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Cathrin Arenz · Michaela Haug
Stefan Seitz · Oliver Venz *Editors*

Continuity under Change in Dayak Societies

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Die Reihe, 1997 in Freiburg begründet, umfasst ein breites Spektrum aktueller Themen der Ethnologie mit interdisziplinärem Charakter. Im Mittelpunkt stehen kulturelle Transformationsprozesse und damit einhergehende Folgewirkungen von sozialem, ökonomischem, religiösem und politischem Wandel. Kennzeichnend ist hierbei die ethnographische Perspektive auf die regionalen Untersuchungsfelder Afrika, Asien und Lateinamerika und deren interdependente Vernetzung in einer globalen, transnationalen Welt.

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Preface

Stefan Seitz

The dramatic and incredibly rapid changes in Borneo's natural environment and economic conditions in recent decades and the ongoing, profound transformations of its indigenous societies have provoked a growing interest in ethnological research.

However, comprehensive anthropological research on Borneo has primarily taken a general focus, embedded in interdisciplinary Borneo studies as part of the wider Southeast Asian area studies. In this sense this publication is presented within the framework of the "Grounding Area Studies in Social Practice: Southeast Asian Studies at Freiburg" program, supported by the BMBF (German Federal Ministry of Education and Research), in which political, anthropological, historical and economic disciplines cooperate. This anthology is the result of a workshop on "Change and Continuity in Dayak Societies," which was held from July 17-18 2015 at the Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology at the University of Freiburg. The workshop provided an opportunity for the younger generation of anthropologists in Germany and beyond engaged in ethnological research in Borneo and actually involved in or having done such field research to come together to discuss recent processes of economic, political and social (dis)continuities in Dayak societies. Several presentations during the workshop illustrated vividly the close intertwinement of cultural continuity and change. We thus decided to emphasize this relatedness by changing the book's title slightly from that of the workshop to "Continuity under Change".

Whereas quite a number of publications document and analyze these transformations, continuity and persistence within Dayak cultures are less often examined. Therefore, the workshop and the contributions to this volume were not only aimed at analyzing the effects of discontinuities but also at specifically considering continuities within Dayak societies from various anthropological perspectives.

The contributions show how flexibility and cultural dynamics, considered key values among the Dayak, enable them to navigate and persist through

change, strengthening their identity and ethnicity at the same time. In this sense the anthology reflects the main focus of ethnological research on Dayak societies in the last two decades (see King 2013: 4).

The impetus of the workshop came from earlier research activities undertaken by Freiburg scholars on the Dayak Benuaq. As contributions on the Benuaq have received considerable attention, the original idea was to organize a conference specifically focused on Benuaq research in Kalimantan to bring together scholars from different countries and different disciplines working on the Benuaq. Unfortunately this initial idea could not be realized. Instead, however, a workshop was held with a smaller group of people but with a broadened scope from just the Benuaq to Dayak societies in general.

One of the initiators of the idea was Christian Gönner (GIZ Tiflis), the first student from the Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology in Freiburg to graduate through studying the Benuaq in 2000 and later one of the organizers of the CIFOR (Centre for International Forestry Research) program in East Kalimantan on "Poverty and Decentralization" as part of an interdisciplinary project at the University of Freiburg on the impact of decentralization reforms in Indonesia. With his experience of more than a quarter of a century continuously observing the economic and political trends in East Kalimantan and especially in Benuaq communities, he stimulated further fieldwork on the Benuaq among students of the Institute, with Michaela Haug (University of Cologne) and Oliver Venz (University Malaysia Sarawak) conducting research on the Benuaq since the early 2000s, and with Cathrin Arenz (University of Freiburg) doing the same between 2004 and 2007. These three were the main actors involved in preparing the workshop and the present volume. I extend very special thanks to all of them.

Thus a certain concentration of Benuaq research was undertaken here in Freiburg. Further fieldwork in Kalimantan by students from Freiburg was done by Viola Schreer (University of Kent) and Anna Fünfgeld (University of Freiburg), who were also participants in the workshop. Further contributions came from Timo Duile (University of Bonn), Kristina Großmann (University of Passau), Andrea Höing (BRINCC), Christian Oesterheld (Mahidol University International College), Richard Payne (Yale University) and Irendra Radjawali (University of Bonn). I am very grateful for their active participation and extend my thanks to Jürgen Rüland and Judith Schlehe as leaders of the BMBF project for their strong support of the workshop, and Lothar Käser for his scientific advice. Unfortunately not all participants could – for various reasons – contribute to this edited volume. I thank all for inspiring contributions and fruitful discussions. I also want to express my thanks to Isabell Herrmans and Anu Lounela (both University of Helsinki), who contributed to the edited volume but could not attend the workshop.

References

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1. Dayak Societies in Transition - Balancing Continuity and Change

Cathrin Arenz, Michaela Haug, Stefan Seitz and Oliver Venz

1.1 Introduction

"Any book about the peoples and forests of late twentieth-century Borneo must be about change" (Padoch & Peluso 1996: 1). With this sentence, Christine Padoch and Nancy Lee Peluso mark the beginning of their edited volume "Borneo in Transition," published in 1996. Their statement reflects the amazement and concern with which researchers started to witness the pervasive presence of change all over the island of Borneo from the 1970s and the resulting exigency to pay scholarly attention to processes of environmental, economic and social transformations.

As a consequence, research on Borneo, which had been predominantly focused on social structures, kinship and descent during the 1950s, 1960s and well into the 1970s, made a "turn towards development and practice" (King 2013b: 41) from the late 1970s onwards. At that time it was mainly the rapid expansion of commercial logging and the obvious impacts of deforestation on local communities which provoked growing scholarly attention. Thus, during the 1980s and 1990s a fast-growing body of literature emerged which explored an expanding diversity of development trajectories (cf. Ave & King 1986, Colfer 2008[1], De Jong 1997, Dove 1982, 1985, 1986, 1993) and the (often marginalized) position of the indigenous population within these processes (e.g. Tsing 1993, Fried 2003).

Looking at very recent publications on Borneo and Dayak societies, 'change' continues to be omnipresent, as nicely demonstrated by the title of the edited volume "Borneo Transformed" by DeKoninck et al. (2011). And this is no wonder, as life in Borneo has been characterized by rapid and far-reaching ecological, economic and social transformations since the turn of the century.

1 This publication compiles several publications by Carol J. Pierce Colfer written during the 1980s, 1990s and the 21st century.

C. Arenz et al. (Hrsg.), *Continuity under Change in Dayak Societies*, Edition Centaurus – Sozioökonomische Prozesse in Asien, Afrika und Lateinamerika, DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-18295-3_1

The Indonesian part of Borneo has experienced particularly far-reaching political transformations, arising when the previously highly centralistic system of the *Orde Baru* (New Order) was replaced by one of Southeast Asia's most rigorous decentralization reforms in 2001. Regional autonomy has transferred much authority to the regions and significantly altered power relations which previously construed Kalimantan and the other so-called 'Outer Islands' as the state's margins (Haug et al. 2016).

The increasing integration of even small communities and rather remote "out-of-the-way places" (Tsing 1993) into the global capitalist economy, as well as the ambitious plans of local governments to generate income through natural resource extraction, have accelerated environmental change and related processes of sedentarization, urbanization and modernization all over Borneo. Deforestation, increasing pollution and the inexorable expansion of oil palm monocultures and mining are challenging local communities' ways of life – their natural resource management practices, their rights to the forest, their knowledge and their views of the future. This is not to argue that they are passive victims of change. The Dayak (individuals as well as collective actors) are very much engaged in governing, shaping, manipulating and resisting the processes that transform the landscapes of Borneo and their societies alike. It is, however, true to say that it is nearly impossible to live in Borneo nowadays and not talk about change and the question of what life will look like if this path of development is followed further.

We argue that due to this dominant presence of change, recent research on Borneo and Dayak societies has tended to unilaterally emphasize aspects of cultural change while paying relatively little attention to the broad variety of continuities. We have thus invited the contributors to this volume to look at recent transformation processes by paying special attention to the manifold continuities that can be observed within the context of change. As most authors work in Indonesian Borneo, this book explores a broad variety of topics including political and environmental change and related changes in natural resource management, religion and ritual performance, social transformations and (re)formation of ethnic identities in Kalimantan. Paying attention to discontinuities as well as to continuities within Dayak societies, this volume seeks to generate a balanced picture of continuity and change from anthropological perspectives.

1.2 Empowered Dayak Communities: Democratization, Decentralization and the Rise of the "Local"

The downfall of former president Suharto, democratization and the implementation of regional autonomy in 2001 have significantly altered the political landscape of Indonesian Borneo (Aspinall & Mietzner 2010). Through regional autonomy, regencies (*kabupaten*) have become the main recipients of new authority and are now responsible for such important areas as education, health, labor, public works, and environmental and natural resource management. Decentralization further abolished the previously highly standardized village structures and instead encouraged the revival of customary forms of village government (cf. von Benda-Beckmann 2001). In addition, new regulations on fiscal balance further set out a new system of fiscal arrangements between the center and the regions, under which regencies receive a much larger share of the revenues generated within their borders and additionally are allowed to generate their own revenues.

An important consequence of decentralization has been the 'blossoming' of new administrative and budgetary units, commonly referred to as *pemekaran* (McWilliam 2011). Although this phenomenon emerged all over Indonesia, it has been quite extreme in Kalimantan. While between 1996 and 2007 the number of regencies increased by 7.8 percent in Java and Bali, it rose by 82 percent in Kalimantan (Brata 2008: 1). Through this excessive *pemekaran* process many new political and administrative centers have been created all over Kalimantan, endowed with new political authority and new economic opportunities. The resource rich regions of Kalimantan, and especially East Kalimantan, profited fairly well from the new fiscal arrangements: Kutai Kartanegara, Kutai Timur, Kutai Barat, Berau and Pasir are among the wealthiest regencies of Indonesia.

After having experienced systematic economic, political and social marginalization and various assimilation policies during the *Orde Baru* 1966-1998 (cf. Duncan 2004; Duile, this volume), the Dayak have on the whole been empowered by regional autonomy. Their political self-determination has increased and in several regencies the Dayak have become ruling majorities (cf. Haug 2010). Like other regions of Indonesia, Kalimantan experienced what Davidson and Henley have called a "Revival of Tradition" (2007) and manifold (re)constructions of Dayak identities (Widen 2002). Dayak people all over Kalimantan possess a new pride in their indigenous identity after having experienced the devaluation of their culture under colonial and post-colonial rule. In many regions this new self-consciousness has been outwardly expressed through a revitalization and folklorization of *adat* dances, costumes and art.

However, this new pride and (sometimes rather rhetorical) reorientation towards an autochthonous culture has also taken on threatening forms. The politically powerful category of *putra daerah* ("children of the region" or "local sons") which recently became important in Kalimantan has often been aimed against claims and demands of (trans-)migrants from other parts of Indonesia and has fueled violent conflicts in West and Central Kalimantan (cf. Davidson 2003; Peluso 2003; van Klinken 2002; Widen 2002; Österheld, this volume).

Although regional autonomy improved the position of the Dayak as a whole, it has also led to new inequalities among the rich and the poor, the powerful and the powerless, and the old and the young as the newly gained economic wealth is not equally enjoyed by all (Haug 2016). Furthermore, new inter-ethnic rivalry has emerged. On the one hand we have witnessed the emergence of an inclusive Dayak identity which has united the various Dayak groups in their struggles against state policies, marginalization and pressure from outside (cf. Duile, this volume). On the other hand, inter-ethnic rivalry has increased within the context of decentralization as ethnic and even sub-ethnic identities start to play an increasingly important role in gaining access to political positions, economic resources and (higher) education.

1.3 Challenged Dayak Communities: Changes in Nature, Environment and Natural Resource Exploitation

Despite a long and interwoven history of environmental and cultural change, societies and nature on Borneo have often been depicted as unchanging: "Much, though not all, early research on the ecology and human-ecology of Borneo focused on two intertwined constants: the supposedly traditional and exotic in culture, and the presumably pristine in nature" (Padoch & Peluso 1996: 1). Whether this lack of change was seen in a derogatory sense as "backward" or more positively as "traditional" varied depending on the perspective of the respective author. As a consequence, various publications during the 1980s, 1990s and beyond have argued against these static depictions (e.g. Cleary & Eaton 1992, King 1993, Brookfield, Potter & Byron 1995, Padoch & Peluso 1996, Wadley 2005) and instead demonstrated that Bornean landscapes as well as societies have undergone manifold transformations over recent centuries and that the rainforests today do not resemble the image of "untouched nature," but rather are a result of human-forest interactions. Dayak societies have participated for millennia in long-distance trade in forest products, cash crop production and mining, and have experienced various changes in response to migration, the

introduction of new species and shifts in levels of resource exploitation and trade (Padoch & Peluso 1996: 2).

However, the current environmental change, which began during the *Orde Baru*, is unprecedented in its rate and reach. During the *Orde Baru*, the state intensified its control over land and natural resources as well as the people who use them. Sectoral laws on forestry, mining, oil and natural gas, irrigation, and fisheries and various forms of "internal territorialization" (Vandergeest & Peluso 1995: 385) increased state control over natural resources and facilitated their exploitation by private interests (Thorburn 2004a: 37; Thorburn 2004b; Lucas and Warren 2000: 222). Customary *adat* rights to land and forests, on the other hand, were increasingly limited, and millions of hectares of communally and individually owned forests, fallow land and forest gardens were given to logging companies or converted to commercial agriculture. As a result of this policy, monospecific plantations of rubber, oil palm and fast growing pulp and paper have replaced species-rich forests in many areas of Kalimantan. "Something shocking began to happen in Indonesia's rainforests during the last decades of the twentieth century: Species diversities that had taken millions of years to assemble were cleared, burned, and sacrificed to erosion. The speed of landscape transformation took observers by surprise" (Tsing 2005: 2). Through the expansion of logging, mining, oil palm plantations and other industries, Dayak livelihoods have become increasingly integrated into the nation state and the global capitalist economy: "few forest and agricultural products, and few of the social arrangements for producing or extracting them, have been left untouched by commercialization" (Padoch & Peluso 1996: 3).

Regional Autonomy did not automatically reverse the ecologically destructive and socially unjust practices of natural resource exploitation that emerged during the *Orde Baru*. While there are some optimistic examples of inclusive and forward-thinking resource management as demonstrated, for example, by Bakker (2009), decentralisation in Kalimantan has more often been accompanied by an acceleration of environmental decline. The early phase of decentralisation has been characterised by an increased extraction of natural resources and the rise of new inequalities (see e.g. Rhee 2000, Barr et al. 2001, Warren & McCarthy 2002, McCarthy 2004, Bullinger & Haug 2012). Mining, pushed by the Indonesian coal boom, has lately gained in importance as a driver of deforestation and environmental change. Kalimantan represents the centre of Indonesian coal mining – 83 percent of Indonesia's proven coal reserves are located there (Lucarelli 2010: 40). The masterplan for acceleration and expansion of Indonesia's economic development (MP3EI) for the period 2011-2025 designates Kalimantan as the centre of the production and processing of national mining and energy reserves (Government of Indonesia 2011). It is thus

very likely that forest loss will continue at alarming speed. Between 1985 and 2005 Borneo lost an average of 850,000 hectares of forest every year and it is prognosticated that if this trend continues, forest cover will be reduced to less than a third by 2020 (WWF 2007).

Rapid deforestation, forest conversion and related environmental degradation seriously challenge the continuity of forest tenure, forest ownership and guardianship, which supported sustainable resource management practices (Sellato 2007) as well as the continuity of the highly flexible and resilient combinations of swidden agriculture, trading of (agro-)forest products and non-farming activities found throughout Bornean societies (see Gönner as well as Höing & Radjawali, this volume). Losing access to land and natural resources does erode livelihood choices and finally leads to comprehensive livelihood transformations. For many villagers this creates a serious dilemma. They become increasingly dependent on working for the very industries that destroy their environment and the basis of their livelihoods. This raises important questions about the future, especially for the younger generation. Environmentalist visions of customary practices and visions of living "close to nature" often seem to stand in contrast to the desire for a modern lifestyle, education and "development" – however individually diverse conceptions of this might be (Schreer 2016). On the other hand, it is obvious that despite far-reaching changes, the rainforest remains important to former forest dwellers and is still considered "a home with which they associate closely" (Sercombe 2007: 250). Opinions, reactions and the anticipation of these changes are accordingly very heterogeneous (cf. Meijaard et al. 2013). While the expansion of logging, mining, oil palm plantations and other industries is desired by some as the realization of development, it is rejected outright or even violently resisted by others (cf. Potter 2009, Haug 2014). However, many villagers do not oppose resource exploitation or forest conversion per se, but rather the specific forms and structures in which these processes currently take place.

Looking at the enormous speed with which forests in Borneo continue to disappear, environmentalist efforts can seem unwinnable and frustrating. A major recent attempt to protect Bornean rainforest is the "Heart of Borneo" initiative, a government-led and NGO-supported program initiated jointly by Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia to sustainably manage the mountainous area running through the center of the island from Mount Kinabalu in the northeast, down to the Schwaner Range in the southwest.[2] However, the initiative seems to be of dubious value as coal mining (Großmann & Tijaja 2015) and palm oil plantations are allowed within the area. The WWF, the major NGO involved, has

2 http://www.heartofborneo.org/ (accessed 08.06.2016).

been especially heavily criticized for promoting a green economy which something of a wolf in sheep's clothing (Eilenberg 2015). Another ray of hope, for some at least, has been the approach to mitigate global climate change through "Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation" (REDD+). By creating a financial value for the carbon stored in trees, REDD+ makes forests more valuable. While proponents of the mechanism view this enhancement of forest value as a necessary and important precondition for including forests in a future carbon trading system, REDD+ critics warn that such a conception will have largely negative impacts for forest dependent communities and cast doubt on the effectiveness of this model (for critical discussions of REDD+ see Bumpus & Liverman 2011, Corbera & Schroeder 2011, Griffiths 2009, McGregor et al. 2015). Lounela (this volume) shows how a climate change mitigation program in Central Kalimantan contributes to conflicting value orientations as the rubber economy promoted by the program is associated with values and economic behavior that stand in sharp contrast to those associated with swidden cultivation. But despite increasing anonymity and accumulation, villagers continue to uphold the values of sharing and solidarity.

In 1993 Victor King wrote: "Unless something is done to halt or considerably reduce rainforest clearance, then the prospects for the Dayaks must be bleak indeed. The very resources upon which they have depended for centuries – the land, forests and rivers – will no longer be able to sustain them. […] [The Dayak] who, over the course of four thousand years or so, have adapted to the natural environment, used it and protected it, will have been transformed into marginal peasants, estate workers and urban wage laborers, in the space of about 40 years" (King 1993: 302). At the time of writing, the year 2033 is still 17 years away. However, for some Dayak this dark prophecy has already come to pass, while others are pushing it forward, gaining huge profits from resource exploitation. Others still struggle against this bleak forecast, eager to create a brighter future.

A major step forward can be identified in the announcement by the Indonesian Constitutional Court on May 16, 2013 that customary forests are no longer considered to be state forest. This case was based on a petition by the Indonesian indigenous peoples' movement (*Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara*, AMAN) and two indigenous communities, and was filed in March 2012.[3] The new legislation is perceived as a critical breakthrough in the struggle for indigenous rights and although the results remain to be seen (Butt 2014), communities have been motivated by it to engage in new creative ways to protest

3 http://www.forestpeoples.org/topics/rights-land-natural-resources/news/2013/05/constitutional-court-ruling-restores-indigenous-pe

against non-transparent development practices and to demand the acknowledgement of their customary rights. An innovative example is the usage of unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) to generate high-quality community controlled maps to challenge spatial planning processes as described by Radjawali and Pye (2015).

1.4 Debated Ethnic Categories: Identity, Ethnicity and Ethnic Violence

Borneo is an island of extreme social, cultural and linguistic mobility. From prehistoric times, Borneo has been vital to Austronesian migrations due to its location at the center of Southeast Asia and today it presents us with "an amalgamation of ethnic groups with often very different origins" (Adelaar 1996: 81). In its subsequent history, Borneo became a crossroads for virtually all major civilizations − Chinese, Indic, Islamic, European − and the world religions based upon them. In more recent times, colonialism, Borneo's division among the three nation states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, and its embedding in the wider global arena brought about still more transformations. The island is a melting pot of diverse influences and, therefore, a challenge for systematic approaches to "ethnicity," "comparative religion," and, more generally, for theorizing "change" as well as "continuity."

It was with Fredrik Barth's (1969) influential book on "Ethnic Groups and Boundaries" that the term "ethnic(ity)" gained currency in social anthropology and began to replace what had previously been referred to as "races," "tribes" or "cultures" (see Despres 1975, Cohen 1978). Not long after, King and Wilder (1982) presented their focus volume "Southeast Asia and the Concept of Ethnicity," the goal of which was to present a corrective against the prevalent Western "xeno-ethnocentrism" (King & Wilder 1982: 1) based on notions of "tribal cultures in isolation" and "tribal homogeneity" and to help ethnicity take its place as "a central rather than a special problem of social structure" (King & Wilder 1982: 5). Most importantly, in that focus volume King also presented his "Ethnicity in Borneo: An Anthropological Problem," which is considered a key summary of the difficulties which scholars face in studying ethnicity in the context of Borneo. Since then, there has been a multitude of publications on ethnic identity in Borneo studies and it is especially during the last two decades that "the theme of identity and more specifically ethnicity and ethnic relations [has become] one of increasing and significant interest in the literature, and one which has resonance in other parts of Southeast Asia as well" (King 2013b: 4). The most recent initiative on Dayak ethnicity is Sillander and Alexander's (eds., 2016) "Belonging in Borneo: Refiguring Dayak Ethnicity in Indonesia."

When talking about ethnicity, identity and culture, King's statement that "[o]ne of the first and most important tasks for a field anthropologist is to define his units of analysis" (King 1982: 23) is undoubtedly correct. However, at the same time, King problematizes the search for clear analytical units for Borneo: "with a few noticeable exceptions, the delimitation of ethnic categories and groupings and the examination of inter-ethnic relations have met with numerous difficulties" (King 1982: 23). Indeed, the complex history of Borneo produced a plethora of names for a great number of diverse communities, which posed a significant challenge to "ethnic identification" and ultimately led to various schemes of "classification" and concomitant underlying criteria[4] (see Needham 1975 and Großmann, this volume, on polythetic classification).

Clearly, the task of classifying 'ethnic units' is an example par excellence of the methodological and theoretical difficulties of anthropology, that is to avoid terminological 'ethnocentrism'. Are the Western 'cultural constructs' of 'ethnicity', 'culture' (see e.g. Fishman 1985, Rousseau 1990: 44, Metcalf 2010: 4) and 'identity' (Fearon 1999: 2, Buckingham 2008: 1) transhistorically and transculturally applicable? And if, then, how to adapt them to the Borneo context? Obviously, the relation between identity, ethnicity and culture remains a difficult one. Some scholars consider the latter concept to be central to the former ones, treating ethnicity as synonymous with cultural identity (King 2013a: 18), while others consider it a special kind of identity. Still others argue that "'ethnicity' and 'identity' are not necessarily inseparable" (see Chua 2007: 282). And, finally, Sillander and Alexander (2016: 98), in their recent discussion of Dayak ethnicity (as regards pre-colonial localized groups), concluded that "association with a locality, political unity, kinship and to some extent descent, were the key factors − the sources of consciousness of kind − while culture was notably insignificant."

In pre-colonial Borneo, Rousseau (1990: 11) explains, "groups have not defined themselves primarily in ethnic terms." Indeed, most of the current ethnonyms of Dayak societies are exonyms of recent origin (e.g. Iban, Ngaju), while traditionally, locality, and more specifically the stretch of the river where

4 It should also be noted here that Austronesian historical linguistics has made much progress in the study of Bornean languages and ethnic classifications over the last five or six decades. Linguistic subgrouping hypotheses are based on sound methodologies which produce reliable results, provided the necessary language data are available. See, for example, Dahl's (1951) relating of Malagasy to Ma'anyan of southeast Kalimantan, Adelaar's (1994) sub-grouping of Tamanic with the South Sulawesi languages, Blust's (2007b) analysis of Sama-Bajaw as belonging to a Greater Barito grouping or Smith's (2015) recent look at the classification of Kayanic and Kenyah (as well as Penan and Sebop). However, it needs to be stressed that historical linguistics is primarily concerned with classifying languages, rather than ethnicities.

settlements are located, has been the major criterion for self-identification, even if group members do not share a common origin or language (see also Sillander's recent introduction of the concept of "microethnicity," 2016: 102-120). It was only with the onset of the colonial period and in the context of modernity that a limited number of major ethnic categories crystallized and ethnic identity (in the Western sense) emerged (Rousseau 1990: 11, 74, King & Wilder 2003: 203-204).

Of tremendous importance was the early division of Borneo societies into the two major categories of Dayak and Malay. Starting out as a derogatory term used by coastal dwellers, Dayak came to be used by the British and Dutch colonial administrations as a general term for all non-Muslim natives of the interior. In British North Borneo, on a subordinate level, it also served to differentiate between Sea-Dayak (Iban) and Land-Dayak (Bidayuh). After European colonialism, the label Dayak became, so to speak, officially latent. In Malaysian Borneo, a fixed system of ethnically based categories (Chua 2007: 271) developed consisting of a four-fold classification of Dayak societies into Bidayuh, Iban, Melanau and Orang Ulu (in addition to Malay, Chinese and Indian), while in Indonesian Borneo, Dayak ethnicity was largely suppressed by Suharto's *Orde Baru* regime. However, following the collapse of the *Orde Baru* in Indonesia (and, if less overtly, increasingly also in Sarawak), the term Dayak re-emerged as a positive term in the development of a specific *identitas* of Borneo's (non-Malay) natives below the level of national identity, even to the point of what is now often referred to as pan-Dayak identity (e.g. Maunati 2012). Thus, as Sillander and Alexander (2016: 96) recently expressed it: "In the process, ethnicity itself, along with identity, has become an important concept and political problem for the Dayaks, from having formerly been of limited concern and mainly an administrative and ethnographic problem." In this volume, Duile, focusing on West Kalimantan, gives an overview of the process of Dayak identity construction from colonial times until the present and analyses the changing 'constitutive outsides' (Laclau 1990, Thomassen 2005) pivotal in shaping Dayakness as a collective identity over time. The transmigrant's ethnic identities, he argues, emerged as the 'constitutive outside' for pan-Dayak identity. Duile further shows that the development of Dayak identity is a complex history of both continuity and ruptures in discourses and practices.

Classifications of ethnicity and identity remain the objects of intense anthropological debate. The study of ethnicity and identity in Borneo and beyond has been shaped primarily by two different sorts of approaches commonly referred to as "primordialist" or "essentialist" on the one hand, and "constructivist" or "instrumentalist" on the other (see Großmann, this volume, for an overview). That is, borrowing Chua's (2007) terms, scholars have focused

on either 'fixity' or 'flux' (which is, as King 2013a: 25 notes, also true of debates in relation to the concept of culture and, we might add, the current ontology versus ontogeny debate in new animism studies). While ethnicity has long been equated with "primordialism" (King & Wilder 2003: 196), it is the dynamic, negotiated and relational character of ethnicity and identity that has enjoyed wide consensus among scholars (e.g. Boulanger 2009: 19). "Nevertheless," says King (2013a: 25-26), "we should not lose sight of the fact that however fluid and contingent 'identities' are, they take on a real and more solid and fixed quality, for most if not all of us (...) and language (...) is a vital element in claims for distinctiveness and difference or alternatively sameness and shared identity/ethnicity" (ibid.: 216-217). Taking up many of these threads, Großmann, in this volume, offers an interesting micro-study of the (Kaharingan practicing) Punan Murung and (Muslim) Bakumpai of Tumbang Tujang in Central Kalimantan and presents an example of the emergence of a new shared "relational ethnic identity," which she terms "content, close to nature, half-nomadic indigenes." Language, marriage and food, she says, are the only realms in which ethnic difference is enforced. Großmann further identifies continuities within the ethnification of resource and rights politics, when ethnic groups continue to be treated as "static and clearly demarcated" by cultural rights and development programs, which therefore "empower members of certain ethnic groups but exclude members of other ethnic groups."

Quite naturally, most of this recent literature on Dayak ethnicity has been concerned with changing conditions rather than with aspects of continuity. Indeed, especially in the nascent anthropology of Christianity, a dominant, albeit contested, view developed "that cultural anthropology has generally been a science of continuity" (Robbins 2003: 221). It is probably Chua, in her work on religious conversion, who has argued most fervently "that if Robbins's ambition to align anthropological analysis and native exegesis is to be followed through, then it behooves us to take those continuity centered discourses as seriously as we do those on discontinuity" (2012a: 513). In her ethnography of a Bidayuh village in Malaysian Borneo, Chua (2012 a, b) "reveals how conversion can also foster modes of thinking and speaking about continuity between Christianity and 'the old ways'" (2012a: 511). In his contribution to the present volume, Oesterheld takes up this focus with respect to anti-Madurese violence in Kalimantan. Current analyses on the issue, he says, have largely ignored "Dayak people's insistence on tradition and 'continuity speaking.'" In his genealogical approach, he explores the significance of a more distant past (reaching back to the mid-19th century) for the understanding of contemporary anti-Madurese violence by focusing on the local narratives, which lead him to discern "continuities of both form and function of 'justified' violence in Kalimantan."

1.5 New Approaches in Religious Studies: Animism, Ritual Practice and Language

While Western contact with Borneo probably reaches back as far as 500 years,[5] the bulk of our early knowledge about the island's religious life only began to form in the second half of the 19th century through adventurers, colonial officials and missionaries. Precious as most of these early accounts are, this first period of engagement with Borneo was dominated by non-professional observers and is, therefore, often described as pre-scientific. The scientific period only began around 150 years ago, after Wilken's (1884-85) reception of Tylor's (1871, 2 vol.) epoch-defining theory of animism, followed by Kruyt's (1906) major study on Indonesian animism and the works of such eminent Borneo scholars as McDougall (1911) and Nieuwenhuis (1911, 1917). Evolutionist theories, that is animism and its later rival pre-animism (e.g. Ossenbruggen 1916, Kruyt 1918, van der Leeuw 1928), as well as diffusionism (e.g. Heine-Geldern 1928, 1932) were primarily concerned with processes of historical change, and were later dismissed as conjectural history in academia. However, while animism became obsolete as a theory of the origin of religion, it persisted as a general label for the Dayak religions.

A third period in religious scholarship began in the 1940s with de Josselin de Jong's (1935) 'Leidener School' (e.g. Schärer 1946) and ended with Needham's 'Oxford School' (e.g. Jensen 1974) in the 1980s. It was the period of structuralist approaches, which were primarily concerned with principles of social and symbolic classification rather than socio-cultural change (King and Wilder 2003: 63, 135) and, as regards Borneo, developed a strong focus on the so-called 'dualistic principle' as a core structural element in Dayak religious systems. With the turn towards development and practice in the 1980s, reinforced by rapid transformations during the last two decades, a fourth period can be recognized: "Following Conley (...) (1973), we have enjoyed a spate of studies, mainly examining processes of conversion (...) as well as the continuities and discontinuities which result from changes in religious belief and practice" (King 2013: 41). Also, scholars began to develop a stronger interest in rituals, i.e. ritual symbolism, ritual language, conceptualizations of health, illness and death (e.g. Wilder 2003, Couderc & Sillander 2012, Herrmans 2015). More recently, and reinforced by ontological anthropology, Borneo scholars have finally begun to focus on developments in so-called 'New animism' studies (e.g. Béguet 2006, 2012, Appleton 2012, Couderc 2012, Uchibori 2014, Herrmans 2015, Sillander 2016).

5 Trusting in claims of Varthema's arrival in 1504-1507.

The return of animism in Borneo studies is reasonable, as over the centuries it has remained a constant element in the matrix of island life. That animism has persisted into the present is not only evident from recent ethnographies (e.g. Venz 2012, Herrmans 2011, 2015), but also from informal talks with Borneans and from the local media landscape. Remember, for example, the collapse of the famous Kutai Kartanegara Bridge (Indonesia's longest suspension bridge modeled after San Francisco's Golden Gate Bridge) in Tenggarong on 26 November 2011, killing several dozen people and leaving even more injured and missing. The more immediate cause of the collapse was probably a steel support cable, which snapped when workers were performing maintenance on the bridge. However, informal opinion widely understood the tragic incident to be a reaction by the Mahakam river dragon (*naga*) against either rampant political corruption or indecent behavior among youths, as the bridge area was also a favorite meeting point for young couples. Or recall the turmoil caused by the four foreign hikers who, on 30 May 2015, posed naked on Mount Kinabalu (a UNESCO World Heritage site). The tourists were fined RM 5,000 (ca. USD 1,300) each and sentenced to three days in prison. Unfortunately, six days after this incident, Mount Kinabalu was struck by a magnitude 5.9 earthquake, trapping and killing dozens of climbers. Joseph P. Kitingan, the Deputy Chief Minister of the eastern Sabah state, blamed the earthquake on the hikers because they "showed disrespect to the sacred mountain." Indeed, this view was widely shared among the people of Sabah and Sarawak at the time.

But, why do animistic concepts and associated ritual practices persist? And, indeed, what is animism? Interestingly, when browsing through the post-Tylorian Borneo literature, it transpires that opinions differed quite substantially over what constitutes the concept of animism and how it relates to other religious institutions such as divination, ancestor worship or shamanism, and whether the label animism should be used at all to describe local religious attitudes. Today, the minimal consensus among religious scientists is that animism is "the belief in the existence and activity of anthropomorphically (human-like) and theriomorphically (animal-like) conceived spirit-like beings (souls and spirits)" (Käser 2014: 26). But, how to explain its persistence? While there is, of course, no easy answer, we agree with Käser (2014: 31-32) that animism is not only not 'primitive religion' (in its derogatory sense), nor only 'religion', but also subsumes what - in the West - has come to be called 'natural science', 'philosophy' and 'world view'. Brief, a most important function of animism is "the provision of (culturally overlaid) knowledge, which serves those who possess it as a directive of action in satisfying the needs of daily life and solving the problems of existence" (Käser 2014: 35). Different foreign sources of knowledge, such as the spread of the book religions and missionary activities,

the introduction of modern Western-based educational systems, development programs, the availability of the internet and so on, each offered and continues to offer alterative views for different aspects of the local knowledge systems and led to diverse forms of individual and cultural change. Despite these manifold changes, however, animistic concepts persist - not least because they form cognitive frameworks, i.e. systems of thought, which simply cannot be "taken off" as if clothes, as they lie encrypted in native language structures and vocabulary.

Today, the religious landscape of Borneo looks extremely diverse, and overall we may speak of a "peaceful co-existence in religious diversity" (see also Sintang 2014). Islam, specifically the Sunni branch, is the state religion in Malaysia and Brunei, and Indonesia is the most populous majority Muslim country in the world. Freedom of religion is recognized by all three states, while Indonesia officially recognizes six religions: Islam, Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Consequently, the majority of Borneans are Muslims in the five provinces of Kalimantan, Brunei and Sabah, while Christianity makes up the largest religion in Sarawak. Dayak societies have aligned themselves differently in the course of history. Some Dayak adopted Islam, such as the Melanau in North Sarawak or the Bakumpai in South Kalimantan (see Großmann, this volume). Most, however, embraced the Christian faith. The Iban and Bidayuh are predominantly Roman Catholics or Anglicans, while most Orang Ulu belong to the Borneo Evangelical Church (or Sidang Injil Borneo). Among Dayak societies in Central Borneo, more specifically the Kenyah-Kayan, Christianity led to a reform of old indigenous religious practices known today as the Bungan cult. And Palangka Raya, the capital of Central Kalimantan, has become the administrative center of the Hindu Kaharingan religion (officially recognized by the Indonesian government as part of Hinduism in 1980) of the Ngaju people.

The Dayak's autochthonous religions have had a rather difficult standing throughout Borneo's modern history and are still officially recognized only as *kepercayaan* (beliefs), rather than as *agama* (religions). However, far from being on the verge of extinction, they have managed to survive as part of the diverse *adat* systems, which have recently become pivotal in Dayak identity politics, especially in Indonesia after the downfall of Suharto and the implementation of regional autonomy in 2001. Indeed, several community rituals are now part of the official calendars. *Adat gawai*, for example, an annual Dayak festival in Sarawak and West Kalimantan, finally became a public holiday in Sarawak in 1965 and is usually celebrated on 31 May-1 June (often continuing throughout the entire month). In Kutai Barat, East Kalimantan, former Bupati Ismail Thomas has turned the *pakaatn nyahuq* ritual at Lake Aco into an annual official

event to be celebrated every year in November (Kaltim Post 06 Nov. 2009). Apart from such official festivities, healing, mortuary and harvest rituals, the taking of auguries and omens, eschatological ideas and, linked to these, traditional shamans and mediums are still, if to different degrees, vital aspects of Dayak (and Malay) life. All over Borneo, animistic worldviews linked to the old Austronesian heritage are also generally referred to as animism (in Malaysia or Brunei) or animisme (in Indonesia) and, unfortunately, still understood, both in official discourse and in public opinion, as a label for religious inferiority. However, as Käser (2014: 28) expressed it, "[t]he phenomenon that has been and can still be referred to as animism undoubtedly exists," not only in Borneo, but worldwide and even in (the popular expressions of) the so-called world religions.

Last but not least, as mentioned above, animisms are cognitive frameworks, and this brings us to questions of methodology in learning to understand animism. Recent ontological approaches are still struggling with the challenge of overcoming Eurocentric notions. The major challenge for any future ontological program, it seems, will be to accommodate a "re-turn" from currently predominant perspectives of (Western) analysts to "what was once called the native's point of view" (Helmreich 2014: 379). Likewise, considering ontological anthropology's move beyond the linguistic turn of the 1980s and 1990s, it will be essential to reconsider the significance of language(s) in animism studies in particular and social sciences in general, as well as questions of how to "translate different worlds" (see e.g. recent discussions in editions of HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, the NSM approach of Goddard and Wierzbicka 2016 etc.). Indeed, ethnography is about studying what people *do* and what they *say*. In part three of this volume, we are happy to offer both a practice- and language-based approach to ethnography represented by the contributions of Isabell Herrmans and Oliver Venz (see relevant chapters of this book).

1.6 Approaching Cultural Continuity: Addressing an Academic Void

Current anthropology has been much concerned with change and a main objective has been the identification of mechanisms of cultural change in general or with regard to one of its sub-areas. A case in point is religious change, where in addition to the basic processes of 'invention,' 'innovation' and 'diffusion,' our terminological inventory contains processes, such as 'addition', 'deletion', 'reinterpretation', 'elaboration', 'simplification', 'purification', 'syncretism', 'schism' or 'fission' and, last but not least, 'abandonment' and 'extinction' (see Eller 2007: 162 for an overview). However, all of these terms are used slightly

differently by different scholars and the concept of 'change' in anthropology remains a broad and sometimes vague concept. However, compared to the manifold theories, models and concepts of change that have been developed within anthropology and its various sub-fields, cultural continuity remains a rather under-theorized phenomenon.

Browsing through the anthropological literature, one finds 'continuity' in titles and subtitles of numerous ethnographies portraying "change and continuity" among a specific group of people, within a village community or a certain region (e.g. Akiner 1991, Champagne 2007, Godwin 1972, Netting 1981, Thomas & Benda-Beckmann 1985). But continuity is hardly conceptualized at all[6] and the focus of the actual ethnographic descriptions mostly lies on depicting and analyzing cultural change. Interestingly, we also find opposing views concerning the significance of change and continuity within anthropological research. While some anthropologists argue that change has largely been the focus of anthropology, e.g. Bollig who claims that "[a]nthropology has been occupied (and perhaps preoccupied) with a focus on change" (2014: 276), Robbins argues that cultural anthropology has largely been "a science of continuity" (2007: 6, see also Robbins 2003).

Bollig, an expert in human-environment relations in Africa, comes to his conclusion by reviewing the broad body of literature that emerged around 'resilience' (Bollig 2014). The resilience concept emerged within ecology during the 1970s as a method of measuring the ability of an ecological system to withstand shocks and disturbances. In its original meaning resilience was closely linked to the image of a bounded ecological system existing in an equilibrium condition to which it will return. In recent decades the concept has been broadened and has become a guiding concept within ecology, the social sciences and psychology. Leading resilience thinkers define resilience as "the capacity of a system to experience shocks while retaining essentially the same functions, structure, feedbacks and therefore identity" (Walker et al. 2006: 2). Transferring these ideas to social systems, "[s]ocial resilience is understood as a quality of social units to withstand or adapt to a wide range of stressors. Whereas ecological thinkers habitually thought of environmental stressors (e.g. pollution, climate change, flooding), adherents to a social resilience paradigm included economic and social perturbations (e.g. violence)" (Bollig 2014: 264). Although the concept of social resilience is not necessarily linked to a social system with clear boundaries (cf. Greiner & Sakdapolrak 2013), for many researchers 'resilience' remains closely linked to natural sciences and to systemic thinking.

6 An interesting and rare exception is for example Alvin W. Wolfe's Ethnography on the Ngombe in Central Africa (1961), in which the author develops a theory of "stability and change" (1961: 144-161).

Anderies, Janssen and Ostrom (2004: 18) have thus offered the concept of 'robustness,' which they define as "the maintenance of some desired system characteristics despite fluctuations in the behavior of its component parts or its environment" as an alternative. However, this concept has gained little traction.

Despite the broad variety of definitions of resilience, the core idea is always that a social unit reacts to, withstands or adapts to some external factors, which are mainly considered to be something negative (a shock, a stressor, or environmental crisis). Put simply, resilience can be understood as the ability to survive as a social unit despite adverse conditions. However, Bollig criticizes that "'[c]ultural resilience' is oddly absent from the resilience discourse" despite the fact that "[c]ultural resilience directly contributes to social and psychological resilience […]" (2014: 276). He thus tries to encourage more anthropological research within the field of resilience as this could provide "anthrophony with an agenda for research on stability and robustness in the face of profound challenges" (2014: 267) – a field which has so far been largely neglected.

Robbins developed his perspective of continuity and change from the emerging field of the anthropology of Christianity, arguing that anthropology's preference for "continuity thinking" (2007: 16) is hampering research on Christianity and the "radical discontinuities in personal lives and cultural histories" (2007: 7) that are linked to Christian conversion. However, this supposed preference for continuity has not led to a detailed debate about continuity, but rather seems to implicitly underlie much thinking in our discipline: "cultural anthropologists have for the most part either argued or implied that the things they study – symbols, meanings, logics, structures, power dynamics, etc. – have an enduring quality and are not readily subject to change. This emphasis is written into theoretical tenets so fundamental as to underlie anthropological work on culture from almost all theoretical perspectives. It is even at least implicitly written into most definitions of culture" (Robbins 2007: 9). One of Robbins's ambitions is thus to encourage the development of more precise and varied models of cultural change that account for change as well as for continuity: "These models would not only identify the presence of both continuous and discontinuous elements in any cultural situation but allow us to explain why specific cultural elements persist or change. They would problematize continuity as well as discontinuity, rather than treating the former as in need of no explanation" (Robbins 2007: 31). Despite their different perspectives, Bollig and Robbins seem to view the absence of profound elaborations of continuity as an academic void and both writers seem to suggest that we need more precise definitions and concepts of continuity (and change) in order to understand how cultural continuities are actually generated.

If we look at the "grand theories" of our discipline, notions of continuity feature most prominently within British structural functionalism – focusing on the continuity of institutions and social structures – and French structuralism – searching for cognitive continuities (besides older German diffusionism theory that looks at the continuity of single cultural phenomena). One of Émile Durkheim's major concerns was the question of how societies maintain internal stability and survive over time. Structural functionalists, in contrast, perceived society as a complex system whose different parts work together in order to maintain an assumed state of stability. They were thus eager to identify those social structures that create continuity. Within Borneo studies this approach is characteristic of the four scholars that were sent to Borneo by the Colonial Social Science Research Council to conduct research in Sabah and Sarawak during the late 1940s and early 1950s: Derek Freeman, William Robert Geddes, Harold Stephen Morris and T'ien Ju-K'ang. Freeman's work on the Iban most clearly demonstrates the influence of the British school of thinking, a focus on social structure and the mechanisms and processes which provide social order and continuity (King 2013: 21).

With the decline of French Structuralism and British Functionalism and the increasing focus on individual actors and everyday social practice, the search for general structures and the observance of the continuities they produce have taken a back seat in anthropology. The crucial questions of how and why people produce continuities thus remain unsatisfactorily addressed. Various fields of research have provided interesting empirical insights into these questions, for example the rich body of literature on the continuity of institutions (cf. Streeck & Thelen 2004) and property (cf. Benda-Beckmann 1979), as well as studies on the maintenance and transmission of traditional knowledge (cf. Ellen 2007). However, although many of these works provide rich ethnographic details, there have been few attempts to conceptualize or theorize the production of cultural continuities beyond the respective examples.

In many of the pertinent anthropological encyclopedias and dictionaries, continuity is not even listed as key concept. Rather, scholars seem to use the term in its everyday usage. This stands in contrast to the widely held notion that continuity is the absence of change, as "[m]ost anthropological theories emphasize cultural continuity as opposed to discontinuity and change" (Robbins 2007: 5). Although the everyday usage of the term 'continuity' allows for change as long as it is not sudden change, most ethnographies speak of the continuity of some kind of knowledge, certain practices or beliefs if these remain more or less the same in contrast to changes in other realms of society. Continuity thus often serves as the contrastive point to change and is accordingly associated with

stability.[7] This is well exemplified by Margret Mead's attempt "to investigate the stability of […] different elements involved in the complex activities centering about canoe building, house building and tattooing in five insular cultures of Polynesia" (1928: 82).

Such a perspective on continuity emphasizes the continuance and duration of something over time but simultaneously afflicts continuity with a notion of passivity –from this perspective continuity seems simply to be what remains if everything else changes. In this volume, however, we want to promote an understanding of continuity which first, can include some change (see below) and second, which views continuity as something that can be actively and consciously produced by members of the respective groups. However, it is far beyond the scope of this book to provide a comprehensive analysis of the term or to develop a preliminary theory of continuity. We rather want to draw attention to this academic void and hope that the ethnographic examples compiled in this edited volume will serve as motivation and inspiration to engage more intensely and consciously with cultural continuities and the mechanisms by which they are produced. We further wish to point out that in addition to our own attempts to define our categories of thought in terms of our own words (etic), we want to encourage future research on the concepts used by Dayak societies themselves (emic). That is, begin a shift from analyzing the dynamics and persistence of culture through anthropological concepts (change, continuity, etc.) towards understanding Dayak through their concepts.

We assume that cultural change is a continual process in all societies. Culture is always changing, but not everything changes in the same way and at the same pace, and the process that determines what changes and what is maintained over long periods of time is not arbitrary. We are thus interested in understanding how people engage actively to produce certain continuities, what they value as important to maintain and why. Consequently, we follow here an understanding of continuity that includes persisting as well as dynamic elements (cf. Wernhart 1978) and view the persistence of knowledge, concepts, practices, identities and social entities over time neither as the opposite to change nor as a mere byproduct of change. Instead, we perceive change and continuity as closely intertwined. Sometimes forms of certain things have to be changed in order to maintain their function and vice versa. The performance of a ritual, for example, may be changed to comply with different living conditions in order to maintain its social function, as nicely demonstrated by Herrmans (this volume). We argue that sometimes changes are necessary in order to produce certain desired

7 While the notion of stability and consistency prevailed in anthropology, within European anthropology (Volkskunde) it has been debated whether continuity is characterized by uninterrupted consistency or if it allows for some modifications (cf. Bausinger et al. 1969, Bausinger 1985).

continuities. A family that manages to maintain a leadership role over generations, for example, may have to use different claims to uphold their position: while noble descent may have been enough to gain a leadership position in the past, economic success or higher education might be of greater importance in the present. The social continuity of leadership depends in this case very much on the ability of this imagined family to adjust their claims to changing conditions.

It would seem that continuity, i.e. something usually done (usualness), something regularly done (regularity), something habitually done (habit), something that is customary (custom), and traditional, is what most Borneans refer to with the term *adat*. It is the persistence of *adat* in all its different manifestations that, despite all change, we wish to emphasize in this book. Looking at recent Dayak societies and the rapid processes of economic, ecological and political change, we ask: What changes can we observe and what kind of continuities do we find? What kind of change is desired, anticipated and resisted? What kind of continuities are perceived, reproduced and created, and with what purposes in mind?

