DEVIANCE AND INEQUALITY IN JAPAN

Japanese youth and foreign migrants

ROBERT STUART YODER

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In memory of my mother

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About the author

Robert Stuart Yoder has taught at a number of American and Japanese universities, including the University of California, Irvine and Sophia University in Tokyo. The author has lived in Japan for 30 years at four different time periods, beginning in 1972 as a student at Sophia University. This book stems from years of fieldwork, publications and concern with deviance and inequality in Japan. At present, Dr Yoder is Adjunct Professor of Psychology and Sociology at Japan Branch, Lakeland College in Tokyo and also teaches at a number of Japanese universities.

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ONE

Introduction: power, inequality and deviance in Japan

Inequality and deviance in Japan

It may be a surprise to many why Japanese youth and foreign migrants are paired together in a book on inequality and deviance in Japan. The life situation, however, of these two subculture group's ties in with inequality as a precursor to deviance in a strikingly similar manner. Japanese youth and foreign migrants are powerless and yet perceived to be a major threat to the status quo. Both subcultural groups have consistently been the main targets of tight and restrictive formal and informal social controls propagated by sensationalised accounts of their deviance. Inequality, setting the stage for deviant reactions pertaining to these two subcultural groups, clearly shows that conflict is as an integral and dynamic feature of Japanese society, a contrast to the harmony or *nihonjinron* (theories of Japanese) perspective.

It is astonishing that so much has been made of societal togetherness in Japan. In scholarly writings and popular fiction, in the mass media, in Hollywood movies, at academic conferences or as a topic of conversation, Japan has been consistently viewed as a society of *wa* (harmony), racial homogeneity, egalitarianism and group solidarity. Inequality and deviance at best are considered a minor issue and when the subject *is* approached, attention is given to the uniqueness of Japanese culture that somehow makes aberrant behaviour and class conflict less of a social problem compared to Western countries. This *nihonjinron* model is challenged in this book, showing that inequality, conflict and deviance in Japan is no less a part of human relations than harmony.

Near the train station, boys and girls from a low-ranked high school in Kanagawa prefecture mockingly wearing a school uniform light up their cigarettes. The boys with school trousers pulled half way down their buttocks, shirts open and unconventional hairstyle try to look cool and give off an 'I don't give a damn' attitude. The girls wear conspicuous long shorts under skirts pulled way up near their upper thigh. They have bleached brown and blond hair and pierced body parts. Such dress and rebellion is commonplace among students at their high school, a school with a bad reputation. It is a place where 'student misfits', most from the lower class, are sent to by a class tracking school system.

The largest employer of native English language teachers, the English language school chain Nova, becomes bankrupted. For the past couple of months, 4,000 English language teachers (mainly Australians, Britons and North Americans) have not been paid and are out of a job (*The Japan Times*, 2007d, p 1; Yoshida, 2007).

Destitute and unable to pay rent, a work for food programme is established for jobless Nova instructors to give English language lessons in exchange for basic food or meals (Yoshida, 2007).

The downfall of Nova is attributed to earlier government sanctions against the company for false advertisement and the shady business dealings of Nova's President, Nozumu Sahashi, arrested for the embezzlement of ¥320 million (over US $3 million) of the company's employees benefit funds (*The Japan Times*, 2007e, p 8, 2007f, p 1, 2008e, pp 1-2, 2008f, p 1). While the public was shocked by Nova's downfall, what was not publicised and not known was that this was nothing new. Foreign language schools in Japan are big business. Employers have exploited foreign migrant language instructors for years, instructors not being paid and denied the same benefits as Japanese employees, and discriminate firings are all part of the profit motive. Foreign migrants, having little recourse to take action against job discrimination and that voicing discontent is construed as 'aggressive criticism of Japan' inappropriate behaviour for non-Japanese, allows for discrimination to proceed rather unabatedly.

These two stories are but a small part of the larger picture that links together inequality with deviance. Social restrictions and opportunities to freely pursue one's life differ according to age and nationality. This is quite evident for youth and foreign migrants (also referred to as foreign nationals or non-Japanese residents), the focus of attention in this book. Although two quite different segments of the Japanese population, they share one thing in common: both are subjugated under a group that possesses the most power and privilege called the dominant subculture group. Japanese youth and foreign migrants' struggles for equality are met with fierce resistance by the dominant subculture group that holds a stronghold over the management and control of societal arrangements and human affairs that works in their interests. The efforts of the dominant subculture group to contain these two subordinate subculture groups and ensuing deviant reactions are the subject of this book told from the subordinate not dominant subculture group perspective.

The link between inequality and deviance

Deviance broadly means the violation of social norms. Societal norms, whether encoded in laws or mere prescriptions of appropriate behaviour, represent the status quo central to the maintenance of keeping people in line with what has been defined as normative by those with power and privilege. Rule breaking brings social conflict (Lofland, 1969: pp 13, 19).

Deviance is one type of social conflict; other types of social conflict include civil uprisings, social movements and mainstream party politics (Lofland, 1969, p 15). Lofland (1969, p 19) described deviance as related to social conflict.

> It is the situation of a very powerful party opposing a very weak one that the powerful party sponsors the idea that the weak party is breaking the rules of society. The very concept of 'society' and its

> 'rules' is appropriated by powerful parties and made synonymous with their interests (and, of course, believed in by the naive, for example the undergraduate penchant for the phrases 'society says…', 'society expects…', 'society does…'). It is not so easy to sponsor such notions of a solid society in conflicts with organised opponents.

Deviance as a type of social conflict fits perfectly well with the situation of youth and foreign migrants. Both groups have little or no power and are at best loosely organised. They are feared by those in power with a history of non-conformity and ever-present potential for conflict; youth at an age of rebellion and foreign migrants of a different culture. Both groups have been at the centre of state concern regarding deviance, controls and reform measures. Finally, discriminate social controls and laws characterise their powerless situation with various consequences on deviance.

The conditions and situations of conflict and deviance are detailed and discussed throughout the book appropriate to a conflict labelling perspective. The theory as applied to deviance involves three elements of conflict and labelling: entry, participation and replication. First, by virtue of age for youth and nationality of foreign migrants, both enter into a situation confronted by discriminate laws and social controls affecting deviance. Second, while all members of both groups are held accountable, susceptible and liable for remedial attention or punishment from a myriad of formal and informal laws, regulations and controls, the lower class in both groups is most vulnerable to being the object of control and likely to participate in deviant behaviour. Third and finally, the theory focuses on the persistence or replication of inequality, vulnerability and deviance in spite of social change. Throughout the times, youth and foreign migrants have been perceived by those in power as a threat to the status quo. While formal and informal social controls and the extent and types of deviance have varied over time, the inequality and vulnerability to such controls affecting deviance have remained constant.

Powerful parties

Powerful parties are composed of individuals who occupy upper-echelon positions in government, business and education. They dominate in society and are viewed as guardians and representatives of cultural ideals, values and norms. Only these individuals are given the authority to make and uphold laws and manipulate policy at the local and national levels of government, in the economy and in schools. They are most influential in controlling the dissemination of information through the mass media and their voice dictates and shapes public opinion.

