

UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM: ANALYSIS OF SOCIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS

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Understanding Terrorism: Analysis of Sociological and Psychological Aspects

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Foreword

Terrorism is one of the most important phenomena of our contemporary world. There have been several attempts to explain different aspects of this problem. This research is important for several reasons. It will enable us to understand terrorism with a comprehensive approach. Also, terrorism is analyzed from a different conceptual framework and underlying causes of terrorism with case studies are presented.

Underlying causes of terrorism, such as poverty, inequality, injustice, instability stemming from immigration, or effects of globalization should be targeted. While responding to terrorism, it should be kept in mind that fundamental human rights and liberties must be protected.

This book includes the proceedings from the NATO 2006 Advanced Research Workshop on “Understanding and Responding to Terrorism: A Multi-dimensional Approach”, which was held at the Capital Hilton Hotel in Washington, D.C., on September 08–09, 2006.

The editors of this book, Dr. Suleyman OZEREN and Ismail Dincer GUNES are members of the Turkish National Police. Both of these researchers developed independent projects to study different issues related to terrorism. Dr. Suleyman OZEREN’s project titled “Sociological Approaches to the Al-Qaeda Terror Organization” and Ismail Dincer GUNES’ project titled “The Assessment of Social Impact of Al-Qaeda Attacks and Overt Security Measures in Target Countries” were submitted to the NATO Headquarters in November, 2005. The NATO granted their two proposals and combined them under the Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) entitled “Social and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism.”

In line with the content of the presentations, the book has been organized under five major parts:

1. Understanding terrorism: Conceptual framework and individual and organizational terrorist behavior,
2. Understanding causes of terrorism: Multidisciplinary approach,
3. Responding to terrorism: A comprehensive review,
4. Legal aspects of responding to terrorism: A delicate balance,
5. The impact of communication and technology on terrorism: Effective facilitators.

We hope that through this book, we will have the opportunity to make a contribution to the field of responding terrorism, which is very complex with multifaceted issues.

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We really appreciated the unwavering support of all of the individuals who made this event possible.

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Introduction: Sociological and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism

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Abstract. This chapter introduces the articles presented in this volume. The book is composed of five parts, all of which focus on different aspects of terrorism. Terrorism is one of the most important phenomena of our contemporary world. Understanding terrorism requires a comprehensive approach. Unless all aspects of the problem are addressed it is almost impossible to wipe out it. Therefore in order to identify effective and result-oriented strategies, it is necessary to understand the phenomenon, and to find out underlying causes. This chapter summarizes the entire volume.

Introduction

With the beginning of this century, specifically after September 11, 2001 attacks to the United States, terrorism became a center point for the world. Condemning terrorism and its actors is an immediate reaction; however, it is not enough to struggle against these catastrophic attacks and their perpetrators.

Terrorism is one of the most important phenomena of our contemporary world. There have been several attempts to explain different aspects of this problem. This research is important for several reasons. First, this research will enable us to understand terrorism with a comprehensive approach. Second, terrorism is analyzed from a different conceptual framework and underlying causes of terrorism with case studies are presented. Moreover, response strategies are discussed from different perspectives such as legal measures, organizational changes, and policing strategies all of which have important components within the psychological and social aspects of the problem. Fourth, the impact of technology and communication are examined in detail since both these issues have effect on how terrorists operate and how new technologies can be used by the terrorists to support their activities. Furthermore, the book has both theoretical discussion and practical experience which makes this study a source book for the academicians and practitioners. Finally, this study has comparative perspectives from different countries which also add to the value to the book.

This book is an attempt to understand the underlying causes of terrorism in a way which involves rather a comprehensive approach. To achieve this, the book is composed of five major parts all of which provide different perspectives.

1. Understanding Terrorism: Conceptual Framework and Individual and Organizational Terrorist Behavior

1.1. Conceptualization of terrorism

The first part of the book focuses on understanding terrorism which involves conceptualization of terrorism and understating of terrorist behavior. Conceptualization and understanding terrorist behavior are crucial components of comprehending this phenomenon. The first one deals with the definition of terrorism, and the second one focuses on the individual dynamics resulting in one's decision of becoming a terrorist.

Conceptualization of terrorism is rather a difficult task. There are several attempts to define and describe the concept of terrorism. In fact, definition of terrorism is proposed as one of the most difficult tasks. Sezgin, in his article, "Formation of the Concept of Terrorism", states the difficulty to define the concept of terrorism. According to Sezgin, each state determines the definition of terrorism according to their national interest which of course varies from state to state. Also, conceptualization process may be affected by the cultural, social, political, and other factors. But defining terrorism still posses problems. As Laqueur [1] claimed in 1977

"It can be predicted with confidence that disputes about a comprehensive, detailed definition of terrorism will continue for a long time, that they will not result in consensus and that they will make no noticeable contribution to the understanding of terrorism."

While Laqueur seems to be pessimistic about defining terrorism, time has proven that his statement, in fact, was true [2].

1.2. Understanding terrorist behavior: Social and psychological analysis

The second major aspect of this part has to do with understanding terrorist behavior. This section attempts to explain terrorism from both social and psychological perspectives. Although victims' emotional responses such as demonization of an entire culture in which terrorists live psychologically, it is the responsibility of academicians to inform the society with their objective studies. The prevalent anxiety and confusion necessitate greater responsibility for the academicians to bring clarity and an insight to the ongoing debates. Understanding terrorism requires looking at several aspects including social, psychological, political and cultural. Basically, there are three approaches that explain the formation of terrorist organizations and the responses that has to be taken against these twisted structures within the societies.

The Instrumental model views terrorism as a response to external incentives. It assumes that the rationality in the behavior of terrorists is to attain their goals by using different means. Thus, increasing the cost of terrorism will lead to a decline of the terrorist activities. The instrumental approach views terrorism as a bargaining process based on "power to hurt," or to coerce the other party, while it presents similar counter-measures to struggle against terrorism by proposing two strategies; defense (preemption, prevention) and deterrence (denial, retaliation), for combating terrorism. These responses aim to reduce the reward and raise the cost of terrorism for the terrorist organizations (Pape).

The organizational model considers terrorist organizations as regular organizations governed by similar principles such as competition within the organizations and actions concerning the survival of the organization. Beside, recruiting and retaining membership have great importance for these isolated groups. They also struggle against probable decline by restricting departure and dissent (Crenshaw). Organizational survival takes priority even over ideology that is often modified to serve organizational goals. Based on these observations, the organizational theory suggests a different set of proposals for controlling terrorism other than instrumental approach. Instrumental approach, by seeing the solution in giving immediate and short term responses to attacks, presents a part of the bigger picture, while organizational approach claims that terrorist organizations have long term objectives. Both models that have great importance to understand the nature of terrorist organizations have to be taken into consideration during the struggle against terrorism. Instrumental and organizational models have to be seen as the parts of the whole.

In addition to the above two models that are developed, theoretical observations (Baudrillard, Bourdieu, Barber) and field researches in the religious realm (Juergensmeyer, Mamdani, Kimbal, Barkun, Stern) and in the secular arena (Wievorka, Rapoport) have fleshed out certain cultural components of terrorism. A cultural approach to terrorism has emerged recently.

1.2.1. Extremist subcultures

Terrorism can not be understood without realizing the effect of culture on these organizations. These “extremist subcultures” or “anti-movements” provide the environment in which local cultural, political, and religious norms and values, usually frustrated by real or perceived barriers of expression and implementation, acquire radicalized and rejectionist guises that later become basis for terrorist ideologies and organizations (Sadri). These extremist subcultures, like any “deviant” subculture, transmit skills and attitudes toward crime to their membership in a manner articulated by the classical sociology of deviance (Sutherland and Cressey).

Fundamentalism is a timely example which sometimes confused with other concepts. Oguzhan Basibuyuk, Onder Karakus, and Huseyin Akdogan provide a description of fundamentalism with a case study in their article, “Fundamentalism as a Universal Mindset Case Study of Religious Fundamentalism: Turkish Hizbullah.” They applied two features, “exclusivity” and “oppositional character”, identified by Barr as basic features of Protestant fundamentalism, have been applied to a specific religious fundamentalist group: the Turkish Hizbullah (THB). They analyzed the ideology and premises subscribed to by the THB, and they claim that it is possible to observe these features of exclusivity and oppositional character in almost all of their claims and propaganda materials.

Mahmoud Sadri in his article “Terrorism as Suicidal Homicide: A Durkheimian Approach” applies Durkheim’s typology of suicide to homicide and suicidal homicide. According to Sadri, the altruistic type of suicidal homicide is designated as the most intractable variety because of its high level of integration in its culture of origin, whereas egoistic and anomic varieties of suicidal homicide are manageable with requisite global mobilization and vigilance.

According to Bandura [3] terrorists using four moral disengagements to insulate themselves from human consequences of their terrorists act:

1. Moral justification: They are fighting against the evil “the society is evil” the victims are the evil.
2. Displacement of responsibility on the leader or the member.
3. Minimizing or ignoring actual suffering of the victims (i.e., not seeing them, using time bomb).
4. Dehumanize victims by labeling and stigmatizing them as tools of the system pigs oppressors...etc.

1.2.2. Aggression and Frustration

Ismail Dincer Gunes and Suleyman Ozeren also look at the relationship between frustration and aggression. In “Theory of Prism: Individual Capital and Frustration” Gunes and Ozeren attempt to offer a new perspective on the relationship between frustration and aggression. Even though the initial relationship was assumed to be between aggression and frustration, this study will present how frustration does not only lead to aggression and also how the link between frustration and behavior affect the outcome. A socio-psychological approach is used to explain this process and the authors assert that when an individual faces a problem that causes frustration, he/she has different options up until he or she engages in an aggressive behavior. First and foremost, aggressive behavior is not the only option. There are other options as well. The path that will be followed by the individual is dependent on that person’s level of any form of capital. According to their model, violence, terrorism in particular is predominantly an option for the people who have lower social, cultural or economic capital. People who have higher levels of capital would be more likely to follow a different path other than violence.

1.2.3. Socialization

As Tamara Kiknadze revealed in the article, “Terrorism as a Social Reality” in order to understand the tendencies for present and future behavior of persons, we must begin with public attitudes toward different issues of politics, economics, social life, culture etc. Kiknadze also gives emphasis on the social culture, and considers it as a critical element in understanding people’s actions across countries or across time. Furthermore, she presents the events in Pankisi, Georgia in her explanation of social environment and how terrorism benefits from such environment. Wahhabism played significant role in spreading fundamentalism all over the region in the Caucasus, including Pankisi.

Kiknadze summarizes socialization process in terms of terrorism. According to her, three general points about socialization and learning need to be emphasized. First, there can be either direct or indirect socialization. Socialization is direct when it involves the explicit communication of information, values, or feelings toward subject. Second, socialization continues throughout and individual’s life, and early family influences can create an individual’s initial values, but subsequent life experiences—becoming involved in new social groups and roles, moving from one part of the country to another, shifting up or down the social ladder, becoming a parent, finding or losing a job—may change one’s perspectives. She draws our attention to the impact of dramatic events on the psychology of the individual. For example, immigration, refugee status, loss of close relatives and alike may have significant effect on the individual. Third, patterns of socialization in a society can either be unifying or divisive. Particularly, subcultural values can be very divisive.

1.2.3.1. Terrorist Decision Making

Murat Ozer also examines how terrorist organizations make decisions to recruit new members. In his article, "The Impact of Group Dynamics on Terrorist Decision Making" explores the impact of group dynamics on terrorist decision making by exploring the nature of terrorist organizations. His study showed that preconditions of terrorism prepare a fertile condition for terrorism and specific precipitators such as anger and hate motivate certain individual's especially young people to join terrorist organizations. The study also showed that terrorist organizations usually try to recruit their members from economically, politically, and socially deprived locations. Ozer also examines the decision making process. He suggests that provocative situational context is a first vehicle for terrorism, the impact of group dynamics has more implications than external factors. Since psychological progression toward terrorism occurs inside the organization, group think process may moderate the importance of provocative situational context. There is a direct relation between provocative situational context and group terrorist organization.

1.2.4. Globalization

Globalization has also impact on terrorism in many ways. Some argues that there is a process of globalization of terrorism. Fuat Keyman, in his article, "Terrorism in the Post-September 11 Era: Continuities and Changes" focuses on globalization and terrorism. He also presents a good summary of the characteristics of terrorism especially after September 11, 2001. While there are methodological differences in terms of how we explain terrorism. Keyman summarizes them as follows;

- 1-Terrorism is a social consternation of events and causer
- 2-Terrorism is not a philosophy but a method.
- 3- Terrorism is political as it uses power to achieve political goals.

As indicated before understanding terrorism requires considering many influential factors. Contemporary terrorism has been affected by the foreign policy decisions of the states unparalleled to the past. Particularly in the Middle East, the United States military presence, particularly invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq provide psychological motivation to the radical groups for them to use for their future operations. Keyman also agrees with this by saying globalization, weakness of the Arab region and American military presence in that region has changed the nature of terrorism.

Contemporary terrorism may include "anti-abortion activists, animal rights activists, anti-globalization activists, and religious activists [including cults, such as the Japanese group Aum Shinrikyo, and pro-Hindu as well as pro-Muslim terrorists like Bin Laden and his followers]" [4] Huseyin Ors and Hakan Cem Cetin further explains the characteristics of terrorism in detail. In their article "Characteristics of Global Terrorism and the Factors Fostering Its Spread All Over the World" Ors and Cetin analyze the characteristics of global terrorism as follows:

1. Use of Technology. Terrorist networks follow technological developments closely and use communication technologies effectively.
2. Dangerousness. They have become extremely dangerous with their horizontal and indistinguishable organizations across the world.
3. Decentralization. They have become decentralized and divorced from territoriality. Terrorist networks have no longer a proper chain of command among their subgroups as well as they do not have specific territorial interests.

4. Unpreventable. They have become almost unpreventable with their suicidal attacks

5. Target All. They target societies without distinguishing between innocent people and perceived enemies.

6. Threat. They pose a huge threat with the possibility of accessing weapons of mass destruction.

7. Autonomous groups. Their subgroups carry out their operations autonomously from each other. Thus, they no longer carry out their operations in accordance with their commandship but according to their ideological determinations.

8. Cyber terrorism. They have potential power of committing various violence including cyber-attacks on computerized infrastructure since they have a high capacity of using sophisticated technologies especially communication technologies [5].

While there are many factors fostering the spread of global terrorism, according to Keyman, religious extremism, states' foreign policies, failure of states, sense of injustice and inequality and globalization are the major ones. To deal with such a phenomenon, the authors propose continuous dedication of the international community, multi-national security cooperation, and effective supranational lawful regulations as the fundamentals in overcoming this new kind terrorism.

2. Underlying Causes of Terrorism: Multi Disciplinary Approach

Defining the concept of terrorism is not an easy job; however, discussion of the underlying causes of terrorism is also equally difficult. Identifying the underlying causes of terrorism is very crucial given the fact that being able to address them would provide the answers to solve the seemingly never ending problem. If we are to summarize the underlying causes of terrorism poverty, inequality, social status in a given society, immigration, and alike can be listed.

2.1. Inequality, Poverty, and Globalization

Inequality is a critical factor which can be a source of terrorism. In equality and lack of social order may lead violence and terrorism. Mustafa Kayaoglu, in his article, "Does Inequality Trigger Terrorism?" attempts to answer the question of whether inequality triggers terrorism. Kayaoglu states that disorder and inequality in a state result with increasing attacks on their legitimacy. In that environment, the people's sense of political community disappears and individuals feel alienation. Consequently the social contract that binds individuals and social structures loses its legitimacy which leads a chaos, or in Durkheim's words, anomie. Instead of common values which bind society, marginal ideologies which may lead to the emergence of terrorist ideologies. According to Durkheim, anomie occurs usually after an unexpected and immediate social, economic or political change within a given society. As he argues, such abrupt changes inevitably curtail society's collective conscience in regards to norms and values. According to Durkheim, during this time of structural transition, individuals are not sure of the moral laws that constrain them. Merton also explains anomie. According to him, social disorder or anomie occurs when society or the social structure holds high ideals of values for all its members, yet some members of that society are structurally barred from living up to those ideals.

While these theorists provide in-depth analysis for social disorder, globalization plays an important role. According to Kayaoglu, globalization does not just affect the economics, but it also threatens every aspect of life. Especially today while all societies emphasize these inequalities and the results of inequality, the inherent inequality seems to be increasing all around the globe due to the impact of globalization. Kayaoglu presents two conflicting opinions about the globalization and its impact. On the one hand Hassman and Rhoda [6] claim that while in the short run globalization may have negative effect, in the long-run it will have positive effects and will result in “greater moves to democracy, economic distribution, the rule of law, and the promotion of social and civil rights.” On the other hand “as a direct consequence of globalization and the expansion of capitalism, national and international economies are increasingly being controlled, dominated, and shaped by global financial markets and transnational corporations as well as by foreign governments [7]”

In term of the relationship between poverty and inequality and terrorism, Mutlu Koseli’s study provides an analysis through an empirical research. In his article “Poverty, Inequality and Terrorism Relationship: An Empirical Analysis on Some Root Causes of Terrorism” Koseli assesses the empirical validity of crime literature and crime theories for explaining cross provincial rate of terrorist incidents in Turkey. His research claims that high numbers of terrorist incidents in some provinces of Turkey are related to poverty and inequalities between provinces. Besides these two main factors Koseli examines the effect of other issues derived from the crime literature, such as labor participation, population, young population, and education that might have negative or positive effect on the number of terrorist incidents. These does not mean that this study do not accept any other reasons of terrorism but specifically looks at these mentioned issues and left the other issues for other studies.

The study found that urbanization brings some specific problems, and these might be related to terrorism issue such as uncontrolled growth of the urban areas, uncontrolled migration towards urban areas, and indirect results that these situations might cause. The study also showed that there is more evidence to support the idea that inequalities between geographical regions are the factors that increase terrorism. Unequal distribution of infrastructure, unequal distribution of government investment between region and unequal distribution of health services are important factors which could be related to the number of terrorist incidents and this should be considered by the policy makers who are dealing with counterterrorism issues.

2.2. Democracy and Terrorism

Curtis R. Ryan, in his article, “Democracy, Terrorism, and Islamist Movements: Comparing Hamas, Hizbullah, and the Islamic Action Front” examines three different organizations that have differences in terms of their ideology and methods and tactics to achieve these ideologies. Indeed Ryan provides a comparative examination of three key Islamist movements -- the Palestinian movement Hamas, the Lebanese Hizbullah movement, and the Jordanian Islamic Action Front. He states that these three organizations have made different choices regarding reform, revolution, democracy and terrorism. Compare to Hamas and Hizbullah, IAF does not have a military wing. The author asserts that IAF, the Jordanian movement does not exist in the structural constraint of occupation, which allows it to focus on more moderate ends and means. He further suggests that a real counter-terrorism strategy will strive to address the root causes in the first place.

Diab M. Al-Badayneh, in his article, "Social Causes of Terrorism in the Arab Society" analyzes the social causes of terrorism. By taking the Arab society as the example, he presents a powerful case. He claims that social causes of the terrorism in the Arab Society can be attributed to two major social deficits in the Arabs' life: 1. Human development deficit within and between Arab societies, including but not limited to freedom deficit, knowledge deficit and the empowerment deficit, 2. Human security deficit (such as personal, environmental, economic, and political, community, and health and food security) in the Arab society. Furthermore he considers terrorism as a social product of mutual interaction within societies, and Al Badayneh gives repression; inequalities, tortures; and violation of human rights as examples of such interactions. Moreover ignorance of the free world, support of the dictatorship, and monarchical regimes etc. are proposed as the interactions between societies. According to Al Badayneh, terrorism is the result of the failure to free people from fear and want within and between Arab societies. The current social tension situation in the Arab society will open the social system to many changing forces which produce an unstable society with a countless number of angry people and terrorists. Those oppressed youth people will turn to violence and terrorism and do everything at their disposal to vent out their anger and frustration at these social systems

2.3. Immigration

Immigration is another factor affecting terrorism. The relationship between immigration and terrorism goes in two ways. On the one hand terrorism may cause people to migrate from one location to another. On the other hand immigration can be a source of instability which may trigger terrorism or at the least help terrorism spread.

Yilmaz Simsek, in his article, "Terrorism and Migration in Turkey between 1992-1995" tests the effects of terrorism on domestic net-migration in Turkey. Particularly, in the terror infected provinces of the Eastern and South Eastern regions of the country between the years 1992 and 1995. He used "terrorism incident rate" and the "rate of people and security forces killed" as independent variables to be able to explore the real impact of terrorism on immigration. Also, it included the major economic effects of migration into analyses. His study revealed that the net-migration in high terrorism incident provinces is higher than the net-migration in other provinces. Also it is confirmed that there was a positive relationship between net-migration and terrorist incidents during 1992-1995, when the number of terrorist incidents hit its all time highest level. Furthermore, results confirm that net-migration is positively related to the number of "people and security forces killed". In addition, economic variables, such as GDP and unemployment also related to net migration. Finally the study confirmed that population density and distance were related to net-migration.

2.4. Individual Characteristics

Individual characteristics may play important role for those who join terrorist organizations. Particularly personal characteristics, family characteristics, and political background of the family are critical components of individual characteristics which may lead an individual to become a member of a terrorist organization. In "The Recruitment Process of Terrorist Organizations: A Case Study of Devrimci Halkin Kurtulus Partisi Cephesi (DHKP/C) Revolutionary People's Liberation Party Front"

Samih Teymur, Emile Sahliye, Ahmet Yayla, and Ismail Yılmaz analyze these factors and how they affect individual's decision to join terrorist organization. According to them, about half of the terrorists came from rural backgrounds as they were born either in a village or a farm, while 22 percent were born in towns and 30% were born in cities and suburbs. Members of terrorist organization tend to come from low-income families. Finally, the political preferences of the respondents and the conditions which facilitated the respondents to join the terrorist organization indicate that the vast majority of the respondents stated that they had connections with either leftist parties or radical leftist parties before they joined DHKP/C movement.

2.5. Gender

Gender is an important component of research in the area of terrorism. As being part of the problem, female terrorists have unique characteristics. While the number of female terrorists is lower than the male members, focusing on the issue of female terrorist can provide invaluable data. It is also important look at their motivation and try to understand whether there are other sources of motivations for them to join terrorist organizations. There are of course personal motivation, yet organizational motivations also play an important role to accept females to the terrorist organizations.

In that context, Kubra Gultekin provides a good piece for this book. In her article, "Women Engagement in Terrorism: What Motivates Females to Join in Terrorist Organizations?" she examines the underlying causes why females join in terrorist organizations. According to Gultekin, there are personal reasons, such as a relationship with a man who has taken her into the organization, or personal tragedy (e.g. lose of family member or husband, rape, exploited). Moreover, women are more likely considered victims than perpetrators, and an attack by a female terrorist is normally less expected than one by a man; therefore, accessing important targets and carrying out attacks is easier for women than men. This can be a profitable and an effective strategy for a terrorist organization. Furthermore, the female ability to reproduce is also exploited by the organization because weapons and bombs can be hidden easily under maternity clothes. At the personal level, motivation may also vary from organization to organization. For instance, the motivation of female terrorists in south Asian terrorists groups, such as LTTE and Sikh militants, differs from that of European and American female terrorists. Personal motives (e.g., family, rape, financial issues) are the most dominant reasons for completing suicide missions. On the other hands, for Chechen women rebels or so-called Black Widows the dominant motivating factor is feeling hopeless. Most of those women are widows whose husbands were killed by the Russian army. They join in rebels to take their revenge.

3. Responding To Terrorism: A Comprehensive Review

Responding to terrorism starts with having a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon. Response strategies should target the causes of the problem. Short term solutions may seem to be working, but the history showed that they indeed had little effect. Therefore response strategies should involve both short-term and long-term tactics. Responding to terrorism in that context may involve legal measures, organizational restructuring and reorganizing, strategic and tactical changes, and alike.

3.1. Legal Measure

Zeliha Ozdogan and Ali Ozdogan analyze the effect of amnesty as a counterterrorism policy. In their article, "Responding to terrorism Amnesty as Counterterrorism Policy: An Evaluation of the Turkish Amnesty Law of 2003" they evaluate the Turkish National Amnesty Law of 2003 which has been in effect for 6 months period. The law granted amnesty for the non-violent terrorists and granted pardon for the violent terrorist in case they cooperate with the law enforcement. Their study revealed that this policy had no impact on the number of armed and unarmed incidents, number of deaths and injuries. Of course there may be other factors affecting this result. According to Ozdogan and Ozdogan, terrorist organization may escalate their activities to intimidate their associates from being the beneficiaries of the policy. Second, the beneficiaries have been un-proportionally are the associates of the terror organizations not active today. Third, the post intervention period may not be enough to assess the policy.

3.2. Organizational Response

Critical events may affect states in such as way that it may lead them to take extraordinary measures. Such measures may involve structural changes within and among the agencies. Phillip D. Schertzing, in his article, "Historical Perspectives on the Role of Federal, State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies in the United States in Domestic Intelligence Operations Relating to National Security" reveals a comprehensive historical review in terms of how the U.S. reacted to crisis involving national security. He concluded that an apparent pattern emerges in which agencies at all levels mobilize with widespread public, legislative and judicial support during times of war or domestic crisis in an effort to coordinate domestic intelligence operations, but are later forced to alter or scuttle the operations in the face of legal challenges, bureaucratic rivalries, and waning public support in peacetime.

In September 11, 2001 he claims that imbued with wartime patriotism and concerns over national security, the American courts and public generally tended to support—although this support was seldom universal—the combined efforts of federal, state and local law enforcement in domestic national security operations. He further suggests that such support even may expand itself at the temporary expense of civil liberties. He, on the other hand, assures that this support continued only up to a certain point, and only for a time, until peacetime conditions resumed. Contrary to that, after September 11, the decisions of the Bush administration have been debated from the very beginning.

3.3. Public- Law Enforcement Interaction

Responding to terrorism may involve effective public- law enforcement agency interaction. Murat Gozubenli and Halil Akbas, in their article, "Adaptation of Community Policing in Arab and Muslim Communities in response to Terrorism" suggest community policing as an effective strategy to reach out the Arab and Muslim communities in the U.S. According to them police agencies who have Muslims and Arab communities in their jurisdictions can adapt community policing as a strategies to establish relationship with Arab and Muslim communities, so that they can gain legitimacy in the eyes of these communities, which then will lead cooperation between

the community and the police. Such cooperation to the authors will provide intelligence from them and reducing fear among community members.

4. Legal Aspects of Responding to Terrorism: A Delicate Balance

Legal measures taken as a response to terrorism always become a source of debate. The debate or controversy emerges from the fact that there is always a balance between maintaining security without endangering or limiting fundamental rights and liberties. In other words, there is a delicate balance, and in some cases it is very difficult to maintain that balance. This section provides a comparative perspective since three examples; the U.S., U.K., and Turkey are presented.

4.1. United States

The PATRIOT Act (Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) of 2001 made significant changes to more than 15 federal statutes. Although the Act aims at terrorism and incidents related to terrorism, it covers a wide range of topics including terrorism, money laundering, wiretaps, expanded search warrants, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), investigation techniques involving different computer technologies, and other computer related offenses. The heart of the matter in this Act is that it grants federal agencies greater powers to trace and intercept communications of terrorists both for law enforcement and intelligence purposes [2]. However, there are critics who consider such authority potentially dangerous in terms of the power and ability it gives to the government. Ahmet Celik and Fatih Vursavas, in their article, "Evaluation of the PATRIOT ACT: Section 215" evaluate Patriot Act's most notorious provision, Section 215. This so-called "angry librarians" provision allows federal agents to ask The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to issue an order directing the recipient to produce tangible things in national security and terrorism cases. Celik and Vursavas claim that there are many criticisms for this provision. The authors also emphasize the importance of the delicate balance. According to them, there are two obligations for the government: to protect civil safety and security against violence, and to preserve civil liberties, and one should not be preferred over the other one.

4.2. United Kingdom

In "The Senior British Judiciary and the "War On Terror": "Not Ready To Make Nice" Anthony Bradney examines the attitudes of the British judiciary to the propagation of the "war on terror". By looking at different cases, Bradney claims that the new attitude that the senior British judiciary have to their role in matters relating to questions of national security is a by-product of broader changes that have occurred in judicial thinking about their proper place in the governance of the UK. He also cites from Fekete, who observes,

"[b]y opposing the creation of a shadow criminal justice system beyond the ordinary rule of law for 'enemy aliens'...we uphold the most important principle of all: the universality of human rights as indivisible by race, nationality or religious affiliation.

4.3. Turkey

Zuhtu Arslan, in his article, “Rethinking the “Liberty-Security Balance” in Difficult Times: Some Notes on the Turkish Experience” analyzes Turkey’s long experience in combating terrorism with a special reference to the recent amendments to the Anti-Terror Law. He also examines the recent European Court of Human Rights about the violation of the fundamental human rights. Arslan further argues that most of these violations have been the direct and indirect result of the state of exception which has prevailed because of terrorism. The author concludes that it is necessary to reconsider and revise the prevailing concept of state of exception to avoid any violation of human rights in times of terrorism in which we live today.

5. The Impact of Communication and Technology on Terrorism: Effective Facilitators

Terrorism is a dynamic phenomenon which means terrorists adapt themselves to the environment in which they live. Such adaptation may involve tactics, structures, member profile, and alike. Accordingly they follow new developments and get benefit from them. The information age is shaping not only the types of weapons and targets the terrorists select, but also the ways that terrorist groups structure and operate their organizations [8]. According to Zanini and Edwards, large terrorist organizations are using information technologies, such as computers, telecommunication devices, software, and the Internet to organize and coordinate activities [8].

5.1. Cyberterrorism

Cyberterrorism emerges another threat for the globe. If we consider terrorists as rational people who calculate the necessary preparation and consequences of their actions, cyberterrorism provides ample opportunity for terrorists because the attacks are cost-effective and may potentially disrupt and destroy enough lives to serve their political agenda [9].

In “The Emerging Threat of Cyberterrorism” Jeffrey F. Addicott discusses the threat emanating from cyberterrorism. He claims that the threat is real and not just the public security agencies but also the private sector has to do something to avoid such risk. He proposes a cooperation which will include multilateral cooperation.

Ashlee Woods describes in her article, “Terrorists and the Internet” terrorists use the communication technologies very effectively. They utilize the opportunities provided by such equipments. Particularly the Internet is very efficient tool from them. As Woods revealed terrorists can use the Internet in many ways, including, communication, recruitment, propaganda, data mining, networking, and fundraising. The Internet may also play another role which to some changes the way the terrorist organizations carry out their activities.

5.2. Communication Techniques

Ilker Pekgozlu, Habib Ozdemir and Ertan Ercikti examine communication techniques of religiously motivated terrorist organizations in Turkey. In their article,

“Communication Methods in Terrorist Organizations: A Case Study of Al-Qaeda Connected Terrorism in Turkey” They found that religiously motivated terrorist organizations use different methods of communication. For instance Al-Qaeda connected terrorists use Face-to-face conversation, couriers, the Internet, telephone, and proclaiming carried attacks in mass media. The authors claim that killing people or violence is not as important as influencing people for terrorist organizations. They also assert that to lessen the impact of terrorist attacks responsible institutions should work together including the police, media, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other private sectors.

5.3. *Media*

Communication technologies also involve media. The relationship between media and terrorism is rather odd in a sense that while the media uses terrorism events in their programs they do that to inform the public, terrorists use that to expand their area of propaganda beyond their imagination. In “Osama bin Laden Audiotape and its Effect on the US Newspapers”, Yusuf Yuksel analyzed the media attention on terrorism and approach of the media to the Bush Administration’s terror policies before and after the broadcast of the audiotape. In this study, Yuksel looked at the reactions of the New York Times and Washington Post against the audiotape of Osama bin Laden. The study revealed that the audiotape released by Osama bin Laden has more or less the power to set the agenda in the US in the fifth year of 9/11. Also, the media is still paying considerable attention to the terrorism issues. Iran nuclear crisis, the situation in Iraq, Palestine-Israel conflict are still popular topics since they are connected to terrorism.

5.4. *Utilization of technology*

Technology can also be utilized to do more effective research on terrorism. This will help the academicians and practitioners to work efficiently. In “Creating a Data Archive to Facilitate Research on Understanding and Responding to Terrorism” Christopher D. Maxwell and Steven Chermak describe The Terrorism Data Resource Center (TDRC) which is an initiative of the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data at the University of Michigan’s Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). This Center, according to the authors, will archive and distribute data collected by government agencies, NGOs, and researchers about the nature of intra- (domestic) and international terrorism incidents, organizations, perpetrators, and victims; governmental and nongovernmental responses to terror, including primary, secondary, and tertiary interventions; and, citizen’s attitudes towards terrorism, terror incidents and the response to terror.

Technology can also be utilized in a way that public access to government information can be effectively provided. In “Public Access to Government Information as a Basic Human Right: Turkish National Police Digital Repository,” Oguz and Lofca examines right to information concept. They claim that governments have an obligation to make information equitably and conveniently accessible to the public because that is a pre-condition for the realization of human rights and democracy. They provide a case study from Turkish experience. And they note that failure of the state in providing access to information or state suppression of information can lead to human rights violations.

Conclusion

Terrorism is a dynamic phenomenon, which is responsive to the changes in the environment where it is active. The concept of terrorism itself is hard to define since it is a political issue. So-called “one’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter” summarizes the problem in defining terrorism. However as Sezgin states that countries define terrorism according to their national interest which makes things more complicated.

Understanding terrorism requires a comprehensive approach. Unless all aspects of the problem are addressed it is almost impossible to wipe out it. Therefore in order to identify effective and result-oriented strategies, it is necessary to understand the phenomenon, and to find out underlying causes. It is then possible to come up with solutions. Failure to do that will not only deter us from solving it, problem will exacerbate. In other words, any mistake made under the title of counterterrorism will act like a fertilizer.

Underlying causes of terrorism, such as poverty, inequality, injustice, instability stemming from immigration, or effects of globalization should be targeted. While responding to terrorism, it should be kept in mind that fundamental human rights and liberties must be protected. Otherwise, terrorists will achieve their goals. In a way, the governments, by limiting the rights of the law abiding citizens, help the terrorist organizations. Overreactions of the governments will be used by the terrorists as a propaganda instrument which in return will hamper counterterrorism efforts.

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Part 1

Understanding Terrorism: Conceptual Framework and Individual and Organizational Terrorist Behavior

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Formation of the Concept of Terrorism

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Abstract. The study centers upon various definition of the concept of terrorism and different arguments. This study proposes the exploitation of the concept formation in philosophy and breaking up the concept of terrorism according to its principles. It also proposes the application of family resemblance structure as apposed to dominantly use of necessary and sufficient conditions. It tries to offer method that helps to better understand the concept of terrorism. It also tries to provide a guide that shows international organization how to examine the concept. In other words states understandings of terrorism may differ from each other although they resemble. This study shows that each state determines its own definition of terrorism according to its national interest. The concept of terrorism is socially constructed. Due to different reasons, and facts different states haven't reached to a common definition for terrorism.

Keywords. Terrorism, definition, target, purpose, actor, political character

Introduction

The use of “terrorism” as a concept was not coined at the time of the attacks of September 11, 2001; on the contrary, it has a long history, and there have been many states in the world that have been dealing with it for some time. September 11 was that the whole world was able to see the magnitude and the cross-national characteristic of terrorism. It became quite obvious that the issue was not a problem of only one country or government, but that attacks may be carried out anytime and anywhere. It is now clear that terrorism is not a problem of a single country, but rather an issue requiring cooperation among many nations.

What differentiates a terrorist action from any other type of crime is also the reason states do not cooperate in counter-terrorism. This far, states have been unable to adopt a common definition of terrorism, and hence they lack the common grounds on which they may all fight against it. This lack of common definition of terrorism as a concept has been the focus of many scholars, inter-state relations and international organizations.

The issue of definition does not only have legal, but also social and political implications. The efforts for a common definition have proved to be ineffective so far because many states demonstrated a different understanding of the concept. As Kastanidou states, “[t]errorism is a phenomenon pertaining to social and political life, and its definition within the framework of criminal law cannot be disassociated from its social and political milieu” [1].

“What is called terrorism...seems to depend on one’s point of view. Use the term implies a moral judgment; and if one party can successfully attach the label *terrorist* to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint” [2]. The fact is very well explained in the UN Report of the Commission on Human Rights

about Terrorism and Human Rights, which states “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” This expression was symbolic of the problems in defining terrorism even before the UN Report. States are not willing to adopt an extensive definition that does not fit within their political and social values. [3]

At this point the risk of not remaining neutral, but going along with the interests of the culture to which they belong lies for researchers who study terrorism. However, what must be done is to have a broader picture of the concept covering all possible understandings.

For this purpose, this study proposes the exploitation of the concept formation in philosophy and breaking up the construct of terrorism according to its concepts. Additionally this study proposes the application of *family resemblance* structure as opposed to dominantly used structure of *necessary and sufficient conditions*. By that the study seeks to contribute to the field by offering a method that helps to better understand the construct of terrorism.

1. Definitional Problem

When the concept involved [in a conceptual dispute] is appraisive in that the state of affairs it describes is a valued achievement, when the practice described is internally complex in that its characterization involves reference to several dimensions, when the agreed and contested rules of application are relatively open, enabling parties to interpret even those shared rules differently as new and unforeseen situations arise, then the concept in question is an “essentially contested concept.” Such concepts essentially involve endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of the users. [4].

Since the state of affairs described by terrorism is a valued achievement, because of its multidimensional structure, and parties involved interpret rules differently as new and unforeseen situations arise, terrorism is an *essentially contested concept*. Therefore, although there is a common agreement on the abstract notion of terrorism, there are different understandings and interpretations.

Terrorism is one of the most disputed concepts in social sciences [5], and defining terrorism could be considered as one of the most controversial issues in the contemporary international legal and political arena [6]. Similarly, Webel states that the concept of terrorism is as contested as it is open. [7] However, states have yet to agree upon a common definition. It is due to the high political stakes regarding the task of definition, as well as its being an emotive concept. [8]. *Terrorism* has a multi-dimensional structure, and the parties involved continue to interpret those dimensions differently; therefore, it does not seem likely that a common definition with the consensus of all the states will be adopted in the near future.

As Hoffman [9] writes, most people have a vague idea or impression about terrorism, but they do not have a more precise, concrete and truly explanatory definition of the word. In fact, there have been many attempts to define terrorism; however, common one is needed. Laquer proposes that it is impossible for any definition of terrorism to cover all the varieties of terrorism that have appeared throughout history, and states that terrorism is a dangerous ground for simplifications and generalizations [10]. Besides, *terrorism* carries almost always the flavor of some (subjective) moral judgment: The same type of conduct or behavior will or will not be viewed as terrorism by a particular observer according to the moral meaning or

justification ascribed to it. Therefore, labeling a particular act as “terrorist” may be more a formulation of a social/ political judgment than a description of a set of phenomena. As a consequence, a descriptive (objective) definition of terrorism may be useful but not absolutely precise or satisfactory in containing and explaining a relativist concept, such as terrorism [6].

Schmid [11] states that the lack of definition is believed to be one of the factors likely to encourage future terrorism. However, the problem of defining terrorism has proved not to be an easy one to solve due to the complex structure of the concept. As stated by Ganor [12] it is important to have a common understanding of what constitutes “terrorism” for the following reasons:

1- Legislation and punishment: A definition of terrorism is necessary when legislating laws designed to ban terrorism and assistance to terrorism, as well as when setting minimum sentences for terrorists or confiscating their financial resources and supplies.

2- International cooperation: An internationally accepted definition of terrorism is required to strengthen cooperation between countries in the struggle against terrorism, and to ensure its effectiveness.

3- States sponsoring terrorism: Modern terrorism is increasingly dependent on the support of nations. States sponsoring terrorism use terrorist organizations as a means to their own ends, while these organizations depend on the assistance they receive from such countries at the eco, military, and operational levels.

4- Offensive action: To ensure international support for states struggling against terrorism.

5- Attitudes toward the population supporting terrorism: An effective instrument in the limitation of terrorist activity is to undermine the ability of the organization to obtain support, assistance, and aid from this population. Since a definition of terrorism could determine new rules of the game at both the local and the international level, any organization contemplating the use of terrorism to attain its political aims will have to risk losing its legitimacy, even with the population that supports its aims.

6- Public relations: A common definition will enable an international campaign designed to undermine the legitimacy of terrorist organizations, curtail support for them, and incite a united international front against them.

Especially in the light of the recent developments in the area of studying terrorism there is no doubt that, no matter where a terrorist incident takes place, it is likely that the incident has some international connections. As Schmid [11] emphasizes, international terrorism can only be fought by international cooperation. Therefore, there has to be a common definition, or, if it is not possible, a common understanding of what constitutes terrorism. Probably, the biggest obstacle for that is the fact that definitions “tend to reflect the interests of those who do the defining” [11].

Although the term *terrorism* lack a common definition upon which all parties agree, some characteristics have been attributed to it, which can help us gain a better understanding of the concept [13]. Schmid [11] offers ten of those characteristics:

1. The demonstrative use of violence against human beings;
2. The (conditional) threat of (more) violence;
3. The deliberate production of terror/fear in a target group;
4. The targeting of civilians, non-combatants and innocents;
5. The purpose of intimidation, coercion and/or propaganda;
6. The fact that it is a method, tactic or strategy of conflict waging;
7. The importance of communicating the act(s) of violence to larger audiences;

8. The illegal, criminal and immoral nature of the act(s) of violence;
9. The predominantly political character of the act;
10. Its use as a tool of psychological warfare to mobilize or immobilize sectors of the public.[17].

Schmid [11] notes that a single terrorist incident does not have to have all of those key characteristics. He states that “[o]ne incident might have five of the ten component elements, another might have more or less and a third might show yet another combination of elements” [11]. This understanding is in fact named as *family resemblance* in philosophy, and will be adopted of this study.

2. An Illustration

For the purpose of examining how different definitions of terrorism could have dissimilar combinations of characteristics that are mentioned above, definitions from two different countries will be illustrated; the United States and Turkey.

USA PATRIOT Act: Acts of domestic terrorism are those which: "(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended— (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

The Anti-Terrorism Act of Turkey: Terrorism is any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and external security of the State, public order or general health by means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat.

The USA PATRIOT Act definition have four of those characteristics, and points out that only civilians could be the target of such acts. On the other hand, the Turkish definition makes reference to five of those characteristics, while the coverage of the target component is larger than the definition in the USA PATRIOT Act. The comparison also revealed the fact that only three of the characteristics are common in the two definitions.

What is needed to observe is that this study, as well as the vast majority of studies in the field, focuses political terrorism in spite of the fact that there are other types of terrorism, such as *vigilante terrorism*. This type of terrorism refers to nonstate groups that illegally impose force on other nonstate groups or society by terrorism. The actors of vigilante terrorism are all political actors who use terroristic violence which is not directed at the state power itself nor is exercised on behalf of the state [14]. This and other types of terrorism will not be included in this study.

When we increase the number of the definitions for comparison we will be likely to see that there are several overlapping points among those definitions, but many characteristics are either uncommon or not-at-all referred to. People will continue to

hold them as valid definitions, but how could states with different definitions of the same concept to cooperate?

The problem gets more serious in nature, especially when the issue about the dichotomy of terrorism and freedom-fighter, and whether states could be considered as sources of terrorism. To illustrate, are Palestinians fighting against the Israeli authority terrorists or freedom-fighters? Could the state of Israel consider as terrorist, and its acts against Palestinians as state-terrorism? The same problem exists between Turkey and the PKK terrorist organization; Russia and the Chechens; Spain and the ETA; and between many more states and groups around the world.

Schmid [11] explains that it is theoretically possible that the various component elements of two incidents will not be overlapping at all; however, within the universe of a larger sample of violent incidents that seem to qualify as terroristic, there should be frequent overlap. He says "Even when there is no common core, they resemble each other like members of a family, as a number of characteristics can be found in different combinations so that one can talk about a "family resemblance" between them" [11]. Schmid is not the only scholar proposing use of family resemblance structure to examine the concept of terrorism; however, he does not give further information about how it should be done. Similarly, Daase [15] focuses on family resemblance to explain the concept. Daase argues that there is no significant problem in defining terrorism; nevertheless, there is a tendency to explain many different kinds of events with the concept of terrorism. In that case, for the author, political power may misuse the concept because of its similarity with many other cases. Attributing to Ludwig Wittgenstein [16], Daase states that it may also be one of the solutions to defining terrorism. However, Daase does not go into the details of how it can be done [15]

With this particular study, this paper makes a contribution to the relevant literature through offering the use of family resemblance structure. For that purpose, from the principles of *concept formation* in philosophy is applied to the concept "terrorism". It will be brief information about *family resemblance* and its main alternative, *necessary and sufficient conditions*, is presented together with information about *concept formation*, and then examine the concept of *terrorism* according to the principles of concept formation.

3. Concept Formation and Terrorism

Having a concept requires its implicit or explicit categorization, since concepts carry ontological commitments [17]. The multidimensional structure of the concept of terrorism is examined.

Stating that most important concepts are multidimensional and multilevel in nature, Goertz explains the levels as follows:

1. Basic level: It is cognitively central, and as Collier and Levitsky state it is the noun to which we attach adjectives, such as parliamentary *democracy* and democratic *corporatism*. [18]

2. Secondary level: It is used to give the constitutive dimensions of the basic-level concept. The multidimensional character of concepts appears when we move down to the secondary level.

3. Indicator/Data Level: This level requires us to be specific enough, so that data can be gathered. It also allows us to categorize whether or not a specific phenomenon falls under the concept. At this level researchers get down to actual empirical data.

According to Goertz, levels and dimensions of a concept are combined to build a concept through two major archetypical structures: *necessary and sufficient conditions* and *family resemblance* [17]

In classic philosophical logic to define a concept is to give the conditions “necessary and sufficient” for something to fit into the category. Each of these conditions is a secondary-level dimension, and the mathematics of necessary and sufficient conditions binds the secondary-level dimensions together to form the basic level [17].

In *Philosophical Investigations* Ludwig Wittgenstein [16] proposed that concepts can have no essential or necessary characteristics, but that nevertheless there is a family resemblance that allows one group together many objects under one rubric. This idea was an attack on essentialism, and hence the necessary and sufficient conditions structure. Containing no necessary conditions, the family resemblance structure is opposite of the necessary and sufficient conditions structure. It only requires enough resemblance on secondary-level dimensions to be part of the family. [26].

People use either AND or OR between dimensions when we construct a concept. The logical AND typifies the necessary and sufficient structure, while the logical OR is the natural way to model the family resemblance structure [17]. In terms of substitutability of conditions, the necessary and sufficient conditions and family resemblance structures contrast with each other. By definition, a necessary condition cannot be substituted for another. On the other hand, in the family resemblance approach the absence of one dimension can be compensated by the presence of another dimension. Therefore, all things being equal, the family resemblance structure is more tolerant than the necessary and sufficient conditions approach. If there seems to be significant substitutability between dimensions then the family resemblance structure is likely to fit better [17]

Due to the multilevel and multidimensional character of many social science concepts, almost always *one* concept appears at the top of the pyramid, which is the one that appears in theoretical models, propositions, and theories [17]. We can name this concept as the *positive pole*; however, it is not the only issue that should be explained by the concept-builder, and at the basic level there are three important separate, but related issues: (1) negative pole, (2) the substantive content of the continuum between the two poles, and (3) the continuity that exists or not between the poles [17].

Goertz argues that “Frequently the goal of the research project is to explain the positive pole. The basic-level concept is often controversial because it is the dependent variable under scrutiny; much research thus begins not with a conceptual range, but rather with one end of the continuum. Hence part of concept building is to think not only about the positive, but also about the negative end of the spectrum” [17]. After considering the nature of the positive and negative poles the researcher needs to explain the substantive character of the continuum linking the two.

According to Goertz [17] another related term in philosophy is *conceptual stretching*, which refers to the relationship between *extension* and *intension* of concepts. Goertz explains *intension* as the concept, and the *extension* as the cases that fall under the concept. In necessary and sufficient conditions structure, which had been the major structure until 1953 since Aristotle’s time, the basic principle is that as intension decreases extension increases. That means as concepts become more permissive by requiring fewer attributes, they cover more cases. However, in the family resemblance structure, as extension increases so does intension. More specifically, the number of the

attributes (the extension) increases with the increase of the number of the attributes in the intension.




Figure 1. the relationship between extension and intension according to the model used.

The problem with defining terrorism is that states look at the phenomenon from their political perspective, and would not like to involve some others' interpretations that might contradict with their interests. As discussed above, there are many characteristics of the concept of terrorism which can be reflected as components in any definition. Theoretically, it is possible that every state defines the concept of terrorism according to, for example, Schmid's [11] ten characteristics of terrorism, and it is likely that the definition problem disappears from the literature.

However, the problem is not so easy to solve, since all interpretations are subject to re-interpretation; therefore, the validity of such a prominent scholar's studies can also be discussed. For example, civilians, non-combatants and innocents are included in the target groups, but not the *state*. The idea is in agreement with that of Tuman [19] who wrote that the majority of the contemporary attempts at defining terrorism have focused on those against whom violence is practiced, and showed "innocents" and "noncombatants" as the target. According to this understanding, for instance, Hezbollah in Lebanon cannot be considered as a terrorist organization when it directly attacks Israeli territory from the territory of another country. What if some countries would like to apply sanctions on Hezbollah because they consider it as a terrorist organization? This is just an example of discussions around the topic, and several more can be, and in fact are, generated. It can be stated that studies can determine the coverage of the concept of terrorism broader than others, but it cannot be alleged that a single study is large enough to cover all possible alternatives.

To contribute to the solution of the problem, the author would like to break the concept of terrorism down to its secondary and data/indicator level dimensions. In terms of the secondary dimensions the concept has six dimensions (1) in form of serious crimes, (2) target, (3) purpose, (4) political character, (5) actor and (6) use of

illegal/immoral violence. These components are sufficient in terms of determination of the concept’s *positive pole*. As stated by Goertz [17] the purpose of establishing the secondary level dimensions is to give the constitutive dimensions of the basic level concept, which is terrorism.

It is better to write the indicator/data level dimensions separately under each dimension of the secondary level. As advised by Goertz [17], those dimensions should be specific enough to allow data collection. In the issue of terrorism, those should be as encompassing as possible, so that they cover the issue from all aspects available, in particular, all possible interpretations of terrorism. As indicator/data level dimensions, The author determined a total of (15) dimensions that fall under the (6) secondary-level dimensions.




Figure 2. Levels and Dimensions of the Concept of Terrorism

However, the issue is not yet complete. The initial purpose was to increase both the *intension* (concept) and the *extension* (the cases that fall under the concept), therefore the use the *family resemblance structure* among the dimensions of the concept of terrorism is needed. This issue is especially important for the indicator/data level dimensions, since states are not expected to be in a conflict regarding, for

example, whether or not terrorism should have the target component, but what targets terrorism could have. Therefore it is propose to use OR, instead of AND among the indicator/data level dimensions for each secondary dimension. To illustrate, in terms of the target component, an action will be considered *terrorism* if it targets civilians OR combatants OR non-combatants. Similarly, the actor will be considered terrorist even if it is a civilian OR a state OR state-sponsored.

If accepted by the international community the limitation of defining the concept would be eliminated. The discussions regarding whether or not common definition of terrorism is needed are subject to continue in a vicious circle, since international relations are based on national interests and those interests may occasionally conflict with one another.

Conclusion

This paper is based on the assumptions that international relations are depending on national interest, and each state determines its own definition of terrorism according to its national interest. Obviously, this is a realist argument. On the other hand, as liberalists argue, nation-states may want to abide by rules of international organizations, including adopting an international definition of terrorism into its national laws. However, the concept of terrorism, like many other social science concepts, is subject to interpretation of people; that is, it is socially constructed. The problem rises when the issue comes to the codification of these social values. As seen here, neither of the main international relations theories suffice to explain one state's relations with other states and international organizations in terms of the definition of terrorism.

Due to the fact that the status quo does not allow states to gather around a common definition, the proposal in this paper may contribute to the field by providing a guide that shows international organizations how to examine the concept, and states the scope of agreements and disagreements with other states. Just like in a family album where members may look alike, but not exactly the same as others; states' understandings of terrorism may differ from each other although they resemble. This study is an attempt to demonstrate this fact to states.

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Theory of Prism: Individual Capital and Frustration

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Abstract. The goal of this paper is to offer a new perspective on the relationship between frustration and aggression. Even though the initial relationship was assumed to be between aggression and frustration, this study will present how frustration does not only lead to aggression and also how the link between frustration and behavior affect the outcome. A socio-psychological approach will be used to explain this process and a new model of relationship will be provided in the conclusion.

Keywords: Social-psychology; Frustration-aggression; Forms of capital; General Theory of Anomie and Strain.

Introduction

Newman [1] asserts that the social theories are; (1) not concerned with single events but recurring patterns, (2) not concerned with the individual but the aggregates, and (3) always tell us the relationship between variables. Because of these common characteristics of a good social theory, the social scientists feel themselves to be constrained to focus on the structure and its effect on the individual.

Moreover, if the three levels of analysis are considered in social sciences; being the macro-, meso-, and micro-level analysis, it becomes more obvious that the focus of social sciences in general is the study of the structure on the individual behavior. Especially, if one defines him/herself as a sociologist who has a dominant functionalist or conflict perspective, it is always easy to underestimate the individual factor. As important ramification of this general belief, social scientists, particularly sociologists, tend to neglect the formation of different forms of individual behavior within the same social context.

On the other hand a good psychological theory always places the individual at the center of its analysis. While analyzing the individual behavior, the psychologists commit the sociologist's identical mistake that was mentioned in the above paragraph. It is extremely difficult for an uneducated mind to comprehend the effects of external social forces in shaping our own identity and behavior. This is not only a problem of an uneducated mind, but most of the time it is easy to explain behavior from an individualistic perspective. This application is also another extreme where it could be defined as an underestimation of the structure.

The purpose of this paper is not to argue the analytical boundaries between psychology and sociology. However, we assert that, especially the social problems directly related with the individual such as terrorism must be addressed from a well


established social-psychological perspective. To strengthen this claim, this study will focus on a predominantly psychological explanation, that is being the frustration-aggression hypothesis, and explain this process by combining sociological explanations, that are being Bourdieu’s forms of capital and Merton’s general strain theory.

1. Theoretical Framework

1.1. Frustration and Aggression Hypothesis

In the first step of our analysis we will introduce the frustration-aggression hypothesis. This hypothesis is an attempt to state a relationship believed to be important in many different fields of research. It would not be unfair to state that this hypothesis is indeed induced from commonsense observation. Furthermore clinical studies, psychological experiments, sociological studies are the scientific sources of this approach.

It is generally stated in the literature “that the occurrence of aggression always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrawise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression” [2].



According top Miller [3], the first half of this statement, the assertion that the occurrence of aggression always presupposes frustration is defensible and useful as working hypothesis. The second half of the statement, namely, the assertion “that the existence of frustration leads to some form of aggression” is unfortunate.

In the first place Miller believes that too much importance is placed on frustration. This statement suggests, though by no means logically demands, that frustration has no consequence other than aggression. This suggestion seems to have overestimated the causal relation, which requires temporal order, association and causation, between frustration and aggression.

So, as presented in the second figure, we could say that frustration produces tendency for different types of response, one of which is some form of aggression.



1.2. Theory of Anomie and General Strain:

Second step of our analysis is on Merton’s anomie and general strain theories. Propelled by Durkheim’s theory of anomie, Merton uses his contentious ideology

against the postulate of universal functionalism whereby he introduces the notion of the dysfunctionality of structure. Merton argues that, anomie is a consequence of the double facedness of structure whereby normal social institutions are functional for certain sub-groups, and at the same time dysfunctional for a certain segment of the population. Merton adopts the anomie concept as part of his effort to suggest that biological explanations of deviant behavior are inadequate to explain social reality and that, instead, structural conditions should be considered as inducing deviation from prescribed patterns of conduct [4].

In illustration of his theory of anomie, Merton [5] argues that, social disorder occurs when society or the social structure holds high ideals of values for all its members, yet some members of that society are structurally barred from living up to those ideals. For example, the institution of culture may call for loyalty of certain norms, values, and behaviors from all members of a given society. Concurrently, the social structure or institutions; for instance discrimination as based on racial, income, or religious stratification may bar certain segments of the population from attaining the same high cultural values or ideals.

However, social institutions do not avail everyone equal chances to achieve the success ideal. As Merton indicates, realistically a certain segment of the population is constrained from living up to that value of material success. Merton argues that, social disorder and anomie results from individuals striving to live up to the cultural value of success, but with no or with inadequate institutional means, whereby they find different alternatives to achieve the cultural goal, even if it is through crime. For Merton, anomie results as the different kinds of individuals adapt to these cultural ideals based on whichever available means possible.

In his illustration pertaining to the source of anomie, Merton introduces five types of individual adaptation to the established cultural goals.

Adaptation	Means & Goal
Conformist	Accepts & Accepts
Innovator	Rejects & Accepts
Ritualist	Accepts & Rejects
Retreatist	Rejects & Rejects
Rebel	Revolts & Creates New

For instance, Merton talks of the individual that takes the conformist adaptation approach. As according to Merton, the conformist internalizes the cultural goals, and at the same time society offers him/her the sufficient institutional means to realize the same goals. That is to say, social structure is functional for the conformist. However, the dysfunctional face of the same structure is visible from the other side whereby, some individuals of the same population are denied adequate institutional means to achieve the high ideals. It is from this other side of structure that individuals choose to adapt to the cultural goals, but in a disruptive manner.

Merton cites four additional adaptation types. One of them is the innovator that internalizes the cultural values but is denied the institutional means to achieve the same

goals. The innovator adapts by reaching the goals through any means possible, including crime. Merton describes the third type of adaptation as that of the ritualist who rejects the cultural goals but internalizes the institutional means; thus working diligently hard in acknowledgement of his/her position in society. Merton also refers to the retreatist who rejects both the cultural goals and the institutional means by declining taking any action, such as the drug dealer or drunkard. Merton’s fifth adaptation type is the rebellious who rejects both the cultural goals and the institutional means, yet seeks alternative goals and means.

This statement opens up further possibilities. If you consider Merton’s general strain theory, you would see that there is more than one way of adapting the strain. Merton argued that the problem is a social structure that holds out the same goals to all its members without giving them equal means to achieve them. It is this lack of integration between what the culture calls for and what the structure permits that causes deviant behavior.

According to this view being a rebellion is only one of the options. However, Merton’s analysis was based on the acceptance and rejection of cultural means and goals. So, we believe that his analysis was too structural. This is the reason why we introduce the third perspective to our working model.


1.3. Forms of Capital:

The next step of our analysis is an attempt to bring a more individual-centric sociological perspective. We are aware that the Bourdieu’s explanation on the forms of capital is not a micro-level theory, but for the sake of our model we are interested in the amount of the capital that is accumulated by the individual. So, we will focus on the individual aspect rather than the social or structural aspect of his explanation.

Bourdieu [6] stated that capital takes time to accumulate. According to Bourdieu capital can present itself in three fundamental guises:

- 1 - as economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the forms of property rights;
- 2 - as cultural capital, which is convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the forms of educational qualifications; and
- 3 - as social capital, made up of social obligations ("connections"), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the forms of a title of nobility.

We assert that an individual’s response to any stimuli will be dependent on the amount of any form of capital accumulated by the individual. So, in our model we will integrate these three perspectives to explain the individual basis of violence. The model that we developed can be summarized as in the following figure.




2. Theory of Prism:

In our model we integrated these 3 theories, which are frustration-aggression theory, Merton's strain theory, and Bourdieu's forms of capital.

Frustration-aggression hypothesis is basically a psychological explanation, which is the basis of our model. However, this basic model lacks significant parts for the outcome behavior as well as the individual process that takes place between frustration and behavior. To come up with a more general explanation we will use Merton's general strain theory to explain different forms of behavior that is possible in any given situation. Moreover, Bourdieu's forms of capital will be used to explain how different forms and levels of capital transform a particular source of frustration into different types of behavior.

Our final model is presented in the following figure.



We assert that when an individual faces a problem that causes frustration, he/she has different options up until he or she engages in an aggressive behavior. First and foremost, aggressive behavior is not the only option. There are other options as well. The path that will be followed by the individual is dependent on that person's level of any form of capital.

Conclusion

According to our model, we believe that violence, terrorism in particular is predominantly an option for the people who have lower social, cultural or economic capital. People who have higher levels of capital would be more likely to follow a different path other than violence.

This model also gives a fundamental approach to governments and or other organizations fighting against terrorism. Generally the focus of these organizations has been on the economic sources of terrorism. It is usually stated that solving basic economic problems will decrease the likelihood of engaging in violent activities. However, solving these problems are not simple and must be dealt at societal or macro level. We, on the other hand, suggest that the attempts and policies which focus on the individual will bring out the same solution.

For example, we don't see people talking about inequalities or other social problems as their basic reason to enter a terrorist organization. When we focus on the

general social problems, we believe that we miss the smaller part of the big picture. On the other hand when we focus on the individuals only, then we are more likely to miss the big picture.

We believe that terrorism is the result of both of the social and psychological factors. Simply focusing on one of these aspects will not provide the expected outcome. Solving social problems without supporting the individuals may not work for the society in general.

Our working model may seem too eclectic, however our goal is not just to put different theories together and create a mixture, contrawise, it is to come up with a synthesis of two clashing ideas to suggest a new model to solve violence and terrorism.

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Terrorism as Suicidal Homicide: A Durkheimian Approach

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Abstract. Instrumental and organizational theories of suicidal terrorism neglect the cultural dimension. Terrorism is not a “lone wolf” phenomenon but a “relational” process: a result of a radicalization of cultural norms and values in extremist subcultures with varying levels of moral and material support from the local culture. This essay outlines the general contours of a cultural approach to the phenomenon of Terrorism. Specifically, it applies Durkheim’s typology of suicide to homicide and suicidal homicide. The Altruistic type of suicidal homicide is designated as the most intractable variety because of its high level of integration in its culture of origin, whereas egoistic and anomic varieties of suicidal homicide are manageable with requisite global mobilization and vigilance.

Keywords. Terrorism, suicidal homicide, Durkheim approach, models of terrorism.

Introduction

“May my death be as clean and sudden as the shattering of crystal like cherry blossom in the spring let us fall clean and radiant ... most important, do not weep for me” Unknown Kamikaze “Kaiten” Pilot, 1944 [1].

“Make an oath to die and renew your intentions shave excess hair from the body and wear cologne. Shower does not seek revenge for yourself. Strike for God’s sake” Mohammad Atta, 2001 [2].

The “Tell-tale heart”, the eye of the fire storm of September 11, is the synchronized tryst of the unflinching nineteen with fiery death. Their nightmarish composure confounds, angers, and, understandably, frightens the survivors. Hence a deafening silence about what could have made their homicidal minds tick; a silence occasionally broken by a flurry of infantile accusations that range from cowardice to madness. Such characterizations are more indicative of the survivors’ anxiety than the killers’ intentions. Victims are justifiably apprehensive about the terrible and tragic truth but cathartic expressions ranging from displays of the flag to the demonization of the cultural “other” do not reduce that threat. The prevailing apprehension and confusion concerning the origins and nature of terrorism places an even heavier responsibility on the shoulders of social scientists to bring conceptual clarity and comparative-historical insight to bear on the debate, thus bolstering analytic “good sense” rather than hegemonic “common sense” among the victims [3].

1. Three Models of Terrorism

The Instrumental model presents terrorism as a response to external stimuli. It assumes means-end rationality in the behavior of terrorists whereby increasing the cost of terrorism will lead to a decline of the terrorist activities [4]. Consequently, the instrumental approach casts terrorism as a bargaining process based on “power to hurt” or to “coerce.” As such, it responds to similar counter-measures. Thus, this approach proposes two strategies for combating terrorism: defense [preemption, prevention] and deterrence [denial, retaliation]. These responses are meant to reduce the reward and raise the cost of terrorism. Despite its popularity, critiques of this theory range from its reliance on “dispositional” model of social behavior, thus neglecting the “effects of aggregate properties” [5] to its dependence on unverifiable “cognitional states” [6].

The organizational model, on the other hand, understands terrorism in terms of the organizational imperatives governing it, such as group survival and team competition [7]. Recruiting and retaining membership is of utmost importance for these exclusive and largely insular fraternities. They struggle against impending decline by restricting departure and dissent. Sometimes, as a concession to the extremists within their ranks, these organizations embrace ever more radical options, thus preventing those elements from branching out to “fight harder.” In the same vein, they monitor ideologically similar organizations lest they lose their rhetorical or tactical edge. Organizational survival takes precedence even over ideology. The latter is often modified to serve organizational goals. Based on these observations, the organizational theory suggests a different set of proposals for controlling terrorism; for example, decreasing departure costs through clemency and advocacy of parallel “non violent alternatives” so deserters can find a venue of expression and action without losing face.

It seems that terrorist causes that have short term objectives [a minority of cases] are better suited for an instrumentalist analysis; whereas those with long term objectives are more susceptible to organizational imperatives. Therefore, instrumental and organizational models can be seen as complementary theories. However, the claim of either theory to logical clarity and predictive power may be exaggerated, as recent research has suggested.

Besides the above two models that are proposed, for the most part, by political scientists, there is a body of literature that is being developed, mainly, by sociologists and anthropologists. This approach adumbrates a cultural theory of suicide terrorism. Theoretical observations [8, 9, 10]. Historical and comparative analyses and field research in the religious realm [11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. And in the secular arena [16, 17, 18, 19] have fleshed out certain cultural components of terrorism. Terrorism, they conclude, is rarely a “lone wolf” phenomenon.

A thumb nail sketch of the cultural approach features disparate ideological enclaves identified as “extremist subcultures” [11] or “anti-movements” [16], primed by real or perceived events such as external domination or internal oppression, provide a relational environment in which local cultural, political, and religious norms and values, frustrated by barriers of expression and implementation, acquire radicalized and rejectionist guises. These, then, serve as launching pads for ultra radical mutations in the form of terrorist ideologies and organizations. Such extremist subcultures, like any “deviant” subculture, transmit requisite deviant skills and attitudes to their membership in a manner articulated by the classical sociology of deviance [20]. Some observers have aptly described these movements as “ethno-nationalist terrorism” [21], thus underlining the cultural dimension of the phenomenon.

2. Suicidal Homicide: A Durkheimian Typology

An adequate theory of terrorism cannot be confined to instrumentalist and organizational approaches. Nor can it suffice to “dispositional” explanations of the motives of the perpetrators. Cultural analysis sheds light on the nature of relational bonds between cultures and the extremist [and terrorist] subcultures embedded in them.

Emile Durkheim’s seminal 1897 monograph: “Suicide” as the adopted theoretical point of departure. Durkheim’s “suicide” constituted the first scientific treatment of the phenomenon [22]¹. It cast a scientific gaze at an intensely emotional issue that had been, until then, the subject of either romantic glorification or religious condemnation [23]. Durkheim’s categories of suicide to homicide, and suicidal-homicide [the so called “suicide bombing” or “suicide missions”] are applied. The resulting typology will provide not only a theoretical frame of reference but also a set of practical propositions toward the amelioration of the problem.

First, plot Durkheim’s original typology of [egoistic, altruistic, anomic] suicides is plot on a comparative ground, applying it to Western and non Western cultural domains [table 1]. Vernacular [egoistic] suicide is found in both Western and non Western societies. Altruistic suicide, too, is spread across the cultural divide. There are varieties of martyrdom, heroic suicide, and self sacrifice in both cultural realms. However, the idea of honorable [socially approved] suicide has disappeared from the roster of Western values². The non Western -- particularly the far Eastern – cultures, on the other hand, have cultivated this notion. The Japanese practice of “Seppuku,” is understood as an honorable way of fulfilling one’s obligation [“giri”]. More recent instances of this practice include the Buddhist self immolations in Vietnam to protest the war [1963] and the Fulan Gong self immolations in China to protest religious persecution [2002]. Analyses of self immolations between 1963 and 2002 [24] conclude that they are effective in two ways: they can incite sympathizers to contribute more to the cause and convert bystanders to the cause by signaling the depth of the collectivity’s grievances. Hence the appellation: “communicative suffering”.

Instances of anomic suicide are found in crisis suicides both in Western and non-Western cultures. The familiar Western example is the 1929 stock market crash suicides. The iconic non Western example would be the suicides among the Native Americans of Cuba during the conquest [Stoner]. The first table depicts the above types of suicide and cites historical examples pertaining to each type.

¹ It must be conceded that the modern Western civilization, based as it is on the Thomas Hobbes’s “commonwealth,” John Locke’s “Civil Society,” and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s “social contract,” is explicitly based on the preservation of individual life, and is, thus, alien to deliberate contemplation and cultivation of death.

² The iconic instances of mass altruistic suicide in religion and philosophy have been ignored on the level of cultural emulation in the West (Roots). Notable contemporary exceptions such as the 1981 suicide of Bobby Sands and other Irish hunger strikers are exceptions that prove the rule. Only recently has the legal and moral permissibility of euthanasia and “assisted suicide” re-surfaced in the Western culture. (Rawls, et. al).

Table 1. Types of Suicide in Western and non-Western Societies

	Egoistic	Altruistic	Anomic
WESTERN	Vernacular Suicide	Martyrdom, Heroic suicide, Self- Sacrifice, Honorable Suicide.	Crisis Suicide
	Ex. Personal-trouble suicide	Ex: Stoic Suicide	Ex: Stock Market Crash Suicides.
NON-WESTERN	Vernacular Suicide	Martyrdom, Heroic Suicide, self sacrifice, Honorable suicide	Crisis Suicide
	Ex. Personal-trouble suicide	Ex: Seppuku suicide	Ex: Native American Suicides During the Conquest

Durkheimian typology can be applied to homicide. Vernacular homicide, that is, criminal murder, is found everywhere in the forms of individual, serial, or mass homicides. Altruistic homicide, too, exists in both Western and non Western societies under the rubrics of war and execution. Also, instances of religious and ideological assassinations and full fledged terrorism are abundant across the board. The practice of “killing without dying” [25] can be honed to inflict maximum damage to the enemy without the loss of personnel. Only when factors such as “political repression and economic misery” are added to the mix do we find the incentive to escalate such operations into suicide terrorism that makes the perpetrator the “ultimate smart bomb” [25].

Anomic homicide is found in the form of cult or ritual murders as well as in destructive acts prescribed in rare ideologies such as in certain varieties of the nineteenth century Russian anarchism³. The second table illustrates the varieties and examples of homicide in the Western and non-Western cultures.

Table 2. Types of Homicide in Western and non-Western Societies

	Egoistic	Altruistic	Anomic
WESTERN	Criminal Homicide	War, Execution, Ideological	Cult Homicide
	Ex: Individual, Serial, and Mass murder	Assassination, Terrorism Ex: Universal	Ex: Manson Family, Sharon Tate murder
NON-WESTERN	Criminal Homicide	War, Execution, Ideological,	Cult Homicide
	Ex: Individual, Serial, and Mass murder	Assassination, Terrorism Ex: Universal	Ex: Aum ShinRikyo, Tokyo subway attack

³ Ivan Tourgeniev’s protagonist “Bazarov”, provides a rare glimpse into the mentality of the Russian anarchists

Finally, the same typology can be applied to suicidal homicide. Again, we find the “egoistic” both in the Western and non-Western societies. These take the form of “suicide pacts” that are featured in tragic folk tales of unrequited love in many cultures [the, so called, Romeo and Juliet complex]. Actual instances of this type of suicidal homicide surface as local news items from time to time. Another variety of egoistic homicidal suicide is “Murder-suicide”. Whereas in suicide pacts both parties collude to die together, in murder-suicides perpetrators kills others against their will and then turn the murder weapon on themselves. A salient instance of this type is the so-called “disgruntled worker” phenomenon in the United States [from 1986 onward] that has led to the coining of the slang term: “going postal.” Under the rubric of altruistic suicidal homicide we find two types: military “suicide missions” and terrorist suicide operations that range from focused killings [with individual targets along with “collateral” casualties] to indiscriminate murder. The prime example of culturally sanctioned military suicide missions are the sustained waves of 3400 “Kamikaze” attacks on the American fleet during the last two years of the Second World War. Although, as Hill documents in a recent essay on the phenomenon, such attacks were not confined to the Japanese and had equivalents among the German “Rammjager” planes as well as the Soviet and Italian air forces, the bulk of the attacks came from the well prepared Japanese suicide squadrons [26]. Anthropologist Ruth Benedict published her classical “Chrysanthemum and the Sword”, in part, to explicate this aspect of the Japanese culture [27]. Contemporary examples of the terrorist variety⁴ include Tamil Tiger suicide bombings targeting political gatherings, Palestinian operations against entertainment and shopping centers, Chechen attacks targeting educational and health institutions, and, of course, the Al-Qaida assaults on New York [2001] and Madrid [2004]. A credible pledge of ideological loyalty and an ardent claim of sacrifice for the sake of the larger good is the distinguishing feature of this type of suicide. A telling linguistic dichotomy among Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers underlines the ability of the local culture to valorize altruistic suicidal homicide. The Tamil word for suicide is *thatkolai*, the Tigers prefer *thatkodai*, meaning “to give of yourself” [26]. Similarly, the culturally approved “desire for glory” and “combining the images of the victim and the hero” among Palestinian suicidal terrorists override the instrumentally rational considerations. The suicide terrorists decide not to flee after planting the bomb, even when such an avenue is available and conducive to repeated returns and perpetration of more terrorist acts. [27]

Significantly, we find no major examples of this category of suicidal homicide in the recent Western history. Durkheim’s explanation of the paucity of altruistic suicide in complex societies can only partly explain this pattern of distribution. Cultural explanations [value of sacrifice and glory] and situational causes [external and internal oppression] are more adequate to the task.

Finally, the anomic type of suicidal homicide is found in both Western and non-Western societies. Here, too, the most salient variety is attributable to cult suicidal homicide. Like the egoistic variety, there are two types of anomic suicidal homicide: mass suicide pacts exemplified in events such as “Masada” [Jerusalem, 70 AD]⁵, “the

⁴ I define terrorism as “focused violence against noncombatant civilians.” I believe that, in order to gain universal consensus on combating terrorism, the phenomenon must be narrowly defined. Conceptual and moral clarity on the meaning of terrorism (as opposed to paramilitary action) facilitates reaching international resolve to combat it.

⁵ Josephus (The Jewish War) describes the mass suicide pact of the besieged “Zealots” fearful of the imminent Roman victory. In order to avoid the biblical injunction against suicide, ten warriors were chosen

order of Solar Temple” [Swiss Alps, 1994] and “Heaven’s Gate” [San Diego, 1997]; and mass murder-suicide events recorded in Jonestown [Guyana, 1977], and the Branch Davidian compound [Waco, 1999]⁶. Mass murder-suicides could also encompass those outside the cult. The Columbine high school mass murder-suicides [Columbine Valley, 1999], for example, were based on a quasi cultic ideology. Non Western examples include urban guerilla activities of cultic political organizations such as “People’s Mojahedin Organization” [PMO] of Iran and “Kurdistan Workers’ Party [PKK] of Turkey that embarked on a series of suicidal politically motivated operations against religious and security institutions 1980s and 90s. The success of such operations is due to what Hudson calls “dedication, including absolute obedience to the leader of the movement” [18, p. 107]. The third table illustrates the varieties and examples of suicidal homicide.

Table 3. Types of Suicidal Homicide in Western and non-Western Societies

	Egoistic	Altruistic	Anomic
WESTERN	Suicide Pacts, Murder-suicide Ex: Romantic, Domestic, Work place incidents.	War: Suicide Missions, Terrorism: Ideological Suicidal homicide Ex. No examples of Ideological Suicidal homicide	Cult Suicidal homicide: 1. mass suicide pacts, 2. mass murder-suicides Ex: 1. Heaven’s Gate, 2. Columbine murders.
NON- WESTERN	Suicide Pacts, Murder-suicide Ex: Romantic, Domestic, work place incidents	War: Suicide Missions, Terrorism: Ideological Suicidal homicide Ex: Kamikaze attacks	Cult Suicidal homicide: 1. mass suicide pacts, 2. mass murder suicides Ex: 1. Masada, 2. PKO

The second column of this table, altruistic suicidal homicide, is the type recognized, in most societies, as suicide bombing. The difference between the second and the third columns of this table is significant for the purposes of this essay because anomic suicidal homicide is alternatively regarded as intriguing, incomprehensible, and revolting; whereas altruistic suicidal homicide generally resonates with deeper cultural sensibilities. Immediate and intense emotional moral response [pro and con] distinguishes the altruistic suicidal homicide. Often the perpetrators are accorded a heroic status, even when their deeds are not condoned.

by lot to dispatch their companions and then one of the ten would behead the others and “summoning all his strength” would fall on his sword. The only biblically literal case of suicide, therefore, was the last warrior. The dead numbered 960.

⁶ Anomic suicide pacts are difficult to set apart from anomic murder-suicides due to paucity of reliable evidence. In both Jonestown and Waco instances, cases of murder suicide were reported among a larger suicide pact matrix.

3. Implications

The cultural and political scope of suicidal homicide obviously extends beyond the explanatory capacity of the instrumental and organizational models, hence the need for a cultural frame of reference.

It is well known that cultural support for terrorism, however implicit, complicates the attempts to predict and control it. The case of Eric Rudolph, the 1996 Atlanta bomber is instructive: he eluded capture for five years despite the fact that the authorities knew his general whereabouts [rural North Carolina] and that no less than seven federal and local agencies were mobilized to apprehend him [28]. Mr. Rudolph's success as a fugitive was, in part, due to the widespread empathy of the local community for his conservative Christian ideology. Supportive bumper stickers and T shirts urging him to "run" and to "hide" adorned trucks and public spaces while numerous local encounters with Mr. Rudolph went unreported [29, 30, 31]. If such marginal cultural support for a lone domestic terrorist can frustrate the all-out attempts to bring him to justice, one can only imagine how intractable culturally supported terrorism would be on a large scale and on an international level.

The cultural model, using both a systemic and a relational approach, envisions three concentric circles where the local culture [the outer circle] contains any number of extremist subcultures [the middle circle] that, given the requisite external and internal pressure, launch terrorist ideologies [the innermost circle]. Terrorism, then, is the result of a two stage process of radicalization and mutation of local cultural values and aspirations.




Figure 1. Cultural theories of [religious or secular] suicide terrorism

Levels of cultural support for terrorism can be measured. The more insular the concentric circles, the more starved and vulnerable extremists and terrorists. The more

porous the separating walls, the easier the flow of the moral and material support into extremist and terrorist groups. The real or perceived external threat or internal repression fosters a sense of defeat, desperation, and disenfranchisement that accelerates the formation of extremism and facilitates the mutation of extremism into terrorism.

The Durkheimian model proposed in this essay, distinguishes three varieties of suicidal homicide and suggests that the most intractable variety is the altruistic category. According to this model, it is imperative that suicidal homicide is transported from the altruistic to anomic column of table 3. This would deprive terrorism of the vast cultural resources otherwise available to it. The effort, however, requires a long term approach and significant investment of global resources.

Concerning anomic and egoistic varieties of terrorism, Durkheim's caveat about the "normal rates" of egoistic suicide in the complex societies is worth noting. Modern society, Durkheim argued, increases the freedom, privacy, and autonomy of the individuals and groups. Enhancement of these capacities improves not only the vast majority's ability to pursue peaceful goals but also the small minority's power to engage in self-destructive action. The "normal risk" of egoistic and anomic suicides that the modern societies accept and routinely manage can extend to egoistic or anomic suicidal homicides. In other words, there will always be eccentrics and radicals of various stripes who may engage in terrorist homicide or suicidal homicide; and the society can mobilize its resources to handle their threat and to "keep terrorism within manageable proportions" [32, 33]. The altruistic type of suicidal homicide, however, is deeply embedded in cultures of support that can readily draw upon the vast reservoirs of the community. It operates and spreads at a scale beyond the capacity of any free modern society to predict or to control it. Only through understanding the nature of the bonds between the terrorist cells and their respective cultures of extremism, and through denying them the blood vessels of ideological and logistical support from their larger local cultural environments can the international community hope to stem the tide of terrorism.

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Fundamentalism as a Universal Mindset

Case Study of Religious Fundamentalism: Turkish Hizbullah

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Abstract. Especially, since the events of September 11, religious, specifically Islamic, fundamentalism has become one of the controversial issues among scholars. In his prominent book, James Barr makes a detailed analysis of Protestant fundamentalism. Two leading characteristics of this kind of fundamentalism are exclusivity and opposition. In this paper, we analyzed these characteristics, and we tested whether these characteristics may be applicable to an Islamic fundamentalist movement or not. More specifically, after making a specific definition of fundamentalism, the main features of Protestant fundamentalism, application of these features to Turkish Hizbullah, the main doctrines of Turkish Hizbullah, and a brief history of the group have been discussed in this paper.

Keywords. Fundamentalism, Turkish Hizbullah, Religion, PKK, Terrorism, Turkey

Introduction

This research focuses on understanding the mentality associated with fundamentalism, especially religious fundamentalism. In this study, the concept of fundamentalism as described by James Barr has been used as the core paradigm. Barr primarily explains a Protestant concept of fundamentalism. However, by employing this concept to another context, the applicability of this concept to a different religious ideology-based fundamentalist group will be tested. Thus, it is assumed that though the base – which is primarily religion – is different, it is possible to observe the same kind of features of fundamentalism among different groups from different religions. Specifically, the features of Protestant fundamentalism mentioned by Barr will be examined to see whether they are applicable to an Islamic fundamentalist group, the Turkish Hizbullah.

One of the most controversial questions among theologians and social scientists is the definition of *fundamentalism*. From the outsiders' point of view, *fundamentalism* is often a stigmatizing, pejorative label “associated with exclusive, ruthless, and dogmatic behavior” [1]. However, being labeled *fundamentalist* may be a source of honor and pride for insiders who consider themselves as exhibiting pure faith and strictly adhering to religious dictates. Moreover, although fundamentalism may pertain to notions of group identity or be seen as a collectively shared phenomenon, it also has an individual component and perspective. For example, among others, Bruce [2] while classifying Islamic fundamentalism as communal and pre-modern, characterizes Protestant funda-

mentalism as individual and modern. Contrary to this popular belief, it is not possible to say that only certain religions are associated with fundamentalist ideologies. Indeed, most, if not all, religions, whether they are, in Weberian terms, “innerworldly” or “otherworldly” or “mystic or ascetic”, have fundamentalist tendencies. In fact, as many scholars have mentioned, although its main ideology seem to stem from religious motives, fundamentalism is not just limited to religious movements. In reality, every ideology, even those tied to secular movements has a tendency to be radicalized [3]. In reality, every ideology, even those tied to secular movements has a tendency to be radicalized [3]. In this paper, after making a specific definition of fundamentalism, we discussed the main features of Protestant fundamentalism, application of these features to Turkish Hizbullah, a brief history of Turkish Hizbullah (TH) and the main doctrines of the group.

1. What Is Fundamentalism?

The term *fundamentalism* dates back to an early 1900s religious movement in the United States. A conservative evangelical Protestant group first started the movement as a religious reaction to the modernism of the new 20th century. The term was inspired by the four volume set of books called *The Fundamentals of the Faith*, published between 1910 and 1925. As Bruce [2] mentioned, since then the term has been used to describe an organizational phenomenon characterized by a reactionary viewpoint stemming from a sense of alienation from the surrounding culture. Although the starting point was a Christian religious reaction movement, today the notion of fundamentalism has broadened not only its main ideology but also its types of reaction. In its current conceptualization, fundamentalism “may refer equally to militantly orthodox sections with in the Jewish population in Israel, separatist and national elements in the Sikh Community, Tamil liberation movement in Sri Lanka, or Hindu groups opposed to foreign missionary influences in India” [4].

Nowadays, from a Western perspective, the most frequently identified form of fundamentalism may be Islamic fundamentalism especially because of the conditions in the Middle East. However, a fundamentalist ideology, as mentioned above, is the foundation for most revivalist movements, be they religious, nationalist, or “religio-military”. Caplan insists that “an adequate understanding of fundamentalism requires us to acknowledge its potential in every movement or cause... We are all of us, to some degree and in some senses, fundamentalists” [4].