1.7 The Chapters of this Book

This book is structured in three parts. The first section addresses human-environment relations and the continuity of values and livelihood strategies in the face of rapid environmental change. Christian Gönner (Chapter 2) and the co-authored chapter by Andrea Höing and Irendra Radjawali (Chapter 3) both show how increasing environmental change and related environmental degradation seriously challenge long-practiced strategies of diversification.

Having studied a Dayak Benuaq village in East Kalimantan for more than 25 years, Gönner (Chapter 2) argues that earlier events, such as new market opportunities, the boom-bust cycles of resource prices, or disasters have shaped and widened the 'extended subsistence' portfolio. The recent expansion of oil palm cultivation, however, puts the continuity of the Benuaq's diversified and resilient livelihoods at a crossroads. At the moment, both the further enrichment of local livelihoods through the integration of smallholder oil palm cultivation and the irreversible transformation of the diverse land use seem possible.

Höing and Radjawali (Chapter 3) make similar observations by comparing two study sites in Central and West Kalimantan which are facing severe landscape transformation. While communities in the first study site are still able to continue an 'extended subsistence' strategy despite various challenges, this is no longer possible in the second field site due to the effects of Bauxite mining.

Höing and Radjawali further show how inequalities arise within the respective communities as different actors are differently affected by environmental change and are incorporated on different terms into newly emerging economic systems. Dynamics within the communities are also used to explain why resistance is more successful in the second case study site.

Anu Lounela (Chapter 4) shows how cultural values and human-environmental relations are produced by a climate change mitigation program in Central Kalimantan which compensates reforestation activities with money, creates carbon markets in the villages, and promotes economic entrepreneurship. The value orientation towards individualism, anonymity and accumulation associated with the new rubber economy promoted by the program thereby stands in sharp contrast to the values of sharing and solidarity which are closely linked to swidden cultivation. Within this context, choices about what to plant have not only social and environmental consequences, they also mirror what is considered good or proper.

The second part of the book explores issues of ethnicity, identity and related conflicts. Focusing on West Kalimantan and grounding his study in post-structuralism and post-Marxism, Timo Duile (Chapter 5) looks at continuities and changes in the development of Dayak identity construction from colonial times until the present. He pays particular attention to the role of indigenous activists in shaping Dayak identity in local and international discourses since the 1990s and analyses Dayak identity within the process of its construction by determining this identity's "constitutive outside" (Thomassen 2005).

Based on her fieldwork in the Punan Murung and Bakumpai villages of Kalasin and Tumbang Tujang in Murung Raya regency of Central Kalimantan, and working within a relational approach to ethnic group formation, Kristina Großmann (Chapter 6) shows that (sub-)ethnic identity is close to irrelevant at the village level (socially), but becomes increasingly relevant at the district level (politically). Also, her study is an example of two ethnically and religiously heterogeneous communities, in which, unlike other parts of Borneo, no signs of rising inter-ethnic conflict in daily life are to be found.

Oesterheld's contribution (Chapter 7) focuses on Dayak narratives of anti-Madurese violence while tracing historical genealogies of the conflict. Since large scale Dayak-Madurese violence coincided with Indonesia's political transformation in the late 1990s and early 2000s, current approaches comprehend ethnic violence in Kalimantan as a function of change. This focus, he says, has largely neglected the Dayak narrative (cf. Dove 2006) and in consequence fails to account for the constitution and genealogy of violence. Influenced by recent discussions on the "generation rather than causation of violence" (Kivimäki 2012: 286-87), Oesterheld develops an alternative approach through local

perceptions. Incorporating Wittgenstein's "family resemblances," he analyzes Dayak-Madurese conflict at the turn of the millennium as an episodic recurrence of earlier types of violence, such as "tribal warfare" or "headhunting," all of which belong to the same "family." In contrast to scholarly analyses, which frame Dayak-Madurese conflict as "ethnic violence" or "ethnic conflict," Oesterheld's informants spoke of it as "war" (*perang*) and, therefore, as a form of "just violence."

Finally, the third section provides insights into continuity and change in Dayak religion. Oliver Venz (Chapter 8) provides a general overview of ontological approaches to animism and summarizes recent fieldwork related to aspects of Dayak animism. Working in the cognitive framework of Käser (2014, [2004]), he takes issue with what he considers to be the major methodological weakness in the history of animism studies, which may also be understood as a continuity in method, namely the absence of language as a fundamental methodological tool.

Isabell Herrmans (Chapter 9), working within a practice-based approach in studying rituals strongly influenced by recent anthropological ideas on relational ontologies, offers a lively comparative description of ritual performances in two different Luangan villages in the border area between East and Central Kalimantan, Sembulan and Anan Jaya, and how these reflect both the cosmological order and socioeconomic developments. In this paper, her focus is on values, more specifically on the "multiple levels of scale on which value negotiation by Luangans operates today."

As a collection of research on a great variety of topics, this volume does not pretend to offer a comprehensive exploration of continuity under change in Bornean societies. It is, rather, a sampling of the diverse ways in which certain kinds of knowledge, performances and practices continue within the context of rapid and profound change.

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PART I:

Human-Environmental Relations

2. Changing Tides - Waves of Opportunities on a Sea of Oil Palms?

Christian Gönner

2.1 Introduction

Livelihoods of forest-dependent people throughout Southeast Asia often show a typical pattern of swidden farming combined with diversified utilization of forest products (e.g. Belcher and Kusters 2004; Belcher et al. 2005; Brookfield and Padoch 1994; Colfer 1997; Colfer 2005; Cramb et al. 2009; Dove 1985; Godoy and Bennett 1991; Gönner 2002; Pattanayak and Sills 2001; Weinstock 1983; Wollenberg et al. 2001; Wollenberg et al. 2004). For a long time, swiddens have been the center of rural livelihood systems in upland Borneo structuring the annual activities through the agricultural calendar (cf. Colfer 1997; Dove 1985; Freeman 1992; Gönner 2002). Swidden agriculture has also been at the heart of ritual and social life. Group work for clearing forests, planting and harvesting rice, and the rituals associated have shaped social institutions and reinforced social cohesion. Yet, 'swidden farming is [only] one element in larger livelihood systems' (Cramb et al. 2009). Access to markets, e.g. for native rubber, rattan or resins had enabled even remote villages to extend their subsistence modes since centuries (cf. Dove 1994: 383-385; von Heine-Geldern 1945; Weidelt 1990: 26; Wolters 1967). Today, typical commodities traded and supplementing subsistence in Borneo are rubber (from *Hevea brasiliensis* Müll. Arg., e.g. Dove 1993; de Jong 2001), rattan (e.g. Bizard 2013; Pambudhi et al. 2004), *gaharu* (resinous heartwood from *Aquilaria spp*., e.g. Soehartono and Newton 2001) or nests of swiftlets (*Aerodramus spp*, e.g. Cranbrook and Koon 1999).

'Extended subsistence' (Gönner and Seeland, 2002) along with the diversification of both, cultivated crops, including high agro-biodiversity of rice varieties (Gönner 2002: 122), as well as forest products and non-farm activities has been explained as a risk-minimizing strategy, developed to cope with the uncertainty inherent in these environments, as well as with the typical boom-bust cycles of the commodities traded (e.g. Arnold and Ruiz Pérez 1998; Ellis 1998,

C. Arenz et al. (Hrsg.), *Continuity under Change in Dayak Societies*, Edition Centaurus – Sozioökonomische Prozesse in Asien, Afrika und Lateinamerika, DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-18295-3_2

2000; Godoy and Feaw 1991; Homma 1992; Sellato 2001; Stoian 2000). Depending on alternative, more stable income sources, access to markets, as well as reliability and significance of a given resource, the diversity can range from narrow portfolios, such as in the case of *damar* (resin) gardens in Krui, Sumatra (Wollenberg et al. 2001) to locations in Kalimantan with higher degrees of diversification (Belcher and Kusters 2004; Gönner 2002).

According to Ellis (2000: 292) diversification "obeys a continuum of causes, motivations and constraints that vary across individuals and households at a particular point in time and for the same individuals or households at different points in time." People may diversify their livelihoods out of explicit *ex ante* risk-minimizing strategic considerations or in the form of necessary *ex post* coping behavior as responds to events or shocks (Adger 2006; Dercon 2002; Ellis 2000), though experiences of the latter might lead to new ex ante strategies in the future as part of adaptive learning. The ability of reacting to external shocks, while maintaining the overall systemic properties (in the narrow sense of the definition) or general livelihood patterns (in the wider sense), is commonly referred to as resilience (e.g. Adger et al. 2005; Folke 2006; Levin et al. 1998).[8]

The century-long survival of such diversified and resilient modes of livelihoods together with their diverse forest landscapes have been viewed by scientists and NGOs as a promising example of sustainable land use (e.g. Colfer 1997; Michon et al. 1986; Sardjono 1990; Weinstock 1983). Utilizing the safety net functions and the manifoldness of economic (also non-farm) opportunities, combined with necessary assets[9], diversified livelihoods have been attributed a sound potential to help poor households escape from extreme poverty (Ellis 1998, 2000)[10] and to reduce vulnerability (Cramb et al. 2009: 342). Other authors, however, stressed that alternative, specialized occupations, such as oil palm cultivation, may lead to better livelihoods, especially in terms of income, health care, education opportunities and infrastructure, and, thus, often are preferred by rural households over farming and traditional forest use (Feintrenie et al. 2010; Pambudhi et al. 2004; Rist et al. 2010; Rival and Levang 2014: 20).

Given the massive expansion of oil palm plantations in Indonesia (see further below), as well as the expansion of open pit coal mining in East Kalimantan, the continuity of the Benuaq's diversified and resilient livelihoods is at a crossroads. New opportunities offered by oil palm and coal mining companies 'pull'

8 For a comprehensive overview on the conceptual use of resilience, see Brand and Jax (2007). For its possible application in anthropology see Bollig (2014).

9 See the literature on Sustainable Livelihood Approach (Chambers and Conway 1991; Scoones 1998).

10 For a critical discussion of community-based adaptation in the framework of adaptation towards climate change, see Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2008).

especially young people away from extended subsistence farming (Pambudhi et al. 2004), promising modern lifestyles. On the other hand, the massive expansion of these companies into the forest frontiers, combined with often non-transparent and unfair contractual arrangements supported by vested district authorities or corrupted community leaders (Colchester and Chao 2013; McCarthy et al. 2011: 564; Zen et al. 2008) has led to a 'push' of people away from their traditional livelihoods (Pambudhi et al. 2004), often causing or contributing to severe deforestation[11] and the subsequent loss of livelihood opportunities of traditional landowners (Colchester 2010; Fitzherbert et al. 2008; Obidzinski et al. 2012; Potter 2015: 10-14; Potter 2008; Sheil 2009: 21-24), followed by resistance and conflict (see Haug 2014 and further below).

This chapter examines the detailed dynamics of livelihood diversification, elsewhere described as 'surfing on waves of opportunities' (Gönner 2011), and discusses the prospects of smallholder oil palm cultivation as an integrated element of the Benuaq's extended subsistence, allowing the continuation of a century-old livelihood pattern in the midst of highly dynamic change, rather than its replacement by a sea of oil palms.

2.2 Study Area and Methods

Research Area

The study was conducted in Lempunah, a Dayak Benuaq community in Kutai Barat regency, East Kalimantan, Indonesia. The community's territory covers 9,200 ha south of Lake Jempang, comprising individual plots of swidden fields, secondary forest at various stages of succession between one and more than 50 years, forest gardens of rattan and rubber, mixed forest gardens and some remaining old-growth forest. A mapping inventory counted almost 1,000 forest gardens cared for by a population of approximately 350 people in 117 households (census 1996).[12] A detailed description of Lempunah, including a settlement history of more than 300 years, ethnography and demography is provided in Gönner (2002).

11 The deforestation pattern is complex and depends among other factors also on the history of previous land use, as well as on the particular region in Indonesia. For a comprehensive overview of the role of oil palm plantations regarding land use changes, see Potter 2015, pp. 10-14.

12 Little in- or out-migration was observed over the years, and the village basically remained the same in terms of size and extended families from 1988 until 2015.

Methods

Data were collected between 1988 and 2016, with the most intensive research phase between 1996 and 2000 and annual revisits between 2001 and 2008, one visit in October 2014, as well as telephone interviews in 2013, 2015 and 2016. Socioeconomic data of households were collected through semi-structured household interviews with a census in 1996 and a random sample of 33 percent of households in 1997, 1998, 1999, 2003, 2004, and 2006 (Gönner 2002; Gönner et al. 2007). Household interviews from 1996 through 1999 were conducted by the author; the interviews conducted in 2003, 2004, and 2006 were part of a regency-wide monitoring survey in Kutai Barat conducted by local assessors (Cahyat et al. 2007). Earlier data collected by the author between 1988 and 1993, as well as during a field visit in October 2014 were used for overall conclusions. The additional telephone interviews were used for checking new development issues with a special focus on the expansion of oil palm.

2.3 Continuity under Change in Lempunah

Despite or rather due to many events and changes over time, the Benuaq of Lempunah have created a mosaic forest landscape around their village over a period of at least 300 years, reflecting a highly diversified and resilient mode of livelihoods (cf. Gönner 2002, 2011). However, recent large-scale landscape changes from forests to oil palm plantations put the resilience and sustainability observed so far under risk. The main section of this chapter sheds some light on the dynamic livelihood pattern of the Benuaq, as well as on social cohesion and the main events observed in Lempunah over the last twenty five years. This is followed by a brief overview of the ongoing expansion of oil palm cultivation in Indonesia and around Lempunah, including a summary of the social conflicts caused by it and the discussion of possible forms of co-existence of oil palm and more traditional types of land use as Lempunah's current development vision.

Diversification and Extended Subsistence – Surfing on Waves of Opportunities

The general livelihood pattern revealed by integrating individual behavior over the entire community of Lempunah has been addressed as 'extended subsistence' (Gönner and Seeland 2002) based on subsistence swidden farming combined with various market-oriented income sources, such as rattan (Calamus spp., Daemonorops crinita), rubber (from Hevea brasiliensis), wood products

(shingles, beams), handicrafts (ulap doyo - Benuaq language - fabrics woven from fibers of Curculigo spp, blowpipes made out of ironwood- Eusideroxylon zwageri), game, turtles and tortoises, pet birds and many other forest-based products (see Gönner 2002). Income sources were diversified partially in order to utilize economic opportunities and to minimize risks, but occasionally also due to necessities, e.g. in years of extreme weather events, after harvest failures, in case of urgent cash needs or during bust phases of resource prices. Considering the highly individual rational of decision-making (see Gönner 2002: 96, 110, 157, 169) and the often very short-lived opportunities for new income sources it is not always possible to differentiate between ex ante deliberate choice of diversifying and ex post coping behavior out of bare necessity (see Ellis, 1998, 2010, cited in the introduction). In addition, the diversification is performed over time and space (i.e. by maintaining a diverse and utilized mosaic forest),13 as well as by using the entire work force of the household and the extended family. While some household members are engaged in swiddening, tapping rubber and harvesting rattan, hunting or logging, older children and younger women work in the oil palm's nursery, and grandmothers contribute to the livelihood by weaving ulap doyo fabric to be sold to middlemen, whereas young boys may go electro-fishing on Ohookng River or look for jobs as truck drivers and security guards at the nearby coal mine.

This pattern of multi-dimensional diversification has been described from many other areas throughout Southeast Asia (see introduction above, e.g. Belcher et al. 2005; Brookfield and Padoch 1994; Cramb et al. 2009; Dove 1985; Godoy and Bennett 1991; Pattanayak and Sills 2001; Weinstock 1983; Wollenberg et al. 2004). However, the exact composition of the subsistence elements, based on the annual swidden, and of the diversified income sources has usually not been described and analyzed in detail over a longer period of time.

Figure 2.1 (based on Gönner 2014: 279) visualizes the changes over time – between 1995 and 2005, both in terms of swidden dynamics, as well as the dynamics of principal income sources:

13 For spatial and social patterns, see Gönner 2002: 207-231.

Figure 2.1: Multivariate 'Resource Longhouses' 1995-98, 2003-05.



The width of the different columns represents the relative proportions. The length of the roof represents the percentage of households with a swidden in the given year, while the columns of the longhouse's interior stand for the distribution of different forest types cleared for the swiddens. The stilts' width represents the relative importance of income sources ascribed by interviewed households.

The amount of work dedicated to preparing swiddens, especially in old growth forests (*kerengkakng* and *bengkar* - Benuaq language), where felling of

trees is most difficult, depends to a large extend on previous harvests, i.e. remaining rice stocks for food security, as well as on cash income. Only if no alternatives are available, or if large rituals with many guests are planned, such as *kwangkai* mortuary rites or *guguq*/ *nalitn tautn* ceremonies (all Benuaq language), people invest into the preparation of high yield swiddens in old growth forests. In other years, swiddens in younger *babar* and *kwakoq* (Benuaq language) fallow forest or *payaq* swamp forest (Benuaq language) closer to the village are preferred, or if there is sufficient cash income, no swidden is prepared at all (Gönner 2002: 96, 110). In most years, a sufficient number of households prepares a swidden and, thus, also contributes to the in situ conservation of agro-biodiversity, including rice varieties. After extreme years, such as the drought of 1997, when only few households cultivated rice, the diversity of seeds drops significantly. In 1998, the diversity of non-glutinous rice had decreased by 24 percent and by 49 percent for glutinous varieties compared to 1995 (n=24 households). Re-finding lost varieties – mainly through barter trade with other communities – is difficult and slow. In 2000, the diversity of both types of rice varieties had only slightly recovered (Gönner 2002: 123).

However, swidden agriculture is clearly more than just an economic safety net. The social organization of work around the *umaq* (Benuaq language for swidden), the time spent during preparation, seeding and harvesting, in field huts, often shared by different core families, and the manifold rituals related to swidden agriculture still play an important role in the Benuaq's lifeworld, similar to other Dayak groups (e.g. Freeman 1992 for Iban, Dove 1985 for Kantu', or Colfer 1997 for Kenyah). Rice and its spirit, *Lolakng Luikng*, still are of great ritual importance, especially in the still frequently held *beliatn* (Benuaq language) curing rituals, when rice is offered to please spirits, or as a means for communication with the spiritual world (Gönner 2002: 90). Swiddening also is a highly social activity. Most fields are prepared by groups, generally involving close kin (mainly son-in-laws and own children) and friends as direct neighbors, mutually supporting each other in group work, in cases of sickness, or for protecting the fields against animals (e.g. wild boar or monkeys feeding on the crops).

Kin remains to be the glue of social cohesion in Lempunah. An analysis of family relations in Lempunah's main settlement (RT I/II) in 1996 (Gönner 2002: 54), revealed that 50 core families were all part of the same coherent network of first order relations (parental or sibling connections), while only 10 other core families were not directly linked to the main net, although they are linked by second order (*warsinai* – Benuaq language). This cohesion is reflected in economic activities (e.g. swiddening), ritual life and along conflict lines (see further below).

While swidden farmers are still being depicted as 'conservative', 'traditional' forest dwellers, who are 'resistant to change' (see critical review in Colfer 1983: 84, but also much more recent statements by government officials and oil palm plantation managers), the income generating part of the Benuaq's 'extended subsistence' shows a high level of flexibility and dynamics. Switching between income sources, i.e. the stilts of the 'resource longhouses' in Figure 1 is partially driven by external events, partially by economic opportunities or the lack of those. The dynamic pattern itself has been described elsewhere as 'surfing on waves of opportunities' as shown in Figure 2.2 (adapted from Gönner 2011: 169):

Figure 2.2: Waves of Opportunities



Trajectories of the importance of income sources in Lempunah at the household level from 1995 to 2007. The scores were ranked by the author based on household interview data and key informant interviews.

The decision to switch between different opportunities and subsistence-oriented activities depends on the individual situation of a household and is driven by availability of and access to resources, market prices, cash demand, food (i.e. rice) security, availability of time and income alternatives, perceived risks, emotional considerations, as well as the success or failure of fellow villagers (Gönner 2011: 170). Many of these 'waves' are short-lived, and people need to react swiftly to utilize their opportunities.

The following section provides an overview of events and drivers shaping the 'extended subsistence' and the 'waves of opportunities' in Lempunah over the last decades.

Events and Drivers Shaping Livelihoods

Table 1 (partially based on Gönner 2002: 83-85) provides an overview of drivers and events observed between 1988 and 2016. Events recorded during the intensive research period 1996-2007 directly correspond to the 'waves of opportunities' shown in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Events and Livelihood Patterns 1988-2016

Years	Events and Income Opportunities
1970s	A logging company selectively cuts timber in the forests around Lempunah. Conflicts are rather small, as the local people are allowed to use the logged-over area for swidden agriculture.
1988	Most villagers harvest rattan (*Calamus caesius*) due to high prices. Many families buy household goods, TV sets, boat engines or generators with their income.
1989	Due to new export restrictions, the price for rattan has dropped dramatically. Besides, most gardens are depleted, and many families have sold the goods bought a year before.
1991	Rattan prices are still low. Mast fruiting of Durian trees (*Durio* spp) provides income from selling fruits.
1992-93	A tree plantation (HTI) combined with a new transmigration settlement clear-cuts several dozen hectares of forest, including burial sites and forest gardens, triggering a serious land-rights conflict.
1994	Clearing for the HTI-Trans project has stopped, although without any financial compensation. A tree bark (*kayu lem – Litsea* sp c.f. - Benuaq language) is intensively collected due to its good price. The natural stock is soon depleted.
1995	Many myna birds (Common hill myna – *Gracula religiosa*) are caught and sold to traders. A good price for rubber provides income for most households.
1996	The oil palm company London Sumatra starts clearing forests for establishing plantations. Despite severe resistance and escalating conflicts, villagers also use the opportunities to work as day laborers in the nursery and for land clearing.
1997	Many people still find day labor jobs for land clearing at the oil palm plantation. The clearing of forests is often combined with logging and the preparation of ironwood shingles.

1998	Due to the extreme drought, normally inaccessible swamp forests are visited and thousands of freshwater turtles and tortoises are collected. The animals are sold through middlemen via Banjarmasin to Hong Kong and Singapore. After May 1998, the swamps are inundated again.
1999	After the forest fires and the drought 1997/98 rubber can be tapped again, and many people use this opportunity although the price remains rather low.
2000	The price of rattan (*Daemonorops crinita* and *Calamus caesius*) has increased. Gardens of both species have matured over the previous ten years since the last rattan boom, and most villagers decide to harvest their stocks.
2001	Fish caught by electrocution in Ohookng River and the swamp forests around Lempunah is traded, while the selling price of *Daemonorops crinita* remains high.
2002	The price of rubber has begun to increase. Rattan (only *Daemonorops crinita*) still fetches a relatively good price, and decentralization offers income opportunities in the new logging boom. The local tourism market is slowly recovering after the forest fires and the political turmoil in the country.
2003	More jobs are offered by the mining company, as well as on the oil palm plantation. At the same time the rubber price continues to increase, while souvenirs (blowpipes, *ulap doyo* fabric) sell well, too.
2004	No clear wave is visible in 2004. Most households combine wage work at the oil palm plantation (few at the coal mine) with tapping rubber, harvesting rattan and logging. Fish and tortoise populations are depleted.
2005	Ten years after the last larger catches (Jepson *et al.* 1998) the population of Common hill mynas (*Gracula religiosa*) has recovered, and more than 100 birds are caught and sold to pet traders. The price of rubber remains at a high level, and many people get at least temporary work at the oil palm and the coal mining company. Some are still engaged in logging.
2006	Logging becomes too risky because of stricter law enforcement in the district. The price of *Daemonorops crinita* has dropped dramatically due to the replacement with synthetic fibers for the fabrication of café furniture in Europe.[14] The oil palm company mainly hires migrant workers from other Indonesian islands leaving only few jobs for the villagers.

[14] The case of *Daemonorops crinita* is a good example of Homma's transformation theory with a phase of extraction from nature, followed by cultivation and finally by substitution (Homma 1996).

2007	After more than ten rather weak years, the rubber price has reached a new maximum. In addition, both the oil palm company, as well as a coal mine in the vicinity of Lempunah offer wage labor. Rattan stocks have been largely depleted, and prices are low. New forest regulations have been passed, and illegal logging is being prosecuted severely.
2008-2014	Wage work becomes increasingly important. Some villagers get permanent jobs at the coal mine, while many others work on daily basis at the (old) oil palm plantation. During most of the years rubber remains a main income source, while the price of rattan has declined substantially. In 2013, large areas of Lempunah's forest are cleared for a new oil palm plantation (PT Borneo Surya Mining Jaya).
2015-2016	Rubber remains the main income source. The coal mine has seized its operations, while the new oil palm plantation has stopped clearing forests. Permanent jobs with the oil palm plantations are almost exclusively provided to people from outside the area, but some villagers work on daily labor regimes.

While earlier events and drivers had shaped the Benuaq's environment and socio-economic behavior maintaining a certain continuity of the general pattern, current events put this at risk. For the first time in the settlement history of Lempunah, an irreversible change of the surrounding landscape may occur, mainly driven by the rapid expansion of oil palm cultivation in Indonesia.

Expansion of Oil Palm – Impacts on Livelihoods and Earlier Conflicts

Due to the high global demand for palm oil and the respectively high export revenues, the Indonesian Government aims to increase crude palm oil (CPO) production from 22 million tons in 2010 to 40 million tons in 2020 (Obidzinski 2013), requiring a plantation area of around 15 million ha (2010: 8.385 million ha, Direktorat Jenderal Perkebunan - Kementerian Pertanian 2014). The economic considerations, as well as the involvement of district authorities in the current oil palm boom have been analyzed in detail elsewhere (McCarthy et al. 2011; Potter 2015; Rival and Levang 2014).

Regarding impacts of oil palm cultivation on rural livelihoods examples from various regions of Indonesia provide a mixed picture. While migrant workers from Java, Madura or eastern Indonesia often manage to improve their livelihoods by following oil palm schemes, local communities frequently lose

out (Anderson 2013; Colchester and Chao 2013; McCarthy 2010; Pambudhi et al. 2004; Potter 2015). Villagers – especially the less educated and poor – are commonly left ignorant of contractual arrangements, including payment schemes, and end up without land and without income. Others, not seldom village leaders and local entrepreneurs, quickly adapt and benefit from the new opportunities, be it from paid jobs, compensation payments or direct investment into oil palm cultivation. Hence, the expansion of oil palm plantations may widen social gaps and erode social cohesion.

This general pattern was also observed in Lempunah and its neighboring villages, which the oil palm boom had reached in 1995 with the arrival of PT London Sumatra. Based on a mere recommendation letter of the governor of East Kalimantan at the time, the company had illegally started to convert forest lands, including hundreds of forest gardens into plantation land. Soon a severe conflict developed which led to the months-long occupation of the company's base camp and the violent intervention of special police forces in 1999 (see Gönner 2002; Haug 2014). The conflict had severely undermined social coherence in Lempunah and its neighboring villages. Especially people with few land resources wanted to join the plantation scheme[15], while others who owned many forest gardens rejected the company. A partial schism divided the community, and the conflict led to arson in people's forest gardens during the drought of 1997/98 in order to clear the land of those who were not willing to give it up (Gönner 2000). However, in contrast to all its neighboring villages, Lempunah managed to keep its mosaic forest from 1995 until 2013. Eventually, strong community leadership, support of NGOs, as well as a detailed map of almost 1,000 forest gardens created a significant barrier for the company to enter.[16] After the escalation of the conflict in 1999, the company had temporarily stopped its operations also due to the financial crisis of 1998 (see Casson 2000), and because of (temporary) lack of support by the newly decentralized regency of Kutai Barat, then dominated by Dayak representatives. In an interview in April 2005, a manager of London Sumatra still considered giving up the production plans despite the significant investments (US$ 22 million, see Haug 2014) over the previous ten years. However, PT London Sumatra's three local branch-companies remained in the district and resumed operations, especially after a CPO factory had opened in Kutai Barat in 2011 (Haug 2014), and initial

15 The foreseen scheme was a so-called *plasma-inti* (satellite-core) scheme (PIR) as explained in McCarthy 2010. Mainly households outside of the first order social network (see above) opted for the oil palm company. Some of them had married into Lempunah and, thus, owned much fewer forest gardens compared to the long-term residents.

16 See the more detailed description of the mapping process and its consequences in Cronkleton et al. 2008.

uncertainties of decentralization had disappeared in favor of enhanced expansion of oil palm plantations.

Despite the earlier conflict between villagers of Lempunah and PT London Sumatra, in 2002/03 more than 20 persons – mainly women and youths – worked as day laborers for the very same company substantially contributing to the respective household income. This figure remained rather constant until 2015, including also members of those families who had originally resisted the oil palm company most during the conflict of 1995-99.

The pioneer phase of the oil palm boom in Indonesia, including many cases as the one described for Lempunah, had led to massive international critique and pressure on the sector. As a direct reaction, various (initially voluntary) standards, such as the RSPO (Round Table for Sustainable Palm Oil)[17] or ISPO (Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil) were developed in cooperation with international NGOs, aiming to consider the rights and demands of local people more adequately while adhering to the principles of sustainability. While in general, oil palm companies behave slightly better today than twenty years ago, the ongoing expansion of oil palm cultivation in Indonesia is far from being without conflict. In 2012, the Indonesian Land Agency BPN (*Badan Pertanahan Nasional*) registered some 8,000 land disputes in the agrarian sector, of which about half are related to oil palm (Colchester and Chao 2013: 9). In Lempunah, this moderate change of attitude and behavior, but also the remaining deficiencies of the oil palm sector can been seen in the development of the last years.

A New Company Appears on the Scene

In 2010, PT Borneo Surya Mining Jaya[18] (in the following called PT BSMJ), received an oil palm concession area of 11,210 ha[19], including large parts of Lempunah's territory. Land-rights conflicts soon developed in Muara Tae and Ponak, two neighboring villages of Lempunah (Borneo Project 2012[20]). In 2013, forest clearing expanded to the territory of Lempunah, and by October 2014, the

17 See http://www.rspo.org

18 The company belongs to First Resources Ltd, listed at the Singapore Stock Exchange.

19 The Decree of Regent of Kutai Barat No. 525.26/K.037/2010 dated January 21, 2010 grants a location permit (*Ijin Lokasi*) to PT Borneo Surya Mining Jaya with total area of 11,210 ha located in Muara Nayan Village, Pentat Village, Lempunah Village, Ponak Village, and Kenyanyan Village. The current Plantation Permit (*Ijin Usaha Perkebunan*) falls under the Decree of Regent of Kutai Barat No. 525.26/K.935b/2010 dated on November 22, 2010 with the same area.

20 http://borneoproject.org/updates/rspo-fails-to-act-as-muara-tae-is-destroyed. The case is being tracked by RSPO, see http://www.rspo.org/members/complaints/status-of-complaints/view/21.

formerly intact mosaic forest of Lempunah was substantially fragmented, although several larger areas, including the immediate vicinity of the village still remained untouched. According to the former village head and main opponent of PT London Sumatra, no serious conflicts had developed in Lempunah until February 2016[21] as PT BSMJ had only cleared land agreed upon by the community and forest gardens close to the village were left intact. In addition, dirt roads were constructed by the company upon request of the villagers to allow better access to their swiddens and to a forest spring.

By February 2016, the area cleared in Lempunah by PT BSMJ had not been extended further. However, the initial hopes of the local people had also not yet come true. Neither had the company paid all pending compensation claims, nor offered permanent jobs to local people. Like in many other areas of Indonesia outsiders were preferred as permanent staff. Also the smallholder scheme (on 20 percent of the concession area, see TÜV Nord undated: 27) promised earlier had not yet been initiated.[22]

As part of the company's obligations under the RSPO certification system[23], 379.21 ha of so-called high conservation value forest (HCV) were identified in May 2012 and demarcated with sign posts. The HCV includes riparian forest along Ohookng River, forest springs, graveyards, and traditional conservation areas. The identified location coincides with the area most rich in biodiversity (Gönner 1999, 2002), and the identification process is well documented (TÜV Nord undated). TÜV Nord (undated: 27) claims to have followed the free, prior informed consensus (FPIC) principles stated in the RSPO criteria during the identification process. However, villagers were surprised when they read the sign posts erected around the largest HCV stating that neither swidden agriculture nor hunting was allowed inside as the particular HCV[24] was basically confined to the conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem services. Yet, as the Principles and

21 Interviews were conducted in Lempunah in October 2014, and by telephone on 31 October 2015, as well as on 13 February 2016.

22 Decree 525/645/Hk-TU.P/VI/2012, 25 June 2012 issued by the Regent of Kutai Barat request the allocation of 20% of the concession area to local people. This scheme, sometimes referred to as *satu atap* ([under] one roof, see Potter 2015, p. 21), is favouring the companies compared to the earlier 70:30 *Plasma Inti Rakyat* (PIR) scheme, though is still is unclear what the exact smallholder regime considered by PT BSMJ would be.

23 According to the website of First Resources Ltd (http://www.first-resources.com/) accessed on 31 October 2015, none of the holding's plantations holds an RSPO certificate. However, it is stated that RSPO certification is intended. In addition, the company had published its own policy on sustainable palm oil at http://www.first-resources.com/upload/file/20150630/20150630105141_79375.pdf.

24 This HCV forests falls under Category 1 and 4. HCV1: areas containing globally, regionally or nationally significant concentrations of biodiversity values (e.g., endemism, endangered species); HCV4: areas that provide basic services of nature in critical situations (e.g., watershed protection, erosion control) (RSPO undated).

Criteria of RSPO state, "great care needs to be taken to ensure that communities retain access to adequate land and resources to secure their basic needs; all such relinquishment of rights must be subjected to their free, prior, and informed consent" (RSPO 2013: 22). Quite obviously, this principle has not yet been fully met.

Lempunah's Vision

When interviewed in October 2014, most people in Lempunah welcomed the new oil palm company. The attitude of PT BSMJ was clearly different compared to London Sumatra almost twenty years earlier, and – at least in Lempunah – no larger conflicts had occurred so far. Despite the irritation about the strict protection of the high conservation value forest, villagers appreciated the new forest roads and the protection of an important forest spring In general, people hope to keep essential parts of their forest for livelihoods, such as swiddens, rubber and rattan gardens, as well as *simpukng* forest gardens in the vicinity of the settlement, while utilizing at the same time the new opportunities offered by the company, such as new jobs, income for independent smallholders, compensation for converted forest gardens, as well as improved infrastructure and better healthcare. As elsewhere in Indonesia, especially the younger generation longs for a modern, rather urban lifestyle, including motorbikes, smart phones, internet and fashion with the associated demand for cash (e.g. Pambudhi et al. 2004; Rival and Levang 2014), and, thus, experience the 'pulling' character of oil palm companies (Pambudhi et al. 2004). But they also grew up living in and from the forest. They experienced the pleasures of a feast after planting rice, and the taste of smoked game after a laborious but joyful group harvesting day (*ngotapm* - Benuaq language) out on the platform of their field hut. Their lifeworld still includes the highly social participation in curing *beliatn* rites or *kwangkai* mortuary rituals, and many want the best of both worlds, the provisioning services of the forest, and health, education and good income.

2.4 Conclusions – Is there a Change of Tides?

As discussed elsewhere (Gönner, 2002, 2011) the 'extended subsistence' of the Dayak Benuaq has created a mosaic landscape in Lempunah over more than 300 years with patches of succession forest of various ages interspersed with hundreds of forest gardens (rattan, rubber, and mixed *simpukng* fruit gardens).

Biodiversity assessments revealed a high level of avian and mammalian diversity comparable to old secondary forest (Gönner 1999). Hence, Lempunah's mosaic forest can be considered, similar to (agro-) forest gardens elsewhere in Indonesia as a sustainable land-use model balancing socio-economic needs, biodiversity and ecosystem services.

The Benuaq's mode of livelihood proved to be resilient in the sense that the general pattern of 'extended subsistence' persisted despite the manifold events and stressors described above. In fact, the latter rather had widened and shaped the portfolio than destroyed it – clearly a form of continuity under change. In addition, social cohesion also remained relatively intact with little in- or out-migration over the last twenty five years, a high level of mutual help in agricultural activities, and – compared to most other regions of Borneo – a still vivid ritual life.

This continuity is now at risk. While in the past, pressures had mainly affected groups of plant or animal species, such as rattans, timber or tortoises without destroying habitats and landscapes irreversibly, the severe land-use changes observed since the clear-cutting for the HTI-Trans in the early 1990s constitute a different quality of change. Although hunting may have brought individual species to local extinction (such as the Sumatran Rhinoceros that was last observed near Lempunah in the 1980s), and logging certainly had led to habitat degradation, the transition from a still highly diverse mosaic forest to an oil palm plantation or, even more extreme in Lempunah's vicinity, to open pit mining is an irreversible shift between two very different systemic states putting an end to any type of resilience.

Even assuming Lempunah's vision comes true and a 'patchwork landscape' (Koh et al. 2009, cited in Potter 2015: 23) develops comprising agroforest elements, swiddens and intensive oil palm plantation, the *umaq* or swidden may play a very different role compared to today. Until the forest clearing started in 2013, old-growth forest (*bengkar*, *kerengkakng*) offering fertile soil was still sufficiently available around Lempunah; old forests which are now lost due to clearing or strictly protected under the HCV scheme. The envisaged patchwork landscape will only leave relatively young fallow forest or bushland for preparing swiddens. A certain trend towards using younger fallow forest, such as *babar* (1 year old) or *kwakoq* (2-10 years old) for swiddening was already observed over the last years (e.g. in 2014), as it allows the combination of wage labor, swiddening and forest use (as in the vision). Access to such forest is typically easier (closer to the village) and the preparation takes less effort, also in terms of group work. On the other hand, using younger fallow forest for an *umaq* also means lower yields (Gönner 2002, p. 101). Hence, having mainly the economic return of land use in mind, some authors expect farmers to ultimately

switch from such 'patchwork landscapes' to monocropping oil palm (Koh et al. 2009, cited in Potter 2015, ibid.; Rival and Levang 2014: 36-38). This argument is also in line with Rist et al. (2010) and Feintrenie et al. (2010) who emphasize the higher economic returns of smallholder oil palm cultivation (e.g. compared to rubber agroforesty and wet rice cultivation in Sumatra). However, the authors do admit that the long-term prospects and vulnerability of farmers, e.g. due to price fluctuation, remain unclear (also cf. Cramb et al. 2009). In any case, the *umaq* as the traditional economic safety-net is at risk, while it is uncertain whether other strategies of reducing the household's economic vulnerability will be available instead. Yet, the umaq is more than just an economic safety-net. It has been the center of the Benuaq's lifeworld for centuries. Families used to spend the biggest part of the year with activities related to the umaq. Back in 1996, the most common answer in a survey among adults in Lempunah regarding the most important goal in life was 'a successful swidden providing sufficient food' (Gönner 2002: 90 footnote 2), and for most families, a successful rice harvest still is the precondition to (co-)host a large ritual, such as a *kwankai* or a *nalitn/ guguq*. However, the importance of the umaq as the spiritual, social and economic center of the Benuaq's lifeworld is eroding quickly. A lifeworld that encompasses far more than just livelihoods: a cultural landscape, including sacred sites, the oral history of space, cultural identity, religion, and, last but not least, a unique (agro-) biodiversity are at stake.

In the discussions held in October 2014, it became clear that the people in Lempunah are aware of this threat, and given the resource use and conflict history of Lempunah and its neighboring villages, it is not surprising that the villagers opt for further enrichment of their 'extended subsistence' portfolio instead of only choosing or rejecting the oil palm option. However, the addition of oil palm to the Benuaq's 'resource longhouse' comes at a higher risk than any former expansion of the livelihood portfolio (e.g. by integrating rubber or rattan as cash crops). The risk is at least twofold. The 'pulling' elements of an oil palm scheme, the – at first glance – economic advantages, the promises of a modern life, the increasing need for cash constitute a driving force for individuals who may want this change for very personal and legitimate reasons. A driving force that may lead to the 'self-reinforced dismissal of the swidden' observed by Cramb et al. (2009: 329) throughout Southeast Asia. The second risk is external and depends on the future behavior of PT BSMJ (or its future successors). Is the company 'entering the house with just one foot' as the former village head had once stated in a similar situation with PT London Sumatra, or is it more likely that the company will slowly but surely convert all of Lempunah's forests into a 'sea of oil palm'? Both pathways are likely to be intertwined, pulling and pushing the future development of Lempunah.

So, how realistic is the vision of a 'patchwork landscape'? How realistic is it that PT BSMJ will not enter Lempunah 'with both feet'?

If one compares the attitude and behavior of PT London Sumatra in 1995-99 with PT Borneo Surya Mining Jaya in 2013-15 several important differences can be observed. PT BSMJ conducted a sincere and professional analysis of potential HCV forest areas, involving local representatives through an international auditing company.[25] Despite the short-comings reported above, the company applies most principles and criteria of the RSPO standard in Lempunah. Existing land-rights conflicts with the nearby local communities of Muara Tae and Ponak are being mediated and documented in a more transparent way than during the conflicts with PT London Sumatra, basically following the procedures of the RSPO, although the conflict has not yet been resolved (as of October 2015).[26] Culturally important sites, such as graves and forest springs were spared from conversion and included sufficient buffer forest around these locations. Old-growth forest and trees important as honey trees (Koompassia excelsa Becc. Taub.) were exempted from clearings, although it remains to be seen whether bees keep using those trees now often standing alone.[27]

On the other hand, so far, only some 25 percent of the area allocated have been cleared by PT BSMJ, and more severe conflicts may lie ahead, similar to the ones in the neighboring villages.[28] Unfulfilled expectations of the villagers in terms of sparing forest and forest gardens close to the settlement, compensation payment, and the promised smallholder scheme may further aggravate the situation.

What could be factors to ensure that oil palm cultivation does not necessarily replace existing forms of land use? As Anderson (2013) states, it remains to be seen whether traditional land rights are being better acknowledged under international auspices compared to the frontier behavior of oil palm companies during the first phase of oil palm companies during the mid-1990s. Given the high risk communities face in such an arrangement, intensive communication among the parties involved, clear and transparent rules (including FPIC[29]), the

25 Though see the shortcomings in terms of communicating the HCV to the entire community.

26 http://www.rspo.org/members/complaints/status-of-complaints/view/21 accessed on 31 October 2015.

27 The protection of honey trees was discussed and promised during the HCV discussions (see TÜV Nord, p. 23).

28 According to the plans of PT Borneo Surya Mining Jaya, large areas of Lempunah's forest will be cleared in the next years (TÜV Nord, p. 11).

29 FPIC is not required by the new national ISPO standard (see http://www.ispo-org.or.id).

sincere recognition of traditional land rights, fair smallholder schemes[30], good (local) political governance, sufficient agricultural extension services, adequate and sensitive attitude on the companies' side, close and independent monitoring, possibly by NGOs, as well as formalized mediation and arbitration procedures are indispensable preconditions for any kind of co-existence between smallholder oil palm cultivation and traditional forest use.

Like many other communities throughout Indonesia, Lempunah clearly is at a crossroads. Whether the community will be given the chance to fulfil its own vision of achieving better livelihoods through adding oil palm cultivation to its 'resource longhouse', remains to be seen. The overall trends of modernisation and commercialisation of land use are not very promising. On the other hand, Lempunah has shown remarkable and highly adaptive continuity of its livelihood patterns in the face of a constantly changing world and successfully resisted earlier attempts of large-scale forest conversion. The community's flexibility, its relatively high social cohesion and conflict history, as well as its clear vision may provide a fair chance for a self-determined path as an alternative to the usual trend of replacing existing and well-functioning livelihood systems with monocropped oil palm.

The sea of oil palms might be rough, but the people of Lempunah are skilled surfers on the waves of opportunities, at least, as long as such opportunities exist.

30 See the literature on implications and requirements of the various smallholder schemes including recommendations in Colchester and Chao 2013; Cramb 2013; Feintrenie *et al*. 2010; Lee et al. 2014; Li 2015; Potter 2015; Rival and Levang 2014.

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3. Flexible Livelihood Strategies Coming to an End? The Case of Forest-Dependent Communities in Central and West Kalimantan

Andrea Höing & Irendra Radjawali

3.1 Introduction

The livelihood strategies of forest-dependent communities in Southeast Asia have been highly diversified and flexible in reacting to local, national and international market demands, as well as in adapting to political, social and environmental changes. Among Dayak communities livelihood strategies are often described as consisting of subsistence activities with additional activities which serve to generate income. These additional activities mainly rely on natural forest resources, 'cash crops' produced for national and international markets, and (seasonal) wage labor. Some scientists call this a "dual or composite economy" (e.g. Eghenter 2006: 164; Dove 2011: 13), "semi-subsistence" (Potter 2011: 154, Rigg 200: 179-180) or "extended subsistence" (Gönner 2007: 3, see also this volume). A basic requirement for these flexible and highly resilient livelihood strategies is the availability of and access to land and natural resources. Current environmental changes like the conversion of forests for commercial agriculture and mining have increased deforestation and pollution, which constrain the livelihood options for local communities. Due to the high dependence of forest-dwelling Dayak communities on intact ecosystems, the question arises whether the centuries-long practice of diversified and flexible livelihood strategies can endure.

In this chapter we discuss the consequences of large-scale landscape transformations on Dayak livelihood strategies, their responses to current challenges and the possibility of maintaining a flexible use of natural resources in the future. We ask three questions: How do local communities respond to the environmental changes caused by large-scale resource extraction? How are different actors in a community affected by those changes? And what forms of resistance occur? Initially, we describe the development of land use changes in Indonesia with a focus on Kalimantan, and link them to the theoretical concepts

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used to frame our findings, namely access, ecological resilience, and resistance. We then present two case studies in which we describe the livelihood adaptations of forest-dependent communities at different stages of 'landscape development,' before we discuss our findings.

The first case study describes the livelihood strategies of two forest-dependent communities who have recently been subject to large-scale resource extraction. Logging companies have been active in the study area since 1992 and coal mining companies are just about to start extraction. We describe how the communities interact with their natural environment, how they perceive the ongoing environmental changes and how they adapt their livelihood strategies. The second case study presents a community in an advanced stage of landscape transformation: Villagers have lived for years alongside large-scale mining and an expanding oil palm industry. We describe local people's livelihoods in this massively transformed environment as well as their responses to companies' activities and discuss opportunities and potential difficulties for future livelihood strategies.

Data for the first case study were collected as part of an international research project by *BRINCC* (Barito River Initiative for Nature Conservation and Communities) in the villages of Kalasin and Tumbang Tujang, Murung Raya regency (*kabupaten*), Central Kalimantan, during field research in 2011 (July-September) and subsequent visits in 2012, 2013 and 2014. Additional secondary data were collected and informal interviews were conducted by visiting local and regional governmental offices as well as villagers' second residences in the regency's capital Puruk Cahu and in the provincial capital Palangka Raya. Apart from interviews and focus group discussions (including the elaboration of village histories and participatory mapping), questionnaire surveys were conducted to gather data on resource use, perceptions of nature and companies' activities in the area. A more detailed description on methods and results can be found in Höing et al. (2015a and b).

Data used for the second case study in Sejotang village, Tayan Hilir district, Sangau regency, West Kalimantan was collected as part of the DFG research project "Connecting the urban and the rural: A political ecology of the Kapuas River, Kalimantan, Indonesia" between 2013 and 2015, within which the most intensive research phase took part during 2014 and 2015. A new methodological approach called "Participatory Hydro-Political Appraisal" (PHPA) was developed in the course of this study (Pye et al. (in review) provide a detailed description of this method).[31] Group discussions, key informant interviews and

31 PHPA consists of a combination of Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), a set of approaches and methods enabling local people to plan and act by sharing, enhancing and analyzing their knowledge of life and conditions (Chambers 1994: 953) and Participatory Action Research (PAR).

the establishment of citizen researcher groups helped in analyzing problems and identifying objectives and potential interventions. In addition, drones (unmanned aerial vehicles) were used for counter-mapping purposes (Radjawali and Pye 2015).