It is in the interests of powerful parties to maintain their control and one such way of doing that is by 'duping' the population into believing that there is equality and that existing normative rules of conduct serve in the best interests of all the people. This partially accounts for, among other things, the very popularity of the *nihonjinron* model. Studies on Japan by both Japanese and non-Japanese

writers have focused their attention on the lifestyles, values and perspectives of the dominant subculture group. This occurs among Japanese writers since most often the authors and editors of publishing companies themselves are members of the dominant subculture group (Sugimoto, 2003, pp 12-13). Or, for non-Japanese writers, *nihonjinron* research gets funding, allows for easy access to information, receives 'red carpet' treatment in Japan, the books sell well and writers stand to benefit in their own careers such as being a welcomed speaker at conferences, attaining a higher job position or, particularly in Japan, a tenure at the university. Describing Japan from the viewpoint of those with power and privileges diverts attention away from conflict in the lives of Japanese youth and foreign migrants contributing to a misleading perception that social problems are of minor concern in a harmonious Japan.

Subcultures

To understand the complexity and heterogeneity of Japan or any society and how this relates to inequality and deviance, the concept of subcultures is introduced (see Sugimoto, 2003). Society is composed of many subcultures. Subcultures are associated with one or more social categories. One's values and beliefs, access to limited resources and treatment in society tie in with subcultural characteristics such as age, gender, education, occupation or on a broader scale ethnic or foreign migrant group and social class. Individuals belong to a number of subcultures; for example, an 18-year-old female who is single with a high school education and works part time at a convenient store belongs to five subcultures (age, gender, marital status, completed education and occupation).

Identity and behaviour are strongly influenced by the subcultures we are a part of. From the cradle a child is socialised dependent on gender and parents' subcultures, mainly social class (education, occupation and economic capital), region (and its dialects and customs) of the country, religion and ethnic group. Close interpersonal relations, identity and behaviour from childhood, then tend to be formed with others of the same subculture(s) near and in the home, at school, in outside activities on the job and so on.

Marriage in Japan, elsewhere as well, usually occurs between two people from the same class background. Even outside of class, married couples share much in common such as age, coming from the same region of a country, religion, ethnicity or race, and nationality. Marriage also interconnects the couple together with others of the same subcultures, leading back to bringing up their children and starting the same cycle as they were brought into this life.

Belonging to a subculture, obviously, is not a necessary requirement for having access to a primary group, the group that has the most influence over our behaviour and identity. People have close friendships with or marry others from quite different subcultural backgrounds, influencing their thoughts and behaviour. Close interpersonal ties, however, with people from quite different subcultural backgrounds are the exceptions, and even then it is most likely that

the more dominant subcultural characteristics are shared in common. For example, exogamous (interracial or outside ethnic or religious group) marriages usually involve spouses from the same class background.

Our identity and behaviour are also affected by interactions when others stereotype us by the subculture(s) that we belong to. Stereotypes, imaginary attributes of all persons belonging to a particular subculture group, flow out of the social cultural realm of society widely shared through the influence of the mass media (Henslin, 2004). Stereotypes are often remnants of past history; today's imagery of Burakumin, women and foreign nationals can be traced back to Japan's patriarchal caste society in the Tokugawa era (1600-1867). Regardless of the historical origin, stereotypes characterise who another person is before actually knowing them, influencing disposition, attitude, expectation and action while interacting with them. The person so stereotyped at least wonders whether or not they actually are the type of person implicitly or explicitly judged to be by the person carrying out the stereotyping.

Stereotypes persist even though, obviously, not all, in fact usually most people of the stereotyped subculture group are not of the same ilk as the stereotyped image due to selective perception. Selective perception follows the precept that we tend to see and act based on our beliefs (Weiten, 2004). Stereotyped attributes are looked for when interacting with the stereotyped person while other attributes that go against the stereotype are ignored or dismissed as irrelevant. This may involve exaggeration of the other's behaviour to fit the stereotype. For example, if a person is stereotyped as being direct in their opinions then other people will consciously be prepared for a direct comment from them to validate the stereotype. And, even if a direct comment is not made, something said will be construed as being a direct opinion.

Stereotypes become validated through generalisation in selective perception. Expecting people to be certain kinds of people leads to a preoccupation of looking for 'just that type'. This often coincides with a 'mass media' barrage that in Japan quite often targets youth and their mannerisms. Expecting youngsters to be unruly, others look for such youngsters and generalise unruly behaviour to the wider population of youth.

Stereotypes consistently applied to 'others' of a given subculture group are synonymous with labelling. Given that individuals belong to more than one subculture, labelling involves singling out one stereotypical category as representative of 'those' people. Lofland (1969, p 124) refers to this as the singling out of a pivotal category:

> For public purposes and on occasion of face-to-face engagement, one of the clustered categories is singled out and treated as the most important and significant feature of the person or persons being dealt with. It is seen as defining the character of those animals who are so clustered. That is there comes to be a pivotal category that defines 'who this person is' or 'who those people are'.

Labelling and normative rules of conduct characterise interpersonal activity based on subcultural traits affecting deviance. For example, the physical appearance of Western migrants in Japan (in Japanese, *seiyō-jin*, a Westerner, or *gaijin*, a foreigner, are generic terms commonly associated with Europeans and North Americans) subjects them to being labelled as a 'Westerner', that being a pivotal category while interacting with Japanese. Western migrants are labelled as being employed in the fields of foreign language instruction or as entertainers. They are thought proficient in these occupations because of stereotyped traits associated with their nationality (for example native language speakers and extroverts), such work thought suitable to their culture and place in Japanese society. Regardless of the particular job in these fields, whether it is a college professor of English, a foreign language conversationalist at a private language school or a bar hostess entertaining Japanese clientele with her foreign ways, these jobs fit the image of a Westerner appropriate for outsiders to Japanese society. Subcultural group or individual differences among Westerners such as educational background, specialty and knowledge of Japan are less important characteristics than being a Westerner; nationality, the pivotal category, considered as the reason for being employed in these jobs. Befitting the 'label', these occupations are the most accessible and a main line of employment for Westerners. This serves in the interest of the dominant subculture group since these occupations provide a service hard to find in the general population and keeps such persons at a distance from Japanese culture, limiting their social influence and blocking their inroad to positions of power and privilege.

When this does not happen, for example the Westerner attempts to assimilate and opts to become a business manager in a Japanese company, work as a therapist at a Japanese mental health clinic or become a proprietor and main chef of a sushi shop, the Westerner is thought to be a deviant violating stereotypes, expectations and normative rules of what a Westerner can and cannot do. Westerners are simply considered different from Japanese. Connoting foreigner with Westerner, Pulvers (2006b, p 16), a scholar and long-term foreign resident in Japan, puts it well:

> Japanese don't expect foreigners to be like them. Their view of their own culture and traditions is as something practically unique and peculiar to these islands. When a foreigner 'knows too much' or acts in an archetypal Japanese manner, the Japanese response is likely to be one of befuddlement, amusement, shock or dismay.

Westerners are not supposed to be proficient in the Japanese language. It is quite usual even for Japanese children as young as four or five years old when confronting a Westerner to speak first and say '*eigo dekinai*' (I can't speak English, connoting we cannot understand each other) and it is not at all unusual for this to be said when responding to a Westerner who has just spoken perfectly understandable Japanese. It is simply believed that Westerners cannot understand the Japanese psyche, language and culture and thus are unsuitable to be employed within the

mainstream of society. There are numerous discriminate barriers making it difficult for a Westerner to obtain mainstream employment and conflict characterises interpersonal activity should they pursue such occupations.

Deviance can also come about through attempting to avoid being stereotyped. Trying to protect their children from discrimination, a large number of Korean residents in Japan are given by their parents a Japanese name at birth to cover up their Korean heritage and pass as Japanese. They do not, however, have Japanese citizenship since citizenship is only obtained at birth if one of the parent(s) is a Japanese national; children of foreign parent(s) born in Japan are not granted Japanese citizenship. Passing as Japanese when in fact a Korean by nationality presents the possibility of being detected and passing itself means living a deviant life by the very cover-up of one's heritage. This has created a number of identity problems for Korean residents not to mention the devastating effects among those discovered as Koreans and not Japanese by both Koreans and Japanese (Fukuoka, 2000).

