Quality of Life in Asia 9

Ming-Chang Tsai
Wan-chi Chen *Editors*

Family, Work and Wellbeing in Asia

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Quality of Life in Asia

Volume 9

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Preface

This project of an edited book focusing on the work–family relations and wellbeing in Asia attempts not only to highlight the wellbeing element in the conventional study of work–family research but also to place the whole enterprise in an explicit comparative context. The ways in which work–family tensions are derived and the extents of their impact on happiness or life satisfaction in Asia are different from those in Western societies. The two editors believe that looking at these variations from a cross-cultural angle is very much critical for a deeper understanding of contemporary Asian families.

We started to open call for submissions, rather than soliciting manuscripts through our personal network, in the spring of 2015. There were 25 proposals or so received in the autumn of 2015. Along manuscript preparation and review process that were accomplished in October 2016, we were able to publish nine papers, as well as our introductory chapter. We regret that some interesting works had to be excluded, although they could enrich the diversity of research topics and geography in this collection.

We like to especially thank Prof. Alex Michalos for his enthusiastic support for this project. He was more than positive when we approached him with an idea of this project. He has devoted his academic life to promote the study of quality of life. The now-established status of wellbeing study cannot be realized without his strong determination and persistent effort in mobilizing "new hands" into this field and convincing them of the great values wellbeing research can generate for human betterment. Ming-Chang Tsai particularly feels lucky to have been encouraged by his warm and wise advices. He is definitely a role model for academics. This edited book is dedicated to him.

Nangang, Taipei, Taiwan — Ming-Chang Tsai
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Wan-chi Chen received her Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Chicago and is currently a professor of sociology at National Taipei University. She also serves as the director of Research Center for Taiwan Development at National Taipei University. Her research interests range from education to family, with particular emphases on examination-oriented educational systems in East Asian countries and family changes in Taiwan. Her recent works appear in Social Science Research, Social Indicators Research, Population Research and Policy Review, Sociological Perspective, Marriage & Family Review, Taiwanese Journal of Sociology (in Chinese), and Taiwanese Sociology (in Chinese).

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Part I
Introduction

Chapter 1
The Family-Work Nexus and Wellbeing in Asia: An Introduction

Ming-Chang Tsai and Wan-chi Chen

Abstract This chapter is an introduction to the edited book of Family, Work and Wellbeing in Asia. It begins with a brief review of current research on family-work issues in this region, specifically focusing on four domains: the experiences of work and family lives; work organizations' response to employees' work-family concerns; the impact of the above two domains on family life, relationships and wellbeing; and public policy concerning work-family life. Then, each chapter is summarized before it concludes with suggestions for future researchers.

Keywords Family policy · Work-family conflict · Work-life balance · Quality of life · Well-being

The intersection of work and family has long been a key issue in family study, because this sprawling domain of research, by unravelling the interplay between work and family, contributes to the understanding of modern family in the context of the expanding service economy, active female labor participation, and changing gender norms of division of household labor and care provision. Most research focuses on the experiences and consequences of the work-family relationship on the basis of wealthy countries (Bianchi and Milkie 2010; Parcel 1999; Perry-Jenkins et al. 2000; Wharton 2012). There is a consensus that family-work tensions generate decisive influences on both psychological and physiological wellbeing. To cite an interesting finding from a study on parental time allocation for child care, Roeters and Gracia (2016) show that in a national sample of Americans, mothers experienced child care time as more stressful than fathers, while fathers experienced it as more "meaningful". Furthermore, paid work hours increased mothers' level of

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stress but it reduced that of fathers. It is understandable that even in a modernized society like the United States, child care remains a major responsibility of mothers. When they fail to allocate sufficient time for offspring due to work demands, stress can increase. This is where we often observe the gendered nature of parents' child care time and its influence on wellbeing.

To what extent can the findings obtained by Roeters and Gracia (2016) possibly be generalized toward the Asian context? While more females and mothers in Asia? have opted to stay in a job or even pursue a career in the past decades (although their labor force participation rate has lagged behind that of the wealthy countries) (Brinton 2001; Chang and England 2011), the gendered distribution of household responsibility operates forcefully in their disfavor. The stress level of mothers might thus be much higher. In a patriarchal cultural environment, Asian fathers might feel proud of their willingness to allocate precious personal time to help with care of children or adolescents, and might feel it is meaningful. Usually, they are absolved of responsibility to care for infants and toddlers, a responsibility culturally assigned solely to mothers. When mothers' job duty has to be fulfilled in the first place, grandmothers often are called in as a substitute. The gendered difference in child care hence looms larger in Asia. Thus, cross-cultural comparison of how work demands devour family life, how family duties affect a career, and how all these conflicts and tensions get in the way of a better life quality, even more severely in some societies than others, is indeed a new urgency in work-family research (Bianchi and Milkie 2010; Perry-Jenkins et al. 2000).

Scholarship on the work-family intersection has expanded, with new findings being reported regularly and outmoded assumptions being replaced by innovative theorizing. Wharton (2012) provides a very useful schema to capture the nexus and flux of family, work and wellbeing, suggesting observation of four specific domains: (1) the experiences of work and family lives and the efforts to juggle both sets of responsibilities and commitments; (2) work organizations' response to employees' work-family concerns; (3) the impact of the above two domains on family life, relationships and wellbeing; and (4) public policy concerning work-family life. We adopt this useful framework to highlight the current research efforts and provide an overview of the field of work-family life in this region. A forewarning is given: Asia is an extremely broad term, covering more than 30 countries and populations totaling 4.4 billion, not to mention the numerous, diverse cultural legacies in this vast region. For practical reasons, we concentrate our attention on East Asia and Southeast Asia, which is in fact the geographical space this edited book is devoted to. Other scholars have proposed issue-specific approaches for understanding current efforts to untangle the complexity of work-family experiences. In particular, parents' paid work, multiple role constraints, and stress transmission have been highlighted (Bianchi and Milkie 2010; Perry-Jenkins et al. 2000). These important issues can be accommodated well in the four domains as proposed above.

1.1 The Experiences of Work-Family Life

The issue of role demands and pressures between family life and work is rooted in contemporary industrial capitalism. Even in the beginning of the second half of the 20th century, a portrait of the "ideal woman" as such was popular: she was devoted fully to home responsibilities, while her husband could commit all his time and energy to work to be successful in his career and earn a decent wage to support an adequate standard of living. If she had to be a worker in an office or factory, she was only earning an income supplementary to her husband's and was expected not to pursue a career, because she had to be first of all an adequate wife and mother. The cultural belief that men should be good providers and women should be caretakers was derived from the experiences of a typical middle-class family in the American context (Wharton 2012). When economic growth became stagnant and increasing inflation damaged the purchasing power of a family with only one income, the conventional division of labor in the model of the male breadwinner was not sustainable. Married mothers' labor participation in the US as well as in Western Europe increased starting in the 1960s and reached a peak before entering the 21st century.

Looking from a historical comparative perspective, women's withdrawal from the labor force was rare. Cultural constraints on their participation in production tended to be overstated, either in Europe, China and Japan when trade for markets began to expand in the early phase of capitalist growth. Women always worked, either in paid jobs or in domestic production. Pomeranz (2003) contends that in China, female virtue in reality never meant abstaining from paid work, and was not associated with a prestigious way of life. Rather, women's employment was associated with the highly desired goal of modernity. This is even more apparent in the development model of post-Mao China: a large number of women migrated to the coastal cities to work in export-oriented assembly-line plants. Many township and village enterprises also utilized local female workers. Moreover, feminization of agriculture was also observed in many rural areas, as men became "migrant workers" and moved into better-paying industrial and service jobs (Pomeranz 2003).

Women in Asian countries are no less motivated to work in the market economy. However, a large number of working women quit their jobs at the time of marriage, and only reenter the labor market later when their children grow up and no longer need their care. As Lee and Hirata (2001) indicated for Taiwanese and Japanese women, their "job separation" has much to do with a lower wage compared to that of the husbands. This gendered wage gap (Chang and England 2011) and its impact on females' early departure from the labor market is in accord with a prediction from the "new home economics" perspective. Lee and Hirata also proposed that short job duration can especially be unfavorable to Korean and Japanese working women. Labor market constraints appear to operate as well against women's staying in jobs outside the home.

It is surmised that working women with higher human capital have particularly experienced difficulty in balancing employment and motherhood in East Asia (Raymo et al. 2015). A number of studies in this line have conducted a close-up

observation of workers in top positions such as managers (Spector et al. 2004). Li and Leung (2001) reported a substantial trade-off between work success and family responsibility among female hotel managers in Singapore. Wang et al. (2010) found that married female employees in the banks in China and India reported higher interference of work with their family life, which led to dissatisfaction with work. Additionally, the overtime and irregular shifts of nurses, along with their loaded care responsibility and work-family life conflict have been documented (Fujimoto et al. 2008). In Taiwan and South Korea, a substantial proportion of women work in small—and medium-size family enterprises and are in substantial charge of production supervision or finance (Lu 2001; Kang 2014). How these female entrepreneurs adopted effective strategies to manage conflicting demands between business and home responsibility might also be worth exploring.

Given that working mothers and wives might have quit jobs to avoid acute work-family conflicts, those remaining in the labor market may report *less*, rather than more, conflicts as such. Table 1.1 shows an interesting outcome we obtained from the data collected by the International Social Survey Program in 2005 (ISSP Research Group 2013). Only those respondents who were married and had a job are analyzed. Compared to wealthy countries like the US, working women in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan indeed reported a considerably lower level of work interfering with family life (see the upper panel), as well as family life interfering with work (the lower panel). However, the respondents in the Philippines reported a higher level of both conflicts. Across genders, females experienced significantly more interference than males did. Working women in Japan experienced

Table 1.1 Perceived work-family conflict in selected societies (%)

	Age < 50		Age: 50–64		N[b]
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
1. Work interferes with family life					
Japan	16.9[a]	41.5	10.6	22.6	240
South Korea	14.6	33.3	9.3	28.6	454
Taiwan	21.8	21.0	13.5	10.0	717
Philippines	45.1	55.9	60.0	53.8	298
United States	35.1	35.7	20.5	26.4	441
2. Family life interferes with work					
Japan	38.1	59.5	24.4	50.0	242
South Korea	36.4	45.2	21.2	35.7	453
Taiwan	37.8	31.9	26.0	23.5	718
Philippines	56.2	64.7	70.9	46.2	298
United States	69.0	49.2	51.1	51.9	440

Source International Social Survey Program (2005)

[a]The figures throughout the table refer to percentage of "always", "often" and "sometimes" in responding to the question: How often do you feel that the demands of your job (family life) interfere with your family life (job)?

[b]The sample is from only those who were married and had a job

particularly acute conflict, as 60% of Japanese working women reported that their work interfered with family life. This may be a consequence of a strong familialism which demands that females prioritize the needs of other family members even if they assume a job outside family. Across countries, those aged under 50 particularly felt stress from work-family conflict, because many working wives were also burdened with responsibility to care for both children and ageing parents.

A recent, distinctive approach to observing work-family conflict highlights "transnational families" in Asia. This new social morphology features a split-household across borders, due to an increase in migration over this region (Yeoh et al. 2005). Given the feminization of labor migration, many "absent" mothers, while working in another country to maximize income to sustain family needs, have adopted various strategies to keep intimate ties intact. One often-used technique is to use long-distance communication to perform care work across borders: by using internet tools (online phones, message texting, emails, etc.) to stay connected with children, to arrange care work, to negotiate a new system of household responsibilities, and so on. Sobritchea (2007) documented Filipino women's practices of "long-distance mothering" in Saudi Arabia and Hong Kong and revealed their narrative identity in which homesickness, guilt and fears intermingled with a determination to perform the role of homemaker and guide their children properly. Hilsdon (2007) interviewed a very special group of female Filipino mothers working in the entertainment industry in Babah, Malaysia. Most were married with children left in their homeland. They appeared "single, sexual and available" while performing on stage. Their glamorous bodies might encase a maternal identity that promised to take good care of the health and education needs of their children at home. Some had developed new de facto relationships and produced additional children, thus rejecting the conventional sexual norm. Rich in ethnographical details of working mothers overseas, these qualitative studies focused much on their stories of reasserting subjectivities. Unfortunately, how they managed families from a long distance and whether they really succeeded in overcoming tensions, difficulties or crisis in marriage relationships or in family caring is not well documented. Perhaps this is because the feminist studies center more on the construction of identity for females, than on subsequent sustainment of a conventional familial configuration, in which the husbands might have remained secure in a patriarchal familial system.

1.2 Work Organizations' Response to Work-Family Concerns

Compared with the other three topics, research concerning work organizations' response to work-family concerns in Asian countries is relatively scarce. Very few studies have dealt directly with organizations' response to work-family concerns. A limited number of studies have focused on how corporate organizations put into practice government legislation and the impacts thereof, both intended and unintended.

Based on interviews with managers from multinational corporations which operate in East and Southeast Asia, De Cieri and Bardoel (2009) reported that most human resource (HR) managers acknowledged the importance of work-life policies. These multinational corporations regard work-life policies as a tool to attract and retain employees and are actively seeking to manage a range of work-life issues under the pressure of competing for talent in Asia. Practices include flexible work arrangements (e.g., schedule flexibility and location flexibility), providing child care centers, offering company support for transportation, etc. These practices vary from country to country, responding to diverse corporate norms and expectations.

Is enthusiasm of the human resource managers a sufficient factor in creating a family-friendly work environment? Brinton and Mun (2016) portrayed a more complicated picture by studying the case of Japan. They found that most HR managers express enthusiasm for the policies and considerable willingness to have career-track female employees utilize them. Nevertheless, their qualitative interview data also suggest that the managers' tacit assumption that it is women's responsibility to care for children reflects a deeply rooted cultural norm, which may account for the pattern of ever-lengthening parental leaves in Japan taken almost exclusively by female employees. The practice of generous parental leave has the unintended consequence of reinforcing the highly gendered division of labor in Japanese households and, in turn, the subsidiary workplace status of the majority of Japanese women.

What other factors affect how family-related benefits are utilized in a corporate organization? Some researchers hypothesized that a higher percentage of female managers can constitute a more family-friendly work environment. Mun and Brinton (2015) analyzed panel data on more than 500 large Japanese companies from 2001 to 2009 to seek empirical evidence. They found greater utilization of parental leave in firms which have a higher representation of women in managerial positions and have human resource executives on the corporate board. The gendered distribution of power in organizations seems to exert influence on maternity policy.

The next question comes to how effective these work organizations' support for work-family balance is. Foley et al. (2005) analyzed data from Hong Kong and found that employees' perceived organizational support also matters. The higher the level of perceived organizational support is, the less the frequency of work-family conflict reported. Moreover, perceived organizational support plays a buffer role mediating the association between work-stressors and work-family conflict. Hill et al. (2004) stressed the importance of organizational practice. On the basis of the surveys of IBM employees from 48 countries, this research team reported that job flexibility was related to reduced work-family and family-work conflict, as well as to enhanced work-family fit.

Mun and Brinton (2016) further argued that work-family policies can create incentives for employers to advance women into better paid jobs. Analyzing changes in women's promotion rates across 1000 large Japanese companies from 1987 to 2009, they found that "more women, not fewer, have been promoted into managerial jobs since the government pressured employers to provide more work-family benefits. Moreover, many employers have voluntarily increased their

provision of leave benefits beyond the legal requirement…" (p. 9). This sort of positive impact was more likely among high-skilled women. It is perhaps not an issue in firms where women disproportionately fill lower-skilled jobs.

1.3 Work-Life Conflict and Impact on Wellbeing

How does work-life conflict affect individual wellbeing in the Asian contexts? Situated in the genre of cross-country study of work-life conflict (Bianchi and Milkie 2010), Wharton and Blair-Loy (2002, 2006) found that Hong Kong respondents are more likely than those in the United States and in England to worry about work-family conflict, holding constant their job and family characteristics. They attributed this disparity to the cultural aspects of family and societal expectations. For people in Hong Kong, emphasis of familial ties and obligations can be a key factor leading to the observed tensions. Nemoto (2013) described the details of how a culture of long working hours in Japan is disadvantageous for women workers.

From the perspective of personnel psychology, Spector et al. (2004) conducted a comparative study of work-family stressors and wellbeing across three culturally distinct regions (the Anglosphere, China, and Latin America). In all three regions, work-family stressors decreased psychological wellbeing as well as physical health. More specifically, Zhang et al. (2014) administered a three-wave questionnaire survey among married Chinese employees using a time lag of one month. Their study showed that work-to-family conflict at one time point predicted a lower score of psychological well-being at the next time point. Furthermore, both "work-to-family facilitation" (e.g., 'my work performance makes me feel good…') and "family-to-work facilitation" (e.g., 'family life makes me feel relaxed both mentally and physically…') help improve the respondent's psychological well-being. Cheung and Wong's (2013) study dealt with a different outcome—affective commitment (e.g., 'I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my organization') in Hong Kong. Their results indicate that negative effects of work-family conflict on affective commitment are stronger among employees with working spouses than among those with non-working spouses.

A few studies have focused on specific occupational groups. Takeuchi and Yamazaki (2010) collected survey data among Japanese registered nurses, reporting that work-family conflict was significantly related to the sense of coherence, and in turn, had a negative impact on their physical and mental health. Noor and Zainuddin (2011) observed female teachers in Malaysia with a family and at least one kid, and found that emotional labor (especially "surface acting") was positively associated with emotional exhaustion; also, work-family conflict mediated the relationship between emotional labor and burnout.

The impacts of work-life conflict usually are moderated, either negatively or positively, by other factors. Foley et al. (2005) have shown that, in Hong Kong, perceived organizational support reduces work-family conflict, whereas work

stressors (including role ambiguity, role conflict, and role overload) increase work-family conflict. In contrast, Oishi et al. (2015) used a merged dataset from four East Asian societies (Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan) and documented that living with a frail elderly person significantly increases work-to-family conflict as well as family-to-work conflict. Lim and Lee's (2011) study focused on a factor which has rarely been investigated—workplace incivility. In the context of Singapore, superior-initiated incivility was associated with increased work-to-family conflict.

While work-family conflict is expected to generate unfavorable influence in personal wellbeing, in the Asian context, this hypothesis can be further extended, to understand how it affects wellbeing in the family domain. Moreover, familism and gendered role responsibility seem to operate through influencing the work-family intersection in this region. Admittedly, the evidence is scattered, and is not yet as systematic as desired. How work and family combine in specific patterns in affecting quality of life in this region promises to be an interesting research issue.

1.4 State Policy Support for Working Parents

Only recently has family policy attracted considerable attention in Asian social science, while it had been an established field of research in the US or Europe (Bogenschneider and Corbett 2010; Lewis 2006). Indeed, in the past two decades, there has been an increase in policies promoting work-family reconciliation in Asia. First of all, most East Asian countries have implemented maternity leave to various extents. For instance, Japan's working mothers can have 14 weeks for leave and claim two-thirds of their regular wages during the leave. This benefit comes from social insurance, and is a secured entitlement which female employees in established enterprises are more likely to claim (see Table 1.2). When the fund is provided by employers, such as in Taiwan, the benefit frequently is merely "on paper" and is not offered to new mothers, especially when they work in private, small and medium-sized enterprises, not to mention those in informal sectors. In India, employers tend to consider balance of work and family life an issue only for top-skilled workers (Rajadhyaksha 2011).

Another social policy that should also be considered as a basic element in the work-family conflict issue is childcare. Until recently, this policy domain has been deliberately overlooked in Asia (Lin and Rantalaiho 2003). The Taiwan government nowadays gives cash to parents of newborn babies to boost the birth rate, along with a tax deduction. However, child care in the market is expensive because public day care centers are in very short supply. As a result, many new mothers remain at home as caretakers until their children reach age 5, when they qualify for subsidies for preschool education (a universal entitlement implemented in 2011). Feminists have criticized that conventional family policies (Devasahayam and Yeoh 2007:7) have failed to effectively "accommodate both mothering and women's

Table 1.2 Maternity leave policy in Asia as of 2012

Country	Duration (weeks)	Amount of benefits	Source of benefits
Japan	14 weeks	66.67%	Social insurance (state also contributes)
Republic of Korea	13 weeks	100%	Social insurance and Employer
Taiwan	8 weeks	100%[a]	Employer
China	14 weeks	100%	Social insurance
Philippines	9 weeks	100%	Social insurance
Singapore	16 weeks	100%	Employer[b]
India	12 weeks	100%	Social insurance
Australia	12 months[c]	18 weeks paid federal minimum wage level	Social insurance

Source International Labour Organization (2013); Ministry of Labor, Taiwan (http://www.mol.gov.tw)

[a]Workers hired for less than 6 months are given 50% of wage during maternity leave

[b]May claim reimbursement up to a ceiling from the government for the last eight weeks (first and second child), 16 weeks for third and subsequent child

[c]The duration can be shared between parents

freedom and equal opportunity…in the wage economy". The Taiwan case might not be atypical of this region.

This chapter is not the place to go into policy details of specific Asian countries. Yet, Lin and Rantalaiho (2003) and Sung (2003) convincingly argued that the "family-friendly" employment policies in this region are intended as responses to pressing demographic changes: an increasing female working population, super-low fertility, and lack of household care for the rapidly aging population. Work-family reconciliation policy has thus come about with the purpose of reaching a new equilibrium between the family and a fast-growing market-oriented economy. This functional model has been contrasted with a universal right model as exemplified by the Nordic welfare states. As Lin and Rantalaiho (2003: 11) summarized, "redistributing family income is explicitly expressed as the policy goal in Scandinavian family policies, but the Confucian Asian cases emphasize the population policy…and endorse the principle of family dependency and support the families with children mostly in an indirect way". The family policies in the former are established on a cross-class consensus of sharing the costs of care of children and elderly people, whereas in Asia care is understood as a private affair, a responsibility of the family members rather than of the state. Family support policies in Asia have appeared as a patchwork of scattered government responses, lacking a coherent system aiming at promoting working mothers' rights on the basis of a philosophy of gender equality. What has made the working mothers' situation more difficult in the Confucian Asia is an enduring patriarchal ideology (Sung 2003). For an instance, South Korea's welfare policy has been criticized for lack of sufficient state provision of care because the government placed an emphasis on the

virtue of "filial piety", which ascribed responsibility to the family and in the end, to the women. Along with their paid work, working women also have to perform as filial daughters-in-law in a cultural context in which men are not responsible for most household work, and are comfortably privileged in a strong "male bread-winner" culture.

The above criticism of a Confucian welfare regime should not prevent us from recognizing a welfare expansion since the 21st century in the higher-income countries of Asia. In South Korea and Taiwan (Fleckenstein and Lee 2014; Huang 2012), child care benefits (to cover private child care costs) were offered that also included middle-class families for the first time. Parental leave was granted and made more flexible (although mandatory corporate nurseries were implemented only recently in some larger firms). These progressive moves were taken under governments with very different political ideologies. That is, both conservative and center-left governments pursued similar pro-family policy in the past two decades, with South Korea taking even larger strides forward than Taiwan. Fleckenstein and Lee (2014) contended that this was a result of party competition. The provisions became more inclusive to especially mobilize votes of women and young urban members of the middle class. Democratization in Asia might have pushed the political parties to behave as vote and office seekers, and therefore to pursue modernization of family policy.

The party competition approach should be used with caution. It assumes that the mass public has a clear idea of party platforms, in particular the intentions and plans for better resolution of tensions between work and family responsibilities. Sagi and Bolzendahl (2015) recently pinpointed the phenomenon of low political salience of family issues. They gathered evidence in the American context and showed that the stress on family *values* was in accordance with an individualistic and privatized view of family policy. When it came to the specific family *issues* or *policies*, people were very much "candidate-centered", using political elites as a convenient short-cut in forming opinions. The mass public have only a vague concept of family issues, and they lack prioritization and clarity when it comes to lobbying the legislature or advocating specific laws. It is hard to speculate on whether this public opinion perspective can equally well explain family policy making in Asia. This can be an interesting topic in the research agenda to come.

1.5 The Intersection of Family, Work and Wellbeing: A Summary of Chapters

The authors in this book represent the current realities of family-work life in Asia from an interdisciplinary perspective, and together provide both quantitative and qualitative evidence to test various theories as well as highlight distinctive family-work intersections in this region. Some chapters concentrate on in-depth description of how male members of the urban middle class started to manage

family life when their wives increasingly were involved in the labor market, or how lower-income rural females worked long hours in the field while also taking the major responsibilities of family care. Some chapters are able to provide observation of nuances in gender ideology, household division of labor, or interactions between generations across countries. Through this collective effort, we hope to offer timely, innovative research and solid evidence on Asian families. Of course, Asia is a large continent with 4.4 billion people, accounting for 60% of the world population. This book should be considered a humble contribution to understanding family and work life in this vast, culturally diverse region.

The first two chapters in the next session provide a refreshing observation into exchanges between family members in East Asia. Ming-Chang Tsai and Wen-Shan Yang highlight the phenomenon of reciprocation of financial support and housework between adult children and their parents in four East Asian societies across generations. Contact activities, though appearing as casual, informal interactions, often imply an expression of attention and intimacy. Tsai and Yang find that grown-up children provide financial support to parents in exchange for their assistance with housework, which as a result increases their daily contacts with parents on other matters. They also document the difference with Japan, where intergenerational exchanges of this sort happen less frequently than in South Korea, Taiwan and China.

Minzhi Ye, Yiwei Chen and Yisheng Peng focus on the residence of elderly people in China, through which they address the urgent issue of family care in a rapidly aging society. Filial piety has long been stressed as a focal familial value in Confucian Asia. This value system prescribes that adult children should reside with and take care of parents when they become old. This is in contrast to the independence model adopted in western societies where the elderly tend to live separately from their children. Their study of a national sample of old people suggests that those living alone tend to be less financially secure and healthy than those living with their spouse or with children. The former's quality of life also deteriorates. It seems that filial values are particularly important in a policy environment where pensions and care facilities for the elderly are insufficient.

The four articles in the third section examine the primary ways in which gender and work interact. Yean-Ju Lee notes that while traditionally attitudes towards gender and work are analyzed on a liberal-conservative spectrum, this axis does not necessarily exhaust all the possibilities. She introduces an alternative method which categorizes gender expectations into four categories: male breadwinner, female income earner, male homemaker, and female homemaker roles. In a comparative perspective, her chapter find that this combination of presence or absence of these expectations paints a more interesting picture than can the traditional spectrum.

In a similar vein, Thijs van den Broek and Makiko Morita focus their attention on gender-role expectations with regards to filial support in Japan. They discovered that such expectations can also be roughly categorized in a dichotomy that is based on economic roles—those who expect women to perform caretaking for their elders ("the patriarchal high family responsibility ideal"), those who merely expect financial aid from children regardless of gender or seniority ("the gender egalitarian low family responsibility ideal"), and those who are neutral. It is suggested that class

factors may influence these ideals—for instance, the gender egalitarian low family responsibility ideal finds adherents among those who are supposedly advantaged by it ("women, the young and the highly educated"), while the opposite group ("men, older persons and people with lower levels of education") espouse the patriarchal high family responsibility ideal which can be said to serve their class interests.

Noriko Iwai used data from the East Asian Social Survey (EASS) to examine the division of housework in the four East Asian states (Japan, South Korea, China, and Taiwan). It was found that various factors—economic ones such as working hours or income or structural ones such as employment conditions or family relationships—influence the frequency and relative share of housework and their differentials across the East Asian societies. This detailed structure of division of housework provides a basic reference for cross-national comparison.

Wan-chi Chen and Yu-Chun Hsieh bring attention to the factors influencing the labor force exits of wives in Taiwan society. They arrived at the simple yet interesting conclusion that women with higher earnings are less likely to quit, much more so especially in recent years; decisions to leave the labor force are not affected by husbands' incomes; exits followed childbirth closely. They suggest that these patterns do not show an expected trend toward more independence of females or greater gender equality. Rather, it was conjectured that shifts in parenting ideals might have influenced these behavioral patterns.

The three articles in the last section provide us with a cursory yet useful glance at the issue of interaction between family and work, management of the incurred tension and conflict for males and females. Oishi in the first article describes the changes in non-standard work in Japan, and finds that increasing numbers of workers, especially those who are mothers, are engaging in non-standard hourly work. On the basis of a very fine analysis of time slots in a day, she argues that increased nonstandard work among mothers does not necessarily translate into children's time of being left uncared for, because other family members could make it up for working mothers. However, single mothers tend to have the most difficulties in providing care for their minor children.

Iori Hamada's article contributes by offering a unique observation of Japanese men's increased involvement in unpaid housework. She argues that this somewhat surprising trend does not constitute a revolution in gender norms. Rather, it represents an expansion of the old ideals where men are expected to be potent, not just in the old field of paid work, but also in this new field of housework. It is quite intriguing to see how a conventional masculine ideology ironically encouraged men to do more housework.

Daphne E. Pedersen and Hathairat Punyopashtambha in the last article place their attention on the responses of the lower classes to work-life conflicts in Southeast Asia. Drawing from interviews of urban slum residents in Thailand, they discovered that community and household cooperation is key in managing work-life issues. Through reciprocal aid between neighbors and extended family members, these people fulfilled both sets of demands from work and family. This chapter highlights a number of strategies employed by low-income mothers to achieve a balance between work and family obligations.

1.6 Looking Ahead

The family-work intersection is a highly intriguing field in which researchers seek to untangle the complexity of the nexus between family life, jobs and wellbeing and to help map out future policy suggestions for specific economic and cultural contexts. As we have shown, work-family conflicts are widespread in the Asian region, and insufficient policy actions have been taken to reduce them and to facilitate the concomitant commitment to family and work, from both of which people achieve pride in their self-worthiness and obtain a sense of a meaningful life. It is our hope that this edited book effectively indicates the value of this research field and can attract more attention from concerned scholars on the various issues which the chapter authors have made great efforts in exploring and delineating. This edited book is a first move, and we hope that more will follow from the readers of this volume.

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Part II
Family Structure

Chapter 2
Familial Exchange and Intergenerational Contact in East Asian Societies

Ming-Chang Tsai and Wen-Shan Yang

Abstract This paper has two goals. The first one is to propose a typology of familial exchange between adult children and their parents. The second is to examine whether such exchanges influence frequency of contact with parents in four East Asian societies. By specifying the reciprocation of finance and household chores, we suggest four types of familial exchange: balanced (indicating regular exchange), credited, indebted and self-reliant (indicating infrequent exchange). Drawing data from the East Asian Social Survey, we conduct regression analysis of a subsample who did not live with parents, and provide strong evidence for the effects of spatial distance and intergenerational exchange. Neither family structure nor parental demands exert substantial influence.

Keywords Social exchange · Intergenerational transfer · Familial relationship · Social interaction · Piety values

2.1 Introduction

Changing intergenerational relationships have become a critical issue in family studies in East Asia, as this region has experienced declining fertility, reduced family size, increasing female employment, changing expectations of filial responsibility, and an expanding aged population (Agree et al. 2005; Lin and Yi 2013; Logan et al. 1998). How can East Asian families maintain intimacy and solidarity in the face of these changing demographic and social trends? This issue is important, particularly as cultural values are shifting from collectivism toward one stressing more autonomy and independence for individuals. Indeed, both parents

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and their children increasingly believe separate residence is a better residential arrangement for personal wellbeing (Logan et al. 1998). Parents who do not reside with adult children have increased, and now constitute a substantial group, even though they are not a majority in this region (Chang and Yu 2014).

Ideally, adult children living at a distance from the home can maintain regular contact with parents to sustain close interpersonal relationships and familial solidarity (McChesney and Bengtson 1988), but a number of factors may prevent contact between parents and their nest-leaving children. An individual level factor is that those who lack a feeling of intimacy with parents tend to move out as soon as they grow up and become independent economically. At the family level, the family structure approach proposes to evaluate the composition of siblings, as the number of brothers and sisters may differentially affect contact activities and frequencies. Moreover, parents' own resources and needs additionally influence contact, because the more resources a parent has, the less contact and support he or she requires from children, especially when it comes to functional assistance or services (Logan and Spitze 1996; Mangen 1988). Finally, the literature agrees that physical distance can deter intergenerational contact. Distance continues to have negative impacts on parent-children's associations across different populations and societies (Bian et al. 1998; Bucx et al. 2008; DeWit et al. 1988; Frankel and Dewlt 1989). In the East Asian context, scholars further contend that filial piety can play a significant role in intergenerational ties, although its practices and "degree of influence" have been reshaped and reconstructed across this region (Ikel 2004). Familial values contribute to familial cohesiveness by encouraging contact and associations among family members.

While these approaches have merit in highlighting plausible factors which correlate with intergenerational contact, they fall short in conceiving reciprocal behaviors in a family that do not merely involve exchanges of resources, support, and affect, but also constitute an important mechanism to extend interpersonal interactions and strengthen solidarity with other members. By constructing a typology of intergenerational exchange and examining its potential effects on contact behaviors between parents and their nest-leaving adult children, this study offers a new contribution to understand the current conditions of family solidarity in East Asian society. In empirically assessing the validity of the exchange hypothesis, we simultaneously examine major arguments derived from the literature on family composition, family values and parental needs.

2.2 Intergenerational Ties in Exchange Perspective

Reciprocation between parents and children can be considered an act of exchange, because it involves a series of swaps, although in specific forms. In general, exchange partners enjoy the benefits in a paired event, which constitute a single social entity called transaction (Emerson 1981). In a typical transaction within a family, a mother may financially assist children in opening a business or with

housekeeping, and children may pay her back with luxurious consumer electronics (when the business is successful) or send regards more frequently to show their affect and caring for parents (if the business makes little money). What matters is that such sequences of gives and returns can establish a firm basis on which norms of commitment and obligations are built and the affective ties strengthened (Molm and Cook 1995). These norms and ties often are an emergent outcome, yet they in turn strengthen the interest in future exchanges. It would be insufficient to rely solely on the characteristics of the either parents or children, for instance, their status, resources, or value dispositions, to understand how contact persists and becomes more frequent across generations.

This study focuses on the "restricted" exchange between parents and their adult children. From a network perspective, a transaction between parents and their offspring represents restricted exchange, because the beneficial events involve only two persons, each of whom provides benefits to the other, usually contingent upon benefits from the other. Exchanges as such differ from *a generalized exchange*, which involves more people in the circle of reciprocation. Usually, exchange activities take the form in which A gives to B, B gives to C, and C in the end gives to A (Homans 1962). Exchangers involved in a diffuse network of mutual reciprocations usually build up a support system which is characterized by increased trust and commitment. Satisfaction and solidarity are more likely to happen as a consequence (Ekeh 1974; Uehara 1990). Yet this observation is drawn from exchanges in a large non-kin network. Family members involved in exchanges, in a network which is restricted in terms of size, place less value on gains than on mutual support as an end in itself.

Exchanges can be differentiated alternatively by the contingency of repayment because this contingency factor is decisive in influencing the dynamics and continuity of exchanges. When a contribution (a free gift or altruistic act) initiates a response, it may come with or without an underlying expectation of return transaction. The repayment is thus not a necessity. Exchange as such is termed *reciprocal transaction.* The conditions of the returns are thus noncontingent (Emerson 1981: 33). In contrast, in a *contingent transaction*, the interactions between the dyads negotiate for the best realization of self-interests and therefore exercise rational calculations intensively; a contingent transaction is practiced. It is argued that the outcomes of the contingent transactions tend to be distrustful, emotionally loaded and brittle (Uehara 1990). Arguably, reciprocal exchange can conceived as an ideal type that entails strong ties built on the basis of constant give-and-takes.

Looking from a power-dependence relations perspective (Emerson 1962), reciprocity over time can enhance stability and solidarity in the system of exchange relations, either in the dyad or a larger network. The issue of equity, although not openly discussed, is not entirely neglected. Interaction between parents and children may still be governed by a fundamental principle in which each attempts to obtain desirable outcomes from exchanges. If exchange follows closely a norm of reciprocity (Mauss 1967; Gouldner 1960), the cost is balanced out by a reward derived from interactions. The exchange relation is characterized by more equity, and more interactions are likely to continue.

Exchanges between parents and offspring belong to the type of restricted exchange; yet at the same time these swaps can be *reciprocal*. In this relationship, a parent initiates an exchange process and offers contributions to a certain child, without knowing when the child will reciprocate, and in some cases without knowing whether repayment will happen in the end. Certain contingencies may be specified as exchanges are carried on overtime. Even in this case, the time frame usually is not specified beforehand (Uehara 1990). As a rule, generosity is expected and respected. As Mauss (1967) described, exchanges of gifts among tribes, clans and families represent an interest in "fraternizing". Embedded in a "gift economy", people are required to fulfill the obligations of giving, receiving and repaying. It is through reciprocity as such that family strengthens trust, commitment and solidarity (Molm 2003; Molm et al. 2007).

Moreover, the value or gains from transactions are highly particularized. What is typical in exchanges across generations is financial assistance given by a party, while receiving help with household work or informal advice in return from another party. Exchange asymmetry (that is, unequalness in value) is less an issue than the consequential evolution of a process of reciprocation, stressing the importance of mutual trust, obligations, and commitment (Edwards 1969). Equity, in contrast to a demand of exact equality in material value, is fulfilled in this manner. In short, a repayment as an *act* of giving in return is highly valued over the instrumental benefits obtained therefrom (Molm 2003).

Interactions can be deterred when a party is not rewarded from exchanges (Homans 1974). But within family, an act of giving without expecting anything in return constitutes a gift. This represents a *credited* exchange. Continuous giving which receives no paybacks becomes regarded as generosity "down the drain." Parents can feel frustrated when their love for their children is not respected or appreciated. Altruism has its limitations in the intergenerational context. Excessive giving by parents cannot be maintained if reciprocation by adult children, even a belatedly delivery, does not happen. Imbalance as such can be termed *indebted* exchange, which may imply a breach of distributive justice, leading to disapproval and dissatisfaction with the exchange relationship.

Parents and adult children may cease to exchange resources on a regular basis, reaching a status of "*self reliance*". Both children and parents approach a type of "self helper". In her study of African-American networks, Uehara (1990) depicts "self helpers" as persons who tend to draw on a variety of resources from wider social arenas rather than depend on close kin or friends. Because they have very thin resource-exchange relations within their own networks, the others usually do not incorporate them among their core relations as well. This observation of Uehara's (1990) is more applicable to exchange activities outside the primary group. Since the family is a prescribed group, rarely does a child (or a parent) withdraw from linage relations due to increasing "costs" or insufficient returns in the exchanges. Yet defaulting on one's indebtedness can still happen. Besides bad relationships between parents and children, researchers have particularly focused on adult children's "distancing" themselves from their parents, and have conceived of this as indicating a movement toward "filial maturity". That is, they move toward

adulthood and anticipate separateness from their parents, while they might simultaneously develop a peer-like relationship with them, which features more intimacy and equality, but less authority (Nydegger 1991; Birditt et al. 2008). At any rate, self-reliance constitutes a distinct category which delineates a withdrawal from parent-offspring reciprocations as are prescribed by societal norms.

2.3 Hypothesis

This paper argues that exchange is a precondition to group cohesion. From this proposition we derive a hypothesis concerning contact behaviors across generations. We hypothesize that an intensive exchange relation increases contact between parents and their adult children when they are separate in residence. The exchange relation operates not only to sustain a morality that prescribes the obligations of giving after receiving; it also strengthens the legitimacy of diffuse regard for the involved parties in exchange. In consequence, more contact and exchanges are activated.

This study focuses on contact with parents of adult children who lived separately. It tests the influences of different exchange activities on such contacts. Specifically, *balanced exchange* should induce contact with parents more than does *indebted exchange*, in turn producing a higher frequency of contact than does *credited exchange*. We further expect that *self-reliance*, which involves nearly no exchanges with parents, will be associated with the lowest contact frequency. The hypothesis we propose expects that the effect on contact can be ranked as follows: balanced exchange > indebted exchange > credited exchange > self-reliance.

This exchange approach has a number of merits over other approaches to intergenerational relations. First, most researchers tend to observe gives and takes in an empirically independent manner; that is, what children offer to and receive from parents is separately analyzed, despite conceptually recognizing their association (Silverstein et al. 1997; Lin and Yi 2011, 2013; also Silverstein et al. 2002). From a social exchange perspective, this usage of exchange activities as single elements fails to firmly capture the dynamics of mutual reciprocation. What we have proposed in this study is a sharp conceptual tool that can effectively depict social exchanges as two-way phenomena.

Second, previous studies additionally suffer from mixing up exchanges and their consequences in constructing an overall index of intergenerational ties or solidarity. For instance, Silverstein et al. (1997) bracketed single gives and takes, similarity in opinions, geographic distance, contact, etc., in a latent class analysis and produced five intergenerational types. However, the outcomes of their statistical procedures actually resulted in group categories that are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive, conceptually. Lying between the two ends represented by the so-called *tight-knit* group and the *detached* group are “the sociable”, “intimate but distant” and “obligatory” groups, whose theoretical positions are difficult to pin down (see also Lin 2012). Compared to this data-driven re-grouping, our typology follows

more closely the theoretical logic in the tradition of social exchange theory when we propose four meaningful clusters in a systematic way.

Third, as this study aims to analyze intergenerational ties, rather than attempt a broad coverage of the outcomes from parent-adult children exchanges, the attention is given to the contact behavior across generations. Adult children's contact with their parents can indicate a strong communal relation when they leave their parents' home for pursuit of a career or their own intimate relationship. Moreover, frequent contact can also reveal care and regards to be exchanged, which enhance the subjective quality of life, particularly for parents (Clark and Mills 2004). Low frequency of contact, on the other hand, usually represents a weak, bland relationship between parents and children.

In testing the exchange hypothesis, we will also examine hypotheses suggested by other major arguments for comparison. Firstly, the family structure approach contends that certain family compositions may generate specific interaction patterns in which parents receive more emotional and instrumental assistance from adult children. In light of this reasoning, two competing models are worth attention (Logan and Spitze 1996). The *additive model* suggests that children as providers of assistance are functionally equivalent and yet independent. The assistance from one child does *not* prevent other children from offering theirs, because what individual children offer to parents is unique and irreplaceable. Thus, the main effect is derived from family size: the more children, the more assistance the parents receive from them. In contrast to this hypothesis is the *substitutional model*, which proposes that the offers from adult children are not necessarily independent. Emotional or material support from one child may fill in where needed, and other children may therefore not be required to offer theirs. An *only child* might have to be responsible for answering all the calls from parents. If there is more than one child, the difference can be noticeable: when the parent has received help from one child, the others are relieved of the burden. Thus, more children do not increase the volume of support, as what one child does for parents substitutes for others' assistance. As Logan and Spitze (1996: 57) summarize for this model, an only child in a small family has to make up for the inadequacy of assistance, while each child in a larger family would be expected to have less responsibility. Following this rationale, this study incorporates the number of siblings in estimation of contact with parents.

Secondly, researchers of East Asian families tend to argue that family norms may weigh more heavily than family structure in influencing intergenerational behaviors. As a general rule, normative expectation prescribes that the eldest son assumes the major responsibility of taking care of parents. Filial piety particularly is a strong value in determining exchanges and contact for adult children required to fulfill their responsibilities to the family (Yeh et al. 2013). In the ideal typical Confucian family, the eldest son is expected to live with his parents, organize family members, and make decisions on collective actions such as rituals, ancestor worship, or the sharing of the inheritance (Hsu 1971). Even when they do not live with parents, on the basis of the patriarchal culture, they are more likely than other children to pay visits to parents or to contact them by other means. The cultural

approach maintains that the role of the eldest son is a critical factor in understanding relations across generations in this region.

The third approach stresses the needs of parents. Contingency theory provides a fundamental rationale for an argument that when the health condition of parents deteriorates, grown children step in and increase support to parents in response to parental needs (Eggebeen and Davey 1998; Fingerman et al. 2004). Contact by adult children thus increases consequently. However, when parents live with other siblings and can obtain the desirable care, those children living separately may feel less burdened and therefore contact them less frequently. It can be hypothesized that other things being equal, parents with better health and living with other family members would receive less contact with children living away from the parents.

Finally, distance is one influencing factor in frequency of contact across generations. Distance limits opportunities for physical contact with parents, as has been shown in numerous studies across cultures (Logan and Bian 1998; Lin and Yi 2011; Logan and Spitze 1996). In testing the reciprocity hypothesis, this study will simultaneously assess the key factors proposed by these competing explanations.

2.4 Data and Method

This study uses data from the East Asian Social Survey (EASS)[1] which was launched in 2006 to collect topical information from national probability samples in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China. The 2006 EASS data used for this study concentrated on the respondents' familial behaviors, values and attitudes. Information about family members was also collected. The surveys were conducted by local teams from social science institutes following scientific protocols. The sampling techniques of the EASS adopted the administrative procedures developed by the General Social Survey in the US (Smith et al. 2006). Two- or three-stage stratified random sampling was applied to select respondents among men and women aged 18 or older (aged 20–89 in Japan). Face-to-face interviews were employed except in Japan, where interviews and self-administered questionnaires were mixed. The response rates varied. In Japan and South Korea, response rates were 60.0 and 65.7%. They were lower in Taiwan (50.6%)[2] and China (45.5%).

