for instance, basic democratic rights and the rule of law prevail is deemed optimal, but is always considered dispensable as soon as it could endanger stability. This is why the risk management approach, apart from abstract phrases, is hardly capable of developing specific ideas of what is supposed to happen to the regions in which interventions take place. The fact that the intervening states and their decisions are guided by more or less short-term benefit and power calculations does not contribute to facilitating the development of political concepts, nor does the fact that these short-term interests may differ from state to state. But it would certainly be simplistic to blame the lack of will to shape the political situation on the political administrations alone.

In this context, I would just like to give some hints to this complex problem. Colonialism has a very bad image, and rightly so. This is why the intervening states have to find local partners for cooperation in order not to appear as colonial powers. Between the political administrations and within the democratic public of the intervening Western states, there is a general consensus that after any intervention it is desirable to have political constitutions securing the rule of law in the newly formed states. The people are supposed to have universal suffrage, the executive power of the state is to be chosen by free elections, and the state is supposed to acknowledge human rights. Even though implementation of these points may be unsatisfactory in detail, a minimum level of legal security is deemed indispensable because it guarantees the market-based movement of capital and goods between states. It is a matter of dispute to what extent and in which form interventions in economic, social and related cultural situations and practices in the regions may be

deemed permissible for the intervening states as well as for NGOs. These issues become all the more obvious, if the cooperation partners, possibly in contradiction to their public declarations, actually disapprove of key components of any democratic constitution for their societies; in short, when the cooperation partners are unwilling.

The ongoing economic crisis knocks the bottom out of any euphoria on what the world should look like in the future and on how civil societies should be committed to building it. Also in view of the scarcity of natural resources it is not easy to arrive at positive predictions for the global future. In view of the current discourse on environmental degradation, the finiteness of fossil fuels, and the growing scarcity of resources of all kinds, including water, we can hardly imagine that in the future there will be excessive quantities of goods and possibilities to shape the global scene in a way that enables all people to participate. We cannot see either technical innovations⁸ or new social and political forms of cooperation that could possibly avert the scarcities and the destruction of people's livelihoods looming on the horizon. This leads to a situation where, due to the seeming finiteness of goods to be distributed to meet people's basic needs, prosperity in other societies tends to be perceived as threatening. There are, for instance, numerous studies and reports about the rising standards of living in China, India and Brazil, where the middle classes have increased their consumption of meat.⁹ As soon as just a fraction of the population living in those countries develops consumption habits similar to those common in Western industrialized nations, the fear of dwindling quantities of feed, environmental degradation and possible conflicts over resource distribution arises.

All this enhances the civil society's acceptance of the criterion of stability. In the eyes of Western industrialized societies, everything should remain as it is. However, if foreign and security policies dedicate themselves to preserving the status quo, they are likely to fail. This would be a battle which the Western democracies would be doomed to lose.

If political debates on military interventions get fiercer, this is not necessarily because there is the wish to contain these interventions. It may as well be an effect of the failure of such containment, for instance because there is no local or regional power to be found as a partner for intervention. And the

8 This is not to say that there is no technical innovation. But the notion that photovoltaics, for instance, will be able to secure our energy supply in the future currently seems excessively optimistic.

9 A study commissioned by *Greenpeace*, dealing with the impact of livestock breeding on the climate, is just one of the large number of publications to be mentioned in this context (http://www.greenpeace.de/themen/klima/kampagnen/klimaschutz/detail/artikel/landwirtschaft_und_klima/).

possibility of individuals, NGOs or social milieus lobbying for military intervention cannot be excluded either. A case in point is what happened in France in 2011 with a view to the civil war in Libya. This way of lobbying political administrations is particularly effective during election campaigns, but it may also be applied in cases of spectacular war crimes, as reported from Syria, provided they are covered by the media and shock the public.¹⁰

What does this mean for a military intervention that a German federal government wants to push through in the future? The government will have to be prepared for a situation where it will be more difficult than in the past to arrive at a comprehensive political consensus in parliament in favor of military action. This, in turn, will mean that the individual soldier cannot hope for general political consent by parliamentarians to the extent that he could before. Soldiers, however, do not have much sympathy for political controversies, if at the same time they are ordered to risk their life and limb. They will be increasingly uncertain about whether their sacrifice will be acknowledged at present as well as in future, rather than being mainly viewed as an error. Should the political administrations actually have a harder time achieving parliamentary consensus, there will, in addition, certainly be a debate on the extent to which parliament can participate in future decisions on Bundeswehr missions. As a result, the government might gain more freedom in its political decision-making, but would not be able to remedy the deficit of legitimation.