These examples point to the social and psychological dynamics that link inequality with conflict and deviance for subordinate subcultures. Life situations and conditions for subordinate subcultures are unequal to that of the dominant subculture group. Subcultural group values, particularly for the least privileged or lower-class subcultural group, often clash with the values espoused by the dominant subculture group. In Japan, the propagation of harmony, egalitarianism and social solidarity by the dominant subculture group clearly is exposed as a myth when we look at the other side of the story, real-life struggles among individuals confronted with limits on their rights and opportunities because of the subcultures they belong to. With little or no representation among the elite groups that make the decisions on how things are run and who should do it, youth and foreign migrants are often left with little other choice but to deviate from societal norms.

The dominant subculture group

Normative is not an individual thing; it is decided by those with power and privilege. Whether it is sweeping changes in education or behind the scenes manoeuvring on hiring of new employees, those with power and class privilege determine the criterion that sets people in their place within society. Theirs is a subculture, a dominant or core subculture group.

A dominant subculture group parallels what Schermerhorn (1978, pp 12-13) called a dominant group in society: 'dominant group signifies that collectivity within a society which has preeminent authority to function both as guardians and sustainers of the controlling value system, and as prime allocators of rewards in the society.' The power and privilege of the dominant group is rarely absolute, rather it is relative to other groups. Viewed here, the dominant subculture group is simply that: it dominates not in an absolute sense but in a relative one, having the most power and privilege of other subcultural groups.

In all modern capitalistic democratic societies, indigenous nationals in positions of power and privilege are the dominant subculture group. They are cliques consisting of a multitude of primary groups in the upper echelons of government, business and education. In regards to youth and foreign migrants, obviously youth have no power and the situation of foreign residents is not that much better. Foreign migrants are not indigenous nationals, hold no political offices of power and have no representation in public occupations at the higher levels. Perhaps the most significant positions of power available to them although their representation in these is limited are business executives and full professors in universities.

There are Japanese males and less so Japanese females who are quite rich (for example entertainers) but do not hold positions of power. Divisions within subculture groups also make for a difference. Japanese with a college education predominate in positions of power and privilege but even within this subculture group, graduates from the most prestigious universities are highly disproportionately represented at the highest levels of power and privilege, particularly as government leaders. To make matters simple and workable, the defining feature of Japanese in positions of power and privilege as the dominant subcultural group is that they have a stronghold over the higher-echelon positions in Japanese society and dominate the control and management over access (who gets what and how) to limited resources in society. This proceeds by the formation and actions of 'elite cliques' and furthers the probability of Japanese with a similar background gaining a position of power and privilege more so than any other comparable subcultural group. For the remainder of this book, the dominant subculture group refers to Japanese nationals who hold positions of power and privilege and the dominant culture group or the dominant group in society refers to Japanese citizens.

Class stratification

Class stratification in Japan is no different from that of other modern capitalistic societies. The Gini index, measuring income deviation from perfect equality – the higher the coefficient or per cent, the higher the level of income inequality – indicates that Japan since the middle 1980s ranks high in income inequality among advanced capitalistic societies (Sugimoto, 2003, pp 9-10; Kajimoto, 2006, p 3). The latest figures in 2004 indicate that Japan with a Gini coefficient at .381 is lower than the United States (US) at .45 but higher than the United Kingdom (UK) at .368 and Australia at .352. It should be noted that there are variations in measurement of the Gini index and the years when it is taken, making it difficult to compare all modern capitalistic societies in the same year (Wikipedia, 2008).

Standard indices of class (income, occupation and education) in Japan are highly intercorrelated; the lower-, middle- and upper-class groups are quite consolidated. Class consolidation has also increased through the years, making it more difficult, for example, for those with a low level of education in 1995 to obtain comparatively as high of a job status and income as those in 1975 (Sugimoto, 2003, p 49).

The poverty rate has increased, recent data indicating that Japan is the second highest among 30 nation member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in the proportion of the population living in relative poverty (SSJ Forum, 2007). The percentage of Japanese having less than one half of the median household disposable income was 13.5% in 2000 with only the US at 13.7% at a higher per cent. Japan's poverty rate has increased in this millennium reaching 15.3% in 2006 (Spiri, 2007, p 16).

Pure mobility, or mobility from one generation to another after removing structural mobility (societal-induced occupational shifts of white- and blue-collar jobs), is lower in Japan than in the US and England (Sugimoto, 2003, pp 35-6). Over the years, a decrease in the rate of progressive taxation, greater value of assets (land, houses, financial holdings), increase of income differentials and class inheritance have made the rich richer and the poor poorer (Sugimoto, 2003, pp 48-53).

Class privileges or economic capital and cultural capital (such as education) equate to power. The dominant subculture group members hold the highest-paid occupations, possess the most assets such as land, stocks and bonds and are graduates of the best universities (Hashimoto, 2003; Sugimoto, 2003). Social reproduction of class is most pronounced for the dominant subculture group. Intergeneration class reproduction through marriage is highest in the professional and managerial class; spouse backgrounds closely match that of their parents (Sugimoto, 2003, pp 170-1). Those in power largely come from families at the upper echelons of society and pass this on to their children in a class reproduction of power and privilege (Hashimoto, 2003; Sugimoto, 2003; *The Japan Times*, 2005b, p 3).

Conflict and deviant behaviour

Conflict and deviant behaviour relates to the power differential whereby ideals, values, normative arrangements and opportunities are largely construed, defined and controlled by a dominant subcultural group over subordinate subcultural groups. There are also variable differences of conflict and deviance for subordinate subculture groups depending on the privilege and distance of these subcultural groups from that of the dominant subcultural group. Variations within subordinate subcultures are most noticeable along the lines of social class and minority group status. For example, youth are powerless as a subordinate subculture group but higher-class youth are privileged and share the same class culture as the higher class and are less prone to deviant behaviour associated with anti-school subcultures than lower-class youth. Or, Koreans are better established in Japan and of a higher class than Japanese-Brazilians, facilitating a greater degree of integration, and less likely to engage in property crimes, crimes associated with the lower class.

Types of deviant behaviour and consequences that follow relate to subcultural group traits and relative subordinate position. White-collar crimes are most prevalent among the dominant subcultural group in their abuse of power and class privilege. Such crimes, however, are usually brought to the attention of the

public by competing parties for power or economic privilege and represent but a very small amount of the actual amount of white-collar crime (see Kerr, 2001, for an excellent account of white-collar crime by dominant subculture group members in Japan).

With control over the criminal justice system, the dominant subculture group, mainly those in top governmental positions, directs attention towards crime that is at a distance from their power base. Surveillance, arrests, prosecution and punishment of crimes are directed towards subcultural groups with far less social cultural (status based on education, occupation, titles etc.) or economic (income, property, stocks, bonds etc) capital and rights (age and nationality) since they have little recourse of action to challenge those in power. Tightened controls over subordinate subculture groups also come about when subcultural values and traits are seen to be a threat to the status quo as an alternative lifestyle or just by their very difference clash with what the dominant subculture group propagates and upholds as culturally appropriate and normative lifestyles and behaviour. Discussed in detail later, while in general this applies to youth and foreign migrants, the most vulnerable among them are the lower class within both subordinate subcultural groups.