[1]For further information about survey topics and data distribution, see the official website of EASS at http://www.eassda.org.

[2]The usage of the sampling frame is responsible for the lower response rate in the Taiwan Social Change Survey. The survey team obtained a sampling frame from a local administrative district which was selected in the last stage of the sampling. However, in the Taiwanese system, the registration of a household at a certain address is mainly for taxation purpose; it does not require this household to live at that residence. Many 'blanks' therefore somewhat reduced the response rates in the TSCS. Additionally, urban residences included a significant number of households living in guarded tall buildings which involved greater difficulty in obtaining consent to interviews from sampled respondents.

Table 2.1 Coresidence patterns in four East Asian samples (%)

	Japan	South Korea	Taiwan	China
Both parents alive				
Coresiding with both parents	20.1	16.1	32.9	14.5
Coresiding with either parent	1.3	1.8	3.3	1.6
Not coresiding with either parent	37.7	45.2	29.8	50.3
Only one parent alive				
Coresiding with parent	9.8	5.6	11.3	7.0
Not coresiding with parent	31.1	31.3	22.7	26.6
N	1195	1140	1444	2092

The original sample sizes varied: 2130 in Japan, 1605 in South Korea, 2102 in Taiwan, and 3208 for China.

Those respondents who did not reside with parents were selected for analysis. To simplify the study goal, the respondents who had only *one* living parent but lived in a separate home were further excluded from the analysis. Most parents in this grouping are mothers. Based on this criterion, in China, adult children currently not living with parents constitute approximately half of the respondents, a percentage higher than in the other three countries (see Table 2.1). In South Korea, this group comprises approximately 45%. Taiwan appears to have the smallest group in this regard, with a percentage of nearly 30%. The difference in this aspect might be due to high mobility from rural to urban areas in China.

2.5 Measurement

Contact with parents. Two sorts of contact with parents are used as the dependent variables. The first is face-to-face contact, which is recoded into "number of times in a month" from the original response categories (ranging from "almost every day" to "less than once a year"). The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2.2. In addition, contact which does not require physical presence is measured. This includes contact by letter, phone, email, etc. Each parent was separately measured for their frequency of contact.

Exchange across generations. Exchange involves gives and takes for the persons involved in reciprocation (Ekeh 1974; Emerson 1981; Tsai and Dzorgbo 2012). Any measures that tap merely a "one-way" direction of either give or take necessarily miss the dynamics of the two-way interactions. Measures of intergenerational exchange should also capture such mutually reinforcing forces inherent in the elementary form of exchange relations. Accordingly, this study adopts two pieces of information from the EASS survey: (1) "how frequently have you provided financial support to your parents? in the last 12 months?" (2) "how frequently have

Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics

Variable	Japan	South Korea	Taiwan	China
Sex[a]				
Male	59.9	58.8	64.4	61.7
Female	40.1	41.2	35.6	38.3
Age	39.38	35.70	38.84	35.17
	(9.22)	(8.08)	(8.48)	(8.97)
Marital status[a]				
Married	86.5	74.8	83.3	85.8
Single	13.5	25.2	16.7	14.2
Education (completed)[a]				
Junior high school or less	3.6	4.5	16.7	52.6
Senior high school	53.2	54.2	35.8	30.0
College and above	43.2	41.3	47.5	17.4
Income ($US)	55704.3	47892.0	33741.1	3472.5
	(31764.0)	(45184.6)	(38236.4)	(4862.4)
Health	3.6	3.8	4.0	4.0
	(0.9)	(1.0)	(0.9)	(0.8)
Eldest son[a]				
Yes	24.4	24.7	18.8	22.6
No	75.6	75.3	81.2	77.4
Number of siblings	1.6	2.8	3.3	2.5
	(0.9)	(1.6)	(1.5)	(1.8)
Father's health	3.3	3.0	3.5	3.7
	(1.0)	(1.2)	(1.1)	(0.9)
Mother's health	3.3	2.9	3.4	3.6
	(1.0)	(1.1)	(1.1)	(1.0)
Familial piety	–	–	5.6	5.5
			(0.7)	(0.8)
Father currently lives with[a]				
Married children	22.3	8.0	36.0	26.5
Unmarried children	12.6	20.0	18.1	4.2
Spouse only	57.9	68.1	37.7	64.7
Living alone	1.8	2.1	3.3	2.9
Others	5.4	1.8	4.9	1.7
Mother currently lives with[a]				
Married children	21.6	8.4	37.0	26.5
Unmarried children	13.5	20.3	19.1	4.2
Spouse only	57.7	68.4	37.7	64.5
Living alone	1.6	1.6	1.6	3.1
Others	5.6	1.3	4.6	1.7

(continued)

Table 2.2 (continued)

Variable	Japan	South Korea	Taiwan	China
Distance to father's (min)	84.3	108.2	84.4	77.5
	(85.6)	(83.5)	(85.4)	(87.6)
Distance to mother's (min)	83.5	107.1	81.9	77.5
	(85.1)	(83.2)	(83.3)	(87.8)
Face-to-face contact with father (times monthly)	4.0	3.0	7.1	6.4
	(6.9)	(5.0)	(9.4)	(8.5)
Indirect contact with father (times monthly)	4.5	10.5	8.5	7.1
	(6.8)	(8.6)	(8.5)	(7.6)
Face-to-face contact with mother (times monthly)	4.2	3.2	7.2	6.5
	(7.0)	(5.4)	(9.5)	(8.5)
Indirect contact with mother (times monthly)	5.5	11.1	8.8	7.2
	(7.4)	(8.8)	(8.5)	(7.6)

[a]Denotes percentages; otherwise are means (s.d.)

you done the household chores for your parents? for the last 12 months?" The advantage of the EASS survey is that it simultaneously solicits both the providing of finances to parents from children and parents doing household chores to help their children. The response categories are all on a five-point scale: "very frequently", "often", "sometimes", "seldom", and "not at all". Based on the above discussion, four groupings are constructed. First, those who give financial support to parents (from "very frequently" to "sometimes") and receive assistance with household chores from parents (suing the same coding method as above) are grouped into the type of balanced exchange. Exchanges between parents and their adult children can be unbalanced, in that either one may give more often than they receive, though this does not necessarily lead to a concern of unfairness, as an imbalance can be overridden by the primordial relationship built on blood. Adult children who give financial support frequently but receive housework assistance infrequently from parents (including "seldom" and "not at all") are placed in the grouping of credited exchange. Those who are in an opposite situation are categorized as indebted exchange. Finally, both exchanges which seldom or never happen between the respondents and their parents are considered as self-reliance, and are expected to produce the least contact.

The balanced exchange as we have operationalized it does not imply parents or children are obligated to give the exact equivalent and demand immediate payback (which would be "symmetrical reciprocity"), since our operationalization focuses on exchanges of different elements, the values of which are hard to price (or should not be priced) within the family context. The concept of "balanced" reciprocity stresses the *disposition* of giving back following the receipt of a favor, to highlight the *sequential* reciprocity rather than interest-based calculation within a designated

period. The four exchanges do not exhaust all possible formats of reciprocation, further exploration of which will be discussed in a later section.

Number of siblings. The family structure perspective suggests examination of the number of siblings to evaluate the potential substitutional effect. This study calculates the number of siblings the respondents have and uses it as a predicting variable. Additionally, those respondents who are the eldest son (or the only son) are coded into a dummy to assess whether they are more likely to contact parents when they leave their parents' home.

Parental characteristics and residential distance. A number of parental characteristics are considered, as contact by children may be conditioned on these factors. Their level of health is measured on a five-point scale (5 = very good, 1 = very bad). Their living arrangement is regrouped into five categories: living with married children, with unmarried children, with spouse only, living alone, and other situations. Those living with the spouse only are used as a reference group in regression estimation, as this group may reveal more need of care, because children are not immediately available. Note that marital status (married or single) is not considered in the analysis, because most respondents' living parents remained in marriage (thus it is a constant variable). Distance of residence between parents and children was measured in minutes of traveling. The Chinese respondents reported an average of 78 min, which is the lowest among the four analyzed samples. In comparison, their counterparts from South Korea indicated the largest distance, which is 108 min for fathers and nearly the same for mothers (107 min). For the respondents from Japan and Taiwan, distance from parents ranged between 82 and 84 min. In general, children in East Asia, even after leaving the parents' home, tend to live close to parents geographically. However, the variation of distance in China is somewhat larger than that in other samples.

Several demographic characteristics of the respondents are included as control variables. Besides gender, age and education level, income and health are both considered, as the respondents with higher income and better health may be in contact with parents more frequently. Income is calculated as a standardized score for each country sample. Health is a self-rated score measured in the same way as for parent's health. In measuring filial piety as an individual's value, we used the responses to four questions: (1) I am grateful to my parents for raising me; (2) No matter how badly my parents treat me, I should still treat them well; (3) One should give up his/her interest or choice of career to fulfill parents' expectation; and (4) I should support my parents to make their life more comfortable. Note that these questions were only on the Taiwan and China surveys. On this seven-point scale, we coded "strongly agree" as 7 and "strongly disagree" as 1. The factor analysis revealed that one main factor is predominant because the items are highly intercorrelated. Respectively for Taiwan and China samples, we calculated a standardized score on the basis of the factor score coefficients and used it as a predicting variable.

2.6 Result and Analysis

A main motivation of this study is to observe whether exchanges between parents and adult children lead to higher frequency of contact. Figure 2.1 displays the patterns of intergenerational exchanges across East Asia. Nearly 28.7% of the respondents from China reported that they frequently offer financial assistance to parents, and their parents often help with the housework. In contrast, balanced exchange was least likely to be seen among Japanese respondents—about 8.5% reported so. The gap with Japanese respondents also is obvious among respondents in South Korea and Taiwan, as approximately 21% and 25% of the samples reported regular exchanges with parents, respectively. Credited exchange stands out as the most often-seen exchange type across generations in South Korea, Taiwan and China. For Taiwanese, a high proportion of 44.0% belong to this group. In contrast, only 7.8% of the Japanese respondents are identified as such. Indebted exchange is also popular among Japanese, with 28.6% of the sample grouped into this category. The other three samples show a relatively small percentage. The sharpest contrast is observed in the type of self-reliance. The Japanese register a high percentage of 53.0%. The Chinese come in second, with a substantial gap of 22.3%. Intergenerational exchanges, as indicated by the sequential reciprocation of adult children's upward financial flow and parents' help with housework, appear to be practiced much less frequently in Japan, in comparison to the other East Asian societies.

Table 2.3 reports the regression outcome of contact with parents among the Japanese respondents. The first panel shows the regression coefficients of the demographic backgrounds. Males are less likely to be in contact with parents in indirect ways,



Fig. 2.1 Give money in exchange for housework from parents

Table 2.3 Contact with non-coresiding parents in Japanese families

	Face to face	Other contact	Face to face	Other contact
	With father		With mother	
Demographic characteristics				
Male	−1.205	−2.555**	−1.559	−3.866***
Age	0.164	−0.341	−0.009	−0.470
Age squared	−0.227	0.490	−0.058	0.602
High school (elementary or less = 0)	−0.093	−0.855	−0.770	−1.448
Some college or more	−1.352	−1.941	−1.773	−2.559
Married	−0.441	−0.208	−0.041	0.574
Income (standardized)	−0.724*	−0.319	−0.699	−0.303
Health	−0.561	0.262	−0.557	0.074
Sibling status				
Being eldest son	1.915	1.017	1.803	0.921
N of siblings	−0.316	−0.616	−0.280	−1.088**
Parental characteristics				
Parent's health	−0.016	0.143	−0.093	−0.191
Parent currently lives with (with spouse only = 0)				
with married children	−0.790	−0.807	−0.746	−1.465
with unmarried children	−0.740	2.220*	−1.060	1.739
living alone	−3.762	−3.162	−3.697	−1.509
others	−0.286	0.435	−0.728	0.257
Distance of residence	−0.275***	−0.087*	−0.290***	−0.103*
Intergenerational exchange (Self-reliant = 0)				
Balanced	5.107***	3.824**	5.321***	4.551***
Credited	0.550	3.320**	0.596	3.209*
Indebted	1.670*	2.352**	1.586*	2.570**
constant	6.639	11.273	11.545	18.769
Adj R^2	0.260	0.131	0.266	0.171
n	434	431	433	430

***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$

yet the male-female difference is statistically not discernible for face-to-face contact. Age, education, and self-rated level of health produce only scant influence. Those with higher income tend to be in contact with their fathers less frequently. However, income does not affect other forms of contact on this table.

The second panel tests the influences of family role and composition. Being the eldest son does not generate more contact, even though this variable carries the correct sign expected from the family lineage perspective. Nor do those with more siblings interact less often with parents, except on the other forms of contact with mothers (one more sibling decreases contact frequency by approximately one

instance per month). This outcome lends limited support to the family structure hypothesis.

Parental characteristics are usually used as proxies to reveal parental needs, which in turn encourage contact with children residing elsewhere. Our finding, however, shows that health of the parent has weak predictive power. Living arrangement is not associated with contact with children, except for non-face-to-face contact when parents live with other unmarried children. That is, being widowed or living alone, which suggests need for more regard and care from children, is not associated with more contact from children in Japanese society. When parents live farther from the children, as was expected, intergenerational interaction decreases substantially.

The last panel provides the result for testing the exchange hypothesis. For those engaging in balanced exchanges, their frequency of contact is significantly higher than the self-reliant group. The gap is slightly more than five times per month in terms of face-to-face contact. As for other forms of contact, the difference is also quite substantial. The credited exchanges similarly lead to more indirect contact (3.3 times per month with the father, and 3.2 times with the mother). When indebted exchange is practiced, contact also happens more frequently (approximately 2.5 times for either parent) in comparison to the self-reliant group. This contact might reflect compensational behaviors, as children offer regards or greetings in return for non-material assistance from their parents.

The estimation results for South Korean respondents are shown in Table 2.4. With regard to the demographic factors, males show more direct contact with either parent, a gendered difference dissimilar to what was observed among Japanese. The males' "other contact" is, however, not more habitual than females'. Age effect, a negative one, is shown only on indirect contact with the mother. Those with a college degree also report higher frequencies of contact of this type. Married respondents, compared to single persons, are in contact with parents more often, especially with the mother indirectly. Income does not play a major role in contact. Health is correlated solely with face-to-face contact with the mother.

Being the eldest son in South Korea, rather than enhancing contact, suppresses the contact frequency by about 1.7 times with both the father and mother per month. There seems to be a detached relationship between an eldest son and his father when living apart. This finding runs contrary to the role expectation of a patrilineage system. The number of siblings is not related to contact frequency across the table, showing weak predicting power of this family structure variable.

Parental characteristics do not perform well in predicting contact. Mothers who reported better health obtained less contact from their children. Health's effect is far from substantial in other equations. Mothers who live with unmarried children are more likely to have more contact with adult children, which might involve assistance with or care for minors. Distance remains a decisive factor: clearly it decreases contact frequencies in all equations.

Table 2.4 Contact with non-coresiding parents in South Korea

	Face to face	Other contact	Face to face	Other contact
	With father		With mother	
Demographic characteristics				
Male	1.500**	−0.702	1.812**	−0.856
Age	−0.036	−0.588	−0.054	−0.891*
Age squared	0.020	0.577	0.009	0.884
High school (elementary or less = 0)	1.430	3.347	1.183	3.685
Some college or more	0.874	5.120*	0.589	5.021*
Married	0.950	1.698	1.197	2.352*
Income (standardized)	0.062	0.293	0.073	0.252
Health	0.417	0.329	0.522*	0.389
Sibling status				
Being eldest son	−1.659*	−1.079	−1.753*	−0.687
N of siblings	−0.091	−0.025	−0.093	−0.050
Parental characteristics				
Parent's health	0.056	0.541	−0.493*	−0.620
Parent currently lives with (with spouse only = 0)				
With married children	0.407	0.429	0.185	1.445
With unmarried children	0.862	0.522	1.199*	0.905
Living alone	−1.563	−3.789	1.538	−0.225
Others	−1.506	−1.274	−0.843	−0.164
Distance of residence	−0.211***	−0.169***	−0.232***	−0.205***
Intergenerational exchange (Self-reliant = 0)				
Balanced	0.343	2.573*	0.708	3.400**
Credited	−1.171*	−0.532	−1.129	−0.232
Indebted	−0.033	−0.261	0.117	1.260
Constant	2.904	17.597	4.971	27.023
Adj R^2	0.206	0.136	0.227	0.171
N	512	512	507	508

***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$

In the last panel, the positive influence of balanced exchange is notable, particularly on indirect contact. Credited exchange seems to reduce face-to-face contact with the father. But this negative association is not strong in other equations on this table. Indebted exchange has little to do with contact.

The estimation result for the Taiwan sample, which is displayed in Table 2.5, reveals some notable influence of personal backgrounds. Males are more likely to be in contact with parents face-to-face, while their contact through other ways is not

Table 2.5 Contact with non-coresiding parents in Taiwan

	Face to face	Other contact	Face to face	Other contact
	With father		With mother	
Demographic characteristics				
Male	2.983**	−1.281	2.962**	−1.377
Age	0.045	−0.869*	−0.063	−0.674*
Age squared	0.041	1.140**	0.128	0.907*
High school (elementary or less = 0)	−0.238	1.907	−0.218	2.124
Some college or more	−1.878	2.672*	−1.740	3.041*
Married	−0.401	−1.261	0.229	−1.045
Income (standardized)	−0.356	0.061	−0.391	−0.071
Health	0.509	0.948*	0.951*	0.852
Familial piety	0.603	1.174**	0.470	1.070**
Sibling status				
Being eldest son	−1.743	−0.059	−2.154	0.087
N of siblings	−0.513	−0.335	−0.487	−0.338
Parental characteristics				
Parent's health	0.843*	0.571	−0.138	0.494
Parent currently lives with (with spouse only = 0)				
With married children	−1.642	−2.012*	−1.441	−1.638
With unmarried children	1.444	−0.070	1.118	−0.026
Living alone	−0.924	−1.129	−2.216	3.911
Others	−1.176	0.688	−2.146	0.292
Distance of residence	−0.506***	−0.176***	−0.517***	−0.158**
Intergenerational exchange (Self-reliant = 0)				
Balanced	3.697**	3.941**	4.253***	3.950**
Credited	−0.091	−0.512	−0.092	−0.230
Indebted	4.798***	2.705	5.099***	3.134*
constant	5.423	20.526	9.240	16.537
Adj R^2	0.354	0.173	0.346	0.165
N	429	429	430	430

***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$

less frequent (despite the negative regression coefficients), statistically speaking. Age carries a negative sign while age squared has a positive sign for "other contact". This curvilinear relation reveals changing patterns over the life course. Respondents with a college degree are also indirectly in contact with parents more often. Health is a useful predictor for indirect contact with father and for direct contact with mother. Respondents with a high score on the piety scale have more indirect contact with parents.

The family structure hypothesis receives scant supportive evidence in Taiwan, as neither the eldest son nor number of siblings is associated with frequency of contact. As for the parental characteristics, the father's health correlates positively with direct face-to-face contact. This relationship seems to reflect the capability, rather than the need, of the fathers when they initiated the interactions with children. When the father lived with a married sibling, the respondents tended to have less contact, compared to when the father lived with his spouse. Other living arrangements do not have substantial influences on both forms of contact. Distance shows a notable influence consistently across the equations. The positive influences of balanced and indebted exchanges replicate what is observed in the Japanese sample. Credited exchange slightly reduces contact frequency, but its magnitude is not significant statistically.

Table 2.6 reports the estimation results from the Chinese sample. Males tend to have more contact with both parents. Respondents with better education were in indirect contact with parents more often. Marital status, income, health and piety value do not have substantial influence. Number of siblings is negatively correlated with indirect contact with both parents, supporting the compensation hypothesis as proposed from the family composition perspective. Being an eldest son, however, does not ensure more frequent contact with parents. Parental characteristics show little influence, except that living with married children decreases indirect contact. Yet, distance clearly reduces the opportunities for intergenerational contact. Both balanced and indebted exchanges once again generate positive effects consistently. Credited exchange is not associated with contact with parents in China.

2.7 Robustness Check

Two robustness checks are performed to ensure validity of the obtained findings. The first concerns the problematic situation of the single equation estimation. The previous regression estimations of various forms of contact were fitted one by one with the least squares techniques. Empirically, contact with each parent is highly correlated. That is, seeing the father and seeing the mother can happen simultaneously. Moreover, direct contact tends to be associated with indirect contact, as they both are parts of a continual interaction between parents and offspring. These correlations indicate that the error terms across different regression equations are highly correlated. This information can be employed to improve the precision of other regression equations under consideration. The seemingly uncorrelated regression (SUR) method can provide better and more efficient estimation in this situation than does the ordinary least squares method (even though the latter's estimation remains unbiased and consistent) (Felmlee and Hargens 1988; Zeller 1962). Following the joint estimation approach, we performed the SUR estimation for the four contact equations simultaneously for each country. The results improve to some extent but there are no major changes for the regression coefficient across tables.

Table 2.6 Contact with non-coresiding parents in china

	Face to face	Other contact	Face to face	Other contact
	With father		With mother	
Demographic characteristics				
Male	2.007**	1.683*	1.938**	1.442*
Age	0.168	−0.162	0.131	−0.156
Age squared	−0.240	0.223	−0.183	0.216
High school (elementary or less = 0)	0.250	1.405**	0.347	1.573**
Some college or more	−0.115	1.592*	−0.053	1.785**
Married	−0.613	0.371	−0.552	−0.007
Income (standardized)	−0.211	0.048	−0.268	−0.042
Health	−0.318	0.062	−0.261	0.055
Familial piety	0.161	0.234	0.103	0.339
Sibling status				
Being eldest son	0.552	−0.240	0.621	−0.214
N of siblings	0.065	−0.442**	0.058	−0.445**
Parental characteristics				
Parent's health	0.202	−0.109	0.211	−0.110
Parent currently lives with (with spouse only = 0)				
With married children	−0.742	−1.165*	−0.825	−1.245*
With unmarried children	2.105	−1.009	1.613	−1.179
Living alone	0.431	−0.299	0.084	0.041
Others	−1.167	−0.952	−1.239	−0.400
Distance of residence	−0.426***	−0.270***	−0.422***	−0.268***
Intergenerational exchange (Self-reliant = 0)				
Balanced	2.059**	2.420***	1.942**	2.505***
Credited	−0.026	0.841	−0.037	0.809
Indebted	3.117***	2.120**	3.125***	2.079*
constant	6.203	10.946	6.458	11.224
Adj. R^2	0.267	0.187	0.267	0.192
N	1017	951	1018	950

***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$

The second robustness check is an extension of the conceptualization of reciprocity, which is the key element in this study. As noted, the previous analysis concerns one form of exchange and is not exhaustive. Other types of exchange exist and may generate favorable influences as well. For instance, the pooling of familial finances can be seen as a distinct form of exchange, in which children and parents often offer financial help to each other when needs occur. As the EASS provides information for constructing various exchanges, this study additionally analyzes their potential influence on contact. The three dimensions of exchanges are taken into further account: (1) the pooling of finances across generations; (2) children

offer housework assistance in return for financial help from parents; and (3) children and parents assist each other with housework. For each dimension, four groupings were constructed and then entered into regressions as a set of dummies. The results show that in South Korea, the respondents who engaged in indebted exchange with parents in financial pooling reported more indirect contact (not shown to save space). Other exchanges also resulted in similar findings. In Taiwan, the financial pooling does not lead these offspring in indebted exchange to be involved in more frequent contact. Nor does any influence on contact appear in the exchange of children using housework to pay back for parental financial support. In both Japan and China, the other types of exchanges appear to enhance contact, as was observed in the previous regression tables. Thus, it is safe to conclude that the two important robustness checks assure that our findings are reliable against different approaches of estimation and operationalization.

2.8 Conclusions

Regular contact with parents when the offspring establish their own families indicates a robust intergenerational tie. Though contact behavior and frequency as studied in this chapter do not necessarily mean "quality interaction", from the exchange perspective (Homans 1974), willingness to engage in contact continuously suggests that contact as such can be very rewarding itself. Admittedly, we are not able to directly measure the amount of such rewards. This constitutes one limitation of this study. Second, it is likely that contact breeds motivation to exchange, when intimacy, trust and solidarity are firmly built up as a consequence. Investigation of this causal process requires longitudinal observation. The cross-sectional data we used are not able to explore this possibility. This additional limitation is noted. Finally, as a research issue like ours targets a subsample rather than all the respondents in a survey, that is, our analysis is conducted with a smaller group of informants than ideally desired, statistical estimation might be affected with regard to reliability. With these limitations in mind, we now make our conclusion.

The adults in East Asian societies increasingly choose to establish their own residence rather than live with their parents. The key issue is whether this trend of separate living arrangement may have decreased opportunities for interacting with parents, hollowed out the ideal content of a home, and deprived this place of its emotional attachment and a sense of togetherness. In this study we approach this issue by examining the pattern of contact between adults and their parents, focusing on the subgroup that adopts separate living arrangements in this region. We investigated a number of potential factors which may facilitate such contact, and obtained several important findings. First, in comparing the pattern of living arrangements across this region, the Chinese adults in particular show a high propensity to live separately (nearly 77%). The Taiwanese show the lowest level (52.5%) of this, which nevertheless show a high incidence of independent housing.

Thus, living arrangements in modern East Asia clearly deviate from the orientalist idea of "big family" which presumably accommodates three or even more generations under the same roof. Second, frequency of contact with parents differs among the four analyzed samples, with Taiwanese adults in contact with their parents most regularly. Comparatively, Japanese were least frequently in contact with the parents. Third, in testing the competing factors of contact with parents, this study provides strong evidence for spatial distance and intergenerational exchange theories. Neither family structure nor parental demand exerts substantial influence. Filial piety, a widely discussed Confucian value, increases contact with parents in indirect ways in Taiwan but not in China. It does not play a significant role in influencing direct contact in both Chinese societies.

This study particularly stresses the significance of exchange across generations. It is through mutual reciprocation that adults and their parents can construct an active linkage, which induces further interactions and communications. A key contribution of this paper is specification of a new typology of exchange on the basis of social exchange theory. Among the four types of familial exchange, both balanced and indebted exchange operate to facilitate contact. In contrast, credited exchange produces only a weak effect, and this implies that financial support for parents seems to fulfill a responsibility so that infrequent contact can be justified. Balanced two-way exchange features a favorable consistent effect, suggesting that familial solidarity is not spontaneous and is a by-product of ongoing takes and gives.

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Chapter 3
A New Era in Living Arrangements: Determinants of Quality of Life Among Chinese Older Adults

Minzhi Ye, Yiwei Chen and Yisheng Peng

Abstract Empty-nest older adults are the fastest-growing population in China. There are three objectives of the present chapter: (1) to provide a national portrait of the changing pattern of co-residence of older adults in the past decade; (2) to identify the sociodemographic determinants of empty-nest families among community-dwelling older adults; and (3) to examine the relationship between older adults' living arrangements and quality of life. We used the 2006 and 2010 Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) samples to document the trends in the rates of co-residing families. In addition, we tested sociodemographic factors that may impact older adults' living arrangements using the 2005 Chinese Longitudinal Healthy Longevity Survey (CLHLS). We found that the co-residence rate decreased from 60.5% in 2006 to 52.4% in 2010. In addition, age, gender, race, urban living, health, and wealth were associated with co-residence. Finally, compared to older adults living alone, those living with a spouse and those living with their adult children had higher quality of life after controlling for sociodemographic factors. Older adults who live alone are the most vulnerable group. Policymakers as well as health care providers need to identify various risks in this group to promote the health and well-being of older adults.

Keywords Chinese older adults · Population aging · Living arrangements · Empty-nest · Quality of life

3.1 Introduction

Co-residence is a type of traditional living arrangement which has been found to be a powerful predictor of older adults' physical and mental well-being in Asia (Sun et al. 2015). However, with the rapid socioeconomic development of China, this

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traditional living arrangement is gradually losing its popularity and feasibility. Census data from 1982 to 2000 reveal that the proportion of older adults living in empty-nest households (i.e., older adults who do not co-reside with their adult children and/or grandchildren) has steadily risen in mainland China (Zeng et al. 2008). With the increasing number of empty-nest families, the Chinese government is concerned with these older adults who are not able to rely on their families for support (Teets and Hurst 2014). In fact, the Chinese government started a series of policies to support traditional families. For example, in the 12th government 5-year plan, the Shanghai government announced that 90% of older adults should take care of themselves or be taken care of by their families (Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau 2012). Although we do not know the exact changes in the national sample after 2000, it is estimated that older adults in China who live alone or with their spouses will account for 10.4 and 8.2% of the aging population, respectively, in 2050 (Zeng et al. 2008).

The increasing number of older adults also brings increased needs for care. The increase in chronic health conditions and the associated disability burden among the aging population requires a better understanding of the lives of older adults with different living arrangements, namely the heterogeneity of older adults who live in empty-nest households: older adults who live with a spouse and older adults who live alone. The present chapter aims to examine the determinants of this emerging trend of living arrangements and its impact on Chinese older adults' quality of life.

The chapter is organized as follows: First, we introduce the existing literature on the living arrangements of older adults and their relationships with quality of life. Second, we use two datasets to address three objectives: (1) to provide a national portrait of the changing pattern of co-residence of older adults in the past decade; (2) to identify the determinants of empty-nest families among community-dwelling older adults; and (3) to examine the relationship between older adults' living arrangements and quality of life. These findings will help to deepen our understanding of how living in empty-nest households shapes the interactions between older persons and their surrounding social environment, and how their living arrangements may influence their quality of life. Implications and future research directions will be discussed in the final section.

3.2 Trends of Chinese Older Adults' Living Arrangements

The increase in empty-nest households among Chinese older adults has occurred for various reasons, most notably the changes in population structure, economic patterns, and cultural norms of filial piety over the past 30 years. There has been a large increase in the Chinese elderly population in recent decades. China is currently an aging society due to the decline in fertility rates and the increase in life expectancy. The birth rate in mainland China has decreased for several decades. Part of the reason is the "world's strictest birth-control" policy (Phillips and Feng

2015), which stipulates that each couple have only one child.[1] (The birth rate of China has decreased from 18.2‰ in 1980 to 12.1‰ in 2013; National Bureau of Statistics of China 2014). Conversely, with the development of technology in medicine (Harper and Armelagos 2010), Chinese life expectancy has increased from 71.4 in 2000 to 74.8 in 2010 (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2015). As a result, the proportion of households with at least one older adult has dramatically increased.

Socioeconomic changes also shape older adults' living arrangements. The decollectivization of agriculture and encouragement of private enterprise resulted in rapid economic growth at the end of the 20th century (Davis and Harrell 1993). With the establishment of pensions and the social security system, older adults in urban areas have more independent economic resources than their predecessors. In a modern city such as Shanghai, nearly 90% of older adults aged 60 and above have independent income resources, including salary, pension, retirement benefits, as well as other investments (Shanghai Research Center on Aging 2014). With the industrialization of the economy and the implementation of the social security system, older adults do not have to rely on financial support from their adult children.

Moreover, the intra-national migration of working-age adults from rural to urban areas has had a dramatic impact on older adults' living arrangements (Norstrand and Glicksman 2015; Phillips and Feng 2015). With adult children leaving their hometowns to work in other cities, older parents are left behind. Zhan (2013) found that the booming job market in big cities has drawn young labor from rural areas, which has led to an increasing number of empty-nest families in rural areas.

Furthermore, there is evidence that the cultural norm of traditional co-residence has been reshaped by the socioeconomic environment (Wu et al. 2005; Zhang and Goza 2006). The obligations (e.g., instrumental assistance) prescribed by filial piety have been substituted or supplemented by other forms of social resources such as nursing homes, community service centers, and paid caregivers (Wu et al. 2005). Both adult children and older parents are more open to these alternatives now (Chen and Ye 2013). For example, although filial piety (i.e., the cultural proscription that adult children should take care of their elderly parents) is seen as a norm in Chinese society, Lei and his colleagues (2011) showed that fewer adult children lived with their elderly parents or preferred to provide care in person. Adult children prefer providing financial support to their older parents to bring health care services from outside the home instead of offering their own services (Lin and Yi 2011). Consequently, these cultural changes over the past decades have shaped the current living arrangements of older adults so that they are more likely than their parents' generation to reside in an empty-nest household. The latest study using nationwide data showed that for people aged 65 and above, the number of empty-nest households is projected to increase 2.9 times from 2010 to 2050 (Zeng et al.

[1]Although the "one-child policy" has been amended since 2016, it is hard to observe the effects of this new policy currently.

2014b). While several cross-sectional regional data showed that many older adults reside in empty-nest households (e.g., Liu and Guo 2007; Ye and Chen 2014; Zhou et al. 2011), it is not quite clear whether this is a broader national trend. Our study will provide a national portrait by using the 2006–2010 national data.

3.3 Determinants of Chinese Older Adults' Living Arrangements

Demographic characteristics, individuals' health conditions, and socioeconomic status can influence older adults' living arrangements. For example, there are gender differences in terms of living arrangements. Compared with older men, studies have found that older women prefer living with their adult children (Sereny and Gu 2011). One possible reason is that women live longer so they are more likely to become widowed than men. Based on the norm of filial piety, adult children have an obligation to take care of elderly parents, especially when they do not have a spouse to serve as their primary caregiver. Another possible explanation is that traditional domestic gender roles allow older women to have opportunities to provide instrumental support to their adult children (Chen et al. 2011), such as taking care of grandchildren. Therefore, elderly women are more welcomed to live with their adult children.

Studies of the relationship between older adults' health and their living arrangements present competing findings. On the one hand, based on the norm of filial piety, when older adults have health crises, they tend to move into or nearer to their children's homes in order to receive better health care. Sereny and Gu (2011) found that older adults with higher ADL problems also tended to prefer a co-residential living arrangement. Because age is positively associated with health problems among older adults, studies show that co-residence among older adults increases with age in China (Sun et al. 2010; Zimmer 2005). Zeng and his colleagues (2002) found that the majority of the oldest old (aged 80 and above) lived with their children. On the other hand, with the changes in the filial piety norm, some older adults, especially in urban areas, consider using public care facilities instead of adult children's support. A qualitative study in Shanghai found that older adults considered moving to a nursing home following a health crisis instead of living with their adult children because these elderly parents wanted to relieve their children of the caregiving burden (Chen and Ye 2013).

Aspects of older adults' social status, such as income, also need to be considered when analyzing their living arrangements. In Western countries, living arrangements have long been linked to older adults' economic resources. For example, Eckermann (2015) claims that in developed countries, not living with children is seen as a symbol of independence. Therefore, as long as the older adult can afford it, living alone is a desirable lifestyle. In China, study results are mixed. Some research finds similar results to Western countries; Sereny (2011) found that older

adults in China tended to prefer living independently On the other hand, from the children's point of view, Lei et al. (2015) found that "*if parents have higher income, one of their children is more likely to be living with them.*" (p. 1). Further, because children are expected to support their older parents, disadvantaged older adults with fewer resources, such as those in rural areas, may prefer living with their adult children (Liu and Guo 2007; Silverstein et al. 2006).

Many of those studies do not specifically test factors that influence older adults' living arrangements. Individuals' sociodemographic features that are related to living arrangements could help to understand the determinants of living arrangements among Chinese older adults. Some studies have used statistical models to predict older adults' living arrangement preferences (Sereny 2011; Sereny and Gu 2011). For example, Lei et al. (2015) used a national dataset to investigate factors that determine older adults' living arrangements; however, the maximum age in their sample was only 70. By using a national dataset designed for older adults with a wide age range, our study aims to give a better picture of determinants of Chinese older adults' living arrangements.

3.4 Influence of Living Arrangement on Older Adults' Quality of Life

Although there is a large body of research on the topic of living arrangements and older adults' quality of life, results are mixed in terms of which living arrangements are better for older adults. According to traditional Chinese culture, a family means "*the inter-dependence of parents and children.*" It is advocated for elderly parents to live with their adult children because "*it gives security to the old who are no longer able to work*" (Fei 1939/2006, p. 28). Recent studies in both mainland China and Taiwan showed that intergenerational support based on the norm of filial piety is still popular among older adults (Lin and Yi 2011).

We suggest that the heterogeneity among empty-nest families requires further examination. Indeed, Liu and Guo (2007) found that older adults in the empty-nest group reported higher levels of loneliness than those in non-empty-nest group. However, the concept of an "empty-nest family" may include several categories of living arrangements, such as living alone, living with a spouse, or living with other elderly relatives.

Most studies demonstrate that older adults who live alone experience higher rates of depression (Sun et al. 2010), lower subjective wellbeing (Chen and Short 2008), as well as lower life satisfaction (Ren and Treiman 2015), compared with living with a spouse. A qualitative study in Hong Kong that specifically investigated those who lived alone revealed that traditional family-oriented relationships can actually help these individuals cope with loneliness (Lou and Ng 2012). This finding shows that living alone per se may not predict loneliness. Moreover, Sereny

and Gu (2011) found that even living in a nursing home in China is a good option as long as older adults can emotionally accept it.

A few studies did not find significant differences between living alone and living with a spouse only (Chen and Silverstein 2000; Liu and Guo 2007; Silverstein et al. 2006). For example, Guan et al. (2015) reported that living with other elderly relatives led to the same negative effect on older adults' well-being as living alone, when the preferred living arrangement and actual living arrangement did not match. Moreover, living with a spouse only is not a good living arrangement for health, even if older adults prefer this arrangement (Guan et al. 2015). This is likely due to the fact that the spouse is usually the primary caregiver and caregiving exacts a toll on health. Cooney and Di (1999) had a survey in Shanghai and revealed that elderly spouses reported great feelings of fatigue and loss of personal time. Tennstedts et al. (1993) advocated for a reconsideration of living arrangements when one partner has severe health conditions in Western countries.

Other research argues that living only with a spouse is good for older adults' quality of life, when compared with those who are living with children. For example, Ren and Treiman (2015) found that older adults who lived with their adult children were less happy compared with those who lived with their spouse only. In addition, those who lived with their adult children and grandchildren showed no difference in life satisfaction, happiness, and depression. Many studies demonstrate that personal economic status has a positive association with individuals' quality of life and psychological well-being (Liu and Guo 2007; Xu and Chi 2011; Zhou et al. 2011, 2015). Therefore, testing family income instead of personal income may led to different conclusions. For example, Bai et al. (2016) pointed out that if older adults depend on their children's economic support, their sense of burden to the family is positively associated with their depressive symptoms.

Alternatively, a separate body of literature suggests that living with children is better than living with a spouse only (Silverstein and Giarrusso 2010; Xu and Chi 2011; Zhou et al. 2015). For example, some studies find that older adults may benefit from living with adult children by getting financial support, which increases their psychological well-being (Silverstein et al. 2006). Guan et al. (2015) also point out that among those who are living in their preferred arrangement, those living with both spouse and children reported higher levels of life satisfaction than those living with a spouse only.

Finally, some studies claim that there is no difference between living with a spouse only and living with children (Chen and Short 2008; Li et al. 2014; Wang et al. 2014). Chen and Short (2008), for instance, point out that co-residence with either spouse or children is positively associated with older adults' subjective quality of life. Additionally, Li et al. (2014) demonstrate that both spouse and children's contribute positively to older adults' well-being.

To date, studies have come to no consistent conclusion regarding the relationship between living arrangement and quality of life among older adults in China. Many such studies are limited, however, by regional samples (Zhou et al. 2011), which only focus on rural (Liu and Guo 2007; Silverstein et al. 2006; Xu and Chi 2011; Zhou et al. 2015) or urban areas (Chen and Silverstein 2000; Lou and Ng

2012; Sun et al. 2015), specific populations such as the oldest-old (Chen and Short 2008; Wang et al. 2014), or the respondents who only answered specific questions about living preference (Guan et al. 2015; Sereny 2011; Sereny and Gu 2011). Moreover, these studies used either living alone or living only with a spouse as a reference group to compare to other living arrangements. Therefore, it is difficult to detect how these living arrangements differ from each other in terms of older adults' quality of life in one dataset. By using two reference groups, our study can test the differentiation among living alone, living with a spouse only, and living with children in one sample, controlling for other important sociodemographic factors in one dataset.

3.5 The Present Study

In the present study, we describe the trends of co-residential family patterns in China, paying particular attention to the heterogeneity among empty-nest older adults. Specifically, we examine the sociodemographic factors that may impact older adults' living arrangements. We also address the relationship between living arrangement and older adults' quality of life. The increasing number of older adults living in empty-nest families (Zeng et al. 2008) and the associated vulnerabilities may strain the resources of existing social policies and programs, posing significant challenges to Chinese society. China must be ready to respond to the unique challenges and needs of the growing population of older adults.

3.6 Methods

We first used two waves (2006 and 2010) from the the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS), which investigates basic population information, such as age, gender, marital status, and household components. The questionnaires were set into a General Social Survey (GSS)-type questionnaire, with face-to-face interviews and self-enumerated questionnaires, covering both urban and rural areas for a nationally representative sampling design. Samples were selected by multistage stratified random sampling. Since the CGSS has valuable information that consists of representative samples from the whole of mainland China, it is useful for predicting social trends, especially for population structure and individuals' quality of life. The targeted population of the CGSS were aged 18 and above. Respondents in the Chinese region were collected from June to December in each survey year. Wave 2006 had a 51.1% response rate (N = 3,208). Wave 2010 had 73.2% valid rates (N = 11,783).

The second study used the 2005 Chinese Longitudinal Healthy Longevity Survey (CLHLS, N = 15, 638). We examined the sociodemographic determinants of community-dwelling elders with different living arrangements. We also tested

the relationships between living arrangement and individuals' quality of life. In particular, we differentiated three types of living arrangements: living alone, living with a spouse, and co-residing families. CLHLS collected information from adults aged 65 and older in 22 provinces of China, with a randomly selected sampling design. The survey covered smaller cities at the county level and districts in the large cities as well. The local "neighborhood/village residents committees" (Zeng 2008, p. 27) provided name-lists for older adults, including elderly residents in institutions. Respondents were randomly selected using pre-designed random codes. Respondents were asked about their demographic information, health conditions, socioeconomic characteristics, family, and lifestyle (Gu 2008; Zeng 2008).

Considering the statistic power, we deleted 422 older adults who lived in institutions and 106 people who lived with their elderly parents and/or with their siblings. Thus, this study only focuses on community-dwelling older adults who lived alone, lived with their spouses, or lived with their children. The final sample was 15,110 with 58% females (mean age = 86.1).

3.7 Measures

Co-residence was coded as a dummy variable in the CGSS Chinese regional data, with 1 representing the co-residence households and 0 representing non co-residence households. Because we were only interested in co-residence with older adults, other types of co-residence (e.g., an 18-year-old son living with his 40-year-old parents) were not included in calculating the rate of co-residence in this study. Older adults in our study was defined as those age 50 or over. This definition reflects the culture of age norms in China, where retirement age (i.e., 60 for men and 55 for women) is earlier than that of Western societies (Gomersall and Wang 2013). The co-residence household in our study includes three categories: (1) those age 50 or over and currently live with either their children, or grandchildren; (2) those aged 49 and less and living with at least one elderly parent or parent in-law who was age 50 or over; (3) those aged 49 and less and living with at least one grandparent. This strategy helps to capture a full picture of co-residence household regardless the age of respondents. These three categories were coded as 1, and other types of living arrangement were coded as 0.

Three types of living arrangement among older adults in CLHLS were coded as: living alone, living with a spouse, and the co-residents (i.e., older adults who lived with at least one member of a younger generation such as children, grandchildren, or nephews). The three categories were all coded as dummy variables.

Older adults' quality of life was assessed by asking them to self-rate their current quality of life on a five-point scale (1 = very good, 2 = good, 3 = so so, 4 = bad, 5 = very bad).

Demographic information, health, and economic factors were included as controls. In CLHLS, age was reported in years since birth. Gender was coded as a dummy variable with 1 = female and 0 = male. Ethnicity was coded as a dummy

variable with 1 = Han and 0 = minority. Urban residence was coded as a dummy variable with 1 = live in city/town and 0 = live in rural area.

Personal health condition was represented by the Active Daily Living scale (ADL). Respondents were asked if they needed any assistance with the following six activities: bathing, dressing, toileting, indoor transferring, continence, and feeding. The answers were coded as 1 = need at least one part assistance and 0 = without assistance. At first, the scale was summed with a higher score indicating more functional problems. The range of the scale was 0 to 6. However, because 75% of older adults scored zero in the sample, the scale was skewed. Therefore, we recoded the scale into dummy variable with 1 = need assistance on at least one activity and 0 = without assistance on any activity.