Despite its popular controversial concept, fundamentalism does not have a commonly shared meaning among scholars. Definitions range from a non-violent desire to return to the “good old days” or “golden age”, to the most extreme violent actions nourished especially by radical religious or secular ideologies. As a general concept, Bruce [2] defines fundamentalism as “a response of religious traditionalists to local circumstances that threaten them”; however, as seen above, religion is only one source or tool used by fundamentals. Therefore, we can more broadly define fundamentalism as a categorical, uncompromising, and self-enclosing ideological mindset that is used by certain people in any society as a response or reaction to the current conditions of that society which threatens their material or intangible interests.

When the emergence of any fundamentalist movement is analyzed, it is usually possible to observe a three-stage process. Beeman [5] says that according to Eric Sharpe, the first stage is an awareness of a threat and a “rejection” of new forms of ideas or beliefs. In the second phase, called “adaptation”, people try to accommodate the new values by matching or remixing their old values. The third stage is “reaction” in which people who are reluctant to adopt the new values resist and fight back against these new forms and their causes. Fundamentalist practices usually emerge from this last stage [5].

1.1. The Main Features of Barr’s Conceptualization of Fundamentalism

In his influential book entitled *Fundamentalism*, James Barr [6] makes a detailed analysis of Protestant fundamentalism. Instead of giving a narrow definition, he tries to identify the causes, the consequences and the functions of this kind of fundamentalism. He states that his purpose is to “understand fundamentalism as a religious and intellectual system and to see why it functions as it does” [6]. Although the main focus of his study is on Protestant fundamentalism, Barr depicts the general features of any kind of fundamentalism. According to Barr, the main features of fundamentalism are the “exclusivist” nature of the ideology and the “oppositional” character of their thoughts [1].

Exclusivity of the ideology simply means the categorical bifurcation of people as either believers/insiders or others/outsideers. The main consequence of this type of divergence is an established sense of chosen “true believers”; members are accepted into the group by embracing the main dogmas of the ideology espoused by the true believers. This sense of uniqueness is a feature in nearly all groups; however, the “important thing here is the degree of social exclusivity determined by the belief in a closed ideology” [1]. Depending on the persuasion of the ideology, the outsiders are considered as ignorant, disbelievers, sinners, hypocrites or even infidels by the adherents of the ideology.

The second common feature of fundamentalism is the “oppositional character” of the ideology. Barr [6] asserts that in terms of Protestant fundamentalism, “especially on its more intellectual side, opposition to criticism and modern theology is almost the total goal and purpose of the movement”. As a consequence of this oppositional character, fundamentalists presuppose a constant existing threat not only to beliefs but also to believers: “The presence of the questioner breaks down the unnatural symbiosis of conflicting elements which makes up the total ideology of fundamentalists... Fundamentalism as an ideological option is profoundly threatened by the presence of people who do not believe in it, who do not share it, who question it” [6].

The reaction policy caused by hostility against this existing threat varies based on the belief of the ideology, and is often used as a “weapon of ideological conquest” [1]. For the fundamentalists, the ideas and thoughts of others are inconsequential. As Barr states, “the fundamentalist policy is not to listen to the non-conservative arguments and then reject them: it is that the non-conservative argument should not be heard at all” (p. 315). Indeed, as a result of this reluctance to communicate with the outsiders and of the indignant nature of the ideology, more radical responses may arise against these threats. For example, instead of ignoring the outsider views, the group may respond actively and try to defeat the perceived threats.

2. Turkish Hizbullah: a Brief History and Explanation of the Ideology of Organization

According to their own literature, the Turkish Hizbullah (THB) (also known as Kurdish Hizbullah) emerged in the 1980s in the southeastern part of Turkey. However, despite the shared name, there is no organizational relationship between the Lebanese Hezbollah group and the Turkish Hizbullah group. In their pamphlet, THB asserts that despite the specific circumstances caused by cultural and geographical differences, all Islamic movements around all Islamic geography shows similarities; this is basically because they all aim and fight for similar results. Although the THB benefited from the experiences of different Islamic movements in all phases of its struggle, the THB is not an offshoot or branch of any current or former movement and or organization [7].

The main difference between Lebanese Hezbollah and THB is the religious doctrine that they emerged from. The THB espouses Sunni Islam whereas Lebanese Hezbollah consists of predominantly Shia Islam members. However, it is believed that the THB accepts and admires the Iranian Shia regime established after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran [8].

The THB originally operated mainly in the Turkish cities of Diyarbakir, Van, Batman and Mardin. Members of this terrorist group habitually gathered in and around mosques and bookstores where they discussed their ideologies and spread their propaganda [9]. The main motive and ideology of the organization was and is, (as seen in most religious fundamentalist groups) to overthrow the secular regime of Turkey and establish an Islamic-based regime. Besides this religious motive, another important issue featured in its propaganda is the growth of Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish identity. In fact, the THB defines itself as *an* Islamic group who emerged from Kurdistan, which consisted of predominantly Kurdish members [7].

At this point, it is interesting to observe the commonalities between the THB's purposes and doctrines and those of another terrorist group in the region, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a secular (Marxist-Leninist) separatist movement. Despite seeming to have a shared purpose in their doctrines, each group is the other's greatest opponent. During the violent rivalry between these two groups, hundreds of members from each side have lost their lives. As Cagatay and Uslu [10] note, for the THB, one of the most important results of this conflict with the PKK between 1991 and 1995 is the consumption of the vital assets of the organization, such as suffering attrition as a result of the conflict.

The THB delineates two important periods in the history of the organization. The first phase, between 1979 and 1991, is identified as the time of "education, invitation, and congregation" [7]. During this period the organization specifically avoided conflict with any group in the region, including the state's security forces. The main activity of the organization at this phase was disseminating propaganda about the organizational doctrine. The THB argued that in addition to ignoring the religious beliefs, the grievances and problems of the people in the region were being exploited by many insincere groups, including state agencies. Thus, as representatives of "true believers", THB members claimed to want to make people aware of the untrustworthiness of other groups, to prevent their further exploitation, and to help people solve their problems. The organization used the mosques and local bookstores to spread its ideology, and received support from the religiously conservative tribes, whereas the PKK, under the influence of its Marxist ideology, targeted Kurdish tribal structure [10].

The second phase, between 1991 and 2000, is referred to as the “period of struggle”. In this decade, the group primarily engaged in violent disputes with the PKK. A controversial view held by some researchers maintains that at the beginning of the emergence of the organization, some of THB members received military training in the PKK camps [8]. However, this cooperation did not last long and the two groups quickly became rivals. Although the reason for the conflict is often ascribed to the secular vs. religious ideologic differences between the groups, it is not unrealistic to consider the so-called “benefit sharing” problem in the region. That is, since the two groups emerged from essentially the same geographic region, each organization would have to have been interested in the same resources, especially the finite, human ones. Each group needed to get new members and obtain financial and logistic support from people. And, as mentioned above, even the emotional and motivational resources revolved around the same concerns – “the problems of Kurdish identity”.

Thus although the ideologies that these two groups claim to base their struggle on might seem to be different, in reality they are not. The only real difference between them is the methods they have used to achieve their goals. For example, the PKK Manifesto (grounded in Marxist Leninist theory) says that the only way to solve the problems in the area is by means of a revolution against the local and global imperial forces in the region; specifically a revolution against the bourgeoisie class and local landlords [11]. At an earlier point, the PKK considered Islam to be a “Trojan horse”, a dogma introduced to the Kurds to deceive them. However, more recently, recognizing the importance of the Islamic religion for the people in the region, the PKK has established the Kurdish Prayer Leaders Association (Kurdistan Imamlar Birliği) as a sub-organization to gain supporters from the religious population.

In contrast, while recognizing all the problems in the region, the THB suggests that another party be held responsible. According to THB, the Kurds suffer these problems because the regimes that they live under do not promote the true Islam; thus, they are not fair and discriminate against the Kurdish population. In their view, the only solution to this problem is to overthrow those non-Islamic regimes by introducing a new regime based on true path of Islam [7].

Another important event during the period of struggle was the division of the organization into two components. A short time after the establishment of the organization, the THB separated into two groups. The breach was primarily due to a polarity of ideas about the methods advocated to undertake the ultimate goal: to overthrow the non-Islamic regime and the introduction of a true Islamic system. One group, the Ilimciler (or scientists), led by Huseyin Velioglu, who was killed during a police operation in 2000, met at the Ilim Bookstore, and supported the idea of armed struggle. They became known as Hizballah’s most brutal faction, whereas the Menzilciler (the rangers), led by Fidan Gungor, gathered together at the Menzil bookstore, and believed that it was too early to start an armed struggle.

This methodological difference, along with the ensuing leadership struggle, caused a giant schism between the two factions, and both subsequently attempted to destroy each other. This internal conflict escalated in 1993; hundreds of members were killed from each subdivision. Both groups accused each other of betraying the mission and of being hypocrites and infidels. The conflict resulted in the assassination of Menzilciler’s leader Fidan Gungor by the Ilimciler members in 1994. After that incident, the THB became a group dominated by the Ilimciler, the more activist and more radical faction [9,8].

2.1. Applying Barr's Features of Fundamentalism to the Turkish Hizbullah The Idea of Exclusivity in the THB

As mentioned above, according to Barr [6], one of the key characteristics generated by any fundamentalist ideology is the idea of "exclusivity". In terms of the THB, espousing and maintaining the main dogmas of the ideology are the most important criteria for being accepted to the group. All so-called "candidates" who want to join to the group have to fill out a background report. On these forms, candidates are expected to give detailed information not only about themselves but also their families. The most important indicator of "exclusivity" is the idea of being a true believer. This was clear not only during the period of emergence but also of struggle; any activities carried out or beliefs held by other Islamic groups were always defined as non-Islamic and wrong.

Another example of this exclusivity may be identified in the internal conflict of the group. Although their ultimate goals are the same, because the groups could not agree on the methodology, they started to accuse each other of being betrayers and hypocrites, and tried to destroy each other. If the enmity towards a group that shares a common goal and ideology is so adamantly held, it is not difficult to estimate how strong the attitude towards outsiders. In fact, by killing many moderate Muslim businessmen, intellectuals, and civilians, the THB showed its strictly-defined, narrow, and intolerant attitudes for people who are not true believers, or adherent members of the organization. In their comprehensive study of THB, Aras and Bacik [8] assert that from the beginning, for the THB, the world was plainly divided into the good and the bad. It is likely that in closing themselves off from others they became isolated and lived in an imagined community that struggled to destroy the "unjust other" in order to prove that they were the "just selves". Their "unjust other" category seems to have included not only "infidels", having no religious beliefs, but those in other Muslim groups that they considered to be on the "wrong path" given their having religious beliefs they themselves did not have. Perhaps the narrow limits of their imagined world would not allow them to enter into constructive dialogue so that they could recognize the realities of contemporary life. Instead, their stance led them to postulate an Islamic discourse that satisfied their purposes and allowed them no room for other alternative interpretations.

2.2. The Idea of Opposition in the THB

When the concept of outsiders and enemy is analyzed in THB terminology, it appears that there are four major opposition groups: The State, PKK, Menzilciler (The Rangers), and a collection of other moderate Islamic groups. As previously mentioned, the State is considered as opponent on the basis of being a secular regime and of its discriminative attitudes toward "Kurdish identity". Secularism in Turkey is the central pillar of the Turkish modernization process. The official state position on secularization can be summarized as the notion that "modernity and democracy require secularism. Thus, in order to bring modernity, Islam had to be kept under state control or confined to personal conscience" [12].

Indeed, this concept of secularism is the main target of the THB. In their pamphlets, they accuse the State's secular regime of forcing Islam outside of public life and keeping the Muslim population oppressed. According to the THB, in order to keep Islamic movements under control, the State institutionalizes the religion through its secular ideological conceptualization, thus not permitting Muslims to live the true religion.

They further argue that this is especially clear when it comes to the Muslim Kurdish population—the State uses even more unethical methods [7]. They assert that because of its consistent oppositional attitude toward Islamic movements, the State, according to the THB, tried to demolish the organization of true believers not only through operations conducted by security forces, but also by disseminating misleading propaganda against the THB organization in the region.

THB's second most important opposition group is the separatist Turkish terrorist group, the PKK. As mentioned above, a continual tension has existed between these two rival groups from the beginning, but this tension escalated into armed conflict after 1991. The THB assert that, in order to maintain its dominance in the region, the PKK tried to destroy the THB. They further claim that when they tried to negotiate with the PKK, the terrorist group offered them three options. The first option was to give up the dispute and join the PKK by accepting the leadership of PKK. The second option was to leave the region without demanding anything, and the third option was to be completely destroyed by the PKK. The THB considered all three options to be the same; they decided to continue to fight against the PKK.

The third oppositional group of the THB is the Menzilciler group. As already mentioned, this splinter group separated from the THB because of polemic disagreements for achieving the organizational goals along with a leadership dispute. As soon as the Menzilciler diverged from the Ilimciler, the Ilimciler (now considered to be the main faction of the Turkish Hizbullah) condemned them as hypocrites; as well as accusing them of being agents of the State and of the PKK.

In addition to these three groups, many moderate Islamic organizations were also identified as adversaries by THB. In defining the oppositional character of THB towards other Islamic groups, Aras and Bacik [8] contend that

it can be said that the Turkish Hizbullah held to an anachronistic ideology. In their terminology almost all other Islamic movements and organizations had deviated from the "truth path". Perhaps the recent history of the group explains their isolation. They seem to have planned for a two-step organizing scheme. The first phase was about inviting people to the group – they used the term *davet* (to invite). It was in the second phase that they looked to dealing with other organizations in the region, once they had gathered enough supporters. Along with their expansion plans, the Hizbullah kidnapped more than 200 Kurdish businessmen who had had various relations with other Islamic organizations and movements in the last six months prior to the police operation.

A clear example of the THB "dealing" with one of the opposition organizations can be seen with the killing of Izzettin Yildirim, who was the leader of a moderate Islamic group called Zehra Vakfi. He was kidnapped, tortured, and killed by the THB in 2000 [13].

As a result of following of Sufi tradition of Islam, tolerance is acknowledged as one of the main characteristic of Turkish Islam. The actions and ideas of TH do not accepted by the majority of the population. Beside many prominent religious leaders have denounced any action associated with violence by asserting that a terrorist "could not truly be a Muslim and, a Muslim could not be a terrorist", overwhelming majority of the population dislike the fact that these type organizations are called Islamic. Most of these reactions and criticisms were rejected by TH. Indeed, in their pamphlet, TH did not only reject these criticisms, but also they accused the owners of these ideas as being state agents and hypocrisy.

Conclusion

This study's primary objective was to use a specific conceptualization of fundamentalism and to apply it to a specific case. It can be argued that all fundamentalist ideologies have common premises. In order to examine this assumption, two features, "exclusivity" and "oppositional character", identified by Barr as basic features of Protestant fundamentalism, have been applied to a specific religious fundamentalist group: the Turkish Hizbullah. When we analyze the ideology and premises subscribed to by the THB, it is possible to observe these features of exclusivity and oppositional character in almost all of their claims and propaganda materials. They believe that they are the only real followers of the true path of the Islamic religion. However, they also believe that their principles and dogmas are constantly being threatened, both internally and externally.

As Barr maintained, "fundamentalism is a highly self-enclosing ideology"; this type of ideology is not particular to a specific kind of religion. Indeed, there is almost no religion that has sacred texts that advocate total peace or total war with outsiders. "The Judeo-Christian and Islamic religions are not immune to criticisms of war and violence" [14]. There are also clearly different interpretations of religions in different time periods, cultures, and even in different geographical locations. None of these interpretations are the religion itself, they are instead interpretations that are based on different "social interests" of different societies; "they are not sacred and all of them are possible" [14]. In our case study, not only do we see that features of a fundamentalist interpretation of particular religion can equally be applied to a fundamentalist interpretation of a different religion, but we also see different applications based on different interpretations of the same religion.

In spite of some expectations that religion is losing its importance in modern public life, it seems, in fact, to be reviving. Like "modernity" itself, "fundamentalism" is also a modern concept. Since problems and complications of modernism will continue to exist, it will not be surprising to see a rise, or at least the continued existence, of fundamentalism in the future. As may clearly be observed in many different cases, fundamentalism flourishes through the use of social-structural instruments such as oppression, discrimination, and isolated or miscommunication. Thus, in order to prevent the clashes between and within ideologies, it may be useful to eliminate these structural instruments through more representative participation and by keeping the communication channels open.

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Terrorism as a Social Reality

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Abstract. Today terrorism has made the world more uncertain and dangerous. Nowadays the target of terrorist acts is innocent people, and terrorism poses a threat to human rights, which include the fundamental right to life. All the scientific calculations, plans of global changes in the present-day world economy and policy may strongly change, if terrorism is effective. The problem of terrorism is universal, because anyone can be its victim even without having any connection with the enemies of the terrorists. Terrorism is a brutal solution to the problem of incompatibility among people, which works by destabilizing the psychological condition of the opponent through violence, not limited by civilized morals and law. Diagnostics of terrorism, its “treatment” and prediction, consists not so much in revealing and destroying its militarized structures, but in having exact knowledge and understanding of the reasons for its existence: psychological and political instability in societies. To understand the tendencies for present and future behavior of persons, we must begin with public attitudes toward different issues of politics, economics, social life, culture etc. Maybe it does not explain everything, but the social culture is a critical element in understanding people’s actions across countries or across time. If we do not take it into account, we will not be able to understand their actions.

Keywords. Terrorism, Social environment, Values, Attitudes, Socialization

Introduction

The acts of September, 11, 2001 and the subsequent period have shown that any state, irrespective of its power – political, military and economic – is not capable of fighting terrorism alone. Today terrorism has made the world more uncertain and dangerous. For modern terrorism the extremely rigid forms of violence are typical, as a result of which victims become the civilians in no way connected with the addressees of terrorist acts. Thus, nowadays the target of acts of terrorism is innocent people, and terrorism poses a threat to the human rights, which include the fundamental right to life [1].

The largest change of the last decades is that terrorism has become one of the methods used by militant elements of a society. Organizations which have arisen from the very beginning have two wings: political and terrorist. The political wing provides social services, education, has the business enterprises, and conducts pre-election campaigns while the military or terrorist wing is engaged in the organization of acts of intimidation, arranges ambushes and organizes murders. Such a “division of labour” has certain advantages: the political management can officially distance itself from terrorists when the latter make especially imprudent actions or fail. The statement of political leaders that they do not supervise a military wing sometimes is true, as terrorists prefer to operate in conditions of absence of control. People armed with automatic devices

and bombs, quite often lose sight of the wider purposes of the political movement, and finally turn to criminal acts [2].

Picture of the world, Outlook, Life position, mode of life – are constants of the psychological system of protection of man from the dangers of life. “Breakthrough” of these constants of consciousness is dangerous and man intuitively understands it. Just around these changes, naturally, a fight started, terrorism being one of its expressions. Change of consciousness under the influence of global changes in the world is perception of the impossible as possible, the improbable as probable, the inadmissible as admissible, and the unreal as real. Globalization generates a whole system of changes in the internal world of man. Globalization has neither author nor owner, but it equally presents all of mankind with problems, which it did not face earlier. Modern terrorism is an unequal response to the global changes in the world. Adaptation to these changes is the affair of all of mankind and is on the subject of discussions. It is a very difficult intellectual and psychological problem, which still occupies a small place among the tasks of struggle against terrorism.

Today the world is at a new stage of civilization; consequently, the outlook changes with great difficulty for millions of people, entire countries and peoples, which have no place in the new changing world. Therefore, terrorism today should be considered as a creation of globalization, as its natural expression. Theoreticians of globalization say that it is a series of empirically fixed changes, diverse but united by the logic of transformation of the world into a single whole according to the formula: “global interdependence plus global consciousness.” At present each has really fallen into dependence on the other, but modification of the global consciousness has been limited only to perception of global changes of informational community. Theoreticians of globalization missed a deeper layer of consciousness, in regard to which there started war, one of the participants of which, world terrorism, is not acknowledged as a belligerent party [3].

In other words, the struggle is not for territory, not for resources, not for economic positions, but for the contents of consciousness. Still, the outlooks and ways of life of terrorist and anti-terrorist forces are incompatible, because it is a complex system, and it is easier to use weapons for compulsion than intelligence for persuasion.

1. Definition of Terrorism

Terrorism is a brutal solution to the problem of incompatibility among people, which works by destabilizing the psychological condition of the opponent through violence, not limited by civilized morals and law. The purpose of terrorism is psychological and political destabilization of the community, resulting in financial collapse, changes of governments, reduction of production, suspension of transport streams – everything that financially embodied the world of other people rejected by terrorism. Terrorism is the infection of others with psychological and political instability, from which terrorism also suffers. Diagnostics of terrorism, its “treatment” and prediction, consists not so much in revealing and destroying its militarized structures, but in having exact knowledge and understanding of the reasons for its existence: psychological and political instability in societies.

2. Motivation of Terrorism

Motivation of contemporary, including international, terrorism essentially differs from the motivation of terrorism during the Second World War and the terrorism of the totalitarian states. At present specificity of motivation is, to no small degree, determined by the fact that usually small-numbered groups, well-concealed, trained and armed, exercise influence on national and interethnic establishments and institutions. Some of them are being formed and supported by states, as a rule, totalitarian ones. The contents of the motives and intensity of their display in the terrorist activities of the group depend also on what forces back it, to what extent it is independent, what concrete aims it sets, what is the basis uniting its members, what structure it has, and who it is headed by. Ideology of the group is of exceptional importance.

Scholars posit the following motives:

- Mercantile motives. For a certain number of people terrorism is a way to earn money.
- Ideological motives. Such motives arise as a result of the introduction of the person to certain ideological and political orientations.
- Motives of transformation and active change of the world. These motives are connected to experience of injustice in the existing world and desire for its transformation on the basis of subjective understanding of validity.
- Motive of authority over people. Through violence the terrorist asserts himself as a person. Giving fear to people, such a person strengthens his authority.
- Motive of interest and appeal of terrorism as fields of activity. The risk connected to terrorism, development of plans, specificity of realization of acts of terrorism can involve terrorists.
- Companionable motives of emotional attachment in terrorist group. Such motives can be: motive of revenge for lost comrades, motives of traditional participation in terrorism because someone from among relatives was engaged in it.
- Motive of self-realization. It is a paradoxical motive. On the one hand, self-realization is a destiny of strong-willed people. On the other hand, similar self-realization – a recognition of limitation of opportunities, ascertaining of an inconsistency of the person who is not finding different ways of influence on the world, except for violence. Terrorism is the action directed on the equation of chances [4]. From the point of view of terrorists, their actions are a form of restoration of the trembled validity [5]. Terrorism represents the perverted representations about validity in the world, and always is the inadequate answer of the weak side to actions of strong [6].

Terrorists themselves fail to reach political goals with their activities. They hope that the activities of the terrorists will provoke the response of the public at large and that only this can provide achievement of the political goal.

What promotes a person, who becomes a member of a terrorist organization? What is it he wants to achieve by this? People joining the groups of terrorists come from different social strata and life spheres [7]. There evidently exists a definite set of personal traits, which the terrorists should possess. There exists every reason to believe that these traits, in many respects, are similar to those, which differentiate adherents of religious cults. Serious changes in personality, connected with belonging to any cult and acceptance of its normative system, are described. Sharp changes in personality,

“jump” comes with joining a terrorist organization, because a person rejects belonging to a definite social group, breaks links with the society and is forced to lead an illegal existence [8].

Motivation of terrorist suicides is rather difficult, as the motives of both terrorism and suicides intertwine in them. The motives mentioned are often displayed in a combination of nationalistic stimulations with religious fundamentalism. But this is mostly outwardly: I do not underestimate at all the significance of educating a person in the spirit of fanaticism and extremist tradition of age-old hatred of other peoples and their religion; along with it I would like to observe that a terrorist-kamikaze should possess personal, subjective predisposition to such kind of suicide. When he starts preparing for it, and even more, when he conducts it, his psyche is in another, qualitatively different from usual intention, he already exists as if not in this life. Death, his and of others, attracts him with the most powerful force, so with a greater degree of probability it can be said about such kamikaze that he is a necrophilia personality. The present supposition is pertinent even in such a case when death for him is something beautiful.

2.1. Terrorists and Terroristic Groups

To study a terrorist's personality is an extremely difficult task. The terrorists are practically inaccessible to researchers. They express readiness to meet the journalists with the aim of popularizing their opinions, but any contacts with psychologists are undesirable for them.

The problem of reasons, psychological roots and motivation of terrorism is of regular character. Terrorist activity may be, depending on the degree of the community stability, a cause, a consequence, an accompanying factor or a form of social, political, ethnic, religious or other conflicts. From the psychological viewpoint object factors determining the entire social processes, find their socio-psychological reflection in individual and group consciousness in the form of aims, stereotypes and prevailing psychological stances, which are direct motivation regulators of human behavior.

Terrorists of any rank, from religious terrorists-kamikazes to commune-fascist dictators, always felt deep, vague, diffusion fear of success of their case, in regard to which they are in great need for success, and the support of invisible, but powerful, forces. It's not mere chance that many of these named persons are very superstitious and believe in omens. Terrorism in their activities becomes a means of elimination and intimidation of rivals and, probably, a sacrifice. Annihilation of thousands of people in the state terror may be explained not only by the potentials of a totalitarian state to conduct violence on such scale, but by the fact that such a state thus settle a grand task – to preserve its system of power [9].

Terrorist groups have very different ideology and diverse social base. However, despite this diversity, terrorist groups, in addition to the cases when they directly oppose one another, establish most efficient interrelation among themselves. They assist one another with arms and information, sometimes, displaying peculiar international solidarity, conducting terrorist acts for one another. The very fact of cooperation among the different terrorist groups speaks on existence of a great similarity among them. It seems that class, religious, and purpose differences among the terrorists are not as important as that community, which unites them today into some terrorist international. We shall try to understand what that community is.

First of all, this community is, surely, integral, ideological. All the terrorists are characterized with contempt towards human life; all of them consider it possible to

sacrifice the lives of innocent people with the aim of achieving the goal being lofty from their viewpoint. But there is psychological similarity. The terrorists of Palestine and Italy Ireland and Japan belong to one and the same human type, their unions function based on one and the same psychological laws. Then what kind of persons become terrorists?

Some psychologists say socially non-adapted, less successful people are recruited as terrorists. They did not study well at schools and in high schools. They failed to achieve their career, they could not reach what those of the same age managed to do. They used to suffer loneliness; they could not manage to establish contacts with the representatives of the opposite sex. So, they were everywhere and always outsiders, nowhere could they feel really at ease, neither in the family, nor at work, nor at a friendly party either.

There have been discussions more than once on whether psychopathological deviations can be considered to be a main incentive stimulus for terrorism. Some researchers give a negative answer to this question. One of the articles in the journal "Terrorism" observes: "A majority of terrorists should, apparently, be considered as the persons not being out of the frame of normal". Even more, a renowned researcher of terrorism N. Livingstone considers there are all the bases to believe that psychopathology is quite a rare case among political terrorists [10]. Apparently, neurotic complexes play an important role in this sphere. Among the terrorists we come across, considerably more frequently, the people, who are emotionally unstable, losers, striving to force anyone to talk about them, dreaming of fame, leadership, etc. For young people, an overwhelming majority of terrorists are, such activities may become attractive thanks to the opportunity of self-assertion, of feeling their own significance, of overcoming alienation and frustration. Terrorist organization may give the young people "an opportunity to become a hero", writes K.L. Oots in his research dedicated to psychological motives of terrorism. "An atmosphere of adventures may become a stimulus. Young terrorists get satisfaction also from belief that they facilitate an important affair. In some cases even an opportunity to die and become a martyr may be a significant stimulus" [11].

The language of the terrorists is the language of absolutism, of black and white, without any grey shades, without the slightest hint of uncertainty. It is rhetoric of "us" against "them", kindness against evil, with idealization of "us" and projection on "them", of all that is bad. The reasons of tension should be searched for in the society, the society being the only serious pathogenic factor. Thus inner, individual crisis turns into hatred towards establishment shared with others. Having determined the establishment as an enemy, as the cause of problems of the society [and of their own], terrorists consider an attempt to destroy establishment to be not only not immoral, but extremely moral as well, because according to the perverted logic of terrorists, destruction of the establishment is the destruction of the source of evil, from which only kindness may proceed.

The world is divided into two camps of enemies and friends, so those, who are not fully with us, are against us. In written statements made by terrorists and in group discussions there exists a tendency towards polarization at idealization of their own group. A source of all the problems is taken out from outside. An idealization of their own group is, in particular, the idealization of its brotherhood and harmony; intra-group tensions are also projected on an external enemy. "It's not us, it's they" – this is a slogan of the unlucky youth, who are on the sidewalks of the society and who strive to find an external cause of their problems. How much attractive it is for such a young man to discover that he is not the only one, that there are others like him and that in

reality there exists integral ideology, regularly proving that “they” are responsible for the problems, he and his deprived comrades suffer from.

A terrorist makes death his fetish, as a terrorist act itself should inspire fear, even horror. Here jeopardy of death and destruction, quite possible in the future, is built over already occurred, forming a pyramid, which should particularly jeopardize. Surely, lust for bloody violence is characteristic to not only terrorists, but to hired killers, military mercenaries, sexual maniacs-killers, to all those, who deprive another of his life not “by chance”, under a strong pressure of circumstances, not in fury or in condition of an emotional stress, not once, but permanently and gradually, starting from minor acts of violence, who, while killing, just in that very moment lives the most full life. It is very important to stress that this present motive as well majority of others, exists on unconscious level and very rarely is apprehended by an acting subject. It is often a leading one that does not exclude presence of other, additional motives, for example mercenary ones [12].

Some terrorists, especially terrorists-kamikazes, are literally fascinated with death, but at the same time with their voluntary destruction try to immortalize themselves and thus to overcome their own fear of death. The thing is that sowing the seeds of death is one of the means to remove fear of death, because in such a case it is psychologically closer to a man in a maximum extent and it becomes more understandable. A terrorist-kamikaze is a personality with a very high level of alarm and therefore he permanently, but unconsciously, seeks for what causes his alarm and finds it in death. It's not casual that those terrorists, who survive after conducting a terrorist act, keep striving towards death.

3. Social Environment, Events in Pankisi [Georgia]

The social environment is of enormous importance for the realization or liquidation of the ground for terrorism. As an example we can cite events in Pankisi [Georgia].

As it is known, fundamentalism is a rich ground for terrorism. The problem of fundamentalism is a subject of analysis for the Georgian state as well. From the 90s one of the most radical-extremist trends of the Islamic fundamentalism – Washbasin – started spreading in Georgia with the support of external forces.

In the Soviet Union political conjecture and atheism in the rank of state ideology, more or less protected Caucasus from religious impulses of fundamentalism, so the probability of turning religion into a weapon of struggle was less. When Georgia gained independence, the disposition to religion changed. All religious confessions have an opportunity to openly preach their own views, to freely spread their doctrine. After this the situation in Georgia radically changed.

It is of great interest to determine how fundamentalism influences consciousness of the population, what are historical and modern aspects of it, their relation to the Caucasian-Georgian reality.

Georgia is a Christian country, but is completely encircled with Islamic countries. Both Georgian and non-Georgian Muslims live in the country. On the one part – Iran, Turkey and Azerbaijan and, on the other: Republics of North Caucasus [parts of Russian Federation] – Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Adighei and Circassia closely border Georgia. But Muslims surround not only country borders; they live in Georgia in abundance. Among them are Azerbaijanis, Kists, Lezghins, Kurds

and Abkhazs [partially], Muslim belief is professed by Georgians as well – partially by Adjarians and Ingiloes.

It is true that Islam is a consolidating factor in the fight of separate peoples of Caucasus for national independence, but, on the other part, it historically opposes ethnic traditions, while traditional values seem to be a major obstacle for fundamentalism.

Co-existence of Georgians and Kists in the region of Central Caucasus has been ongoing for centuries. The life of highlanders was so integrated that it is quite difficult to determine genetically what tradition these people belonged to. Many holy places are equally respected by “christened or non-christened” highlanders. Anatori Cross was a common holy place for Shatillions and Kists to pray. Kists used to often take Khevsurian spiritual elders to bless their holy places. While retelling these stories the narrators never stress religious difference of Chechens. That Chechens and Georgians had similar cult services, is well seen in the evidences of the beginning of the century. There have been friendly relations between Kists and Georgian highlanders over centuries. However, in the present period this friendship of theirs has faced jeopardy through the “assistance” of external forces, which was caused by appearance of Wahhabis in Pankisi Gorge.

The spread of Wahhabism in Pankisi is connected with the war in Chechnya. Wahhabism was “preached” by the youth returned from the war. At first Wahhabism did not express reaction views and was limited to theological issues, only in a narrow circle and did not cause any indignation in the society. This was, probably, also caused by the fact that in the beginning a number of Wahhabism adherents were 15–20, and no one worried about it.

However, peaceful co-existence between Wahhabists and the local population did not continue long. The first opposition took place on the religious basis – they failed to agree on the specificity of prayers and the contradiction between them grew. Miurids were in furious with Wahhabits’ disrespectful disposition to their tradition and habits and rules, which were considered to be arrogance, their attitude to Wahhabits became radical, and they were named as heretics [13].

The relation between local Miurids and Wahhabits became especially tense after the second Chechnya-Russia war, after 1999, when Chechen “boeviks” [the armed groups] started coming to Pankisi together with Chechen refugees. The criminal situation in Pankisi became most tense, thousands of different people were gathered, each of them behaving according to their own wish. The activities of Chechen criminals disguised as Wahhabits became most frequent. Robbery, narcobusiness, especially, kidnapping intensified. This business developed so much that Pankisi has become a market of slaves. So, Pankisi has become a centre of terrorism.

Pankisi has been first mentioned within this context by Russia, which from the very beginning negatively evaluated the decision of the Georgian government on giving shelter to Chechen refugees. However absurd it may be, the September 11 terrorist act made the situation in Pankisi tenser, i.e. external forces intensified their efforts to make this tiny part of land an area of international significance. The foreign minister of Russia even expressed a supposition that Bin Laden is sheltered in Pankisi, that Al-Kaida has close relations with Chechen rebels that Al-Kaida has its residents in Pankisi and Al-Kaida is as numerous in Pankisi as flies.

In August 2002, joint forces of Georgian defense ministry, police and security entered Pankisi, block posts were opened, and entrance to Pankisi was blocked so that entire Pankisi was controlled by law enforcement. Georgia’s jurisdiction was fully restored. Before taking a decisive measure, the law enforcers did their best to force Che-

chen “boeviks” leave Pankisi without any excess along with Georgian borders, and did achieve positive results. Local criminals also left Pankisi together with “boeviks”. It was clear the criminals, who entered Pankisi from outside, could not have maintained themselves and ran away.

After the Georgian government conducted the measures mentioned above, the situation in Pankisi became stable. Chechen boeviks and criminals were followed by a majority of Wahhabits.

As for the situation today, the experts in Caucasian issues mention that at present about 200 Wahhabits are in Pankisi. It should be mentioned that these Wahhabits are not radically disposed. They are carriers of the ideas, which were preached by Al-Kaida, i.e. there is seen not a single trace of extremism in their activities [14].

4. Measures – Socialization

Before taking the measures, directed against terrorism and improving the legislation, it is necessary to precisely define the phenomenon itself and coordinate. Despite scientific discussions in regard to this issue there has not been a universal definition of what the terrorism is. The evaluation often depends on political views, religious beliefs and ethnic identity, and the search for a uniform approach to the problem of terrorism is ongoing up to the present day. In due time terrorism was considered to be one thing and “the fighter for the freedom and ideals” is absolutely another. However any terrorist movement has the purpose and frequently it may be noble, terrorists may act in the name of freedom as well.

Specific value of scientific substantiation of the activities of law enforcement structures for preventing terrorism should be increased. As for concrete proposals: at each level it should start from studying general [be they political, economic, national, religious, etc] reasons and concrete expressions of terrorism. Therefore socio-legal grounds should be elaborated for protection of the society and an individual from terrorism as a phenomenon. Just on this theoretical platform there should be built tactics of influence on terrorism.

The problem of operation-tactical character should be settled, those inclined to terrorism should be determined. They may be different people – their psychological profile should be determined with sufficient accuracy. Relying on this, psychologists, apparently, may model peculiarities of behavior of such people and relatively accurate psychological portrait of the carrier of pro-terrorist behavior, elaborate typical scenarios and mechanisms of psychological and social influence on the community.

To understand the tendencies for present and future behavior of persons, we must begin with public attitudes toward different issues of politics, economics, social life, culture etc.—what we call values. It does not explain everything. Even people with similar values and skills will behave differently when they face different opportunities or problems. Nor are values unchangeable. New experiences can change the attitudes of individuals; for example, people who migrate to another country learn new ways of life. But cultural norms typically change slowly and reflect enduring patterns of action. This means that social culture is a critical element in understanding people’s actions across countries or across time. If we do not take it into account, we will not be able to understand their actions.

These values are sustained or changed as people acquire their attitudes and experiences. We use the term socialization to refer to the way in which these values are

formed and the culture is transmitted from one generation to the next. Most children acquire elementary but distinctive attitudes and behavior patterns at a relatively early age. Some of these attitudes will evolve and change through life, but others may remain as part of themselves throughout life.

At any specific time, an individual self will be a combination of several feelings and attitudes. At the deepest level, there are general identifications and beliefs such as nationalism, ethnic or class self-images, religious and ideological commitments, and a fundamental sense of rights and duties in the society. Divisions between ethnic or religious groups often generate such attachments because they are based on deep self-images. At an intermediate level, individuals acquire less intense emotional attitudes toward politics and governmental institutions. Finally, there are more immediate views of current events, policies, issues, and personalities. All these levels of attitudes can change, but those in the first group usually were acquired earliest, have been most frequently reinforced, and tend to be the most durable.

Three general points about socialization and learning need to be emphasized. First, there can be either direct or indirect socialization. Socialization is direct when it involves the explicit communication of information, values, or feelings toward subject. Civics courses in public schools are direct socialization, as are the efforts of Islamic fundamentalist movements to indoctrinate children. Communist political systems also heavily used indoctrination programs. Socialization is indirect when views are inadvertently molded by our experiences. Such indirect socialization may have particular force in a child's early years. For example, the child's relationships to parents, teachers, and friends are likely to affect the adult's posture toward political leaders and fellow citizens in later life. Or, growing up in a time of deprivation and hardship may leave the future adult more concerned about economic well-being.

Second, socialization continues throughout an individual's life. Early family influences can create an individual's initial values, but subsequent life experiences—becoming involved in new social groups and roles, moving from one part of the country to another, shifting up or down the social ladder, becoming a parent, finding or losing a job—may change one's perspectives. More dramatic experiences, such as immigration to a new country or suffering through an economic depression or a war, can sharply alter even quite basic attitudes. Such events seem to have their greatest impact on young people.

Third, patterns of socialization in a society can either be unifying or divisive. Some events, such as international conflict or the loss of a popular public figure, can affect nearly the entire nation similarly. In contrast, subcultures in a society can have their own distinctive patterns of socialization. Social groups that provide their members with their own newspapers, their own neighborhood groups, and perhaps their own schools can create distinctive subcultural attitudes. These divisive patterns of socialization can have a momentous impact on the society.

Individuals in all societies are affected by agents of socialization: institutions and organizations that influence attitudes. Some like civics courses in schools are direct and deliberate sources of learning. Others, like play and work groups, are likely to affect socialization indirectly.

4.1. The Family

The direct and indirect influences of the family—the first socialization source that an individual encounters—are powerful and lasting. The family has distinctive influences

on attitudes. The family also shapes future social, cultural, political attitudes by locating the individual in a vast social world; establishing ethnic, linguistic, class, and religious ties, affirming cultural values, and directing occupational and economic aspirations.

4.2. Schools

Schools provide adolescents with knowledge about the social, cultural and political world and their role in it, and with more concrete perceptions of different institutions and relationships. Schools also transmit the values and attitudes of the society. They can play an important role in shaping attitudes about the unwritten rules of the social game, instilling the values of public duty, and developing informal relations. In some nations educational systems do not provide unifying, peaceful socialization but send starkly different messages to different groups. Education also affects the skills and resources of the public. The better-educated have mental skills that improve their ability to interpret and act on new information. They also have more information about different processes and undertake a wider range of activities. These effects of education appear in studies of attitudes in many nations.

4.3. Religious Institutions

The religions of the world are carriers of cultural and moral values. The great religious leaders have seen themselves as teachers, and their followers have usually attempted to shape the socialization of children through schooling, preaching, and religious services.

The emergence of aggressive religious fundamentalism in recent decades has had a major impact on the society and politics of countries as diverse as the United States, India, Israel, Lebanon, Iran, Pakistan, Algeria, and Nigeria. Such fundamentalism is often a defensive reaction against the spread of scientific-views of nature and human behavior, and the libertarian values and attitudes that accompany these views. Fundamentalism usually defines a world in which believers must engage in the great struggle between the forces of spiritual goodness and evil. While the influence of fundamentalism has been most visible in the Middle East and among Muslim countries, it is important in Christian countries as well. There are both Protestant and Catholic versions of fundamentalism in the United States, Europe, and Latin America. Versions of fundamentalism are also to be found, combined with ethnic and nationalist tendencies, among the Confucian, Buddhist, and Hindu countries of Asia. Broadly speaking, fundamentalism seeks to raise conservative social, moral, and religious issues to the top of the contemporary policy agenda.

Of course, religious institutions of many kinds offer valuable moral and ethical guidance that individuals often need to make choices in complex societies. Religious affiliations are often important sources of partisan preferences and can guide people in making other choices.

4.4. Peer Groups

Peer groups are important social units that shape values and attitudes. They include childhood play groups, friendship cliques, school and college fraternities, and small work groups, in which members share relatively equal status and close ties.

A peer group socializes its members by motivating or pressuring them to conform to the attitudes or behavior accepted by the group. Individuals often adopt the views of their peers because they like or respect them or because they want to be like them. An individual may become interested in some processes or attend some meetings because close friends do so. In such cases, the individual modifies his or her interests and behavior to reflect those of the group in an effort to be accepted by its members. As we mentioned above this is also source for involving in terrorist groups.

5. Social Class and Gender

Most societies have significant social divisions based on class or occupation. Individuals live in different social worlds defined by their class position. Similarly, in many less developed nations the life experience of the rural peasantry is radically different from urban dwellers. In many instances these social divisions are politically relevant: identifying oneself as a member of the group leads to distinct views about what issues are important and which groups best represent ones interest.

Gender is another important pattern of social, cultural and political learning. From birth, nature and society ascribe different patterns of behavior to males and females. Traditionally these social divisions have carried over to different fields of life. In many less developed nations these gender roles still exist today and therefore this is a source for conflicting situations. It is very important to raise the social role and educational level of women.

6. Mass Media

Much of the world has become a single audience, exposed to the same information and moved by the same events. There is virtually no part so remote that its inhabitants lack the means to be informed almost simultaneously about events elsewhere: mass-produced and inexpensive transistor radios are omnipresent. The mass media—news-papers, radio, television, magazines—play an important part in internationalizing attitudes and values around the globe.

Television, enlisting the senses of both sight and sound, can have a powerful emotional impact on large public audiences. To providing specific and immediate information about events, the mass media also convey, directly or indirectly, the major values on which a society agrees.

7. Political Parties

Political parties play an important role in process of socialization. Political parties attempt to mold issue preferences, arouse the apathetic, and find new issues to mobilize support. Party leaders and party spokespersons provide the public with a steady flow of information on the different issues. Party organizations regularly contact voters by mail or phone, and in many nations party activists visit voters at home. Elections can serve as national civics lessons, and parties are the teachers and have a great influence on society [15].

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The Impact of Group Dynamics on Terrorist Decision Making

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Abstract. This study tries to figure out the impact of group dynamics on terrorist decision making by exploring the nature of terrorist organizations. This study shows that preconditions of terrorism prepare a fertile condition for terrorism and specific precipitators such as anger and hate motivate certain individual's especially young people to join terrorist organizations. It also shows that terrorist organization usually try to recruit their members from the similar places, where the economic, political, and social deprivation are at most degree. The study also investigates the reason that lies behind terrorism. It suggests that provocative situational context is a first vehicle for terrorism, the impact of group dynamics has more implications than external factors. Since psychological progression toward terrorism occurs inside the organization, group think process may moderate the importance of provocative situational context. There is a direct relation between provocative situational context and group terrorist organization.

Keywords. Group dynamics, terrorism, decision making, group-think.

Introduction

Since more than three decades, researchers have tried to figure out the sociology and psychology of terrorism. Meticulous studies revealed that the reasons of terrorism are truly complex and stem from multilevel motives. Individual level and contextual level factors are closely related to each other when try to explain why people resort to terrorism.

Studies regarding the sociology and psychology of terrorism stress the importance of both contextual level and individual level factors. For instance, research indicates that terrorist organizations generally recruit their new members from areas that characterized by low economic status, high ethnic, and residential mobility. In addition to these contextual level variables, individual level factors, such as low self esteem and low self efficacy, are considered having effects in joining terrorist organizations. In other words, it can be said that micro level and macro level perspectives together help us to understand the causes of terrorism.

These two sources of explanations, however, still seem inadequate to explain atrocious activities of terrorists because the gap between contextual level factors and individual level factors hinders to elaborately elucidate the causal mechanism of terrorism. For this reason, additional factors can be considered within this causal mechanism in order to able to offer plausible explanations regarding how terrorists justify/rationalize their evil activities even when they kill babies¹.

¹ PKK killed many babies in Turkey to give its message to the other people.

At this point, the causal gap between contextual level factors and individual level factors can be filled up with group dynamics of terrorist organizations which appear important to explain terrorist activities. Della Porta stresses this reality and suggests that commitment a violence terrorist act can be best explained by the help of the identification of the group dynamics [1]. In other words, without considering the impact of organization, judgments for terrorist behavior will be inadequate because most involvement in terrorism results from gradual exposure and socialization towards extreme behavior by the help of groupthink [2].

Briefly summarizing the reasons of terrorism in the literature, it can be said that the causes of terrorism have mainly focused on three areas: "(1) political, economic and social conditions that correlate to increased incidences of politically motivated violence, (2) group dynamics-related process that facilitates radicalization and an increased risk of violence in previously nonviolent protest groups, and (3) psychological traits and characteristics of group members that predispose them to seeking membership in violent organizations such as terrorist groups" [3].

In this context, this study will try to figure out the impact of group dynamics on terrorist decision making by exploring the nature of terrorist organizations/groups. First, contextual level and individual level factors will be briefly introduced in order to able to make a smooth transaction to the impact of group dynamics on terrorist decision making. Second, group dynamics of terrorist organizations will be examined with related theories.

1. The Role of Contextual Level and Individual Level Factors on Terrorist Decision Making

In criminology literature, researchers heavily emphasize the importance of environmental factors on delinquent acts. Generally, environmental factors are accepted as preconditions of crime. Similarly, without certain preconditions, such as economic, political, and social instability, terrorist organizations rarely find supporters for their activities. First, terrorist organizations use the existing instabilities in the community as an initial vehicle to exploit individuals' emotions along with their ideology. However, while criminologists explain preconditions of deviant behavior, they also stress the effects of biological and psychological factors in order to able to suggest plausible explanations why certain individuals turn to delinquent behavior but some others not under the same environmental conditions. Very similarly, counter-terrorism researchers also try to offer similar suggestions that individual level factors, such as low self esteem and low self efficacy, can be considered as precipitators in joining terrorist organizations.

For environmental factors, Shaw and McKay's [4] social disorganization and Hirshi's [5] social bonding theory can be thought as useful keys to elucidate preconditions of terrorism. According to Shaw and McKay's empirical studies, crime generally aggregates in inner cities and slum areas. These places were characterized by high ethnic, low economic status, and residential mobility [6]. By analyzing these findings and observation, Shaw and McKay [4] stressed that certain factors, such as high residential mobility and poverty weaken the informal social control of a society, and subsequently, failure of social institutions [e.g., schools, family, criminal justice system] cause criminal behavior. These observations are also valid for terrorism that

most of the people in Turkey joined various terrorist organizations from those similar places.

Parallel to social disorganization theory, “Hirschi states that delinquent behavior is “resulted from the absence of a strong social bond. According to Hirschi, an effective social bond consists of four elements: attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief” [6]. If individuals’ social bonds can not be supported by social institutions, such as family, school, and criminal justice system, weakened social bonds also weaken the conformity of the society and subsequently society loses its informal social control on individuals. To summarize, both theory stress that external factors, such as poverty and high mobility, deteriorate the social control, and individuals begin to lose their faith against the values and the norms of the society; thus, crime flourishes.

On the other hand, Durkheim [7] states that rapid changing in the community can cause abnormality because during this time, individuals/society can not adjust themselves spontaneously to their new lives. Durkheim explains this situation with the term of “anomie” which refers to a condition in which societal norms are absent, weak or in conflict. In other words, if societies change too rapidly, people lose their place and their bearings. They no longer know where they fit in this gigantic social web. They lose their faith in the institutions within society. In this respect, rapid changing can be also accepted as a precondition factor for terrorism because modernization produces disharmony in societies in terms of unbalanced economic growth and communication structures [8; 9; 10]. For instance, with rapid economic growth, many people migrate to urban areas in order to work in industrial sector. Since the city life requires higher standard for new comers, around the corner of cities, ghettos or slum houses are built up for basic requirements, such as housing. This rapid changing also brings certain vulnerabilities with itself. People, especially young generation, who get used the social life in their first place, try to find the same environment. However, the city life, particularly ghettos, rarely offers the same social interaction. Hence, people begin to become alienated in their new environment.

More specifically, sociologist William Ogburn explains the relationships between disharmony of society and crime with his “*cultural lag*” theory [9]. Ogburn developed his theory at the beginning of 1900s and conducted many empirical studies. According to Ogburn, “a cultural lag occurs when one of two parts of culture which are correlated changes before or in greater degree than the other part does, thereby causing less adjustment between the two parts that existed previously [11].” In his definition, Ogburn simply divides culture into two parts: (1) social institutions and (2) technology. At the core, Ogburn’s cultural lag’s components are very similar to Durkheim’s mechanical and organic solidarity distinction. Whereas Durkheim explain disharmony or anomie of society with the transaction of mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity, Ogburn states that disharmony happens when social institutions can not well adjust their values to the new technological developments. For instance, when people leave their first places [generally rural areas] for better job and better education, possible maladjustments between first place’s social institutions and urban life culture may produce cultural lag between two cultures. In this situation, people will be in strain and they will try to find their previous existed social institutions/ties because of the maladjustment.

In the light of these possible preconditions of terrorism, empirical studies suggest that terrorism is an “unconscious reaction to temporary strains” [12]. In addition to this, terrorism generally flourishes as a result of conflicts in society. It can be assumed that every type of rapid changing or cultural lag between social institutions and technology


can be result in a strain situation that increases possibility of unstable environment for terrorism. For instance, terrorism experiment of Turkey reveals that terrorism flourished during the time of rapid changing and high mobility from rural areas to urban areas [13; 10].

Taken together, similar preconditions or contextual level factors may cause social disorganization in the society, and social disorganization may weaken individuals' social bonds. Eventually, individuals may begin to lose their sense of belonging and alienate against their own community/values.

At the last step, the cycle of terrorism procedure can be more specifically narrowed by considering individuals' psychology under strain conditions. The psychology of individuals who are in such kind of situation can be explained with Abraham Maslow's "hierarchy of needs." Maslow draws attention to the needs of individuals. He posits that each need has important implications on individuals' behaviors and he ranks specific needs from low to high. According to Maslow, the most urgent two needs, at the bottom of his triangle, are physical and security needs. These needs are basically fundamental needs. Once physical and security needs are met, one's attention turns to social and ego needs. These needs are related to belonging to a group, interaction with friends, self esteem, self respect, and the other social and ego needs [14]. In other words, meeting only physical and security needs is inadequate for human beings. Certain additional needs, such as social and psychological needs are important for individuals. If these needs of people can not/inadequately be met, people will be in a strain situation. As noted above, criminologists try to figure out this first gap of individuals during their life course in order to figure out preconditions of deviant acts.

Similarly, empirical studies show that individuals who become terrorists are generally socially alienated, and they lack a sense of belonging to a group, self esteem, self respect, and so on. Joining a terrorist group gives them a sense of self importance. Beside this, for the new recruit, a terrorist organization becomes a substitute family, and the leader becomes a substitute parent. As Post pointed out joining in a terrorist group "represents the first real sense of belonging after a lifetime of rejection, and the terrorist group become the family they never had" [15]. In short, external events may weaken the collective consciousness [social control] of society and subsequently cause abnormality and anomie in the community.

Taken together this big picture of terrorism, it can be said that preconditions of terrorism prepare a fertile condition for terrorism, and specific precipitators, such as anger and hate, motivate certain individuals [especially young people] to join terrorist organizations. On the other hand, individual factors [generally accepted in literature as precipitator factors] offer plausible explanations why certain individuals join terrorist organizations and some other not under the same conditions. The below figure explains this cycle.




As can be seen, precondition factors are important for the first step. Terrorist organizations usually try to recruit their members from the similar places where the economic, politic, and social deprivation are at utmost degree. In those places, people are generally frustrated and hopeless for their future life. Hoffer noted that people who have not found their place in life, but still hope to find a better life, such as adolescent youth, unemployed college graduates, veterans, poor people, minorities, new immigrants, and other similar categories that dissatisfy with their positions, are open targets for being converted or lured by extremist groups [16]. Due to their positions in life, those people are restless, dissatisfied and haunted by the fear that their best years will be wasted before they reach their goal. In short, when terrorist organizations select their new members, they use existing social problems to lure dissatisfied people because vulnerable people are more likely to turn outward movements that offer explanations. At this point, terrorist organizations offer their ideologies and some credible explanations by imposing bright hopes for changing [17].

For precipitator factors, it is very hard to distinguish/measure the effect of personal characteristics of individuals, such as being suppressed, depressed, anger, and hate, on terrorist recruitment. Research suggests that those personal characteristics are important in joining a terrorist organization. However, it is also very difficult to make a distinction whether immediate situation cause those personal traits and consequently create a tendency towards the call of terrorist organizations. Nonetheless, research suggests that narcissistic personality is an important indicator among terrorists [15; 2].

2. The Role of Group/Organization on Terrorist Decision Making

Becoming terrorist is a gradual exposure towards extreme behavior [13]. One can not be ready to kill or to be killed in one day. Terrorist groups act as converting machines that estrange individuals from their previous personality and give them a new character, which is necessary for their survival. Generally, terrorist groups are seen in the scene between precondition and precipitator factors of terrorism process. They act as a precipitator factor that converts resentful/strained individuals into terrorists to protest unwanted situations in extreme manner.

Very similar to above terrorism process, Post et al. [3] summarize the above explanations by identifying four main conceptual categories to classify the reasons of terrorism: (1) External factors [i.e. historical, cultural], (2) key actors affecting the group [i.e. regime, opponents, supporters], (3) the group/organization [i.e. ideology of group, leadership style], and (4) characteristics of the immediate situation, such as triggering events. With the below figure, the authors posit that the group factors are as the centre of those four conceptual categories because political violence or terrorism is usually a product of group process and structures.



Post et al. (2002) "the radical group/organizations risk for terrorism in context."

As can be seen, the other three factors play as an initial role in joining terrorist organizations, but somehow, group process has a key role to turn individuals' face to terrorism. Post et al. [3] stress three important phenomena regarding group process: (1) Psychological progression toward terrorism, (2) group characteristics and process, and (3) behavioral progression toward terrorism.

Empirical studies suggest that becoming a terrorist can not be explained without considering terrorist groups' impacts. In other words, very rare people who encounter strained environmental factors can be terrorists by their own will. Fruitful data reveal that "for the individuals who become active terrorists, the initial attraction is often made by a friend or group, rather than an abstract ideology or to violence" [19]. For instance, a survey showed that 71 percent of PKK members joined the PKK unlike their individual decision [20]. Parallel to the PKK findings, Della Porta [21] points out that among Italian extremists, the decision of joining a terrorist organization was rarely given individually. Outside attractions, such as social relationships and personal connections, have crucial role in joining a terrorist group [15]. Therefore, it can be safely assumed that an existed group is a crucial component of terrorist acts. This explanation, however, has also limit with itself because it disregards the point that how a terrorist organization first emerges in a society.

Terrorist organizations can be considered as informal groups that are generally spontaneously created by the nature of human needs [22]. At this point, the form of

human needs is highly important because it determines the characteristics of the group. If a group consists of heavily strained people as a result of political oppression, the characteristics of that group most probably will be radical or as oppressive as the opposite-political group in order to carry out its organizational goals. It is the physical rule that the power of reaction is based on the power of an action or a reaction occurs parallel to an action's power. Therefore, this mutual oppressiveness will create a radical situation inside the group or terrorist organization that day by day, members of terrorist organization gradually will turn to violence.

This point is important because it emphasizes how a terrorist organization first emerges in a society and acts based on external factors. Subsequently, it also stresses that how oppressive external factors affect the characteristics of terrorist organizations. These two approaches or process can be explained with Bandura's self efficacy term and Irving L. Janis's groupthink theory. It seems first process is directly related to external factors and the other is related to groupthink process. Indeed, Janos's groupthink theory tries to explain both process, however, it leaves some points of group process blur by inadequately explaining the relationship of external events and self efficacy. The reason for this unclearness is that Janis did not develop his theory to explain terrorist groups. He mainly mentioned about fiasco decisions of politicians regarding failure events.

Irving Janis' groupthink theory is worthy in terms of explaining terrorist organizations groupthink process because he briefly summarizes the influence of organization on individuals in his study [23]. Groupthink theory tries to explain how independent critical thinking of an individual melts down as a result of groupthink process. Janis divides groupthink process into separate components in order to elucidate the impact of external events on individuals and in turn groupthink process. Although Janis did not develop his theory to explain the groupthink process of terrorist organizations, his explanations highly related group dynamics and group process of terrorist organizations. When a reader follows his theory, he/she can have a judgment that why an individual becomes a terrorist and how that individual can see irrational terrorism events as rational ones. In addition to this, Janis theory reveals that how groupthink process create such an environment that group members can easily justify their inhumane activities. On the other hand, Bandura's self efficacy term is important because it offers plausible explanations to Janis's groupthink theory during the process of the creation of group cohesion.


This section of the study will introduce Janis's groupthink model in order to reveal the close relationship between groupthink model and the process of group dynamics of terrorist organizations.

3. Janis's Groupthink Model

Janis used the term of *groupthink* to emphasize a way of thinking that when people deeply engage in a cohesive group, they lose their mental efficiency and the ability of critical thinking as a result of group pressure [24]. This approach simply presumes that the severity of external events, such as economic, political, cultural, and historical, is highly effective in determining the characteristics of the group. As noted earlier, more strain situations create such an environment that people who expose that sort of situation will feel high pressure on them and they will strictly need to cohere with each other to overcome that strain situation. Now, it is time to mention about 'self efficacy'

term that under the severe strain situations people feel low self efficacy and they want to unify their low-self efficacy around a group in order to able to get rid of their low self efficacy by the help of collective self efficacy. Before deeply engage in self efficacy term, first Janis's groupthink model will be briefly summarized.

Janis's groupthink model can be illustrated with five steps.



“Organizational behavior and human decision process”[25]

As can be seen, the first/central antecedent of groupthink model is ‘group cohesion’ [26]. The need for group cohesion is a first step for creation/emerging a group, however, group cohesion is not sufficient to explain groupthink. Since group cohesion is a common feature of all groups before creating an informal group, ‘group cohesion’ alone can not explain groupthink, which emphasizes lack of critical thinking among the members of any oppressive group. For this reason, Janis added ‘provocative situational context’ into his model in order to elucidate the impacts of provocative/oppressive external events to group cohesion and groupthink process. As inferred from the above sentence, ‘provocative situational context’ has two antecedants, external and internal threats that usually stimulates people for group cohesiveness, as noted earlier. In this respect, it can be said that the main indicator of groupthink is provocative situational context. External threats, such as economic, cultural, historical and political, may arouse certain feelings on people for group cohesiveness and consequently this pressure may lead to groupthink. In addition to provocative situational context, the level of group cohesiveness is determinate by external events. The worse external situation, the more cohesive and violence group is. In other words, there is a direct relation between external events and group cohesiveness. For instance, in Turkey, most terrorist organizations flourished during 1970s because those years had been surrounded with poor economic conditions and stressful political debates [27]. The reflection of this provocative situational context to society resulted with the

foundation of more than 100 terrorist organizations in Turkey within 6 years [1974-1980]. This remarkable example shows the importance of provocative situational context on group cohesiveness or concurrence seeking among people.

While Janis explains the degree of group cohesiveness with macro/contextual level factors [provocative situational context], he also mentions about 'low self esteem' as a component of provocative situational context in order to able to explain psychological process of people under the provocative situational context. According to Janis 1982, people can feel low self esteem from recent failure [24], and they can see the external events responsible for this crash. Therefore, in order to overcome this situation, they try to seek same kind of people for group cohesion. Janis, however, only mentions about the name of 'low self esteem' but rarely explains its functions on group cohesion or concurrence seeking. For this reason, Bandura's self efficacy term is very important to see the causal relationship between provocative situational context [external threats] and group cohesion as a result of internal threats such as low self esteem.

At this point, Whyte's study is remarkable because he extended Janis's theory by adding Bandura's 'self efficacy' term [25]. Bandura [28] explains self efficacy as "people's judgments of their capabilities to organize and execute courses of action required to attain designated types of performances. It is concerned not with the skills one has but with the judgments of what one can do with whatever skills possesses." [21]

Indeed, Bandura divides 'self efficacy' into two terms: (1) efficacy expectations and (2) outcome expectations. "An efficacy expectation is a belief that one can successfully perform a particular action. It is a judgment of one's personal efficacy. It is simply one's belief or judgment about performing a job. On the other hand, "an outcome expectation is an estimate that a given action will lead to a certain outcome" [29]. This distinction is important because the first one is a belief one's capability, but the second one is a belief one's environment [30]. Thus, if one believes that his failure and subsequently his low self efficacy stems from social system that surrounds him, he may strongly feel to change his immediate environment. In addition to this narrow picture, if this feeling is a common emotion among all people in a particular area, those people most probably will gather under certain groups to overcome their low self efficacy. Rethinking the above paragraph that if certain people tend to believe and blame that their failure stems from external factors, group cohesion will spontaneously be product of this belief.


Up to this point, it seems this process is a normal one in terms of emerging an informal group in a given society. However, the shape of group cohesiveness is determinate by provocative situational context. As noted above, the worse external situation, the more cohesive and violence group is. In other words, there is a direct relation between provocative situational context and group cohesiveness. This explanation seems plausible because when examining terrorist organizations with their contexts in the world, the most distinguishable denominator of terrorist organizations is the existence of provocative situational contexts, such as economic and political instabilities. For this reason, provocative situational context is a necessary element of terrorists groups.

For the last example, Hoffer observed nearly all mass movements in the world in his time and wrote a book named *True Believer*, 1951. He briefly explained the historical-social movements and asked a question why people joined mass movements. Although he never directly mentioned narcissism/low self efficacy in his book, explained the causes of mass movements with the term of narcissism and low self

efficacy[16]. He first described the changing situation in the society, then, built up his approach on this base. For instance, according to Hoffer, before the rising of Nazism and Communism in Germany and Russia, people were feeling that their lives were spoiled and wasted. At this point, charismatic leaders exploited the emotional neediness of vulnerable people. He also expressed that under frustrated circumstances, people are more willingly to see a strong and charismatic leader to recover their self-worth and self esteem/self efficacy. This approach suggests that these types of people are ready for movements which offer them a better explanation for their future life. It seems Hoffer’s observations offer an integrated approach for the psychological theories of terrorism. This approach weighs both situational factors and people characteristics and tries to explain the reasons of mass movements and indirectly the reasons of terrorism.

4. Structural Organizational Faults

Figure 1: Antecedents of Groupthink in Janis’s Theory



Groupthink in the Sandpile: A formal theory of failure in small group decision making.[31]

The above figure illustrates the relationships of antecedents of groupthink. The last component of antecedents of groupthink is “structural aspects of group.” This point is crucial because generally almost all terrorist organizations have these similar ‘structural organizational faults.’

The first structural fault of terrorist organizations is isolation. As everyone knows, terrorist organizations are underground groups and they have intently isolated structures. Terrorist organizations do this process intently because they don't want to interact with the real world. Since interaction with real world entails fruitful minds inside organizations, terrorist groups never want this kind of situation. They strictly prefer single voice and single mind and they are intolerable against different notions inside the groups. For this reason, isolation is the first nature of terrorist organizations. For instance, when a new recruit first steps into a cohesive group, the organization tries to isolate the new recruit from his outside by eliminating all preexisting bridges between him and community. The secret and hidden aspect of the group becomes only resource and reference for the new recruit. Day by day, with the features of the group, he loses his own identity and becomes like a robot in the hand of the group [32]. Hudson states the same notion and implies that extremist groups are similar to religious cults. They require total commitment by members and impose conformity [2]. They prohibit relationships with outsiders. The collective group identity gives a new personality to their members, and this group identity becomes of paramount importance. Subsequently, individual judgment and behavior are strongly influenced by the powerful forces of group dynamics. As a result, the terrorist group becomes the only source of information and security. This situation produces pressure to conform and to commit acts of terrorism. Especially peer pressure, group solidarity, and the psychology of group dynamics help to pressure an individual member to remain in the terrorist group. Terrorist organizations manage this process by isolating themselves from the real world.

The second fault of terrorist organizations is ideology. Ideology is an essential part of terrorism and has an important appeal on new recruits. Ideology speaks to people who feel a lack of self worthiness, meaning, and hope. Those people can be easily drawn into ideologies by promising them to change their social reality and to give them a meaningful role in the society.

Ideology is necessary element for adhering new recruit to organization during the isolation process. As stated above, terrorist organizations require total obedience from their members and strictly prohibit relationships with outsiders, so they can separate and isolate their members from other social groups by building up a barrier between the real world and them with their particular ideology. In addition to this, terrorist organizations try to impose new recruits their ideology and offer that ideology as an absolute remedy for existing problems. Once a person steps into a terrorist organization, the unquestionable ideology of a terrorist organization becomes like a holy book for him/her. Answers are ready for every possible question in extremist groups' ideology. This approach, in turn, dominates single type of mind inside terrorist organizations.

The third part of structural organizational faults is homogeneity of members. Extremist groups select their adherents from the same type of humanity and appeal to the same types of mind [16]. This monotone and single mind prevent to flourish fruitful minds, which subsequently kill the richness and openness of people's minds. Single mind or reading single source of information generally makes individuals prejudice and prejudicism makes people fanatic and fanaticism generally leads to violence because individuals who limit their mind with single source of information are more likely to see the word just in black and white. Therefore, this strict line gives to fanatic individuals a kind of justification mechanism for their atrocious activities [15].

The last two parts of organizational structural faults are the lack of impartial leadership and the lack of norms requiring methodological procedures. These two features lead to arbitrary implications inside the group. Leadership in organizations is very broad concept, however, it can be briefly said that the existence of impartial leadership in an organization also bias group members through his/her prejudicism. In addition to this, the lack of norms and methodological procedures inside organizations provide a big room for impartial leaders for their arbitrary decisions.

5. The Symptoms of Groupthink and Concluding Remarks

As Post et al. [3] pointed out the structure of a group helps us to understand its members' possible violence act. For instance, if majority group members suffer from low self esteem or if they are hopeless for their future life, those people's groups are more likely to be an intolerable group against their outside. One step back of this explanation suggests the importance of provocative situational context. Generally, external or environmental factors, such as economic, political and cultural, dictate how terrorist organizations' structure will be. For instance, oppressive situation creates an oppressive situation inside a terrorist organization, in turn. Since the characteristics of a terrorist organization are usually determined by external events, researchers may assume whether an organization will turn to violence or not by looking at the level of provocative situational context.

This argument suggests that provocative situational context is a first vehicle for terrorism; however, the impact of group dynamics has more implications than external factors. Since psychological progression toward terrorism occurs inside the organization, groupthink process may moderate the importance of provocative situational context. According to Janis, placing in a cohesive/oppressive group affects the attitudes of individuals with particular features. For instance, a group gives its members the emotion of *invulnerability*, which ensures them some degree of encouragement for obvious risks or dangers. Additionally, groupthink helps to *rationalize* the wrong doing and gives a *morality* to its members to justify their selves. As noted earlier, *stereotyping* is one of the most dangerous characteristics of groupthink. In this step of group socialization, members of the group dehumanize their enemies and justify themselves to kill the others in their mind. In addition, group *pressure*, *self-censorship*, *unanimity*, and *mindguards* provide group solidarity inside the organization [23].

For the final words, groupthink process of terrorist organizations suggests researchers to explore more inside the terrorist organization. It seems it is impossible to ameliorate all provocative situational contexts around the world. Beside this, if the methods of terrorist organizations can be decoded and anti-methods can be developed, it is expected that terrorist organizations' activities will be limited with a restricted area. The terrorism experiment of Turkey suggests that struggling with terrorist organizations with their own methods is the best way to prevent future activities of terrorist organizations.

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Terrorism in the post-September 11 Era: Continuities and Changes

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Abstract. The nature of terrorism has changed due to globalization, weakness of the Arab region and American military presence in that region. On the other hand, the terrorist methods have also changed. Nowadays terrorists for instance use information technology to fund their operations and speed up their mobility. Thus, it is important to consider terrorism as a by-product of historical shifts in international relations. The effects of terrorism include initiating the clash of civilizations and increasing doubts about the democratic and liberal principles of liberty, tolerance individual rights and free dams. In addition to the military approach, there is a democratic response to terrorism. The democratic response considers terrorist attacks as a crime against humanity, calls for multi lateral global fight against terrorism, and promotes cosmopolitanism as the basis of global fight against terrorism. In conclusion, a democratic cosmopolitan approach allows us to develop tough measures against terrorism.

Keywords. September 11, war on terrorism, understanding terrorism, globalization.

Introduction

As accepted in the academic and public studies and debates on terrorism, the history of terrorism is a long and diverse history. There has always been terrorist attempts throughout history, but yet the systematic study of terrorism is of much more recent origin. It would not be wrong to suggest that it was only in the early 1970's that the scholarly interest in terrorism began, mainly because of the increasing use and activities of terrorism in that time. As a matter of fact, as some have suggested, it was mainly in the post-Cold War era that a real interest in terrorism has occurred in academic and public discourse, and this interest has lastly and widely increased after the inhumane September 11 attack, where terrorists hit the World Trade Center and Pentagon and as a result killed around 3000 civilian and innocent people.

Since 9/11, the discourse of "global war on terrorism" has had a significant transformative power in our understanding of international relations, and thus it has become impossible to study or debate world politics without reference to terrorism. 9/11 and its war-based aftermath has altered the terms of discourse in international relations, and placed terrorism as one of the crucial areas of world politics. Today, we are referring to such concepts as "the clash of civilization", "the abuse of evil", "fundamentalist world" and "after terror" in discussing the present nature of global affairs" [1]. Hence, it is no longer possible to neglect or underestimate the importance of the concept of terrorism in any discussion of globalization, global affairs, world politics or international relations theory.

1. A Methodological Approach to Terrorism

However, although the aim and direction of research on terrorism have changed over time, the term terrorism has remained contentious and essentially contested, and this controversial characteristic of the subject has to do with its definition. Over the years, as Gordon McCormick argues, “the world itself has become a term of rhetoric. When used in this capacity, its purpose is not to define but to defame”. Yet, if we map the recent literature on terrorism, we may discern a number of common points, shared by observers and scholars despite their different methodological approaches to terrorism, whether rational choice, organizational, cultural or economic [2]. These points can be listed as follows [3]:

- (i) Terrorism is a “social construction”. Contrary to the impression fostered by official incidence counts and media reports, as Austin Turk suggests in his work of “Sociology of Terrorism”, “terrorism is not a given in the real world but is instead an interpretation of events and their presumed causes [4]. And these interpretations are not unbiased attempts to depict truth but rather conscious efforts to manipulate perceptions to promote certain interests at the expense of others”. We could see that both in “state-terrorism” and “group of factional terrorism”, where to label the other either as a “terrorists” or as an “enemy” to be eliminated or destroyed, it is necessary first to socially and discursively construct the reality accordingly. For example, the famous dictum in the study of terrorism, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” illustrates this point. Another illustrative example is Al Qaeda interpretation of Western modernity and America as the source of the underdevelopment and poverty in the Islamic world. Representing Western modernity in general, and America in particular, as the main source of the existing problems in the Islamic world is a social construction of the reality through interpretation.
- (ii) That terrorism is a social construction goes hand in hand with the fact that terrorism is not a philosophy but a “method” which can be used for and infinite variety of goals. Unlike other “ism”s, terrorism comes into existence as it is put into practice as a means to achieve an “end”.
- (iii) Because it is a method, as Bruce Hoffman suggests, terrorism is also inherently political, in that it is a calculated process of pursuit of power, acquisition of power and using power to achieve political change. In this sense, we can approach terrorism as a method based on the systematic use of coercive intimidation, usually to service political ends. It is used to create and exploit a climate of fear among a wider target group than the immediate victims of the violence.
- (iv) In this sense, we could suggest that the aim of terrorist act is “very much larger than the physical destruction it causes”. The best example of this is the audacious September 11 attack, which killed around 3000 civilians but its effect was much beyond the killing, in that it has created a big rapture in the international atlas and started the act of “global war on terrorism”. Also the Istanbul, Madrid and London explosions, which resulted in the lastly increasing

Islamophobia in Europe, as well as the strongly voiced backlash of multiculturalism.

- (v) Terrorism employs violence used and directed in pursuit of or in service of a political aim. But more importantly, the violence that terrorism initiates is always against the innocent. Even if terrorism is employed different actors with different ideologies and political aims, the common future is that as a result of the terrorist act innocent civilians, sometimes foreigners who know nothing of the terrorists' political quarrel are killed or injured.

Having outlined common and shared points in academia and public discourse on what terrorism entails, we could suggest that terrorism is a systematic use of coercive intimidation and violence, directed mainly to civilians in service to political ends. Like conventional warfare, guerilla warfare and sabotage, it is a form of armed struggle in which its exercise of violence on civilians aims to get something much beyond the killings and physical destruction it causes.

2. How to Understand Terrorism?

On the basis of the above-methodological understanding of terrorism, we could proceed by looking at the basis of terrorism in terms of its sources and operation. In his very important and enlightening book, *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*, Paul Wilkonson suggests that "It is grossly misleading to treat terrorism as a synonym for insurgency, guerilla warfare or political violence in general". Wilkonson goes on to suggest that "There are two key factors which help to explain the ubiquity and strength of the ethno nationalism which underlies so many modern campaigns of insurgency" [5].

- (i) First, despite the Marxist preoccupation with socioeconomic class as the prime referent for the analysis of social conflict, it is ethnic identity which has provided a more durable and powerful influence on human behavior. Even in the era of globalization, ethnic distinctiveness remains as important as it was in the heyday of European national self-determination movements
- (ii) Second, there remains a colossal mismatch between the international state system, with its legally recognized sovereign governments and frontiers, and the demographic map of distinctive ethnic groups or national identities. This has been compounded by the fact that the borders of over two-thirds of the member states of the UN were drawn quite arbitrarily by the diplomats of the major powers on the 19th and early 20th centuries without any respect for maintaining ethnic or tribal homogeneity. This has given rise to bitter interstate conflicts in which ethno nationalist movements demand self-determination [India, Nigeria, Congo, Middle East]

Terrorism is one of the forms of armed struggle used by contemporary insurgents

- (i) Conventional warfare
- (ii) Guerilla warfare
- (iii) Terrorism
- (iv) Sabotage".

This understanding of terrorism, provided by Wilkinson, helps us see not only the main sources of terrorism and its *modus vivendi*. It also leads us to come up with a more adequate definition of terrorism: again quoting from Wilkinson, "Terrorism is the systematic use of coercive intimidation, usually to service political ends. It is used to create and exploit a climate of fear among a wider target group than the immediate victims of the violence, and to publicize a cause, as well as to coerce a target to acceding to the terrorists' aim. Terrorism may be used on its own or as a part of a wider unconventional war. Even if it is employed by different actors, the common feature is that innocent civilians, sometimes foreigners who know nothing of the terrorists' political quarrel, are killed or injured"[6].

3. Globalization of Terrorism

However, what Wilkinson's very useful and adequate definition of terrorism does not entail is the reference to the changing nature of "historical/world context" in which terrorism operates. This historical/world context is the increasingly globalizing nature of world politics and international relations. Indeed, today we are living in a highly globalizing world, generating important impacts on our inter- and intra- national relations. As globalization functions as the widening, deepening and speeding-up of interconnectedness between states, economics, cultures and individuals, it also functions as an emerging historical/world context. And it is within this context that terrorism has altered its *modus vivendi* and *modus apprande*, going beyond its international character, and thus becoming more and more global. Today, when we talk about terrorism, we are speaking of not only international terrorism but also global terrorism. Indeed, today we are witnessing a process of "globalization of terrorism". More concretely, it should be underlined that in recent years, especially since 9/11, we have been witnessing the changing tactics and method of terrorism. As Audrey Kurth Cronin suggests,

"1- the evolving changes of globalization;
2- the inherent weakness of Arab region;
3- the American military presence in that region; and
4- the inadequate American response to globalization and problems of the Arab region"[7].

These factors together, have constituted a platform for this changing nature of terrorism and its increasing power and threat to the world.

Moreover, since 1990's, but more importantly since 9/11, again with reference to Cronin, we have seen;

- "1- an increase in the incidence of religiously motivated attacks;
- 2- an increase in the lethality per attack; and
- 3- the growing targets of America and its alliances.

In these changes, we have also seen important changes in terrorist methods, embedded in globalization. Through globalization:

- 1-the use of information technologies such as internet, mobile phones
 - 2- these organizations have broadened their reach in gathering financial resources to fund their operations;
 - 3-the organizations have widened, deepened and speed up their mobility
- More over, in terms of ends,

1-terrorist organization is increasingly inclined to lash out against US-led globalization;

2-they voice a strong opposition to the US military presence in the region;

3-they also voice a strong opposition to the xenophobic and exclusionary policies and attitudes against Islam and Muslim identity” [8].

On the basis of these changes, we could suggest that it is important to see terrorism as a by-product of broader historical shifts in international relations, more concretely in the global distribution of power in all of its forms – political, economic, military, ideological and cultural. With globalization, in other words, with the increasing widening, deepening and speeding-up of interconnectedness between states, economies, cultural flows and human nobilities, terrorism begins to alter its tactics, its operational capacities and its discourse. Interestingly, what characterize and define the forms of power that give meaning to the Western-led globalization becomes the technology and discourse that terrorism use in initiating its activities.

4. 9/11 World and the Consequences of Globalized Terrorism

There is a consensus within the debates on terrorism that the aim of terrorist acts is “very much larger than the direct physical destruction” they cause [9]. Both the audacious September/11 attack that killed around 3000 civilian and innocent people, and the series of bombs exploded in İstanbul, Madrid and London, killing more than 300 innocent civilians and carried out by the Islamist militants with links to al Qaeda, illustrates this point very clearly. They do so, insofar as the effect they have generated in the world in which we live have gone much beyond the physical destruction they have caused. Their effect can be said to have gone much beyond even their political aim, voiced by Osama bin Laden, the leader of the al Qaeda network, at creating a “clash of fundamentalisms” in world politics “in the name of the Islamic Cihad against the infidel American imperialism” in particular and the Western modernity in general.

Since the US president George Bush defined September/11 as a “war on homeland” and responded to it by declaring unilaterally a global war on terrorism, we have seen the emergence of a number of radical developments, changes and crises in world affairs that today it has become possible to characterize the “present” as the post-September/11 era [10]. The unilateral declaration of the US-led global war on terrorism, aiming at revitalizing the state-centric international politics, based on the normative and strategic primacy of security issues over global-wide social justice problems, has concenterized itself not only as war, occupation, the regime change through coercion, as well as the rapid increase in terrorist activities in a large spectrum throughout the world from suicide-bombers to deadly bomb-explosions. Such unilateralism has also unearthed the concealed problems of the key international institutions, such as the UN and the NATO, created a split in the process of European integration, and divided the world into those who are the friends of the US and those who are against the war on terrorism. Thus, in the name of a global war on terrorism, the state-centric reordering of world affairs has operated not only by establishing a linear causality between fight against terrorism and war, but also by codifying cultural difference and the Other as a direct or indirect threat to security. In this sense, both the gruesome terrorist attack on September/11 and the state-centric response to it have created a radical change in international relations, in which we are forced to choose

between security and liberty, between hegemony and autonomy, between community and individuality, and between state-centric nationalism and democratic cosmopolitanism.

A similar development and risk has occurred in Europe, as a result of the terrorist attacks of the Islamic militants with links to al Qaeda in Istanbul, Madrid and London. These terrorist attacks in Europe have created a serious doubts in the minds of state elite, political actors and people about the role of multiculturalism in creating the possibility of co-existence of different cultural identities in a given national social formation, and the adaptability of Islamic identity to democratic, secular and plural modern life. Not only the terrorist attacks carried out by Islamic militants, but also the brutal slaying of Theo Van Gogh [a controversial Dutch filmmaker whose ideas were viewed by Islamic groups as anti-Islam] in the Netherlands by an Islamic extremist have caused furor and anger that have paved the way to the re-examination of multiculturalism and tolerance towards the Other, more particularly the Islamic other. Today, in Europe, the effect of terrorism is felt more about the rapidly increasing doubts about the democratic and liberal principles of liberty, tolerance, individual rights and freedoms, and the co-existence of different ethnic, religious and cultural communities. In Amsterdam, “the city of deliberate decadence, an unruly mix of Enlightenment ideals and base pleasures”, the emergence of Islamic extremism today is forcing the Dutch to ask [may be a wrong-formulated] question; should we tolerate those who do not tolerate us? [11]. Of course, this question, now being asked in different parts of Europe, is being posed in an historical context in which countries have already had their own “September/11, or are in danger of having it in near future. And, in this sense, we could suggest that, in addition to the war and occupation-based attempts to initiate the clash of civilizations throughout the world, the effect of the audacious September/11 terrorism has also been the question of Islam and the crisis of multiculturalism in Europe.

5. An Effective Response to Terrorism

However, it can be said that there is another response to terrorism, a democratic response which:

[a] approaches terrorist attacks as a “crime against humanity”;

[b] defines September/11 as a terrorist attack not only on America but on humanity as a whole;

[c] calls for a multilateral and multidimensional global fight against terrorism, which pays equal attention to security and legitimacy; and

[d] promotes and puts into practice cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism as the philosophical and political basis for our global fight against terrorism [12].

A democratic response to terrorism should be constructed on the basis not only of a theoretical framework capable of analyzing critically the present nature of world affairs but also, and more importantly, of altering it in such a way that democratic global governance could be made possible. In this sense, a viable democratic response to September/11 both globally and in Europe should not bash or get rid of multiculturalism. Instead, it should attempt to reconstruct the existing and problematic nature of cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism in such a way that not only does it provide a powerful critical analysis of the present nature of world affairs, but also promotes a democratic global governance which approaches “international and

domestic security”, “sustainable economic development” and “democratization” as intertwined processes or problem-areas. We could call this type of cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism a “democratic cosmopolitanism”.