Crime is but one type of deviance. Most normative rules of conduct are not encoded in criminal law. Also, what is deemed normative may vary according to the targeted subculture; there are different behavioural expectations and formal and informal rules of conduct for youth and non-Japanese residents. Sanctions range from actions aimed at reforming the offender, for example punishment of students for violation of school regulations, to exclusionary acts such as politely but adamantly not allowing a foreign migrant admittance to a 'Japanese-only' establishment. Such normative rules serve to keep subordinate subculture members in their place and are a source of conflict.

Conflict and division of subordinate subculture groups

It is in the interests of the dominant subculture group that subordinate subcultural group members 'police' themselves. Inequality and deviance is sustained from conflict and division among members of the same subordinate subcultures and between subordinate subcultures. The main route to attain positions of authority and privilege is to adhere to the status quo and please those in power. Rising up through the company or government ranks, attaining tenure at a university, becoming a principal of a secondary school and so on requires that an individual from a subordinate subculture group be accepted by dominant subculture group members. They have to defend 'the system' of inequality since they themselves have become a part of it and at least on the surface take on the values and norms of the dominant subculture group.

The socially upward mobile subordinate subculture group members act as a 'showcase' for the dominant subculture group. This detracts attention away from the actual state of inequality for subordinate subcultural groups. In Japan, the

message comes across that with hard work and adhering to a Japanese cultural way of life, 'anyone' can be successful, diverting attention away from the conditions that account for a high degree of underrepresentation for subordinate subculture groups. And, at least an implicit agreement is part of the mobility package for subordinate subcultural group members who come to occupy positions of power, which they must oppose or at least not get involved with those of their own subordinate subculture who speak out and take action against issues of inequality relevant to their subculture group. Among foreign migrants, successful business entrepreneurs or professors are not likely to support foreign migrants active in demanding an improvement in human rights for non-Japanese in Japan. There are exceptions: upwardly mobile youth attaining a position of power as an adult may become a 'vanguard' for disadvantaged youth. Usually, however, those of the higher class regardless of how they attained their class status, act in their own interests to maintain the status quo.

In the struggle to obtain scarce resources, subordinate subcultural group members are competing against each other for the limited number of positions of power and privilege accorded to them by the dominant subculture group. Particularly, status and class divisions exist within subcultural groups, creating a different consciousness and awareness of inequality of their subcultural group. Higher-class Japanese students through family privilege are able to attend the 'best' schools and find no fault with practically all unaware of a class bias educational system that works in their favour for college attendance and later access to the best jobs. It is not in the interests of permanent resident foreign migrants to take the side of foreign migrants on work-related visa restrictions. A gain by one subgroup equates to a loss of the other.

This internal competition and subgroup division of subordinate subcultural group members inhibits in a Marxian sense the development of a 'subculture' class for itself; movements against inequality hampered by a weak sense of subculture group solidarity (Coser, 1977, pp 48-9). Division (most evident by class and also nationality for foreign migrants) and different interests by subgroups within subordinate subculture groups divert attention away from issues of equality (such as human rights) for the subordinate subcultural group itself. Furthermore, it is in the interests of the dominant subculture group that subordinate subcultural groups do not become conscious of or organised against their imposed subordination impeding cognitive awareness of their subordinate status.

Relative deprivation, interest group organisations and conflict

There is no direct relation between the level of inequality of subordinate subculture groups and open conflict with the dominant subculture group. In fact, the most oppressed subordinate subculture groups are the least likely to challenge their state of oppression. Conflict usually comes about through relative deprivation or as the situation improves for subordinate subculture groups they become more aware of their disadvantaged situation and demand more. Central to relative deprivation

is that 'people perceive themselves to be unfairly deprived in relation to other people' (Light et al, 1989, p 601).

In the most deprived state of inequality, subordinate subcultural group members are highly unorganised and have little recourse of action but to simply do as they are told in order to survive.

Only as their economic condition and social situation improves are they able to become organized enhancing a sub-cultural group conscious awareness regarding exploitation by a dominant subculture group. The key here is the availability of and recourse to participation in organisations that are set up to protect the rights, create solidarity and further the interests of the subordinate subcultural group. In Japan, these organisations range from foreign ethnic schools to human rights groups.

Conflict ensues from subordinate subcultural interest groups making demands for change, posing a threat to the dominant subcultural group's power and privilege. These clashes have taken on many forms in post-war Japan, from student protests against university and government policies to foreign migrants refusing to be fingerprinted (required of foreign migrants at city and ward offices) as an act of defiance against discriminate 'fingerprinting' of foreign migrants. The government's response has been to 'label' such actions as deviant and mobilise forces against such movements in an attempt to discredit their claims and the individuals involved and steer public opinion against the issues and demands made by such subordinate subcultural groups.

It is in the interests of the dominant subcultural group that subordinate subcultural interest groups do not become formed in the first place. Subordinate subcultural group status with limited rights places roadblocks in front of youth and foreign migrants to establish organised interest groups. While aside from youth protests such as student movements and fairly well-organised Korean special interest groups, for the most part youth and foreign migrants need to rely on outside human interest groups to speak and act on their behalf, a weak and vulnerable position. This coupled with possible repercussions from the dominant subculture group should they make demands for equality, breeds apathy and a reluctance of subordinate subcultural group members to become involved with issues of inequality for their group.

The neglect of inequality and deviance in Japan

Although there is ample literature on the underclass, not much attention has been given to inequality as a precursor to deviance. And, the subject is even more neglected in the mass media. There is a reason for this. The power and privilege of the dominant subculture group allow them to manipulate information in an attempt to minimise attention to conflict that takes place because of inequality. Show business and politics, research and business grants, multinational corporations and international partnerships, cultural exchange programmes and so on are initiated, supported and backed by the financial and political power of the

dominant subculture group. In the case of Japan, these create an image both in and outside of the country dominated by the *nihonjinron* model.

The dominant subculture group through the mass media mainly is at the forefront bringing forth issues of deviance to public attention. Politicians, police chiefs, school authorities and so on are those who broadcast to the public problems of crime, troubles at schools and other various kinds of deviant behaviour in Japan. The problem is aimed at 'the persons and group' said to be deviant, whether it be crime by foreigners or young Japanese girls involved in prostitution. They are to blame for the problem, not the condition of inequality. In turn, reforms are called for harking back to cultural ideals that, of course, once implemented serve to validate and protect positions of power and privilege held by the dominant subculture group. This also further reinforces the false perception that problems lie with 'erring' others that set out to disrupt the harmony, egalitarianism, group orientation, homogeneity, obedience, selflessness and so on that make Japan a unique society.

Equally important is that issues relating inequality with deviance are not brought to public and international attention. Governmental and large corporate controls over the mass media are subtle but powerful forces in the dissemination of information. In Japan, the mass media is organised and generates information from its press clubs. Press clubs operate out of office space provided by the local authorities (government ministries, police, business and union organisations) and restricted to reporters of major news organisations; reporters of minor presses or foreign news organisations are not allowed membership. Government and big business dominate as the origin of sources with one survey in the late 1980s indicating that 90% of news stories in the Japanese press originated from government and business leaders (Asano, 2004, p 6). Sugimoto (2003, pp 239-40) gives us an insight into the dominant subculture group's control over the mass media.

> [G]overnment officials, politicians, and business and union leaders use these [press] clubs as venues for prepared public announcements which the reporters write up as news stories. By constantly feeding information to reporters in this environment, representatives of the institutions which provide club facilities can obliquely control the way in which it is reported to the public.
>
> Reporters cannot risk being excluded from their club because they would then lose access to this regular flow of information. The sentiment of mutual cooperation among all parties involved runs deep, and club members at times agree to place reporting embargoes on sensitive issues.
>
> The media establishment is also involved in the policy-making process of government by sending their representatives to its advisory councils.