Financial security was measured by asking: "Are all financial sources enough for your life?" The answer was coded as 1 = yes and 0 = no. Wealth was measured by the following item: "How about your life compared with other local people?" The question was answered on a 5-point Likert scale: 1 = very poor, 2 = poorer, 3 = fair, 4 = richer, and 5 = very rich.

3.8 Analytic Strategies

We first presented the rates of co-residence in 2006 and 2010 by using CGSS data to capture the trend of living arrangements among families in China. Results were weighted according to the CGSS survey instruction. Then we used the CLHLS (2005) data to investigate the sociodemographic factors that were associated with older adults' living arrangements and the relationship between living arrangement and older adults' quality of life. Multinomial logistic regression was employed to analyze determinants of the two types—empty-nest families and co-residing families. Then we conducted multiple regression analyses to examine quality of life, comparing the empty-nest families and the traditional co-residing families.

3.9 Results

Our analysis based on the CGSS data found the co-residence rate decreased from 60.5% in wave 2006 to 52.4% in wave 2010 (Fig. 3.1). Moreover, the rates of co-residence among different age groups also changed between 2006 and 2010 (Fig. 3.2). In 2006, the co-residence rate (as defined in this study) among those aged 49 and younger was 45.1%; this number decreased (to 34.6%) in 2010. The co-residence rate among those aged 50 and above dropped significantly during this period, from 89.5 to 78.6%.



Fig. 3.1 The changing pattern of co-residence of older adults



Fig. 3.2 The changing pattern of co-residence of older adults (by primary respondents' age)

Table 3.1 provides descriptive information for all variables of the 2005 CLHLS data in the present study. In terms of living arrangements, 20.1% of the elders were living only with a spouse, 13.9% were living alone, and 66.1% were living with children (co-residing families).

Next, we conducted multinomial logistic regression to identify the sociodemographic determinants of living arrangements (Table 3.2). Comparisons were made with the referent (i.e., older adults living alone). For people living with a spouse only, age (Coef. = −0.1, $p < 0.001$) and being female (Coef. = −1.0, $p < 0.001$) were associated with decreased odds of living with a spouse only. For people living in an urban area (Coef. = 0.3, $p < 0.001$), more problems with ADL (Coef. = 0.9,

Table 3.1 Means/% and standard deviations for all variables across the three living arrangements (N = 15,110)

Variable	Living with a spouse only (N = 3,029)		Living alone (N = 2,097)		Co-residence with children (N = 9,984)	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Quality of life	3.7	0.8	3.4	0.9	3.71	0.8
Age	78.2	9.8	85.9	10.5	88.6	11.4
Female (male as reference)	36.4%	–	62.2%	–	62.8%	–
Han (minority as reference)	96.7%	–	95.7%	–	92.6%	–
Live in urban (rural as reference)	27.8%	–	19.3%	–	24.5%	–
ADL	13.4%	–	13.5%	–	30.9%	–
Financial security	78.7%	–	72.2%	–	77.8%	–
Wealth	3.0	0.7	2.79	0.76	3.0	0.7

Table 3.2 Multinomial logistic regression on living arrangement (N = 15,110)

Living arrangement (living alone as reference)	Living with a spouse only (N = 3,029)	Co-residence with children (N = 9,984)
Predictor	B	B
Constant	5.1***	−0.2
Age	−0.1***	0.01***
Female (male as reference)	−1.0***	−0.1
Han (minority as reference)	0.1	−0.8***
Live in urban (rural as reference)	0.3***	0.1*
ADL	0.9***	1.0***
Financial security	0.02	−0.1
Wealth	0.4***	0.5***
LR chi2(14)	2860.6	

*$p \leq 0.05$. ***$p \leq 0.001$

$p < 0.001$), and wealth (Coef. = 0.4, $p < 0.001$) were associated with increased odds of living with a spouse only. With regart to coresiding with children, age (Coef. = 0.01, $p < 0.001$), living in an urban area (Coef. = 0.1, $p < 0.05$), more problems with ADL (Coef. = 1.1, $p < 0.001$), and wealth (Coef. = 0.5, $p < 0.001$) were associated with an increased odds of co-residence. Being Han (Coef. = −0.8, $p < 0.01$) decreased the odds of co-residence.

Finally, we used multiple regression analyses to examine the relationship between older adults' living arrangement and their quality of life. With "*living alone*" as the comparison group, other types of living arrangements were regressed in Model 1 on Quality of Life (Table 3.3). Model 2 controlled for demographic variables, health, and economic conditions. We found that compared to older adults living alone, those living with a spouse only (Coef. = 0.2, $p < 0.001$) and living

Table 3.3 Regression models on quality of life (N = 15,110)

	Model 1	Model 2
Predictor	B	B
Constant	3.4***	1.8***
Living arrangement (living alone as reference)		
Living with a spouse only	0.2***	0.1***
Co-residence with children	0.3***	0.2***
Demography		
Age		0.002**
Female (male as reference)		0.02
Han (minority as reference)		−0.1+
Live in urban (rural as reference)		0. 1***
ADL		−0.02
Financial security		0.3***
Wealth		0.4***
Adjusted R	0.01	0.2
F	93.9	467.9

+$p \leq 0.1$. *$p \leq 0.05$. **$p \leq 0.01$. ***$p \leq 0.001$

Table 3.4 Regression models on quality of life (N = 15,110)

	Model 1	Model 2
Predictor	B	B
Constant	3.7***	2.0***
Living arrangement (living with a spouse only as reference)		
Live alone	−0.2***	−0.1***
Co-residence	0.04*	0.02
Demography		
Age		0.002***
Female (male as reference)		0.02
Han (minority as reference)		−0.1+
Live in urban (rural as reference)		0.1***
ADL		−0.02
Financial security		0.3***
Wealth		0.4***
Adjusted R	0.01	0.2
F	93.9	467.9

+$p \leq 0.1$. *$p \leq 0.05$. **$p \leq 0.01$. ***$p \leq 0.001$

with children (Coef. = 0.3, $p < 0.001$) had higher quality of life. These two living arrangements still positively predicted older adults' quality of life after controlling for demographic variables, health, and economic conditions.

3.10 Discussion

By using the 2006–2010 CGSS data and 2005 CLHLS data, we not only documented the decrease in the co-residence living arrangement among Chinese older adults in the past decade, but also discovered the sociodemographic determinants of co-residence. Furthermore, the present study differentiated three types of living arrangements and extended the prior literature on the relationship between living arrangements and quality of life among Chinese older adults.

3.11 Trends of Empty-Nest Families and the Heterogeneity of Empty-Nest Older Adults

The proportion of older adults who live with their children has decreased over the last decade. This trend has been documented over the last century (Bian et al. 1998, p. 19). By using CGSS 2006–2010 data, we found that the proportion of co-residence has declined quickly. Our study found that by the end of 2010, around 52.4%of people had co-residential living arrangements, compared with 60.5% in 2006. Those who did not live with their children or grandchildren either lived with other older adults or lived alone. Investigating co-residence rates across different age groups, we found that the co-residence rate decreased during the period from 2006 to 2010 both among those aged 49 and younger and those aged 50 and above. However, since the CGSS 2006–2010 data were cross-sectional waves, we could not track intra-individual changes in living arrangements. Thus, this finding should be interpreted cautiously.

After deciphering the empty-nest family using CLHLS 2005 data, we found that among the empty-nest families, around three-fifths of them lived with their spouses, whereas two-fifths lived alone. As China's population ages, the number of empty-nest families will grow quickly as young people continue to leave their homes and the number of people aged 65 and above increases (Zeng et al. 2014b; Zeng et al. 2008). Across the entire nation, older adults living only with a spouse appear to be a new living arrangement trend in both rural and urban areas. This conclusion echoes previous studies based on older census data (e.g., Zeng et al. 2008).

3.12 The Influence of Filial Piety on Living Arrangements

Although older adults today tend to live by themselves more often than their predecessors, the idea of filial piety may still play an important role in older adults' living arrangements. Our study show that increase in age and functional limitations (e.g., ADL) are associated with higher likelihood of co-residential living

arrangements among older adults. This finding is different from studies in Western Western countries. According to the U.S. Census Bureau (Vespa et al. 2013), in 2012, among those aged 65 and above, 18.9% of men and 36.1% of women lived alone. Particularly among those who were 65–74 years old, the percentage of living alone among men was 16.7%, and 27.2% for women. However, the numbers increased as people aged; among those aged 75 years and over, 22.2% of men lived alone and 46.3% of women lived alone. Norstrand and Glicksman (2015) concluded that in the United States, the proportion of older adults who live alone increases with age. Our finding of higher co-residence with increasing age and decreasing health in China may indicate that the filial piety norm still has an impact on living arrangements when the need for care increases. However, since the filial piety norm was not directly assessed in the present study, this conclusion should be cautioned.

According to the assumption of family altruism, Zimmer (2005) argues that family members in China tend to support all family members for comfortable survival. Under this scenario, when care needs increase due to events such as advanced age, health conditions, or a spouse's death, co-residence with adult children is more likely to occur among older adults. In China, due to the lack of a national social security system and limited health care providers (Chen 2015), it is possible that older adults tend to especially rely on their adult children when the need is great. For example, previous studies on the Chinese oldest-old (i.e., aged 80 and above) reveal that the majority of the oldest-old live with their children, especially widowed people (Zeng et al. 2002). One study in urban China revealed that the proportion of living with children among older adults was actually a "U-shaped" curve (Sun et al. 2010).

3.13 The Influence of Socioeconomic Status on Living Arrangements

Economic status presents a paradox in terms of living arrangements. On one hand, an increase in wealth among older adults increases the likelihood of living with their children. This finding echoes a previous national study, which found that the more income elderly Chinese parents had, the more likely they were to co-reside with their children (Lei et al. 2015). On the other hand, our study shows that higher wealth is also associated with an increased likelihood of living with a spouse. The reason could be that elderly Chinese people with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to purchase services outside of the family (Chen 2015). It also could be a trend of preferring living independently among Chinese older adults (Sereny 2011). In Western countries, living independently is a symbol of independence (Eckermann 2015). Our finding indicates that some Chinese older adults may be beginning to accept this idea. Nevertheless, our finding shows that older adults who live alone face the greatest vulnerabilities, compared with those living with a spouse

or with adult children. Increased wealth among older adults is associated with increased likelihood of living with others, as opposed to living alone.

Gender is also a factor in living arrangements. Being a woman decreases the likelihood of living with a spouse. Since women's life expectancy is longer than men's, the number of women who were aged 60 or above was 5% higher than the number of men (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2010). Women are more likely to experience widowhood than men. Therefore, compared with men, women are less likely to live with a spouse.

We also found support for the relationship between race and living arrangements. Compared with minority groups, the Han have a lower likelihood of having a co-residential arrangement. However, what these data do not tell us is why there is a racial difference in the percentage of co-residence.

Two possible reasons may explain this phenomenon. First, minority groups are more likely than the Han to value traditional co-residence. Although both the Han and the minority groups share the tradition of co-residence, the Han are more likely to adopt Western cultural values and experience greater urbanization than minority groups. Therefore, while living with younger generations is still a favored arrangement among minority groups, some elderly Han people in urban areas have adopted the idea that not living with their adult children is a symbol of an independent lifestyle. For example, in big cities such as Shanghai where 98.8% of residents are Han (Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau 2011), more than 70% of elderly parents prefer to rely on community-based long-term care services instead of being taken care of by their adult children (Shanghai Research Center on Aging 2012). Future studies need to investigate the filial values, which perhaps are practiced in different ways by Han and minority groups.

Another possible reason for this is the economic inequality between the Han group and minority groups. Minorities are more likely to slip into poverty (Gomersall and Wang 2013). On average, minorities have lower educational levels than the Han group. Moreover, the majority of minority groups live in rural areas where pensions and health services are lower and difficult to access (Li et al. 2007). As a result, minority family members may prefer co-residence for survival reasons. However, since we controlled for the urban/rural factor, urban-related factors such as economics, environment, and social welfare may not fully explain the racial differences in living arrangements. A number of Chinese studies on minority older adults in China have documented the high prevalence of co-residence among these groups (Qiang 2014; Zheng 2013). Future studies need to investigate the causal relationship between race and living arrangement in China.

Older adults who live in Chinese rural areas are more likely to live alone. Contrary to previous findings that older adults in rural areas or developing countries tend to have co-residential living arrangements (Eckermann 2015; Teerawichitchainan et al. 2015; Zeng et al. 2002), our study found that older adults who lived in rural areas are more likely to live alone. This may be due to the great internal migration in China. Chan (2013) points out that in the past 30 years, around 340 million rural migrant workers have moved to cities. Because of the restricted household registration system (i.e., *hukou*) and inequality of education between rural and urban areas, older adults

living in rural areas have difficulty finding good jobs in cities and do not have health care services with affordable prices in urban areas (Liu 2005). Therefore, as young people relocate to the cities for jobs, older adults are left behind in rural areas with limited support and resources. Likewise, another study predicted that by 2050, the percentage of older adults who live alone in the middle area of China, where most migrant workers come from, will be 1.3% higher than the eastern area of China, where many urban cities are located (Zeng et al. 2014a). Similar to previous studies (Zeng et al. 2008; Zhou et al. 2011, 2015), our study also found that older adults in rural areas were more vulnerable and faced more serious problems than those living in urban areas.

3.14 Not Living with Children Does not Always Predict Disadvantages for Elders

Previous studies (e.g., Liu and Guo 2007; Zeng et al. 2008) may oversimplify the negative influences of empty-nest family living on older adults' quality of life. For example, Liu and Guo (2007) reported that older adults with empty-nest families had higher levels of loneliness and mental disorders, compared to older adults with non-empty-nest families. It might be true that older adults who live with their children have more support; however, many studies show that although young generations may not be willing to live with their elderly parents, non-co-resident sons and daughters tend to live close to their elderly parents and provide support regularly (Bian et al. 1998). Therefore, not living with children does not always predict disadvantages. Considering the busy schedules of the younger generations, older adults may hardly be able to rely on their children for support. In fact, Chen and Ye (2013) found that when facing large health care demands, many older adults chose to move to a nursing home instead of living with their children, because their children could not? provide sufficient care at home.

3.15 Living Only with a Spouse Does not Differ from Living with Children for Quality of Life

On the other hand, living only with a spouse means that there is another person in the home. Moreover, spouses are more likely to care for partners than are adult children for their elderly parents (Ren and Treiman 2015). This arrangement could potentially provide care support, including instrumental and emotional support. Guan et al. (2015) found that older adults who lived with a spouse reported better health care than those who lived alone, and Wang and his colleagues (2009) found that elders living with a spouse experienced faster recovery from health crises. Our finding is consistent with previous studies that either living with a spouse or living

with children is positively associated with quality of life (Chen and Short 2008). The present study demonstrates that after adjusting for demographic features, health, and economic factors, older adults who live with a spouse do not differ in quality of life from those living in co-residential living arrangements. But older adults who live alone report lower quality of life than older adults who live with a spouse. Therefore, older adults who live alone seem to be the most vulnerable group compared with older adults in other living arrangements (Sun et al. 2010).

3.16 Limitations

This study has several limitations. First, our data have some limitations. Although CGSS has detailed information on living arrangements, it is difficult to capture the detailed changes in living arrangement, as it is not a longitudinal study. On the other hand, CLHLS has collected both the oldest-old and detailed information on respondents' living arrangements. However, the first several waves of CLHLS only selected older adults who were aged 80 and above. Therefore, it is difficult to identify the trend of living arrangements among older adults by simply using CLHLS data. Second, since these datasets are cross-sectional, causal directions of the relationship between living arrangements and quality of life cannot be studied. Future longitudinal study is necessary. Further, this study did not specifically separate those who never had offspring or those who had lost their offspring. Future studies might consider these groups when studying living arrangement among older adults.

3.17 Policy Implications

Policymakers must consider the heterogeneity of empty-nest families. The rise in empty-nest families has significant impact on policies related to elderly people. Our findings illustrate the vulnerabilities of older adults living alone, compared with those living with a spouse or co-residing with their children. Older adults living alone have the lowest quality of life. The absence of other people around the home makes older adults who live alone more vulnerable because they are less likely to have close and reliable support.

Moreover, older adults living alone in rural areas are the most vulnerable group in our study. They are more likely to need social support, as social security benefits and health care resources are limited in rural areas. Zhou et al. (2011) found that rural older adults have significantly lower scores on a 36-item health survey than those in urban areas. As young migrant workers continue to move to cities, there will be more older adults living alone in rural areas. Institutional supports are needed to accommodate the greater demands for health and long-term care services for these older adults.

3.18 Conclusion

With regard to our three objectives, we found that (1) the co-residence of Chinese older adults has declined further in the past decade; (2) a number of sociodemographic factors such as age, gender, race, urban or rural residence, physical health, and economic resources contribute to the living arrangements of older adults; and (3) compared to older adults living with a spouse or co-residing with their children, those who live alone have the lowest quality of life. On the other hand, there was no difference in quality of life for older adults living with a spouse and those living with their children. Policymakers need to provide more institutional supports to older adults living alone in rural areas.

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Appendix

See Figs. 3.1, 3.2 and Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4.

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Part III
Gender, Work and Culture

Chapter 4
Multiple Dimensions of Gender-Role Attitudes: Diverse Patterns Among Four East-Asian Societies

Yean-Ju Lee

Abstract The existing literature simplifies the measure of gender-role attitudes into a single liberal-conservative scale, whether aggregating multiple statements or using only one statement on specialized roles for the two genders, "A man's job is to earn money and a woman's job is to look after the home and family." Typically, a respondent occupies one position along the continuum. However, role expectations for the two genders can be more complex. Using data from four East Asian societies—China, Taiwan, Japan, and Korea—in an international survey titled "Family and Changing Gender Roles," this study explored four dimensions of gender-role expectations (male breadwinner, female income earner, male homemaker, and female homemaker roles) in addition to the typical global measure of gender roles. The findings show distinctive combinations of the attitudes toward the four dimensions by the society, shedding rich insights on belief systems of the four nations. These observed cross-cultural variations attest that reducing gender-role norms to a single liberal-conservative scale can lead to a misleading conclusion.

Keywords Gender-role attitudes · East Asia · Family · Role specialization · Gender

4.1 Introduction

With the expansion of female education and labor force participation, women's social positions relative to their male counterparts have improved and people's attitudes toward gender roles have changed across the societies. Despite the trend of generally liberalizing attitudes, the pace of changes in attitudes and behaviors may differ by the aspects of gender roles and by the cultural and social contexts. Recent studies on East Asia discuss contradictions in gender-role attitudes and practices (Takeuchi and Tsutsui 2016; Tu and Chang 2000; Xie 2013; Yamaguchi 2000). For

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example, women in Taiwan are more likely to participate in the labor force compared to their counterparts in Japan and Korea, even though women from all three countries hold equally favorable attitudes toward the traditional homemaking roles of women. This suggests that attitudes toward income-earning and homemaking roles are not necessarily complementary with each other (Takeuchi and Tsutsui 2016). In China, women's socioeconomic status has improved significantly compared to that of men, yet homemaking is still the domain of women and the pattern of hypergamy persists (i.e., marriages are mostly between grooms of higher social status and brides of lower social status (Xie 2013). In Japan, women with non-traditional gender-role attitudes may be divided into two distinctive groups—those who are pro-work and those who are anti-work—suggesting multi-dimensionality of the gender-role norms (Yamaguchi 2000). In Korea, despite the reversal in gender gaps in higher education, women's commitment to motherhood, especially devotion to their children's academic success, has remained strong (Yamane and Hong 2008).

In the case of the United States, gender-role attitudes were becoming increasingly liberal until the mid 1990s although the change has since stalled with some attributing the pause to the importance of motherhood which cannot easily be further contracted (Cotter et al. 2011; Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001). Recent data, however, show that married fathers' childcare time has increased more rapidly than married mothers' childcare time (Bianchi et al. 2012), which reflects the recent trend of intensive parenting on the part of fathers as well as mothers and suggests that the importance of motherhood cannot alone explain the stalled gender-role attitudes. To understand the complexities and contradictions in gender-role expectations during the period of massive social transitions across the world, it is important to explore the multiple dimensions of gender roles (Davis and Greenstein 2009; Inglehart and Baker 2000).

4.2 Dimensions of Gender-Role Attitudes

Most research on gender roles assumes that a respondent's attitudes occupy a point along the continuum from conservative to liberal ones. Studies either aggregate a set of questions into a global scale or just use one comprehensive indicator (Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004; Cotter et al. 2011; Cunningham 2008; Pampel 2011). A typical indicator conceptualizes gender roles as a division of labor between the two genders, i.e., men as breadwinners engaging in gainful employment and women as homemakers in charge of childcare and housework. While "strongly agreeing" may reflect the respondent's belief in distinctive roles expected for men and women, such a lineal conception can miss a complexity in people's ideas about gender roles. Disagreeing with the specialized roles by gender is often equated with egalitarian attitudes/beliefs, but different respondents could have different role arrangements in mind. Because society takes it for granted that men work full-time, it is construed that the opposition/objection is to women being full-time

homemakers while agreeing with the importance of male breadwinner roles. However, at least technically, it is possible that people may object to men being the breadwinners, to men not participating in familial roles (even when agreeing with their breadwinning role), or to women not participating in breadwinning (even when agreeing with their homemaking role). Or, people may just object to any fixed enforcement of any gendered roles, arguing for the flexibility in male roles as well as in female roles. In short, the objection to the specialized gender roles may not necessarily imply any uniform role arrangement. Of course, any objection to the specialized gender roles may reflect "more" egalitarian attitudes in the sense that the respondent's position deviates from the division of labor by gender, but there can be diverse stances toward the different aspects of gender roles. It is important to systematically disaggregate the dimensions in order to understand why gender-role attitudes might stall or appear to be contradictory to behaviors.

When interpreting responses to a role arrangement, it will be helpful to consider its desirability versus inevitability (for biological, psychological, social, economic, or any other reason), since the alternatives to a "disagreed" role arrangement may differ depending on the motives for the objections. In the same line of reasoning, the "neutral" position may mean a unique stance of not enforcing any arrangement and leaving the decision to the individual families, which goes beyond the scale of agreement or disagreement. In other words, the level of rigidity (or flexibility) adds another perspective to understanding the gender-role norms.

By simple logical reasoning, this paper distinguishes four main dimensions of gender roles (breadwinner and homemaker roles by each of the two genders), and predicts that attitudes toward the four dimensions do not change in a uniform manner. Over the centuries of changing modes of production, norms about women's roles have changed substantially, from co-workers at the family farms in the agrarian economy to partners in charge of domestic work during the process of industrialization, to working partners of dual-earner families in the post-industrial economy with the expanded service sector. Over the past several decades, female labor force participation has increased rapidly in the West as well as in East Asia, first among unmarried women, then among married women, and most recently among mothers of young children (Brinton 2001; Lee and Hirata 2001; Percheski 2008). By the early 2000s, nearly 70% of children in the United States were from families where all their parents, whether single or married, were employed (Heymann 2002; Jacobs and Gerson 2004). Through these historical transformations, expectations about women's roles have become flexible; women may be full-time workers or full-time housewives by their circumstances and/or preferences without incurring much negative social sanctions. This is true even though the very flexibility may imply an ambiguity in female roles and may draw some contradictory sanctions whichever roles women choose (Belkin 2003; Hays 1996; Lee 2016; Stone 2007).

Despite such profound changes in women's role prescriptions, there is little evidence that expectations about male provider roles have been much altered. In some societies, an expansion of women's labor force participation has been concurrent with a contraction of men's labor force participation, but not to a

comparable extent. Further, the little contraction in men's labor force participation is mainly due to the prolonged duration of skill accumulation, education, and job training in the long-term and due to the labor market turmoil in recent years, not necessarily due to the weakened norms about provider roles (ILO 2015). Stay-at-home fathers are still a rarity across the societies; they comprise only 1% of married couples with children under 15 in the United States (Census Bureau). Expectations about the husband's breadwinning obligations may not be particularly noticeable in growing economies but tend to resurge in the times of economic hardships (Beck 1992, p. 210; Scott et al. 1996). Across the societies men hold onto the masculine identity as providers and protectors for the family (Lee 2016; Thebaud 2010). In some sense, "men are stuck" in gender roles; while women are encouraged to move into typically male roles, society holds rigid stereotypes for men (Reyes 2013).

Thus, the first two dimensions of gender-role attitudes are related to breadwinning roles of the two genders; the first concerns how strongly people believe in male responsibility for breadwinning; in parallel, a second dimension concerns expectations about women's income-earning role, indicating their views on whether women should contribute to the family income. The third and fourth dimensions are related to the homemaking roles (roughly defined as housework and childcare combined) by the two genders, respectively. Even though an increasing number of women participate in the labor force, homemaking is still considered to consist of highly gendered tasks, and surveys are limited in exploring attitudes toward men's homemaking roles beyond the socially desirable responses. Thus, expectations about male homemaking roles may be measured indirectly through a question probing how homemaking is entirely the woman's responsibility (Breen and Cooke 2005; Hochschild and Machung 2003; Kamo 2000). For example, one may ask whether the family would suffer if the wife had a full-time job, where agreeing with the statement reflects a belief that housework or childcare by women is irreplaceable and cannot be done by the husbands or any other persons. As such, this question concerns men's domestic roles as well, reflecting whether husbands can and will complement the reduced homemaking roles done by their working wives. On the other hand, surveys have asked about the importance of homemaking roles for women, such as whether the task is intrinsically rewarding for women.

Lastly, a few additional attitudinal indicators may supplement data on these four dimensions. For one, the question on whether one parent can be as effective as two parents in raising children seems to encompass all four roles, breadwinner and homemaker roles for each of the two genders. Endorsing the statement would reflect beliefs in the "potential" capacity of both genders for all three roles: housework, childcare, and breadwinning (perhaps, regardless of their desirability). On the other hand, attitudes toward the marriage institution will provide insights on individuals' positions along the conservative-liberal or rigid-flexible attitudinal scale. Juxtaposing such general orientations toward the family institution with the four dimensions of gender roles attitudes will add insights on cross-cultural variations in family values.

4.3 East Asian Context and Research Issues

Over the past several decades, East Asian societies witnessed a dramatic improvement in women's socioeconomic status (educational attainment and employment status, in particular), and yet data suggest that Confucian ethics of gendered family practices remain prevalent. With such seeming contradictions, the region provides a good context to explore the multiplicity of gender role attitudes. Furthermore, evidence suggests that East-Asian societies have adapted differently to the changing structural conditions and developed different priorities with regard to the various aspects of gender roles (Lee 1998; Slote and DeVos 1998; Thornton and Lin 1994). The existing literature based on the modernization perspective that depicts social changes in a linear mode (e.g., Goode 1970) tends to oversimplify the concept of gender-role attitudes and is unable to capture the complexity in social changes within and across the societies.

This study compares the four East-Asian societies—including China, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea (Korea hereafter)—with the purpose of exploring the unique configurations of each society in their attitudes toward these dimensions of gender roles. Based on the discussion so far, we make one major prediction that men's breadwinning is a universal norm across the societies while norms about all the other dimensions will differ among the societies. The findings will provide a clue for the future effort developing a systematic scheme that can measure the multiplicity of gender-role attitudes in diverse cultural contexts.

4.4 Data and Methods

Data: Data are from a cross-cultural survey titled, "Family and Changing Gender Roles (FCGR)," conducted in 2012. Under the leadership of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the participating research institutes from dozens of countries globally have administered social surveys annually with different topics, with the common questionnaires translated into the national languages. The 2012 module focused on family and gender issues, providing perfect data for this study. The surveys are based on nationally representative samples of adults 18 or older, and this research is restricted to ages 25 through 54, prime working ages in the life stages of childbearing and rearing, and when gender-roles attitudes matter most in determining one's life trajectories. This study uses data from four surveys (China, Taiwan, Japan, and Korea) and will refer to each society also as a country (regardless of their formal definitions of the national boundaries). For China, the sample is further restricted to urban residents, as the average educational attainment among rural residents is much lower than that of their urban counterparts as well as those from three other nationalities, which makes fair comparisons difficult. The educational attainment of urban China is still lower than that of the other societies, but they are more comparable. The resulting sample sizes are 1,130, 1,168, 565, and

665 for urban China, Taiwan, Japan, and Korea, respectively. All the analyses were weighted using a variable constructed by the author to standardize the gender and age distributions and, in aggregate statistics, to control for the sample size variability among the four societies. After the standardization, women and men comprise 51 and 49%, respectively, and the six 5-year age groups comprise roughly equal percentages (14, 16, 18, 18, 18, and 16%). Table 4.1 presents the weighted sample distributions for educational attainment and marital status.

Methods: The FCGR questionnaire divided approximately 30 statements regarding attitudes toward gender roles and family relations into several sections. Although the survey did not label them, the author finds some categories are well suited to the four-dimension approach of this paper. The categories/scales include attitudes toward: overall gender division of labor, women's work role (including expectations about homemaking roles of women and men), men's breadwinning role, efficacy of parenting by single or homosexual parents, and importance of the marriage institution. We tested each scale's validity and equivalence across the societies by calculating Tucker's phi scores (He and van de Vijver 2012) based on a factor analysis for the total sample, and also for each country separately. The phi scores (comparing the factor loadings of each country with those of the overall sample) were beyond 0.95 in all categories, confirming both the validity and equivalence. For intuitive analysis, this study further chose one or two representative items from each category. The final list of questions used for the analysis is as follows: (Note that the name in parenthesis is for convenience and based on the question, not the corresponding dimension of gender roles.)

1. A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family (specialized roles).

Table 4.1 Sample characteristics (Gender and age distributions are standardized)

	China	Taiwan	Japan	Korea	Total
Educational attainment (years)					
Less than HS (0–11)	35	22	6	10	18
High school (12)	30	28	35	36	32
Some college (13–15)	18	19	26	17	20
College or more (16+)	16	32	33	37	29
Total (%)	100	100	100	100	100
Mean years of schooling	11.6	13.3	13.8	13.5	13.0
(Standard deviation)	3.8	3.5	2.2	2.8	3.2
Marital status					
Married	85	65	67	67	71
Previously married	7	7	6	9	7
Never married	7	28	27	24	21
Total (%)	100	100	100	100	100
Weighted sample size	884	884	883	883	3,534

2. Consider a family with a child under school-age. What, in your opinion, is the best way for them to organize their family and work life? (child presence).
3. Both the man and woman should contribute to the household income (contribution).
4. All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job (suffering).
5. A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children (housewifely wish).
6. One parent can bring up a child as well as two parents together (one parent).
7. It is all right for a couple to live together without intending to get married. (cohabitation).

These statements will be further examined in the findings section, but a brief explanation is due here. The first question is the global gender-role measure and is often used alone. The next four statements disaggregate the gender-role attitudes into four dimensions: male breadwinner role (child presence), female breadwinner role (contribution), male homemaking role (suffering), and female homemaking role (suffering, housewifely wish). The statement on "one parent" functions as another global measure, in the sense that agreeing with it requires confidence in all four dimensions of role performances. The question on cohabitation is one of the three given in the questionnaire regarding the family institution.

The measurement scale for the statements with the exception of question 2 [child presence] consists of five choices, 1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = disagree, and 5 = strongly disagree. For statements 1, (specialized roles), 4 (suffering), and 5 (housewifely wish), a higher score (i.e., disagreeing) represents more liberal (or gender-neutral or gender-egalitarian, but called "liberal" throughout the paper) attitudes. Agreement with statements 3 (contribution), 6 (one parent), and 7 (cohabitation) represents more liberal, and the scale was reversed in the analysis to make the high scores consistently representing liberal attitudes across the six questions. Furthermore, the five categories were collapsed into three, with "strongly agree" combined with "agree" and "strongly disagree" combined with "disagree."

For each of these six statements, although another response category ("cannot choose") was given in the questionnaire, some refused to answer; on average, approximately 1% of the respondents had either of these two responses. For the analysis, which treats each statement separately, the undecided responses of "cannot choose" and refusal to answer were assigned the value of the highest frequency for the corresponding statement in each country. These cases of undecided responses were not excluded from the analysis in order to maintain the consistent sample across the seven statements of gender-role attitudes. The preliminary analysis with and without those estimated values produced virtually identical results.

The second question asks what is the best role arrangement in the presence of a child under school age, and has a unique scale which consists of seven categories: (1) The mother stays at home and the father works full-time, (2) The mother works part-time and the father works full-time, (3) Both the mother and the father work full-time, (4) Both the mother and the father work part-time, (5) The father works



Fig. 4.1 Attitudes toward seven aspects of gender roles and family institution (percentages)

Table 4.2 Results from ordered logit analysis: bivariate and multivariate models

	Specialized gender roles		Work-family with young child[a]		Contribute to family income		Family life suffers		Women want home		One parent can be effective		All right to cohabit	
Bivariate analysis (Model 1)														
	b		b		b		b		b		b		b	
Country														
China	−0.39	**	0.27	^	1.04	**	1.14	**	−1.16	**	−0.91	**	−0.26	**
Taiwan	0.09		0.03		0.91	**	2.30	**	−1.37	**	0.81	**	0.89	**
Japan	0.46	**	−0.78	**	−0.77	**	1.35	**	0.09		0.02		1.19	**
(Korea)														
Pseudo R^2	0.01		0.01		0.07		0.08		0.06		0.05		0.05	
Multivariate analysis (Model 2)														
	b		b		b		b		b		b		b	
Country														
China	−0.14		0.49	**	1.02	**	1.30	**	−0.93	**	−0.80	**	−0.10	
Taiwan	0.18	^	0.08		0.89	**	2.35	**	−1.34	**	0.81	**	0.98	**
Japan	0.46	**	−0.79	**	−0.79	**	1.34	**	0.08		0.02		1.25	**
(Korea)														
Gender (female)														
Male	−0.34	**	0.11		−0.34	**	0.00		−0.28	**	−0.35	**	0.21	**
Age (25–44)														
Age 45–54	−0.06		0.03		0.21	*	0.17	*	−0.07		0.07		−0.72	**

(continued)

Table 4.2 (continued)

	Specialized gender roles		Work-family with young child[a]		Contribute to family income		Family life suffers		Women want home		One parent can be effective		All right to cohabit	
Education														
Less than HS	−1.10	**	−0.84	**	0.35	**	−0.50	**	−1.04	**	−0.07		−0.42	**
High school	−0.50	**	−0.71	**	0.41	**	−0.26	**	−0.61	**	−0.05		−0.07	
Some college	−0.34	**	−0.32	*	0.15		−0.12		−0.42	**	−0.08		0.00	
(College+)														
Marital status (Married)														
Previously married	−0.05		0.29		0.01		−0.25	^	0.03		0.47	**	0.55	**
Never married	0.09		0.15		0.23	*	0.23	*	0.20	*	0.63	**	0.33	**
Pseudo R^2	0.03		0.03		0.08		0.08		0.07		0.06		0.07	
Number of cases	3,534		3,303		3,534		3,534		3,534		3,534		3,534	

Refer to the text for the full questions and response categories

[a]The analysis is from the binomial logit where 0 = father works fulltime, 1 = else, excluding the cases of undecided attitudes

^ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

part-time and the mother works full-time, (6) The father stays at home and the mother works full-time, and (7) cannot choose. To reflect the whole spectrum of the attitudes, the scale is used as is, with the exception that categories 5 and 6 are combined due to their minimal percentages, where the mother works full-time and the father either stays at home or works part-time. While one may consider the scale as representing a conservative-liberal continuum in the multivariate analysis, it actually does not. The categories where both spouses are working, either full-time or part-time, should not be considered more conservative than the category where only the mother works full-time.

The descriptive statistics present the distributions of the gender-role items separately for the four societies (Fig. 4.1) and the independent variables (Table 4.1). The results from the ordered logit analysis present the cross-country variation in attitudes after controlling for age, gender, marital status, and educational attainment in Table 4.2.

4.5 Findings

4.5.1 Bivariate Analysis: Attitudes Toward Gender Roles Among the Four Societies

The findings in Fig. 4.1 reveal an interesting uniqueness in each country, but before exploring country-specific details, a summary of the findings is presented here here: (1) as expected, the country differentials in attitudes toward the component dimensions of gender roles are not always consistent with the patterns shown in their attitudes toward the global measure of specialized gender roles; (2) paramount expectations about male breadwinning are more or less universal across the four societies; (3) on the other hand, expectations about women's contributions to family incomes vary more widely among the four societies, which indicates that perceptions about income-earning roles by the two genders are rather independent of each other; (4) the paramount expectations about male breadwinner roles may coexist with expectations about (or confidence in) male homemaking roles in some societies, notably in Taiwan, (5) likewise, female homemaking roles are not necessarily perceived as complementary to (or as a substitute for) female income-earning roles; some societies (China and Taiwan) endorse both; and (6) neutral positions (i.e., neither agreeing nor disagreeing) seem to convey a distinctive attitude rather than representing a medium level of liberal or conservative attitudes; neutrality appears to mean leaving the decision to the individual couples without imposing any norms onto them, as prominently shown among the Japanese.

In sum, while male breadwinning is the unshakable norm across the societies, expectations regarding other components may differ across the four societies to a variable degree. For all seven crosstabs shown in Fig. 4.1, chi-square tests were

significant and the following discussions will focus on the cells whose adjusted z-scores were significant (tests not shown).

Specialized Gender Roles: For the global measure, on average in the four societies, one half disagrees with the statement, and the other half is roughly equally divided into agreeing with the statement and being neutral (Fig. 4.1). The percentage disagreeing with the statement is highest in Japan, followed by Taiwan, Korea, and China. The percentage agreeing with the specialized gender roles is lowest in Japan, corresponding to the highest percentage of disagreement among the four societies. The percentage expressing a neutral position is lower in Taiwan than in any other society. Putting it all together, an interesting pattern emerges: the average attitude is most liberal in Japan, yet this country also has the highest percentage expressing a neutral position. A majority of Taiwanese people are liberal but one-third of them are conservative, leaving only a few Taiwanese expressing a neutral position. Chinese urbanites are most conservative among the four societies, and the Koreans occupy the middle ground in their attitudes. These findings may mean that gender role attitudes are most liberal in Japan, followed by Taiwan, Korea, and China. However, the responses to the remaining questions will show that the picture is more complex than that.

Work-Family Organization in the Presence of a Child: The next question is regarding the best arrangement of work and family life in the presence of a young child. This is a question for a specific period of the family lifecycle, and the answers may not be considered relevant to families at different stages. However, the attitudes shown in this question may reflect the most fundamental beliefs about gender roles, whether there are true gaps between what the mothers and fathers can do best.

Across the four societies, an absolute majority (approximately 80%) favors the father working full-time and the mother not working or working part-time (Fig. 4.1). Nearly no one (less than one in hundred) favors the mother working full-time and the father not working or working part-time. On average, approximately one in ten (a little more in China and Taiwan and a little less in Japan and Korea) favors both spouses working full-time. As much as 17% of Japanese respondents answer they cannot choose, which is much higher than 8, 4, and 0% in China, Taiwan, and Korea, respectively (because of these high percentages, the category was retained in the analysis). Such a high percentage of undecided respondents in Japan seem to indicate the Japanese' propensity to not impose any fixed norms upon others, but to allow individual spouses to choose their own arrangements. This suggests that, relatively speaking, the Japanese may be more individualists rather than more liberal or gender-egalitarian. Overall, this question on work-family arrangement in the presence of a young child strongly reflects the persistent expectations about men as the primary breadwinners.

Female Contribution to Family Incomes: Given the overwhelming support for the male breadwinner role, the statement, "whether both genders should contribute to the household income," is a good measure of expectations about the female income earning role. Contrary to the patterns shown in earlier questions, answers to this question divide the countries into two distinctive groups, ethnic Chinese and non-Chinese societies. In China and Taiwan, a vast majority (more than 80%) agree

with the statement, whereas only 43% in Japan and 63% in Korea agree. Again, the percentage of respondents who choose a neutral position is the largest in Japan at 36%, as compared to 25% in Korea, the next largest percentage among the four societies. The percentage disagreeing with the statement is also the largest in Japan, larger than in other societies by 10 or more percentage points. Through the attitudes shown so far, Japan stands out as a country with the individualist perspective, i.e., reluctant to impose any normative prescriptions on others and mandating neither homemaker nor income-earner roles to women.

Meanwhile, a strong endorsement of women's income-earning roles in China and Taiwan is noteworthy, given their considerably different attitudes toward specialized gender roles. The data suggest that even some of those who agreed with or were neutral about specialized gender roles agree with women's obligation to contribute to the family income across the societies, but particularly in China. This apparent contradiction in people's attitudes may result from their beliefs that specialized gender roles are ideals but reality requires women to play a role at least as secondary income earners, or that women should perform the homemaker role even when they work for incomes, i.e., doing the "second shift". Or, people may believe that women should contribute to the family income in other ways than being employed (as the statement does not specify how women should contribute to incomes), e.g., by investing the family wealth wisely to reap a profit or by assisting the husbands to earn higher incomes (although this explanation is rather implausible).

Family Life Suffers: The question on whether family life suffers when the woman (supposedly, the wife or the mother) has a full-time job explores the perceptions about the homemaking role of the wife as well as the husband. The question inquires whether the reduced amount of housework or childcare done by women due to their employment can be replaced by the increased housework by the husbands, other family/kin members, or purchased services. Thus, the answers may be partly affected by the market or social circumstances regarding the availability and the price of services (e.g., food or laundry services, etc.) and kinship support (e.g., grandparents' childcare, etc.), but it is largely affected by the beliefs about the husband's contribution to homemaking.

Taiwan and Korea stand out with regard to this question; a vast majority of Taiwanese disagree with the statement, whereas a majority of Koreans agree with it. If we assume that the availability of non-spousal services is roughly equal in the two societies, this contrast is noteworthy. Korea was ranked in the middle of the countries regarding liberal (or conservative) attitudes toward specialized gender roles and women's contribution to the family income, but here they are most deeply convinced of the irreplaceability of women's homemaking roles. Taiwanese people seem to trust men's participation in and capability of doing housework. In this question, the Chinese again diverge from the Taiwanese, with a relatively large percentage agreeing with the idea that family life will suffer when the woman works full-time. Chinese urbanites seem to believe men would neither participate in homemaking nor do it well (as much as Taiwanese men). Based on the questions thus far, the finding of relative conservatism (except for expectations about

women's income-earning roles) is surprising in socialist China, but consistent with the literature (Shu and Zhu 2012).

Japan, again, marks the highest proportion of respondents who take a neutral position, expressing neither agreement nor disagreement, and reiterates their individualist perspectives (as if to say that it is the couple's decision). Classifying the responses into a binary mode of agree/disagree or liberal/conservative, as in Yamaguchi (2000) and Lee et al. (2010), may cause one to overlook this key characteristic of the Japanese.

What Women Want: The FCGR survey includes a question, "A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children." This is the second question related to the homemaking roles among women, and the two questions together provide deeper insights into people's belief system. This question again divides the sample into two distinct groups, ethnic Chinese and non-Chinese societies; however, at first look, the answers appear to be contradictory to the attitudes shown so far, in particular to the attitudes toward women's contribution to the family income. A surprising majority (about two-thirds) of respondents in both China and Taiwan agree with the statement, whereas less than one-third of Japanese and Korean respondents agree. Remember that a vast majority of Chinese and Taiwanese respondents advocated for women's contribution to the family income; their approval of the traditional housewife (housewifely wish) coexists with their expectations about female income-earning role (as compared to the Japanese and Koreans).

Pooling together the above answers so far, one may characterize Taiwan as having the most flexible attitudes toward gender roles. They agree with women's desire to be home, yet they perceive women as comparable income earners to men, while rejecting the idea of homemaking as a women-only domain (i.e., rejecting the idea that family life will suffer when the woman works full-time). Chinese respondents express a similar contradictory pattern, with their overwhelming support for both women's economic contribution and the housewifely wish, but are otherwise more conservative and less flexible than the Taiwanese.

Japanese respondents again marked the highest percentage among the four societies in expressing a neutral position, at 42% (in contrast to 16, 9, and 23% in China, Taiwan, and Korea, respectively) confirming once again their individualist orientations, where they are either not daring to talk about what others would do or just not caring about it. Lastly, Koreans appear to feel serious anguish in defining desirable gender roles; they assign homemaking as a female-only domain (i.e., they are most likely to agree that family life will suffer if the woman works full-time), and yet they are least likely to believe that what women really want is a family and a home. Koreans are practically saying that women have to serve the family with their gender-specific capacity even though such homemaking roles are not what they really want and at the same time have to contribute to the family incomes.