Democratic cosmopolitanism links security and democracy by making the following propositions:

- (i) Democratic cosmopolitanism should recognize that the world in which we live is increasingly marked by the idea of “world risk society”, in which global terrorism is in fact a real danger to humanity both in terms of the physical destruction it causes and with respect to the impacts and effects it generates in inter and intra-national relations. World risk society is a social formation, where the relationship between the self and the other, the self and the nature and the self and his/herself is characterized by ambiguity, ontological insecurity and fear that created a dilemma between security and liberty, between community and individuality, and between essentialism and cosmopolitanism, between nationalism and multiculturalism. Democratic cosmopolitanism aims to challenge this dilemma by approaching security and liberty, community and individuality and responsibilities and rights not as a set of oppositions, but rather as *relation and intertwined* normative principles and social facts. This way, democratic cosmopolitanism accepts the basic parameters of world risk society, but at the same time urges its democratic governance which sees the relationship between the self and the other as a co-existence rather than a clash of differences, and in doing so pays equal attention to security and democracy in its fight against global terrorism;
- (ii) thus, democratic cosmopolitanism with its *modus vivendi*, democratic global governance, provides a strong alternative to the unilateral operation of American hegemony, and in doing so promotes [a] the principle of multilateralism that will frame the functioning of international organizations, nation-states and global civil society, [b] the idea of politics as democratic and participatory deliberation that will resist its Carl Smithian articulation as a friend-foe opposition, and [c] tolerance, dialogue and coexistence that will confront the discourse of “clash of civilizations”. On the basis of these principles, democratic cosmopolitanism constitutes the philosophical and normative foundation of the multipolar world vision supported by the agencies of trilateralism, namely those of international regimes, regional organizations and global civil society;
- (iii) the multipolar world vision, as the democratic global governance of the post-September/11 era, requires a critical analysis of neo-liberal globalization and its free-trade ideology. In this sense, democratic cosmopolitanism, while attempting to construct a democratic alternative to the unilateral operation of American hegemony, also functions as a transformative discourse of globalization which takes as its starting-point the problem of global justice. Thus, it aims at altering the existing neo-liberal globalization by suggesting that the problems of inequality, poverty, recognition and participation, embedded in the domain of social justice, constitute global problems that require global solutions. Hence, democratic cosmopolitanism locates global social justice at the center of globalization debate, and, as opposed to unilateralism, attempts to link

- security problems with those of sustainable economic development and democratization; and
- (iv) in doing so, democratic cosmopolitanism pays attention to global civil society and global civil resistance to neo-liberal globalization, and promotes the bottom-up rather than the top-down direction of globalization. This way, it has the potential to transform the “anti-globalization” discourse, voiced within global civil society, into the “alter-globalization discourse” that forces the important and powerful actors of the multipolar world vision, namely those of [the universal and the regional] international organizations and the nation-states, to produce effective and long-term solutions to the problems of global social injustice.

On the basis of these four functions, democratic cosmopolitanism not only explains the existing structure and dynamics of inter and intra-national relations in the post-September/11 era, but also can give a democratic direction to it. That direction has not been taken by the Bush administration and its neo-conservative ideology in its response to September/11, and as a result the effect of terrorism has gone very much beyond its direct physical destruction. Instead, while capturing increasingly globalizing and also lethal characteristics of terrorism of today, we should develop democratic rule of law-based strategies against terrorism, which I have called “democratic cosmopolitanism”. By doing so, we become able to create an effective and multilateral fight against terrorism.

Conclusion

A democratic cosmopolitan approach, operating on the basis of democratic norms/procedures and the framework of the rule of law principle, also allows us to develop and initiate a strict and tough measures and responses to terrorism in a time when we are confronted by it. These principles are listed by Wilkonson as follows:

“1 no surrender to the terrorist;

2 no deals and no concessions, even in the face of the most severe intimidation and blackmail;

3 an intensified effort to bring terrorists to justice by prosecution and conviction before courts of law;

4 tough measures to penalize the state sponsors who give terrorists movements safe haven, explosives, cash, and moral and diplomatic support; and

5 a determination never to allow terrorist intimidation to block or derail international diplomatic efforts to resolve major conflicts in strife-torn regions, such as the Middle East: in many such cases terrorism has become a major threat to peace and stability, and its suppression therefore is in the common interests of international society” [13].

Democratic cosmopolitanism, involving an absolute determination to defeat terrorism both within the framework of the rule of law and democratic norms/procedures, and by initiating the above-listed tough measures, seem to be the only chance we have to be successful in our “global war on terrorism”.

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Characteristics of Global Terrorism

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Abstract. Global terrorism has become a major threat in the 21st century, thereby becoming the most prominent issue on the agenda of international relations. This study discusses the characteristics of global terrorism and the potential causes; why terror has become an international in the modern world. Although there are numerous sources about terrorism itself or international terrorism, few of them put sufficient arguments about the transformation process of terrorism from domestic level to the to the global level. First, what international terrorism initially reminds us is argued by making some comparisons between domestic and international terrorism. Then, briefly, the definition and its dilemma is noted. Subsequently, the historical perspective and the prevailing causes of internationalization or terror are examined more substantially. And the article ends with some concluding remarks relating the whole argument.

Keywords. Global terrorism, international terrorism, characteristics, injustice, globalization, inequality, foreign policy.

Introduction

International terrorism forms a distinctive example of asymmetrical warfare. Although asymmetrical warfare is an old practice, it has become an effective method of international terrorism in the modern time. It establishes its networks indistinctly and conducts operations linearly. Committing unexpected even unpredicted political violence, international terrorism may sometimes, render traditional counterterrorism policies exhausted.

In some way, international terrorism is a matter of choice from cost benefit perspective which means it is more profitable with low cost compared to domestic terrorism. Domestic terrorism is risky and costly for terrorist groups because it is usually responded by states severely. Further, domestic terrorism may not attract substantial worldwide attention, since it is usually perceived as local issue by the outside world. On the other hand, under today's immediate media coverage, politically motivated crimes against international symbols have become more effective in achieving worldwide publicity. Terrorist groups achieve great propaganda advantages from low-cost international terrorist operations. Therefore, particularly the revolutionary movements have carried their violent activities to the international arena.

Furthermore, there is a close relationship between international terrorism and global politics. As an extremist form of political violence, occurring frequently and publicly, and international terrorism is denounced by some countries while it is perceived as legitimate by other countries in the world. Therefore, despite the existing United Nations' resolution defining terrorism, still, there is no international

compromise on terrorism definition. Due to same dilemma, countries are not combating terrorism in the same way, even though they all agree that terrorism can not be accepted.

1. Definitional Dilemma

There is no internationally accepted common definition of international terrorism. Numerous definitions, existing all over the world, reflect either theoretical approaches to the issue or political interpretations of terrorist incidents. This definitional dilemma is reflected in the continuing inability of United Nations in reaching a consensus on the definition of international terrorism. Nevertheless, by integrating various elements of previous works, more simple but functional definition of international terrorism can be made as: *“The repeated use of politically motivated violence with coercive intent, by non-state actors, that affects more than one state.”* As it is identified in this definition, the distinctive elements of international terrorism are: *“Repetition, motivation, intent, actors, and effect”* [1].

There are two main contexts which provide a frame for identifying international terrorism. The first one is the *“spillover effect”*; refers to politically motivated violence which occurs domestically but causes international impacts, thus enabling the revolutionary fights spill over national borders into the international arena. The second one refers to *“interaction”* between international terrorist networks and their trans-border joint operations when their interests overlap each other [2]. International terrorism differs from domestic terrorism in both quality and effect. In domestic terrorism, targets have symbolic importance and its impacts primarily stay at domestic level, whereas in international terrorism, targets have international significance and its impacts echoes over traditional state borders.

2. Historical Patterns of International Terrorism

Modern time international terrorism has commonly associated with Middle East violence. Middle East violence is also a typical indicator of the controversial approaches to the definition of terrorism. Because; Israeli side accepts Palestinian militants as terrorists, committing airliner hijackings, suicide bombings etc, whereas Palestinian side constantly accuses Israeli state of committing state terrorism by killing innocent people, destructing houses, and assassinating their leaders. Middle East violence itself is significant in reflecting how the consensus on defining terrorism is challenging but also important in terms addressing terror incidents appropriately.

In the 1940s, Zionist groups inflicted terrorist violence in order to accomplish their Jewish state in Palestine. Over the time, Israeli Sate was successfully established in 1948. It also gained a strong control over the region by winning the 1967 Six Day War against the Arabic countries in the region [3]. Following those incidents, Palestinian nationalist groups such as Palestinian Liberation Organization, Hamas, Al-Fatah started trans-border violence. They conducted high-profile operations in order to draw the attention of international community to their cause. From their perspective; they were fighting for the freedom of their nation therefore they didn't worry about international condemnation of their violent activities. They justified their operations as legitimate because their enemy was incomparably powerful and there was no way out

from that desperate situation except conducting trans-border operations [2]. Further, Palestinian people's desire for negotiations and peaceful settlement was consistently confronted by Israeli forces oppressively. Thus, the situation deteriorated and led Palestinian militants to apply new resistance operations on international scale [4].

In this manner, airliner hijackings are significant in internalization of terrorism. Hijackings first started by the militants of Palestinian Liberation Organization who had been exiled to foreign countries by Israel. On July 22, 1968, three armed Palestinian armed militants, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, hijacked the Israeli national commercial flight in order to force Israeli government to release the imprisoned members of their organization from the prisons in Israel. The hijacking worked, and got the Israeli Government to accept the release of the prisoners. This operation was also effective in drawing broad media coverage and publicizing their cause [5].

Another international operation carried out by the militants of Yasser Arafat's Fatah organization during Munich Olympics in 1972 summer. They took the members of Israeli Olympic team hostage and asked for the release of 234 Palestinian prisoners jailed in Israel in return for the release of hostages. During the negotiations with militants, German police initiated an unsuccessful rescue operation and consequently 11 hostages were killed by kidnappers [6]. Although, making a great deal of worldwide publicity with live television broadcasts across the world, this hostage operation was not successful in producing popular support on Middle East conflict. Thus, the world society was introduced to the international terrorism fact [3].

In the latter years, Radical Kurds, Armenians, South Malaccans, Chechen Rebels, Hezbollah, Hamas etc. all followed the same methods and conducted kidnappings, assassinations, hijackings, and bombings in third countries. Further, sometimes, some of those terrorist groups cooperated and conducted joint operations. From 1960s to 1980s Palestinian nationalists and the leftist terrorist groups used to be the leading practitioners of international terrorism. As it is evident from the above noted terror incidents, in those years, terrorist groups' preferred international terrorism mostly to get international media publicize their claims all over the world.

In addition, Russian Revolution transformed the leftist terror from domestic borders to the international arena. Thus, communist activities remained as the biggest threat to the Western World until the early 1980s. Soviet Union was accepted as directly responsible for transnational left-wing terrorism and in 1983; President Ronald Reagan labeled the USSR as the "Evil Empire". It is noteworthy that these international terrorist activities used to be local cases aiming political objectives at domestic level [7].

3. Characteristics of Global Terrorism

In the 1990s, the nature of international terrorism has been changed considerably. Its objectives varied ranging from "anti-abortion activists, animal rights activists, anti-globalization activists, and religious activists [including cults, such as the Japanese group Aum Shinrikyo, and pro-Hindu as well as pro-Muslim terrorists like Bin Laden and his followers]" [3].

In the contemporary world, religious extremism has become the most dominant factor of global terrorism. Al-Qaeda organization among them has been the most effective terrorist network which caused Islamic religion to be identified with terrorism

by conducting several destructive operations across the world. Striking on World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 was the most tragic global terror incident conducted by Al-Qaeda network. Subsequently, the United States of America has changed its foreign policy drastically and entered in two wars and the President called Syria, Iran, and North Korea as the “axis of evil” [7].

This new kind of terrorism largely benefited from globalization process which decreased state authority but increased global integration. Terrorist organizations are now networked linearly and operate horizontally across the globe. Thus, terrorist threats can target global institutions, even the world’s powerful states such as the United States. Second, some terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda have changed their operation strategies and have started massive, destructive and mortal attacks. The primary goal, in these attacks, is killing as many people as possible from their enemy side rather than publicizing their struggle all over the world. This new phase of terrorism called as “*Apocalyptic Terrorism*” [3, P. 351]

In the present era of globalization, this mega terrorism has become distinctive with the following characteristics:

1. Use of Technology. Terrorist networks follow technological developments closely and use communication technologies effectively. Particularly the advances in communication technologies facilitated the interaction and organization of the networks of terrorism across the world.
2. Dangerousness. They have become extremely dangerous with their horizontal and indistinguishable organizations across the world. Having enjoyed the sophisticated facilities of globalization, international terrorist networks considerably divorced from strict organizational structures and hierarchies. Thus, they began to organize autonomously from each other and thereby the linkages between the networks have become very indistinctive.
3. Decentralization. They have become decentralized and divorced from territoriality. Terrorist networks have no longer a proper chain of command among their subgroups as well as they do not have specific territorial interests. That means they may target their perceived enemy’s interests anywhere in the world.
4. Unpreventable. They have become almost unpreventable with their suicidal attacks. It is almost impossible to detect suicide attacks since they can be conducted by using any means.
5. Target All. They target societies without distinguishing between innocent people and perceived enemies. Because; it is also typical of terrorist groups to perceive even innocent people as their enemy to be terminated.
6. Threat. They pose a huge threat with the possibility of accessing weapons of mass destruction. They operation strategies have been changed and massive attacks and mass killings have become their primary concern.
7. Autonomous groups. Their subgroups carry out their operations autonomously from each other. Thus, they no longer carry out their operations in accordance with their commandership but according to their ideological determinations. It is believed that Bin Laden is not anymore directing or coordinating the operations of his network around the world. However, his ideology is continuously spreading, recruitments to the network growing, and its subgroups operating without stopping.
8. Cyber terrorism. They have potential power of committing various violence including cyber-attacks on computerized infrastructure since they have a high

capacity of using sophisticated technologies especially communication technologies [8]. Security experts have already made serious warnings about the threat of cyber-terrorism to a global economy. Particularly the 21st century economy is highly vulnerable for such an attack due to its computerized infrastructure [3].

With the above characteristics and unexpected even unpredicted political violence, global terrorism may sometimes, make traditional counterterrorism methods ineffective. Because; it is very hard especially for democratic countries to develop certain security policies against asymmetric warfare due to concerns of democratic liberties.

4. Factors Fostering the Spread of Global Terrorism

It is quite difficult to identify the underlying causes of international terrorism definitely as well as addressing them effectively. This is because; there are numerous complex motivations and different conditions coming together and causing international terrorist activities. It may serve not only for revolutionary or dissident groups but also for the interests of states. Even sometimes, it may be the expression of a covered war between super powers. However, if we look at the issue from the perspective of Al-Qaeda style terrorism which currently dominates the world's terrorism agenda seriously and provides a typical example of the new global terrorism, some certain reasons may become evident

4.1. Religious Extremism

Religious extremism has been identified as a significant way of trans-border violence that terrorist groups justify their operations and motivate their militants by using religious arguments. Particularly, the radical and false interpretation as well as deliberate distortion of the religious concepts; "*jihad*" and "*holy war*" by the leaders of Al-Qaeda terrorist network, caused Islam to be labeled as the religion of terrorism. For instance, the key figures of such religion-motivated terrorist groups often encourage their militants that after committing suicidal attacks they will directly be awarded with heaven. This is because; they believe in fighting for the victory of the religion of God [9]. This radicalized global ideology provides a great opportunity for terrorist groups to recruit members anywhere in the world ranging from very rural regions to the suburbs of mega cities in western countries.

In addition, radical pronunciations of religious concepts like "*jihad*" or "*holy war*" etc. not only motivate the militants of the radical religious groups but also automatically create counter influences on the populations of other religions. As Al Qaeda leaders pioneer some provocative religious slogans against Christianity or other religions in the world, it naturally causes the raise of hatred between the religious populations. For instance, Western Christian Democrats will possibly be the first political group to be effected negatively from such radical Al Qaeda propagandas and thereby using the same methods against Muslim populations in retaliation. That is one specific reason; Islamo-phobia has been raised higher than ever in the contemporary Europe. Certainly, terrorist networks take the opportunity to benefit from such bilateral provocations.

On the other hand, Saudi monarchy's promotion for the anti-Western fundamentalist interpretation of Islam has fostered growth of radical groups significantly. Wahhabism began to export its radical reading of Koran to the rest of the Middle East. In that way, Saudi regime intended to repair its reputation, damaged because of accepting US military existence in the country, and to regain its leadership in the Middle East. But it did not work due to contradictory policies of Saudi regime and the radical groups turned against both West and Saudi Arabia in 1990s. Iran's efforts to export its regime right after the Islamic revolution and the trans-border activities of Hezbollah in this regard must also be noted as one cause of the expansion of terrorism from domestic to international scope.

Aum Shinrikyo [supreme truth] case is another notable example to show how religious motivations can be used to justify mass killings. This cult was a religion which combined some elements from Buddhism and Christianity and was founded by a Japan citizen Shoko Asahara. According to their absolute truth, all the people who were the members of outside groups including governments intended to destroy their organization and therefore, they must be killed. In 1995, upon the order of their leader Asahara, the militants of the cult spread nerve gas in a Tokyo subway station and killed 12 people and injured thousands. Later on, following the further investigations, it was detected that the cult militants had prepared for may further attacks by using chemical substances [10].

4.2. States' Foreign Policy

Taking American foreign policy first; unconditional support for Israel in the Middle East since the beginning of conflict is perceived in the Muslim world as an unfair treatment to the Muslims people living in the region. Especially the unlimited support of military technologies impacts even on the Muslim countries far from Middle East. Terrorist leaders such as Osama Bin Laden often accused the U.S. that they have been pressuring on Palestinian people to stop terrorism but supporting Israeli state terrorism.

Continued bombings and sanctions against Iraq which cause the death of more than one million innocent people including hundreds of thousands of children caused a deep frustration among Muslim population across the world. In the recent times, United States led coalition forces entered Iraq forcibly and almost destroyed the entire country and still couldn't achieve the anticipated peaceful environment in the Iraqi society. On the contrary, the situation is deteriorating, the hatred is deepening among the ethnic communities in the country, and Muslim people hold America responsible for this deterioration.

United States' military existence in Saudi Arabia and the US led anti-terrorism campaign are all the prevailing factors fostering anti-Americanism and thereby causing international terrorism targeting American interests all over the world. Initially US military located in Saudi Arabia upon the demand of Saudi regime in order to protect their country from Iraq's Saddam regime but US troops stayed there about ten years. Such a long existence of non-Muslim soldiers in the holy grounds of Muslim world provoked the extremists even the moderate Muslims people in the country [11].

On the other hand, The United States continuous support of oppressive Middle East regimes perceived by Muslim populations in this way: United States supports those oppressive regimes just in order to maintain its oil interests in the region, no matter how those Middle East rulers are corrupted and abuse the human rights of their people. In one media report, Osama Bin Laden stressed that, the incidents such as

September 11, attacks on Germans in Tunisia, explosion of French tanker in Yemen, attacks on US Marines in several places across the world, and the explosions on in Bali targeting primarily the Australians and Britons were all the responses of Muslims to the United States and its allies in defense of Muslim religion [9]. These are some significant remarks in addressing; how American foreign policy has been perceived in the Middle East and how it has been motivating international terrorism.

Terrorism is a weapon not only for the illegal groups but also for some states. Although, most states don't engage in terrorism actively, they may support it by providing terrorist groups with logistic support, safe havens, intelligence, or technical aids. Military training havens for radical groups in Afghanistan, training camps in South Florida for anti-Castro Cubans, Libyan aid to the Irish Republican Army, American support for the Contras in Nicaragua, and US tolerance to financial aid collection for Sinn Fein in America in the past are all notable examples for encouragements of international terrorism [1].

It is also very interesting that Hamas was initially supported by Israel against Palestinian Liberation Army and was tolerated by the United States as it suited the US regional interests. It was also the US policy during cold war era, to support mujahideen in Afghanistan against Soviet invasion, and to establish a mechanism to recruit people from other countries for mujahideen and also to expand this Islamic war to the other Russian Republics. Osama bi Laden was found to lead this war. CIA played a key role in enabling radical Islamic militants' international access. This was because; all these supports were the requirement of American foreign policy against the "evil empire" [Soviet Union]. By the drastic change in American foreign policy following September 11 attacks, US entered in Afghanistan and Iraq and Al-Qaeda, as international terrorist network, has become more effective with its continuous operations [12]. Likewise, the Soviet foreign policy to expand communism during Cold War era, the intersection of Libyan state policy with the interest of terrorist organization and its resulting with Lockerbie disaster can all be mentioned as the causes of international terrorism.

4.3. Globalization

Globalization has also underlying impacts on international terrorism. On one hand, it offers enormous opportunities to the world population; on the other hand, it is one source of the sense of injustice and inequality all over the world. This is because; today, the world is experiencing spiky globalization which has paradoxical results which means some places across the world extraordinarily developing like peaks while other places staying behind very rural and deepening like valleys. There is no place for the middle class people in this spiky world which means some people enjoy economic prosperity very much while other people suffer from poor life conditions increasingly. Furthermore, dynamics of globalization do not operate vertically between the populations of peaks and valleys but operate horizontally between the prosperous populations at the peaks or between the poor populations in the valleys [13]. This dramatically growing gap between the social classes of the world also creates huge dissident groups among the poor populations. Certainly this is another factor boosting the recruitment of militants and causing international terrorism.

On the other hand, globalization has empowered terrorist networks with developing resources of communication and information technologies. Rapid development of communication, transportation, and information technologies resulted in the emergence of international networks and proliferation multinational

corporations. The traditional barriers between the countries have been considerably removed with the globalization that terrorists, as well, profited from the easy movement of people, goods and services across the world. New technologies made it possible to conduct huge attacks with massive casualties. Furthermore, terrorist organizations have been decentralized and operating like a network of transnational corporation which made combating terrorism much harder [14]. In other words, globalization of economy, transportation, communication, information, and technology not only contributed to environmental degradation like global warming, ozone layer depletion, water contamination, air pollution, acid rains but also it contributed to spread of international terrorism.

4.4. Failure of States

States may fail in delivering and regulating services due to several internal or external reasons. First, when central state authority collapse or weakens, the country will become a convenient atmosphere for all illegal activities as it happened in Somalia and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, after gaining their freedom from former Soviet Socialistic Republics of Union, people continued to suffer from the absence of legitimate authority. The country became arena of clashes between the rival tribes in order to gain the control of the state. Consequently, Taliban group came into power but failed to deliver the quality of service with their radicalized interpretation of Islam and the country remained unstable. Because of both political and military reasons, Taliban regime couldn't operate sufficiently and the country have become the safe heaven of international terrorist groups.

When there is a recognized authority but no defined borders, the country will be ruled by other countries as it happens very typically in the Palestine case. In this case, there have been internationally recognized state and a legitimate leadership of Palestinian people but not defined borders of their country. Because; Palestinian territories have been under Israeli occupation for decades which caused the constant failure of Palestinian state in controlling its territories thereby producing a convenient environment for terrorist activities. Further, the resistant groups in the region used Israeli occupation and continuous brutalities very effectively in order to legitimize their terror activities.

On the other hand, in the absence of adequate state capacity in order to exercise state power, the country will become vulnerable for the control of other powers rather than legitimate state authority like in Cambodia, Srilanka, Haiti and Columbia. If the states is kept together forcibly by a more powerful and authoritarian state, again that country will become a conflict area like Tibet case of China, Chechen dispute of Russia, and the ongoing violence in Iraq. Especially due to forcible intervention of Coalition forces in Iraq and their abuse of power and misconducts, the situation has constantly been deteriorating in the country. Certainly, Al-Oaeda network has been the party benefiting from this situation and gaining popular support from all over the world. Although the situation was a bit different for the postwar Lebanon, this country has also been a suitable arena for terrorist groups [15].

Taken together, it is quite obvious that the common feature of above mentioned countries is the collapse of the legitimate authority and the failure of the state to ensure the control and the security of their countries. Furthermore, looking from the historical perspective, all these countries used to be the conflict areas and the sources of international terrorism. Therefore, one key issue for terrorist groups and their activities

is the absence of legitimate authority in the region where they want to locate and proliferate. Because, such territories are quite suitable to be used as safe havens by terrorist groups. Even the civilian people of such countries are very likely to become vulnerable for the influences of terrorist organizations.

4.5. Sense of Injustice and Inequality

Populations who are far from the benefits of poverty, governance, globalization, and conflicts etc. accept themselves in a desperate situation which encourages them to apply to the violent ways to get out of this desperation. These political and economic disadvantages create dissident groups among those people who are more vulnerable for terrorist exploitation to be recruited and motivated for terrorist activities. In this respect, Even September 11 attacks on World Trade Center may, to some extent, be a consequence of neglecting Afghanistan 10 years ago in terms of supporting it economically. It is noteworthy that the United Nations organized a pledge conference for reconstruction of Afghanistan in Tokyo, in January 2002 and 1.8 billion dollars were promised by donating states but in the latter times only 800 million of this donation could be gathered. Due to such kind of several other economic and political reasons, the sense of injustice has been spreading all over the world from Palestine to Afghanistan to Africa which is a suitable atmosphere for terrorist recruitment [9].

Middle East is also distinctive region in exemplifying the emergence of dissidence and international terrorism. After the displacement of monarchs and colonial powers, single party dictatorships have come to the power with socialistic ideologies and leftist economic strategies. These regimes always kept both Marxian and Islamist groups under oppression with the iron fist of security forces and almost all country resources have been collected in the hands of a small wealthy group. Consequently, this situation in those countries has rendered those dissident groups to apply for terrorist strategies. Upon the oppressive regimes' brutal suppressions of those revolutionary groups, the survivors left their countries and constituted their networks in third countries. Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Afghanistan and other Central Asian countries are all typical examples for this situation. It is not coincidence that international terrorists, assembled in Al-Qaeda network, are emerging from these countries [16].

Another important point to note here is the constituencies living in the suburban areas of big cities particularly in Western countries. After a long time of economic struggle these people integrate themselves to the social life in those developed countries. Although, they catch a pretty good life standard in time compared to their home countries, still they can not throw the sense of secondary class citizenship from their minds due to several social and economic conditions where they live. Recent street violations in Paris were the typical indicator of this situation. On the other hand, they also know how people in their home countries suffer from economic, political and other external conditions inflicted upon their countries [Middle East] by some foreign states. Therefore, having already a sense of dissidence in their minds, these people become quite vulnerable for the propaganda and recruitment process of the international terrorist networks. Ironically, such people benefit from the free atmosphere of the West while preparing for terrorist activities against West. September 11 hijackers are the striking example for this situation. Certainly this is another factor contributing to international terrorism.

Conclusion

Taken together, it is hard to identify a certain number of reasons why terrorism has become international phenomenon. Terrorism, itself, is a multi-dimensional threat. It is not new in human history and may be encountered in every field of human life. Its dynamics operate in different directions. Its outcomes can not be manifested in one direction. It doesn't have a religion or nation but numerous motivations. It may serve not only for revolutionary or dissident groups but also for the interests of states. Sometimes, it may be the expression of a covered war between super powers. It is because of this dilemma, giving a certain definition to both terrorism and international terrorism is quite difficult. Likewise, explaining the reasons of international terrorism specifically is difficult as well.

Furthermore, as it is evident from all above arguments, several prevailing reasons, ranging from economic, political, cultural, and social conditions, can be highlighted for terrorism to become international. Radicalization of religion or ideology, government policies, misdistribution of resources, weak regimes and poor governance, misuse of power by oppressive regimes, underdevelopment, globalization waves, unsolved conflicts, international rivalries etc. may all form the sources of international terrorism. For some people international terrorism may appear to be more strategic and feasible alternative to accomplish their goals. Even sometimes, it may be used by the states as suiting their interests. However, it is hard if not impossible to say that either domestic or international terrorism works in terms of finding out a complete solution for any dispute.

On the other hand, it is very important to note that international terrorism is not an Islamic phenomenon. Although, terror is a strategy to articulate dissatisfaction with the ruling regime by rallying popular support for the alternative solutions, presented by terrorism, the popularity of Islam is far from being an alternative revolution under the current political conditions in the world. However, in the present time, it is a fact that Islam has been used as an ideology with radical if not distorted interpretations by some extremist groups in order to reach their political objectives. Therefore, it is possible for revolutionary groups to mobilize oppositional groups against authoritarian regimes by using the radicalized Islam [16].

It is also important that targeting innocent people can not be justified by any religion. In this respect, extremists and moderate Muslims must be distinguished from each other and Islam mustn't be labeled as a terrorist religion. Fighting against terrorism doesn't mean fighting against Islam. Islam itself means peace and the word Muslim means practicing peace, source of peace and assuring the peaceful existence of all beings. In relation to Al-Qaeda case, certainly, the world faces the misuse of the Islamic concepts. In fact, as Eskridge pointed out in his article very clearly, the contemporary so called Islamic terrorism is neither rooted in Islamic religion nor in the Middle East culture but it sourced from the lack of political, economic and social reforms in the Arabic world.

Finally, terrorism is highly likely to dominate world's political agenda in the future. It will continue to pose new threats with its globalized nature. Conventional tactics may not be so successful in handling this asymmetric warfare. Therefore, continuous dedication of the international community, multi-national security cooperation, and effective supranational lawful regulations will be fundamental in overcoming this new kind terrorism.

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Part 2

Underlying Causes of Terrorism: Multidisciplinary Approach

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Does Inequality Trigger Terrorism?

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Abstract. This study investigates the reasons that might trigger terrorism. Inequality and lack of social order lead to a state of hostility, violence, and terrorism. Anomie takes the place of social order. That is anomie occurs usually after an abrupt social, economic or political change within a community. Another reason is that loosening of the bonds between common moralities is the root source of social disorder (Durkheim). Both social disorder and anomie result from individuals motivated to live up to the cultural values of success. While inequality within the state bars some cultures and increases the differences between the groups, inequality between the states as an external force increases the strain within the state. In a situation like this it is hard to maintain the social order and equality which forms as a sense of inequity in the hearts of individuals. This in turn creates frustration and aggression in the society. Individuals who identify themselves as part of these subcultures see these threats as a threat to their personal identity and to the meaning of their life. Inequalities in the society initiate the antagonistic ideologies which find their ground in these deviant subcultures.

Keywords. Inequality, lack of social disorder, anomie, violence, and terrorism.

Introduction

With the opening of the new millennium, the world has become more aware of the threat of terrorism. Lack of social order and inequality in a state threatens global stability. Today states have become the primary building blocks of order around the globe after the collapse of empires. Global stability relies on states to protect against disorder and inequality

A healthy functioning state should act between the constraints of the international ground and the dynamics of its domestic economic, political, religious, educational social structure. States are expected to provide good governance of security, wealth, education and moral values to all their citizens equally. In a state lack of social order and equality results with a “rise in criminal and political violence, a loss of control over their borders, rising ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural hostilities, civil war; the use of terror against their own citizens, weak institutions, a deteriorated or insufficient infrastructure...” [1].

This study investigates the reasons that might trigger terrorism. Lack of social order and inequality lead to a state of hostility, violence, and terrorism. Every individual has equal rights in a given society, 'individuals are equal in nature' Rousseau. Anomie takes the place of social order. That is anomie occurs usually after an abrupt social, economic or political change within a community. Another reason is that loosening of the bonds between common moralities is the root source of social disorder

1. Social Order and Inequality

Disorder and inequality in a state result with increasing attacks on their legitimacy. The people's sense of political community disappears and individuals feel alienation. The social contract that binds individuals and social structures loses its legitimacy. Chaos, or in Durkheim's words, anomie takes the place of social order. Instead of common values which bind society, marginal ideologies which may lead to the emergence of terrorist ideologies.

Social norms and laws both serve as fundamentals of social order in a state. These norms and laws ensure that all people will act according to these social expectations [2]. For Hobbes, sovereignty of the state is necessary to maintain social order. For him, an extremely centralized government, with complete power at the center, could solve the problem of social order. Hobbes believed that human life could continue only within the security of a stable social order by claiming that the problem of the state of nature will force individuals to establish a state with absolute monopoly over the means of coercion. The search for peace and social order in the state necessitates the obligation to obey the authority [3].

Rousseau Starts his book *The Social Contract* by stating "Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains" [4]. For him, individuals are equal in nature, but with the development of cooperation, society begins to emerge, and the society creates inequality. As to the social order, Rousseau's aim is freedom, which is a perfect submission of the individual to what he termed the general will. The general will is what rational individuals would prefer for the common good. Society gives government its sovereignty by forming the social contract to achieve liberty and well-being as a group which in turn brings social order to the state. For Rousseau, "social order is a sacred right which is the basis of all other rights" [4].

Although Marx's main focus was on social change, one of the vital questions for Marx was the sources of political order. In unequal societies, why the masses of people go along with the agenda rather than rising up in rebellion? Marx's answer is not just alienation, or the exerted power on them [5]. believes that it was what he called in *Capital* the "dull compulsion of economic forces," which results with alienation from any meaningful control over the material conditions of everyday life. Finally, this alienation creates a sense of isolation and powerlessness. Marx presents how social disorganization is built into the existing capitalist system with unequally distributed private property. Marx's answer to rising alienation is to remove the conditions that create alienation, rather than modifying or reforming society and its organizations.

For Marx, each existed systems emerged through conflicts and antagonisms that had developed in the previous order. "No social order ever disappears before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have been developed; and new higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society" [6].

In his speech in London to the Fraternal Democrats, he implies one of the reasons of the existing social order as the brotherhood of the bourgeois free traders. For him it is "the brother of the oppressors against the oppressed" [5]. For social order there has to be a common interest between the individuals of that society which is only possible by abolishing the existing property relations and by forming a society which is no longer based on class antagonism [5].

He claims that "the bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production." When they have been overthrown by the workers,

the unequal social order that ruled the previous societies ceases to operate, while harmony replaces the conflict in the society [5].

According to Durkheim, anomie occurs usually after an abrupt social, economic or political change within a given society. As he contends, such an abrupt change inevitably curtails society's collective conscience in regards to norms and values. According to Durkheim, during this time of structural transition, individuals are not sure of the moral laws that constrain them. Durkheim's argument is that, loosening of the bonds between common moralities is the root source of social disorder [7]. However, Merton argues that, anomie is a consequence of the double facedness of structure or say it inequality, whereby normal social institutions are functional for certain sub-groups, and at the same time dysfunctional for a certain segment of the population. Merton adopts the anomie concept as part of his effort to suggest that biological explanations of deviant behavior are inadequate to explain social reality and that, instead, structural conditions should be considered as inducing deviation from prescribed patterns of conduct [8].

In illustration of his theory of anomie, Merton [9] argues that social disorder occurs when society or the social structure holds high ideals of values for all its members, yet some members of that society are structurally barred from living up to those ideals. By saying that, in fact, Merton implies the inequality that is embedded within the social structure and some groups have consistently inferior opportunities than others, while this gap generates a sense of unfairness when the effected individuals have little to do.

Cultural values may call for loyalty of certain norms, values, and behaviors from all members of a given society. At the same time as the social structure or institutions; for instance discrimination as based on racial, income, or religious stratification may bar certain segments of the population from attaining the same high cultural values or ideals.

However, social institutions do not avail everyone equal chances to achieve the expected success. Merton argues that, social disorder and anomie results from individuals motivated to live up to the cultural value of success, but with no or with inadequate institutional means, whereby they find different alternatives to achieve the cultural goal, even if it is through crime. For Merton, anomie results as the different kinds of individuals adapt to these cultural ideals based on whichever available means possible.

Merton introduces us five types of individual adaptation to the established cultural goals. The "conformist" internalizes the cultural goals, and at the same time society offers him/her the sufficient institutional means to realize the same goals. That is to say, social structure is functional for the conformist. However, the dysfunctional face of the same structure is visible from the other side whereby, some individuals of the same population are denied adequate institutional means to achieve the high ideals. It is from this other side of structure which offers inequality that individuals choose to adapt to the cultural goals, but in a disrupting way.

Merton cites four additional adaptation types which may lead to deviance. The "innovator" internalizes the cultural values but is denied the institutional means to achieve the same goals [9]. The innovator adapts by reaching the goals through any means possible, including crime. Merton describes the third type of adaptation as that of the "ritualist" who rejects the cultural goals but internalizes the institutional means; thus working diligently hard in acknowledgement of his/her position in society. Merton also refers to the "retreats" that reject both the cultural goals and the institutional means

by declining taking any action, such as the drug addict or drunkard. Finally, the “rebellious” who rejects both the cultural goals and the institutional means, yet seeks alternative goals and means.

Beck believes that paid work was the key point for struggle against poverty and for providing social order. In order to maintain democracy, and equality people had to work for political rights and freedom [10]. Denotes cultural goals as a frame of aspirational reference defined firstly by social and cultural structure. Then institutional norms develop as a result of the same structure to regulate and control the acceptable modes of achieving these goals. The system is said to be in order or equilibrium in so far as these two entities are in agreement [9].

Parsons views society as consisting of interdependent parts which work together to maintain the equilibrium of the whole, rather like the human body with its interdependent organs working for the health of the entire organism. Key concepts of this theory are differentiation and integration. Differentiation occurs as society becomes more complex but the new institutions must be integrated with each other into the whole. The new structures are integrated to ensure the smooth functioning of society. Social order requires that members of society work towards achieving order and stability within the society, and functionalist theory asserts that this is the most desirable social state for people [11].

Terror is dysfunctional in social life. Continued fear weakens social relations; consequently terror makes the circumstances worse than before. From the macro level the equilibrium, or balance between the social institutions, from the micro level stable social relations offer relief and confidence.

In the absence of a commonly accepted authority, or in Hobbes’ terminology, sovereign, a functioning society seems to be impossible. Thus, not only terror weakens the existing social order, but also in the absence of social order and equality frustration, aggression and in turn violence and terrorism can emerge.

2. The Impact of Globalization on Inequality

The feeling of powerlessness and helplessness due to the increasing inequality is not a new phenomenon. However, today while all societies emphasize these inequalities and the results of inequality, the inherent inequality seems to be increasing all around the globe. Since 1980s, “inequality has risen in most countries and in many cases sharply” [12].

Globalization does not just affect the economics, but it also threatens every aspect of life. Dominated by Western media, beliefs, values, preferences, have a powerful impact on non-western cultures and often by the Western culture these impacts have been seen as apart of global penetration. Western culture spread through the world with the developing communication systems. “With the internet and email, it is easy for citizens of all nations of the world to acquire information and to communicate with each other instantaneously” [13]. Movies, music, TV programs, transmit individualism that fragments strongly knit societies by the circulation of western culture. Technological innovations, such as radars, GIS, Internet wireless connections e-mails, cellular phones and other electronic devices, have transformed the way we communicate [14].

However, this diffusion of information is not a penetration, but a one way process. Societies that have the power of the media and technology have a greater chance to

influence others. Indeed, media corporations are ambitious by a pursuit for profit; however, “the seemingly innocuous market quest for fun, creativity, and profits puts whole cultures in harm’s way and undermines autonomy in individuals and nations alike” [15].

One claim is that in the short-run globalization may have negative effects, but in the long-run globalization will have positive effects and will result in “greater moves to democracy, economic distribution, the rule of law, and the promotion of social and civil rights” [13].

However, it is important to cite that “as a direct consequence of globalization and the expansion of capitalism, national and international economies are increasingly being controlled, dominated, and shaped by global financial markets and transnational corporations as well as by foreign governments” [14].

These entities which operate in global level are able to influence and restructure laws, regulations and policies in order to gain not only economic, but also political and military power. Therefore, these international entities shape both the national and global agenda.

It is clear that during this process of expansion of capitalism, these transnational corporations also are the engines of development that “promote economic rights through investment and job creation, and civil and political rights through the creation of a stable and tolerant environment” [16]. However, today, there are greater economic gaps between the rich and the poor which promotes inequality and the sense of unfairness in the hearts of the poor. While societies develop in a great acceleration economic inequality and poverty also continued to increase [17].

About 20% of the world population is living on the equivalent of less than a U.S. dollar a day [17]. Furthermore, in the urban area of the world’s poorest countries, poverty is increasing at an alarming rate with severe health problems which results with high levels of infant mortality and low levels of life expectancy [14].

Thanks to globalization, now, people all around the world are aware of all these information. The news on human right abuses, protests, crimes and social conflicts along with wars are not domestic any more. The extension of communication networks all over the world helped people to become aware of their poverty and misery, while, it alienated some others.

Not to mention that not all societies have access to these communication systems, nor do they have the opportunity to hear the diffusing information. These opportunities are limited due to the existing extreme poverty. Thus, opportunity to access to information for a great number of the world population is limited, which in result creates a “digital divide” which intensify the existing inequalities around the globe.

As the inequality between nations and between individuals increase, new kinds of tensions emerge. These tensions afflict nations and promote conflict and instability if states stay unable to mediate on going changes, and if states had begun to crumble before the initiation of stabilization social order will leave its place to these conflicts and tensions which will cause further problems [18].

The legitimacy and mediatory capacity of a state depends heavily on its provision of basic services which are provided by the social institutions. Here a Parsonian approach is efficient to explain the ongoing tensions. For Parsons each institution performs a specific function for the good of the whole, thus there are four crucial functions that every institution must perform to maintain the social fabric. These institutions must function in harmony in order to form social order which necessitates equality [11].

“Adaptation” to the environment that is performed by the economy, but not any economic system, only capitalism can adapt to the environment. States –these states are commonly non-western states- which can not adapt to globalization- have weak economies. The opposite can also be said; states with weak economies can not adapt to the changing world, which necessitates changes in the structure.

“Goal attainment” is performed by the government. Globalization also influences politics. States with weak politics are impotent to find solutions to ongoing problems of globalization. New goals can not be set for the society; this in turn results with loss of trust to the existing system.

“Integration” is performed by the legal institutions and religion. With the diffusion of cultural values, non-western states face with new values, belief systems, and perspectives which threaten the traditional values. Within the society and between generations’s conflicts emerge due to the tension created by the impotent social structure.

Finally, “latency” is the maintenance and transmission of values from generation to generation - performed by the family as a historical basic human organization, and education. The educational differences between the generations, different life styles, values attitudes results with problems within the family. As the individualism increases around the globe existing social orders cease to satisfy new generations. As Sandbrook and Romano [19] clearly explain, “the rise in insecurity and sense of inequity, if coupled with an increasingly ineffective and unpopular regime, provides openings for extremist movements and political violence. The domestic political consequences of transnational strains depend heavily on the depth of pre-existing cleavages, the organization and goals of dissident groups, and the flexibility and coherence of institutions.”

3. A Cultural Approach to Global Inequality

As it is well known culture consists of material and non-material culture. Developed communication systems with the help of high technological artifacts formed new much more complex network systems all around the world. However, once more the technological innovations divide the world by creating an unequal opportunities. The diffusion of information from the west to the rest of the world has also consequences such as the diffusion of western culture.

Although many cultures have welcomed and adapted the new comer, many concerns such as losing cultural identity, maintaining existing value systems, or ways to adapt the already existing culture to the new one. The newcomer was also a threat indeed. Life styles, values, believe way of behaving, and acting, the way of organizing, and the way of management clashed with the existing ones. Society as a whole experienced all these strains which are explained above. However, culture consists of different subcultures which are whether in harmony or in conflict with the existing culture.

Subcultures acquire strict social rules that guarantee their persistence. They have easily definable measures of genuineness that form social borders tough enough to allow one to call them a subculture. They form their own interpretations of wider society norms by rejecting them or modifying them to some extent to provide meaning to their own lifestyles. Counter-cultures oppose with the existing culture and resist some particular institutions. In fact they are already under constraint and experience

tension. A second constraint coming from outside may mutate these already deviant subcultures into a violent terrorist group by creating frustration, fear, and antagonism against the powerful. But, the crucial element here is the mutation of these marginal groups to extremist, violent terrorist groups.

Here Berger's [20] approach illuminates our understanding. For Berger, socialization is a dialectical active process; there for individuals can never completely socialize. The weak instinctual nature of human beings necessitates the externalization of a social world. There is always difference between the individual and the environment. Increased differences and inequalities result with anomie while unrecognized differences cause alienation, which may be a source of inner strength [20, P.81-94]. Thus, it is clear that in deviant subcultures there is an increased difference between the dominant culture and the deviant cultures. A second divergence due to the external forces leads to anomie. In Berger's terms the "cosmos" that they have created for themselves is threatened and "chaos" is agonizing. To maintain their cosmos which give meaning to their lives, the antagonistic ideas become more apparent.

Individuals constantly structure their social and physical environment by their actions, while both the social and physical environments structure the individuals and their self concepts. Mead claims that the "me" is the internalization of social roles which derive from symbolic processes such as interaction, playing, and gaming; whereas the "I" is a "creative response" to the symbolized structures of the "me." [21]. However, [22, P. 44] has a more liberal approach to me and states that "... a man's "Me" is the sum total of all that he can call his." Thus self does not only consist of the body, but also social and physical environment such as material objects that individuals own or statuses that they possess are part of their selves, or say it identity markers that symbolizes their individuality, their belonging to a group or a society. It is important to state that belief systems, which give meaning to one's life, are also part of these identity markers, and become part of self. By selecting these identity markers individuals also differentiate themselves from others and gain a self identity [23].

From this perspective, individuals extend the self of sense and "me versus not me" becomes "me and mine versus not me and not mine." [24]. When these boundaries are violated or threatened by the outside forces, individuals can show powerful and irrational reactions. [25, 24]

Social reality offers a shield against the forces of chaos which threatens the existence of individual. Social order becomes the ordered structure of individual human consciousness. Language spoken in the society, belief systems, institutions, values and meanings become the languages, the beliefs, institutions, values and meanings of the individual [20, P.20].

Anomie can be observed not only on the social level, but also on the individual level. On the societal level, confrontations and conflicts which can not be decided or controlled by commonly accepted value systems, can be observed, where as on the individual level, individuals face with disturbance which may lead to frustration and aggression. These conflicts often create violence in societies which faces institutional disturbance and conflicts. The weakening of these social institutions are both the cause and the result of the violence. Individuals prefer to stay in the smaller and closer groups where there predict to find more stable and ordered life; however these close groups may also hold various ideologies such as nationalism, fundamentalism, or some other alternative ideologies. [26]

Individuals seek equality, order and stability in their lives. Therefore, a life without equality, order and stability is hardly a life at all. A society that is under a continual anomie presents a painful life that is full of frustration, anxiety and aggression.

Terror management theory suggests that [27], death is the biggest threat, which generates anxiety, to the self, and life is an instinctive desire of all humans. Thus, individuals look for social order in their community in order to maintain the stability. It is crystal clear that the vision of death creates anxiety, but the main argument is if one of identity markers is lost and threatened, also one's part of self identity is lost and destroyed. In their study Burris and Rempel [24] found out that "contemplation of death may be sufficient but not necessary to increase one's investment in a world that makes sense: Disorientations or erasures that are neither catastrophic nor total—like dust mites in one's bed—may pose a similar threat to the integrity of one's stable, familiar world, [24] which may result with unexpected violent responses. Thus, when one's cosmos becomes his/her identity, any assumed threat can be understood as a threat to him/her self which may result with unexpected violent group reactions.

Conclusion

As Miller clearly states, "...to overcome violence in the world will require many corresponding layers of understanding and effort. More caring, nourishing ways of education and childrearing are essential elements, but they are not sufficient. Political activism is also essential, but also not enough. Spiritual practice of some sort is crucial...." The problem of terrorism can not be well understood with a deterministic approach. Many different variables play their role during the emergence of terrorist reactions. The desired order which necessitates equality within the society is destabilized both by the external forces and internal forces [23].

While inequality within the state bars some cultures and increases the differences between the groups, inequality between the states as an external force increases the strain within the state. In a situation like this it is hard to maintain the social order and equality which forms as a sense of inequity in the hearts of individuals. This in turn creates frustration and aggression in the society. However, these strains are understood as a higher level of threat in deviant subcultures that are the extremes of the dominant culture. Individuals who identify themselves as part of these subcultures see these threats as a threat to their personal identity and to the meaning of their life. Inequalities in the society initiate the antagonistic ideologies which find their ground in these deviant subcultures.

Rather than persisting to build security by building boundaries in an age when material and nonmaterial boundary protection is impossible, a global conception of security necessitates cultural relativism that leads us to global norms, values. The international order is eminent by stable inequalities such as economic, political and military, power. Thus, one of the contradictory characteristics of globalization is fragmentation and a stress on differences and heterogeneity [28]. The understanding of security requires approaches that go beyond traditional military understandings and the zero-sum logic. Strategies that attempt to respond to terrorism without addressing the complexity of the phenomenon are bound to fail.

The struggle against terrorism should continue in three different levels which are state level, on the sub-cultural level, and struggle against terrorists. On the state level the order in the society has to be maintained, necessary actions for the recovery of the

order has to be taken. Subcultures are the shelters for the terrorist groups, realization of these subcultures as terrorists will foster new problems and create new strains in the society, thus these subcultures who may either be recruited by terrorist organizations, or recovered to the society need a different application than terrorist groups. Finally terrorist groups should be eliminated from the society by any means, either by military responses or ostracizing them from the subculture that they live in and recruit new members.

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The Poverty, Inequality and Terrorism Relationship: An Empirical Analysis of Some Root Causes of Terrorism

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Abstract. This study describes the relationship between inequality, poverty and terrorism. Understanding such a relationship helps policy makers to develop effective policies to encounter terrorism. Poverty and inequality are important factors that cause terrorism. Terrorism can be seen as a symptom of social disorganization and the unequal distribution of means of success in society. Inequality may work as motivating factor for people to become involved in terrorist activities.

Keywords. Inequality, poverty, terrorism, causes of terrorism, anomie.

Introduction

This study examines whether poverty, inequality have any relationship to terrorism. Terrorism has been one of the biggest threats for people's daily life by means of many threats to people's life. Looking at the issues that is triggering terrorist incidents or issues which help to increase people's possibility of joining terrorist organizations or involving in terrorist incidents we can help policy makers to develop better policies against terrorism.

Although there have been many statements by many respectable agencies and respectable people emphasizing that poverty and inequalities between races, regions, social classes are important root causes of terrorism, there are not enough empirical studies on this topic. This study was undertaken in order to assess the empirical validity of crime literature and crime theories for explaining cross provincial rate of terrorist incidents in Turkey. Many studies have found that poverty is an important determinant of crime, delinquency, regional conflict and terrorism; on the other hand some studies indicate that poverty alone is not enough to explain the crime, delinquency regional conflict and terrorism, then inequalities between groups, race, gender, or geographical areas should also be considered. [1] Poverty and inequalities issues have been a problem of Turkey for a long time [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7]. Besides these problems Turkey's terrorism problem is another important issue for the country, and it is wise to look at whether these phenomena are related to each other. In this sense this study looks at poverty and inequalities relationship to terrorism problem of Turkey. Since many terrorist incidents were carried out by different terrorist organizations from different back ground, this study looked at which variations in socio-economic conditions made it likely that these terrorist groups commit terrorist incidents.

The study mainly alleges that high numbers of terrorist incidents in some provinces of Turkey are related to poverty and inequalities between provinces. Besides these two main factors this study also examines the effect of other issues derived from the crime literature, such as labor participation, population, young population, and education that might have negative or positive effect on the number of terrorist incidents. These does not mean that this study do not accept any other reasons of terrorism but specifically looks at these mentioned issues and left the other issues for other studies.

These aforementioned topics can be found related to the motivation of terrorism. [8] People's perception of injustice is also accepted as an important motive for terrorism. [9] Previously crime literature searched for the relationship between poverty, inequalities and high crime rate. This study will first examine the poverty-inequality literature and the related crime issues; [9, 10] this study also examines theories which explain poverty, inequalities relationship to crime rates. These demonstrate a very good explanation to the question why some regions have more crime rate than others. Also these are able to explain what variations in socio-economic conditions help people to commit more terrorist incidents comparing to the other regions where there are no or less terrorist incidents.

1. Theories

It is said that people in the lower-class experience a greater subjective feeling of powerlessness. A number of theorists have suggested that, for the powerless, crime and delinquency are desperate efforts to claim control over their lives. Those who feel powerless are more likely then others to engage in delinquency [[11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19]. Researchers explain reason for high number of crime as deprivation, decay and other conditions of social disorganization within the urban centers, because these conditions left an urban population of disadvantaged underclass people [12, 13, 11, 17]. Blau and Blau explain that these conditions as roots of crime in the social structure, and other studies show that convictions, arrests, incarcerations and other measures of official rates of crime and delinquency are high among the residents in underclass neighborhoods [18, 17].

Further studies found that poverty of people is not enough to explain crime but the inequalities is important factor to consider. So this study also considers this important explanation of mentioned studies and includes inequalities between geographic regions in its search for reasons of terrorism in Turkey. Theories that explain the observed relationship between inequality and crime are constructed by Shaw and McKay [11]. The early hypothesis attempted to explain the connection between inequality, and social disorganization through a failure of social formation and normality. This theory first developed by Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay in 1942, tried to explain urban crime and deviance. The most significant finding of their study was that the rate of delinquency in the lower class neighborhoods was highest near the inner city and decreased as you moved toward the more affluent areas [12, 13]. Social Disorganization Theory explains that low economic status; high levels of racial/ethnic heterogeneity and residential mobility affect the community's level of social disorganization [11]. The areas in which Shaw & McKay 1942 found high delinquent rates are characterized by poor housing, physical decay, incomplete and broken families, high rates of illegitimate births, and an unstable population.

Anomie theory also has a very good explanation to the relationship between inequality and crime. Anomie theory starts with Emile Durkheim who first used the term “anomie” to refer to a lack of social regulation that promotes higher rates of suicide [12]. Developing Emile Durkheim’s theory Merton 1938 identified inequality as a causal factor in crime. His hypothesis states that “*crime is a symptom of specific sort of social disorganization: the unequal distribution of means of success in society necessary to achieve “the American dream”*”. He explains that inequality of opportunity creates situations in which certain individuals engage in crime, in order to achieve culturally defined success. Merton states that the American dream promotes the idea that equal opportunity and therefore success is available to all. However, the reality is quite different as equal opportunity to achieve success is not available to all. For example, disadvantaged minority groups and the lower class do not have the same access to such legitimate opportunities [12]. As Merton points out, disadvantaged groups are often far removed from the conventional educational and occupational opportunities needed to realize those objectives. The social structure effectively limits certain groups from achieving their goals through the standard institutionalized means available to others. Following Merton’s ideas later studies showed that effects of poverty is not limited to property crime alone; it is also related to violence crime [20]. Additionally, absolute deprivation and the lack of opportunity may have its effect on the psychological well being of those affected and can result in violent behavior.

2. Previous Researches

This study states that poverty alone cannot explain terrorist incidents so we must look at the effects of inequality on terrorism incidents. Using the evidence that we have from the studies concerning the relationship between crime, poverty, and inequality might extrapolate a relationship between crime, poverty and terrorist incidents [21, 22, and 23].

Eli Berman [24] points out that the actual terrorists are drawn from a large pool of volunteers who tend to be from the poorest part of their societies. As Jessica Stern [25] found out in her study, most of the people who join terrorist groups are from the poorest classes. Among those groups those who are selected for missions are likely to be the most committed and also the most capable. Inequality may be a motivating factor for people to become involved in terrorist activities [8]. Driven by a feeling of injustice, a group that is convinced that what they do is meaningful can justify their use of violence. If income inequality exists, the people at the economic bottom feel little loyalty to the political system and they may feel completely justified in their use of violence, including terrorism. Thus it can be said that terrorism is often driven by a sense of injustice and helplessness rather than just economic poverty [26].

The high crime rates in urban areas with physical decay, poor housing, and heterogeneous population where the residents are from the bottom of the socioeconomic scale with low incomes, low education levels, have taken the attention of researchers [11, 27, 18, 17, 28, 29]. Studies showed that the poverty crime relationship is not limited to property acquisition alone; violence crime is also related to these [20]. Lin Corzine et al 1991 examined the role of poverty on the deadly violence rate and the suicide-homicide rate for blacks and whites. Their findings show that high rates of poverty are absolutely connected with lethal-violence. Krivo, & Peterson’s 1996 study also evaluated the disadvantaged groups and relationship to

crime. They allege that extremely disadvantaged neighborhoods have higher rates of crime.

2.1. Inequality, crime and terrorism

Inequalities in and the social arena increases the likelihood of terrorism, because terrorism occurs as a response to injustice [30]. Previous studies showed that lower-class people experience greater subjective feelings of powerlessness, and those who feel powerless are more likely than others to engage in delinquency [13, 11] while some studies found no relationship [31, 22, 10]. This study thinks that same kind relationship exists between inequality and terrorism that is why crime literature is examined. Researchers found out that the expected level of crime will be higher in a community with increased inequality Francois [32, 33, 26, and 34]. Chester argues that poverty is not the only issue that we should focus on, but rather we should look at “perceived relative deprivation” [35]. In most studies the inequalities examined were by income inequalities; however Martin [36] and Anderson [37] stated that there are much kind of indicators of inequalities which have been previously used to examine inequalities between race, gender, age. This part of the study examines income inequality and its relationship to crime, terrorism, and conflict. This study uses more indicators of inequalities such as the inequality of distribution of government resources, and health inequalities as the data is available.

Demombaynes & Ozler [38] examined the effects of local inequalities on inequalities and violent crime in South Africa. They related the inequalities to crime. They hypothesized that inequality and social welfare in general may have effects on crime through other channels. They explained the reason for inequity was a lack of social capital, lack of upward mobility or social disorganization. They concluded that all of these may cause higher levels of crime. Further more, economic inequities between groups may produce conflict in society by consolidating and reinforcing ethnic and class differences. Blau & Blau interpreted these results as the emphasis on culture of poverty. They concluded that socioeconomic inequality between races, as well as economic inequality generally increases the rates of criminal violence. Significantly, in this study once the economic inequalities were controlled for poverty no longer influenced these rates. So, if there was a culture of violence, one should be able to look at the economic inequalities to identify its roots.

Besides inequalities in income of people there are many other ways in which inequality can be measured, depending on the issue that best fits the population. Arnartya Sen 1998 explained that different forms of inequality become important according to different circumstances. According to their priority they are considered in policy agendas. Policy makers mainly focus on inequalities which appear most damaging or most objectionable to the common notion of justice. These inequalities may be the status of particular groups, lack of access to particular goods and services, such as education, health or justice, or just an unequal income distribution [33]. In recent times the focus of justice has focused on distribution of resources [34]. From these studies this study proposes the hypothesis that “*Provinces of Turkey with higher inequalities comparing to other provinces have more terrorist incidents.* To be able to measure the inequalities between provinces of Turkey, this study uses different indicators such as distribution of health services, distribution of education, employment, distribution of infrastructure which shows the equality or inequality of distribution of government services.

This study also looks at the effect of education to number of terrorist incidents by looking at the schooling ratio in each province besides percentage of university graduates to total school graduates. This might give us the effect of higher education to terrorist incidents. Education has effect on crime rate by encouraging political participation and channeling conflict through institutional pathways rather than violence. It is suggested that education should be representative of earnings potential, and that this should be related to the crime rate [27, 16]. There is no consensus on the effects of education on delinquency. Robert D. Crutchfield; Susan R. Pitchfork's study 1997 point out that education is inversely related with general criminal involvement and violent crime, but does not effect property crime. Involvement in criminal activities is less when youth are participating in school because their involvement in education makes them less likely to engage in crime. Similarly, many other study's findings show significant and positive relationship with delinquency and education level. Elhrich explained the inconsistent findings of the studies between crime and educational attainment [39]. First of all, the effect of education on unreported crime rate should be considered and secondly, that the unequal distribution of schooling and training is more important than mean level of education which appears strongly related to the crime rate. Education has some indirect effect on the crime rate as explained by Merton 1938 who states that lack of education hinders occupational opportunities, and this result limiting the possibilities of individuals within certain groups. Nicholas Shamanism's 2004 study also looked at the effect of education on political violence although his study's mainly focused on poverty, inequality and political violence. Results of multiple regression statistical method showed that the educational level was related to political violence.

Another economic variable which has an effect on crime levels is unemployment. Bloch 1957 mentioned the psychological cost of unemployment. He explained that the loss of a job lower the threshold of social inhibition, and this may make individuals more prone to be criminals. Areas with a high proportion of unemployment will experience more crime than areas with an overall low proportion of unemployment, as Elli's study 1991 proved. Studies of Land et al. 1990 Yamada et al. 1991, Freeman 1995 al indicated that unemployment was positively related to crime. They found that increasing the unemployment rate increases the crime rate. Stephen Machin, Costas Meghir 2004's study hypothesize that in a simple economic model declining labor market opportunities are likely to increase illegitimate [criminal] activities while participation in legitimate [labor market] activity is decreasing. Their finding showed a relationship between low wage labor markets and crime. Between the mid-1970s and mid-1990s, areas where wage growth was at the bottom of the wage distribution experienced faster rising crime rates. S. Mansoob Murshed and Scott Gates's study 2003 about the Maoist insurgency in Nepal concluded that the lack of employment opportunities is an important factor that assists Maoist recruitment and retention, making life in Maoist cadres a relatively attractive option. Therefore the hypothesis is that *province of Turkey which has higher labor participation rate have less terrorist incidents compared to other provinces.*"

A high population size increases the rates of [35]. Results of Arthur's study 1991 showed that population size was positively associated with both violent and non-violent crimes. Kau and Rubin's 1975 study's results indicate that the size of an areas population is related to property and violent crime rates. Blau & Blau's study February, 1982 showed that criminal violence is positively related to population size. Looking at

the results of these studies we hypothesize that “*provinces of Turkey which has higher population have higher number of terrorist incidents compared to other provinces.*”

One of the demographic variables that were found to be associated with crime was age. Many studies used percent of young male [population age 15-24 as a control variable to see its possible effect on crime. They stated that young people are more prone to be involved in crime. Further more, it is likely that different proportions of young in a city's population contribute to crime rates. Nagin and Land's study 1993 alleged that during certain age periods, an individual's possibility of being involved in criminal activities increases. Fernando Reinares's study 2004 on ETA terrorist organization offered an empirical assessment of ETA. The study examined militants' social and demographic characteristics from data which was derived from oral interviews with militants. The results of the paper showed that most of them were recruited between their late teens and early twenties. One can infer that a percentage of the age group between 15-24 might affect the likelihood of terrorist incidents in a geographic area. These studies show that different proportion of young in a city's population may also contribute to crime rates. Therefore it can be proposed that “*Provinces of Turkey which has higher percentage of young population have higher terrorist incidents compared to other provinces*”.

3. Researching Design and Methodology

This study uses secondary data and cross sectional research is designed. A cross sectional research design is used to identify collect data measured at a single point in time on all appropriate variables [36]. Unit of analysis is provinces of Turkey. A province is administrative divisions. An independent province should have population more than 20,000, including its sub-areas such as, central city, towns, and villages. Each province depends on the central government of Turkey and central government directly control and decide the quantity and quality of public services including distribution of resources [37].

Secondary data for this study is obtained from three different sources data for number of terrorist incidents for each cities of Turkey comes from Turkish National Police terrorist incidents database. The data contain the number of incidents which are counted as terrorist incidents according to Turkish penal law. Data for economic and demographic variables come from Turkey's National Statistic Department's database, and Turkey's Government Planning Office's database.

3.1. Dependent variable:

Number of terrorist incidents: Data for this variable is derived from Turkish National Police's Counter terrorism Department's database for the year 2002. In this study number of terrorist incidents for per 10.000 in each province is calculated.

3.2. Independent variables

Poverty indicators: This study uses two indicators of poverty that are accepted by the United Nation Development Institute. The first indicator is number of people living below the poverty line, and the other indicator is GDP per capita. Since data for the

number of people living below the poverty line is not available for the cross-section of the country, the number of people using a green card is used as a proxy variable for the number of people living below the poverty line.

Inequality indicators: This study uses different indicators of inequality between provinces of Turkey. Variables are chosen among the development performance indicators which are used by Turkey's Government Planning Office. These are demographic variables: urbanization, population, percentage of young people. Education indicators: schooling ratio, percentage of university graduate to total school graduates. Infrastructure: availability of drinking water, asphalt roads. Health indicators; Distribution hospitals beds. Economic indicators: government investment per capita between 1995 and 2000, bank deposits per person, percentage of electric consumption. Labor participation rate.

3.3. Statistical Analysis

This study uses the multiple regression analysis as a statistical technique which is used to analyze the relationship between a single dependent variable and several independent variables. While the purpose of correlations emphasizes the relationship between the dependent variable and independent variables, regression analysis put an emphasis on prediction using the regression model. Multiple-regression is suitable when the analyst is interested in statistical relationships. In addition to that, the researcher can assess the percentage of variance in the dependent variable predicted by regression, as well as, assess the relative importance of the independent variables. It should be kept in mind that multiple regression analyses reveals the relationship among variables but that does not mean that there is a causal effect among the variables; it cannot show causality.

Although the variables are chosen according to theory and previous literature for the best results of regression analysis, independent variables should strongly correlate with the dependent variable but should not be correlated with each other. Which variables are included in the regression analysis is also important, because the results are highly sensitive to the combination of variables. Before starting to run the multiple regression analysis in the statistical software, this study examined the assumptions of multiple regressions, to make sure that all assumptions of multiple regressions are met, such as missing values, absence of outliers among dependent variables and independent variables, absence of multicollinearity and singularity, normality, linearity and homoscedasticity.

Skewness and kurtosis is examined to be able to ensure normality is met Tabarchnick, & Fidel, 2000. It is found that some variables has problem of skewness and kurtosis and to prevent possible distortion of the results, square root transformation is considered for three of these variables, and lg 10 transformation is done for 3 of the variables [38]. Screening the residual is an alternative to screening the variable if a multiple regression analysis is to be performed. If normality is present then the residuals are normally distributed and there is no reason to screen the individual variables for normality. Residuals were checked for normality and it was observed that there was no problem of normality, after transformation and normality was acquired for the dataset. Also univariate and multivariate outlier were checked, although some outliers found they were not dropped from the dataset because of the concern that this may affect the generalizability of the study. Besides multicollinearity was also examined to ensure that independent variables were not highly correlated with each

other, which would distort the results of the analysis, and examination results showed no multicollinearity problem in the dataset.

4. Findings

Result of the multiple regression analysis found five of the variables significantly related to number of terrorist incidents for per 10.000 in provinces of Turkey. Table 1 below shows the results of the statistical analysis. According to the results Urbanization [$\beta=.415$, $t=2.079$, $p=0.41$], percentage of young population [$\beta=.250$, $t=2.188$, $p=0.32$], Availability of asphalt roads [$\beta=-.368$, $t=3.448$, $p=0.001$], government investment per capita [$\beta=-.203$, $t=2.235$, $p=0.029$], and bank deposits [$\beta=-.397$, $t=2.296$, $p=0.025$], found significantly related to number of terrorist incidents per 10.000. The statistical analysis could not find statistically significant relationship with the other variables; distribution of hospital beds [$\beta=-.162$, $t=-1.744$, $p=0.086$], percentage of electric consumption [$\beta=-.138$, $t=-1.215$, $p=0.162$], higher education rate [$\beta=-.076$, $t=-.491$, $p=0.625$], schooling ratio [$\beta=-.190$, $t=-1.213$, $p=0.230$], availability of drinking water [$\beta=-.079$, $t=-.951$, $p=0.345$], Labor Participation rate [$\beta=-.181$, $t=-1.042$, $p=0.301$], Gini Coefficient [$\beta=-.027$, $t=-.312$, $p=.756$], percentage of electricity consumption [$\beta=-.138$, $t=-1.495$, $p=0.162$]. Table 1 shows the variables in the regression with the results of the regression analysis.

Table 1. [1] Regression analysis if the independent variables terrorist incidents for per 10.000 in provinces of Turkey

		B
Poverty	Percentage poor	.026
Demographic Variables	Urbanization	.415**
	Population	-.119
	Percentage of young population	.250**
Education Variables	Schooling Ratio	-.190
	Percentage of university graduate to total school graduates	-.076
Infrastructure	Availability of drinking water	-.079
	Asphalt roads	-.368***
Health Indicators	Distribution of hospital bed	-.162*
Economic indicators	Government investment per capita [1995-2000]	.203**
	Percentage of electric consumption	-.138
	Labor participation rate	.181
	Bank Deposits per person	.397**
Income inequality / Gini Coefficient	Gini	-.027

* $p<.10$, ** $p<.05$, *** $p\leq .001$

5. Discussion

The results of the analysis could not find any statistical relationship between number of people living under poverty line and number of terrorist incidents. Finding of the study is not consistent with the findings of previous studies which indicate a statistically significant positive relationship between poverty level of a geographical region and the number of delinquencies [20, 14]. Reason for these inconsistent findings may be because of different reasons such as the nature of the data, the variables that are included in the regression analysis. Similarly, results show that population of a province is not related to the number of terrorist incidents in a region. This finding of the regression analysis also is not consistent with the results of many of the previous analysis, in which it is found that that the higher the population of a region, the higher the crime and delinquency [17, 39]. This inconsistent finding might be from different reasons such as different statistical analyses that studies utilized or different methodological structures of studies, such as different time periods covered, difference in units of analysis and samples. Both of the variables that are aimed to measure the effect of education to the number of terrorist incidents in a region show no relationship between numbers of terrorist incidents. These two indicators for education are not used in the previous studies which mostly utilized education attainment.

Although one of the indicators of inequality [asphalt roads] shows statistically significant relationship between geographical regions the other [availability of drinking water] does not show any statistically significant relationship. These two aimed to measure effect of unequal distribution of government services between regions. This study also could not find any relationship between percentage of electric consumption in provinces and number of terrorist incidents. This variable is accepted as one of the indicator of economic level of provinces.

Study also could not find any relationship between labor participations rate and number of terrorist incidents. Previous studies have different findings on this issue. Some of them are consistent with the finding of this study [29], however the others are not Bourguignon, [27, 18].

Results show that urbanization has statically significant relationship to number of terrorist incidents in provinces. Although many studies do not include "urbanization" directly in their analysis this variable represent many different problems under this name. Such as rapid and uncontrolled growth of provinces, migration from one part to other, fast increase in population, and the indirect problems comes with these such as lack of education, lack of enough government support and services etc.

Also percentage of young population found related to the number of terrorist incidents. This finding of the study is consistent with the findings of the many studies which found relationship between high number of delinquencies and number of young population.

Distribution of health services which is measured by distribution of hospital beds according to the provinces is one of the indicators of distribution of government services, and this variable found related to the number of terrorist incidents. Besides this study found that, there is a statistically significant relationship between amount of government investment for per person and number of terrorist incidents. Also another indicator of people's economic situation is amount of bank deposit for per person in each province. This study also found statistically significant relationship between this variable and the number of terrorist incidents.

Conclusion

This study shows that terrorism problem of Turkey is related to rapid urbanization of some provinces of the country, high number of young population in some specific provinces, inequalities between provinces which are measured by some indicator including distribution of some government services such as health services, infrastructures such as roads, drinking water and some economic contributors such as bank deposits and per person in each provinces.

Urbanization brings some specific problems, and these might be related to terrorism issue such as uncontrolled growth of the urban areas, uncontrolled migration towards urban areas, and indirect results that these situations might cause. These findings advises that policy makers should consider problems that comes with urbanization as they are developing policies against high number of terrorist incidents. Findings of this study also advises that young population needs special attention as the association between youth and terrorism is also pointed in some different studies besides this current one.

One of the most important findings of the study is that there is more evidence that inequalities between geographical regions are the factors that increase terrorism. As the study found unequal distribution of infrastructure, unequal distribution of government investment between region and unequal distribution of health services are related to number of terrorist incidents policy makers should consider these issues while developing policies against terrorism.

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Democracy, Terrorism, and Islamist Movements: Comparing Hamas, Hizbullah, and the Islamic Action Front

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Abstract. Contemporary policy discussions regarding Islamism and terrorism too often fail to draw the distinctions between democratic and reformist Islamism, Islamism as part of a national liberation movement, and finally, militant Islamism in the form of global Jihadist organizations. This article provides a comparative examination of three key Islamist movements -- the Palestinian movement Hamas, the Lebanese Hizbullah movement, and the Jordanian Islamic Action Front. These three organizations have made different choices regarding reform, revolution, democracy and terrorism. This paper explains the origins and development of each of the three movements, noting the critical importance of domestic setting and social context in determining when Islamist movements opt for ballots or bullets, with strong implications for effective counter-terrorism and pro-democracy strategies.

Keywords. Democracy, Terrorism, Islamism, Islamists, Hamas, Hizbullah, Islamic Action Front, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine

Introduction

On November 9, 2006, suicide bombers set off explosives simultaneously in three crowded upscale hotels in the Jordanian capital, Amman. More than sixty people were killed, and hundreds wounded. While security officials at first feared that the attackers were themselves Jordanian, al-Qa'ida quickly claimed responsibility. The suicide bombers turned out to be ethnic Iraqis who had crossed the border, on the orders of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was at that time a leader of the al-Qa'ida movement in Iraq. Before the rubble had been cleared, massive anti-al-Qa'ida demonstrations were staged across the capital – organized in part by Jordan's indigenous Islamist movement: the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun), and its political party, the Islamic Action Front (Jabha al-'Amal al-Islami)¹. The horrid circumstances and the response by Jordan's largest Islamist organization underscored a marked difference in regional politics that is too little noticed: the difference, in short, between a global jihadist movement, on the one hand, and a democratically-minded domestic Islamist movement, on the other.

These differences are worth emphasizing; for while most Muslims are not Islamists, most Islamists are not militants. And even among those Islamists who do utilize

¹ Author's interviews in Amman, Jordan. May 2006.

violence to attain their political goals, there are differences between those that see themselves as global jihadists, and those that see themselves as part of a national liberation movement. Among Western countries, more attention has been paid to such militant organizations as al-Qa'ida, which may be too often falsely equated with groups like Hamas or Hizbullah. But are these latter groups themselves best seen as jihadist, or terrorist, or national liberation movements? Or is it possible to be more than one of these at the same time? And even if so, do they carry any potential to transform into political party organizations in the long term?

Failure to recognize the many distinctions noted above is reminiscent of early Cold War failures to see the differences between democratic socialists and revolutionary communists, between nationalist movements and global communist ones, and even between and among communist movements themselves. In many ways, the facile approaches that often marked Cold War debates are simply being reproduced: with Islamic fundamentalism replacing communism in the Western political lexicon, with similarly misguided and even disastrous results.

This paper examines the profound differences in tactical and strategic choices among Islamist movements; between those that pursue ballots and those that use bullets and more. Why do some movements use violence, while others are reformist and even comprise a major part of the grassroots pro-democracy movements across the Middle East? And regarding the latter, does access to elections and peaceful political activism serve to moderate these movements still further? Conversely, what types of circumstances seem to lead to greater radicalism and to the choice of bullets and bombs over ballots?

This paper provides a comparative analysis of three major Islamist movements in modern Arab politics: the Palestinian group Hamas, the Lebanese organization Hizbullah, and finally, the Jordanian Islamic Action Front – the political party wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. The three Islamist movements examined in this paper all share a common Islamist ideology in the broadest sense. They all believe that secularism has intruded far too much in regional political life and that secular regimes have squandered the rich cultural and religious heritage of Islam. They see the regimes that dominate the region as insufficiently Islamic and far too beholden to Western imperial powers. They all call for a more Islamic state and for the implementation of Islamic Shari'a law. Yet despite these general similarities in worldview, the three movements nonetheless emerged in very different structural circumstances, and have therefore made different choices regarding both means and ends.

Under the Jordanian monarchy, the Sunni Islamist movement retained its heritage of working with the royalists, as a loyal opposition, even through a series of domestic and external challenges to the security of the Hashemite state. Unlike more radical Wahhabist movements, most of the Islamist movement in Jordan has been rooted in the more mainstream politics of the Muslim Brotherhood. To the West of the Jordan river, in the occupied Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza, yet another offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood – Hamas -- rose to challenge not only Israel, but also the secular nationalist leadership of the PLO. In Lebanon, meanwhile, the Hizbullah movement emerged in the early 1980's to re-assert Shia rights within Lebanese politics, pursue an Islamic state in Lebanon, and above all, resist and reverse Israeli occupation of the largely Shia south.

1. Hamas in Palestinian Politics

Hamas was founded in 1987 by Sheikh Ahmad Yasin at the outset of the first Palestinian uprising – Intifada – against Israeli rule and occupation. The name of the organization is actually an acronym: *harakat al-muqawama al-islamiyya* (Islamic Resistance Movement) or HAMAS (which also happens to mean “zeal” in Arabic) [1]. From its very inception, Hamas posed a challenge not only to Israeli authorities but also to the main Palestinian nationalist movement: the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO leadership was mainly in exile in Tunisia and other locations, while Hamas was a grassroots organization based in the occupied West Bank and Gaza. The movement therefore rose to prominence through grassroots organization of daily demonstrations and acts of civil resistance against Israeli military forces. While the PLO had many supporters and activists on the ground in the territories, the main leadership remained more distant and in some ways struggled to gain control over the Palestinian rebellion itself.

In the years that followed, the rivalry between Hamas and the PLO – and particularly the latter’s main Fatah faction led by Yasir Arafat – only increased. While the PLO accepted a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, with the goal eventually of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, Hamas rejected this as a betrayal of the Palestinian people. In 1988, the PLO officially recognized Israel (as Israel, and no longer as the “Zionist entity”), renounced terrorism, and accepted a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For Hamas, the two state solution amounted to capitulation. In contrast, Hamas called for the end of Zionism and the Israeli state, to be replaced by an Islamic state in all of historic Palestine. They also refused to rule out violent resistance to Israel, including terrorism. Still, Hamas remained a diffuse organization, with multiple factions ranging from more moderate to more radical Islamists[2]. This internal diversity yielded over the years different statements regarding the movements goals, tactics, and methods. But in all cases the ultimate aim was certainly an Islamic state in all of Palestine: a goal at odds most obviously with Israel (and indeed with Israel’s very existence) but also with the secular nationalism and two-state agenda of the PLO.

Following the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords between Israel and the PLO, and the establishment in the occupied territories of a Palestinian administration – the Palestinian Authority (PA) – tensions rose again between Hamas and the PLO. This time Sheikh Yasin and his main deputy, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Rantisi, continually condemned the emerging corruption within the PA. In doing so they directly challenged the authority and administration of Fatah and Yasir Arafat. While Hamas attacked the PLO and PA for what they regarded as cronyism and corruption, Hamas itself continued to build its own grassroots network of charitable organizations, schools, medical clinics, and other civic organizations. In doing so, Hamas was able to draw on sources of financial aid that skirted the coffers of the PA. Many of the Gulf monarchies (especially Saudi Arabia) continued to resent the PLO alignment with Iraq during the 1991 Gulf war, and hence poured money into the treasury of Yasir Arafat’s main rival, Hamas.

With the collapse of the 2000 Camp David peace negotiations between Israel and the PLO, a second Intifada erupted in the occupied territories. With Fatah reeling from the failure of the peace talks, Hamas seized the initiative and pursued an explicitly violent strategy of suicide terrorist bombings within Israel, in an effort to end the Israeli occupation and presumably also to undermine the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority.

While the military wing of Hamas (the Izza ad-Din al-Qasem Brigades) chose suicide bombings as its main tactic, similarly the now-dissident militia wing of Fatah (the al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigades) also shifted to bombings and terrorist attacks. Israeli forces re-occupied West Bank locations that they had briefly left, and the intifada descended into a cycle of tit-for-tat violence with each perpetrator certain that he or she was retaliating for a specific attack from the other side.

Few observers hoped for a local source as the solution to this endemic violence, given that the respective leaders of Israel and the Palestinians were Ariel Sharon and Yasir Arafat. While Israelis considered Arafat to be a terrorist, Palestinians regarded Sharon as a war criminal. Arafat and the PA, meanwhile, had to deal with attacks from the Israeli military that were more often than not responses to Hamas or Islamic Jihad - not Fatah - bombings. Israel bombed and effectively destroyed the Palestinian security forces (under Fatah control) claiming these amounted to "terrorist infrastructure", even as Israel demanded that Fatah rein in Hamas. But each attack further weakened Fatah's security and governance capabilities and, comparatively speaking, strengthened Hamas.

With the death of Arafat in 2005, the stage was set for a new phase entirely in Palestinian politics. The election to succeed Arafat as President of the PA resulted in an easy victory for the new Fatah leader, Mahmoud Abbas (although Abbas was himself one of the most well-known old guard members of the Fatah leadership and a longtime veteran of the PLO). Many Hamas members voted for him out of solidarity in this new era, which seemed to hold the opportunity of a major peace settlement between Israelis and Palestinians, as well as reconciliation within Palestinian politics. But the peace process sputtered and shifted, in fits and starts, pushing more disaffected Palestinians to demand a more dramatic change. That change came with the January 2006 elections for the Palestinian parliament, which yielded a Hamas victory over Fatah for the first time [3]. Now, it seemed, Hamas had shifted from militant or terrorist movement to legitimate political party, like so many guerrilla or resistance organizations before it [4]. Ironically, this includes militant Zionist groups such as the Irgun and the Stern Gang whose members, after Israeli statehood in 1948, either merged into the regular Israeli army or became activists in the right-wing Likud political party. Hamas had in fact campaigned not as a guerrilla movement but as an anti-corruption political party, pledging to clean up government within Palestinian politics.

Unfortunately, the Palestinians received virtually no credit for running a free and fair democratic election. Instead, government officials in Israel, the United States, and many European countries focused on the election winners with extreme distaste, to say the least. Hamas was immediately cut off from many international aid sources as well as from tax revenues under Israeli control. The Hamas government was ostracized before it had issued a single policy directive. As its isolation grew, so too did unemployment, while those Palestinians who were employed in the public sector remained unpaid from the empty coffers of the PA.

To the chagrin and at times violent opposition of Fatah activists, Hamas formed the new Palestinian cabinet under its Prime Minister Isma'il Haniya. While Hamas controlled the Prime Ministry and all cabinet posts, Mahmud Abbas and therefore Fatah retained control of the presidency (which, under Arafat, had been by far the more powerful institution). Still, this split government remained in flux, with each wing claiming to be the more powerful, and the legitimate face of Palestine to the world. The struggle lasted a mere matter of months, before a single incident - typically, a violent attack - changed everything.

It may have been out of this context of increasing desperation that some Hamas militants reverted to their more familiar form: attacking an Israeli military outpost, killing several soldiers, and capturing or kidnapping one. This, in turn, led to a massive Israeli response, including the capture or kidnapping of four Hamas cabinet ministers as well as a bombing campaign against Palestinian government buildings and infrastructure. What followed was a far-too-familiar cycle of retaliation in the form of Israeli attacks in the West Bank and Gaza, and Hamas suicide bombings within Israel. Israel's policy of overwhelming force and collective punishment thus returned to the occupied territories, and within weeks would return with even greater force against Israel's northern neighbor, Lebanon.

2. Hizbullah in Lebanese Politics

Two weeks after the eruption of Hamas and Israeli violence, the cycle worsened still further, as the Lebanese Shi'ite Islamist movement – Hizbullah – also carried out a border raid, capturing two Israeli soldiers. The Israeli military response was massive, and in no way limited to Hizbullah or the group's south Lebanon bases. Rather, Israeli forces bombed locations throughout Lebanon, including the capital itself, killing almost 1,000 Lebanese civilians. Hizbullah's idea of a "solidarity act" toward Hamas seemed to have triggered an unexpectedly broad Israeli offensive, carrying with it the threat of a region-wide war as Israel and the United States both threatened Iran and Syria as well. Hamas and Israeli exchanges of violence also continued, to the point that it seemed hard to believe that merely months before, Hamas had assumed the role of civilian political party – and a successful one at that. Hizbullah, on the other hand, had attempted to expand its role to include activism as a civilian political party as long ago as the early 1990's [5].

Hizbullah first emerged in 1982 although, contrary to popular belief, it was not entirely the creation of Iran. Hizbullah remains, in fact, a Lebanese organization, albeit one with very strong links to Iran. The context of Hizbullah's emergence make both these points clear. Hizbullah was formed in the midst of Lebanon's horrific 1975-1990 civil war, and was also inspired and indeed supported by the then newly revolutionary regime in Iran. In 1982, the civil war had entered its seventh bloody year as Israeli launched its second invasion of Lebanon (the earlier invasion had occurred in 1978). Lebanon, meanwhile, had degenerated into sectarian violence. The Maronite Christian dominated regime was under siege by a broad coalition of forces that included most other Christian sects, Sunni Muslims, Druze, and the Shia. The PLO, representing several groups of guerrilla fighters and hundreds of thousands of refugees, also joined the fight against the Maronite government [6].