3.2 Large-Scale Landscape Transformation in Indonesia

Indonesia and Indonesian forests have a long history of natural resource extraction. This intensified under the power of Suharto between 1966 and 1998, during which time the extraction of natural resources was crucial in driving economic development. Logging concessions were granted for an area of 53 million hectares between 1967 and 1980, and by 1990 covered more than 62 million hectares of forest land (Kartodiharjo and Jhamtani 2009: 23-24). Indonesia even managed to dominate the world's tropical plywood market in the 1990s (ibid.: 23-24). The liberalized regime promoted foreign investments in commodities such as oil and timber, supported by foreign aid (Gellert 2010: 38-39), and encouraged investments in mining companies from the USA, the UK, the Netherlands and Australia (Kartodiharjo and Jhamtani 2009: 22).

A new phase of landscape transformation started with the oil palm boom in the 1990s, when Indonesia and Malaysia became the world's major suppliers, accounting for 80 percent of global palm oil production (Pye 2013: 1) with key expansion areas in West Kalimantan and Papua (Jiwan 2013: 58). In 1990 an area of 3 million hectares of land had been converted into oil palm plantations, increasing to 9 million hectares by 2003 (Li 2010: 8). In 2013 permits had been issued for future expansion into a further 26.7 million hectares of land (Jiwan 2013: 49). However, local communities were often dispossessed and excluded from the economic benefits of these large scale conversions. Although the ecological and social consequences of massive landscape transformations have become more and more visible, the central and regional governments have continued their policies and have licensed forest areas for large-scale industries such as the production of oil palm, pulp and paper as well as mining sites, e.g. for bauxite, coal and gold, at a steady pace. The hunger for land and natural resources also has curious consequences: In West Kalimantan, concessions occupying 130 percent of the actual size of Tayan Hilir district have been issued in 2015. This is possible due to overlapping concessions, indicating a flexible, non-transparent and interest-driven spatial planning process (Radjawali and Pye 2015: 1). Even though the spatial planning process is required under Indonesian law to integrate multi-sector interests, including public and community interests,

concessions were mainly granted without the consent or even the knowledge of local communities (ibid.: 1).

Plans for further forest and landscape conversions to meet Indonesia's development goals continue to be made. In 2011, the "Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs Republic of Indonesia" launched its "Masterplan for Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia's Economic Development" (hereafter: MP3EI), intended to realize "high, balanced, fair and sustainable economic growth" (Coordinating Ministry For Economic Affairs Republic of Indonesia 2011: 9). MP3EI justifies any efforts to improve the investment climate through regulation, incentives and the acceleration of infrastructure development.[32] This includes the establishment of the Kalimantan Economic Corridor as the center for production and processing of national mining and energy reserves. Radjawali and Pye (2015: 1) call the development plans of MP3EI "land grabbing (…) [as] an integral part of the state-coordinated development effort." More detailed impacts of the Kalimantan economic corridor will be given in the case studies described below.

These economic development plans, especially those advertising the oil palm sector, are often used to portray the success of an "inclusive economy" and rural development: "Since around 40% of this [palm oil] is grown by smallholders – with incomes per hectare up to 10 times that of rice – palm oil also drives rural development, providing much needed jobs, services and local infrastructure" (Indonesia Estate Crop Fund For Palm Oil: 10).

However, many scholars are countering such descriptions of the benefits palm oil brings to local people: "poverty reduction through employment or compensation for land is not an investor's concern" (Li 2011: 3). Based on Marx's notion of "relative surplus population", Li describes another current trend in investment capital: "places (or their resources) are useful, but the people are not, so that dispossession is detached from any prospect of labor absorption" (Li 2010: 3).

3.3 Access to Resources and the Limits of Ecological Resilience

The flexible and highly resilient livelihood strategies of Dayak communities are currently being challenged by decreasing access to land and natural resources as well as by environmental degradation. Through the granting of mining, palm

32 MP3EI has been portrayed as complementary to the National Medium-Term Development Plan 2010-2014 and 2015-2019 as well as to the National Long-Term Development Plan 2005-2025, the overall aim of which is to achieve "a more advanced and prosperous, more self-reliant, more secure and peaceful, and more democratic and just Indonesia" (Presiden Republik Indonesia 2010).

oil and logging concessions, not only are local people's customary rights threatened, but they also lose the ability to benefit from natural resources. Ribot and Peluso emphasize the difference between access and property in their "theory of access." They define access as the "ability to benefit from things—including material objects, persons, institutions, and symbols" (2003: 153). Whereas property is seen as "a bundle of rights," access is seen as a "bundle of power." This bundle of power is determined by a wide range of factors such as access to information, space and economic essentials that can restrict or enhance people's ability to benefit from things as well as the availability of social relationships. In that sense we frame the findings from our two case studies and argue that large-scale land conversion for mining and commercial agriculture result in local communities losing access to large tracts of land for their subsistence economy. Since the abundance of a variety of natural resources and the guaranteed access to those resources form the basis for the continuity of flexible livelihood strategies among forest-dependent communities, decreasing access to land and the commensurate reduction in resource availability impact the potential for continuing flexible use of resources in order to maintain local communities' livelihoods.

Environmental degradation further threatens local livelihoods. Oil palm cultivation, similar to other mono-cultural plantations, is associated with severe negative consequences such as forest and peatland conversion, water pollution from waste, pesticides and fertilizers, soil degradation and the emission of stored carbon (Jiwan 2013: 59). Hence, it is questionable how useful the land will be after the palm oil companies leave (Li 2010: 9). Open pit mines are similarly related to irreversible environmental transformations due to forest clearing and released poisons which often pollute soils and rivers and cause decline in fish species. In addition, mines need much surface water, which can result in water shortages for nearby villages, as well as landslides or flooding (Maderazo 2011: 72-73).

All these forms of environmental damage directly affect local communities who depend on rivers and forests for their daily needs as they threaten the resilience of local ecosystems. Ecological resilience measures the ability of ecosystems to absorb and resist acute stresses and to return to a particular state after disturbance events (Bellwood *et al.* 2004, UNEP-WCMC 2006, Hoegh-Guldberg *et al.* 2007). Disturbances are divided by climate scientists into global and local stressors, and by anthropologists (e.g. Antweiler and Hornidge 2012: 8) into "globally-induced changes" and "locally-induced changes." Global stressors are most often related to climate change, i.e. global warming. For Southeast Asia the increase in temperature is predicted to average 2.5°C (ibid.: 8), however, diverse impacts on weather conditions and seasonality affecting local small-scale

agricultural practices can already be observed. For example, a shift in the seasons makes it difficult to predict the appropriate time to clear and plant the rice fields, while rainfall conditions with local extreme weather events can lead to flooding or landslides in local small-scale agriculture and village infrastructure. Locally induced changes are often related to anthropogenic disturbances, such as industrial developments in the form of plantations or large-scale logging or mining activities (ibid.: 8). Company activities might affect species in many ways, from noise pollution by heavy machinery that inhibits reproduction to habitat loss that leads to inter- and intra-species competition for food and space and could culminate in the extinction of species. If wildlife, important to local communities' nutrition, or non-timber forest products collected for sale disappear, the livelihood systems of local communities will be imperilled. Large-scale plantations and mining sites therefore have an irreversible impact on ecosystems essential to the maintenance of subsistence economies by local communities, and the adaptation of livelihood strategies to changing environmental conditions thus depends on the availability of alternative species.

While both globally and locally induced changes affect biodiversity, mid-range climate change scenarios are predicted to lead to an even higher level of species extinction than that caused by habitat loss at the local level (Thomas et al. 2004: 146). If an ecological system is already weakened due to locally induced changes, it might not be able to recover from or adapt to globally induced changes. These ecological transformations directly affect the feasibility of continuing diversified livelihood strategies based on the availability of forest and river resources. Both access and ecological resilience influence the scope of action for forest-dependent communities. Whereas access to land and resources is a precondition for the adaptability of livelihoods, it is the level of ecological resilience that determines the limits of adaptability: Communities with access to ecologically degraded land may find it impossible to continue their flexible, diversified resource use strategies.

3.4 Communities' Responses to Large-Scale Transformation Processes

The impact of landscape transformation and the competition over resources usually creates winners and losers (Antweiler and Hornidge 2012: 9). Competition occurs not only between "outsiders" and "local people," but also within and among communities. Communities not only differ from each other, but a community itself is a heterogeneous dynamic group which consists of multiple actors with various interests (Agrawal and Gibson 2001: 20). The two

case studies presented in this paper give examples of how "different access of actors within communities to various channels of influence, and the possibility of layered alliances spanning multiple levels of politics" (Agrawal and Gibson 2001: 19) influence future opportunities for the continuation of people's strategies to maintain their livelihoods.

Communities and individual actors thus – due to varying individual or collective interests – implement different strategies in response to large-scale industries in their respective regions. At our case study sites we observed various reactions, ranging from optimistic hope to outright rejection. We also observed various forms of resistance, for example, the daily resistance of local people who disregard official boundaries or signs claiming private property rights, or "countermovement[s]" (Hall, Hirsch, and Li 2011: 9). Resistance also occurs in the form of collective actions, often encouraged by the creation of a collective identity. Groups can be found organizing demonstrations or, as we will show in our second case study, by challenging existing maps used in the spatial planning process with the help of researchers and a local NGO by creating their own maps using "community drones" (Radjawali and Pye 2015).

3.5 Living in the Forest: Flexibility of Livelihood Strategies at an Early Stage of Landscape Transformation

This section describes our first case study in Murung Raya regency where landscape transformation is just about to start. The Murung Raya regency, the capital of which is Puruk Cahu, is located in the northeastern part of Central Kalimantan with the Müller and Schwaner mountain ranges in the North West. The rugged hilly-to-mountainous terrain in the study area is inhabited by a large number of species, including globally threatened and endemic[33] species of mammals, such as the Red Langur (*Presbytis rubicunda*) (Cheyne et al. 2015: 43).

Apart from being home to a large number of plant and animal species, Murung Raya is rich in natural resources such as timber, coal, gold and copper. The Murung Raya regency stores an estimated one billion tons of exportable coal. In 2012, 66 mining licenses had already been issued (Arman 2013: 86). The building of a freight railway connecting the interior of Kalimantan to the coast exclusively for the transportation of coal, is one of the national government's development plans under MP3EI (Coordinating Ministry For Economic Affairs Republic of Indonesia 2011: 137). National and international investors are

33 Endemic means that the species are native and restricted to a region.

attracted by the proposed expansion of infrastructure in the area, enabling easier and cheaper transportation of minerals and coal (Arman 2013: 29-31).

In this case study the neighboring villages of Kalasin and Tumbang Tujang are described, both along the Murung River, which flows into the Barito River. Both villages are in the Uut Murung district (*kecamatan*), of which Tumbang Olong is the capital. Tumbang Tujang was accessible by road in 2011, but by 2012 the road was broken between Tumbang Olong and Kalasin, and thus both villages could only be reached by boat. In 2009, Kalasin comprised 546 inhabitants and was divided into two neighborhoods; Tumban Tujang was about the same size with 592 inhabitants (Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Murung Raya 2009). A variety of ethnic groups live in the villages, such as the Punan,[34] Bakumpai, Siang, Ot Danum, Kahayan, Kapuas and at least one migrant from East Indonesia. The dominant ethnic group in Kalasin are the Punan, whereas in Tumbang Tujang the Islamized Bakumpai form the majority.

In 2011, the areas surrounding the two villages were mainly categorized as "limited production forests" (*Hutan Produksi Terbatas*), with two patches of "Protection Forest" (*Hutan Lindung*) south of Tumbang Tujang and one of "Forest Preserve" (*Hutan Suaka Alam*) situated in the Müller and Schwaner mountain range north of both villages. Apart from small patches, the whole area is allocated to logging companies, of which four concessions were active in 2011 and two were inactive.[35] In addition, four coal mining companies hold exploration permits (IUP – *Izin Usaha Pengguna)* partly overlapping the "Protection Forest" south of Tumbang Tujang according to the map. Both villages are located inside logging concessions and the spring on which the village of Tumbang Tujang relies for clean water lies in the concessions area. Legal access to land and clean water is hence highly limited.

Livelihood Strategies

Community members interviewed in 2011 engaged in a wide variety of activities to maintain their livelihoods including fishing, hunting, farming, collecting forest products and additional income-generating activities.

The forest serves various functions as it provides food, clean water, medicinal plants, commodities to be sold on the local and regional markets,[36] and

34 According to Sellato the Punan Murung formerly lived in the study area (Sellato, 1994: 17).

35 A map was provided by Fauna and Flora International that was created during a GIS training program conducted with the local government of Murung Raya.

36 Eaglewood has even been traded at the international level. Business men from Saudi Arabia and China travelled to Puruk Cahu to buy the wood from local traders.

building materials (see Höing et al. 2015a). Swidden agriculture provides basic subsistence. Forest and river products are collected to complement nutrition and some are sold to traders in the villages or in Puruk Cahu, for example gold, gemstones, eaglewood (*gaharu*) or animal parts, e.g. the gall stones of sunbears (*Helarctos malayanus*), scales of pangolins (*Manis javanica*), bezoar stones of porcupines (*Hystrix brachyura*) or softshell turtles (belonging to the *Trionychidae* family). Women are involved in fishing and farming, whereas men are mainly hunters and eaglewood collectors. Over the course of the research, more and more villagers started growing rubber and eaglewood trees in their forest gardens as a long-term livelihood strategy.

Some villagers earn additional income as teachers, traders, carpenters, shamans and government employees. During times of peak activity by logging companies in the area (1992-present in Tumbang Tujang and 1994-2009 in Kalasin), local villagers supplemented their income by selling vegetables. Logging companies offer job opportunities as, for example, boat drivers, but wage labor was not mentioned and seems to play a minor role in livelihood strategies, if any. A mining company started exploration of the area in 2011 and some villagers were employed by the company; women were hired to cook and clean the camp and men to drive company staff by boat and guide them in the forest. Seasonal activities such as collecting honey and hunting pigs (during pig migration in the fruiting season) were also carried out. When outsiders such as researchers, government officials or NGOs visit the area, villagers have opportunities to earn additional income as guides, assistants or boat drivers.

The extraction of forest products is conducted in a flexible manner depending on availability and seasons. Gold mining is most lucrative during the dry season, whereas eaglewood is gathered throughout the whole year. The following example shows how flexibly and rapidly livelihood strategies can change, but also explains the investments made by villagers in order to be able to search for rare eaglewood.

Due to prices for eaglewood[37] rising to 7000 Euro/kg at the village level (2012), villagers made extensive use of the available stocks. In 2011 searching for eaglewood already played a major role in livelihood activities and its importance seemed to increase yearly until 2014 when almost every man and also many children were involved in Tumbang Tujang. As a consequence the availability of the resource declined, and this decrease resulted in an even greater search effort. Groups of up to ten men search the forest for the infected

37 Eaglewood has already been identified as playing an important role in trade before 1800 (Sellato 2001: 74). It was used in trade in most parts of Kalimantan e.g. East Kalimantan (Donovan and Puri 2004, Momberg, Puri, and Jessup 2000: 59, Wollenberg 2001), West Kalimantan (Paoli et al. 2001).

heartwood for up to one month at a time. Due to the wood's increasing rarity, groups now go one day's travel further upstream by boat and then have to undertake a week-long trek to the area where eaglewood might be found. Such expeditions thus become costly due to travel expenses (boat and petrol), as well due to the food and equipment needed for a month-long trip. There is no guarantee that the search will be successful and if someone from the group does find eaglewood, he is the sole recipient of the profits. Many eaglewood seekers become indebted and bound to a local patron.[38] In 2015 a villager reported by phone[39] that at that time the whole village was shifting from searching for eaglewood to seeking gemstones, which are nowadays a popular commodity in Indonesia.[40]

Living in a Changing Environment

Most of the interviewees in both communities perceived a change in the abundance of resources. Reasons for the decline of trees as well as animals are, depending on the species, habitat loss due to company activity, but also due to the establishment of forest gardens; overexploitation of the species by the villagers themselves (some trees/animals were target hunting species), or because they were target tree species for logging companies. For birds, as well as gibbons, the noise pollution of the machinery from the logging company was identified as contributing to their decline. Some animal and plant species that were not target species for villagers or companies are perceived as increasing in abundance. During village meetings in each village we aimed to reconstruct significant points in the history of the villages by recording them on a timeline. Environmental changes in Kalasin included a decrease in fish observed from 2009 onward, the same time that villagers started utilizing the spring for drinking water instead of the river. Villagers further reported that regular crop failures

38 "The patron-client relationship—an exchange relationship between two roles—may be defined as a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection and/or benefits for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron" (Scott 1972: 9). Some villagers avoid becoming indebted to eaglewood patrons and manage to become new patrons themselves, developing various income opportunities to secure their livelihoods.

39 Telephone conversation with Pak Julie, 26.05.2015

40 Many local people including government officials, NGO activists and "normal" villagers frequently post about gemstones on social media such as Facebook. Also, at the national level gemstones became very popular. (Jakarta Post 31.01.2015 "Gemstone fever hits Jakarta", Sita Dewi)

began in 2006 and also stated that 2011 was the first year that Kalasin was not self-sufficient in rice and thus depended on subsidized rice. The villagers identified an unpredictable shift in the seasons and the abundance of pest species as the causes of this loss of self-sufficiency. In Tumbang Tujang villagers commented on difficulties in fishing and hunting from 1990 onwards. In 1993 most villagers started taking drinking water from the spring instead of the river.

While a noticeable shift in and increasing unpredictability of the seasons created difficulties for farmers in preparing and growing rice and vegetables, the decreasing amount of fish and game species made it more difficult to take in adequate nutrition. During our visits in 2012, 2013 and 2014 we observed a shortage in vegetables and fish, especially in Tumbang Tujang. Instant noodles and eggs (imported from the city) were the majority of foodstuffs offered to us. We were told that most of the vegetables from forest gardens were sold to the companies and the vegetable sold in the village, if there was any, quickly sold out.

Even though the perception of environmental change was often connected to companies in the area, villagers were generally neutral or positive in their attitude towards the companies. Some of the main advantages the villagers derived from the logging companies' presence were road access, corporate social responsibility activities,[41] the sale of goods to the companies, and employment. In Kalasin villagers were also provided with free transportation. Disadvantages that were recognized included the destruction of the living environment, decreasing resources, polluted rivers, and natural disasters such as land slides and flooding. In Kalasin the loss of land was perceived as a negative impact of the companies' presence (Höing et al. 2015b contains a more detailed description of factors influencing attitudes towards companies).

During subsequent visits we found further commercial developments and expansions. At least one coal mining company that had been exploring the area in 2011 had already prepared its environmental and social impact assessment (*analisa dampak lingkungan*, ANDAL). According to local villagers, there had been no consultation and no information had been given about the positive and negative impacts of mining, as claimed in the ANDAL[42]; no free prior informed consent process had taken place. From participatory mapping with villagers we found that the area is of great social importance as it includes forest gardens, and

41 In Kalasin these included, among others, building houses and paying teachers' salaries.

42 We were asked about environmental and social impacts of mining by the community because no consultation took place until at least September 2013. The ANDAL of PT. Maruwai Abadi nevertheless states that consultation took place (BabII ANDAL PT MBA Tambang: 18)

fishing and hunting sites that will probably be affected by the open pit mining due to soil, water and noise pollution and forest destruction.

The decrease in natural resources important to villagers' livelihoods shows the potential threat posed by the government's future development plans for attracting investors, especially from the mining sector, for example by building a freight railway. We expect villagers' access to land will be reduced, water and soil quality will suffer, and resources will decline further due to habitat loss and other side effects.

Forms of Resistance

The ongoing environmental changes have given rise to several forms of resistance in these communities. In 2011 most of the logging companies in the area were (temporarily) inactive. Nevertheless, on the concession maps (mentioned earlier), coal mining and logging concessions covered the entire village area, including the area containing the spring that supplied the village with drinking water. The community had been informally protecting this area for seven years and was planning to officially apply for its recognition as "village forest" (*hutan desa*) in 2011. However, even though the area was mapped using participatory mapping approaches, it had still not been officially recognized in 2014.

In 2009, a local NGO (with international support) came to the area to advocate against a logging company. We were told that a document had been prepared claiming that customary wood had been illegally felled by the company. The NGO tried to claim the rights of the Punan ethnic group living in Tumbang Tujang, which created tension in the village as most of the other ethnic groups felt excluded. Even though company areas were demarcated by signs forbidding villagers to burn or extract trees, the participatory maps showed that those areas were still used for gardening, hunting, gathering eaglewood and other activities. These observations can be framed as forms of daily resistance which differ in extent and vehemence from the resistance found in the second case study presented below.

3.6 Living on a Mining Frontier: Limits of Livelihood Adaptation at an Advanced Stage of Landscape Transformation

Livelihoods in Tayan Hilir district differ significantly from those in Tumbang Tujang and Kalasin, as the area is known as a "mining frontier" in West

Kalimantan. The district of Tayan Hilir is located in Sanggau regency, West Kalimantan Province. This regency is a hotspot for land-based extractive industries in West Kalimantan, ranging from oil palm plantations to different kinds of mining industries.

Tayan Hilir district is portrayed as being at a "very strategic" point due to the proximity of the Kapuas River, the longest river in Indonesia. It is furthermore becoming one of the important bridges for the planned 3,200 kilometer "Trans Kalimantan" road connecting West and East Kalimantan.[43] Tayan Hilir's strategic position is acknowledged in MP3EI, reflecting its geographical importance for Kalimantan development in the eyes of decision-makers at national and regional level. The 740 billion IDR (53.5 million USD) Tayan Bridge, 90 percent funded by a loan from China and 10 percent by the Government of Indonesia's national budget (Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia 2015), echoes this importance: It is the second longest bridge in Kalimantan and has become an icon of development in the region.

The population of Tayan Hilir amounts to 31,985 (Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Sanggau 2014), including the 1,931 inhabitants of the village of Sejotang, which is located about 20 kilometers away from the center of Tayan Hilir district. The district center of Tayan Hilir developed rapidly, mainly due to the establishment of mining companies. Tayan Hilir has been the "hotspot" of bauxite mining, attracting capital for infrastructure development. Economic activities range from trading daily necessities to working at mining companies. Its proximity to Pontianak, with relatively good access to roads, has contributed to the flow of goods and resources. The transformation of Tayan Hilir has been marked by rapid infrastructural development. Tayan Hilir Bridge connects the north-south axis of Borneo, is praised as an important development and is cited as a success story at many levels. The area of Tayan Hilir is portrayed as the nexus of Borneo, enabling the effective flow of resources and thus boosting the economy (Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs Republic of Indonesia 2011).

Swandiri Institute, a local NGO in West Kalimantan, has reported that concessions in Sanggau regency are dominated by mining companies (comprising an area of 547,000 hectares) oil palm plantations (530,000 hectares) and industrial forests (286,000 hectares). Mining resources primarily include bauxites and gold, which account for 71 percent and 17 percent of the total mining concession area respectively. Further concessions have been granted for

43 Edy Sujatmiko: "Rp9 Triliun Untuk Tuntaskan Lintas Selatan Trans Kalimantan", Antara Kalteng 27.11.2015 (http://www.antarakalteng.com/berita/247812/rp9-triliun-untuk-tuntaskan-lintas-selatan-trans-kalimantan?utm_source=topnews&utm_medium=home&utm_campaign=news).

iron ore, zirconium and coal mining. More than 100 mining companies and 51 oil palm companies are operating in the area. These concessions have resulted in the acquisition of 1,360,000 hectares of land for industrial purposes, a figure which actually exceeds the 1,275,000 hectares size of Sanggau regency (Swandiri Institute 2015). Similarly, at the Tayan Hilir district level, Swandiri Institute (2015) has reported that the combined total area of all types of concession (forest estate, mining and oil palm plantations) is 140,013 hectares, which exceeds the actual size of the district (119,502.25 hectares). The report further states that 22,648 hectares of land are designated for oil palm plantations. Another 9,966 hectares have been assigned to rubber plantations mostly run on a rather small scale by the local communities.

The center of Tayan Hilir has been a melting pot for migrants from all over Kalimantan, as well as from other parts of Indonesia, mainly attracted by the mining industry. One of the main players is Tayan PT. Aneka Tambang (hereafter: ANTAM), a state-owned mining enterprise conducting bauxite mining. It was followed into the area by a number of other mining companies. The Pontianak-based mining company PT. Mahkota Karya Utama (MKU) started operating in Sejotang village, a subject of this study, in 2013. The company has drained the Semenduk lake and degraded the water quality of the Kapuas river by discharging effluent directly into the river (for more detailed information see also Radjawali and Pye 2015, Pye, Radjawali and Julia 2015).

Changing Livelihood Strategies

The population of Sejotang pursue a variety of livelihoods ranging from harvesting natural resources (i.e. farming, forest resources, rubber plantation) to wage labor, e.g. at mining companies. Until the early 1990s, local community members relied on swidden agriculture and fisheries for their livelihoods. The area of Tayan Hilir is a wetland ecosystem including various lakes. It thus became the fishing ground not only for people from villages within the district, but also for those from other districts. During the dry season, people would come to harvest fish that were trapped in the lakes. During the high tide that usually happened at the end of the month, people used bamboo to "close" the small rivers in order to trap fish. For most of the year people would fish in the river, mostly in the tributary of the Kapuas River. Collective fishing was practiced and characterized by a fishing schedule and a strong commitment to use only traditional tools. Fish of different species were caught and consumed locally, for example *Ikan Gabus* (*Channa striata*), *Ikan Toman* (*Channa micropeltes*) or *Ikan Kerandang* (*Channa pleurophthalma*). According to the villagers, in a

single hour of fishing a person could catch enough food for the whole household, i.e. five kilograms of fish. Fish were said to be very abundant and customary laws forbade the use of poison and other "unsustainable" fishing methods like electrocution.

A mining company has been able to obtain a concession to conduct bauxite mining-related activities in the area since 2009. Only in 2011 did the company start their operation on the ground (Mongabay Indonesia 2015). This operation has proven to be very destructive as after just two years since it began, the lake had literally disappeared and turned into a dry desert landscape as a result of the company using river water to "wash" the raw materials of bauxite compounds and then dump the waste products into the lake (Pye, Radjawali and Julia 2015; Pye, Radjawali and Julia in review). The people of Sejotang couldn't resist as Semenduk Lake had been "legally" acquired by the company. The company bought the rights from a person from the neighboring village of Kawat who claimed to own the rights to the area. Figure 1 shows Semenduk Lake prior to its desertification as a result of bauxite mining activities.

Figure 3.1: Bauxite mining area at Semenduk Lake



The brown area shows Semenduk Lake after desertification as a result of bauxite mining activities. The grey area is the bauxite company's official concession area. © Swandiri Institute 2014.

Local community members still fish for food but their catches are far from sufficient. Fish stocks seem to be severely depleted and now it takes several days just to catch two or three kilograms of fish. The decrease in fish has also exacerbated tensions among community members who are fishing in the lakes. Interviewees suggested that the cause of the decline of fish populations was related to the presence of mining and oil palm companies. Local community members also identified a phenomenon at some lakes near a rubber factory in Tayan Hilir where the whole surface of the lake was covered by algae. There have been attempts to spray the lake to kill the algae but these were unsuccessful. Some fish still live in the lake, but villagers say the fish smell like rubber and have an unpleasant taste.

As a result, the self-sufficiency in food has declined and imported rice from Java is increasingly relied upon. As large areas of land were sold to the companies, local community members have difficulty maintaining swidden agriculture. However, not all local residents have "lost" their land; some are still able to practice agriculture. Nevertheless, swidden agriculture, which constitutes an important part of Dayak culture and identity, is no longer practiced in the area. This is not only due to decreasing access to (previously) available land for agriculture, but also due to the attractiveness of wage labor in oil palm industries. Moreover, another local community member explained that the condition of the soil – the soil fertility – has worsened since the companies entered the area. This problem has become more severe as local farmers are no longer able to rely on predictable weather. Previously, farmers knew that the rainy season started in September and thus they could start clearing land and preparing the rice farms in advance. However, the rainy season now often comes late and the hot season is often longer than anticipated. Thus, due to the high pressure to secure food supplies, those who still have access to land have shifted to more "modern" agriculture. This means using chemical compounds like herbicides to kill grass during land clearance and using pesticides during the farming season. This has increased their dependency on the "cash economy."

Forms of Resistance

The spatial planning process in Indonesia is meant to be open, transparent and participatory (cf. Radjawali and Pye 2015), but in reality those criteria are often not met. Concessions are often granted without the consent or knowledge of the communities affected, and even access to concession maps is limited. However, in the course of this research, a citizen researcher group was formed and this mapped out their customary forested and non-forested areas in Tayan

Hilir with the use of drones in order to protect them. The local research group was supported by Swandiri Institute, an NGO based in Pontianak, West Kalimantan (Radjawali and Pye 2015; Radjawali, Pye and Flitner in review). The area mapped included the dried-up Semenduk Lake. The mapping revealed that a bauxite mining company that operated in Tayan Hilir had exceeded their concession area. The images further proved that the company's activities had destroyed the lake which was so important to local people whose livelihoods depended greatly on fishing. This so-called "counter mapping" (Peluso 1995) movement, which aims to challenge established power over maps and land use categories, has a long history in West Kalimantan (Radjawali and Pye 2015: 1-3). The mapping process is resource-intensive in terms of both time and money and the use of drones provided a cheap and more efficient method by which to fight for local people's rights. Previous protests organized by the Dewan Adat Dayak/Dayak Customary Council had failed to deliver results: In fact, the mining companies were able to expand their areas. The newly created maps provided proof of the mining company's illegal operations outside its concession area and the constitutional court acknowledged them as an acceptable form of evidence. The maps produced by the drones have been further used to strengthen the community's political bargaining position with regards to protecting their remaining land, as well as gaining political recognition within the spatial planning process. The low resolution satellite images that are used in the spatial planning process often overlook hamlets, which in turn means that those hamlets lose their rights to their land. By using high resolution drone images, not only can hamlets be located and rights reclaimed, but the existence of fruit trees and farming areas can also be proven.

The research and the use of drones has to be seen as a political process, enabling communities to document the environmental consequences of mining, such as the dried-up lake caused by bauxite mining. Furthermore, communities were able to give testimony in front of the constitutional court by providing detailed drone photographs to prove the violation of the 2009 national mining law requiring mining companies to build smelters and refineries (Radjawali and Pye 2015: 1, 9-10).

3.7 Discussion

The case studies presented above show that the highly flexible and diversified livelihood strategies which Dayak communities have practiced over centuries are currently at a crossroads due to decreasing access to land and natural resources and increasing environmental degradation.

Different Situations in Murung Raya and Tayan Hilir

In the remote area of Murung Raya, there are currently still enough opportunities to make a living from a broad variety of forest resources, although this is becoming more difficult. Rights to natural resources have become increasingly restricted due to the presence of concessions. Resources are perceived to be decreasing due to locally and globally induced changes, resulting in several negative consequences including, among others, an increase in the level of effort and investment required to search for specific resources, and decreasing availability of essential food sources such as fish or game species. Also, the rate of rice harvest failure has increased due to climate unpredictability. As a result, there is a higher dependency on monetary income to buy food and other essential goods which previously would have been provided by the surrounding forests. Nevertheless, in this case study local communities can still engage in a relatively flexible extended subsistence economy, although it remains in question how long this will continue to be possible.

In Tayan Hilir the situation is different as the area is characterized by far-reaching environmental and social transformations. The destruction of the lake ecosystem, landscape transformation and the loss of land are so advanced that people in Tayan Hilir can no longer "surf on the waves of opportunities" (Gönner 2007: 7). They have to completely reorient their livelihood strategies. As a consequence, many villagers currently seek employment at local companies. However, the prospect of finding secure and stable income is now very limited. The oil palm sector and the mining industry attract workers from all over Indonesia to West Kalimantan and these are often preferred by companies as they are easier to "discipline" compared to the local population (cf. Li 2010: 5-6). Wage work at local companies thus does not provide a promising alternative for Dayak households that have lost their previous livelihood bases. Li (2010: 5) argues that a "surplus population" had already been created during colonial times by large-scale investments, and neither investors nor the state feel responsible for creating (new or alternative) livelihood strategies for those people displaced by large-scale investment. This story is repeated in many areas of Kalimantan today: While the land is needed for economic development, the people living there are not.

New Inequalities and Resulting Conflicts

Both study sites reveal the heterogeneity of local communities, the existence of different interests and different grades of vulnerability to changing

circumstances. The first case shows that those who are able to gain enough capital while resources are still abundant will be able to maintain a diversified income that does not necessarily depend on natural resources, while rather poor households are driven into more severe stages of poverty and struggle for survival. The fact that some people adapt better to new economic systems than others produces new inequalities within communities, for example when people become indebted to patrons who supply the resources necessary to conduct expeditions to search for eaglewood. Hence patrons have more opportunities and greater capacity to react to environmental changes, whereas those people who are indebted to them face extreme difficulties in pursuing their livelihood strategies. We found that some community members wish to shift from forest dependency towards a higher integration into markets and wage labor. They try to benefit from the companies' presence as much as they can, whereas others prefer to continue traditional practices. As a result, conflicts have emerged within and between local communities. "For rural people as for urbanities, cost-benefit analysis is an everyday matter" (Li 2001: 162). A villager in Murung Raya explained that it would be better to join the mining company to derive some economic benefit, despite the negative environmental impacts, than to refuse to work for them while having no means of stopping them exploiting the area. This statement reflects the feelings of 'powerlessness' and exclusion from decision-making and the rational cost-benefit analysis.

Resistance

In both study sites people resist environmental transformations. In Central Kalimantan various forms of daily resistance could be observed, for example when villagers disregarded company signs forbidding them to hunt or slash and burn in concession areas in the first case study. Other forms of resistance found in the first case study were based on common interests and collective identities, claims to a village forest area, as well as to customary trees. Both forms of resistance were unsuccessful in delivering justice to those groups. The village forest was not officially acknowledged due to lengthy official processes and requirements for highly detailed maps, whereas no assistance in the form of GPS units or compensation for costs incurred during the mapping process were provided by the local government. The second attempt failed due to a conflict of interests arising because the village contained many ethnic groups that did not feel suitably represented by the claims of the NGO-supported group. Many social movements that are based on collective identities decline if the members cease to feel adequately represented (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 292). In this case

the protest letters would have needed to be endorsed by the village council, but as the NGO aimed to represent the interests of just one ethnic group, the Punan, members of the village council (most of whom belonged to a different ethnic group) refused to sign the protest letter. The protesters were therefore unable to officially advance their claims.

In the second case study resistance was more successful due to the provision of technology and assistance by researchers and an NGO in forming groups of "citizen researchers" that collectively challenged existing maps used in the spatial planning process in West Kalimantan by creating their own maps using "community drones." The action-research conducted in Tayan Hilir using low-cost drones "revolutionized" (Radjawali and Pye 2015: 11) counter-mapping and gives hope to local communities struggling for recognition in spatial planning processes and thereby becoming active actors determining future developments.

Anticipating an Uncertain Future

Our two case studies illustrate how the Dayak's flexible and diversified livelihood strategies are currently challenged in areas that are characterized by large-scale landscape transformation processes. While they currently still continue in the first example, people in the second study site have had to reorient their livelihoods. The processes of landscape transformation are characterized by the exclusion of local people from spatial planning processes, from information and decision-making about potential concession areas, as well as from the benefits of company activities. All these forms of exclusion contribute to the increasing loss of access to land and the ability to benefit from natural resources.

If and how forest-dependent communities will be able to deal with the uncertainties of future environmental change and the insecurity of their livelihood systems is yet to be seen (Antweiler and Hornidge 2012: 11). In any case, we argue that it will be highly dependent on many factors, such as opportunities to access information, the inclusion in landscape planning processes that do not simply seek to maximize immediate profit for certain key individuals and companies through 'hit and run' strategies. In our opinion an important factor influencing future developments is the formation of social movements that represent the interests of those communities that are expected to stay and live in rural areas in 'post-extractive' times, when the local environment will be heavily degraded. In the worst case scenario those communities might be left alone to deal with poisoned and degraded soil and river water, and deforested areas prone to environmental disasters with little support to help them maintain their lives and health.

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4. Continuity and Change in Central Kalimantan: Climate Change, Monetization of Nature, and its Bearing on Value Orientations

Anu Lounela

4.1 Introduction

This article explores how market-based environmental intervention – along with associated processes of nature monetization – bear effect on a local population in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia. The principal focus lies on how cultural values and nature / people relations are produced through climate change mitigation which compensates reforestation activities with money, creates carbon markets in the villages, and promotes economic entrepreneurship. The empirical case presented particularly illuminates how this effects the local rubber economy, monetization, and commodification of nature among the Ngaju Dayak in the village of Buntoi, Pulang Pisau district, in the southern part of Central Kalimantan.[44]

The Ngaju Dayak of this area gather various nature products and cultivate swidden rice and rubber, tending to value "immediate return" on their activities in the swamp forests in Central Kalimantan. This term and accompanying discussion dates back to an article by James Woodburn (1982) in which he argued that many hunter and gatherer societies prefer an immediate return on

44 This article is based on five months of ethnographic research in the village of Buntoi (2014-2016) funded by two Academy of Finland research projects: my own postdoctoral research project, "Climate change disputes, values and local reasoning", and the collaborative project, "Contested values in Indonesia", with Isabell Herrmans and Kenneth Sillander. Prior to my fieldwork in Buntoi I conducted two months of fieldwork in the districts of Kapuas and Palangka Raya, 2012-2013. I also want to thank KITLV for the short research period during which I explored the literature on the history of the area from the 17th century onwards. A version of this paper was presented at the Euroseas Conference in August 2015, and at the research seminar in social and cultural anthropology at the University of Helsinki in November 2015. I thank Isabell Herrmans, Kenneth Sillander, Tuomas Tammisto, and my other colleagues at the University of Helsinki for comments. A note on language: most of the discussions were in Bahasa Indonesia but sometimes people used Ngaju. During fieldwork I gained some understanding of Ngaju, but all the interviews took place in Indonesia.

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their labor, which promotes an ethos of solidarity and egalitarianism. According to Woodburn, as summarized by Signe Howell and Anja Lillegrave,

> "these societies may be characterized by a number of features that include an egalitarian, non-competitive ethos and economies that favour 'immediate return' (rather than 'delayed return'). Together these values and practices discourage the accumulation of wealth and property and encourage sharing, resulting in what he [Woodburn] calls immediate return societies." (2013: 275)

Even though the Ngaju are also shifting cultivators, they too, like other Southeast Asian groups with similar subsistence strategies, have always exhibited this characteristic orientation of immediate return and solidarity in respect to the economy and social relations (Gibson and Sillander 2012). Changes in the rubber economy and the ongoing monetization of nature in Buntoi, however, would seem to suggest the development of a contrasting value orientation to sharing and solidarity in economic and social spheres: anonymity, delayed return, and accumulation. For instance, while rubber used to be collected from the mixed swamp forests and integrated with the subsistence economy and planted rubber trees, a related commodity economy has started to dominate the livelihood system. Recently, rubber estates have been established, with the latex being sold on to mills where it is turned into a commodity for the global markets. While it is a non-edible product that immediately leaves local circulation, nonetheless it is socially produced. The process of turning rubber into a commodity from its non-commodity form (Tsing 2013: 26) involves the alienation that Tsing claims is built into any commodity.[45]

Michael Dove has coined the concept "dual economy" to refer to the contrast in Western Kalimantan between swidden cultivation and the subsistence economy on the one hand, and the rubber or market-oriented commodity economy on the other (1993, 1998, 2000, 2012). It thus refers to two distinct but complementary transactional orders: the long-term reproduction of the social and cosmological order associated with a subsistence economy and especially swidden cultivation, and an orientation of short-term and individual benefit which is connected with rubber and a market economy (Dove 2012: 15; Parry and Bloch 1989).

Analytically, it is important to make this distinction. I argue in this paper that the rubber economy stresses individual interests through monetary income and increases dependency on the market, while swidden rice cultivation underpins

45 I am not going to discuss the distinction between commodity and gift (Gregory 1982, 1997; Tsing 2013); suffice it to note that I concur with those who claim that social relationships are built into both gifts and commodities, but alienation and thus disengagement of things or goods from social relations through capitalistic transactions is what makes the commodity – which, however, according to recent research may also shift in and out of its commodity form according to circumstances (see Tsing 2013: 22).

self-sufficiency in food production and sharing among kin; in short, these transactional orders implicate different moral economies. This does not mean that income from the rubber economy does not contribute to running the household and long-term social reproduction – by financing education, for instance; rather, what it does is cultivate a value orientation that endorses delayed-return on outlay and individual orientation. Furthermore, I argue that the rubber economy contributes to the value landscape in Central Kalimantan: when rubber trees occupy large tracts of land, they replace rice fields and influence swidden and subsistence livelihood systems, which are intrinsically related to value production.

I suggest that in this context it is important to ask: How is nature (re)valued? How is a nature product converted into a valuable commodity to be exchanged for money? What effect does this outcome have on social relationships?

4.2 Value production and moral choice

In this part I explore how anthropological theorizing on cultural values could be used as an analytical tool to help understand how climate change mitigation program affect the rubber and swidden cultivation in Central Kalimantan. My starting point is Joel Robbin's definition of value as something that is considered good or desirable in human life. In his view, values are understood to "arrange other cultural elements […] into hierarchies of better and worse or more or less desirable" (2012: 120). Thus, valuing is intrinsically linked up with devaluing; the process evokes multiple, contrasted values, and entails a choice. Consequently:

> "in all societies morality encompasses the demand that people adhere to shared models of action and the fact that people sometimes confront situations in which no single model of action is clearly best and must make moral choices between a number of models of how to proceed" (Robbins 2012: 118).

Robbins' idea of moral choices expresses the notion that value is relational, that it is always to be compared to something else in a given society. His discussion is based on the thought of Louis Dumont (1980) who argued that values are hierarchically organized through opposing principles (such as right/ left) in relation to the "whole" which encompasses and articulates the principles: "The whole is founded on the necessary and hierarchical coexistence of the two opposites" (1980: 43). Since the opposing principles are in a hierarchical relation, one is always superior to the other in relation to the whole, with the higher-ranked values encompassing the lower. Robbins combines Dumontian value theory with the Weberian theory of "plural value spheres", spheres which

may be in conflict with each other; in principle, people have to make (moral) choices between the elements that are considered important in a specific culture (2007: 296, 299; 2013). The idea that there are multiple spheres of value (or scales) indicates the importance of choice, but within a specific structure.[46]

Let me illustrate the point I am making. Ngaju Dayak value solidarity and its element of sharing, but they also value autonomy and its element of flexibility. These different values seem to be reflected in the ways swidden cultivation and rubber economy has been organized among the Ngaju people who have to make choices between the "models of actions": for instance, should they plant rubber trees, which might prevent them from practicing swidden cultivation? Choice, in my view, points to action. However, structuralist theory tends to stress abstract categories and understand values as objects rather than as practices that produce values. For instance, Graeber (2013: 222) argues that "value will necessarily be a key issue if we see social worlds not just as a collection of persons and things but rather as a project of mutual creation, as something collectively made and remade".

In Graeber's view, production is a key term when examining values: people's actions produce what they *imagine* to be good and, as the embodiments of their choices, the results represent the exemplars around which they orient their actions. This even more clearly brings out the point that when people act in relation to the "imagined good of the society" (the actions of others), they can always imagine alternatives, that is, things could be done differently. Graeber calls this the "politics of value" (2001: 88). Holism in the Dumontian sense is still present, since values are always relational (compared to other elements) and imagined and realized in society; but people's actions entail choices, which produce values in any given time and place. Further, for Graeber, the Marxian concept of production means the production "of material goods and social relations" (2013: 223). In this vein, my point is to show how the rubber economy and swidden cultivation illustrate continuity and change in the values. Pak Nampun[47], my host during my stay in Buntoi, described value change in the following way:

> "I was born in 1968 when meat did not have monetary value (*nilai*); it was bartered. It was seldom used in business (*usaha*). If we think about it, our parents rated sociality very highly. Togetherness and taking care of each other were important and desirable. Togetherness meant that they could survive because of they supported each other in any circumstances. Maybe we will vanish because we ignore one another […]. People say that we are progressing (*maju*), but I

46 The notion that all things and ideas are part of the whole and yet relate to each other as opposites is the basis of his value theory whereby ideas and objects that are in opposing relation to each other are values. Since the opposing principles are in a hierarchical relation, one is always more desired than the other in relation to the whole.

47 All the villager's names are pseudonyms.

say, 'Yes, it looks like we are progressing, but in terms of moral, we are degenerating (*merosot*).'" (10.1.2015)

Pak Nampun often expressed his concern about the money economy in which people were selling land, trees, and gardens. His parents used to come from the forests with meat and fish and it was just shared (*bagi-bagi*). In the past, Ngaju family groups used to wander together, collecting rubber latex in the natural swamp forests in which wild rubber trees grew among the other trees, and in mixed forests inhabited by different animals and spirits.

Being a frontier area (see below), Central Kalimantan has been exploited and "developed" since the Dutch colonial period, and the planting of rubber (*Hevea brasiliensis*) imported from South America expanded into Southeast Kalimantan at the beginning of the twentieth century. However, the current rapidity of change and the increased scope of new capitalistic schemes and interests only really started during the Suharto era (1968-1998) and the era of decentralization (1999-) that followed.

Today, climate change mitigation programs may promote a rubber economy as a strategy to stop deforestation or mitigate climate change through reforestation. REDD+ pilot projects or demonstration activities have become widespread in Indonesia since the BALI COP13 meeting in 2007 (Wertz-Kannounikoff 2009: 1); there are over 30 pilot projects on the ground (the number varies since some have been stopped, restarted, and continued) (Lin et al. 2012; Resosudarmo et al. 2014: 69). Initially REDD (without +) aimed at reforestation and forest conservation through result-based payments and carbon trade. However, due to pressure, especially from civil society actors in the arena of global climate change negotiation, REDD+ has also become a social program that aims to reduce poverty (Howell 2014: 5). Since the 1990s the "community-based forestry" model has gained support among politicians and donors who mainly argue that people reap economic benefits when they get access and control over land and natural resources (Li 2005: 428). Conversely, some scholars have noted that this is a risky course in the sense that it simply shifts the burden of reforestation and forest conservation to the people at the localities; besides, sometimes the income from such activities is lower than what can be earned from agriculture (Jewitt et al. 2014: 413; Lounela 2009: 201). Ultimately, the focus of the REDD+ projects lies not only on forests and land, but is also very much about humans and value creation.[48]

48 The anthropology of climate change has mainly focused on local perceptions; production of climate science; circulation of climate knowledge and related use of language and communication; and mitigation efforts and interactions with local populations (Barnes et al. 2013: 541-542). As noted by Barnes et al., climate change interventions and discussions resemble earlier debates on development: "Indeed climate change adaptation could be seen as the new development buzzword. It

Dove claims that policies related to REDD+ are "exercises of imagination" produced by global environmentalism, which create an image of local landscape as "valuable" in ways unrecognizable to the local populations (2012: 234, 252). As it is, climate change mitigation projects are said to provide models for "cost-effective" nature conservation that draws on market-based principles and individualism as a value. At the local level, projects are often justified by the urgent need to save the world from total environmental (and social) collapse and disaster, besides offering economic benefits and social wellbeing for the population in question. REDD+ suggests monetary fees for tree planting, clear ownership rights, and commodification of nature, raising the question of how money and products of nature, such as trees, relate to local, socially constituted value landscapes. A value landscape is a project of mutual creation, it is produced both through people-to-people and people-to-nature relations in a specific environment. Landscape is thus social (Tsing 2005: xi), including non-objectified humans, plants, forests, and spirits. In this vein, we can examine values that emerge when, for instance, rubber trees occupy large areas of the land.

Pak Nampun told me that in the past fruit from the old communal gardens nearby was shared, and family members used to plant trees when visiting the gardens. Now, however, everybody quarrels over land borders and trees, because everything is now valued in terms of money instead of needs. Tensions and debates that concern the choices made in the landscape production are clearly visible: for instance, when it comes to climate change mitigation projects, what species are selected for planting? What consequences do those choices have on values?