One Parent: The question, "One parent can bring up a child as well as two parents together," goes back to the global measure of specialized gender roles, except that there is a slight difference in the nuance (and its scale is also in the reverse direction). To agree with the statement, one must believe that each gender

can perform both the breadwinning and homemaking roles effectively. However, unlike the question on the specialized gender role arrangement, this is not stated in a normative way (i.e., not in the phrase of "one should" or "one would rather") which would make a difference for respondents with individualist attitudes, such as the Japanese. As this statement does not speak for imposing a norm onto others, the answers by individualists may be more true to their own beliefs. Thus, the Japanese who were most liberal (i.e., most likely to disagree with) regarding specialized gender roles, are only the third most likely to agree and the second least likely to disagree with the effectiveness of single parents, although once again they are the most likely to express a neutral position.

As expected from the answers to the above questions, the Taiwanese are more likely to agree and less likely to disagree with the statement than any other nationals by large margins. Chinese respondents are more likely to disagree than any other nationals by wide margins. Koreans rank in-between the Chinese and Taiwanese, with the average score similar to that of the Japanese, although Koreans are slightly more bipolarized than the Japanese.

Cohabitation: The last statement, "It is all right for a couple to live together without intending to get married," measures attitudes toward the marriage institution. The cross-cultural patterns of the answers are more or less consistent with the findings so far: A majority of the Japanese and Taiwanese agree that cohabitation is all right, whereas a majority of the Chinese say it is not all right, and Koreans rank in-between. Stated in a normative expression, Japanese people are again most likely to be non-normative: equally agreeing with the statement as often as the Taiwanese and most likely to take a neutral position. Taiwanese respondents are as likely to agree that cohabitation is all right, but at the same time they are more likely than the Japanese to say it is not all right, with the result that they are the least likely to take a neutral position among the four groups of nationals.

Ranking behind the Taiwanese and Japanese, Koreans are closely aligned with the Chinese in approving cohabitation, with half of them saying it is not all right. For no other question regarding gender roles were the Koreans as comparably conservative as the Chinese. Relatively speaking, Koreans are the "worriers" and seem to be uncomfortable with any type of family or role arrangements. Koreans showed anguish in assigning desirable gender roles and they say cohabitation is unacceptable.

4.6 Bivariate and Multivariate Analysis of Ordered Logit

Results from the ordered logit analyses with the seven ordinal dependent variables are presented in Table 4.2. For each dependent variable, Model 1 refers to the bivariate analysis where the independent variable is country (i.e., country dummies with Korea as the omitted category), and Model 2 refers to the multivariate analysis controlling for age, gender, educational attainment, and marital status. Note that all

the dependent variables were coded in such a way that the higher scores represent more liberal or egalitarian attitudes. By performing two binary comparisons with the assumption of the same coefficients, the ordered logit would not yield the coefficients (for country dummy variables) that reflect the detailed category information shown in Fig. 4.1. Most notably, they do not show which nationals have a high or low concentration in the neutral position.

As such, the results in models 1 should be generally consistent with those in Fig. 4.1, but they should provide a slightly different picture. As shown in Fig. 4.1, the Chinese are significantly more conservative than are the Koreans (omitted category) with regard to specialized gender roles, what women want, effectiveness of single parents, and cohabitation; however, they are more liberal with regard to women's contribution to family income and family suffering when the woman works full time. The Taiwanese are consistently more liberal than, or as liberal as, the Koreans, with the exception of the question on what women want. The Japanese are more liberal than the Koreans with regard to specialized gender roles, work-family arrangement in the presence of a young child, family suffering when the wife works full-time, and cohabitation. When the statement is not phrased in a normative style, the Japanese are as liberal/conservative as Koreans, as shown in the analysis of what women want and effectiveness of single parents. The Japanese are even more likely than the Koreans to be against egalitarian gender roles if the egalitarian ideal is phrased in a normative fashion, as in "both the man and woman should contribute to the household income."

Even after controlling for demographic characteristics of the respondents in Model 2, the cross-country patterns (i.e., the signs and magnitudes of the country coefficients) are very similar to those in Model 1, with the exception that the magnitudes of the coefficients for the urban Chinese increase slightly across the equations and that, as a result, the negative coefficients in two questions (specialized gender roles and cohabitation) are no longer significant. Some additional analysis showed that the differences were mainly due to the effect of education (results not shown) (i.e., their generally lower level of education make Chinese more conservative).

The effects of the control variables are generally consistent with the literature, but are not the focus of this study. Education is an important factor for liberalizing attitudes or allowing for flexible perspectives, although less educated people are more likely to agree with women's contribution to family income. Men are more conservative than women, with the exception of their attitudes on cohabitation. Middle-aged respondents are more liberal than their younger counterparts in terms of women's contribution to family income and family suffering when the wife works full-time, but the reverse is true for cohabitation; with expanding family and work-related life experiences, age may neutralize gender norms in certain aspects (Cunningham 2008). Never-married and previously married respondents tend to be more liberal than the currently married. Additional analysis examined the interaction effects between the country dummies and these control variables, but there were little noticeable findings (results not shown).

4.7 Discussion and Conclusion

The insights gained from the cross-country comparisons may be viewed in two slightly different perspectives: one, focusing on the patterns of four different dimensions and, the other, highlighting the overall country comparisons. With regard to the former, the data confirm the prediction of this study. Male breadwinning is the paramount norm in all four societies, but the expectations regarding the other dimensions (including male homemaking, female contribution to family incomes, and female homemaking) are different among the four societies to variable degrees, perhaps according to their cultural tradition and various institutional arrangements. An exploratory analysis of the FCGR data from approximately thirty countries shows similarly strong expectations about male breadwinning when a child under school age is present, with the exception that a relatively high percentage of Scandinavians favor both parents' working equally, either full-time or part-time.

Regarding country comparisons, there appeared to be interesting patterns. Chinese urbanites are relatively conservative, similar to or slightly less than Koreans in some measures. Chinese conservatism is partly due to their lower educational attainment. It appears that the socialist ideology is not (or is no longer) powerful enough to liberalize gender role norms, but viewed differently, some statements of these gender and family arrangements (such as single parenthood and cohabitation) might be construed as capitalist pathologies. The Chinese are most likely to advocate for both spouses' working full-time (in the presence of a young child) although the magnitude differences from the other countries are not large. One noticeable finding is their similarity with the Taiwanese in two distinctive aspects: people in the two societies overwhelmingly agree that both the man and the woman should contribute to the family income even while they agree that what most women really want is a home and children. Ethnic Chinese people may share some historical lessons revering familial yet economically productive women.

Taiwan stands out in the "flexibility" of their attitudes toward gender roles, even with the presence of a minority opposing the view. With their generally flexible attitudes endorsing comparable roles for the two genders, their overwhelming approval of the housewifely wish seems to be a part of their flexible or accommodating attitudes. In Taiwan, a vast majority (as in China) agree that both the man and the woman should contribute to the household income, three quarters (a much higher proportion than in any other country) disagree that family life would suffer if the woman had a full-time job, nearly two-thirds (again, by far the highest proportion) agree that one parent can bring up a child as well as two parents together, and more than half (as in Japan) agreed that it is all right for a couple to live together without intending to get married. Accordingly, more than half disagree with the specialized gender roles. One may speculate that such flexibility originates from their social environments, including the tradition of extended families (where family relations are characterized as less hierarchical than in the stem families of Japan or Korea), the contemporary economic trait of a large share of family

businesses where the wife's contribution is common, and the relatively high rates of women's labor force participation.

The Japanese are as liberal as the Taiwanese in some questions, but it is apparent that they are taking "individualist" stances, i.e., refusing to endorse any normative commands or to impose them onto others. Japanese respondents are most likely to choose the neutral position of neither agreeing nor disagreeing with a statement across the questions, and are more likely to disagree if the statement was phrased in a normative style (in the relative sense among the four societies). For the two statements phrased in a rather factual style, effectiveness of single parenthood and the housewifely wish, they are no more liberal than Koreans, but are only more liberal than Chinese urbanites. In short, compared to the other nationals, Japanese people appear to be more liberal, but they are not necessarily more likely to believe in the equality of the two genders.

Koreans may be characterized as "worriers" or "pessimists." A majority of them agree that family life will suffer if the woman has a full-time job, where the percentage in agreement is higher than the country that is second highest in agreement by more than 20% points, yet only a third agree that what women really want is a home. Furthermore, they are generally against specialized gender roles and believe that women should contribute to family incomes. In addition, Koreans feel that it is not all right to cohabit, and they are bipolarized with regard to the effectiveness of single parents. Koreans seem to be torn between the traditional model of the women's familial roles (which, they seem to believe, only women can do) and the model of egalitarian roles (which, they seem to believe, a majority of women really want). Accordingly, (in the presence of a young child) the percentage supporting women's in-between arrangement, i.e., part-time employment, is the largest in Korea than in any other society.

It appears that Korea is going through a rather turbulent process of attitudinal transformations toward gender roles. Gaps between economic stagnation in recent decades and people's obsession with upward mobility inherited from the earlier decades, and between aspirations for equality among social groups and widening inequality might be among the factors behind both outcomes. It is known that conflicting social and economic policies, including relaxation of the labor laws to allow a large share of non-regular employment among the workforce and the following welfare policies intended to ameliorate the insecure labor-market positions of male breadwinners by providing public support for childcare and early childhood education, have created a confusing social environment in Korea since the 1990s (Peng 2011). One may wonder if such social displacement also has anything to do with Korea's highest suicide rate among OECD countries.

To conclude, gender roles may be roughly disaggregated into four dimensions: breadwinning and homemaking by each of the two genders. The typical attitudinal measure describing specialized roles for the two genders (a man's job is to earn money and a woman's job is to look after the home and family) encompasses all four dimensions and is based on an implicit yet strong assumption that the four dimensions co-vary with one another. Disagreeing with the statement is often regarded as endorsing equal or comparable roles for the two genders, even though

respondents may disagree (or agree) with the statement for different reasons. This study explored the multidimensionality of gender role attitudes. The FCGR survey conducted in 2012, under the coordination of ISSP, provided perfect data. The sample in this study was restricted to men and women aged 25–54, who are likely in the stages of childbearing and rearing, as their attitudes would matter most for the quality of life among the families.

The paramount expectations about male breadwinning are noteworthy, while expectations about the other three dimensions vary more widely among the four societies. The findings from the four East Asian societies strongly reflect the complexity in gender role attitudes across the four dimensions and across the response categories beyond the mean scores. These findings suggest that placing societies, or individuals for that matter, along the linear continuum from conservative to liberal attitudes would lead to a reductionist fallacy and to a potentially misleading conclusion. Furthermore, for an elaboration, the four dimensions may be further differentiated; for example, homemaking may be divided into childcare and housework. For now, the four dimensions were fairly informative, enough to demonstrate the need for considering the complexity of gender-roles attitudes. Rejecting the simple linearity of gender-role attitudes must be an important step toward understanding the variable paces of attitudinal changes, including when they stall.

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Chapter 5
Moral Beliefs About Filial Support, Work and Gender in Japan: A Latent Class Analysis

Thijs van den Broek and Makiko Morita

Abstract For decades, Japanese governments have grappled with the issue how to formulate a policy response to population ageing and the rising need for long-term care. Public opinion can determine the borders to which reforms are feasible, but opinions about care for older persons have become increasingly diffuse during the second half of the twentieth century. We conduct latent class regression analyses on Japanese Generations and Gender Survey data (n = 8,636) to identify moral beliefs about care for older people. Taking multiple dimensions—filial support, work and gender—into account conjointly, we identify three clearly distinct ideals. In the *patriarchal high family responsibility* ideal, it is deemed the responsibility of the eldest sons to make sure that parents are cared for. Daughters are expected to take on the bulk of the care tasks and paid work is deemed primarily a task for men. In the *gender egalitarian low family responsibility* ideal, neither eldest sons, nor daughters are considered to carry substantial caring responsibility. Upward intergenerational support is expected to be financial, rather than instrumental and paid work is considered a task for women as well as men. In the *neutral* ideal, people tend to be rather reserved about issues regarding filial norms, work and gender. Adherence to the gender egalitarian low family responsibility ideal is strong among women, the young and the highly educated. Men, older persons and people with lower levels of education are, in turn, relatively likely to adhere to the patriarchal high family responsibility ideal.

Keywords Care ideals · Filial norms · Intergenerational support · Gender · Family · Japan

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5.1 Introduction

In the globally ageing world, Japan is the most aged nation, with the population aged 65+ accounting for 26.7% (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2015; cf. OECD 2014). In contrast to other countries with ageing populations, not only rural, but also urban communities are ageing in Japan (Muramatsu and Akiyama 2011). This makes the care for older people an urgent and prioritized issue on socio-economic and socio-political agendas (Tanaka and Johnson 2008). In 2000, the long-term care insurance scheme (LTCI) was implemented, with the objective to 'socialize care responsibilities' and not leave them to the family (Tsutui and Muramatsu 2007). However, the growing pressures on public expenditures and funding led the government to undertake several reforms in the following years, which resulted in tightened eligibility criteria and increased user fees (Hayashi 2013). Some scholars perceive these reforms since 2000 as a trend of 'refamilialization' (Fujisaki 2009).

Public opinion can determine the borders to which reforms are feasible (Svallfors 2010), particularly for policy issues that are considered highly salient (Burstein 2003). However, moral beliefs about care for older persons have in Japan become increasingly diffuse. In the first half of the twentieth century, older individuals were typically cared for by their eldest son—with whom they tended to share a household—and his wife and children (Koyano 2003). This is no longer self-evident, however. Since WW II, historical and demographic changes in Japanese society have led to tensions on the question where the morality of care should belong (Tanaka and Johnson 2008).

Our aim is to shed light on moral beliefs among the Japanese population about care for older persons. Drawing on the work of Hochschild (1995), we conceptualize such moral beliefs as images that reflect different models deemed ideal. Moral beliefs about how care should be organized can only be grasped when the various dimensions on which these models vary are jointly assessed. We conduct latent class regression analyses on Japanese Generations and Gender Survey data (1) to distinguish moral beliefs about care for older persons and (2) to identify socio-demographic characteristics that predict holding specific moral beliefs. The current study is, to our best knowledge, the first attempt to identify such moral beliefs and their antecedents among the Japanese population. Given that the nature of our research aims is exploratory, we refrain from formulating explicit hypotheses.

5.2 Moral Beliefs About Care for Older Persons

Hochschild (1995) has argued that moral beliefs with regard to how care ought to be organized are best perceived as images that reflect distinct models of care. These distinct ideal models can only be understood when the various dimensions on which

they vary are assessed jointly. In this paper, we specifically focus on the dimensions of (1) filial support, i.e. the support that adult children are expected to provide to ageing parents, (2) work and (3) gender. From Hochschild's work, it can be derived that the level of family responsibility versus the level of responsibility assigned to the state is of a key dimension of moral beliefs about care for older persons. With regard to the responsibility of the family, gender is an additional dimension that needs to be taken into account. This is because what is expected of daughters with regard to caregiving often does not mirror what is expected of sons (cf. Finch and Mason, 1991; Van den Broek et al. 2015). From Hochschild's work it can furthermore be derived that beliefs about the division of paid work are inherently linked to beliefs about how older persons should be supported.

Hochschild (1995) proposed a typology of four so-called care ideals. People adhering to the *traditional* care ideal believe that it is the task of, particularly female, family members to provide care to those in need. They perceive the state as an entity with only a very limited caring responsibility. This ideal fits with the male breadwinner model, in which men are active in paid work and women are relegated to the domestic sphere where they take on unpaid care tasks. The *cold-modern* care ideal, in contrast, fits with a dual breadwinner model. In this ideal, family caregiving is undesirable, because women and men are expected to focus fully on a career in paid labor. People adhering to a cold-modern care ideal believe that the state should take away the need for family members to provide care by providing care services for those in need. Hochschild also described a *warm-modern* care ideal in which the care for those in need is a joint responsibility of the family and the state. The fourth and last care ideal distinguished by Hochschild is the *post-modern* care ideal. Here, it is an individual responsibility to have care needs met and neither the state nor the family carries a large responsibility towards those in need.

Hochschild (1995) has explicitly stated that her essay concerned the case of the United States and that "[further] research may uncover rough parallels between the American case and that of the countries of Western Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan" (p. 333). Recently, scholars have largely validated Hochschild's typology in Western Europe (Van den Broek et al. 2015). Similar attempts to explore moral beliefs in Japan about how care for older persons should be organized have, to our best knowledge, not been undertaken thus far. This is unfortunate, given that, as Hochschild explicitly acknowledged (1995, pp. 333–334), Japan's case can be expected to differ substantially from Western contexts. In addition, moral beliefs about care for older persons have, as we will elaborate later, arguably become increasingly diffuse in Japan since WW II. As Koyano (2003) has stated, "the ideal way of family life in old age was clearly defined and institutionalized in the first half of the twentieth century, [but] it is quite ambiguous now" (p. 281).

5.3 Family Structures in Prewar Japan

In the first half of the twentieth century, the bulk of care for older persons in need was provided within families, typically by coresiding eldest sons. As Nishikawa (2000) has noted, family should be understood as a social institution in order to understand its role and functions in the modernization process of Japan. The notion of the nation state was adapted from the Western world, and the family was constructed as a societal unit under the idea of the nation state. Within the family registration system implemented during the *Meiji* era (1868–1912), the so-called '*Ie* system', the head of *Ie* was obligated to protect and support the family members. It is generally understood that the creation of *Ie* as a legal unit resulted in shaping a clear idea about roles of family among Japanese citizens, and that it, as a consequence, formed a particular moral belief of familial care and support.

Nishikawa (2000) has emphasized the importance of understanding *Ie* together with the concept of *Katei*, which has been used as Japanese equivalent to the English word, home. According to her, there were two institutions of family; *Ie* and *Katei*. She argues that *Katei* was an important form of family as well as *Ie* even though the position of *Katei* was not legally defined as *Ie* in the family registration system.

The noteworthy difference between *Ie* and *Katei* is the nature of the relationship amongst the family members. The core relationship of *Ie* is a vertical relationship of parents and children where a family existing at a given moment in time is perceived as small link in a long chain of lineage. The powerful position of household head belongs to the father, with the eldest son being his successor. By contrast, the horizontal couple relationship is a basis for *Katei*. *Ie* was inherited by the eldest sons, whereas the other younger sons from the same *Ie* each started their own *Katei*. Nishikawa has termed the coexistence of *Ie* and *Katei* in the prewar era as the dual structure of family. *Ie* embodied the multiple generational families where older parents live with oldest sons and their wives whereas *Katei* was the nuclear families of the parents' other children and their offspring. Unlike the vertical *Ie*, the horizontal *Katei* was not legally defined. *Katei* was a part of the *Ie* in the family registration system but in reality, they often created a separate household and lived individually.

Following the idea of *Ie*, eldest sons who succeeded their fathers as household heads had many moral obligations to their parents, including the obligation to provide support if need be (Koyano 1996; Tanaka and Johnson 2008), whereas the head of *Kateis* also helped their parents—or younger siblings if they cohabitated—financially when possible. In turn, *Ie* helped *Katei* too when *Katei* had difficulties in financial and material ways (Nishikawa 2000). On the one hand, support and protection within families were institutionalized, and the *Ie* system clearly prescribed family life in old age. On the other hand, the *Ie* system divided children of older parents into a main provider of care, namely the eldest son, and the others, e.g. younger brothers who formed a new family and sisters who were regarded to become a part of their husbands' families after marriage. Thus, the caring role for

older parents was clear to the eldest son who inherited *Ie*, but not so clear to the other siblings. Consequently, taking care of older parents under the same roof was not such a common experience among the Japanese population as it is commonly perceived to be; the majority of children did not experience it (Ueno 2011).

5.4 The Emergence and Construction of Gendered Division of Work

The *Ie* system was abolished after the civil law was revised in 1947 (Ueno 2011). However, the norm of patriarchal ideology remained to some extent and new, clearly defined gender roles within the married couple subsequently emerged. In the prewar period, women were regarded to be inferior to men, and did not have the same rights as men. However, there was not an explicitly gendered division of work between them associated to the dichotomy of public and private spheres. That is, among other things, a postwar feature of gender relations (Ochiai 1997).

Ochiai and Joshita (2014) have shown how gender roles were perceived by the prime ministers in Japan in the postwar period. Their study revealed the complex process of constructing the 'tradition' of family and gender relations where women are considered a provider of unpaid work inside house including care for older parents and men are supposed to work outside as a main breadwinner. As many scholars have noted, this family model was considered 'ideal' in most Western societies as well, and this is certainly not a particular tradition of Japan. However, such family and gender relations were constructed to be 'tradition' in the policy making process (Ochiai and Joshita 2014). Some may speculate that the emergence of 'traditional family' was influenced by the *Ie* system as it contributed to impose a certain type of family norm, but gender roles attached to the clear separation of public and private spheres were not necessarily one of the conditions for families associated with the *Ie* ideology (Nishikawa 2000). Interestingly, the female labour force participation rate in Japan had been higher than in many of Western countries until the beginning of 1970s (Economic Planning Agency of Japan 1997; Ochiai and Joshita 2014).

Ochiai and Joshita (2014) call the tendency of seeing the male breadwinner family orientation as a unique characteristic of Japanese families, the 'traditionalization of modernity'. What is remarkable about Japan is not the family orientation where women were main providers, but that the Japanese government has deliberately maintained the policies and systems on the basis of the male breadwinner family model. Most Western societies have, in contrast, departed from such a model, and started to focus more on the equality and equity between men and women with regard to rights and obligations.

In postwar Japan, the patriarchal ideology and male breadwinner family orientations have normatively coexisted. The patriarchal ideology has brought about expectations that adult children provide care for older parents, and the male

breadwinner family ideology has contributed to leaving instrumental care work to women. Conservative elites have made efforts to maintain the family orientation, for instance by keeping the supply of care services low and by providing benefits to dependent housewives (Tanaka and Johnson 2008). In fact, the special tax deduction scheme (*Haigusha tokubetsu koujo*), which discourages housewives to work full time, is still in force.

There are, on the other hand, some indications of changes in the roles of the family. With regard to care for older people, the implementation of the long-term care insurance system in 2000 embodied a social consensus that care for older people is not the family's responsibility, even though care for older parents never formally was the responsibility of children under the postwar family law (Ueno 2011). This sign of significant change is perhaps still wobbly, given that emphasis on the roles of family has been recurrent in the policy debate, and that recent reforms have arguably refamilialized long-term care to some extent (Fujisaki 2009).

Unlike in the prewar period, the roles of family in terms of care for its older members are vague in the contemporary Japan. They are not as explicitly defined in the laws or regulations as they used to, but there are institutionalized expectations towards family in addition to cultural norms formed through those institutions. However, the demographic structure and the meaning of family have been rapidly changing, and 'family' may not have a shape to meet the expectations any longer. Thus, we attempt to explore what the gap between socio-political expectations and the reality of family and gender relations has brought to moral beliefs about filial support, work and gender.

5.5 Method

The aim of the current study is to identify moral beliefs about how care for older people should be organized. As does Hochschild (1995), we perceive such beliefs as multidimensional images. These images are unobserved, however. In other words, they cannot be measured directly. Here we operationalize them as a latent categorical variable that underlies persons' observed answering patterns on a range of manifest items, i.e. survey questions. To distinguish the various latent categories, we conduct latent class analyses (LCA) (cf. McCutcheon 1987; Hagenaars and Halman 1989). In later models we include covariates. Like the manifest items used to distinguish the various latent moral beliefs, these covariates are observed. Their function is different, however. We include the covariates in the model to shed light on the personal characteristics that are associated with holding specific moral beliefs, rather than for the purpose of determining which different moral beliefs exist.

We estimate our models using the poLCA package in R (Linzer and Lewis 2010). This package uses the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm (see Dempster et al. 1977). Depending upon the initial parameter values chosen in the first iteration, the EM algorithm may only find a local rather than the global

maximum of the log-likelihood function (McLachlan and Krishnan 1997). Therefore, we estimate each model 500 times with different starting values and assume that the best local maximum is the global maximum.

We first estimate a two class model without covariates and keep adding classes until the addition of a class does not improve the model fit. Whether or not the addition of a class improves the model fit is determined by comparing the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) scores of the model with the added class and the previously best fitting model (Schwarz 1978). After determining the optimal number of classes, we estimate a model with this number of classes again, but this time we allow the prior probabilities of membership for each latent class to vary as a function of a set of observed covariates (Linzer and Lewis 2010). This allows us to assess which characteristics are associated with holding specific moral beliefs about filial support, work and gender.

Predicting class-membership can be done in a multi-step or in a one-step approach. In the former, predicted scores on the latent categorical variable are calculated and these scores are subsequently treated as observed dependent variables in a multinomial or binary logistic regression model predicting class membership. In the latter approach the coefficients of the covariates are estimated simultaneously as part of the latent class model. We choose to use this one-step approach, because bias in the coefficient estimates is lower than with the multi-step approach (Bolck et al. 2004). A disadvantage of the one-step approach is that we can only include a limited number of covariates before our models become unidentified. The number of covariates that can be included depends on the number latent classes, the number of manifest variables and the number of these variables' categories (Linzer and Lewis 2010).

5.6 Data

Our data are from the Japanese version of the Generations and Gender Survey (for more information, see www.ggp-i.org). The Japanese GGS is a mail survey about family and daily life conditions. It was collected in 2005. The Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare has funded the survey. It is based on a national two-stage stratified probability sample of Japanese men and women aged 18–69: 530 localities were randomly selected and for each of these localities, between 25 and 39 individuals aged 18–69 were randomly selected. A survey was sent to 15,000 men and women. The response rate was 60% (n = 9,074). After list-wise deletion of respondents with missing values on any variable of our interest a final sample of n = 8,636 remained.

5.7 Measures

5.7.1 Manifest Items

As described above, the moral beliefs about care for older persons in which we are interested are not observed. We try to distinguish these latent moral beliefs by analyzing answering patterns on four manifest or observed items. These items capture the various dimensions on which we expect moral beliefs about care for older persons to vary. As an indicator for the extent to which respondents expect that eldest sons carry responsibility for care provision, we use the statement "It is the eldest son's duty to look after his parents". We used the statement "When parents are in need, daughters should take more caring responsibility than sons" to capture the extent to which the respondent expects daughters to take on care tasks. The extent to which children are expected to provide financial support to parents in need is captured with the statement "Adult children should provide financial help for their parents when the parents are having financial difficulties". The final dimension we take into account is the extent to which the respondent believes that the sphere of paid work should be gendered. To capture this dimension, we use the statement "When jobs are scarce, men should have a priority for a job over women."

For each of the statements, respondents could indicate whether they (1) strongly agreed, (2) agreed, (3) neither agreed, nor disagreed, (4) disagreed, or (5) strongly disagreed. As is commonly done in studies using LCA, we collapsed response categories so that the number of cells in our data matrix remained manageable (cf. Hagenaars and Halman 1989; Hogan et al. 1993; Van den Broek et al. 2015). Although this procedure implies a loss of information, data would become unacceptably sparse if we would use all response categories (cf. Van Gaalen and Dykstra 2006). For each statement we created a categorical variable with three categories instead of the original five. Respondents who "disagreed" or "strongly disagreed" with the statement were assigned to the first category, those who "neither agreed, nor disagreed" were assigned to the second category and those who "agreed" or "strongly agreed" were assigned to the third category.

5.7.2 Covariates

With the aim of identifying antecedents of holding specific moral beliefs about care for older persons, we included a range of manifest covariates in later models. These covariates are known antecedents of normative beliefs about care for older persons (e.g. Dykstra and Fokkema 2012; Gans and Silverstein 2006; Ogawa and Retherford 1993; Van den Broek et al. 2015). As described above, only a limited number of covariates can be included, given the simultaneous estimation of classes and class membership (see Linzer and Lewis 2010).

We included a dummy variable for gender, coded as 1 for women and 0 for men. The values on the variable age were centered on the mean. In addition, we estimated models where age squared was included to assess whether the effects of age on the log odds of adherence to specific care ideals were curvilinear, rather than linear.

In our models, we made a three category distinction according to the level of urbanization of the respondent's place of residence. The first category consisted of respondents who lived in the one of the following major cities: Tokyo, Yokohama, Kawasaki, Kyoto, Chiba, Osaka or Kitakyushu. Respondents who reported living in other cities were assigned to the second category and those who reported living in rural areas made up the third category.

We also made a distinction between three levels of education. Respondents who had no more than a high school diploma were coded as being lower educated. Those with a vocational or junior college degree were coded as having an intermediate level of education and respondents with at least a degree from a four year college education were coded as higher educated.

Employment status was measured with a dummy variable coded 1 for those who reported that the status "employed or self-employed" best characterized their activity status. Respondents who picked any of the alternative statuses were coded as 0: "helping family member in a family business or farm", "unemployed", "student, in school, in vocational training", "retired", "on maternity leave, parental leave or childcare leave", "ill, disabled for a long time or permanently", "looking after home or family", "in military service or social service" or "other".

We furthermore included a dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent had any children. Another dummy variable was included to capture whether or not the respondent was in the so-called Omega position within families (Hagestad 1988), i.e. whether both parents had passed away. A final dummy captured whether any living parent was coping with a limitation or disability. Table 5.1 provides an overview of descriptive statistics of our covariates.

5.8 Results

A comparison of Bayesian Information Criterion scores of LCA-models without covariates indicated that the model fit was optimal with a three class model.[1] A similar comparison indicated that a three class model with covariates fitted the data best when the effects of age were specified as curvilinear, rather than linear, i.e. when age squared was included in the model.[2]

[1]BIC scores of empty models with two, three and four classes were, respectively, 63,251.4, 62,654.8, and 62,663.4.

[2]BIC scores of the models with and without age squared were, respectively, 61,966.1 and 61,988.3.

Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics

Variable	Share/mean
Woman	52.9%
Mean age[a] (Standard deviation)	47.1 (14.3)
Level of urbanization:	
Major city	13.3%
Other city	66.2%
Rural area	20.5%
Educational attainment:	
Low	55.0%
Medium	24.0%
High	21.1%
Employed	69.4%
Has children	74.3%
Both parents deceased	27.1%
At least one parent has limitation/disability	11.5%

Source Generations and Gender Survey Japan 2005; n = 8,636;
[a]Values represent scores before mean centering

Estimated conditional probabilities of scores on our manifest variables for all three distinguished latent classes are presented in Table 5.2. To enable comparison of these response probabilities with the overall distribution of response scores, descriptive statistics of the observed responses on the manifest items for the total sample are presented in the column labeled "observed overall".

Persons in the first latent class have a response pattern that fits with what we label a *patriarchal high family responsibility* ideal. They are relatively likely to agree with the statement that it is the eldest son's duty to look after his parents (54%) and very unlikely to disagree with it (9%). They are also relatively likely to agree (35%) and relatively unlikely to disagree (13%) with the statement that daughters should take more caring responsibility than sons when parents are in need. Furthermore, they are highly likely to believe that adult children should help their parents financially if need be (77%), and also have a strong tendency to agree with the statement that men should have a priority for a job over women when jobs are scarce (80%).

The response pattern of persons in the second latent class is in stark contrast with that of those in the first latent class. It reflects what we label a *gender egalitarian low family responsibility* ideal. Persons in this class are relatively unlikely to agree with the statement that it is the eldest son's duty to look after his parents (19%) and relatively likely to disagree with it (38%). They are highly likely to disagree (50%) with the statement that daughters should take more caring responsibility than sons when parents are in need, but they have a strong tendency to agree with the statement that adult children should provide financial help for their parents when the parents are having financial difficulties (72%). Finally, they have a high

Table 5.2 Estimated class-conditional response probabilities

			Latent classes		
Statement	Response	Observed overall (%)	Patriarchal high family responsibility (%)	Gender egalitarian low family responsibility (%)	Neutral (%)
It is eldest son's duty to look after his parents	(strongly) Disagree	15	9	38	7
	Neither agree nor disagree	51	38	42	64
	(strongly) Agree	34	54	19	29
Daughters should take more caring responsibility than sons	(strongly) Disagree	18	13	50	4
	Neither agree nor disagree	64	52	38	87
	(strongly) Agree	18	35	13	9
Adult children should provide financial help for their parents	(strongly) Disagree	5	5	8	3
	Neither agree nor disagree	30	18	21	44
	(strongly) Agree	65	77	72	54
Men should have a priority for a job than women	(strongly) Disagree	20	2	62	9
	Neither agree nor disagree	46	18	31	73
	(strongly) Agree	35	80	8	19
Estimated class population share			31	25	45

Source Generations and Gender Survey Japan 2005; N = 8,636

probability to disagree (62%) and a low probability to agree (8%) with the statement that men should have a priority for a job over women when jobs are scarce.

The response pattern of the third latent class can be labeled as *neutral*. Persons in this latent class have a high probability to neither agree nor disagree with three of the four statements included in our model. For the statements about eldest sons' responsibility, daughters carrying more responsibility than sons and gendered rights to jobs the probabilities of neutral answers are, respectively, 64%, 87% and 73%. Only with regard to the statement that adult children should provide financial support to parents in need are they somewhat more likely to agree (54%) than to answer neutrally (44%). However, the likelihood of outspoken agreement with this statement is still lower and the likelihood of a neutral answer is higher than in the two other latent classes.

Results of the latent class regression model predicting class membership are presented in Table 5.3. The coefficient estimates presented here can be interpreted as those in a multinomial logit model. Controlling for all other characteristics, the model predicts that the odds of adhering to the gender egalitarian low family responsibility ideal relative to the neutral ideal are a factor 2.295 ($p < 0.001$) higher

Table 5.3 Results of latent class regression analysis predicting class membership

	Patriarchal high family responsibility		Gender egalitarian low family responsibility	
	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	–0.524*	0.212	–1.531***	0.209
Woman	–0.145	0.090	0.831***	0.092
Age[a]	0.030***	0.005	–0.021***	0.005
Age[a] squared	0.002***	0.000	0.001**	0.000
Level of urbanization (ref: rural area)				
Major city	–0.150	0.142	0.276	0.142
Other city	–0.157	0.097	0.105	0.107
Educational attainment (ref: low)				
Medium	–0.275*	0.109	0.368***	0.099
High	–0.130	0.115	0.976***	0.107
Employed	–0.129	0.094	0.014	0.097
Has children	0.119	0.127	–0.276*	0.112
Both parents deceased	–0.039	0.120	–0.131	0.151
At least one parent has limitation/disability	0.188	0.129	–0.232	0.151
Observations	8,636			
Estimated parameters	48			
Residual degrees of freedom	32			
Log-likelihood	–30,765.5			
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)	61,966.1			

Source Generations and Gender Survey Japan 2005; Reference category: Neutral; [a]Mean centred; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

for women than for men. Every additional year in age is associated with a higher predicted likelihood of adherence to the patriarchal high family responsibility ideal relative to the neutral ideal ($b = 0.030$; $p < 0.001$). This positive effect becomes increasingly strong with increasing age ($b = 0.002$; $p < 0.001$). Every additional year in age is associated with a lower predicted likelihood of adherence to the gender egalitarian low family responsibility ideal relative to a neutral ideal ($b = –0.021$; $p < 0.001$), and this negative effect weakens with increasing age ($b = 0.001$; $p < 0.01$). Compared to their lower educated counterparts, persons with an intermediate level of education are less likely to adhere to the patriarchal high family responsibility ideal relative to a neutral ideal (OR: 0.760; $p < 0.05$), and more likely to adhere to the gender egalitarian low family responsibility ideal relative to the neutral ideal (OR: 1.445; $p < 0.001$). The odds of adhering to the gender egalitarian low family responsibility ideal relative to the neutral ideal are a factor 2.653 ($p < 0.001$) higher for persons with a high level of education than for those with a low level of education. Finally, the odds of adhering to the gender egalitarian low family responsibility ideal relative to the neutral ideal are lower for persons with children than for their childless counterparts (OR: 0.759; $p < 0.05$).

We calculated predicted probabilities for a "typical" woman or man with increasing age and at different levels of education to adhere to the patriarchal high family responsibility ideal and the gender egalitarian low family responsibility ideal. Predictor variables other than gender, age and educational attainment were set to the mean (see Table 5.1). Model predictions are presented in Fig. 5.1. The figure clearly shows that adherence to the patriarchal high family responsibility ideal—the predicted probabilities of which are plotted with the solid line—is relatively strong among men, older persons and people with lower educational attainment. The predicted probabilities of adherence to the gender egalitarian low family responsibility ideal are plotted with the dashed line. The figure shows that women, younger persons and people with higher educational attainment are relatively likely to adhere to this ideal.

5.9 Discussion

The last decades, Japanese governments have grappled with the issue how to formulate a policy response to rapid population ageing and the associated rising need for long-term care. Public opinion is of great importance for the success of policy reforms (Burstein 2003; Svallfors 2010). However, during the second half of the twentieth century, public opinion on how care provision ought to be organized has become increasingly ambiguous (Koyano 2003; cf. Tanaka and Johnson 2008). The aim of our exploratory study was to shed light on this ambiguity by identifying moral beliefs about care for older people among the Japanese population. Drawing on the work of Hochschild (1995), we have taken multiple dimensions of such moral beliefs—filial support, work and gender—into account conjointly.



Fig. 5.1 Predicted probabilities class membership

Our analyses identified three clearly distinct moral beliefs. People adhering to the patriarchal high family responsibility ideal believe that it is the eldest son's duty to look after his parents. They also tend to agree with the statement that daughters should take more caring responsibility than sons when parents are in need. People adhering the patriarchal high family responsibility ideal believe that paid work is a task for men, rather than for women. The ideal they adhere to somewhat resembles

the so-called traditional care ideal distinguished in European and North-American contexts (Hochschild 1995; Van den Broek et al. 2015), which fits with a male breadwinner model.

Our analyses also show substantial adherence to a gender egalitarian low family responsibility ideal. In stark contrast to those adhering to the patriarchal high family responsibility ideal, people adhering to this ideal believe that neither eldest sons, nor daughters are considered to carry substantial responsibility for the provision of care to parents in need. They also believe that upward intergenerational support should be financial, rather than instrumental, and that paid work is as much of an activity for women as it is for men. The gender egalitarian low family responsibility ideal resembles the so-called cold-modern ideals distinguished in European and North-American contexts (Hochschild 1995; Van den Broek et al. 2015). Such a care ideal fits with a dual-breadwinner family model, with care tasks largely being performed by professionals.

Finally, a neutral category can be distinguished. People adhering to this ideal are not likely to be outspoken about issues with regard to filial norms, work and gender. They may not have strong opinions on these matters, but their neutral responses to normative statements may also result from a so-called *enryo-sasshi* communication style. According to Ishii (1984), taking this style of communication into account is crucial if one wants to understand Japanese interpersonal communications. *Enryo-sasshi* entails that one is reserved and cautious, rather than explicit, when communicating with someone, in order not to disrespect that person's inner world. As a consequence, scores on normative survey items from persons with an *enryo-sasshi* communication style have a high risk of being biased by socially desirable or overly neutral responding.

Our analyses suggest that the most profound normative conflicts about care, work and gender can be found along the lines of age, gender and the level of education. As discussed above, the patriarchal ideology institutionalized in the prewar period has lived on in the postwar family system based on the male breadwinner family model. This model has been continuously maintained at the institutional level, but one could question whether it is feasible or desirable in a world leading ageing society with a low fertility rate. It has been argued, for instance, that raising female market participation is important to maintain Japan's economic growth rate (Steinberg and Nakane 2012). Scholars have pointed out that recurrent emphasis on family in Japanese care arrangement makes care for older people burdensome for family, especially women who are regarded as a main care provider within a family (Ochiai et al. 2010; Soma and Yamashita 2011). In Japan's Annual Report on the Aging Society it has been recognized that particularly women quit or change their jobs due to the difficulties of balancing their work and care for older family members in the wake of long-term care cutbacks (Cabinet Office 2014). Nevertheless, our results suggest that men, older persons and people with lower levels of education have a disposition towards the patriarchal high family responsibility ideal, in which it is deemed appropriate that women are relegated to

the domestic sphere. Women and the young, to whom care provision could be a 'burden' under the current care arrangement, tend to support more a gender egalitarian and less familial approach, embodied in the gender egalitarian low family responsibility ideal. The patriarchal high family responsibility ideal and the fundamentally different gender egalitarian low family responsibility ideal are both adhered to by substantial shares of the Japanese population. This makes it a challenge to formulate a morally plausible policy response to the growing need for care, i.e. a response that fits with people's moral beliefs (cf. Mau 2004).

This study has a number of limitations. First of all, an indicator explicitly capturing the level of caring responsibility assigned to the state was not available in the Japanese Generations and Gender Survey. An ideal similar to Hochschild's warm-modern care ideal—in which the family and the state carry a joint caring responsibility—would therefore be difficult to distinguish in our data. Furthermore, a substantial share of the Japanese population is older than 70, but persons in this age range were not present in our sample. Plausibly, inclusion of the oldest old in our analyses might have yielded different results, given that these persons would have been socialized in the pre-war era when *Ie* was propagated. In our sample, even the oldest persons only spent their early childhood years in pre-war Japan. Our data were cross-sectional, rather than longitudinal. This made us unable to determine to what extent the strong effect of age was an actual age effect or and to what extent it captured a cohort effect.

Finally, as described above, the neutral ideal is difficult to interpret. The neutrality of the responses of people in this class may imply that these individuals do not have strong opinions about matters related to filial support, work and gender, but it may also be attributed to social desirability bias or neutrality bias related to an *enryo-sasshi* communication style. Inventive approaches to deal with social desirable responding have been developed (for an overview, see Krumpal 2013). Possibly, future studies based on data in which these approaches are applied will show that fewer Japanese individuals belong to the neutral class than our study suggests.

Despite these apparent limitations, we believe that this exploratory study provides valuable insights on moral beliefs about care for older persons in Japan. Our study sketches three distinct ideals about filial support, work and gender. In addition, it sheds light on the socio-demographic lines along which normative conflicts with regard to the morality of care are likely to exist in Japanese society. Future studies drawing on even richer data can build on this and refine the images sketched here.

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Chapter 6
Division of Housework in Japan, South Korea, China and Taiwan

Noriko Iwai

Abstract Using national samples, this paper examined factors related to the frequency of housework done by husbands and wives in Japan, South Korea, China and Taiwan. The main results were: (1) Japanese husbands did housework far less than South Korean, Taiwanese, and Chinese; (2) In China, both frequency and relative share of husbands' housework were the highest among the four societies; (3) Husbands' housework frequency was associated with wives' working hours, own income (except for Japan), own working hours, and the presence of alternative resource (mother), but not with wives' income; (4) Wives' housework frequency was strongly linked to own employment conditions (mostly income), health status and family structure, and only weakly related to their gender role attitudes and husbands' condition except for China where wives did more as their husbands worked longer; and (5) Husbands' relative share of housework was strongly related to both wives' and husband' working hours.

Keywords Housework · East Asia · Cross-national comparisons · East Asian Social Survey

6.1 Introduction

China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are among top 24 societies in the Gross Domestic Product in 2010. However, their ranks in the Global Gender Gap Index (Hausmann et al. 2010) are far behind their economic achievement. China ranks 61st, Japan 94th and South Korea 104th. In 2007, the ratio of the estimated earned income of female to that of male[1] is 67.8 in China, 51.8 in South Korea, and 45.3 in

[1]Calculated based on figures from Human Development Report 2009 (United Nations Development Programme 2009).

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Japan. As in almost all other societies, the gender gaps in these societies exist not only at work place but also at home. Based on the data from the 2002 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the mean women's share of total housework in the household was the highest for Japan among 34 societies; Taiwan placed in the 11th (Knudsen and Wærness 2008).

Using the data from the East Asian Social Survey (EASS) 2006, this paper examines the division of housework in Japan, South Korea, China and Taiwan and explore the similarities and differences in wives' and husbands' housework frequency, as well as their relative share, among the four societies. These societies generally share Confucian values which emphasize wives' obedience to their husbands. However, different historical situations and political and economic systems have shaped wives' and husbands' roles in earning and doing housework differently. This paper especially focuses on Japan because previous studies reported extremely gendered division of housework in Japan (Batalova and Cohen 2002; Davis and Greenstein 2004; Greenstein 2009). I will first overview married couples' work situations based on the data, review previous studies, and state factors to be examined in the study.

6.2 Work Situations of Wives and Husbands in the Four Societies

In East Asia, labor climate varies significantly. The EASS 2006 data show that the proportion of dual-earner couples was the highest in China (66.2%), followed by Taiwan (56.9%), Japan (50.4%) and the lowest in South Korea (48.0%). While more wives had a paid job in Japan than in South Korea (54.5% > 51.7%), the average weekly working hours for wives who had a paid job were much longer in South Korea (47.1 h) than in Japan (31.4 h), and so were in China (48.9 h) and Taiwan (46.9 h). This is because the majority of Japanese employed wives work part-time (50.8%), not full-time, due to difficulties for women in maintaining full-time employment after childbearing and finding new full-time jobs once they quit. The proportion of part-time working wives is much less in other three societies; 15.3% in South Korea, 11.2% in China and 7.3% in Taiwan.