In this context the Shia were perhaps the most disaffected of all Lebanon's population groups. With a population grouped heavily in the impoverished south of the country, or in poor southern Beirut neighborhoods, the Shia were the least powerful and most neglected constituency in the country. But seven years into the civil war, many already disaffected Shia became still more disillusioned with the largest Shia party and militia – the Amal movement led by Nabbi Berri. These disaffected activists, supported by Iranian revolutionary cadres, together formed Hizbullah as an alternative to the perceived moderation of Amal [7].

Unlike Amal's goal of a non-confessional Lebanon (i.e. an ecumenical Lebanon no longer governed with specific reference to religious sect), Hizbullah's stated goal was

that of an Islamic Republic of Lebanon. But with the Israeli invasion the same year, Hizbullah also joined the national resistance to the invading Israeli army, especially as the southern-based Shia bore the brunt of the invasion. Hizbullah continued to fight the Israelis as an irregular or guerrilla force, using bombing tactics and perhaps even inventing suicide bombing in its efforts to win the struggle. Hizbullah was probably also responsible for suicide bombing attacks on French and U.S. forces that had intervened in the conflict in the early 1980's. These attacks included the 1983 destruction of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut that killed 241 marines. For the most part, however, Hizbullah focused on the Israeli forces, from 1982 until the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000. Hizbullah declared victory that year, and many Lebanese agreed with them. Even their many opponents in Lebanese politics, in short, credited Hizbullah with forcing the Israeli military withdrawal [8]. But the Hizbullah-Israeli conflict continued at slow burn across the border, with occasional rocket and missile exchanges. In 2006, as noted above, a Hizbullah attack on an Israeli army convoy triggered a larger-than-expected Israeli response.

Still, it is important to recognize that Hizbullah is also more than just a guerrilla movement or terrorist organization. It has a large militant or military wing, to be sure, and without question uses terrorist methods. Yet while that remains clear, Hizbullah also has a large political party that takes part in democratic elections, winning many parliamentary seats in the – until recently – reconstructed Lebanon. More importantly, Hizbullah has an enormous public works and charity wing, and sponsors medical clinics, schools, and other public services in the impoverished southern part of the country. These are not for the Shia alone, but are available to all Lebanese, including the country's large Christian population [9].

In dealing with Hizbullah, then, one must recognize it in all three of these forms. Israel's policy of bombing guerrillas in the south (and worse, bombing civilians throughout the country) was likely not only to fail to defeat Hizbullah, but also to make it stronger. Hizbullah was the only party to have failed to disarm its militia in Lebanon in the wake of the civil war and Lebanese reconstruction. Why? In the summer of 2006, amid direct negotiations with the leaders of all other Lebanese factions, Hizbullah's main leader Sheikh Hasan Nasrallah argued an armed Hizbullah was not a threat to a united Lebanon, but a deterrent to the threat of Israeli intervention. Given their geographic position bordering Israeli, and the weakness of the Lebanese regular army, Hizbullah argued that it must therefore retain its arms in case of Israeli attack. By promptly invading the country, Israel unwittingly confirmed all of Hizbullah's arguments, even if they had originally seemed dubious or self-serving.

While Israel and the U.S. government saw Hizbullah as merely a terrorist organization, many Lebanese and others throughout the region saw it increasingly as a legitimate national liberation movement. The Israeli assault in effect rehabilitated Hizbullah, making it and its leader, Sheikh Hasan Nasrallah, wildly popular throughout the region [10]. Surely that was not the intended outcome.

Meanwhile, officials in Israel and the U.S. continued to insist that much or all of the violence in Lebanon and Israel was actually the fault of Iran or Syria, arguing that these states control Hizbullah. But this is a gross, and potentially dangerous, oversimplification. Iran and Syria have influence over Hizbullah, and do support it, but it is not their puppet. It remains as much a Lebanese nationalist organization as it is a Shia Islamist group. Iran's Shia and Islamist government is a source of inspiration, as well as finances and arms, for Hizbullah, and the organization's leaders take Iranian viewpoints very seriously. Syria, meanwhile is the more local sponsor of the group, but

like the Syrian-Iranian relationship in regional politics, it is more a marriage of convenience. Syria's Ba'thist regime is resolutely secular and left-leaning. Its support for a militant right-wing Islamist group stems from its security interests: it gives Syria a hand in neighboring Lebanese politics and most importantly provides a source of pressure on Israel, which still occupies the Syrian Golan Heights. Supporting Hizbullah is a way of attempting to counter Israeli regional hegemony without direct Israeli-Syrian confrontation [11].

Thus while Syria and Iran have varying degrees of influence on Hizbullah, this should never be mistaken for control. Those that fall for the latter error mirror another common misperception in the region: that the U.S. controls Israel as a mere proxy for U.S. regional interests. This is a parallel fallacy. The U.S. does have influence, and it does support and supply Israel, but here too it does not control Israel. Unfortunately, these parallel fallacies have clear policy corollaries, leading many in Washington, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Damascus, Tehran, and elsewhere to opine that the "outside agitators" should simply flick the "off" switch on their local proxies. The fallacies thus turn quickly to fantasies. Yet these same parties are nonetheless deeply influential and remain key sources of material support – both in terms of finances and weapons. This implies, in short, that any really effort to halt Hizbullah-Israeli conflict would have to involve direct discussions amongst these parties – a sensible but unlikely event. Instead the violence on the ground only increased in intensity, bringing the war to steadily more civilian population centers in both Israel and Lebanon, and threatening to drag Iran, Syria, and the United States into an utterly unnecessary war.

This brings up another question, however. If diplomacy is essentially bypassed, can military force accomplish the goal of ultimately and paradoxically ending the violence and restoring security? The evidence suggests that the answer to this question is a resounding "no". Ironically, Israel's tendency to use massive retaliation and collective punishment has consistently strengthened its enemies. Israel's destruction of much Palestinian infrastructure and of Fatah capabilities paved the way for Hamas to grow steadily stronger and even win a democratic election from an increasingly desperate Palestinian population. Similarly, Hizbullah was a minor faction even within Shia politics until the Israeli invasion and occupation catapulted it over its Amal rival. The extreme circumstances undermined Amal's more moderate approach, while empowering the more militant Hizbullah.

It should therefore be no surprise whatsoever that Israel's 2006 massive bombing campaign and third invasion of Lebanon had the usual opposite effect from what was intended. The campaign to weaken or destroy Hizbullah did indeed kill many Hizbullah fighters. But it killed far more innocent civilians – Shia and Sunni, Christian and Druze. It destroyed 16 years worth of successful rebuilding efforts, led to the flight of tens of thousands of foreign residents, and made at least temporary refugees of 1 million Lebanese citizens. Predictably, this made Hizbullah resistance appear that much more heroic – not terroristic – to many throughout the entire region. Hizbullah became politically stronger even as it became militarily weaker. And its leader, the charismatic Sheikh Hasan Nasrallah became the focus of a virtual cult of personality throughout the region, even in areas not known for their love of the Shia. As with its previous invasions of Lebanon, or its hardline tactics more generally, Israel was in many respects winning the battles but losing the war.

The alternative remains unpleasant and distasteful in the extreme for all parties: direct discussions amongst the main backers of Israel and Hizbullah, at minimum. As noted above, however, it also remains sadly unlikely. But aside from the specific 2006

eruption of Hizbullah-Israeli fighting, is it possible for an Islamist movement to engage in a decidedly different pattern of behavior? Is it reasonable to expect that a fundamentalist movement could choose ballots over bombs or bullets? While Hamas and Hizbullah have each opted for a three-pronged approach that includes social work and charity as well as democratic and parliamentary politics, both have retained their militant or military wings. Yet in both cases there is an outstanding and in no way resolved structural issue of occupation and lack of sovereignty. If that feature is not part of the political landscape, the prospects for democratic Islamism are far brighter.

When Israel withdrew from its 18-year occupation of south Lebanon, Hizbullah pursued a steadily stronger campaign to alter its image within Lebanon. It maintained its role as self-proclaimed defender of south Lebanon and victor over the Israelis, but also pursued electoral and policy alliances with its former rival, Amal, and even with secular, leftist, and Christian political forces in the country. With Israel continuing to hold onto the disputed Shebaa farms region, and holding Lebanese prisoners, Hizbullah maintained its militia in the south, and thus the organization failed to make a complete transition from militant group to political party.

Similarly, despite its success as a political party in Palestinian elections in January 2006, Hamas never really had a single moment to consider a more complete transition. It may or may not have been likely, but we will now never know, since hostility from Israel and Western countries resulted in the new government's immediate ostracism from much of world politics. And ultimately, a violent incident – that may have been triggered by exiled Hamas leaders in Damascus rather than those actually attempting to assemble government in the West Bank and Gaza – brought the usual overwhelming military response. Still, despite the militant edge of both Hamas and Hizbullah, it is difficult to draw more generalizable conclusions about Islamists and more democratic approaches, since the more unique circumstance of occupation continues to intervene. That is precisely why the neighboring case of Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Action Front is so instructive. In many ways, the Jordanian case illustrates both the successes and some of the pitfalls of such a project: democratization and the moderation of Islamist movements.

3. The Islamist Movement in Jordanian Politics

The Islamist movement in Jordan may well be as old as the Hashemite regime itself. While not technically legalized until the 1990's, Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) maintained a functional relationship with the Hashemite monarchy especially throughout the reign of King Hussein (1953-1999), who tolerated the Ikhwan as a loyal opposition [12]. This *de facto*, if not *de jure*, relationship between the monarchy and its opposition was originally intended to provide a counter to left-leaning secular oppositional trends such as Ba'thism, Nasirism, and Communism, especially in the context of local and global Cold War dynamics. This allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to become by far the best organized group in the Jordanian opposition. It is also important to note, however, that beyond the Brotherhood, Jordan has a long tradition of independent Islamist activism in addition to that of organized groups such as the Ikhwan, or their contemporary political party: the Islamic Action Front (IAF) [13]. As in Lebanese and Palestinian politics, the broader Islamist movement can be found not only in political parties, but also in assorted charitable societies and professional associations [14].

In 1989, when the Hashemite regime began its program of political liberalization and elections for the lower house of parliament, the Ikhwan were therefore poised to reap the benefits of decades-worth of organization. To the surprise of many in the Hashemite regime, the Muslim Brotherhood secured 22 parliamentary seats (out of a total of 80), while independent Islamists won an additional 12 seats. With a bloc of 34 seats in parliament, the Jordanian Islamist movement was able to have one of its members, Dr. 'Abd al-Latif 'Arabiyat, elected Speaker of the House. Islamists were even invited into the government, taking several cabinet posts for the first time. But the regime also responded to the Islamist victories with a sweeping change of the electoral system: changing to a one-person one-vote structure with modified electoral districts. While the earlier system, which allowed Jordanians to vote for multiple MP's (depending on how many would represent the given district) had perhaps exaggerated Islamist strength, the new system was designed to do precisely the reverse. In the 1993 elections, which followed the legalization of political parties in the kingdom, the IAF secured only 16 parliamentary seats, while independent Islamists dropped to a mere 6 seats [15].

Following the drop in electoral strength in the 1993 elections, the Islamist movement demanded a repeal of the newer electoral system. They correctly argued that the districts themselves were unbalanced: over-representing more conservative, pro-regime rural areas, and under-representing more urban -- and more Palestinian -- areas that had provided key bases of support for Jordanian Islamism. With no change forthcoming, the IAF led the opposition in an 11-party boycott of the 1997 elections [16]. The resulting parliament naturally proved to be overwhelmingly conservative, nationalist, and pro-Hashemite. With only 6 independent Islamists in the new parliament, and none whatsoever from the IAF, Islamist strength and strategy shifted from parties and parliament, toward the professional associations instead. In short order, Islamist candidates won the leadership posts of almost every professional association in the kingdom (e.g. engineers, pharmacists, medical doctors), thereby creating a basis for Islamist political activism outside the halls of parliament, but very much within Jordanian civil society [17].

In 2003, after two years of postponements, Jordan held its fourth round of parliamentary elections since the start of the liberalization process in 1989. The 2003 elections were the first under King Abdullah II, and marked the return of the opposition to electoral politics. This time the IAF and the opposition parties eschewed the boycott tactics of 1997 and instead contested the elections, which were held under a new set of laws extended the number of parliamentary seats from 80 to 110, including a minimum of 6 seats to guarantee women's representation in parliament. 17 IAF members gained parliamentary seats (including Hayat al-Musani, who gained the first seat under the women's quota), along with 5 independent Islamists [18].

Jordan's parliament serves as a debating forum on major issues, but more often than not provides a majority of votes in favor of government initiatives. In this context, the IAF has had little recourse -- and certainly no success -- in achieving many of its main goals: implementing Sharia (Islamic law), preventing normalization of ties with Israel, and ultimately of abrogating the Wadi 'Arabah peace treaty entirely. On the other hand, the IAF has at times found itself allying with various other forces over shared concerns. The secular left and the religious right, for example, were united in opposition to the peace treaty with Israel as well as the anti-democratic measures periodically introduced by the government (especially regarding restrictive laws on elections, political parties, professional associations, and rights to organize political

demonstrations). Similarly, the Islamist movement in Jordan often united with secular left activists in their opposition to U.S.-style neoliberal economic policies imposed on Jordan by organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and indeed to the neoliberal development agenda of King Abdullah's regime. [19]

In the summer of 2005, the IAF deputies in parliament joined a broad coalition of parliamentarians threatening to vote against the installation of the newly-appointed government of Prime Minister Adnan Badran. The regime finally maneuvered its way out of the crisis, by reshuffling the cabinet again and removing some of the most polarizing figures, while also appointing others to ensure more representation from the largely Transjordanian south of the country (which had been a major complaint among southern Transjordanian MP's). The IAF, however, remained opposed to the new government, and voted accordingly, although most of the temporary anti-government coalition had by that time vanished and been co-opted to vote confidence in the new government [20].

As noted at the outset of this paper, in November 2005 al-Qa'ida suicide bombers struck three luxury hotels in central Amman, killing 60 people – mostly Jordanians – and injuring more than 100 [21]. The IAF and the Muslim Brotherhood were among the first to respond to the tragedy by organizing anti-al-Qa'ida demonstrations in the capital. But the Islamist movement in parliament soon found itself squaring off with the government again, following a major cabinet reshuffle. The new government reflected a regime that was very much in security-mode, with Ma'ruf Bakhit as prime minister (former ambassador to Israel and very much a security hawk). Similarly, conservative royalists retained the Speakership posts in both the lower house of parliament (under 'Abd al-Hadi al-Majali) as well as the upper house or senate (under former prime minister Zayd al-Rifa'i). Since security concerns had provided the pretext for a host of earlier deliberalization moves over the years, the IAF deputies in parliament urged the regime not to use the tragedy of the bombings as an excuse for new martial laws. The government, meanwhile, announced that counter-terrorism would be a key policy focus and called for "pre-emptive war" on militant forms of Islamism. While the IAF and Muslim Brotherhood remained by no means militant, they nonetheless feared that new security measures might be used against them.

In January 2006, the government arrested one of the IAF leaders, Jamil Abu Bakr, for "harming the dignity of the state" after he made charges regarding government corruption. The charges were later dropped. But in June 2006, following the killing in Iraq of al-Qa'ida leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, several Jordanian Islamist parliamentarians paid a condolence call on Zarqawi's Jordanian family in Amman. The MP's insisted that this in no way amounted to an endorsement of Zarqawi or al-Qa'ida, but instead remained simply a typical Islamic gesture of support for a bereaved family. The response of the Jordanian government, however, was swift and uncompromising, as the deputies were immediately arrested and charged with undermining national solidarity and security. They were convicted, and later pardoned, but the sense of an overall campaign of intimidation remained.

After many years of a kind of winking relationship between the Hashemite monarchy and the reformist (rather than revolutionary) Islamist movement in the kingdom, Jordan appeared to be turning a corner toward increasing repression of Islamism. Since this more coercive approach has invariably led to increasing radicalism and militancy in Islamist movements when employed elsewhere, the Jordanian stance was not only alarming, but also potentially self-defeating.

Conclusions

As the cases of the three Islamist movements examined here demonstrate, the political and social setting can greatly affect the ends and means pursued by Islamist organizations. While Jordan has at times suffered from Islamist terrorism, these attacks are mainly rooted in external and often al-Qa'ida linked militants; whereas the kingdom's indigenous Islamist movement has tended to be non-violent and a major proponent of democratic change and political participation. Hamas and Hizbullah, meanwhile, emerged in the context of Israeli occupation, and styled themselves as national liberation movements as well as Islamist organizations. In addition, both Hamas and Hizbullah gained momentum from the perceived failures of rival movements. Hizbullah gradually overtook the Shia Amal movement in Lebanon, as the country's largest Shia organization. Hamas, similarly, rose to challenge directly not only Israel, but also the more secular nationalist PLO. Hamas – like Hizbullah and the Islamic Action Front – ran as a political party in national elections on an anti-corruption platform. Clearly, this type of platform has a great deal of appeal when governing elites are perceived to be weak, ineffectual, and mired in corruption and cronyism.

Still, the Islamic Action Front remains more distinct from the other two organizations because it operates within a fully sovereign country, without the shadow of occupation or even of war with Israel (which is perhaps ironic, since the IAF opposes the 1994 peace treaty). Most importantly, unlike Hamas and Hizbullah, the IAF has no militant or terrorist wing whatsoever. While the IAF has been limited in its ability to achieve its aims (such as preventing the peace treaty), it nonetheless still pursues its various legislative policy goals, as a peaceful and loyal opposition within Jordanian politics. At present, activists in Hamas and Hizbullah assume that they have no such “luxury”. For either organization to shift ultimately away from its militant roots, toward exclusively its roles as social movement and political party, the external structural factors would have to be addressed. Terrorism is, after all, a method – albeit a violent and abhorrent one – for achieving political goals. It is therefore essential to provide Islamist and other opposition movements with the political space and opportunity to participate in public life and to achieve at least some of their more moderate political goals.

It is not accidental that, unlike Hamas and Hizbullah, the Islamic Action Front has no military wing. The Jordanian movement does not exist in the structural constraint of occupation, allowing it to focus on more moderate ends and means. This does not, of course, rule out all militancy or terrorism. Indeed, nothing can. And Jordan has been victimized by jihadist terrorism. Yet it remains striking that the majority of Jordanian Islamists remain committed to democratization and peaceful opposition – indeed, they appear to be more committed to liberalization than the regime itself. While the Jordanian state must attempt to curb and eliminate the threat of jihadist violence, it must also resist the temptation to use this as an excuse to counter the broader Islamist movement in the country. State repression would only drive more people into the arms of extremists, while discrediting the moderation of the majority of Islamists. Meanwhile – in Lebanon and in Israel and Palestine -- the focus must not be simply on stopping specific attacks, or even attacking the military capabilities of more militant Islamist groups. Rather, a real counter-terrorism strategy will strive to address the root causes in the first place. If those root causes continue to include occupation and lack of full national sovereignty, then all other counter-terrorism measures are doomed to fail.

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Social Causes of Terrorism in the Arab Society

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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to focus on the social causes of terrorists' behaviors and actions originated in the Arab society. It composes all social causes of terrorist acts whether it occurred in the Arab society or abroad as well. Moreover, it calls attention to the people in risk of becoming terrorism. This paper suggests that social causes of the terrorism in the Arab Society can be attributed to two major social deficits in the Arabs life: 1. Human development deficit within and between Arab societies, including but not limited to freedom deficit, knowledge deficit and the empowerment deficit, 2. Human security deficit (such as personal, environmental, economic, and political, community, and health and food security) in the Arab society. Terrorism can be seen as a social product of mutual interaction within societies (i.e., repression; inequalities, tortures; and violation of human rights... etc) and between societies (i.e., ignorance of the free world, support of the dictatorship, and monarchial regimes etc.) of these two deficits. Terrorism is the result of the failure to free people from fear and want within and between Arab societies and between Arab societies. The current social tension situation in the Arab society will open the social system to many changing forces which produce an unstable society with a countless number of angry people and terrorists. Those oppressed youth people will turn to violence and terrorism and do everything at their disposal to vent out their anger and frustration at these social systems.

Keywords. Social causes of terrorism, Arab society, human development, human security deficit.

Introduction

The emergence of the terrorism as global threats to the collective global security calls the attention to understand the original roots of its social causes. Issues related to terrorism, like the new terrorist forms (cyber terrorism; information warfare; possible chemical and nuclear terrorism) suiciders, youth recruitments, child and female terrorism (i.e., Terrorist Sajedah (Alzarkawi group), Amman-Jordan hotels terrorist event) - increase the need to look to the root social causes of terrorism, whether the terrorist event is a demotic; state; regional; global or transitional terrorism.

In the globalization era, no country is an isolated island. People and countries are virtually and physically connected, and mutually interdependent in all over the world, wither they are in rich countries or in poor countries. Societal changes have created new and unprecedented conditions for terrorism, such as a multitude of terrorists' targets, mobility, communications, anonymity, and large scale audiences of terrorism. This makes terrorism transitional and global problems that cross national borders

without permission. National, regional and global collective security cannot be achieved at a national level only.

Social causes of terrorism might answer questions like why do some individuals join a terrorist group? Why do terrorists commit a terrorist act? Why do terrorists act the way they do? Why do some individuals deviate from the social norms and embark on a career in terrorism? Why is one brother a terrorist and the other one is a very successful businessperson? Why do people kill themselves in order to kill the other people? Are the social structure and environmental settings in the Arab society producing terrorism? To what extent deficits in human development; human security and empowerment are responsible for the production of terrorism.

This paper deals with the social causes of terrorist behaviors and acts originated in the Arab society. Terrorists' acts are not limited to the acts occurred in the Arab society, but also to the terrorists acts abroad committed by Arabs. Terrorism, like any type of violence, occurs within society or between societies, it can prevail among all social status of society, whether deprived, poor, uneducated, unemployed, low class people as well as upper one, high class...etc. It is a transgenerational and transinstitutional behavior. In addition, it can be anywhere in the global, physical or virtual setting. It can occur in developing as well as developed countries.

1. The Arab Society

1.1. Demographic Profile

The Arab population is about 303.9 million in 2003; the Population size varies by country, Egypt has the largest population (68 million), followed by Sudan (31 million) and Algeria (30 million). At the other end of the scale, Qatar has a population of 565,000, and Bahrain, Comoros, and Djibouti have a population of less than one million each. In global terms, the Arab countries account for about 5 per cent of the world population. The age structure of the population is significantly younger than the global average, reflecting the large proportion (38 per cent) of children ages zero to 14 and the relatively small proportion of that age 60 and older (6%). The dependency ratio (the ratio of the economically inactive to the working age population, defined as those 15 to 64 years of age) is around 0.8, above the world average. Fertility rates have declined significantly in many Arab countries but are still high by international standards. High fertility rates are associated with rapid population growth. Among the Arab countries, population growth rates ranged from a low of 1.1 per cent in Tunisia to a high of 4.1 per cent in Yemen; of the 22 Arab countries, only Tunisia had a growth rate below the global average of 1.4 per cent. Population size, growth and age distribution can be either a demographic gift or a demographic curse, depending on whether countries can use the human potential represented by their populations well enough to satisfy people's aspirations for a fulfilling life [1].

1.2. Social and Cultural Profile

Arab society is considered to be a patriarchal system, where male has the authority and power over female due to his dominance of material and social resources. Men are considered strong, independent, not passionate and aggressive, while women is

considered weak, submissive, passionate and peaceful. The distribution of power in Arab family is hierarchic, where male are superior and women and children are subordinate. According to this system, violence in the family can be seen as practicing the masculine power to achieve power and control the family [2].

1.3. The Arab World

Another Arab family's characteristic is the family identification; ties and social network, where the individual participates within the group (family, tribe) in both happiness and sadness. The achievements are for all as well as the failures (blood ties and social ties). Therefore, problems that encounter the individual are faced with a collective responsibility especially when it concerns the status or the social prestige of the group such as murder crimes, rape and what is known as honor crimes. Honor is for all as well as the shame, and it is the responsibility of all to clean up the shame and disgrace of being victim of murder or honor crime. Restoring dignity of the family might take the form of revenge. Social stigma causes shame and disgrace to people. Individual might kill themselves (suicide) in order to restore family honor in the case of female ill-legal sexual behavior or the intentional murder of one of the family member. This can be generalized from the family to the social and cultural system. In this type of social system the prevalence of culture of shame rather than culture of responsibility. This can be attributed to the social membership and identification, and the collective sense of shame. The obedience and inferiority are based on gender and age; therefore, it is not rare to find that suicide is spread over more among females and youth compared to the other social categories. Because these social categories are less integrated [3].

The Arab family is a nuclear in its structure and extended in its functions, man's control is not only on woman and children but also on their social and financial resources. That is because man is responsible for providing financial support for his wife in exchange for her fidelity and her domestic services. The control of wife is not only a control of power and sex but also a control of finance. The honor of man is measured by the devotion of his wife, so if the wife deviates, (or female in general) restoring the honor is not the responsibility of the husband only, but the responsibility of family and tribe. Because of the severe social stigma to this kind of crimes, the social reaction to them is very severe and ends up by retaliation and sometimes by murder of the female victim.

The Arab social culture accepts the using some types of violence with the child or the wife as a kind of discipline, and this acceptance are supported as a custom. Hurting the individual or harming him (physically, sexually or emotionally) is not accepted religiously.

2. Terrorism: The Concept

The concept of terrorism varies and is inadequate. Most researchers neglect to define the term operationally other than citing the basic U.S. Department of State (1998) definition of terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience" [4].

The concept of terrorism as terrorize individual; group or state by another individual; group or state in a certain time and social setting is composed of nine elements: 1. Actor (individual, group, state), 2. Target (human, infrastructure, civilians, information), 3. Goal (political, social, religious) 4. Impact (national, regional, global) 5. Means (cyber-terrorism or physical). 6. Definer (victim vs. perpetrator) who defines terrorism attaches certain meanings depending on the side being taken. 7. Social setting Different social settings have different meanings of a certain action as legal action vs. terrorist action. 8. Time a terrorist action today might be considered as legal action in different time. 9. Place In one place people might consider an action as a terrorist action while other people might consider it a self-defence action. In the Arab society, authorities establish loosely-defined offences which, restrict the right to freedom of expression and increase the number of offences punishable by death and life imprisonment and give a free hand to the secret police agencies to exercise wide powers of arrest and detention and hold suspects incommunicado and without charge for interrogation for periods. In practice, detainees are denied access to lawyers and their families and to any independent witnesses to their treatment and conditions. Almost the security sector and the legal system exercise unlimited power over those they detain.

3. Social Causes of Terrorism

3.1. Human Development Deficit: The concept of human development

Human development is defined by HDR (1998) as a process of enlarging people's choices. Enlarging people's choices is achieved by expanding human capabilities and functioning. At all levels of development the three essential capabilities for human development are for people to lead **long and healthy lives**, to be knowledgeable and to have a **decent standard of living**. If these basic capabilities are not achieved, many choices are simply not available and many opportunities remain inaccessible. But the realm of human development goes further: essential areas of choice, highly valued by people, range from political, economic and social opportunities for being creative and productive to enjoying self-respect, empowerment and a sense of belonging to a community [5].

According to the Arab Development Report [6] Arab society suffers from three deficits with regard to the human development, these deficits are: 1. the freedom deficit; 2. the women empowerment deficit and 3. the human capabilities knowledge deficit relative to income. These deficits compose the core failure of human development in the Arab society.

3.1.1. Freedom Deficit Factor

Freedom is the center of human development itself. Or as Sen, (199) puts it in his well known book "Development as Freedom". Human development means to be free from want, hunger, etc. Human development means to enlarge individuals' choices by a free selection in the elections. In most Arab societies the colonial powers install ruler who friendly and well comply the Western governments, support their stay in power and ignoring all calls for reforms and change within the Arab society. Rulers remain in power until they die or are forcefully removed. Most regimes in the Arab society are

dictators, violate human rights, and govern by force transferring society to a military zoon or a big prison. Stockholm syndrome¹ can be applied to the Arab society situation. Citizen can be seen as hostages by the regimes security forces from all types covert and overt forces. Citizen are suffering from different threats to their existence, Citizen develop emotional attachment with the regime as means to endure the survival threatening fear they under. The relief resulting from the removal of the threats of death generates feelings of gratitude and fear to make the victim or the captive (citizen) reluctant to display negative feelings towards the regime and its forces. The citizen needs to survive is stronger than the feeling to hate the regime. Citizen detached from the outside support makes the regime the only available to them.

No denounce or condemn by the Western governments to the repression, violation of human rights, or inequality in the Arab society.

External political reforms are not welcomed by the Arab regimes and rulers due to the fact that they threaten and challenge their status queue. Arab regimes justify resisting external reforms by cultural specificity and national sovereignty and social dignity. They present these efforts as external aggression using the Iraqi situation as an example. Western governments fear that democracy might bring radical governments in the Arab society like Hamas. As a matter of fact and due to the limited choices people have in the Arab society. Arabs are forced indirectly to choose between two bad parties. The corrupted, dictator party represented by the authority and rules, whom experienced for a long time with oppression and violation of human rights. On the other hand a new radical party who experience as good in social services with a narrow ideology which might not fit the modern life. People choose the best alter nature choice available to them.

People in the Arab society are facing internal and external fears. They are squeezed in side their societies by their rulers and by the outsiders pressure and ignorance. Arab people fear their own governments and regimes. Arabs are entitled to enjoy freedom and to be free from fear. A culture of fear in the Arab society causes a cycle of violence and terrorism.

3.1.2. Equalities Deficit Factor

Equality of most rights is ensured for all citizens in the constitutions in the Arab society, with no distinction as to race, ethnicity, religion, or language. But Governments in the Arab society have created laws or modified laws and regulations that violate almost most human rights. Governments justify these violations as enforcement to the law. Another justification is that democracy is a Western phenomena and it is contradict the religion, social values and culture. Dictatorship controls the political life in the Arab society. Responsible and dissent opposition cannot develop and function and is driven underground and toward extreme. Almost half (7 out of 19) of the most repression regimes in the world are included in the region.

Inequality is a fundamental issue in human development and human security. Inequalities threaten social justice and social cohesion. As Adam Smith expressed the idea of inequalities " No society can be flourishing and happyOf which the far greater part of members are poor and miserable" [7]. Poor people are denied choice, opportunities, education, health and security. Poor people enter the market on unequal

¹ Stockholm syndrome refers to incident in Stockholm where four bank employees were held hostage in the bank's vault for 131 hours by two perpetrators. When the victims were finally freed, they expressed gratitude toward perpetrators for sparing their lives.

terms and leave it with unequal rewards. In Arab society inequality sharply varies within society and between Arab societies.

Terrorists have built a zero-order belief, and convinced that their rewards are not achieved in their lives, but later on the permanent life. According to Bandura [8] terrorists using four moral disengagements to insulate themselves from human consequences of their terrorists act:

1. Moral justification: They are fighting against the evil “the society is evil” the victims are the evil.
2. Displacement of responsibility on the leader or the member.
3. Minimizing or ignoring actual suffering of the victims (i.e., not seeing them, using time bomb).
4. Dehumanize victims by labeling and stigmatizing them as tools of the system pigs oppressors...etc.

Due to the lack of information and to the avoidance of negative evaluation and social labeling to the disapportunate and the poor, individual will conform to the terrorist group in order to get acceptance and belonging, it enhances individual commitment to the group's norms and validates their membership [9].

Table 1. Gender inequality in economic activity in the Arab society.

	Female economic activity (ages 15 and above)		
	Rate (%)	Index (1990=100) 2003	As % of male rate 2003
Developing countries	56.0	102	67
Least developed countries	64.3	100	74
Arab States	33.3	119	42
East Asia and the Pacific	68.9	100	83
Latin America and the Caribbean	42.7	110	52
South Asia	44.1	107	52
Sub-Saharan Africa	62.3	99	73
Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS OECD	57.5	99	81
	51.8	107	72
High-income OECD	52.8	107	75
High human development	51.1	106	71
Medium human development	56.4	101	68
Low human development	61.3	99	71
High income	52.5	107	74
Middle income	59.5	102	73
Low income	51.2	103	61
World	55.6	103	69

Source: UNDP Report, 2005

3.1.3. Knowledge Deficit Factor

People have the right to knowledge as a public good. Knowledge is a tool that enables people to enlarge their capabilities and widen their choices. It can liberate people and societies from human poverty. Arab society has fallen behind in acquiring knowledge. Knowledge is one of the major deficits impeding human development in the Arab society. Research in the Arab world is far from innovation. It has the lowest funding in the world. Research productivity is low (26 papers per million) in 1995 compared to 144 papers per million in Korea. Only 1.6 owns computers, 0.6% has the access to the internet and the expenditure on research is only 0.14% of the GDP in 1969. Illiteracy is prevalent among men and women and low girls enrollment and attendance in all educational levels. In this sense, one can say that half of the society is excluded. Educational system lacks relevance, mismatch between labor market and developmental needs [10].

Table 2. Gender inequality in education

	Adult Literacy rate		Youth literacy rate	
	(% ages 15 and above)		(% ages 15–24)	
	1990	2003	1990	2003
Developing countries	67.0	76.6	81.1	85.2
Least developed countries	44.2	54.2	57.2	64.2
Arab States	50.8	64.1	68.4	81.3
East Asia and the Pacific	79.7	90.4	95.0	98.0
Latin America and the Caribbean	85.1	89.6	92.7	95.9
South Asia	47.7	58.9	61.7	72.2
Sub-Saharan Africa	51.1	61.3	68.5	73.7
Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS OECD	98.7	99.2	99.7	99.5
Low income	50.2	60.8	64.4	73.0

Source: UNDP Report, 2005

3.1.4. Empowerment Deficit Factor

Empowering people is to secure their lives requires democratic governance (open, participatory, and responsible). A great proportion of the people in the Arab society are at risk of being recruiting in terrorism activities. This can be attributed to failure of empowering people in general and people at risk in specific. People at risk include but limited to: The least powerful members of the Arab society, the poor, marginalized and excluded categorizes. The lack of men and women empowerment, participation in political and economic sectors is another cause of insecurity and a driving cause to terrorism. Adding to that the high unemployment rate (rate 15-30%) which pushes people to the excluded edge, the attractive target for terrorism recruitment.

Deficits in freedom, education, human rights good governance, basic needs...etc. prevent people empowerment. Deficit in empowerment of individual level, which leads to incomplete socialization with the social norms and values and excluding individual from the social system and alienating which create a low self-control. According to Gottfredson and Hirschi, low self-control is evident in early childhood through specific

personality characteristics, such as an inability to postpone gratification, a low tolerance for frustration, and a tendency to engage in high levels of risk-taking behavior. Self-control develops through parental emotional investment in the child, monitoring the child's behavior, recognizing deviance when it occurs, and punishing the child. Parental emotional investment is necessary in order to activate the three forms of parental management [11].

Good health is intrinsic to human security. Human survival and good health is the core of security. Health permits human choice, freedom, and development. Poor health, illness, injury, disability and death are threats to security.

International evidence that lack of empowerment correlated to the transnational crimes (terrorism) can be seen in Friday's findings. An index of organized crime is significantly correlated with the Human Development Index (-0.69) and with Gross Domestic Product (-0.69), Education (-0.52), and democracy (-0.36). It is positively related to unemployment (0.34) and poverty (0.56) and with the high level of corruption (0.7230) (pp10-11) [12].

One of the terrorism risk factors associated with the demographic factors is the youth characteristic of the Arab society. Youth (under 15) is accounted for nearly 40% of the population. A striking fact is that terrorist recruit youth people for several reasons: their physical fitness, and most important their psychological stage of development. This stage is marked with instability, unconformity, low self-control, and crisis. Youth is easily persuaded to involve in the terrorist thoughts, ideas, beliefs; values and acts. Terrorist energize youth to revenge from repressed society. They build a zero-order belief which is taken for granted by youth that the real life is in the day after, and current life does not deserve putting too much effort in it. Moreover, youth squeeze in the society and become alienated and excluded. Taking into consideration their parental rearing style which is authoritarian accompanied by over-protection, youth is less integrated and lack social investment (no job or no family). Not surprisingly, that the highest social category in committing suicide is youth and females [13]. Demographic factor affects the standard of living especially the inactive economic population (youth and women) which makes this social group attractive to the recruitment of terrorism.

Frustrated youth in the Arab society can be recruited to terrorism as a response to the frustration of various political, economic and personal needs [14]. Taylor (1988) characterizes terrorist's demography as being in their early twenties and unmarried. Age in the 16- to 17 year-old age. Laqueur notes that Arab and Iranian groups tend to use boys aged 14 to 15 for dangerous missions [15]. Young people might develop a negative identity [16] (Knutson, 1981) as a result of their disappointment by the failure of their aspiration to attain their goals; as a result they assumed a negative identity by becoming a terrorist [17].

4. Human Security Deficits

Human security was first used in UNDP 1994, HDR and was defined as "freedom from fear and freedom from want". It has seven forms: personal, economic, political food, health, environmental, community security). Failure in all aspects of human development can be seen as input in the human security deficit.

4.1. Fear factor

In the Arab society fear is a day life meal for most citizens. Fear of the future, fear of the authority, fear of secret service, fear of the police, fear of speech and expression, almost fear of everything surrounding people. People are forced to be loyal to the regime. People cannot feel free if their nation is threaten or used force against them. Arab states are threat in itself to the security of its citizens. Arab states misuse and abuse the power against its citizens.

A democratic system of government is frequently associated with lower likelihood of internal political violence and terrorism. It will not produce terrorism. Based upon freedoms, openness and popular participation, democracies tend to enjoy greater legitimacy among their population – hence dissatisfaction rarely reaches a level of serious threat to the existence of the regime itself. In addition, democratic systems have various alternative channels for expression and influence through which potential frustration and dissatisfaction can be directed.

In the Arab society, national or homeland security is equated with the regime security in specific the ruler security. Loyalty to the nation is equated with loyalty to the ruler. All types of security forces (covert or overt) tasks and job to maintain the security of the regime first. Security forces covered in its work all locations within society, informal origination in private sector in all places where people might be available, they will be there. The main issue of security in the Arab society is preventing citizens from criticizing the regime. The war on terrorism is equated also with the security of the regime in indirect way (attempts to throw the regime). In some societies there are laws that prohibit people from criticizing the regime. Job applications need people are alienated in their societies. Security approval prior to the job involvement. Individuals who are member of previously members of opposite political parties are denied the work in the public sector.

Human rights violations in the Arab society vary, it includes and not limited to torture, police abuse and reported mistreatment of detainees, arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention, instances of impunity, denial of due process of law, limited judicial independence, infringement on citizens' privacy rights, harassment of members of opposition political parties, restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, movement, and on some religious practices, legal and societal discrimination against women, discrimination, restrictions on labor rights and abuse of foreign domestic workers. Preventing and disallowing political and human rights activists from renewing their passports, and denial of citizenship.

Literature on the Cycle of violence suggests that abused children grow up to be abusing parents and violent adults have been widely expressed in the family violence literature [18]. One review that examined self-reports of the intergenerational transmission of violence toward children concluded that the best estimate of the rate of intergenerational transmission is 30 percent [19]. Physically abused and neglected children are at risk of becoming violent offenders when they grow up [20]. Evidence from studies of parental and marital violence indicate that, although witnessing or experiencing violence by caregivers in one's family of origin is often correlated with later violent behavior [21]. Abused children will identify with the abuser, and individuals enact the same violent behavior as their abusers, because this behavior enables them to eschew the feelings of powerlessness that they experienced as children [22, 23 and 24]. Knowing that occurrence of terrorism in one generation will extend to

another generation, from family to society, from one organization to another and from one country to another.

Corruption, face value democracy, lack of empowerment, order by force, violation of human rights, check points between cities, are common and shared characteristic of the Arab political (system). No legal way to seize power in the Arab society. Artificial election with (99.9%) in favor of the ruler result is a common result in the Arab election, and in some cases people who decide to be in opposite as a competitor to the ruler, he/she will be accused with anything to put him in prison (i.e., Ayman Noor, Egypt). Arab rulers rely on a religious legitimacy or spatial or charismatic personality instead of public legitimacy. That is to say that they have been selected by God not by human beings. The symbolic association with religion will be taken for granted as a zero-order belief by society. Rulers are "gifts" of God. They are over the law and therefore no one in society can judge or accuse or criticize them.

The lack of or absence of participatory, transparent, effectiveness, equitability, rule of law and accountability of the government increase fragmentation and alienation in Arab society, which leads to violence and terrorism.

State legitimacy enables state to enjoy popular support and that the citizens consider the rule to be rightful and proper. Legitimacy has many sources to be found in legal traditions, norms, history, ideology, personal characteristics, and in functional factors like efficient rule and satisfaction of needs. Legitimacy also involves the capacity of the system itself to engender and maintain popular belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society.

The conditions for the emergence of terrorism are most favorable in countries where the public is fragmented into several opposing groups, polarized on a dimension ranging from acceptance to rejection of the state. Engene focuses on three main challenges to state legitimacy: unsolved ethnic demands; problems of continuity in the development of democracy, and problems of integrating politically marginalized groups. All these factors are prevailing in the Arab countries and are seen as a direct cause of terrorism [25].

4.2. Want Factor

Regardless of the wide agricultural variation and richness of the Arab world, most basic needs (i.e., food and water) are not satisfied in the Arab Society. Basic needs insecurity threatens the existence physical existence of people. Reliance on the outside supplier for food and water threatens the security. In the Arab culture poverty is justified by religion. It is a God's test to the poor people's tolerance. The real poor are one who is the poor in the day after. The culture of accountability is absent "where did you get that from?" People no longer accept to be ignored and excluded from their societies. People are pushed to other avenues (i.e., terrorism) to escape from poverty, inequality suppression and take terrorism as mean to revenge from the regime and society as a whole.

Young people in the Arab Society feel that their future is uncertain. People turn to the supernatural and to religion as solutions to their predicaments. Mosque attendance has increased when all other avenues are closed, people turn to the religion as a protector from expected and unexpected threats. Approval of the secret agencies is required to the pre-written speeches in mosques. The internet provides excellent alternative to express thoughts and to collect funds and to terrorists.

In conclusion fear and lack of freedom drive people to external and alternative power to protect them and restore their dignity. One open channel might be terrorism, where the ability to challenge the regime power and avoid being victim of the suppression.

High levels of organized crime are also highly correlated with corruption at both the bureaucratic and high government levels. The index of corruption was based on data from the World Bank Institute [26] and included distortions resulting from lobbying groups, likelihood of biased judicial rulings, perception of the relative value of procurement contracts paid for bribes and the prevalence of "state capture" of funds. Corruption is highly correlated with low levels of human development and high levels of poverty and a tax system that is prone to evasion. It is negatively correlated with an independent judiciary. Transnational and organized crime functions best in areas of political instability [27].

Conclusion

Terrorist behavior is a learned behavior through incomplete socialization process, reinforced by social and environmental setting. Empowering people at risk and improving living standards, expediting opportunities for health, education, work and building the institutions needed to deliver real democracy are the first line of defence against terrorism. Rejection of terrorism and socially stigmatize terrorism are achieved when people are free from fear and want. Poverty is number one threat to security. Violation of human rights is the trigger to the involvement in terrorist acts.

Encountering terrorism and terrorism thoughts in the Arab society needs an understanding to the personal, social, environmental and cultural factors producing terrorism in society. Freedom and democracy are essential tools in the fight against terrorism. Measures to encounter terrorism should fully respect international standards of human rights; the rule of law and human rights. Social, economic, political response to terrorism should be first.

In the Arab society, terrorists come from a selected, at risk population, who has suffered from early damage to their self-esteem. With incomplete socialization, poor marginalized, social, economic and political inequality. Living in a community with lack of human development, and lack of empowerment. Terrorism is not an individual choice only; it is a group and social production of multi-factors in the social system. Individuals who become terrorists often are youth, males, unemployed, poor, politically inactive, insecure, socially alienated individuals, low self-control. Social system with limited channels of expression and participation, closeness with no protection to human rights will produce terrorists. As a group, people appear to have been unsuccessful in obtaining a desired traditional place in society, which has contributed to their frustration. The underlying need to belong to a terrorist group is symptomatic of an incomplete or fragmented psychosocial identity.

The free world has to face this reality: either ease the pressure and discontinue supporting absolute dictators' regimes in the Arab society, or face a countless number of angry people. Those oppressed and youth will turn to violence and terrorism and do everything at their disposal to vent out their immense anger at the external world countries that support these cruel rogue regimes. In conclusion all causes of fear and want in the Arab society will be the causes of future terrorism.

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Terrorism and Migration in Turkey between 1992 and 1995

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Abstract. This study tests the effects of terrorism on domestic net-migration in Turkey, especially in the terror infected provinces of the Eastern and South Eastern regions of the country between the years 1992 and 1995. In order to explore the real impact of terrorism on immigration, it used “terrorism incident rate” and the “rate of people and security forces killed” as independent variables. Also, it included the major economic effects of migration into analyses. Results of the control-series regression analysis show that the net-migration in high terrorism incident provinces is higher than the net-migration in other provinces. Findings also confirm that there was a positive relationship between net-migration and terrorist incidents during 1992-1995, when the number of terrorist incidents hit its all time highest level. Moreover, results confirm that net-migration is positively related to the number of “people and security forces killed”. In addition, economic variables, such as GDP and unemployment also related to net migration. Findings also confirm that population density and distance were related to net-migration.

Keywords. Terrorism, Migration, PKK, Turkey, Affests of Terrorism.

Introduction

Unlike the other terrorism related studies, this study will not examine the causes of terrorism, but focuses instead on the social impact of it. It examines the affects of terrorism on people by examining the relationship between terrorism and migration. Specifically, it studies the impact of terrorist incidents on migration in provinces with especially high terrorist incident rates, specifically in the East and Southeast parts of Turkey. In order to investigate terrorist incidents’ impact on people’s motivation to migrate, it utilizes annual “net-migration rates,” “terrorism incident rates,” and specific economic indicators of those provinces between 1992 and 1995.

Besides the physical effects, terrorism has also psychological impacts on people that can cause political change [1, 2, 3]. “Fear of terrorism” is one of its major effects. Fear and future uncertainty, as a result of terrorism, may motivate people to leave their home towns. Intensity and duration of this motivation will depend on the environment created by the terrorists and the terrorist incidents. Currently, there are more than a million people moved out their terrorism infected home towns in Turkey. This number is a good indicator of the relationship between terrorism and recent migration patterns. Studying this social result of terrorism is important and can help us to better understand another important impact of terrorism on our society.

1. Background Information: Conflict & Migration

The Anatolian people lived together for more than ten centuries, so they have a common past, creating a Turkish identity [4]. Rather than ethnic minority rights, the Turkish constitution is based on civic rights. It accepts civic nationalism, but not ethnic nationalism. In the Constitution, the term “Turkish” refers to being a Turkish citizen, and does not reflect any ethnicity. The 1982 constitution (article 66/1) states that “any person who is connected to the Turkish State throughout the link of citizenship is a Turk.” Turkish citizens of Kurdish ethnic origin reside throughout the country and can take part in all walks of economic, social, and political life on equal grounds with other Turkish citizens. There have been senior officials of Kurdish origin in the Ottoman administration and in senior governmental positions of the present Republic of Turkey.

Kurds from the East and Southeastern part of Turkey, where we find underdevelopment and often poor economic conditions, have often migrated to the cities in west part of the country. Since the 1980s, with the appearance of more nationalist militant movements and the authoritarian response by the state, living conditions of the people of these regions have deteriorated [5]. The region is home to 1.947 million families, 14.5% of all families nationwide with 10.2% of the national income [6]. It is also a geographically uninviting place to live. More than half of the land in the region is higher than 1000 meters. The region as a whole has a harsh terrestrial climate. And most importantly, it suffers from the terrorism for a few decades. Therefore, it might be concluded that migration is not related to being of Kurdish origin, but to the economic conditions and the armed conflict.

2. Problem

During the Cold War years, Turkey witnessed waves of terrorist activities. These activities continued throughout the 1990s. During 1990s, even though terrorist activities had decreased in most regions throughout the country, they had dramatically increased in the East and Southeast region(s). Separatist terrorist organization Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL, PKK here after) was the primary terrorist organization in the region. It was established as a Marxist-Leninist political party in 1978 [7]. However, after its class-based characteristics were discovered, it lost the sympathy with foreigners and has since changed its image to that of a Kurdish nationalist organization [7, 8]. In order to achieve its aims, PKK performed violent acts aimed at the people in the region. It tried to wipe out the ruling power of the state in the region and was successful in preventing investments that were essential for the region’s economic and social development [9].

During the early 1990s the PKK increasingly widened its area of influence by attacking and killing both security forces and civilians, including unarmed villagers, civil servants, doctors, teachers, and even mayors [4, 6]. Among those civilians, most were Kurdish descendent and were accused of collaborating with the state. Also, roadside explosions, land mines or other improvised explosive devices in the provinces of the region occurred regularly. In response, the Turkish National Police (TNP) and armed forces waged an increasingly intense war against terrorism and targeted persons that they believe supported with the PKK.

In 1993-1994, PKK was at its peak with 10,000 estimated forces. It instigated about 21,866 terrorist actions between 1984 and 2000 [10]. In these incidents, 5,546

security guards, 4,561 citizens, and 18,958 terrorists died. It caused significant destruction in the East and Southeast of Turkey. It also targeted the country's economic infrastructure. It has attacked pipelines and other government investments in the southeast and selectively bombed hotels, restaurants and tourist sites [6]. However, its estimated total strength inside the country declined after 1999 when its leader was captured at the Greek ambassador's residence in Nairobi, Kenya [8].

All these terrorist incidents made people fearful about living in the region. In addition to creating fear, the high number of terrorist incidents impacted economic activities and investments in the region. For instance, villagers of the region could not be allowed to drive their animals far from their residences. This restriction caused economic difficulties because it limits the main economic engagement of the regional people. Thus, during 1990s, increasing number of terrorist incident in the region caused not only "fear" and "future uncertainty" but also economic difficulties, which might have motivated people to leave the region. As a consequence, many people from the region left their places of origin and tried to start a new life either around big cities in the region or in the western part of the country. For most of them, leaving their places of origin was either inevitable or mandatory.

The purpose of this study is to find out if there is a relationship between migration patterns and terrorist incidents in provinces of Turkey, especially those located in East and Southeast regions, infamous for terrorism related killings, bombings, waylays, and kidnappings, during the period of 1992-1995 [11, 12]. According to push-pull model, which explains migration as a consequence of all factors at the origin and the destination, there can be many push and pull forces other than the economic ones [13]. Push-pull model can explain all impacts on migration decision [14, 15, 16, 13]. After reading the literature about push-pull forces of migration, it is suggested that a "security need" could be one of the push forces, that cause people to leave their home towns [17, 18].

Therefore, this study is going to try and determine if the terrorist incidents had any push effect in net-migration patterns in Turkey, especially in Eastern and Southeastern regions. The study will control for economic related pull forces. It will focus on the impact that a number of extremist incidents in Turkey have had on motivation to leave their provinces. If any relationship between the terrorism related incidents and migration patterns is found, affectivity of those incidents will also be measured.

2.1. Research Questions

- Is there a relationship between terrorism and net-migration in Turkey?
- What influence does the terrorism related incidents have on inclinations to leave the cities within terrorism infected [Eastern and Southeastern] provinces of Turkey?

3. Literature Review

The migration literature is very huge in size, so it is difficult for this study to offer a complete review of it. The information in this part is the basis for the hypotheses of this study. It will concentrate on the relationship between terrorist incidents and migration patterns. Since there is a scarcity of migration literature directly related to terrorism,

migration literature related to conflict, chaos, and violence are given special importance.

To make the conceptual variables easier to understand, this study will divide variables into groups (table 1): terrorism, conflict and violence related; economy; and other. As is mentioned in hypotheses, this study hypothesizes that there is a positive relationship between migration and terrorist incidents. It may be a direct relationship as it is going to be mentioned in hypotheses 2 and 3 or an indirect one as is going to be mentioned in hypotheses 4 and 5.

Table 1. Selected literature related with migration and refugee movement.

SELECTED LITERATURE RELATED WITH MIGRATION AND REFUGEE MOVEMENT			
TYPES	VARIABLES	REFERENCE	RELATION
T E R R O R & V I O L E N C E	Corpses found, Casualties (killed or wounded people), Assassinations, & Executions	Baragaber (1997), May and Morrison (1994), Moore and Shellman (2002);	-(.05) / + (.1) + +
	Afraid of deprivation of life, Fear of terror and persecution, Insecurity, Threat, & Violence	Stanley (1987) Baragaber (1997), Moore and Shellman (2002, 2004a) Kernot and Guring (2003);	+ + + +
	Sum of terrorist incidents, riots & guerrilla attacks	Moore and Shellman (2002);	+
	Conflict, Civil War, & War	Goodman (1975), Ritterband (1978), Cohen (1988), Schmeidl (1995, 1997);	+ + + +
	Likelihood of an individual to be a victim	Moore and Shellman (2004b);	+
E C O N O M I C	Wage, Earning, & Income	Sahota (1968), May and Morrison (1994), Carlos (2002), Moore and Shellman (2004b);	-(destination) + + +
	Size of the economy	Moore and Shellman (2002);	+
	General Economic Conditions	Stanley (1987); Schmeidl (1997);	-
	GNP & GDP	Sahota (1968), Atalik and Ciraci (1993), Moore and Shellman (2002, 2004b)	+ + +
	Poverty	Pendleton (2001);	+
	Income Desperation	Sahota (1968)	-
	Industrial workforce & Electricity consumption	Atalik and Ciraci (1993), Pazarhoglu (2001);	+ +
	Employment & Unemployment	May and Morrison (1994), Pazarhoglu (2001), Carlos (2002);	+ + +
O T H E R	Geographic distance & economic, psychic, or transaction cost of relocation,	Sahota (1968), May and Morrison (1994), Moore and Shellman (2002), Moore and Shellman (2004b);	+ + - +
	Density of population	Sahota (1968);	+
	Urbanization & Industrialization	Sahota (1968)	+
	Literacy rate	Sahota (1968);	+
	& Education	May and Morrison (1994), Pazarhoglu (2001);	-(destination) +
	Number of Doctors per Capita	Pazarhoglu (2001)	+

Studies related with migration mostly focused on voluntary migration, with very little emphasis on the event of necessary or involuntary population movements. Some

scholars criticized migration theories for not including the involuntary migration and added in involuntary migration along with overall migration [19]. Even so, the central focus of broad-spectrum migration theories is on voluntary population movements [14, 15, 20, 21, 22]. As a voluntarily profit seeking movement, economists are interested in migration. They mostly relate the causes of migration with the mobility of labor force for better employment and income opportunities [15, 21].

However, avoiding conflict, violence or disaster is also a basic need for human-beings [17]. After the cold war era in late 20th century, many causes forced people to migrate out of their homes as refugees. Some authors began to support the dominance of the refugee practices as a model of displacement [19]. Unlike the voluntary migrants, involuntary migrants must accept the loss of houses, tools, lands, and rights [23]. Moreover, as will be mentioned in hypothesis 4, an armed conflict may be a cause of economic collapse through the destruction of the economic structures. It may also result in a decline of the public services and infrastructures which may also impact negatively on the functions of economic consistency, so it also impacts the economy causing new conflicts. Ultimately, unmet essential needs forced people to migrate in an attempt to get them met [17].

During the times of conflict, an environment of violence is the main cause for people to flee their homes (hypotheses 2 and 3). According to Boano [23], violence threatens the individual's sense of security, which is a basic need for people. They point out that the level of violence is related to the level of apparent threat. Thus, individuals assess the level of violence to decide their future moves. The level of violence is an important variable in determining the causes of migration. In order to indicate the level of violence this study uses a number of terrorist incidents as will be mentioned in the hypotheses.

Still, the number of studies examining the level of violence as an indicator for out-migration is limited. However, a few authors have made a distinction concerning the types of violence [24]. According to them the types of violence have different results on migration flows. Whereas the types of violence are different, the theories used by the violence related migration studies are almost all the same. They all utilize the "push and pull" model as a theory to understand migration patterns.

In their study, May and Morrison [11] focused on the impact of political and economic factors on internal migration within Guatemala from 1976 to 1981. They explore the constant violence in Guatemalan politics and examined the impact of that violence on migration between 1960 and 1985. Similar to the second and third hypotheses of this study, they hypothesized that violence shaped migration flows. Their statistical results supported their hypothesis.

In their study, Davenport [24] explored reasons for being "internally displaced persons (IDP) or a refugee". They claimed that the main reason for fleeing from their home was the threat of personal integrity. They performed a least square analysis on a pooled cross-sectional time-series (PCTS) data from 129 countries for 1964–1989 and measured the following: state threats towards individual integrity, dissident threats towards individual integrity, and (state and dissident) joint threats towards individual. As a dependent variable, they used net-migration data, the difference of emigration and immigration, reported by the United States Committee on Refugees. The authors found that the more a distinct type of conflict occurred, the more likely individuals were to view them as threats to their safety and leave their home. Other findings indicated that shifts toward democracy increased conflict due to changes in policies.

In their article, Moore and Shellman [25, 42] declared that the main reason people abandoned their homes for an uncertain life elsewhere was “fear of persecution” in other words, violence. Their study was unclear about IDPs and did not mention the people who relocated inside the state because of violence. However, their study still provided a good understanding of the impact of fear of persecution (or violence) on migration. They found that the impact of the dissident violence on forced migration was clear. The violent behavior of both dissidents and governments were key indicators of forced migration flows. In addition to fear of persecution (or violence), institutional democracy and income both have an impact on the size of forced migration flows; however, their affect was comparatively small. Therefore, rather than the pull factors, the push force of violence, drove the process.

Gian Sahota [26] tried to answer the question, “Why do people leave their homes?” In order to find the reasons, he looked at the rationality of typical migration decision, and sought the incentives of those decisions. His study looked at the interstate migration within Brazil. Because there were many differences among the states of Brazil in terms of living conditions, economic opportunities and structures, and growth rates, he looked at the issue from an economic angle. However, he also tried to find out if there were non-economic factors, like belonging to a particular group. According to his findings, density as a pull force for destination had a gravitation effect on migrants, with an elasticity of 0.93 for the middle-aged migrants and 1.35 for the young migrants. Distance was highly significant with a negative sign meaning it was deterrent to migration. Education was also significant both in the origin region and the destination region. Moreover, industrialization was significant, but only for the middle aged group. Urbanization was not significant for the destination region; however, it was significant for the origin region for both of the age groups. In sum, according to Sahota, internal migration in Brazil was highly related with earning discrepancies.

Atalik and Ciraci [27] looked at the impact of regional differentiations in Turkey on internal migration. They used net migration rate, as a dependent variable, between 1980 and 1985, and they attempted to measure the impact of per capita GNP, population, density of population, the population growth rate, industrial workforce, distance, and literacy rate on net migration. Their regression analysis showed that the most important indicator of net migration was per capita GNP.

Yamak and Yamak [28] also examined internal migration patterns in Turkey by using data from all (67) provinces and found a statistical relationship between internal migration and income in Turkey between 1980 and 1990. According to their results, income inequalities between provinces were the major actor of internal migration. According to their results, high wages in in-migrating provinces were the main reason for internal migration.

Pazarlioglu [29] created a domestic migration model for Turkey. He used time-series data from 1980, 1985, and 1990. According to his study, migration is based on population, economics, environment, political problems, and wars. He hypothesized that the following were among the major reasons for internal migration: increasing population, developing farming technologies, decreasing farming lands, as in Bolu in West Black Sea region, industrial and transportation developments, unemployment, and conflict in the Southeast region.

Finally, he concluded that (9) of the provinces, under emergency rule, were directly affected by terrorism problems. This resulted in using a discrete variable to differentiate those provinces from each others. Despite his efforts, his study did not find

a relationship between terrorism and migration patterns due to data limitations. He found that migration in Turkey was mostly economical.

4. Research Design

In order to answer the research questions, this study is going to use secondary data and conduct a quasi experimental design. The intention is to find a relationship between terrorist incidents and citizens inclinations to migrate from the South East region of Turkey. A multiple regression analysis is going to be performed. In this study, the time frame for the analysis is going to be 1992-1995. The unit of analysis is going to be provinces of Turkey, especially the ones with high terrorism incidents located in the East and Southeast regions of the country.

Net-migration rate is going to be used as dependent variable to find out inclinations to leave the area. Independent variables are going to be the number of terrorism related incidents and casualties (the number of people killed and the number of security forces). Additionally, as in push-pull model, there are going to be some economic (control) variables that are going to be used to avoid associating incorrect explanatory power to some of the independent variables [30]. Those variables are going to be as follows: density of population (per square km), GDP per person, unemployment rate, and average distance to industrialized provinces.

4.1. Hypotheses

H₀₁: there is no difference in net-migration between the areas with high terrorist incidents and low terrorist incidents.

The aim of this hypothesis was to check if there was a significant difference in net-migration between areas with high terrorist incidents and low terrorist incidents. As was mentioned earlier, high terrorist incidents may effect motivation to leave the areas [11, 17, 25]. To check this hypothesis, this study is going to look at the migration difference between high terrorist incident (region A) provinces and low terrorist incident (region B) provinces. Since the provinces of East and Southeast region of Turkey is 25-30% of all provinces, it is thought that choosing the top 25% of the high terrorist incident provinces can also reflect Eastern and Southeastern provinces. In order to select "region A" (high terrorist incident) provinces, all provinces are arranged in descending order by their rate of total terrorism related killed people and their rate of terrorist incidents. Then, the first 21 chosen provinces are called "region A" and others are called "region B" provinces. A significant difference in "net-migration rate" between regional groups will support the hypothesis.

H₀₂: there is no relationship between net-migration and terrorist incidents.

This hypothesis was derived from the literature [11, 12, 31, 24, 25, 32, 42]. To find out if there is a relationship between net migration rate and terrorist incidents, a multiple regression is going to be performed. In order to manage other impacts on net-migration control variables from the literature are going to be included into the multiple regression analysis. These variables are going to be GDP rate, unemployment, distance to major cities, and density of the population. The analysis was performed for all provinces and only for "region A" provinces. A significant relationship between net-migration rate and terrorist incidents will support this hypothesis.

H₀₃: there is no relationship between the number of deaths caused by terrorism and net-migration.

This hypothesis is also originated from the literature [11, 12, 25]. Again a multiple regression analysis is going to be used for both all provinces and region A provinces. A significant relationship between net-migration rate and number of deaths will support this hypothesis.


H₀₄: there is no relationship between GDP per person and net-migration in provinces with high terrorist incidents.

This hypothesis tries to determine the relationship between economic deprivation and migration. In the literature, there might be a relationship between net-migration and economic deprivation [15, 26, 29]. To find out if there is a relationship between net migration rate and GDP per person in “region A” provinces are going to be chosen. A multiple regression analysis is going to be performed on the selected provinces. Also, the control variables mentioned above are going to be used. A significant relationship between net-migration rate and GDP per person would support this hypothesis.

H_{05a}: there is no relationship between the terrorist incidents and the amount of GDP per person in high terrorist incident provinces of Turkey.

H_{05b}: there is no relationship between the terrorist incidents and the unemployment rate in high terrorist incident provinces of Turkey.

Both hypothesis 5a and 5b are exceptional hypotheses that are trying to show if there is a relationship between high terrorist incidents and poor economic conditions. According to some scholarly literature, socio-economic conditions are the main cause of terrorism [33, 34]. Here, it is certain that terrorism in the region had impacts on [both the regional and the national] economy, which may in turn impact the prevalence of terrorism [5, 35, 36].



Since terrorism is related with the economical deprivation of a region, it might also have an impact on net-migration as well. To find out if there is a relationship between terrorist incidents and economic variables, a multiple regression analysis is going to be performed. The number of terrorist incidents is going to be used as dependent variable and the net-migration rate is going to be the one of the independent variables. As control variables, GDP rate, unemployment, and population density are going to be added in the regression models. This analysis will not only show the relationship between economic variables and terrorist incidents, but also will prove the relationship between the net-migration rate and terrorist incidents. A significant relationship between terrorist incidents and economic variables (GDP in H5a and unemployment in H5b) is going to support this hypothesis.

4.2. Reliability and Validity

The precision of the measurements may be affected by reliability and validity [30]. For good reliability, larger samples are always preferable. In order to make this research more reliable, the maximum number of cases was added into the equation by using panel data, which also helps to control for time effects on the empirical data [30]. Obtaining an initial representative sample is not going to be a problem in this study because all the provinces were selected as its samples. Since the panel data for the measurement came from the formal sources, data reliability and validity is not going to be a concern either.

Validity in quantitative research depends on careful instruments construction. The study used tools that came from the literature. This helped to minimize the validity problem. Since all the concepts are clear, including the variables, this study does not have a problem with construct validity. Researchers often succeed in compensating for the internal validity problem by matching or expanding the number and variety of contrasted groups [30]. Here, the study is going to use various combinations of variables to test for the strength of the results, so this may increase validity.

4.3. Limitations

This study is limited to secondary data concerning migration and terrorist incidents. Also, this study is limited as to the number of extremist incidents implemented by terrorist groups between 1992 and 1995. Only the extremist incidents implemented by [non-governmental] terrorist groups were examined. Furthermore, this study examines effects of terrorism on migration by comparing it to the number of the terrorist incident an individual is exposed to. The study will not be able to evaluate the level of effect each single incident has on every person in the study. Finally, this study does not cover the effect of families or friends, as stated in social capital and social network theories. However, the total number of the out-migrants is going to cover all the migrants, who moved out from the region for what ever reason.

5. Findings

The aim of this study is to show whether there is a relationship between net-migration and terrorism. In order to develop responses to the research questions, several models were used. Models for all the provinces and for provinces with high terrorism incident rates (Region A) were developed. The research findings show that there is a statistical significance difference in net-migration between provinces with high terrorism incident rates and those with low terrorism incident rates. Secondly, the findings show net-migration is going to increase, if the incident rate increases. In addition to the number of terrorist incidents, results confirm that net-migration is also related to the number of deaths caused by terrorism. This relationship is also positive, meaning that net-migration is going to increase as the number of deaths rises.

Research findings related to the economic variables demonstrates that both GDP per person and unemployment impacted net-migration. However, their impacts vary in different models. Results show that while GDP has the most significant impact on models with all the provinces, it has no significant impact on models with the high terrorism provinces. Therefore, if the GDP per person drops off, net-migration

increases; this relationship is not valid for the models with high terrorism incident provinces. Interestingly, results related with unemployment are in contrast with the result related to GDP. This finding indicates that in the high terrorism incident provinces net-migration was increased due to unemployment.

Density, as an important pull factor, was one of the major agents that impacted on net-migration in all the models. Distance, which was measured by two variables, had two different results. While distance to Istanbul had in negative relationship with net-migration in high terrorism incident provinces, distance to Mersin had in positive relationship with net-migration in high terrorism incident provinces. In short, the further the distance to Istanbul from the high terrorism incident provinces, the less the net-migration is; and the further the distance to Mersin in high terrorism incident provinces, the more the net-migration is.

5.1. Differences in Net-Migration between Provinces

A T-test was used to find out if there was a difference between the provinces. First, a dummy variable was created to differentiate the provinces. Then an “independent samples T-test” was run and the group statistics table was checked. According to this table, for Region A, sample size (N) as 84, mean was (-282.3629), standard deviation was (178.9581), and standard error was (19.5259); for Region B, sample size (N) was 212, mean was (-126.5137), standard deviation was (207.6982), and standard error was (14.2647). Independent Samples Test Table shows that homogeneity of variance assumption was not violated ($p = .233$). Here, the observed difference in the means (155.84) is significant ($p = .000$). The SPSS output indicates that the difference in the means is significant ($t = 6.044$, $p = .000$, $df = 294$, $\eta^2 = .11$), so for Period I, the null hypothesis (H_01) is rejected in favor of $H1$ at 5% significance level.

5.2. Net-Migration by Terrorist Incidents, Deaths, and GDP

In order to test the relationship between net-migration and terrorist incidents stated in H_02 , the number of terrorism related deaths stated in H_03 , and GDP per person stated in H_04 , a standard linear multiple regression for all cases (provinces) and another standard linear multiple regression for high terrorism incident provinces (region A) were run. In this part, H_02 , H_03 , and H_04 are examined together because they are all tested with same statistical test by using the same DV and IVs. For all three hypotheses, net-migration rate is going to be the dependent variable. Independent and control variables are going to be as follows: terrorism incident rate, rate of people and security forces killed, rate of total killed terrorist, population density per KM^2 , gross domestic product, unemployment rate, distance to Istanbul, and distance to Mersin.

Because migration decisions may not happen immediately, a one year lag effect for the terrorist incidents and deaths was also used to determine if a time lag would have a different impact on net-migration than the previous models. Before running the regression analysis, the data was checked to assure that it met the assumptions of multiple regression [37].

Screening data prior to the analysis showed that all assumptions were met, except for some outliers, which were acceptable with a large N. In this particular example, no variables or cases with univariate outliers were eliminated because the cases with univariate outliers were the key cases to determining the relationship mentioned in the

research question. However, it is known that outliers may lead both Type I and Type II errors [37]. So to control their impact, the variables with outliers were also transformed and another linear multiple regression run with the transformed variables for all models. In terms of hypothesis testing, the regression results without transformed variables are going to be the base. However, if the transformed variables produce very different results, they are going to be reported as well.

First, multicollinearity was checked. Because of multicollinearity, "rate of people and security forces killed" variable was eliminated from the 1st and the 2nd models. After the lagged variables, there was still multicollinearity between those variables for all cases and Region A cases, so "rate of people and security forces killed" was omitted from the 3rd and 4th models too. Then, a standard multiple regression for each model was run.

According to 1st model, the explanatory power (R^2) was (.577), and $N = 296$. The model was significant overall. According to the coefficient table, net-migration was significantly related to incident rate ($t=4.739$, $p=.000$, $Beta=.317$), rate of killed terrorists ($t = -3.867$, $p = .000$, $Beta = -.244$), population density ($t = -5.878$, $p = .000$, $Beta = -.259$), GDP ($t = -10.376$, $p = .000$, $Beta = -.574$), and distance to Mersin ($t = 5.044$, $p = .000$, $Beta = .209$) at 95%. However, distance to Istanbul ($p = .305$) and unemployment rate ($p = .239$) was not significant.

Table 2. SPSS results of 1st model for 1992-1995.

1992-1995	Non-Transformed β values of IVs with outliers	Transformed β of IVs with transformed outliers
All Cases/Provinces (1 st Model) S Sig. Variables	($R^2 = .577$ $N=296$) Incident Rate = .317**** Killed Terrorist = -.244**** Population Density = -.259**** GDP per Person = -.574**** Distance to Mersin = .209****	($R^2 = .671$ $N=296$) Population Density = -.567**** GDP per person = -.320*** Unemployment = .177***

* $p<.10$; ** $p<.05$; *** $p<.01$; **** $p<.001$

Table 3. SPSS results of 2nd model for 1992-1995.

1992-1995	Non-Transformed β values of IVs with outliers	Transformed β of IVs with transformed outliers
Region A Cases (2 nd Model) Sig. Variables	($R^2 = .598$ $N=84$) Incident Rate = .708**** Distance to Istanbul = -.590**** Distance to Mersin = .477*** Unemployment = .182** Killed Terrorist = -.373***	($R^2 = .563$ $N=84$) Incident Rate = .613**** Distance to Istanbul = -.765**** Distance to Mersin = .503**** Unemployment = .181**

* $p<.10$; ** $p<.05$; *** $p<.01$; **** $p<.001$

For the 2nd model (N = 84), which was run for only Region A cases, the explanatory power (R^2) was (.598). This model was also overall significant. Coefficients table shows that net-migration was significantly related to incident rate ($t = 3.525$, $p = .000$, Beta = .708), rate of killed terrorist ($t = -3.136$, $p = .002$, Beta = .373), distance to Istanbul ($t = -4369$, $p = .000$, Beta = -.590), distance to Mersin ($t = 3.608$, $p = .001$, Beta = .477), and unemployment rate ($t = 2.270$, $p = .026$, Beta = .182) at 95% confidence level. However, population density ($p = .111$) and GDP ($p = .105$) had no significant relationship with the DV at 5% significance level.

Table 4. SPSS results of 3rd model for 1992-1995.

1992-1995	Non-Transformed β values of IVs with outliers	Transformed β of IVs with transformed outliers
Lagged All Cases (3 rd Model) Sig. Variables	($R^2 = .499$ N=222) Incident Rate = .262*** Killed Terrorist = -.217*** Population Density = -.263**** GDP per Person = -.551**** Distance to Mersin = .200****	($R^2 = .676$ N=222) Population Density = -.505**** GDP per person = -.335*** Unemployment = .212***

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; **** $p < .001$

After using a one year lag for terrorism related variables, a standard linear multiple regression for all cases and another multiple regression for only region A were run. According to 3rd model (table 4), which used lagged variables for all cases, the explanatory power was ($R^2 = .499$, N = 222). The coefficient table shows that net-migration was significantly related to lagged incident rate ($t = 3.264$, $p = .001$, Beta = .262), rate of killed terrorist ($t = -2.919$, $p = .004$, Beta = -.217), population density ($t = -5.001$, $p = .000$, Beta = -.263), GDP ($t = -8.352$, $p = .000$, Beta = -.551), and distance to Mersin ($t = 4.037$, $p = .000$, Beta = .200) at 95%. However, distance to Istanbul ($p = .548$) and unemployment rate ($p = .407$) were not significant.

Table 5. SPSS results of 4th model for 1992-1995.

1992-1995	Non-Transformed β values of IVs with outliers	Transformed β of IVs with transformed outliers
Lagged Region A Cases (4 th Model) Significant Variables	($R^2 = .591$ N=63) Incident Rate = .668**** Distance to Istanbul = -.507*** Unemployment = .223** Distance to Mersin = .422*** Population Density = -.333** Killed Terrorist = -.411***	($R^2 = .591$ N=63) Incident Rate = .529*** Distance to Istanbul = -.649**** Unemployment = .305 *** Distance to Mersin = .459*** Population Density = -.207*

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; **** $p < .001$

For the 4th model ($N = 63$), which was run for only Region A cases with lagged variables, the explanatory power (R^2) was (.591). Here, lagged incident rate ($t=5.249$, $p=.000$, $Beta=.668$), rate of total killed terrorist ($t=-2.915$, $p=.005$, $Beta=-.411$), population density ($t=-2.495$, $p=.016$, $Beta=-.333$), distance to Istanbul ($t=-3.116$, $p=.003$, $Beta=-.507$), distance to Mersin ($t=2.695$, $p=.009$, $Beta=.422$), and unemployment rate ($t=2.344$, $p=.023$, $Beta=.223$) had statistically significant relationships with the DV at 5%. However, GDP ($p = .646$) had no statistical significant relationship with net-migration at 95%.

The result indicated that there was a statistically significant relationship between net-migration and terrorist incidents in all four models. Beta values showed that terrorism incident rates had the biggest positive impact in all the models towards out-migration. Therefore, when all other variable values were held constant, the second null hypothesis (H_02) was rejected in favor of H_2 for all models.

As in the models of all periods above, regression results with transformed variables supported this finding only for the Region A cases. With transformed variables, net-migration was positively related to terrorist incidents in high terrorism incident provinces (2nd and 4th models); however, there was no such relation in (1st and 3rd) models with all cases. Therefore, when all other variable values were held constant, the second null hypothesis (H_02) was only rejected in "Region A" models with transformed variables.

Again, in order to test H_03 , the rate of people and security forces killed was entered into the models instead of the overlapping variables, and multiple regression models were run. As it was seen in table 2, 3, 4, and 5, there was a significant positive relationship between rate of people and security forces killed and net migration for both models with all provinces and models with Region A provinces, even after the lag effect of terrorism related variables were added. Therefore, the more the rate of people and security forces killed, the more the net migration was; when all other variable values were held constant, the third null hypothesis (H_03) was also rejected.

However, with the transformed variables, this relation is significant only for the 2nd model at 5%; it is not significant for all other models ($p = .063$ for the 1st model; $p = .157$ for the 3rd model; and $p = .74$ for the 4th model). Therefore, when all other variable values were held constant, H_03 was only rejected for the 2nd model with the transformed variables.

Regression coefficients of models with "Region A" provinces showed that the GDP was not statistically significant in any of the models. Therefore, the fourth null hypothesis (H_04) failed to reject when all other variable values were held constant. Even though GDP per person did not have a significant relationship with net-migration, unemployment did have a significant relationship with net-migration for models with "Region A" cases.

5.3. *Terrorist Incidents and Economic Variables*

As was mentioned above, testing the fifth hypothesis done by standard linear multiple regression too. Again, assumptions were checked before running a standard linear multiple regression. Since all cases of H_05 are from high terrorism incident provinces, extreme cases are not as important as in previous hypothesis. In addition, the data was not homoscedastic. Then, the decision was to make a transformation for both reducing the impact of outliers and having homoscedasticity. LN transformation was used and seen that it eliminates all univariate outliers and reduces the heteroscedasticity problem,

but there are still some multivariate outliers existing. Now, the data was ready to test for both H_{05a} and H_{05b} .

Again, multicollinearity was checked. Correlation table showed that there was no multicollinearity problem. According to the results, the explanatory power was ($R^2 = .185$, $N = 84$). The model was significant overall. The coefficient table shows that, GDP ($t = -2.589$, $p = .011$, $Beta = -.296$) was in significant negative relationship with terrorism incident rate for high terrorist incident provinces at 5%, but unemployment rate ($p = .384$) was in any statistically significant relationship with DV at 5%. Result also indicates that net-migration rate was still in positive significant relationship with the net-migration rate in high terrorism provinces between 1992 and 1995 ($t = 2.353$, $p = .021$, $Beta = .296$). According to these findings, when all other variable values were held constant, H_{05a} was rejected for "Region A" cases. This relationship meant that the less the GDP rate was, the greater the terrorism incidents. The findings also indicated that H_{05b} failed to reject in Region A provinces, when all the other variable values were held constant. The chart below represents the relationship of this finding.

Table 6. Significance of variables for H_5 .

INCIDENT RATE (Region A)	GDP	Unemployment	Net-Migration	Density
$R^2 = .185$	$p = .011$	X	$p = .000$	X
$N = 84$	$\beta = -.296$		$\beta = .448$	

X : no statistical significance at 5%.

6. Summary of Findings and Conclusion

In this study, the main purpose is to find out if there is a relationship between net-migration and terrorism. It hypothesizes that there is a positive relationship between net-migration and terrorism. Staying away from violence is a basic need for human-beings [17], so an environment of violence conflict is the reason for people to migrate out. Also, a violent conflict may be a reason for economic deprivation [5, 23]. Therefore, a direct relationship between net-migration and terrorism is tested in hypotheses 2 and 3 and an indirect one is tested in hypotheses 4 and 5.

This study is different than the general migration studies because rather than voluntary migration, it mainly focuses on necessary population movements. Previous studies mostly focused on the relationship between net-migration and economic deprivation, with almost a very little stress on the event of necessary population movements [15, 38, 39, 40, 42]. Studies looking at the necessary or involuntary migration movements are very limited, but they affirm that the relationship between violent conflicts and net-migration is as significant as the relationship between economic deprivation and net-migration [11, 12, 24, 41]. They state that migration cannot be explained only by economic variables; however, to control their impact, they mostly used economic variables to test their hypotheses.

This research shows that (terrorism related) violence and fear are at least as important as economic deprivation in people's decisions to move. Based on the terrorism incident rates, this research first compared net-migration differences between provinces with terrorism problem and those without. Then, the research looked at the

relationship between net-migration rate and terrorism related variables (incident rate and related deaths). Also, it tested the relationship between net-migration and GDP. Finally, this study examined the relationship between terrorism incident rates and economic variables (unemployment and GDP).

Findings show that terrorism incident rates had a strong relationship with net-migration. In addition to terrorism incident rates, the rate of people and security forces killed in Region A provinces had a strong relationship with net-migration. Results also show that GDP is not related to net-migration in models with high terrorism incident provinces. Tests for the relationship between terrorism incident rates also show that GDP is related to terrorism incident rate, but unemployment is not related to terrorism incident rate.

Table 7. Outcomes of the hypotheses.

Hypotheses	Outcomes
H1: net-migration is higher in the areas with high terrorist incidents than those with low terrorist incidents.	Supported
H2: the higher the terrorist incident rate, the higher the net-migration.	Supported
H3: the higher the number of deaths caused by terrorism, the higher the net-migration.	Supported
H4: in high terrorist incident provinces, the less the province's average GDP per person, the higher the net-migration.	Not Supported
H5a: in high terrorist incident provinces of Turkey, the more the terrorist incident rate, the less the GDP per person.	Supported
H5b: in high terrorist incident provinces of Turkey, the higher the unemployment rate, the more the terrorist incident rate.	Not Supported

With these results, it is easy to come up with the following statements:

- Terrorism has a strong force on migration process towards out-migration.
- (Terrorism related) fear and violence are related to net-migration.
- As stated in economic models of migration, economic depression is related to the net-migration.
- While economic depression is more significant in nationwide migration movement, rural insecurity is more significant in migration movement in Eastern and Southeastern (high terrorism incident) provinces.
- The impact of terrorism might have overshadowed the impact of GDP on net-migration in high terrorism incident provinces.
- While GDP is more significant in nationwide migration movements, unemployment is more significant in migration movements in high terrorism incident provinces.
- Distance is an important factor in migration movements.
- In high terrorism incident provinces, the bigger the “distance to *Istanbul*,” the less the out-migration from provinces.
- In high terrorism incident provinces, the bigger the “distance to *Mersin*,” the more the out-migration from provinces.

- Population density, as a pull factor, impacts on nationwide migration movements.
- People migrate towards more populated places with the intention of escaping from both rural insecurity and economic depression.

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The Recruitment Process of Terrorist Organizations: A Case Study of Devrimci Halkin Kurtulus Partisi Cephesi (DHKP/C) Revolutionary People's Liberation Party Front

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Abstract. This study analyzes the recruitment process of the DHKP-C. In particular, the study analyzes individual characteristics, family background, and political characteristics of the families, and explores these factors and tries to find out how they affect individual's decision to join terrorist organization. According to them, about half of the terrorists came from rural backgrounds as they were born either in a village or a farm, while 22 percent were born in towns and 30% were born in cities and suburbs. Members of terrorist organization tend to come from low-income families. Finally, the political preferences of the respondents and the conditions which facilitated the respondents to join the terrorist organization indicate that the vast majority of the respondents stated that they had connections with either leftist parties or radical leftist parties before they joined DHKP/C movement.

Keywords. Recruitment process, DHKP-C, personal characteristics, family background, and political characteristics of the family.

Introduction

Though terrorism is an old phenomenon, it has assumed an added significance during the last decade. The 9/11 attack upon the United States in 2001, the bombing in Istanbul, Bali, Moscow, Madrid, Sharm el Sheik and London among other places in 2003-2005 resulted in thousands of deaths and thousands more wounded. Additionally, modern media and newly emerging technologies provide an instantaneous tool for the terrorists to spread the effects of their terror through out the world.

As a result of the devastating effects of these terrorist attacks upon civilians, the debates about how to deal with terrorism assumed added urgency and momentum.

Though different countries adopted a variety of approaches towards terrorism, the appalling and disturbing images and consequences of modern-day terrorism compelled policy-makers to search for an immediate military counter-response to terrorism. The use of law enforcement and military force rather than focusing on the root causes of terrorism and the processes of recruitment of new followers, however, may provide terrorist organizations a propaganda tool to increase their recruitments.

This study analyzes the recruitment process of the DHKP/C (Devrimci Halkin Kurtulus Partisi /Cephesi –The Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front), a domestic terrorist organization in Turkey, and explores the underlying reasons which motivate individuals to join terrorist groups and the factors which make terrorist movements appealing to new recruits. The DHKP/C, which has been active in Turkey and Western Europe, was formed in 1978 as Devrimci Sol or Dev- Sol, which is a splinter faction of the Turkish People's Liberation Party/Front (THKP/C). As a result of factional infighting in 1993, it was renamed as the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front DHKP/C. The movement has a strong Marxist ideology as evidenced in its advocacy of an anti-US, anti-NATO, and an anti-western orientation and its call for the creation of a classless society and the establishment of the revolutionary power of all the forces that are against oligarchy and imperialism (Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998).