4.2 *Increasing Discord*

What does increasing discord between soldiers and policy-makers mean? Above all, there will be tendencies of dissociation. These can be observed even today when studying the attitudes of soldiers toward policy-makers in particular and civil society in general. Anja Seiffert (2005: 176ff.), for instance, has observed that Bundeswehr soldiers, as a result of taking part in missions, go through a process of rethinking and adjusting their self-perception as soldiers to the day-to-day requirements of the military deployment situation. The deeper their integration into the “mission world”, the more imbued they become with military standards and values (Seiffert 2005: 198, 176). Their views are less and less related to the reference frameworks of society at large. As a consequence, it is feared that the military and civilian worlds of values and meaning will drift further apart (Seiffert 2005: 231).

10 The case for a military intervention in Syria is mainly based on the concept of the Responsibility to Protect. This concept’s validity in international law is a matter of dispute.

If this prediction proves correct,¹¹ this means that there will be an increasing number of soldiers who are, at best, not interested in, and indifferent to, political processes. It further means that within the armed forces there will be an increasing number of so-called heroic communities with their own canons of standards and values.

How severe the effects of the gap between soldiers and political leaders will be depends on the course of military interventions and the number of soldiers confronted with misery, loss and death during their deployment. It can be taken for granted that training programs and improved framework conditions, ranging from the quality of equipment to the amount of pay, can improve the soldiers' level of satisfaction. What is of eminent importance, however, is how society and the state act towards the soldiers when they return from war. In Germany, they have been almost invisible. But this is going to change.¹² After two World War defeats, there will be no simple way of recognizing former combatants. And just another site for dropping wreaths will certainly not do justice to the veterans' need for recognition.

It would certainly be an exaggeration to call the Bundeswehr soldiers' mood extremely disgruntled. But the soldiers' level of satisfaction will go down, if their environmental conditions deteriorate and the soldiers get the impression that their commitment has been in vain and is not acknowledged. The families and friends of individual soldiers will typically be the first to feel the effects of their discontent and disappointment. However, in case of further aggravation, military subcultures may develop within as well as outside the armed forces, leading to the formation of groups and organizations dissociated from civil society and taking a hostile stance toward democratic political ideas.

Samuel Finer makes the distinction between legitimate exertions of influence defined by participation in the democratic process and concealed interventions by soldiers implying a threat of refusing to obey their employer's orders unless specific demands are met. Alternatively, military units may publicly threaten to refuse specific orders. And even if, at present, there is no illegitimate intervention of the political sphere by the armed forces in any of the leading NATO states: If policy-makers fail to respect the limits to instrumentalizing the military, the military will cease to be a mere political instru-

11 In her essay on the Bundeswehr's ISAF 2010 mission in Afghanistan, Seiffert refers to her study from 2005. The results of the more recent study confirm that a mission can actually become an instance of socialization and contribute to the formation of a collective identity (Seiffert 2012: 88).

12 The founding of the organizations *Bund deutscher Veteranen* and *Deutsche Kriegsopferfürsorge* in 2009 is a case in point.

ment of foreign and security policy and will become a factor of domestic policy. It will not even take a worst-case scenario to get there.

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About the Authors

Prof. Dr. Donald Abenheim, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey/California, United States of America.

Brigadier Ben Barry, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, United Kingdom.

Prof. Dr. Eyal Ben-Ari, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel.

Dr. Heiko Biehl, Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences, Strausberg, Germany.

Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop, Egmont Institute, Brussels, Belgium.

Prof. Dr. Dr. hc. Wilfried von Bredow (ret.), Philipps-University Marburg, Germany.

Prof. Dr. Helena Carreiras, ISCTE – University Institute, Lisbon, Portugal.

Prof. Dr. Manas Chatterji, Binghamton University, New York, United States of America.

Prof. Christopher Dandeker, Ph.D., King's College, London, United Kingdom.

Brigadier Dr. Walter Feichtinger, Austrian Defense Academy, Vienna, Austria.

Rüdiger Fiebig, Berlin, Germany.

Dr. Bastian Giegerich, Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences, Strausberg, Germany.

Brigadier General John Henderson, Royal College of Defense Studies, London, United Kingdom.

Julius Hess, Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences, Strausberg, Germany.

Prof. Dr. Franz Kernic, Swedish National Defense College, Stockholm, Sweden.

Dr. Florian Kühn, Helmut-Schmidt-University, Hamburg, Germany.

Dr. Gerhard Kümmel, Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences, Strausberg.

Prof. Christian Leuprecht, Ph.D., Royal Military College, Kingston/Ontario, Kanada.

Dr. Sabine Mannitz, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

Dr. Tim Oliver, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, United Kingdom.

Chiara Ruffa, Ph.D., Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden.

Dr. Niklas Schörnig, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

Dr. Anja Seiffert, Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences, Strausberg, Germany.

Marco Seliger, Loyal – Journal of Security Politics, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

Prof. Dr. Joseph L. Soeters, Netherlands Defense Academy, Breda, & Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands.

Colonel Ralph Thiele, Air Force Administration, Cologne, Germany.

Prof. Dr. Pascal Vennesson, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Dr. Jens Warburg, Offenbach, Germany.