Additionally, part-time working Japanese wives are not provided with their own medical insurance and pension; they are provided with them as dependents of their full-time working husbands. Once a wife's annual income exceeds 1,030,000 yen (=US$13,579 as of November 29, 2011), she has to pay income tax and her husband has to pay more tax and he cannot get dependent allowance. Furthermore, once a wife's annual income exceeds 1,300,000 yen (=US$17,139), she has to pay for health insurance and pension by herself. Thus, there may be additional blocking

factors for the Japanese wives to work full-time. Husbands' working hours did not differ much across the four societies.

6.3 Previous Studies and Analytical Framework

Research on housework has examined various factors associated with the absolute amount and the relative ratio of wives' and husbands' household labor. Based on an extensive review on the division of household labor, Shelton and John (1996) pointed out three explanations dominant in the empirical research. First, the relative resource explanation posits that individuals with the most resources, such as earnings, education, or occupational prestige, use these resources to negotiate with his/her spouse to lighten his/her own household labor. Second, the time constraints/availability explanation posits that men and women participate in housework to the extent that they have available time. Indicators of time constraints often used are employment status, working hours, or work schedule. Lastly, the ideology explanation posits that women and men with egalitarian attitudes have a more equal division of household labor than those with traditional attitudes. Men's educational level has often been found to be related to their ideology. Among the above three explanations, Shelton and John observed that time constraints accounted for the largest amount of variation in the division of household labor in most studies, but they also pointed out that gender remains a more important determinant of housework time than any other factor (1996:317).

With an availability of comparable data on the household labor in various societies, researchers have started to compare the amount of wives' and husbands' household labor and examine the applicability of the explanations cross-nationally. Using a sample of 13 nations from the International Social Justice Project (1991), Davis and Greenstein (2004) showed that the proportion of married couples in which housework was always done by the wives was the highest in Japan (79.3% by wife-report and 62.8% by husband-report). Their results supported the time availability explanation, but the relative resource explanation was partially supported.

Batalova and Cohen (2002) introduced the effects of national-level measures (cohabitation rate and gender empowerment of each nation) into their analysis by using a hierarchical linear model with a pooled data of 22 nations from the 1994 ISSP. Using the same data set, Fuwa (2004) extended the analysis and found that the equalizing effects of time availability and gender ideology were stronger for women in more egalitarian nations and that women in less egalitarian nations benefit less from their individual-level assets. Greenstein (2009) confirmed the importance of national-level gender equity for understanding wives' housework time and their share of household labor based on a pooled data of 30 nations from the 2002 ISSP.

6.4 Previous Studies on the Division of Household Labor in East Asia

Research on housework has been also actively conducted in East Asia. With a female national sample, National Survey on Family in Japan (Nishioka 1998) suggests a U-shaped curve with husbands aged 40 s did least housework; time of husbands' coming home, couple's income difference, wives' education, wives' gender role attitudes, co-residence with parents, and area of residence were related to husbands' housework. Based on national surveys of married men and women, Tsuya et al. (2005) found that wives' work hours, couples' education, residence in a larger city were positively related with husbands' housework, while co-residence with parents/parents in-law was negatively related to it (couples' income were not controlled).

Tsuya et al. (2000) also examined housework in Japan, South Korea and the United States. They confirmed that the division of housework was influenced by time availability of each spouse as well as family situation such as presence of non-adult children and co-residence with parents. In Japan and South Korea, wives responded to increases in the domestic needs created by non-adult children at home, but co-residence with parents reduced wives' housework, particularly in Japan.

In China, a national-level probability sample has been limited. Lu et al. (2000) examined factors related to husbands' participation in household labor based on the 1991 China Health and Nutrition Survey which is a large-scale study including rural population. Their findings were generally consistent with previous U.S. studies and showed at least partial support for each of the three major explanations. They found that urban husbands spent more time on household labor absolutely and relatively than rural husbands. Urban husbands who contributed more were those with employed wives and those whose earnings were closer to their wives. Higher educational levels increased relative, but not absolute contributions. Husbands without children or other relatives in the household did more.

Using data from the 1997 East Asia Social Survey (different from the current EASS), Hsu (2008) compared wives' and husbands' housework labor between Taiwan and China; the latter data was a purposive sample of coastal regions. Hsu found that wives with more liberal gender role attitudes spent less time on housework and husbands with more liberal gender role attitudes spent more in both China and Taiwan, while income difference between husbands and wives, and respondents' education affected only in Taiwan, and wives' paid work hours did not affect in either society. Using data from the 1995–96 Taiwan Social Change Survey, Hu and Kamo (2007) found that wives' relative share of housework according to wives' report was explained by their occupational status, not by their economic resources and gender ideology, while husbands' share according to husbands' report was explained by the gender role ideology and the economic resources explanations (the amount of paid working hours was not controlled).

6.5 Factors to Be Examined

In the following analyses, I will examine predictors on the division of household labor in East Asia. The three major explanations will be examined. Education which is one of the indicators of resources has often been found to be related to ideology. Higher education promotes liberal gender-role attitudes especially in East Asian societies which had a strong tradition of the patriarchal family system. In the present study, the effect of a respondent's ideology and the effects of respondent's and his/her spouse's educational background will be examined simultaneously. Education could have its own direct effect on housework.

In addition to the three explanations, the presence of alternative resources in a household (assistance by co-residing mother/mother-in-law, teenage sons, teenage daughters, adult unmarried sons, adult unmarried daughters, or married children), needs of family members (presence/number of small children and spouse's health status), and characteristics of the community where a couple lives in (big cities or not) will be considered.

The presence of unmarried adult children will be included because, unlike in most Western societies, many college graduates continue to live with their parents, especially in Taiwan and Japan. In the United States, unmarried adult children who live with parents do considerable amount of housework and daughters' contribution actually decrease their parents' housework time whereas sons tend to increase mothers' housework time (South and Spitze 1994). Japanese adult children, regardless of sex and work status, tend to depend on their parents for housework as well as living expenses, (Iwai 2002). Such adult children are called as "parasite singles" (Yamada 1999).

Wives' and husbands' health status will also be examined. Although Japanese husbands' participation in housework is in low gear, those who retired from the company tend to do more housework. Husbands who are around or in 60 s do core housework more when their wives have a job, or in poor health (Szinovacz and Harpster 1994 with U.S data; Iwai 2002, with Japanese data); husbands' own health status also affect their housework (Iwai 2002).

6.6 Data

6.6.1 EASS 2006 Data

The EASS is a collaborative project of research teams from Japan, South Korea, China and Taiwan. Four teams jointly make common questions based on issues and concerns unique to East Asian societies, and incorporate them into national surveys which have been conducted by four teams in each society. The theme for the first EASS (EASS 2006) was "Family." Distributions and means for each question by gender and age groups across four societies are graphically described in Iwai and

Yasuda (2011). The number of valid respondents and response rates are 2,130 (59.8%) for Japan, 1,605 (65.7%) for South Korea, 3,208 (38.5%) for China, and 2,102 (42.0%) for Taiwan. Because the age range of each survey varies, the sample for the following analysis is limited to the common age range of the four surveys (from 20 to 69 years).

6.6.2 Dependent Variables

Dependent variables are the following three: (1) Husbands' housework frequency (husband-report); (2) Wives' housework frequency (wife-report); (3) Husbands' relative share of housework (husband-report). In the EASS 2006 family module, respondents were asked how often they and their spouse do the following three kinds of housework—preparing the evening meal, doing the laundry, and cleaning the house. The data were not paired data. Original response categories were "almost everyday," "several times a week," "about once a week," "about once a month," "several times a year," "about once a year," and "never." They were recoded into a continuum variable that indicates the number of days in which respondents do housework in a week (7.00, 3.50, 1.00, 0.25, 0.10, 0.02 and 0.00). The variable enable us to grasp wives' and husband's weekly engagement in each of the three kinds of housework and to calculate husband's relative share of housework. Rather than summing up the frequency of three kinds of housework, this study will examine them separately. The husbands' relative share of housework is a quotient of husbands' frequency of housework divided by a sum of husbands' frequency of housework and that of wives.

6.6.3 Independent Variables

Indicators of wives' and husbands' time constraints are their weekly working hours. Indicators of wives' and husbands' resources are their annual income. In South Korea and China, the respondents were asked to answer the amount of their earnings. In Japan and Taiwan respondents were asked to choose the category to which their earnings fit, and thus the mid-value of the category was used as the amount of their earnings for Japan and Taiwan. Except for Taiwan, respondents were also asked to answer on their spouses' earnings. Since the value of a currency differs across societies, earnings were converted to standardized values within each society to permit the comparison across societies. The values which exceeded 3 standardized values were recoded as 3.

Indicators of wives' and husbands' educational background were years of schooling. Respondents were asked the highest level of school they and their spouses have attended which were converted to years of schooling based on each society's educational system.

The scale of the liberal gender role attitudes was composed of the following two items: (1) It is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to pursue her own career; and (2) A husband's job is to earn money; a wife's job is to look after the home and the family ("strongly agree" = 1… "strongly disagree" = 7; Cronbach α for married men is 0.72 and for married women is 0.73). As previously mentioned, one's educational level is related to one's gender role attitudes. Correlations between years of schooling and scores of gender role attitudes are highest in Taiwan (0.48 for wives and 0.42 for husbands) and next highest in Korea (0.45 and 0.34). They are statistically significant but much lower in Japan (0.27 and 0.20) and in China (0.13 and 0.12). This study will examine the direct effects of wives' and husbands' education as well as those of their gender role attitudes.

Living arrangements, such as living with mother/mother-in-law, living with married son, living with married daughter and characteristics of residence (living in a large city) were treated as dummy variables. In addition, the effects of the number of pre-school children, teenage sons, teenage daughters, unmarried adult sons and unmarred adult daughters were examined.

Table 6.1 shows the characteristics of the samples which will be used for the OLS regressions.

6.7 Results

6.7.1 Housework Performance Among Married Couples in East Asia

Figure 6.1 shows the mean frequency of housework in a week by age group for husbands and wives. Mean scores for husbands were calculated using husband-report and those for wives were calculated using wife-report. Japanese husbands performed housework the least frequently, whereas Japanese wives performed housework the most frequently except for cleaning the house. Chinese husbands' housework frequency was relatively high. In Japan, as previous studies pointed out, there was a U-shaped curve with husbands in 40 s doing the least. In China, not only wives but also husbands in 40 s did considerable housework. Regarding the three kinds of housework, wives prepared evening meals most frequently except for Taiwan, whereas husbands did the cleaning work most frequency except for China.

Figure 6.2 shows the husbands' relative share of housework using husband-report. The husbands' relative share using husband-report is higher than that using wife-report by 1–4% in Japan and Taiwan, 3–8% in China and 6–8% in South Korea, although the form of the graph is generally similar to each other. Japanese husbands did less in their middle ages. South Korean husbands did less housework as they get older. Among the three kinds of housework, husbands' relative share was the highest for cleaning.

Table 6.1 Characteristics of samples for OLS regression: percentages or means

		Japan		South Korea		China		Taiwan	
		Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
n		377	491	349	464	578	740	518	536
Age (60–69)	20–39	22.6%	22.8%	27.2%	41.4%	38.8%	42.7%	22.8%	35.3%
	40–59	46.4%	54.2%	60.5%	49.4%	46.2%	43.7%	60.4%	52.2%
Live in a large city (No)	Yes	20.2%	18.5%	57.0%	48.3%	38.2%	37.4%	37.1%	35.6%
Live with mother/mother-in-law (No)	Yes	15.4%	17.9%	6.6%	8.2%	10.6%	8.5%	23.2%	20.5%
Live with married son (No)	Yes	3.7%	4.9%	0.6%	0.7%	4.8%	4.6%	8.9%	9.3%
Live with married daughter (No)	Yes	0.8%	1.8%	0.6%	0.0%	1.9%	1.9%	0.6%	1.3%
No. of children aged 0–6	(0–4)	0.24	0.22	0.32	0.34	0.18	0.17	0.28	0.26
No. of sons aged 13–18	(0–3)	0.11	0.15	0.19	0.21	0.11	0.08	0.18	0.21
No. of daughters aged 13–18	(0–3)	0.11	0.14	0.25	0.18	0.08	0.09	0.14	0.17
No. of unmarried sons over 23	(0–3)	0.14	0.14	0.07	0.09	0.05	0.04	0.24	0.22
No. of unmarried daughters over 23	(0–3)	0.14	0.14	0.09	0.06	0.05	0.04	0.18	0.15
H's health condition	(1 = very good, 5 = very bad)	2.48	2.45	2.24	2.45	2.10	2.06	2.03	2.12
H's years of schooling	(0–23)	13.1	13.0	13.3	13.5	9.9	10.1	11.3	11.7
H's annual income (standardized)	(−3 to 3)	0.84	0.52	0.45	0.44	0.34	0.08	0.34	–
H's weekly working hours	(0–140)	40.0	38.3	46.2	47.3	48.6	34.4	40.6	40.0
H's liberal gender-role attitudes	(2–14)	7.8	–	7.1	–	6.9	–	6.6	–
W's health condition	(1 = very good, 5 = very bad)	2.34	2.38	2.31	2.43	2.08	2.28	2.06	2.22
W's years of schooling	(0–23)	12.5	12.5	12.3	12.3	9.4	9.0	10.4	10.5
W's annual income (standardized)	(−3 to 3)	−0.53	−0.49	−0.52	−0.23	−0.05	−0.12	–	−0.11
W's weekly working hours	(0–140)	18.9	17.5	19.7	21.2	24.4	42.5	28.1	30.2
W's liberal gender-role attitudes	(2–14)	–	8.1	–	7.5	–	6.8	–	6.7

Note The correlation coefficients of the couples' years of schooling were 0.62 in Japan, 0.77 in South Korea, 0.59 in China and 0.74 in Taiwan. The correlation coefficients of the wives' weekly working hours and their annual income were 0.49 in Japan, 0.53 in South Korea, 0.45 in Taiwan and 0.19 in China. The variance inflation factors for these variables did not exceed 4 in the OLS regressions



Fig. 6.1 Mean frequency of housework in a week by age group



Fig. 6.2 Husbands' relative share of housework by age group (husband-report)

6.7.2 *Factors Affecting Husbands' and Wives' Housework and Husbands' Relative Share*

Table 6.2 shows the results of OLS regressions for each of the three kinds of housework done by husbands in East Asia. Table 6.3 shows the results for wives' housework frequency.

In order to focus on direct effects of independent variables on ones' housework frequency, their spouses' housework frequency is controlled. Whether it is controlled or not generally does not change the sign and size of unstandardized coefficients of other independent variables. In all societies, wives' frequency in preparing meals was negatively associated with husbands' frequency in preparing meals (Table 6.2). The same inverse relationship was also found for laundry except for China. Regarding the cleaning, the inverse relationship was found only in South Korea. On the other hand, wives' housework frequency was affected by husbands' housework frequency to a much lesser extent (Table 6.3). Moreover, husbands'

Table 6.2 Husbands' housework frequency: OLS regressions (husband-report)

	Japan			South Korea			China			Taiwan		
	Dinner	Laundry	Clean	Dinner	Laundry	Clean	Dinner	Laundry	Clean	Dinner	Laundry	Clean
	b	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*
Live in a large city	0.034	0.243	0.573**	−0.167	−0.206	−0.101	0.116	0.137	0.240	0.616**	−0.246	−0.315
Live with mother/mother-in-law	−0.522*	−0.229	−0.032	−0.581	−0.383	−0.370	−1.227***	−0.711*	−0.601+	−0.547*	0.113	−0.130
Live with married son	−0.715+	−0.302	−0.780+	−1.173	−0.776	−0.752	−0.534	0.041	−0.028	−0.374	−0.237	−0.469
Live with married daughter	−0.314	0.362	0.094				0.762	−0.309	0.023	−0.890	−0.076	−0.813
No. of children aged 0–6	−0.112	0.367*	0.181	−0.574**	−0.284	0.132	0.016	0.258	0.304	0.362+	0.288	0.313
No. of sons aged 13–18	−0.099	0.019	−0.142	−0.396+	−0.172	−0.177	0.132	0.277	0.124	0.004	−0.345	−0.055
No. of daughters aged 13–18	−0.144	−0.188	−0.087	−0.237	−0.367+	−0.213	−0.442	−0.009	−0.029	0.523*	0.095	0.206
No. of unmarried sons over 23	0.000	0.089	0.125	−0.154	−0.809*	−0.293	1.204*	0.680+	1.198*	0.117	0.236	0.260
No. of unmarried daughters over 23	−0.288	−0.035	−0.323	−0.154	−0.362	−0.171	−0.252	0.426	−0.411	−0.079	−0.164	0.491*
H's age: 20–39	−0.086	0.084	−0.768*	0.732	−0.047	−0.079	−0.327	−0.105	−0.951*	−0.561	−0.737	−0.783+
40–59	−0.291	−0.144	−0.523*	0.340	0.201	0.317	−0.048	0.004	−0.535	0.183	0.021	0.093
H's health condition	−0.067	−0.109	−0.240*	−0.017	−0.097	−0.182	0.126	−0.088	0.078	−0.101	−0.164	0.010
H's years of schooling	0.003	−0.052	−0.065	0.019	0.014	0.111*	0.039	0.032	0.072+	0.035	0.030	0.056
H's annual income (standardized)	−0.119	0.038	−0.130	−0.414*	−0.476**	−0.660**	−0.262+	−0.069	−0.336*	−0.350*	−0.492**	−0.500**
H's weekly working hours	0.002	−0.015***	−0.009+	−0.018***	−0.015**	−0.020***	−0.010	0.002	0.000	−0.004	−0.004	−0.006
Ws health condition	0.086	−0.086	−0.069	−0.008	0.001	0.185	0.101	0.169	0.151	0.076	−0.066	−0.105
Ws years of schooling	−0.007	0.008	−0.016	0.002	−0.005	−0.058	−0.027	−0.036	−0.052	−0.023	0.078+	0.039
Ws annual income (standardized)	0.244	−0.193	−0.437*	−0.011	0.179	−0.238	0.728	0.412	0.516			
Ws weekly working hours	0.003	0.022***	0.028***	0.012*	0.007	0.016**	0.009*	0.010**	0.009*	0.017***	0.018***	0.016***
H's liberal gender-role attitudes	0.011	0.047	0.011	0.093**	0.114**	0.123**	−0.017	−0.021	−0.020	−0.032	−0.001	0.000
Ws housework frequency	−0.321***	−0.191***	0.008	−0.188**	−0.109*	−0.190***	−0.173***	−0.023	−0.022	−0.106**	−0.169***	0.043
Constant	3.032***	2.475***	2.673***	2.397**	2.168**	1.947*	3.759***	1.304*	2.299**	1.699**	1.727*	0.531
F	3.435***	3.717***	3.158***	4.111***	3.470***	3.797***	2.988***	1.319	2.032**	2.904***	3.754***	2.766***
Adjusted R^2	0.120	0.132	0.108	0.152	0.124	0.139	0.067	0.011	0.036	0.069	0.096	0.064
n	376	377	377	349	349	349	578	578	578	518	518	518

Note $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{+}p < 0.10$

Table 6.3 Wives' housework frequency: OLS regressions (wife-report)

	Japan			South Korea			China			Taiwan		
	Dinner	Laundry	Clean	Dinner	Laundry	Clean	Dinner	Laundry	Clean	Dinner	Laundry	Clean
	b	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*
Live in a large city	0.029	−0.044	−0.338	−0.096	−0.393*	−0.461*	0.175	0.247	0.421*	−0.324	−0.357^{+}	−0.352
Live with mother/mother-in-law	−0.038	0.484**	0.441	−0.467^{+}	−0.929**	−0.698*	−0.310	0.562^{+}	−0.116	−0.535^{+}	0.349	−0.137
Live with married son	−1.313***	−0.106	0.633	−3.016**	−4.033***	−4.151***	−0.059	0.413	0.106	−1.283**	−0.738*	−0.737^{+}
Live with married daughter	−1.070*	−1.313*	0.309				−2.116***	−1.297*	−0.938^{+}	0.531	−0.866	0.937
No. of children aged 0–6	0.024	0.622***	0.052	0.028	0.455*	0.236	0.138	0.036	0.310	−0.172	0.257	0.322
No. of sons aged 13–18	0.218	0.478**	0.028	0.571**	0.603**	0.421^{+}	0.291	−0.122	0.057	0.363	0.010	0.305
No. of daughters aged 13–18	−0.044	0.247	−0.281	0.086	0.243	0.361^{+}	0.229	0.715*	−0.021	0.061	0.410^{+}	0.157
No. of unmarried sons over 23	0.176	0.281	0.033	−0.634*	−0.397	−0.197	0.658*	0.592	0.562	0.449^{+}	0.092	−0.079
No. of unmarried daughters over 23	0.098	0.168	0.117	0.125	0.528	0.004	−0.100	−0.071	−0.424	−0.115	−0.153	−0.232
H's health condition	−0.041	−0.094	−0.003	−0.155^{+}	−0.045	0.118	0.161^{+}	0.177	0.450***	0.140	−0.218*	−0.072
H's years of schooling	−0.020	−0.004	0.008	−0.061^{+}	−0.043	−0.056	−0.006	−0.014	−0.033	−0.022	−0.093**	−0.125**
H's annual income (standardized)	0.099	0.158^{+}	0.129	0.065	0.070	−0.087	−0.121	−0.369	−0.117			
H's weekly working hours	0.002	0.000	0.010^{+}	−0.005	0.003	0.001	0.006*	0.012***	0.011***	0.007	0.000	0.003
W's age: 20–39	−0.266	−0.024	−0.621	−0.605^{+}	−0.860^{+}	−0.104	−0.440	−0.207	−0.243	−0.751	0.002	−0.114
40–59	−0.396*	0.343	−0.371	−0.387	−0.543	−0.480	0.023	0.253	0.283	0.346	0.199	0.706^{+}
W's health condition	−0.035	0.045	−0.295*	−0.029	−0.040	−0.225*	−0.126	−0.261*	−0.321***	−0.083	−0.063	−0.104
W's years of schooling	0.009	−0.112*	−0.017	0.016	−0.032	−0.025	−0.024	−0.024	−0.014	−0.020	−0.013	0.021
W's annual income (standardized)	−0.229*	−0.255^{+}	−0.492*	−1.430***	−1.167***	−1.202***	−0.355**	−0.285^{+}	−0.418**	−0.860***	−0.543**	−0.665**
W's weekly working hours	−0.005	−0.006	−0.039***	−0.012**	−0.007	−0.007	0.000	0.002	0.000	−0.011*	−0.003	−0.005
W's liberal gender-role attitudes	−0.003	−0.009	−0.113*	−0.005	−0.025	−0.008	−0.069*	0.018	−0.022	−0.066^{+}	−0.049	−0.088*
H's housework frequency	−0.081*	−0.113*	0.159*	−0.038	0.051	−0.086	−0.004	0.121***	0.074*	−0.010	0.030	0.098^{+}
Constant	7.215***	7.315***	6.792***	7.976***	7.146***	7.406***	6.867***	4.580***	5.349***	5.990***	7.558***	6.197***
F	3.255***	4.372***	5.612***	8.812***	5.442***	5.876***	3.565***	2.702***	3.617***	6.601***	3.703***	3.938***
Adjusted R^2	0.089	0.127	0.165	0.252	0.161	0.174	0.068	0.046	0.069	0.173	0.092	0.099
n	488	490	491	464	464	464	740	740	740	536	536	536

Note $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{+}p < 0.10$

cleaning frequency was positively, not negatively, related to wives' cleaning frequency in Japan, China and Taiwan. In China the positive relationship was also observed for laundry.

Table 6.4 shows the results for husbands' relative share of housework using husband-report. The effects of each factor on the frequency of husbands' and wives' housework and husbands' relative share of housework are summarized in the following and their implications will be discussed in the last section.

6.7.3 Time Availability

Wives' working hours was more influential than husbands' working hours on husbands' housework frequency across three kinds of housework and across the four societies. The longer wives worked, the more frequently their husbands did housework. On the other hand, its impact on wives' own housework frequency was much less. Wives did not necessarily decrease their housework time, as they worked longer. The negative relationships were observed only for cleaning in Japan, and preparing meals in South Korea and Taiwan. As wives worked longer, husbands' relative share increased, but in China, its effect is smaller.

Compared with wives' working hours, the impact of husbands' working hours on both husbands' and wives' housework was limited, but to the expected direction. The longer husbands worked, the less frequently South Korean and Japanese husbands did housework, and the more frequently Chinese wives did housework. Therefore couples correspond to husbands' longer working hours differently across societies, but in both cases, husbands' relative share of housework decreased.

6.7.4 Relative Resources

Wives' income predicted wives' housework frequency. The more wives earned, the less frequently wives did three kinds of housework across the four societies. However, wives' more income was not related to significant increase in husbands' housework. On the other hand, husbands' housework was associated with their own income except for Japan. The more husbands earned, the less they did three kinds of housework in South Korea, China and Taiwan. As wives' income did not affect husbands' housework, husbands' income neither affected wives' housework.

The effects of wives' and husbands' income on husbands' relative share were country-specific. Wives' more income increased and husbands' more income decreased husbands' share in South Korea.

Table 6.4 Husbands' relative share of housework: OLS regressions (husband-report)

	Japan			South Korea			China			Taiwan		
	Dinner	Laundry	Clean	Dinner	Laundry	Clean	Dinner	Laundry	Clean	Dinner	Laundry	Clean
	b	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*
Live in a large city	0.020	0.032	0.092	0.011	−0.019	0.020	0.012	0.036	0.014	0.071**	0.123	−0.006
Live with mother/mother-in-law	−0.046	−0.040	−0.003	−0.070	−0.086+	−0.080	−0.064+	−0.076*	−0.080*	−0.051+	−0.076	−0.014
Live with married son	−0.052	−0.047	−0.095	−0.123	−0.107	−0.129	−0.015	0.012	0.018	−0.003	−0.003	−0.041
Live with married daughter	0.158	0.326	0.024				0.013	−0.051	−0.063	−0.061	−0.017	−0.074
No. of children aged 0–6	−0.002	0.008	0.014+	−0.027	−0.027	−0.014	0.010	0.036	0.037	0.028	0.059	0.011
No. of sons aged 13–18	−0.027	−0.020	−0.011	−0.028	0.010	−0.009	0.006	0.045	−0.023	−0.004	−0.007	−0.003
No. of daughters aged 13–18	0.023	−0.002	−0.013	−0.049*	−0.059*	−0.027	−0.031	0.015	0.051	0.022	0.033	−0.003
No. of unmarried sons over 23	−0.027	−0.040+	−0.021	0.009	−0.049	−0.054	0.155**	0.105+	0.145**	0.015	0.029+	0.031
No. of unmarried daughters over 23	−0.019	−0.019	−0.040	−0.034	−0.042	−0.006	0.085+	0.111*	0.012	−0.013	−0.022	0.033
H's age: 20–39	−0.040	0.011	−0.072	0.088+	0.030	0.046	0.032	0.066	−0.046	0.038	0.057	−0.040
40–59	−0.045	−0.041+	−0.085	0.062	0.037	0.041	0.016	0.013	−0.044	0.041	0.071	0.032
H s health condition	−0.008**	−0.021	−0.032***	0.004	−0.016	−0.003	−0.009	−0.011	−0.017	−0.009	−0.032	−0.007
H s years of schooling	0.004	−0.002	−0.001	0.000	0.000	0.008	0.003	0.006	0.009*	0.005	0.060	0.006
H s annual income (standardized)	−0.013	0.005	0.001	−0.056**	−0.061**	−0.067**	−0.016	−0.004	−0.018	−0.032	−0.087	−0.043
H's weekly working hours	0.000***	−0.002***	−0.002***	−0.002***	−0.002**	−0.002**	−0.002*	0.000	−0.001***	−0.001+	−0.091	−0.001+
W s health condition	0.023	0.018+	0.023	0.000	0.011	0.016	0.031*	0.044**	0.040*	0.014	0.045	0.006

(continued)

Table 6.4 (continued)

	Japan			South Korea			China			Taiwan		
	Dinner	Laundry	Clean	Dinner	Laundry	Clean	Dinner	Laundry	Clean	Dinner	Laundry	Clean
W's years of schooling	−0.004	−0.003	−0.009	0.006	0.008	0.004	−0.003	−0.007	−0.006	0.006	0.089**	0.009+
W's annual income (standardized)	0.027	0.008	−0.041	0.074**	0.017	0.063*	0.060	0.041	0.057			
Ws weekly working hours	0.001***	0.003**	0.004***	0.002*	0.002***	0.002**	0.001**	0.001	0.001+	0.003***	0.253***	0.003***
H's liberal gender-role attitudes	0.005	0.009	0.009**	0.005	0.009*	0.010*	−0.006	−0.001	−0.006	−0.003	−0.031*	0.008+
Constant	0.017	0.124	0.244+	0.125	0.079	0.055	0.332***	0.128	0.333***	0.013	−0.102	0.005
F	1.743**	2.943***	3.654***	4.541***	3.724***	4.277***	2.193**	1.773*	1.991**	3.111***	4.123***	3.814*
Adjusted R^2	0.038	0.094	0.124	0.164	0.130	0.199	0.040	0.026	0.033	0.075	0.105	0.095
n	373	375	376	345	346	347	573	570	574	499	507	511

Note $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{+}p < 0.10$

6.7.5 Education

The effects of husbands' educational background on their housework were limited but in a direction which an ideology rather than a resource explanation expects. Husbands' years of schooling showed positive influence on South Korean husbands' cleaning frequency and on Chinese husbands' relative share in cleaning. In Taiwan, wives whose husbands' were educated longer did less laundry and cleaning. Wives' education did not affect husbands' housework frequency. Japanese wives' with more education decreased their laundry frequency.

6.7.6 Ideology

The effects of gender role attitudes on ones' housework frequency were limited. Only in South Korea, husbands who held more liberal gender role attitudes did three kinds of housework more frequently. On the other hand, wives who held more liberal gender role attitudes cleaned the house less often in Japan and Taiwan, and prepared meals less often in China. Husbands' more liberal gender role attitudes lead to husbands' more share in cleaning the house in Japan and South Korea.

6.7.7 Household Members: More Demands or Providing Help

The presence of children under 18 predicted more housework, especially more laundry work for wives. As the number of pre-school children and teenage sons increased, Japanese and South Korean wives did laundry more frequently. In South Korea, living with teenage sons also increased wives' preparing meals. Japanese husbands with preschool-children did laundry more often, whereas South Korean husbands with preschool-children prepared meals less often. Teenage daughters did not contribute to a decrease in their parents' housework. They rather led to more housework in China and Taiwan; Chinese wives did laundry more often and Taiwanese husbands prepared meals more often. The presence of pre-school children did not affect husbands' relative share, whereas that of teenage daughters decreased husbands' share in South Korea.

The effects of unmarried adult children were in the opposite directions across societies. Living with unmarried adult sons in South Korea predicted low frequency of wives' preparing meals and husbands' doing laundry, whereas unmarried adult sons in China predicted high frequency of both wives' and husbands' housework.

Living with unmarried adult daughters in Taiwan was linked to an increase in husbands' cleaning the house. The impact of unmarried adult children on husbands' share also differed across societies. In China, living with unmarried adult sons and daughters (except for cleaning) was associated with an increase in husbands' share.

Different from unmarried adult children, co-residing married children were uniformly related to a decrease in wives' housework frequency across societies, while they had no significant influence on husbands' housework frequency.

The presence of a mother or a mother-in-law in a household was negatively related to husbands' cooking work in the four societies and laundry work in China. On the other hand, its effect on wives' housework differed across societies; co-residing mothers predicted the low frequency of wives' housework in South Korea but predicted more laundry work for Japanese wives. The negative effect of co-residing mothers on husbands' relative share was significant only in China.

6.7.8 Couples' Health Status

Among the three kinds of housework examined, cleaning the house was related to wives' health status and was partly related to husbands' health status. The poorer wives' health was, the less frequently they cleaned the house except for Taiwan. Chinese wives who suffered poor health also did less laundry work and their decrease in housework in response to their poor health led to a significant increase in their husbands' relative share. Chinese wives whose husbands suffered poor health did more cleaning work. Japanese husbands who suffered poor health cleaned the house less frequently and decreased their relative share in cooking as well as cleaning.

6.7.9 Urban Living and Generation

The amount and share of the cleaning work was also affected by size of community couples live in. Japanese husbands and Chinese wives who live in large cities cleaned the house more, whereas South Korean wives living in big cities did less. In Taiwan, urban living husbands prepared meals more often, which was also reflected in their larger share. Husbands' frequency of cleaning was also affected by their generation. Younger husbands tended to clean the house less often except for South Korea.

6.7.10 *Wives' Relative Share of Working Hours and Husbands' Relative Share of Housework*

Lastly, I examined the relation between wives' relative share of working hours for a paid job and husbands' relative share of housework among couples aged 20–59, living together and living apart from a mother(s) and married children in four societies using wife-report (Fig. 6.3). Those cases where both husbands and wives did not work were excluded from the analysis. The diagonal lines in the figures represent a balanced division of labor.

Husbands' relative share of housework was far below the diagonal lines, meaning that many wives performed much larger share of housework. Compared to other three societies, Japanese division of household labor was slanted most to wives' side; Japanese husbands' relative share of housework stayed very low as long as their wives worked as part-time workers (wives worked for less than 39% of couple's total working hours); even when a proportion of wives' working hours was more than 40% of the couples' total working hours, Japanese husbands shared less than 20% of the housework. On the other hand, Chinese husbands shared about 23% of the housework regardless of their wives' relative share of working hours; even when wives did not have a paid job, Chinese husbands shared 20% of the housework. Although the level of the relative share of the housework was lower than that for Chinese husbands, Taiwanese husbands also shared a certain amount



Fig. 6.3 Wives' relative share of working hours and husbands' relative share of housework (wife-report)

of housework, even when their wives' relative share of working hours was less than 10%. Chinese husbands tended to share all three kinds of housework in a similar extent, whereas Korean and Taiwanese husbands tended to share the cleaning the most.

6.8 Discussion

In this paper, I compared the division of housework in Japan, South Korea, China and Taiwan with national representative samples, and examined predictors on wives' and husbands' housework frequency, and husbands' relative share. In addition to the three major explanations of the division of housework, I examined factors which are unique to the East Asian families, such as, presence of co-residing mother(s), unmarried or married adult children, and other factors, such as wives' and husbands' health status, and size of community couples live in.

The main findings are as follows. Japanese husbands did housework far less than South Korean, Taiwan, and Chinese husbands. In China where two-thirds of couples are dual-earners and wives' working hours are the longest, both husbands' frequency and relative share of housework were the highest among the four societies. Among the three kinds of housework, wives prepared evening meals most frequently except for Taiwan; husbands cleaned the house most frequently and husbands' share was the largest except for China where husbands prepared meals the most frequently. Wives' and husbands' performance were complementary in preparing meals for which the amount of needed work is rather constant in each family. On the other hand, couples tended to share the similar standard of cleanliness, and thus wives' and husbands' frequency of cleaning the house were often positively related to each other.

Some factors were influential across societies, while some factors were society-specific; some factors were influential across three kinds of housework, while some factors were housework domain-specific. Husbands' housework frequency was associated with wives' working hours, own income (except for Japan), own working hours, and the presence of alternative resource (mother), but not with wives' income. Husbands gender role attitudes affected only in South Korea. Wives' housework frequency was strongly linked to own employment conditions (mostly own income), health status and family structure, and only weakly related to their gender role attitudes and husbands' condition except for China where wives did more as their husbands worked longer. Husbands' relative share of housework was strongly related to both wives' and husbands' working hours. In Japan it was also related to husbands' health status. In South Korea, it was related to husbands' and wives' income and weakly related to husbands' gender role attitudes. In China, it was related to wives' health status and the presence of mother.

As repeatedly pointed out in previous studies, a time availability explanation predicted husbands' relative share the most. A relative resource explanation was supported for wives' housework, but only partially supported for husbands'

absolute and relative housework. An ideological explanation was only weakly supported. Husbands' educational background functioned in a direction which an ideology rather than a resource explanation expects, but its effect was weak.

The effects of alternative resources in households differ depending on their age and marital status. Some effects were uniform, while some effects were housework domain-specific. The presence of children under 18 increased wives' laundry work. The presence of mother(s) predicted husbands' less cooking work. The amount and share of the cleaning work were affected by wives' and husbands' age, health status and the size of community couples lived in.

As a whole, although there were some similarities in predictors across societies along the three major explanations, factors which are unique to the East Asian societies also affected with some patterns. Among the four societies, the division of housework was the most egalitarian in China, but whose variances in wives' and husbands' housework were explained the least by the above analysis. This suggests the fact that Chinese husbands tend to do housework as their everyday practice which may have been formed through its historical and political background. Therefore, it may not be possible to induce some hints for other East Asian societies to increase husbands' participation in housework based on the Chinese case. The national-level gender equity did matter.

Japanese husbands' relative share of housework was mainly predicted by couples' working hours and husbands' health status; the time availability explanation fits well. On the other hand, South Korean husbands' share was predicted not only by couple's working hours but also by couples' income and husbands' gender role ideology; the three major explanations fits well. This suggests that an increase in women's wage and more egalitarian gender role attitudes among South Korean men in the future may result in an increase in husbands' share of housework. In the case of Japan, some fundamental changes in the tax system as well as the payment system for medical care and pension programs, seem to be necessary to change couples' work situations and hence to change their division of housework. Taiwanese husbands' housework share was mainly affected by wives' working hours. Since the Taiwanese data lacked information on spouses' annual earnings, we cannot conclude that the time availability alone explain the Taiwanese situation.

As Shelton and John pointed out, gender still remains a more important determinant of housework load than any other factor (1996:317). Among the present four East Asian societies, there are differences in which kind of housework wives reduced their engagement when they had less time; Japanese wives reduced their frequency of cleaning the house, while South Korean and Taiwanese wives reduced their frequency of preparing evening meals. Japanese working wives would not give up cooking but think it all right to lower the cleanliness of the house. Hiring housekeepers is still not common in Japan, but using robotic cleaners does not produce psychological resistance and their sales have been growing in the last several years.

Among the present three kinds of housework, cleaning the house has some peculiar aspects. Except for China, husbands did the cleaning the most frequently and did the most share compared with other two housework; wives' and husbands'

frequency of cleaning the house is correlated except for South Korea, based on wives' report; South Korean husbands with more education engaged in more cleaning, and Chinese husbands with more education engaged in more share of cleaning. It seems that these husbands put rooms right in their houses as they put their work right at their work places.

The present study has some limitations. Given that the data were not paired-data, there should be some gaps between wives' and husbands' perceptions. When predictors of husbands' relative share were analyzed by using wife-report data, instead of husband-report data that the present study used, there were some differences, but main results were common. In addition, there were society-specific limitations. The Taiwanese data lacked information on spouses' annual earnings. The Chinese data represented the national population which included a large proportion of the rural population, but most of the Chinese respondents who were engaged in farming were dropped from the above regression analysis because they answered that their own or spouses' working hours varied too much or can't say and did not provide specific working hours. Despite these limitations, this study is a good starting point of comparative study on the division of household labor using national samples in East Asia.

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Chapter 7
Women's Greater Independence from Family? Change and Stability in the Social Determinants of Wives' Labor Force Exit in Taiwan

Wan-chi Chen and Yu-Chun Hsieh

Abstract Labor force exit is often regarded as a negative sign for future career development. Although it is widely known that married women in East Asia are more likely to leave the labor force (temporarily or permanently) for family reasons, it is unclear how this tendency changes over time or whether family effects remain persistently strong. Taking advantage of the short-panel datasets of Manpower Utilization Quasi-Longitudinal Data (MUQLD) in Taiwan, this study explores how individual and household factors affect married women's labor force exit and whether these effects change over time. Our analysis of couple data yields several conclusions. First, women's earning capability becomes increasingly important for work decisions: the more a woman earns, the less likely she is to quit her job. This effect has grown significantly in the past two decades. Second, the husband's earning has no effect on the wife's work decisions. Third, childbirth increases the likelihood that the woman will exit the labor force. The effect of childbirth remained stable and strong from the 1990s until recent years, when the effect grew significantly more pronounced. Our findings are seemingly contradictory in the sense that women are growing both more independent from and more dependent on family. We surmise that changes in parenting culture might be the driving force behind this recent trend.

Keywords Labor force exit · Female employment · Couple data · Childbirth

7.1 Introduction

Women's employment has been widely studied in Western countries and in countries marked by late industrialization and rapid social change, most notably in East Asia. Although most East Asian societies have gone through the equalization

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of women's educational opportunities (Tsai 1994; Grant and Behrman 2010) and increasing female labor participation (Yi and Chien 2001; Brinton et al. 1995), it is rather common that women retreat from paid work temporarily or permanently after marriage or childbirth (Yu 2005, 2009; Brinton 2001). Therefore, women's labor-participation rate by age is either an M-shaped pattern or a decreasing-by-age graph (Lee and Hirata 2001; Raymo and Lim 2011). In these strong patriarchal societies, the economic contribution of married women to families is often regarded as supplementary, especially when a decent job is not available, and sometimes even unnecessary when the husband is doing well financially (Chien 2004; Yu 2009).

Existing studies from Western countries have shown that, in the context of gender equality and women's empowerment, women's labor market decisions became more sensitive to their own earnings capability in previous decades (Cohen and Binchi 1999). As career-oriented women increased numerically and proportionally, family variables, such as husband's income or the presence of a young child, became less crucial in determining women's work decisions (Cohen and Binchi 1999; Leibowitz and Klerman 1995). Research investigating the same question for East Asian societies is scarce. Scholars and policy-makers in this region regard the phenomenon of lowest-low fertility as an urgent issue to deal with (Frejka et al. 2010). According to many studies, the blame for very low fertility rests largely on traditional gender ideology that expects women to be good care-takers for family (McDonald 2000; Frejka et al. 2010). However, very few studies have explored the question of whether and why families' influence on women's work life has decreased, increased, or remained persistently strong.

Psychologists have documented how job interruptions affect health and mental well-being negatively (Baethge et al. 2015). In addition to well-being, wage is an important variable that would suffer reductions from a temporary labor force exit. The disadvantage that mothers experience regarding monetary returns often stems from the women's inferior work experience, itself caused by short-term or long-term absences from work or by reduced working hours (Waldfogel 1997; Lundberg and Rose 2000). The length of a work leave can play a pivotal role in determining the career prospects for women upon their return to the work force. A longer leave often results in a lowering of both job status and pay (Gangl and Ziefle 2009; Evertsson and Duvander 2011; Evertsson et al. 2016). Even in "woman-friendly" Sweden, the length of leave matters, as career prospects improve for women if they return to paid work sooner rather than later (Aisenbrey et al. 2009).

Like wages and mobility opportunities, job quality is an important concern. Studies from Japan and South Korea have shown that, once mothers exit the labor force, it is very difficult for them to return to a job with prospects for stability and wage growth. Many have to choose nonstandard, part-time employment that is qualitatively much worse than the employment they left prior to motherhood (Ma 2014; Shirahase 2014). Although some scholars suggest that the difficulty of balancing employment and motherhood is greater in Japan and South Korea than in

China and Taiwan (Brinton 2001; Yu 2005), there is scant literature that, from an over-time perspective, investigates the "family effect" in these regions.

In this era of women empowerment, it is reasonable to speculate that women's own earning capabilities play a more determinant role in their labor market decision than it used to be. That is, women are obtaining greater independence from family when they have the ability to decide for their own. On the other hand, the seriousness of the problem of very low fertility in East Asia[1] may reflect the persistency of heavy burdens brought by family responsibility which prevents married women from achieving better balance between family and work. It seems to suggest the possibility that the impact of childbirth or child-rearing on women's work life has been tenaciously strong.

In order to fill the gap of the literature, we are going to take a trend perspective to further understand women's retreat from paid work. Taking advantage of a series of short-panel datasets from Taiwan's labor survey, this study explores how individual and household factors affect married women's labor force exit and whether these effects change over time.

7.2 Literature Review

Married women's labor market participation implies their economic independence which is often associated with higher levels of autonomy and more bargaining power in their marriages. The significance of this topic has resulted in a great deal of research. Among the numerous studies investigating women's labor market participation, a study by Van der Lippe and Van Dijk (2002) identified three approaches: the macro approach, micro approach, and macro-micro approach. Although macro factors, such as differences in institutions, laws, or social norms across countries, affect women's opportunities to participate in the labor force, our study focuses on factors at the individual level only.