The selection of the DHKP/C as a case study is prompted by the fact that three of the authors worked in the Turkish National Police Anti-Terrorism Department and participated in anti-terrorist operations and interrogate many DHKP/C members. These operations included the investigations of terrorist events and the confiscation of documents from terrorist cells. Between 1991 and 1996, the Turkish National Police (TNP) carried out several major operations against cells of DHKP/C in the cities of Istanbul, which is located in the cosmopolitan western part of the country and is Turkey's economic capital, Ankara, which is located in the center of Turkey and is its political capital, and Malatya, which is located in the eastern rural part of Turkey. During these operations, the Turkish National Police confiscated the DHKP/C's archives.

Among the captured reports is a survey that the organization required from its potential senior members to fill out. The data which we use in our study are derived from the answers to questions which were asked by the terrorist organization. These written reports were submitted to the leaders of the central committee of the DHKP/C to screen the candidates before they were accepted as senior terrorists capable of carrying out more serious terrorist activities. Needless to say, these answers are useful in understanding the criteria which the leaders of DHKP/C used to recruit their followers. They are also helpful to reconstruct the profile of the potential terrorist and the reasons behind their desire to join DHKP/C.

The reports of the TNP archives included 28 answers by the terrorists. However, none of the original questions, which were asked by the Central Committee of the DHKP/C, were found. Based upon the 28 answers, the authors recreated the questions, which were asked by the central committee. We include these questions in Appendix 1 at the end of the study.

In the next section, we regrouped these answers into three main clusters of variables. The variables include the family background, respondent's personal characteristics, and the respondent relationships with terrorist organizations. In an effort to establish some relationship between each variable and the recruitment process, we created a recruitment map which we present in the concluding section of our study.

1. Personal Characteristics of the Respondents

The study revealed that about half of the terrorists came from rural backgrounds as they were born either in a village or a farm, while 22 percent were born in towns and 30% were born in cities and suburbs. It also suggests that 60% of the respondents moved from villages and farms and smaller towns to larger cities. This observation suggests that the terrorist organizations find it easier to recruit and establish connections with potential recruits who moved from rural areas to larger cities.

The study shows the distribution of the age groups of the respondents. It reveals that the average age of terrorists who participated in the survey is around 25 years. The respondents were born between 1952 and 1979. Also, 8.5 %of the terrorists were born between 1952 and 1960, 29% were born between 1960 and 1970, and 62.5% were born between 1970 and 1980.

With regard to the gender of the potential terrorists, 33% of the respondents are female while 66% are male. With regard to the social status of the potential recruits, the overwhelming majority of the respondents or 87% are single and that 10% are married and 3% are divorced. Moreover 94% of the respondents did not have any children. These findings suggest that most of the respondents did not have family responsibilities of taking care of spouses or children. 80% of the parents of the terrorists were alive at the time of the survey.

Concerning the level of education of the respondents, the study suggests that 7% of the respondents are university graduates, 21% university dropouts, 23% high school graduates, 14% high school dropouts, 8% middle school graduates, and 12% graduated from primary schools. Furthermore the study denotes that 80% of the respondents were unemployed and that 8% worked part-time. Only 5% held full-time jobs and that 39% of those who worked full-time were involved in physical labor and that 17% held office jobs.

2. Family Background Factors:

Members of terrorist organization tend to come from low-income families. The study reports that 37% of the fathers of the terrorists are farmers, 9% occupied menial jobs, 5% work for the government, 16% are self-employed, and 12% are retired. It also confirms that 81% of the mothers of the terrorists are stay-home mothers and that only 5% are employed. The families in this research clearly lacked a secondary income from the mothers. Based upon these findings, we conclude that most of the terrorists come from considerably poor or lower-class families.

The economic status of the families is further constrained by the large size of the family. The study shows that 52% of the families have more than 4 children and 29% have 3 children or less. The large size of the family creates economic burdens and reduces the attention that parents can give to each child. The lack of parental control, along with the limited resources for each child, creates stress in the family.

The study also reports the social class background of the respondents. It reveals that 12% of the respondents classified themselves as coming from upper-middle class families, 27% from lower-middle class families, 13% working-class, and 35% come from poor families. To sum up, the data indicates that most of the terrorists and their families had financial difficulties.

3. Political Background of the Family

The political preferences of the respondents and the conditions which facilitated the respondents to join the terrorist organization indicate that the vast majority of the respondents stated that they had connections with either leftist parties or radical leftist parties before they joined DHKP/C movement. Of the respondents, 41% stated that they had political affiliation with leftist political party and 33% claimed to have affiliation with radical leftist parties, most of which are the political arms of the terrorist organizations.

The study also reveals interesting information about the relationship of a terrorist's family with a terrorist organization. In response to a question concerning their families' contact with terrorist organizations, 70% of the respondents stated that their families had some connection with a terrorist organization. This finding suggests that there is a strong relationship between family connection with a terrorist organization and becoming a terrorist.

Another significant finding relates to the number of the terrorists who have a family member arrested due to terrorism related activities. Of the terrorists, 48% stated that one of their family members was arrested at least one time because of a terrorist activity. This finding shows that there is a strong relationship between the prior arrests of a family member and being a terrorist.

Based upon these findings, we suggest that individuals who have strong leftist political party affiliation, prior arrest or imprisonment of family members due to terrorist activities, and the families' contact with terrorist organizations are likely to join leftist terrorist organizations.

This study also sheds light on additional reasons which prompt individuals to join terrorist organization. It denotes that losing a friend or a family member during a terror incident, including if the lost one happen to be a terrorist, predisposes emotionally the relatives and friends of the killed terrorists to the terrorist organizations. The study indicates that forty percent of the respondents lost somebody to a terrorist related incident including the terrorists themselves. There is a strong relationship between losing a close friend or family member to a terrorist incident and subsequently joining a terrorist organization. The death of a terrorist may bring more members to the terrorist organization due to the emotional condition of the close relatives and friends.

With regard to the question about the initial contacts with the terrorist group; 32% responded that their friends dragged them into the terrorist organization; 24% claimed that that a relative who introduced him or her to the terrorist organization; 15% indicated that they were introduced to the terrorist organization through the publications of the terrorist organization; 7% stated that they were introduced to the terrorist organization while being in Prison; and 5% claimed that it was the umbrella association established by the terrorist organizations introduced to the terrorist groups.

Table 1. Facilitating conditions for joining terrorist organizations

Means which introduced the respondent to terrorist group	Percentage of respondents	Facilitating conditions for joining terrorist organizations	yes	no	Family members political party affiliation	Percent of respondents
Friend	32	Loss of relative or a close friend	40%	50.7	Left	41.3
Relative	24	Prior contacts or relationship with a terrorist group	65.3	29.3	Right	1.3
Prison Related	6.7	Police Prior arrest of respondents	69.3	26.3	Radical Left	33.3
Organizational publications	14.7	Family members relationship with terrorist groups	50%	33.3		
Demonstration	1.3	Family members ever arrested or jailed	48%	30.7		
Organizational Association	5.3					
Social Problem, Unhealthy Mental Status.	2.7					
Identification and Sympathy with the organization values and ideals	2.7					
Loss/Arrest of Close Circle	1.3					
Total	90.7					
Missing responses	9.3					

Conclusion

Taken together, a majority of terrorists had a moving experience; have parents with low income job; not married or do not have a responsibility of taking care of a family; dropped out of either from high school or university; unemployed or had no job; and unemployed. Families of terrorists, on the other hand, are from poor and lower-class members. Terrorists have large-size families which further constrain their economic

status and parental supervision. A considerable number of terrorists have family background with a radical political party affiliation and thus become an easy target in terms of recruitment. Similarly, most of the families by and large had a connection with a terrorist organization which makes them ignorant or tolerable to their children in their affiliation with a terrorist group. If any of those family members who had previously been involved a terrorist group were killed, one can assume that their children or loved ones be hostile against authorities. Almost of a half of the terrorists lost either one of their family members or friends. Finally, a majority of the terrorists were influenced by either family members or relatives. All of the aforementioned findings indicate that family is a key factor for terrorists to adopt the ideology or to be involved in terrorist activities.

Appendix-List of Questions

What is your name?

- 1 Where were you born? What is your birth date?
- 2 What is your ethnicity?
- 3 What is your level of education?
- 4 How many brothers and sister do you have? What is your family's economic situation?
- 5 What is the current social and economic situation of your family?
- 6 What is your family's political background?
- 7 Do you have any relatives who work in the police or army force?
- 8 Have you ever been in love with someone?
- 9 Do you have any job experience?
- 10 Do you have any special knowledge, such as computers or electronics?
- 11 Have you ever been abroad? And do you have any relatives who live abroad?
- 12 Can you speak any foreign language?
- 13 Do you know how to use a gun?
- 14 Do you have any health problems?
- 15 Have you ever been involved with or in contact with any other terrorist organizations?
- 16 Could you briefly give information about your political and ideological background?
- 17 How did you get in touch with the organization initially?
- 18 What are your best and worst qualities? Do you have any bad habits?
- 19 Have you ever been in police custody? Did you give any information about the organization to police?
- 20 Do you know the purpose of the organization? Did you read the organization's written materials?
- 21 To you, what is the meaning of the organization?
- 22 Can you accept any kind of duty without questioning?
- 23 Why did you join the organization? What was the reason that you are a member of DHKP/C?
- 24 What is your area in the organization, or which part of the organization are you working in?
- 25 Could you make a judgment about your team leader?
- 26 Could you make a judgment about your subordinates?

Women Engagement In Terrorism: What Motivates Females To Join In Terrorist Organizations?

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Abstract. Throughout history women have taken part in terrorist organizations. For a long time, female terrorists' low numbers and passive roles kept them out of the public eye. Recently, however, the number of female members of terror organizations has escalated, as well as the number of women in leadership roles. This increase prompts questions about these females. Who are they? Why do they choose to be a terrorist? What are their motivations and characteristics? This research proposal intends to answer these questions. This article offers wide literature review about the definition and root causes of terrorism as well as common knowledge about the motivating factors for female terrorists all over the world.

Keywords. Terrorism, female terrorists, motivations, causes.

Introduction

The world has witnessed many wars throughout history. However, the 21st century world hosts a new kind of war: terrorism. Even though the background of terrorism is as old as history, many countries have recently started giving attention to this issue. Terrorism showed its cold face to the world again on the September 11, 2001 attack to the Twin Towers in New York City. After this tragic event, terrorism has become a more outstanding issue. The ideas that 'there is no common definition of terrorism' and 'one's terrorist is another's freedom fighter' have been discussed throughout the world [1].

Terrorism, however, is an extremely complex issue. Simple definitions are not adequate to cover this multifaceted issue. To understand terrorism, the root causes, motivations, aims of the organizations, and psychology of terrorists should be examined together deeply.

Turkey is one of the countries struggling with terrorism for more than 30 years. PKK (Workers' Party of Kurdistan) and DHKP/C (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party) are the most well-known Marxist-Leninist terror groups in Turkey. Turkey has lost more than 30,000 soldiers, policemen, and civilians, including innocent women and children, because of these groups [2]. An increasing number of female members of terrorist organizations must be considered. For instance, PKK carried out 15 suicide attacks on Turkish police and military targets between 1996 and 1999. Most of the militants were women [3].

Understanding the motivation of members of terrorist organizations as well as their characteristics is one of the strong tools available to prevent other members of society from becoming a toy of terrorist organizations. In this purpose, this paper aspires to discover what motivates women to become terrorists and what kind of characteristics female terrorists possess. To achieve this goal, the literature review is presented through multi-directional aspects. Different definitions and root causes of terrorism are widely reviewed. Motivations for women becoming terrorists are presented under a different title. All of these reviews give an extensive understanding of the issue.

1. Definition of Terrorism

Many countries have struggled with terrorism at length; however, terrorism was never as public as after the events on September 11, 2001. After these tragic events, the issue of terrorism has become a well-discussed problem not only in the United States but all over the world. Though there is no generally accepted definition of terrorism or terrorist groups [4], the United States' Code (Title 22, section 2656f[d]) defines terrorism in the following ways:

(1) The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than 1 country;

(2) The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents;

(3) The term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism.

Similarly, the UN Member States have no agreed-upon definition of terrorism because one state's terrorist is another state's freedom fighter. Nevertheless, some definitions of terrorism have been proposed. It has been defined in the League of Nations Convention (1937) as all criminal acts to create a state of terror in the minds of either an individual person, group of persons, or the general public. The UN Resolution language (1999) has a similar definition: all acts, ways and performances of terrorism are strongly condemned no matter when and where terrorism occurs.

Scholars define terrorism from different perspectives. For example, Crenshaw (2001) has two definitions for terrorism. The first is based on the assumption that political actors choose the act of terrorism deliberately. The organization acts to make radical changes in political and social conditions. Therefore, terrorism can be defined as a stimulating response to government actions. The second explanation of terrorism is the results of struggles of organizations. Terrorist groups' leaders ensure organizational protection to prevent their group members from divergence and disagreement [5].

Terrorism, according to Whittaker has different meanings for those who are responsible for peace, order, and security, for those who are television viewers or radio listeners, for those who are victims or relatives, and for the terrorists themselves [5]. The workable definition of terrorism is the planned and intended violent act against the government to coerce it to promote political, religious, or ideological outcomes, and using subnational or secret groups to intimidate and increase fear in the public [6].

Horgan (2005) defines terrorism in broader terms. He states that terrorism is using violence against people or governments to achieve some sort of effect within a political system. An important characteristic of terrorism that distinguishes it from other kinds

of crime or violence is the political dimension to the terrorists' motivation. It is obvious that the goal of terrorism is to create widespread fear among people, create uncertainty about the future, and be more effective than targeting a victim alone, thus, influencing the political process. How terrorist organizations do this depends on their available resources, knowledge, capability, and other factors [7].

In addition, Horgan asserts that terrorists want more people to watch their acts than to die in their acts [8]. This provides support for Horgan's arguments by addressing that mass media communication helps the terrorist propaganda. Therefore, the immediate result of violent terrorist acts is to create fear rather than a great number of deaths. The ultimate aim is to achieve their agenda by effecting the political change. According to the definition of International terrorism, terrorists go abroad and strike their targets. Their victims or targets are people who have connections with a foreign state, such as diplomats, foreign businessmen, or foreign corporations [9].

Moreover, Stevens identifies terrorism under three major variants: ethnic terrorism, ideological terrorism (political, religious, and eco-terrorism), and state-based terrorism (state terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism) [4]. Similarly, Grob-Fitzgibbon (2005) gives a definition of terrorism under four categories: national terrorism, religious terrorism, reactionary terrorism, and revolutionary terrorism [10].

2. Root Causes of Terrorism

As cause, any scholars, writers, and researchers propound different opinions and reasons. Forest [9] categorizes these causes as political, socioeconomic, and religious dimensions. [12]. In the political extent, Chenoweth [10] examines the relationship between political instability and the origins of the terrorism in three countries: Indonesia, Afghanistan, and Philippines [13]. According to Chenoweth, terrorism emerges in countries which are weakened, failed, and collapsed. Non-democratic countries and politically unstable regimes especially invite terrorist organizations rather than stable regimes to develop. Guilmartin [10] looks at right-wing extremists in the United States in terms of their ideology, personality, and rejection of government institutions. These Far-Right groups such as militias, common-law courts, tax protesters, survivalists, and sovereign citizens do not differ by age, education, income, or level of violence. Instead, the political institutions they choose to reject are different [14]. The Oklahoma City bombing and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms assault near Waco, Texas are two important symbols of right-wing groups. In the same dimension, superpowers', especially the US, foreign policies and public diplomacy in the Middle East countries help establish a terroristic environment [13, 14, 15, 16].

From a socioeconomic perspective, Klare [16] asserts that under the guise of controlling a huge amount of oil produced by the Middle East, Western nations overpower Islamic societies, occupy their territory, and exploit their resources [19]. Besides socioeconomic reasons, Ehrlich and Liu [17] mention another root of terrorism: demographics [20]. For example, the increasing rate of population in Palestine affects consumption, revenues, prices, and demand for money. The impact of those trends supports terrorism and the recruitment of terrorists in the developing areas, such as the Middle East, and south central and southeast Asia. In contrast, Maleckova's [18] study concerning participating in militant activities in the Middle East reveals that poverty hardly connects with terrorism although her hypothesis is that poverty and

hopelessness because of economic deprivation are the main reasons why people become terrorists [20].

Pearce argues that there is a relationship between religion and violence. religious doctrines provide motivations, religious organizations provide organizational structure, and religious diasporas provide resources. All of these three components lead to more intense conflict [22]. Religiously-motivated terrorism is considered the fourth-wave of terrorism, while the Soviet atomic bomb in 1949 and the increasing nuclear arms race are considered first wave, and nuclear-biological-chemical terrorism is considered the third-wave of terrorism. Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda members can be gives as examples for new terrorism [23].

Likewise, in her book, *Terror in the Name of God*, Stern [21], looks deeply into the motivations and goals of religious terrorists. Unlike many scholars who only correlate Islam with terrorism, stern tries to explain the role of not only Islam, but also Christianity and Judaism in inspiring terrorism. Even though, reasons are different, being a martyr is one of the biggest motivations for all terrorists [24]. For example, the “save the babies” movement in the United States seeks to attract attention to abortion by killing innocent people. Paul Hill, one of the members of the “save the babies” extremist movement, said in his interview with Stern that God would forgive him of his murders and give him a great reward because of being a martyr. On the other hand, the reasons of being a martyr are different in Pakistan Indonesia, or Palestine: Pakistani *Jihadist* groups want to cleanse Indians from Kashmir, while Palestinian suicide bombers reject the occupation of Israel.

On the other hand, in the perspective of suicide terrorists, Merari [22] claims that religion is neither a prerequisite reason nor a major factor. In fact, secular terrorist groups are more responsible for suicide attacks than religious groups. Similarly, Ahmed [23] states that the main motivation for Palestinians to complete suicide missions is not based on the idea of being a religious martyr; Israeli occupation is the major reason.

At this point, it is necessary to examine the issue of suicide bombing separately. Kimhi and Even [24] define suicide terror as the human body being used as a walking bomb. First, suicide terrorists do not need to hurry to escape attack. Second, it is very difficult to prevent suicide attacks because a suicide terrorist can easily change the target and commit suicide when security forces intervene. Fourth, there is no risk of being imprisoned or forced to give any information about the organization. Fifth, the ambition of suicide terrorists is to die, so they have strong psychological motivation to carry out their mission. According to Kimhi and Even, most of the Palestinian suicide terrorists are young (81% are aged 17 to 23). Most of them are single (93%) and most of them are educated (14% elementary, 51% high school, 32% higher education).

Looking at different perspectives in order to explain suicidal behavior in the context of Palestinian terrorists, Pedahzur, Perliger, and Weinberg (2003) focus on two dimensions of suicide behavior: altruistic and fatalistic suicide. Their study shows that both altruistic and fatalistic suicidal behaviors have affects on Palestinian suicide terrorism. The result of the study supports Durkheim’s proposal that both the results of social regulations and integration, and the individual’s subjective point of view play an important role in suicidal terrorism.

As well as root causes of terrorism, motivations of suicide terrorism can be categorized under nearly the same dimensions. Hafez [25] states individual motivations, organizational strategies, and societal conflicts compose the complex nature of suicide terrorism. For an individual, religion is one of the most influential

motivations for suicide attacks. Additionally, martyrdom befits a culture that venerates self-sacrifice. Many Palestinian suicide bombers believe that being a martyr is a religious order. It is the preferable way to go to heaven and the best option to prevent living under Israeli occupation. Looking at the cost-benefit point, suicide bombers suppose that they give their life to heaven because they believe that they will meet someone they loved in heaven. [26]. Islamic radicalism is not the only type of terrorism. Aum Shinrinko, the Japanese religious cult, performed the first terrorist attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995 by using chemical weapons. Similarly, American right-wing militants bombed the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma. Christian Identity terrorists have identified other places for same purposes [20] The first Palestinian woman martyr was Loula Addoud who was a Christian [27].

It would be a mistake, however, if suicidal violence was only connected with religions. Secular groups also support suicide bombing [25]. For example, the characteristics of suicide bombers who are members of the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE), a Sri Lankan secular terrorist organization, are different from Middle East terrorists groups. The Tamils do not use religious motives to encourage the members; instead, the history of martyrdom in Tamil society motivates them.

For organizations, strategic considerations in the perspective of asymmetric authority are another reason why suicidal violence is an adopted method. Divergence is the common point for both groups who support suicide bombing and groups who oppose them. [26] also evaluates suicide terrorism on the organizational and individual levels. Although exact motives for volunteering for suicide missions differ from one individual to another; it can be said, as a brief discourse, religious and national motives are the most noticeable reasons. Organizations which seek candidates to achieve the organization's goal take advantage of its members' weaknesses. Under the mask of training, organizations brainwash candidates using religious and political propaganda [26].

On the society base, people embrace and support martyrdom when three conditions come together: (1) cultural standards such as a belief system, symbolic descriptions and historical customs; (2) legitimate authorities who promote violence; and (3) communities who are considered victims and are mistreated by external enemies [25].

From a different viewpoint, Kruglanski and Fishman [29] discuss two psychological aspects of terrorism. The first is based on the *syndrome* view, implying that terrorists are different from non-terrorists in their personality and psychopathology. Additionally, poverty or oppression is considered root causes. Findings, however, shows that there is no difference between the personalities of terrorists and non-terrorists, nor does poverty or oppression constitute root causes. The *tool* view rests on the assumption that terrorists use fear in order to achieve its goal. Therefore, terrorists use terrorism when they perceive they can accomplish their agendas through it [38].

Separating these causes from each other is almost impossible because organizational strategies would not be successful if they were not able to convince individuals, or generate a high level of volunteerism for suicide bombings. In this point, using peoples' beliefs and encouraging a culture of martyrdom by means of ritual and ceremony are important powers in the hands of these organizations. Similarly, individuals who believe the benefit-cost calculation of being a martyr would not achieve their goals without the effective strategy of radical groups against potential enemies [25, 24, and 26].

3. Female Engagement in Terrorism

Participation of women in terrorist organizations is as old as the history of terrorism. This issue has been discussed recently by scholars and researchers [30]. Throughout history, females have been recruited by terrorist organizations in Sri Lanka, Iran, West Germany, Japan, Italy, Northern Ireland, and many other countries [31, 30, & 32].

The frequency of women committing terrorist acts is lower than that of men, but it appears to be rising. Invisibility of women both in the organization and society attracts groups to involve them in terror organizations. However, why women join these groups, their roles in the organization, and how they are recruited by terrorist groups need further investigation. Cunningham states [30] that regardless of region, answers to these questions are categorized into several themes. First, the general assumption is that most of these women who have joined the terrorist groups have personal reasons, such as a relationship with a man who has taken her into the organization, or personal tragedy (e.g. lose of family member or husband, rape, exploited). Second, women are more likely considered victims than perpetrators, and an attack by a female terrorist is normally less expected than one by a man; therefore, accessing important targets and carrying out attacks is easier for women than men. The female ability to reproduce is also exploited by the organization because weapons and bombs can be hidden easily under maternity clothes [30, 32, and 34]. For example, no one suspected Dhau, a member of LTTE, who was seen as pregnant, in the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991. When she garlanded him, she set off her body bomb, killing him, herself, and 17 others.

Because almost all terror organizations have different goals and are motivated by different reasons, the recruitment process and role of females in the organizations are different from one group to another. For example, Algerian women started to join politically violent organizations during the 1950s Algerian resistance against the French. In Europe, women have joined both leftist and rightist organizations for achieving their goals varying from separatism to Marxist-Leninism. Women in the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), the Irish Republic Army (IRA), and the Italian Red Army (RD) also play leadership roles. With more than 20 percent female members, leftist and nationalist Italian groups are overrepresented by women in leadership positions [30, 32, & 34]. According to Harmon the percentage of women terrorists is more than 30, and females take part in nearly all terrorist activities. For instance, leftist terrorist groups or operations have frequently been led by women. ETA has been known since the late 1960s, and at that time, the majority of the members were single males [53]. However, between the early 1970s and the mid 1990s, the number of female members increased [54]. German's Red Zora, active from the 1970s to 1987, recruited only women and committed many terrorist acts. In 1991, German police caught 22 terrorists, 13 of which were female. Similarly, IRA women have played an increasingly important role in "frontline" actions against British troops and Protestant paramilitary units, as well as in terrorist actions against the British public. As a result, in the late 1960s, the IRA merged its separate women's sections within the movement into one IRA. Women have also played a significant role in Italian terrorist groups. Particularly, the Red Brigades had 215 female members, 7 percent of which played leadership roles.

Women's roles in North American terrorist groups vary. The leftists groups especially have links with international terrorism because these terrorists have social and political freedom; travel, communication, and organizational advancement, as well

as respect to their legal entry and residency status in the United States and Canada. Right-wing movements such as the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) involve a remarkable number of female members. According to SPLC, women demand greater roles, such as leadership, in the organization [30].

The Puerto Rican Armed Forces of National Liberation (FLAN), Los Macheteros (the Puerto Rican People's Army), Puerto Rican New Independence Movement (NMIP), Colombia's FARC, and the Shining Path of Peru are examples of Latin American terrorist organizations which have particularly recruited and retained women [30].

The motivation of female terrorists in south Asian terrorists groups, such as LTTE and Sikh militants, differs from that of European and American female terrorists. The structures of the organizations are generally based on suicide bombing [30]. Personal motives (e.g., family, rape, financial issues) are the most dominant reasons for completing suicide missions. Many women bombers have been raped or sexually abused either by representatives of the state or by insurgents, thereby contributing to a sense of humiliation and powerlessness, only made worse by stigmatization within their own societies [31]. Self-sacrifice is the common idea among those who are socially prohibited from marriage and motherhood due to being raped. For example, Zarema Muzhakhoyeva, caught before detonating the bomb surrounding her body, was 23 when she was caught in 2003. She had been kidnapped by a man who was 20 years older than her and got pregnant. After discovering her pregnancy, she became a shame to her family, and she agreed to be a suicide bomber because there was no alternative [35].

The world's media have met with Chechen women rebels, known as Black Widows, with the tragic Dubrovka Theater incident in October 2002. Fifteen women had a role and were killed at the end of the siege. After this event, talked with the family of two of these women. The common motivating factor for Black Widows is feeling hopeless. Most of those women are widows whose husbands were killed by the Russian army. They think they have nothing to lose; they have already lost their life — a husband, a brother, a father, or a son. Therefore, they kill themselves in revenge for husbands and brothers arrested or killed. Another root cause is that their territory is under the Russian occupation; they do not live their life in the way that they want. Knowing that, the extremist rebels offer the best peace for them: being a martyr for Chechen independence.

Freedom and liberation are also motives among increasing number of Pakistani and Sikh females. For example, more than 30 percent of Tamil bombers are women [36]. Confrontations over Kashmir between Pakistan and India and over Khalistan between Sikhs and India are reasons for the freedom and liberation movements [30].

Palestinian women have started to join both leftist and rightist organizations since the Palestinian struggle against Israel in the 1960s. However, women have been more active in the nationalist/secular groups rather than among rightist groups because martyrdom was not first approved by Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, spiritual leader of Hamas. For example, the action of Wafa Idris, member of Al-Aqsa, had been motivated nationalism rather than religion [30]. Additionally, Ayat Akhras was 18-year-old high school student blew herself up at the entrance of a Jerusalem supermarket, killing two Israelis. She was expecting a scholarship to study journalism at Bethlehem University, and she was engaged [37]. Consequently, Palestinian teenagers are motivated by

nationalist groups such as Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, rather than fundamentalist groups like Islamic Jihad and Hamas.

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Part 3

Responding to Terrorism: A Comprehensive Review

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Amnesty as Counterterrorism Policy: An Evaluation of the Turkish Amnesty Law of 2003

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Abstract. This study attempts at evaluating the Turkish National Amnesty Law of 2003. The Law being active for 6 months period, granted amnesty for the non-violent terrorists and granted pardon for the violent terrorist in case they cooperate with the law enforcement. The law aims to decrease terrorism. The monthly data is obtained for the number of armed and unarmed incidents, and number of deaths and injuries, for three time periods: 10 month before the intervention, 6 month during the intervention, and 10 month after the intervention; for the 4 major and the other terrorist organizations in Turkey. Hence, there are four dependent variables, three time series and five cross sections. After applying the Generalized Least Square in cross sectional multiple time series analysis, the study found that the policy has no impact on any of the dependent variables. There are at least three explanations of the findings: First, the terrorist organizations may escalate their activities to intimidate their associates from being the beneficiaries of the policy. Second, the beneficiaries have been un-proportionally are the associates of the terror organizations not active today. Third, the post intervention period may not be enough to assess the policy.

Keywords. Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Amnesty, Turkish Amnesty Law.

Introduction

This study evaluates the Turkish National Amnesty Law of 2003 (NAL). The study includes eight parts. First part is introduction. Second and third parts present some descriptive and theoretical concepts relevant to amnesty. Fourth, a literature review is presented. Fifth, the NAL is briefly summarized after brief information about the context in which the NAL is implemented. Sixth part is about the methodology. Seventh part contains the findings and the discussion about them. The final part is the conclusion.

1. Amnesty

1.1. *A Descriptive Concept*

The original meaning of amnesty is “forgetfulness”. The word “amnesty” comes from the Greek word “amnestia”, which means the erasing from memory of past events¹. Practically, amnesty is the legal oblivion of previous offenses.

Amnesty is a broad term that encompasses a range of situations. In some cases, amnesty is morally and politically defensible, while in others it is hard to view amnesty as anything other than helping the criminals or at most absence of justice. In fact, amnesty has a complex relationship with justice. Both terms can be elusive and their intersection is difficult to map. For some, they are opposite to each other: where justice is punitive, amnesty is forgiving; where justice seems principled, amnesty seems pragmatic; justice is just, amnesty is unjust. However, this perspective ignores the existence of restorative justice where the central concern is not retribution or punishment. The central concern of the restorative justice is the healing of breaches, the restoration of broken relationships between the terrorists and state, providing the opportunity to the beneficiaries to be reintegrated into the community. Hence, if justice is understood broadly enough to encompass restorative justice, there is no inconsistency between justice and amnesty [1, 2].

Amnesty would be just an absence of punishment where there is no rule of law, no respect for the lives or bodies or dignity of others, no accepting the wrongful actions of the beneficiaries. Amnesty is not just the absence of punishment, but the failure to punish for great ideals varying depends on the context in which amnesty is granted. Those great ideals may encompass some the followings: national unity, peace, healing, relationship building, political stability, economic stability, harmony, promoting democracy, cleansing of the past wrongs, inclusiveness, producing restorative justice, promoting deterrence which has intrinsic and instrumental values² and so forth. For example, in Angola, the primary ideal was coming together peacefully in the pursuit of the common good. In Fiji, it was racial harmony and social cohesion. In the US and Turkey, it meant unifying people, establishing harmony [1, 2].

For some, amnesty is unnecessary as it is granted as a result of politically popular choices³. Besides, it is unjust as lawbreaking should not be forgiven no matter the circumstances. If one people or group is permitted to defy the law, there is nothing to prevent other groups from defying laws that displease them⁴. This perspective raise a question about the core concern of this study: Does an amnesty make future engagements in terrorism more likely?⁵

¹ Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, 1930.

² Intrinsic value of deterrence is having peace and instrumental value of it is promoting respect for the rule of law.

³ It is actually granted just for the popularity in some cases. In the ancient China, the emperor had frequently granted amnesty as a demonstration of his power and increasing his popularity among the people [6].

⁴ This last argument recalls the “domino theory”.

⁵ Hopefully, this question is answered at the later parts of this study!

1.2. Classification

While all amnesties remove the threat of prosecution, there are two general types of amnesties: conditional, and unconditional. A conditional amnesty may have requirements such as the performance of some public service before the amnesty takes legal effect, an unconditional amnesty has no strings attached. Damico identifies following six situations in which amnesties granted [3]: These are amnesties granted:

- for the supporters of the overthrown government, after a successful political rebellion.
- for the defeated rebels, after a civil war.
- for the war criminals of the rival country, as a part of peace treaty upon the international conflict.
- for military deserters⁶.
- for the country's own people who committed offense during the war.
- for the political offenders of the country.

Amnesties may or may not contain pardons for those who convicted or under indictment for political offenses. Although amnesties may include pardons, there is an important distinction between pardon and amnesty. Pardon is an act of forgiveness, while amnesty is an act of forgetfulness or decision not to judge past behaviors [3].

1.3. Amnesty: A Theoretical Concept

Counter terrorism methods can be classified into two broad classes: Repressive and conciliatory classes [4]⁷. Both classes encompasses many methods including war, preemptive strikes, counter terrorism legislations, economic sanctions, negotiation, amnesty laws, and so forth. Deciding what combination of counter-terrorism methods depends on many strategic and tactical factors as well as the constitutional, institutional and political constraints⁸. In this section, theory of amnesty as a method of CT is attempted to be explored by examining the strategic and tactical factors.

2. Deciding the CT Methods

2.1. Strategic Factors in Deciding the CT Methods

According to Sederberg, modeling terrorism is a major factor in determining the counter-terrorism methods [5]. He identifies two models: "war" and "rational actor"

⁶ The deserters may have either political or personal-comfort reasons or both.

⁷ Martin termed those classes as "hard" and "soft" [4].

⁸ The strategic and tactical factors are discussed later in this study. Constitutional constraints include governments' obligation for implementing the constitutional requirements such as "probable cause", etc.; institutional constraints included the human and material capacities of institutions in charging of counter terrorism, etc.; and political constraints include the decision of the politicians' whose self-interests depend on the opinions of their constituents.

models⁹. Deciding which model of terrorism used is the strategic step in deciding the counter-terrorism methods¹⁰ [5].

In the “war” model, terrorist are assumed to seek the total destruction of the state, and the state seeks the total elimination of terrorists. This model is criticized as inflating the significance of the most terrorist threats and the most CT efforts by assuming that both the terrorists and state have unlimited agenda. Undoubtedly, some terrorists have unlimited agenda, but not most of them. For example, ethnic terrorist groups such as Sikhs, ETA, Tamil Tigers and PKK do not seek the total destruction of the states [5]. Similarly, states usually constrained by the Constitutions and international institutions do not seek the total destruction of terrorists.

The “war” model usually implies choosing repressive CT methods. However, embracing the war model doesn’t automatically exclude the possibility of conciliatory methods, unless the state aims total destruction of the terrorists. If it is the limited war, then conciliation including amnesties, ceasefires, negotiations, etc. comes along as part of the state’s agenda of war termination¹¹.

The second model identified by Sederberg is the “rational actor model”. Assuming the terrorism is a crime (not war!) rational actor model usually suggests conciliation as a primary CT strategy [5].

Repression arguments usually rely on two interrelated rationality arguments. The first argument assumes that terrorists possess adequate rationality to calculate costs and benefits¹². Hence, if the regime increases costs to an adequate level of severity and certainty, it will deter the terrorists from employing terrorism. The second argument suggests that if the regime raises rewards of terrorism, terrorism is more likely employed.

In this study, rational actor theory is explored from three views: Opportunity, rational deterrence, and collective action. According to opportunity view, opportunities resulted from the democracy make the states more vulnerable to terrorism.

In a simple terrorism case, there are two rational actors: the terrorist and the state¹³. The terrorist decides attacking to the regime or not, and the state decides threatening to retaliate the terrorist or not. If the threatened retaliation out-weighs the expected benefits of the attack, the terrorist is deterred. Here, a successful deterrence depends on credibility and severity of the threat [5]. Lebow & Stern observe that the rational actor calculates not only the expected costs and benefits of his/her actions, but also the risks and the opportunity costs and benefits of his/her inactions [7]. In addition, he/she assigns weights to each of the benefits and costs before calculating the equation¹⁴.

For collective action view, both the state and the terrorist group are not unitary, but collective actors. Consequently, terrorists confront a free-rider problem. In other words, although they value the public good, their individual contributions make no

⁹ This distinction may be absurd, as the proponents of the “war” model build their strategies based on rational-like arguments.

¹⁰ For example, if war model is chosen, the counter terrorism method is more likely a repressive method. Conciliatory methods are more likely the options used if the rational actor model is chosen [5].

¹¹ The point is that repression sticks and conciliatory carrots are not mutually exclusive. Subsequently, the discussion in this section should conclude that conciliatory options including amnesty can be used against terrorism regardless of the model (i.e. war or rational actor!).

¹² Rational models have at least two major limitations: actors have perfect information about the costs and benefits, and agents are egoistic.

¹³ In this section, the words “state” and “regime” are used interchangeably.

¹⁴ The risk calculation is quite important as the risk lover people are hard to be deterred by the CT.

considerable difference on the likelihood of achievement. Besides, their participation to produce a public good is quite risky. At the very least, they devote their limited resources including time to the movement; at the worst, they could get killed. Subsequently, rational terrorists will sit out the movement, even if they strongly value the public good. They choose to become free rider. If we assume that all the terrorists are rational, the terrorist movement fails [8]¹⁵. However, failure is not an absolute result. In fact, Lichbach identifies a number of ways through which a terrorist group might solve the free rider problem [8]. The ways are: increasing selective benefits, reducing selective costs, increasing the chances of contributions to the outcome, increasing risk-loving, manipulating incomplete information, building a bandwagon¹⁶, increasing mutual expectations, increasing mutual exchange, changing people's rationality, using tit-for-tat to learn not to defect, locating revolutionary entrepreneurs, locating patrons, reorganizing, and imposing and monitoring agreements.

The state can work to reverse each of the strategies listed above in the hope of either increasing defections and undermining organizational coherence, or encouraging the transformation of terrorists' agenda. While repressive CT methods play role in increasing the selective costs, conciliatory options may reward defection and start a reverse bandwagon effect [5].

According to Granovetter participation in riots depend on how many others are participating [9]. He argues that people have different threshold in this regard. The threshold varies depending on the risk taking behavior of each individual [9]. The reverse of this logic implies that each defection on those waiting to defect as well. Sederberg claims that conciliatory strategies can contribute to such calculations through amnesty programs [5]. Lichbach observes that radical groups are deradicalized in the long term, if states buy the individuals (through amnesties, etc.) [8].

2.2. *Tactical Factors in Deciding the Amnesty*

Sederberg proposes several tactical factors affecting the success of conciliatory methods [5]. In this section, we transform Sederberg's ideas about the conciliatory methods into the amnesty. Hence, the factors affecting the success of amnesty as CT method are characters of the group such as group solidarity and size of the group, political context of amnesty, benefits of the state from amnesty, timing of the amnesty, ideological attachment of the terrorists¹⁷, reactions of the terrorists for whom amnesty is not granted¹⁸, and geographical size of the area where the terrorists are active¹⁹.

¹⁵ Lichbach named the prisoner dilemma problem of the terrorists as "rebel's dilemma".

¹⁶ In bandwagon model, individual (non)contributions depend on previous (non)contributions. Those arrive early to collective movement influence the latecomers [8].

¹⁷ Amnesty is appropriate if there is a loose attachment to the ideology.

¹⁸ The terrorists who are either not eligible for the amnesty according to the law, or do not accept the amnesty will tend to increase the violent attacks, because they try to revenge to the regime targeting structure and order of the terrorist organization.

¹⁹ While repressive methods are appropriate for small groups supported and operated in relatively narrow geographical areas. Amnesty is an appropriate method for the terrorist organizations with broad base. For example, ethnic terrorist groups such as ETA and PKK have sympathizers all around the country.

3. The Literature

Reviewing the amnesty literature has a difficulty, because of the implementations of the amnesty in very broad spectrum. At the one extreme of the spectrum, the amnesty is granted for the criminals killed hundreds of people at Rwanda genocide, or the criminals like Pinochet who ordered killing of hundred-thousands in Chile. An amnesty is granted for the people who engaged in thousands of offenses during in racial and tribal conflicts in South Africa. At the other extreme, the amnesties are granted for the minor disobediences who protested the Vietnam War in the US, and who criticized the specific politics of the regime through the press in Egypt.

The focus of this study is an evaluation of an amnesty for the misdemeanor-terrorists; subsequently, the literature irrelevant to the focus of this study is not reviewed in this study. Unfortunately, no empirical literature has found about the amnesty similar to the NAL. However, there are several studies about the conciliatory CT methods. For example, based on the rational actor model, Lapan and Sandler, and Sandler & Scott systematically analyze the hostage negotiation situations in game theoretical frame [10, 11]. Enders and Sandler examines the displacement effects of various CT programs; Lee, and Lee & Sandler examines the optimal CT policies [12, 13, 14].

4. A Case Study: Turkish National Amnesty Law of 2003

In this section, the Turkish Amnesty Law (NAL) is briefly summarized. Before the summary of NAL, a brief overview of the terrorism in Turkey is presented, in order to give a rough idea about the circumstances in which the NAL is drafted.

4.1. *Terrorism in Turkey*

Founded in 1923 on the legacy of Ottoman State, Turkey has had the problem of political violence since about its foundation. In 1925, The Turkish Communist Party was established in Moscow under the ideological and financial sponsorship of the Communist Russia. The Party moved into Turkey and started to promote Communism in Turkey after 1925. As a reaction to communists, a national extremism had grown by 1950s. Both communist and nationalist organizations have engaged in ideological campaigns and few violent attacks against each other by 1960s. After the 1960s, the violence of these extremist groups started to accelerate. The violent activities have included bank robberies (for supporting the terrorist organization), sabotages and violent attacks against the symbols of communism and capitalism (i.e. Russian and American embassies, National Police etc.), gunned violence between the communist and nationalist organizations, and so forth. At the end of 1960s and 1970s, the terrorism had been so prevalent that the government failed to respond. Those failures were abused by the military which did not help the government, so that the country experienced two military coups. The military governments of 1970 and 1980 almost eradicated the terrorism problem in Turkey at the expense of democracy. In 1984, a new terrorist movement, Kurdish separatism was launched in the country. Inspiring from the tactics and ideas of Cuban Revolution, the Kurdish separatists have used guerilla warfare at the rural areas of Turkey. In those rural areas, there are many rocky-mountains which geographically isolate the region from the other parts of

Turkey. The geographical isolation provides advantage for the guerilla for hiding, and keeping its members under close supervision. The Kurdish separatists killed about 4500 civilians and 5500 security personnel from 1984 to 2000. At the same period, about 20000 terrorists killed by the government officials during the gunned conflicts. At the same period, Turkey spent about one third of its budget for counter terrorism, each year. In year 2000, the leader of the Kurdish terrorist organization was seized by the Turkish authorities. Then, the terrorist organization declared a ceasefire and launched political campaigns both in Turkey and in various countries of the Europe. Today, political campaigns of the terrorist organization constitute a disadvantage for Turkey in the international arena as those political campaigns are manipulated by the other countries as a negotiation power against Turkey.

In sum, terrorism has been a major problem in Turkey. It threatens the citizens as well as consuming the economic and diplomatic power of the country. Subsequently, counterterrorism has been a crucial part of the Turkish government's policy in the last several decades.

Despite the ceasefire, Kurdish separatist organization (formerly known as PKK) has engaged gunned violence with relatively less volume, today. In addition, communist groups and relatively small groups of religious extremists have terrorist activities in Turkey. In brief, there are four major terrorist organizations, as well as small organizations, in Turkey.

4.2. Turkish National Amnesty Law of 2003

As a part of counterterrorism (CT) policy, Turkish Parliament passed a National Amnesty Law (NAL) that the terror organizations' members who had not engaged in armed and (or any other lethal) attack would be granted amnesty, if they applied to the Turkish Courts in any time from July 7, 2003 to January 7, 2004. Besides, the NAL includes pardon for the terrorists engaged in armed activities, and agreed to give information about the terrorist organization.

The law was enacted to forgive two groups of people who applied to the courts for the amnesty: terrorist organization members who have not engaged in violent attacks, and the people providing material logistic to the terrorist organization. Besides, the law reduces the penalties for the terrorists who engaged in criminal activities and accepted to give information about the members, structure and future attacks of the terrorist organization.

The first article of the Law states that it aims to provide a way for some members of the terrorist organizations to integrate to the society, and to strengthen the peace and solidarity within the community.

According to the Article 2 of the Law, terrorist organization members who have not engaged in violent attacks and the people providing material logistic to the terrorist organization do not receive any punishment if they apply to the Courts within the 6 months of the Law enacted. Besides, the penalties for the terrorists engaged in violent (terrorist) attacks before the enactment of the law, are reduced if they apply to the Courts by agreeing to provide information about the structure, strategies and future plans of the terrorist organization to the law enforcement agencies. After the Court's decision on that the information received is significant, the beneficiary receives only one fourth of the original penalty predetermined by the Turkish Penal Code for the offenses he/she engaged in. If the original penalty was the life in prison, the reduced penalty would be 9 years in prison.

According to Article 3, the upper cadres of the organization who has had influence over all members of the organization are not eligible for granting the amnesty by the Law.

The law granting some amnesty to the terrorists who were arrested before the law and whose penalty was decided by the Court. In case those people provide valuable information, their penalties are reduced up to one third of the original sentencing they have already received from the Court.

If the Court determines that the information provided by the amnesty applicants are deceptive, the applicants receive additional penalty for their deception and they lose their chance to be a beneficiary of the amnesty.

Article-6 guarantees that the beneficiaries and their cooperation are confident, and the beneficiaries are protected against the possible threats of the terrorist organization because of his/her cooperation.

4.3. The Practical Outcomes of the NAL

During the intervention total number of 3107 people was applied to for the amnesty. 2419 people were from the prisons, so that they just applied for the “pardon” part of the NAL. The remaining 688 people were applied for the amnesty.

The distribution of the 3107 according to their affiliated terror organizations are seen on the Table 1.

Table 1. Distribution of the beneficiaries of the intervention according to the terror groups.

Terrorist Organization	Number of Beneficiaries
TO1 (DHKPC)	151
TO2 (PKK)	1518
TO3 (MLKP)	23
TO4 (TKP/ML)	68
TO5 (Others)	1347

5. The Research Design

In this study, the impact of NAL on the terrorist activities in Turkey is evaluated. Hence, the research question is about whether the NAL decrease terrorism in Turkey?

The hypotheses tested in the present study are follows:

- $H1_0$ = The NAL has no impact on the number of armed terrorist incidents in Turkey.
- $H1_1$ = The NAL reduces the number of armed terrorist incidents in Turkey.
- $H2_0$ = The NAL has no impact on the number of unarmed terrorist incidents in Turkey.
- $H2_1$ = The NAL reduces the number of unarmed terrorist incidents in Turkey.
- $H3_0$ = The NAL has no impact on the number of people killed in the terrorist incidents in Turkey.
- $H3_1$ = The NAL reduces the number of people killed in the terrorist incidents in Turkey.
- $H4_0$ = The NAL has no impact on the number of people injured in the terrorist incidents in Turkey.

- H₄₁= The NAL reduces the number of people injured in the terrorist incidents in Turkey.

The independent variable is the policy intervention, Turkish National Amnesty Law of 2003 (NAL). We have four dependent measures, in order to exploit the advantage of multiple outcomes which leads higher statistical validity. The dependent variables are the numbers of armed incidents, unarmed incidents, deaths and injuries. The variables, monthly counts are obtained for: a) the 10 months before the intervention (i.e. from September 2002 to June 2003), b) the 6 months during the intervention (i.e. from July 2003 to December 2003), and c) for the 10 months after the intervention (i.e. from January 2004 to October 2004). In order to improve the statistical validity, separate data will be obtained for the activities of different terror organizations (i.e. Kontragel, DHKPC, TIKKO, TKP/ML and Others). In sum, the data table has five cross sections and 3 time series. Hence, the data is cross sectional multiple time series data.

The model has four measures; subsequently, the design has four regression equations with different dependent variables. All regression models are the same except for the dependent variables (i.e. Y).

The regression equation is:

$$Y_{it} = a + b X_{it} + \sum d_i d_{it} to_i + e_{it} \quad (1)$$

where:

Y_{it} : The impact of the program (one of the four dependent measures)

a : Constant

b : Regression coefficient

X : Program variable (intervention). Score 0 for the data collected before and after the program, and 1 for the data collected during the intervention.

d_i, d_t : Dummy variables for the cross sections, and times respectively. Where $i = (1-4)$, and $t = (1-25)$. Each dummy is equal to 1 for all the observations associated with the i^{th} , and t^{th} observations and 0 for all the other observations.

to_i : Terror Organization

e : Stochastic error term.

The statistical technique to be used for this study is cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression. In cross sectional time series design, measurements of dependent variables are taken for each month in 26 months for 5 terrorist organizations. The sets of dummy variables are defined for each time series and cross sections (except for the reference ones), so that the effects of underlying trends are aimed to incorporate into the study.

Before running the analysis, it is assumed that there is heteroscedasticity across panels and autocorrelation within panels. Based on these assumptions, the STATA is run in such a way as to eliminate these heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems.

6. Findings and Discussion

After randomly selecting one of the terror organizations, one of the months and pre-intervention period as references, we run the regression on STATA for the four dependent variables separately. The software dropped two dummy variables defined for

months due to collinearity. The results for the armed incidents, unarmed incidents (i.e. protests), deaths, and injuries are shown on the Table 2.

Table 2: Impacts of the NAL on Terrorism in Turkey

	Model 1: Armed Incid.		Model 2: Unarm Incid.		Model 3: # of Deaths		Model 4: # of Injuries	
	Coef.	P> z	Coef.	P> z	Coef.	P> z	Coef.	P> z
Interventn	-1.27	.44	-4.26	.88	-.21	.48	-.45	.71
Postintrvn	-1.74	.29	-9.51	.74	-.26	.38	-.50	.69
Dto1	-.075	.92	2.14	.92	-.00	.99	.33	.63
Dto2	12.49	.00	200.05	.00	2.25	.00	9.86	.00
Dto3	5.86	.00	10.53	.62	-.04	.78	.24	.76
Dto4	-.04	.95	4.04	.85	-.00	.99	.20	.73
dt1	.40	.81	-8.28	.77	-.26	.39	1.16	.35
dt2	-1.35	.41	-8.89	.75	-.28	.36	-.79	.52
dt3	-.28	.86	-9.42	.74	-.24	.42	.30	.81
dt4	-1.29	.43	-11.27	.69	-.26	.39	-.60	.63
dt5	-1.49	.36	-8.11	.77	-.24	.42	-.08	.95
dt6	-.06	.97	-7.82	.77	-.28	.35	-.35	.78
dt7	-1.27	.43	-7.22	.78	-.23	.45	.55	.66
dt8	-.07	.68	-6.06	.79	-.21	.49	.11	.93
dt9	-.97	.51	-4.35	.81	-.24	.41	-.10	.92
dt11	1.10	.50	9.87	.72	.06	.85	1.55	.21
dt12	.37	.82	.98	.97	.04	.91	.93	.46
dt13	.894	.58	9.17	.72	-.02	.95	.16	.90
dt14	.64	.69	8.95	.70	-.03	.91	.08	.95
dt15	-.40	.79	8.44	.64	-.02	.95	.18	.86
dt17	1.06	.51	3.34	.91	-.03	.91	.22	.86
dt18	.78	.63	1.19	.97	-.02	.88	.40	.75
dt19	.70	.67	2.13	.94	.03	.45	.47	.71
dt20	.54	.74	1.47	.96	-.02	.94	.72	.56
dt21	.71	.66	-.29	.99	.12	.69	.52	.68
dt22	.74	.65	-.76	.98	-.00	.99	.47	.70
dt23	.69	.67	1.44	.96	.00	.99	.03	.98
dt24	1.60	.32	.59	.98	.20	.50	.61	.61
dt25	.97	.52	1.99	.91	-.03	.91	.49	.65
cons	1.29	.29	6.12	.80	.25	.29	.19	.84
Waldchi2	93.31		12.06		43.54		34.96	

dt10 & dt16 dropped due to collinearity
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
Coefficients: generalized least squares
Panels: heteroskedastic
Correlation: panel-specific AR(1)
Number of obs: 130
Number of groups: 5
Time periods: 26
Model 1: Impact of the NAL on the number of armed incidents carried out by the terrorist organizations.
Model 2: Impact of the NAL on the number of unarmed incidents carried out by the terrorist organizations.
Model 3: Impact of the NAL on the number of deaths carried out by the terrorist organizations.
Model 4: Impact of the NAL on the number of injuries inflicted by the terrorist organizations.

The policy variable (i.e. intervention) doesn't demonstrate any significant relationships to any of the dependent variables (i.e. number of armed incidents, unarmed incidents (protests), deaths and injuries, even at 20 % level. Therefore, the findings don't provide strong evidence to reject any of the null hypotheses.

The reason of not finding the impact of the policy may be at least three. First, the terrorist organizations predicted the negative impacts of the policy. Then, to intimidate their associates from applying for the amnesty, and to demonstrate their capabilities to accommodate their members within the organization, they might have escalated their activities during the intervention period. Their tendency to increase the activities might have been continued after the intervention period also. Second, the beneficiaries of the amnesty are un-proportionally from the terror organizations which had not been active for many years²⁰. Therefore, their amnesty might not have made significant difference on the outcomes. Third, the 10 month period may not be enough to assess the impact of the policy, reliably. The information obtained from the beneficiaries may have impact in the long run.

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²⁰ On Table 1, the beneficiaries from the "other" groups which has not been much active in the recent years constitute about 43 % of all beneficiaries.

Historical Perspectives on the Role of Federal, State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies in the United States in Domestic Intelligence Operations Relating to National Security

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Abstract. Abjuring a national police force, the United States relies instead on a decentralized network of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to fight crime, including the modern threat of terrorism. The FBI has primary jurisdiction for all domestic counterterrorism investigations and intelligence operations, but the USA PATRIOT Act and other post-9/11 homeland security measures emphasize the need for sharing national security intelligence information among agencies at all levels as full partners. This quest has been hampered by controversy and challenges of all sorts—a situation not unprecedented in American history. Following the premise that history may provide useful lessons for the present, this paper examines the roles and relationships among federal, state and local law enforcement agencies in domestic intelligence operations relating to national security during a succession of crises, from World War I to the current War on Terror. An apparent pattern emerges in which agencies at all levels mobilize with widespread public, legislative and judicial support during times of war or domestic crisis in an effort to coordinate domestic intelligence operations, but are later forced to alter or scuttle the operations in the face of legal challenges, bureaucratic rivalries, and waning public support in peacetime.

Keywords: Terrorism; National Security; Domestic Intelligence; Law Enforcement

Introduction

Among the myriad complex and controversial issues involved with American response to the modern threat of terrorism is the law enforcement role in domestic national security investigations and intelligence operations intended to prevent or respond to terrorist attacks. Problems arise at several distinct, but interrelated, levels.

First is the inherent difference between law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Law enforcement and intelligence are very different worlds, with different missions, operating codes and standards [1]. According to Jonathan White [2], the police collect information and conduct investigations for the purpose of criminal prosecution in keeping with American standards of jurisprudence, and within certain constitutional constraints designed to protect civil liberties. In contrast, intelligence agencies collect information to defend the country and ensure national security, unburdened by law enforcement's concerns for rules of evidence, civil liberties or bringing cases into open

court. Thus, the co-mingling of law enforcement and intelligence operations often leads to outright conflict or competition among the respective agencies.

Another problem involves the need to balance security interests with constitutionally protected civil liberties, especially the rights of free speech, assembly and political dissent guaranteed by the First Amendment. Geoffrey Stone [3] asserts that the federal government has never attempted to prohibit political dissent and opposition to government policies *except* in time of war, and never during peacetime. However, Jerome Skolnick (2005)[4] cautions that the modern threat of international terrorism is something quite new and different, raising serious challenges for maintaining traditional ideals of democratic policing:

Policing in a time of terror raises issues for democratic “rule of law” policing that are only beginning to emerge. . . . Under the rule of law, police, who are part of the executive branch of government, may not behave arbitrarily, and must be accountable to an independent judiciary. It does not mean, however, that the judiciary will necessarily overrule the police. Since the 1970s, the judiciary has become increasingly deferential to police practices, and especially so following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. (p. 209)

This illuminates another, related balancing act that occurs in wartime, involving the traditional separation of powers with checks and balances among the executive, legislative and judicial branches as provided by the Constitution. During either a declared war or an undeclared war such as the current so-called War on Terror, the president wields considerable power as both chief executive and commander-in-chief to act by fiat. It often seems that Congress and the courts are left struggling to catch up, assert their own constitutional roles, and apply constraints on the executive power without appearing unpatriotic or unsupportive of American armed forces in the field.

1. Historical Review: Complexity of Federal System and National Security

Problems arise from the decentralized or fragmented system of law enforcement within the broader context of the American system of federalism. The U.S. Constitution reserves general policing powers to the states rather than provide for a centralized, national police force. However, federal statutes and executive orders assign primary jurisdiction for domestic national security investigations and intelligence operations to the most powerful federal law enforcement agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Thus, state and local governments and their law enforcement agencies must struggle to define their proper roles, authorities and missions in relation to domestic national security work.

Describing this system as “imperfect federalism,” Eisinger [5] claims that “National security is a fundamental responsibility of the central government, but given the nature of terrorism as a highly localized phenomenon, the homeland aspect of the war against terror requires a close, cooperative intergovernmental partnership” (p. 53). Eisinger [5] concludes, however, that efforts to achieve this ideal of partnership since the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have been hindered by lack of clear national leadership, by partisan political maneuvering in Congress, and by the frustration of state and local officials with the growing financial burdens foisted on them by the federal government.

While considerable attention has been paid to the federal response to terrorism, there has been less debate or analysis concerning the state and local response, which

seems to derive from, and reflects to some degree, the federal program. Donohue and Kayyem [6] contend that recent state-level antiterrorism legislation has tended to fall into one of three categories: legislation prohibiting support for international terrorist organizations; legislation focusing on the threatened or actual use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorists; and legislation defining terrorism. They portray this system of parallel federal and state antiterrorism laws or measures as a dual law enforcement regime within the United States.

This dual system and the interaction of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies (i.e., municipal police and county sheriffs) in domestic national security investigations and intelligence operations during the ongoing War on Terror is a source of considerable debate, controversy, and intergovernmental or interagency friction. According to David Carter [7], it is essential to distinguish between the definitions of law enforcement intelligence and national security intelligence:

Law enforcement intelligence, therefore, is the **PRODUCT** of an analytic process that provides an **INTEGRATED PERSPECTIVE** to disparate information about crime, crime trends and security threats, and conditions associated with criminality. . . . National security intelligence (NSI) may be defined as “the collection and analysis of information concerned with the relationship and homeostasis of the United States with foreign powers, organizations and persons with regard to political factors as well as the maintenance of the United States’ sovereign principles.” (pp. 10, 14)

Although recognizing that state and local law enforcement agencies necessarily interact or cooperate with the FBI in sharing information through Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) and intelligence fusion centers, Carter [7] cites three lessons to be learned from his review of national security intelligence:

State, local and tribal law enforcement officers have no jurisdiction to collect or manage national security intelligence.

Using national security intelligence in a criminal investigation by state, local or tribal law enforcement could derail the prosecution because of Fourth Amendment protections.

Use of national security intelligence by a state, local or tribal officer, and/or retention of national security intelligence in an official or personal state, local or tribal records system could open the potential for civil liability under federal civil rights legislation.

Suggesting a new paradigm, there is a growing consensus that the United States must redefine its concept of national security in the post-9/11 law enforcement context, that keeping America safe from terrorists is also the urgent task of state and local law enforcement—no longer the sole province of the U.S. military or federal agencies [8]. Supporting this view in a historical context, Henry [9] argues that Americans have always expected their state and local law enforcement agencies to help restore some sense of safety and security in past crises, and this mandate continues during the present War on Terror. In this new environment, traditional lines between domestic law enforcement and national security requirements are becoming increasingly blurred in the face of both foreign and domestic threats [10].

It is probably safe to say that no other historical event has transformed American policing in such radical, fundamental and permanent ways as the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001 [9]. Federal legislation such as the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 and a succession of other post-9/11 measures address law enforcement, intelligence and information-sharing in the context of national or homeland security

The 9/11 Commission Report [11] cited “the wall” that had been erected between intelligence and law enforcement agencies following the Vietnam era that prevented them from sharing intelligence or “connecting the dots” to expose the 9/11 plot and prevent the attacks. Published by the Department of Justice, *Report From the Field: The USA PATRIOT Act at Work* [12] claims that this law has helped law enforcement and the intelligence community tear down this wall and collaborate more effectively. However, it would be naïve to believe that everything is now resolved and operating smoothly.

The PATRIOT Act and other measures notwithstanding, there remains a historical record of friction, petty jealousies, misunderstandings, lack of trust and full-blown turf battles between the FBI which has primary jurisdiction in all terrorism cases, and state and local law enforcement which typically serves in a supporting role to the FBI in such cases, and on which the FBI depends for a great deal of the information used to develop national security intelligence [9]. Saddled with the baggage of traditions and organizational culture tracing back to the era of long-time FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI continues to struggle with internal and external challenges. Hoover’s influence instilled a near obsession with the primacy of internal bureaucratic interests and favorable public relations within the FBI, even at the expense of productive cooperation with the intelligence community or even other law enforcement agencies.

According to Rossler [13], domestic intelligence gathering is an extremely unpopular concept in the American tradition. It carries connotations of sinister secret police, suppressing all dissent and trampling on civil liberties in the service of oppressive, totalitarian regimes throughout history.

Public hostility toward domestic intelligence operations arose, to some degree, because law enforcement and intelligence agencies, including the FBI, CIA, Military Intelligence, and state and local police, occasionally engaged in illegal or unconstitutional domestic political intelligence operations under the guise of national security. In his study of state and local police intelligence units in Michigan, Jacobs [14] defines political intelligence as “the process by which the government uses its powers, usually in some secrecy, to identify, record and often act against individuals or organizations because of their suspected political beliefs” (p.2).

Given this background, it may be no surprise that some state and local law enforcement officials display caution or outright reluctance to become overly involved in the federal program of domestic national security intelligence. Many state and local police executives recall the severe public backlash against their involvement in anticommunist “Red Squads” in cooperation with the FBI’s counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO) during the Cold War, and the legal limits placed on police intelligence operations in the mid-1970s. Fearing that what seems appropriate and popular today during a surge of patriotic fervor may become odious when a fickle public changes its mind and the political winds change years later, they want to avoid the possibility of future litigation or public relations disasters reminiscent of the “bad old days” following the end of the Vietnam War [15].

However, federal, state and local collaboration in domestic national security investigations and intelligence operations did not begin, or end, with the demise of COINTELPRO or police Red Squads during the mid-1970s—a single generation ago. Historical precedents may be traced much further back—all the way to American involvement in World War I and the postwar Great Red Scare. To be sure, domestic crises in wartime had occurred even earlier, during the American Revolution and the Civil War, for example. But the years surrounding World War I brought something

quite different. This period saw the growth of federal and state law enforcement agencies on the bureaucratic, professional model of the Progressive Era. For the first time there was not only the legal basis, but the rudimentary bureaucratic machinery and methodology for federal, state and local cooperation in domestic intelligence operations for national security.

Chronically lapsing into relative dormancy during peacetime, this system evolved and grew in scope and sophistication during a series of subsequent crises including World War II, the early Cold War and Korean War, and the Vietnam War era. Close examination of those events reveals an apparent historical pattern:

During each crisis, the federal government enacted repressive legislation, and expanded or mobilized the federal bureaucracy to protect national security against threats posed by both foreign and domestic enemies.

The state and local response typically reflected, and derived impetus from, the federal program.

A major element of the government response in each case was mobilization of federal, state and local law enforcement in an effort to coordinate domestic national security investigations and intelligence operations.

At the outset of each crisis, there was widespread—but never universal—support from the courts, the media, the legislative branch and the general public for the government national security program, even at the expense of traditional civil liberties.

The actual threat to national security was typically exaggerated, but there was always some factual basis.

With few actual spies, saboteurs, subversives or terrorists ever caught or prosecuted, law enforcement agencies tended to shift the focus of their intelligence operations to domestic radicals or political dissenters.

Once the initial passions, hysteria or patriotic surge subsided, domestic national security intelligence operations were curtailed or even terminated in the face of growing legal challenges, legislative or media attacks, bureaucratic rivalries or “turf battles,” reduced federal funding, and waning public tolerance or support for extraordinary infringements on civil liberties.

Thus, there seem to be many parallels or precedents from the past which may prove instructive in current circumstances. To be sure, the pattern described above is admittedly a broad generalization, with several unique twists or exceptions at various times. That being said, history may nevertheless be able to provide valuable, useful lessons in terms of best practices or models, and even warnings for avoiding pitfalls in the present. Policy-makers must be cautious when using history, however, always asking what is the same, and what is different, between now and then before rushing to judgment. It also seems important to remember that the circumstances and issues involved in the debate over national security and domestic intelligence operations during the current so-called War on Terror have been shaped by the past, and may be viewed as the consequences of the cumulative actions and experiences of successive generations of political and law enforcement leaders.

Following is a brief review of the succession or historical pattern of significant episodes and events involving federal, state and local law enforcement engagement in domestic national security investigations or intelligence operations. It is not intended as a comprehensive historical examination of any of these episodes; rather, it seeks to provide a concise overview illuminating the key issues and lessons to be learned.

1.1 World War I and the Great Red Scare, 1917-1921

Although the United States remained officially neutral when war erupted in Europe during the summer of 1914, divided public sentiment increasingly inclined against Germany in response to Allied propaganda about “Hun” atrocities in Belgium and France, and to German U-Boat attacks against unarmed merchant or passenger ships flying the American flag or carrying American passengers. Anxieties caused by events overseas spurred a national preparedness movement at home that called for expanding America’s military and naval strength for national defense.

The American declaration of war against Germany in April 1917 unleashed a surge of anti-German, antiradical, nativist hysteria across the country, but it wasn’t entirely spontaneous. Because there had been no direct attack against the United States, the administration of President Woodrow Wilson needed to create an “outraged public” to arouse Americans to enlist in the armed forces, contribute money, make other necessary sacrifices, and abandon their former pacifism or divisive ethnic ties to unite behind the government’s war effort [3]. To help build patriotic support and fervor, Wilson established the so-called Creel Committee—the Committee on Public Information—run by a progressive journalist and public relations expert, George Creel. The official slogan endorsed by government policy was “100 percent Americanism,” a euphemism for enforced loyalty and assimilation. Congress also passed the Espionage Act of 1917, and the Alien and Sedition Act of 1918, providing the legal foundation for prosecution of foreign or domestic enemies.

The results of the Creel Committee far exceeded expectations. Fearing the threat of sabotage and espionage by German immigrants or resident German aliens, Americans imagined the sinister influence of enemy spies behind every suspicious situation. Hatred of the German enemy was a powerful force, but even more potent was the demand for blind allegiance and patriotic loyalty. Political dissent was treated as sedition, and efforts by radical socialist or labor organizations such as the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) to further their own interests by protesting the war and conscription or by disrupting vital war production through the use of strikes were branded as treasonous acts. Alleging a sinister anti-American conspiracy, government officials, business leaders and the popular press linked the IWW with Germany, claiming that the IWW was financed by “German gold” [16].

Formed as a small unit of the U.S. Department of Justice in 1908, the U.S. Bureau of Investigation (forerunner of the modern FBI), the U.S. Secret Service, and the U.S. Marshals were the only federal law enforcement agencies available during the war. Hoping to harness the nationwide surge in patriotism among loyal citizens in an effort to augment its domestic intelligence network, the Department of Justice authorized a semiofficial, volunteer vigilante force of local government officials, businessmen and others to join the American Protective League or APL. For a 50 cent membership fee, APL agents received official-looking “secret service” (i.e., plain-clothes or undercover agent) badges. Armed with this dubious authority, they carried out covert surveillances and illegal arrests of suspicious individuals. The Military Intelligence Division of the U.S. Army also engaged in domestic political intelligence operations [14].

Anxious to do their part, many states passed legislation and formed war preparedness boards or public safety committees to coordinate mobilization of state agencies, industry, and agriculture to help the national war effort, but also to ensure domestic security on the home front. Facing the loss of their state National Guard

divisions to federalization for the American Expeditionary Force, many states formed replacement militia forces of state troops to augment local law enforcement for domestic security. According to Bechtel [17] and Schertzing [16], only three states enjoyed the services of full-time, “modern” state police forces or “state constabularies” (i.e., semimilitary, mounted police) during the war: Pennsylvania; New York; and Michigan. These early state forces would serve as the pioneers of a national state police movement, one of many reform movements spawned during the Progressive Era.

There were very few actual incidents of German espionage or sabotage in the United States during the war, certainly far fewer than was suspected or alleged at the time. One of the few prosecutions of an alleged saboteur involved Albert Kaltschmidt, a resident German alien convicted in federal district court in Detroit on charges of conspiring to blow up the Grand Trunk Railroad Tunnel linking Port Huron, Michigan, with Sarnia, Ontario, in 1917 [16].

Despite the dearth of actual spies and saboteurs, the combined forces of federal agents, military intelligence officers, APL vigilantes, state troops, state police and local police creatively stretched the definition of “enemy” to produce a target-rich environment. The objects of their attention included any groups or individuals suspected of political dissent or disloyalty in wartime. Domestic political intelligence operations with little regard for traditional constitutional protections or civil liberties thus seemed urgent and righteous in the pursuit of national or domestic security in wartime.

During the war, federal, state and local law enforcement raided IWW offices in major cities nationwide, and police broke up various IWW-led strikes or assemblies. By the end of the first year of American participation in the war, severe government repression had effectively crushed the IWW as a potential threat. Expanding their domestic security operations, state and local police and state troops also provided security patrols at vital war production facilities, apprehended draft-evaders or “slackers” in large-scale slacker raids, forced reluctant farmers to bring hoarded grain to market under wartime price controls, and kept tabs on German immigrants and resident aliens.

Following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the perceived betrayal of their former Russian ally by withdrawing unilaterally from the war against Germany, many Americans suspected a “Prussian-Bolshevik” conspiracy. The American “hate list” expanded to include not only Germans and the IWW, but anyone suspected of Bolshevik, socialist, communistic or other radical politics and ideology, along with anyone of Russian or Slavic ethnic origin or nationality. Reinforcement for this expanded definition of the enemy derived from American military intervention in Siberia against Red (i.e., *Bolshevik*) forces during the Russian civil war, which continued even after the end of hostilities with Germany.

Thus, even before the so-called Great War ended with the Armistice of November 11, 1918, the seeds of the antiradical, anti-foreigner hysteria that would become known as the Great Red Scare had germinated. Determined to enforce universal loyalty for the war effort under the banner of national or domestic security, federal agents, APL members, military intelligence officers and police engaged in repressive political intelligence operations against a broad array of labor activists, political radicals and immigrants with Russian or Slavic surnames—all suspected of being potential Bolshevik sympathizers—with the same enthusiasm they had mustered against German immigrants and IWW members. In Michigan, state troopers joined local police and APL agents in plain-clothes “secret service” operations, conducting surveillances,

infiltrating meetings, developing informants, and keeping secret files on suspected radicals [16].

With American belligerence in the Great War relatively short-lived, the mobilization of American manpower, industry and patriotic passion had really just begun to reach its stride when the war abruptly ended by Armistice. Scarcely pausing for a breath of relief at the advent of peace and still seeking a surrogate for their pent-up fears, hatreds and frustrations, Americans succumbed to the national hysteria of the Great Red Scare, which would not be sated until the early 1920s. Fueling the flames of this antiradical hysteria were public anxieties caused by an unsatisfactory end to the war and peace treaty negotiations; postwar economic depression and reconstruction; widespread labor unrest; and fears that the disaffected masses of African Americans and unskilled immigrant labor crowding American cities and mining camps would prove fertile ground for the spread of Bolshevik ideology, revolution and anarchy.

Continuing wartime methods and practices into peacetime, the federal government continued to suppress political dissent through liberal use of the wartime Espionage and Sedition Acts to prosecute radicals or other administration foes. APL vigilantes remained active until mid-1919, when their excesses proved embarrassing and the government could no longer justify official support for the organization. However, a resurgent Ku Klux Klan and returning Great War veterans who formed the American Legion replaced the APL, albeit without official sanction, as champions of 100 percent Americanism.

Federal agents, state and local police continued to harass suspected Bolsheviks, socialists, and the IWW through raids, undercover surveillance or infiltration, and use of informants. Adding to the so-called "German files" compiled by a young Justice Department official, J. Edgar Hoover, during the war, authorities now included the names of suspected Bolsheviks and other radicals. Borrowing from an old military system, these files were kept in the form of "dossiers," raw, unanalyzed data such as names, birthdates, occupations, physical descriptions, etc., painstakingly typed or printed on small index cards and catalogued alphabetically [7].

After the home of the U.S. Attorney General, A. Mitchell Palmer, was damaged by an explosion and other bombs targeting government officials were discovered in the mail, federal authorities, aided by state and local police, launched massive raids and dragnets, rounding up thousands of suspected radicals, IWW members or Bolsheviks, and seizing their administrative records or propaganda literature in orchestrated raids nationwide. These so-called Palmer Raids resulted in warrantless searches, seizures and mass arrests, often of innocent immigrants who had committed no offenses. Hundreds of them were deported or otherwise treated in deplorable fashion [18].

When federal laws proved inadequate to prosecute individuals for mere membership or sympathy with radical organizations, many states enacted "criminal syndicalism" laws prohibiting the advocacy of, or membership in organizations, or teaching of any doctrine, that called for the overthrow of the American political or economic system through force or violence. Many states also passed laws banning the display of red flags—the symbol of anarchy and bolshevism.

By 1921, the Red Scare had nearly run its course, although vestiges remained locally. Much of the impetus for the hysteria had passed with the end of the Russian civil war with no revolutions here at home, with the signing of a peace treaty with Germany, with severe restrictions on immigration passed by Congress, and with a general improvement in economic conditions. Americans became more concerned

with prosperity, and with flouting national liquor prohibition. President Warren G. Harding explained that postwar American craved a “return to normalcy” [16].

Congress repealed the wartime Sedition Act, and the Supreme Court, which had affirmed the government’s right to suppress free speech in wartime, now began to set aside many wartime convictions of political dissidents. Reflecting a sea change in public attitudes, Congressional committees investigated and condemned the Palmer Raids, and restricted the use of mass raids and deportations. By 1924, a new U.S. Attorney General issued orders forbidding the U.S. Bureau of Investigation, with J. Edgar Hoover as its new director, from engaging in domestic political espionage or intelligence operations. Lacking any further crisis or federal impetus, state and local police agencies generally followed suit and terminated their domestic political intelligence operations.

The American experience of World War I and the postwar Great Red Scare had profound impacts on the evolution and course of national security intelligence operations by federal, state and local law enforcement. It established the first rudimentary bureaucratic machinery, legislative authority and methodology for a systematic internal security program based on ideals of the Progressive Movement. Congress enacted repressive laws with minimal debate to satisfy demands of the public and president, while the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the government program by establishing the “clear and present danger” standard for legal repression of free speech and civil liberties during time of war.

Further, the success of the Creel Committee showed the potential for official propaganda to inspire strong public support for government policies and repression even at the expense of civil liberties, to equate dissent with disloyalty, and to foment public hatred of enemies. Federal agents, state and local police learned countersubversion and domestic intelligence tactics that would expand and become more sophisticated during later crises, even though they would continue for decades to employ the old-fashioned dossier system for intelligence files without analysis. Finally, outrage and resistance to official repression led to the birth of the American Civil Liberties Union and a civil liberties watchdog movement within the United States that could not be ignored in later episodes [3, 7].

1.2 World War II, 1939-1945

With the U.S. Bureau of Investigation (reorganized as the FBI in 1935) prohibited from engaging in countersubversive activities, state and local law enforcement agencies enjoyed a relative hiatus from organized national security intelligence operations during peacetime from the early 1920s to the early 1930s. There were many local exceptions, however.

During the early 1930s, the political, social and economic upheavals caused by the worsening Great Depression gave rise to radical labor movements and many Americans began to seriously consider communism as an alternative to the capitalist system, which seemed to have failed. Alarmed at the potential threat of Communist subversion as exposed by testimony before the Congressional committee led by Congressman Hamilton Fish Jr. (known as the Fish Committee), state and city governments reacted. Using the authority of state-level criminal syndicalism and red flag laws, a number of state police agencies and large municipal police agencies formed countersubversive “Red Squads” to engage in domestic political intelligence operations targeting suspect Communists or militant labor radicals [19]. Lacking any war crisis, foreign enemy or

federal leadership in a national security program, each state and major city was left to its own needs, authorities and capabilities to fight Communist subversion on its own.

With war clouds looming overseas, however, events soon escalated to the national level. Led by Republican Congressman Martin Dies, the House Un-American Activities Committee (also known as HUAC or the Dies Committee) commenced hearings on Nazi, Fascist and Communist subversion in the United States. With the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939 and the outbreak of war in Europe, fears of Soviet or Nazi espionage and subversion in the U.S. by foreign agents or domestic traitors known as “Fifth Columnists” or “Trojan Horses” prompted President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) secretly to authorize the FBI to begin domestic counterespionage and national security intelligence operations. State and local police agencies were directed to cooperate with the FBI in this program [19]. Congress afforded the FBI a firmer legal foundation for its campaign by passing the Alien Registration Act (Smith Act) in 1940 to help root out subversive immigrants and resident aliens.

Facing strong political pressures from isolationists, the U.S. remained “officially neutral” as the Nazi military machine and its new tactic of “Blitzkrieg” swept across Europe. However, as American industry revived from its Depression torpor to handle growing federal defense contracts, FDR anticipated that America would eventually be drawn into the war and possibly attacked by military or naval forces from the Axis nations of Germany, Italy and Japan. Alarmed by the death and destruction rained upon British civilians and cities by Nazi bombers during the “Blitz,” FDR appointed New York mayor Fiorello LaGuardia as the first national director of civilian defense to prepare for possible future Axis aerial attacks here at home.

FDR launched the first peacetime draft in U.S. history and federalized the National Guard. At the state level, several states such as Michigan formed state defense councils and created state police anti-subversive squads [16].

The Japanese surprise attack at Pearl Harbor imbedded December 7, 1941 as a “day of infamy” in the American national memory for generations to come. America was now squarely in the war against the Axis. The attack shocked and united Americans behind the war effort and spurred total mobilization of industry and commerce for total war. The massive mobilization of American defense industries and military expansion accomplished what the New Deal could not: it ended the Great Depression.

FDR officially designated the FBI as lead agency for counterespionage and domestic intelligence. Urged to assist the FBI and Military Intelligence (G2), state and local police created or expanded plain-clothes antisubversive or security squads. At the outset, Director Hoover made it clear that the FBI had primary jurisdiction and authority for all national security work. Unlike during World War I, in this war, he would tolerate no amateur vigilante organizations such as the APL. His new program would be much more professional, and sophisticated. Americans willingly accepted this wartime role on the home front for the combined forces of the FBI, state and local police, and military G2.

Considered security risks during the early hysteria and surge of anti-Japanese racism, thousands of Japanese-Americans were dispossessed and interned in concentration camps throughout the war. Suspected Nazi spies or domestic traitors were also quickly rounded up by the FBI.

Although the Soviet Union was now officially an ally of the United States in the war against Germany, many Americans, including some police, continued to consider

Soviet agents and domestic Communists as serious threats. This awkward duality required diplomatic finesse for government officials.

In Michigan, the chief of the state police anti-subversive squad acknowledged the need for a wartime alliance with the U.S.S.R. as a necessary evil, but he claimed that communism was a greater threat than Nazism, and that the U.S. would eventually have to fight the U.S.S.R. Toward that end, he quietly ordered his detectives to continue amassing files on suspected Communists and labor radicals along with suspected Nazi sympathizers during the war. Aware of the real focus of his squad, wags within the state police privately referred to the detectives as "the Red Squad" (Schertzing, 1999).

Tens of thousands of Southern Whites and African Americans migrated North or West to work in defense plants in urban areas during the war, bringing historical racial enmities with them. When racial tensions erupted into savage race riots in American cities like Detroit and Los Angeles in 1942 and 1943, the FBI investigated allegations that Axis or Communist agents had fomented the unrest and treasonous opposition to the government's war program through subversion in the black community. The official FBI report on Racial Conditions (RACON) found no evidence of subversion, but blamed the unrest on militant blacks ([16].

Wartime mobilization was massive and multifaceted. Federal, state and local civil defense programs expanded. Volunteer nursing corps, bomb disposal squads, fire brigades, defense plant security guards and air raid wardens were mobilized. America's vast industrial complex converted to war production. Defense plant workers were subjected to loyalty checks and fingerprinting. Rationing of gas, meat, sugar and nylon was implemented, as well as a 35 mile per hour wartime national speed limit.

New state and federal laws were enacted to prosecute sabotage, espionage, rioting, and arson. State troops were mobilized to replace the federalized National Guard divisions for domestic security. Vital defense industries and other critical infrastructure were fenced off and designated as Emergency Protection Zones with strict enforcement of trespassing laws.

Many wartime civil defense or security measures terminated or lapsed into dormancy following American victory and the end of World War II in 1945. Many laws and programs were repealed, or automatically ended through sunset clauses that required them to expire at the end of the war.

Under the leadership of the now-revered FBI and its director, J. Edgar Hoover, American law enforcement had vigorously engaged in domestic national security investigations and counterintelligence operations with widespread popular, legislative and judicial support. Federal, state and local authorities had now amassed enormous political intelligence files which became dormant at war's end, remaining unanalyzed, but available for future reference if needed. A very sophisticated program of cooperation and information-sharing had been developed among authorities at all levels, and with private, corporate security officials. Lapsing into relative dormancy for a few years after the war, this national security system and methodology would be easily revived and updated in response to future crises.

The American people rallied behind their government in a spirit of almost unprecedented national unity, patriotism and self-sacrifice. Americans supported most wartime measures without complaint or significant dissent, including widespread support of the law enforcement role in counterespionage and national security intelligence work. All branches and levels of government cooperated to win the war. In these respects, World war II stands out as something of an exception to the historical

pattern described earlier in this paper, in that there was never any later public or official backlash in peacetime against the government's wartime national security program.

1.3. The Early Cold War and Korean War, 1950-1953

Even as World War II ended, the United States and its former ally, the Soviet Union, squared off in a "Cold War" that pitted the competing ideologies of communism and democracy in a global struggle that would last nearly a half-century. As a Soviet "Iron Curtain" of hegemony spread over Eastern Europe, American government officials determined that Soviet expansionism and Communist subversion at home posed serious threats to national security. In response to the new crisis, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, which linked the various branches of the armed forces into a single Department of Defense, and established the American "intelligence community," including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other agencies.

International tensions escalated with the successful test of an atomic bomb by the Soviets and the "fall" of China to the Communists in 1949. The so-called Cold War erupted into a "hot war," when Communist North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950, setting off a new Red Scare in the United States. With the endorsement of the new United Nations, President Harry Truman ordered American armed forces to help defend South Korea. Just five years after the end of World War II, Americans found themselves at war again. Although the Korean conflict was a relatively limited action, it posed the threat of escalating into a Third World War, this time between the U.S. and the twin Communist powers of the Soviet Union and Red China.

On the home front, Congress swiftly acted to protect national security from the threat of Soviet spies and domestic Communist subversion by passing the McCarran Internal Security Act and the Subversive Activities Control Act in 1950. To protect American cities from possible atomic attack by Soviet long-range bombers, federal and state civil defense programs were revived. Many states also passed anti-subversion or Communist control legislation. State and city police agencies formed anti-subversive "Red Squads" to assist the FBI and Military G-2 with domestic counterintelligence and national security operations. Most Americans and the popular press hailed the leadership of the FBI and the participation of their state and local police in domestic national security operations. In Michigan, people expressed public confidence and support for the new Michigan State Police Security Squad as "Michigan's own FBI" [16].

Riding the wave of anticommunist hysteria to achieve celebrity and advance his own partisan political agenda, the junior Republican senator from Wisconsin, Joe McCarthy, launched a vicious, specious and spurious campaign to expose domestic traitors and Communists within the American government, including its armed forces and civil service. His name would become attached as a pejorative label for this campaign and its driving passion: "McCarthyism," or the "McCarthy Era."