Kerr (2001, p 112) is quite critical of press clubs in Japan:

> What is surprising is that the media in a democratic country with legally mandated freedom of the press, collude in these deceptions. It comes down to the fact that the press is essentially a cartel. Reporters belong to press clubs that specialize in police or finance or politics, and so forth (which do not admit foreigners), and these clubs dutifully publish handouts from the police or the politicians in exchange for access to precious information…. If a reporter shows any independence, the agency or politician can exclude him from further press conferences.

Avoiding issues relative to inequality and deviance operates at other levels as well. The more than 100,000 Japanese ultra-rightists belonging to some 1,000 groups in Japan most affiliated with the National Organization of Patriotism (*Zennippon Aikokusha Dantai* in Japanese) are an intimidating presence against the mass media not to be critical of Japan (Kerr, 2001; McNeill, 2006). Censorship occurs in the schools. Yoneyama (1999, p 69) stated: 'There are layers of censorship in and around Japanese high schools including what students, parents, teachers, librarians and sometimes even local communities can say or do.' The Ministry of Education is sensitive to any studies that deal with students' class background, making it difficult to obtain such information (Letendre, 2000, p 217). Teachers themselves are unaware or at least downplay the significance of social class as having an impact on getting a good education and ignore class as a correlation with student deviant behaviour (Mizutani, 1998; Yoneyama, 1999; Yoder, 2004).

While not necessarily purposeful, diversion from problems within the country occur from hyping up internal threats from outside sources or relishing on sufferings of the past. In Japan, attention is diverted away from inequality and its link with deviance particularly in regards to foreign migrants in that the mass media and political leaders portray Japan as the victim. An enormous amount of attention is given to the suffering of the Japanese people from the Second World War, sentimentality for the selfless acts of Kamikaze pilots and the soldiers and sailors who went on suicidal missions and today national outrage over the abduction of Japanese by North Koreans that took place 30 years ago. While certainly Japan suffered greatly from the Second World War from indiscriminate carpet bombing of Tokyo and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, what is lost amidst playing the role of the 'victim' is that Japan was also the victimiser.

The people in China and Korea believe that Japan feels little remorse over the atrocities it committed in the Second World War. Although the state has made informal apologies, the government officially and conservative elements in politics and academia have not owned up to and taken responsibility for the Nanjing massacre and forced prostitution of women in their former Asian colonies, particularly Korean women (Chang, 1998; Ueno, 2004; Kingston, 2007; McNeill, 2007). China and Korea both have voiced their objections to revisionist claims

by former Air Self-Defense Force chief general Toshio Tamogami. The general, in a highly publicised national prize-winning essay, wrote that Japan was a victim being led into the Second World War and was not an aggressor nation in China and Korea before or during the Second World War; in fact, the general contended, Japan's colonial rule brought forth prosperity to the two nations (Kamiya, 2007, Hongo and Nagata, 2008; Martin, 2008; *The Japan Times*, 2008k, p 1; Hongo, 2009).

Korea and China vehemently object to Japanese Cabinet and Diet members' continual visits to the Yasukuni shrine, a Shinto shrine akin to a nationalistic religious deity that honours the soldiers in the Second World War, including war criminals (Nagata, 2008). School history books (all such books screened for approval by the Ministry of Education) downplay or ignore Japan's colonisation of Asian countries and atrocities committed in these countries. Iris Chang, a Chinese-American and author of *The Rape of Nanking*, points out how government censorship and victimisation in Japan go together (Chang, 1998, pp 205-6):

> All textbooks used in Japan's elementary and secondary schools must first be approved by the Japanese Ministry of Education. Critics in Japan note that social studies textbooks come under the heaviest scrutiny. For example, in 1977 the Ministry of Education reduced a section on World War II within a standard history book of several hundred pages to only six pages, which consisted mainly of pictures of the American firebombing of Tokyo, a picture of the ruins of Hiroshima, and a tally of Japan's war dead. The text neglected to mention the casualties on the other side, Japanese war atrocities or the forced evacuations of Chinese and Korean prisoners to labor camps in Japan.

Taking the position of being a 'victim', along with the revisionist view reinterpreting Japan's history along nationalistic lines, whitewashes any wrong by the government and nation-fuelling nationalism, furthering the disregard of conflict within Japan that has been brought about because of power and privilege. It is but another detractor away from inequality within the country and deviance that is associated with it.

As Sugimoto (2003, p 2) aptly puts it: 'While every society is unique in some way, Japan is particularly unusual in having so many people who believe that their country is unique.' And, this sentiment of Japan's uniqueness is perhaps shared even more so outside of Japan. Pulvers (2006a) brought up this very point in an excellent critique of the very popular Hollywood movie *Memoirs of a Geisha*. His poignant remarks point out the distorted 'unique' image of Japan in popular fiction and movies. Hollywood has a history in the 'Japan market' of presenting the 'exotic' at the expense of 'reality' since it reinforces and confirms stereotypes making such productions popular and profitable. A few of Pulver's insightful and knowledgeable comments are presented here (Pulvers, 2006a, p 16).

> Stereotypes die hard, and none more so than outsiders stereotypes of Japan. Time and again, they are not so much reinvented as recycled, using potent but often semi-mythical symbols from a potpourri of favorite bygone eras. In the end, they tell us more about the foreigners who have dredged them up than anything genuinely Japanese.
>
> Two key themes are whitewashed in "Memoirs of a Geisha."
>
> First, the entire system of recruiting young girls for work in the *okiyacho* (red light district) was one of institutionalized slavery. While it is true, as the film points out on a number of occasions, that the elite among the geisha were not prostitutes (though many, as the favorites of wealthy patrons, were kept women), the institution lent an aura of cultural legitimacy to the enslavement of hundreds of thousands of girls and women who were forced into the sex trade in the major cities and virtually every provincial town in arch-sexist traditional Japan.
>
> The second issue arises from a gross omission. The generous entrepreneur, known as The Chairman, is beholden to his comrade-in-arms, Nobu. The latter's face has been disfigured in battle. Nobu apparently saved The Chairman's life when they were fighting for the Imperial cause in Manchuria. In fact, "Memoirs of a Geisha" skirts the issue of war responsibility entirely, save for a few voice-over broadcasts of Hitler's progress through a distant Europe.
>
> However, the Japanese military establishment was the major customer of the *okiyacho* around Japan, and tens of thousands of women were forced to be so-called comfort women by and for the Japanese military, having to endure mass rape in Japan and its far-flung colonies for the glory of the empire.
>
> Whatever the filmmakers' motive in recycling an antiquated fabrication, there was nothing mysterious or exotic about the world of the *okiyacho* to those who were chained to its walls. By producing this visual and moral euphemism, its creators have only prettified and distorted what was a ruthless institution akin to the modern trafficking of women; they have also raised yet another opaque screen in front of what Japan once was – and what it is today.

Put together, the monopoly by the dominant subculture group in the dissemination of public information, schisms within subordinate subcultures, portrayal of Japanese as victims, the profit motive in business and the entertainment industry both at home and abroad and neglect of academia has led to a general ignorance of inequality and its link to deviance within Japanese society. This book hopes to fill in this gap by bringing out the complexity and dynamism of conflict, inequality and deviance, real components of everyday life among youth and foreign migrants in their struggle to make it in Japanese society.

Actual social class differentials and the inequality of subordinate subcultural groups and clashes with the dominant subcultural group in Japan are not at all

unique or that different from other modern democratic capitalistic societies. Cross-cultural comparisons, however, are not the subject of this book; rather, I simply seek to demonstrate that conflict, inequality and deviance are a very active force in everyday life and an important and integral feature of Japanese society. In these regards, that Japan is not that different from other societies is a bolster for the social sciences that advocates universality in its theories and concepts, not myths of culture as some would like us to believe.