4.3 Producing a frontier value landscape: spatio-temporal dimensions of value

In this sub-chapter I explore how Indonesian state formation contributes to the production of a frontier value landscape in Central Kalimantan, taking a historical view of the changes that have taken place in people-nature relations. Central Kalimantan is a unique place to conduct research on values, climate change schemes, and revaluation of nature as it has often been represented as a frontier which

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has become the hot topic of the moment for researchers and program directors who seek international financial support, the successor to 'basic needs', 'participation', 'rights', and 'sustainable livelihoods' that led earlier waves of development intervention and funding flows to developing countries." (2013: 543)

> "is characteristically a physical place in rapid transition. Frontier areas tend to have low population densities and high rates of in-migration; the organs of the central state tend to be weak and consequently the law an abstract concept. Different actors compete to establish claims over the abundant natural resources that are up for grabs in a frontier context. Accordingly, violent conflicts can erupt between actors – indigenous people, pioneer farmers, bureaucrats, loggers, miners, and developers - attempting to secure their claims over natural resources." (McCarthy 2013: 183)

Rapid environmental and social change has taken place in Central Kalimantan since the 1960s. However, rubber plantation, timber logging, oil, and mining industries entered the area at the beginning of the twentieth century when Dutch colonial rule began to take a greater economic interest in the island and its resources. Lindblad has argued that between 1880 and 1942 Southeast Kalimantan experienced a "decisive turn" in its history due to colonial and other economic interests that were expanding in the area (1988: 6).[49] Back then, however, business was principally conducted by Bekumpai, Banjar, and Malay traders who travelled by boats to the interior of Kalimantan and negotiated the trade or barter of different forest products with the Dayak (ibid.: 57). Commercial cash crop plantations mainly failed, on the other hand, although after the 1880s rubber and rattan prospered relatively well because they could be integrated into swidden and other agricultural systems or gardens (Knapen 2001: 276).

Indonesia became independent from the Dutch in 1949, and a new period of state formation started in Central Kalimantan. Environmental and social change accelerated rapidly when President Suharto took power in 1967, along with the mass killings of about half a million so-called communists; strong military dominion was established not only in Java, but also in different parts of Kalimantan. The New Order government also started to promote economic development based on the exploitation of natural resources; in 1967 it became possible to lease state land to the corporations after the inauguration of the Basic Forestry Act 1967 (McCarthy 2013: 187). In Central Kalimantan, intensive logging has only been carried out since the1970s when timber concessions got permits from the forestry department and began cutting "valuable" timber from the swamp forests. Meanwhile, many people from outside of Kalimantan (transmigrants) moved, or were moved, to the area in order to benefit from the activity. When the logging corporations and later the Mega Rice Project (see below) started operations in the forests surrounding Buntoi, the villagers felt it impossible to resist them due to the authoritarian regime. In 1990 there were 115

49 Knapen (2001: 5), however, who has studied the history of the area, has argued that huge environmental changes started as soon as the Dutch entered the area with their commercial interests in the 17th century.

logging companies (HPH) in Central Kalimantan out of a total of 561 in Indonesia (McCarthy 2013: 190).

In the mid-1990s logging was followed by the Mega Rice Project (henceforth MRP) – President Suharto's initiative to turn Kalimantan's swamp forests into rice fields to feed all the people of Indonesia. The project was massive in scale and effect: 1.4 million hectares of swamp forests were logged and turned into vulnerable peat land that was ready to burst into flames at any time during the dry season (as the big fires in 1997 and 2015 have shown). Furthermore, about 4,000 kilometers of wide, lengthy canals were cut across the landscape, a combination that was environmentally disastrous (see Galudra et al. 2010). A transmigrant program was part of the MRP scheme and was responsible for moving 80,000 families to the area (McCarthy 2013: 191). Today, swamp forests and peat land are considered carbon storages and sinks, which have become economically valuable through carbon credit schemes such as REDD+, a new valuation of nature that reflects the idea that nature products can be turned into commodities, as we will see below. Further, these projects may have impact on how access to land is organized, regulated, and contested.

4.4 Buntoi: collecting and sharing along the river

The Ngaju elders of Buntoi claim that the village, situated on the Kahayan River, dates back to 1670, when it was called Lewuk Dalam Betawi.[50] According to the villagers, it has been a trading port for the Batawian people (today Jakarta) since the seventeenth century. Today Buntoi is one of eleven villages in the sub-district of Kahayan Hilir, with 2,729 inhabitants,[51] of whom many are immigrants (Banjar, Javanese, Madurese) who have married Ngaju villagers or moved there for work (both as loggers and rubber tappers). The first Javanese immigrants were part of the transmigrant program (*bedol desa*) between 1963 and 1965 (Oktayanty 2015: 39); the Banjarese have been marrying in for a long time; while the Madurese have an interesting history as the villagers say that they were bought as slaves (*jipen* in Bahasa Ngaju) to work on their gardens collecting latex or planting cassava.

50 At some point, Buntoi was also called Petak Bahandang or red land. An old woman told, because of local head hunting practices and attacks from neighboring communities, whereas Pak Isep said the name was due to the red land under the church nearby where the German missionary couple was killed in 1870s.

51 *Dokumen Perencanaan Penggunaan Lahan Desa Buntoi, Kecamatan Kahayan Hilir Kabupaten Buntoi Pulang Pisau Tahun* 2014-2024.

Today, the village land amounts to 16,261 hectares.[52] Houses have been built either along the Kahayan River or on the small rivers that cut across the village and lead into swamp forests which used to be rich with flora and fauna and accessed either on foot or by small wooden boats (*sudur* in Bahasa Ngaju). The small rivers that cut across the settlement horizontally from the main river are named after the family lineage (*sei* in Bahasa Ngaju) heads, and are inheritable or, in villagers' words, *turun temurun*, meaning that rights to land along a specific river were then passed on to the children.

During my stay in Buntoi (2014-2015) I settled in the "central neighborhood", close to the longhouse that had been newly renovated and was now in restricted use for tourism or important meetings. I focused principally on five "main" neighborhoods (*Rukun Tetangga*) along the Kahayan River. Behind the riverfront houses runs the asphalted main road that leads to Palangka Raya (the capital city) in one direction and to Bahaur in the other. On the other side of the road grow the old mixed rubber gardens, whereas two to three kilometers from the Kahayan River new rubber gardens, which look more like monoculture plantations, dominate the landscape. These extend until the big canal which traverses a number of smaller rivers – also transformed into canals – about six kilometers away from the Kahayan River. The old rubber gardens that grow close to the settlement (extending about two kilometers from the river) are mainly mixed forest gardens where bamboo, cassava, rattan, and some fruit trees are also grown. Ngaju Dayak in Buntoi have long practiced trade and barter in rubber, rattan (most probably the *Korthalsia flagellaris*), pepper (*Piper nigrum*), agarwood (*Aquilaria*), and so forth while cultivating cassava and swidden rice and practicing horticulture.[53]

In Central Kalimantan, wild latex collection (mainly gutta-percha) and trade flourished in the nineteenth century during Dutch colonial rule (Dove 2000: 214; Knapen 2001: 361; Lindblad 1988: 101). A worldwide rubber boom began around 1900 which was when rubber (*Hevea brasiliensis*) was first brought to Southeast Kalimantan. During this colonial period the first European rubber plantations were established although these were concentrated in certain areas and managed by Europeans with labor (coolies) mainly from Java; in some areas, however, local people became laborers on low wages (Lindblad 1988: 58-59). Until the 1930s, mainly Banjar people worked on European plantations, integrating rubber into their own gardens (Lindblad 1988: 61). This was in many ways practical as it only took a few hours per day for Banjar families to tap the

52 *Ibid.*

53 Rattan is a rainforest plant abundant in Central Kalimantan and it seems they could be re-harvested. Rattans have also been planted in the swiddens (*ladang*) in Central Kalimantan for a long time (MacKinnon et al. 1997).

latex in their mixed rubber gardens (ibid.: 99). For the Ngaju Dayak along the Kahayan River things were different.[54]

Ngaju people in Buntoi told me that until logging started in the 1970s people used to travel in little wooden boats that were pushed by a wooden stick to the swamp forest located about three kilometers from the village settlement where wild latex called *pantung*, *jelutung*, and more valuable *hangkang* could be found. People gathered as much of it as they were "strong" to collect during one day, normally returning home at two in the afternoon; collecting resin was not really a heavy job, Pak Parlan told me (31.1.2015). They dried the latex and sold or bartered it on to the buyers that came to the village by boat. Barter was arranged so that traders negotiated the price of items such as rattan and rubber latex on their trading trips upriver, leaving items to the value of the goods which they would collect on their return. Pak Rajait told that rubber trees (*Hevea brasiliensis*) were planted on their mixed gardens in the forties, but the Dutch forbade them from selling the latex, being afraid of competition in the markets – when the Second World War ended Ngaju Dayak were able to sell the industrial rubber latex (8.5.2016). Pak Nampun mentioned the Madurese slaves (*jipen* in Bahasa Ngaju) that worked for the local Ngaju people (11.5.2014). According to Pak Isep, born in 1949, Madurese – who suffered from hunger and were brought by boats from Java to Buntoi - first lengthened rivers manually and then cultivated cassava, around the forties and fifties (6.5.2016). Since the fifties they started work on the rubber gardens. In due time, most of the slaves became free and got or bought land from the "owners", meaning they could cultivate their own gardens and rubber trees. While I could not confirm these narratives about slaves from Madura, there were Madurese people in Buntoi who had worked for Ngaju families in their rubber gardens in the past, but now had their own land.

Collecting wild latex was connected to Ngaju subsistence practices at that time; they also practiced swidden rice cultivation, fruit gardening, and collected plants such as sago, bamboo, and kalakai, besides hunting wild boar and deer or maybe monkeys. Game was shared among the people living nearby; the harvest was eaten by family groups. Thus, Ngaju Dayak were almost self-sufficient in food, but they also collected wild latex and rattan from the swamp forests that provided them the opportunity to earn some money. These practices continued till the seventies when the logging company entered the village area.

54 Thomas Lindblad (1988) has written an extensive history on rubber collection and rubber plantations in Southeast Kalimantan from 1880 to 1942. While it mostly focuses on the Hulu Sungai or Barito and Mahakam areas, which are not exactly my field study site along the Kahayan River, it gives a picture of the development of rubber plantations nearby.

4.5 Changes and continuities: making a frontier in the village

During the twentieth century Ngaju Dayak experienced dramatic changes, which transformed their livelihood practices. The villagers have been planting *Hevea brasiliensis* rubber (locally called *karet*) in their gardens for decades; the head of a neighborhood 1 once told that there were seventy-year-old rubber trees in the mixed rubber gardens (10.1.2015). Rubber gardens more than three kilometers away have been planted on previous swiddens, since Ngaju Dayak plant rubber trees to mark more permanent rights to previous swidden land, which is customary to many Dayak groups. These younger, rather monotonous rubber gardens differ from the earlier mixed forest gardens in that they tend towards monoculture (although sometimes rattan and bamboo also grow there) indicating recent simplifications (Scott 1998).[55]

In the 1970s, the so-called timber period commenced when a logging company constructed a saw mill on the opposite side of the Kahayan River facing the settlement of the five neighborhoods mentioned earlier. Pak Ise said that it covered an area of about one kilometer: "Big ships came and went," and it certainly felt big in scale (21.1.2015). According to some men in the village, all the most substantial trees in the area were subsequently felled to fuel it. Later, during the MRP (1995 to1997), the villagers said that the remaining forests, excluding the forest gardens behind the houses, were "cleaned" (*pembersihan*) with heavy machinery. Pak Nampun explained that first they logged all the big *ramin* (*Gonystulus bancanus*) trees, and when those trees were gone, even economically productive rubber trees such as *jelutung* (*Dyera costalata*) were cut down; there are hardly any *jelutung* trees left nowadays (31.1.2015). Furthermore, the main asphalted road was built across the village in the 1990s. Now, money, loggers, rubber traders, goods, and people flow in and out of the village freely.

Prior to 2010, the government at the province level made an agreement with the villagers about a big coal power plant that would produce electricity for the whole province, to be situated near the site where the saw mill had been located in the seventies. It should be opened in 2016. Some villagers said that they were glad about the power plant since it was "*ramai*" (crowded), and therefore good, because it brought development and work. Others, to my surprise, claimed that they were ready to move the whole settlement if the plant produced too much pollution.

55 James Scott (1998) has proposed that when land and natural resources became scarce the state and its officials took complex land tenure systems and practices and made them legible through state legislation; this process involved simplification of plural rights and diverse forest types.

In 2006 a plan to enlarge and deepen the rivers into canals (*handel*) was discussed among the villagers, and the village head and local government supported the idea; during the ensuing years each river was lengthened from about two to about six kilometers, and also widened and deepened. The aim was to ease access to inland areas and intensify cultivation there. Digging small canals through the peat land had probably already been initiated by the Dutch in order to ease access to remote forest products and claim rights to territories (Knapen 2001: 246; personal communication with the villagers 27.5.2014), and these recently enlarged canals imitate the Dutch canal model, just as, it seems to me, the new rubber tree gardens imitate the colonial plantation model. Villagers formed *handel* groups (17) and distributed the land which became available, each family getting 1-2 hectares. Anybody could join the groups, but in practice they often operated on the basis of family relations while some were organized around "river owners" who had started cultivation around the rivers in earlier times.[56]

The destruction of tropical swamp forests first by logging and then by the MRP, and the consequent forest fires, have been used to justify conservation and climate change mitigation schemes and the revaluation of nature in Buntoi, and in Central Kalimantan more generally. However, as is characteristic of frontier zones, changes have been rapid, large-scale, and contradictory in terms. Prior to the twenty-first century, the main external drivers were economic interests connected to land grabbing, which turned local socio-ecological life upside down in the long term. However, in the next section I will explore how the devastated peat land landscape has begun to be seen as a carbon-rich storage, which could be turned into ecosystem services and thus become economically valuable in Buntoi, the primary field site of my research since 2014.

4.6 Climate change mitigation project at the village level; nature of / in money, time and value

In 2010 Central Kalimantan became a climate change pilot province. A few years later, on September 3, 2013, Buntoi was granted a Climate Communications Facilitation Center that local villagers call Bamboo House.[57]

56 It was clear that people also sold land along the *handel*s so that there were now mixed groups of people, formally called peasant groups (*kelompok tani*). Some people gained tens of hectares of land.

57 "The Centre is a component of a larger programme in place for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD +) that is entrusted by the President of the Republic of Indonesia (RI) for Central Kalimantan. *Bupati* of Pulang Pisau, Mr. H EdyPratowo SSos MM said in his speech that he considers the Climate Communications Centre placement in Buntoi Village, one of

One of the donors making an appearance in Buntoi was USAID, a US-based governmental donor, with a program called Indonesia Forest and Climate Support (IFACS).[58] It opened a call for NGOs to submit proposals on climate change mitigation in 2012. Two NGOs (POKKER SHK and Lembaga Dayak Panaruan – LDP) won the bid, garnering one milliard IDR each for a year: one with the goal of strengthening the forest village unit (POKKER SHK), and the other of enhancing rubber production (LDP). USAID IFACS works on two "landscapes" in Kalimantan: the first, Ketapang landscape (nearly two million hectares), is located in West Kalimantan; Buntoi belongs to the Katingan landscape which comprises 1.7 million hectares of mainly deep peatland, swamp forests and degraded ex-MRP areas, including the Sebangau National park, parts of the Katingan and Pulang Pisau districts, and the municipality of Palangka Raya (USAID IFACS report 2015: 126.) It aims "to reduce carbon emissions through the control of fire and improve existing rubber production, *thus giving previously unprofitable and degraded land important value*" (italics mine, ibid.: 77).

In legal terms Buntoi village is surrounded by state forest land, which starts some kilometers from the settlement and extends to the Sebangau conservation park. During the MRP this area was mostly deforested and canals were dug across it. At some point after the MRP ended, the land between the village gardens and the protected forest area was regulated as Forest for Other Land Uses (APL – Areal Penggunaan Lain), meaning that people could cultivate rubber, oil palm and so forth in those areas; now new and old rubber trees grow there. The protected forest (*hutan lindung*), in which village forest (*hutan desa*) – a state regulated community forestry entity – is located, begins about six to nine kilometers away from the settlement.[59] There is a production forest area in between the APL and protected state forest area, but its borders are currently under debate between the villagers and the officials. Landscape-wise, 7,025

the areas classified as vulnerable hotspots, very appropriate" (http://www.unorcid.org/Index.php/redd-in-the-news/from-the-provinces/185-in-buntoi-village,-redd-programme-begins retrieved February 4, 2015).

58 USAID wished to "capitalize" on the Indonesian REDD+ Agency (that was shut down in 2015), and it subcontracted PT Hydro Program with five different carbon emissions projects or "Project Concept Notes" in five areas, including Pulang Pisau and Buntoi. Even though it is not called a REDD+ project, it could be included in that scheme in the sense that it aims at carbon emission reduction through the commodification of nature and reforestation by rubber planting. In an interview a USAID staff member mentioned that they wished to develop carbon trade in the Katingan landsacape (5.2.2015).

59 In an interview, the provincial forest department staff (*dinas kehutanan*) noted that current protected forest area was established in 2012, a year before it was granted a village forest status in Buntoi. This means that the management of the village forest differs from what it would be, if it was on the state production forest area (9.5.2016).

hectares of the total about 16,000 hectares of the village has been reserved as village forest (*hutan desa*) where they may not hunt, cut timber or cultivate rice, but where they can collect non-timber forest products such as honey, rattan, and so on. Some hundred hectares of the village area are reserved for wet rice cultivation (*cetak sawah* and *surut pasang*, or tidal waves rice field).[60] New rice fields (*cetakan sawah*) covering 83 hectares were opened up on the borders of the village forest and claimed by a couple of villagers during my stay, causing a new land dispute.

After the village forest (*hutan desa*) received legal recognition with assistance from POKKER SHK in 2012[61], USAID IFACS claimed that a rubber economy would bring economic benefits to the villagers and discourage them from cutting or burning the natural forests. As noted in the final report:

> "It has been long understood that Central Kalimantan is particularly susceptible to forest and peat land fires. When an economic crop is present, farmers and landlords are more responsive to putting out neighboring fires and will take greater care to reduce the conditions that may lead to fire in the first place. The presence of profitable stands of rubber is expected to deter additional burning that releases massive amounts of GHG and particle pollutants." (USAID IFACS final report 2015: 76)

Rubber needs empty land and this could be found around the rivers that had been transformed into canals after 2006, while rubber production activities demanded new organization at the village level and a rubber tappers' business group (KUBK) was formed; the aim of the USAID IFACS program was to plant rubber trees on 25 hectares before 2015, when the project would end (temporarily). The final report of USAID IFACS describes some of its activities and KUBK as follows:

> "KUBK, Rubber Farmer Business Model in Central Kalimantan. The KUBK is an informal and non-registered entity, structurally derived from the Indonesian cooperative model. The terminology, *Kelompok Usaha Bersama Karet*, was developed by an IFACS grantee, Lembaga Dayak Panarung (LDP). Each KUBK has a Chairman, Secretary, and Treasurer. IFACS staff and partners introduced the KUBK structure in response to a perceived need to organize rubber farmers at the village level. The KUBKs were formed to enable the rubber farmers to capture higher value by upgrading their rubber to meet the industry standard, or SIR20 Standard, and then selling directly to the factories." (ibid.: 76)

And further:

> "Demonstrated Income Increase from participating in KUBKs. From an IFACS analysis, the members participating in this system realize a 25-28% income increase by marketing their rubber through the KUBK. This generates increased interest amongst farmers, leading to farmers not previously connected to IFACS or the CCLA process registering to join. The KUBK model is still new, and is currently establishing itself as a village level cooperative business. However, the

60 *Dokumen Perencanaan penggunaan lahan desaBuntoi. Kecamatan Kahayan Hilir Kabupaten Pulang Pisau tahun* 2014-2024.

61 Forestry Minister Decree SK.586/Menhut-II/2012.

model provides interested community members with additional opportunities to develop their social capital and improve their livelihoods." (ibid.: 68-69)

The role of the KUBK, with the assistance of the LDP, was to educate villagers in latex management so that its quality would improve and its price rise, particularly as the KUBK would be collecting and drying latex to sell it directly to the latex factories, thus getting higher prices than offered by brokers at the village level; furthermore, it could connect tappers with the bank, which could give them, for instance, micro loans.

However, despite the donor's claim that the income of farmers participating in KUBK has increased by 25 or more percent, I found the Buntoi KUBK storage house empty in January 2015. In our discussion at his home, the KUBK head told me that they were unable to persuade villagers to be active in the organization or to sell their latex through it; there had been some activity but it had stopped some months before. The rainy season was clearly one reason for this, since it is difficult to tap latex when it is raining. Furthermore, rubber prices had fluctuated and decreased dramatically; during the previous two years very low market prices have prevailed (only about 6,000 IDR/kg compared to about 15,000-20,000 IDR/kg before that). He further added that if the price of wet and dry rubber is almost the same, people will not dry their latex and then wait for a week or a month to get paid. The treasurer of the Buntoi KUBK told me that villagers were stuck in the old pattern (*pola lama*): the latex was wet and dirty; because the price of wet latex was almost the same as dry one; they did not want to dry it; and they wanted money immediately (*langsung*): "S/he gets it [money] today; it is used up today" (12.1.2015). This resembles what the USAID IFACS staff told me on another occasion in an interview. It is a paradigmatic problem; the villagers do not want to be troubled (*repot*); they have had it easy because of receiving cash immediately; and they do not understand the process (5.2.2015). Some villagers who told me that the KUBK method of drying latex took some time and the resulting product could only be sold to the mill once every four weeks while they could sell wet latex through brokers – though at a lower price – and get money the same day they tapped rubber.

Ultimately, after two years of training villagers to produce dry latex and form a rubber tapper's organization, after planting 35 hectares of rubber trees on the shared land along the canals, as well as building a new storage unit (*gudang*) costing 75 million IDR, there was virtually no resulting activity and it seemed that many villagers were simply not willing to sell their latex through KUBK.[62]

62 KUBK head told that USAID IFACS funded 25 hectares, while the villagers planted 35 hectares on their own. I travelled to the area in 2016, and all the planted rubber trees had burned during the forest fires taking place in the village area in 2015. In 2016, some villagers said they wanted to sell latex through KUBK, however, the organization had borrowed bank credit money to some villagers

Ngaju people told me that they value rubber tapping because they can decide how much they work per day, how many days per week, and if they do not choose to do it at all, they can source their livelihoods from somewhere else. On the other hand, Pak Nampun complained that nowadays Ngaju make themselves dependent on only one source of cash income at a time: if it was pepper it was only pepper, if it was rubber it was rubber – and nowadays it was rubber (11.5.2014). This was not completely true; there were people who sold fruit (especially *rambutan* and *durian*) and rattan. Ibu Nampun, his wife, had become an oil and gas broker during the period Pak Nampug was village head, although she was clearly an exception among the village people. However, Pak Nampun's argument could be understood in terms of values; what he was referencing was a loss of flexibility that is considered a key value among the Ngaju people.

One could argue that villagers were reluctant to wait for four weeks to get dry latex because they were experiencing a money shortage (poverty); however, this is not the only reason, because villagers could get part of the price immediately, and the rest when the organization actually sold the latex to the mill (at least so I was told). Their wish to sell latex directly and on their own behalf, and receive cash immediately, rather seems to point to the value of autonomy, as Pak Ise expressed it when we were fishing on the Kahayan River in 2015: "I have never worked for other people; I want to decide for myself – only those who don´t have garden are forced to work for salary (*upah*)" (21.1.2015). With regards value production, we could argue that money received from rubber seems to be understood in terms of immediate return, as noted at the beginning of this article. Immediate return societies share and consume their harvests and hunted game as soon as they get it; while, according to research which has studied such groups, practices leading to immediate return go hand in hand with solidarity and an egalitarian and non-competitive ethos. Could it be that money is understood in terms of immediacy, often circulating as soon as it is received, among the Ngaju? A theoretical discussion of money by Parry and Bloch (1989) invoke the theories of Simmel and Marx.

> "Unlike Simmel, who sees money itself as the principal catalyst for the transformation of social life, Marx's treatment links it to the (for him) more fundamental phenomenon of production for exchange – this being what ultimately creates the need for an abstract money medium. For both writers, however, money is associated with, and promotes, the growth of individualism, and the destruction of solidary communities." (1989: 4)

In this line of thought, money is seen as problematic, since, as a generalized yardstick, it dissolves social bonds and differences of quality. However, as Parry and Bloch note, even in the domain of the market social bonds and obligations

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or it has been used up for other purposes (it was a bit unclear), and it was now also unable to buy latex from the villagers anyway.

do exist and it is not simply money that transforms relationships (ibid., p. 8); this resonates with Polanyi's idea that "the economy is 'embedded' in society and subject to its moral laws" (ibid.: 9). The point I am making, based on empirical observation, is that many villagers wanted immediate return on their work as rubber tappers. However, money received from latex sales is often spent on food and consumer goods right after receiving it, while some of the villagers store rubber money on children's education taking place after the high school. In this sense wealth has not been accumulated (Howell 2012: 52-54), indicating equality as an important value. On the other hand, it simultaneously increases dependency on the market and a growth in individualist orientation as sharing practices decline, pointing to the short-term reproduction of social order (Parry and Bloch 1989).

Dove (1993) argues that swidden cultivation and the rubber economy are directly linked to local cultural values. For instance, among the Kantu people in West Kalimantan rubber cultivation differs from swidden rice cultivation in terms of associated value orientations, but the same people hold these differing values. Dove further argues that "rubber kills the land" (2012: 146), meaning that land under rubber represents short-term reproduction because it is individually managed and its returns are individualistically benefitted from. This is in contrast to swidden rice cultivation which contributes to long-term social reproduction through collective labor, distribution of harvest, and subsistence agriculture. However, in Borneo, swiddens and the rubber economy have of course often been integrated with each other as complementary parts of a whole. Among the Kantu:

> "The great value of the rubber-swidden combination is that it achieves not just minimal competition for resources but mutual enhancement of resource use. This, in turn, enables politically and economically marginal farmers to participate in the market economy to a remarkable extent on their own terms as opposed to the market's, thereby avoiding many of the risks that the latter entails." (Dove 1993: 145)

The Ngaju moral economy of rubber in Buntoi is interesting, since it has not been as individualistically-oriented as Dove claims: the rubber economy has long been based on the practice of collecting wild latex from the swamp forests; families moved around in groups; and sociality also included non-humans. In the course of time rubber cultivation motivated the adoption by some Ngaju families of immigrant people (Madurese) who shared latex harvest with the land owners. Even today some families have laborers in their rubber gardens who share the harvest, though if the price of latex is too low it is not possible to share the harvest unless there are other resources as well.

In Buntoi swidden rice cultivation has been performed in family groups with men and women working together. Rice was usually distributed among family members who could store it, even beyond the household, and in some occasions

leftovers were sold; it was subsistence agriculture that did not exclude the cash economy, meanwhile providing a degree of self-sufficiency in food production. When I stayed in the village during the rainy season in 2015, some people tapped rubber even though it was not the proper time to do it. Probably this is nothing new, since Dove also notes that the Dayak may tap rubber when rice is not quite ready to be harvested (Dove 1993: 140). However, even more interesting, the Ngaju I talked to did not cultivate swidden rice in 2015. Actually, many women said they had nothing to do (tap rubber, cultivate rice etc.) and young men worked on construction in the coal power plant on the other side of the river or mined for gold further along the Kahayan.[63] Rubber trees occupied large tracts of land but the price of latex had dropped so low that the villagers were reluctant to tap it at all. At the same time, shifting cultivation had become difficult due to land use pressure created by the newly established forest village unit in the protected forest area and the fear of burning rubber trees belonging to someone else.

The social consequence of the rubber economy seems to be that it discourages subsistence agriculture and "kills the land" – while at the same time turning people into consumers who are in constant need of money: they buy phones, motorcycles, and televisions, and have to pay electricity bills. New brick and cement houses, requiring cash, are being built in the village and some people have bought larger tracts of land for their rubber gardens. All in all, there was a need for money on a regular basis which seems to be one reason for selling "dirty" latex instantly. But, as some villagers noted, the old model (*pola lama*) of immediate money still survives among the villagers, pointing to continuing value being placed on solidarity and an immediate-return, or egalitarian ethos.

4.7 Conclusions: Continuity and change in value and landscape production

At the beginning of this article I posed three questions: How is nature (re)valued? How is a nature product converted into a valuable commodity to be exchanged for money? What effect does this outcome have on social relationships?

63 I wish to thank Michaela Haug for her comment that Dayak may seek income elsewhere than in swidden cultivation, if there were other alternatives. It is clear, though, that Ngaju people in Buntoi also declined to practice swidden cultivation in 2015 because they were afraid that they would burn the rubber trees of the other villagers, not because they had other livelihood alternatives. However, following my recent visit jn Buntoi in 2016; forest fires reached the village in autumn 2015 burning large areas of rubber gardens, and for that reason villagers cultivated rice on that land.

Firstly, nature is (re)valued by the climate change mitigation program discussed in this paper. It encourages rubber cultivation by supporting rubber planting and a rubber tappers' organization, networking with banks and organizing rubber management training in the village – and it integrates people into the market economy. In these ways, it has effects on the production of value landscape.

The rubber economy encourages increasingly individualistic orientation in terms of the changing land tenure system and a decline in the subsistence economy and sharing practices. However, the rubber economy does not necessarily emerge as a capitalistic strategy to accumulate wealth among the Ngaju people, as they may spend money earnings immediately, just as if it were a game, although they may also store "wealth" in jars, education, and rice[64].

Meanwhile, the cultural values associated with rubber have changed over the years. While latex from wild local trees was once collected from the swamp forest and bartered or traded with people travelling to the village by boat, the new rubber trees are planted according to a monoculture model on private land and exchanged for money – some rubber estates have also grown in size. Thus, it is increasingly alienated from the social relations within Buntoi.

Secondly, rubber is increasingly disconnected from swiddens, a combination which was the basis of the local dual economy. Through swidden cultivation, gathering and hunting Ngaju Dayak have tended to stress immediate return, which is related to the distribution of wealth and promotes egalitarian social relations, with solidarity as an important value. The climate change mitigation program by USAID IFACS in Buntoi encouraged new technologies of rubber management, suggesting that rubber latex should be sold to mills, and production could be funded by loans from the banks. According to the donors and some state officials, villagers should become rubber entrepreneurs. On the other hand, becoming an entrepreneur is not an easy thing to do when the whole ecosystem has been altered, overlapping claims and definitions of natural resources complicate cultivation and nature management practices as well as social relationships, and the local subsistence system is changing.

Thirdly, because of the plurality of the backgrounds of the people involved, the changes in the environment and politics, and the effects these have had on social relations, there is a constant debate about what to plant, and what kind of livelihoods one should choose: some wish to practice swidden rice cultivation; some want to establish oil palm plantations; and some practice rubber cultivation and the collection of non-timber forest products. These are choices with both

64 Jars or old vases have been used for storing food, but they are also places of spirits, thus indicating power and wealth.

social and environmental consequences, which also convey what is considered good or proper among the Ngaju. Many people regard subsistence economy and sharing as important practices that reinforce solidarity and egalitarian social relations, but at the same time there is a growing sense of differentiation, alienation, and dependence on the markets. Money does not necessary indicate accumulation wealth, but in the rubber economy, it increasingly points to delayed return and saving, and thus adverse value.

Monoculture rubber gardens cover increasingly large tracts of land and canals are created across peat swamps. Interestingly, climate change mitigation schemes bring to the mind the ways that the Dutch colonial power, and later an independent Indonesian state, encouraged permanent settlement and agriculture through private land ownership and commodity crops; in a similar way rubber cultivation promotes a monetary economy and individualism, which work as value exemplars for Buntoi villagers.

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PART II:

Ethnicity, Identity and Conflicts

5. Being Dayak in West Kalimantan: Constructing Indigenous Identity as a Political and Cultural Resource

Timo Duile

5.1 Introduction

In both Western and Indonesian societies, the word Dayak evokes images of indigenous people close to nature, living in a mysterious world of huge trees, dense vegetation, ancient longhouses and exotic rituals. Those images of the noble or dangerous savage in Borneo are the result of at least 150 years of economic, political and cultural processes and discourses, and are appropriated by the indigenous peoples of Borneo themselves in order to deal with economic, cultural and ecological challenges and threats. This chapter provides an overview of the construction and development of a common Dayak identity which transcends the hundreds of local ethnic identities and pools them into the umbrella identity of Dayakness. It deals with the production of identity from colonial times until the present, setting its focus on identity-generating processes in the province of West Kalimantan and pays particular attention to indigenous activists shaping Dayak identity in local and international discourses since the 1990s. However, the concept of Dayakness has roots reaching back approximately 150 years into the past. A closer look at that history exposes continuities and changes within the history of Dayak identity construction.

In order to be adopted by individuals and groups, every identity has to appear natural, that is, as an identity independent from other identities. Such identities are in post-structural theory described as transcendental signifiers or the centers of a symbolic order: They govern the symbolic order of meanings, since the meanings of all other elements within the symbolic order of language seem to be dependent on that center. But this is, of course, a deception: Although it appears to be a center, an independent symbol, as a symbol within the structure of language, it is actually dependent on other terms and symbols within the structure (Derrida 1997: 278-280). Identity as a symbol within a symbolic order is thus dependent on other symbols, which themselves can be other identities or symbols from other contexts such as political, social or scientific terms.

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Identities thus are mutually constitutive and embedded in a political and economic framework of meanings. Influenced by poststructuralist approaches, post-Marxist scholars point out that identities, particularly when they emerge as political forces, claim to be unitary but are, in fact, determined by the play of power and exclusion of the "other" or "constitutive outside" (Thomassen 2005: 109-111).

This essay seeks to analyze Dayak identity in West Kalimantan and its construction through identification of its constitutive outside, which enables Dayakness to appear to be a natural identity and a force of political and social struggles for recognition and justice for the marginalized people who refer to themselves as Dayak. Embedded in economic, political and ecological struggles of marginalization, exploitation and resistance, actors, processes and ideas are crucial for constructing the very meaning of Dayakness, since actors, processes, ideas and other identities shape Dayak identity and give meaning to the very term "Dayak."

Since the late New Order era, there has been a growing number of NGOs concerned with social, cultural and political issues in Kalimantan, taking Dayak identity as their conceptual foundation. These NGOs, for example the Kalimantan branches of AMAN (*Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara*, Alliance of Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago), the Institut Dayakologi in West Kalimantan (Tanasaldy 2012: 283-287), the pan-Kalimantan *Forum Solidaritas Masyarakat Dayak* (Acciaioli 2007: 305) or the *Solidaritas* movement in East Kalimantan (Maunati 2012: 98-100), are not just using Dayak identity but are sharpening and (re-)constructing it by referring to it in their specific ways. In order to deal with the threats Dayak communities are facing, Dayak identity has become a source of agency. What threatens the Dayak has become the identity's constitutive outside. For instance, binary oppositions can be found in many publications of the Institut Dayakologi: Dayak and their ways of life are described as sustainable, biodiverse, natural, based on the ideals of collectivity and cooperation, spirituality, traditional rituals, subsistence economy, customary law (*adat*) and locality, whereas the opposite of Dayakness is monoculture, individuality and competition, scientific rationality, commerciality, the state and globalization (for example, Bamba 2008b, Bamba 2010, Gunui & Ngiuk 2012: 48-60). To explain why Dayak identity is perceived this way, a closer look at both general international discourses on indigeneity and the specific history of Dayak people are of importance, but this essay focuses on the latter.

Although Dayak people live throughout the island of Borneo, political circumstances are different in Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia, and so are their struggles for recognition and justice within these countries. I will focus on the Indonesian province of West Kalimantan, a province heavily affected by

ecological transformation, especially since the 1980s, and with a vivid civil society developed since the late New Order period. However, many processes of Dayak identity construction are also at work in other parts of the island.

5.2 The Emergence of Dayak Identity: Colonialism and the Old Order

The idea of Dayakness as a translocal identity signifying all autochthon groups that do not speak Malay as their mother tongue and are not of Muslim faith was unknown before colonialism. Colonialism did not generate the differentiation between Malay Muslims and non-Muslims, but it facilitated the emergence of Dayakness when it juxtaposed it as a homogenous identity in contrast to the Muslim Malay. Collective identification as Dayak by people from different areas in West Kalimantan began to emerge when young students gathered in Catholic mission schools and began to identify themselves as what the Dutch colonialists already believed them to be: Members of an island-wide ethnic group, separated through customs and language but unified as an autochthon identity separated from the Malays (Davidson 2003: 4-5). In late colonial times, mission schools rather than government schools were the main providers of Dayak education. Although Dayak people were still marginalized, literacy enabled them to work in occupations they had not had access to before the missions started. Many of those occupations were related to church missions, for instance nursing in mission hospitals or teaching in schools. Catholic missions did not expand before the late colonial period: in 1915, there were only eleven mission schools in West Kalimantan; by 1938 their number had risen to 71 (Tanasaldy 2012: 71-73). It was an urban-based, Christianized elite that emerged during the late colonial period and was responsible for the spread of Dayak identity, since that elite also founded organizations based on the idea of Dayakness (Sillander 2004: 43). Since that time, Dayak identity has been closely related to Catholicism and, later, to Christianity more generally. Before missions helped in forming a translocal identity, it had been common for autochthon groups to refer to themselves in relation to a geographic entity, i.e. “people from the river XY” (Rousseau 2000: 11). The term Dayak used by the colonists to name the new emerging identity might come from Kenyah language in which it means “upriver” or “interior” – a connotation locating the Dayak in terms of ascribed characteristics in the remote, “uncivilized” interior of Borneo. Similar words can be found in other Dayak languages, too. The pejorative connotation is of European origin and rests on the idea that “the interior” is backwards and uncivilized. In Dayak languages where the term “daya” or similar words can be found, it has no pejorative connotation.

The term "Dayak" as an externally coined ascription emerged when the Dutch established a colonial system of indirect rule in most parts of Kalimantan. In West Kalimantan, for instance, only the regencies of Boven Kapuas (Kapuas Hulu), Melia and Pinoh Laden were under the direct rule of the Dutch. In the sultanates, the Dayak had virtually no access to education, they had to pay special taxes to the sultans and occupied the lowest strata within the sultanate's population (Bamba 2000: 38, Tanasaldy 2012: 58-61, Davidson 2003: 3). Within the colonial hierarchy, Dayak were not just inferior because they were *inlanders*, but even within the hierarchies of *inlanders* they experienced marginalization and discrimination. Therefore, conversion to Muslim faith was not unusual at that time. Dayak people who converted to Islam became *Senganan* and enjoyed the same privileges as the Malay. They gained access to education, followed a Malay way of life and tried to distinguish themselves from the Dayak who had been associated with a lack of civility and heathenism. Their place was remote villages, not the cities: Whereas the Malay comprised the largest groups in cities, the Dayak were larger in numbers in rural areas (Tanasaldy 2012: 53-56). From that time onwards, the Dayak came to be associated with the interior (*pendalaman*) of the island, which also resulted in the labeling of the Dayak as primitive, as "close to nature" and forests. The Malay, in contrast, are associated with trade, coastal habitation, and a higher degree of cultural sophistication (Sillander 2004: 35). The Dayak also experienced discrimination by the colonizing Dutch: Colonists accused the Dayak of being unable to manage their natural resources and, perceiving it as an ecological threat, the Dutch sought to outlaw traditional shifting cultivation (Wadley 2007: 112-114). However, this perception simply strengthened the image of the Dayak as a people close to nature because their traditional knowledge was portrayed as unscientific and backward. This fits with the evolutionist discourses at that time which gave the Dayak a low ranking in the evolution of mankind (for example Wallace 2012 [1890]: 68-72).

Prior to the Japanese Occupation and the subsequent independence of Indonesia, the political activities of the *inlanders* in West Kalimantan had been carried out by educated Malay and migrants from other parts of the Dutch East Indies. This is also why the Dayak did not play any crucial role during Japanese occupation, although that time was of importance to Dayak consciousness: The executions and disempowerment of Malay sultans and the Malay elite persuaded many Dayak that the Malay rulers had no spiritual power and therefore no right to rule the Dayak. Since large parts of the former elite and skilled personnel disappeared during the Japanese occupation, some educated Dayak were put in place to fill government positions when Indonesia became independent (Tanasaldy 2012: 74-75).

After the war, Dayak identity quickly emerged as a political force. Oevaang Oeray became their most recognized political leader. Johanes Chrisostomus Oevaang Oeray was born in 1922 in the regency of Kapuas Hulu (at that time Boven Kapuas) and initially worked as a teacher. He was a member of the educated Dayak elite which emerged on the eve of Indonesian independence. During the struggle for independence, he stated that the Dayak's backwardness was not the result of their own ignorance but of a "wicked politics of feudalism" which subjugated the Dayak. Oeray accused not only the Malay rulers but also the Dutch for working with the sultanates, and depicted their interplay as "multi-layered colonialism" (Davidson 2003: 12-13). Thus, Dayak identity as an emerging political force gained an anti-colonial connotation. By highlighting colonialism and feudalism as the constitutive outside and as a threat to the Dayak, this new political consciousness portrayed Dayak identity as implicitly progressive and set it into the frame of Indonesia's new political culture, a culture rejecting both Indonesian tradition and colonialism, ready to create a new country in a process of struggle (Lane 2008: 23-28).

The first formal Dayak organization in West Kalimantan, "Dayak in Action" (DIA), transformed itself into a political party just one year after it was founded in 1945. DIA was established with the help of the Catholic Church in West Kalimantan. When DIA became the United Dayak Party (*Persatuan Dayak*, PD), its political aims were to raise the Dayak's self-esteem as non-Malay who had been subjugated by sultans and colonists, to eliminate discrimination in civil service recruitment, to abolish the special taxes the Dayak had to pay to the sultanates and to achieve political freedom for the Dayak (Tanasaldy 2012: 90-93). Like their chairman Oeray, the PD was strongly influenced by the ideas of modernization, progress and abolishing tradition. The PD congress in 1950, for instance, passed motions ordering that "primitive" dry-rice cultivation (*ladang*) be replaced by "orderly" wet-rice cultivation, that longhouses be replaced by individual houses and that "ancient customs" be abandoned (Davidson 2003: 14). Dayak political identity here appeared as the opposite of the old way of life (*kuno*) and the primitive (*primitif*), criticizing not only colonialism and feudalism, but also their own traditional custom.

The PD achieved overwhelming success in the first elections in West Kalimantan: It became the second largest party in the 1955 provincial election and gained a further 20% in the 1958 election, making the PD the strongest ethnic political party in Indonesia (Tanasaldy 2012: 99-100). Although Oeray served as the governor of West Kalimantan until 1966, his PD was outlawed in 1959 due to Sukarno's regulation banning all regional political parties in order to prevent secessionist movements. The PD elite joined other political parties, most going to the leftist Partindo and the Catholic Party, but Dayak identity as a

political force was in decline (Davidson 2003: 16-17, Tanasaldy 2012: 109-121). When mass killings of alleged and actual communists erupted, Indonesians of Chinese descent were suspected of being communists and the Dayak engaged in the killings and evictions of Chinese Indonesians (Davidson 2008: 67, see also Oesterheld in this volume). Thus, in addition to Malayness, Chinese identity also became part of Dayak identity's constitutive outside.

5.3 Dayakness: A Marginalized Identity during the New Order Era

During Suharto's New Order (*orde baru*) era, the Dayak were represented poorly in regional legislatures, governments and the bureaucracy. The regime's centralized approach, which was also anti-ethnic, prohibited any preferential treatment for the marginalized Dayak, and often Dayak people could not ascend political parties' hierarchies and bureaucracies as nepotism and cronyism made it hard to progress in a political establishment dominated by Malay people and, in particular, people from Java. Notwithstanding the fact that poor Dayak education had ceased to be an issue since the 1980s, political and economic marginalization lasted throughout the whole New Order period (Tanasaldy 2012: 155- 175). Dayak identity as a regional identity ranging over several provinces could not provide a foundation for a political struggle. The New Order regime aimed to domesticate cultural diversity in order to prevent local identity from competing with national identity. This was necessary to prevent separatism, but the issue of Javanese domination and marginalization of many Dayak communities could not be broached in ethnic terms. Ethnicity was a taboo when it came to political issues but was present in conflicts and in the ways the regime managed the archipelago's cultural diversity. Thus, ethnicity was "nowhere and everywhere in Indonesia" (Klinken 2003: 64). Local identities were conceptualized by the regime as one identity in each province of the nation, represented by typical houses, dress, swords and dances.[65] By this approach, specific ethnic identities were increasingly supplanted by a national identity which was, in fact, very much inspired by Javanese culture. Dayak villages in West Kalimantan, for instance, were named according to the naming conventions of villages in Java. Furthermore, some Dayak communities were classified by the department of social affairs as isolated communities or alienated tribal communities (*masyarakat terasing* or *masyarakat suku terasing*) (Bamba 2008b: 260). As

65 The Taman Mini theme park near Jakarta, opened in 1975, is a product of this approach (Herrmann 2005: 102-104). Its aim is to show the diverse culture of Indonesia by presenting a culture from each province, not from each ethnic group.

Tanasaldy (2012: 198) describes it, the decision to include only Dayak communities in this category was very much influenced by a perception of the Dayak as a people with traditional ways of life, practicing shifting cultivation or living as nomads and practicing an exotic, that is, "primitive" culture. In 1975 there were 66 such "isolated communities" classified in West Kalimantan, representing 42% of the West Kalimantan Dayak population. The New Order regime portrayed itself as a government of progress, aiming at developing Indonesia's margins. Thus, development (*pembangunan*) became a crucial discourse in the New Order era (Arnscheidt 2009: 117-124) and the Dayak became one of that doctrine's objects. Just like colonial administrations, the New Order government blamed the Dayak's shifting cultivation for forest destruction and forest fires. Also, longhouses were portrayed by the New Order government as dirty, unhealthy, dangerous and as breeding grounds for communism. Therefore, the Dayak were instructed to destroy their longhouses and in some cases Dayak communities were forced to do so by the military (Tanasaldy 2012: 199). For Dayak activists in the post-Suharto era, the destruction of these cultural symbols became equivalent to the destruction of Dayak solidarity and livelihoods (Bamba 2000: 46).

Another factor serving to alter Dayak culture was the decline of traditional beliefs. The state of Indonesia recognized only five religions, all of which were conceptualized as monotheist faiths. These religions (Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism) were perceived as civilized faiths and as beliefs in a single God (*Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa*). That concept is also codified in the first principle in Indonesia's state ideology, *pancasila*. Religion thus became a public-political issue (Intan 2008). Animism, in contrast, was not recognized and was seen as a backwards faith which would disappear sooner or later – a perception of animism very much influenced by an evolutionist point of view, identifying monotheism as the most advanced form of faith. In official numbers, Animism declined drastically during the New Order period: According to the 1971 census, 655,097 people in West Kalimantan professed "other religions" than the five officially recognized ones. The large majority of these people were very likely Dayak animists. After the fall of the New Order in 2000, their numbers had declined to 16,059 (Tanasaldy 2012: 197). Whereas Dayak activists emphasize that Catholicism accepts Dayak rituals, Protestantism is perceived as incompatible with Dayak culture since Protestant clergies often urge the Dayak not to believe in spirits and demand that they stop performing their traditional rituals (Bamba 2000: 42). Thus, Dayak rituals and traditional beliefs became more important in the construction of Dayak identity, as they contrasted with the "new faiths from outside," as put by some activists from the Institut Dayakologi interviewed during my fieldwork.

Furthermore, the state of Indonesia claims rights for itself over resources on behalf of national interests. It thereby gained control over indigenous peoples' land and leased that land to corporations for the purpose of establishing plantations (mostly palm oil plantations which, since the 1990s, have replaced rubber and extensive agriculture in many places) or for mining activities. Claiming control over land by the state is a legacy of the so-called liberal period of Dutch colonialism and has always been legitimized by reference to the alleged benefit for the nation, for example in order to achieve economic growth and development. During colonial times the idea emerged that land and forests belonged to the state, and this situation continued after independence. In 1870, the colonial government passed a law declaring territories not extensively used to be state-owned (Fitzpatrick 2007: 133). New Order administrations took this to the extreme by issuing several sectoral laws on forestry, mining, oil and natural gas, irrigation, and fisheries, all of which increased state control over natural resources and facilitated their exploitation by private interests. Concerning access to and ownership of forests and their resources, a law passed in 1967 (UUPK 5/1967) is crucial, since it only recognized private and state ownership of forests, completely ignoring adat and ownership by local communities (Safitri/Bosko 2002: 17, Pichler 2014: 127). Not surprisingly, many indigenous communities perceived the state and, later, the very ideology of capitalist economy, as a threat to their land rights and livelihoods. The issue of land rights became a crucial issue for indigenous movements all over the Indonesian archipelago and beyond (Acciaioli 2007: 307-313).