7.3 Married Women's Human Capital as Work Incentives

Existing literature has consistently shown that human capital is the most important factor accounting for married women's opportunities to participate in the labor force. Highly educated women are more likely to be employed than less educated women. This pattern is most evident in Western countries (England et al. 2004; Evertsson et al. 2007; Konietzka and Kreyenfeld 2010; Kanji 2011; Henz and Sundström 2001; Evans and Kelley 2008; Cloïn et al. 2011) and in East Asian

[1]Almost every East Asian society ranked world lowest in total fertility, including Singapore, Macau, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea and Japan.

countries (Lee and Hirata 2001; Cheung 2002; Chuang and Lee 2003). Jao and Li (2012) investigated trends in the employment of married mothers in Taiwan, arguing that educational expansion has been the main driving force.

Where panel data is available, we obtain the information of work transitions instead of simply work status at any one time point. Longitudinal survey data allows researchers to explore what factors affect women's work decisions such as job quitting. Among this type of studies, the education effect is largely the same. That is, the more human capital a woman has, the more likely she is to stay in the labor force. Analyzing the subsample of married women from the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC), Raymo and Lim (2011) stated that university graduates have a relatively lower likelihood of exiting the labor force than their less-educated counterparts. This educational difference reflects how education can give people an incentive to remain in the labor force, regardless of whether the incentive takes the form of enhanced full-time employment, better jobs, or greater job stability. Research studying Taiwan has yielded findings that indirectly support this conclusion: when transitioning into marriage or motherhood, highly-educated women have been less likely than less-educated women to quit their jobs (Chuang and Lee 2003; Chien 2004).

Higher education translates into higher earning potential and hence a higher opportunity cost accompanying a labor force exit. It is reasonable to conclude that earnings positively affect women's labor participation. Focusing on first-time mothers with co-resident partners in the United Kingdom, Kanji (2011) found that wives whose relative earnings are higher than or at least equal to their husband's are more likely to participate in full-time employment. Taking advantage of the data from Sweden's national taxation register, Henz and Sundström (2001) studied a sample of Swedish mothers and found that wives' own income had a larger and more significant effect on their labor market transition than their spouse's income. Similarly, Shafer (2011) uncovered evidence that wives' relative income is more predictive of their labor force exit than is their own or their husband's absolute income.

Most studies from Taiwan have reported a similar pattern. For instance, the higher the earning capability of married women, the less likely they are to exit the labor force (Chuang and Lin 2006). However, not all women leave their jobs for the same reasons. Chang (2006) identified diverse reasons for women's decision to quit a job and found that the higher a woman's earnings, the less likely she is to quit her job because of marriage, pregnancy, or childbirth.

In addition to education and earnings, work experience is an important indicator of women's human capital. Several studies from East Asian countries have shown that elevated work experience is negatively associated with the likelihood of labor force exit for married women (Chuang and Lee 2003; Chuang and Lin 2006; Lee and Hirata 2001).

7.4 Married Women's Family Concerns as Work Interruptions

Whereas women's own human capital provides them incentives to remain in the workforce, family-related reasons often incentivize movement in the opposite direction, increasing the probability of work interruptions or permanent withdrawal from the workforce. Numerous studies have recorded that the presence of children (especially young children or large numbers of children) is associated with a reduction in hours worked as well as an increase in the likelihood of a labor force exit among married women (Shafer 2011; Lundberg and Rose 2000; England et al. 2004; Henz and Sundström 2001; Evans and Kelley 2008). To estimate the causal effect of children on female labor supply more accurately, Cristia (2008) adopted a delicate analytical design and concluded that having a first child reduces female employment by 26% points.

The extent to which pregnancy and childbirth shape women's career trajectories might be even larger in East Asian countries than in the West. Research—especially in Japan and South Korea—has rigorously documented the well-known M-shaped pattern showing that women's labor force participation is high both before marriage or childbirth and after late midlife but drops sharply in the late twenties or thirties owing to child-rearing responsibilities (Lee and Hirata 2001; Raymo and Lim 2011).

Using labor-survey data from China, Zhang et al. (2008) showed that the observed gender gaps in employment status and earnings can be explained chiefly by marital status and parenthood. In other words, women's disadvantage in earnings comes mainly from work interruptions due to family-related factors. As in Western countries, the presence of young children and the presence of large numbers of children are associated with low levels of labor force participation and with high levels of job departure in such East Asian regions as Japan (Raymo and Lim 2011; Yu 2005), Hong Kong (Cheung 2002), and Taiwan (Chuang and Lee 2003; Chuang and Lin 2006).

Just as child-rearing can "pull" married women back home, so too can the family-related factor of household income (or husband's income). Economists call this phenomenon the "income effect" (Goldin 2006). If a husband has a high income, his wife would be less compelled to work than she would be if his income were low. In other words, the lower a husband's earnings, the greater the "push" of the wife into the labor market for a supplementary income. For example, Evans and Kelley (2008) analyzed panel data from Australia and concluded that, in general, a husband's income reduces the extent of his wife's workforce engagement, although the effect is somewhat weak.

Past studies from East Asia have provided a largely consistent picture of these factors' effects on wives' workforce engagement. In Japan, housewives' absence from the labor force used to be an indicator of family wealth (Kohara 2007). A recent study by Wu and Zhou (2015) investigated urban China, showing that women's labor force participation had become more responsive to incomes from

other family members and that the poorer a woman's family, the more likely she was to join the labor force. In a similar logic, Huang et al. (2012) studied the case of Taiwan and showed that labor-market inactive wives respond to husbands' unemployment by higher likelihood of labor force entry. A literature review by Chuang and Lee (2003) concluded that, in Taiwan, the husband's earnings were negatively associated with the wife's labor force participation.

7.5 Increasing Independence or Persistent Interference?

The literature reviewed above discusses how married women's own human capital and family-related factors affect their labor market participation. However, given the world's rapidly increasing rates of female labor participation, these effects might vary over time.

Analyzing CPS data, U.S. researchers concluded that women's labor supply had become more sensitive to their own earning opportunities and less sensitive to those of their husbands (Cohen and Bianchi 1999). In other words, access to other incomes, primarily earnings from a spouse, exerts a downward pressure on women's allocation of time to paid work. Furthermore, researchers found that, in the United States, infants up to 3-months old became less of a barrier to employment between 1971 and 1990 (Leibowitz and Klerman 1995).

Economists tackling the same issue in the context of the United States have provided slightly different answers. Blau and Kahn (2007) reported a dramatic decrease in women's own wage elasticity over the 1980–2000 period as well as a long-term trend toward declines in the magnitude of spouses' wage elasticity. That is to say, whether women chose to work or not became less and less dependent over time on both their own income and spousal income. The results fit interpretations proposed by Goldin (1990, 2006), who argued that married women's employment had gradually shifted from "jobs" to "careers" for the past few decades, possibly reflecting increasing divorce rates and the increasing career orientation of women at that time. Outside of the United States, Henz and Sundström (2001) studied trends among Swedish mothers. The authors found that mothers' own income has a more significant effect on their work choice than spouses' earnings and that the effect of the latter had actually declined over time.

The literature mentioned above might give the impression that, since the 1970s, married women have become more career-oriented and independent from family influence than those from farther back in the past. However, when the determinant centers on the presence of young children, the pattern of change seems to be somewhat different. Evans and Kelley (2008) tackled this issue in the context of Australia and drew two conclusions: first, the presence of young children greatly reduces women's labor force participation, and second, there is no significant decline in children's effect over time. Berghammer (2014) accounted for educational level before investigating this trend in Austria, yielding a rather surprising

conclusion—there had been a return of the male-breadwinner model among highly educated women with infants or preschoolers.

Although there has been a great deal of research on the topic of female labor participation in East Asia, studies concerning the possible changes in or stability of related social determinants are scarce. Using survey and census data, Wu and Zhou (2015) estimated the key factors affecting women's labor supply in urban China between 1990 and 2010. The authors found that, since 2003, female labor participation had become more and more responsive to incomes from other family members. In other words, spouses' income effect had become stronger over time. The authors speculated that the steady increase in female labor participation since 2003 in urban China may have been driven by the surge of living costs (e.g., housing, education, and healthcare). Kohara (2007) focused on the case of Japan, reporting that husbands' income had a rather weak effect on wives' employment in 1993 and that this effect has become insignificant in 1996.

Since 1990, the literature on factors affecting women's labor participation around the world have provided mixed results: research from the 1990s provided a picture of married women's growing independence, as their work choice was determined more by their own capability than by family conditions; by contrast, more recent studies have reported that the influence of family on these women's work choices has either stabilized or even grown. A no less important point is that research investigating family effects on women's labor force participation is far sparser in East Asia than in the West. We hope that the present study can help fill this gap in the literature.

7.6 Data and Method

7.6.1 Data

Data for this study come from Manpower Utilization Quasi-Longitudinal Data (MUQLD), which cover the 1990–2014 period and which constitute an extension of Taiwan's most frequently used labor-survey data—Manpower Utilization Survey (MUS). The MUS, conducted annually by the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) for the Executive Yuan, is a nationally representative household-based survey that collects labor market information on household members age fifteen and above in Taiwan. The execution of the MUS is based on a rotation scheme in which half the interviewed households receive a follow-up survey the next year. In order to facilitate empirical research, the Survey Research Data Archive (SRDA) of Academia Sinica took advantage of this sampling design and constructed MUQLD by linking together the individuals repeatedly surveyed across 2 years in an MUS series.

There are several reasons for our use of this dataset in the present study. First, using households as sampling units, the MUS contains abundant information on the

work status and the demographic variables of each member in a household. Thus, for each marriage we have been able to match the spouses with each other and to obtain important information on them both as a couple and as individuals. Second, the MUQLD's 2-year short panel has enabled us to estimate how both the personal capital of married women and the relevant features of the women's households affected their labor-participation choice. Third, the MUS has been conducted annually for the past three decades and, in this regard, is a reliable source for observing two important phenomena: the overtime trend of labor market behavior or outcomes and the effects of related social determinants.

MUS data collected before 1987 do not contain "number of children" information. Also, the data from 1988 and 1989 might be less reliable than the data from other years owing to a noticeable surfeit of errors on child-related variables during these two consecutive years. These problems explain our decision to abandon pre-1989 data and to focus on the period extending from 1990 to 2014. For each 2-year short-panel dataset, we identified married couples by using the variable "relationship to household head" and, therefore, obtained a series of short-panel couple data. In other words, for any given married couple, their individual demographic information and labor market information are available for two consecutive years.

Our analytic subsample comprises records on married women who were under the age of 50 and who were in the labor force in the first-year survey. The age restriction underscores one of the main focuses in this study: the effects that childbirth or the presence of young children can have on female employment. Table 7.1 lists sample sizes for each set of 2-year panel data (the first column from the right); 14 datasets are available covering the 1990–2014 period. The total sample consists of 43,870 observations.

It is worth noting that, although "unpaid contributing family workers" are often associated with one type of labor market participation, we chose to exclude this category from the current study. Only paid work counts when the rate of female labor participation is calculated. From the second column on the left in Table 7.1, we can see that the percentage of married women working for pay was 36.3% in 1990, which gradually increased to 55.8% in 2013. The second column on the right in the same table reveals that the percentage of working married women leaving the labor force was 17.6% between 1990 and 1991. Twenty-four years later, this percentage had dropped to 5.5%.

7.6.2 Variables

Table 7.2 presents information on the summary statistics of the datasets' variables. What follows is a description of each variable.

Leave Labor Force in the 2nd Year: As mentioned above, since the main focus of our current study is labor force exit, we restricted our sample to married women who worked for pay in the first year. About 11% of working married women quit

Table 7.1 Married women's labor market participation in Taiwan, 1990–2014

Survey year	All married women		Working married women	
	% working 1st year[a]	N	% leave labor force[b]	N
1990–1991	36.3	3,791	17.6	1,372
1991–1992	36.5	4,227	16.7	1,540
1992–1993	38.2	4,110	16.5	1,568
1993–1994	39.7	4,594	16.5	1,820
1994–1995	40.2	4,187	16.5	1,681
1995–1996	41.1	4,889	16.7	2,006
1996–1997	43.1	4,174	14.7	1,791
1997–1998	43.1	5,028	11.7	2,160
1998–1999	42.3	4,291	11.4	1,809
1999–2000	44.3	4,779	11.2	2,108
2000–2001	44.2	4,040	11.5	1,777
2001–2002	46.6	4,576	11.9	2,122
2002–2003	46.6	4,532	10.1	2,109
2003–2004	47.7	4,115	9.2	1,956
2004–2005	49.7	4,063	8.2	2,014
2005–2006	48.4	3,668	7.4	1,771
2006–2007	51.4	3,828	9.5	1,963
2007–2008	53.1	3,900	7.5	2,066
2008–2009	52.2	3,467	9.2	1,807
2009–2010	52.8	3,538	6.6	1,852
2010–2011	54.4	3,153	7.9	1,707
2011–2012	53.5	3,167	6.3	1,691
2012–2013	53.5	3,123	6.5	1,667
2013–2014	55.8	2,717	5.5	1,513
Total	45.8	95,957	11.0	43,870

Data Source Couple data constructed from 2-year panel datasets of Manpower Utilization Quasi-Longitudinal Data (MUQLD), 1990–2014

[a]Labor market participation refers to paid work only. Percentage working does not include unpaid contributing family workers

[b]Parental leave is not regarded as labor force exit

their paid jobs at some point between the start of the first year and the end of the second year. It is worth noting that "parental leave" is categorized as "currently working" because it does not involve quitting a job and should not count as leaving the labor force.[2]

[2]The original question for the construction of "currently working for pay" is "Did you work last week?" We coded the category "have a job but did not work last week" as "yes, working for pay" because such a scenario is indicative usually of a temporary absence from work for reasons such as sickness or vacation.

Table 7.2 Summary statistics of working married women, 1990–2014 (N = 43,870)

	Mean or %	S.D.	Min	Max
Leave labor force in the 2nd year	11.0%	–	–	–
Wife's monthly wages (NTD)	27,573.2	16,740.7	1	600,007
Husband's monthly wages (NTD)	36,384.4	28,848.0	0	999,999
Number of kids under 6	0.4	0.7	0	6
Childbirth	9.6%	–	–	–
Wife's years of schooling	11.2	3.5	0	21
Husband's years of schooling	11.8	3.5	0	21
Age	37.6	6.8	16	49
Age group				
15–24	2.6%	–	–	–
25–29	11.1%	–	–	–
30–34	20.0%	–	–	–
35–39	24.3%	–	–	–
40–44	23.5%	–	–	–
45–50	18.7%	–	–	–
Survey year	–	–	1990	2013

Data Source Couple data constructed from the series of 2-year panel data of Manpower Utilization Quasi-Longitudinal Data (MUQLD), 1990–2014

Monthly Wages: Both a wife's and a husband's monthly wages refer to wages from the first-year survey. The condition of "under deficit" has been coded as one. We conducted a log transformation of monthly wages in the analyses. Therefore, we recoded the wages of the given husband into one to prevent observation dropping.

Child-Related Variables: There are two variables involving information on children. One variable concerns the number of kids under 6 years of age in the first year. The other variable, childbirth, rests on the information concerning total number of children each year. It can be assumed that any increase in child number from year one to year two most likely resulted from childbirth. About 9.6% of working married women experienced childbirth from the first to the second year.

Control Variables: Variables to be controlled in the analyses include each wife's years of schooling, each husband's years of schooling, dummy variables for age groups, and survey years. All control variables refer to the information from the first-year survey. In subsequent analyses, which include interaction terms between survey years and the targeted variables, survey years will be centered on the beginning of the observed period.

7.6.3 Analytical Strategies

First of all, we divided total samples into five subsamples according to the timing of the survey's first year. Every 5 years form a survey period. We ran a logistic regression separately for each survey period so that we could observe how large the independent variable's effect was on married women's labor force exit and whether or not these effects might change over the five survey periods. Of course, such an analysis—by itself—cannot yield sufficient answers to the question of whether or not the coefficients across models statistically differ from one another.

In the next step of our analyses, we thus pooled all subsamples together. By adding interaction terms, we tested whether the effects of women's own human capital or family-related factors on labor market exit varied over time.

7.7 Results

7.7.1 Both Personal Earnings and Childbirth are Crucial

Using survey periods consisting of 5-year blocs, Table 7.3 displays logistic regression analyses of labor force exit for working married women. Overall, the most stable significant effects on this labor force exit during each survey period came from two sources: women's own earnings and childbirth.

As displayed in Table 7.3, the higher a woman's own monthly income in the first year, the less likely she was to exit the labor market in the second year. The coefficients varied across periods but seemed to increase over the past two decades. We set out to test whether the effect changed over time. In contrast with wives' own earnings, husbands' monthly income had no effect on their respective wives' labor market exit for any of the survey periods. This result is in line with existing literature, most of which reported either that husbands' income was noticeably weaker than wives' own earnings or that the income effect was insignificant (Evans and Kelley 2008; Kohara 2007).

Then we come to the presence of children. Although existing studies often reported that the presence of young children reduces women's active participation in the labor market, Table 7.3 shows no significant effect of the number of children under 6 years of age on labor force exit. This startling difference in reported findings is probably a reflection of our research design and sample restrictions. If a mother with at least one young child remained in the labor force in the first year of the survey, she likely did so because she had already made satisfactory childcare arrangements. Therefore, the number of kids under 6 years of age was not associated with labor market exit in the following year.

In contrast, childbirth between year one and year two played a significant role in women's labor market exit. Although the coefficients appear to have been slightly up and down across the first four survey periods, they were as a matter of fact more

Table 7.3 Logistic regression of labor force exit for working married women in Taiwan, 1990–2014

Variable[a]	Survey periods (by survey year)					Total
	1990–1994	1995–1999	2000–2004	2005–2009	2010–2013	
Wife's own log wage	−0.52***	−0.39***	−0.38***	−0.88***	−0.85***	−0.49***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.03)
Husband's log wages	−0.01	−0.01	−0.00	−0.00	−0.01	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Number of kids under 6	−0.02	−0.06	−0.05	0.01	0.01	−0.03
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.02)
Childbirth	0.46***	0.31***	0.39***	0.32*	0.68***	0.40***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.05)
Wife's own years of schooling	−0.07***	−0.10***	−0.07***	−0.08***	−0.02	−0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Husband's years of schooling	−0.06***	−0.04**	−0.03	−0.02	−0.01	−0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Constant	5.02***	4.18***	3.32***	8.10***	7.11***	4.75***
	(0.53)	(0.51)	(0.50)	(0.88)	(1.22)	(0.28)
N	7981	9874	9978	9459	6578	43870
χ^2 (df)	405.22 (15)	452.76 (15)	265.07 (15)	294.40 (15)	147.07 (14)	1996.79 (34)

*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; standard errors in parentheses

[a]All models also control age groups (six categories) and survey years in the form of dummy variables

stable while comparing with the large effect in the 2010–2013 survey period. Does this relative stability indicate that the effect of childbirth on mothers' labor force exit dramatically increased in recent years? We decided to test this possibility in our subsequent analyses.

7.7.2 *The Growing Importance of Women's Own Earnings for Work Decisions*

Pooling subsamples together from different survey periods, Table 7.4 presents the results of our logistic regression regarding labor force exit in the second year among working married women. The coefficient of the survey year in M1 (−0.06) shows that married women were more and more likely to remain in the labor market over time—a trend we had already observed in Table 7.1. This coefficient reduces to −0.02 in M2, indicating that the trend can be largely explained by women's increasing human capital (education and earnings) and by family-related factors. This conclusion is consistent with a recent study by Jao and Li (2012), who argued that educational expansion is crucial for increasing female employment.

Table 7.4 Logistic regression of labor force exit among working married women, 1990–2014: changes in the effect of own wages (N = 43,870)

Variable[a]	M1	M2	M3
Survey year[b]	−0.06*** (0.00)	−0.02*** (0.00)	0.10* (0.04)
Wife's own log wage		−0.47*** (0.03)	−0.37*** (0.05)
Husband's log wage		−0.00 (0.00)	−0.01 (0.01)
Number of kids under 6		−0.02 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)
Childbirth		0.41*** (0.05)	0.40*** (0.08)
Wife's own log wage × Survey year			−0.01** (0.00)
Husband's log wage × Survey year			0.00 (0.00)
Childbirth × Survey year			0.00 (0.01)
Wife's own years of schooling		−0.08*** (0.01)	−0.08*** (0.01)
Husband's years of schooling		−0.04*** (0.01)	−0.04*** (0.01)
Constant	−1.49*** (0.03)	4.73*** (0.27)	3.77** (0.45)
χ^2 (df)	570.67 (1)	1931.63 (12)	1939.90 (15)

*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; Standard errors in parentheses
[a]All models also control age groups (six categories) in the form of dummy variables
[b]Survey year is centered on the beginning year, 1990

By integrating interaction terms into the model, M3 in Table 7.4 covers our analysis of whether the effects of either women's personal factors or family-related factors on labor force exit changed over time. The coefficient of the interaction term between wife's own income and survey year is negative and significant, indicating that income became increasingly important in determining wives' employment decisions over the two decades.

Regarding M3, we also found that neither husband's income nor childbirth changed over time. However, M3 rests on the possibly incorrect assumption that the independent variables would have a linearly decreasing effect, a linearly increasing, or a stable effect on women's labor force exit over time. Moreover, the effect of childbirth on women's employment seems to have decreased from the 1990s to the 2000s before sharply increasing.

7.7.3 The Spike in Childbirth's Effect on Women's Labor Force Exit

A few recent studies have suggested that the effect of young children on mothers' employment has been either stable or even increasing (Evans and Kelley 2008; Berghammer 2014). In the case of Taiwan, the question is this: do we have enough evidence to say that childbirth's effects on mothers' careers has been exhibiting a reverse trend? In order to test the possibility that childbirth's effects on female

Table 7.5 Logistic regression of labor force exit among working married women, 1990–2014: changes in the effect of childbirth

Variable[a]	1990–2007 (N = 33,633)			2008–2013 (N = 10,237)		
	A1	A2	A3	B1	B2	B3
Survey year[a]	−0.06*** (0.00)	−0.01*** (0.00)	0.10 (0.06)	−0.09*** (0.02)	−0.07** (0.02)	−0.67 (0.49)
Wife's own log wage		−0.45*** (0.03)	−0.36*** (0.05)		−0.69*** (0.10)	−0.81*** (0.14)
Husband's log wage		−0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)		0.00 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.02)
Number of kids under 6		−0.02 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)		−0.02 (0.07)	−0.02 (0.07)
Childbirth		0.39*** (0.05)	0.47*** (0.09)		0.52*** (0.13)	0.09 (0.23)
Wife's own log wage × Survey year			−0.01* (0.01)			0.06 (0.05)
Husband's log wages × Survey year			0.00 (0.00)			0.00 (0.01)
Childbirth × Survey year			−0.01 (0.01)			0.18* (0.08)
Wife's own years of schooling		−0.08*** (0.01)	−0.08*** (0.01)		−0.05* (0.02)	−0.05* (0.02)
Husband's years of schooling		−0.04*** (0.01)	−0.04*** (0.01)		−0.03 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.02)
Constant	−1.47*** (0.03)	4.58*** (0.28)	3.75*** (0.49)	−2.37*** (0.06)	6.11*** (0.92)	7.42*** (1.42)
χ^2 (df)	324.17 (1)	1489.50 (12)	1495.20 (15)	15.50 (1)	230.23 (12)	237.69 (15)

*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; Standard errors in parentheses

[a]All models also control age groups (six categories) in the form of dummy variables. Survey year is centered on the beginning year, 1990 and 2008 respectively

employment in Taiwan first decreased and later increased, we repeated the same analysis from Table 7.3, only this time not by survey periods, but by survey years. We compared the results for each survey year and found that the lowest value (i.e., the smallest coefficient of childbirth) occurred in 2007 and 2008 (results not shown). Therefore, we used this timing as the cut-off point, dividing the total sample into two parts: one part covering the period from 1990 to 2007, and the other part covering the period from 2008 to 2013. Table 7.5 presents the results.

The results displayed in the left-hand panel of Table 7.5 are similar to the conclusion that we drew from the analysis associated with Table 7.4. Working married women's own earnings are the most important factor accounting for these women's tendency to remain in the labor market. This effect of own human capital grew in strength in the 1990s and 2000s. As for the other crucial factor, childbirth, it significantly increased the likelihood of mothers' withdrawal from the labor force at almost all times. The effect of childbirth remains stable and persistently strong since the coefficient of the interaction term between childbirth and survey year was not significant.

Of special interest are the results presented in the right-hand panel of Table 7.5. As shown in B3 in Table 7.5, we found that the effect of childbirth on mothers' work decisions sharply increased between 2008 and 2014. The coefficient of the interaction term between childbirth and survey year is positive and significant, with a large coefficient size.[3]

7.8 Discussion and Conclusion

Abundant research by sociologists and labor economists has helped us understand how married women in East Asian countries compromise when family and work collide. Although we know that it is rather common for married women in this region to withdraw from the labor force (temporarily or permanently) owing to family reasons, we are not familiar with how the tendency changes or whether family effects remain as strong as decades ago. Taking advantage of a series of short-panel datasets (Manpower Utilization Quasi-Longitudinal Data, or MUQLD) over the 1990–2014 period, this study has explored how individual and household factors affected married women's labor force exit and whether these effects changed over time.

Our analysis of short-panel couple data has yielded several conclusions. First, women's earnings capability became increasingly important for their labor market decisions. The more a woman earned, the more likely she was to choose to remain in the labor market. This effect grew significantly in the last two decades of the

[3]Did the childbirth effect observed here vary according to respondents' earnings or education? We went back to the last model in Table 3 (i.e., 2010–2013) to repeat the analysis after having added interaction terms. It turns out that the strong childbirth effect between 2010 and 2013 did not vary according to either women's earning levels or education levels (results not shown).

period. Second, husbands' earnings were not associated with wives' retreat from paid work in the second year. Third, childbirth increased the likelihood of a woman's labor force exit; the effect of childbirth on a change in mothers' employment status remained persistently strong from the 1990s through the 2000s. Furthermore, the effect of childbirth spiked dramatically in the period's final years.

At first glance, our findings portray two seemingly contradictory trends. The first and second aforementioned conclusions—that a woman's own earnings capability increasingly determined whether or not she would leave the labor force and that a husband's earnings had little to no effect on his wife's decision to quit her job—imply rising independence among women in the age of female empowerment. However, the third conclusion—that childbirth's effect on married women's career trajectories not only endured but in fact spiked in the period's final years—harkens back to traditional gender models. In short, the former conclusions are what we would have predicted and are consistent with existing literature, but the latter conclusion is somewhat surprising.

In an era when most of us expect trends to shift toward greater gender equality as regards the sharing of child-rearing responsibilities, do the results obtained in this study signify a generally unanticipated return to a traditional gender division within households? How should we interpret these results? We think that they might be significantly related to two notable trends: changes in parenting cultures and the expansion of welfare benefits.

First of all, the culture of East Asian parenting might be broadening its patterns along Western middle-class lines. Several studies reported that parents nowadays have been investing more time in child-rearing than did their parents and grandparents in previous decades (Bianchi 2000; Sandberg and Hofferth 2001). Using cross-country data, Gauthier et al. (2004) indicated that parent–child activities, such as playing, accounted for most of this overall increase in time spent on childcare. The series of studies investing parental time spent on children provides us important insights into the international trends that underlie the evolution of parenting cultures.

Other important insights have emerged in a slew of qualitative studies. For example, as is well-known, Lareau (2003) developed the concept of "concerted cultivation," referring to a parenting style that is marked by parents' effort to foster their children's talents through the incorporation of organized activities into the children's lives. Although the original purpose of developing this concept was mainly to distinguish the parenting styles of middle-class parents from those of working-class parents in the United States, similar parenting styles have been observed across countries. According to one recent study, many present-day parents in Taiwan, especially middle-class parents, have been rejecting traditional, authoritarian parenting in favor of Western-style practices that emphasize everyday parent–child bonding and that can help pass cultural capital from the parents to the children (Lan 2014).

We surmise that the trend of changing parenting cultures around the world might play a role in the growing importance of childbirth's effect on women's career decisions. As they place greater emphasis on parenting practices, contemporary

parents are getting more involved in their children's everyday lives. Indeed, valuing the importance of parent-child interaction does not necessarily lead to mothers' withdrawal from paid work after childbirth. However, it is highly likely that social climate affects women's temporary family–work arrangements to some extent.

The other trend that might help explain our results is the expansion of welfare benefits, especially those related to parental leave over the past few years. As we have described in the "data and method" section, the construction of our analyses' independent variable (leaving the labor force in the second year) excluded mothers who were on parental leave. Given that this exclusion is in place, why do we argue that family-friendly governmental welfare policies might be associated with the trend of increasing childbirth impact on women's work decision? It is because we speculate that welfare benefits, such as parental leave with pay which encourage women's job interruption, might reinforce the pattern.

Although the original intention of family-friendly governmental welfare policies was to reduce family–work conflicts and to alleviate some of the burdens of child-rearing, not all types of these welfare benefits have helped shape a more gender-egalitarian environment. Existing studies have indicated that, whereas the expansion of public childcare programs tends to be beneficial, longer parental leave may not. Analyzing data from 19 countries, Pettit and Hook (2005) found that parental leave has an inverted U-shaped relationship with the effects of young children on women's employment. Extended-leave provisions actually do not help keep women attached to the paid labor force. Another study adopting a similar analytical design revealed that gender divisions in housework are more unequal in nations where parental leave is long (Hook 2010).

Current evidence suggests that extensions of parental leave can promote traditional—and, thus, unequal—gender divisions in household work. Parental-leave policies reinforce a parenting culture that prioritizes family over work and may have a greater effect on mothers than on fathers because most societies still expect women to be the major care-takers of children. Particularly in the social-media era, parenting cultures can quickly gain prominence when spread across social strata. We speculate that such policies affect not only mothers who choose to be on short-term parental leave but also those who are encouraged to take a longer break than the length of paid parental leave due to social climate or peer behaviors.

In conclusion, although both the evolution of parenting cultures and the expansion of welfare benefits help explain the growing effects of childbirth on women's work decisions, readers should avoid generalizing: a few years of observations cannot serve as a rigorous basis for asserting that a brand new era of parenting practices and child-rearing behaviors has established itself. The overall issue is an important one and the current study's findings merit attention, but much more research is needed before the existence of broader trends can be asserted with any degree of confidence.

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Part IV
Family and Work: Reconciliation, Wellbeing and Frustration

Chapter 8
Effect of Mothers' Nonstandard Work Hours on Children's Wellbeing in Japan

Akiko Sato Oishi

Abstract Despite concerns over inequality of children's well-being, an increasing proportion of mothers work nonstandard hours. However, the effects of such work on the well-being of children is poorly understood in Japan. In the present study, analysis of time use data confirmed a rising proportion of mothers working nonstandard hours in the period of 2001–2006. Single mothers were found to be more likely to work nonstandard hours than their married counterparts. While educational aspirations for their children affect a single mother's decision to work nonstandard hours, economic hardship was identified as a major determinant for married mothers. In Japan, a mother's time spent with her children and her frequency of having dinner together with her children decrease if she works in the evening, and the magnitude of the decrease was found to be larger for single mothers. These findings suggest that prevalence of nonstandard work hours among mothers may have detrimental effects on their time spent with their children.

Keywords Time use · Nonstandard work · Single mother · Economic hardship · Parent-children's relations

8.1 Background

In the past few decades, many societies have transformed from industrial and post-industrial economies to service economies, which Presser (2003) called the "24/7 economy." This economic shift has increased consumer demand for continuously available services, which require more around-the-clock workers than does the manufacturing based industry. As a result, a considerable proportion of people worldwide work in the evenings, nights, and weekends. Presser (2003) showed that 40% of the American labor force works mostly in the evenings,

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overnight, on rotating or variable shifts, or on weekends. In 13 European Union countries, 9.7–22.2% of all employees work evening and night hours (Presser 2003). In Australia, 25.2% of workers regularly work weekends and 14.6% regularly work some form of shift work (Dockery et al. 2009). Japan is no exception to these other countries in work hours. There has been a noteworthy increase in the amount of employees working late nights and early mornings since the mid-1990s (Kuroda and Yamamoto 2012).

With the prevalence of the 24/7 economy, more people have come to face conflicting needs from their family life and work schedules. This conflict is more prominent for parents with young children because day care centers and schools operate on a traditional work schedule. This raises concerns regarding the potential impact of parents' nonstandard work hours on children's well-being. In fact, studies in the US have shown significant associations between parents' nonstandard hours of work and negative influence on a child's well-being (Li et al. 2014).

This issue is more important for single-mother families because single mothers are more likely to work nonstandard hours. Additionally, single mothers have less time and money to spend on children compared with their married counterparts. Furthermore, not only in the US, but also in Japan, the gap in time spent with children between single-parent families and two-parent families has widened in the past few decades (Fox et al. 2013; Tamiya and Shikata 2007, 2010). Despite the growing concern over inequality in children's well-being in Japan, there have been no studies that explicitly focused on mothers' nonstandard work schedules and their possible effect on time spent with children.[1]

Therefore, using a unique survey that comprised single and married mothers in Japan, this study: (1) examined major features of nonstandard work hours of mothers, (2) explored factors influencing the decision to work nonstandard hours by examining the difference between single and married mothers, and (3) looked at how mothers' nonstandard work hours affect the time they spend on their children.

The major findings of this study are as follows. First, single mothers are more likely to work nonstandard hours than their married counterparts. Second, factors affecting the decision to work nonstandard hours differ between single and married mothers. Logistic regression results indicated a higher probability of married mothers working during the night time if they have economic hardship, while single mothers' probability to work nonstandard hours increase if they aspire for university education for their oldest child. For both single and married mothers, working nonstandard hours results in reduced time spent with their children and lower frequency of having dinner together. The magnitude of the effects of mothers' working nonstandard hours on time spent with their children was larger for single-mother households than two-parent households.

[1]Using the same data set (NSHC), Raymo et al. (2014) analyzed the time mothers in Japan spend with their children. While their main focus was the effect of living arrangements and support from grandparents, they did not identify the mothers' working times.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 overviews the relevant literature on this topic, describing institutional factors associated with nonstandard work hours in Japan. Sections 8.3 and 8.4 explain the method and results of empirical analysis on mothers' decisions to work nonstandard hours, and the effect of such work choices on time spent with children. Section 8.5 provides the conclusions of this study.

8.2 Conceptual Framework and Institutional Background

8.2.1 Motivation for Concern About Mothers' Nonstandard Work Hours

To address the reason why we should care mothers' nonstandard work hours, the theory of household production by Gronau (1973) and other theoretical contributions by economists and sociologists were used in this study. In Gronau's model, parents allocate their time on market work, home production, and leisure. Parents engage in home production, such as child care and home-made meals, using their time, market goods, and services as inputs (e.g., meat and vegetables when cooking). Equivalents of home-produced goods and services can be purchased from the market, such as pre-prepared foods and day care.

From the viewpoint of children, their well-being and human capital depend on the amount of goods and services, and the length of time that their parents spent with them (Becker and Tomes 1976). Therefore, an increase in parents' time allocated for market work does not necessarily decrease their children's well-being if less time spent with children by parents is compensated by an increase in market goods and services purchased for children. However, some of the market goods are considered to be imperfect substitutes for home-produced goods and services (Connelly and Kimmel 2010). An example of this situation is that high-quality child care services are rarely available in the middle of the night and early morning. Even when these services are available, children may not feel safety and comfort comparable with that which they enjoy with their parents.

Moreover, parents working nonstandard hours may deteriorate the quality of time spent with children at home in a negative manner through an elevated stress level of parents. Studies have shown that women who work nonstandard schedules are more likely to report lack of sleeping, higher levels of work-to-family conflict (Maume and Sebastian 2012; Tuttle and Garr 2012), and low marital quality (Maume and Sebastian 2012). Another study showed that maternal nonstandard work schedules are associated with lower sensitivity of mothers, and reduced stimulation and support for children in the home environment (Grzywacz et al. 2011). Such evidence suggests that parents working nonstandard hours may have detrimental effects on children's well-being and development, thus leading to poorer outcomes of children. In fact, an increasing number of studies in the US and

other Western countries have investigated how nonstandard work schedules of parents affect children's outcomes, such as their behavioral problems, cognitive capability, and health (Li et al. 2014).

With regard to children's behavioral problems, research in the US and Canada has shown that young children with at least one parent who works nonstandard schedules have more emotional and behavioral problems compared with those whose parents work standard schedules (Strazdins et al. 2004, 2006; Joshi and Bogen 2007). Han (2008) found that behavioral problems among school-age children increase with the number of years that mothers have worked nonstandard schedules. With regard to adolescents, the mothers' number of years working night shifts are linked to a higher risk of misbehavior, such as smoking, drinking, drug use, delinquency, and sexual activity (Han et al. 2010).

With regard to cognitive capability, children of mothers who work nonstandard hours in their first year of life tend to have poorer cognitive results 2 or 3 years later (Han 2005). A study that used data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth showed that school-age children's low academic achievements, such as reading scores and math skills, are linked to the number of years that mothers worked nonstandard hours (Han and Fox 2011).

Other studies have examined the association between mothers' nonstandard work hours and children's mental and physical health. In Australia, Dockery et al. (2009) found a negative impact of parents working nonstandard hours on adolescents' mental health as measured by the SF-36 mental health summary score. In the US, Han and Miller (2009) showed that years of maternal night shifts and paternal evening shifts were associated with higher adolescent depression. With regard to physical health, researchers have often focused on a link between parents' (especially mother's) work hours and childhood obesity (Brown et al. 2010). If a mother's work hours interfere with healthy mealtimes, this may result in children's weight gain. This weight gain occurs through a greater reliance on energy-dense fast food and pre-prepared food, later mealtimes, or more snacking and television watching by children (Miller and Han 2008; Brown et al. 2010). Recent analyses have demonstrated that children face a higher risk of overweight or obesity if their parents work nonstandard hours (Miller and Han 2008; Champion et al. 2012).

Compared with a large amount of literature in Western countries, there have been few studies in Japan that investigated the association between parental nonstandard work hours and the well-being of children. An increasing number of Japanese researchers have examined the effect of the *length* of mothers' work hours on children's well-being and outcomes. However, no studies have focused on mothers' *timing* of work or their work schedules.

8.2.2 Reasons for Working Nonstandard Hours

Despite the pioneering work of Winston (1982), the issue of the timing of work had attracted little attention from economists until Hamermesh (1999) provided

theoretical background of why people are motivated to work nonstandard hours. The basic idea of Hamermesh's model is based on the theory of compensating wage differentials by Rosen (1986). People are assumed to have heterogeneous desires for the timing of work. Each individual has a different reservation wage, and even for the same individual, the reservation wage varies according to the time of day. On the other hand, firms have different costs of offering work at various times of the day. There is also the assumption that there are some times of the day that are viewed as undesirable by relatively more workers than what firms would require to maximize profit. Therefore, firms pay a wage premium to attract a sufficient number of workers at these time periods. In this case, workers whose reservation wage at a particular time is lower will be more likely to be at work than otherwise identical workers.

Theoretical predictions from Hamermesh's model are that, among a cross-section of workers, those with less human capital and those who are in poorer households are more likely to work at undesirable times because their reservation wages are lower. In the case of mothers, those who have less education and skills, fewer young children to care for, and a lower household income will be motivated by a wage premium to work nonstandard hours.

8.2.3 Laws Related to Long Working Hours

Before discussing empirical analysis, three institutional factors that are associated with long working hours of Japanese employees are described as follows. The first factor is the absence of law that sets the effective limit of working hours. The Labor Standard Act in Japan prohibits employers from employing workers exceeding daily and weekly statutory working hours, which are currently set at 40 h per week and 8 h per day. However, under the provision of Agreement 36 (*Saburoku Kyotei* in Japanese), if employers and employee representatives agree, this limit can be waived, which is usually the case in Japan. Under Agreement 36, employers can allow their employees to work overtime for up to 45 h per month and 360 h per year. Moreover, if the employer and employee representative can agree on including a "special clause" to Agreement 36, there should virtually be no limit for overtime. According to MyNews Japan, a Japanese magazine, globally famous companies, such as Sony, Nintendo, and Nikon, unanimously set the limit of overtime hours at 1,500 h per year (Mynews Japan 2016).

With regard to the second institutional factor, there has been a gradual reduction in statutory working hours since the late 1980s. This process started by the 1987 revision of the Labor Standards Act, in which standard hours were set at 46 per week. This process was completed in March 1997 when the 40 h work week had become the standard across industries. A reduction in standard hours was realized by the introduction of a 5-day work week and did not accompany a reduction in working hours on weekdays. Rather, the daily working hours of full-time employees have increased since the 1990s because workers have continued to

work the same approximate number of hours per week compressed over 5 days instead of 6 (Kuroda 2010).

As a result, annual working hours of full-time regular employees have remained at a high of 2,000 for decades. Notably, a 5-day week and an increase in labor costs associated with a 40 h work week have prompted many companies to hire non-regular employees. The average number of annual hours worked by Japanese employees has decreased from 1,910 in 1994 to 1,741 in 2014, but this is attributable to a larger proportion of non-regular employees among workers. Non-regular employees comprise more than 40% of employed people, and most of them are female part-time workers.

With regard to the third institutional factor, repeal of the Large-scale Retail Stores Law in 2000 has stimulated retail stores and department stores to extend their opening hours. Before this repeal, the Large-scale Retail Stores Law had allowed the local committee at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry broad discretion over site location, total floor area, and opening hours of large-scale retail stores to protect local retail stores. The Japanese government did not begin moving toward de-regulation until the start of the US-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative in 1989. As of 2014, 46% of supermarkets in Japan operate more than 14 h a day (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2014). Additionally, the total operating hours of major department stores averaged 3,553, which is an increase of 700 h from 1990 (Japan Department Stores Association 2016).

8.2.4 Trends in Maternal Employment and Child Poverty

Balancing time devoted work and family life is an ongoing challenge for Japanese women. In 2010, 60% of new mothers withdrew from the labor market. Many of them return to work several years after, typically by the time the youngest child reaches school age. However, in the past two decades, there has been a prevailing tendency among mothers to return to the labor market at an early stage of the youngest child's life.

The employment rate of mothers with children aged younger than 3 years has risen from 21.7% in 1996 to 47.5% in 2014. With regard to mothers with children who are 3–6 years old, the employment rate increased from 38.7% to 60.9% over the same period. These statistics indicate that, currently, children spend less time with their mother over their childhood years compared with children of two decades ago.

An increasing trend of the mothers' early return to work can be attributed to two factors: expansion of parental leave and a declining income of fathers. The Parental Leave Act enables Japanese workers to take leave until their child reaches 12 months old. If the child cannot enter a day care facility, parental leave can be extended until the child reaches 18 months old. During this leave, a parent can receive 67% of monthly earnings as Parental Leave Allowance (PLA). The number of PLA recipients increased from 112,000 in 2004 to 275,000 in 2014, which indicates that one in four mothers of newborns take parental leave (fathers

comprised only 2% of PLA recipients in 2014). This increased leave-taking by mothers indicates a rise in job retention rate among women of childbearing age. It should be noted, however, that not all workers are entitled to take parental leave or receive PLA. Non-regular workers, who comprise 40% of all employees and of whom 70% are women, have limited opportunity to take parental leave. This is because PLA is provided to workers covered by employment insurance and who have been employed for at least 12 months over the 2 years prior to commencement of leave.

Employees' earnings have declined for the past 2 decades, and the worst affected are workers in their 30s. The average annual salary of male employees aged 30–34 years peaked at 5.1 million yen in 1997 and declined to 4.5 million yen in 2014 (National Tax Agency 2016). The negative income effect resulting from declining male earnings has prompted mothers to resume working.

This decline in employees' earnings has also led to a rise in the child poverty rate. The Japanese government had long believed that poverty was nonexistent in Japan. In October 2010, 1 year after the Democratic Party came into power, the official poverty rate was finally released for the first time. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Family Database, Japan ranked the fourth highest among OECD countries with regard to the poverty rate in the mid-2000s, and was 12th highest with regard to the child poverty rate. Unlike many OECD countries, Japan's child poverty rate has been on the rise since the mid-1990s, reaching 16.3% in 2012 (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2013). Currently, one in six children below the age of 18 years live in poverty (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2015).

Strikingly, there is a high incidence of poverty among single-mother households. The number of single-mother households in Japan has risen by 25% since 1998, reaching 1.23 million in 2011.[2] As of 2010, 7.6% of children below age 18 were raised in single-mother households, including those who were living with grandmothers and other relatives (Statistics Bureau 2010). With regard to the poverty rate of single-parent households, Japan ranked the highest among the OECD countries at 57.8% in the mid-2000s.

Notably, unemployment is not the cause of poverty among single-mother households in Japan. A total of 80.6% of single mothers are employed and many of them work 2,000 h a year (Oishi 2013). Although more than half of single-mother households are in poverty, they comprised less than 7% of all households on welfare in March 2016. Despite paid labor of single mothers, their median earned income in 2011 barely reached 1.5 million yen. Job opportunities for women are limited in the Japanese labor market, and approximately half of single mothers work on a non-regular basis and earn low wages.