Methodology

The compilation of data for this book goes back nearly 30 years when this author first engaged in fieldwork on a subordinate subculture group in Japan (Yoder, 1983, 1986, 1995, 2004, 2008; see Appendix 1 for more details on methodology). With 11 years of residence in Japan in the 1970s and 1980s combined with now continual residence in-country since 1991 or a total of 30 years living in Japan, observations of 'what is going on' has been central to the organisation and perspective of this book. Also, a thorough review of the literature and popular media regarding youth and foreign residents in Japan took place once research for this book began in the summer of 2005.

The focus of this book is directed towards the experiences of people who are the subject of attention, that is, youth and foreign migrants. The perspective presented attempts to portray the lives of these subordinate subcultural group members through their eyes rather than of those who wield power over them.

Outline of the book

Each chapter proceeds in approximately the same manner. The defining features of the subordinate subculture group and the group's class and status position in Japanese society are first discussed. Issues of inequality and conflict with the dominant subculture group are then brought up. Next, the internal division and strife within the subordinate subculture group such as within-class differences receive attention especially as they relate to identity, subcultural group consciousness and policing within the group itself. The deviance characteristic of each subculture group given their particular subordinate subculture status and position is described in detail and related to inequality. Finally, the role of organisations in the support of the subordinate subculture group and conflict with the dominant subculture group that comes about as a result of different interests concludes the chapter.

Chapter Two focuses on youth, their limited rights and powerlessness, relentless and discriminate social controls over them and their rebellion against adult authority. The social reproduction of class and its interconnection with youth deviance is highlighted, seen as a function of maintaining the status quo manipulated through the power and class privileges of the dominant subculture group. Chapter Three focuses on the tight social controls, discrimination against

and very limited rights of foreign migrants. Their situation resembles that of a lower caste and deviance comes about in reaction to their subservient status. Chapter Four consolidates information presented in the first three chapters and applies labelling conflict theory to explain and describe inequality and deviance for youth and foreign migrants equally applicable to other subordinate subcultural groups. Chapter Five concludes the book and brings forth suggestions for future research in the study of inequality and deviance in Japan.

TWO

Japanese youth: inequality and deviance

The modern-day concept of youth

It has only been in the modern-day era that adolescence has become a separate category from adulthood. Before modernisation, youth had the same rights as adults and, should they violate social norms, faced the same punishment (Kassebaum, 1974, pp 80–5). Age was not a legal and social barrier to work, setting up a household and participating in community life. Parents, relatives and the community were mainly responsible for their young, with little or no intervention from the state. The onset of modernisation brought greater state control over human activity and institutions became formalised and regulated by the state. In order to limit competition in the workforce and because of the greater need for education in a rapidly technologically based society, the concept of adolescence was born. Adolescence became a subcultural category defined and characterised by state controls, restrictions, limitation of rights and mandatory activity such as school attendance. In short, youth became an object of control by the state and today are powerless as a group.

The powerlessness of youth makes them a most vulnerable target of the dominant subculture group. This is exacerbated in that youth are also at an age of rebellion and idealism apt to question the status quo in search of a new and better tomorrow (Erickson, 1978). Youth are more in tune with the present than adults and the past and tradition has far less meaning to them. This is particularly so in today's information and high technology society, where personal computers, mobile phones and instant global information are as familiar to youth as letter writing, public telephone booths and libraries were to the older generation. The gap today between the generations is wide and, in Japan as with other modern societies, the social control of youth gives us an insight into how the dominant subculture group goes about in an attempt to maintain the status quo in the midst of an increasingly smaller world.

It is important to keep in mind that social control measures over youth have not been of their making. That is, they have had no say over the way the state decides to control them. They are considered dependants of their parent(s) or guardians and subjected to special state laws that define their status as adolescents within society. In Japan, institutional policies and laws affecting youth are national as Japan operates under a national police agency and national educational system. With minor regional, prefecture and city variations, youth, legally encompassing

the ages from 13 to 20 years of age, are subjected to nation-wide institutional controls regarding their behaviour, rights, duties and obligations. For example, compulsory education up to nine years of schooling is required for all Japanese adolescents and all adolescents are liable for punishment under Japan's National Penal Code that includes special criminal law offences that apply only to them.

The most significant national institutional controls over youth are that of crime and education. Not only are controls extensive and far-ranging but they have also escalated through the years, increasing the state's mandates and supervision over youth behaviour. In crime this has meant an increase of juvenile criminal laws and delinquency prevention measures and in education further state control over schools, teachers and the educational curriculum. We will begin with crime controls.

The criminal justice system and its official and non-official (private organisations, volunteers and so on) agencies maintain crime controls over youth that mainly cover surveillance, apprehension, guidance, arrests, disposition, adjudication and punishment of crimes and crime prevention activities. Youth are not only liable for the same crimes as adults but are also subjected to punishment for violation of pre-delinquent or youth status offences, commonly referred to as misbehaviour. These special youth criminal offences fall under the precept of pre-delinquency in Japan's Penal Code referred to as 'crime-prone juveniles' (guhan shōnen in Japanese) or 'unwholesome-activity juveniles' (furyō kōi shōnen in Japanese) (Ames, 1981, p 77).

In actual practice, the far majority of pre-delinquent cases that result in police action against the erring offender are placed under the category of 'unwholesome-activity juveniles' also called misbehaving juveniles. Pre-delinquent cases of 'crime-prone juveniles' are usually sent to the family court for adjudication while those of 'misbehaving juveniles' are not (Yoder, 1986, pp 6-7; Hanzai Hakusho, 2009, pp 136-7). Disposition in pre-delinquent cases of 'misbehaving juveniles' result in official act(s) of guidance (youth reprimanded for their misbehaviour), a police record, and parents and often the schools (middle schools but seldom high schools) or for, working youth, place of employment are notified of the misconduct (Ames, 1981, pp 83-4). Below, a list of status offences based on types of misbehaviour acts indicates the wide range of criminal acts that apply only to youth (Kiyonaga, 1982, pp 2-3):

> 1) carrying a weapon; 2) rough behaviour; 3) quarrelsome; 4) runaway; 5) curfew violation; 6) truancy; 7) sexual enticement; 8) being naughty; 9) impure relationship (a sexual relation) with the opposite sex; 10) alcohol (drinking alcohol) violation; 11) tobacco (smoking cigarettes) abuse; 12) unhealthy amusements: frequenting a pachinko parlor, bar, club or cabaret, porno theater or places off-limits to youth; 13) reading a pornographic magazine; 14) member of a gang; 15) drug abuse (sniff glue or paint thinner) and 16) unsound companionship (contact with persons of a youth or adult gang etc).

Kassebaum (1974) noted some years ago that criminalisation and decriminalisation or the adding and subtracting of crime controls are part of a political process. As such, Kassbaum (1974, p 72) stated:

> Because of this political basis of criminalization and decriminalization, it is to be expected that mass societies (urbanized, industrialized, democratized, bureaucraticized) should have higher crime rates and more rapid change of what is defined as crime than do nonindustrialized, communal societies.

The dialectical of criminalisation and decriminalisation creates an uncertainty of what is and how to control juvenile crime since that is dependent on the interests and perspectives of those in power at the moment. This lack of stability and rapid social change in modern capitalistic democratic societies like Japan somewhat accounts for the ever-changing configuration of controls and youth crime itself. Throughout the post-war years, the waxes and wanes of juvenile guidance and arrests in Japan, elsewhere as well, can be partially attributed to politics and changes in the laws and controls over youth behaviour.