As "isolated" and "underdeveloped" parts of Indonesia, many Dayak territories were also locations used for the *transmigrasi* program which caused not only ethnic tensions but also ecological damage, as it fueled the expansion of monocultures (Whitten et al. 1987). Through transmigration, population and labor force were to be distributed from the densely populated islands of Java to remote parts of Indonesia in order to develop the outer regions. The first transmigrants came to West Kalimantan in 1955, but their numbers quickly grew during the New Order period, reaching a peak in the 1980s. Within Dayak communities, people believed that transmigants were privileged because they got land which had been taken from Dayak communities in some cases when this land was only extensively used. Also, many Dayak believed that these people from outside Kalimantan had taken jobs from locals. The *transmigrasi* program therefore caused some serious tensions between natives (mostly Dayak) and transmigants (Tanasaldy 2012: 189-192). Thus, the transmigrant's ethnic identities emerged as the constitutive outside for pan-Dayak identity. This is not only the case during violent ethnic conflicts, but also, for instance, during election campaigns when candidates are eager to stress their ethnic background,

portraying themselves as locals belonging to a respective local and ethnic community. Thus, transmigrant programs often accompany large-scale environmental transformations, since the programs aim to develop the margins of Indonesia. This strengthens the perception of Dayak people as the original inhabitants of an imagined original (that is, natural) landscape, while transmigration stands for development and environmental transformation.

Ethnic violence in West Kalimantan also strengthened the perception of the Dayak as wild warriors outside of civilized society. Violence, savagery and nature thus became a topos for the depiction of Dayakness within the context of ethnic conflicts. Nancy Lee Peluso points out that nature and violence play a crucial role in the larger scheme of iconic simplification and conceptualization of identity production in West Kalimantan, a process in which "both nature and natives are reduced to caricatures of political and economic ends" (Peluso 2003: 236).

Due to the New Order`s development ideology, which is still a point of reference for post-New Order governments, West Kalimantan has faced massive ecological transformation, especially since the 1980s. Deforestation and monoculture plantations shaped the West Kalimantan environment. Most of all, logging and concomitant oil palm expansion changed the environment and transformed the livelihoods of many Dayak, also resulting in an enormous impact on Dayak identity. In 1984, 5,000 ha were planted with oil palms in West Kalimantan, but this number rose to 382,000 ha by 2005 (Potter 2009: 109). In 2010, the conversion of more than 1 million ha was approved by regional and local authorities in West Kalimantan. Of this area, 66% was already cultivated with oil palms (Caroko et al. 2011: 2-3). This expansion caused many conflicts with locals, mostly with Dayak communities who became victims of land grabbing. Conceptualized as a state development strategy, plantations were soon perceived as a threat and anti-plantation protests started at the beginning of the 1980s, although they went unreported until environmental and indigenous NGOs established a network in West Kalimantan and helped organize the protests (Tanasaldy 2012: 188-189). The regime's identification of the Dayak as backward, traditional and savage made many Dayak people feel ashamed of their identity (Sillander 2004: 43). But within the context of a growing resistance against economic and social marginalization, Dayakness became more and more a point of reference for activists. Thus, the state of Indonesia, especially the New Order regime and its ideology of development (*pembangunan*), became the constitutive outside of Dayak identity. Whereas Dayakness as a political identity was conceptualized as progressive and anti-traditional by PD activists in the early years of the Indonesian Republic, it was perceived by both activists and the

state as "traditional" from the New Order era onwards – the former saw it as a strength, the latter as an obstacle to development.

5.4 Dayak identity and indigenous movements

The indigenous movement in Indonesia is a phenomenon emerged at the end of the New Order regime and gained in importance in the post-Suharto era. To explain the success of this movement it is crucial to mention the socio-economic background of globalization and weakening nationalism. National identity is also undermined by conditions created by regional elite groups which gain power in the context of the decentralization process which started shortly after the fall of the centralized New Order regime (Mietzner 2014). Furthermore, rapid globalization also undermined nationalism as the main force of collective identity. Within this process, new opportunities arose for indigenous people as historically marginalized groups, since they could mobilize their identities within the weakening frame of a national identity (Turner 2003). However, indigenous movements in Indonesia do not reject the nation state, rather arguing for making Indonesia a 'plural state' (*negara majemuk*) (Acciaioli 2007: 305).

Indonesia was integrated into the capitalist world economy under Suharto, but economic liberalization within Indonesia was strengthened in the post-Suharto era, perhaps reaching its peak during the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. On the one hand, many Dayak communities became more marginalized during the process of the commodification of their lands. On the other hand, ethnicity as a political resource could also be strengthened in these political and economic conditions of transnational capitalism and weakening nationalism. Political circumstances in Indonesia changed quickly after the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998: A more liberal political frame was established and NGOs were able to organize and articulate their protests more freely. Indonesia's biggest indigenous people's organization, the Alliance of Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago (*Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara*, AMAN), has its roots in West Kalimantan. Founded on a regional level in 1998 as *Aliansi Masyarakat Adat* (AMA), Dayak communities organized protests against the conversion of *adat* forest into plantations and mines (Potter 2012: 12-13). Dayak communities here were conceptualized as *masyarakat adat*, as "people of customary law" or, more generally, "traditional society", since the term *adat* means not only customary law but custom and tradition in general. *Masyarakat adat* became the Indonesian translation of the term "indigenous people" (Li 2007: 343). AMA thus was the nucleus of AMAN founded one year later in Jakarta. AMAN's aim is the recognition of indigenous people by the state, and

this recognition first of all means recognition of indigenous people's rights to their land and resources (Acciaioli 2007: 295). When more than two hundred representatives of indigenous communities stated at the first AMAN congress in 1999 that they would not recognize the state if it would not recognize them as indigenous communities, it reflected their frustration with the Indonesian state, a state unable to solve long-lasting conflicts and consistently rejecting indigenous people's rights (Moniaga 2007: 275) – rights that the Dayak in Kalimantan became increasingly aware of due to international discourses on indigenous peoples. With its provocative statement, AMAN put itself in opposition to the state and the state appeared as a constitutive outside for indigenous people's identity in Indonesia. But at the same time, the state became a part of indigenous people's identity, too: Since the statement seeks mutual recognition, indigenism as a political force emerged from the state's recognition of it, and indigenous activists used the state, its institutions and the political arena for their aims.[66]

In the 2014 presidential election campaign, AMAN supported Joko Widodo and now hopes that the new president will improve the situation of indigenous people in Indonesia. AMAN achieved its biggest success when it was campaigned for the striking down in court of a law passed in 1999 which had given control over *adat* forests to the state. Until that court decision, administrative bodies had the right to allocate concessions to companies. However, with the passage of this law, *adat* forests were declared state forests. The Indonesian Supreme Court (*Mahkamah Konstitusi*) decided in favor of AMAN, ordering the state of Indonesia and its institutions to respect *adat* rights on land insofar as adat communities could prove that they maintained their adat institutions and laws up to today. By doing so, the Indonesian state (in the form of the judiciary) influenced the meaning of being indigenous: Indigenous communities have to prove that they persist with "static" cultures and institutions over a long period of time.

In West Kalimantan, civil society organizations referring to *adat* and ethnicity emerged during the late New Order. The Institut Dayakologi (ID) became the largest indigenous NGO operating on a provincial scale. Founded in 1990 as the Institut Dayakologi Research and Development, it initially dealt solely with cultural and folkloric issues but became involved in political work from the mid-1990s onward, when palm oil expansion was identified as a threat to the Dayak (Potter 2009: 10). *Pancur kasih*, an organization closely connected to the ID, is the biggest credit union in Indonesia (Tanasaldy 2012: 283). It provides credit for people in the rural areas of West Kalimantan and enables

66 In Indonesia's official view that all Indonesians are "indigenous," or no one is (Li 2003: 380-381), but now the state recognizes *masyarakat adat*. Through that term, indigenous activists found a way to apply the concept of indigeneity in Indonesia.

these people, who are mostly Dayak, to resist pressure to sell their land or plant palm oil monocultures. According to the indigenous activists, the Dayak "developed a distinct management of resources based on living in harmony with nature" (Bamba 2000: 35) and the credit should help the Dayak to re-establish or to maintain such a "traditional" life. The *pancur kasih* credit union movement is, therefore, closely connected to the Dayak activists' perceptions of Dayak identity (Bamba 2010). Transnational capital, in contrast, is thus perceived as the constitutive outside since it threatens the Dayak's traditional livelihoods and culture by financing agribusiness and mining. Another important factor in the strengthening of Dayak identity by activists is their reference to the "local character of Dayak culture" and to the village community, whereas "the global" is portrayed as the opposite of Dayak identity (Gunui & Ngiuk 2012: 55, 59).

The *pancur kasih*-ID network's Dayak activism is based on a specific concept of Dayakness which is rooted in the idea of the Dayak as indigenous people suppressed by hegemonic forces. Dayakness is thus the opposite of global capitalism and the state: it is related to subsistence, village community and customary law (see, for instance Gunui & Ngiuk 2012: 51-60, Bamba 2008a: 244-249). In the activists' perception, New Order legacies of development, dispossession and destruction of tradition have effectively confined Dayak identities to state-sanctioned definitions of Dayakness as unpolitical folklore, an approach nowadays rejected by Dayak activists.

Folklore references to Dayak identity became a tool in political campaigning. Within the context of decentralization, local Dayak elites seek votes by using symbols generally perceived to be Dayak symbols. Dayak marginalization in politics quickly came to an end after the New Order era. Dayak people embedded in elite networks achieved success in local elections, particularly in regencies predominantly inhabited by Dayaks. For instance, in the 1999 election, most legislators elected in these regencies were Dayaks (Tanasaldy 2012: 289-290). In the 2005 election, Dayaks were elected as district heads (*bupati*) in Sintang, Bengkayang, Sekadau and Melawi. One year later, Cornelis became the first Dayak governor since Oevaang Oeray (Supriyadi 2011). The *pemekaran* process (a territorial reform process, usually results in the foundation of new districts) of the post-Suharto era also led to new *kabupaten* in West Kalimantan, where the Dayak have become the majority. In 1999, the *kabupaten* of Bengkayang split from Sambas, a coastal area predominately inhabited by Malays. Two years later, the city of Singkawang, well-known for its Chinese majority, split from the *kabupaten* of Bengkayang, a process leading to a new regency with a Dayak population of more than 50%. In the *kabupaten* of Landak, which split from the city of Pontianak (with its Malay majority and huge Chinese community) in 1999, almost 80% are Dayak.

Dayak identity, an obstacle during Suharto's New Order now became a valuable resource in politics and in public space in general. The Dayak Kanayatn greeting *Adil ka`talino bacuramin ka`saruga basengat ka`jubata* ("Just with other people, virtue as guidance, trust in God") became common not only at political events but at many other events and gatherings where it is nowadays used together with the Islamic greeting *As-Salamu 'alaikum wa Rahmatullahi wa Barakatuhu* ("May the peace, mercy, and blessings of Allah be with you"). Both greetings are used if the audience is neither solely Christian/Catholic nor Muslim and this indicates the equality of the Dayak and Muslim Malay within the public sphere. The longhouse, a symbol of backwardness during the New Order era, is now perceived as a symbol of Dayak culture, heritage and pride, although there are almost no longhouses left in West Kalimantan. The city of Pontianak built a giant longhouse used for cultural performances. However, in political campaigns on the sub-district level, the ethnic identities of Dayak sub-groups became important as well. In campaign posters (*spanduk*) it is common for candidates to wear traditional dress and to use local languages so that they appear, for instance, as Iban, Bakati or Kembayan. Self-portraying as Dayak, in contrast, is common in areas where many different Dayak groups are living or in provincial elections.

A closer look at relationships and interactions between Dayak and non-Dayak peoples reveals that frequent interaction between Dayak communities and those outside, most of all Malay communities, are important as they lead to local identities which prove the generalized dichotomy between Dayak and Malay to be an ensemble of stereotypes. Kenneth Sillander (2004), for instance, demonstrated this with reference to Central Kalimantan. In West Kalimantan, interactions are also common. However, the boundary between Malay and Dayak identity there is strengthened by the fact that a Dayak converting to Islam becomes Malay, which is not the case in other provinces in Kalimantan. This example illustrates well the contingency of identity construction.

In the context of deforestation and ecological conflicts described above, the perception of Dayak identity as uncivilized and close to nature has been gaining in importance, as Dayak activists have portrayed Dayak identity as traditional and sustainable (i.e. Bamba 2008a: 244-247, Bamba 2010: 419-423, Gunui & Ngiuk 2012: 51-56), a perception sometimes also propagated by scholars (for instance Ngabut 2003: 252). This reflects a still ongoing debate in anthropology on the question of whether indigenous people are ecologically sustainable (Hames 2007). In the case of the construction of Dayak identity, ecology and sustainability have become crucial characteristics of Dayakness, strongly opposing the characterization of Dayaks as unsustainable and prodigal made by both the colonizing Dutch and the New Order regime. However, Dayakness as an indigenous identity is not just a force rejecting ecological damage and market

economy. Indigenous identity is actually very compatible with neoliberalism and capitalist economy; it is in itself an object suitable for both market exploitation and a potential opener of exclusive resource access (Comaroff & Comaroff 2009). The latter has become an issue in Indonesia especially since the Indonesian Supreme Court (*Mahkamah Konstitusi*) decided in favor of AMAN, ordering the state of Indonesia and its institutions to respect *adat* ownership rights on land if *adat* communities can prove that they have been maintaining their *adat* institutions and laws up to today. The Indonesian Supreme Court decided that Forestry Law 41/1999 was not in line with the Indonesian Constitution. People now have access to their land based on ethnic affiliation insofar as they can prove that their indigenous community still exists and maintains their adat institutions. A new law passed in 2014 (UU No. 6 2014(3)) permits and regulates companies owned by villages and indigenous communities (*Badan Usaha milik Desa*, BUMDes and *Badan Usaha milik Masyarakat Adat*, BUMMA). Under the auspices of that legal framework, indigenous activists support economic activities carried out under the banner of BUMMA, contrasting the indigenous companies with state-held companies and private firms (Nababan 2015). However, this makes indigeneity compatible with market demands and might integrate indigenous communities into the capitalist market they have struggled against since the New Order era. In West Kalimantan, where access to land is highly contested, Dayakness might now become an economic advantage.

5.5 Conclusion

The Dayak have been portrayed as uncivilized savages by both colonial regimes and the New Order government in order to bring the achievements of progress and civilization to them. This characterization as people close to nature and far from civilization was rejected in earlier times but is now being appropriated by Dayak activists: For them, the idea of being close to nature does not mean the opposite of modernity, but rather provides a notion of their imagined origin, that is, revitalizing an identity constructed as people living in harmony with nature and therefore entitled to rule over their land and resources. By turning this ascription into capital they can use in national and international discourses, the Dayak can portray themselves as people fighting against neocolonialism, resisting ecological destruction and economic marginalization. In a country lacking powerful leftist critical narratives such as peasant movements, indigenous identity has become a force for conceptualizing the

struggle against marginalization, dispossession and disregard as backwards people.

When Dayakness was created in the political and ideological framework of colonialism, it soon became a force fighting against feudal and colonial rule in the early years of the independent republic. Despite the ban on political activities based on ethnicity, Dayakness did not disappear but experienced its re-conceptualization as the development ideology's constitutive outside. Thus, turning the meaning of development and modernity into an obstacle to Dayak recognition, the terms ascribed to development – the state, market capitalism, ecological destruction, neocolonialism – became the constitutive outside for the Dayak movements emerging in the late New Order period. The indigenous activists' anti-globalist approach (which depicts Dayak identity as "local" and based on subsistence economy) fits into the frame of national discourses which counteract neoliberal agendas, in particular those during the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014), when anti-globalism became one of the important tropes in political debate (Fakih 2015). However, by providing a legal framework for indigenous communities to gain sovereignty over their land and resources, Dayak communities in West Kalimantan might soon become potent economic players, entering the global market and fulfilling the government's aspiration to expand palm oil production.

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6. The (Ir)Relevance of Ethnicity among the Punan Murung and Bakumpai in Central Kalimantan

Kristina Großmann

6.1. Introduction[67]

A major change in the ethnic composition of the village of Tumbang Tujang in the north of Central Kalimantan forms the starting point for my analysis of ethnicity, ethnic identity, ethnic revitalization and the use of strategic ethnic essentialism. In the 1980s Tumbang Tujang was mostly populated by Punan Murung[68] whereas today Bakumpai form the ethnic majority and occupy all political positions. The designation Punan generally refers to forest dwelling hunting and gathering nomadic or formerly nomadic groups living predominantly in the interior part of Borneo. The Bakumpai have descended historically from Ngaju groups that converted to Islam and those in Tumbang Tujang migrated to the upper part of the Murung River mostly due to trade activities. Focusing on these two ethnic groups with different origins and cultural backgrounds, I will elaborate in this chapter on changes and continuities within processes of ethnic identity formation and the instrumentalization of ethnicity.

After summarizing different approaches to ethnicity I describe difficulties in finding systematized differentiations for ethnic groups in Borneo. A useful approach in this regard is the concept of polythetic classifications which I apply in delineating and describing the ethnic categories of Dayak, Punan and Bakumpai in general and in the specific case of Tumbang Tujang. I present the revitalization of ethnicity and the development of a new specific ethnic identity comprising the 'content, close to nature, half-nomadic indigenes' employed by

67 I thank Cathrin Arenz, Stefan Seitz and Oliver Venz for their endurance in commenting on earlier drafts of this chapter. Additionally, I am very grateful to Michaela Haug and Andrea Höing, who provided me with valuable information and who never tired of discussing the topic. Special gratitude goes to Bernhard Sellato for providing me with his data on the Punan Murung and who served as a source of information and inspiration in my studies on the Punan.

68 I focus on the Punan Murung, as they are the majority Christian/Hindu-Kaharingan group in Tumbang Tujang.

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both Bakumpai and Punan Murung. I use the term half-nomadic in reference to the formerly nomadic Punan Murung and the non-nomadic Bakumpai who live in the forested area of Uut Murung, engage in temporary migration, have a close and reciprocal relationship with their natural environment and natural resources, and show flexibility with regard to their livelihood strategy and different ethnic affiliation. Furthermore I describe in this chapter how relevant or irrelevant ethnicity is in daily life activities, work and settlement patterns, rituals and food habits. In the last section of this chapter I analyze the relevance of ethnicity in the use of strategic ethnic essentialisms in struggles over environmental and cultural rights and the exclusion of the 'wrong' indigenes.

I collected data for this chapter during two ethnographic fieldwork phases comprising three months altogether in 2014 and 2015. I lived with Punan Murung/Bakumpai families in the village of Tumbang Tujang and with Punan Murung and Siang families in the regency capital Puruk Cahu. I conducted participant observation of life-cycle events (e.g. marriage and burial ceremonies) and healing rituals, as well as of meetings of political/traditional village authorities, family representatives and village representatives with the management of the nearby logging company. I also conducted semi-structured and narrative interviews with villagers on ethnicity and natural resource use as well as with state officials and members of several civil society organizations in Puruk Cahu on development and environmental protection programs implemented in the village.

6.2 Approaches to Ethnicity

The Functionalist: The Cultural Stuff

The classical understanding of ethnicity prevalent in academia until the middle of the twentieth century tended to perceive ethnicity as static and primordial. Dominated by a structural functionalist understanding of the human world, in this conceptualization ethnic groups are treated as clearly demarcated and bounded homogenous collectives; ethnic belonging is understood as pre-existential and ethnic identity as a homogenous entity with little flexibility (Jenkins 2008). Ethnicity is thus associated with specific cultural features, descent, and language – what Fredrik Barth (1969) calls "[…] cultural stuff […]" (Barth 1969: 15).

The Constructivist: Relational Ethnic Identities

Since the 1970s, the classical understanding of ethnicity which perceived ethnicity as static and primordial was challenged by the constructivist turn, in which researchers conceptualize ethnic groups as constructed and imagined. Studies focus less on the cultural characteristics – the 'cultural stuff' – of ethnicity and more on the social processes which (re)produce boundaries of identification and differentiation. Ethnicity is perceived in the sense of ethnic identity, which is seen to be constructed and habitually reproduced in a mutual process of delineation against the 'outer' (see below). Therefore, the focus shifted to the question of how a person might understand, live and feel her or his ethnic identity.

The constructivist conceptualization of ethnic groups is very much influenced by Max Weber's definition (1978). He describes ethnic groups as imagined communities and not bound by common descent or 'blood.' Fredrik Barth (1969) has contributed much to this constructivist understanding of ethnicity by emphasizing that the constitution of ethnic groups is very much based on their delineation in contrast to other ethnic groups and thereby stresses the relationality of ethnic group formation. This point is also made by Everett Hughes (1994), who states that an ethnic group is constituted because the "[…] *ins* and the *outs* talk, feel, and act as if it were a separate group" (Hughes 1994: 91). Shared culture is in this framework constituted by processes of ethnic boundary maintenance in the interaction between the 'inner' and the 'outer' and takes place across the boundary. In this definition ethnic groups are conceptualized as groups which have common interests and consequently focus on or construct their common origin or descent, rather than the other way round (a common origin being the cause of common interests). This approach predominantly addresses the issue of social categorization, which is intimately bound up with power relations.

Complementing these aspects, current constructivist and anti-essentialist approaches focus on the ascription and self-ascription of actors – thereby 'rehabilitating' the researched person – and conceptualize ethnicity as a cognitive way of interpreting or making sense of the world (Brubaker 2004: 64-87). Ethnicity is thus seen as ethnic identity and as a biographically grounded way of living, experiencing, perceiving and remembering everyday life situations, both enabling and constraining social action (Karner 2007). Ethnicity is one category amongst others, e.g. gender, in the development of one's identity. Identity formation is conceptualized as a process and as relational and its development is – as before – based on the relationship and interaction between individuals and groups. Therefore, the ethnic identity of an individual, understood as the self-

designation or self-definition, is always bound to interconnectedness with others (Sökefeld 1999).

The Instrumentalist: Strategic Ethnic Essentialisms

Ethnicity gained importance in the process of postcolonial transformations and the political self-determination of marginalized groups. For several decades, rising culture reflexivity, ethnic revitalization, and the instrumentalization and politicization of ethnicity have affected struggles over power and authority. During the authoritarian regime under former president Suharto, ethnicity was taboo in political discourses. In the endeavor to create a modern and non-ethnic Indonesia, the so called SARA topics: ethnicity, religion, race and affiliation to certain groups (*suku, agama, ras, dan antar golongan*) were abolished because of fears that separatist and centrifugal powers would threaten national unity. The fall of Suharto in 1998 enabled the revitalization of ethnicity, which is closely connected to struggles over land rights and natural resource use. The politicization of ethnicity or the ethnicization of politics is closely related to indigenous peoples' rights. Spivak (1998) coined the term "strategic essentialism" referring to the shared experience of marginalization of groups asserting their distinctiveness in their challenge to hegemonic structures. Therefore, ethnicity may be used in an essentialist way to enhance power and authority, as a political tool and a commercial asset. Tania Murray Li (2000) terms the opportunity and capacity of marginalized groups to mobilize and articulate "tribal slot." Factors for successfully using the tribal slot are a competition for resources in the context of ethnic boundary-making combined with heightened interest in the case, an affirmative political structure, the capacity to present ethnic identity by the group, and interest from urban activists in supporting exemplary indigenous subjects. However, the romanticized and essentialized instrumentalization of ethnic attributes can result in boundary-making, selection, and exclusion. Therefore, the empowerment of certain marginalized groups can lead to the marginalization of others.

In the analysis on ethnicity in this chapter I follow constructivist and instrumentalist approaches to ethnicity and refer to the basic social anthropological model of ethnicity summarized by Richard Jenkins. He states that ethnicity is a matter of cultural differentiation which involves a dialectical interplay between similarity and difference; ethnicity is a matter of shared meanings (what is called culture) and is produced and reproduced during interactions; ethnicity is not fixed; ethnicity, as an identification, is collective and individual, externalized in social interaction and internalized in personal self-

identification (Jenkins 2008: 14).[69] In a nutshell, I use the term ethnicity to refer to constructed relational cultural differentiations and similarities as well as shared meanings which can be instrumentalized in struggles over power. I elaborate on changes and continuities in self-designations and external ascriptions referring to ethnicity as well as in the formation of ethnic groups and ethnic identities, with particular focus on current developments but also taking a historical perspective. Furthermore, I analyze the politicization of ethnicity in struggles over power and authority. Special interest is taken in the tensions between ethnic self-designation and the formation of relational ethnic identities as well as on ethnic ascriptions and the enforcement of ethnicity by actors who refer to allegedly primordial and static ethnic characteristics.

6.3 A Polythetic Approach to Differentiating Ethnic Groups in Borneo

The abovementioned primordial approach which perceives ethnicity as static and treats ethnic groups as demarcated, bounded, homogenous collectives was the predominant ideology and conceptual framework in descriptions of ethnic groups in Borneo until the 1960s. In this line of thought, ethnicity is associated with specific cultural features, descent, and language. Ethnic groups are associated with having a common origin, as well as having fixed attributes for systematization and delineation.

This homogenization of ethnic groups in Borneo was increasingly problematized by scholars from the 1960s onwards. Rodney Needham (1962) was one of the first scholars to criticize the classical descriptions of the Dayak as homogenizing and essentializing, thereby questioning the fundamental difference between groups as stated, for example, by Waldemar Stöhr (1959). Most scientists working in Borneo agreed that ethnic labels have the problem of being artificial and arbitrary, and that there is no obvious single set of characteristics found by researchers (e.g. language, descent, sociopolitical organization or spirituality) that can clearly distinguish any given group from others (Rousseau 1990: 43-75).

Disparities regarding the constitution and differentiation of ethnic groups, the arbitrariness of group distinction and arguments that ethnic groups are not monothetic entities led some scholars such as Rodney Needham (1983) to follow the approach of polythetic classifications. This means that the members of a given group do not necessarily all share all of the identified characteristics and,

69 For more details on the basic social anthropological model of ethnicity, see Jenkins 2008, and for an introduction into social identity, see Jenkins 2014.

conversely, that not all characteristics usually ascribed to any given group are shared by all members. Needham (1983) and Harrington (2014) apply a polythetic approach for the Siang, Ot Danum and Ngaju.[70] Following the polythetic approach, ethnic groups cannot be seen as static, homogenous entities which can be clearly delineated against other groups. Therefore, defined features which should characterize groups are somewhat arbitrary. Nevertheless, the polythetic approach, despite offering greater flexibility, sticks to the aim of finding and systematizing ethnogenetic characteristics to differentiate groups.

In the framework of polythetic classification, the term Dayak generally comprises autochthonous Christian or Hindu-Kaharingan people living upriver in the interior of Borneo. The Dayak are predominantly constructed in contrast with the Muslim Melayu or Malays living along the coastal areas (Sellato and Sercombe 2007: 6). In the colonial period the differentiation between the inland Dayak and the coastal Melayu was strengthened by colonial administrators (Rousseau 1990: 74). The term Melayu is generally applied to autochthonous Muslim people. Although some coastal Melayu settlements were historically founded by Arab traders, most Melayu are descended from Dayak groups that converted to Islam (Sellato and Sercombe 2007: 6).

The general description of the Bakumpai designates them as followers of the Muslim faith originating from the lower Barito and Kapuas watershed. They converted to Islam in the seventeenth century and are related to the Ngaju ethnic group. The Bakumpai have been engaged in trade since at least the nineteenth century and have become key to the trade of rattan and other Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFP) along the River Barito in recent decades, settling in large numbers at the river banks (Sellato and Sercombe 2007: 40).[71]

The term Punan/Penan generally refers collectively to forest-dwelling hunting and gathering nomadic or formerly nomadic groups living predominantly in the interior part of Borneo.[72] The Punan Murung, an exonym,

70 Most Siang people live in the regency of Tanah Siang in Central Kalimantan, an area located on the upper stretches of the Barito River. Formerly, Puruk Cahu, the capital of the former administrative division also named Puruk Cahu in colonial times, was a Siang town. Today, Siang usually live inland and away from the Barito River (Harrington 2014: 41). Most Ot Danum people live in the northwest of Murung Raya. Kapuas and Kahayan or Ngaju people live on the southern banks of the Barito River.

71 The Bakumpai increasingly tend to dominate the trade and economic activities in cities like Puruk Cahu, whereas the Siang, Ot Danum, Ngaju or Punan tend live in rural surroundings that provide natural resources like rubber, rice or NTFP.

72 There is no systematic and clear cut differentiation between Punan and Penan. The autonym (self-designation) Punan or Penan is used in relation to other groups and is situational (Brosius 1991). Scholars mostly use Penan for hunter-gatherers living predominantly in Sarawak, Malaysia, and Brunei (Seitz 1981: 283). Penan are generally distinguished as Eastern and Western Penan, differing in regards to language and social institutions (Needham 1972; Brosius 1991, 1997a, 1997b)

got their name from the area in which they live between the headwaters of the upper part of the Murung River (Hoffman 1986 [1983]: 16). Scholars who work on nomadic hunting and gathering groups in Borneo stress their autonomous, egalitarian and cooperative band organization and their pragmatic and predominantly secular attitudes (Sercombe and Sellato 2007).[73] The designation Punan/Penan was often used in contrast to the term Dayak to distinguish between village-dwelling riverine people (Dayak) and forest-dwelling nomadic people (Punan/Penan). Showing that it is too simple to distinguish between mere settled/agriculture lifestyle versus mere nomadism/hunter-gatherers, researchers point out that there is instead a continuum of activities. The distinction between rainforest gathering and agroforestry is thus blurred, the difference is merely conditional (Rousseau 1990; Seitz 1981; Sellato 1986, 2002; Sercombe and Sellato 2007).

6.4 Punan Murung and Bakumpai in Tumbang Tujang

The focus of the study is the village of Tumbang Tujang in the region of the upper part of the Murung River in the district (*kecamatan*) of Uut Murung, the northernmost district of the regency (*kabupaten*) of Murung Raya, which forms the northernmost regency of the province of Central Kalimantan. Today, the overall number of inhabitants living in three settlements along the River Murung (Kalasin, Tumbang Tujang and Tumbang Topos) is more than double that of 1985 when Bernhard Sellato visited the region.[74] According to the Central Statistical Bureau (*Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Murung Raya*), in 2009 Tumbang Tujang comprised 592 inhabitants. What has also changed is the composition of the villagers in terms to their ethnic and religious affiliation. Today Tumbang Tujang is predominantly inhabited by Bakumpai and Punan

73 Punan move or used to move in bands of twenty-five to fifty people through the forested areas and subsist on sago, hunted meat and fish as well as on other forest resources (Sellato 1986, 2002, Sercombe and Sellato 2007). The bands, which are economic and migrational units, consist of nuclear families that enjoy a high degree of freedom as they can leave the band at any time. Band heads are chosen for their competence and have no substantial power in decision-making. There is may be no political, economic or ritual organization at band level and certainly none above band level (Sellato 2002: 68-69 and Sellato 1986). Property does not belong collectively to a group but only to a family and property is distributed upon the founding couple's death (Sellato 2002: 77). Nuclear families gather into extended families due to sedentarization, but the extended family, a residential and economic unit bound to a house, is not static as the nuclear family has broad autonomy (Sellato 2002: 77).

74 Sellato describes a Punan Murung population of 400 to 500 people dwelling in four settlements in the Murung area (Sellato 1986: 239).

Murung as well as by Siang, Ot Danum, and Kahayan peoples. The main religion is Islam with 323 members, but there are also 34 Protestants, two Hindus and 233 belonging to 'other religions,'[75] i.e. Hindu-Kaharingan.[76] Bakumpai people form the majority today, and this has changed in contrast to 1986 when Sellato visited the village –he described there being only a small number of Bakumpai families in Tumbang Tujang. According to my observations, all the Bakumpai are Muslim but not all Muslims are Bakumpai, as shown by one Punan Murung man who converted to Islam after he recovered from a serious illness. In Tumbang Tujang, Bakumpai people have for two generations occupied the positions of Village Head (*kepala desa*), Village Secretary (*sekretaris desa*) and the Village Council BPD (*badan perwakilan desa*), while the positions of the adat elder (*kepala adat*) and most healers are occupied by Punan Murung people. In Tumbang Tujang there is a mosque and a small Islamic school where Muslim children take part in Islamic education on Friday afternoons. In addition, several wooden planks (*toras*) have been erected for use in the primary Kaharingan death ritual.

The livelihood strategy of the Punan Murung and Bakumpai in Tumbang Tujang follows what has been called "extended subsistence" by Christian Gönner (Gönner 2007) or "dual or composite economy" by Michael Dove (2011: 13). Villagers practice small-scale agriculture, hunting, fishing, and engage in wage labor according to need and opportunity (Höing et al. 2015a und 2015b). They search for and trade Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFP) such as gem stones, animal parts and birds' nests, engage in small-scale gold mining, as well as search for and trade Agarwood (*gaharu*). Men are frequently absent from the village and their families, searching for NTFP and *gaharu*, staying in companies' camps for work, or traveling through the cities to trade in what Carol J. P. Colfer terms circular migration. Usually only about two-thirds to one-half of the registered inhabitants, mostly women and children, are present in the village. Travelling, circular migration and going on expeditions is reported to be important among many Bornean societies. Carol J. P. Colfer describes circular migration or going on expeditions as inherent traditions and of high value among the Kenyah ethnic group. Circular migration is defined by the Uma' Jalan Kenyah as a man's absence from the village "for extended periods, essentially in search of fame and fortune (…) with the intention of returning home" (Colfer 2008: 212).

75 The Central Statistical Bureau report does not include the category of Hindu-Kaharingan. The category 'other religions' was described by villagers as being equivalent to the category of Hindu-Kaharingan (see as well Höing et al. 2015b, p. 25).

76 In 1980, Kaharingan was declared a variety of Hinduism and thus Hindu-Kaharingan received the official status of a religion (*agama*) after a struggle for official recognition of Kaharingan spirituality.

6.5 Relational Ethnic Identity

Scholars point out that people, especially in the interior of Borneo, rarely used ethnonyms prior to the naming, labeling, and construction of ethnic groups by outsiders, e.g. representatives of the Dutch colonial power, missionaries, and researchers. Autonyms – self-designations – were formulated, but not in a homogenous, systematized way.[77]

In contrast to descriptions that the Punan were quite reluctant to self-designate in the 1980s, the situation is different today. Villagers in Tumbang Tujang, including Bakumpai people, subsumed themselves under the ethnic category Dayak as a general category for self-designation. Dayak is used as an umbrella term under which additional reference to a specific sub-category of, for example, Punan Murung, Bakumpai, Siang, or Ot Danum is made. Bakumpai is thus used as a sub-category of Dayak, showing that the distinction between Dayak living in the interior and Bakumpai living in the lowland areas, as described in the section on polythetic approaches to differentiating ethnic groups, is not important to the Bakumpai in Tumbang Tujang. The geographic location of the mountainous area where the Bakumpai settle, the half-nomadic lifestyle they practice and their mingling with Punan Murung, obviously play a stronger role in self-designation than their coastal origin and religious affiliation.

Common Ethnogenesis for Shared Ethnic Identity of Bakumpai and Punan Murung

Both the Punan Murung and Bakumpai use a common ethnogenesis in their construction of a shared origin and half-nomadic ethnic identity. They refer to a common descent from nomadic people living in the region of the upper River Murung in contrast to people living downstream. According to Sellato (1986), a common history and origin of the Punan along the River Murung can be traced back according to oral histories. Sellato (1986: 225-226) explains that the Punan

77 Autonyms often were used situationally, in relation to other groups and referred to historical and genealogical commonality (Brosius 1991: 140-141). If individuals and groups used self-descriptions they usually referred to geographic referents, e.g. rivers, where they lived (Rousseau 1990: 11). Bernhard Sellato describes that in the 1980s, the Punan Murung did not use any systemized autonym. They either named themselves according to a geographic referent without the term Punan, or referred to themselves as Punan without mentioning a toponym. As some of these groups have almost never left this region, a name referring to that region seemed to be redundant for them (Sellato 1986: 223-224). Carl Hoffman states that the Punan usually refer to themselves by "[…] using some local lexeme meaning 'us'" (Hoffman 1984: 128).

Murung consider themselves to have originated from a place called Tarun Tapan, located close to a vast limestone mountain area upriver of rapids at the banks of the River Sebunut, a tributary of the River Barito, where their ancestors probably dwelled in caves sometime in the second half of the eighteenth century. At the end of the eighteenth century, some Punan moved to Bura' Tarun at the banks of the River Bura'. In about 1870 a group of Punan moved down the River Bura' to a place called Tasang Butung at the River Murung (Sellato 1986: 231). In 1880, a group migrated to a place far down the River Murung called Tumbang Bajoit, which formed the origin of modern-day Tumbang Tujang and in 1960 more people from Tasang Butung moved to Tumbang Tujang.

Today, villagers in Tumbang Tujang often describe the former settlement Tasang Butung at the River Murung as the common place from which people who now live along the River Murung descended. The common history and descent is stressed not only by the Punan Murung, but is also emphasized by Muslim Bakumpai, despite the fact that they may have been settled in these villages for no more than two generations. Their self-designation as Dayak-Bakumpai and the construction of a shared origin with the Punan Murung illustrates the construction of a shared half-nomadic ethnic identity and of an 'imagined community' or imagined ethnic group living in the upper part of the River Murung in contrast to people living downstream.

However, material aspects which could prove and symbolize the common origin have seemingly little importance in today's construction of a shared ethnic identity. Bakumpai and Punan Murung people in Tumbang Tujang remember a place at the River Bura' where the Punan lived in earlier times which seems to be identical to Bura' Tarun. Some villagers frequently travel to this limestone mountain area in order to start their expeditions heading into the forested areas to search for Agarwood (*gaharu*). They know a cave with human skulls and bones, and take this to be the location of a former spiritual place or the graveyard of former Punan settlements. The people I talked to don't ascribe this place a particular spiritual importance today, and are known to take pictures of themselves posing with bones and skulls in their hands. Nevertheless, they think that in former times people may have seen this place as spiritually or culturally valuable and state that the remnants of the graves and the surrounding area should be preserved and people should always have access to them.

Building a Relational Ethnic Identity

The described self-designation of members of the Bakumpai people as Dayak-Bakumpai and their construction of a shared ethnogenesis with the Punan

Murung provides a good example for a more decisive analysis of the development of a relational ethnic identity which questions Fredrik Barth's elaborations on processes of ethnic boundary maintenance. The Bakumpai obviously refer to the 'outer', and their self-designation and ethnic identity formation is interconnected with their surroundings. But rather than delineating against the 'outer,' the Bakumpai adapt and don't emphasize a Muslim low-land identity in a differentiating way to the 'others.' The construction of their shared ethnic identity – exemplified by their self-designation and their common ethnogenesis – is therefore interconnected with the 'outer' but not, as Fredrik Barth describes, in delineation against the other ethnic groups, not in a process of ethnic boundary maintenance. The process of constituting ethnic identity amongst the Bakumpai is thus better understood as a flexible, contextual process of merging aspects of both the 'ins' and the 'outs.' Classical ethnic ascriptions and boundaries – Melayu or Bakumpai referring to lowland/coastal regions and Dayak referring to mountainous regions – are not valid in the case of the Bakumpai and Punan Murung in Tumbang Tujang.[78]

6.6 Revitalization of Ethnic Identity: The 'Content, Close to Nature, Half-Nomadic Indigenes'

Punan Murung and Bakumpai people living in Tumbang Tujang do not only formulate their ethnic belonging clearly, they also emphasize being content and proud of living close to nature. They stress the higher quality of a more clean, relaxed, and calm life in the villages. Furthermore, young people and families especially emphasize their contentment with the forested area, the half-nomadic way of living, the village community, family ties and the economic aspect, as they tend to spend less and earn more money in the village than in the city. Villagers formulate their ethnic self-designation and belonging clearly, and moreover explicitly describe their half-nomadic 'nature-close' life in positive terms. This constitution of a positive ethnic indigenous identity stands in harsh contrast to the era under former president Suharto when ethnicity was abolished from public and political discourses and highly instrumentalized under Suharto's developmentalist authoritarian regime. Being a Punan or Dayak had derogatory connotations connected with living in a remote area (*suku terasing*) and being underdeveloped, backwards, and primitive and therefore subject to

78 A hybrid identity formation and cultural adaptability among East Kalimantan's 'Dayaks' referring to Dayak-Malay intermarriages is also emphasized by Christian Oesterheld (2016).

discriminatory and paternalistic development programs (Sellato and Sercombe 2007: 32-33; Duncan 2007, Li 1999).[79]

The revitalization of ethnic identity found in many parts of Indonesia can be framed in Lars Kaskija's (2002: 91-93) notion of "cultural reflexivity" which includes the awareness of cultural uniqueness in terms of increased self-identification as a political tool and a commercial asset. This is embedded in the course of the revitalization of ethnicity in the post-Suharto *reformasi* era when ethnicity came to be a central asset improving bargaining power in struggles over land and natural resources. One example is the construction of a specific Dayak identity that is utilized for political mobilization (McCarthy 2004, Schiller 2007, Klinken van 2006), which is described by Duile in this volume.

Villagers in Tumbang Tujang emphasize, in the framework of rising cultural reflexivity, being content and proud of living close to nature, and this is embedded in a process of changing identity formation from discriminated against formerly 'underdeveloped savages' towards still marginalized but nevertheless 'content, close to nature, half-nomadic indigenes'. A positively framed nomadic indigenous identity is constructed comprising a nature-close and flexible lifestyle unlike that of people who do not live in that remote area and stands in contrast to the formerly discriminatory terminology of the 'underdeveloped savage.'

6.7 Flexibility, Adaptation, and Separation between Bakumpai and Punan Murung

In the 1980s, Hoffman stressed that, with regard to the Siang, Punan Murung, and Ot Danum, it is nearly impossible to state who actually belongs to which ethnic group, as

> "Intermarriage and assimilation have occurred to such an extent that whatever "ethnic boundaries" might have existed between these groups in the past have all but broken down. This situation is displayed most dramatically at Tumbang Tupus, where virtually everyone is multilingual in Siang, Punan Murung and Ot Danum and where the same individuals alternately refer to themselves as Siang and Punan" (Hoffman 1986 [1983]: 16 and also Hoffman 1984: 131).

I experienced a similar situation with the Christian/Hindu-Kaharingan groups among the Punan Murung, Siang and Ot Danum. I observed that intermarriage is

79 This led to the rejection of ethnic belonging, identity and difference amongst members of ethnic groups as stated by Anna Tsing (1984), who asserts that for the Meratus in South Kalimantan "ethnicity has defined their inferiority" (Tsing 1984: 32), therefore they deny distinctiveness.

very common, and there is no obvious difference in everyday activities or work and settlement patterns that is directly related to their ethnic affiliation.[80]

Relations are good between Christian/ Hindu-Kaharingan groups and Bakumpai people in everyday activities, routine practices and work, and villagers show huge flexibility and tolerance regarding different ethnic and religious affiliations. The Bakumpai and Punan Murung join together in searching for NTFP or *gaharu*, both join village meetings or meetings with state officials or representatives of the nearby logging company and help each other when firewood, tools or medicines are lacking. However, in terms of settlement patterns, rituals and food habits, there are differences between the Punan Murung and the Muslim Bakumpai.

Adaptation by the Punan Murung to Bakumpai characteristics can be identified in the fact that the Punan Murung tend to speak Bakumpai language with members of that group and the Bakumpai language is the *lingua franca* in Tumbang Tujang as in the whole region.[81] Similarly, in the case of interreligious/interethnic marriages, non-Muslim spouses usually convert to Islam and marriages are legitimized through Islamic authorities at the village or district level, usually also registered at the state registration office at a later date.[82]

Settlement patterns reveal the separation between the Muslim Bakumpai and the Punan Murung as the groups tend to stick together and build their houses in certain parts of the village. Religious affiliation is moreover important in life-cycle events such as marriage and death rituals. Rituals are conducted according to the specific ethnic and religious affiliations. But all village members are invited to join in all parts of both Muslim and Hindu-Kaharingan rituals regardless of religious affiliation. The only strict division concerns food. As most Muslim Bakumpai in the villages eat no pork, there is usually one dish including pork and another *halal* dish excluding it. Muslim women cook *halal* dishes in the house of a Muslim family and Muslim men and women sit together to eat in that house whereas non-Muslim women cook non-*halal* dishes in the house of a non-Muslim family, and non-Muslim women and men sit together in that house to eat. Alcohol is usually consumed by both Muslims and non-Muslims alike,

80 Kenneth Sillander observes a similar phenomenon amongst the Bentian and explains that the lack of significance of ethnicity is grounded in a non-ethnic comprehension of social life (Sillander 1995: 81).

81 The Punan Murung usually speak several languages, as also pointed out by Sellato. He stresses the multilingualism of the Punan as they usually spoke four to five languages, such as in Tumbang Tujang where people spoke Punan, Siang, Ot Danum, Bakumpai and Indonesian.

82 Inter-ethnic marriages between Bakumpai and Punan Murung could be motivated by strategic means in order to get access to Punan-dominated political positions or pacify tensions amongst the Bakumpai and Punan Murung.

therefore on occasions like traditional Hindu-Kaharingan feasts, all mingle after eating for extensive drinking and gambling.

6.8 Strategic Ethnic Essentialism

In Indonesia, forest is increasingly being converted into commercially used land, and natural resources are undergoing large-scale exploitation by powerful national and transnational companies supported by the national governments and local elites. In their aim to further environmental protection, scholars, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and development agencies argue that indigenous people such as the Punan are especially capable and engaged in the protection of their natural and cultural environment due to their nature-close lives and are expected to serve as role models for efficiently managing the environment (Sellato 2007: 83-86). Therefore, they should be involved in the setting of frameworks for local resource management policies to protect the natural and cultural environment (Sellato 2002: 64). Indigenous people are, in an essentialized and instrumentalized way, often connected to a more monistic conception of the human-nature relationship and a stronger reciprocity between humans and the environment (Descola/Pálsson 2002; Ingold 2000; Brosius 1997b).

Inclusions/ Exclusions: Punan the 'Noble Savages'; Bakumpai the 'Greedy Traders'

As Tumbang Tujang is situated in an area rich in resources and of environmental preservation, villagers are approached to be workers in large-scale natural resource exploitation projects and as key persons in environmental protection.[83] They are addressed in the course of environmental protection and development programs by local governments as well as environmental and indigenous peoples' rights organizations. The latter tend to focus on the promotion of specific indigenous ethnic groups, e.g. the Punan, and predominantly work together with key persons in these groups. Several years ago development and conservation programs were implemented in the region of the

83 Tumbang Tujang is situated in the preserved area of the Heart of Borneo, which is the subject of an agreement between the neighboring countries of Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei to use the area sustainably, which was initiated, supported and coordinated by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the world's largest conservation organization.

upper Murung River, funded by a small international NGO cooperating predominantly with a local indigenous peoples' rights organization based in Puruk Cahu. As the international and local organizations concentrated on enhancing the circumstances and rights for the Punan, they cooperated mostly with members of that group. The Punan thus had access to income opportunities as project facilitators, guides, and cooks. Furthermore, they were able to enhance or facilitate their own environmental protection or village development initiatives. However, members of other groups living in the village who were not defined as 'indigenous' by the organizations, e.g. the Bakumpai, were excluded. Ethnic groups were thereby constructed as demarcated, bounded, homogenous collectives, similar to the outdated functionalist, primordial approach to ethnicity. Moreover, in informal talks, stereotypes referring to ethnic features were cemented, for example, Punan people were allegedly more engaged in enhancing environmental protection as well as development and were depicted as 'noble savages.' The Bakumpai in contrast were allegedly more interested in earning money than engaging in social or environmental affairs and were depicted as 'greedy traders.' Thus indigenous peoples' rights organizations ascribed to certain 'indigenous' villagers – in an essentializing and homogenous manner – a more monistic relationship with nature and thus a higher capacity to protect their natural and cultural environment.

The Bakumpai felt excluded, insulted, and very disappointed. They did not perceive themselves as different from the Punan Murung in terms of natural resource use and environmental protection. Quite the opposite: Their self-designation as Dayak-Bakumpai, their reference to a common ethnogenesis with the Punan Murung, and their ethnic identity as half-nomadic, nature-close indigenous makes clear that they construct and emphasize closeness and affiliation with other half-nomadic Dayak groups living in Tumbang Tujang. The discriminatory practice of the organizations led to immense tensions between members of the Punan Murung and the Bakumpai in the village and in the region with regard to access to money and facilities provided by the organizations.