Intoxicated by the foul brew of McCarthyism, the Senate Internal Security Committee and House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) held hearings to expose Communist subversion—branded by critics as "Red-baiting witch hunts" that trampled civil liberties and led to blacklisting in employment of government civil servants, Hollywood writers/actors, university faculty and others. Loyalty oaths were required for public employees and teachers; labor unions were pressured to oust Communists from their leadership and ranks.

The federal government dusted off the 1940 Smith Act to prosecute suspected Communists. The campaign gained a measure of apparent legitimacy when Alger Hiss was convicted of perjury, and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were convicted and executed for treason.

The Red Scare hysteria of McCarthyism began to wane after Soviet leader Joseph Stalin died and the Korean War ended in Armistice in 1953. Disgusted with his abuses and false allegations, the Senate censured McCarthy in 1954, and public support for McCarthyism melted away. Frustrated that it was nearly impossible in the absence of overt criminal acts to prove that anyone was a “card-carrying” Communist or posed an actual threat to overthrow the U.S. government, law enforcement lost interest in countersubversive work. Enjoying a booming peacetime economy with few international tensions, Americans turned their attention from Communist conspiracies to “conspicuous consumption” [18].

There was no widespread public backlash against law enforcement activities pertaining to domestic national security or counterintelligence operations. Despite initial publicity, the operations were conducted and dossier files collected in strict secrecy. State and local police Red Squads continued to operate, but with greatly reduced manpower and funding. Another postwar period of relative dormancy for domestic national security operations now set in.

1.4. The Vietnam Era, 1965-1975

When the Supreme Court overturned Smith Act convictions in 1957, the FBI realized that criminal prosecution of subversives had now become nearly impossible. Hoover adapted by launching a new campaign of “dirty tricks”—illegal or unethical tactics designed to disrupt or discredit groups and individuals considered to be subversive and thus inimical to national security. In this new Counterintelligence Program—dubbed as COINTELPRO—there was little or no concern for conducting investigations or securing evidence with the thought of bringing cases to court for scrutiny by the American legal system. In the coming years, state and local police Red Squads would tend to mimic the FBI program.

America experienced a variety of international and domestic crises during the 1960s that fueled anxieties over national security and civil defense. These included: the U-2 spy plane affair; the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba; the Vietnam War; the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, his brother, Senator Robert Kennedy, and the black civil rights leader, Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.; the U.S.-Soviet Space Race; the 1967 Arab-Israel Six Day War; and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The domestic scene was further rent by growing militancy, mass civil disorders, riots and acts of domestic violence or terrorism associated with the black civil rights or “Black Power” movements; white supremacist or hate groups such as the KKK or neo-Nazis; and the anti-Vietnam War movement.

Further, rising U.S.-Soviet tensions and advances in long range jet bombers and ICBMs with nuclear payloads fueled fears of nuclear holocaust. Civil defense against nuclear attack became a major focus. Americans built home bomb shelters, public civil defense shelters were identified and stocked with provisions, schools and offices conducted nuclear attack drills.

For more than a decade, FBI agents harassed civil rights and antiwar groups and leaders through the auspices of COINTELPRO. CIA and Military Intelligence agents conducted illegal domestic political espionage on American citizens. State and local

police red squads expanded in size, scope and activity to conduct surveillances, infiltrate subversive groups, and collect information for their subversive files. Once again, these political intelligence files were raw dossiers with little or no analysis conducted. Confidential files and information was routinely shared among federal agents, military intelligence, state and local police, and corporate security officials [19, 14]

By 1975, with the publication of the so-called Pentagon papers concerning the Vietnam War, the death of FBI director, J. Edgar Hoover, the resignation of President Nixon following the Watergate scandal, the unsatisfactory end of the Vietnam War, Americans had grown to distrust their government and disrespect law enforcement officials at all levels. The new hostility toward federal agents and police was exacerbated by public outrage at the televised police attacks on peaceful antiwar and civil rights protesters, and by exposes from media reports or Congressional and legislative hearings concerning civil rights abuses committed in the name of national security through the FBI's COINTELPRO or by state and local police Red Squads.

Responding to this sea change in public values and opinion, Congress strengthened the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). New laws, court orders and department policies restricted domestic political intelligence operations, and required a criminal nexus for initiating intelligence activities. Some law enforcement officials claimed this would "handcuff" the police, as national security investigations often overlapped with general criminal cases such as narcotics and organized crime investigations.

COINTELPRO was terminated; state and local police Red Squads were disbanded and their files released or destroyed. Unenforceable, various federal and state anti-Communist laws that remained on the books were repealed or ruled unconstitutional.

This extreme reaction against domestic counterespionage and national security intelligence operations by federal, state and local law enforcement eventually influenced erection of the information "wall" described above. It was the latest in a historical series of ebbs and flows in domestic national security intelligence programs, and the most recent leading up to the present crisis of the War on Terror.

2. Looking Back in the "Cool Light of Hindsight"

As we have seen, there are enough similarities or parallels in the way state and local law enforcement agencies supported the FBI in domestic national security investigations and intelligence operations on the home front during the various wars and domestic crises of the twentieth century so as to constitute an apparent historical pattern, with potentially valuable or useful lessons to be learned and applied in the present, twenty-first century War on Terror. At the same time, there were enough significant differences in the circumstances between the past and present episodes that policy-makers should pause and reflect carefully before rushing to codify and apply those lessons. Remaining to be answered are the questions: What is really the same, and what is actually different, between now and then? What are the lessons to be learned that actually have relevance, and can be applied in the present?

From World War I to the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the primary national security focus for law enforcement agencies during wartime was the threat of subversion, sabotage, and espionage by domestic traitors and foreign agents. At various times, the nationalities or ethnicities linked with those enemies were German,

Austrian, or Russian, and the sinister, foreign ideologies were a noxious brew of imperialism, fascism, Nazism or communism.

There were few actual, verifiable acts of sabotage, espionage, treason or subversion—much was hyperbole or official propaganda. But there was just enough substance to create anxiety and pose a credible threat. In terms of the terrorist threat today, few could discount the impact of the September 11 attacks, and of other conspiracies uncovered since then. The question is whether this threat is exaggerated for political reasons, or understated because of continuing government obsession with secrecy, and whether our national response is adequate, or appropriate.

In some respects, it seems that one could simply replace the name of our chronic domestic foe, subversion, with that of our new menace, terrorism, and most everything else would read the same now as it did decades or even generations ago. Instead of communism, the foreign ideology that confronts us now is militant, fundamentalist Islam, which apparently inspires some people of to plan or carry out hostile, murderous plots against the United States and the American people. Historic wartime antipathies toward Germans, Russians or Japanese have revived and shifted focus toward people of Middle-Eastern ethnic or national origins who practice the Muslim faith.

There is a certain enduring consistency in national security-related jargon, with minor evolutions or adaptations for present times. Expressions like “domestic security,” “internal security,” “domestic preparedness,” and protection of “vital war production facilities” or “defense industries” have been replaced by the modern, generic terms “homeland security” and “critical infrastructure protection,” but the meanings and issues have remained fairly constant.

As if not content to fight a foreign enemy during wartime, Americans have typically regarded those who dissent in wartime as disloyal and guilty of aiding the foreign enemy, thus making them “legitimate” targets of official repression and national security intelligence operations. Although the FBI has retained primary jurisdiction of such operations from World War I to the present, the FBI has consistently relied on state and local police for cooperation and assistance in its national security mission.

Due, in part, to the inherent or inevitable inefficiencies and bureaucratic rivalries in decentralized law enforcement within a federalist system, the domestic national security program was seldom free from interpersonal, interagency, or intergovernmental feuds and turf battles. At times, it truly seemed we were our own worst enemy.

Would this suggest that Americans would have been, or would now be, better served by a centralized, national police force on the European model? It is not at all clear that the benefits would outweigh the problems, or prove more effective. Considering that there are currently nearly 700,000 local and state police and federal agents representing thousands of agencies nationwide, a national police force would presumably have to incorporate this veritable army of law enforcement officials. Even with a central command and nationwide jurisdiction, there is every reason to believe that internecine strife among various divisions, units or special services occurring on a local, regional or organizational basis would, in fact, merely imitate the interagency or interjurisdictional conflicts that have traditionally plagued American law enforcement under the current system.

Further, given the traditional American fear, or at least begrudging tolerance, of centralized authority, it seems likely that a national police force would be perceived as an un-American effrontery, somehow reminiscent of a totalitarian system. With

information and intelligence sharing barriers removed in a single, centralized agency, the potential for civil rights abuses with reduced accountability could, theoretically, multiply exponentially. Local citizens currently have recourse in the case of abuses by local police through the ballot box, local media or local legislative body. It would become much more difficult for individual citizens to “fight city hall” in terms of law enforcement if that “city hall” was a mammoth national police agency with headquarters in Washington, D.C.

Conclusion

Imbued with wartime patriotism and concerns over national security, the American courts and public generally tended to support—although this support was seldom universal—the combined efforts of federal, state and local law enforcement in domestic national security operations, even at the temporary expense of civil liberties. But this support continued only up to a certain point, and only for a time, until peacetime conditions resumed. Following each wartime domestic crisis, the pendulum of public and judicial favor typically swung back toward restraint of law enforcement, restoring a traditional peacetime balance between security and cherished civil liberties.

Current administration policies and law enforcement operations regarding national security, homeland security, the War on Terror, have been controversial from the start. However, there has been a solid, passionate, vocal bloc of support for government policies that equates political dissent with disloyalty. It remains to be seen whether the historical pattern described in this paper will hold true in this War on Terror, whether Americans will no longer feel that security trumps civil liberties.

If there are no major new terror attacks on U.S. soil for several years, Americans may later feel (perhaps some already feel) that extraordinary national security measures and methods may no longer be necessary, and may even prove counterproductive or harmful if continued. Will legislation such as the USA PATRIOT be repealed a few years hence? Will law enforcement intelligence fusion centers or FBI-led JTTFs go the way of COINTELPRO and police Red Squads? Will the American public or judiciary eventually become less tolerant of law enforcement operations relating to national security, or will future terrorist attacks inspire public demands and tolerance for even greater, centralized police authority to achieve security, even at the risk of further erosion of civil liberties? These are questions worth considering now.

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Adaptation of Community Policing in Arab and Muslim Communities in Response to Terrorism

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Abstract. One of the controversial issues that has emerged following the 9/11 terrorist attacks is what role American local law enforcement agencies should play in response to terrorism. Those Arab and Muslim communities who are living in the U.S. were begun to be seen as potential terrorists on some occasions. It is argued within this article that police agencies can use traditional tactics in order to catch and interrogate suspects of terrorist acts. However, only relying on traditional and harsh police tactics and treating all Arab and Muslim communities as potential terrorists can easily break the relationship with those communities which may help police agencies in response to their terrorism activities. Rather than just using temporary and short term strategies, policing strategies should include long term considerations. Community policing offers long term solutions to establish cooperation with Arab and Muslim communities, and to prevent certain terrorist acts. We will argue in this article that police departments who serve Arab and Muslim communities, especially those with longstanding community policing experience, can adapt strategies of community policing to establish relationship with Arab and Muslim communities, gain legitimacy in the eyes of these communities, gain intelligence from them and reducing fear among community members.

Keywords. Community policing, terrorism, Arab-Americans

1. Introduction

Terrorism has become a critical concern of the U.S after 9/11 terrorist attacks and several metropolitan cities in different part of the U.S. have attempted to bolster their security against potential terrorist attacks. While it is widely accepted that the police in a modern society plays an important role in responding to terrorism, it is currently unknown which strategies will be the most successful in developing preventive strategies and tactics as well as apprehending terrorists immediate after attempted or successful attacks. It is also generally known that gathering information about terrorist activities and problem solving related to terrorist activities is vital for any successful anti-terrorism policing strategy, though again, it is unknown how best to implement such strategies. In many communities, traditional models of policing still exist, which often rely on harsh punishment-oriented practices, and reacting to crime through responses to call for service from the community. There are some more progressive police agencies, however, that have established models of community policing that

focus on establishing a partnership with the community and attempt to address the underlying causes of crime through problem solving efforts.

Community policing emerged in the 1980's in response to two major problems in the professional policing era. First, community policing evolved as a response to the complaints of minority citizens about the unequal and discriminatory treatment they received during the professional policing era [1]. Traditional police strategies have distanced police from the public and led to political conflict and social unrest [2]. Community policing intended to reform the police so they would become more accountable to the public. It also sought to eliminate the historically poor relationship with minority communities and build trust among these communities [3, 4]. Second, there was a longstanding criticism against the police because their traditional crime prevention strategies had proved ineffective and unsuccessful. Community policing emerged to create new skills for police officers in fighting crime and solving the problems of the community [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. To achieve these two goals, community policing promises that police officers should become familiar with the neighborhoods they serve, and build a trusting relationship with the members living in these neighborhoods [7].

Community policing promises significant benefits to the public and the police. The benefits include an increase in the quality of life, a decline in fear of crime, greater police legitimacy and establishment of a partnership and trust between the police and the public. Most studies have found that community policing has had a modest effect on crime, but a considerable effect on the quality of interaction between police and the public [9, 10, 11]. Some studies suggest that community policing programs had an impact on increasing quality of life, reducing the fear of crime, and improving police legitimacy and favorable assessments of police practices [8, 9, 10, 12]. To be successfully implemented in police departments, community policing requires the presence of three major elements: establishment of community partnerships, 2) organizational change, and 3) adoption of a problem-solving model.

It is argued that for police agencies to successfully implement effective anti-terrorism strategies there must be a focus on long term strategies, rather than policing practices that only provide temporary or reactive responses. Thus, this paper addresses the transformation and successful implementation of community policing strategies when applied to terrorism. After reviewing the relationship between the police and Arab-American communities in the U.S., this article will discuss how police departments that serve Arab and Muslim communities can implement community policing elements in those neighborhoods. Two possible challenges to the implementation community policing in Arab and Muslim neighborhoods will be explored including resistance from police officers toward community policing activities and the lack of community member involvement in programs. Recommendations will be presented to cope with these challenges. Finally, it will review a case study involving the implementation of community policing in the Dearborn, Michigan, Arab-American community and the experience of its police department in Homeland security by demonstrating the importance of local police agencies in response to terrorism.

2. Relations between Law Enforcement Agencies and Arab-Muslim Communities

Studies have shown that there has been historically poor relationship between police and Arab and Muslim communities in the U.S. [6]. In terms of Arab-American

communities, this poor relation became worse following the 9/11 terrorist attacks [6, 13, 15]. Arab and Muslim communities have become associated with terrorism following the 9/11 terrorist attacks [15]. Since then, they have also been subject to new federal policies and practices imposed in response to terrorist acts. They suffered from a heightened high level of suspicion exacerbated by increased media attention and targeted government policies, such as special requirements, and the detention and deportation of community members. Especially, Arab Americans have become the targets of individual acts and hate crimes. The hate crimes and new policies increased the fear and anxiety among Arab and Muslim communities [15]. These new federal policies and the heightened fear of terrorism also placed new pressures on local police agencies. They had to incorporate new responsibilities in response to terrorism. Immigration enforcement and offender search were among those responsibilities. However, some local police agencies reported that these new policies that were poorly defined and inconsistently applied [13].

2.1 The Vera Institute of Justice Study on Relations between Law Enforcement Agencies and Arab- American Communities

In particular, one of the first studies to examine the effect of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the relationship between Arab-Americans and law enforcement was conducted by the Vera Institute of Justice, a nonprofit policy research center based in New York. The study was conducted from 2003 to 2005 and financed by the Justice Department. Around 100 Arab-Americans and 111 law enforcement personnel, including F.B.I. agents and police officers, participated in the study. Some respondents were interviewed privately, and others took part in focus groups in cities around the country.

The study found that the 9/11 attacks had a significant impact on Arab- American communities and law enforcement officials. Arab-Americans reported that they were mainly concerned about an increasing sense of victimization, suspicion of law enforcement, concerns about protecting their civil liberties, and a fear of surveillance. They also reported that they were reluctant to contact law enforcement officers because they did not trust them. On the other hand, law enforcement officials reported that they had to incorporate new counterterrorism efforts in their daily activities. These new activities and measures threatened to break the long-term efforts by police departments to build trust in their communities, especially among immigrants. It appeared that most police officers lacked knowledge of Arabic language and culture which prevented them from working together with Arab communities. However, the study pointed out that there is a growing willingness to improve the relationship between law enforcement officials and Arab-Americans. The authors of the study recommended that police establish a strong relationship with Arab-American communities to gain the trust of individuals. As a conclusion of their study, they suggested that the promises of community policing are well suited to improve the relationship and trust between the two parties.

3. Adaptation of Basic Elements of Community Policing in Arab and Muslim Neighborhoods

The study by the Vera Institute of Justice has revealed that the perceptions of Arab and other Muslim communities have always been negative and suspicious of federal police

whereas they have a fair amount of goodwill toward local police agencies. Therefore, these new polices have the potential to break this goodwill [13]. Having a good relationship with Arab and Muslim communities will help police agencies gather information and conduct investigations regarding terrorist activity. Those departments which have a considerable number of Arab or other Muslim communities have to consider the benefits of a relationship with the members of those communities. As Goldstein [16] suggests, community policing can gain the confidence of the Arab and Muslim citizens and eliminate negative views of police in their neighborhoods. This paper propose that police departments can adopt their longstanding community policing experiences in order to build relationships with Arab and Muslim communities, gain their trust, increase police legitimacy and reduce the fear of hate crimes of community members by applying basic elements of community policing which are partnership, organizational change and problem solving.

3.1. Partnership with Arab and Muslim Communities

Local police agencies are in the best position to establish relationships with Arab and Muslim communities. Despite the fact that citizens generally distrust police institutions, they may trust the individual members of the institutions. Building a personal relationship leads to trust between police and communities who have previously-held opinions of police [17]. There are two apparent benefits of establishing partnership with Arab and Muslim communities.

First, setting up a partnership with community members increases police legitimacy in Arab and Muslim communities. Community policing emphasizes the legitimacy and fairness of police practices. When a strong partnership is established, communities learn about police officers, which can lead to the elimination of negative views of police in those minority neighborhoods [18]. It has been known that citizens not only evaluate police officers according to their effectiveness in reducing crime rates, but also they evaluate them on how sensitive they are to their constitutional rights and how well they meet their needs [19]. Fighting terrorism in many cases requires the application of proactive policing techniques and methods, such as searching persons, houses and cars. A great deal of research has found that proactive approaches carry potential risks, one of which is that it increases negative attitudes toward the police [20]. Therefore, partnership-building with the community is an important element in this phase. Building a strong communication network between communities and the police will eliminate possible rumors or other false information regarding police operations. This partnership will also help community leaders to bring their concerns to the police [17]. Partnership with Arab and Muslim communities will enhance perceptions of police legitimacy and fairness. Studies have shown that citizens are more cooperative when police treat them fairly and with respect for their values, beliefs and cultures [14].

Second, police can gain vital information in learning the activities of terrorist groups when they establish partnerships and trust with those communities. It has been established that traditional intelligence methods have limited power to penetrate Arab and Muslim communities [17]. This trust helps police officers gather information, and develop knowledge and vital intelligence of the resident activity related to terrorist activities. Creating an intelligence network base helps police officers to watch their activities. Otherwise, it is impossible to penetrate these communities [17].

Third, establishing partnerships with Arab and Muslim communities helps local police agencies in the phase of the investigation and the interrogation of terrorist activities. For example, federal law agencies have to conduct investigations and interrogations in Arab and Muslim communities after a terrorist attack. When local police agencies have a good relationship with those communities, they can help federal police agencies in the process of locating the interviewees and interacting with them. Those Arab and Muslim community members who see their local officers in these investigations and interviews feel more comfortable themselves.

3.2. Changes in Police Departments

In order to implement community policing programs in Arab and Muslim communities, police departments should make some changes within their organizations. First, community policing philosophy should be adopted department-wide. Police departments that have fully embraced the community policing philosophy should also be more effective in establishing partnerships with the Arab and Muslim communities [21]. Community policing programs in Arab and Muslim communities can not be effective in problem solving and creating partnerships unless police officers fully comprehend the attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors that are required in community policing philosophy. In order to make an effective partnership with community, police officers must be more compatible community policing objectives. For example, police departments should establish procedures and policies, including how to interact with Arab and Muslim communities.

Second, police departments should redefine the role of their officers and give them new responsibilities beyond their traditional crime-fighting roles [6]. Establishing partnerships with Arab and Muslim communities, organizing meetings with community members, gathering raw intelligence from Arab and Muslim communities are among their new roles [22]. Police departments need to make their police officers more sensitive to possible hate crimes against Arab and American neighborhoods. Police officers who are conducting patrols in Arab and Muslim neighborhoods or their workplace must also look for possible hate crimes in addition to looking for criminal activities. This new role must be highlighted especially after a terrorist attack.

Third, police departments should adopt some important operational strategies that are in accordance with community policing principles in order to develop long term solutions relative to partnerships with Arab and Muslim communities. Police departments can decentralize their police services by assigning their sensitive and skillful police officers to Arab and Muslim neighborhoods, opening mini-stations and conducting foot patrols in those neighborhoods. Decentralization enables police officers to be innovative and flexible in finding solutions to the problems of the community because they are closer to community. For example, officers who are assigned to Arab and Muslim neighborhoods can understand the problems and considerations of community members; otherwise, it is impossible to learn these problems. Consequently, these activities help police officers to maintain close relationship with those communities.

Finally, police departments should provide community policing training and education to the police officers in Arab and Muslim neighborhoods. Community police officers are supposed to organize meetings and discussions, communicate with the community members effectively, and deal with complicated situations affectively. However, most police academies do not offer courses that involve these kinds of

community policing activities and most police lack the necessary training to deal with minority communities [10]. A police officer who does not know the culture, the verbal or non-verbal communications of Arab and Muslim communities, may easily harm the relations with those community members. For example, the conversational distance is closer for Arab Americans than for other Americans. Therefore, an untrained officer may misinterpret the behavior of an Arab- American who comes very close to him [15]. Therefore, it is necessary to train police officers about religious and cultural awareness of Arab and Muslim communities. Police awareness of cultural and religious sensitivities may increase the trust between the police and diverse communities.

3.3. Problem-solving

In order to reach the root causes of the problems between police agencies and Arab and Muslim communities, a problem-solving approach is necessary. While eliminating the root causes of these problems is beyond the role of the police, they can use their existing problem-solving tactics in order to solve the problems that face with Arab and Muslim communities. Police departments can use the following or similar problem-solving models in accordance with their problems in their homeland security efforts.

3.3.1. Problem- Solving Model: 1

Scanning the Problem: Law enforcement agencies had some difficulties and problems in dealing with 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. First, police received limited intelligence from the public regarding forthcoming terrorist attacks. Second, law enforcement officials had difficulty interacting with and taking information from Arab-Americans while conducting investigations [23].

Analysis of the Problem: There is a poor relationship and a lack of trust between the police and Arab and Muslim communities. This poor relationship mainly stems from historically negative police practices in Arab and Muslim neighborhoods, stereotyping all Arab and Muslims as terrorists, and a lack of ethnical, cultural and religious sensitivity training of police officers.

Responding to the Problem: In order to overcome this kind of problem, police agencies should take some steps in like the followings:

- Identify Arab and Muslim community leaders and take the lead in reaching out to key community leaders by demonstrating an open and honest way
- Avoid focusing on contacts solely for information extraction; instead, the relationship should be driven by information sharing with the community
- Increase the resources of police department for outreach community members
- Organize cultural and religious awareness training for their police officers
- Hold meetings and forums with Arab- American community members
- Recruit from Arab and Muslim communities
- Appoint a community police liaison who works as a bridge between two parties
- Demonstrate that police officers are sensitive to the constitutional rights of Arab- American community members
- Appoint a liaison officer who will serve as a bridge between police departments and those minority communities

- Work closely with federal law enforcement agencies to ensure that federal engagement of area residents does not damage existing local police–citizen relations or undermine community-policing principles

Assessing the Problem: After conducting these activities, police departments should review their response and evaluate it. Have they established a relationship with the community? Do the community members trust them now? Can police officers take information from them? What should be done next?

3.3.2. Problem Solving Model: 2

Scanning the problem: As tensions rose after the 9/11 attacks, police agencies found themselves facing an increasing number of hate crimes targeting Arab and Muslim communities [15]. It appears that the police were not successful in reducing the fear of hate crimes among Arab- American communities [13].

Analysis of the problem: Police agencies should find out where those hate crimes are mostly committed; when they are committed; what types of hate crimes are committed; who the perpetrators were (certain individuals or most of the community); and how the perpetrators are encouraged to commit hate crimes. Use the data from police records and interview with community members.

Responding to the problem: Police agencies should take some steps as the followings:

- Show zero tolerance to hate crimes. Act immediately, identify the perpetrators and try to arrest them by demonstrating clearly that hate crimes will not be tolerated by police
- Establish a partnership with the media to dissuade from influencing community perception Arab and Muslim communities
- Conduct focus patrols in Arab-American neighborhoods, workplaces and places of worship to prevent possible hate crimes
- Educate citizens that most Arab Americans are law abiding people and are not terrorists

Assessing the problem: Police agencies should assess their response. Specifically, have the rates of hate crimes reduced? Do community members feel safer? What should be done next?

4. Challenges to Community Policing Activities in Arab-American Communities

Implementing community policing in Arab and Muslim communities is a challenging issue for police agencies departments, especially for traditional police agencies. Police agencies may have difficulty in the implementation of community policing programs stemming from both internal and external sources.

4.1. Resistance from Police officers

Resistance from employees is among the major internal impediments to any community policing program [10, 24]. Successful implementation of community policing depends heavily on the ability of police departments to cope with the potential resistance of police officers [25]. Resistance mainly arises from the specific culture of police. Resistance may occur because community policing redefines and changes their

traditional roles and working styles [26]. Skepticism towards community policing and internal confusion about the operational definition of community policing may also lead to police officer resistance [11, 24, 27]. For example, police officers who support harsh tactics in response to crime and terrorism may assume community policing is soft and ineffective. Their belief may cause them to forego establishing close relationships with Arab and Muslim communities that they could (in their minds) be connected to terrorist activities.

4.2. Lack of Involvement of Arab and Muslim Community Members into Community Policing Programs

Police departments must involve community members into their community policing activities for successful implementation. However, community policing in diverse and heterogeneous communities like Arab and Muslim communities is more challenging as the level of citizen involvement tends to be lower than in other communities. This lower level of community involvement is the major external impediment to community policing and may stem from several reasons.

First, research has shown that minority community members are reluctant to involve themselves in community policing programs because their historically hostile relationship with the police has led to a lack of trust. The practices during the professional era of police distanced police from minorities. They were often victims of police abuse of power and traditional aggressive police strategies [28]. Therefore, as Terry and Grant [29] suggest, Arab and Muslim communities may fear and distrust the police, and subsequently any efforts to install a community policing program.

Second, Arab and Muslim community members may not be aware of the real value of community policing programs and practices in their community. They may perceive these programs as social functions instead, such as parties, barbecues or neighborhood fairs. Even community leaders may not have an adequate understanding of community policing programs in their communities [28].

Third, Grinc [28] suggests that citizens may become reluctant to continue their relationship with police and attend the community policing programs when the beat officers in their area change without a stated reason. Similarly, Arab-American community members may request more sensitive and qualified police officers in their neighborhoods and engage with them more frequently, especially if the officers have made positive interactions and relations with the community.

In addition, community members may fear retribution from drug dealers, gang members, [1, 12, 28] as well terrorists. This is relatively common in communities where citizens feel that the threat of retribution is greater than the police's ability to protect them. Further, not speaking English as a primary language could hinder participation in community policing programs. It may seem simple, but a language barrier prevents things that are taken for granted, such as simply understanding the content of community policing meetings [28].

There are several steps police departments should take in order to involve Arab-American community members into community policing programs. First, police need to understand the reasons that may encourage reluctance of community members to become involved in community policing activities [12]. If the reason is a lack of trust in the police, the department should proactively contact Arab American community leaders to honestly demonstrate their desire to improve the quality of life in Arab American neighborhoods via community policing programs. Police officers should

demonstrate how they can protect their neighborhoods, workplaces, or places of worship [30].

Second, education of community members is a key issue in community policing [28]. Therefore, police departments should stress community education, outreach and organization when they pursue a community policing program in Arab and Muslim communities.

Third, increasing the representation of ethnic minority police officers will provide both the police department and the community significant benefits [29]. Police officers from Arab and Muslim communities will have a solid foundation of knowledge about the cultural values and norms of these communities. In turn, it will increase the likelihood of strong police-community partnership and involvement of these communities in community policing activities.

Fourth, as Davis and Murphy [6] point out, multicultural forums and councils can provide important benefits to law enforcement agencies. During meetings with ethnic minorities, law enforcement agencies can discuss and learn concerns of Arab American community members and jointly devise ways to solve their problems. Police officers can also ask for help and support from minority groups throughout the investigation and interview process. In short, with the help of multicultural forums and councils, police departments can create an environment in which candid discussions can easily be carried out and collaboration between the police and the public can be obtained.

Involving Arab- American community members into community policing programs will take some effort, but the benefits suggest that police departments should try to eliminate these impediments to initiate community policing activities. As Goldstein [18] suggests, when citizens are reluctant to contact the police, police officers must initiate the first contact. Police officers can participate in their ceremonies and celebrations and community gatherings. Police officers can also improve their relations by providing small favors during the prayer days. For example, they can provide extra parking service with persons attending on the weekly prayer day, which is held on Fridays. Small gestures during these days to community members will go a long way in demonstrating their sensitivity to their culture and religious activities of Arab Americans.

5. Case Study: Dearborn Police Department Community Policing Experience in Arab-American Neighborhoods

One of the first studies to examine the role of local police agencies in response to terrorism was conducted by Thacher in Dearborn, MI. Thacher [23] conducted his study by reviewing Dearborn's homeland security activities and gathering information through interviews, observations, and document reviews. He made these findings with the leaders and members of the Arab- American community and police command staff members. He observed activities of community police officers and several neighborhood meetings. Finally, he reviewed written documents that included government reports and articles in newspapers since 1988, and several informational e-mails from community groups.

One of the first studies that examined the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the Arab community and relations between Arab- American communities and the police was conducted in Dearborn, Michigan. Dearborn has one of the largest Arab American populations in the United States, including Lebanese, Yemenis, and Iraqis. Community

policing programs were established there to repair historically deteriorated relations between the police and Arab communities. During the 1990s, more Arab police officers were hired, and officials began to work more closely with Arab American community members. In 1996, a community policing substation was opened in the region where Arab communities live. Police officers who worked in this substation were held mainly responsible for increasing the positive interactions with the community, providing services and addressing quality of life concerns. The community policing efforts were strongly supported by community leaders of Arab communities [23].

Thacher [23], in examination of these efforts, interviewed the leaders and members of the Arab-American community and members of the police staff and command, and observed the activities of community police officers and police-community meetings. Thacher revealed several important explanations that underscored the importance of building partnership with communities, especially minorities in the time of terror.

First, continuous community policing efforts in Dearborn helped officers handle situations in Arab communities more easily than expected after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Following the terrorist attacks, Arab-American communities became more strained because of the threat of and actual hate crimes against them. America's multicultural neighborhoods, particularly Arab and Muslim communities, were initially affected by a backlash violence and hate crimes following the terrorist attacks. Even though they were willing to reach out to local police to prevent or report these crimes, many refrained from doing it due to the fact that they thought that police would help deport, interrogate or otherwise act against them. In some cities Arab American conducted demonstrations to show their sufferings from hate crimes. However, in Dearborn, it was never out of control because of the improved relationship between the police and the community. City officials declared that community policing efforts were the main instrument that helped control the tension in Arab communities. In order to control the situation in Dearborn, Dearborn Police Department (DPD) and the major office held meetings with community leaders and other city officials in DPD. In these meetings, the police chiefs learned that the main concerns of community leaders were security concerns, particularly hate crimes, their civil liberties and media coverage. City officials immediately took action. For example, DPD deployed more patrol officers near potential Arab targets, such as mosques, local schools, and Arab business districts.

The second benefit was that Federal Law enforcement agencies made use of community policing activities employed by Dearborn Police Department during the process of investigation and collecting information regarding 9/11 attacks. After the 9/11 attacks, the local police officers assisted the federal law enforcement officers during their interviewing of more than 200 Arab- Americans. Because the local police have a better relationship with Arab community members, federal agents were more productive during the interviews. Local police helped the FBI investigators to locate interviewees and, in some cases, they served as translators because the FBI officials had a lack of Arabic language. Local police also sent letters before visiting interviewees and arrived at homes with plain clothes and emphasized the voluntary nature of the interviews. The letters indicated that "We have no reason to believe that you are associated with any terrorist activities". In the end, Dearborn officers made more concessions to community concerns about the interviews than any other part of the community and were recognized as a model in the rest of the country. Thacher noted that the participation of local police officers in the interviews could have undermined

the trust and support they had worked to develop in Arab community. However the trust between the local police and Arab American community and the way that the local department participated in the interviews helped them to maintain their positive relationship. Local police declined to conduct interviews by themselves and they presented themselves as the monitors of both FBI officials and community members. Local police sought to work with FBI investigators to make sure that they followed fair procedures and that federal agents treated interviewees with respect.

Consequently, the Thacher's study reveals that local police departments can play a key role in the phase of investigation and intelligence of terrorism activities. It also shows that implementation of community policing in Arab and Muslim communities can significantly help law enforcement officers to carry out their activities regarding the prevention and investigation of terrorist activities.

Conclusion

Apprehension of criminals is an unquestionable responsibility of the police. Serving justice is the one significant role of the traditional police [8]; from this perspective, arresting terrorists and punishing them is the desired goal of traditional policing. This justice-based approach to the problem produces short-term solutions to the crime problem. On the other hand, long term considerations to solve the terrorism problem must be the first priority of police agencies. Therefore, current policing strategies and tactics should consider long terms considerations.

Community policing promises long terms solutions to the problems of the community as well as terrorism threat. It has been dominant policing model in the U.S. for nearly three decades. It promises significant benefits to the public and the police, such as an increase in the quality of life, a decline in fear of crime, greater police legitimacy and establishment of a partnership and trust between the police and the public. Therefore, local police agencies that are already familiar with community policing practices can adapt the basic principles of community policing in their efforts in response to terrorism. It provides local police agencies important strategies to establish partnerships and trust with Arab and Muslim communities, gain legitimacy in the eyes of these communities, gain intelligence from communities and reducing fear among citizens. This may, in turn, help gain vital information from those community members in dealing with terrorism. In addition, as understood from the Dearborn Police Department Experience, local police can significantly help federal law enforcement agencies in contacting, interviewing and interacting with Arab and Muslim communities.

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Part 4

Legal Aspects of Responding to Terrorism: A Delicate Balance

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Evaluation of the PATRIOT Act: Section 215

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Abstract. Terrorism has been on the face of the world for centuries, but not until September 11, 2001, had terrorism impacted the world to such an extent that not only foreign policies and security strategies but also legal issues became a matter of controversy. After 9/11, Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism [1] H.R. 3162, S. 1510, Public Law 107-56 became a United States legislative law, enacted in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Patriot Act's most notorious provision, Section 215, the so-called "angry librarians" provision allows federal agents to ask The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to issue an order directing the recipient to produce tangible things in national security and terrorism cases. There are many criticisms for this provision. There are two obligations for the government: to protect civil safety and security against violence, and to preserve civil liberties. One should not be preferred over the other. They are supposed to work parallel to each other. If the government leaves one of them behind, the system will lose its equilibrium level.

Keywords: Terrorism, PATRIOT Act, security vs. liberties and Section 215.

Introduction

Terrorism has been on the face of the world for centuries, but not until September 11, 2001, terrorism impacted the world to such extend to which not only foreign policies and security strategies but also legal issues became a matter of controversy. Some even argued that nothing would be the same after this tragic event. While it has changed the threat assessment at the global scale, this event also brought up the issue of security versus liberties.

Imagine that an object stands on a surface, exactly in the position where it is supposed to be. That is the equilibrium level for the environment. Everything is balanced and in peace. As the object is moved away from where it is supposed to be, the balance in the environment is lost. Every thing is disturbed and cannot stand long in that position. There is an urgent need for setting up the order again. The only way to put the object into its original position and set the balance again is to apply exactly the same amount of force, which moved it away, in exactly the opposite direction. Others will not bring it to the equilibrium level and maybe will cause situations that are even more terrible. Therefore, that is almost a surgical operation.

In order to bring environment to the equilibrium level, several “Emergency Laws” were enacted in the history of America; Alien and Sedition Acts of 1790’s, Suspension of Habeas Corpus during Civil War, Abrams: Muting of Free Speech during WWI, Red Scare and Palmer Raids in post WWI period, FDR, Great Depression New Deal Legislation, Internment of Japanese during the WWII, Blacklisting and Congressional Hearings in the McCarthy, Anti-Communist Era, Post WWII era, Wiretapping and general harassment of government critics in civil rights and Vietnam War era. After 9/11, Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism [1] H.R. 3162, S. 1510, Public Law 107-56 became a United States legislative law, enacted in response to the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by international terrorists.

The bill passed 98-1 in the United States Senate, and 357-66 in the United States House of Representatives: Senator Russ Feingold (D - Wisconsin) cast the Senate's lone dissenting vote. President George W. Bush signed the bill into law on October 26, 2001. The USA Patriot Act is not a stand-alone act. It contains more than 150 sections and amends over 15 federal statutes. Assistant attorney general Viet D. Dinh and current Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff were the chief architects of the act. The USA Patriot Act expanded the federal government’s power to investigate and prosecute suspected terrorists. Among other provisions, the law allowed the government to detain non-citizens suspected of terrorism for months or longer without filing charges and to hold court hearings about them in secrecy. [2].

The Patriot Act includes five main areas that amend or modify existing procedures.

1. Criminal Investigations: Tracking and Gathering Communications
2. Foreign Intelligence Investigations
3. Money Laundering
4. Alien Terrorists and Victims
5. Other Crimes, Penalties, Procedures [3].

According to Section 224 of Patriot Act, other than sections 203(a), 203(c), 205, 208, 210, 211, 213, 216, 219, 221, and 222, and the amendments made by those sections shall cease to have effect on November 31, 2005 that means the following sections of PATRIOT will expire on 12/31/ 2005: §201, §202, §203(b), (d), §206, §207, §209, §212, §215, §217, §218, §220, §223

Although the U.S. Congress approved the USA Patriot Act quickly, discussion over the renewal of certain provisions scheduled to expire at the end of 2005 has already sparked controversy on Capitol Hill. Those sunset provisions apply to changes related to the FBI’s expanded wiretap authority and increased ability to acquire business records in intelligence investigations.

A sunset law is a statute or provision in a law that requires periodic review of the rationale for the continued existence of the particular law, administrative agency, or other governmental function. That is why, the sunset provisions were included to force Congress to evaluate whether the administration has used the powers appropriately and whether the provisions should be expanded, kept the same, or terminated.

1. Section 215

For foreign intelligence investigations, many of the provisions ease restrictions on surveillance. Here after, this study is going to focus on the Patriot Act’s most notorious provision, Section 215, the so-called “*angry librarians*” provision. The section allows

federal agents to ask The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to issue an order directing the recipient to produce tangible things in national security terrorism cases [2].

Table 3. FISA Pre and Post Period of PATRIOT Act

Before USA PATRIOT ACT	After USA PATRIOT ACT
<p>Business Records and Other Tangible Items: Prior to passage of the Patriot Act, FISA empowered the judges of the FISA court to grant the FBI access to certain business records, 50 U.S.C. 1861-1863 (2000 ed.). As noted below with an emphasis on the components later changed, the procedure called for :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ a FISA court order granting FBI access to the business records of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • common carriers (airlines, bus companies, and others in the business of passenger transportation); • businesses that provided public accommodations (hotels, models, etc.); • storage locker facilities; or • vehicle rental agencies; ➤ either (1) in order to gather foreign intelligence information, i.e., information that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • related to (and if the information concerned an American was essential to) U.S. ability to protect against: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • attacks or other hostile acts of a foreign power its agents; • sabotage or international terrorism committed by a foreign power its agents; or • clandestine intelligence activities by a foreign power, its intelligence services, or agents; or • related to (and if the information concerned an American was essential to): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.S. national defense or security; or • the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs; ➤ or (2) in order to conduct an investigation of international terrorism, i.e., of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • dangerous or violent crimes • apparently intended to • coerce a civilian population; • influence government policy by coercion; or • affect government conduct by kidnaping or assassination; and • that are committed overseas or are international in nature or effect; <p>upon a specification of a reason to believe that the records sought were those of a foreign power or one of its agents; and those to whom the order was directed were required to comply and were forbidden to disclose the existence or specifics of the order.</p> 	<p>Section 215 of the Patriot Act rewrote the business records provisions, 50 U.S.C. 1861-1862, so that now:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ - a FISA judge may grant an FBI request for an order granting access to any relevant tangible item (including books, records, records, papers, documents, and other items); ➤ - either (1) in order to gather foreign intelligence information that does not concern an American, i.e., information that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • related to the U.S. ability to protect against: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • attacks or other hostile acts of a foreign power its agents; • sabotage or international terrorism committed by a foreign power its agents; or • clandestine intelligence activities by a foreign power, its intelligence services, or agents; or • related to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.S. national defense or security; or • the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs; ➤ - or (2) in order to conduct an investigation to protect against international terrorism, i.e.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • -- dangerous or violent crimes • -- apparently intended to • --- coerce a civilian population; • --- influence government policy by coercion; or • --- affect government conduct by kidnaping or assassination; and • -- that are committed overseas or are international in nature or effect; ➤ - or in order to conduct an investigation to protect against clandestine intelligence activities; ➤ - as long as any investigation of an American is not based solely on the American's exercise of his or her 1st Amendment rights; and - those to whom the order is directed are required to comply and are forbidden to disclose the existence or specifics of the order.
Source : [27]	

As it is seen on Table-3, investigators had limited tools at their disposal to obtain certain business records before Patriot Act. The government needed at least a warrant and probable cause to access private records. Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act [4], authorizing warrantless surveillance, the primary purpose was to obtain foreign intelligence information. Also under FISA, records could be sought only "for purposes of conducting foreign intelligence" and the target must be "linked to foreign espionage" and an "agent of a foreign power."

Section 215 modifies the rules on records searches in two ways. First, there is expansion on the types of entities. Under the old provision, the FBI could obtain

records only from "a common carrier, public accommodation facility, physical storage facility, or vehicle rental facility." Post-Patriot Act, third-party holders of target's financial, library, travel, video rental, phone, medical, church, synagogue, and mosque records can be searched without target's knowledge or consent. Second, there is expansion on the types of items. Under the old authority, the FBI could only seek "records." Now, the FBI can seek "any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items)." Now the FBI needs only to certify to a FISA judge without evidence or probable cause.

In his speech to the nation on 20th of January 2004, President Bush explained very well what the government expects from the USA Patriot Act. He said, "*Inside the United States, where the war began, we must continue to give our homeland security and law enforcement personnel every tool they need to defend us. And one of those essential tools is the Patriot Act, which allows federal law enforcement to better share information, to track terrorists, to disrupt their cells, and to seize their assets. For years, we have used similar provisions to catch embezzlers and drug traffickers. If these methods are good for hunting criminals, they are even more important for hunting terrorists*" [5]. In addition to the Presidents' words, conservatives say the Patriot Act has played a key part and often a leading role in a number of successful operations to protect innocent Americans from the deadly plans of terrorists dedicated to destroying America and our way of life [2]. In addition to this argument, they believe that the USA Patriot Act revised outdated rules that fatally pampered surveillance of suspected terrorists in America [6]. There might be an unanticipated cost for the government that Section 215 received too many critics and became the first target point within the USA Patriot Act.

At this point "*clever labeling legislation*" comes to the scene. The act was passed after the 9/11 attacks and was labeled as "patriotic." Therefore, it is difficult for anyone to declare publicly that he or she is against the "*Patriot Act*." Due to its name "Patriot," the public would perceive any opponents of the act as unpatriotic. The Patriot Act's very name has come to serve as a symbol for all of the domestic anti-terrorist law enforcement actions.

1.1. Criticism of Section 215

There are many criticisms for this provision. The first one is that according to section the court *shall* issue the requested subpoena. From the use of the word *shall*, liberals infer that the obligation to issue the requested subpoena is mandatory. Thus, the issuing court has no discretion to reject any application. In response to this argument, conservatives say that this criticism misreads the statute, which, while saying that the subpoena *shall* issue, also says that it shall issue as sought or *as modified*. Section 215 authorizes judicial review and modification of the subpoena request, which occurs before the subpoena is issued. This is a substantial improvement over the situation in traditional grand jury investigations where the subpoena is issued without judicial intervention and the review comes, at the end, only if the subpoena is challenged [7].

The second criticism is that Section 215 imposes a gag rule in two ways. First, whoever goes to a library, they may see the following notice. "*Under Section 215 of the Federal USA Patriot Act (Public Law 107-56), records of the books and other library materials you borrow from this Library or use of other library services, such as computers, may be obtained by federal agents. This federal law prohibits librarians from informing you if records about you have been obtained by federal agents.*" It

means that a third party person who has been asked to give tangible records to the government official has no right to disclose any information to anybody. The requirement that recipients of these orders keep them confidential is based on "*National Security Letter*" (NSL) statutes. According to the Conservatives, on the other hand, the NSL rule has existed for decades; therefore, it is not a new concept. In addition to this, Assistant to the US Attorney General for a legal policy, Daniel Bryant defended the gag order in May 2004 at a House Judiciary subcommittee hearing. He said that the USA Patriot Act prevents people from interrupting terrorism investigations [8]. Secondly and more importantly, section 215 takes away a great deal of liberty and privacy but it is not likely to get any security benefit in return. There is a real possibility that setting the FBI loose on the American public will have a profound chilling effect on public discourse. If people think that their conversations, their e-mails, and their reading preferences are being monitored, people will inevitably feel less comfortable to say what they think, especially if what they think is not what the government wants them to think [9].

Another criticism comes from a due process point of view. According to this, Section 215 violates the Fourth Amendment by allowing the government to search and seize personal records or belongings without a warrant and without showing probable cause. The Fourth Amendment ordinarily prohibits the government from searching an individual's home or office, or from seizing their records, unless it first obtains a warrant based on *probable cause*. The Supreme Court has applied this protection not just to physical objects but also to personal records and electronic data. Section 215 does not require the government to obtain a warrant or to establish probable cause before it demands an individual's personal records or belongings. In addition, section 215 violates the Fourth Amendment because it does not require the government to provide the individuals with notice ever that your records or belongings have been seized. Ordinarily the Constitution requires that the government notify you before it searches or seizes your records or belongings. Indeed the Supreme Court has held that this "*knock and announce*" principle is at the core of the Fourth Amendment's protections. Without notice, after all, a person whose privacy rights have been violated will never have an opportunity to challenge the government's conduct [9].

A counter argument comes from the conservative side. They claim that when considered in the intelligence-gathering context, it is easy to see that the scope of authority already exists in traditional law enforcement investigations. Obtaining business records is a longstanding law enforcement tactic. Ordinary grand juries for years have issued subpoenas to all manners of businesses, including libraries and bookstores, for records relevant to criminal inquiries. For example, in the 1997 Gianni Versace murder case, a Florida grand jury subpoenaed records from public libraries in Miami Beach. Likewise, in the 1990 Zodiac gunman investigation, a New York grand jury subpoenaed records from a public library in Manhattan. Investigators believed that the gunman was inspired by a Scottish occult poet and wanted to learn who had checked out books by that poet. In the Unabomber investigation, law enforcement officials sought the records of various libraries, hoping to identify the Unabomber as a former student with particular reading interests [7].

A response to this claim comes from civil libertarians. The American Civil Liberties Union said that the Patriot Act was enacted in haste without adequate debate and that Congress should revisit it, not make it permanent because, section 215 threatens individual privacy. It allows the government free reign to monitor our activities. They argue that the government does not need this power because the

government already has the authority to prosecute anyone whom it has probable cause to believe has committed or is planning to commit a crime. It also has the authority to engage in surveillance of anyone whom it has probable cause to believe is a foreign power or spy, whether or not the person is suspected of any crime [9].

The architect of Patriot Act, Viet D. Dinh defended section 215 and said, "Contrary to what the critics claim, Section 215 is narrow in scope. The FBI cannot use Section 215 to investigate a variety of crimes, nor even domestic terrorism. Instead, Section 215 can only be used to *"obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person,"* or to *"protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities."* The records of average Americans, and even not-so average criminals, are simply beyond the reach of Section 215" [10]. However, an article published in the New York Times on September 28, 2003 denied his claim. The article says that *"The Bush administration, which calls the USA Patriot Act perhaps its most essential tool in fighting terrorists, has begun using the law with increasing frequency in many criminal investigations that have little or no connection to terrorism"* [11]. Civil Libertarians also criticize the FBI for abusing and misusing its power. For example, a survey conducted by the University of Illinois suggested that, by November 2001, the FBI had already approached 85 out of some 1500 libraries. Moreover, based on a survey done by USDOJ showed that FBI has contacted libraries at least fifty times [9]. Dinh's argument is quite satisfactory on this claim. He says Congress embedded two significant checkpoints into Section 215. First, only a federal judge can issue and supervise a Section 215 order. By contrast, the court clerk routinely issues Grand Jury subpoenas for records. Second, the government must report to Congress every six months the number of times, and the manner, of the provision's use. The report of House Judiciary Committee supports Dinh's arguments. After reviewing the Attorney General's first report, House Judiciary Committee indicated that it was satisfied with the Justice Department's use of Section 215. *"The Committee's review of classified information related to FISA orders for tangible records, such as library records, has not given rise to any concern that the authority is being misused or abused."* An updated support to Dinh's arguments comes from The Inspector General for the Department of Justice. *"Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 1001 of the USA Patriot Act"* has reported that *there have been no instances in which the Patriot Act has been invoked to infringe on civil rights or civil liberties"* [12].

The ACLU is actively opposing the expansion of FISA through legislative advocacy and litigation. They oppose efforts in Congress to further broaden FISA's spying powers, and support proposed laws to increase public oversight of the ultra-secret FISA court. Fundamental privacy rights should not be determined by courts that sit in secret, do not ordinarily publish their decisions, and allow only the government to appear before them [9]. Contrary to this argument, Senators from outside the Administration made very interesting comments. For example, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) said, *"I have never had a single abuse of the Patriot Act reported to me. My staff...asked [the ACLU] for instances of actual abuses. They said they had none"* [13]. The lone Senator to vote against the Patriot Act, Russ Feingold (D-WI), said that he supported 90 percent of the Patriot Act and that there is too much confusion and misinformation about the Act [13]. In addition, The Associated Press reported that Frank Wolf (R-VA) read the Justice Department letter written by assistant attorney general William E. Moschella stating *"a member of a terrorist group closely affiliated with al-Qaeda used Internet services provided by a public library."* The release provided no specifics on how the government obtained that information [14].

2. Attempts to Amend PATRIOT Act

There are some attempts to modify or cancel some of the USA Patriot acts' sections. In March 2003, Rep. Bernie Sanders had introduced the Freedom to Read Protection Act [15]. that would minimize or repeal Section 215. A day before the vote, the President's budget office sent a memo to House members warning them if they passed anything to weaken the PATRIOT Act, the President would veto a \$39.8 billion bill. It would be the first veto in the President's term [16]. The final vote, a 210-210 tie, denied the amendment in July 2004. Another one is the SAFE Act, which is bipartisan bill and introduced by Sen. Larry Craig (R-ID) and Sen. Dick Durbin (D-IL) that would amend the USA Patriot Act to limit the alleged Fourth Amendment encroachments of the use of surveillance equipment and search warrants by the federal government. It is still pending but promised to be vetoed by President Bush.

On one hand, there is ongoing debate on this issue that supporters from both sides are presenting their arguments. On the other hand, public poll results of different institutions tend to support political argument on this debate. Some poll results showed that the public supports the government's war on terrorism, some do not support it. According to a September 9, 2003 CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll, 75% of Americans are not worried about the USA PATRIOT Act violating their civil rights. Just 22% say the legislation goes "*too far*," while about the same number, 21% say "*not far enough*." A plurality, 48%, says the Act is "*about right*" [17]. Another poll result comes from Newsweek. The percentage of Americans who held that the government went too far in restricting civil liberties to fight terrorism remained consistently small (8%) and the percentage of those who believe that the government just about right is 72% [18]. Contrary to the poll results above, data on perceptions about personal freedoms shows that a year before the September 11 attacks, 54 % of Americans were not concerned that the government threatens their own personal rights and freedoms; while two months after the attacks, the figure rose to 67 %, encompassing two-thirds of all Americans [19].

2.1. Evaluation Strategy

An important point in the evaluation of a policy is that of the evaluator. Politics and ideology can color research in many ways. Therefore, neutral and non-partisan researchers who are not politically motivated on either side should make the evaluation study of this policy. Experts in research fields have a professional obligation to search for the truth and to speak the truth, even though most people would prefer not to hear it.

To evaluate any study, researchers seek answers of the following questions. First, "*are policies being implemented as planned?*", and second, "*are policy achieving their intended goals?*" With the same logic to measure impact of the policy, we need to find the answer to one question. "*Are the expansions of the type of entities and type of items helpful to catch terrorists or helpful to prevent terrorist attacks against the U.S?*" In order to answer the question, we have to find out how to measure the expansions to be helpful or not. The following questions need to be answered.

1. How many applications and orders, pursuant to Section 215 of the Act, have been made or obtained for tangible objects in any investigation to protect the United States from international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities?

2. Has Section 215 been used to obtain records from a public library, bookstore, or newspaper? If so, how many times has Section 215 been used in this way?

3. How the amendments made by sections 215 have helped intelligence investigations both operationally and administratively and resulted in the capture of terrorist or dismantled terrorist organizations?

After receiving answers to these questions, we have to turn our attention to pre period of policy execution. We have to seek answers to the same questions according to FISA. In addition, we need to have a control group to provide reliable correlation result.

Conceptualizing an evaluation research does not mean that it is possible to obtain required information. In this evaluation, there seem to be two sources of information: the recipient of order side and the government side. Unfortunately, both sources were not publicly available until 5th of April 2005 when USDOJ Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales gave his statement to the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The statement make it partially possible evaluate government side but recipient side still not possible to access this source based on "*National Security Letter*" (NSL) statutes.

As mentioned above, the gag rule applies for the recipient of order and it is considered a federal crime if the recipient discloses the information, which is requested from the recipient. If the information were asked about use of section 215 from the government the answer would be quoted as: "the number of times the government has requested or the court has approved requests under this section since passage of the USA Patriot Act, is classified, and will be provided in an appropriate channel" [20].

However, today there are some answers to this question. First answer comes from former Attorney General John Ashcroft in his 2004 statement *The Department of Justice: Working to Keep America Safer* reported that as of November 16, 2004, the USA Patriot Act has been used to charge 372 suspected terrorists and convict or plead guilty 194 of them [21]. Another information comes from new USDOJ Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales declassified the fact that the FISA Court has issued 35 orders requiring the production of tangible things under section 215 from the effective date of the Act through 30th of March 2005 [22].

USDOJ Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales has also answered second question in his statement to the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary that none of those 35 orders were issued to libraries and/or booksellers, and none were for medical or gun records. He added that provision 215 has been used only to order the production of driver's license records, public accommodation records, apartment-leasing records, credit card records, and subscriber information, such as names and addresses for telephone numbers captured through court-authorized pen register devices up today [22].

James A. Baker, Counsel for USDOJ, states in his testimony to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security United States House of Representatives in April 26, 2005 that number of applications for surveillance or search filed under FISA were 1,012. In 2004 government filed 1,758 applications, a 74% increase in four years [23].

Table - 1 Comparison of FISA Applications Pre-Post 9/11 attack for Three Years Period

Pre 9/11 Attack Three Years Period - Number of FISA Applications			
Year	Presented	Approved	Rejected
1999	886	880	0
2000	1005	1012	0
2001	932	934	0
Total	2823	2826	0
Post 9/11 Attack 3 Three Years Period - Number of FISA Applications			
Year	Presented	Approved	Rejected
2002	1228	1228	0
2003	1727	1724	4
2004	1758	1754	0
Total	4713	4706	4
Difference between pre and post 9/11 Attack in total three years period			
Total	1890	1880	4
% of difference	66.95%	66.53%	N/A

Source: Adapted from http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html

Table 2. Comparison of FISA Applications Pre-Post I. World Trade Center Attack for Three Years Period

PreI. World Trade Center Attack Three Years Period - Number of FISA Applications			
Year	Presented	Approved	Rejected
1991	593	593	0
1992	484	484	0
1993	509	509	0
Total	1586	1586	0
Post I. World Trade Center Attack Three Years Period - Number of FISA Applications			
Year	Presented	Approved	Rejected
1994	576	576	0
1995	697	697	0
1996	839	839	0
Total	2112	2112	0
Difference between pre and post I. World Trade Center Attack in total three years period			
Total	526	526	0
% of difference	33.17%	33.17%	N/A

Source: Adapted from http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html

When the Table-1 and Table - 2 examined carefully, it is obviously visible that the volume of application to FISA court increased drastically (consequently at %66.95, %33.17) for three years pre and post II. World Trade Center attack September 11th, 2001 period in total and pre and post period of I. World Trade Center attack in

February 26th, 1993. It is not surprise to see similar pattern since it is natural reflex that any governments in the world tries to do something in order to not to have such kind of terrorist attacks and solve the case after attacks.

Another issue for this evaluation research is the availability of data and information about patriot act. This might be so difficult because this data and information are "classified." In addition, it is not possible to create a control group because there is no place in the U.S. where USA Patriot act is not implemented.

It is remarkable that The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States did not recommend any sunset provisions that should be made permanent in their 9/11 report. President Bush clearly asked for the renewal of USA Patriot Act's sunset provisions in his speech to the nation on 20th of January 2004. He said, "*key provisions of the Patriot Act are set to expire next year. The terrorist threat will not expire on that schedule. Our law enforcement needs this vital legislation to protect our citizens. You need to renew the Patriot Act*" [5].

Conclusion

The U.S. government has changed numerous U.S. laws and established new institutions to enhance the war against terrorism, including trimming some rights and redefining others since the 9/11 terrorist attack. Recently the Senate approved a landmark bill to restructure the nation's intelligence community and created a new national intelligence director position to sum up fifteen federal intelligence agencies in the same framework. The bill was one out of forty-one recommendations of 9/11 Commission Report, which set the legislative process in motion. In the mean time, the bill started to receive a lot of criticism. Libertarians argue extension of the power to exempt sensitive information. They believe that the power could be extended broadly under the new bill. Now everybody is asking the same question whether the new structure will make much of a difference in combating terrorism [24]. The government has already started to discuss what will be the next steps. Most probably the next step will be the USA Patriot Act II, unified national ID card with RF-ID, Driving License with RF-ID, and new U.S. passport with microchip to be able to track people in the U.S. All of these will bring some restriction on civil liberties and create a lot of debate.

At this point, it would be helpful to know civil libertarian's "*slippery slope effect*" about how democracies are lost to come to a conclusion on this issue. Their way of thinking is basically as follows. First, the government, in the name of national security or some other such cause, trims some rights, which raises little alarm at a time (e.g., the massive detention of Japanese Americans during World War II.). Then a few other rights are curtailed (e.g., the FBI spies on civil rights groups and peace activists during the 1960's). Soon, more rights are lost and gradually the entire institutional structure on which democracy rests tumbles down the slope with nobody able to stop it [25]. If one fears setting foot on the slope, there is only one alternative -to remain frozen at the top, opposed to all changes (Etzioni, 2004) It is easy to see that the government has no fear to put their step forward on the slope.

There are two obligations for the government: to protect civil safety and security against violence, and to preserve civil liberties. One should not be preferred over the other one. They are supposed to work parallel to each other. If the government leaves one of them behind, the system will lose its equilibrium level. At this point, the author of this article agrees with Mr. Otter who said, "Section 215 dangerously undermined

the people's confidence in their government and threatens citizens' First Amendment freedoms." Neither in the short term nor in the long term, there will be any benefits to renew sunset provisions of the USA Patriot Act. But, USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 created a new sunset of December 31, 2009, which requires greater congressional and judicial oversight for section 215 orders and requires high-level approval for section 215 FISA orders for library, bookstore, firearm sale, medical, tax return, and educational records [26].

In fighting against terrorism there might be gaps in the legislation, but such gaps should be fixed in a way that legislation should not be source of fear among the law-abiding citizens. Civil liberties should not be sacrificed for counterterrorism activities. Instead, the government, and, in particular the law enforcement agencies should avoid any action which might result in the otherwise.

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The Senior British Judiciary and the “War on Terror”: “Not Ready to Make Nice”

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Abstract. In this article the attitude of one section of the British judiciary to the propagation of the “war on terror” will be examined. The article will only look at those who are characterized as the senior British judiciary, that is those judges in the higher courts whose judgements are reported in law reports and whose decisions not only determine the fate of those in the case before them but, in the manner usual in any common law jurisdiction, also contribute to the development of law. The article will look at the reasons why there has been a change in the attitude of senior British judges towards their relationship with the executive and the legislature when it comes to things like decisions about national security. Finally, the article will look at how the actions of the senior judiciary might contribute to the lessening of tensions within the Muslim communities in the United Kingdom that have resulted from the “war on terror”.

Keywords. War on terror, British judiciary, national security

Introduction

In this article the attitude of one section of the British judiciary to the propagation of the “war on terror” will be examined. The article will only look at those who are characterized as the senior British judiciary, that is those judges in the higher courts whose judgments are reported in law reports and whose decisions not only determine the fate of those in the case before them but, in the manner usual in any common law jurisdiction, also contribute to the development of law. The article will thus not look at those judges in lower courts whose decisions are not reported. In doing this I do not intend to imply that these judges are unimportant in regard to the “war on terror” because this is not the case. It is, for example, magistrates, the lowest of all of those who hold judicial office within the criminal justice section of the English legal system, who have made initial decisions about the continued detention of those suspected of planning the destruction of aircraft flying out of the United Kingdom in August 2006. However, since their decisions are unreported and since we have no other source of evidence, we have no information that would enable us to know whether their attitudes mirror or differ from their more senior colleagues.

The article will begin with a description of the traditional approach taken in the United Kingdom by senior judges when faced with an executive decision that relates to questions of national security. It will then look at decisions that have been made which relate to British government actions in relation to the current “war on terror”. After this the article will look at the reasons why there has been a change in the attitude of senior

British judges towards their relationship with the executive and the legislature when it comes to things like decisions about national security. Finally, the article will look at how the actions of the senior judiciary might contribute to the lessening of tensions within the Muslim communities in the United Kingdom that have resulted from the "war on terror".

1. *Liversidge v Anderson*

The traditional approach by the British judiciary towards matters of national security is illustrated by the Second World War case of *Liversidge v Anderson* [1]. This case centred on the question of whether or not the Secretary of State's decision to detain someone under Regulation 18B of the Defence (General) Regulations 1939 had been properly made. Under this regulation the Secretary of State was given power to order someone's detention if they had

"reasonable cause to believe any person to be of hostile origin or associations or to have been recently concerned in acts prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the realm or in the preparation or instigation of such acts...".

When a decision by the Secretary of State to detain someone was challenged in the courts the case eventually came to be determined by the House of Lords, the highest British court. In the House of Lords, in upholding the Secretary of State's decision, one judge said that,

"this [the decision to detain someone] is so clearly a matter of executive discretion and nothing else that I cannot myself believe that those responsible for the Order in Council [creating the regulation] could have contemplated for a moment the possibility of the action of the Secretary of State being subject to the discussion, criticism and control of a judge in a court of law" [2].

Elsewhere in the judgements another judge said of the Secretary of State's decision,

"[t]he Secretary must...act on his own responsibility if he has reasonable cause to believe. That is, believes that he has in his own mind what he thinks is reasonable cause. If that is his mental state, the duty to act in the national interest attaches. That is a higher duty than the duty to regard the liberty of the subject. I cannot see any ground for holding that performance of that duty is to be subject to the decision of a judge, who cannot possibly have the full information on which the minister has acted or appreciate the full importance to the national interest of what the information discloses" [3].

As these quotations illustrate *Liversidge v Anderson* is an example of the complete deference that the courts have traditionally shown to executive decisions in the area of national security [4]. In this instance a statutory power to detain if there is reasonable cause to detain becomes, in the eyes of the courts, a power to detain if the Secretary of State thinks that there is reasonable cause to detain; that which was objective becomes subjective and, in any event, is deemed not to be something that should be reviewed by the courts.

Even at the time that the decision in *Liversidge v Anderson* was made, during the height of war, reaction to it was mixed. The two major law reviews of the time took different attitudes. Holdsworth, in the *Law Quarterly Review*, supported the decision

but Keeton, in the *Modern Law Review*, criticised both the decision and Holdsworth's support of it [5]. Subsequently it is probably true to say that "[i]nformed judgement of this decision, undertaken in the 'sober light of retrospect', has been almost unanimously condemnatory" [6]. Lord Atkin's dissenting judgement in the case where he said, "I protest, even if I do it alone, against a strained construction put on words with the effect of giving an uncontrolled power of imprisonment to the minister"

and went on to argue of the approach taken by the majority of judges,

"I know of only one authority which might justify the suggested method of construction: 'When I use a word', Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, 'to means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less'"

has received more subsequent academic attention and support than the majority judgements [7]. Moreover, in 1980, in giving judgement in the House of Lords, Lord Diplock finally asserted that the majority decision in *Liversidge v Anderson* was wrong [8]. Nevertheless, the notion of deference inherent in *Liversidge v Anderson*, has continued to be good law; even in overturning *Liversidge v Anderson*, Lord Diplock noted the decision was expedient and perhaps excusable.¹ The manner in which the majority of the House of Lords had managed their deference to the executive in relation to matters of national security had become to be seen as clumsy and intellectually indefensible, creating wider problems for the judiciary when they sought to reconcile the decision with their interpretation of statutory powers in cases not involving national security, but the necessity for deference in relation to national security was not in question. Thus, in the 1991 case of *R v Home Secretary Ex Parte Cheblak*, the courts refused an application for both a writ of habeas corpus and an application for judicial review where the Secretary of State for the Home Department had served a deportation order under s 3(5)(b) of the Immigration Act 1971 on Cheblak on the grounds that his presence in the United Kingdom was not conducive to the interests of national security [9]. In his judgement Lord Donaldson noted that "national security is the exclusive responsibility of the Executive" whilst in his judgement *Bedlam LJ* held that "[i]t is well settled that the courts must accept the evidence of the Crown and its officers on matters of national security" [10].

2. The "War on Terror"

In fighting to the "war on terror" the British government has both sought to use previously existing legal powers and, through Parliament, has taken on new powers [11]. It is unsurprising that the executive's use of these powers has come to be tested in the courts.

In the *Belmarsh* case, *A v Secretary for State for the Home Department*, detainees, who had been held without charge for an indefinite period of time under section 23 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, challenged their detention in the courts [12]. As in *Liversidge v Anderson* some detainees challenged their detention in court with their case finally being decided by the House of Lords. In the words of Lord Hoffmann, given that the United Kingdom had incorporated the European Convention

¹ *Inland Revenue Commissioners v Rossminster* loc cit.

on Human Rights Article 5 right to liberty into its law via the Human Rights Act 1998 into its domestic law,

"[t]he technical issue in this appeal is whether such a power [to detain people indefinitely without charge or trial] can be justified on the ground that there exists a 'war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation' within the meaning of article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights" [13]

thus permitting the Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001 which had been issued. Lord Hoffman's argument was straightforward.

"I do not underestimate the ability of fanatical groups of terrorists to kill and destroy, but they do not threaten the life of the nation. Whether we would survive Hitler hung in the balance, but there is no doubt that we will survive Al-Qaeda" [14].

More than this he asserted that "[t]he real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with traditional laws and political values, come not from terrorism but from laws such as this" [15].

In Lord Hoffmann's view the executive had failed to make out their case for the existence of a war on terror and he was therefore prepared, as a matter of law, to substitute his judgement about whether such detentions were necessary in the interest of national security for that of the executive.

The other majority judgements in the Belmarsh case are much more circumspect than Lord Hoffmann's and take a different approach. Lord Bingham begins his judgement by noting that he

"would accept that great weight should be given to the judgement of the Home Secretary, his colleagues and Parliament in this question, because they were called to exercise a pre-eminently political judgement...

The more political (in a broad or narrow sense) a question is, the more appropriate it will be for political resolution and the less likely it is to be an appropriate matter for judicial decision. The smaller, therefore, will be the potential role of the court." [16]

However, in Lord Bingham's view, "while any decision made by the democratic body must of course command respect, the degree of respect will be conditioned by the nature of the decision" [17]. As Lord Hope put it,

"I accept at once that the executive and the legislature are to be accorded a wide margin of discretion in matters of national security, especially when the [European] Convention [on Human Rights] rights of others such as the right to life may be put in jeopardy...But the width of the margin depends on the context. Here the context is set by the nature of the right to liberty which the Convention guarantees to everyone, and by the responsibility that rests on the court to give effect to the guarantee to minimise the risk of arbitrariness and to ensure the rule of law...Its absolute nature, save only in the circumstances that are expressly provide for by article 5(1), indicates that any interference with the right to liberty must be accorded the fullest and most anxious scrutiny.

Put another way, the margin of discretionary judgement that the courts will accord to the executive and Parliament when this right [to liberty] is in issue is narrower than will be appropriate in other contexts. We are not dealing here with matters of social or economic policy, where opinions may reasonably differ in a democratic society and where choices on behalf of the country as a whole are properly to be left to government and to the legislature. We are dealing with actions taken on behalf of society as a whole which affect the rights and freedoms of the individual. This is where the courts may legitimately intervene, to ensure that the actions taken are proportionate" [18].

Since the government had sought to take powers to detain just non-nationals and not nationals, since it was prepared to let such non-nationals leave the United Kingdom rather than be detained and since it was unable to convince the court that there was a greater threat from non-nationals than from nationals the majority in the House held that the government's actions were not compatible with the Human Rights Act 1998 since they were disproportionate to the threat that was being posed. The court therefore quashed the 2001 Derogation Order and issued a declaration of incompatibility with the Human Rights Act 1998 with respect to s 23 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.²

The approach taken by the majority of the House is more complex and more nuanced than that of Lord Hoffmann.³ Lord Hoffmann did not believe that a threat to the life of the nation had been demonstrated. The majority of the House accepted that such a threat might exist and also acknowledged that the executive might, for a variety of reasons, be better placed to know whether such a threat existed.⁴ However they also believed that the courts have a role to play in judging whether the executive's reaction to any threat fell within the bounds of legality.⁵ For both Lord Hoffmann and for the other judges in the House of Lords, the simple deference of *Liversidge v Anderson* and other previous cases was a thing of the past.⁶

It is important to note not only the fact of the abandonment of the notion of deference when analysing the impact of *A v Secretary for State for the Home Department*; it is also necessary to note the speed with which the senior judiciary have altered their approach. The court's first approach to the "war on terror" in general and the events of 9/11 in particular had been in the 2001 case of *Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman* [19]. Here Lord Hoffmann, in what is a quite conventional approach, had said of 9/11,

"[t]his seems to me to underline the need for the judicial arm of government to respect the decisions of ministers of the Crown on the question of whether

² Subsequent events seem to have vindicated the view of the courts. Bombs in London in July 2004 were set off by British nationals and all those accused of planning the bombing of aircraft in August 2006 are British nationals. On the other hand *Liversidge*, whose detention the House of Lords had supported was subsequently released (Keeton op cit p 172).

³ Thus Lord Bingham's judgement takes 38 pages whilst Lord Hoffmann's takes three pages.

⁴ Thus, for example, Jowell notes that the court's might accept that the executive has greater "intelligence-gathering capacity" than the executive (J Jowell "Judicial deference: servility, civility or institutional capacity?" (2003) Public Law 592 at p 598).

⁵ Two of the majority judgements express some scepticism about official evidence in relation to threats to national security (*A v Secretary for State for the Home Department* op cit per Lord Scott at p 148 and Baroness Hale at p 172).

⁶ For a similar approach by the Court of Appeal see *Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2006] EWCA Civ 1140.

support for terrorist activities is a threat to national security. It is not only that the executive has access to special information and expertise on these matters. It is also that such decisions, with serious potential results for the community, require a legitimacy, which can be conferred only by entrusting them to persons responsible to the community through the political process" [20].

It is not only the fact of the judiciary's volte-face but its speed that is remarkable.

Early reaction to the Belmarsh decision, both academic and judicial, has shown more support for the majority approach than for Lord Hoffmann's arguments. Thus, for example, Gearty has described the majority approach in the Belmarsh case as being "the finest assertion of civil liberties that has emerged from a British court since at least [the eighteenth century case of] *Entick v Carrington*" [21]. However, in commenting on Lord Hoffmann's judgement, he argued that

"[i]t is not for judges to engage in the assessment of future risks, and in a democracy those who are accountable to the electorate must be the people with the responsibility to assess the nature of the threat to a people's way of life. If the assessment is fabricated or otherwise untenable, or if the political leader's making the assessment are not to be trusted, then that is a matter for political not legal resolution. Lord Hoffmann's comments are a very useful addition to an important discussion, but it is not one that judges wearing their judicial hats are entitled to make."⁷

Similarly, Arden, a judge in the Court of Appeal, the United Kingdom's second highest court, commenting extra-judicially on the core of Lord Hoffmann's judgement, has written that

"I have had some doubts whether...this is truly an expression of a legal judgement. It seems to me to be more a matter of political science." [22]

The new judicial attitude towards its position carries with it the possible charge is that it arrogating to itself a role that is political rather than judicial, a role that, since it is not an elected body, it is not qualified to undertake, an argument that had been put to the court in the pleadings which led up to the Belmarsh decision. Lord Bingham's response to this argument in his judgement was straightforward.

"I do not...accept the distinction which he [the Attorney-General] drew between democratic institutions and the courts. It is of course true that the judges in this country are not elected and are not answerable to Parliament. It is also of course true...that Parliament, the executive and courts have different functions. But the function of independent judges charged to interpret and apply law is universally recognised as a cardinal feature of the modern democratic state, cornerstone of the rule of law itself. The Attorney-General is fully entitled to insist on the proper limits of judicial authority, but he is wrong to stigmatise judicial decision-making as in some way undemocratic" [23].

In a country whose political character includes the concept of the rule of law the courts, by virtue of their judicial role, are part of the government of the country and, if

⁷ Gearty op cit at p 33.

they do not take part in the government of the country, they then abdicate their judicial role [24].

As Dickson has noted when politicians talk about a war on terrorism one thing that they are doing is "providing a justification for disregarding the ordinary rule of law when fighting against terrorism and for applying instead the law of war" [25]. If this is part of the political case that is now being put by the British government the judicial reaction has been that, contrary to previous dicta, they are now competent to give verdict in the case and that, to date, the case has not been proved.⁸ For the senior judiciary, as Lord Woolf remarked in *Gillan v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis*, "[a]lthough terrorism necessarily changes the context in which the rule of law must operate, it does not call for the abdication of law" [26]. On the face of it this is a remarkable failure on the part of the executive. In a country that has historically seen the judiciary as being subservient to the executive one consequence of the war on terror seems to have been an end to that subservience. Examination of the wider context, however, suggests a somewhat different analysis.

2.1. *The House of Lords and a Period of Revolutionary Science*

In Auden's poem, *Musée des Beaux Arts*, he writes

"In Brueghel's *Icarus*, for instance: how everything turns away
Quite leisurely from the disaster; the ploughman may
Have heard the splash, the forsaken cry,
But for him it was not an important failure; the sun shone
As it had on the white legs disappearing into the green
Water; and the expensive delicate ship that must have seen
Something amazing, a boy falling out of the sky,
Had somewhere to get to and sailed calmly on."

What seems central and of overwhelming significance is, from another perspective, peripheral and of limited consequence; so it is with the law on terror and the judiciary's change towards their attitude of deference to the executive in matters of national security.

For several centuries the British judiciary's relationship with both the executive and legislature has been dominated by the notion of the sovereignty of parliament, the idea that Parliament could make or unmake any law whatsoever and that no body, including the judiciary, could gainsay this power.⁹ The attitude of the judiciary to their role has been conditioned by this concept, cautioning a respectful attitude on the part of the judiciary to both executive and legislature. In Kuhnian terms the notion of parliamentary sovereignty has constituted a paradigm that has rarely been questioned,

⁸ The term "war on terror" has uses other than those relate to the law of war. Thus, for example, Fairclough has argued that the phrase should be read in terms of a globalization project where "[f]or Blair, what is at issue is a continuing commitment to 'globalization'...and the understanding that 'globalization' imposes 'global interdependency' not only in the economic and political domains, but also in the domain of national security" (N Fairclough "Language in New Capitalism" (2003) 13 *Discourse and Society* 163 at p 165). On the nuances of language in this area see also R Johnson "Defending Ways of Life: The (Anti)-Terrorist Rhetoric of Bush and Blair" (2002) 19 *Theory, Culture and Society* 211.

⁹ The classic formulation and defence of this concept is to be found in AV Dicey "Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution" (1st ed, 1885) Part I.

at least within the English legal system.¹⁰ However in the last few decades there have been gradual constitutional changes that have begun to threaten this paradigm's hold. More recently these changes have increased in pace and the courts, again in Kuhnian terms, seem to have moved from an era of normal science to a period of revolutionary science where the paradigm loses the purchase it once had.¹¹

Describing in detail the constitutional alterations that have affected the relationship between the judiciary and the executive and legislature lies outside the scope of this article. However several events are plainly of consequence. First chronologically, there is the United Kingdom's accession to the then European Economic Community, now the European Union, with the consequent effect on the country's sovereignty and the House of Lords' decision in *R v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd No 2* on this point [27]. In *Factortame (No 2)* the House of Lords held that,

"[i]f the supremacy within the European Community of Community law over national law of members states was not always inherent in the EEC Treaty it was certainly well established in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice long before the United Kingdom joined the Community. Thus, whatever limitation of its sovereignty Parliament accepted when it enacted the European Communities Act 1972 was entirely voluntary" [28].

Secondly, there is the development by some of the senior judiciary of the notion of fundamental rights under which,

"the principle of legality means that Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political cost. Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words...In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual" [29].

Thirdly, there is the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the duty of the courts, under section 3 of the Act, to interpret legislation "so far as is possible" so that it is compatible with rights found in the European Convention on Human Rights.

These changes, both individually and collectively, do not mean that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is no longer tenable in either an intellectual or a legal sense. They could be interpreted as being, at most, a limitation on the way in which Parliament could pass particular laws, not on its power to pass any law that it wished, including, for example, laws that are oppressive, arbitrary and grossly in contradiction of the rule of law. Nevertheless, as these changes have come about, so judges have begun to analyse their relationship with the executive and legislature in different and more complex ways than has been the case in the past. In the late 1990s notions such as bi-polar sovereignty entered the language of debate and analysis when judges were

¹⁰ T Kuhn "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" (2nd ed, 1970) chp V. In Scotland and Northern Ireland there has always been some scepticism about how far this idea can be accepted because of what have been seen as fundamental and unchallengeable constitutional terms in the Acts of Union which created first Great Britain and then the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (see, for example, J Mitchell "Constitutional Law" (2nd ed, 1968) chp 4). On the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty as a paradigm see further A Bradney "Parliamentary Sovereignty – A Quest of Status" (1985) 36 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 2 at pp 8-10.

¹¹ On "revolutionary science" see Kuhn op cit chp IX to XIII.

writing, in an extra-judicial capacity, about their relationship with the executive and legislature [30].

As Kuhn notes "[w]hat occurs during a scientific revolution is not fully reducible to a reinterpretation of individual and stable data".¹² What causes a shift in paradigm is partially a result of a change in the basic information that the community is dealing with, in this case the legal rules, but it is also the result of the changing social nature of the community. As long ago as 1979 Stevens argued that, in relation to judges in the House of Lords, "the belief in the anonymity and irrelevance of the judicial contribution [to the development of law] had largely evaporated" [31]. An increasing professionalisation amongst the judiciary has led to different ways of them thinking about themselves. The culmination of this is to be seen in the House of Lords case, *R (Jackson) v Attorney General*, where, in judgement, a number of judges rejected the pure doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty; parliament, in their view, should not be seen as having an unqualified legal right to make any law whatsoever.¹³ The detailed approach taken by the judges in *Jackson* is not uniform and indeed it is only a minority who directly reject the pure doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.¹⁴ Nevertheless denial of the doctrine in judicial dicta is highly significant, underlining the very different view that the senior judges now take of their relationship with the other branches of government compared with that which they had in the past. Lord Steyn, writing after his retirement as a judge in the House of Lords, has argued that

"the dicta in *Jackson* are likely to prevail if the government tried to tamper with the fundamental principles of our constitutional democracy, such as five-year Parliaments, the role of the ordinary courts, the rule of law, and other such fundamentals. In such exceptional cases the rule of law may trump parliamentary supremacy" [32].

In this context is not surprising to find that other decisions, unrelated to the "war on terror", seem to have confirmed the new judicial attitude towards the executive. Thus, for example, in *R (Pro-Life Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation*, a case about election and broadcasting law, it was said that,

"although the word 'deference' is now very fashionable in describing the relationship between the judicial and other branches of government, I do not think that its overtones of servility, or perhaps gracious concession, are appropriate to describing what is happening. In a society based upon the rule of law and the separation of powers, it is necessary to decide which branch of government has in any particular instance the decision-making power and what the legal limits of that power are. That is a question of law and must therefore be decided by the courts" [33].

¹² Kuhn *op cit* p 121.

¹³ [2006] 1 AC 262, [2005] UKHL 56.

¹⁴ See Lord Steyn at pp 302-303, Lord Hope at p 303 and Baroness Hale at p 318. The significance of judges as expressing doubts in their judgements as opposed to their extra-judicial capacity should not, in a common law context, be under-estimated. Whilst judgements have legal authority and contribute to the development of the law extra-judicial writing, no matter who the author is, has no such effect. See further R Ward and A Wragg "Walker and Walker's English Legal System" (2005, 9th ed) pp 9-13 and chp 3. On the relationship between extra-judicial writing and the development of law see N Duxbury "Jurists and Judges: An Essay on Influence" (2001).

Similarly, in *R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions*, a case about planning law, the court held that

“[t]here is no conflict between human rights and the democratic principle. Respect for human rights requires that certain basic rights of individuals should not be capable in any circumstances of being overridden by the majority, even if they think the public interest so requires. Other rights should be capable of being over overridden only in very restricted circumstances. These are rights which belong to individuals simply by virtue of their humanity, independently of any utilitarian calculation. The protection of these basic rights from majority decision requires that independent and impartial tribunals should have the power to decide whether legislation infringes them...” [34].

The restatement of their position by senior judiciary has not met with universal approval. Thus, for example, Griffith has written about the “massive shift of power from the executive and Parliament to the judiciary” [35]. For him “[t]he political question is whether or not this is to be supported, whether it is likely to result in a society more just, more free, more equal”.¹⁵ Equally Government ministers have sometimes been critical of the new judicial attitude both when it is manifested in its general form and when it is applied to the war on terrorism.¹⁶ The judicial response to ministerial criticism has been unaccommodating, Lord Steyn, for example, noting both that

“[i]t is natural and healthy that tensions between the branches of government will sometimes arise...a cosy and non-transparent co-operation between the executive and the judiciary does not enhance democratic values”

and, more robustly, that the “Law Lords and Cabinet Ministers are not on the same side” [36]. When the Dixie Chicks were subjected to sustained criticism after their comments on the Iraq War their response in their next album, “Taking the Long Way”, was the track “Not Ready to Make Nice” [37]. The senior British judiciary are, seemingly, similarly “not ready to make nice”.