In Japan, delinquency prevention activities appreciably increased in the late 1970s by expanding the police force, establishing more police and community delinquency prevention programmes and passing the Business Affecting Public Morals law (*shin fuzoku eigyō hō* in Japanese), further restricting youth behaviour in public places (Yokoyama, 1989, 1997; Yoder, 2004). This was followed by a movement towards major changes in the juvenile law in the 1990s, assisted by the mass media frenzy in sensationalising juvenile crimes (Schwarzenegger, 2003).

Numerous changes increasing criminalisation and delinquent controls over youths have occurred in this new millennium. A crackdown on younger-aged youth has come about by lowering the age of criminal liability (liability or accountability allows for a more severe disposition and adjudication of the crime(s) committed by the youngster) from 16 to 14 years old and a change in the Penal Code allowing for criminal prosecution as an adult for youngsters 16 years and older charged with homicide (*The Japan Times*, 2000, p 1; Schwarzenegger, 2003; Yoder, 2004). The minimum age of 14 for detention in juvenile centres and reformatories has been lowered to 12 years old, which may even apply to eleven year olds; previously detention of youth under 14 years old took place in family-like facilities (Ito, 2007b; *The Japan Times*, 2007g, p 2). The police have been given additional powers that now include the rights to summon minors for questioning and conduct searches and seize evidence in their homes not only in the investigation of juvenile crimes but even if they suspect that a child is likely to commit crime(s) (*The Japan Times*, 2004a, p 2, 2004b, p 3; Ito, 2007b). Finally, provisions have been made to make it easier to send minors on probation to reformatories for failing to comply with preset rules (*The Japan Times*, 2007g, p 2).

Community and police crime prevention activities

Crime prevention in Japan is quite extensive particularly in regards to adolescents. Most neighbourhoods in Japan have a community association (*chōnai kai* in Japanese) and within the association an organised crime prevention unit (*bōhan kai* in Japanese). The *bōhan kai* patrol neighbourhoods and are especially on the watch for youth deviant behaviour. Neighbourhoods have ordinary households that serve as police checkpoints (*bōhan renrakushō* in Japanese), informing the police of suspect youth and youth crime. Volunteer adults, usually of an older age, patrol places where youth hang out, offering guidance although they have no official authority to apprehend the offending youth. The school and police actively work together in school–police coordinating councils (Yoder, 1986; Foljanty-Jost, 2000). The police may notify the schools of their students who have committed crime(s) and the schools inform the police of any particular student trouble that may warrant police intervention. The police and teachers often team up and go on patrols for the purpose of catching youth in 'the wrong'.

The list of other complementary delinquency prevention organisations is quite long. Adult-sponsored delinquency control programmes are a central feature of such organisations as Youth League, Volunteers of the Police, juvenile guidance centres, volunteer probation officers, local assemblies for youth development, YWCA, Boy and Girl Scouts, P.T.A. and Big Sister and Big Brother organisations (Ames, 1981; Yoder, 1986; Foljanty-Jost, 2000; Minei, 2003).

'Delinquency prevention' is a misleading term since surveillance activities, apprehension and monitoring the youth offender are its defining characteristics, not preventing delinquency. Excepting organisations that offer youth an opportunity to engage in social activities such as YMCA and Boy and Girl Scouts, delinquency prevention connotes adult control and sanctions of youth deviant behaviour, a one-sided and un-trusting relationship in preventing delinquency.

Youth have no rights nor any input into delinquency prevention matters. The success of delinquency prevention programmes is enhanced if youth are motivated to go along with these programmes and feel that they have some say in the matter and, yet, only adults are in charge of the whole gamut of delinquency prevention. Furthermore, delinquency prevention activities are class based, with greater police and volunteer adult activity occurring in working-class residential communities or in entertainment districts located in lower-class areas (Mizushima, 1973; Yoder, 2004). Quite a few delinquency prevention activities run contrary to the United Nations (UN) guidelines for the prevention of juvenile delinquency, particularly the UN's precept that (Minei, 2003, p 211) '[y]oung persons should have an active role and partnership within society and should not be considered as mere objects of socialization and control'.

While inequality characterises institutional delinquency controls, this does not mean that adults involved in delinquency prevention are necessarily coercive or that guidance is not effective, as much depends on the individuals involved and nature of the adults' delinquency prevention measures. Sources have found

both ameliorative and negative outcomes of adult controls in dealing with youth problem behaviour (Ames, 1981; Kiyonaga, 1982; DeVos and Wagatsuma, 1984; Foljanty-Jost and Metzler, 2003; Yoder, 2004). Also, local variances in regards to teachers, adult volunteers involved with youth in different capacities, youth counsellors and other social control agents have to be taken into account to adequately assess the actual affect of delinquency prevention. The inequality lies in the fact that youth are solely the recipients of a myriad of adult control measures. Furthermore, youth are powerless to the logistics or where adult social control agents decide to concentrate their efforts of controls, what youths are targeted and the means of control (although there are limitations) that adults decide to use.

Educational reforms

The conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has maintained control over the government for the past four decades. Education has been of major concern for the ruling party. Their educational policies are a powerful force in the socialisation of youth as educational reforms extend to all schools in the nation.

While national educational changes have taken place since the Occupational (1945-52) transformation of Japan's pre-war education, dramatic reforms in education advocating greater attention to traditional values began most notably in 1985 with the passing of a Bill in the Diet (Japan's bicameral legislature) for the official establishment of an Ad Hoc Council on Education (*Rinji Kyouiku Shingikai* in Japanese), championed by the-then LDP Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (Hood, 2001, pp 42-3). Justification given for the need of an Ad Hoc Council on Education marking a significant change in the tone and future of education in Japan was accomplished by appealing to the cultural uniqueness of Japan and harking on Japan as a victim of the allied powers.

A trend towards conservative educational reforms was signalled soon after Nakasone became Prime Minister of Japan in 1982. In 1983, an official statement by the Minister of Education, Setoyama Mitsuo, received wide public attention, setting the course for the Ad Hoc Council on Education. The minister blamed a purported increasingly hostile youth culture on the American-led Occupation and the post-war educational system it enforced on Japan:

> The deepest root (of juvenile violence) is the influence of Occupation policies (after World War II). The Occupation Policy was aimed at destroying Confucian morality and customs which existed in the past in Japan.
>
> The educational minister's remedy was:
>
> We should study old-fashioned teaching methods. The juvenile delinquency problem is not a problem merely for the Education

> Ministry, but a problem which should be tackled seriously by the school, family, society, and the country as a whole. (Yoder, 1986, p 291)

Yoneyama (1999, pp 142-54) argues that Japan's educational system has become increasingly more nationalistic over the years, with greater state control over teachers and students, upgrading of moral education and a more thorough and nationalistic textbook screening process by the Ministry of Education. This nationalistic trend began in earnest with the establishment of Nakasone's Ad Hoc Council on Education as Yoneyama (1999, p 109) stated:

> The members of Nakasone Cabinet's Ad Hoc Council on Education included conservative nationalistic bureaucratic and business leaders unified around the demand for the revision of the Fundamental Law of Education (Kamata, 1995: 256). One of the major proposals put forward by the Council was that the 'eternal, unchanging traditions' of Japan be given greater emphasis, that the mythic dimensions of Japanese nationalism be restored, and that a tightly controlled form of moral education be implemented (Horio, 1988: 366). [I]n the end, the nationalistic programme was accomplished in 1989; the order to hoist *Hinomaru* [Japan's national flag] and sing *Kimigayo* [Japan's national anthem] at all school ceremonies. Although this had to some extent been practiced previously, the 1989 policy 'guideline' was accompanied with the comment that teachers who resisted this policy would be disciplined. At the same time, the content of textbooks was revised considerably, along the lines of glorifying the nationalistic history of Japan while erasing the references to aggression of the Japanese military during World War Two, and deleting any elements of peace education from textbooks.