For some Punan Murung, ethnicity is an increasingly important factor in gaining access to international and local organizations and thus access to money and power. Ethnicity, understood by these organizations in a primordial sense, is imposed upon villagers and produces inequalities of power and authority. Referring to Spivak (1988), 'strategic essentialism' comprises the construction and use of, for example, ethnic essentialisms in order to challenge hegemonic structures and enhance the power of marginalized groups. The Punan Murung were able to successfully use the 'tribal slot' – as conceptualized by Tania Murray Li (2000) – because there was a heightened interest in environmental protection issues in the area, because the Punan Murung had the capacity to

present their particular ethnic identity, and because urban activists supported and created the Punan Murung as exemplary indigenous subjects. However, the romanticized and essentialized instrumentalization of ethnic attributes and the advancement of the Punan Murung resulted in boundary-making, selection, and the exclusion of the Bakumpai. Therefore, the empowerment of a marginalized group led to the marginalization of another.

The Myth of the 'Guardians of Nature'

Contrary to the image of the 'noble savage,' scholars increasingly point out that nomadic groups do not automatically protect their natural and cultural environment but to the contrary are in some cases heavily involved in the (over-) exploitation of natural resources. Lars Kaskija describes a Punan 'hit-and-run strategy' in the extraction of natural resources, involving a lack of ideological constraints on these activities and very little concern about environmental degradation (Kaskija 2007: 146-148). Scholars depict hunter-gatherers as flexible in terms of ownership of land and resources, and as being open to taking advantage of transient opportunities. In consequence, some natural resources like scented wood or edible birds' nests were exhausted when hunter-gatherers were involved in trade relations and competition with outsiders. This approach could be framed in James Woodburn's (1982) conceptualization of 'immediate-return' foragers, meaning that food and materials are gathered for immediate consumption rather than being stored or rationed.[84] The 'immediate-return' approach is rooted in a set of values, attitudes and practices associated with high flexibility and mobility which remain despite the fact that these people have settled down and taken up farming. This high flexibility and 'immediate-return' strategy of hunter-gatherers can go hand in hand with rather opportunistic behavior, so-called codeswitching, and the utilization of opportunities as they arise (Kaskija 2007: 148-150). Therefore, scholars have revised the

84 Similar to this is the concept of the "original affluent society" coined by Marshal Sahlins (1972). He describes that hunter-gatherers in their relationship between material wants and material means reduce their material wants through cultural processes. They are furthermore characterized by having few possessions, lacking interest in technical innovation, lacking foresight and being reluctant to put aside food surpluses. Therefore, their way of life provides affluence for its followers and requires only three to five hours of work per adult per day. Nurit Bird-David (1992), in reference to Sahlin's concept, developed her concept of the "cosmic economy of sharing" based on her metaphorical model of the "giving environment" (Bird-David 1990). She explains that 'immediate-return' hunter-gatherers link their material wants to the means which are available for sharing. They want a share of however much is available and therefore have a sharing way to approach affluence.

essentializing stance of 'indigenous' or nomadic people being the guardians of the environment (Sellato 2002: 65).

I observed a similar attitude in the villages. Securing their livelihoods in terms of, for example, clean water, food, shelter, medicine and money, is the predominant concern for most community members. This could be due to insecure living conditions as food is sometimes scarce, water polluted, medicine is rarely available and school education is dependent on the availability and payment of the teacher. Therefore, protection of the natural environment is predominantly related to securing livelihoods and tends to have little to do with environmental conservation ideology.[85] This stands in contradiction to the essentialized and romanticized picture of indigenous people being the guardians of the environment as described above. This is not to deny that community members have a close and reciprocal relationship with their natural environment and natural resources, but their cosmologies and rituals should not be romanticized as a form of natural protection or conservation (Sellato 2002, 2007).

6.9 Conclusion

The Bakumpai have developed a relational ethnic identity by designating themselves as Bakumpai-Dayak, constructing a common ethnogenesis with the Punan Murung referring to nomadic ancestors and stressing their content, close to nature, half-nomadic way of living. The topography, their lifestyle, the need and wish to mingle with the Punan Murung – maybe in order to improve trade in earlier times – seem to be important factors in the conception of a specific Bakumpai-Dayak self-identity. The construction of their shared identity therefore is interconnected with the 'outer' but not, as Fredrik Barth argues, in delineation against other ethnic groups; not in a process of ethnic boundary construction or maintenance. Overall, the development of ethnic identity and group formation in the villages is less in reference to other ethnic groups, less a differentiation between non-Muslim and Muslim groups, and more a shared – positively framed

85 This is also stated by Banks (2002) who analyses protest movements against land expropriation and environmental degradation in Papua New Guinea and states that the central aim of people who protest is to secure their livelihood and regain control over their lives (Banks 2002: 41). Peter J. Brosius (1997a) explains that Eastern Penan in Sarawak, Malaysia resisted logging in contrast to the Western Penan who tended to acquiesce to it. He explains this different attitude and reaction with reference to the Eastern Penan's contemporary political context regarding the organization of people, their historical context particularly with respect to their relations with colonial authorities, and in the constitution of social relations characteristics.

– identity comprising a 'content, close to nature, half-nomadic indigenes' in delineation against people not living in the remote area of the upper Murung River.

In contrast to the shared ethnic identity of the Dayak/ Bakumpai-Dayak/ Punan Murung, ethnic affiliation to the Bakumpai or to the Punan Murung is increasingly relevant in gaining access to organizations and thus to money and power. Indigenous peoples' rights organizations that operate in this area have predominantly cooperated with the Punan Murung and not with the Bakumpai, and therefore members of the 'right' indigenous group have been able to enhance their power in the sense of strategic essentialism and use what Tania Murray Li calls the tribal slot.

Changes and Continuities within Processes of Ethnic Identity Formation and the Instrumentalization of Ethnicity

In Tumbang Tujang new opportunities for cultural and political self-determination after the fall of President Suharto led to the development of a new cultural consciousness among the villagers which (re-)shaped local identities. New relational ethnic identities evolved in contrast to the primordial view of ethnic groups as static and clearly demarcated, and this new approach conceives of ethnic belonging as pre-existential. The emerging ethnic identity of the 'content, close to nature, half-nomadic indigenes' is employed by different ethnic groups with formerly different ethnic and religious identities such as the Muslim Bakumpai and the Kaharingan Punan Murung. Classical ethnic dichotomies such as that between the lowland Bakumpai-Muslims, and inland Dayak-Kaharingan are increasingly blurred. In Tumbang Tujang, villagers with different origins and diverse migrational histories integrate, merge, and affiliate with each other. They even use a common ethnogenesis in their construction of a shared ethnic identity. Therefore, their current ethnic identity formation is predominantly not in delineation against other ethnic groups.

In contrast, within the processes of the politicization and instrumentalization of ethnicity and the ethnicization of resource and rights politics, ethnic groups continue to be treated as static and clearly demarcated. Environmental and indigenous peoples' rights organizations tend to focus on and cooperate with specific 'indigenous' ethnic groups, in this case the Punan Murung. Therefore, ethnic differentiation is central to the implementation of cultural rights and development programs which empower members of certain ethnic groups but exclude members of other ethnic groups. Thus, within changing processes of ethnic revitalization and the empowerment of indigenous groups, problems of

exclusion continue to be major issues and are often merely relocated rather than solved.

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7. Genealogies of Anti-Madurese Violence in Kalimantan

Christian Oesterheld

7.1 Introduction

When I visited East Kalimantan for the second time, in early March 2001, some of the "knowledgeable men" (*orang pintar*),[86] whom I had met in the previous year during travels along the Ohong river and in the foothills of the Meratus mountains, had gone. They had followed calls from the neighboring province of Central Kalimantan, where violence between the indigenous Dayak population and migrants from the island of Madura was raging. The conflict had precedents in some areas of West Kalimantan in the late 1990s, but the scale and totality of violence in Central Kalimantan surpassed earlier events: by the end of April 2001 an estimated seven thousand people had been killed and tens of thousands of Madurese migrants were internally displaced, their houses burned to the ground and their return to the area additionally hampered by popular sentiment and ensuing regional decrees (*peraturan daerah*) with decidedly ethno-nationalist dispositions.[87]

It was not only "knowledgeable men" from East Kalimantan who had joined the strife. In the course of subsequent field research across a variety of locations in Kalimantan between 2002 and 2007, I met a wide range of ritual specialists and combatants who had been partaking in warfare against the Madurese. My informants and interviewees included members from a variety of Dayak communities (or *suku*) from all the Indonesian provinces of Kalimantan, but also Dayak people from Malaysian Sarawak in the north of Borneo, and migrants from other parts of Indonesia, mostly from Sumatra and the Eastern Indonesian islands, who had settled in Kalimantan and had "become" Dayak in the eyes of the local population. Transpiring from their diverse narratives was a collage of violent practices, symbols and agency that often stands in stark contrast to scholarly analysis of "ethnic violence" in contemporary Kalimantan. Whereas

86 A frequently used term for people gifted with supernatural abilities.
87 Particularly *Peraturan Daerah Kotawaringin Timur Nomor 5 Tahun 2004 Tentang Penanganan Penduduk Dampak Konflik Etnik*.

C. Arenz et al. (Hrsg.), *Continuity under Change in Dayak Societies*, Edition Centaurus – Sozioökonomische Prozesse in Asien, Afrika und Lateinamerika, DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-18295-3_7

my informants spoke of war (*perang*), scholars framed the events as "riots", "uprisings", or "ethnic conflict". Whereas active combatants elaborated on the significance of traditions (*adat*) in their explanations of conflict behavior and modes of warfare, observers reduced this to the reemergence of "headhunting and human heart-eating",[88] or attenuated its meaning to a "strategic" use of "weapons of the wild" (see Peluso 2003). And when the local Dayak stressed their long-standing enmity with the Madurese community in Kalimantan and their fear of a Madurese take-over of their homelands, scholars regarded these narratives as an unfounded imagination, which reassigned their troubles with the Indonesian state to a vulnerable segment of Kalimantan's population, or they argued that grievances were fabricated and provoked by local power-seekers.

Since large scale Dayak-Madurese violence coincided with Indonesia's political transformation in the late 1990s and early 2000s, scholarly explanations focused on exploring the links between inter-group conflict and social change. Informed by a broader analytical framework of "New Wars" (low-intensity and intra-state conflicts, fought over identity, see Kaldor 2000), these studies regard "ethnic violence" in Kalimantan as a function of change, either at times when accumulated grievances have become unbearable and "relative deprivation" leads to violence (cf. Gurr 1970, Homer-Dixon 1999), or when conflict becomes attractive as a method of exploiting novel opportunities for political or economic gain (cf. Collier 2000). In this context, scholars have discussed how the policies of Suharto's New Order (*Orde Baru*) disadvantaged and marginalized the Dayak population and created the conditions for later violent conflicts (e.g. Harwell 2000; Bertrand 2004; Peluso & Vandergeest 2011), or they have scrutinized the enticements offered by Indonesia's recent decentralization process (*otonomi daerah*) to a resurgent revitalization movement in Kalimantan (e.g. van Klinken 2002, 2007 and 2008). These studies have contributed valuable insights into the political context of anti-Madurese violence at the turn of the millennium. Their focus on the political economy – and political ecology – of conflict, however, has largely neglected the "Dayak narrative" of events (cf. Dove 2006) and in consequence fails to account for the constitution and genealogy of violence and conflict in Kalimantan. "Confronted with popular violence", Tania Li notes critically, "we pay superficial attention to the ethnic or religious idioms through which people explain their own actions, preferring to treat violence as a manifestation of underlying, political-economic inequalities" (2002: 368). 'Violence' then "is very much a word of those who witness, or who are victims of certain acts, rather than those who perform them. Yet what is required is that

88 Andrew Marr in his "Letter from the Editor," *The Independent*, 14 June 1997; similar depictions have dominated the international media coverage of Dayak-Madurese conflict throughout.

performance should be understood and explained" (Riches 1986: 3; original emphasis; cf. Krohn-Hansen 1994).

While examining Dayak narratives of conflict with the Madurese, this chapter engages in the development of a genealogical framework for the study of violence in Borneo and aims to uncover some layers of past violence that have become constitutive of a broader Borneo memory-scape. This approach is linked to recent discussions of the "generation rather than causation of violence" in Kalimantan and the suggestion that "the immaterial sources of conflict opportunities are not always easy to model as causal relationships" (Kivimäki 2012: 286-87). I regard Dayak-Madurese conflict at the turn of the millennium as an episodic recurrence of earlier types of violence and warfare in Kalimantan, with "both the crises and the responses [having] deep and intertwined genealogies" (Reid 2011: 174). In order to unveil the relations of contemporary conflict with historical antecedents, my analysis builds on Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblances. Like "language", or "games", Borneo violence forms a "complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing", with no particular feature being "common to all" instances, but nonetheless constituted by a number of "similarities [that] crop up and disappear" (1999 [1953]: 31-32). I suggest that a major similarity of past and present inter-group conflict in Borneo lies in strategies of justifying the recourse to violence, and I am interested in the narratives of ordinary people who presently take part in violent actions, and their ideas of "just violence", as they have developed in reference to past instances of conflict. My analysis focuses on continuities in conflict behavior and its ritualized guise. Although Dayak-Madurese violence is not an unabated continuation of tribal warfare and headhunting traditions, in many ways it belongs to the same "family". Likewise, the war with the Madurese is not identical to anti-colonial uprisings or resistance against the Japanese occupation, but its structure and formula are reminiscent of these historical events: they have contributed to the generation of particular aspects of contemporary violence.

7.2 The Present: Voices and Practices of Dayak Combatants

About a decade after arguing in favor of transitional violence as an explanation of Dayak-Madurese conflict in West Kalimantan, Michael Dove acknowledged that "[w]hereas outside observers […] tended to attribute this conflict to the political-economic legacy of Suharto's New Order regime, the Dayak themselves attributed it to cultural differences with and offenses by the Madurese", and suggested that such an "indigenous explanation, claiming

'agency' at the expense of political inexpediency, poses a challenge to scholarly conventions of representation" (2006: 192, cf. 1997). His point about the prevalent "ethnographic refusal" (Ortner 1995) of Dayak voices in scholarly discussions of anti-Madurese violence is well taken, but indigenous explanations are not limited to accounts of "cultural differences with and offenses by the Madurese". In fact, the simplistic portrayal of cultural incompatibility between the Dayak and Madurese features more prominently in Indonesian language comments and scholarship (e.g. Alqadrie 2002; Purwana 2003) than it does in the narratives of people who actively took part in the conflict with the Madurese. For them, I argue, "cultural differences" as such do not pose major problems. For a long time, at least since the late colonial period, Dayak people across the provinces of Kalimantan have demonstrated a high degree of socio-economic and cultural adaptability. They have increasingly embraced a plurality of lifestyles, often localizing extraneous influences and showing vivid interest in a dialogue with "the other". Yet convergence and cultural appropriation are rendered impossible if one's own core values are challenged, or worse, treated with contempt. According to my interview partners, this had been the case in Dayak-Madurese interaction for several generations, with inter-ethnic grievances accumulating and resulting in attitudes of profound enmity, represented in local and inter-regional narratives and rumors that eventually made a bogeyman out of the Madurese "other". As a result, by the late 1990s there was widespread fear of a Madurese conspiracy to take control of certain areas of Kalimantan, mobilizing an assembly of ritual specialists, young warriors and famous "magical" leaders of the older generation in an inter-regional alliance to "defend" the "Dayak homeland" (*tanah Dayak*).

The Hyperreality of a Madurese Plot

Rumors of a Madurese conspiracy have been widespread in both West and Central Kalimantan since the mid-1990s. During one of the major episodes of inter-ethnic conflict in West Kalimantan in 1999 in the Sambas regency, leaflets about a Madurese plot to make Sambas a "second Madura" were circulated. At the time, even Dayak officials suspected "that these leaflets were fabricated to incite Dayak people" and stated that "it is not clear who made these leaflets, and all of them seem to be photocopies".[89] A few years earlier, preceding the conflict

89 See "*Aparat Bertindak Lamban, Pers Memanipulasi Fakta*", interview with Libertus A Hie, chairman of the Dayak Adat Council Sambas, in: Petebang & Sutrisno 2000: 45-46. Translations from Indonesian sources throughout this article are my own.

of 1996/97, lists appeared of Madurese public figures (*tokoh*) who were suspected of "organizing meetings to mobilize their people to conduct raids".[90] Even photocopies of a Madurese 'masterplan' to "cripple" Dayak traditions had come to the fore. The document, most likely also a fabrication, suggests that "Dayak strength" (*kekuatan suku Dayak*) is based on inter-ethnic solidarity in times of war, in Dayak leadership traditions, and in their connections to the "ancestors" (*roh nenek moyang*). Later in the document, strategies to "destroy" (*menghancurkan*) the strength of Dayak people are explored. Advised courses of action include, among others, infiltration of the Dayak community by "seducing Dayak girls" and "besmirching" them, the creation of an insecure socio-economic environment by spreading gambling and violence, seeking to "create psychological tensions in their community", or attacks on their traditional leadership and their ancestral beliefs.[91] The impact such rumors had on Dayak sentiment is corroborated by many of my interview partners. One of them, a traditional war-leader (*panglima*) from the region of Darit, was convinced that several *pantak* – wooden effigies that store powerful ancestral souls (see Oesterheld 2012) – had been stolen from the area by Madurese gangsters. Others invoked local histories of Madurese attacks on Dayak leaders or told stories about the abduction of girls from their villages.

Fabrications or not, these leaflets reflect a "basic reality" of Dayak anxieties, "mask[ing] and pervert[ing]" it and in the end constituting a *simulacrum* of Madurese conspiracy that is "regenerating a reality principle in distress" (Baudrillard 1988: 170, 173). Presumably, whether a Madurese conspiracy actually exists is of less importance than why and how the existence of such a conspiracy became plausible for ordinary Dayak people. In the process of *simulation*, "correspond[ing] to a short-circuit of reality and its reduplication by signs" (Baudrillard 1988: 182), narratives about a Madurese threat contributed to its hyper-real *scenario* and provided the basis for Dayak participation in – and participants' justification of – anti-Madurese violence.

The commitment of West Kalimantan Dayak people to take part in anti-Madurese warfare in the neighboring province of Central Kalimantan two years later (see Oesterheld 2012), provides further indication of the widespread perception of a Madurese menace. They had been asked by Dayak leaders in Central Kalimantan to assist ritual preparations for the anti-Madurese "operation" and to lead some of the Dayak "troops" (*pasukan Dayak*).[92]

90 *Nama-Nama Tokoh Madara [sic] yang sudah Mengadakan Pertemuan untuk Menggerakan Orang-Orangnya Melakukan Penggeledahan di Penirman*; undated manuscript.
91 *Orang Banyak Tahu Suku, Tetapi Ada Satu Suku Yang Perlu Dilumpahkan Bagaimana Caranya Melumpahkan / Mempengaruhinya*; undated manuscript.
92 Interviews with the Panglima Mangkok Merah in Gulong, Darit district, July 2003.

Persuaded of a Madurese conspiracy to turn the city of Sampit into a "second Sampang" (referring to a major regency on the island of Madura), the West Kalimantan Dayak were showing solidarity with Dayak people in the neighboring province and became 'brothers in arms.' In the course of the conflict, which spread from Sampit to other areas of Central Kalimantan during the following months, additional support from across Kalimantan was solicited by emerging "evidence" of this Madurese plot. It had been "uncovered" and documented by the Consultation Council of Dayak Society and the Region of Central Kalimantan (*Lembaga Musyawarah Masyarakat Dayak dan Daerah Kalimantan Tengah*, LMMDDKT). The organization's leaders were later implicated as possible provocateurs of the violence and were interrogated by police, but were released soon after. The documents they had assembled included photographs and organizational charts of local Madurese militias,[93] which were supposedly planning to dislodge Sampit's Dayak population with bomb attacks. Alleged evidence for such a plan came to the fore when violence started to rage in Sampit. A number of bombs, hand grenades and firearms were found in abandoned Madurese homes, along with banners reading: "Long live the Madurese people, death to the Dayak people" (*Hidup Suku Madura, Bunuh Suku Dayak*), or "Welcome to Sampang II" (*Selamat Datang di Sampang II*). As in West Kalimantan a few years earlier, much of this "evidence" could have been fabricated by third parties, and the fact that most of it emerged after the event supports such suspicions. However, whether "real" or a simulation, the "Madurese plot" is omnipresent in the narratives of active combatants and is perceived by them as a factual reality, necessitating a bellicose response.

At War with the Madurese

Observers of the ensuing violent conflicts with the Madurese – 1997 and 1999 in West Kalimantan and 2001 in Central Kalimantan – were astonished by their extensive scale and ritualized scope. Lasting for weeks and months, each of the episodes spread to a wide range of localities, resulted in a great number of deaths, massive destruction of property, and the internal displacement of tens of thousands of Madurese people. Dayak action during the conflicts is often described using the eye-catching imagery of "headhunting Dayak warriors", "mimicking the ritualistic killings of their ancestors" in an "outbreak of ethnic

93 So called *Gencar* (*Gerakan Carok Antar Pulau*, Inter-island *Carok* Troops).

violence and grisly murders", "gruesome ritual killings", and "ritual savagery".[94] The images of beheaded corpses, however, only scratched the surface of "what appeared to be a ritual war against Madurese communities" (HRW 1997). Local newspapers and some Indonesian-language sources (e.g. Petebang 1998; Sutrisno & Petebang 2000; Giring 2004) noticed elaborate ritual preparations for the anti-Madurese war and the significance of protective magic and traditional leadership during the conflicts. The same issues were stressed by many of my interview partners, including a number of Dayak *panglima* (ritual war leaders) allegedly in possession of supernatural abilities and sometimes regarded as "generals [who] were still connected with spiritual beings of war and violence, and often described as 'possessed' by the ancestors" (Peluso 2006: 119). They emphasized that anti-Madurese "operations" in the late 1990s and early 2000s should be seen as "war" (*perang*), with its own laws and traditions (*adat*) in reference to "ancestral" knowledge and strength (*kekuatan leluhur*). These *panglima* came from several Dayak groups, with diverse traditions and "magical" abilities.[95] Often they noted that people "learned from each other" and re-explored a diverse repository of "Dayak" traditions. One of them, the Panglima Mangkok Merah from West Kalimantan, told me that he had to teach his fellow combatants in Central Kalimantan how to call upon ancestral spirits for support in battle (see in detail Oesterheld 2012), because "they didn't know about the traditions of war (*adat perang*)." Together with a party of more than twenty West Kalimantan Dayak, the Panglima Mangkok Merah had come to Sampit in mid-February 2001 to provide support and introduce (West Kalimantan) "Dayak traditions" which had proven successful in the anti-Madurese wars of 1997 and 1999. When violence spread in the following months, other traditions were contributed by "knowledgeable people" (*orang pintar*) from the headwaters of Central Kalimantan rivers (see Rini 2005: 136), and other West and East Kalimantan Dayak. In order to "conquer fear" and facilitate "frenzy" (cf. Horowitz 2000: 95-109) prospective fighters were ritually bathed or given magical oils to confer invulnerability. Some of them "participated in a trance-inducing ritual that produced a disinhibiting mania

94 See international media reports, e.g. "Carnage and Cannibalism in Borneo as Ethnic Conflict Rages", *The Independent*, 24 March 1999; "Transmigration Fuels Wave of Bloodletting", *The Nation*, 25 March 1999; "2,000 refugees brought to safety in Java", *South China Morning Post*, 25 March 1999; "Borneo Riots Marked by Grisly Ritual Killings", *CNN*, 21 March 1999; "Borneo Sinks into Ethnic Bloodletting", *The Times*, 23 March 1999.

95 Repeated interviews were conducted on various occasions between 2002 and 2007 with the Panglima Mangkok Merah (a Dayak Ahe in the area of Darit), the Panglima Angsa (a Dayak Sungkung from the border with Sarawak), one of the so-called Panglima Burung (a Dayak Kanayatn from the area of Meliau) and a self-declared Panglima Berat Bumi (a Dayak from the Kahayan minority in Tering, East Kalimantan).

facilitating their attacks on the Madurese" (ibid.: 107). Supported by representatives of Dayak people from across Kalimantan – and their diverse ancestors – they saw their cause as a justified reaction to Madurese assaults. Their reference to local history, in performance and narrative, overlooked the time of inter-tribal warfare between different Dayak communities, and instead built upon the shared experiences of local heroism in fighting former "invasions".

7.3 The Recent Past: Local Histories of Dayak-Madurese Violence

Memories of conflict with the Madurese community in Kalimantan date back to the early days of Indonesian independence,[96] and stories about former communal clashes have become an integral part of the Dayak account of anti-Madurese violence in the late 1990s and early 2000s. My interview partners were aware of a variety of incidents across West and Central Kalimantan and were able to describe some of these cases in great detail, sometimes referring to additional stories that were passed on from person to person. At the very least, since the late 1970s, after major conflicts between Dayak and Madurese communities in the region of Samalantan, there has been much talk about increasing enmity between the groups. When contextualizing the conflicts of 1997, 1999 and 2001 in local narratives of precursory events, I am following Anna Tsing's suggestion that "talk of killings, like killings themselves, inspires fear, threats, and further killings" (1996: 188) – the momentum of "mimetic escalation" (Girard 1977 [1972]).

Narratives about earlier violent clashes are also invoked in a number of documents which have circulated since the late 1990s. A "postulation" (*tuntutan*) of the Dayak community in Sambas regency claims that despite the Dayak's "love for peace, calm and security", unrest (*kerusuhan*) had been frequent in the area and has "always been initiated by the Madurese community",[97] listing nine such incidents as evidence. Another "declaration" (*pernyataan sikap*) from the same time, signed *SUKUDAYAK* ("the Dayak people"), claims that "historical facts prove that murder, theft, and attacks by the Madurese" have been frequent.[98] The document lists seven incidents, most of them different from those in the Sambas "postulation". More than a dozen documents of this kind have been in circulation, not only during the late 1990s in West Kalimantan, but also

96 A compilation of all instances of Dayak-Madurese communal violence in West and Central Kalimantan, as they appear in documents and interviews, comes close to fifty separate incidents.
97 *Tuntutan Warga Masyarakat Dayak di Kabupaten Sambas*; undated manuscript.
98 *Pernyataan Sikap Suku Dayak Terhadap Suku Madura*; undated manuscript.

in the early 2000s in Central Kalimantan. The most exhaustive list mentions fifteen incidents preceding the Sampit conflict of 2001.[99] According to this version, Dayak-Madurese clashes in the province have occurred since the early 1980s.

Scholarly publications on Dayak-Madurese conflict often lack serious consideration of the local legacies of communal violence in Kalimantan. In a somewhat patronizing fashion, some scholars have noted that "Dayak narrators inevitably told the origins of the war as a historical *litany* of violent acts by Madurese against Dayaks" (Peluso & Harwell 2001: 111, my emphasis). Consequently, the impact of past episodes of violence is regarded as minimal, and sometimes it has been suggested that memories of former clashes have been fabricated. At the same time even scholars profoundly suspicious of the "Dayak narrative" of events concede that "[a]lthough these memories were to be endlessly reinvented in the weeks that followed [the 1997 riots in West Kalimantan], that does not make them a post facto effect of the violence" (van Klinken 2007: 56). Further attesting to the long duration of communal violence between Dayak and Madurese people are a number of accounts published prior to the escalation of conflict at the turn of the millennium, with detailed references to earlier violent episodes (e.g. Nungkat 1994: 6, 66-67; van Hulten 1992 [1983]: 296-297; Alqadrie 1990: 335 and 1994: 32-33; Roekaerts 1985: 9). The long history of violence also resonates in concerted peace declarations, signed by representatives (*tokoh*) of both groups. One of these peace agreements, reached after the 1997 conflict in West Kalimantan, invokes the "experience of former clashes," explicitly referring to some conflicts in the late 1970s and early 1980s.[100]

Generating the "Rhythm of the Riot": Violence between 1950 and 1976

Only sketchy information is available about the local conflict history from the 1950s to the mid-1970s, and the scale of violence involved seems to have been limited. Dayak-Madurese clashes during this time are reported in several locations in the regencies (*kabupaten*) of Sambas and Pontianak,[101] mostly

99 *Daftar Kronologis terjadinya tindakan kekerasan/kejahatan etnis MADURA terhadap suku Dayak warga Kalimantan Tengah*; manuscript, 3 March 2001.

100 *Ikrar Kebulatan Tekad Bersama Suku Dayak dan Suku Madura Kalimantan Barat*; manuscript, 15 March 1997.

101 The proliferation of administrative areas has since resulted in a number of new regencies (*kabupaten*). In 1999 Kabupaten Bengkayang and the municipality of Singkawang (since 2001 separated from Bengkayang) were created out of the southern parts of Kabupaten Sambas, which is

corresponding to areas of later conflicts in West Kalimantan. According to my informants, these clashes usually originated in personal quarrels, which sometimes resulted in short episodes of communal violence due to poor law enforcement and the refusal of the Madurese community to resolve problems according to Dayak *adat*.

There is some indication of repeated conflict in the area of Samalantan, Sambas regency, in the early 1950s, where quarrels among youngsters and instances of theft seem to have triggered "inter-ethnic fighting" on at least two occasions (Surata & Andrianto 2001: 78; cf. Petebang 1998: 79). The same area was to become the site of violence on a much larger scale in the late 1970s. From the late 1950s to the mid-1970s, however, Dayak-Madurese violence was more frequent and pronounced in relative proximity to Pontianak, in the areas east and north of the municipality. References can be found to an early case of communal conflict in 1959 in the Sungai Ambawang area east of Pontianak,[102] but no detailed information is available. Like other incidents, this case is part of unspecific lists of "communal clashes" which also include episodes in 1962, 1963, 1969, 1971, and 1972 (e.g. Alqadrie 1990: 335, 1994: 32-33 and 1999: 5; Wantoro & Wahyono 1999: 1). For these incidents, the scope and scale of violence remains unclear and they are possibly best regarded as personal quarrels that were quickly contained. At the same time, violent arguments between individuals must have been incomparably more frequent in the area, but will often have gone undocumented. Few local studies have discussed such cases in detail. One study (Giring 2004) provides a vivid account of eight violent arguments in Salatiga, a village at the border of the former Sambas and Pontianak regencies. In all of these incidents people of the Dayak Kanayatn community were attacked by Madurese people and wounded with a *celurit* (a traditional Madurese sickle) in a tradition called *carok*, which allows for quarrels to be resolved honorably (see Wiyata 2002). A Madurese proverb that has often been invoked by my interview partners in order to demonstrate the remorseless character of Madurese people is connected to this tradition: *Ango'an potea tolong, potea mata* – "better to end up with white bones than with white eyes," or, more simply put, "better dead than embarrassed (*malu*)". In Salatiga, four of the Kanayatn victims died, the others were severely wounded and admitted to hospital. Although these incidents did not trigger violence on a communal level, stories about the events spread among the wider Kanayatn community, contributing to the Madurese stereotype as ruthless and prone to enacting *carok*.

now reduced to the northern half of its former area. Similarly the current regencies of Landak (since 1999) and Kubu Raya (since 2007) were part of the former Kabupaten Pontianak; its remaining area in the north of the municipality of Pontianak was renamed Kabupaten Mempawah in 2014.

102 *Pernyataan Sikap Suku Dayak Terhadap Suku Madura*; undated manuscript.

The prevalence of *carok* attacks is repeatedly stressed in Dayak "postulations" and "declarations" and is contrasted with Dayak perceptions of the sacredness of the human soul (*nyawa manusia*).[103] The accumulation of violent incidents, in conjunction with "talk of the killings", contributed to the escalation of fear and the spread of rumors, "anxiety laden perceptions" that exaggerate and distort actual events and often precede mass violence, generating the "rhythm of the riot" (Horowitz 2000: 71-88).

Such rumors were rife in the area north of Pontianak in 1966-68, when several violent incidents took place, culminating in the death of Sani, a local district chief (*camat*) in Toho, stabbed by Sukri, a Madurese migrant. This case was described in some detail by a Dutch missionary in the area (van Hulten 1992 [1983]: 296): Thirty Madurese people were beheaded by the Sangking Dayak and violence eventually spread to a number of surrounding villages. Both groups mobilized further support, and only when West Kalimantan's governor Oevang Oeray came to the area personally was it possible to contain the violence. Different from later incidents, there was no formal peace agreement reached in 1968. To the contrary, some Madurese were heard vowing vengeance, and violence flared up in the area again on various occasions between 1974 and 1976, leading to more "talk of killings" and the othering of "the Madurese" in its wake.

From Conflict to a "Simmering War": Violence between 1977 and 2000

Conflicts with the Madurese in Kalimantan reached a new level from the late 1970s onwards. On the one hand, the conflicts increasingly took on the characteristics of warfare – more organized strikes, the reinvention of violent traditions, a larger scale of violence, and subsequent peace agreements officiated by representatives of the Dayak and Madurese communities. On the other hand, violence began to spread to other areas of West Kalimantan and to the neighboring province of Central Kalimantan.

In September 1977 communal violence returned to Samalantan in the Sambas regency, a quarter of a century after the first reported Dayak-Madurese conflict had taken place in the same area. This case is seen as the first of a series in which "relatively minor incidents […] led to serious instances of communal conflict" (Wilson 2001: 15). According to local informants, the death toll ran into the

103 *Tuntutan Warga Masyarakat Dayak di Kabupaten Sambas*; undated manuscript.

dozens,[104] and close to a hundred Madurese homes were burned and destroyed. The clash was triggered by the death of a Dayak police officer, stabbed by a Madurese in the city of Singkawang (see HRW 1997). Some sources (e.g. Poerwanto 2005: 347 fn. 92) call the conflict "the Red Bowl Incident" (*Peristiwa Mangkok Madura*), since it is seen as the first case of Dayak-Madurese conflict in which the "red bowl", a traditional call-to-arms, was circulated in a wider area (see Nungkat 1994: 66, 90, Chang 2001: 91). The Madurese housing complex adjacent to the Samalantan mosque was rebuilt shortly afterwards and the Madurese community, having "fled to the forest", was allowed to return.[105] But the situation remained tense, with some minor incidents reported in 1978,[106] and a new escalation of conflict in 1979. The violence of 1979 is widely recognized as "the biggest previous [i.e. pre-1997] Dayak-Madurese war" (Peluso & Harwell 2001: 112), with unofficial death tolls running "into the hundreds" (HRW 1997) and similar numbers of houses burned.[107] Thousands of Madurese were internally displaced and fled to the city of Singkawang (Hamdani 2000). After the conflict subsided, they were not allowed to return to some of the areas most affected by the violence, particularly the town of Montrado (HRW 1997). Just as in earlier episodes, the conflict was triggered by a series of personal quarrels in the region, but unlike previous conflicts it did not subside quickly. It had spread throughout Samalantan district by late 1979 and could only be resolved when the Indonesian military stepped in. In early 1980, official peace pacts were signed by representatives of the warring factions and a peace monument (*tugu perdamaian*) was erected – "to remember the dead, to symbolize national peace, and to [the military's] own role in the peace" (Peluso & Harwell 2001: 133). The peace agreement apparently "include[d] a provision that if its terms were violated, the violators would be expelled from the province" (HRW 1997). At this stage, the enmity between the Dayak and Madurese communities had become intrinsic. The achieved "peace", when broken by criminal actions of the Madurese, was to become the basis and justification for later Dayak "warfare" (*baparakng* in the Kanayatn language).

The situation in the area of Samalantan remained calm until the 1990s, but violence returned to the area north of Pontianak on several occasions throughout the 1980s. A minor incident was reported in 1978 (see Petebang 1998: 79;

104 Interviews in Samalantan, 2007. The Human Rights Watch report cautiously notes that "more than five people died" (HRW 1997), based on official military statistics.

105 *Note Book* [containing personal diary entries of 1977-1979 by F. Kimsong, e.g.:] *Peristiwa Mangkok Merah* [or:] *Berita Penting Tanggal 26 Desember 1978* [and] *Kasus pembunuhan* [...] *Sidik*.

106 Ibid.

107 The official death toll, reported by *Tempo* magazine was twenty-two (see Petebang 1998: 79).

Roekaerts 1985: 9), probably a spill-over of the Samalantan conflict. Another conflict in 1983 in the Sungai Ambawang area, also attests to its lasting impact. Triggered by the death of Jealan, a Dayak, at the hands of a Madurese, the conflict left more than fifty people dead and more than a hundred houses destroyed (HRW 1997).[108] Violence spread to a wider area after the 'red bowl' was circulated (Nungkat 1994: 94) and the Dayak Kanayatn community mobilized for war (*baparakng babunuh* in the Kanayatn language). The Dayak community regarded Jealan's murder, and the Madurese communities' refusal to solve the case according to Kanayatn *adat* law, as a breach of the Samalantan peace agreement, according to eyewitnesses.[109] In the course of the conflict, even Madurese from areas further away fled their homes, some of which were burned by the local Dayak communities (Giring 2004: 96-97). A number of communal conflicts in West Kalimantan, usually on a smaller scale, were reported for the following years, including in the mid-1980s (see Purwana 2003: 127-28; Alqadrie 1990: 335 and 1994: 32-33) and the early 1990s (see Petebang & Sutrisno 2000: 202; Wilson 2001: 15; Alu Tampu 2003: 16). In the end, Dayak-Madurese enmity had been transformed into a simmering war that would escalate on an unforeseen scale in the late 1990s.

The 1980s also saw the beginning of Dayak-Madurese conflict in the neighbouring province of Central Kalimantan. A minor clash in the province's capital Palangka Raya followed the rape of a Dayak girl in 1982. The case was resolved by *adat* law, but tensions remained high and later in the year a Dayak was killed in the city and the suspected Madurese murderer escaped (see Ridyasmara, 2001: 23).[110] Violence flared up again in 1983, in the Bukit Kasongan area, halfway between Palangka Raya and Sampit, "leaving at least a dozen and up to 50 people dead" (van Klinken 2007: 56). In the aftermath, a peace deal was struck, similar to the Samalantan agreement in West Kalimantan. The agreement was reportedly signed in 1985, after "a long series of conflicts between Dayak and Madurese".[111] Some sources suggest that the "agreement was drawn up with the then governor of East Java to allow the Madurese to stay, on the condition that they would behave reasonably".[112] This provision,

108 Official statistics estimated twelve deaths.

109 Mangkok, quoted by Nungkat (1994: 93-94); also remembered by some of my interview partners.

110 A chronology of the Sampit conflict of 2001 refers to these incidents as initiating a series of conflicts throughout the 1990s. See *Daftar Kronologis terjadinya tindakan kekerasan/kejahatan etnis MADURA terhadap suku Dayak warga Kalimantan Tengah*; manuscript, 3 March 2001.

111 According to a "Dayak Elder, witness to the Kasongan Agreement," cited in Smith (2005:13).

112 Email by Lucia Cargill, distributed via the Borneo Research Council discussion list on 6 March 2001, with an attached report by Ridwan Dobson, "an expatriate businessman living in KalTeng", dated "Palangkaraya March 2001".

understood to mean that the Madurese would have to return to Madura if crime and violence persisted,[113] was later used to justify the totality of violence directed against the Madurese community in 2001.

7.4 The Distant Past: Repertoires of Violence

The local history of Dayak-Madurese violence had generated a state of war, exemplified by the use of the 'red bowl' as a call-to-arms, since 1977, as well as the institutionalization of traditional peace-making ceremonies and signed peace pacts to end violent action since 1979. At the same time, this local history of enmity does not elucidate the ritualized guise of violence against the Madurese. To address the issue, it is crucial to scrutinize the "constitution of conflict behavior in existing norms" (Kivimäki 2012: 287). As illustrated above, to be at war in the late 1990s and early 2000s meant following the Dayak traditions of war (*adat perang*) and rediscovering ancestral strength in support of the strife. In this last part of the chapter I intend to demonstrate that many of the violent repertoires which were reenacted by Dayak fighters at the turn of the millennium, were been "reinvented" from an imagined primordial past of tribal fighting, but had been a constituent of Dayak warfare on various occasions in the modern era, with old traditions accommodated in new conflict contexts. In a cross-cultural comparison of ethnic riots, Donald Horowitz remarks that although "[a]tavism is not likely […] the participants' analogy to war and to the ancestral ways felt appropriate to it is unmistakable" (2000: 95). In Borneo, this was the case during anti-colonial rebellions in the 19th and early 20th centuries, but also in Dayak resistance against the Japanese occupation during World War II, or at the time when Dayak troops supported the Indonesian army in their operations against "Chinese communist rebels" in the late 1960s. A consideration of these events, and of their legacy in the Borneo memory-scape, helps to reassess 'tribal' repertoires of warfare in Dayak-Madurese violence, which seemed to be out of place in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

The following brief review of some episodes is mainly based on local Indonesian language publications, which provide a good indication of the historical imagery and imagination of Dayak communities. These publications – some commissioned by local branches of the Indonesian Ministry of Education and Culture (*Depdikbud*), others monographs written by Kalimantan-based intellectuals and public figures (*tokoh*) – are usually based on an eclectic mix of

113 This perception has been frequently invoked by my interview partners (cf. Smith 2005:13; ICG 2001: 3).

materials including colonial sources, scattered documents kept in local archives, as well as the oral history accounts of Dayak elders. The resulting historical amalgam aims to represent the "History of Resistance against Imperialism and Colonialism" (*Sejarah Perlawanan terhadap Imperialisme dan Kolonialisme*) in the provinces of Kalimantan, or their "History of National Awakening" (*Sejarah Kebangkitan Nasional*), to invoke just two generic titles (cf. DEPDIKBUD 1978/79; 1983; 1984 [1981]). In these publications, the depiction of rebellions and uprisings focuses on local intrepidness and the inter-ethnic solidarity of Dayak communities and Malay sultanates, with frequent references to "traditional", "tribal" aspects of violent practices. In consequence local historiography in Kalimantan has contributed to "an ordering of inheritances [and] a sorting of traditions", resulting in "an identity legend" (Geertz 2010: 173) of Dayak heroism and cultural history.

Anti-Chinese Violence in the late 1960s

When the Indonesian military launched operations against Chinese "rebels" and "communists" across West Kalimantan in 1966/67, they were able to secure support from local Dayak communities, leading to massive violence with a death toll of up to three thousand (van Hulten 1992 [1983]: 295; Jenkins 1978: 25). As indicated earlier, comparisons with episodes of past violence are usually absent from scholarly explanations of Dayak-Madurese conflict, and if they are made they remain sketchy. The legacy of anti-Chinese violence, however, has been frequently recognized and has sometimes been explored in detail (e.g. Davidson & Kammen 2002; Peluso 2008). The involvement of Dayak communities in the "anti-communist" operations had been provoked and facilitated by the military early on, but support on a larger scale could only be secured after several Dayak villagers had been killed and ensuing peace accords with the Chinese rebels had failed. In early September 1967, nine Dayak were allegedly kidnapped and later found dead. A "series of traditional ceremonies" was conducted in the aftermath, including peace oaths sworn between Dayak and Chinese villagers in the Bengkayang and Mempawah areas (Davidson & Kammen 2002: 64), but after the rituals were concluded, "kidnappings and killings of a number of Dayak people" continued, leading to the perception that "the communist guerillas did not comply with their oath" (Soemadi 1974: 93). By November, the military's "efforts […] to encourage 'traditional' Dayak war practices, including the passing of the red bowl and head-hunting" (Davidson & Kammen 2002: 69) had yielded the desired results. A range of Dayak communities organized the "Pangsuma Troops" (*Pasukan Pangsuma*), named after a famous local hero from

the time of anti-Japanese resistance (ibid.: 71, fn. 83), and the "spirit of taking heads (*ngayau*) flared up everywhere" (Soemadi 1974: 96). Chinese enemies were beheaded, some of their blood consumed and parts of their livers eaten "to ward off the avenging spirit of the corpse and transfer his strength to the killer" (Horowitz 2000: 113; cf. Mackie 1976: 126-28). Soemadi, then a general in the Indonesian army, remembers: "Whenever the Dayak people achieved a victory in the villages, we held a traditional celebration, with dances and rice wine, and the heads of the slain communists were always brought along" (1974: 96).[114]

As demonstrated, there are discernable parallels between the constitution of Dayak-Madurese violence in the late 1990s and the anti-communist operations in the 1960s. The infringement of peace pacts, the circulation of the red bowl as a traditional call-to-arms, and the revival of head-taking are not the only junctures. Dayak narratives often compare action against the Madurese to the events of 1967, linking their war against the Madurese to the Indonesian state's operations against the Chinese communists and emphasizing that "we, the Dayak people, have aided the army […] in 1967." This was acknowledged by President Soeharto, who travelled to Pontianak to express his gratitude to the Dayak by gifting a ritual gong.[115] Thirty years later, documents and interviewees alike insist, the Dayak community had to fight the "black Chinese" (*Cina hitam*) – an alias sometimes used for the Madurese – and expected aid from the Indonesian army. This position was particularly pronounced among members of the Communication Forum of West Kalimantan Dayak War Leaders (*Forum Komunikasi Pangkalima Perang Dayak Kalimantan Barat*), an offshoot of the group of Dayak war leaders who had been "bestowed with honorary military titles" in the aftermath of anti-Chinese violence (Davidson & Kammen 2002: 69). A member of this group provided me with documents listing its "membership" in September 2001, including a number of panglima who later led Dayak troops during the Dayak-Madurese conflicts of the late 1990s and early 2000s.[116]

114 Not only did the military join in Dayak festivities akin to those celebrated after successful headhunts in the 19th century, the Dayak were also "awarded medals, [since] the practice [of head-taking] was excused as being in accordance with Dayak *adat*" (Somers Heidhues 2001:143).

115 *Team* [sic] *Pengamat Tokoh Masyarakat Dayak terhadap Gerakan Spontanitas Masa Dua Etnis yang Bertikai di beberapa Kecamatan Kabupaten Pontianak*; manuscript, 6 February 1997.

116 *Forum Komunikasi Panglima Perang Dayak Kalimantan Barat* [Letter] *Nomor: 01/FKPPD-KB/IX/2001 Kepada Yth.: Bapak Kepala Intelijen Strategis RI di Jakarta* [Enclosed:] *Pernyataan Sikap Forum Komunikasi Panglima Perang Dayak Kalimantan Barat* [...and:] *Keputusan Gubernur Kepala Daerah Propinsi Kalimantan Barat Nomor SK 003 Tahun 1974 Tgl. 1 Januari 1974: Daftar Nama-Nama Panglima Perang Kalbar*; manuscript, Pontianak, 11 September 2001.

Anti-Japanese Resistance in World War II and the Indonesian War of Independence

Some twenty years prior to the anti-communist operations, Dayak people in West and Central Kalimantan took part in guerilla warfare against the Japanese occupation in World War II and resisted the return of Dutch colonial authority in its aftermath. As indicated above, Dayak troops in 1967 were named after one of the local heroes of Dayak resistance against Japanese incursions into West Kalimantan's interior, Pang Suma, who fell in battle against Japanese militias. According to local historiography, the reason for fierce Dayak resistance against the Japanese was also similar to later episodes of violence and war: "Forced labor occurred, and one could hear stories about rape, cruelty and robberies everywhere in the area" (Frans 1981: 11). Similar too was the eventual Dayak response. The circulation of the red bowl is reported (Rachman et al. 1991: 99) and Dayak communities from a range of villages formed guerilla troops spearheaded by local *panglima*. One of them, the so-called Panglima Burung, led Dayak assaults against the Japanese headquarters in Pontianak (Edisaptura 1977: 216). According to several of my interview partners, he later joined the Dayak-Madurese war of the late 1990s as a revered ritual leader, but died shortly afterwards. His "special abilities" were allegedly passed on to a "new" Panglima Burung who would join the Dayak troops in Sampit in 2001.[117] At the time, the local media coverage featured several depictions of the famous war leader, usually stressing his magic abilities in spectacular but vague terms. He has been depicted as "a powerful authority" (*berwibawa*), "invulnerable" (*kebal*) and gifted with "supernatural powers" (*sakti*). Some thought of him as a person, others as an "imaginative force", which could be called upon and would eventually re-appear as a human being.[118] Indonesian-language sources concerning his role during the anti-Japanese resistance are focused on bravery and heroism, but invulnerability and magical powers are occasionally noted. Local historiography more generally also emphasizes the ritual repertoire of violent action against the Japanese, including the beheading of slain enemies or instances of ritual cannibalism, well remembered by the older generation.[119] Sources suggest that "hundreds of Japanese soldiers' heads were cut from their

117 One of my interview partners claimed to be the successor of the Panglima Burung of old. He also appears in local news reports and attended some of the post-war rituals in Sampit 2001.
118 See "Peran Mistik Panglima Burung," *Banjarmasin Post*, 28 February 2001.
119 For similar practices in Central Kalimantan see Rousseau (1998: 88), who heard "first-hand accounts of this kind of ritual cannibalism, the most recent instances being at the end of the Second World War when some Japanese soldiers were killed".

bodies with traditional weapons, called *mandau*" (Rachman et al. 1991: 3-4) and were "kept as heirlooms (*pusaka*)" (Alqadrie & Sastrowardoyo 1984: 102).