Conclusion

The new attitude that the senior British judiciary have to their role in matters relating to questions of national security is a by-product of broader changes that have occurred in judicial thinking about their proper place in the governance of the United Kingdom. This does not lessen the importance of that attitude or the impact that it might have. 9/11 and the “war on terror” has inevitably heightened tensions within Muslim communities in the United Kingdom [38]. One commentator has noted a fear that a “criminal justice system based on equal rights is under threat from measures that corral Muslims into a separate and more punitive system” [39]. The judicial insistence on their role in protecting the rule of law from either an executive or a legislature too narrowly focussed on the immediate imperatives occasioned by terrorist activity may,

¹⁵ Griffith *loc cit*.

¹⁶ See, for example, the comments of both the present and previous Home Secretaries, John Reid and Charles reported in the *Guardian* for August 2nd 2006 and July 4th 2006 (<http://www.guard.co.uk>).

in part, serve to ameliorate such concerns. If so the benefits of the judicial approach spread beyond the Muslim communities of the United Kingdom. As Fekete observes,

“[b]y opposing the creation of a shadow criminal justice system beyond the ordinary rule of law for ‘enemy aliens’...we uphold the most important principle of all: the universality of human rights as indivisible by race, nationality or religious affiliation” [40].

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Rethinking the “Liberty-Security Balance” in Difficult Times: Some Notes on the Turkish Experience

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Abstract. This paper aims to explore the long debated issue of striking a delicate balance between human rights and security in states of exception. To this end, the paper, first of all, questions the so-called balance or trade off argument by unraveling some of the traps embedded in this generally accepted argument. Secondly, it analyses Turkey’s long experience in combating terrorism with a special reference to the recent amendments to the Anti-Terror Law. An examination of Turkey’s record before the European Court of Human Rights will help to reveal the heavy price of combating terrorism in terms of human rights violations. It will be argued that most of these violations have been the direct and indirect result of the state of exception which has prevailed because of terrorist threats. The paper concludes that we should reconsider and revise the prevailing concept of state of exception in order to better protect human rights in times of terrorism in which we live today.

Keywords. State of exception, terrorism, human rights, Turkey.

“Men are so foolish that they take care to avoid what Mischiefs may be done them by Pole-Cats, or Foxes, but are content, nay think it Safety, to be devoured by Lions.”
 John Locke[1]

Introduction

This paper aims to explore the possibility and indeed necessity of fighting against terrorism without sacrificing such basic values of liberal democracy as the rule of law and human rights. This problem is generally formulated as striking a delicate balance between security and freedom. This paper, therefore, first of all questions the so-called balance or trade off argument by unraveling some of the traps embedded in this generally accepted argument. Secondly, Turkey’s long experience in combating terrorism will be analyzed with a special reference to the recent amendments to the Anti-Terror Law. An examination of Turkey’s record before the European Court of Human Rights will help to reveal the heavy price of combating terrorism in terms of human rights violations. It will be argued that most of these violations have been the direct and indirect result of the state of exception which has prevailed because of terrorist threats.

The recent legal and political amendments to prevent human rights breaches will also be briefly outlined to better understand the political attempts to protect rights while fighting terrorism. However, Turkey’s transition from state of exception to normalcy is

by no means a linear process without hurdles. This transition involves setbacks. The most recent amendment to Anti-Terror Law is the best example of such setbacks. The paper will therefore discuss the meaning and political/legal significance of the changes in Anti-Terror Law.

The paper concludes that an effective way of protecting liberties while combating terrorism is to abandon the authoritarian paradigm of state of exception. My paper suggests mainly that an alternative paradigm of state of exception must be adopted to preserve and protect the traditional liberal values like human rights in difficult times in which we live today.

1. Uneasy Relations between Security and Freedom

The most formidable challenge that the contemporary liberal democracies face is to preserve and promote freedom while fighting and defeating terrorism. It is widely believed that these two basic aims are mutually exclusive. For many people, the success in the fight against terror depends on exceptional measures that require curtailment of basic liberties. This argument rests on the idea that security and public order is a precondition for the possession of certain rights and liberties. There is no liberty without security. Even social contract theories in liberal tradition suggest that the main reason for the creation of the state is to provide and maintain security with a view to guaranteeing a safe social and political sphere where individuals enjoy liberties. Therefore if and when there is a threat like terrorism that jeopardizes public order, certain rights and liberties must be sacrificed for the sake of security. In order to mitigate the draconian results of this idea, the argument is sometimes presented as a necessary balance or trade off between security and liberty.

There are certain problems with the balance argument. First of all, the meaning of the term 'balance' is far from being clear. If it is taken literally what is the measure of the "balance"? How much security is needed to weigh a certain amount of freedom? If it is used as a metaphor, as usually the case, the question of the essence of this metaphor becomes relevant. The attempt to strike an "objective" balance between different values will inevitably end up in failure, simply because the balance point will vary according to those who have the power to decide on the very act of balancing.

Secondly the term 'balance' reflects a dangerous and very well known utilitarian idea that utility is prior to every kind of moral considerations. Someone's rights may be restricted, if it serves to increase the general utility, that is, the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people. Utilitarian concepts such as general welfare, public health, territorial integrity and most notably national security are used as legitimate grounds for restricting basic rights. Terrorist activities are undoubtedly great dangers to these concepts especially national security. However, one must keep in mind that these utilitarian grounds are extremely vague and ambiguous conceptions. They may be, and often are, interpreted in a too broad manner to arbitrarily curtail certain rights of individuals.

Thirdly, the extraordinary measures taken by governments that are justified by the balance metaphor generally affects a small number of "terror suspects" rather than the majority of people. It is tempting to say that maintaining "our" security requires the restriction of "our" rights and freedoms. However it is in fact others' rights and freedoms that are sacrificed for the sake of our security. Ronald Dworkin emphasized exactly this point when he responded critically to the anti-terror measures of Bush

administration following 9/11. He rejected the argument of balance or trade-off, which has been invoked to justify the restrictive administrative measures, by declaring that:

"We must decide not where our interest lies on balance, but what justice requires, even at the expense of our interests, out of fairness to other people—those resident and foreign aliens who might very well be ensnared in the less protective and more dangerous legal system the administration is constructing for them. We cannot answer that question by simply comparing the costs and benefits to any person or group" [2]

Dworkin [2] concedes that fundamental rights we have may be abused to impair our security to some degree. We might even be safer, he argued, if the police have the power to arrest "people they thought likely to commit crimes in the future, or to presume guilt rather than innocence, or to monitor conversations between an accused and his lawyer." However a fair criminal system, which cannot be based on such calculations of risks and corresponding restriction of rights, requires the state to provide equal minimum rights for all suspects. According to Dworkin "whenever we deny to one class of suspects rights that we treat as essential for others, we act unfairly, particularly when that class is politically vulnerable, as of course aliens are, or is identifiable racially or by religious or ethnic distinction" [2].

Finally, and most importantly, terrorism threatens not only security but also liberty. Indeed, modern terrorism aims at, among others, destructing the basic values of the western democracies such as rule of law and human rights. The victory of terrorism is therefore visible, as Jean Baudrillard [3] puts it, "not only in direct, economic, political, market and financial recessions for the whole system, and in the moral and psychological regression that follows; but also in the regression of the value system, of all the ideology of freedom and free movement etc... that the Western world is so proud of, and that legitimates in its eyes its power over the rest of the world". In this regard, maintaining security at the expense of rights, an attempt that may be justified by the balance argument, is certainly not the right method for combating and defeating terrorism.¹ The violation of human rights by security forces breeds the exceptional situation from which terrorist organizations benefit. This is also contrary to international law. For instance, the European Convention on Prevention of Terrorism to which most European countries, including Turkey, are a party stipulates that "all measures taken to prevent or suppress terrorist offences have to respect the rule of law and democratic values, human rights and fundamental freedoms..."²

¹Indeed, prior to 9/11, the UN General Assembly accepted a resolution (54/164) describing terrorist acts as "activities aimed at the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening the territorial integrity and security of States, destabilizing legitimately constituted Governments, undermining pluralistic civil society and having adverse consequences for the economic and social development of States". ("Human Rights and Terrorism", adopted on 17 December 1999). One year after 9/11 the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan emphasized the importance of protecting rights while fighting against terrorism. He stated that : "By their very nature, terrorist acts are grave violations of human rights. Therefore, to pursue security at the expense of human rights is short-sighted, self-contradictory, and, in the long run, self-defeating. In places where human rights and democratic values are lacking, disaffected groups are more likely to opt for a path of violence, or to sympathize with those who do." [4]

²The same principle is explicitly stated in the European Council Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism (2005). Under the heading "Prohibition of arbitrariness" it indicates that "All measures taken by States to fight terrorism must respect human rights and principle of the rule of law, while excluding any form of arbitrariness, as well as any discriminatory or racist treatment, and must be subject to appropriate supervision" [5].

Without lapsing into the dangerous idea that sacrificing human rights for a short period is necessary for effective fight against terrorism, one must recall the following principle laid down in the European Council's Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism: "it is not only possible, but also absolutely necessary, to fight terrorism while respecting human rights, the rule of law and, where applicable, international humanitarian law" [5].

2. Turkey's Agonizing Experience in Combating Terrorism

The balance metaphor is frequently invoked in states of emergency in order to justify the curtailment of individual rights and liberties. Terrorism provides a legitimate ground to declare a state of emergency where the legal guarantees may be suspended to a certain extent. The danger of terrorism creates therefore a state of exception [6] in which arbitrary restrictions on the rights and suspension of certain legal remedies are easily justified [7]. Turkey is by no means an exception in this regard. Terrorism has been a source of the enduring state of exception in Turkey. The remaining part of this paper attempts to reveal the consequences of this state of exception.

The European Court of Human Rights has played a significant role in taming the emergency powers in Turkey. Indeed Article 15 of the Constitution, which is the heart of the "emergency constitution", is almost identical with Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It provides the general conditions and restrictions for the emergency situations. Article 15 of the Constitution stipulates that in times of emergency "the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms can be partially or entirely suspended, or measures may be taken, to the extent required by the exigencies of the situation, which derogate the guarantees embodied in the Constitution, provided that obligations under international law are not violated." Like the Convention, the Turkish Constitution protects some absolute rights such as right to life, prevention of torture and freedom of thought and conscience. However, Article 15 of the Constitution differs from Article 15 of the Convention in that it does not give us a definition of the term "emergency". This definition is provided by other articles of the Constitution that deal with the emergency situations in greater detail.

Article 15 of the Convention describes "public emergency" as "threatening the life of the nation". If there is such a danger "threatening the life of the nation" the contracting states "may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation". In applying Article 15 of the Convention the Strasbourg Court established a twofold test. First, the Court questions the existence of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. For the Court, there must be an "exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of which the State is composed" [8]. Second, the Court takes up the question whether the measures taken by the national authorities to interfere with the rights are "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation". The Strasbourg Court, however, accords a large margin of appreciation to the contracting states in deciding "both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of derogations necessary to avert it" [9]. It goes without saying that despite such a wide margin of appreciation the measures taken by the national authorities are subject ultimately to the control of the Court. The jurisprudence of the Court suggests that the contracting states

are not completely free to adopt whatever measures they deem necessary under Article 15 of the Convention.

The supervision of the Court provides a further opportunity to remedy an authoritarian aspect of the Turkish state of exception. The Constitution excludes some executive decrees with the force of law from the scrutiny of the courts. Article 148 declares that "no action shall be brought before the Constitutional Court alleging unconstitutionality as to the form or substance of decrees having the force of law issued during a state of emergency, martial law or in time of war". This provision seems to be contrary to the rule of law.³ Furthermore, the emergency decrees, issued by the Council of Ministers, empower the provincial governors to restrict certain rights and liberties without providing judicial remedies.

In a number of cases concerning the emergency measures taken by the Turkish governments, the Strasbourg Court found violation, alongside other principal articles, of Article 13 of the Convention which guarantees "an effective remedy" for those whose rights are restricted. In a recently delivered judgment, where the issue of whether the ban imposed on the applicant's newspaper by the governor of state of emergency region at the material time violated the Convention was raised, the Court has emphasized the lack of effective remedies.

"As the courts had no power to review administrative bans, the applicants had been deprived of adequate safeguards against possible abuse. Accordingly, the interference caused by section 11(e) of the State of Emergency Act and Article 1 (a) of Legislative Decree no. 430, and the way in which those provisions had been applied in the instant case, could not be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society" and went beyond the requirements of the legitimate aim pursued. It therefore concluded, unanimously, that there had been a breach of Article 10"

The Strasbourg Court also held that "there had been a breach of Article 13 on account of the absence of a remedy under Turkish law before a national authority to challenge the measures taken against the applicants by the governor of the state-of-emergency region" [10].

Turkey has faced an unprecedented terrorist threat which caused the loss of more than thirty thousand lives and thousands of injuries. The struggle against such a devastating danger has brought about massive violations of human rights. An analysis of the statistical data provided by the European Court of Human Rights as to the violation record of Turkey will reveal the necessity of preserving rights while combating terrorism. The following Table 1 and Table 2 unleash a number of violations that the Court found in the year 2005.

³ However, under the Constitution, it is not only emergency decrees that are kept outside the judicial review. Some acts and decisions of the President of the Republic, decisions of the Supreme Military Council and of the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors are not equally subject to judicial control (Articles 125 and 159).

Table 1. The number of violations of the Convention by Contracting States in 2005.

Country	<i>Number of Violation⁴</i>
Turkey	270
Ukraine	119
Greece	100
Russia	81
Italy	67
France	51
Poland	44
Czech Republic	28
United Kingdom	15
Germany	10

Table 2. Turkey’s violations by articles of the Convention

<i>Article of the Convention</i>	<i>Rights</i>	<i>Number of Violation</i>
2	Right to life: (a) Negative obligation: Deprivation of life (b) Positive obligation : Lack of effective investigation	15 26
3	Prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment: Torture Inhuman or degrading treatment Lack of effective investigation	0 27 1
5	Right to liberty and security	49
6	Right to fair trial Length of proceedings	93 32
7	No punishment without law	1
8	Right to respect for private and family life	3
10	Freedom of expression	39
11	Freedom of assembly and association	6
13	Right to an effective remedy	36
P1-1	Protection of property	65
Others	Other articles of the Convention	10
Total		270

Source: The official website of the European Court of Human Rights, www.echr.coe.int

Table 2 clearly indicates that fighting terrorism gives rise to a heavy price to be paid in terms of human rights breaches. Indeed the most of the applications against Turkey have been coming from the South Eastern part of the country where a conflict has continued for a long time between security forces and the members of the terrorist organisation PKK (Kurdistan Worker Party). Most of these cases were lodged in the first half of 1990s when the terrorist attacks intensified. Some violations were the result of the structural problems such as the existence of the National Security Courts which

⁴ This indicates the number of the Strasbourg Court’s judgments finding at least one violation.

were established by the Constitution to deal with the offences against the state like terrorism. The Strasbourg Court found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention in cases concerning the involvement of the State Security Courts on the ground that the presence of a military judge in these courts contravened the right to fair trial which requires inter alia the existence of an independent and impartial judiciary.

3. Reform Laws Concerning Human Rights and Struggle against Terrorism

In the process of meeting the Copenhagen Criteria of the European Union, Turkey has undertaken radical legal and constitutional steps to dry up the sources of the human rights violations. At the same time these reform laws can be regarded as positive steps to struggle against terrorism more effectively, given the fact that human rights violations breed political violence and terrorism. It is necessary, therefore, to briefly outline the constitutional and legal changes which aim to liberalize the political/legal system in general and to strengthen the protection and promotion of human rights in particular.

3.1 Constitutional Changes

Let us begin with the 2001 constitutional amendments. It is significant that less than one month after the 9/11 terrorist attacks Turkey took perhaps the most radical steps to amend the originally authoritarian Constitution. The Constitution was rescued to some degree from its authoritarian characteristics through the adoption of the following changes.

Article 13 of the Constitution was modified to exclude the general reasons for restricting rights and liberties. Before the amendment, Article 13 contained such general grounds for restricting rights as the protection of the Republic, the indivisibility of the state, national security, public order, public morals, public health and so on, the grounds which were applicable to all fundamental rights and liberties guaranteed in the Constitution. The removal of these utilitarian grounds was significant, because their vagueness and ambiguities were susceptible to the arbitrary denial or restriction of constitutional rights. The criterion 'essence of rights' was also introduced to the text of Article 13 as a further safeguard against arbitrary restrictions on rights.

Article 14 of the Constitution was also changed in the light of Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The former Article 14 prohibited the abuse of rights, among others, to place the state under the control of an individual or a group of people, or to establish the hegemony of one social class over others, or to create discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion or sect, or to establish by any other means a system of government based on these concepts and ideas. This article provided a constitutional basis for the laws prohibiting the propaganda of certain ideologies like communism. The prohibition of the abuse of rights is now limited to 'the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, and endangering the existence of the democratic and secular order of the Turkish Republic.' The second paragraph of the Article was also altered to prevent the state alongside individuals from abusing any constitutional provision to destroy the fundamental rights and freedoms or to restrict them more extensively than stated in the Constitution.

Article 19 of the Constitution was amended to reduce the period of detention for collective offences to four days maximum. Prior to the amendment it was possible to keep in police custody those who have allegedly committed collective offences including terror offences up to fourteen days. The aim of the constitutional amendment in this respect was to make the Constitution compatible with the European Convention. Although Article 5 of the Convention does not specify a period of detention, the case-law of the Strasbourg Court has established that a period exceeding four days seems to be a breach of Article 5 [11].

Articles 20, 21 and 22 were amended to provide further protection for right to privacy, inviolability of the domicile and freedom of communication respectively.

Articles 26 and 28 of the Constitution were amended to remove the ban on the use of any language legally prohibited in the expression and dissemination of thought. Similarly, amendments to the Law on Foreign Language Education and Teaching removed the restrictions on the learning of different languages used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives.

Article 33 and 34 were modified in order to remove some restrictions previously imposed on freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

Article 38 of the Constitution was amended to abolish the death penalty except in time of war, or imminent threat of war, or for the crimes of terrorism. On 19 June 2003, the Turkish Parliament modified the law (Law no. 4771) to limit the order and implementation of death penalty to time of war and imminent threat of war in line with the Protocol No.6 of the European Convention. Article 38 was modified also to prohibit the use of improperly obtained evidences. The amended Article 38 reemphasized the statutory rule that 'findings obtained through illegal methods shall not be considered as evidence.' This change aims to strengthen the fight against torture and ill-treatment.

Article 69 of the Constitution was revised to make the dissolution of political parties more difficult. To this end, a definition of the term "center" (*odak*), albeit elusive and ambiguous, was introduced into the text of the Constitution. Amended Article 69 of the Constitution states that a political party is considered to be a 'center' when (a) its members act intensively against the elementary principles of the Republic, and these activities are accepted explicitly or implicitly by the party organs such as the general congress, leader, central executive committee, and the parliamentary group, or (b) these party organs themselves are insistently engaged in such activities.⁵ The new Article 103 of the Law on Political Parties contains the same definition of the centre set forth in the Constitution. It should, however, have provided much more detailed and concrete conditions for becoming the centre, given the fact that the terms like 'intensively' and 'insistently' are extremely vague and elusive and as such require a detailed elaboration. It is still up to the Constitutional Court to determine the questions when and how the members of a political party are considered to have acted intensively against certain principles of the Republic, or what kinds (and frequency) of activities

⁵ Prior to this amendment, the Constitutional Court had almost an absolute discretion to decide whether a political party had become the center of activities contrary to fundamental principles of the Republic. As a matter of the fact, the Law on Political Parties included a provision laying down in a detailed manner the conditions under which a political party became the center. The Constitutional Court annulled this provision (Article 103 of the Law) on the ground that some of these conditions became unattainable after the abolishment of certain crimes under the Turkish Penal Code. See E.1998/2, 1998/1, 9.1.1998, *AMKD* 34/1, pp.232-244. For an analysis of the case-law of the Constitutional Court concerning the dissolution of political rights see Zuhtu Arslan, "Conflicting Paradigms: Political Rights in the Turkish Constitutional Court", *Critique*, 11/1, (Spring 2002): 9-25

necessary to decide that the competent organs of a political party have engaged insistently in unconstitutional activities. Furthermore, Article 69 of the Constitution has introduced an alternative sanction to the dissolution of political parties. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court is empowered to prevent the political parties, instead of dissolving them, temporarily or permanently from receiving state aid. The same reasons for the dissolution of political parties equally apply to this sanction. In deciding about the deprivation of political parties of the state aid, the Court will take into account the 'intensity of the actions brought before the court'. Although this seems to be a positive step taken to protect political parties, it is very difficult to apply this sanction. This is so, simply because most of the political parties facing trial before the Constitutional Court are so-called 'marginal parties' which have been already deprived of the state aid.

The last comprehensive changes in the Constitution were made in May 2004 and ten articles of the Constitution were amended by the Parliament. Alongside the changes to democratize and demilitarize the political and administrative system such as excluding the military member from the Higher Education Council (YÖK) and subjecting the military expenditures to the review of the Audit Court, some significant amendments were made with respect to human rights. They can be summarized as follows:

A new paragraph was introduced into Article 10 of the Constitution to emphasize the state's obligation to implement gender equality. It reads that "men and women have equal rights. The State shall have the obligation to ensure that this equality exists in practice."

Parallel to Protocol 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, capital punishment was abolished in absolute terms and removed from the Constitution as a legitimate ground for restricting the right to life in the time of emergencies.

Article 30 of the Constitution was modified to provide an absolute protection against the seizure and confiscation of "a printing press or its annexes duly established as a publishing house under law" on the basis of being an instrument of crime. The revised Article deleted the exception for "cases where offences against the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, against the fundamental principles of the Republic or against national security leading to conviction are involved".

The last paragraph of Article 90 of the Constitution was supplemented by a new provision making the international human rights treaties superior to the national law. Accordingly, "in the case of a conflict between international agreements in the area of fundamental rights and freedoms duly put into effect and the domestic laws due to differences in provisions on the same matter, the provisions of international agreements shall prevail".

The controversial State Security Courts, which had been restructured by the constitutional amendment of 1999 to remove the military judges and prosecutors, were abolished completely and their jurisdictions were allocated to Assize Courts.

3.2 Statutory Changes

For the last five years a number of so-called "harmonization packages", which contain important legal amendments, have been introduced to comply with the *acquis* of the European Union. Some of these legal changes, which are directly related to the principle of protecting rights while fighting terrorism, are briefly explained as follows.

The reform laws included important legal changes aimed at preventing torture and maltreatment. First of all, the new Penal Code increased the term of imprisonment for the crime of torture and ill-treatment and lengthened the statute of limitations for these crimes from ten to fifteen years. The new Code of Criminal Procedure and relevant regulations also contain significant provisions that may be invoked in combating torture. Secondly, in relation to the compensation paid by the government in the cases before the Strasbourg Court it is possible to recover payment from the civil servants responsible for the cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Thirdly, measures are taken to prevent the long delays in investigations and trials of the cases of torture and maltreatment. As a rule, hearings may not be adjourned for more than thirty days, and the courts shall continue to hold these hearings even during the judiciary recess. Finally, the punishment of imprisonment for the offence of torture and maltreatment shall not be commuted to fine. In complement with the governmental policy of "zero tolerance for torture" these measures have led to a diminishment of the torture incidents [11].

The Parliament enacted the new Penal Code and Code of Penal Procedure that came into force on 1 June 2005. In the 2005 progress report on Turkey the European Commission made it clear that "the (new Penal) Code adopts modern European standards in line with criminal law in many European countries." The Commission, however, has drawn attention to some articles of the Code "which may be used to restrict freedom of expression" [12]. Article 216 of the Penal Code (former Article 312) which penalizes inciting people to violence and hatred on such grounds as religion, race or language, was modified to provide more protection for freedom of expression. Accordingly, someone may be considered to commit this offence only if he or she incited people to hatred or violence in a manner endangering public order. The criterion of "present and immanent danger" was also incorporated into this article. Article 301 of the Penal Code (former Article 159) was modified to reduce the minimum penalty from one year to six months for those who "openly insult and deride Turkishness, the Republic, the Grand National Assembly, the moral personality of the Government, the Ministries, the military or security forces of the State or the moral personality of the judiciary". Article 301 also ensures that expressions made solely for the purpose of criticism are not subject to any penalty. Due to the restrictive approaches of the national courts, the ambiguous terms of these articles have been used to restrict freedom of expression.

In 2004 the Turkish Parliament enacted the Law on Compensation of Losses Resulting from Terrorist Acts according to which the commissions were established in the relevant provinces to receive applications and provide compensation for losses. In May 2005 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a circular to the provincial governors urging them to strictly apply the law. The Law on Compensation is obviously a positive step to cure the sufferings caused by terrorism, even though there are serious concerns as to the implementation of this law [13]. It is also fully in compliance with the European Council's Guideline on Human Rights and Fight Against Terror which stipulates that "when compensation is not fully available from other sources, in particular through the confiscation of the property of the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of terrorist acts, the State must contribute to the compensation of the victims of attacks that took place on its territory, as far as their person or their health is concerned" [14].

4. Recent Amendments to the Turkish Anti-Terror Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back

During the process of democratization the Turkish Anti-Terror Law, which was originally enacted in 1991, has undergone some modifications to narrow the ban on the expression of opinions. The definition of terror, set forth in Article 1 of this Act,⁶ was reformulated by making the use of force or violence the precondition for the crime of terrorism. Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law which prohibited the propaganda, meeting and demonstration aiming to destroy the indivisibility of the state was repealed in 2003.

Despite these positive steps, the Turkish Parliament has recently made amendments to the Anti-Terror Law as the situation has been deteriorating in the South Eastern part of Turkey. The amendments, which have been on the political agenda for a year, generated a heated debate among scholars, politicians and human rights activists. It is generally believed that the government introduced the law under the immense pressure of the security apparatus which claimed on frequent occasions that they lacked the necessary legal tools in combating terrorism. The draft law, which was much more restrictive in its original version, was softened during the debates in the Parliament.

The new Anti-Terror Law extended the number of offences committed for terrorist purposes by referring to further articles of the Penal Code. The law provides longer term of imprisonment for these offences. The draft version of the amendment law prohibited the glorification of the aims of the terrorist organizations alongside the ban on propagating the terrorist organizations. The word "aims" was eventually deleted by the parliamentary commission on the ground that it might lead to draconian problems for freedom of expression. However, the amended law still contains some provisions that may be used to restrict freedom of expression especially freedom of press. Article 5 of the Law states that if any of the offences defined in this law are committed by the press and media, owners and editors of such press and media organs shall also be punished even though they have not participated in the commission of crime. Moreover Article 5 of the law grants the judge to suspend, from 15 days to one month, "the periodicals which openly encourage the commission of crimes within the framework of the activities of the terrorist organization, praise the committed offences and its offenders, or make publication for the propaganda of the terrorist organization". If the delay is detrimental, the public prosecutor may use this power to suspend provided he shall report such decision to the judge within twenty four hours at the latest. The decision of the prosecutor shall be null and void unless the judge approves it within maximum forty eight hours. This means that a newspaper may be suspended by a decision of public prosecutor for three days. Article 6 of the Law stipulates that if the offence of making propaganda of the terrorist organization is committed through press or media, the penalty shall be increased by half, and the owners and editors of such press and media organs, who have themselves not participated in the commission of these offences, shall be punished.

⁶ Article 1 of the Anti-terror Law provides the following definition of terrorism: "Terrorism is any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and external security of the State, public order or general health by means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat."

Another controversial provision of the amended Anti-Terror Law is concerned with the direct use of force by the security officers during operations against terrorists. Additional Article 2 of the amended Law stipulates that "during operations to be carried out against terrorist organizations, if the "surrender" order is not obeyed or there is an attempt to resort to arms, law enforcement officers shall have the power to use arms directly and without any hesitation against the target to an extent and amount sufficient to render the danger ineffective." In a judgment delivered in 1999 the Constitutional Court invalidated an almost identical provision of the Anti-Terror Law.⁷ The applicants in this case argued that "this provision was taken from "the Law on Emergency" and was aimed to make an 'extraordinary' measure permanent in a 'normal' period". The Constitutional Court held that:

"Disobedience to surrender order and attempt to use arms do not always enforce the security officers to use firearms against the target. In some cases it is possible to make the perpetrators ineffective through the adoption of different means that would pose less danger to the right to life. Without resorting to these methods, under particular circumstances of each case, the use of "firearms" directly and without hesitation against the target will produce the result of violating the right to life."⁸

The President of the Republic approved the law amending the Anti-Terror Law, but subsequently lodged an annulment application to the Constitutional Court on the ground that Articles 5 and 6 of the law contravene the Constitution. The Court is expected to deliver its decision about constitutionality of these provisions within a year or so. Apart from this, it is not premature to say that revised Anti-Terror Law will give rise to a great deal of legal conflicts where the courts will have the opportunity to interpret the abstract and sometimes vague provision of the law.

Conclusion

The post-9/11 period in which we live has witnessed the dramatic eclipse of political reason and the normalization of the state of exception. The dizzying rhetoric of "war on terror" has been easily mobilized to create a state of exception in which the power is abused. Experience has verified the universal truth as to the nature of unlimited political power. As Lord Acton put it eloquently "power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely". There is no reason to believe that Acton's warning ceased to be applicable to our time.

As for Turkey, the reform laws triggered the process of recovering from the authoritarian state of exception initiated by the 12 September military intervention and of returning to political/legal normalcy. Behind these positive steps there was, among other things, an idea that combating terrorism should not be reduced merely to an ongoing armed struggle which is doomed to reproduce a vicious circle of violence and death. An effective and successful fight against terror entails, beside the armed

⁷ The additional Article 2 of the Law annulled by the Constitutional Court stipulated that "during operations to be carried out against terrorist organizations, if the surrender order is not obeyed and there is an attempt to resort to arms, law enforcement officers shall have the power to use firearms directly and without any hesitation against the target with a view to rendering the perpetrators ineffective."

⁸ E.1996/68, K. 1999/1, 6.1.1999.

struggle, the adoption of multifaceted measures from democratizations to winning the hearts of the people of the region where terrorist organization operates. The reform laws must be complemented with the implementation, bearing in mind the fact that it is much more difficult to change long practiced and adopted attitudes and behaviors of the rulers as well as ruled.

Finally, we must abandon the problematic metaphor of balance or trade-off and focus instead on the issue of fighting terrorism without violating human rights. This is by no means an easy job. It above all necessitates the emergence of a political culture which is based on such liberal values as toleration, pluralism and the recognition of "other". The pre-condition of cultivating such a political culture is to eliminate all forms of fanaticism irrespective of whether they are religious, ethnic or secular. As the French writer Amin Maalouf rightly observes, "nobody has a monopoly on fanaticism" [15].

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Part 5

The Impact of Communication and Technology on Terrorism: Effective Facilitators

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The Emerging Threat of Cyberterrorism

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Abstract. The Internet has completely become a part of every day life. Cyberterrorism is the employment of computing resources to intimidate or coerce another (government) to achieve some political goals. Cyberattacks involve activities that can disrupt, corrupt, deny, or destroy information stored in computers or computer networks. Cyber terrorism attacks can be: cyber attacks or physical attacks both affecting the informational infrastructure. This paper aims at distinguishing the threat of cyberterrorism from cyber attacks and to address some tools that has employed to encounter the cyberterrorism attacks.

Keywords. Internet, Cyberterrorism, Cyberattacks, cyber attacks, physical attacks

Introduction

To the casual observer September 11, 2001 is the date that America entered the War on Terror. It is clear, however, that the threat posed by international terrorist organizations has been present for years, and that the United States has been the target of their hatred. In hindsight it is all too clear that the United States was ill-prepared for the devastation wrought by the Militant Islamic network known as al-Qa'eda. A "failure of imagination," is the oft-coined phrase used to describe our nation's inability to anticipate the terrorist attacks of that day [1]. In fact, the Congressional leaders who compiled the 9/11 Commission Report believed, "the 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of failures: in imagination, policy, capabilities, and management"[2]. The government and its various law enforcement agencies did not seriously consider the possibility that a terrorist network might use commercial airliners as weapons on such a massive scale.

Since September 11, 2001, the response by the government in crafting new legislation to support counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism efforts has lessened the probability of a future terrorist attack in the physical world. Notable legislation includes the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, the USA PATRIOT Act, and the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security. Tactical focus in the government has shifted from punishing nations, organizations or individuals who commit terrorist acts to newer and broader methods which are designed to anticipate perceived threats and prevent criminal acts before their commission.

While the aforementioned efforts should be applauded, the government still faces another danger that, due to inadequate imagination, policy, capabilities and management, we have yet to adequately address. It is the threat posed by cyberterrorism. Admittedly, the government has taken modest steps to anticipate the emerging threats to the "cyber" world [3]. The truth of the matter is, however, that due to inadequate planning and implementation of government policies, the United States still remains vulnerable to crippling cyberattacks [4].

It is a known fact that terrorist organizations such as al-Qa'eda and Hamas have used computers, email, and data encryption in order to propagandize on behalf of their respective organizations and in order to finance those organizations for years [5]. It is logical to conclude that these and other terrorist organizations are fully aware that cyberattacks can offer a low cost method for inflicting extensive damage to existing infrastructures and can be extraordinarily difficult to trace [6]. Indeed, it would be naïve to believe that terrorists could not imagine their own unique plot to attack cyber space in an effort to directly or indirectly harm innocent persons. Until adequate measures are put in place to protect the cyber world, it remains an extremely vulnerable sector of American society, and is ripe for terrorist attack.

This article's purpose is to distinguish the threat of cyberterrorism from cyberattack, outline the threat cyberterrorism presents, and to address some new tools that the United States has employed to address the cyberterrorist threat. First, give an overview of the threat of cyberterrorism to the nation's critical infrastructure. Second, the article will review some important pieces of legislation and strategies that have been enacted since September 11, 2001. The focus will highlight legislative efforts related to development of a partnership between the private sector and the government agencies, and whether this cooperation has been effective thus far.

1. The Threat of Cyberterrorism

As it stands, the Internet has become a completely integrated part of our modern society. It is difficult for the vast majority of Americans to go through a day without being affected in some way by its presence. The vast network of interconnected computers not only serves as a fantastic communication medium, but the interconnectedness also helps to regulate various points of critical infrastructure, including, but not limited to, agriculture, banking, electricity, medical services, nuclear facilities, waste management services etc. [7]. Similarly, this network presence is seen in home computers, which through the Internet, connect to vast servers and in turn, have the potential to connect to large computer databases. The greatest danger lies in the fact that a lone individual, acting on behalf of a terrorist organization or solely, could have the ability to expose the weaknesses in our critical infrastructure and disable or destroy the network society has created.

Generally speaking, cyberattacks involve activities that can disrupt, corrupt, deny, or destroy information contained in computers or computer networks. Such a broad term can encompass many criminal acts which happen every day through the use of computers. Of course, not all acts of cyberattacks meet the definition of cyberterrorism [6]. Cyberterrorism can be defined as the employment of computing resources to intimidate or coerce another [usually government] in furtherance of specific objectives. One commentator defines cyberterrorism as "the premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data which results in violence against non combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents" [8]. Cyberterrorist attacks generally come in one of two forms: an attack in the "cyber" world affecting infrastructure; and an attack on the "physical" world affecting infrastructure [9]. Those unfamiliar with cyberterrorism as a term might easily confuse the term with that of a cyberattack. Such a view is too simplistic. An easier way to differentiate a cyberterrorist attack from a mere cyberattack, is by looking at potential targets. In order to achieve the aforementioned goal of employing computing resources

to intimidate or coerce others for a desired political end result, a terrorist need look no further than to our nation's critical infrastructure.

Beginning in the 1970's, the nation's infrastructure began to more heavily rely upon computers and the technology derived from their existence. Government entities and the private sector alike began networking command and control systems such as power grids, dam controls, communication witches, etc. [9]. Within twenty years, some of the more critical infrastructures, such as defense systems, water supply systems, finance systems, and emergency services became electronically controlled. These centralized computer networks, known generally as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition [SCDA] systems took a major role in managing infrastructure [10].

Presently, SCDA systems now provide the "brain power" required to manage critical infrastructures [10]. A successful cyberterrorist attack on only a single SCDA could cause catastrophic economic and physical damage across large portions of the United States. In 2002, information was uncovered emanating out of the Middle East by the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], which revealed that hackers were studying the gas facilities, electrical generators, transmission devices and water storage systems of SCDA digital systems being used to control the utilities for California's San Francisco Bay Area. The very real threat exists that similarly skilled hackers could disrupt any number of SCDA's, or even take command of systems in order to disable flood gates to dams or control millions of volts of electric energy [11]. In fact, activities have already occurred which are similar in nature.

Alarmingly, the Washington Post reported that in June of 2003, a twelve year old boy was found to have hacked the SCDA system at Arizona's Theodore Roosevelt Dam in 1998. The breach entailed the child gaining control of the remote switch that regulated the water level of the dam [12]. Instantly the child had the capability to release millions of gallons of water upon the communities which sat below the dam. The vulnerability of such a critical infrastructure shows the potential ease of coordinating a cyberterrorist act.

On April 23, 2000, in Queensland Australia, a man was apprehended during a routine traffic stop. Vitek Boden was found in possession of a stolen computer and radio transmitter which he used to turn his vehicle into a mobile "command center" [13]. Boden had breached the SCDA system of an Australian water and sewage treatment plant off Australia's Sunshine Coast [13]. Over the course of two months Boden directed the system to pump one million liters of raw sewage into the environment [13]. This was the first reported instance of a hacker successfully breaking into a critical infrastructure and causing massive damage.

Recently, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of Rajib Mitra, a known computer hacker who had intentionally interfered with the computer-based radio system used by police, fire, ambulance, and other emergency communications in Madison, Wisconsin [14]. While his interference did not specifically seek to coerce or intimidate, the disruption of critical infrastructure put the Madison area at risk on thirty-six separate occasions by disrupting the emergency services communication system, a clear burden on critical infrastructure and a key component of cyberterrorism.

Indeed, cybercrimes and cyberattacks are on the increase. A study regarding financial institutions, released in June 2004, found that cyberattacks had more than doubled from the year prior. Studies regularly show that a majority of professionals familiar with computer networks believe a catastrophic attack on Wall Street or similar financial markets and banking institutions is imminent [15]. It has been reported that

al-Qa'eda is attracted to financial institutions and markets where its members can disrupt day-to-day business, steal funds, or create enough system damage to cause a panic [16]. For example, a well coordinated cyberattack would mean more than the mere inconvenience of a disabled ATM machine. It would involve the transfer or disappearance of millions of dollars from individual and business banking accounts.

Apart from a cyberattack directed at the cyber world, law enforcement must also ponder the possibility that a terrorist network could organize a two pronged assault in which a conventional explosives attack is directed at a SCDA system or its equivalent is launched in conjunction with a coordinated cyberattack. For example, a terrorist suicide attack which targets a building housing a major Internet Service Provider [ISP] would be devastating to critical infrastructure alone. The problems arising out of such a physical assault could be exacerbated by a cyberattack which disrupts any of the back up systems the ISP has in place to deal with a disruption in service. Investigators have in the past uncovered evidence that al-Qa'eda operatives have spent time visiting sites which feature programming instructions for digital switches [17]. Digital switches can be used control access to power, water, transportation, and communication grids. Many experts warn that terrorists plan to use "digital switch commandeering" in coordination with a conventional attack in order to cause larger aggregate destruction [17].

In 2004, Peter Zarka, a security expert, published an article in *Computerworld* magazine which expressed concerns over a different type of cyberterrorist threat [18]. Zarka warned that real destruction might not occur through the use of cyberattacks, but from "insider threats" [18]. An insider threat exists by way of hacker infiltration that remains "invisible" to customary security measures. In such a scenario a hacker would infiltrate an internal network and rather than cause an immediate service disruption or other type of harm, he would "stay" behind in order to spy on the system. [18]. The infiltrators could use a technique called "sniffing", which acquires the account information that is necessary to access the network. The hackers would then have the ability to obtain any information that passes along the network, including usernames and passwords. An insider would be most devastating if it were implemented by breaching a high security system such as a flood control computer for a dam. If the appropriate information from operators were extracted by the hacker, then the potential damage to civilians would surpass financial hardship, and could very well extend into loss of life.

An insider threat, by remaining undetected, has the ability to alter encryption and communication applications with the purpose of copying input and output data from control terminals to hidden sections on the system. "Universities and network service providers are prime targets for harvesting of accounts and credentials to access the internal networks of corporations because they have high speed network connections that carry substantial amounts of traffic for a multitude of purposes." [18]

In testimony given before the United States Senate in 2004, the FBI's Deputy Director of the cyberterrorism division stated, "The FBI predicts that terrorist groups will either develop or hire hackers, particularly for the purpose of complementing large scale attacks with cyberattacks. There is no doubt that al-Qa'eda styled terrorists are studying means to attack the West's infrastructure by means of cyber space. If they are successful, the world could suffer an "electronic Pearl Harbor" [19]. FBI Director, Robert Mueller, stated in testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that terrorists are understanding more and more the role technology plays in the United States economy [20]. He claimed organizations such as al-Qa'eda are expanding

recruitment efforts to include computer scientists, engineers, and mathematicians [20]. And perhaps the most alarming proof of the willingness and capability of al-Qa'eda cyberterror attack comes from their leader, Osama Bin Laden, "hundreds of Muslim scientists were with him who would use their knowledge... ranging from computers to electronics against the infidels [12].

2. Protecting the Cyber World

Just as the only certain things in the American life are death and taxes, in the life of a computer hacker the sophistication of cybercrime will increase, and with it the threat to the cyber world. The "super highway" terminology used to describe the cyber world encompasses millions of interconnected computers, servers, fiber optics, switches, and hardware and software that allows out critical infrastructures to function. As long as the nation's critical infrastructure is networked, no single institution is safe. Estimates place 80 to 90 percent of our nation's critical infrastructure in the hands of the private sector. With such a large portion of our nation's infrastructure not under government control, it is imperative that private industry and government agencies collaborate to establish reactive and proactive strategies in response to potential cyberterrorist threats [21].

In the past, private sector businesses have considered cyberterrorism an "abstract threat," spending, "less on cyber protection than coffee" [22]. The events of 9/11 and the continuance of the War of Terror have served to remind the private sector that it must respond to and anticipate potential threats. However, it still remains to be seen if they have taken adequate measures [23]. Despite cybercrime attributing to as much as ten billion dollars worth of consumer financial loss per year, the private sector is still reluctant to join the government in collaboration on anti-cyberterrorist measures, including better software and stronger networks [24]. Owners of critical public infrastructure are just as reluctant to share relevant information about their operations with the government or other companies. Their biggest concern centers around competitors gaining access to proprietary data that can then be openly shared by the government by way of the Freedom of Information Act [FOIA], or by some other means [25]. Another concern which some might consider to be just as large is the negative response consumers or stockholders may have if company information were released, sure as a company's vulnerability to cyberattack.

It has been problematic for the government to encourage private sector industry to collaborate on a joint venture to respond to the threat of cyberterrorism. In 1997 the Clinton Administration made the initial effort to address existing vulnerabilities to the nation's critical infrastructure. The administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 63 [PDD 63], as a response to the information gathered during the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection [26]. The Commission identified cyber vulnerabilities in the existing critical infrastructure—both public and private—which included telecommunications, finance, emergency services and energy, and proposed a public-private countermeasure union [26]. The Directive set as a national goal the ability to protect critical infrastructure by the year 2003.[3] Due to the inability to get a commitment from the private sector, PDD 63 ultimately only called for a voluntary partnership between the government and businesses [3]. In response to the call for voluntary participation, private industry largely failed. Few companies exhibited the interest in joining a joint effort with the government in this

capacity, citing the potential for loss of valuable proprietary information in a competitive economy, and the loss of confidence by customers and shareholders if cyber vulnerabilities were revealed.

The problem with lack of information sharing from the private sector is that as hackers expose the possible weak points of a security system, the remaining institutions are not aware of the vulnerabilities and thus more systems are left exposed. The sooner institutions share their information about security vulnerabilities, the faster all organizations will be able to implement counter measures in order to protect all institutions from cyber terrorists. Unfortunately, the system still does not foster adequate cooperation [27].

Building on the Clinton Administration's approach, the Bush Administration decided to take similar steps in order to develop the public-private alliance to respond to the cyberterrorist threat. The Bush Administration assessed that the private sector was in the best position to respond the cyberterrorist threat, based on the premise that private sector technology created cyber space and is at the forefront of its evolution. In February 2003, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace was released by the Bush Administration [28]. Its purpose was to outline vital mandates for the private sector to self-report security breaches and share information [28]. It stated, "that the private sector now has a crucial role in protecting national security because it largely runs the nation's critical infrastructure" [29].

The main priority of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace is for the establishment of a reliable national cyberspace security response system. The plan calls upon all sectors of society—from Federal, State and Local governments to business owners and private individuals—to engage in focused and coordinated efforts to secure cyberspace [30]. While the Department of Homeland Security [DHS] takes on the responsibility of identifying and protecting against "vulnerabilities" that exists in the current information infrastructure, the Department of Justice [DOJ] is focused on responding to "threats" presented by unlawful and intentional acts that threaten the availability, confidentiality and integrity of information networks.

The DHS has been in the process of developing a response system that unites the government and private sector together to provide specific analysis, warning information and crisis management response infrastructure if a major cyberterrorist act were to occur. The plan calls for a national cyberspace security threat and vulnerability reduction program. Such a program would make an effort to locate and remediate existing vulnerabilities, develop new systems and technology that would reduce future vulnerabilities, and seek out and punish possible attackers [31].

There are observers in the private sector who feel the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace does not do enough the promote participation by companies to create and implement adequate security practices and recommend that government play more of a regulation role in order to replace the market forces that might prevent full comportment with the strategy [32]. As an example, the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, is a congressionally appointed group which is chaired by James S. Gilmore III, Governor of Virginia. The panel has been a harsh critic of the plan put in place by the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. The Gilmore Report's fourth volume states that market forces and public-private partnerships, as they are currently implemented, are not working in order to ensure national security [33]. The current plan is faulty in its reliance on its persuasive efforts to have the private sector industry act, and for not holding the managers of those private industries accountable for

improving cybersecurity to the best of their ability [33].

Despite its inability to achieve its desired results, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, has proven to be moderately effective along with the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets was also released in February of 2003. This plan was also put in place to encourage private sector participation in remedying vulnerabilities to infrastructure:

Customarily, private sector firms prudently engage in risk management planning and invest in security as a necessary function of business operations and customer confidence.... Consequently, private sector owners and operators should reassess and adjust their planning, assurance, and investment programs to better accommodate the increased risk [34].

These two aforementioned strategies are designed to secure the cyber world by setting in place three main objectives: [1] prevent a cyberattack against America's critical infrastructure, [2] reduce the national vulnerability to cyberattacks, and [3] reduce the damage and recovery time from cyberattacks when and if they do occur. These two plans have built upon existing strategies and laws, which seek to remedy the shortfall the United States faces in being prepared for a cyberterrorist attack.

The Critical Infrastructure Protection Act [CIPA], passed by Congress and enacted into law in 2002, has served to enhance the ability of the United States government to link with private sector industry in an information sharing effort concerning previous Internet attacks. Under CIPA, information submitted to the government that involves a critical infrastructure program is exempt from disclosure under FOIA. The information thus cannot be used by any third party or government in a civil action unless the discloser has given written consent [35]. This provides a remedy for private industry, so that they can be assured a certain portion of their autonomy can remain intact.

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act [CFAA], passed in 1994 and amended in 1996, prohibits accessing classified information unlawfully and damaging protected computers that results in physical injury, a threat to public health or safety, or damage to a computer used for national defense or national security. The CFAA expands the criminal penalties for such activities"[10].

The Cyber Security Research and Development Act, passed in 2002, authorized a multi-year effort, which seeks to create vast secure cyber technologies, expand cyber security research and its development, and improve the cyber workforce. Such a law assures that when the West suffers its first "Pearl Harbor cyberattack", the government will have programs in place which will commit private industry to share information and develop necessary security systems and countermeasures. It would be naïve and irresponsible to shift the burden for securing critical infrastructure onto the shoulders of private industry alone, although requisite software designed to protect against cyber terrorism is still not being fully pursued. Presently, there are no other incentives, other than suffering economic loss, for private industry to collaborate amongst each to combat cyber terrorism. The Cyber Security Research and Development Act's purpose seeks to remedy this problem [10].

Several partnerships do presently exist which seek to promote collaboration in the effort to prevent the devastating effects of a cyberterrorist attack. The Center for Infrastructure Assurance and Security [CIAS], located at the University of Texas at San Antonio is one program which proactively seeks to develop countermeasures to cyberterrorism. Among its many efforts, the CIAS, in 2003, conducted the first large-scale simulated cyberattack since the heinous terror attacks of September 11, 2001. The cyber exercise, nicknamed, Dark Screen, tested the ability of business and

government agencies to respond to an attack that affected certain critical infrastructure, specifically, communication and information systems.[36] The Center for Terrorism Law at St. Mary's University School of Law, located in San Antonio has also taken on the task of researching and placing into a database, International, Federal, State, and Local laws relating to cyberterrorism. Hopefully, the information will provide increased understanding and cooperation amongst private and government sectors. Without question, the best known piece of legislation meant to respond to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, is the "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001," otherwise known as, the PATRIOT Act. Designed as a resource to assist law enforcement in disrupting terrorist cells and their bases of operations, the PATRIOT Act was passed by an overwhelming majority of the Congress and signed into law by President Bush on October 26, 2001, and renewed March 26, 2006 [37].

The PATRIOT Act may be the most effective form of legislation designed to counter cyberterrorist efforts. In an answer to cyberterrorism, a wealth of legislative changes was made under the Act that expanded the ability of intelligence agencies and law enforcement regarding surveillance and investigative powers. The PATRIOT Act allows authorities greater freedom to monitor the Internet and provides a streamlined system for sharing gathered information amongst Federal and State agencies. Important resources found in the Act are: The ability of law enforcement agents to employ "trap and trace" devices; "pen registers;" "sneak and peek" searches; and "roving wiretaps," which permits surveillance on the person and not, for example, on the phone or phone number.[37] Section 214 of the PATRIOT Act, entitled: "Pen Register and Trap and Trace Authority under FISA," expands the scope of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 [FISA], providing greater powers to FISA courts to grant orders for surveillance [37].

In addition, both the Cyber Security and Enhancement Act [CSEA] and the PATRIOT Act at §214 have eased warrant and subpoena requirements under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 [ECPA]. Under the CSEA, the government official does not need to obtain a warrant of subpoena if there exists a "good faith" belief regarding the prevention of death or serious bodily harm. Additionally, the CSEA amends 18 U.S.C. §3125[a] [1] to allow a government official to use a pen register or a trap and trace device without a warrant or a court order if there is a "threat to national security and an ongoing attack on a protected computer system"[10].

A pen register is a process that collects outgoing phone numbers from a specific telephone line, and in concert with a trap and trace device, can capture the incoming numbers from a specific phone or computer line. Prior to the PATRIOT Act, pen registers and trap devices were only permitted to intercept the numbers dialed or transmitted that were specifically attached to the device. The old statutory language limited the use of such devices to telephone lines [10] The PATRIOT Act served to redefine pen register to mean "a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted.[37].

The Act also directs the United States Secret Service to create and maintain a national Electronic Crimes Task Force [ECTF] [37]. The ECTF is based on the model laid out by the New York Electronic Crimes Task Force, which was created to fight computer-based crimes and potential cyberterrorist attacks. The ECTF seeks to forge new relationships between scholars, government, and the private sector in order to

facilitate greater information sharing and communication, thus enhancing cybersecurity. The private sector is able to bring issues straight to the ECTF, view existing intelligence regarding how criminals are currently compromising cybersecurity, and alert officials of dangers affecting their industry. Overall, the ECTF gives the government a forum in which to connect companies which might have a “particular expertise and resource”[10].

Conclusion

The threat is real and the tools are in place. The nation has resolved that the failure of imagination which cost thousands of lives on September 11, 2001 will not be a mistake that is made in vain. Aside from legislation, government agencies continually develop weapons to add to their anti-cyberterrorist arsenal. Recently the Department of Homeland Security also developed a new Cyber Security Division which is designed to focus on further reducing the vulnerabilities which face the government’s existing computing networks, as well as in the private sector, in order to further protect critical infrastructure [38]. And the response is not only domestic. The Convention on Cybercrime is the first international treaty to address cybersecurity and create a concerted international effort to prevent it [39]. It has thus far been signed by 42 countries, including the United States, and was ratified by Congress in 2005 [39].

The question remains, will the private sector rise to the challenge? Partnering government and private industry to combat cyberterrorism is in its infancy, but the partnership is imperative. If the private sector as a whole will not participate voluntarily, the government may be forced to implement programs to ensure that private industry shares information and develops security systems. Unfortunately, the complacent habit of controlling information in the private sector has prevented development of the sense of urgency necessary to protect the cyber world. The government must work so that in the upcoming years the cyber world is as safe a place as the physical world.

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Terrorists and the Internet

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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to describe the relationship between terrorist activities and the use of the Internet. It focuses on identifying, analyzing and illustrating ways in which terrorists organizations are exploiting the unique attributes of the Internet, and identify different ways in which terrorists use the Internet. The paper presents different relevant issues to the terrorist use of the Internet i.e., psychological warfare, propaganda, fundraising, recruitment, online gathering, networking, sharing information and coordination and planning.

Keywords: Terrorist, Internet use, Cyber terrorism, Psychological warfare.

1. The Reality of Cyberterrorism

The reality of cyberterrorism is that terrorists do not favor the Internet as the sole instrument to inflict a terrorist attack. Instead, terrorists prefer more conventional attacks. This, however, is a trend that is predicted to change as leadership amongst terrorist organizations shifts from older to younger terrorists who are technologically savvy. Experts agree that terrorists' future use of the Internet as a tool for terrorism will be collaterally to compound the effect of a more conventional attack [1]. The typical example cited is an attack similar to 9/11 coupled with a disruption of infrastructure such as electrical grid outages or controlling 911 call centers. Most military and intelligence leaders agree that this tactic is their biggest fear in terms of homeland security.

2. Micro-Actors and Cyberterrorism

The success of the War on Terror carries with it a disadvantage in terms of terrorist activity on the Internet. The Department of State report identifies that as the U.S. and allied forces accomplish the eradication of Al Qaeda leadership and training camps, small-scale "micro-actors" emerge and take on leadership roles [2]. In fact, the recent bombing attempt in Britain produced the arrest of eight men who, to the surprise of law enforcement, had no direct involvement with Al Qaeda. The authorities report that not one of the eight men arrested were foreign-born or had spent any time in the Afghan training camps, rather, the men were British, Middle-class suburbanites who more than likely were recruited, trained, and organized via the Internet. The Internet is a necessary tool for the terrorist movement because the Internet reaches a global audience of future terrorist recruits, is a channel for funding sources, and facilitates planning.

The most recent report on global terrorism, released March 2006 by the Department of State, provides that the modern trend in terrorist organizations is loosely organized, self-financed international networks [3]. The report confirms that terrorist

organizations are becoming more widespread and increasingly homegrown—often without direct association with Al Qaeda leaders. Terrorists are increasingly individuals who are not formally affiliated with an established terrorist organization [4]. The Internet bridges this gap between organizational disconnectedness by allowing for the global dissemination of terrorists' extremist views and promoting a larger transnational community of terrorists.

Older leadership within extremist organizations gradually is being replaced by younger, more sophisticated terrorists, who are more advanced in the methods of global information exchange. A report compiled by the FBI in 1999 warned that the threat of cyberterrorism would grow in the future “as leadership positions in extremist organizations that are increasingly filled with younger, ‘Internet-savvy’ individuals” [5]. The global information exchange most often occurs on Internet websites. The global population created by the Internet stimulates a growing cross-national network of terrorists—a population that relies heavily upon an ideological movement of propaganda and religious justification for its methods, activities, and attacks.

3. The Hidden Dangers of Cyberterrorism in Cyber-Techniques

The hidden dangers in cyberterrorism is cyber-techniques, or terrorists' everyday use of the Internet, which pose a greater threat to national security than a cyber attack [6]. Gabriel Weimann, an expert in the field of cyberterrorism summarizes that there are eight primary ways modern terrorists use the Internet: psychological warfare; propaganda; fundraising; recruitment; data mining; networking; sharing information; coordination and planning. Explaining cyber-techniques highlights terrorists' Internet use and enables law enforcement agencies to recognize where and what to look for on the Internet.

3.1. Psychological Warfare

The War on Terrorism is both a conventional arms war and a transnational ideological movement. On one front, it entails conventional warfare as soldiers occupy and battle to secure the safety and freedom of democracies. On a second front, the War on Terrorism is an ideological war—where the West is battling a clash of two competing Islamic ideologies [7]. Proponents of one ideology believe that “Islam is compatible with secular democracy and basic civil liberties, while the other proponents are committed to replacing the current world order with a new caliphate—that is, a global Islamic state” [8]. The White House's recently released National Strategy for Combating Terrorism recognizes that the transnational movement amongst terrorists is geared toward an arms war and an ideological war.

Our strategy also recognizes that the War on Terror is a different kind of war. From the beginning, it has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas. Not only do we fight our terrorist enemies on the battlefield, we promote freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorists' perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule. The paradigm for combating terrorism now involves the application of all elements of our national power and influence. Not only do we employ military power, we use diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement activities to protect the Homeland and extend our defenses, disrupt terrorist operations, and deprive our

enemies of what they need to operate and survive. We have broken old orthodoxies that once confined our counterterrorism efforts primarily to the criminal justice domain [9].

The ideological war employs the Internet as the “ideological battlefield” with the war being played out on websites, chatrooms, and message boards. The Internet enables free flow of thought and unrestrained and uncensored content. As such, the Internet allows uncontrolled and non-verified information to be broadcast worldwide, which in turn, creates a “climate perfect for an under-funded group to explain its actions or to offset international condemnation...” [10].

The Internet fuels terrorists’ success in terms of psychological warfare because the Internet allows underdeveloped terrorist organizations to appear much more capable in the cyber-realm than in reality. Terrorists rely on virtual fear techniques, such as the most recent virtual threat made against the Taipei Railway Station, President Chen Shui-bian’s office and presidential residence after terrorist posted threats to bomb the railway station and set fire to the Presidential locations on chatrooms on the Yahoo Web site [11]. The two posts contained instructions on how to make bombs and threatened that bombs had been placed at the railway station. As a result of the cyber-threat, Taipei police tightened security by initiating a security sweep, using police dogs and detectors, and by establishing an emergency command post near the locations. This example solidifies the ability of terrorists to carry out online threats which the terrorists may or may not be capable of carrying out, but which constitute psychological warfare.

Al Qaeda operatives have “flooded its websites with a string of announcements of an impending “large attack” on U.S. targets.” According to Gabriel Weimann, “these warnings have received considerable media coverage, which has helped to generate a widespread sense of dread and insecurity among audiences throughout the world and especially the United States” [12]. These warnings and fear techniques form the very root of psychological warfare by creating.

3.2. Propaganda

Terrorists now use the Internet as a communication tool to “wage an innovative, low-intensity military campaign” in which they globally market terrorist propaganda [13]. The most indispensable benefit of the Internet to terrorists is that the Internet makes possible transnational dissemination of terrorist propaganda because terrorists exploit the Internet’s anonymity. Typical extremist websites’ propaganda packages include articles condemning the West, biographies of terrorists killed in battle [or as suicide bombers], biased accounts of the current war, and religious justification for the activities, transcripts of speeches, songs celebrating jihad, public statements from the group, and motivational films [often beheadings, war tapes, bomb detonations, etc] [14]. Terrorists exploit readily-available Internet tools to free-file upload and pirate software for video-editing and distribution [15]. The videos created and distributed by the terrorists fuels motivation and justification for their efforts. Often the videos are motivation messages from al Qaeda leaders [16], but also take the form of practical training videos—such as and instructional videos in weapon construction [17].

A more extreme example of online terrorist propaganda is the case of Irhabi 007 [Terrorist 007] “which sheds light on what terrorist groups seek from their online activities and how quickly they have become sophisticated in their use of the Internet.” [18] Younis Tsouli, a 22-year old Muslim of Moroccan descent became internationally recognized as the “Internet-jack-of-all-trades”. He is purported to have provided internet support for both Zarqawi [by assisting in distributing his July 2004 Wings of

Victory propaganda film] and Osama bin Laden's Sahaab Foundation website [19]. When arrested by British police in late 2005, the police recovered video slides film on a computer hard drive showing how to make a car bomb...[as well as] video slides film showing a number of places in Washington D.C. on Tsouli's person.

Most website content is aimed at two issues: "the restrictions placed on freedom of expression and the plight of [terrorist] comrades who are now political prisoners. These issues resonate powerfully with their own supporters and are also calculated to elicit sympathy from Western audiences that cherish freedom of expression and frown on measures to silence political opposition" [20].

3.3. Fundraising

Financing is important for modern terrorists. Due to the recent terrorist organization trend of decentralized cell structure, most individual cells usually finance themselves rather than rely on financial support as do traditional hierarchal organizations [21]. The most prevalent fundraising trend amongst terrorists organizations is websites dedicated to humanitarian charities. These "charitable websites" propose to raise money for humanitarian relief purposes, when their actual operation is to fund jihad. Examples of such organizations are the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, the Benevolence International Foundation, the Global Relief Foundation, and the Al-Haramain Foundation [22]. Fundraising techniques on these websites range from posting bank account numbers for accounts to deposit donations, to information on how to donate via credit card, to posted brochures. Such a brochure was posted on Lashkar-e-Taiba's website instructs supporters to make donations online in support of the "fights against the tyrannical forces occupying the Islamic world" [23].

Other methods of fundraising include criminal activity such as credit card fraud [24], kidnapping ransom [FARC] [24], proceeds from counterfeit goods [25], and drug trafficking. A recent Congressional hearing on international drug trafficking and terrorism reported that, "Terrorist acts, crime, and foreign intelligence activities are no longer distinct activities, but rather profound fluid enterprises that through their very existence have a reverberating impact on our national security" [26]. Email solicitation is the most recent form of fundraising whereby recruiters contact those who view the website and bombard them with propaganda material [videos, messages, etc].

3.4. Recruitment

Terrorist organizations prey upon and advertise to disenfranchised youth globally by offering a "community-environment" in which recruits can become part of a larger ideological movement. The Internet environment facilitates this community feeling and terrorist organizations intentionally use technology to create a sense of global connectedness. Former CIA agent, Marc Sageman, reported in a recent interview that, "the Internet is now the place disenfranchised youth go to get radicalized instead of the mosque...[and that terrorists] don't even need the mosque now." [27].

The organizations excel at recruiting individual terrorists by allowing them to find a "home" on the Internet, a place where they associate with other displaced youth searching for a commonality and cause. The Internet's interactive features create a cyber-realm where online visitors, recruits, and recruiters can participate in chatrooms for real-time communicate and idea sharing. Common techniques to promote the community environment are daily posts reporting attacks, regularly updated

documentary videos, e-mail lists for links to other online terrorist communities, chatrooms, and motivational videos and messages.

Terrorists organizations create incentives for low income individuals to join their efforts by advertising monetary benefits for joining the movement. Many terrorist websites post reports of the funds given to families of suicide bombers and encouraging donations for families, widows and orphans of those who have died in pursuit of the extremist cause.

Terrorists are increasingly relying upon technical savvy in their recruitment efforts. A recent trend in terrorist recruitment is the use of Javascript to target the website to particular audiences:

Current versions of web browsers, including Netscape and Internet Explorer, support JavaScript functions allowing Internet servers to know which language is set as the default for a particular client's computer. Hence, a browser set to use English as the default language can be redirected to a site optimized for publicity aimed at Western audiences, while one set to use Arabic as the default can be redirected to a different site tailored toward Arab or Muslim sensibilities [28].

Technological know-how is increasingly becoming one of terrorists' most successful recruitment tools. Terrorist organizations employ "recruiters" who "using more interactive Internet technology, roam online chatrooms and cyber cafes looking for receptive members of the public, particularly young people" [29].

3.5. Data Mining: Intelligence Gathering

Deemed a vast digital library, the Internet offers valuable information to terrorist organizations [30]. Critical information pertaining to important facilities and networks is available on the Internet. Any person, terrorist or otherwise, can freely roam the Internet and gain access to such information as maps, diagrams, and operations. The intelligence gathered from the Internet is one of the leading reasons that law enforcement agencies should appreciate the seriousness of cyber-planning methodologies of terrorists because the intelligence gathered online has been proved to be stored and manipulated by terrorists. For example, a recently captured Al Qaeda computer contained engineering and structural architecture features of a dam. This information enables al Qaeda engineers to plan for and simulate an attack using cyber-methods" [31]. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld commented in regards to an al Qaeda training manual recently recovered in Afghanistan that, "Using public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least 80 percent of all information required about the enemy." [32]

Illegal information gathering also occurs online and poses a significant threat to national security. A July 2004 multiple chatroom posting by a Zarqawi supporter stated that the individual had successfully hacked into the U.S. army computer system based in South Korea, and that he had gained control of the computer to spy on the U.S. for over a month. To support his claims, he produced a screenshot of the hijacked computer's Window desktop, file downloads of video recordings of coalition patrol in Iraq. This instance exemplifies the catastrophic possibilities that can result from illegal terrorist internet activity. Terrorists' technological capabilities to gather intelligence which targets secret information endangers the United States and coalition forces since hacking into government computer systems permits terrorists to steal, disclose, or even destroy sensitive data.

3.6. *Networking*

Therefore, for many terrorists, the Internet is an online haven to connect with other individuals that subscribe to similar extremist ideology.

Terrorist have proven their ability to adapt, and this adaptability has carried over into their highly technological networking strategies. Terrorists are keenly aware of counter-terrorism efforts to shut down websites, and they coordinate strategies to maintain their online global network by creating mailing lists so that newly created websites and message board URLs can be passed along to members. An official Islamic Army in Iraq statement explained, "The enemies of Allah will continuously [shut down] our website...We ask you to register for our mailing list so that you continue to receive the latest news on the Islamic Army in Iraq." [33]

3.7. *Sharing Information*

The most recent White House National Strategy for Combating Terrorism reports that, "Terrorist networks today are more dispersed and less centralized. They are more reliant on smaller cells inspired by a common ideology and less directed by a central command structure." [34] Therefore, the Internet is a necessary tool for sharing information and connecting individuals to the transnational ideological movement. Anyone from the micro-actor terrorist to large terrorist organizations can access the Internet from virtually any location with internet access, and they do. When online, they share information by offering online tutorials in anything from hacking techniques to bomb making skills to online handbooks in sabotage.

In addition, terrorists exploit the Internet to further their information dissemination goals.

3.8. *Coordination and Planning*

Evidence strongly suggests that terrorists used the Internet to plan their operations for the September 11th attack. In addition, laptops seized in Afghanistan reveal that terrorists were actively collecting information and intelligence on targets; and sending encrypted messages via the Internet.

As terrorists become more global dispersed, the Internet serves as a tool for operational control and command. Accomplishing global coordination via the Internet is inexpensive as the individual micro-actor or small terrorist organization need only a computer and an internet service provider to communicate with a designated authority figure. Just recently, the Indonesian police learned that jailed Jemaah Islamiyah [JI] militant Imam Samudra participated in the Bali bombing while jailed. Apparently, a laptop was smuggled into the jail where Samudra gained online access to an Indonesian chatroom and made contact with an Indonesian militant website called anshor.net. [34] Based upon a large amount of communications uncovered by the Indonesian police, the extent of assistance and guidance provided by Samudra to the Bali bombers is estimated to be fundraising for more terrorist attacks [36]. The Indonesian anti-terrorist taskforce recognizes that JI linked-terrorists are using new information technology methods to fund their activities [37].

3.9. *Whack-A-Mole*

Terrorist hackers routinely patrol the Internet in search of vulnerable sites in order to communicate in real time and broadcast messages [38]. The current Internet practice of terrorists is deemed “whack-a-mole” which takes its name from an old carnival game in which moles pop up and the contestant whacks the mole only to find that the mole has appeared in a new hole. Similarly, terrorists commandeer a vulnerable website until the site is found out [“whacked down”], and then re-establish themselves at a newly discovered vulnerable website. To inform other terrorists of the website changes, terrorists maintain mailing lists to distribute new URL addresses. The “whack-a-mole” technique can be valuable in that the site, once shut down, can no longer function as a recruiting, fundraising, or propaganda tool. On the flip side, allowing the sites to remain permits constructive intelligence gathering into monitoring the terrorists’ online activity, methods, and practices. [39] Shutting down terrorists’ websites proves futile as even the terrorists themselves are aware of the “whack-a-mole” technique. The Azzam Publications site, a semi-official Al Qaeda site publishes on its site that, “We expect our web-site to be opened and closed continuously”. Most webmasters post instructions to copy articles and information found on the site and urge web viewers to disseminate it themselves via e-mail, chatboards, or through their own websites. [40] Referred to as cyber-deception [41], terrorists’ websites notoriously skip from one internet service provider to another, enabling the website to remain despite whack-a-mole techniques.

4. Legislative Efforts to Combat Cyberterrorism

Legislative efforts must be aimed at monitoring terrorist online activity. Keeping tabs on terrorists’ online activity “will require a realignment of U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies, which lag behind terrorist organizations in adopting information technologies.” [42] Rather than fighting the cyberdeception game with the whack-a-mole technique, if the websites are left to remain online, field knowledgeable agents can investigate and preempt terrorist cyber activity [43].

An important effort to thwarting cyberterrorism is cooperation from both public and private agencies. Although federal officials have focused their efforts on holding agencies more accountable for cybercrime, cyber security in the United States remains problematic. Lack of awareness among internal users and system managers regarding vulnerabilities in cyber security proves to be the weakest link in information security [44]. Many information technology experts advocate that companies institute cybersecurity training programs to educate internal users of proper technology policies and procedures [45]. In addition, legislation aimed at instituting penalties for cybercrimes and increased funding for law enforcement efforts to combat cybercrime are necessary in the War on Terror.

The international community has also recognized the growing importance of the threat of cyberterrorism. The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime was entered into force on July 1, 2004. Including the United States, the effort includes [46] signatories and 15 parties to cooperatively engage in the international fight against cybercrime. The Convention is the only legally binding multilateral instrument to address computer-related crime. According to its terms, it is purposed to protect citizens against such computer crimes as computer hacking, Internet fraud, computer crimes involving electronic evidence such child sexual exploitation, organized crime, and

terrorism. The parties to the Convention commit to compatible laws and tools to combat cybercrime, and they pledge to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of these crimes. Most importantly, the treaty is calculated at harmonizing computer crime laws, especially those in smaller or less developed nations that may not have restructured their laws to reflect emerging internet crime issues. The United States views the treaty as an important tool to strengthen United States cooperation with foreign countries in obtaining electronic evidence. Since United States law already addresses many of the provisions within the treaty, ratification was primarily symbolic of a global initiative to combat cybercrime.

The United States has legal tools in place to fight cybercrime. Substantively, there are numerous criminal statutes that could apply in a cyberattack scenario. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act [18 U.S.C.A. §1030] makes unlawful, among other things, to illegally obtain classified information; unlawfully obtaining information without authorization from a government computer or federal agency; and causing damage to a protected computer which results in either physical injury, a threat to public health or safety, or damage to a computer system used for purposes of national defense or national security. The United States Department of Justice has used this statute to prosecute numerous hacker cases based upon the illegal acquisition of classified information or cases that resulted in damage to computer systems. Two cases in January 2004 used the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The first case resulted in the prosecution of a hacker who damaged computer systems to obtain user names and passwords to eBay and Qualcomm. The second case convicted a hacker who illegally accessed the New York Time's internal database to obtain information and social security numbers for over 3,000 individuals.

A cyberattack also triggers specific criminal statutes associated with the criminal act of terrorism itself. The United States Code, Title 18, Section 2332b criminalizes acts of terrorism that transcend national boundaries. Since cyberattacks occur online, they facilitate transnational attacks and constitute violations of this provision. Domestic cyberattacks, such as a threat to public health or safety, falls under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 844. Such a case occurred in 2002 where an individual warned that he had electronic evidence of a missile threat targeting the 2002 Olympic Games Opening Ceremony in Salt Lake City, Utah. The threat was a hoax, and the criminal was charged under the domestic threat statute for making a false threat regarding the explosives.

Cyberterrorism, as a criminal method, is taken seriously in the United States, and criminal penalties are severe. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, a cyberattack that results in serious bodily injury is punishable by up to 20 years in prison, and if the attack results in death, punishment may be up to life imprisonment. In addition, the United States Sentencing Guidelines provide for an upward departure in cases where the disruption to critical infrastructure results in a debilitating impact on national security, economic security, public health or safety.

While substantive laws provide the requisite cause of action in the conviction of terrorists involved in cybercrimes, the United States has also enacted procedural laws to assist in the prosecution of cyberterrorism. Because terrorists exploit the anonymity of the Internet and are adept at covering their tracks in the aftermath of their crimes, electronic evidence must hastily be obtained before it is compromised or eliminated. Fortunately, the United States Congress recognized the nature of cybercrimes and enacted crucial legislation, The USA Patriot Act, to assist in the process of swiftly

obtaining electronic evidence and prosecuting cybercrimes to the fullest extent of the law.

The USA Patriot Act [Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 [47], was passed into law by President George W. Bush on October 26, 2001. The stated purpose of the law is to "deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes." The USA Patriot Act provides authority included field guidance provisions to assist in computer crime and electronic evidence:

Authorizations include: intercepting voice communications in computer hacking investigations; allowing law enforcement to trace communications on the Internet and other computer networks within the pen register and trap and trace statute ["pen/trap" statute]; intercepting communications of computer trespassers; writing nationwide search warrants for e-mail; and deterring and preventing cyberterrorism. The latter provision raises the maximum penalty for hackers that damage protected computers [and eliminates minimums]; states that hackers need only show intent to cause damage, not a particular consequence or degree of damage; provides for the aggregation of damage caused by a hacker's entire course of conduct; creates a new offense for damaging computers used for national security and criminal justice; expands the definition of a "protected computer" to include computers in foreign countries; counts prior state convictions of computer crime as prior offenses; and defines computer "loss." In addition, the guidance develops and supports cyber-security forensic capabilities [48].

Conclusion

It is important to remember that terrorists' online activities provide intelligence and law enforcement agencies an opportunity to study their methods, ideas, and plans. Recently, the United States intelligence community released Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate [NIE] "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States" dated April 2006. In this instrument, the intelligence community affirms that "the global jihadist movement is decentralized, lacks a coherent global strategy and is becoming more diffuse." This reinforces that the Internet is a necessary tool for the terrorist movement and that terrorists will continue to use the Internet to reach a global audience. The NIE also states that, "[n]ew jihadist networks and cells, with anti-American agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge [and] the confluence of shared purposed and dispersed actors will make it harder to find and undermine jihadist groups" [49]. Accordingly, more attention should focus in the role the Internet plays in bridging the gap between organizational disconnectedness by allowing for the global dissemination of terrorists' extremist views and promoting a larger transnational community of terrorists. Important to note is that the threat of self-radicalized cells is not only an international concern, but is a domestic concern, as cells emerge within the United States at an alarming rate.

The action to take in terms of terrorist internet sites is not to immediately shut down the site. Rather, intelligence communities should host sites targeted at the same audience sought by terrorist recruiters that expose the flawed and unpopular ideology of the terrorist movement. The NIE expertly explains that "the jihadists greatest vulnerability is that their ultimate political solution—an ultra-conservative

interpretation of hari'a- based governance spanning the Muslim world-is unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims. Exposing the religious and political straightjacket that is implied by the jihadist propaganda would help to divide them from the audiences they seek to persuade" [50].

National security efforts must address the issue of cyberterrorism. Initially, cyberterrorism was seen as a myth. Activities conducted online were taken lightly and were even flippantly termed, "cyber graffiti". However, after law enforcement has connected cyber activity to terrorist activities, such as the Madrid and London bombings, the term cyberterrorism has taken on a much more sinister meaning. Cyberterrorism has quickly gained attention as government agencies and private industry have suffered numerous cyber attacks and encountered a growing number of online crimes. In fact, the Department of Homeland Security recently conducted a cyber simulated attack, Cyber Storm, to evaluate their response, coordination, and recovery to a cyber attack [51]. The findings of the Cyber Storm exercise included among others, the need for interagency coordination, contingency planning, risk assessment, and improved strategic information sharing. These findings should reveal to the national and international community the need for a national and international focus on enhancing the national and international cyber preparedness, response capabilities, and cooperation with the private sector. Professionals within the national security field must remember that above all else, terrorists are criminals. As such, criminals will exploit any medium to further their cause. To deter and prosecute terrorist cyber-criminals there must be universal understanding that computers do not kill people, but people with computers kill people.

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Communication Methods in Terrorist Organizations: A Case Study of Al-Qaeda Connected Terrorism in Turkey

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Abstract. Terrorists' use of communication technology has increased in recent years. Several reasons can be discussed why there is a significant increase in their use of communication technology. The use of new communication tools is not only simple but also facilitates separate operations, main goals of terrorist organizations. This study uses a case study approach to examine the communication methods of religiously motivated terrorist organizations. After reviewing the literature, the study briefly states communication ways of religiously motivated terrorism in Turkey. By focusing on al-Qaeda in Turkey, the study indicates the main communication methods: Face-to-face conversation, couriers, the Internet, telephone, and mass media.

Keywords. Al-Qaeda, terrorism, communication, Turkey, Turkish Police, religiously motivated terrorism.

Introduction

One of the problems that leaders of terrorist groups have is to sustain control and send orders without taking risks that could damage their organizations. Therefore, terrorists groups particularly that depend on charismatic leadership need good communication. For example, Menachem Begin, the leader of the Jewish terrorist group Irgun, and George Grivas, who was the Cypriot EOKA terrorist group, were charismatic leaders and good communication were crucial for them [1].

Terrorists' use of communication technology has increased in recent years. Several reasons can be discussed why there is a significant increase in their use of communication technology. They can access to the Internet and cellular phones easily. The use of new communication tools is not only simple but also facilitates separate operations, main goals of terrorist organizations. As information and communication technologies improve over time, terrorist groups might utilize these improvements more powerfully for offensive uses [2].

This study applies qualitative method that aims to identify the processes of a certain entity, al-Qaeda terror organization in Turkey [3]. Asking a "how" question about a set of events, communication techniques of the terror organization, over which

the researchers have no control, the study uses a case study approach [4]. Data are drawn from archival records including statements of the terrorists, court orders and documents from the organization, interviews with the members of the terror organization, and observations.

1. Literature Review

The latest information and communication technologies used by terrorist groups include cellular phones, fax machines, World Wide Web sites, computer conferencing, and e-mail [5] [6] [7]. For example, after the changes in communication technology spread around the world, al-Qaeda terrorist organization bought new satellite telephones and laptop computers to store data and send e-mails to its members. After they came back to Afghanistan, al-Qaeda's Central Staff was able to supervise a global fight through the use of e-mail, fax, websites, and satellite telephones [8].

The terrorist groups use the Internet for five main aims: propaganda, indoctrination, recruitment, psychological warfare, and fund-raising. For these purposes, white ethnonationalists have been active on the Internet since 1995 by establishing websites and chat forums [9]. Al-Qaeda uses different web sites to support its propaganda and indoctrination, and recruit people by inspiring the Muslim community to carry on its fight [10]. In addition to these objectives, as Ranstrop [11] explains, al-Qaeda terrorist group has used the Internet to facilitate activities among the different organizations and maintain contacts with them [12]. Since they can be easily changed, Internet chat rooms have become an important way of communication among and between terrorist groups [13].

However, in addition to technological tools, traditional methods of communication including couriers are still among the means of terrorist groups [5] [6]. For example, given that al-Qaeda has a cellular structure, cell members do not know how the cell leader and its members communicate with each other. The terrorist group also uses different forms of communication that cannot be electronically detected, such as human couriers [14].

Besides these communication tools, terrorists utilize the mass media, such as television, radio, and newspaper, to attract the attention they want. Generally, one significant element of terrorist organizations' strategy is publicity. By benefiting from the mass media, they try to support propaganda and recruitment activities and declare responsibility for terrorist operations [15] [16]. Terrorist organizations have turned to more sophisticated groups in terms of managing their messages for broadcast and distribution. As political candidates benefit from paid media to ensure their thoughts and plans get out to the public, some terrorist groups have produced their own videos for broadcasting in news entities. Thus, they can reach multiple audiences by these videos [17] [18].

2. Communication Methods of Major Terrorist Organizations and Religiously Motivated Terrorism in Turkey

Communication occurs between at least two people by a face-to-face fashion, or by technological tools such as TV or radio broadcasting, web site, telephone, and e-mail. Distance has no meaning at the use of such high-tech intercommunicating facilities. In

this process, feedback is the major requirement; otherwise, there would be only transmission but not communication. Transmission and communication might differ among individuals based on human nature, social status, and positions. That situation is almost similar at terrorist organizations. Terror organization's position, structure, strategy, and host country's social characteristics would influence the information flow process. This research would examine the data transmission and communication methods of al-Qaeda in Turkey. With this regard, since having similar characteristics, two main religiously motivated terrorist organizations, Turkish Hezbollah and Islamic Great Eastern Raiders-Front (IBDA-C), will be mentioned about their respective exercises to elaborate information flow system of al-Qaeda in Turkey.

2.1. Turkish Hezbollah

Turkish Hezbollah that has no connection with Lebanese Hezbollah has used technological tools at data transmission and communication at minimum level. Secrecy is the most basic rule of Turkish Hezbollah; any disobedient behavior would be punished even by a capital punishment. Couriers are the backbone of communication within the Hezbollah organization. Besides, simple symbols are common communication methods. For instance, a visible "teddy bear" or another certain item from outside of home, or a certain room's lamp should be on as a sign of probable safe conversation; in a contrary situation, there would not take place a contact between terrorists.

Written reporting system is another common way of communication within Hezbollah members. Subordinates report their activities to superiors by writing report on onionskin, which is called as Muslims' paper, easy to swallow in case of emergency.

2.2 IBDA-C

Islamic Great Eastern Raiders-Front (IBDA-C) is another terror organization abusing Islam that aims to found a religious state. In IBDA-C, in addition to classic communication methods, superiors point out targets by the organization's publications. That is named as "*the dialect existed by itself*," trigger small scale groups to carry out a complete attack by their own resources. A group of IBDA-C stated they killed a person, who had been targeted in a secret code by a book "*Telegram (a kind of psychological torture)*" written by their leader when he was serving his sentence in the prison.

2.3. Al-Qaeda in Turkey

Religiously motivated terrorist organizations in Turkey have their own communication characteristics. Al-Qaeda in Turkey also has developed its own information flow system on the basis of members' positions and importance. Followings are the major ways of communication of al-Qaeda terror organization in Turkey:

- Face-to-face conversation,
- Couriers,
- The Internet,
- Telephone, and
- Proclaiming carried attacks in mass media.

2.3.1. Face-to-Face Communication

One of the most safe and clear way of communication is face-to-face conversation; hence, high-level al-Qaeda members mostly prefer it. There is minimum deficiency and erroneous in understanding in a conversation at each side's presence. Because of that fact, al-Qaeda uses face-to-face method in dispersing secret information to its companions.

It is understood from the statements of the members of Al-Qaeda in Turkey, who carried out attacks on November 15 and November 20, 2001, which are known as twin bombings in Turkey. Osama Ben Laden and Ebul-Hafs El-Misri (Muhammed Atef – Military wing responsible) had a meeting with the administrators of al-Qaeda in Turkey in Kandahar, Afghanistan for the twin bombings attacks. Adnan Ersoz concerning that meeting stated:

We had a meeting with al-Qaeda's military wing responsible Ebul-Hafs El-Misri. He said to us our ideas were applicable and they would support us and provide all necessary resources. He asked us the possibilities of carrying out attacks at places belong to the U.S., Israel, and their allies; besides, he requested us to attack the U.S. Incirlik Air Base in Adana and the Israeli cruise-ship visiting Mersin city. We agreed with him the feasibility of his ideas. Later on, we had a meeting with al-Qaeda's leader, Osama Ben Laden, along with Ebul-Hafs El-Misri in Kandahar city, Afghanistan.