[2]Unless otherwise noted, statistics that are referred to in this paper are based on the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare's National Survey on Single-mother Households in 2011.

8.3 Empirical Analysis

8.3.1 Data

The data that were used in this study were from two sources: the Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities (STULA) and the National Survey of Households with Children (NSHC). The STULA is a nationally representative survey that is conducted every 5 years since 1976 by the Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. This survey is conducted over a 9-day period from Saturday through to next Sunday in October. Each respondent fills out time diaries for 2 consecutive days, reporting their activities by choosing from a list that consists of 20 categories of activities in 15 min intervals. Respondents of the STULA are those who are aged 10 years or older. Micro data from the STULA 2001 and 2006 were used to overview changes in mothers' working times. This was because STULA 2011 excluded some districts in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefectures that were devastated by the Great East Japan Earthquake and related disasters in March 2011.

The NSHC was conducted in November 2012 by the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training, a research arm of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. This is a national survey of households that include parents and their minor children. A novel feature of the NSHC is that it oversampled single-parent households to secure sample size. Survey questionnaires were sent to 2,000 two-parent households and 2,000 single-parent households that were selected by two-stage stratified sampling based on the data from the Basic Resident Registry. Completed questionnaires were collected from 1,219 two-parent households (response rate = 61.0%) and 982 single-parent households (response rate = 49.1%), including a small number of single-father households. Single-parent households at the Basic Resident Registry included two-parent households in which fathers lived apart from their family because of job assignments. Therefore, such households had to be re-categorized, resulting in 1,508 two-parent households, 681 single-parent households (25 were run by single fathers), and six households that are not otherwise classified.

8.3.2 Times of Day When Mothers Work

Table 8.1 shows the proportion of mothers at work at various times of the day by family type and age of the youngest child. Data were collected from a question of the NSHC as follows: "What time of a day do you usually work?" The respondents were instructed to choose any of the four categories where applicable: 1 = early morning (from 5:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.), 2 = daytime (from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.), 3 = evening (from 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.), and 4 = night (from 10:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m.). Nonstandard work hours were defined as hours that do not fall in the category

Table 8.1 Proportion of mothers at work by family type and age of the youngest child (as per National Survey of Households with Children)

	N	Early morning (5:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.)	Daytime (8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.)	Evening (6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.)	Night (10:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m.)
Single mothers					
Total	621	6.9	80.4	17.1	7.4
0–5 years old	108	4.6	79.6	14.8	10.2
6–11 years old	206	6.3	79.6	14.1	5.8
12–17 years old	267	8.6	81.6	21.0	7.1
Married mothers					
Total	1456	4.7	64.4	9.1	4.3
0–5 years old	547	3.1	51.0	5.3	4.2
6–11 years old	418	3.8	71.3	8.2	3.8
12–17 years old	421	8.1	75.5	15.7	5.5

Sample includes non-working mothers

of daytime (8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.). Irrespective of the time and age of the youngest child, single mothers were more likely to work than their married counterparts. Among single mothers, 17.1% worked during the evening and 7.4% worked during the nighttime. Surprisingly, 10.2% of single mothers with children aged 0–5 years worked during the night time.

Figure 8.1 illustrates a more detailed pattern of mothers' working times during the day, based on the STULA. Panels **(a)** and **(b)** show the proportion of mothers



Fig. 8.1 Proportion of mothers at work (weekdays) who have children younger than 10 years old. Data were drawn from Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities 2001, 2006

with children <10 years old, and who worked at various weekday hours, in 2001 and 2006. For both single and married mothers, the proportion at work is low in the early morning, but increases after 7 a.m., peaking before noon. The dip in the middle represents the lunch break. The number then increases again in the afternoon and gradually declines into the night.

Panels **(c)** and **(d)** present the change between the 2 years. For example, the proportion of single mothers working after midnight declined between 2001 and 2006, which is shown in the minus area in panel **(d)**. The area in black represents nonstandard hours, while the gray area represents daytime (8 a.m. to 6 p.m.). These figures indicate that, for both married and single mothers, the proportion of mothers at work increased between 2001 and 2006, not only during daytime but also during nonstandard hours.

Another notable feature is that, for both years, a higher proportion of single mothers were at work than their married counterparts, at any time of day, including nonstandard hours. Among mothers with children <10 years old, 30.1% of single mothers were at work at 8 a.m., while 19.4% of married mothers were at work at 8 a.m. in 2006. For the evening, 25.2% of single mothers and 12.2% of married mothers reported working at 6 p.m. At 7 p.m., 10.2% of single mothers were at work, which was a higher proportion than for married mothers (5.6%).[3] If commuting time were taken into account, mothers could be expected to arrive home much later in the evening. These data demonstrate prevalence of nonstandard work hours among mothers, a higher tendency of single mothers to work nonstandard hours than married mothers, and a substantial gap between children in terms of the time their mothers spent with them.

8.3.3 Factors Affecting Work Timing

8.3.3.1 Empirical Strategy

To examine factors affecting a mother's decision to work nonstandard hours, logistic models were estimated using a sample of mothers drawn from the NSHC who were employed at the time of the survey. For the empirical analysis, the sample was limited to working mothers, and respondents with missing information on any of the covariates are excluded. This process yielded a sample data set consisting of 490 single mothers and 915 married mothers. Logistic models were estimated

[3]Other than the difference in surveyed years, discrepancies in the proportion of mothers at work between Table 1 and Fig. 1 can be attributed to the following: (i) the NSHC asks usual work patterns of mothers without specifying the date and day of the week, while the STULA surveys people's time use of 2 consecutive days in October, (ii) the NSHC asks respondents about the timing of work using four categories, while the STULA surveys respondents' activities in 15 min intervals; and (iii) single mothers who work nonstandard hours (especially night time) may have refused to answer the STULA.

separately for single mothers and married mothers because of different sampling designs.

Dependent Variables The theory of the timing of work assumes that an individual's reservation wage changes over a day (Hamermesh 1999). In other words, an individual's perceived disutility from work will differ depending on the time of work. Therefore, three variables were used as measures of working nonstandard hours: early morning (5–8 a.m.), evening (6–10 p.m.), and night (10 p.m. to 5 a.m.). Each dependent variable was an indicator variable assigned the value of 1 if the mother worked during that time period, and otherwise a value of 0. Additionally, a dependent variable was constructed that was equal to 1 if the mother worked any of the three time periods that represented nonstandard hours. Otherwise, the variable was 0.

Independent Variables Following our theoretical predictions explained in Sect. 8.1, independent variables were chosen to reflect the determinants of the mothers' reservation wage.

Human Capital Formal education is thought to be a major component of an individual's general human capital (Becker 1964). After completing formal education, individuals may then accumulate human capital through on-the-job training (Becker 1964; Leuven 2005). Studies on human capital found that years of experience in the labor market, and type of employment, are related to the amount of on-the-job training an individual receives after graduating. With regard to employment type, non-regular workers, especially part-time employees, have limited training opportunities (Booth 1991; Hara 2014), while for regular employees, the intensity of training increases with firm size (Barron et al. 1987). Moreover, in Japan, those who started working as non-regular workers are less likely to find regular employment (Kondo 2007; Shikata 2012).

To operationalize variables identified in the literature as measures of human capital, the following variables were constructed. *Educational attainment* was a three-category measure that indicates the mother's highest level of education completed: (a) high school or less (reference), (b) junior college or vocational school, and (c) university or higher. To indicate the mother's *experience* in the labor market, three dichotomous variables were constructed based on the mother's work history: (a) working without a career change or interruption, (b) working with a career change, but without interruption, and (c) working with interruption (reference). *Employment type* was a four-category measure of the mother's employment type: (a) full-time regular, (b) part-time (reference), (c) dispatched worker, and (d) self-employed. *Large firm* was a dichotomous variable, equal to 1 if the mother worked at firms with more than 1,000 employees or was a public sector employee. *First job* was a dichotomous variable to indicate the mother's first job type (1 = full-time regular, 0 = otherwise).

Economic Hardships Two dichotomous variables were constructed to reflect the mother's experience with deprivation in the previous 12 months. One of these, *food deprivation,* indicated the mother was unable to buy necessary food, while the other, *clothes deprivatio*n, indicated that the mother was unable to buy necessary

Table 8.2 Descriptive statistics of working mothers from the National Survey of Households with Children

	Single (N = 490)	Married (N = 914)
Nonstandard work hours	0.257	0.187
Early morning	0.080	0.073
Evening	0.206	0.139
Night	0.086	0.067
Time spent with children on a typical weekday		
More than 6 h	0.122	0.257
4–6 h	0.318	0.316
2–4 h	0.371	0.294
1–2 h	0.110	0.090
Less than 1 h	0.061	0.035
Almost none	0.016	0.008
Frequency of having dinner together with children		
Every day	0.612	0.774
4–6 days a week	0.112	0.085
2–3 days a week	0.186	0.111
One day a week	0.053	0.014
Almost never	0.037	0.016
Educational attainment		
Junior college	0.349	0.403
University	0.073	0.174
Experience		
W/O change, interruption	0.063	0.163
W change, w/o int.	0.302	0.284
Employment type		
Full-time regular worker	0.369	0.330
Dispatched worker	0.153	0.067
Self-employed	0.071	0.126
Large firm	0.124	0.120
First job	0.702	0.793
Deprivation: food	0.312	0.172
Deprivation: clothing	0.424	0.248
Dissaving	0.357	0.178
Housing	0.433	0.208
Number of children		
Two kids	0.412	0.484
Three or more	0.139	0.277
Occupation		
Specialist	0.182	0.243
Service-related	0.239	0.198

(continued)

Table 8.2 (continued)

	Single (N = 490)	Married (N = 914)
No PC use	0.306	0.258
Side job	0.078	0.031
Metropolitan area	0.306	0.240
Age of the youngest child		
3–6	0.182	0.212
7–15	0.588	0.526
16 and older	0.180	0.109
Grandparental support	0.508	0.481
Educational aspiration	0.529	0.739

clothing. *Dissaving* was constructed based on the question: "How often do you save?" Respondents were instructed to choose one of the following: 1 = almost every month, 2 = every once in a while, 3 = rarely, 4 = never, or 5 = spent savings. Responses were recoded into two categories (1 = never or spent savings, 0 = otherwise). *Housing* was a dichotomous variable to indicate the household lived in was a rented house or an apartment. Additionally, three dichotomous variables were constructed to indicate the *number of children* in the household: one (reference), two, and three or more.

Other Covariates The mother's *occupation* was recorded into three categories: (a) specialist, (b) service-related job, and (c) other (reference). *No PC use* was constructed based on a question to find out the mother's computer skills: "How often do you use personal computers?" Respondents were instructed to choose one of the following: 1 = almost every day, 2 = once or twice a week, 3 = every once in a while, or 4 = rarely. The variable was 1 if the mother rarely used personal computers; otherwise, it was zero. *Side job* was a dichotomous variable to indicate the mother had a side job (1 = yes, 0 = no). A dummy variable was used that was designated as 1 if the mother lived in a *metropolitan area*; otherwise, the dummy variable was 0. Four dummy variables were constructed based on *the age of the youngest child*: 0–2 (reference), 3–6, 7–15, and 16–17 years. *Grandparental support* was a dummy variable to indicate whether a grandmother (mother's mother or in-law) lived with or nearby the family (1 = yes, 0 = no). *Educational aspiration* was a dichotomous variable indicating whether the mother expected her eldest child to attain university education (1 = yes, 0 = no).

8.3.4 Logistic Regression Results

Table 8.2 shows descriptive statistics. Single mothers showed a higher incidence of working nonstandard hours than did their married counterparts. Except daytime, the difference between single and married mothers was largest for night hours. A higher

Table 8.3 Logistic regression results

Single mothers (N = 490)	NS total		Early morning		Evening		Night	
	OR	95% conf. int.	OR	95% conf. int.	OR	95% conf. int.	OR	95% conf. int.
Educational attainment								
Junior college	0.86	[0.49–1.50]	1.51	[0.63–3.64]	0.86	[0.48–1.54]	1.45	[0.62–3.40]
University	1.27	[0.52–3.11]	2.18	[0.48–9.86]	0.81	[0.31–2.10]	1.29	[0.29–5.83]
Experience								
W/O change, interruption	1.94	[0.79–4.81]	3.84**	[1.34–10.98]	1.26	[0.47–3.34]	1.77	[0.48–6.50]
W change, w/o int.	0.73	[0.43–1.23]	0.73	[0.29–1.81]	1.02	[0.59–1.76]	0.71	[0.30–1.66]
Employment type								
Full-time regular worker	1.66	[0.92 –2.99]	2.64**	[1.02–6.83]	2.14**	[1.11–4.11]	3.27**	[1.39–7.68]
Dispatched worker	1.23	[0.58–2.62]	1.87	[0.57–6.19]	1.35	[0.58–3.14]	0.67	[0.12–3.62]
Self-employed	4.17***	[1.76–9.87]	1.36	[0.28 –6.56]	3.63***	[1.56–8.45]	4.17**	[1.41–12.37]
Large firm	1.59	[0.79–3.20]	1.00	[0.28–3.53]	1.68	[0.83–3.41]	1.69	[0.43–6.62]
First job	0.86	[0.52–1.41]	1.56	[0.61–3.99]	0.94	[0.54–1.64]	0.51*	[0.24–1.07]
Deprivation: food	0.97	[0.47–1.99]	1.23	[0.45–3.37]	0.65	[0.31–1.39]	1.37	[0.50–3.76]
Deprivation: clothing	1.66	[0.86–3.19]	1.18	[0.48–2.89]	2.02**	[1.03–3.96]	2.14	[0.76–6.00]
Dissaving	1.33	[0.80–2.22]	2.51**	[1.04–6.06]	1.13	[0.64–1.97]	1.67	[0.77–3.64]
Housing	0.95	[0.57–1.59]	0.62	[0.29–1.33]	0.86	[0.49–1.53]	1.45	[0.66–3.16]
Number of children								
Two kids	1.13	[0.68–1.89]	0.71	[0.33–1.53]	1.03	[0.59–1.78]	1.91	[0.83–4.41]
Three or more	0.78	[0.35–1.74]	1.42	[0.49–4.09]	1.01	[0.44–2.30]	1.76	[0.57–5.40]
Occupation								
Specialist	2.50***	[1.33–4.71]	3.42**	[1.29–9.07]	2.95***	[1.50–5.77]	7.96***	[3.03–20.91]
Service-related	5.43***	[3.01–9.80]	6.48***	[2.55–16.44]	5.38***	[2.85–10.15]	9.88***	[3.28–29.82]
No PC use	1.44	[0.87–2.38]	3.42***	[1.54–7.56]	1.13	[0.65–1.96]	1.94*	[0.92–4.10]

(continued)

Table 8.3 (continued)

Single mothers (N = 490)	NS total		Early morning		Evening		Night	
	OR	95% conf. int.	OR	95% conf. int.	OR	95% conf. int.	OR	95% conf. int.
Side job	4.01***	[1.73–9.33]	2.28	[0.71–7.37]	3.34***	[1.40–7.98]	2.45*	[0.99–6.04]
Metropolitan area	0.93	[0.57–1.52]	0.70	[0.30–1.62]	0.77	[0.46–1.30]	1.43	[0.67–3.06]
Age of the youngest child								
3–6	0.45	[0.16–1.25]	0.78	[0.17–3.48]	0.31**	[0.10–0.94]	1.63	[0.24–10.87]
7–15	1.07	[0.46–2.52]	1.70	[0.52–5.61]	0.81	[0.33–1.97]	1.77	[0.31–10.22]
16 and older	0.79	[0.29–2.13]	1.05	[0.25–4.48]	0.83	[0.30–2.30]	0.60	[0.08–4.29]
Grandparental support	1.93***	[1.19–3.13]	1.43	[0.64–3.19]	2.20***	[1.31–3.68]	1.44	[0.66–3.15]
Educational aspiration	1.81**	[1.05–3.12]	1.28	[0.54–3.07]	1.94**	[1.07–3.52]	1.42	[0.64–3.15]
Pseudo R^2	0.17		0.19		0.16		0.25	
Married mothers (N = 914)								
	NS total		Early morning		Evening		Night	
	OR	95% conf. int.	OR	95% conf. int.	OR	95% conf. int.	OR	95% conf. int.
Educational attainment								
Junior college	0.93	[0.59–1.46]	1.24	[0.66–2.33]	0.71	[0.43–1.18]	1.13	[0.56–2.29]
University	1.07	[0.60–1.90]	0.81	[0.35–1.90]	0.94	[0.49–1.79]	1.06	[0.39–2.86]
Experience								
W/O change, interruption	1.11	[0.62–2.00]	0.68	[0.30–1.56]	0.78	[0.41–1.49]	0.80	[0.31–2.09]
W change, w/o int.	1.61**	[1.04–2.49]	1.39	[0.74–2.62]	1.53*	[0.92–2.52]	1.11	[0.57–2.17]
Employment type								
Full-time regular worker	1.88**	[1.17–3.03]	3.09***	[1.60–5.97]	3.45***	[1.99–6.01]	4.74***	[2.33–9.66]
Dispatched worker	0.98	[0.42–2.26]	0.77	[0.15–3.87]	1.32	[0.49–3.51]	1.05	[0.22–5.08]
Self-employed	2.66***	[1.52–4.64]	1.20	[0.47–3.09]	3.65***	[1.88–7.08]	2.25*	[0.89–5.72]
Large firm	1.99**	[1.18–3.38]	1.05	[0.42–2.60]	1.75**	[0.95–3.24]	2.56**	[1.10–5.95]

(continued)

Table 8.3 (continued)

Single mothers (N = 490)	NS total		Early morning		Evening		Night	
	OR	95% conf. int.	OR	95% conf. int.	OR	95% conf. int.	OR	95% conf. int.
First job	0.74	[0.48–1.16]	0.92	[0.45–1.90]	0.95	[0.56–1.60]	1.22	[0.60–2.50]
Deprivation: food	1.14	[0.58–2.21]	1.50	[0.56–4.02]	1.43	[0.70–2.93]	0.83	[0.36–1.88]
Deprivation: clothing	1.73*	[0.95–3.16]	1.33	[0.50–3.54]	1.46	[0.76–2.83]	3.14**	[1.39–7.10]
Dissaving	2.24***	[1.38–3.62]	1.35	[0.64–2.85]	1.81*	[1.06–3.09]	2.82**	[1.37–5.78]
Housing	0.98	[0.60–1.60]	1.27	[0.62–2.61]	1.03	[0.60–1.79]	0.87	[0.40–1.86]
Number of children								
Two kids	0.70*	[0.44–1.12]	1.17	[0.54–2.57]	0.58**	[0.34–0.99]	0.90	[0.412.00]
Three or more	0.99	[0.59–1.65]	1.98*	[0.904.38]	0.97	[0.54–1.75]	0.67	[0.28–1.60]
Occupation								
Specialist	3.80***	[2.44–5.91]	3.82***	[1.97–7.41]	5.85***	[3.52–9.74]	6.07***	[2.86–12.86]
Service-related	2.66***	[1.59–4.44]	2.79**	[1.21–6.44]	2.78***	[1.49–5.18]	6.29***	[2.75 –14.40]
No PC use	1.05	[0.67–1.63]	0.82	[0.43–1.57]	1.06	[0.63–1.76]	1.66	[0.88–3.13]
Side job	1.62	[0.64–4.11]	0.83	[0.15–4.54]	2.34	[0.87–6.32]	0.84	[0.14–5.12]
Metropolitan area	0.88	[0.57–1.37]	0.67	[0.34–1.32]	0.98	[0.60–1.60]	0.86	[0.43–1.72]
Age of the youngest child								
3–6	2.16**	[1.11–4.18]	1.36	[0.49–3.76]	2.27***	[1.02–5.05]	2.63**	[1.03–6.71]
7–15	1.73**	[0.95–3.16]	1.67	[0.67–4.21]	2.57**	[1.24–5.33]	1.14	[0.46–2.86]
16 and older	3.70***	[1.77–7.73]	2.76*	[0.89–8.53]	6.68***	[2.82–15.79]	1.36	[0.43–4.30]
Grandparental support	0.73	[0.50–1.06]	1.55	[0.92–2.60]	0.70	[0.46–1.08]	0.95	[0.51–1.77]
Educational aspiration	0.97	[0.61–1.54]	0.71	[0.37–1.37]	0.91	[0.53–1.57]	0.62	[0.32–1.23]
Pseudo R^2	0.13		0.13		0.18		0.19	

OR: odds ratio, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

proportion of single mothers were employed as regular or dispatched workers compared with married mothers. On average, single mothers were less educated, had fewer children, and the age of the youngest child was older than that of married mothers. Economic hardships of single-mother households were obvious, where 43.3% of them lived in a rented house and 35.7% did not save or spending down. A smaller proportion of single mothers wished their children to have university education compared with that of married mothers. For single and married mothers, approximately half of them were living with or living nearby their own mother/in-laws.

The results of logistic regression are shown in Table 8.3. The estimated coefficients are presented in the form of odds ratios. Interestingly, some variables related to higher human capital had a positive and significant effect on the probability to work nonstandard hours. Single and married mothers, being full-time regular workers, increased the probability of working nonstandard hours, especially at night. Being a specialist or a service-related worker was a strong predictor of working nonstandard hours for single and married mothers. A married mother was more likely to work nonstandard hours if she was employed by a large firm.

The effect of the number of children and the age of the youngest child substantially differed between single and married mothers. For single mothers, these variables were mostly insignificant, except in the case of mothers working in the evenings. In contrast, married mothers were less likely to work if they had two children, and were more likely to work if their youngest child was older, in the evenings. Married mothers whose youngest child was between 3–6 years of age tended to work in the night time compared with those with a child aged less than 3 years.

Odds ratios for variables that were related to economic hardship were positive and larger than 1 in the case of married mothers working at night time. Married mothers who were unable to buy necessary clothes, or had no savings, were two to three times more likely to work in the night time. With regard to single mothers, the experience of being unable to buy necessary clothes and having aspiration for university education for their oldest child increased the probability to work in the evenings.

8.4 Discussion

Considering that full-time regular workers at large firms receive more intense job training and achieve higher levels of human capital, these results appear inconsistent with our theoretical predictions. However, unlike firms in the US and other Western societies, Japanese firms commonly hire workers without a job description. Additionally, under the provision of Agreement 36, full-time regular workers in Japan are expected to accept long overtime hours in exchange for job security. Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility that a difference in employment practices led to our unexpected results. With regard to the effect of occupation, notably, in the NSHC, some jobs that accompany shift work (e.g., nurses) are

categorized as specialists, which may have resulted in high odds ratios for night work.

Overall, a single mother's decision to work nonstandard hours was not influenced much by economic hardship and the number and age of the youngest child. The reason for this finding may be that the majority of single-mother households are already in poverty (or at risk of poverty), and these variables do not differ much between those mothers who work nonstandard hours and those who do not (the models were estimated separately for single and married mothers). With regard to two-parent households, economic hardships appeared to affect the mothers' decision to work at night time, which is consistent with the theoretical predictions.

8.4.1 Effect of Mothers' Nonstandard Work Hours on Time Spent with Children

8.4.1.1 Empirical Strategy

As described in Sect. 8.1, mothers' time is thought to be an important investment in their children's human capital. Milkie et al. (2015) found that the amount of time mothers spent with children was related to fewer behavioral problems and better outcomes for adolescents. Additionally, recent studies have focused on the association between the frequency of family meals together and children's well-being. Musick and Meier (2012) showed robust associations between family dinners and adolescent well-being.

Therefore, to investigate how children's well-being is affected when mothers work nonstandard hours, two questionnaires from the NSHC related to mothers' time with their children were used. The specific questions were "How many waking hours do you spend with your children on a typical weekday?" and "How many days in a typical week do you eat dinner together with your children?" For the first question, the respondents were asked to choose one of the following six options: "6 or more hours," "4–6 h," "2–4 h," "1–2 h," "less than 1 h," and "almost none." The five response options for the second question were as follows: "almost every day," "4 or more days," "2 or 3 days," "one day," and "almost never." For each question, options were coded so that higher values corresponded to more time with children. Ordered probit models were then estimated using each of the two questionnaires on mothers' time with children as a dependent variable.

There was the expectation that the effect of mothers' working nonstandard hours on time with children varies depending on the time of day. Therefore, three dummy variables that represented each of the nonstandard work hours were included as covariates (early morning, evening, and night). To control for differences in time with children arising from personal, familial, and employment characteristics, the following variables were included: mother's employment status, occupation, and education, firm size, a variable that indicates whether the mother had a side job,

Table 8.4 Results for time spent with children and having dinner together with children

	Time with children				Dinner with children			
	Single		Married		Single		Married	
	Coef.	Std. error	Coef.	Std. error	Coef.	Std. error	Coef.	Std. error
Nonstandard work hours								
Early morning	−0.167	(0.180)	−0.065	(0.166)	−0.477**	(0.238)	−0.084	(0.204)
Evening	0.605***	(0.137)	0.319**	(0.126)	0.936***	(0.146)	0.693***	(0.138)
Night	−0.045	(0.193)	−0.032	(0.174)	0.309	(0.215)	0.203	(0.207)
Educational attainment								
Junior-college	0.099	(0.111)	−0.116	(0.087)	0.042	(0.132)	−0.168	(0.113)
University	0.260	(0.175)	0.016	(0.114)	0.012	(0.217)	−0.033	(0.156)
Employment type								
Full-time regular worker	0.327***	(0.119)	0.579***	(0.090)	0.362***	(0.138)	0.395***	(0.121)
Dispatched worker	−0.083	(0.146)	0.395**	(0.159)	0.170	(0.183)	0.441**	(0.190)
Self-employed	−0.260	(0.221)	0.172	(0.119)	−0.113	(0.241)	0.116	(0.166)
Large firm	0.264*	(0.156)	0.165	(0.108)	−0.065	(0.159)	−0.009	(0.137)
Dissaving	0.103	(0.111)	0.199**	(0.098)	0.079	(0.132)	−0.122	(0.126)
Housing	−0.213**	(0.103)	0.015	(0.098)	−0.074	(0.124)	0.032	(0.130)
Number of children								
Two kids	0.111	(0.108)	0.072	(0.092)	0.160	(0.123)	0.069	(0.122)
Three or more	−0.022	(0.150)	0.064	(0.102)	0.329*	(0.197)	0.051	(0.136)
Occupation								
Specialist	−0.136	(0.145)	0.253***	(0.096)	−0.049	(0.172)	0.136	(0.127)
Service-related	−0.129	(0.127)	−0.081	(0.098)	0.157	(0.150)	0.019	(0.133)
Side job	−0.061	(0.194)	−0.101	(0.202)	0.384	(0.234)	−0.042	(0.232)
Metropolitan area	0.083	(0.100)	−0.011	(0.083)	0.022	(0.120)	0.058	(0.113)

(continued)

Table 8.4 (continued)

	Time with children				Dinner with children			
	Single		Married		Single		Married	
	Coef.	Std. error	Coef.	Std. error	Coef.	Std. error	Coef.	Std. error
Age of the youngest child	0.041***	(0.011)	0.092***	(0.008)	0.054***	(0.013)	0.071***	(0.010)
Grandparental support	0.198*	(0.103)	0.133*	(0.073)	0.525***	(0.133)	0.044	(0.094)
Educational aspiration	−0.205*	(0.106)	−0.076	(0.092)	−0.221*	(0.119)	−0.151	(0.111)
Cut1	−0.601***	(0.195)	0.429***	(0.146)	1.568***	(0.258)	1.668***	(0.206)
Cut2	0.489***	(0.190)	1.409***	(0.151)	1.943***	(0.264)	2.048***	(0.210)
Cut3	1.636***	(0.195)	2.500***	(0.162)	2.812***	(0.279)	2.946***	(0.236)
Cut4	2.231***	(0.205)	3.209***	(0.172)	3.316***	(0.286)	3.223***	(0.251)
Cut5	3.000***	(0.234)	4.007***	(0.233)				
N	490		914		490		914	

*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses

number of children, age of the youngest child, whether the mother lived with her own mother or in-laws, whether the mother lived in a rented house, whether the household did not save or spent savings, and whether the mother had aspiration for university education for her eldest child.

8.4.2 *Results from Ordered Probit Models*

The results of ordered probit models for time with children and frequency of having dinner together with children are presented in Table 8.4. Among the three categories of nonstandard work hours, only evening work had a significant effect ($p < 0.01$ for single and $p < 0.05$ for married mothers) in both tables, while controlling for individual and familial characteristics. Because estimated coefficients from ordered probit models are difficult to interpret, marginal effects of evening work on each outcome were calculated as illustrated in Figs. 8.2 and 8.3.

Figure 8.2 shows that the probability of spending time with children for longer than 6 h or for 4–6 h a day declined when the mother worked during the evening (6–10 p.m.). This effect on time with children was greater for single mothers than their married counterparts. If the mother worked in the evening hours, the probability of spending more than 6 h with her children decreased by 11.4% and 8.9% for married mothers, respectively. Similarly, mothers working in the evening hours reduced their probability of having dinner together with their children every day by 30.3% for single mothers, while the number was 18.0% for married mothers (Fig. 8.3). These results indicate that, in accordance with findings of previous



Fig. 8.2 Effect of mothers' working in the evening on time spent with their children. Marginal effects from ordered probit estimation. Author's estimations using NSHC



Fig. 8.3 Effect of mothers' working in the evening on frequency of having dinner with their children. Marginal effects from ordered probit estimation. Author's estimation results using NSHC

studies, children of single-mother households are more exposed to the negative effects of the prevalence of nonstandard hours of work among mothers.

8.5 Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to understand the prevalence of working nonstandard hours among mothers, and analyze its effects on time they spent with their children. The results showed that the proportion of mothers working outside of traditional business hours has risen over the period of 2001–2006, even among those with young children. These observations imply that, from the viewpoint of children's well-being, there has been an increase in hours without a mother present at home.

Opposing the theoretical predictions, mothers with higher human capital were found more likely to work nonstandard hours. A possible reason for this is Japan's employment practices that demand full-time regular employees work long overtime hours. Consistent with that theory, mothers who were economically disadvantaged were more likely to work nonstandard hours.

With regard to the effects on children's well-being, mothers working in the evening spent less time with their children and had dinner together with them less frequently. Interestingly, the situation of mothers working in the early morning and at night time did not significantly affect time spent with children. This finding may be because, instead of working during the daytime, mothers prefer to work nonstandard hours to spend time with their children, or prefer to be at home so they can

have dinner with them. If such is the case, mothers' nonstandard work hours do not necessarily translate into less time with their children. Additionally, the negative effects of mothers working at nonstandard hours on time spent with their children could be lessened if other relatives, such as fathers or grandmothers, spent more time with them. However, such a mechanism is less likely to work in single-mother households, because the majority of single mothers are the sole earner and care provider in the household. Because the 24/7 economy is an irreversible trend, assessing the effect of changes in time spent at work on children's well-being should be a priority in future research.

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Chapter 9
Men's Unpaid Domestic Work: A Critique of (Re)Doing Gender in Contemporary Japan

Iori Hamada

Abstract This chapter examines Japanese men's involvement in unpaid domestic work in relation to paid (public) work, family and wellbeing, bringing gender into scope. It analyses the government-initiated fatherhood campaign 'Ikumen Project' and a relatively newly emerged gender figure of what is referred to as '*iku-men*' ('men who engage actively in child rearing'). The Ikumen Project, where the trope of the *iku-men* serves as the project's grand concept, offers a useful site that allows us to examine the intersections between the 'old' and 'new' paradigms of work-family models in contemporary Japan. This chapter suggests that the government utilises the particular 'family-friendly' ('*famirī furendorī*') campaign as a public arena for meaning-making, through which to disseminate positive images of men's child rearing, encourage men's unpaid domestic work and women's paid employment, increase the birth rate and ultimately improve the economy. Based on Candace West and Don Zimmerman's theory of 'doing gender', this chapter argues that the Ikumen Project still relies on the 'old' paradigm of a work-family model predicated on the male breadwinning model and thus can 'redo' gender, while legitimising Japanese men's active involvement in unpaid domestic work and family life as a 'new' norm.

Keywords Unpaid domestic work · Japanese fathers · Ikumen · Doing gender · Work-life balance

9.1 Introduction

Work, family and gender are 'interlinked social systems' (Haas and O'Berin 2010). The functioning of the systems also affects human wellbeing, either by enabling or hampering it (OECD 2013). Bringing gender into scope, this chapter illustrates regional variation in the global discourses of 'work-family balance', 'work-family

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integration' and 'work-life balance' interchangeably, where issues of work, family, wellbeing and gender are inextricably involved.

In discussing the intersection of work, family, wellbeing and gender, this chapter looks at the case of contemporary Japan, specifically focusing on Japanese men's shifting relationships to unpaid domestic work. Japanese men's involvement (or lack thereof) in unpaid domestic work—largely dominated by housework and childcare—has gained much attention, along with the increased numbers of Japanese women in paid employment. However, it is still a relatively under-researched and under-theorised area (Ishii-Kuntz et al. 2004; North 2014), while there is a large body of literature written on men's (as well as more recently women's) engagement in paid (public) work (Dasgupta 2013, 2014; Ogasawara 1998; Roberson and Suzuki 2005; Vogel 1963). This chapter offers an important contribution to current discussions on the impact of men's engagement in the domain of unpaid domestic work on the quality of work and family life, wellbeing and gender equality in Asian contexts.

Traditionally, what Japanese men 'do' is largely confined to the domain of paid (public) work, as often signified through culturally specific gender tropes, such as the 'salaryman' ('*sararī man*')—that is, the representation of men who are 'urban, middle-class, full-time white-collar employees of private-sector organisations' (Dasgupta 2013). In other words, a male 'breadwinner'/female 'carer' model has constituted the traditional 'old' paradigm of a work-family model in Japan (Takeda 2011). Examining Japanese men's recent entry into the domain of unpaid domestic work thus allows us to ask the question: When Japanese men engage more in unpaid domestic work, which has long been considered 'women's work', does this result in disrupting traditional male gender norms and roles (that is, the 'breadwinner', the 'provider' and the 'salaryman') that have shaped their relationships to work, family and wellbeing? In exploring the question, I analyse the Japanese government-initiated fatherhood campaign called 'Ikumen Project' and the project's grand concept—'*iku-men*' ('men who take an active part in child rearing'). Using the Ikumen Project and the gender trope of the *iku-men* as a case study, this chapter considers how the 'old' paradigm of a work-family model is publicly contested, individually negotiated, possibly challenged or persistently functions—both in relation to the decline in the proportion of Japanese men holding full-time 'regular' employment and the increase in Japanese women's paid employment outside the home.

In conceptualising the Ikumen Project and the *iku-men* in relation to Japanese men's changing relationships to work, family and well-being, I apply Candace (West and Zimmerman 1987) theory of 'doing gender'. The theory accounts for the reproduction of gender through everyday social interactions, arguing that people 'do gender' by engaging (or not engaging) in particular activities in ways that express themselves as 'masculine' or 'feminine'. West and Zimmerman consider that the division of domestic labour is an apt example of considering how gender is done and redone. Using the theory, they suggest that since unpaid domestic work is culturally associated with 'femininity', a much higher percentage of women engage in the particular domain than men, whereby they can establish their femininity for themselves and others. Equally, they also argue that by not doing housework or particular areas of unpaid domestic work men can establish their masculinity for

themselves and others. Based on this perspective, I ask; Does 'doing the *iku-men*' within the Ikumen Project allow Japanese men to 'undo' conventional gender models, such as the 'salarymen'? Alternatively, does bringing men into the unpaid domestic work and family spheres through the government's family-friendly policies, such as the Ikumen Project, actually 'redo' gender (ibid. 2009)?

This chapter mainly consists of two parts. The first part sketches out Japanese men's shifting relationships to unpaid domestic work in relation to paid (public) work, family and wellbeing over the past few decades. The second part analyses the ways in which 'doing the *iku-men*', as a 'new' gender ideal and a fathering practice, is framed, promoted and embodied within the context of the Ikumen Project to see whether or not it would challenge traditional gender norms and roles persisting in Japanese society.

9.2 Japanese Men's Shifting Relationships to Unpaid Domestic Work and Family

Until 1947, when the ancestral legacy of the '*ie*' ('household/family') system[1] was formally abolished, male household heads called '*kachō*' had legally been permitted to exercise unquestioned patriarchal authority over family members and resources (Hayakawa 2014). Men's roles as husbands and fathers were typically dogmatic and authoritative, often metaphorically referred to as the '*daikoku bashira*'—central pillars upholding the roof typically in traditional Japanese multigenerational agricultural households (Dasgupta 2014). The boundaries of what men do and don't do were thus clearly delineated within the *ie*., system; men as *kachō* were the ultimate authority figures whose responsibilities included educating the eldest son as the next *kachō* and the progeny of the *ie*., while women were seen as subordinate to men and took care of everyday domestic tasks to contribute to the wellbeing of the family and the nation in their position as a 'good wife, wise mother' (Koyama 2014; Smith 2013).

The division of labour between men and women, which as described above was formalised through the *ie*., system, survived through drastic social changes during the postwar period, albeit in a less rigid form. The rapid economic growth between the 1950s and 1970s kept men preoccupied with work, whereby the trope of the salarymen became synonymous with what men 'do'—as both the hegemonic form of masculinity and a normative gender role in the work and family spheres (Gossmann et al. 2004). As a result, men's absence from the home was seen as a 'social problem', charactering Japanese families as '*chichioya fuzai*' ('fatherless') (Ishii-Kuntz 2003). Or even when they could take some time off to spend with their families, it was often considered '*kazoku sābisu*' ('family service'), describing working husbands or/and fathers' engagement with their families as an obligation or a burden, rather than a

[1]The *ie* system was established by the Meiji government in 1898.

pleasure (Jolivet 1997). Hence, while many salarymen dominated paid (public) work and were thus in a privileged position in that sphere, they only held periphery, 'guest status' in the family spheres (Kersten 1996 cited in Taga 2004).

Following the 1990 asset bubble burst, however, salarymen's corporate-centred life became called into question: media reports were filled with middle-aged and older salarymen suffering from depression, domestic violence, suicide, *kitaku kyohi shō* ('home refusal syndrome') and *karōshi* ('death due to overwork'). Work-family conflicts and poor wellbeing largely caused by long work hours were thus the costs that many salarymen had to pay in return for employment security[2] (Dasgupta 2013). Meanwhile, under globalisation and neoliberal economic policies, domestic and foreign competition had increasingly become fierce, resulting in corporate bankruptcies, deflation, falling wages and increasing employment instability (Gao 2000). The term '*risu tora*' ('restructuring' or 'downsizing') came to be the buzzword of the 1990s, posing a threat to salarymen's treasured employment security.

The number of the so-called 'non-regular' employees—that is, temporary, part-time and contract workers who have generally lower wages, less job security and more limited training opportunities than their 'regular' counterparts—has increased from 15% of the workforce in 1984 to nearly 40% in 2015 (Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications [MLAC, hereinafter] 2015). The trend towards hiring non-regular employees with less employment security has also affected family forms. The number of households headed by (mostly male) non-regular employees has increased (Statistics Bureau, MIAC 2014), getting their (mostly female) spouses into the workforce. As a result, the number of dual-income households has reached ten million in 2015 from about six million in 1980, while the number of single-income households (typically consisting of an employed husband and an unemployed wife) has dropped to 7.2 million from 11 million between 1980 and 2015 (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare [MHLW, hereinafter] 2015a). In addition, many of the younger generation in their 20s and 30s, who account for about 30% of non-regular employees (ibid.), delay marriage and childrearing (OECD 2015a). Consequently, the previous work-family model—the 'middle-class Japanese nuclear family of a full-time housewife ('*sengyō shufu*'), a full-time breadwinning husband ('salary man') and two children'—no longer reflects the reality of Japanese families, although it has not completely lost its ideological legitimacy.

Increased public and individual needs for updating or altering enduring patriarchal assumptions about 'who does what around the house' thus appear probable. As studies show, Japanese men's views about gender roles in the work and family spheres have become more flexible and 'egalitarian' over the past few decades (Hirao 2007). According to the Cabinet Office, more men hold 'egalitarian' views about gender roles than before (Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Cabinet Office

[2]Salarymen's employment security includes 'lifetime employment, seniority-based wages, regular promotions, health insurance, and other perks, such as housing subsidies and low-interest loans' (Charlebois 2012).

2015). In their 1979 survey, 75.6% of Japanese men agreed that 'men should work outside and women should take care of the home' (ibid.). The number dropped to 55.1% in their 2014 survey (ibid.). Then the question is; Do their egalitarian views on gender role match their actual practices?

The answer appears to be negative. The 2014 OECD survey results show that men in Japan spend the least amount of time (31 min a day) on unpaid domestic work (i.e., routine housework and care for household members), compared to men (90 min a day) and women (208 min a day) on average in the OECD countries.[3] Men in Japan spend less time on unpaid domestic work, even when their wives work outside the home (OECD 2014). According to Statistics Bureau of Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (2015), women in dual-income households spend on average 293 min a day on unpaid domestic work, whereas men spend on average 39 min a day. It is also notable that while the gendered division of domestic labour is universally evident (Geist and Cohen 2011), inequality in the domain of unpaid domestic work is extreme between Japanese men and women (Tsuya et al. 2012).

The factors that directly and indirectly discourage Japanese men from taking an active role in the domain of unpaid domestic work are multifaceted and can accumulate over time. While a detailed discussion of the detrimental factors is beyond the scope of this chapter, I highlight here the following aspects; Japan's entrenched male-centred work culture (e.g., long work hours[4] and the so-called 'two-track career system'[5]); the spousal tax deduction[6]; and rigid gender norms and roles sustaining Japan's patriarchal social systems. Seeing the Ikumen Project and

[3]According to the 2014 OECD survey, women in Japan spent 225 min a day on average on unpaid domestic work.

[4]By some measures, Japanese people are working less than they used to. The OECD statistics (2015b) show that average annual hours worked per worker in Japan declined from 2,106 h in 1981 to 1,719 h in 2015. Japanese workers also spent less at work than workers in other Asian countries, such as Korea (2,124 h in 2014), as well as workers in the US (1,789 h in 2014) and the OECD average (1,770 h in 2014) (ibid; Tsai et al. 2016). These figures, however, include part-timers, who are estimated to work roughly half of the hours of regular employees. Notably, Japan's ratio of part-time workers has significantly increased from 15% in 1990 to 30%. Full-time employees worked an average of 2,021 h per year in 2014, roughly unchanged over the last decade. Full-time workers spent 173 h on average in overtime in 2014, which is 36 h more than two decades ago and is the highest figure since 1993, according to the MHLW (2015b). In this sense, it is notable that many Japanese men consider that a lack of 'time availability' is the main reason for limiting their participation in unpaid domestic work (Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Cabinet Office 2015).

[5]The system divides job applicants into '*sōgō shoku*' (a managerial 'career track') and '*ippan shoku*' (a clerical 'non-career track'), assigning a disproportionate number of men to the former position (Benson et al. 2007).

[6]Currently, the head of a household (usually the husband) is eligible for a spousal income tax deduction (i.e. 380,000 yen, which is about 3,700 US dollars as of the 30th of July, 2016) if their spouse (usually the wife) earns less than or equal to 1.41 million yen a year (about 12,700 US dollars as of the 30th of July, 2016). Moreover, if the spouse earns less than or equal to 1.03 million yen (about 10,000 US dollars as of the 30th of July, 2016) they also can obtain the national pension and are not required to pay premiums. This system has been much criticised as a disincentive for married women to engage more actively in the workforce (Abe 2009).

the *iku-men* as a critical point of intersections between the 'old' and 'new' paradigms of gendered work-family models, the second half of the chapter will analyse the ways in which gender is done, undone or redone in relation to (both paid and unpaid) work, family and wellbeing in contemporary Japan.

9.3 The 'Ikumen Project': Backgrounds

The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (the MHLW, hereinafter) launched the Ikumen Project in June 2010 as part of their 'family friendly' ('*famirī furendorī*') scheme. Since then the national fatherhood campaign has played a symbolically, if not practically, critical part of the government's countermeasures towards the nation's declining birth rate, ageing population and shrinking labour force, which have posed threats to the economy since the 1990s. Following a Nordic 'dual-earner and dual-carer' work-family model (Sano and Yasumoto 2014), the government has established a number of gender-related family-friendly policies and campaigns from the 1990s onwards (Rush 2015). Fathering has become a new area of focus for policymakers, predicated upon research reports suggesting the association between the declining birth rate and men's lack of family involvement (ibid.). The so-called 'Angel Plan', which was first introduced in 1994 and then revised respectively in 1999 and 2004, was 'the government's first large-scale attempt to seek to rectify the entrenched gender paradigm by urging fathers to spend more time caring for their children' (Roberts 2002). The most prominent promotion of fatherhood within the Angel Plan is the 1999 'Sam Campaign'. The MHLW produced a series of TV commercials and posters with the slogan 'Men who don't childcare are not called father' ('*Ikuji wo shinai otoko wo chichi towa yobanai*'), featuring Masaharu Maruyama (also known as 'Sam'), the former husband of the Japanese pop star, Namie Amuro (ibid.). This fathering campaign set the stage for the Ikumen Project, allowing the government to tap into the public appeal of a 'new' father figure and incorporate it into their Nordic-inspired dual earner and dual-carer work-family scheme.