Similar imagery was invoked for the ensuing independence war fought against the Dutch colonial army after their return at the end of World War II. Tjilik Riwut, one of Indonesia's "independence heroes" (*pahlawan kemerdekaan)* and later first governor of Central Kalimantan province, noted in 1947 that "there is a Dayak tradition […] to consume some of the enemy's blood in order to increase one's own spirit and bravery", and suggested that "all Dayak youths (*putera*) who are currently at the battlefields" can attest to this (Riwut 1947: 74). In West Kalimantan, Dayak people formed troops using the name Pasukan Mandau Telabang [sic] to fight against the Dutch soldiers, later aided by Dayak troops from Central Kalimantan (Syahzaman & Hasanuddin 2002: 153-56; cf. Lontaan 1975: 214). The troops were revived as Gerakan Mandau Telawang Panca Sila (G.M.T.P.S.) in the mid-1950s to fight for an all-Dayak province, which was eventually established in 1957 (see Riwut 2007 [1979]: 79; Usop 1994: 59; cf. Miles 1976: 114-124). As a successor organization, formed in the mid-1990s, the Angkatan Penerus Pejuang Gerakan Mandau Telawang Pancasila (APP-GMTPS) has been suspected of involvement in stirring up violence in Sampit in 2001 (van Klinken 2002). The name "Mandau Telawang" was also used as honorary title for one of the *panglima* during the Dayak-Madurese war in Sampit.[120]

Anti-Colonial Warfare

State-sponsored local historiography in Kalimantan often regards the events of the 1940s as a continuation of anti-colonial warfare ongoing since the mid-19th century – as a last episode in the heroic struggle against "imperialism and colonialism" on the way to "national awakening" (e.g. DEPDIKBUD 1978/79; 1983; 1984 [1981]). Other local sources also stress its impact on the formation of a broader Dayak identity and the generation of ethnic solidarity between interior Dayak groups and coastal Malay sultanates (e.g. Lontaan 1975; Riwut 2007 [1979]; Usop 1994; cf. Duile in this volume). Although it is difficult to pinpoint direct lineages from anti-colonial strife to the war against the Madurese, a brief consideration of uprisings against the Dutch – and their representation in local historiography – helps to explain how "tribal" traditions have been

120 A leaflet, signed by four Dayak *panglima* on behalf of their troops, bears his signature. See *Pemberitahuan* [...] *sebagai pemutihan Warga Etnis Madura diwilayah Kotim*; undated manuscript [ca. May 2001].

accommodated in a changing socio-political environment since the mid-19th century. In particular, this concerns the 'heroization' of local leadership, the use of war magic, and the reenactment of head-taking traditions.

Local sources suggest that the Banjarese War of 1859-62 – and its eventual spread to the interior of Central Kalimantan during the next half-century – contributed to a "confederative" outlook of diverse Dayak groups and the "awakening of a spirit of independence" (*semangat kemerdekaan*), constituting a bellicose Dayak response to the Dutch administration in the late colonial period (Usop 1994: 29-32). Similarly, it has been suggested that various Dayak *panglima* and their warriors aided Malay rebellions in West Kalimantan (Syahzaman & Hasanuddin 2002: 116; Lontaan 1975: 125). During one incident – the so-called Belangkait war (*perang Belangkait*), in the early 20th century in Simpang – Dayak "troops" under the leadership of a certain Panglima Ropa, together with five other *panglima*, supported the local Malay sultanate. They were famous for their ability to "cut off heads while bouncing in the air" (Lontaan 1975: 112). Foreshadowing the mystical stories about Dayak *panglima* at the turn of the millennium, a great number of fighters are remembered for their magical abilities, including their invulnerability (*kekebalan*). Many of them are celebrated in local legends and historiography, for example one Kek Jula Laji. Although "the Dutch rained bullets in the direction of his body", only "his clothes were riddled with holes, but his body remained unscathed" (Lontaan 1975: 113).

The institutionalization of war leadership (as *panglima/ pangkalima*) seems to originate in Dayak alliances with Malay sultanates during joint rebellions against the Dutch, although the concept also resonates in local mythology and legends (see Riwut 2007 [1979]: 369). The term is of Malay origin and has widely replaced corresponding Dayak terms such as variants of *pamanok/ pemanuk* among Dayak groups in Southeast Borneo (see Tiedtke 1872: 54; Hardeland 1859: 352-353), or *pangalangok* in the Western areas (see Schadee 1910: 470; cf. Bamba 2006: 116 and Giring 2004: 121). Local historiography celebrates not only their superhuman abilities, but also their bravery as headhunters – for example in the often invoked narrative of the valiant death of Tentemak, a local leader in a 1914 uprising in the area of Matan (now in Ketapang regency). Tentemak had already succeeded in shooting dead the Dutch officer Frederik Brans, when he realized "that his death had no meaning if his head was not brought along as a customary sign of triumph (*adat menang perang*)." This thought, however, eventually resulted in Tentemak's own heroic death: "just at the moment when [he] swung his Mandau towards Brans' neck, an enemy's bullet hit his chest and took his soul" (Lontaan 1975: 98; see also pp. 114, 211 and cf. Syahzaman & Hasanuddin 2002: 124, 132).

A Note on Head-Taking and "Headhunting"

In an attempt to contradict sensationalist reports about a revival of "headhunting traditions" in Dayak-Madurese violence, scholars have suggested that the taking of heads "was no ritual but terror directed against the Madurese" (Colombijn 2001: 37; cf. Peluso & Harwell 2001: 84; Tanasaldy 2012: 216). Indisputably, the mutilation of enemy corpses contributes to their dehumanization and othering. The taking and public display of enemy heads in particular can also be regarded as a symbolic act emphasizing the victor's strength and bravery. However, these aspects of beheading do not disconnect Dayak practices in the late 1990s and early 2000s from historical antecedents. I argue that past head-taking practices were not exclusively "motivated" by the need to fulfill "particular ritual/ religious purposes" (Peluso 2003: 206; Peluso & Harwell 2001: 84). Since the 19th century at least, head-taking has been an "epiphenomenon of warfare" (Rousseau 1998: 84), and often the same local term (*kayo* or *kayau* in most Dayak languages) was used to refer to headhunting raids and tribal warfare alike. Even where distinct terms existed, like in Central Kalimantan (*hasang* or *haparang* as Ngaju terms for warfare, *hakayau* for headhunting),[121] local historiography reflects a later conflation of the two*: asang kayau* as tribal war "with killings, beheadings and raiding" (Usop 1994: 53). Some colonial sources even emphasize the non-ritual aspects of head-taking: "Apart from the sporting side of the pursuit, where the heads are considered merely as trophies and signs of the prowess of the warrior, there is to a certain extent an undercurrent of meaning" (Evans 1922: 159). Others still report that head-taking has no ritual meaning at all. In some areas of Borneo, people "denie[d] that head-hunting is a religious ceremony among them; it is merely to show their bravery and manliness. […] The possession of heads gives them great consideration as warriors and men of wealth; the skulls being prized as the most valuable of goods" (St. John 1862 Vol. II: 27-28).

Head-taking anything but disappeared with the establishment of Dutch control in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, despite attempts by the colonial administration to put an end to it. The practice was adapted to new contexts, such as anti-colonial uprisings, the anti-Japanese rebellions, the fight against "communists", and ultimately, anti-Madurese violence since the 1960s – events that lay barely a generation apart from each other. During its episodic recurrences, the practice has undoubtedly undergone transformations, but it did not have to be "reinvented" from some primordial past.

121 See Hardeland (1859: 16, 204 and 422).

7.5 Conclusions

By tracing several genealogical layers of Dayak warfare against "outsiders", my analysis demonstrates that a serious concern for the narratives of active combatants contributes to an alternative reading of violent action and its justification. A serious consideration of "the local genealogy of violence, which has often been neglected or even silenced in anthropological studies and government reports" (Schulte Nordholt 2002: 50) emphasizes not only the generation of enmity towards a particular community (in my case Madurese migrants), but also helps to decipher the process of its interpretation vis-à-vis historical antecedents of enmity and inter-group conflict. The neglect of Dayak narratives of conflict with the Madurese often led scholars to look for its "causes" in broad contextualizations of a political-economic outlook. Although this has contributed much to our understanding of shifting power relations in contemporary Kalimantan, such an approach has largely failed to capture Dayak people's insistence on tradition and "continuity speaking" (Chua 2012: 512, 520).

Without dispute, large-scale violence against the Madurese at the turn of the millennium was not "the same" as local conflict between Dayak and Madurese people in the late 1960s and 1970s. Nor was it a simple replication of anti-Chinese violence in 1967 or the rebellions against the Japanese in World War II or the Dutch in the late colonial period. It does, however, invoke these diverse antecedents, sometimes by direct reference and sometimes via broader mnemonic strategies, performative acts and narrative imagination. "The past is not dead", as Christa Wolf once put it[122] – "it is not even passed". It continues to live with those who experienced it and is rediscovered by those who long for it. This longing for a heroic Dayak past, as imagined in local legends and historiography, often speaks from the stories of Dayak fighters whom I interviewed. Surprisingly, there was not so much hatred in their narratives as an insistence of necessity: to rescue "Dayak" culture, imagined as it may be, from "Madurese" menace. The hyper-real conspiracy of the Madurese and the local history of their frequent assaults against Dayak communities likened the Madurese to other invaders and colonialists, spreading the fear of losing one's own cultural autonomy and of impending disorder. To restore balance, the Dayak narrative suggests, the Madurese had to be fought like the Dutch or the Japanese had been fought by the older generation. Coached by local historiography, Dayak people in contemporary Kalimantan have reenacted violent repertoires of a past which is neither "primordial" nor "long gone" – it is a past of imagined heroism

122 To commence her novel *Kindheitsmuster*.

and resistance that has episodically recurred in almost unbroken fashion from one generation to the next, often via direct intergenerational lineages.

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PART III:

Dayak Religion and Animism

8. Values in Practice: Change and Continuity in Luangan Ritual Performance

Isabell Herrmans

8.1 Introduction

In this article I explore cultural values, in the sense of conceptions of "the good and desirable" (Robbins 2012; 2013), as conveyed through ritual performances among the Luangan Dayak in the border area between the provinces of East and Central Kalimantan. This is an area which has undergone extensive environmental, economic, and social change in recent years, occasioning a shift in value orientations. Taking as a vantage point a Luangan myth in which eight shamans – so powerful that they could awaken people from death, so popular that they could live on ritual salaries alone – were killed because they failed to take care of their children, the article examines a widely felt tension between ethical and economic values as reflected in ritual activities (Lambek 2012). Used as a metacommentary, the myth brings up a theme and question both timeless and current: how to balance what Bloch and Parry (1989) call the long-term reproduction of the socio-cosmic order with the short-term advancement of personal gain, or how to choose between the needs of one's immediate family, and those of the community, or society, at large.

I explore these questions by comparing ritual performances in two ethnographic field sites. The first is Sembulan, an East Kalimantan Luangan village where I have conducted fieldwork since 1993, where rituals are informed by an ethos of social solidarity and a relational ontology. The second site is Anan Jaya, a nearby transmigration camp which I have visited intermittently between 1997 and 2015, where local Luangans live alongside an ethnically mixed population of Javanese and non-local Dayak migrants, and rituals are influenced by increasing individualism, shamanic professionalization, monetization of the local ritual economy, and objectification of local tradition. By focusing on different ways of sharing communal meals and paying for ritual services in these two locations, I contrast a ritual economy based on maintaining kin relations and community integration with one associated with what some Luangan pejoratively

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call "business rituals," referring to rituals that may be prolonged for months on end as and because they are financed through gambling, and in which audience participation has become increasingly differentiated for close family and outside spectators. While these examples are presented to reflect shifting and conflicting value orientations among the Luangan, I argue that the latter example may simultaneously be understood as a strategic act, serving to maintain precisely some of those values that it is taken to contradict.

The article is based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted for roughly two years with Luangans living in the border area between Central and East Kalimantan, an area I refer to as the central Luangan area (Herrmans 2015: 30-32).[123] This is a rather remote upriver region, covered by secondary and, to a rapidly decreasing extent, primary rainforest, in which several villages could be reached only by foot when I first visited them. Starting a few years ago, extensive oil palm plantations have come to cover much of the region, and most villages are now connected by roads. This area is also the mythological homeland of the Luangan, where many events in a corpus of Luangan origin myths (*tempuun*) took place, where Mount Lumut, the realm of the dead, is located, and from where various ritual practices are said to originate.

8.2 The Myth as a Commentary on a Problem

They were magnificent, the eight shamans. Women and men. When treating a patient that patient would not not-become cured. So miraculous were they that they could awaken people who were already buried, awaken the dead. They were called to perform *belian* healing rituals from all over, starting off in the village where they lived, going on to neighboring villages, and then to places further and further afield. They had no need to grow their own rice but lived on meat from animals sacrificed in rituals and rice received as ritual salaries. Even when they had children they did not stop, the children being left to be brought up by their grandparents, fed by relatives.

As we might guess, this would sooner or later turn against them. As they grew older, the children of the eight shamans started to ask questions about their parents. Don't we have any real parents? What happened to them? Learning that they did indeed have parents, but that these had left them, "hungry, starving," a long time ago, no one having seen them for years, the children became so angry

123 Fieldwork among the central Luangan was conducted intermittently between 1993 and 2015, with the longest periods in 1993 (6 months) and 1996-1997 (12 months), and shorter periods in 1998, 2007, 2011, 2014, and 2015. The fieldwork was conducted together with Kenneth Sillander.

that they ordered that their parents be killed. Hence it came to be that Putes Lalung Jues and Joreh Lalung Tokah, two assassins hired by the children, severed the heads of the eight shamans.

According to the Luangan myth of ritual paraphernalia – a myth regularly chanted during some major Luangan rituals (*buntang* and *nalin taun* community rituals), here modified by me from a version told by the late shaman Kakah Ramat – it was from the remains of the eight shamans that various sorts of incense wood, flowers, and plants that are used to make ritual paraphernalia came into existence, some of the potency of the eight shamans thus being transferred to later-generation shamans.[124] My interest in this article is not so much with the workings of ritual paraphernalia or the potency of objects, however, as with how the myth, through the story of the eight shamans, brings up a moral dilemma, the relevance of which seems to transcend time and space.[125] Striking an almost Faustian chord, the myth presents the eight shamans as both marvelous (*manget* in the local language) and destructive, extremely successful in their trade, defeating death, but at the price of losing track of what is important in life, and of what ultimately sustains it.

In July 2011, in the small hamlet of Sembulan in an upriver area of East Kalimantan, the shaman Ma Kerudot is no less busy, even if he is certainly less omnipotent. As a six-day long *belian buntang* ritual, a combined thanksgiving and healing ritual, is about to end and as the ritual salaries of white plates, pieces of cloth and meat from animals sacrificed are displayed, he gives a speech, an account of what has been done during the ritual. He points out that he has worked as a *belian*, or shaman (the word *belian* is used by the central Luangan for both the ritual and the shaman),[126] for 28 days in a row, performing four

124 While I try to follow Kakah Ramat's words and expressions as accurately as possible in my retelling and translation of the myth, I have left out some sentences and included commentaries of my own.

125 In this article I use the introduction of the myth to raise questions about value, leaving other themes and a more thorough analysis of the myth's contents for a future publication.

126 I use the word shaman here in a general sense, as commonly employed in the Southeast Asian ethnography (e.g. Atkinson 1989; Sather 2001). A *belian* (or *wara*, death ritual specialist) may be defined as a shaman in the classical sense of a "ritual intercessor" (Sather 2001: 11), who is capable at will of passing "from one cosmic region to another" (Eliade 1964: 259). Like his or her Iban counterpart, a *belian* is "believed to dispatch his soul into invisible regions of the cosmos" and is thought to have "the power to direct [his soul's] movements and to perform deeds within these unseen regions with the help of personal spirit guides" (Sather 2001: 11). In contrast to Iban shamanism, spirit possession is not unheard of among Luangan shamans, but occurs occasionally, either spontaneously or as a result of the use of special techniques (most prominently during divination, *preau*). For most of the time, however, the "possession" by spirit familiars of *belian* shamans (the spirit familiars are said to enter, *sua*, the shaman) is an intentional and highly controlled endeavor – mainly about summoning them rather than possession in a stricter, trance-induced or other sense – and not appropriately described as mediumship.

different rituals in the village without any rest in between. He is not the only shaman around to appoint, he reminds his audience, urging them to understand his predicament. He needs to tend to his fields as well, to get some sleep (rituals often go on for much of the night, and *buntang* rituals in the daytime too, not leaving many hours of rest for the shaman in charge).

Ma Kerudot is not alone in being busy with ritual work. Among his Benuaq and Tunjung neighbors,[127] major rituals may go on for weeks, or, not infrequently today, months on end. Each time that I have travelled through areas inhabited by Benuaq or Tunjung on my way to and from Luangan villages located further inland in recent years, there has been a months-long ritual going on in some village, either a *nalitn tautn*[128] community ritual or a *kwangkai* secondary mortuary ritual, and often several at the same time. In particular, the time between the rice harvest and the clearing of new fields in June and July has become something of a ritual season (due to my children's school holidays, this is also the time at which I have most frequently visited the area in recent years). In June 2015 three extended *kwangkai* rituals were held simultaneously in the village of Sekolaq Darat, inhabited by a majority of Tunjung, and its vicinity, while a *nalitn tautn* ritual was performed in Payang, which is a Benuaq village an hour's drive away (there were probably also other rituals in other villages nearby that I did not hear about during my short stay).

Staging such extended rituals demands the services of a large number of ritual experts, especially toward the end of a ritual, when the program intensifies. At the same time the number of trained shamans is declining in many places, and ritual experts often have to be invited from quite far away.[129] This was part of the problem in the village of Payang, where the ritual had already gone on for several months by July 2015, mostly with minimal activity as all available

127 The Benuaq and Tunjung live north of the central Luangan area where Ma Kerudot lives. Both the Benuaq and Tunjung have been categorized as Luangan (e.g. Weinstock 1983). The Luangan are not an ethnic group in the strict sense of the term, however, but a loosely bounded general category encompassing many subgroups whose members often do not use or even recognize the term for themselves. Especially in the central parts of the Luangan area, people do maintain a degree of self-identification as Luangan, however, based on sharing a common mythology and ritual tradition, which is seen to originate in the upper Teweh River area. Ma Kerudot himself would variously self-identify as Bentian or Luangan.

128 The Benuaq say *nalitn tautn*, whereas central Luangan say *nalin taun,* which explains the discrepancy of spelling used in this article.

129 Young people are often said to be unwilling to take up apprenticeship as shamans today, being attracted by more lucrative educational and occupational opportunities (cf. Haug 2010: 73), and disinclined to undergo the training to become a *belian*, which takes years of practice. Increasing conversion to Christianity is another reason for this situation. However, there are exceptions, especially in Central Kalimantan, where I have met several young men training to become shamans in recent years.

shamans were busy elsewhere. When I visited there was only one shaman present, asleep under his mosquito net at the wooden platform that constituted the village marketplace and that had now been converted to a ritual arena, housing both the sponsoring family and the shaman and his wife. For the sake of the anthropologists, the shaman, an elderly blind man, was woken up, and asked to resume his ritual activities. He sat down by the ritual paraphernalia that had been assembled in the middle of the space and chanted for a while, and then went back to sleep. The family sponsoring the ritual had no clear idea when the ritual would or could be finished, or even whether it would actually become a *nalitn tautn* ritual as planned, or instead turn out to be a smaller *bekeleeu* ritual, due to lack of finances and the difficulty of engaging the required number of shamans (several people contacted were busy with other rituals). Among the ritual paraphernalia a portrait of President Jokowi was displayed in the hope that he or the government he represented would support the ritual financially in return for the support they had provided him in the election campaign the year before. While the ritual program was reduced to a minimum at the time of my visit, there was continuous gambling, the main source of funding for the ritual, going on outside, behind the ritual arena.

There are some significant differences, however, between Ma Kerudot's predicament and that of the shamans appointed to conduct such extended rituals as that described above in Payang. (It is worth noting that, since shamans from the area in which he lives are occasionally called to perform rituals among the Benuaq and Tunjung, Ma Kerudot could potentially be one of those appointed). As we shall see, being busy with ritual work means quite different things in different contexts and reflects differing value orientations.

Like in the myth, in which the activities of the eight shamans stand out as both extremely powerful and as morally questionable (and hence as ultimately destructive), Luangan living in Sembulan and many surrounding villages in what I call the central Luangan area, regard the extended rituals performed by some of the Benuaq and Tunjung – and some local variants influenced by them, such as the ritual performed in the nearby transmigration camp discussed later in the article – with a certain ambivalence.[130] On the one hand, such rituals give local tradition visibility and legitimacy as *adat* (objectified tradition), an increasingly important notion in post-*Reformasi* Indonesia (see e.g. Davidson & Henley 2007;

130 It should be noted here that not all Benuaq or Tunjung rituals are extended because of gambling and that there are nuances of commodification among the Benuaq and Tunjung as well as among the central Luangan. There is a difference between paying shamans in cash, which most Benuaq do today, and extending rituals because of gambling, which some Benuaq reject (Haug, personal communication). Also, while central Luangans often attribute so-called "business rituals" to the Benuaq and Tunjung, many Benuaq ascribe them mainly to the Tunjung (Haug 2010: 74).

Reuter 2009; 2013), and especially in East Kalimantan where the local government has not recognized the local "religion," often called Kaharingan, as an officially approved religion (*agama*), unlike in Central Kalimantan, where it has been recognized as part of Hinduism, under the label Hindu-Kaharingan (see Herrmans 2015: 63-66).[131] The rituals have a festival-like allure, drawing people from afar to participate, showcasing Benuaq or Tunjung tradition, at times with financial support received from the regional government (especially during election campaigns, when candidates are eager to sponsor rituals so as to gain votes). But on the other hand, the rituals are simultaneously seen to contradict some values regarded as essential to that tradition, a criticism also voiced by some Benuaq and Tunjung ritual experts (Venz, personal communication). Reflecting their hesitant stance toward them, central Luangan dismiss such rituals as "business rituals" (*belian usaha*), referring to how they are financed through gambling and how that practice is allowed to influence the ritual format, expressing the notion that the commercialization of rituals and the potential political motives involved influence the moral economy in a negative way.[132]

The revenue generated by gambling can indeed be substantial in some areas and maximization of such revenue is a main reason for extending rituals. Michaela Haug (2010: 74) has described how gambling operators may earn up to 10 million IDR[133] per day during extended death rituals among the Tunjung living close to the capital of the regency of Kutai Barat. There may be up to twenty such operators present during a ritual and the ritual may go on for several weeks, or even months. Similarly, Morgan Harrington (2014: 109) describes how the gambling syndicates that increasingly sponsor mortuary rituals among the Siang in Central Kalimantan may generate hundreds of millions of IDR. In the past, the costs for Siang mortuary rituals (*totoh*), which usually were staged for multiple deceased people, were shared by an extended kin network, while the rituals today are arranged mainly for individuals, with the burden of the costs placed on fewer people, which has led to the Siang seeking funding from non-Siang gambling syndicates (Harrington 2014: 105). According to Harrington

[131] There are only six officially recognized religions (*agama*) in Indonesia, where those "not yet" in possession of a religion (*orang yang belum beragama*) have been considered primitive animists, lacking in national consciousness (see Atkinson 1987: 174; Picard 2011). In the Muslim-governed province of East Kalimantan, Kaharingan is considered to be a set of "beliefs" (*kepercayaan*) only, something which has caused discontent among Luangan living there who are forced to become nominally Christian in order to receive identity cards, for example. Hindu-Kaharingan received recognition as a Hindu sect in Central Kalimantan in 1980 as a result of a long struggle led by the Ngaju (see Schiller 1997: 109-131).

132 Although *belian* refers to life rituals, death rituals are no different in this respect and the expression is also used for them.

133 Equaling US$1100 in 2004.

(ibid.), "Siang cosmology can no longer be reproduced without involvement of external interests."

Often appointed for several weeks or even months, shamans employed to conduct such extended rituals among the Benuaq or Tunjung may be paid several million IDR (as claimed by central Luangan shamans, in some cases with considerable envy).[134] The practices of extending rituals because of gambling and engaging shamans from many different, often far-flung, regions during a single ritual has also led to a degree of professionalization of shamanic practice (cf. Donzelli 2007: 142 for a similar situation among the Toraja of Sulawesi), with some shamans travelling around from ritual to ritual, somewhat like the eight *belian* of the myth (even if few of them are able to live on ritual salaries alone, they, and accompanying family members, are provided with free food and cigarettes during the course of a ritual). At the same time the ritual content has become somewhat standardized and watered down. This is, as we shall see, in rather sharp contrast to the situation in Sembulan, where Ma Kerudot mostly works, and where gambling is not practiced during rituals. (Gambling, in a much more modest form and degree, was in the past part of larger rituals in the central Luangan area, but is not presently practiced in Sembulan at all.)

8.3 The Value of Social Relations

Sembulan is a small village located in a thinly populated headwater area where rivers are shallow and mostly non-navigable. When I first visited Sembulan in the early 1990s, the village, like many other central Luangan villages, could only be reached by foot. The inhabitants made their living from shifting cultivation, in combination with hunting, fishing, and the gathering of forest products. They were largely economically self-sufficient, obtaining cash mainly from the sale of rattan, which they have cultivated in their swidden fields for over a century. Most of them shifted residence between their swidden fields, where they lived in small temporary houses (*blai ume*), and the village, where they lived in either small individual family houses (*blai*), or larger multi-family houses (*lou* or *lou solai*). There was a strong ethos of social solidarity between kin and neighbors, evidenced through the sharing of food and game and through participation in collective work parties and remarkably frequent *belian* rituals. All inhabitants identified themselves as Kaharingan, adherents of the local

134 According to people I worked with, 2-3 million IDR was a minimum for rituals lasting over a week. Among the Dusun in Central Kalimantan I was told that there is a standard price of 2 million IDR paid for conducting a major *siwah* ritual (lasting eight days), set by the regional branch of the Hindu Kaharingan Council.

"religion." Conforming to what could be described as a relational ontology, in the understanding of Tim Ingold (2006) and Nurit Bird-David (1999), personhood and social relations were extended to include non-human beings, especially the various spirits of the local landscape.

Around 2009 oil palm companies entered the area surrounding Sembulan, quickly converting much of the forest around the village into oil palm plantations. Some inhabitants sold their land quite willingly, despite complaining that prices were low, while others tried to hold on to it, but were eventually forced to sell anyway due to the fear that if they did not do so, someone else would, thus robbing them of the potential profit. As local land rights, which are based on clearing communal forest for cultivation, are inherited bilaterally and often overlap, conflicts over ownership became frequent. Before these could be settled by local elders, or even brought to the negotiation table, the companies that had claimed the land rushed to burn the forest, preparing it for the oil palm plantations. As elsewhere in Indonesia, and following a colonial pattern, "plantation managers favored migrant workers over 'locals,'" because migrants, being totally dependent on the income from plantation work, were "more easily disciplined" (Li 2014: 170). Beside the small sum paid for the land, Luangans receive a 20 percent share of the profit of oil palm crops on land that they have sold.[135]

With the arrival of oil palm cultivation, a price was put not only on land, but also on game animals (for which a market developed) and this, along with associated generalized monetization processes, affected local social relations remarkably quickly: Within a few years, several villages had changed from largely exchange-based systems into market-based ones, leading to a dramatic decrease in kin and community solidarity. This is in sharp contrast to how Jérôme Rousseau (2013) describes the disappearance of the traditional practice of distributing meat among the Kayan in the 1970s, which, apparently because it was not associated with the same general economic processes, had no impact on other aspects of social life. While in the 1990s, when I started my work in the central Luangan area, game was shared between the members of a community, or at least an extended family (which generally amounts to the same thing in smaller villages like Sembulan, where most people are closely related), today almost all game is sold, even between close family members, something which was unthinkable before. "Without money you cannot survive today," inhabitants say. Even if the central Luangan have a long history of trade (of rattan, resins, beeswax and other forest products sold when the market price was favorable), it

135 People selling land to the companies actually maintain ownership over 20 percent of the sold land, and receive the profit of the yields of this land. However, fees for fertilizers etc., provided by the companies, are deducted from this sum.

seems that the arrival of oil palm triggered what can be described as a shift from a "market-as-opportunity" to a "market-as-compulsion" approach (Brenner 1985; Wood 2002; Li 2014: 6). With money received from the sale of land, almost every family bought a motor cycle, which, along with the simultaneous arrival of roads, allowed them to reach new markets that appeared around the oil palm camps, further facilitating this kind of shift. At the same time, more and more people have stopped hunting, becoming "too lazy," as some say, and increasingly dependent on store bought food.

However, this development has not affected the ritual economy thus far. On the contrary, it has quite deliberately been kept out of it. Aside from meat and cloth, shamans are mainly compensated for ritual work with dozens of ordinary white, store-bought plates. These have partly replaced the gongs and Chinese jars previously used for the same purpose, but which now, due to increased market value, have either been sold to downriver merchants or are kept out of circulation. Stored in large piles lined up along the walls of most shamans' and elders' houses, the plates provide a physical representation of the value of the act of giving them, and of reciprocal relations, in a way that way money, usually spent immediately, does not (cf. Lounela this volume). To cite Michael Lambek (2013: 155), whose take on value as generated through human activity I draw on in my analysis, the plates "store (or symbolize) the value of the acts [here of giving and of receiving, and of social relations] rather than being fully or purely valuable in and of themselves, let alone on the market." Even people who have converted to Christianity often choose to pay fines and compensation to people helping out during rituals, including funerals and weddings, with plates rather than money, thus marking the activity as one pertaining to ethical rather than economic value.

During my fieldwork in the late 1990s, the central Luangan often described themselves as rich in plates, not in money. In a similar way, they prided themselves in always providing visitors with food for free, in contrast to other areas where one must pay for rice (Sillander 2004: 289). Interesting here is the fact that plates do have a price, both when bought from downriver markets and within the local economy of valuables. In 2015 the price of a box of six dozen plates had gone up to 450,000 IDR,[136] while one dozen plates still equaled one Chinese jar in the local symbolic economy, as decided by local leaders (*manti*) at some point in the past. In this sense, the argument sometimes presented to me that the Luangan use plates instead of money because they have comparatively little income does not tell the whole truth. It is also worth noting that plates cannot be re-sold locally, but are only used to pay for ritual services, as fines, or

136 Equaling US$35 in 2015.

in marriage transactions. In addition, ritual participants often bring a few plates, along with some sugar, coffee, rice, or other food items, as a contribution to cover the costs of a ritual to the family arranging it, contributions which today often are carefully listed in notebooks. The use value of plates is also limited, as there are far more plates in circulation than are needed for the purpose of serving food, even during large rituals when there may be over a hundred guests present. For the central Luangan, being rich in plates entails being rich in social relations (the social significance of plates in this respect being comparable to gifts), with the price paid for plates and the trouble involved in transporting them upriver, especially before roads were built, adding to the value attributed to the maintenance of social relations.

A crucial aspect of plate distribution is their ceremonial display. Before the plates are given as salaries to shamans and others who have helped out with ritual tasks, and in some cases to all members of the ritual audience, piles of plates are spread across the floor, along with pieces of cloth and meat from sacrificial animals, and the number of plates in the piles are counted and re-counted, often repeatedly. A note with each receiver's name is then put on top of each pile, together with a small bill and some turmeric (a cooling substance); the leading shamans receiving the most, with lesser amounts being given to the shamans' assistants (*penyempatung*), those who have prepared the ritual paraphernalia and offerings (*pengeruye*) and other people that contributed. This ceremonial display is accompanied by speeches, which describe what has been done during the ritual, how many animals have been sacrificed, as well as the level of compensation due to those who have helped out. The speeches and the display of plates may be seen to serve, in Lambek's interpretation of Rappaport's take on ritual (1999), to establish "the criteria by which ethical judgement can take place" (Lambek 2012: 348), by making the importance of the Luangans' own actions "visible" or "recognizable" (Strathern 1988, in Graeber 2001: 47) both to themselves and to the spirits to whom the ritual work is ultimately dedicated (cf. Sillander 2004: 302-303).

Figure 8.1: Ceremonial display of plates paid as compensation for ritual work.

Sembulan village. Copyright: Isabell Herrmans.

Plate distribution and ritual sharing of food, to which I will turn next, are not only templates for value, however, but form productive acts through which Luangan relationality is actively constituted and affirmed. During major rituals long rows of plates with cooked meat from sacrificial animals, along with banana leaf packages or bowls of rice, are laid out across the floor and served to all ritual participants, humans and spirits alike (spirits first, then humans), often several times during certain days of the ritual, and usually after lengthy speeches. Similarly, each night of a larger ritual usually ends with the distribution of plates of sweet sticky rice, various cakes, and pieces of barbecued chicken to everyone present, this food having been presented as offerings (*okan penyewaka*) to the spirit helpers earlier in the evening. Like plate distribution, such display and collective sharing of food brings Luangan relationalism into being, indeed representing a precondition for it beyond instigating it, as relatedness is essentially acquired – kin relations, for instance, being as much based on

"practical association," as on pre-established connection through blood or affinal kinship (Sillander 2011: 155; cf. Bird-David 1999: 73). As Lambek (2013: 147) states, "formalized acts of this kind are not merely representations of some prior state of action, after the fact, but are themselves socially constitutive and consequential – acts that create the facts." Like the ceremonial display of plates, the display of food, and its presentation through the shamans' chants (mostly to spirits) and the speeches of elders or leaders (mostly to humans), is an essential element of the process of solidifying relationalism as a value, and of *creating* relationships. In this respect it is arguably even more important than the actual consumption of the food, which is often eaten hurriedly.

Figure 8.2: Ritual Sharing of Food

Muara Mea village. Copyright: Isabell Herrmans.

In a relational ontology such as that of the Luangan, in which personhood and sociality is extended to include not only human beings, but also non-human beings, especially spirits of different kinds (which are regarded as the elder siblings of human beings, as recounted in the myth of human origins and as

frequently invoked in ritual chants), continuous engagement in kin-like relations, of which the sharing of food is an essential element, is conceived as a condition for what constitutes a good life (*bolum buen* in the local language), and for its central elements health and prosperity. It is through interrelation that the kinship is not only realized but sustained. This is also, in part, I propose, why *belian* rituals are so popular among the Luangan, occupying Ma Kerudot and other shamans with seemingly endless ritual work (I attended *belian* rituals approximately every second night during my fieldwork in the 1990s, and the frequency of rituals does not seem to have significantly decreased in much of the central Luangan area). Similar to trances and divination among the Nayaka of south India (Bird-David 2004: 336), a commitment to share and to continue sharing and living together is a central objective of *belian* rituals (Herrmans 2015: 232-237), which are not only about healing in a straightforward way, but also about maintaining and negotiating social relations with those that the Luangan share their environment with, be they humans or spirits. This is so because the maintenance of relations is perceived as a precondition for well-being, and a precaution, preventive of ill-health (even while excessive blurring of boundaries between human beings and spirits, or between the ritual and non-ritual domains, may be problematic and dangerous as well, as exemplified by the myth of ritual paraphernalia).

Unlike the eight *belian* of the myth, however, Ma Kerudot cannot live on ritual salaries alone. Like most of his neighbors, and Luangan shamans in general, he subsists on shifting rice cultivation, and receives most of his cash income not from shamanic work, but from cultivating rattan (and increasingly from the sale of oil palm crops). Prolonged ritual work – in Ma Kerudot's case the result of many shamans in Sembulan having died within a short time span, increasing the pressure on those alive – put him in a position of conflict. Since most people requesting his ritual services were related to him in one way or another, denying such services was difficult. At the same time, continuous ritual work put a strain not only on his strength, but on his and his family's subsistence. This is perhaps also why some Luangan shamans are eager to take the opportunity to perform rituals among the Benuaq or Tunjung when invited, welcoming payment in cash, even though this practice is in conflict with the values *belian* is understood to promote and the relational ontology that it constitutes. Values are, of course, often not unambiguously affirmed, especially in today's Luangan society due to the ongoing processes of monetization. Additionally, it can be observed that the relational obligations placed on Ma Kerudot conflicted with another widely held value in Luangan society (notably associated in important ways with the practice of shifting cultivation): that of autonomy (see Sillander 2011: 161-163).

8.4 Monetization of the Ritual Economy

A contrasting example to Ma Kerudot's case – and to ritual practice in Sembulan more generally – is a *gombok* death ritual performed in 2014. This exhibited some similar elements to so-called "business rituals," albeit in a rather reduced form as the ritual in question was only two weeks long. This ritual was performed in Anan Jaya, a village adjacent to a transmigration camp located some 15 km from Sembulan. Anan Jaya is inhabited by a mix of Javanese transmigrants and Dayak peoples of varying ethnic origin, among them local Bentian (part of those I call the central Luangan), as well as Benuaq. Anan Jaya was built on government initiative close to a large logging camp in the mid-1990s. Today logging activities have nearly stopped and many of the Javanese transmigrants have returned to Java.

The death ritual described was directly influenced by Benuaq practice, a result of the fact that several members of the sponsoring family had Benuaq origins.[137] Seven shamans had been summoned to perform the ritual, some of them locals (one from Anan Jaya and two from adjacent Bentian villages), while others were Benuaq from different regions. The house in which the ritual was performed was a standard white-painted wooden transmigration house, consisting of one rather small room with a kitchen attached at the back. One of the side walls of the house had been torn down for the occasion, visually connecting the inside space to a large wooden platform that had been built outside and covered by a plastic tarpaulin. Directly outside the house, on a small veranda, gongs and drums were suspended. While the shamans were gathered inside the house, preoccupied with ritual work, presenting food to the souls of the dead and escorting them to the death realms, most other people stayed outside on or near the platform, on which gambling of various sorts took place. At regular intervals people from the audience stepped up to the musical instruments and played short melodies, characteristic of *gombok* rituals.

Despite the fact that no visible or audible barrier separated the inside ritual space from the outside, a mental one clearly did. In the course of the ritual, only people closely related to the sponsoring family, or those engaged as ritual experts and their family members, entered the house, while others remained outdoors,

137 In documents used to apply for a permit from the police to conduct the ritual it was called a *gombok/ kenyau* ritual, combining central Luangan and Benuaq designations. Unlike the Benuaq, the historically less stratified central Luangan use the term *gombok* for all secondary death rituals, mainly distinguishing based on whether a *gombok* involves water buffalo sacrifice or not, whereas Benuaq mainly distinguish between *kenyau* and *kwangkai* rituals*, kwangkai* being a more elaborate style of death ritual, in the past performed for "aristocrats" (Venz, personal communication). *Gombok* roughly correspond to *kenyau*, although an elaborate variant involving exhumation of the remains of the dead (*gombok mpe selimat*) more closely resembles *kwangkai*.

participating in or watching dice and other games, betting on cockfighting that was going on behind the house, or hanging about the *warung* (commercial food stalls) that had been erected along the dirt road in front of the house. While constant cooking by the hosts was going on both in the kitchen and outside the house, with large woks containing meat, vegetables, and rice continuously simmering on open fires, food was never publicly served during the ritual (except to the souls of the dead and other spirits, and to the shamans, who consumed part of this food after it had been presented to the spirits). Instead members of the extended family, including many relatives who had come from quite faraway places, were in turn asked into the kitchen to eat, while the outside spectators, local and non-local, who stopped by to gamble, ate in the food stalls. This was in sharp contrast to the practice in Sembulan and many other central Luangan villages, where failure to partake in collective eating is perceived as an offense and as having potential consequences for people's well-being.[138]

For the sponsoring family, serving food to everyone present would most certainly have been a challenge spatially, economically, and socially (as there was a much higher number of passersby than usual for Sembulan, for example). At the same time, drawing as large a crowd as possible was highly desirable for several reasons. Economically, it helped to finance the ritual, as part of the money earned by the people arranging the gambling was paid to the sponsoring family, along with rent paid by stall keepers, while the cocks killed in cockfighting were given to the hosts to be served as food. Moreover, a lively state of "crowdedness" (*ramai*) is, like elsewhere in Indonesia (cf. Sutton 1996; Keeler 2001), understood as a value in itself, a factor associated with modernity and national belonging, and contributing to the success of the ritual in its own right. The ritual had a festive feel, with cars and motorcycles continuously coming and going, people stopping by to take part in gambling, or just to hang around, usually not paying much attention to the activities of the shamans. The principal exception to this lack of attention occurred on the last day when a water buffalo was killed in the customary way by stabbing it with spears on the main road, an activity which was preceded by several speeches and drew a large crowd of onlookers. However, cutting up and cooking the buffalo, in this particular case into a Javanese *rawon* dish rather than the watery and mild sauce usually made in Sembulan, took hours, and when the meal was finally ready late at night, most

138 Not partaking in the ritual meal is seen to subject the people involved to *tapen*, a state of spiritual vulnerability that may entail soul loss. To promote participation in the final ritual meal when the buffalo was eaten, the *kepala adat* (head of tradition) of Anan Jaya, in his speech prior to its sacrifice, also urged members of the extended family to wait for the buffalo to be served before they went home. This nonetheless contrasts with the practice in other central Luangan villages where such invitations are extended to everyone present.

of the spectators, including many of the far-flung relatives, had already returned home.

In some ways, the ritual reflected an adaptation to living in a multi-ethnic environment with decreasing kinship obligations and an increasing monetization of the moral economy. The shamans appointed came from different areas with varying ritual traditions, which contributed to a sort of standardization and simplification of tradition, at least as seen from a central Luangan perspective. Chants were not as elaborate and there was not as much ritual paraphernalia as typical of central Luangan *gombok* involving water buffalo sacrifice (here we may note that the prolongation of rituals among part of the Benuaq and Tunjung does not necessarily mean that the actual ritual program is more elaborate: instead there are usually fewer program elements per day and proceedings are more drawn out). When my fieldwork partner and I, in discussing the Anan Jaya ritual with some central Luangan friends later, expressed our surprise that there had been no large wooden ship (*selewolo*, or *seleeu olo*) to transport the souls of the dead to the death realms as is normally the case in *gombok* rituals in the central Luangan area, they were somewhat pleased to note that even we could spot "errors" being made, considering that evidence of the superiority of central Luangan tradition, not least as they knew that we had studied and participated in many rituals conducted by well-known central Luangan *wara* or death shamans (at that time already passed away).[139]

When paid for their services, the shamans officiating in the Anan Jaya ritual were not given piles of white plates as typical in Sembulan, but rather mostly received money (along with the usual pieces of cloth and chunks of meat). And yet, they were also presented with at least one white plate, just as everyone giving a speech during the ritual had to hold a white plate in their hand. The plates in these cases served to connect them to ancestral tradition and, at least symbolically, to a moral economy defined through relationalism and the maintenance of relations, including, most importantly, relations to ancestors. This is the opposite of the practice in central Luangan villages where a nominal sum of money is paid to shamans along with the plates, which indicates a partial connection to the market economy. This use of plates was seen as an absolute necessity and mentioned in several speeches as a guarantor of sincere intentions,

139 Whereas such a ship is used in *gombok* rituals involving water buffalo sacrifice, it is not a necessary part of *kenyau* rituals (Venz, personal communication). In lesser central Luangan *gombok* rituals not involving water buffalo sacrifice, it is often replaced by a wooden miniature ship (*sampan benawa*) or an unopened areca palm inflorescence (*sampan belawui*).

materially linking people to an ongoing tradition of ritual performance and the negotiation of social relations through such performance.[140]

In this respect the ritual served to maintain precisely the sort of relational ontology it at times seemed to contradict. As a matter of fact, I suggest, the monetization and professionalization of ritual seen in Anan Jaya, and more markedly in some Benuaq and Tunjung villages, may be seen not only as an adaptation to modernity and to reform as a value, but also as a strategy to keep up a relational orientation in a social and political environment increasingly informed by capitalist relations and the individualism characterizing such relations (their motives hence extending beyond the identity politics associated with political decentralization and *adat*-ization in post-*Reformasi* Kalimantan). In such cases, adjusting to changing socio-economic circumstances may be seen as a precondition for maintaining ancestral tradition as a transformative force and for allowing for the maintenance of the relational ontology upon which this tradition is based.

8.4 Conclusion

> *Ethics is always in practice yet also in question.*
> – Lambek (2012: 353)

Through examples from the villages of Sembulan and Anan Jaya, I have in this article highlighted the multiple levels of scale on which value negotiation by Luangans operates today. In Sembulan, a moral economy based on gift relations, epitomized by the large stacks of plates given in compensation for ritual services, is seen to stand in opposition to the "business rituals" of Anan Jaya and other villages, where the generation of profits from gambling has become a driving force. Especially now, as market relations have come to define most other aspects of central Luangan social life, keeping the ritual economy out of such relations appears to be an even more significant choice than it used to. Through a process which, following Joel Robbins and David Akin (1999: 24) could be termed "enclaving," the central Luangan have sought to protect a key reproductive social institution from "disruption by money and commoditization." While money is not barred from rituals as among the Kwaio of Melanesia (Akin

140 While practices involving plates, such as the practice of giving a plate containing some turmeric as a token of ritual participation, are widespread in connection with rituals and *adat* proceedings in Southeast Borneo, the distribution of a very large amount of plates as reward or compensation by the central Luangan appears to be unique.

1999), using plates instead of money to compensate for ritual services puts ritual in a special position as a foundation and exemplar of value.

At the same time, adjusting rituals to changing living conditions can constitute just as much of a choice, as I have shown through the examples of Benuaq and Tunjung practice, and the ritual performed in Anan Jaya. While many central Luangan dismiss these rituals as mere business, for the families or communities arranging them, they serve not only to realize short-term interests or promote individual gain, but also to reproduce the long-term cosmological order. What has happened in this context is that ritual practice has become divided into two different spheres: a "private," but "disinterested," sphere, in which obligations to relatives and spirits are fulfilled through ritual activities performed "inside" the (sometimes non-existent) walls of a ritual house, and a "public" but "interested" sphere performed outdoors, which provides the material means to meet these obligations and caters to the requirements of making a living in modern Indonesia. Whether this sort of division, or the insulation of ritual from contamination by commoditization favored by people in Sembulan and other villages in the central Luangan area, better serves to maintain ancestral tradition as a vital force in society today remains to be seen. Among both "animist" Luangan and Catholic Benuaq, conversion to Protestantism, inimical to the practice of local rituals, has increased in recent years.

As Ma Kerudot indicated in his speech, balancing long-term and short-term cycles of reproduction is never uncomplicated. Value as generated through performative acts is necessarily situated and historically variable. It is also continuously challenged, and contingent on recognition, otherwise there would be little need for the Luangan to persistently single out the importance of relationalism as a criteria for ethical conduct. Social life, as Lambek (2012: 354) observes, "does not stand still and debate over the good life for human beings will never be fully resolved." Much of the appeal of the myth of the eight *belian* consists precisely in this kind of ambiguity (which it shares with myths more generally), in the conflict of its message. Condemned to death because they neglected to keep up their close relations even while pursuing the recognizably commendable goal of curing illness, the eight shamans of the myth are exemplars of amoral behavior. And yet they are also magnificent, a source of great empowerment, even for shamans today, through the ritual paraphernalia they transformed into, which provide present-day rituals with much of their efficacy. This is also why the myth translates so well into a commentary on the situation faced by many shamans today, sometimes nearly as busy as the eight *belian* of the myth and similarly caught between conflicting notions of the good and desirable, forced to make sometimes irreconcilable choices, if for no other reason than for maintaining ritual as a foundation of value.