Baki Yigit of al-Qaeda in Turkey also indicated the credibility of the face-to-face conversation in his statement:

At the meeting with Ebu-Hafs El-Misri at the Meytusselam guest-house, we pointed out the inappropriateness of obeisance to them at that time. Subsequently, he mentioned his ideas about possible attacks in Turkey and asked us whether we could aid with their attacks on Turkish land. We told the possibility of attacks in Turkey theoretically; meanwhile, we exposed him our willingness of carrying out an attack by ourselves.

Moreover, Louai Sakka, Syrian al-Qaeda member who was caught in Turkey due to the relation with abovementioned the Twin Bombings attack, stated "Ebu-Hafs El-Misri and Osama Ben Laden established a dialog at the same situation by writing notes rather than talking." At that circumstance, high-level al-Qaeda members used writing as a counter-intelligence precaution in accord to epigram of "earth has an ear."

Al-Qaeda in Turkey like its main counterpart employs face-to-face communication method within members while making decision and planning of any attack. It is because the first effective way of persuading people by such as facial expressions, voice tones, body language, insisting, and threatening. There are two ways of implementing this method:

- Communication through Contacts at Companions' Homes, or at Specific Locations and
- Communication through Social Activities

2.3.1.1. Communication through Contacts at Companions' Homes, or at Specific Locations

Harun Ilhan of al-Qaeda in Turkey, the coordinator of the November 15th Synagogue attacks told the pre-attack preparation as followed:

We, Huseyin (Code Name-CN) Habib Akdas, Omer (CN) Gurcan Bac, and me, had a meeting at Osman Eken's house before the attack on November 11, 2003. I had met with Osman Eken via Abdulkadir Karakus two months before the attacks. I had established a close relationship with him since he is from my hometown. I met with Omer (CN) Gurcan Bac at around 21:00 hrs at Eminonu Bus Station. I along with Omer (CN) did on-site visiting to figure out the position of Neve Shalom Synagogue in order to carry out the attack successfully. Omer (CN) said to me one of the attacks would be occurred at Neve Shalom. Later on, we proceeded to Karakoy, at where the bomb-truck would stay; afterward, he showed me where I had to wait and advised me to have sufficient knowledge of the place to observe and follow the events unmistakably. Additionally, Omer (CN) said further detailed information would be given at Osman Eken's home.

The leader of al-Qaeda in Turkey, Habib Akdas, handled the financial problem of November 15 and November 20 attacks, with the support of Loui Sakka, Syrian al-Qaeda member. Habib Akdas had a face-to-face meeting with Loui Sakka. At the same time, Adnan Ersoz as a representative of al-Qaeda in Turkey was struggling with the major al-Qaeda administrators in Pakistan for financial resources of the Synagogue attacks.

2.3.1.2. Communication through Social Activities

Social activities, such as picnics, soccer matches, and dinners, are a common way of increasing the organizational dynamism as well as recruiting new members by directing their attention toward the group's slogans. Those kind of social remote gatherings renew members' consciousness; besides, recruitment process is accelerated by organizational synergy over new members. One of these activities was told by Murat Idrak, who was captured while he was planning to go to Iraq. He stated as followed:

We went to a place at Kemberburgaz Forest by a minibus. Huseyin-Selim (CN) Habib Akdas and Sait (CN) Sadettin Akdas, and Yusuf (CN) Gokhan Elaltuntas were waiting us there. They did not have any vehicle; I did not know how they came there. We all did barbecue and played volleyball. Afterward, Huseyin-Selim (CN) Habib Aktas preached us concerning oppressed Muslims; his preach was as similar as what he did at home. Then, we collectively did our prayer. At the same day, we returned to Istanbul with the same minibus, which was driven by Huseyin-Selim (CN) Habib Akdas. When we arrived at the apartment of Omer-Hakan (CN) Gurcan Bac and I along with Fevzi from Van and home-owner Omer-Hakan (CN) Gurcan Bac stayed at the apartment. We discussed about the Muslims' situation at that night. Omer-Hakan (CN) Gurcan Bac asked me, "You mentioned Fevzi about your willingness of Jihad, if you are volunteer we can assist you in this matter."

In sum, we conclude that al-Qaeda members and their local affiliates mostly have a one-on-one consultative discussion before the operation. By this way, the organization benefits the advantages of face-to-face dialogue, which is not only secure and clear for both sides, but also persuasive method.

2.3.2. Communication by Couriers

Courier is a person that delivers packages and mails to recipients. This paper considers the term courier as used within the respective terror organizations. Courier is a member of the organization that delivers an open or secret note or instruction, money, weapon, explosive devices, etc. to the individuals to carry out a planned operation. The couriers do not have detailed knowledge of the package and receiver. They only execute the task. It is forbidden to ask any further question in this process. Administrators select the couriers personally among discreet people. It is of course the result of secrecy strategy that is crucial to all terror organizations.

Al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda in Turkey preferred to use couriers for communication and financial support at November 15 and November 20 Istanbul Twin Bombing attacks. Concerning to this subject, Adnan Ersoz, who is a top level terrorist, stated as followed:

Huseyin (CN) Habib Akdas is the leader of al-Qaeda in Turkey; the members of the committee are Omer (CN) Gurcan Bac and Ahmet (CN) Harun Ilhan. Within this structure, I undertake the task of establishing communication between al-Qaeda in Turkey and al-Qaeda; I was the courier of Turkey to al-Qaeda.

...I have no information about the vehicles and explosive devices that used at the bombings. Huseyin (CN) Habib Akdas asked me to provide \$150,000 as the cost of planned bomb attacks. I told him I would inform him after I contact to al-Qaeda. I did that communication via the Internet, but I cannot recall the e-mail addresses right now. Later on, Huseyin (CN) Habib Akdas told me that he had taken over \$50,000 from Syrian Alaaddin (CN) and \$100,000 from an Iranian person in Iran. He did not tell me Iranian's name or code name. In the meantime, I organized the same amount of money, but when Huseyin (CN) Habib Akdas said he had found the money, I did not take the money. In order to provide the money, I, first, contacted to an Arab al-Qaeda member code-named Suleyman at the end of 2002; he communicate me with another Arab person code-named Abdurrahman; Abdurrahman (CN) brought me to an Egyptian, Ebul-Hafs (CN); I told him about the money needed for the planned attacks in Turkey; Ebul-Hafs (CN) said to me he would inform me later about that issue. In January 2002, Ebul-Hafs telephoned me and we met at a public park in Islamabad. He told me to find fraudulent identity cards to receive the money in small amounts wired from Europe and the Middle East. After Huseyin (CN) Habib Akdas told me he had provided the money in February 2003, I quitted working on the money.

As has been noted from the statement, Adnan Ersoz, in order to receive financial support, could communicate with al-Qaeda by the couriers. Adnan Ersoz was told to leave Pakistan when the al-Qaeda's financial responsible person was captured by the U.S. and Adnan Ersoz passed to Iran.

Syrian Louai Sakka who was caught in August 2005 in Turkey stated as followed:

In January 2002, when I was in Iran, Habib Akdas send me an e-mail for a conversation. Habib Akdas was in Pakistan at that time and he wanted to see me urgently, but we could not meet. In March 2002, he informed me via e-mail that he returned to Turkey and talked with Osama Ben Laden about

suicide bombing attacks to be carried out in Turkey; Osama Ben Laden stated Habib Akdas to attack an Israeli ferryboat in Antalya city harbor, and advised to act after a sound intelligence and contact with me (Louai Sakka) for communication; he would discuss with me about the money. I replied him (Habib Akdas) as I had no connection with al-Qaeda and informed Abu Musab El-Zarkavi. Zarkavi's money was at Abu Rashid. I said to Akdas I found the money and send a man to Tehran after I had contacted with Abu Rashid. I gave \$50,000 to a person named Abu Rashid. Abu Rashid handed over the money to Fevzi Yitiz that I learned his name later in a cyber café.

A person named Burhan Perk who was arrested and seized with a gun at his workplace during the investigation of the Twin Bombings stated that;

Three weeks before then, when I went to Harun Ilhan's home for tea time gathering, I was given a gun by Harun Ilhan and subsequently, he told me to hand over that gun the person who would be sent in a few days to his place. I had hidden the gun at my workplace and the person named Ahmet Demir came to near tea house and ask me to deliver the gun in a few days. Additionally, Ahmet Demir asked me any arrested people around there and I told about people who were arrested recently and would be sent to trial soon.

It is apparent that al-Qaeda in Turkey had received the financial support for the Istanbul Twin Bombings from al-Qaeda through real individuals, couriers. The terror organization has used courier not only for communication but also for supplementary reasons. Once again, the same terror organization member Fevzi Yitiz stated that;

After 10 or 15 days from the start of bomb producing, Huseyin (CN) Habib Akdas gave me 2,000,000 Turkish Lira (TL) to buy two guns from Van city located at the eastern part of Turkey. Thereupon, I went to Van and purchased two guns by paying 1,000,000 TL for each gun from Mehmet Temel, who is public accountant in Edremit city of Van province. Approximately, ten days later, I returned to Istanbul and delivered the guns to Huseyin (CN) Habib Akdas.

Overall, the law enforcement agencies need to consider the importance of the couriers' positions. Adnan Ersoz was in Pakistan to communicate al-Qaeda superiors with Turkish affiliates. The selection reason of Adnan Ersoz was his personal knowledge about the region since he had previously been there for religious education and legal trade affairs then. The reason to send Fevzi Yitiz to Iran for money transaction was his local knowledge about Iran since the closeness of his hometown to Iran. Under the light of this information, we conclude that the law enforcement agencies can give consideration to suspicious people's backgrounds and their family's environment and those persons' positions in the organization, accordingly.

Law enforcement agencies should evaluate cautiously the probability of courier use by terror organizations; further, they should arrange counter-operation timing in accord with the couriers' task. Otherwise, a courier cannot provide more information except his/her position in the organization and the delivery. Besides, that mistake can result in failure of operation and militants' getaway. Moreover, it is recommended that

the border security unit be sensitive to money transferring by couriers and develop a plan to this end.

2.3.3. *Communication via Internet*

The modern world provides terror organizations a new era of communication by the hi-tech facilities which increase their influence over the societies. Terror organizations, today, can use the Internet effectively in reaching any global point as a local place. We can say that the Internet is a magnificent instrument for internationally structured al-Qaeda terror organization. This situation was pointed out by Harun Ilhan as stated;

Al-Qaeda does not have communicating networks as an every country that broadcast its political, cultural, economic, and military affairs to the international world. It has no land on to locate or no settled activities. In spite of these facts, it transferred its operations and news to agencies, its targets and warnings.

There is no information regarding use of e-mail, or the Internet chat by the top management of al-Qaeda. But they are widely used by local al-Qaeda members. Adnan Ersoz, a member of al-Qaeda in Turkey, stated as followed on this issue:

I was communicating with my superior Huseyin (CN) Habib Akdas via e-mail. Most members prefer this method. As far as I know, the organization provides its security with its own armed or disarmed members and secrecy was emphasized as a number one priority. Recruited people were being sent to training camps by examining their references after pre-interview. No one without desired reference was allowed to enter to camps, guest houses, or gathering centers.

It is known that Habib Akdas, the leader of al-Qaeda in Turkey, ordered the rest of the organization to have more than one e-mail addresses, and to this end, even people who do not have basic computer knowledge asked others' help in order to get e-mail addresses. Yusuf Dural, a friend of Feridun Ugurlu who carried out the suicide attack to British Consulate on November 20, 2003, indicated his relationship with Feridun Ugurlu as followed:

Feridun Ugurlu called me from his office and asked me to obtain a Hotmail e-mail address to communicate on behalf of his firm. I got a Hotmail address, activated it, and taught him how to use e-mail. At the end of 2002, he called me again and asked a new Hotmail e-mail address for personal use; then, I got muhammedyasir@hotmail.com, activated it, and informed him. Once again, at the beginning of 2003, Yasir (CN) Feridun Ugurlu called me to get a Hotmail e-mail address for his son Musabbinyasir. I got musabbinyasir@hotmail.com, and I informed him after activated it.

Subsequently, Yusuf Dural stated, "I received a note from Feridun Ugurlu; when I opened the note, two new e-mail addresses were asked for Faik, whose last name I cannot remember, and Cikrikci; passwords were as telephone numbers; I got e-mail addresses for both of them and informed him."

Upon having caught Adnan Ersoz and investigating his e-mail accounts, it was acquired that Habib Akdas, the leader of al-Qaeda in Turkey, sent an e-mail message to him. As a consequence of technical investigation, it is found out that IP (Internet Protocol) address belongs London, UK. However, when his undeleted messages were looked at, IP addresses belonged to different locations such as one day in Houston the other day in New York City. The investigation revealed Habib Akdas employed "IP Hiding" method while communicating with the Internet. Simply, IP Hiding method is described as using fake IPs acquired from the Internet with special software. As has been noted, terrorists utilize technology frequently and effectively. Furthermore, terror organizations communicate with their members by their own web sites. Besides, they can transmit images and texts to members via the Internet for training purpose.

From a counterterrorism viewpoint, we can conclude to cope with terrorism effectively, it is required to invest technology and train personnel on this issue. In addition to that, specific education status and technologic interest of suspects at local level must be considered carefully. Moreover, since the Internet has no boundary, in order to acquire IP addresses, and related matters that could be provided by foreign Internet service providers, bureaucratic procedures need to be minimized and cooperation in this regard should be established. It must be legally required that cyber cafes and ISPs store user accounts within a certain period. Besides, it must be ensured that e-mail service providers such as Yahoo and Hotmail open offices in certain countries, which are under threats of al-Qaeda like terror organizations for speedy information inquiry.

2.3.4. Communication with Telephone

Terror organizations benefit cell phones in their operations by developing their own techniques. For example, they use cell phones to activate bombs. Cell phones are used to send messages directly to assassins or to order and give instructions to suicide bombers as were seen on November 15 and November 20, 2003. It is clear al-Qaeda in Turkey also employs phones widely in addition to other communication tools.

The methods of telephone communication are as followed:

- Over international companies' telephone network,
- Running telephone shops, and
- Telephone communication during attacks.

2.3.4.1. Over International Companies' Telephone Network

Al-Qaeda in Turkey abused the affairs of international companies based in Turkey in communication. Habib Akdas utilized international firms to cover his identity and activities; for example, Hidir Elibol, owner of Onur and Berfin International Companies, stated that Habib Akdas used his companies' communication facilities a lot as a center after they started to work together. Not only did Habib Akdas contact with terrorists, but also arranged meetings at Hidir Elibol's companies. On this issue, Mehmet Kus, a member of al-Qaeda in Turkey, indicated in his statement, Habib Akdas "told they were exporting textile products to Algeria and some Arab countries and gave me Berfin company's telephone numbers. I did not go to that company, but I contacted with him by the company's telephone."

2.3.4.2. Running Telephone Shops

Running local telephone shops is other way of communication process of al-Qaeda in Turkey. For instance, Habib Akdas, his brother Sadettin Akdas, and Gokhan Altuntas

opened a mobile phone shop in Gaziosmanpasa, Istanbul in order to facilitate communication by obtaining customer's cell phones and personal information. In general, Habib Akdas bought the cell phones in large amount and set them ready to deliver for use of the members for the organizational communication purpose within certain period. The used cell phones were destroyed, or sold to other cell phone shops located in different districts. Habib Akdas sent seventeen cell phones, which are used for the organizational activities, to Mehmet Kus to sell before the November 15 and November 20 attacks while leaving from Turkey. In this matter, Mehmet Kus told as followed, "Osman Eken came to home with a bag and gave it to me; I looked into the bag and noticed several cell phones with different brands. Osman Eken told me the bag was sent by Sait (CN) Sadettin Akdas."

Bulent Duman, who had business deals with Habib Akdas and his associates, said about prepaid phone cards and used lines as followed:

Every evening I regularly visit the shop named Ozgur Communication for business. I bought an Aycell brand phone line from that shop for Tevfik Sahin who is my neighbor, and then he handed over that line to his daughter. When I went to the shop almost three weeks before, Sait (CN) and Yusuf (CN) (Gokhan Altuntas) told me they would sell the shop and asked me to find any willing customer to buy the shop.

As has been noted, opening telephone shops method was used actively in order to keep communication secret at a certain level.

2.3.4.3. Telephone Communication during Attacks

People who carried out the attacks received instructions in crypto about operations by using new cell phones and phone cards delivered by Habib Akdas, the leader of al-Qaeda in Turkey. Later then, at the moment of the attacks, the same cell phones were used by suicide attackers and watchmen for communication.

Yusuf Polat, with this regard, stated as followed:

Selim (CN) Habib Akdas picked me up with an automobile and then we led toward his home. While we were on the way to his home, he told me 'It is the time, right now!' I first supposed to go to abroad, but later he gave me a Nokia 3315 type cell phone. I could not remember whether it was working or not. He showed me the recorded numbers. There were three recorded numbers; one of them was for Mr. Mahmut, the other was for elder brother Rashid, and the last one was recorded as 'me.' Since we would have a mutual conversation, I took off the battery as a precaution against eavesdropping. Then, while we were going to his home, Habib Akdas continued to brief me about the operation; there would be a suicide attack with a vehicle, and the bomb would be three and a half tone in weight. We were left alone at the room; he took out a paper from his pocket showing a plan. Afterward, he started to tell me, "in fact, Hakan was supposed to inform you; however, since you did not come yesterday, I will tell you right now," and articulated the operation while utilizing a drawing. In addition, he told me the coded telephone conversations in which "one billion" stands for the synagogue's lower entrance while "two billions" stands for upper entrance.

As has been noted, Habib Akdas told Yusuf Polat how they would communicate with telephone during the attack they would carry out. It is remarkable that they considered using a daily life conversation style to hide their illegal activities.

In another example, Yusuf Polat in his statement indicated,

One day before the synagogue attack on November 14, 2003 at around 20:00 hrs., I called Resit Abi (CN) and asked him, 'How are you? Are you fine? Tomorrow, come here with your wife,' and he replied by saying 'Okay!' and accordingly informed me with a confirmation decipher that meant the operation was not postponed. Thereupon, I, immediately, telephoned Mr. Mahmut (CN) and said him, 'Tomorrow, you may stop by to take your money.' In order to let them know the operation would take place the following day. He replied me with 'Okay!' that implied as he understood the plan. By behaving in that way, we all communicated to prepare ourselves for the operation.

Yusuf Polat, in his statement, pointed out, "I smashed down the telephone which I used at the operation and thrown its parts at different locations. Later on, I cooperated with the officials in recovering the telephone's parts and identified them."

In sum, it is a necessity to establish concrete rules and regulations that require firms to record people's individual identifier and residential information; besides, no one can register a cell phone on any other person's name.

2.3.5. Utilizing Mass Media in Proclaiming the Responsibility of an Operation

The world is categorized under two camps "good and bad" by the terrorist organizations. They naturally belong to the good camp. This philosophy leads terrorists to justify their activities. For that reason, they have faith systems or principles guiding their attacks and establishing scenarios based on their guideline. So, they can neutralize their behaviors and even trigger others for similar attacks. Parallel with this mentality, Habib Akdas, the leader of al-Qaeda in Turkey, tried to tell his fellows about the rightfulness of the attacks. It is apparently noted at his statement in proclaiming VCD of Istanbul Twin Bombings: "We tore down Neve Shalom synagogue since it was being manipulated by MOSSAD; we also tore down Beth Israel synagogue where Jewish people gathered to support Israel." He called the synagogues not temple but politically acting institutes working against Muslims.

In his following statement, Habib Akdas claimed their attacks were successful although the number of killed Jewish people was incredibly less. Further, he insisted it was because the officials covered the real death toll of Jewish people. Besides, he pointed out unrighteous behavior against Muslims in different places, around the world, made their attacks justifiable. Moreover, he insisted al-Qaeda was the only address to apply for justice; subsequently he called their attacks, as necessity for every Muslim. By giving that message, al-Qaeda in Turkey tried to influence other radical groups to act against Islam enemies. As a result, an extremist group carried out an attack against a Mason lodge just after al-Qaeda's propaganda although they both have no connection before.

The terror organization gives importance to produce propaganda VCDs as abovementioned to recruit members and increase the number of sympathizers. There is

reliable information that computers and other related technical devices had been used by the organization for that aim. In this matter, Harun Ilhan stated as followed:

Huseyin (CN), Habib Akdas gave me VCDs that had images of Osama Ben Laden and al-Qaeda war training and he requested me to produce copies by utilizing from those VCDs. I had worked on that issue for five to six months at an office around a business center. Afterward, I closed the office and started to work at my home for production of propaganda VCDs.

There should be sanctions for delivering any terror organization's propaganda materials, especially VCDs that can be produced easily in high quality by the use of technology. Moreover, TV stations should not be allowed to broadcast those VCDs even for the aim of broadcasting news. We have to bear in mind that those propaganda VCDs can influence other individual terror organizations to initiate new attacks to certain targets.

Conclusion

Killing people is not as important as influencing people for terrorist organizations. Terrorist attacks are generally carried out to spoil common sense; psychological impacts are more effective than physical damages. Terrorism is planned violence. Terrorist organizations, by and large, does not aim mass destruction but manipulating people's minds by their attacks. By achieving their aim, they seek to make society hopeless and think about complying with terrorist organization's wants and needs. To this end, they use propaganda in each country around the world in order to voice their ideology. Differently stated, propaganda is the most vital tool for a terrorist organization.

The message given by a terrorist attack should be combated not only by police forces but also by whole society, particularly, families, schools, religious institutes, economists, politicians, and mass media. In this respect, media has a crucial role that could minimize the impact of terrorist propaganda over the society. Therefore, after a terrorist attack, the media should avoid broadcasting news and programs that would cause people hopeless and destroy society's resistance. On the contrary, the media should encourage people in fighting terrorism by emphasizing societal values and common goods.

It is remarkable that in the globalized world, terror organizations do not have any border. They are capable to survive in other countries, prepare themselves for future attacks anywhere, in particular, by cooperating with their foreigner counterparts. From a different viewpoint, a country by herself cannot be sufficient in combating terrorist activities. For that reason, there should be close cooperation among countries for effective counter-terrorism programs. Special agreements should be done between related countries to abrogate international bureaucracy and develop information exchange and joint programs.

Finally, one of the most important tasks for countries in combating terrorism is defining "terrorism" and "terrorist organization" and declaring internationally agreed definitions for both. After then, any country should avoid giving statement, such as, "according to me, it is not terrorism." Countries should be aware of the results of terrorism as the most dangerous enemy to all humanity.

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Osama bin Laden Audiotape and Its Effect on the US Newspapers

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Abstract. This study aimed to analyze the representation of the audiotape in the main media outlets of the US, namely the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*. The content analysis of the news media coverage on terrorism between 15th of January and 24th of January 2006 [five days before and after the broadcasted of the audiotape] can be used to expose whether or not the audiotape has affected media attention to terrorism and the approach of the news media to the 'war on terrorism'. Briefly, this article analyzed the media attention on terrorism and approach of the media to the Bush Administration's terror policies before and after the broadcast of the audiotape. Within the light of content analysis, this study reveals that the release of this audiotape has increased media attention to the terrorism. There is a considerable increase on terrorism reports after the release of this audiotape. Secondly, in contrast to war in Afghanistan and early periods of the war in Iraq, the news media mostly has not supported 'war on terrorism' policies in this period although the Osama bin Laden audiotape which threatens to the United States.

Keywords: Media Attention, war on terrorism, Bush administration, Al Qaeda, agenda-setting.

Introduction

After a year silence, Osama bin Laden released a new audiotape of threats against the United States on the 19th of January, 2006. He warned Americans that Al Qaeda was planning more attacks on the United States. At the same audiotape, he offered a long ceasefire. The audiotape was broadcasted by the Arab satellite television station Al Jazeera. "It was unclear when the recording was made. However, the Central Intelligence Agency verified its authenticity and said the station was probably right in saying that it dated from early December" [2].

The members of the Bush Administration including President Bush, Vice-President Dick Cheney and Whitehouse spokesman Scott McClellan have cited this audiotape in their speeches in the following days. On one hand, they quickly rejected bin Laden's ceasefire offer. White House spokesman Scott McClellan said "We do not negotiate with terrorists. We put them out of business" [3]. On the other hand, they all emphasized the seriousness of the threat coming from Al Qaeda. Scott McClellan responded to the questions dealing with the audiotape as follows, "We continue to act on all fronts to win the war on terrorism, and we will. The president is fully committed to doing everything within his power to prevent attacks, and to defeat the terrorists. We are taking the fight to the enemy; we are working to advance freedom and democracy, to defeat their evil ideology. We are winning. Clearly, Al Qaeda and the terrorists are

on the run. And that is why it is important that we do not let up, and that we do not stop until the job is done. And that's what we will do" [4]. President Bush also cited to the audiotape in the following days. He declared a few times that he takes it seriously. In one of them, he states, "Now, I understand there is some in America who say, well, this can't be true there are still people willing to attack. All I would ask them to do is listen to the words of Osama bin Laden and take him seriously. When he says he's going to hurt the American people again, or try to, he means it. I take it seriously, and the people of NSA take it seriously. And most of the American people take it seriously, as well" [5]. In the same direction, although five years have passed since 9/11, The National Strategy for Homeland Security designates Al Qaeda as "America's most immediate and serious threat" [2].

The Bush Administration is eager to use 'war on terrorism' frame continuously. The discourse used while responding to the audiotape is consistent with the policies followed by the Bush Administration after 9/11. Thus, it is not surprising to hear such comments by the members of the Bush Administration. The discourse exemplified above has been used to reinforce patriotism and to heighten fear of terrorism. In this way, the Bush Administration tries to secure international and national support for policies in the name of fighting against the terror. The audiotapes released by Osama bin Laden gives this opportunity to the Bush Administration and these audiotapes were highly used as a means of propaganda to maintain 'war on terrorism' frame.

1. Media and the Police

These policies cannot be effective without the contribution of the media. The amount of media attention to the terrorism and its approach in these reports are highly important to expose the perception of the public. As it is stated in agenda-setting theory, the newspapers may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is successful in telling its readers what to think about [6]. McCombs and Shaw "found a direct correlation between the amount of news covered on a particular issue in the media and the amount of importance people interviewed gave that issue" [7, P.232-233]. Agenda setting is accomplished simply by the amount of media attention given to a specific political issue. Therefore, the more attention it gets, the more importance people think that it has. The quantitative comparison of the weight given by these newspapers before and after the broadcast of the audiotape shows the amount of importance given by the people to the terrorism.

Within the light of agenda-setting theory, it may be told that media have the ability to focus public attention on selected problems and inform the public of viable solutions. Media has played an important role after 9/11 because media serve as an important source of information for most Americans about events that occur every day [8]. This is especially true of international news events that happen beyond the direct experience of public. For many, the sole source of information about international events is the media. "A study by Salwen and Matera found correlations between foreign news coverage and public opinion that suggested that international news coverage does indeed have an agenda-setting effect. Media coverage of international news then should play an important agenda-setting function" [9, p.365]. At this point, due to media coverage of terrorism, the media may influence the level of fear of terrorism and contribute to the persistence of terrorism as a major national, even international issue [10].

However, this situation does not exactly mean that public and media support the 'war on terror' policies of the Bush Administration. At this point, the tone of the media coverage which has been changing recently on these issues is also very important. Throughout the war in Afghanistan and before the war in Iraq, the mainstream media has mostly supported the 'war on terrorism' policies implemented by the Bush Administration. Al Qaeda terror organization and its leader Osama bin Laden has played the basic role within this process. Mainstream media has shown Osama bin Laden and aired his audiotapes again and again which contributed to the persistence of terrorism as a major national, even international issue.

However, the news coverage of terrorism has turned into more critical stage since the war in Iraq. The diplomatic failures of the Bush Administration, preemptive war policies without broader allied and UN support, and the evidences on which the Bush Administration based its decision to go to war resulted in criticism of the policies both at home and abroad. The members of Congress and possible presidential candidates raised questions. The news media covered the reports including the criticism of members of Congress, "domestic and foreign peace demonstrations against the war, and divided public support for the war based on opinion polls" [1, p.297]. Today, it seems that "the invocations of 9/11 do not have the force they once had" [2].

The analysis of media coverage of terrorism between 15th of January and 24th of January 2006 [five days before and after the broadcast of the audiotape] can be used to expose the media attention to the terrorism and media approach [positive, neutral or negative tone against the Bush Administration] before and after the broadcast of the audiotape. This shows whether or not the threats coming from Osama bin Laden in the audiotape has affected media attention on terrorism and the approach of the media against the 'war on terrorism'.

For these purposes, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* terrorism coverage are taken as the sample of the study. The dates chosen for the analysis of the reports were January 15 to January 24, 2006. These dates include the reports which were published five days before and after the broadcast of the audiotape. Content analysis of the newspapers is used to provide the data for the following questions.

1. What is the number of reports on terrorism before and after the audiotape?
2. What is the distribution of key topics?
3. What is the proportion of negative, neutral and positive tone in the newspaper coverage before and after the audiotape with regard to 'war on terrorism' policies of the Bush Administration?

2. "War on Terrorism" and Media

The history of the relationship between media, military and government dates back to the Civil War [11]. However, the relationship between media, military and government has been investigated extensively by academicians since the Vietnam War because it was the first to be televised and the first of the modern era fought without formal military censorship [12]. Beginning from the Vietnam War, most of the studies focused on the consistency between media and government agendas, implying the effect of government on media. "In the Cold War era, the ideology of anti-communism acted as a significant constraint upon media autonomy when covering international crises, providing journalists with a template with which to understand global events and presenting governments with a powerful rhetorical tool with which to criticize as

unpatriotic those who questioned the wisdom of military endeavors” [13, P.953]. The collapse of USSR provided a comparatively freer period during the 1990s for journalists to criticize US foreign policy [13]. However, the events of 9/11 were the beginning of a new period of media, military and government relations.

In the weeks immediately following 9/11, the Bush Administration applied its public communication strategy “with a central goal of restoring confidence among Americans and building support both domestically and abroad for the ‘war on terrorism’” [11, P.30]. The ‘war on terrorism’ frame has served to mobilize public support for the campaign against terrorism. Public opinion polls showed unprecedented levels of approval for President Bush and the policies followed after 9/11. It has also served as a renewal of national identity and “American patriotism evident in rituals such as flying flags and singing national hymns like ‘God Bless America’ in public settings” [11, P.30]. This powerful construction denies the possibility of criticizing the government’s actions; in this case, criticizing the government can be considered unpatriotic.

In the time of crisis, citizens pay attention to politics and news coverage more than ordinary times. Governments and military officials apply greatest influence over news coverage to affect public opinion in these times [11]. In time of shared crisis such as 9/11, media is caught up in the rally round the flag syndrome. Journalists have a sense of threat which results in close collaboration with government [1]. “Even if journalists seek opposing views on government war policies, they are constrained by their dependence on government access in order to write the news. Balanced presentation is difficult in wartime if official opposition leaders are unwilling to counter government views, either because they concede leadership to the party in government or out of fear of being accused of lack of patriotism” [1, P.297].

Many studies following 9/11 showed media’s considerable reliance on official sources. In spite of tactical differences, Democrats and Republicans supported similar policies through the war in Afghanistan and for many months of the troop increase for the war in Iraq. As it is stated by Hallin and Bennett, in the presence of an elite consensus, “media discourse is more likely to marginalize opposing views because journalists index the news to elite viewpoints” [13, P.954]. The elite consensus at the beginning reflected to the mainstream media and the news media did not offer critical analysis of policy decisions until actors inside the government and Congress have done first [14].

The period of war in Iraq was the beginning of critical analysis of policy decisions of the Bush Administration. The negative tone on the media against ‘war on terrorism’ gradually increased in this period. President Bush seems to have been loosing “control over the framing of policies in the ‘war on terror’ ” [1, P.20]. Public opinion polls have showed lowest levels of approval for President Bush since 9/11. The news media has become more critical on policies such as ‘surveillance act’ offered by the Bush Administration. Therefore, it is highly valuable to analyze the effect of the audiotape on media coverage of terrorism.

3. Methodology

A content analysis of The New York Times and The Washington Post newspapers was performed to measure media attention and approach toward the Osama bin Laden audiotape and terrorism. These two news organizations were chosen because they were

prime examples of elite national media outlets. The combined circulation figures of nearly 2 million for these newspapers represent not a big percentage in the US [15]. However, their mainly middle-class readership including officers, teachers, university lecturers, journalists, and politicians suggests a presence of disproportionately influence the US.

Keyword searches in the Lexis-Nexis database with the terms 'Osama', 'Al Qaeda' and 'Terrorism' provided the sample of reports about the case. Where the search generated irrelevant reports or letters to the editor, these were removed, giving a final data set of 77 and 49 reports respectively, and making a total of 126 reports.

Content analysis was used to examine not only quantity but also the quality of news in the newspapers. Within this context, the frequency and distribution of reports in the newspapers and their approach to the audiotape and terrorism were taken into sample to provide the data for the research questions. In quantitative side, total number of the reports and articles, the distribution and frequency of some topics were analyzed. In qualitative side, the tone of the media coverage on these issues was analyzed and main points asserted by the parties [media, government and opponents] of the debate and their approaches on these issues were exemplified.

The tone of the coverage is important unit of analysis of the study. The views asserted in the reports are used for the categorization. The 'positive' category includes those reports providing explicitly more space for government views, and supporting 'war on terrorism' policies of the Bush Administration. The 'negative' category includes those reports containing negative judgments about the Bush Administration's 'war on terrorism' policies. Although some reports and articles provide space for government views, these views are given as a base for criticism. The 'neutral or mixed' category includes those reports describing the issues independent from the government, containing a mix of positive and negative judgments, or neutral statements.

3.1. Limitations

This study is limited with two newspapers' reports and articles that only cover incidents in ten days. This study does not attempt to cover all incidents of course. There are many more reports in other media sources. The main drawback of the study is that it involves a single case, thus limiting some aspects of its generalizability.

4. Findings and Discussion

The following figures demonstrate empirical basis of the study. They are given in the basis of two periods. The first period refers to the dates from 15th of January to 19th of January. Second period refers to the dates from 20th of January to 24th of January. This distinction is based on the broadcast of Osama bin Laden audiotape.




Figure 1. Total media coverage on terrorism

This figure shows that newspapers include considerably more coverage on terrorism in the second period than the first period. Considering two newspapers together, there were a total of 49 reports in the first period and 77 reports in the second period [Figure-1]. This translates into nearly 5 reports a day in the first period and 8 in the second period for the newspapers. What can be inferred from the first figure?

In fact, there are two things that this figure suggests. The first one is that the news media attach considerable importance to the terrorism in both periods. Both 5 and 8 reports in a day in two newspapers seem quite a lot compared to 1980s and 1990s. “The average number of reports about terrorism on the news was four reports per week during the 1980s but this dropped to two reports per week during the 1990s” [1, P.290]. “Clearly 9/11 had a devastating impact on American perceptions of vulnerability and security. However, even the scale of the tragedy of 9/11 incidents did not put the United States in a category of high terrorist vulnerability comparable to that of many other states in the world. United States citizens have lived in the safest region in the world” [1, P.291]. This is still true considering the last situation in the United States. For instance, in Turkey alone, the conflict between the state and Kurdish Workers Party [PKK] terrorist organization caused more than 30.000 deaths since 1983 and it still goes on. In the last thirty days more than 50 people died in Turkey. This indicates the exaggeration of the problem in the US. This exaggeration has some reasons of course.

When Americans turn their attention from domestic concerns to international crises, they may lend support to the political system as the only way to address the concern. This seems especially likely when the international crisis is perceived as presenting a real threat to the nation, as in the case of 9/11[16]. Within this context, the first reason is President Bush’s intention of setting the agenda on terrorism, shaping domestic opinion and getting broad public support for counterterrorist policies such as ‘surveillance act’. President Bush, through his daily political discourse, tries to contribute and perpetuate the social construction of terrorism in the US. By using the fear of more terrorist attacks against the US and exaggerating the magnitude of the problem, the Bush Administration targets to mobilize public support for the campaign against terrorism which possibly soar his ratings [1].

Moreover, terrorism and other kinds of crimes is media commodity that sells well than any other media product. In other words, it attracts more viewers than anything else which means greater newspaper and magazine circulation, and consequently, larger advertising fees [8]. The media attention on an alleged terror plot to blow up commercial airliners flying from Britain to the US supports this idea. Television stations interrupted regular programming for live coverage of the incident and news

media placed the incident to the front page for a long time. As stated in the last paragraph, both Bush and Blair governments contributed to this process with their mainly PR efforts and used this opportunity to shape the public opinion and get support for the terror policies. The approval rates of the President Bush increased in the following days. The things what he tried to do in the audiotape is not different from this case.

Table 1. Distribution of media coverage on terrorism

	Osama Audiotape	War on Terrorism	Surveillance Act	Israel/ Palestine Conflict	Iran Nuclear Crisis	Air Strike to Al Qaeda	Iraq	Others
First Period	0	9	9	6	3	7	9	6
Second Period	8	16	14	9	5	5	14	6

The second thing is the considerable difference between two periods. As stated earlier, there were a total of 49 reports in the first period and 77 reports in the second period. If the reports about the release of Osama bin Laden audiotape are not counted, it becomes 49 reports in the first period and 69 reports in the second period which still indicates a considerable difference between two periods [Table-1].

The question of which topics are addressed in news coverage is an important indicator which may contribute to explain the difference between two periods. Table 2 shows the number of key themes in this period. There were 7 key themes in this period. These themes were Iraq debate, Israel/Palestine conflict, surveillance program, Osama bin Laden audiotape, air strike to Al Qaeda, Iran debate, and war on terrorism.

Firstly, there were eight reports in two newspapers regarding the audiotape in the second period [Table- 2]. There was also considerable increase on ‘surveillance act’, ‘war on terrorism’ and ‘Iraq’ reports in the second period. The important question is what has triggered the increase on these issues. There was an incident at that time that may affect the difference other than the audiotape. This one was Congressional hearings on surveillance program expected to begin in February, 2006.

The debate over the legality of surveillance program and expectation of Congressional hearing in the near future on this issue looks like the main factor affecting the difference. This debate also increased the reports on ‘war on terrorism’ and ‘Iraq’. There were more reports about terror suspects, security measurement, the balance between civil liberties and security, terror policies and terror problem in the Iraq in the second period which can be thought as ‘Contagious Effect’ of surveillance program debates. Moreover, while the Bush Administration was trying to use Al Qaeda threat to justify the surveillance program, the release of Osama bin Laden audiotape which threats for further attacks contributed to this increase.

The following quotations from President Bush support this view. He presents surveillance program as a necessity for security and protection of American’s lives in

his speech as follows, “We’re going to stay on the offense in the war against terror. We’ll hunt down the enemies in Afghanistan and Iraq and elsewhere. We’ll continue our terrorist surveillance program against al Qaeda. Congress must reauthorize the Patriot Act so that our law enforcement and intelligence and homeland security officers have the tools they need to route the terrorists who could be planning and plotting within our borders” [14]. In another speech, he says as follows “Now, I understand there’s some in America who say, well, this can’t be true there are still people willing to attack. All I would ask them to do is listen to the words of Osama bin Laden and take him seriously” [5]. “In the weeks following September the 11th, I authorized a terrorist surveillance program to detect and intercept al Qaeda communications involving someone here in the United States” [5].

Table 2. Frequency of Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden terms

	Al Qaeda Term	Osama bin Laden Term
First Period	81	13
Second Period	79	92

Table 3. Frequency of reports which include Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda

	The number of reports including these terms	Total number of reports
First Period	19	49
Second Period	22	77

Table -3 gives an idea about the media attention to Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden in the newspapers. Table- 4 demonstrates that some other reports in this period are connected to Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden audiotape. The Bush Administration and officers supporting ‘surveillance act’ used these terms repeatedly to support their arguments in the newspapers and connected the ‘surveillance act’ and some other issues with Al Qaeda.

Terrorists seek to use the media to convey their message, as exemplified by Laden’s ability to transmit his messages via al Jazeera to West and US media. “The success of a terrorist operation depends almost entirely on the amount of publicity it receives. Even though terrorists create televised events, communications specialist argues that the ability to shape reporting remains the province of the government. In other words, terrorists initiate routine or spectacular cases of political violence, but once this catalyst is launched, the communication and framing of the meaning of the events is largely out of their hands. The role of the media is central for the impact of these events upon the general public. The obvious unanswered question is whether the images and tape of a terrorist serves to heighten public fear and anxiety, in line with terrorist objectives or the US government objectives” [1, P.9].

Osama bin Laden’s tape may affect the people in Muslim countries, but it is less likely to affect the people in America. It is always stated that Osama bin Laden aims to reach and give messages to his audiences in Muslim countries rather than West and the US citizens. This means that the release of the audiotape in the US news media does not contribute to the Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. In contrast, it is being used as a propaganda tool by the Bush Administration which gives opportunity to remind terror threat. With his own words “I want to assure you and our fellow Americans I’m not going to put it in the past. The threat to the United States is forefront in my mind”[5]. President Bush has been under intense pressure, accused of breaking laws and diminishing civil liberties in pursuit of terror suspects. His defense has been that America is a nation at war. As a result, Osama Bin Laden’s threats to launch new attacks on the US highly contributed to the idea of underlining this argument.

5. The Tone of the Media Coverage

As mentioned earlier, the situation after 9/11 allowed the Bush administration to direct foreign policy and domestic policy in accordance with its aims and media contributed to this process at the beginning. The war in Iraq was the beginning of critical analysis of policy decisions of the Bush Administration. The Bush Administration is still eager to use the discourse of 9/11. For this purpose, President Bush uses every opportunity to attach attention to terrorism threat. However, his success considerably depends on the reaction of the news media to his discourse. That’s why, the following table is essential to interpret this period.

Table 4. The tone of the media coverage

	Neutral / Both	Positive	Negative
First Period [N 49]	21 [43 %]	6 [14 %]	21 [43 %]
Second Period [N 77]	45 [58 %]	9 [12 %]	23 [30 %]

The number of the reports supporting the policies of the Bush Administration on terrorism was very few in both periods. The number of reports mainly criticizing the policies of the Bush Administration on terrorism was considerably more than the positive reports in both periods. Overall, the news media portrayed the Bush Administration’s ‘war on terrorism’ in a negative way.

The audiotape of Osama bin Laden did not change the negative tone to positive in the second period. In spite of the decrease in the percentage of negative reports in the second period, this did not lead to any increase in the percentage of positive reports. Therefore, there was not considerable difference between two periods. This situation shows that the audiotape attracted considerable media attention, but had not any or had little impact on the media approach to the terrorism.

The selected reports from the newspapers show how main topics were discussed in this period. One of the main topics was ‘surveillance act’. While the Bush Administration was emphasizing its necessity, the opponents emphasized the legality of

the program and civil rights, President Bush has characterized the eavesdropping program as a “vital tool” against terrorism; Vice President Dick Cheney has said it has saved “thousands of lives” [2] and defended that it is “critical to the national security of the United States” [2]. The arguments emphasized by the Bush Administration did not get much support in the news media; “The White House has offered steadily weaker arguments to defend the decision to eavesdrop on Americans’ telephone calls and e-mail without getting warrants. One argument is that the spying produced unique and highly valuable information. The Vice President Dick Cheney, who never shrinks from trying to prey on Americans’ deepest fears, said that the spying had saved “thousands of lives” and could have thwarted the 9/11 attacks had it existed then” [2]. In another example; “In times of extreme fear, American leaders have sometimes scrapped civil liberties in the name of civil protection. It’s only later that the country can see that the choice was a false one and that citizens’ rights were sacrificed to carry out extreme measures that were at best useless and at worst counterproductive” [2]

The reports about ‘war on terrorism’ was mostly critical as follows, “The Bush Administration has a strategy of abusing terrorism suspects during interrogations, Human Rights Watch contended yesterday in its annual report on the treatment of people in more than 70 countries” [15]. Similarly, the policies followed by the Bush Administration to prevent terrorism were not supported as it was after 9/11, “You can be arrested and not charged. You can be arrested and have no right to counsel” said Belafonte. Belafonte acknowledged that the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks demanded a reaction by the United States, but said the policies of the Bush Administration were not the right response” [15]. There were also some positive reports which include the ideas of Republicans like White House Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove as follows, “Republicans have a post-9/11 worldview and many Democrats have a pre-9/11 worldview. That doesn’t make them unpatriotic -- not at all. But it does make them wrong deeply and profoundly and consistently wrong.” [15].

The reports about the audiotape were mostly represented by non-judgmental or neutral statements. The main point in these reports was the message of the audiotape and its content. A report from the New York Times stated, “American officials said the release might have been timed to assure his followers that Mr. bin Laden was alive and well days after an American bombing of a house in a Pakistani village where senior Qaeda officials were said to have been killed” [2]. In another report, the content of the audiotape was analyzed, “Part posture and partly sincere, Mr. bin Laden’s offer of a hudna reinforces a theme repeated time and again in his speeches, Professor Haykel said: as the defender of Islam, he can reciprocate in offering violence or peace” [2]. Washington Post in a report compared this audiotape with another one which was released before, “It is not the first time bin Laden has offered a truce. In April 2004, in a videotape released a few weeks after train bombings killed 191 people in Madrid, he promised European nations that al Qaeda would stop operations against any state which vows to stop attacking Muslims or interfere in their affairs” [15]. The positive ones include reports asserting the seriousness of the threat and giving support ‘war on terrorism’.

The reports about ‘Iraq’ were about the bombings, insurgents, and political improvements in the region. The reports on ‘Palestine/Israel conflict’ mostly focused on the elections, political issues in the region and terror connection of Fatah. The reports on ‘Iran’ mostly focused on nuclear weapon crisis between Iran and the US. Lastly, the reports about ‘air strike to Al Qaeda’ included the civilian casualties, the protests in Pakistan, the speculation about the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri. The reports

in these groups were mostly presented in a balanced manner or by non-judgmental or neutral statements.

If we evaluate all the reports, it can be concluded that the practices of 9/11 do not have the force they had once and tone of the media coverage about Bush Administration's terror policies is mostly negative. However, it is hard to say that his 'war on terrorism' frame is not effective at all. In spite of negative presentation of the 'surveillance act' on the news media, "A Washington Post-ABC News Poll showed that 51 percent of respondents felt that in the fight against terror, it's fine for the government to engage in the warrantless wiretapping of telephone calls and e-mail" [2]. It is even higher than the approval rates of the President Bush which can be another important topic to study.

Conclusion

This study reveals that the audiotape released by Osama bin Laden has more or less the power to set the agenda in the US in the fifth year of 9/11. In the same direction, the media is still paying considerable attention to the terrorism issues. The most popular themes on the media are connected to the terrorism in a way as in the example of 'surveillance act', Iran nuclear crisis, the situation in Iraq, Palestine/Israel conflict. This situation results in the increase of terrorism reports in the news media. The politicians, mostly the members of the Bush Administration, who want to dominate the debate on an issue, try to link it with terrorism. They exaggerate terrorism threat and use the fear of terrorism inherited from 9/11 to justify the policies, maintain the control on these issues and shape public opinion in accordance with their objectives. For instance, The Bush Administration clearly used terror threat to rally support for measures such as 'surveillance act' which is called as 'Patriot Act' by them selves. At this point, the audiotapes released by Osama bin Laden provided a strong base to defend and justify these policies. However, this time, it looks like it did not work as it had worked before.

The analysis of the media approach in this period reveals that the news media mostly has not supported 'war on terrorism' policies in this period although the audiotape which threatens to the United States. In contrast to period before the war in Iraq, the news media presented the critical analysis of policy decisions of the Bush Administration. This is consistent with President Bush's lowest approval rates in that period. Osama bin Laden audiotape which was a useful tool before 2004 election for getting support seems not to have considerable effect on the media approach, and possibly on the public perception. As it is stated by Democrats, the invocations of 9/11 and the policies under the banner of 'war on terrorism' do not have the force they once had. The news media did not take leading role in this process, but at least contributed to this new approach.

Considering the results of 'war on terrorism' until now, it can be told that these policies are not the right way to respond terrorism. The 'war on terrorism', far from making the world a safer place, it has deepened divisions among people of different origins and religions, resulting in more conflict. Even in the US some of the policies on how suspects will be treated have led to debates at all levels. On the foreign policy arena, there is increasing concern that the US will be able to use the 'war on terrorism' to pursue aggressive policies. Within this context, these policies are getting more suspicion in international arena and US has been losing its support in foreign public even in allies. These policies also may contribute the recruitment of new people to Al

Qaeda and increase popularity of this terror organization. The US government should decide what is reasonable for security and attach more importance to the diplomatic efforts to solve international terrorism. I think that the world would be safer now, if the Bush Administration had clearly emphasized and followed the policies based on confidence, truth, intelligent, and diplomacy.

Moreover, media should be more careful in its relationship with the government. The dependence of official sources was apparent during the war against Iraq, when the US government sought to associate Saddam Hussein with al-Qaeda in order to justify war in Iraq. Therefore, media should not fall in to the same traps and determine its own agenda independent from the official sources and should not forget its 'watchdog role'. If media staff had been more critical and suspicious of the evidences before the war in Iraq, it would have been possible to stop it. "It's only when journalists understand the role they play in this propaganda, it's only when they realize they can't be both independent, honest journalists and agents of power that things will begin to change" [17].

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Creating a Data Archive to Facilitate Research on Understanding and Responding to Terrorism

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Abstract. The Terrorism Data Resource Center (TDRC) is an initiative of the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data at the University of Michigan's Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). The TDRC will archive and distribute data collected by government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and researchers about the nature of intra- (domestic) and international terrorism incidents, organizations, perpetrators, and victims; governmental and nongovernmental responses to terror, including primary, secondary, and tertiary interventions; and, citizen's attitudes towards terrorism, terror incidents and the response to terror. It will also organize and streamline access to extant research and administrative data from across the world that are relevant to study of terrorism and the response to terrorism for descriptive and scientific analysis by academics and researchers. The TDRC is jointly managed by researchers at The University of Michigan and Michigan State University, and supported through a cooperative agreement with the National Institute of Justice, the research, development, and evaluation agency of the United States Department of Justice. This paper describes the rationale and organizing concepts for the TDRC.

Keywords. The Terrorism Data Resource Center (TDRC), terrorism achieve, improving accountability and transparency

Introduction

Archiving of social science data began in the United States in the early 1960s and several years later, spread to the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Over the past 35 years, the numbers, sizes, and types have grown dramatically in the U.S. and abroad, and today these archives are critical "building blocks in an infrastructure for empirical social sciences" [1]. Among the oldest and largest digital social science data archive is the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). It was established in 1962 to deliver social science data to university-based researchers. A center within the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, ICPSR is a

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membership-based organization, with over 500 member colleges, universities, foundations, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and government agencies located throughout the world [2]. ICPSR's *General Archive* preserves and distributes data from the traditional social sciences such as political science, sociology and demography. ICPSR also hosts six topical archives that focus on data gathered from researchers addressing issues in child care, education, aging, substance use, mental health, and criminal justice and criminology [2]. Various agencies across the U.S. federal government support these topical archives, such as the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, and the Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, who jointly sponsor the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data [3].

The core mission of ICPSR's data archives, and the many other science data archives as well, is to preserve research and administrative data and to facilitate analysis of these data by distributing them in useable formats, creating finding aids (e.g., metadata), providing user support, and delivering educational programs. Many of the government agencies and universities who partner with ICPSR as well as other data archives do so for several reasons including: (1) providing a capacity to meet the academic standard of open, scientific inquiry; (2) encouraging diversity of analysis and opinion through reproduction and extension of an original investigator's work; (3) promoting the efficient use of research resources by encouraging additional research based on existing data, for example to test new or alternative hypotheses, or use methods of analysis not envisioned by, or available to the original investigator; (4) supporting studies to improve data collection methods and measurement; (5) facilitating the education of new researchers; and, (6) assisting in the creation of new datasets by combining data from multiple sources [4–7]. Accordingly, the various investments made to share micro-level research data benefit both the research community and the larger society.

1. Why Is There a Need for an Archive That Focuses on Terrorism?

While ICPSR's archives hold thousands of studies spanning many topics, it was not until recently that researchers at ICPSR or anywhere else have given much thought to facilitating the sharing of research and administrative data to help policymakers and others understand terrorism.¹ Several new "terrorism" research centers and web-based organizations have begun distributing terrorism information (a number of whom have sponsored the NATO terrorism research workshop), but none appears to systematically share research data with others or have the infrastructure to preserve research materials. While a few scholars have studied terrorism for sometime, it was not until the events of September 11, 2001 that the dearth of scientific research in this area had surfaced, and a call for an emphasis on empirical-based terrorism related research was issued [8–10]. There are now several noteworthy studies that provide evidence of the extent of terrorism as well as support the position that studying terrorism can indeed be a significant scientific endeavor. For instance, LaFree, Dugan, Fogg and Scott's [11]. *Building a Global Terrorism Database* documents over 67,000 terrorist events from 1970 to 1997.

¹ Exceptions to this generality include, for example, the data released by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press data archive. They distribute survey data which contain relevant public opinion questions regarding the war on terror.

Others demonstrated that the destruction caused by terrorist events is worldwide and substantial, and their impact on society is great. Scholars have likewise discussed how such events can adversely influence social frameworks by increasing fear and decreasing trust and social solidarity [12,13]. By 2005, however, there was still “almost a complete absence of high quality scientific evaluation evidence on counter-terrorism strategies” to guide prevention efforts, and [w]hat evidence there is does not indicate consistently positive results [14]. Nevertheless, we believe that this gap can be addressed by facilitating the sharing of existing research data about terrorism through a program focusing exclusively on terrorism related issues. Below we more fully articulate several reasons for building this program.

1.1. Increase Accountability and Transparency of Research Results

The first reason is to facilitate the accountability and transparency of terrorism related research. After the events of September, 2001, many U.S. federal agencies redirected resources to support intramural and external behavioral science research that focused on terrorism. As in other areas, there is a genuine need to preserve and store these data collections to protect the public’s investment and to insure their long-term preservation for future researchers. Furthermore, because the research supported by these collections is likely to lead to policies and laws, attention should be paid to the Office for Management and Budget’s requirement to make these types of data available for “original exploration and reproduction by anyone” [15]. In fact, there is likely no other field within the human sciences besides medicine and criminal justice more generally where public access to data is imperative, given the potentially widespread implications resulting from these data, such as new laws and policies that can lead to restrictions, actions and significant financial expenditures. Thus, the heightened importance connected to this area of research highlights the need for an archive that focuses on preserving and delivering these data.

1.2. Improve Basic and Applied Research

A second reason to create a terrorism-focused archive is to facilitate the growth and rigor of terrorism-related research. While research focused on terrorism (sometimes under a variety of names such as hate crimes) has existed for decades, recent events and subsequent reaction to these events has increased substantially the desire of scholars to publish in this area. The success of NATO’s Terrorism Research Workshop, along with existence of several others over the past few years, demonstrates the considerable interest among researchers and scholars from around the world. However, basic and applied research in this area has struggled to grow in both size and sophistication. In large part, this is because there is little systematically collected data available for researchers to analyze scientifically. Silke’s [16] review of terrorism research found that 80% of the published work in this area is “based either solely or primary on data gathered from books, journals, the media or other published [open access] documents.” Other scholars have noted that statistical analysis is rare in terrorism research [17]. Lum et al.’s [14] more recent systematic review for Campbell of over 14,000 terrorism articles found that only 3% were empirical – in other words, not exactly the type of data traditionally published in refereed, scholarly journals. Yet, there are two outlets,

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism² and Terrorism and Political Violence, which publish some empirical and systematic research exclusively about terrorism. Furthermore, other behavioral science journals, several of which are flagship journals for professional associations including the American Journal of Sociology, American Journal of Public Health, Criminology, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Criminology & Public Policy, British Journal of Criminology and many others³ have recently published articles about terrorism. Accordingly, there are now reputable outlets that are willing to publish strong systematic research on terrorism if researchers take the time to analyze systematically-collected data. Moreover, many of these journals are willing to publish secondary or additional analysis of existing, archival data. For instance, there are over 30,000 publications, presentations and reports based upon data disseminated by one of the ICPSR's archives.

1.3. Expansion of the Profession and Improving Teaching

A third reason to build a terrorism-focused archive is to serve the growing body of faculty and graduate students from around the world wanting to focus on terrorism related research. For example, the Department of Homeland Security has invested significant research dollars to build a research infrastructure through its Centers of Excellence Program. These Centers include multi-disciplinary university partners to conduct research related to the prevention and response to various types of terrorism threats (e.g., biological, agricultural, nuclear, etc.). Researchers affiliated with the Centers of Excellence are already contributing valuable datasets to the NACJD archive, and other scholars have used data available in this archive to publish important scholarly work. For example, Gary LaFree, the Director of the Center of Excellence for Behavioral Social Research on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, recently contributed his open source database on Global Terrorist Events to the ICPSR and thus it is an important asset included in the TDRC. This recent growth and concern about terrorism, particularly among the faculty ranks, has likely occurred because many academic institutions across the United States and beyond have redesigned or added an aspect to their strategic plan that emphasizes the hiring of researchers involved in terrorism related scholarship. Michigan State University, for instance, has added international risk assessment to their strategic vision, which they use to guide their distribution of resources around the University to build a multi-disciplinary infrastructure in a particular area. Many of the new positions are targeted at junior faculty, most just finishing their degrees and who are just beginning the tenure process. Most if not all of these new faculty will immediately need to produce refereed scholarship; and therefore, they do not have the luxury of time that is necessary to develop, fund, and implement a research program that is reliant on their primary data collection efforts. Along with new faculty, there is a growing cadre of graduate students interested in many aspects of terrorism research who also need immediate access to data to com-

² Studies in Conflict and Terrorism aims to cast light not only on traditional sources of national and sub-national conflict but also on the range of new and emerging security issues. The journal publishes theoretical and empirical studies that contribute to a better understanding of the causes of these conflicts, their escalation, and the measures required to achieve their resolution.

³ Some other referred journals publishing terrorism research include Risk Management: An International Journal, Crime and Justice International, Journal of Drug Issues, Journal of Financial Crime, Theoretical Criminology, European Journal of Criminology, Journal of Security Administration, Trends in Organized Crime, and European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research.

plete their thesis and dissertations. We know from our experience working with the students from the Turkish National Police that finding usable data for their master's thesis and doctoral dissertations has been a very challenging ordeal. In fact, this experience led us to propose the idea of creating this terrorism focused archive to the National Institute of Justice.

2. Creating the Archive of Terrorism Data and Research

One of the first tasks for creating a topical or focused data center is to define or operationalize the term or terms used to label the archive. In our situation, we needed to define terrorism to help us choose which data collections fall under or contain terrorism information. There are many competing definitions of terrorism and thus focusing on one is not simple, although we could take the approach that Associate Justice Potter Stewart of the U.S. Supreme Court took when he was asked to define what constitutes obscene pornography. His answer was, "I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so ... but I know it when I see it." In other words, pornography is recognized but is often too difficult to define [18]. The same can also be said about defining terrorism [19]. However, the "you know it when you see it" approach is not typically sufficient for research, as many of us would advise our students during the course of their graduate careers. Nevertheless, Gary King [20], the distinguished Harvard scientist, notes that this "sound" advice can lead to further rather than fewer problems. First, some of the more highly concrete items capturing concepts may produce reliable measurements that are not any more valid. Second, highly concrete measurements are often not interpreted in the same way in different parts of the world.

Clearly, this is the situation that others and we are faced with when attempting to define terrorism. There are important conceptual, ideological, and political dilemmas that must be considered when attempting to define terrorism, and the difficulties in defining terrorism has led to the application of many different definitions when writing about terrorism. For instance, in the late 1980s Alex Schmid located at least 109 definitions of terrorism [21], most emphasizing something about goals, purposes, targets, or methods [22]. Since then many other definitions have been added [23] and the debate over which, if any, of these is acceptable will likely go on for the foreseeable future. A Google search of the phrase "defining terrorism" conducted at the beginning of September 2006 found 97,700 pages. In fact, many might argue that defining terrorism is the longest and most highly contentious debate among terrorism researchers and governments. We immediately confronted this contention when presenting the idea of creating a terrorism archive to ICPSR's Council of Scholars. The debate over the scholarly nature and political rationale for the center went for several hours among ten notable scholars about whether we should or could adequately implement the archive. Shortly into the debate we were asked by several council members how were we going to address the "one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter" paradox, a question which had been asked elsewhere as well. While this and similar questions challenged our proposal, the council ultimately supported the idea under the guise of our "academic freedoms" and not because of the intellectual necessity of the project. We faced similar arguments from some colleagues when we applied in our University's Institutional Review Board when we applied to collect primary data documented domestic terrorist incidents.

In these and in other similar situations we have argued that defining terrorism will also be difficult. First, the study of terrorism is interdisciplinary and therefore there are widely different interpretations of the appropriate boundaries of terrorism activities. This point intersects with the accepted conclusion that terrorism is defined only through a heavily contested social construction process [13,24]. Second, terrorism is a global concern, but governments, in particular, selectively apply “their definition.” That is, terrorism is a political concept: “it is also ineluctably about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change” [25]. Third, activities that certainly would be of interest to the archive are often not defined as terrorism per se because of the statutory provisions related to the law of terrorism. Few offenders are specifically charged with terrorism—most of these cases are pursued using a variety of “ordinary” crime statutes. Such problems are exacerbated at the global level. Fourth, the meaning of terrorism has changed frequently over time [25].

Thus, like others before us, we started this effort in a quagmire, and have just started to dig ourselves out of this difficult situation. At this time we agree with Laqueur [26] when he stated, “a comprehensive definition of terrorism does not exist ... [but] to argue that terrorism cannot be studied without such a definition is manifestly absurd.” Since researchers can rarely agree on a definition of terrorism, we were concerned that including only studies that fit some “definition” would exclude what others might deem relevant. It certainly would open the TDRC to criticism which seemed unnecessary considering the purpose and objective of the archive. In other words, we want to make as many relevant data resources available to scholars as possible.

Accordingly, we did not formulate a definition of terrorism and will not likely do so in the future; instead, we started building the archive by constructing a list of keywords. The list now has 57 words and phrases, including biological warfare, chemical attack, asset protection, extremists/extremism, preparedness, and homeland security. The list also includes many specific terrorism/terrorist keywords such as bio-terrorism, counterterrorism, and ecoterrorism. The use of keywords has not however entirely solved the problem because we are also challenged by the decisions regarding which keywords or phrases are appropriate for the list. Is for example the phrase “War in Iraq” appropriate? Based upon public opinion polls [27] and the U.S. Government’s policies as of 2006, there is support for adding it to the list as well as arguments by others for not including it. Moreover, we believe that there are many outside the United States who would argue that the phrase belongs among our keywords, although their positions would not necessarily be justified by the same reasons that many in the U.S. would use. Thus, our approach to addressing this debate is to avoid taking sides by including the “continuous phases” almost universally, regardless of their justification, because we want this archive to facilitate terrorism related research rather than to build barriers around data.

Furthermore, we believe the range of this archive will be quite exhaustive and inclusive. We expect that it will contain data regarding both national (U.S.) and international data about terrorism (however defined) perpetrated by those within and external to a nation (e.g., domestic vs. international origins). We similarly expect to house collections that document incidents, organizations (hate groups, terror groups), offenders, victims, and the response and prevention of these incidents and organization. Thus, we are taking an approach akin to the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to pornography, “we will know whether not to include it when we see it.” This leads of course to an oppos-




Figure 1. Sources of Data for the Terrorism Data Resource Center.

ing question of what data we are not prepared place in this Archive. Again, it is not easy for us to systematically articulate an exclusionary rule but we have for example taken the position that we are not including data that is somehow focused on violence against women [VAW] even though some have argued that it is a form of terrorism (e.g., “Partner violence is terrorism against women”; [28]). While there are arguments to include all or some of this research, we have chosen to use a practical reason for not including VAW research: we are already planning to develop a VAW Data Resource Program at the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data that will make these data widely available as well.

3. Identify Existing Studies, Acquiring New Studies, and Improving Access

3.1. Selecting Studies

Figure 1 depicts the sources of data we will use to populate the archive. Our first task, which we began in August 2006, is to review systematically the ICPSR data archives to identify exiting collections that are appropriate for the TDRC. To accomplish this task we are using our “terrorism” keywords to search ICPSR’s holdings to build a listing of possible studies. We expect to identify quite a few studies that can be used to understand terrorism, both from our existing large collection of ongoing national surveys as

well as the growing body of administrative record databases archived by a variety of our topical areas. Of particular interest are those time series collections that measure public opinion about terrorism and the response to terror. These extended time series could allow users to track changes in many outcomes, such as the nation's overall "fear of terrorism." In addition, there are specialized data collections that are relevant to the study of hate crimes including the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR)'s hate crime reporting database. We believe that many of these specialized collections include data of substantial historical and contemporary importance.

We will create a list of candidates that will permit us to drill/hyperlink down to their metadata to identify more appropriate studies from the entire ICPSR collection. This table will provide information about the characteristics of the targeted studies, which we will then use to rank the appropriateness of each study. Our final candidate study list will then be "hand" selected by us to identify those studies that fit our "we will know whether not to include it when we see it" standard. For instance, our initial sweep of studies using the keyword "intelligence" identified many studies that measured children's IQ rather than containing information about national "intelligence" activities. These IQ studies will not be included because they do not fit our "look and feel" standard.

Besides identifying existing studies offered by the ICPSR's archives, we will improve finding aides, increase the information provided about selected collections, categorize and organize studies, and upgrade access to existing data through reprocessing parts of the collection. The first priority will be to reprocess or retrofit all of the selected studies with appropriate "setup" files and investigate the quality of their metadata. The retrofitting will create *SPSS*, *SAS*, and *Stata* formatted system files and searchable PDF structured codebooks with frequency counts. The second task will be to prioritize those studies for addition to our online data analysis system. Our online-data-analysis-system is a fully functional web-based statistical analysis application that provides users direct access to our data without having to download a study to their desktop or having access to costly statistical software. Third, for selected studies, we will add the entire question text to the documentation (typically, we only provide the "short" variable labels). Finally, we will select a few studies to highlight with *Data Resource Guides*, a structure similar to those available at the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data⁴. These selected studies will likely be chosen from among the series collections to provide additional assistance to users who are making decisions about whether or how the studies can be concatenated across years or aggregated by geography.

3.2. Identification of Non-Archived Data Collections

In addition to identifying existing studies within ICPSR, we are making a substantial effort to identify other research-related data collections from throughout the world. We are doing this search so that we can provide an online search catalogue or registry of data collections regardless of whether or not they are distributed by an archive within ICPSR. The Library of Congress has created a similar system called the *National Union Catalog of Manuscripts Collections*, which allows users to locate manuscripts across many archival repositories. But rather than just locate data distributed by other

⁴ The Terrorism Data Resource Center (TDRC) see www.icpsr.umich.edu/nacjd.

archives, we envision that our system will codify all data that is used in any published research about terrorism.

Like trying to build a database to conduct a meta-analysis, we will employ various additional strategies to identify relevant data. First, we will review and then update the inventory of databases summarized in a report produced by the Library of Congress [29]. Second, we plan to locate additional data in a fashion similar to the one we used to locate data collections within ICPSR (i.e., develop a linked list of collections using our terrorism key words). But instead of searching our metadata, we will search the metadata of published research abstracts (e.g., the National Criminal Justice Reference Services, Criminal Justice Abstracts, etc.). Third, beyond the abstracts, we also plan to search various federal grant databases looking for sponsored projects that may have collected terrorism-related data. For example, the Community of Science web resource includes over 22,000 records on awards and grant opportunities from across the world. We will run each of our keywords through its searchable database, and document all projects that potentially include data. After we locate and document these studies, we plan, if funding permits, to invite the researchers to archive their data at TDRC if they are not already required to do so by their granting agency. For instance, the National Institute of Justice already requires and supports the archiving of their sponsored research data at the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data. Nevertheless, regardless of the source of the data or the researcher's willingness to have us archive their data, we will attempt to build a metadata record about each data collection similar to the metadata that we create for our existing data collections within ICPSR. We plan to add a URL to the metadata record if the data collection is available on another website or the researcher's contact information if the URL is not available. We will then add these metadata records to the existing TDRC metadata system so that users can seamlessly search and locate all relevant data.⁵ Fourth, we will search the websites of organizations that specifically conduct terrorism research for possible data (e.g., Center for Public Health and Disaster (UCLA), Centers for Public Health Preparedness (Center for Disease Control), Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (University of Saint Andrews), Center for Peace and Security (Georgetown University), and the World Public Opinion Organization), and organizations with a policy-related interest in terrorism (e.g., Southern Poverty Law Center, Anti-Defamation League). Finally, we will search published research on terrorism to identify other sources that might not have been discovered from any of the strategies above.

3.3. Improving Access

Besides upgrading individual studies, we will also improve access to these studies by creating selection menu on the front page that will allow users to move directly from subheading to appropriate studies. This will expedite the search procedure for those

⁵ Another project at ICPSR called Data-PASS, is conducting a similar exercise, but is only focused on social science collections. The goal of this project is to ensure the long-term preservation of our holdings and of materials that ICPSR has not yet collected. Researchers at ICPSR are identifying, acquiring and preserve data at-risk of permanent loss to the research community. The project is supported by an award from the Library of Congress through its National Digital Information Infrastructure and Preservation Program (NDIIPP), and involves partnerships with the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut, the Howard W. Odum Institute at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, the Henry A. Murray Research Archive, a member of the Institute for Quantitative Social Science at Harvard University, the National Archives and Records Administration, and the Harvard-MIT Data Center, also a member of the Institute for Quantitative Social Science at Harvard University.

individuals who may not know their primary search destination. Second, we will work with ICPSR librarians to develop an expanded controlled search vocabulary by focusing on the study descriptions that fall within the TDRC. The keyword search will also be expanded to help users develop better search strategies. Finally, we will add a variable level search feature to the search engine. This feature will search the question text and variable and value labels for variables across all of TDRC that are available for online analysis. Users can search for any term in a question or label; they will have a results page returned with a list of matching variables, and a link to the study descriptions. The users can also see a list of variable name and variable label for each variable in the particular data collection that contains their search term, and when they click on a variable label, they will be taken to the online data analysis codebook for that study. This will provide them with the question text for the variable of interest as well as frequencies and some descriptive statistics.

4. The Web Portal and Its Feature

This data driven environment will highlight the resources of TDRC, make it easier to use them, and entice users into the archive in a systematic way. Thus, the emphasis for the TDRC both on the forthcoming website and in the underlying applications will be to create “lures” – that is, features that bring users to the TDRC site and on to interesting data collections. It is our hope that this data archive portal will provide students, educators, and researchers with access to the data in a systematic way so they can quickly identify and begin investigating many of the emerging research topics.

The design and structure of the impending website will be consistent with our goal of improving access and use of the ICPSR collection for the study of issues related to terrorism. Several of the website features are under development and still require investment from ICPSR’s web development staff before they are released. First, our subject matter menu will be central to the website. This will expedite data searches. Second, we plan to have rotating panels that are designed to entice users to the archive. The first panel called “*Featured Analysis*” will include a table or chart with a brief text description that illustrates interesting analyses that can be conducted using an ATAR study. For instance, we may develop a trend analysis of attitudes regarding some aspect of the “war on terror.” It will also include links to the data file as part of the entry. The second panel labeled “*Featured Data Set*” will illustrate new or interesting data files in collection. We hope to develop a number of vignettes based on substantive research in the subject areas that will rotate through the website randomly. If the TDRC acquires permanent staff, they will continue to update and archive these features as well as monitor new acquisitions to add to the rotating samples.

5. Future Plans

The goal of this project is clear and the work plan has begun in earnest. The first task, after we finalize the study selection, will be to prioritize the reprocessing tasks. For this task, we will seek input from ICPSR and ISR staff as to the archival content and form of the TDRC. The second task, which overlaps the first, is to begin the process of identifying non-archived data collections. We have already begun identifying relevant studies cited by the National Criminal Justice Reference Service and compiled an addi-

tional list of 50 databases used in terrorism publications. We will also search for other databases cited in other scholarly publications using the keywords in our list, and have begun the process of examining the materials presented in the Community of Science. The third task will be to develop our featured analysis and featured data set modules. Fourth, we will build web content including the page structures and links as well as code generator and instructional module. Finally, we will develop materials to “market” the archive more broadly. This will include promotional materials such as brochures and informational packets. Staff of the TDRC will attend the major conferences including the American Society of Criminology, American Sociological Association, American Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, and American Political Science Association, in coming years and plan presentation for the 2007 Istanbul Conference on Democracy and Global Security and the 2007 meetings of the International Association for Social Science Information Service Technology. Additionally we will also investigate training and internship opportunities. We will develop presentation materials for college and university visitations, and target the Centers of Excellence to promote the archive.

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Public Access to Government Information as a Basic Human Right: Turkish National Police Digital Repository

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Abstract. This paper presents an overview of a need for an exploratory research project to identify, describe, and investigate the applicability of the digital repository approach to disseminate intellectual output of the Turkish National Police. Governments are established to serve the people, and therefore, the information, - public information - held by governments is owned by the people. Governments have an obligation to make information equitably and conveniently accessible to the public. Failure of the state in providing access to information or state suppression of information can lead to human rights violations. The right to information is fundamental to the realization of basic human rights as well as effective democracy, which requires informed participation by all. Turkey has approved and passed major democratic reforms to the law since 2003 aiming at improving country's human rights records and meeting European Union standards. One of these major reforms was the Right to Information Act permitting public to access information held by public institutions.

Keywords. Public access to government information, human rights, Turkish National Police.

Introduction

Information held by government agencies is usually more easily acquired and available to the public than privately held information. Most of the developed and developing nations enacted laws (e.g., Freedom of Information Act in the U.S.) to ensure public access to information held by government agencies. The term of *public information* can be described as information held by governments which is not restricted from public disclosure because of national security matters, various laws, or trade secrets etc. Information generated by all levels of any nation's government is often regarded as a "strategic national asset" [1]. This paper discusses public access to information held by the government, specifically the law enforcement agency in Turkey, as a basic human right.

1. Turkish National Police

Turkish National Police (TNP) embodies 13,945 ranking officers and over 2000 of those officers hold at least a graduate degree in various fields including criminal justice, sociology, and public administration, and over 200 of those officers hold Ph.D. degree.

With the advent of the Internet and specifically the World Wide Web (WWW) application, means of accessing data and information have changed forever. As computer technologies become widely available and accessible, the information generated in digital medium grew. TNP's Website provides an online front for the agency but it is oriented towards providing services (e.g., passport, driver's license, or car registration) other than providing access to public information held by the agency. TNP's information potential varies from historical documents to most current crime statistics, from local matters to nationwide subjects, social issues, and scholarly articles and reports published by TNP officers in national and international journals, for example. First of all, the TNP has archives that go back to Ottoman Empire era which is not available online and not known by the public. Second, TNP is one of the most organized police organizations in the world with their educational institutions, training facilities, bilateral and multilateral cooperation with other countries, covering the whole urban geography of Turkey. Simple crime statistics alone are very important. Moreover, the TNP is holding information about associations, foundations, political parties, public demonstrations and so on. All those information are so important to be used in policy development to better serve the citizens. Currently, there is no organized and structured means to preserve, organize, disseminate, and access public information of the TNP unless a right to information petition is filed for specific information or document(s) or it is available through TNP's website.

Even though Turkey has passed a Right to Information Act in 2003 and it went into effect in 2004, at the time of writing of this paper, TNP along with other government institutions were not able to fully comply with requirements of the law in terms of dissemination of public information without a petition. However TNP's website provides a venue to disseminate some part of intellectual output of the agency, such information is not easily accessible and findable because of lack of standards (e.g., metadata) and policies (e.g., preservation, dissemination). In addition, some documents made available on the website one day, but may be taken down and vanish the next day.

This study addresses the need for a digital platform to preserve, organize, and disseminate public information held by the agency so that the TNP will be able to fully comply with the law in addition to responding paper-based Right to Information petitions. Design and implementation of such a technical platform should conform to international (e.g., ISO 15489-1, ISO/TR 15489-2, Dublin Core Metadata Initiative) and national standards (e.g. Electronic Document Management v.2.0) to improve interoperability. Strict and clear policies need to be implemented to let public exploit intellectual output of the agency while regarding national security, privacy, and confidentiality concerns.

2. Access to Information

Access to accurate, reliable information is a crucial element to make knowledgeable and informed decisions. Knowledgeable and informed decisions are vital to protect the individual, as well as his political and social identity. Even economic capacity of individual depends on the information he needs. The difference between citizen and subject stems from the ability to reach required information to realize the capabilities of one [2]. A citizen is owner of the means, while the subject has them if they are provided as privileges. While people are called citizens in democratic societies, they are loyal subjects in authoritarian regimes. United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolution in 1946 stated

“Freedom of Information is a fundamental human right and the touchstone for all freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.” UN General Assembly in 1990 resolution is brought concrete definitions how to realize and adapt right to information in daily life. UN General Assembly resolved “... activities to improve public knowledge in the field of human rights are essential to the fulfillment of the purposes of the United Nations set out in the Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations and that carefully designed programmes of teaching, education and information are essential to the achievement of lasting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, ... Recognizing the catalytic effect of initiatives of the United Nations on national and regional public information activities in the field of human rights” [3].

Same resolution also states the need to carefully design in clear and accessible form of those information materials on human rights which would be tailored in accordance with the national and regional requirements and circumstances. The document clearly addresses to consider specific target audiences to effectively disseminate the information [3].

Right to information is important to realize all other human rights and fundamental freedoms and it is a *sine qua non* to good governance. Hence, it is an essential tool for democratic functioning. Since burden to protect and provide basic human rights and fundamental freedoms is responsibility of the state, providing the means to reach required information should be arranged accordingly [2]. The right to information is a safeguard against corruption [4].

Most nations do not consider public access to government information as basic human right. Some consider public access as a privilege. Some follows policies and laws in opposite direction. There are around 68 countries in the world with a right to information legislation [5].

“It is apparent that a legislation to provide right to information is not sufficient to let citizens enjoy it. The essential element is to provide necessary means to access government information and educate and train citizen to improve their information literacy skills. Today, widespread use of the Internet and revolutionary developments in information technologies (IT) made design and implementation of technical infrastructure for such mechanisms possible in a short period of time. However, incorporating latest software and hardware is not enough alone to accomplish such a project. The will and support of government and bureaucrats is vital to ensure the success of this initiative. Otherwise, the information will never be available for the public accurately. While some information is banned from public access for

state security reasons, some other information is simply not accessible due to stacks of archives which are not easy to explore not only for citizens, but also for government employees themselves. If proper standards, guidelines and IT infrastructure to reach such information are established, it would be much easier for government agencies to comply with the law and to provide information to their citizens. Otherwise, vagueness in policies, hardship in finding information, and lack of technology use set barriers for information access. Such barriers do not necessarily mean to ban citizens from accessing government information access, but cause delays, prevent public participation in decision-making processes, and contradict with government transparency. “

3. e-Transformation of Turkey

Turkey has adopted common goals and priorities with other European Union (EU) member and candidate countries as part of eEurope+ Action Plan in June 2001 [6]. Turkish Government is committed to let public learn about the importance and benefits of information society. The objectives of e-Transformation of Turkey project include [6].

- Transparency and accountability for public management will be enhanced
- Mechanisms that facilitate participation of citizens in the decision-making process in the public domain.

It is clear that open and transparent governance is an important step towards preventing corruption and maladministration as well as effective democracy [2, 4]. In addition, UN General Assembly asserted that “knowledge about openness and access to information is crucial in the implementation and promotion of basic human rights and democratic principles” [7].

“Turkey has passed its Right to Information Act on October 9, 2003 and the law went into effect on April 24, 2004. Article 1 of the law states “The object of this law is to regulate the procedure and the basis of the right to information according to the principles of equality, impartiality and openness that are the necessities of a democratic and transparent government” and Article 2 provides the application of it as “This law is applied to the activities of the public institutions and the professional organizations which qualify as public institutions.” Obviously public institutions are obliged to provide information as regards to their records. However the law explains the exceptions. Those exceptions are set forth in Part Four of the law in articles 15 through 28 and ranges from state secrets to intelligence information, privacy rights to economical interests of the state and many others. One provision that makes this project viable for public institutions is Article 8 which states that “The information and documents that are published or disclosed to the public either through publication, brochure, proclamation or other similar means, may not be made the subject of an application for access to information. However, the applicant will be informed of the date, the means and the place of the publication or disclosure of the information or the document.” Obviously, it is viable for the administration to ease the workload of the public institutions to accept this project. After the system is put in to place, a simple web address will be enough to direct citizens to a place where they can reach publicly available information from TNP. Moreover, it will provide a standards-based application and improve efficiency and interoperability by eliminating fragmented

applications among different government agencies and adopting national and international standards” [8].

3.1. The Turkish National Police and Their Information Potential

The TNP has been officially created on April 10, 1845 with the publication of a legal text called *Polis Nizamnamesi* (Police Code of Conduct) in which first time the term *Polis* (police) was used, the TNP existed well before 1845 though. Today, the TNP is governed by two major legislations which are 1934 *Polis Vazife ve Selahiyetleri Kanunu - PVSK* (Police Duties and Authority) and 1937 *Emniyet Teskilati Kanunu - ETK* (The Turkish National Police Law). While the first legislation explains the duties the police to have and authority to use; the latter is about internal police regulation including organizational structure, discipline, hierarchy, deployment of personnel, and all other related issues with the organization. The police in Turkey have a power to gather intelligence data around the country in addition to other duties.

As outlined above, the TNP is a large scale bureaucratic and hierarchical government organization with a well established organizational knowledge and culture. Moreover, unveiled archives of TNP house extremely valuable information. Beyond that, the information and documents that have historical value might a focal point for museums and historians. The daily data and information the TNP produces and processes are enormously big. The size of the TNP is roughly around 20,000 personnel and responsible to provide police service to more than 70%.

The TNP has a Police Academy since 1937 and trains other nations' police also. The TNP has the second largest police contingent in UN missions in the world. Almost every year 10,000 new cadets join police training and other 10,000 graduates. This reality makes the TNP a highly educated and mobile organization where reforms and transformation are easier than any other organization. As Kleinman reported, the TNP is reformed with training and education by investing new generations, by publishing about the training and by being transparent on police education to let everybody criticize what they see wrong [9].

It is obvious that the TNP, contrary to public perception, is an open, highly trained, technically and professionally capable organization. A digital repository approach appears to be viable and possible and contribute to openness of the agency.

Furthermore, the TNP has won the 2003 the best e-government project award with the Police Network (POLNET) initiative to provide fast and timely service to citizens. Given the technical capacity, historical background, information at hand, and the documents to be preserved, this project is timely and important to safeguard the intellectual output of the agency. It is obvious that this project is also a first step to build an institutional memory to preserve and transfer the organizational knowledge to future generations.

4. Digital Repository Approach

In the context of this research, a digital repository can be defined as a set of services that an institution offers to members of its community for organization, management, preservation, and dissemination of digital materials created by the institution.

Digital repositories are often called as institutional repositories or ePrint archives. Maturing digital library and networked information technologies gave rise to

development of institutional repositories in late 2002 as a digital medium for scholarly publishing [10]. Operational responsibility of a digital repository may fall into various organizational units however; an effective and productive digital repository at TNP requires collaboration among information technologists, ranking officers, faculty, and administrators of different branches of the agency. Since a digital repository does not consist solely of a set of hardware and software.

Conclusion

The reforms in the TNP after 2003 are amazingly fast and accurate as they are welcomed by EU Commission reports issued in 2004, 2005, and 2006. It is obvious that the TNP has the potential and willingness to improve its public service at every front. Its POLNET system is highly improved and has been exemplified by many other police departments including Ohio State police [11, 12, & 13].

This project offers the TNP a means to enhance the TNP information environment and create a system to centralize, present, and preserve the intellectual output of the agency in ways not currently supported by traditional library and publication models. TNP Digital Repository will provide a venue to share its intellectual output and organizational knowledge with public at large and make visible the unique contributions of the agency. TNP needs a permanent, safe, and accessible service for representing its rich intellectual environment. TNP Digital Repository will provide a robust and reliable platform to store, organize, preserve, and make accessible a wide range of digital resources of TNP researchers, faculty, scholars, and officers.

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