The 1990s was also the decade of the emergence of the 'men's lib movement'. A number of men's groups were formed to raise public awareness about the risks involved with pursuing salarymen's corporate-centred lives (e.g.,'*karōshi*' ['death due to overwork'] and other physical and mental breakdown), paving the way for the 'man's lib movement' (Ishii-Kuntz 2013). In 1990, *Menzu Ribu Kenkyūkai* ('A Society for the Study of Men's Liberation') was established, followed by a conference entitled 'Can Men Be Feminists?' sponsored by the Japan Women's Studies Association (Fujimura-Fanselow 2011). In 1995, '*Menzu Sentā Japan*' ('Men's Centre Japan') was established in Osaka (Taga 2004) as a 'nationwide resource center for men's groups, as well as an international point of contact representing the men's movement in Japan' (Fujimura-Fanselow 2011). Men's Centre Japan has held an annual conference called '*Otoko no Fesutibaru*' ('Men's Festival') since

1996, where issues such as domestic violence, couples' relationships, child rearing and gay liberation have been discussed among men and women (Taga 2004).

In the 2000s, the men's lib movement has gained traction, leading to the establishment of non-profit organisations serving fathers (e.g., Fathering Japan [established in December 2005] and Ikumen Club [established in December 2006]) and magazines dedicated to fathering (e.g., Nikkei Kids Plus [established in December 2005] and FQ Japan [established in December 2006]). In parallel, the government continues to move towards a Nordic dual-earner and dual-carer work-family model, further establishing family-friendly policies and campaigns, including the 2010 Revision of Child Care and Family Care Leave Law and also the Ikumen Project (MHLW 2008).

9.4 The Ikumen Project as a Site of Meaning-Making

The Ikumen Project is a nation-wide campaign that taps into the significance of meaning-making on changing people's perceptions and possibly behaviours towards certain cultural traditions. The *iku-men*, a newly emerged father figure, is central to the meaning-making project. The term '*iku-men*' was originally coined by Masaya Maruta, an Art Director of Hakuhodo Inc., Japan's second largest advertising company (Hasegawa 2016). The Japanese neologism combines the Japanese word '*ikuji*' (child rearing) and the English word 'men', bearing a phonetic resemblance to the Japanese slang '*ike-men*' ('handsome men'). In other words, the term '*iku-men*' has the ability to appeal to the Japanese public: it appeared 'new' and yet also 'familiar', thereby allowing itself to be easily accepted within the already established cultural logic. Furthermore, the term signifies men who engage actively in child rearing as 'cool', 'modern', 'fashionable' and even 'sexy', thereby producing positive images of men's child rearing. NPO Ikumen Club, where Maruta is the Representative Director, defines *iku-men* as; 'cool men who can enjoy raising children'; 'men who can get their children to experience the wider world'; and 'men who are thoughtful towards their wife' (Ikumen Club 2016). The government is also in line with their definition, representing the *iku-men* as 'men who enjoy raising children and grow themselves in the process' (MHLW 2010c).

Indeed, linking men's child rearing practices with positive images is crucial to the promotion of the Ikumen Project, and the government utilises social media as a vital platform to do so. The Ikumen Project website is particularly prominent, as it serves to generate both online and offline campaign actions that help to create, promote and disseminate a new meaning of fatherhood. According to data from the MHLW (2013), over half a million people accessed the site in 2013 and about 1,500 people signed up to receive updates about the campaign in 2012. Contents on the website include; fathers' self-submitted declarations, testimonials and prominent figures' statements about childcare and fathering; downloadable handbooks on 'Work-Life Balance' ('*Wāku Famirī Baransu*'); answers to common questions about how to take parental leave; examples of companies who encourage their

workers to take parental leave; profiles and statements of fathers who were selected as the best *iku-men*; video clips showing the past symposiums on fathering and related topics hosted by the Ikumen Project; and even an *iku-men* theme song.

In a traditional Japanese context, images associated with men's (constant) presence in the domain of unpaid domestic work, including child rearing, can be negative (the 'un-masculine', the 'jobless' and the 'loser', for example). Due to these images sometimes attached to men's child rearing, the idea that 'men can take time off to take care of their family' has not widely been accepted and embodied in the society. Tapping into the *iku-men*'s public appeal, the government attempts to renew previous images and meanings of fatherhood through the 'new' male ideal of the *iku-men*. The Ikumen Project, where the *iku-men* is at play, thus functions to legitimise fathers' entry into the domain of child rearing, which is predominantly limited to mothers in the society. Furthermore, the *iku-men* also gives the government a convenient instrument, through which to fit into, and partake in, global discourses on work-family balance, gender equality and human wellbeing. In other words, the Ikumen Project, where the *iku-men* plays a key role, provides a public platform not only for encouraging fathers' engagement in child rearing, but also for meaning-making. In other words, it is this power of signification that the government exercises through the Ikumen Project to redefine binaries between 'work-family' and 'male-female' on their own terms to achieve their multifaceted objectives—namely, raising their take-up rates of parental leave, bringing more women into the labour market, booting the birth rate and possibly reclaiming its economic prominence.

9.5 The 'Stars of Ikumen': Doing, Undoing, or Redoing Gender?

One of the centrepieces of the Ikumen Project featured on the website is the 'Stars of Ikumen' ('*Iku-men no Hoshi*')—a fathering contest to select the 'Best Ikumen of the Month' based on entries' essays on their own fathering experiences (MHLW 2010b). How the Stars of Ikumen are judged and selected is internal and appears rather arbitrary. The Selection Panel consists of members of the Ikumen Project promotion team, including the founder of NPO Fathering Japan, Tetsuya Ando, the former bureaucrat and current Mayor of the City of Yokohama (also known as '*iku-men* bureaucrat'), Masato Yamada and the CEO of Work Life Balance Co, Ltd., Yoshie Komuro (MHLW 2010a). Along with other awards the government offers through the campaign, such as the 'Ikumen Boss Awards' (that is, awards given to bosses supporting their male subordinates' taking parental leave) and 'Enterprise Ikumen Awards' (that is, awards given to companies supporting their male workers' taking parental leave), the 'Stars of Ikumen' is aimed to set the model for fathers and fathers-to-be to encourage their active engagement in child rearing and also to increase the legitimacy of the *iku-men* promoted through their meaning-making practices.

Pages dedicated to the 'Stars of Ikumen' on the website offer useful materials for an analysis of the Ikumen Project's meaning-making practices, where the *iku-men*, as a certain mode of gender role, is promoted. The website features; statements made by the past winners of the Stars of Ikumen contests (between 2010 and 2016); profiles of each winner; and transcripts of a talk among prominent winners. The majority of the Stars of Ikumen were between their 20s and 40s, full-time employed workers (three were self-employed and one was a full-time 'house husband'). Most of their wives were also working and some of them have had full-time, high-level position jobs. Almost everyone (except for one) has taken parental leave (ranging from a few weeks to about 1 year) and returned to work afterwards. While their parenting experiences, work styles and family situations are discrete, they represent some common features that allow us to identify what aspects legitimise fathers as the Stars of Ikumen. That is, I suggest that the Stars of Ikumen are considered men who can 'have it all'—that is, not just being a 'committed' father, but also being a 'successful' worker and even being a 'good, thoughtful' husband.

Linking fathering with success at work is one of the common ways that the winners of the Stars of Ikumen used when expressing their thoughts on who would deserve for the title. This is explicitly suggested by Mr. Ryo Nitta, the winner of the 2010 Stars of Ikumen, when he shared his thoughts with other winners in a talk session hosted by the Selection Panel. The entrepreneur and also published author in his 30 s stated (MHLW 2010d) that:

> When I hear people talking about *iku-men* and men taking leave in general, I see many of them quickly conclude that that would jeopardise job security and make them opt out of climbing the career ladders. But I don't think that's always the case. In fact, these are the people who can survive career competitions. Fathering allows them to improve time and risk management skills, communication skills and couching skills, which I believe can be fully utilised in business. People here today in a way represent that, I think.[7]

The other winners of the Star of Ikumen also described that fathering skills could be transferred and applied in professional settings so they could also help build their careers. Mr. Atsushi Nakayama, who is an employed full-time worker in his 40s and has taken 1 year parental leave to look after his son, commented (MHLW 2010e) that:

> My listening skills improved [through parenting]. Kids want us to be patient. They want us to listen. So I try to listen to my co-workers like I do that to my own kid. Staying firm and calm when I have to say something that people don't necessarily want to hear is also another skill set that I gained through my leave. My co-workers actually told me I became a much calmer person.

Having aspiration, and the capability, to succeed at work is not ascribed, of course, only to men. However, being 'successful' in the domains of paid work is not conventionally perceived as an expected aspect that makes a 'good mother'. Given this, the connection between being a 'successful worker' and being a 'good father' figured via the *iku-men* highlighted in the two fathers' above comments is

[7]All the fathers' comments were translated into English by the author.

noteworthy. The most critical framework that explains this link between masculinity and paid work is the much discussed concept of 'hegemonic masculinity' developed by Raewyn Connell (1998, 2000) and other colleagues (Carrigan et al. 1985; Kimmel 2005). The concept is defined as 'the most honoured or desired' form of masculinity (Connell 2000), one that is generally associated with traditional images of manhood—'being strong, successful, capable, reliable, in control' (Kimmel 2005). What is important to highlight here is that the link between masculinity and paid work, which is a central aspect of hegemonic masculinity, is 'historically rooted in institutions built on the assumption that men would be the primary breadwinners' (Thébaud 2010).

In the context of the Ikumen Project, being a 'successful worker' also lies in this tie between masculinity, paid work and breadwinning, since most of the Stars of Ikumen returned to full-time work after parental leave to support their family as breadwinners. This means that their time spent on the domain of unpaid domestic work is highly dependent on their time spent on paid work. In fact, some expressed that they now spent much less time with their children due to their time commitment to their jobs than they did during parental leave. In this sense, doing the *iku-men* within the Ikumen Project does not necessarily represent men's active involvement in child rearing continuously after parental leave, let alone 'opting out' of corporate career. Rather, I would suggest that the Ikumen Project champions the concept and practice of fatherhood that permits men to step in and out of the particular area of unpaid domestic work so that they can remain dominant in full-time employment and thus fulfill the role of father (and husband) as a breadwinner. In other words, doing the *iku-men* within the Ikumen Project works along with, rather than against, the demands of a hegemonically masculine gender regime, thereby redoing gender. In this sense, it can also be said that doing the *iku-men* within the Ikumen Project overlaps the old paradigm of a work-family model, which is centered on the male breadwinner model. In fact, the government has recently added a new feature called 'Ikumen Tournament' ('*Ikumen Kōshien*') to the Ikumen Project, as an explicit way to push men further into the almost utopian coexistence of a committed 'family man' and a breadwinning 'salaryman'.

What makes a perfect *iku-man* does not end here. Some of the Stars of Ikumen even add being a 'good, thoughtful husband' to the list of what the ideal *iku-men* are expected to do within the context of the Ikumen Project. Mr. Satoshi Fukui, who is an employed worker in his 30s and has taken 10 month parental leave to look after his daughter, said (MHLW 2010d) that 'Parenting is important but that's not only about being *iku-men*. I think many [*iku-men*] also take care of their wife, too.' In fact, the ideal of a 'good, thoughtful husband' fits in well with what the government has promoted through the Ikumen Project and other related 'family-friendly' policies and campaigns: it is men's contribution to unpaid domestic work that reduces a women's share of that work, thereby encouraging female labour force participation, raising the birth rate, expanding the labour markets and ultimately boosting the economy.

In the end, becoming an *iku-man*—that is, a committed father, a successful worker and a good, thoughtful husband all at once—is not just hard work; it also

appears to be unattainable and unrealistic for the majority of Japanese men who are employed increasingly on non-regular jobs and thus often in socially and economically precarious positions. In fact, criticisms about the Ikumen Project often point to the idealisation and institutionalisation of the 'new' father model that can only really accommodate certain types of households where wives' earnings (often in addition to those of husbands) enable husbands to devote their time and labour to unpaid domestic work including child care. One of the popular platforms where one can find such criticisms is personal blogs. In his blog dedicated to the topics of family wellbeing, childrearing and fatherhood, a Japanese man in his 30s writes that 'the media raving about those *iku-men* fathers shows only positive things about child rearing. And quite often, those men [featured on the media] are privileged in the sense that their wives earn enough to let them stay home to spend their time with their children and look after them' (Michio 2016). Notably, criticisms about the Ikumen Project and the phenomenon of *iku-men* in general also come from men *within* such 'privileged' households where husbands can engage actively in the both work and family spheres. A Japanese man in his 30s who is a web programmer, a father of a 5-year-old daughter and a husband of a full-time medical practitioner, is one of them. In his blog he writes that:

> I feel distanced from those who call themselves *iku-men.* … What those fathers seem to be doing is by large '*hare no hi ikuji*' ('childrearing as an special event') as opposed to mundane and often tiring family routines, which I engage in (Anonymous 2014).

While these examples can only partially show the class-oriented aspect of the Ikumen Project, they are still suggestive of how heavily the project relies on households where wives and husbands are expected to manage their work and family commitments without relying on daycare services and other social infrastructures.

9.6 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the Ikumen Project as a site for meaning-making, as well as for a fathering practice. By promoting positive images of fathering through the trope of the *iku-men,* the government has attempted to redefine the cultural boundaries of what men do in both the work and family spheres and legitimise men's active involvement in the domain of unpaid domestic work as a 'new' norm. Analysing the material from the MHLW's website, it has demonstrated that the *iku-men* serves as a convenient instrument through which to redefine men's relationships to work, family and well-being. Using the theory of doing gender, I have also argued that the Ikumen Project institutionalises those who can 'have it all'—that is, being a 'committed' father, a 'successful' worker and a 'good, thoughtful' husband—as a 'new' male ideal.

Despite the government's initiatives and advocates for the program at both institutional and individual levels, Japanese men's take-up rates of parental leave and share in time devoted to unpaid domestic work including child rearing remain

significantly low.[8] In this chapter I have argued that while the government incorporates the 'new' paradigm of fatherhood inspired by a Nordic 'dual-earner and dual-carer' work-family model into the Ikumen Project, they still appear to rely on hegemonic male models, such as the salaryman, tying fatherhood to the full-time employment that still allows men to do what men are socially expected to do. In other words, doing the *iku-men* within the Ikumen Project neither undermines the enduring links between masculinity, paid work and breadwinning. Nor does it offer a complete alternative to traditional gender roles in both the work and family spheres. Instead, this chapter has suggested that it coexists with the male breadwinner model that sustains the society's corporate-centred work-family systems, while at the same time permitting men to enter the domain of unpaid domestic work 'when required'. Hence, it has posited that doing the *iku-men* serves to 'redo' gender rather than 'undo' gender.

Empirical research can provide useful research evidence to analyse the effects and issues of the Ikumen Project. The study would also benefit from further research to investigate the wives of the Stars of Ikumen and the impact of their employment status and perspectives on gender equality on their husbands' involvement in unpaid domestic work.

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[8]The amount of time that Japanese men spent on unpaid domestic work including child care is about half an hour per day, significantly below the OECD average (OECD 2014) and only 2.3% of eligible Japanese fathers took parental leave in 2015 (MHLW 2015b).

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Chapter 10
Strategies to Facilitate Work and Family Balance in the Nualjit Community of Bangkok

Daphne E. Pedersen and Hathairat Punyopashtambha

Abstract This chapter uses qualitative interview data to examine informal strategies used to navigate work-family demands by residents of an urban slum in Thailand. Five primary themes emerged from the interviews with members of the Nualjit Community, centrally located in Bangkok. Results indicate that the following are critical to achieving balance between work and family obligations while living with limited financial means: (1) Convenient, stable employment; (2) Sequencing of work; (3) Extended family households with multiple incomes; (4) Care mobilization; and (5) Mobilizing support from neighbors. These strategies, while similar to those used the world over by low-income families, play out uniquely in the Thai cultural context with distinct implications for individual and family well-being.

Keywords Caregiving · Caretaking · Poverty · Thailand · Urban poor · Work-family

10.1 Introduction

Heavily impacted by the East Asian economic crisis and 2008 world financial crisis, Thailand is a middle-income country undergoing sweeping demographic and social changes. At the center of these changes lie the institutions of family and work, and a chief concern among Thai workers is achieving daily balance while attempting to meet work-family demands (Kusakabe 2006). Among the hardest hit by the economic downturns and recovery periods in Thailand are the urban poor

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(Warr 2005a, 2011). Unemployment, inflation, and reduction in purchasing power mean that the majority of families making up the urban poor struggle to meet their basic human needs (Piaseu and Mitchell 2004). Thus, in the face of rising inequality, those living in poverty are also least likely to have the resources necessary to adequately navigate work-life issues. In this chapter, we consider the informal strategies used by Thai workers, especially women, to deal with the intersection between work and family. We focus specifically on residents of the Nualjit Community, an urban slum in Bangkok.

In Thailand, women make up a substantial part of the workforce and nearly half attend college (Romanow 2012). Still, many women and particularly the uneducated, face multiple forms of gender discrimination that make work-family intersections more difficult. These include limited access to the labor market and lower earning potential (Buvinic and Gupta 1997), and high caregiving demands on top of paid labor, known as the double burden or "double day duty" (Esara 2004; Klasen et al. 2010). Among the most serious work-family issues currently facing Thai women are the intertwined concerns of: (a) adequate provision of care for children, including affordable quality day care; (b) a rapidly growing elderly population, resulting in a greater burden of elder care; and (c) lack of employer support and job loss related to the double and triple burdens of household labor and caregiving (Kusakabe 2006).

There is little formal support for women and families attempting to navigate these issues, particularly for those who make up the underclass. Culturally and practically, Thai women are held responsible for family caregiving (Nyamathi et al. 2007; Richter 1992), even as their country takes on a new social and demographic face. The rapid rise of women's employment and increase in female-headed households (National Statistical Office of Thailand 2012) has resulted in a disproportionate workload for Thai women, especially those with limited financial resources. As a result, Thai women exhibit more symptoms of stress than Thai men (Muecke 1994) and have lower psychological well-being (Fuller et al. 2004). Moreover, governmental support systems for meeting immediate needs, such as food insecurity, are absent or not well organized (Piaseu and Mitchell 2004). Where government policies do exist, they remain founded on the scaffolding of the 'traditional' Thai family, without recognition of structural changes in family composition and women's employment status. As noted by Aycan (2005), "in countries where care of the family is completely left to the responsibility of the family members, organizational support mechanisms to work-family balance are not well-developed." Thus, in addition to occupational segregation and low pay (Tangchonlatip et al. 2006), work-family conflict presents a significant and increasing source of gender inequality in the country.

How do members of the urban underclass—who have few resources at their disposal—navigate work-family demands? For many women, home and informal sector work is the only way to combine work and family roles in a way that does not exhaust limited financial resources. Without formal supports, such as full-time child care or elder care, informal strategies are more likely to be adopted to manage the conflicting demands of work and family. In this chapter, we explore strategies

adopted by residents of the Nualjit Community of Bangkok, an urban slum, to meet work-family obligations in a way that allows them to continue to support and care for themselves and their families.

10.2 Background

Thailand is a middle-income country in Southeast Asia, bordering Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia. In an effort to modernize its agrarian economy, in the late 1950s the Thai government began aggressively promoting foreign investment. This, combined with Thai domestic private savings, helped speed the pace of industrialization and by the late 1980s Thailand had the fastest growing economy in the world (Warr 2005b, 2011). Rapid economic growth and the subsequent crash that came with the 1997 Asian economic crisis, then the 2008 world economic and financial crisis, have contributed to sweeping social changes in Thai work and family life. While these changes are similar to those occurring elsewhere in the world, it is the pace of change and rapid population growth that set Thailand apart.

First, the institution of work has changed. After a period of robust growth, real wages declined for Thai workers while the labor market experienced increasing casualization, especially in female-dominated sectors (Kusakabe 2006). A number of employers fail to comply with federal wage guidelines (Peetz 1996) and many workers, particularly women, have earnings below the standard minimum wage (National Statistical Office of Thailand 2012). When work is found, overtime is often required to make up for poor wages and the increasing cost of goods (Kusakabe 2006). As a result, among the poor, all adults are needed in the labor market in order for families to survive. In Thailand, most women are working women; the female labor force participation rate is high relative to other countries (National Statistical Office of Thailand 2012). Furthermore, there is high occupational sex segregation as women tend to be channeled into low paying jobs (Tangchonlatip et al. 2006), most within the service sector (Romanow 2012). Furthermore, the economic crises affected the region as a whole, leading to an increase in migration—legal and illegal—to Bangkok among working age adults from the bordering countries (Warr 2011). For decades, women have dominated these migration streams (Tangchonlatip et al. 2006).

As well, much like other developed and developing countries, demographic and social trends have put a new face on the family. Although the majority of young Thais wish to marry and have a family (Fuller et al. 2004), they are less likely to do so than past generations and are older when they do marry. As fertility rates have dropped, families have grown smaller (National Statistical Office of Thailand 2012). Divorce rates are on the rise (UNDP 2010a), and there are more female-headed households with children (Warr 2005a). In some ways, smaller families are easier to provide for. However, they also mean that informal sources of caregiving are limited and stretched thin. In light of patriarchal Thai social norms,

in married-couple families this means that wives bear the heavier burden of caregiving (Fuller et al. 2004).

Combined, these changes have led to work-family intersections marked by tension and difficulty. The cost of living in urban Thailand is high, especially for workers making low wages. As families struggle to make ends meet, they are saddled with increasing debt and there is a steady and growing gap between the rich and the poor (Warr 2005a, 2011). In search of the means to get by, families must cope with short- and long-term absences of mothers and fathers who work longer hours or become rural-to-urban or international migrants in search of work (Kusakabe 2006). Declining wages, longer work hours, and physical absence put additional pressure on families performing care work—especially women. Consequently, the number of "skip generation households" has been increasing, in which grandparents and at least one grandchild reside together temporarily or long term, with parents away for work (Knodel and Saengtienchai 2005). Together, these changes mean that dependents are more vulnerable to living in poverty and may spend significant amounts of time unsupervised. And, violence against women and children is rising (UNDP 2010b).

10.3 Approach

When the demands of work and family institutions are incompatible in some way, so that participation in one role is made difficult by participation in the other, *work-family conflict* has occurred (Duxbury and Higgins 2008). Work-family conflict is bidirectional: work can negatively impose on the family, and family demands can hinder the performance of work (Frone et al. 1996). Though these two forms of interference are associated, it is more likely that the needs of the family are relegated to those of work, particularly among the poor (Heymann 2007; Williams and Boushey 2010) and working class (Pedersen et al. 2004). Furthermore, transitioning economies that adhere to traditional gender expectations are predicted to experience work-family conflict to a greater extent than economically developed countries with more egalitarian expectations for men and women (Aycan 2005). However, there is little empirical work to document this. Though a rich literature on work-family conflict exists for the Western industrialized world (Aminah 1996), it is nearly absent for the countries of Southeast Asia. Moreover, although a number of work-family conflicts have been identified in the non-Western world, the strategies women use to accommodate the demands of their work-family lives are not well understood. Indeed, "the largest problem of work-family conflict in Thailand is that it is not perceived as a problem" (Kusakabe 2006).

Work-family conflicts and the strategies used to deal with them have impacts that go beyond the immediate and acute, making them an important focus for study. In addition to individual effects, like reductions in physical and psychological health and satisfaction among workers (Frone and Russell 1997; Pedersen and Minnotte 2012), work-family conflict has significant consequences for children,

families, organizations, and communities. For instance, although cultural practices supporting women after childbirth have enhanced breastfeeding success in Thailand in the short term (e.g., *yu duan* period during which household chores are not to be performed until after 30 days postpartum) (Liamputtong 2007, 2011), only about five percent of Thai mothers breastfeed their infants (UNICEF 2012). Choosing not to breastfeed is a work-family strategy employed by mothers who must work long hours and suffer physical absence in order to support their children. Although necessary to get by, a lack of breastfeeding can result in poorer health for both mothers and children (Stuebe 2009), and cause strain at the organizational and societal levels through increased health risks and associated outcomes like employee absenteeism when a child is ill (Bartick and Reinhold 2010).

By developing an understanding of the work-family strategies used by Thai workers, particularly the urban poor, we can identify real avenues for potential change. This type of work has the potential to contribute to both "practice and policy development, and enhance theory building by introducing the boundary conditions (i.e., cultural contingencies) in conceptualizing the work-family conflict" (Aycan 2005). Cultural context moderates the relationship between work-family conflict and its outcomes, such that the same strategy employed in different countries may have varying impacts (Aryee et al. 1999; Aycan and Eskin 2005; Spector et al. 2005). Given the limited empirical work in Southeast Asia, the current project was undertaken to help identify points of impact between work and family roles in urban Thailand, and the informal strategies those with limited resources use to navigate work-family conflicts. In the next section, we describe the method employed for data collection and the population of interest.

10.4 Method

Data taken from 75 interviews with Nualjit residents provide the empirical foundation for this chapter. Women with backgrounds of urban poverty have been called the "face of illiteracy in Asia and the Pacific" (UNESCO 2012). This, in addition to the utility of qualitative methods for exploring individual decision making (Axinn et al. 1991) meant that semi-structured personal interviews were the most appropriate method to obtain data about strategies used to deal with work-family conflict among the study population. An open-ended set of interview questions was used for each interview, and respondents were encouraged to express their views without interruption.

Participants included men and women who lived in the Nualjit Community of Bangkok, an urban slum. The only precondition for sample inclusion was that we speak with adults who resided with at least one other family member. Thus, our sample included a broad range of adults (age 17–81), most (n = 70) but not all of whom were working. A few respondents (n = 3) were mothers who stayed home with their young children, and fully retired men and women living with their adult child(ren) or grandchild(ren) (n = 2). Seventeen percent of the sample was single,

11% was divorced, 4% widowed, and the remainder of the respondents (68%) were married. The participants were recruited with the help of a public health volunteer and local resident, a long-time contact of one of the study's authors. Interviews took place over the course of one month and were conducted by students enrolled in the sociology program at Srinakharinwirot University in partnership with a faculty member and under their direct supervision. Student interviewers were trained and supervised in the field by the study authors, one of whom is a faculty member of Social Sciences at the university. Once completed, all interviews were transcribed into both Thai and English. The data was then compiled and reviewed as a set. As an exploratory project, data from the interviews was coded and analyzed for key themes surrounding work-family strategies. Detailed data from the interviews was first examined, then categorized and recombined with regard to the goal of this study (Krueger and Casey 2000; Yin 1989).

10.5 The Nualjit Community

The Nualjit Community is located on Soi Ekamai 30, off of Sukhumvit Road in the Wattana District, centrally located within the city and covering 28 acres. The community is bordered by the Sansab Canal to the north, Srichawala Village to the south, a private fence on the east side, and Soi Nualnoi to the west. There are ~3,275 legally registered residents in the area (1,475 men and 1,805 women), making up 634 households. Those who live in the Nualjit Community are principally of working age: 60% (n = 1,950) of the men and women are between the ages of 18 and 59, whereas about 34% (n = 1,109) of community members are children and 6% (n = 216) are elders. Additionally, there are 850 unregistered residents renting apartments and rooms from legal residents. Some residents of the community are migrants from the northern and northeastern parts of Thailand. Others have emigrated from neighboring countries, including Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia.

When the Nualjit Community originated, Sam-in Mosque owned the land and allowed people of various religious faiths to rent the land and build their houses. Rent of 150–200 Thai baht (THB) per month (~4.00–5.50 U.S. dollars—USD) is paid to the Mosque, depending on the size of the land parcel. It was officially declared a (slum) community by the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration in 1994 (Marpraneet 2010). Like other slum areas in Bangkok, many of the houses lack windows and are built on open water due to placement in low-lying areas. This stagnant water source contains trash and motor oil, providing a breeding ground for mosquitoes. Running water is not common, and most households do not have the convenience of washing machines, clothes dryers, dishwashers, or other appliances.

Residents, mostly Buddhists and Muslims, make a living through employment in a number of occupations. The majority work as hired laborers, such as taxi drivers, bus drivers, and construction workers. Middle-age women are likely to work from the home, opening small hair dressing or grocery shops, or food and fruit stalls.

Younger adults tend to work in the private and public sector for job security, higher income, and medical welfare. Virtually everyone who is able works in some way for wages, and many of working age hold multiple jobs. At the time of the interviews, the poverty line per person per month was roughly 2,500 Thai baht (~$69 USD) (Asian Development Bank 2015). The majority (60%) of residents earn from 6,000 to 9,000 THB per month (~$160–240 USD). While 22% make more than this, 5% make less, and another 13% of residents have no monthly income (Chroensuk4 2015).

10.6 Themes

Similar to what others have found in working with the poor in Thailand (e.g., Jongudomkarn and West 2004), most respondents were optimistic about their lives, despite long work hours and poor living conditions. Most of the men and women we interviewed reported liking their jobs and being satisfied with their work, although virtually all respondents commented that they would also like to earn higher wages in order to meet family needs and save for the future. In regard to achieving balance between work and family demands while living with limited financial means, five critical strategies emerged from the data. We review each of these in turn.

10.6.1 Convenient, Stable Employment

Residents of the Nualjit Community valued positions that were near their residence and offered long-term, predictable employment. Many were unable to meet their monthly expenses and desired greater income, but were otherwise satisfied with their jobs because they provided a regular income source. This was exemplified by a young married man we spoke with:

> "I work as a collector, going to houses to demand debt payments. I earn 15,000 THB (~$414 USD) a month, working five days a week, eight hours a day. I have time with my family, but I do not make enough in wages to meet my family's needs. My wife doesn't work so she can take care of our daughter. My father lives with us too. I don't want to change the job I have… because I think that it's stable and it's very difficult to find a job right now. But I hope to earn at least 25,000 THB (~$690) per month." (married man, 25 years old)

Even full time work does not necessarily mean regular income, as wages and tips can vary greatly over time. And many of the jobs held by respondents were marked by extended work hours. Another respondent, a 50 year old divorced woman living with her adult daughter, described her extended work week at a job that was located near her home. Despite long hours and few days off, she hopes to find additional informal sector work to increase her income:

> I work as a housekeeper in an apartment building near my house. I've worked there more than 15 years. I like this job because my workplace is close to home, and I can walk. And, my job is not too hard. I earn 12,000 baht (~$331 USD) a month and work 7 days a week, about 9 h a day. This job and my income fit my family's financial needs, but only because my daughter works and gives me some money for family expenses. I don't want to change my job because my workplace is so close to home, and I am getting old. However, I'd like to earn more because I want my daughter to have money for savings. I am looking for ways to make extra income by doing something from home too. I don't know what that is yet.

In contrast to Esara's (2004) findings among female labor migrants in Bangkok, who did not view their informal sector jobs as "work" and considered them secondary to homemaking, the women in our study readily acknowledged informal sector jobs as employment.

> I own a business selling congee in the morning and evening. My stall is in front of my house. I wake up at 3:00 in the morning to begin preparing, and then sell between 5:00 and 10:00. I sell again between 3:00 and 6:00 in the evening. I can earn about 16,000 THB (~$441 USD) per month working every day. I often cry because there isn't enough money. My income isn't enough, but I don't want to change my job because I've been doing it since I was 12 years old. (married woman, age 45)

As noted by Heymann and colleagues (2004), it is often families for whom extended work hours are likely to be most costly—those who have the fewest resources available to pay for child and dependent care—who have the longest work weeks. Further, extended work hours have implications not just for social inequality, but also the health of individuals and families.

> I live with my husband, my two children, my mother, and six cousins. I have a food stall near my house because it is convenient. I can watch my mother and the kids. I am able to care for them that way, and I can bring my mother to the hospital. I also help my mother with her medical bills. (married woman, age 44; makes 7,000 THB (~$193 USD/month))

10.6.2 Sequencing of Work

In married family households, it was common for one spouse to hold a job that allowed them to watch the children while they worked or for parents to alternate their work schedules to allow the child to be home with one parent at a time. For instance, when children reached school age, one parent would drop the children at school and then go to work and the other parent would pick them up at the end of the school day and watch them in the evenings. This pattern was described by a married woman, age 35: "My husband and I both work full time. He sends our daughter to school every morning. My parents pick her up from school and watch her until I pick her up to watch her in the evening. Before she attended school, we left our daughter with my parents during the day." In single parent or divorced households, or multi-generational households, a grandparent, aunt, or other family

member was often one of the sequencing caretakers. Said a divorced woman with a three year old son, "I work from 5:00 in the evening until 2:00 in the morning. My sister works between 8:00 am and 4:00 pm. So I care for my son during the day, and then my sister cares for my son while I work." (age 36) For some, family members live not in the household, but nearby and can help meet caregiving needs:

> I own a small business selling food. I work every day, about 12 hours a day. My father comes to take care of my sons while I am working. He lives nearby, so he comes in the morning and then leaves at night. If he cannot come, I take my sons to work with me. My husband watches our sons at night when I am still at work. (married woman, age 22 with two young sons under the age of three)

This pattern stands in contrast to the increased reliance on paid child care centers and at-home caregivers prevalent among urban residents in Thailand of higher socioeconomic standing (Richter 1997; Wongboosin et al. 1991). It is much closer to the findings of Connelly and colleagues (1996) and those reported by Wong and Levine (1992). These authors found that in other developing countries, women's ability to work and find child care were jointly determined. In urban Mexico, for example, mothers' labor-force participation depended upon the ability to find low- or no-cost child care (Wong and Levine 1992). As well, Richter (1997) reported that among women employed in the informal sector in Bangkok, reliance on other relatives was common when mothers were not watching children. Preference for relatives to provide care, when mothers are not able, is strong in Thailand (Esara 2004; Richter 1997). In some cases, a deep distrust in day care centers was expressed.

> Before my son went to school and while I went to work, my mother in-law looked after him for me. I trusted her and saved a lot of money. I did not leave him at a child care center because then I wouldn't know what he did during the day. I've heard in the news about some bad centers. There are many children in their care who have been beaten and not given proper food to eat. It's better if parents can take care of their children. (married woman, age 46)

While sequencing is a strategy that helps families meet the immediate demands of child care, the dual roles of wage earner and care provider mean that few will have the opportunity to develop the skills necessary to earn higher wages (Archavanitkul and Pramulratana 1990). Thus, sequencing is a short-term strategy to balance work and family life that has longer-term implications for individual and family well-being.

10.6.3 Extended Family Households with Multiple Incomes

The majority (71%) of Nualjit residents we spoke with lived in extended family households in which their parents, adult siblings, in-laws, and/or grown children also resided. Only 29% lived with a spouse and/or minor children, and no extended

family members. The size of households ranged from two to 12 members, the average household size being 4.13 people. Thirty-five percent of the sample had households made up of five or more family members. Except for young children, students, and elders, all household members made financial contributions to help cover the family's expenses unless they provided daily full-time caregiving for other family members. In multi-generational households, an average of 2.66 earners contributed to the family's expenses. Piaseu and Mitchell's (2004) work with the urban poor in Bangkok showed that among urban slum dwellers, the majority of households relied on multiple income sources. And still, 70% of participants in their study reported difficulty meeting their basic needs and inability to make household payments each month. The same was true of most of our respondents. A divorced man we spoke with, age 34, said of his living situation,

> My family is very big. There are twelve of us living in this house, including me. I live with my father, who is 85 years old, my mother who is 74 years old, my sister, sister-in-law, and seven nieces and nephews. I only earn enough because my sister and sister-in-law both work and contribute toward expenses too. But I need to earn more money. It would also be good to be able to work at home so I can take care of my parents during the daytime.

Although coresidence with extended family members is becoming less common in Thailand (Richter 1997), it is still rare for Thai adults to live alone or separate from family members (Fuller et al. 2004). In Bangkok, the problem of household crowding is about four times that found in North America (Fuller et al. 2004). Another man, also in his thirties, said of his household arrangement and finances:

> There are eight people who live in our house, including my wife and two children, my mother, two older sisters, younger brother, and me. I have enough money to take care of our needs right now because my sisters and brothers are employed. We share family expenses together, so I don't need to have a part-time job. While I am working my wife takes care of the children. She's a housewife and doesn't work. My oldest sister watches our mother. (married man, age 30)

10.6.4 Care Mobilization

Connected to reliance on extended family households for financial support and security, in the Nualjit Community intergenerational living was also a means of facilitating caretaking for both children and elders. One form of intergenerational living is to have a grandparent live as a resident caretaker while parents work. A married woman, age 47, described her family's living and caretaking strategy when her children were younger: "Before my children went to school, I asked my mother to watch them for me while I was working. But now that they attend school, my mother is back at her home in another province." Another resident, retired and living with his grown daughters, described how he and his wife live apart while she cares for their grandchildren:

> I'm retired. I live with my daughters in this house. My wife has moved to another province to live with our sons and help watch their children. I stay at home alone during the day while my daughters are working. They prepare lunch and dinner for me before they leave for work. I know our children work hard and have a lot of responsibilities, so I don't want to disturb them. I wish I could earn some money to help, but I am too old. (married man, age 73)

This quote illustrates that in addition to resident grandparents providing care for grandchildren, it was also common for non-working elders to reside with their grown children who cared for them, sometimes both physically and financially. Some of these adult children were still caretaking young children of their own, as was a 31 year old married woman we spoke with. She was able to combine work and family demands by opening up a shop inside her home. "I have a small business, a flower shop. I live on the second floor of the shop, so I can take care of my daughter and mother-in-law. It's very convenient that I can watch the shop and them at the same time." When possible, others shared elder care with siblings, who also lived in the household:

> There are five people including me living in the household. I stay with my mother, older sister and her husband, and niece. If I have to go out of town, my sister can take care of our mother. It's good to have siblings living together. No need to send our mother somewhere else to be cared for. (single woman, age 45)

This pattern is similar to that reported by Jongudomkarn and West (2004) in their work with residents of the Khon Kaen slum in Bangkok, about whom they noted life was complex and involved responsibility for multiple roles and family members. Some residents combined intergenerational living with informal sector work in order to best combine work and family demands. We saw this in our sample as well.

> I iron and sew clothes. I like my work because I can do it at home and take care of my father and daughter. I earn 8,000 THB (~$221 USD) per month, but it is not enough for our family. I also have a part-time job, but it doesn't bring in much. Still, working from home is very convenient for me because I can care for my father too. It's hard for me to decide whether I should change my job. I want to find a job with more income and stability. But on the other hand, I have to care for my father. (divorced woman, age 42)

Nearly all the elders we spoke with expressed the desire to be able to contribute financially to their households in order to ease the burden they felt they placed on their adult children. This was the case, regardless of gender.

> I have been living with my wife and our three sons and their families. I own a small grocery at home so I can earn some money. I don't want to ask my sons for money very often. They have their own families to care for. I try to pay for my own food and utilities. (married man, age 81)

> My husband passed away five years ago. Now I live with one of my two daughters and my son. I don't work because I'm too old now. My children take care of me. They pay the rent, food, water, electricity, and phone bill. But I want to earn some money so I won't be a burden on my children. (widowed woman, age 72)

10.6.5 Mobilizing Support from Neighbors

Neighbors were viewed as a provisional source of caretaking when necessary, but it was observed that this source of help could not be used too frequently. Those we spoke with were concerned about "bothering" their neighbors by relying on them with any regularity. Thus, while this form of support was a great relief at times, it also caused some anxiety when used. The network of care provided by neighbors was used by those watching over elders and children, with similar sentiments expressed about reliance on neighbors for both forms of care:

> My sisters care for our father because they work from home. Sometimes I ask my neighbors to take care of him when we are not around. That way, they can help my father if anything happens to him. They can protect my father from people who shouldn't be in the neighborhood. However, it isn't good to ask my neighbors for help like this too much. I don't want to bother them. (single female, age 46)

> When I have to run errands for work I leave my youngest daughter with my neighbor. However, I don't feel good about doing this. (married female, age 38 years)

> I live with my grandparents and care for them. There is usually no difficulty [combining work and family] because my neighbors can also watch them for me. But if I do it too often, they will be bothered. My workplace is close to home, so I usually come back home at noon during lunch time to see them. (single female, age 24)

While grateful for the support provided by their neighbors, respondents expressed a preference for family members to watch over their elders and children. Caretaking of elders extended to younger members of the family, including male and female grandchildren, who also expressed concern about providing adequate care for their grandparents.

> When we work, my grandmother stays home alone. We ask our next door neighbors to care for her because she has glaucoma. That way, we're sure about her safety. We are lucky that our neighbors are nice and can take care of her while we are working. However, I really want to have relatives care for her instead. I'd like to find work as a waiter in a nearby restaurant or work from home so I have more time to take care of my grandmother. (single male, age 17)

Logan and Spitze (1994) found that those with minor children in the home know a greater number of their neighbors and have a larger "neighbor network" from which they can mobilize instrumental support. In Richter's (1997) study, those who worked in the informal sector were more likely to live in neighborhoods where they knew those who lived near them, and counted on this network of people to help provide caretaking. Although we did not explore other forms of reliance on neighbors or provision of alternate sources of support, living in a close neighborhood network in which residents have similar jobs can have additional benefits such as helping residents build their career connections and provide occupational support to one another (Jongudomkarn and West 2004). Thus, the provision of caretaking support may extend into the development of other forms of mutual support and aid beyond the initial request. As identified in the literature on social support, the

provision of instrumental help is a form of exchange that is founded in expectations of reciprocity (Uehara 1990). By providing help and support of any form in return, neighbors can overcome the potential barrier of being 'burdensome' when caretaking for children or elders is needed.

10.7 Conclusion

In Thailand, there is little formal support for women and families attempting to navigate work-life issues, and the urban poor have the fewest resources at their disposal. In this study, we considered the informal strategies adopted by residents of the Nualjit Community, an urban slum in Bangkok, to deal with the challenges they face combining work and family demands. Without the benefit of a national and organizational support structure and with limited income, we found that the men and women we spoke with used means of combining work and family that sometimes distinguish them from more affluent residents of Bangkok—but that resemble strategies used by impoverished families the world over: (1) Convenient, stable employment; (2) Sequencing of work; (3) Extended family households with multiple incomes; (4) Care mobilization; and (5) Mobilizing support from neighbors.

It is only by developing an understanding of the work-family strategies used by Thai workers that we can identify avenues for change. Though the means of combining work and family used by Nualjit Community members were similar to those found across the globe, cultural context moderates the relationship between work-family conflict and its outcomes, such that the same strategy employed in different countries may have different consequences (Aryee et al. 1999; Aycan and Eskin 2005; Spector et al. 2005). Thus, for instance, although Nualjit residents relied on neighborhood networks at times to help provide care for children and elders, they were reluctant to do so as they saw the provision of care as a great imposition on others and this caused some residents anxiety. As noted by Thorne (2014), 'ecologies of care' that extend outside household walls and may be based on proximity and convenience are often critical sources of support for low-income parents and relatives. Yet, these networks of care can create feelings of obligation and tension, challenging the very relationships that underlie them. One way to potentially build on this finding is for local organizers to help develop semi-formal care networks within the community, through which low-income residents can trade services without the exchange of monetary resources—much as some child care cooperatives work in the United States (Coontz and Esper 2003). In the cooperative, members may use "chips" or another symbolic form of currency, "banking" hours to use by providing care for another member's child or elder and "cashing in" chips when they need care for their own family members. It is possible that a more organized care cooperative may accomplish the allied goals of providing no-expense caretaking for residents and releasing community members from feelings of imposition when support is needed. The cooperative model has been used successfully in developing countries to meet economic development and social

equity goals, and is a sustainable strategy in areas where resources are limited (ILO 2015).

Although we interviewed both men and women living in the Nualjit Community, many of whom felt the squeeze of work and family caretaking, we argue that any strategies developed to help the Thai underclass navigate these issues should be particularly concerned with helping women. As noted, Thai women labor under a more traditional set of expectations and are held principally responsible for family well-being (Nyamathi et al. 2007; Richter 1992), generating the double and even triple burden of caregiving and household labor layered on top of the obligations of paid labor (Esara 2004; Klasen et al. 2010). As a result, Thai women endure more physical and psychological symptoms of stress and reduced well-being than Thai men (Fuller et al. 2004; Muecke 1994). In order to alleviate this growing source of gender inequality amid the rapid social and population change occurring in Thailand, work-family conflict must necessarily be acknowledged and addressed. The themes presented in this chapter represent starting points for policy conversations surrounding these issues.

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