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9. Animism in Borneo (and Beyond) A Brief Survey of (Dis-) Continuities and the Ethnolinguistic Challenge

Oliver Venz

9.1 Introduction[141]

The concept of animism not only provided the starting point for the academic study of Dayak religions in the 19th century, but it has recently returned as one of the most widely discussed topics in anthropology, including Borneo studies, in the 21st century. In Borneo studies, calls for a serious focus on animism have surfaced many times in recent decades. Harrisson (1975: 162–163) offered the following point:

> "Although most Borneans are now shedding the old 'animism,' the basic attitudes remain deeply imbedded in the matrix of island life. In the changing pressures of the later nineteen-seventies, it is surely becoming quite important to understand more fully the underlying philosophies of the previously less literate peoples of Southeast Asia."

Indeed, despite a century of profound transformations, animism continues to be an essential strategy for the provision of knowledge and shaping existence in Dayak (and Malay) societies. Animism, therefore, surely deserves a place in this volume. However, considering the limited space given here, the scope of my discussion will have to be narrowed down considerably. In what follows, I will neither provide a detailed account of scholarly achievements on Borneo animisms, nor will I present the characteristics of Borneo animisms in comparative terms. Rather, my discussion will center on recent developments in so-called (new) animism studies and, more specifically, on continuities in the methodologies used by scholars. I contend that, despite a long history of research, the characteristics of animisms in Borneo and beyond are not yet well understood. A major reason is a lack of awareness on the part of many

141 This paper was written as part of a Post-Doctoral research program on "Bornean Indigenous Concepts of Man in Comparison - An Ethnolinguistic Approach" (2014-2016) at the Universiti Malaysia Sarawak. I am indebted to Cathrin Arenz, Michaela Haug, Lothar Käser and Stefan Seitz for comments on an earlier (and much longer) version of this paper.

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anthropologists of the significance of *language*. This refers to, as Käser (2014: 37) taught us,

> "the meanings of words, lexical and conceptual fields and their structures, for it is these that shape systems in which animistic ideas are present, in a more or less encrypted form, and which for the most part can only be comprehended with their help."

Below I will begin with an overview of recent ontological anthropology related to (new) animism and slowly move towards arguments for *language* as a fundamental methodological tool in animism studies (and anthropology generally). Indigenous language data will be taken mainly from the Benuaq, a Dayak people of East Kalimantan with whom I am familiar.[142]

9.2 The Rise of 'New' Animism

With the emergence of ontological anthropology in the 1990s, new approaches to animism developed, now often referred to as 'new animism' (Harvey 2005). Starting out in philosophy and spreading through the social sciences, ontology found fertile soil in the field of anthropology in an intellectual effort against the global ecological crises and western neo-imperialism, as well as against the postmodern 'crises of representation' in the social sciences and the associated 'crisis of confidence' in anthropology. Ontological anthropology turned against what has been identified as the culprit of it all: Western naturalism as "the hegemonic cosmology of modernity" (Århem 2016: 17). As it is, anthropologists became aware of the continuing significance of animism in contemporary non-Western societies still "intimately engaged in gaining their subsistence from local ecosystems and continuing to approach their non-human environments through what is now being called a 'relational' stance" (Hornborg 2006: 22). Animism, often framed as 'eco-cosmologies,' came to be seen as the very antithesis of and the antidote to naturalism. Against the western "bifurcation of nature" (Whitehead 1920) that led to the split into subjective culture and objective nature, animism seemed to promise an intersubjective monist cosmos or re-unified nature. Thus ontologists turned against the Cartesian method of science, its dualist epistemology, and its basic concepts, such as 'mind' vs. 'matter,' 'subjects' vs. 'objects,' 'concepts' vs. 'things' and 'nature' vs. 'culture' (and 'society') as ontologically separate categories. Without our Cartesian mindset, says Harvey (2005: xviii), "we can live a theory of personhood and

142 Fieldwork among the Benuaq in Kutai Barat was conducted in 2003 (two months) and from 2005 until 2008.

selfhood that radically challenges the dominant point of view which is that of modernity."

The goal of ontological anthropology is to "reconfigure the parameters of 'our' knowledge to suit informants' representations of reality" (Henare et al. 2007: 9) by substituting Cartesian anthropology with new scientific anthropologies via philosophy, by replacing old asymmetrical with new symmetrical anthropologies and, thereby, turning anthropology into a real comparative science (Latour 1993: 91-92). To achieve this, Western academia needs to overcome its biases and 'to take animism seriously' (e.g. Viveiros de Castro 2014a). How and what to take seriously is the subject of some debate, but most scholars agree that it means confronting ethno-, euro-, and anthropocentrism, while Morrison adds theocentrism and others cognicentrism (see Harner 1982: xvii). The latter stance is represented, for example, by Glass-Coffin (2013), who urges not only that non-modern views on the unseen world (animism) be taken seriously, but also that modern experiences of non-ordinary reality and states of consciousness (neo-shamanism) be accommodated.

"You need ontology," said Blaser to Rival (2012: 129), "as a concept to be anti-dualist […] The key issue is how do we know what the world is made of? We need a new *metaphysics*." Indeed, a major source of inspiration for anthropologists working in new animism frameworks is a classic text by Hallowell (1960) entitled 'Ojibwa ontology,' which developed an early concern for *ethno-metaphysics*. It anticipated the current shift from culture to ontology and from a naturalistic (only humans) to a transcending (including non-humans) notion of person (and society) amounting to what Béguet (2012: 248) called the 'logic' of animic ontologies. The four approaches currently most widely discussed are Ingold's 'anthropology [a]s philosophy with the people in' (1992: 696, termed 'ecological phenomenology' by Costa and Fausto 2010: 97), Descola's 'anthropology of nature' (2013 [2005]; termed 'ontological cartography' by Costa and Fausto 2010: 95), Viveiros de Castro's 'perspectival anthropology' (e.g. 1998; alternatively 'recursive ethnography'), and Kohn's 'anthropology beyond-the-human' (2013, 2015). These philosophical anthropologies have taken animism seriously in a variety of ways which have become known as the 'poetics of dwelling' (Ingold), 'animic systems' (Descola), 'perspectivism' (Viveiros de Castro) and 'engagement with thoughts-in-the-world' (Kohn). Other influential, and related, approaches are Bird-David's (1999) 'relational epistemology' and Willerslev's (2007) 'animism as mimesis' (influenced by Taussig's [1993] 'mimetic anthropology'). Ingold's and Bird-David's ecological-phenomenological approaches are more directly linked to Hallowell, while Descola's and Viveiros de Castro's structuralist approaches are related to Lévi-Strauss. All of these approaches have primarily focused on

hunter-gatherer (and horticulturalist) societies, have developed in mutual stimulation, and, as Århem (2016: 19) recently expressed it, have finally "converged on a largely similar phenomenal formulation of animism – the current standard notion."

Århem and Sprenger's (eds., 2016) 'Animism in Southeast Asia' (AiSEA), which notably contains three papers on Borneo, is the most recent attempt at critical engagement with the current standard notion. While it seemed to Costa and Fausto (2010: 90) that post-Hallowellian social anthropology would inevitably turn into "a study of religion," Århem's (2016: 19) impression is rather that the new approaches, when contrasted with Tylor's, have offered "a considerably downscaled concept of animism – one that has severed the link with 'religion' or left it largely unproblematized." Consequently, AiSEA attempts a reconfiguration of the regional discourse on indigenous cosmologies by examining local ideas of 'life forces,' 'bodies,' 'souls' and 'spirits.' According to Århem (2016: 24):

> "Given that both Ingold and Descola define animism in terms of universalized subjectivity (what I take to be the phenomenal standard notion), their different views on animism boil down to a question of the ontological status of personhood: is personhood (human and non-human) ontologically given or is it an emergent, relational property of an undetermined world, ever in the process of formation?"

That is, are we to posit a Descolan *ontology* or an Ingoldian *ontogeny*? Moreover, considering the diversity of Southeast Asian animisms and incorporating some of Sahlins (2014) recent notes, Århem (2016: 18) suggests a broad concept of animism "as a continuum of phenomenal forms, ranging from an egalitarian or horizontal form (the standard notion) to a hierarchical or vertical type [...] hierarchical animism." Reformulating the standard notion as immanent animism (of egalitarian, mobile hunter-gatherers), hierarchical animism is further divided along the criterion of increasing socio-political hierarchization, into prototype animism – the predominant form of animism in Southeast Asia – typical of moderately ranked, sedentary and village-based mixed farmers, and transcendent animism typical of strongly hierarchical societies in principalities and kingdoms, the latter of which is said to conform to the analogical type of Descola's (2013 [2005]) four-fold typology. Århem's conclusion reads as follows (2016: 35):

> "In sum, where standard animism posits a horizontal, egalitarian and symmetric cosmos, Southeast Asian cosmologies assume a vertical, ranked and graded cosmos in which objects contextually present themselves as subjects and vice versa but where all subject-objects, human and non-human, are graded in terms of degree of power and agency. Spirit, personified as subject or reified as power, is here the integrator but also the differentiator – by degree rather than kind. The 'body,' in hierarchical animism extended to include livestock and other forms of wealth, is also a manifestation of difference – but only as an objectification and material expression of the differentiated spirit."

Finally, the cosmological continuity along the range of different varieties of Southeast Asian animism is said to lie in Fox's (1987) idea of the 'immanence of life,' which, according to Århem (2016: 33), "can be said to articulate the doxic view on Austronesian animism." This, he continues, is "hardly life in the biological sense; rather it is a notion of animacy in the classic animistic sense of anthropomorphic consciousness, subjectivity and agency – but one that is much broader than the current standard concept and, in Fox's words (ibid.:526), ultimately amounts to 'a celebration of spiritual differentiation.'"

9.3 Souls, Bodies, Spirits and Life

For Tylor (1871), animism is an examination of the deep-lying "doctrine of souls and other spiritual beings" (ibid. 1920: 23), which allegedly developed along evolutionary stages towards monotheism. The new approaches comprehend animism as either shaping awareness of the relatedness of the self and the environment (Bird-David 1999), as an expression of "being alive to the world" (Ingold 2000), as "a kind of objectification of nature" (Descola 1992: 114) or as about "learning how to be a good person in a respectful relationship with other persons" (Harvey 2006: xi), etc. Apart from these differences, a common thread across all approaches, new and old, is a view of animism as inseparable from *anthropomorphism* (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 33, Sahlins 2014, Århem & Sprenger 2016, Sillander 2016: 154), although Ingold (2016: 276) relates it to perspectivism and defines the 'animic way' as "rather *anthropo-ontogenetic*." So, animism obviously has *ánthrōpos* at its center. However, in venturing 'beyond human,' new animism studies are more concerned with personhood as a category of human-like subjectivity, agency and emotion in non-humans than with detailed investigations of foreign concepts of man (see Käser 2014: 40). "But," say Brightman et al. (2012: 14), "the nature of soul (a primary attribute of personhood) in the cosmologies with which we are concerned does not correspond to the conventional Western understanding of the term, which follows Kant in loosely equating it with mind."

The study of 'soul' in foreign lands remains a painstaking activity: "Even a cursory glance at the vast literature on the topic offers evidence that indigenous conceptions of the soul tend to be vague, paradoxical, slippery, elusive, and apparently self-contradictory," say Pedersen and Willerslev (2012: 466), and many Borneo scholars agree (e.g. Metcalf 1976: 113, Sillander 2004, Herrmans 2015). Tylor's notion of soul is generally considered by scholars to be 'fuzzy.' So, after Tylor, ethnologists had to create "types, based on particularly characteristic and frequently occurring features of concepts of the soul in the

source material" (Käser 2014: 50), whence epithets such as 'external,' 'free,' 'breath,' etc. were attributed to the word 'soul.' Indeed, much of the old post-Tylorian debate was concerned with the epistemological problem arising from the application of the Western concept of 'soul' or 'spirit' in analyzing similar foreign concepts (see Fischer 1965). Fischer (1965: 47-49) was the first to attempt to do away with the western ethnocentric concept of 'soul' by studying the emic terminologies of Oceanic peoples (see also Käser 1977, 2016). Unfortunately, as much of this academic heritage was published in languages other than English, not much of it entered the Southeast Asian, and Bornean, discourse on animism. The only other scholar of old who enjoyed some major influence in the Indo-Malayan arena was Kruijt (1906). Overall, "the older ethnographic literature showed far more interest in the term soul than in the terms body and spirit," says Käser (2014: 49).

"A key problem for our understanding of animist concepts of the soul," say Pedersen and Willerslev (2012: 467), "is that the soul in Judeo-Christian discourse is part and parcel of an ontological opposition of 'inner' and 'outer,' 'spirit' and 'matter.'" "But," they continue (ibid: 469), "what is the nature and the logic of these soul-concepts that combine the material with the immaterial and swim in and out of focus, and how are they connected to indigenous concepts of the body? Tylor left such questions hanging in the air," while new animism studies have tried to answer them. The basic tenor of the new approaches is as follows: In naturalism the soul (culture) 'differentiates' and the body (nature) 'integrates,' while in animism the soul 'integrates' and the body 'differentiates' (Viveiros de Castro 1998). Similarly, for Ingold, the western notion of body (nature) is 'fixed' and 'enduring,' whereas the soul (culture) is 'variable.' By contrast, in animism any 'inner-outer dichotomy' is irrelevant. The self is open to the world, not closed in; it is not inside the head but rather '*out there* in the world.' (See also Willerslev's (2009: 697, 2012) account of 'body' and 'soul' as 'flip sides' of one another.) "It is curious," Sprenger (2016: 41) comments, "how the current debate on animism seems to mirror earlier approaches, by focusing on practice instead of thought, and on body instead of soul [...]." And Århem (2016: 25) adds, "...the emphasis on the body as cosmological differentiator seems to make any superior and transcendent subject – spirit or divinity – superfluous in the new animist cosmos. There is little elaboration of the human-spirit relation – what Viveiros de Castro (ibid.: 483) refers to as Supernature," which, consequently, became a focus in AiSEA (2016).

Thus the history of animism research has covered some ground: After long focusing on 'soul,' 'body' was added and, finally, 'spirit,' both in the sense of

'non-human spirit' and 'postmortal spirit.' As regards the latter, I should also mention Couderc and Sillander's (2012) 'Ancestors in Borneo' as a major comparative work on 'ancestral spirits' in this region of insular Southeast Asia. However, what students of animism seem to have found difficult to accommodate as a separate field of inquiry is the notion of 'spirit' in the sense of 'intellect' (mind) (see Käser 2014). Seemingly, our theistic cosmology (or theocentrism), the 'kissing cousin' of objectivity as Morrison (2013: 40) put it, only provided space for the three allegedly universal cosmological categories of 'nature' (body), 'culture' (soul, since Kant equaling mind) and 'supernature' (spirit). The recent history of animism studies has also led to various new *termini technici*: 'spirits' became 'supernaturals,' 'other-than-human-beings,' 'superpersons' or 'spirits as ready to hand' (Willerslev 2007: 149) and most 'non-humans' became 'persons'. The 'soul' has been equated not only with the 'mind,' but with 'consciousness,' 'intentionality,' 'subjectivity,' 'reflexivity,' 'feelings,' 'breath,' 'vital energy' or 'point of view.' Several scholars now follow Descola (2013: 116) in framing 'soul' as 'interiority' and 'body' as 'exteriority' (or physicality, the physiological, etc.), while Ingold (2016: 275) says: "I am not convinced [...] that these terms are the right ones."

Another word that is widely used in studies of animism, often synonymously with 'soul,' is 'life' (and associated 'forces'). Unfortunately, it is often unclear whether authors using this term are in fact still addressing animism. Käser (2014: 97) has noted that:

> "Much that is written about animism, especially of the popular scientific kind, usually represents the view that people with an animistic concept of the world regard everything in nature as "ensouled," i.e. especially objects. This expression (soul!) leads inevitably [...] to the conclusion that objects, (plants, stones!) have the capacity to feel, to will, and even to think, and hence are indeed 'alive' in a similar way to animals and humans. At most this is only true in exceptional cases."

Some notion of 'life' is also at the heart of some of the major frameworks. Ingold (1998: 94), for example, suggests inverting the reading of the conventional idea based on Tylor, namely that "*things are in life* rather than *life in things*." Kohn (2013: 100), who earlier referred to his own approach as an 'anthropology of life,' suggests an "extensive conception of life" (Descola 2014: 271): "life thinks; stones don't!" Finally, Fox's (1987) belief in the 'immanence of life' takes center stage in AiSEA (2016), where it is treated as the Austronesian doxa. As regards Borneo, two interesting cases of a belief in 'life forces' among the Kelabit and Penan have been presented by Janowski (2016: 168–188). However, Sillander (2016: 154) recalls Needham's (1976) and Keesing's (1984) earlier critiques on 'all-pervading animating principles' in the regional ethnography. Indeed, such perceptions are not only "somewhat atypical

in Borneo," as Couderc and Sillander (2012: 30) had it, but "tend to be the exception" in animistic systems in general (Käser 2014: 26).

All things considered, one may wonder to what extent new animism studies have been successful in overcoming the Western-centrism of the 19th century. Willerslev (2007: 16) criticizes various post-Tylorian analyses of animism, as: "... it was argued that the indigenous peoples did not understand the real grounds of their own convictions and that the job of the anthropologist was to explain (or correct) the natives' faulty explanations and replace them with his own." His critique also aimed at Bird-David, and may well be directed at all major frameworks within new animism. Note that even Willerslev, along with Pedersen (see above), speaks of "apparently self-contradictory" animistic notions among indigenous peoples and tell us that "[i]t is for reasons of this kind that Tylor's vague [...] definition of *soul* seems to us optimal." Wierzbicka (2014: 153) expressed it thus: "Clearly, glossing indigenous cultural concepts from Polynesia, Australia, or Africa by means of Anglo cultural concepts does not give us, in effect, 'a view from many places' (Shweder 2003). Rather, it sets in concrete the 'view from one place' brought to the ethnographic material by the Anglophone scholar and embedded in English words (e.g. *authority, power, identity, integrity, efficacy,* and so on)." The same is true, of course, when it comes to glossing Southeast Asian concepts with English words, such as 'soul,' 'body,' 'spirit' and 'life.' It therefore seems that we need more accurate semantic analyses of the indigenous concepts from the point of view of the language under study.

9.4 'New' Animism in Borneo

During the last decade, new animism has been the subject of growing interest among Borneo scholars. Appleton (2004), studying the Melanau, offers a relational approach to psychopathology, the source of which she says is located "within the context of human being-in-the-world and which suggests that features of the mental illness experience [...] are historically and culturally constructed within the illness concept itself" (ibid: ii.). Béguet (2006), influenced by Ingold, revisits Iban animism through a cosmocentric approach and investigates different types of 'metamorphosis' as passageways between living beings and invisible entities. In 'Ancestors of Borneo,' Appleton defends "the argument that knowledge about [...] non-human beings [...] is anchored in concrete rather than abstract reference points and that it is accessed experientially using relational ways-of-knowing" (2012: 207–242), while Béguet discusses "metamorphosis [as]... the main process by which ancestorship is

created" (2012: 246) among the Iban. Influenced by Béguet, Couderc dedicates his paper to metamorphosis and mortuary ritual as "two complementary forms of ancestorship" among the Ot Danum (2012: 155). Herrmans (2015, see also 2011) has offered a practice-based analysis of Luangan rituals "in terms of how they reflect and exemplify a way of relating to the world by being alive to it, in the sense of actively engaging with it from within [...]" (Ingold 2004: 51). In 'Permeable Personhood,' Herrmans (2016: 2, forthcoming) focuses on the 'soul' among the Luangan "as a relational construct, anchoring it within a framework in which human beings are defined and continually shaped in the inter-subjective fields of their relations."

Other recent studies have been more cautious with (methodological) aspects of ontological frameworks. A major critique comes from Chua's (2015) 'Troubled landscapes' of the Bidayuh. Her view is that (ibid: 654-655):

> "In the recursive programme, 'taking seriously' amounts to a unilateral decision by the ethnographer to take the 'manifest content of ontological [and other] assertions' (Keane 2013: 188) at face value, and to use her ensuing cogitations to transform anthropology itself. Yet, [...] this move does not only overstate the agency and aptitude of the ethnographer, it also seals her off from the messy social, political, and other circumstances in which ethnography is invariably enmeshed: from the random encounters, calculations, constraints, and other contingencies that determine not only what people say and do, but also to whom they say and do things, and how and why these interactions transpire."

Further critiques were offered in the Borneo papers published in AiSEA (2016), all of which argue against a categorical 'animism-naturalism' divide as a basic tenet of ontological theorizing. Janowski (2016: 183) finds that among the Penan and Kelabit there is an "inclination towards a dualistic 'othering' of humans from the rest of the cosmos," so that there is "no clear-cut divide between 'animists' and 'naturalists.'" Responding to Descola's ontological schemes, she (ibid.: 183) says: "The wonderings, wanderings and thought explorations of real people cannot easily be shoehorned into just one of them." Sillander (2016) looks at human-spirit relations among the Bentian, which "are regulated by two opposed but complementary sets of principles, [...] which explain oscillation between a mode of relation based on integration and similarity, and another based on separation and alterity" (ibid.: 162), thus showing the simultaneous presence of features of Viveiros de Castro's and Bird-David's approaches. Similar to Janowski, Sillander (ibid.: 160-161) points out that Bentian animism is not "an all-embracing paradigm," but "essentially complements a secular and objectifying relationship." In his study of religious change among the Kelabit, Amster (2016) launches a general critique against "[m]uch of the anthropological literature on animism," as it "has been concerned with identifying the defining features of what constitutes an animistic perspective, rather than considering how animistic thought may not necessarily

be that different from other religious and non-religious modes of thought." His conclusion is that "having a more dualistic sense of engagement with the world is probably not unique to life as Christian moderns, but likely was part of the broad cognitive palette available to Kelabit as animists as well (ibid.: 198)." "Perhaps," he concludes (ibid.), "it is overly simplistic to try to pigeonhole animism as fundamentally different from other modes of religious thought, at least as a kind of moral system," thereby criticizing Harvey's (2006: 99) "respectful engagement [a]s the central moral imperative of animism."

9.5 The *Native's* Point of View?

Hallowell asked the following questions about the study of ethnometaphysics (1960: 19-20): "Can we penetrate this realm in other cultures? What kind of evidence is at our disposal? The *forms of speech* as Benjamin Whorf and the neo-Humboldtians have thought? The manifest *content of myth*? Observed *behavior and attitudes*? And what order or reliability can our inferences have? The problem is a complex and difficult one, but this should not preclude its exploration." Hallowell considered the actions of persons to be the major key to a foreign world view, but he also believed that the best conclusions could be drawn "when evidence from beliefs, attitudes, conduct, and linguistic characterization are all considered together" (ibid.: 3-5). During recent years we have witnessed more explorations through the mutual stimulation between anthropology and philosophy. For Latour (2014: 1), the division of labor is straightforward: "You need anthropology – associated whenever possible with its set of ethnographic methods – to overturn philosophy's claims that it has already reached universality; and you need philosophy – with its own set of interpretative skills – to make sure that anthropology's claims to scientific status are not a form of provisional and provincial metaphysics." In practice, however, the relationship between philosophy, anthropology and ethnography is far from obvious: Questions remain as to methodological programs and even as to the notion of 'method' itself in ontological anthropology (e.g. Viveiros de Castro 2004 on "controlled equivocation"; Ingold 2014 on "participant observation as a way of working"; or Henare, Holbraad, and Wastell 2007 on "thing-as-heuristic"). One may even ask to what extent does anthropology need western philosophy, metaphysics and 'virtual ontologies' at all? Will Viveiros de Castro's (2011: 129) (admittedly ironic) framing of anthropology as 'field geophilosophy' and ethnography as 'speculative ontography' fare any better than competing approaches of what he himself (1998: 470) called 'wishful unthinking?' Kant and Herder would have "emphasized that anthropology, not

metaphysics or logic, was the key to the understanding of humans and their life-world" (Berlin 1976: 170, in Morris 2014). Wittgenstein (1953) defined philosophy as "a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language" and Gadamer's (1960) conclusion was: "[B]eing that can be understood is *language*." So, what does the ontological turn offer? It is not "a tool for a better ethnography," according to Latour (2013: 6). And, while it surely offers perspectives, the question is whose perspectives is an ethnographer looking for in his fieldwork for the purpose of informing his anthropological theorizing?

There have been some heated debates of late, not limited to the realm of scholarship on Borneo, as to whether ontology will lead us to a better anthropology and as to how to take animism seriously, even among its most prominent defenders (see e.g. Carrithers et al. 2010; Heywood 2012; Laidlaw 2012; Pedersen 2012; Bessire and Bond 2014 and HAU Vol. 4, No. 1-3, 2014). Recall Ingold's (2013: 13) take on Latour's principle of symmetry, which he says could "[h]ardly [...] rest on a more asymmetrical foundation" and "which could have come straight out of the nineteenth century."In turn, romanticism has been detected in the dwelling perspective (e.g. Willerslev 2007: 187, Morris 2014, Chua 2015: 642). Bird-David (2006: 35) found that "Ingold's distinctive philosophical language of analysis sometimes leaves unclear where his (or the so-called etic) terms end and the native (or the emic) terms begin." Viveiros de Castro considered Bird-David's (1999) relational approach to be "firmly situated within the modernist privileging of epistemology." Viveiros de Castro's perspectivism was mentioned in relation to Disney's 'Fantasia' by Turner (2009: 29) for whom it is hardly more than a "fascinating speculative exercise for non-indigenous intellectuals." Helmreich's (2014: 379) comment on Descola's typology is also revealing: "Descola [...] confesses that he is a native of the naturalist view and that therefore, in some way, the whole text has been a dream dreamed by one ontology." And note Descola's (2014: 271) remark on Kohn (2013): "[O]ne wonders whether the concept of 'interpretation' has not been stretched here beyond recognition, and to the point where its usefulness becomes dubious." When Brightman et al. (2012: 14) brought new animism to the Tundra, says Eller, the results were to a large extent oriented towards "the theoretical agenda ... set by powerful Amazonian-derived models. Siberia has not yet been able to send a big theory back to Amazonia" (Eller 2013: 198). AiSEA (2016), on the other hand, has. However, the terminological inventory that came as a package with the theoretical premises AiSEA adapted to its regional context remain, and questions of method do not figure prominently. Sprenger's (ibid.: 41) central question: "If animism is not informed by the mind-body dichotomy,

the question arises, which other distinctions are pertinent for its Southeast Asian forms?" shows that there is still much room for further exploration.

Much of the ontological literature fulfills Strathern's (1988: 20) criteria "to create the conditions for new thoughts." However, something important is missing, and Fischer (2014: 348) tells us what that is:

> "The problem is that these debates about the so-called "ontological turn" are pursued *entirely in Western vocabulary* and inferences, at a level of abstraction that *rarely deals with the ethnographic material in its own language games* that would provide the grounds to know how and where the Western words lead astray, as translation inevitably does. These are old methodological issues in anthropology (not taking things out of context, always tracing back to the linguistic forms being used in the original contexts), and it is disturbing to see them violated in the name of abstractions called diversity" (see also Salmond 2014: 158).

What we need, then, is what Helmreich (2014: 379) called a move back to "what was once called *the native's point of view*." Ethnography is about studying both what people *do* (practice) and what people *say* (perceptions as manifest in their language). The latter task has remained surprisingly difficult for anthropologists to deal with, as many still hold on to the 'mapping view,' rather than to the 'reality-construction view' of language. Grace's (1987: 3) well-known answer to Berger and Luckmann (1966) was thus: "The human species – and no other – possesses the one essential tool which makes a social construction of reality possible. That tool is language." The idea of "peeling off the symbolic cover of language," exposing "layers of human communication [...] which are shared with non-human beings" and asking "what kind of world is this that lies out there beyond the symbolic?" (Magnus 2014: 157) is well worth discussing. In the end, however, even the ontologist will have to present his creative wanderings into 'sylvan thinking' by means of human language. That is, as the anthropologist uses his native tongue as a primary medium to present his thinking, it would appear reasonable not to ignore the native tongue of his hosts as the primary medium of their thinking.

I draw the following conclusions: First, anthropology's goal is, as Malinowski (1922: 25) proposed: "To grasp the *native's* point of view, *his* relation to life, to realize *his* vision of *his* world." Secondly, there are "still excessively ethnocentric horizons" in much Western philosophy (Viveiros de Castro 2014b: 192) and anthropology. Thirdly, most scholars will agree on Strathern's (1987: 257) formulation of anthropology's, and, of course, philosophy's, main problem, namely: "[H]ow to create an awareness of different social worlds when all at one's disposal is terms which belong to one's own." Now, where has the move (from culture) to ontology led us in confronting the terms which belong to our own world and Western ethnocentrism? It may have shaken "confidence in previously accepted categories of thought," as Harris and Robb (2012: 668) say. However, while it has been keen to debunk old dualisms,

many new dualisms have been presented (many of which are no less Western). Dualistic thinking (probably a psychological universal) is not the main issue here, but its speculative nature is. Moreover, what if the very dualism between ontology (the nature of existence) vs. epistemology (the nature of knowledge) itself fell victim to debunking? Indeed, there are people who confront this classical dualism of Western philosophy, e.g. Ken Wilber, who recently proposed (2015) "a way to seamlessly integrate the two and end this philosophical debate once and for all."[143] While I leave this intellectual exercise to more sophisticated minds, I have no doubt that the results will be inextricably linked to the language in which these are pursued. This brings me to a fourth point, namely the significance of language, which is twofold: In order to take animism seriously and to change our own ways of thinking, we need to look more closely at the terms which belong to *them*, to pay more attention to *their* language-worlds. No doubt, ontological approaches to animism have paid attention to native languages, but not yet to the point where it would change our troubling anthropology (and philosophy). At the same time, we also need to consider the influence of the very medium in which anthropological discussions, interpretations and theorizing takes place and how it shapes the results, that is, 'recognizing the contingency of one's own language' (e.g. Rorty 1989, Wierzbicka 2014). The bottom line is this: The dualism of western scientific thinking – as well as thinking in general, be it African, Amerindian, Asian, Oceanic or Western – often "remain[s] locked in one's own cultural perspective, and especially, in one's own language" (Wierzbicka 2014: 37).

9.6 The Ethnolinguistic Challenge

"As individuals," says Wierzbicka (2014: 3),

> "we often see things differently because we are different persons, with different interests, preoccupations, and assumptions. As speakers of different languages we see them differently because every language equips its speakers with a particular set of cognitive tools for seeing and interpreting the world. This applies both to the literally visible world of colors and light, and the "invisible" world of emotions, relationships, social structures, and mental life,"

to which phenomena such as 'souls,' 'spirits' and the like, which are so vital for animism studies, belong. Every language "draws a circle" (ibid.) and offers potentially different (predominant) "forms of attention" (Sacks 1996: 12). That this characteristic of language may have serious effects on social science

143 https://www.integrallife.com/video/being-vs-knowing-ending-debate-between-epistemology-and-ontology

research, anthropology and philosophy, is hardly news (see e.g. Sapir 1949 [1924]: 157, Whorf 1956 [1941]: 244). However, Wierzbicka (2014: 13) notes, "in view of the ascendency of English in the present-day world, many scholars' (including philosophers') tendency to project English categories and meanings onto the world as they conceptualize it has become, it seems, even stronger." The ways in which English (or any other language) may 'dupe' the researcher have been succinctly summarized by Lucy (2011: 64, see Wierzbicka 2014: 135):

> "First, our understanding of the meaning structure of another language can be impeded by the categories of our own language [...] Second, our understanding of the nature of reality can be shaped by the categories of our own language [...] Our categories not only bias how we *habitually* see the world, they also seem to us uniquely suited to capturing that reality. Third, both of these effects [...] converge to create interpretive problems when we try to understand how other people see reality."

The question is how can these problems be overcome? The first requirement is to understand as fully as possible the semantic scope of one's *own* terms (and the associated culture, reality, ontology, etc.). The second requirement is to study the foreign language (with its associated culture, reality, ontology, etc.) "on its *own* terms" (see e.g. Lucy 2011: 65). And the third requirement is to compare them in neutral or cross-translatable terms, in order to free research "from conceptual Anglocentrism," which is also 'over the heads' of our own informants (see Gerdts 2010: 180, Wierzbicka 2014: 142). A fully fledged attempt to achieve this is Wierzbicka's (and Goddard's) Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) approach. As regards animism studies, "the continuing importance of a 'Whorfian' sensitivity [...] in ethnographic theorizing" has been emphasized by Course (2010: 249) in his 'Of Words and Fog' and, most importantly, Käser's (2014 [2004]) 'Animism: A Cognitive Approach,' as well as Badenberg's (2014 [2007]) 'The Concept of Man: A Guide.' Käser's cognitive approach has guided fieldwork in diverse ethnographic contexts on Chuuk in Micronesia (Käser 1977, 1990, 2016), in Peru (Käser 1995), Zambia (Badenberg 2000) and Borneo (Venz 2012a) and may well become a source of inspiration for other scholars.

Animism studies, and social sciences in general, are confronted with what Underhill (2012: 37) called the *ethnolinguistic challenge*. Willerslev (2007: 170), influenced by Lacan (1991 [1953-54]), says: "It is an illusion to believe that one can reveal through language what the world is really like" and that "ontologically speaking, linguistic representations should not be the starting point for analyzing human perception and knowledge" (ibid.: 202). His (ibid.: 170) argument runs as follows,

> "Language is ... not a well-defined, clearly demarcated structure containing symmetrical units of signifiers and signifieds, as Saussure would have it. Rather it is, as Eagleton puts it, 'like a sprawling limitless web, where there is a constant interchange and circulation of elements, where

> none of the elements is absolutely definable and where everything is caught up and traced through by everything else'" (1983: 129).

These statements nicely mirror current Western obsessions with dynamics (say, change), but ignore much of the current wisdom of lexical semantics (and semantics in general). Space limitations prohibit exploring this issue in much detail here, but as a way of testing it, let's use the term "Borneo." While this word is certainly part of a lexical web, does it not carry (enough) meaning in itself (to be noted down)? One may also wonder if it is not such attempts at disclosing the (really) 'real world,' rather than simply perspectives on it, which will turn out to be illusory, as social scientists will forever be dependent on words (rather than on numbers as natural scientists, see Wierzbicka 2014: 187). Be that as it may, the ethnolinguistic challenge is certainly under no illusions; it fully understands "that our language does not offer us direct unmediated access to the world" (Underhill 2012: 37). But a more optimistic strategy, I think, than "finding ways to think beyond language-like ways of thinking" (Kohn 2014: 277), is that of Wierzbicka (2014: 37-38), namely that "trying to practice social science without ethnocentrism requires an effort of *de-familiarization*" and, more specifically, of *de-anglicization*. Most anthropologists will agree with her (2014: 135) that 'a great deal' is being said about indigenous meanings, but rarely are they ever actually presented. As such, it is exactly this 'sprawling web of indigenous meanings' that we should seek out and a good way to start is to look at *words* 'as carriers of cultural meaning' (Goddard 2015).

9.7 What is a *Given*?

Within the ontological turn, the most crucial turn of all, according to Latour (2014: 1), is "a turn to experience and how to describe it empirically." But recall Lenclud's (2014: 365) critique of Descola's four experiential schemata: "[W]hat allows us to assume that people are even capable of revealing the content of their perceptual experiences? To do so, they must "translate" into words and phrases the sensory effect the world has upon them – an effect that operates both instantaneously and wordlessly" (also Slobin 2000: 107). It would appear that human experience, be it that of ethnographers or their hosts, must be filtered through language in order to be knowable. Language is the mediator between the physical and the mental world and, as Cook (2009: 27) says, both worlds are "parceled up by the words of our language." Thus every communicated 'given' of human experience is filtered through a language-specific conceptual filter (Wierzbicka 2014: 19-30).

NSM researchers have long been looking for the shared semantic core of all languages, that is, universal givens. This is Wierzbicka's (ibid.: 29) version:

> "People are born, live for some time, and then die (existential givens). People have bodies, with parts like heads, eyes, and hands (biological givens). People think, feel, and want; in particular, they want to do things, to know things, and to say things (psychological givens). People have mothers and fathers (socio-biological givens). People can do bad things and good things (moral givens)" (see also NSM's related inventory of universal semantic primes).

But what else is a 'given'? Recall Århem's question (see above) with respect to the major difference between the two main frameworks in new animism: Is 'personhood' a given? And, then, perhaps: Is 'person' a given? And what about 'souls' and 'spirits'? Following Tylor's footsteps into the origins of spiritual beings, Willerslev (2007: 180) concludes that if:

> "[...] concepts of spiritual beings can develop independently of language through the medium of dreams, then our conventional discrimination between the 'natural' and the 'supernatural,' the 'real' and the 'culturally constructed,' cannot easily be maintained. We will no longer be able to hold that conceptions of animals, trees, and mountains are more real than those of spiritual beings."

But then again, how real are 'animals,' 'trees' and 'mountains'? For the philosopher Searle (1995: 1–4), the notion of 'mountain' presented a brute fact. However, Bromhead (2013 and earlier), in her work on ethnogeographical concepts, illustrates how different peoples verbalize aspects of landscape differently. "[T]he philosophical implications of cross-linguistic variations in how "nature" is conceptually carved up in different languages," Wierzbicka (2014: 12) notes, "are still far from being widely appreciated." The same is true of what is called 'culture.' For example, it is now common knowledge among Borneo scholars that Dayak languages don't have words for our 'religion' or 'ritual,' but 'souls,' 'spirits' or 'demons' are still omnipresent in the same ethnographies. The same goes for 'emotion,' 'color,' 'truth,' 'love,' 'hate' and 'war' (see e.g. Underhill 2012), 'life,' 'death' or even 'world,' all of which are culture-specific categories, rather than universal givens.

"We cannot identify conceptual categories without using language," says Wierzbicka (2014: 50). Standing in front of a 'tree,' don't we all see the same 'thing' (or 'reality')? Not necessarily. The question rather is where that 'thing' is located on the conceptual map of the speakers of a language and, consequently, how it is talked and thought about. Again, there exist among different peoples and their languages shared concepts with (unitary) conceptual terminological equivalents, but more often than not there will be dimensions of contrast. "If we want to identify them through English, then we need to recognize that most English words are not cross-translatable into other languages and carry with them a particular culturally shaped perspective" (ibid.). The same, of course, is true of any other language. Let's have a look at the Benuaq wordscape and ask:

Is 'hair' a given? We usually believe that there is always a one-to-one correspondence between words of different languages: German 'Haar' is English 'hair.' However, semantic categories may not correspond between languages and this phenomenon becomes greater when increasingly different languages are compared. I adapt an example from Blust (2013: 343) to show that the 'hair' of the Benuaq does not correspond to the semantic boundaries of English 'hair': Benuaq distinguishes *balo* 'head hair' from *buluq* 'body hair,' while the latter also refers to the 'feathers' and 'fur' of various animals (Venz 2012: 170). Moreover, while English has 'facial hair' (for beard, moustache) and 'grey hair,' Benuaq has the separate morphemes *sumiq* 'moustache,' *jame* 'chin-beard' and *uwaatn* 'grey hair.'

Table 9.1: Category boundaries for English *hair, feathers, fur* and Benuaq *balo, buluq*.

English	Benuaq
Hair	Buluq, balo
Feathers	Buluq
Fur	Buluq

Benua	English
Buluq	Hair, feathers, fur
Balo	Hair

The point is this: While there are Benuaq translation equivalents for some English terms (*fur* = *buluq*), there is no unique correspondence linking any English term with a Benuaq term or vice versa. To use an animal as an example: Is 'Schwein' (Eng. *pig*) a given? In German, we distinguish 'Hausschwein' (Eng. *domestic pig*) from 'Wildschwein' (Eng. *wild boar*), the Benuaq equivalents of which are *uneek* and *bawi*. While the structure of the two German compound nouns define both as kinds of 'Schweine,' such common ground is not captured by the Benuaq terms, nor do they contain any hint as to domestication or wildness. To continue with the term 'animal' itself, which features widely in animism studies focusing on human-animal relationships: Is 'animal' a given? In Proto-Austronesian and Proto-(West)-Malayo-Polynesian, "[t]here is no reconstructed term for 'animal,' the closest equivalent being *qayam 'domesticated animal'" (Blust 2013: 334). However, Blust adds, "a PWMP term meaning 'domesticated animal' would seem to contradict the 'zoological life-form encoding sequence' proposed by Brown (1984: 24, in Austronesian Comparative Dictionary), which maintains that such broad generic lexical categories are everywhere a late development in human languages." Benuaq, a West-Malayo-Polynesian language, uses the term *benatang*, meaning 'animal.' However, it is a local Malay loan obviously borrowed to fill in a conceptual lacuna. Besides which, Benuaq has the autochthonous term *esaaq*, which also

refers to 'animals.' Those in the air are *esaaq tempuq* 'flying *esaaq*,' those in the water are *esaaq danum* 'water *esaaq*', those on the ground *esaaq tana* 'land *esaaq*' etc. However, the term refers not only to animals, but to both flora and fauna: *esaaq bolupm* 'living *esaaq*'. Furthermore, while all of this refers to the visible inhabitants of the Benuaq's life world, the expression *esaaq yaq beaau ditaatn* refers to 'beings that cannot be seen,' i.e. our 'spirit beings.' Finally, if we ask in Benuaq: *Oon esaaq ohooq*? 'What's this?' the answer could be almost anything. So, what is *esaaq*? 'Animal,' (non-) living 'being' or (some) 'thing'?

Continuing the search for concepts of 'animality', 'spirituality' and 'humanity,' one may wonder whether the Benuaq have anything equaling the pervasive Western key dualism of 'body' and 'soul.' The human 'body' is a biological given and, therefore, is verbalized in (probably) all human languages. The human 'body,' however, is a complex structure (see Käser 1991, 2016) and detailed cross-cultural comparisons will reveal conceptual variations. "From the European-Western perspective," writes Käser (2014: 45), "all living things have a *body*, especially if they have a shape that can be recognized, but also objects all around which we perceive in a restricted form." In Benuaq, the term *unuk* has a more restricted use. It is a defining characteristic of humans (*senarikng*) and various animal species, but not of spirit beings, which are also often referred to as *esaaq yaq aweeq unuk* '*esaaq* without *unuk'*, while they do have an *umakng* 'a form' (when they are visible). A fuller discussion of the Benuaq's concept of 'body' can be found in Venz (2012). See also Venz (2014) on the significance of the Benuaq petrified prefix *kele-*.

Now, what about 'soul'? Wierzbicka (1992: 41) expressed her consternation about the "claim often made in the anthropological and philosophical literature about the 'Cartesian' split between body and mind, dominating Western ethnopsychology and ethnophilosophy as a whole." "But this traditional dualism," she continues, "has to do with the distinction between body and soul, not between body and mind. Philosophical discussions often seem to be confused on this point because of their failure to take into account semantic differences among words [...]" (see e.g. Sprenger above). So, is 'soul' a given? Do the Benuaq believe in 'soul' or 'mind?' Certainly not (at least in earlier times). But they know of *juus* and *asakng* (and much more). In the Benuaq literature, such terms are often simply defined as 'soul, spirit' (see also Kayan *belua* 'spirit of man' and *kenep* 'soul of mankind' etc., Southwell 1990), which hardly give a clue as to their differences. In her practice-based framework, Herrmans (2016: 1, forthcoming) recently explained the Luangan term *juus* as "[e]xceptionally multivalent, conceptually evasive, an example of a 'floating' or 'empty' signifier in Lévi-Strauss' sense." The advantages of her approach notwithstanding, shall

we then treat Oceanic *mana* (Lévi-Strauss' prototype floater), Benuaq *juus*, Kayan *belua*, Kelabit *adaq* etc. all the same way, as 'empty signifiers'?

My own modest attempts to understand some of the differences between *juus* and 'soul' are as follows. According to Käser (2014: 42-43), the term 'soul' has various nuances of meaning. It is (1) the 'seat of the emotions' (i.e. 'heart,' 'psyche,' the 'soul-like experiences'), (2) a kind of 'inner person,' which by its presence first enables the actual life of the body (i.e. a 'spirit-like being') and (3) it perpetuates the personality of an individual (i.e. the 'soul of the departed' or 'spirit of the dead'). In theology and philosophy, it has an additional meaning. Here it also refers to (4) the intellectual faculties, the 'mind' (i.e. the 'spirit of man'). Using this template, then, it is clear that *juus* and 'soul' are cases of a categorial non-correspondence. *Juus* only refers to meanings (2) and, according to present Benuaq opinion, (3), while meanings (1) and (4) are captured by the term *asakng*. Following Käser (2014), I have defined *asakng* as SEIC (the Seat of Emotions, Intellect and Character) and *juus* as 'spirit double' or 'dream ego' (see Venz 2012b). I have chosen this solution for the following historical and comparative reasons:

Firstly, as Käser (2014: 176-180) emphasized, research into terms such as the Hebrew *nefesh*, *neshamah*, or *rûah*, Sanskrit atman, Greek *pneuma*, *psyche* as well as Latin *spiritus*, *animus* and *anima* have shown that the "originally separate notions of the person's dream ego as an independent personality, and the SEIC" have progressively been bracketed together. So it is with the composite character of the Western 'soul.' That is, 'soul' as SEIC and 'soul' as dream ego, which perpetuates a person's personality after death, are historically different notions. Secondly, amongst various peoples, these two notions are indeed still separate, e.g. *neenuuk* and *ngúún* on Chuuk, *rajancane* and *ishire* among the Asheninca in Peru, *umutima* and *umupashi* among the Bemba in Sambia (see Käser 2014: 36, 48, Badenberg 2014: 79). The same is true for Benuaq *asakng* and *juus* or Kayan *belua* and *kenep* and, indeed, for Borneo peoples in general (see Venz 2017, forthcoming). Thirdly, many terms for 'dream egos' in Bornean (and other Austronesian) languages incorporate a reflex of Proto-Austronesian **duSa* 'soul' "and so imply that the notion of the soul of a living person as a 'second self' has had a longer history in the Austronesian world" (Blust, ACD). This is one more good argument for rendering terms such as *juus* as '(spirit) double,' thereby building a metalanguage informed by the semantic criteria of the indigenous terms.

Differentiating notions such as SEIC and '(spirit) double' may also be of interest for scholars working under Descola's definition of animism as something based on the extension of interiority to non-humans. As regards *juus*, Benuaq informants have it 'on,' 'at' (= close to) or 'in' the body (*mo unuk*), that

is as an 'inner being.' However, the SEIC is also 'interior,' while informants consider it part of a person's *unuk* 'body' (i.e. physicality). Both *juus* and SEIC are also associated with certain animals, while plants and objects are said to only have *juus*. However, none of the *esaaq yaq aweeq unuk* ('spirits,' including non-humans,) possess *juus*, while they do have an SEIC. Indeed, the metamorphosis of a living person into a dead person (*liau*) is understood by the Benuaq as a change in the qualities of its *asakng* (SEIC). Apart from this, listening to Benuaq's and other Borneans' ways of speaking shows that it is dichotomies such as 'visibility' vs. 'non-visibility,' which are considered more important, than 'interiority' vs. 'exteriority' or 'materiality' vs. 'spirituality.' This glimpse into Benuaq conceptual territory should caution us against too hastily transferring Western notions such as the triad of 'culture,' 'nature' and 'supernature' when discussing animistic concepts of the 'world.' And again, ultimately, what is the 'world'? Is it a given? How did the Borneans themselves conceptualize their 'worlds'? I will leave this as a topic for another paper.

9.8 Summary

This paper has reviewed recent ontology-inspired anthropological approaches to animism. More specifically, it was concerned with methodological continuities in (new) animism studies and on better ways of accessing an understanding of animism both in Dayak societies and beyond. It has brought together some fundamental ideas of senior scholars, which I think ethnography, anthropology, and even philosophy can never do without: the incorporation of *language as a methodological tool*. Ethno-epistemology or intercultural philosophy (if you will) cannot do without semantic analyses of indigenous vocabularies (see Goddard 2016). Fellow anthropologists like to pass on such tasks to linguists. But they should be warned that it is not the primary interest of linguists either! So, who is going to do the job? While the ontological turn is most essentially a turn against the earlier linguistic turn of the 1980s and 1990s, this paper suggests we turn back to language and allow for a methodological change in animism studies in particular and anthropology and philosophy in general. This paper has only touched upon a selection of the intricacies in the comparative study of animisms. However, what should have emerged from the discussion is that we cannot simply assume something is a 'given' (be it 'hair,' 'soul' or 'world'), but rather we need to assess it after careful examination of the animistic cognitive framework of those we work with in the field, as proposed by Käser (2014), whether in Borneo or beyond.

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