The Ad Hoc Council on Education recommended 'moral education' through state directed readings. The Ministry of Education then distributed free to all schools selected readings on moral education. Over time, while some teachers objected to increased moral education, by 1993 all elementary and lower secondary schools had developed teaching plans for moral education in the school curriculum using supplementary readings (Hood, 2001, pp 82-3).

The legacy of the Ad Hoc Council on Education (which officially ended in 1987) continued with numerous educational reforms increasing the state's grip over the schools. While the reforms have been extensive and include a wide range of diverse subjects in cross-subject learning such as computer use, they have increased state control, creating a wider 'rights' inequality gap between the state and those directly involved in education, namely educators and students. The most prominent reforms along these lines are as follows:

- There has been a change in textbook screening, making it more difficult for publishers to negotiate and gain the Ministry of Education's approval. The state has gained more power over what is written in textbooks, replacing teachers (who are more liberal) with local boards of education in the selection of textbooks and all textbooks require the approval of the Ministry of Education (Yoneyama, 1999, pp 83, 148-54; Arita, 2001; *The Japan Times*, 2001b, p 2).
- In 1987, longer probation periods for new teachers placed them under one year of surveillance by their supervisors, evaluations being based on a subjective criterion of 'possessing comprehensive characteristics as a person'. In essence, Yoneyama (1999, p 82) states that this subjective criterion means that during the probation period teachers must demonstrate 'obedience to seniors, uncritical thinking, and support for nationalistic practices'.
- *Nikkyōso* (Japan's Teachers Union), a liberal entity of education, has become a less viable source of opposition to the state's increasing control over education. *Nikkyōso* not only aims to improve the salaries and working conditions of public school teachers and rise up their social and political status but has also been 'keen on promoting democracy, equality and peace among students' (Kamiya, 2008b, p 3). The membership of *Nikkyōso* among public school teachers has steadily dropped through the years from nearly 90% in the late 1950s to around 50% in the early 1980s and it reached a post-war low of less than 30% in 2007 (Kamiya, 2008b, p 3).
- *Nikkyōso* has come under attack by conservative politicians in this new millennium for being opposed to promoting nationalism in schools. Future opposition by *Nikkyōso* has been effectively weakened through a revision to the Ministry of Education guidelines in 2008, which expects schools to appoint teachers responsible enough to make sure that the state's nationalistic-centred moral education programme is carried out correctly (Kamiya, 2008a, p 2, 2008b, p 3; *The Japan Times*, 2008j, p 1). The sharp drop over time in *Nikkyōso* membership among public school teachers and diluted power to oppose increased state controls over the nation's public schools is reflected in a shift to reconcile differences with *Monbushō* (the Ministry of Education). For example, in 1995, a statement from *Nikkyōso* read: 'it would no longer form opposition to *Monbushō* but work in cooperation with it' (Yoneyama, 1999, p 83).
- There have been new grading procedures pressuring students to conform to the state's objectives. Students are now required to perform and be graded on community service. Also, middle-school students are given grades on their attitudes, cooperation and participation in school activities. These new grades are used as criteria for recommendation for high-school entrance.
- Grading students on 'love of country' has increased in elementary schools based on objectives of the Ministry of Education Ministry to foster patriotism in social studies (*The Japan Times*, 2006b, p 2).
- The state in this new millennium has advocated that parents adhere to a set pattern of child socialisation practices that includes more home discipline by the father and improved social education at home. The government provides

guidelines to parents in the socialisation of their children (Yoneyama, 1999, pp 10-12; Hanai, 2000; Kreitz-Sandberg, 2000; *The Japan Times*, 2001b, p 2, 2002a, p 2, 2002c, p 2; Fujita, 2003).

- A major revision of the Fundamental Law of Education 1947 passed both houses in the Diet and was enacted into law in June 2007. This revision is the most dramatic nationalistic shift of educational law and policy in the post-war era. The reference of 'respecting the value of the individual' in the Fundamental Law of Education 1947 was removed and replaced with putting into effect 'love of country' as central to education. This new revision requires educators to instil in their students 'love of the nation and homeland, and respect for its traditions and culture' (*The Japan Times*, 2006b, p 16, 2006d, pp 1-2; Nakamura, 2007b, p 2).
- With 'love of country' and patriotism now central to education, Ministry of Education-revised education curriculum guidelines were set forth in 2008 for elementary and junior high schools, to be fully implemented in the next few years. The guidelines call 'for promoting patriotism and for making children between the first and sixth grade sing the "Kimigayo" national anthem' (*The Japan Times*, 2008d, p 1). Inherent to these guidelines, the Ministry of Education stated: 'Moral education shall be aimed at nurturing respect for [Japan's] tradition and culture, and sentiment of loving our country and our homeland that have cultivated them … and at cultivating morality' (*The Japan* Time, 2008d, p 1).

The government's organisation of educational reforms that has been responsible for changes in education is complicated, involving numerous conferences, councils and different perspectives. The basic contemporary organisational framework centres on, as Kreitz-Sandberg (2000, p 8) puts it, 'educational reform for the 21st century'. Government reforms are consistent with the basic philosophy of Nakasone's Ad Hoc Council on Education, also referred to as the National Council of Education, this resurgence markedly coming about in 1996 when LDP Prime Minister Hashimoto proposed nationwide educational reforms aimed at ridding Japan of the Occupation's post-war educational policies (Kreitz-Sandberg, 2000; Fujita, 2003). This led to the establishment of a National Council of Education Reform (NCER), which acted as an advisory committee to the Ministry of Education that then set up a 'Rainbow Plan' in 2001 based on NCER's proposals for policy reforms and revision of a number of education laws (Fujita, 2003, pp 162-3). One of three general categories of NCER's reform proposals, all of which have since been enacted, targeted moral education, as summed up below:

> nationalistic and moralistic curriculum reforms such as the introduction of quasi-compulsory service activities in elementary and secondary education and a revision of the Fundamental Education Law in order to emphasize the importance of moral education, love for one's family, locality and country, and the spirit of social services. (Fujita, 2003, p 164)

Specific curriculum changes drafted by the Curriculum Council in 1998, one of many councils set up by the government for national educational reforms, took effect in 2002 (Kreitz-Sandberg, 2000, pp 9-10). Under the guise of cross-subject learning, also commonly referred to as consolidated studies learning (*sōgō gakushu* in Japanese), moral education along with other subjects, such as the ageing society and internet learning, increased with each grade from 4th grade of primary school, reaching up to 210 lessons per year by the time of one's high-school education (Kreitz-Sandberg, 2000, p 10). Today, while lesson plans for the actual subjects of cross-subject learning taught vary by the schools and there is confusion over how and what to teach, cross-subject learning is an integral part of school life (Bjork, 2006).

Gregory Clark, the only non-Japanese member of Japan's National Conference on Educational Reform in 2000 wrote (Clark, 2000, p 18):

> [T]he government's first priority was reform of the Fundamental Law of Education allegedly imposed on Japan in 1947 by the US Occupation authorities (in fact, progressive Japanese scholars were the main drafters). That law in effect revoked the 1890 Meiji period Rescript on Education. Its [Occupation educational reforms] emphasis on rights rather than obligations, on fostering respect for truth and peace rather than loyalty to the state, has resulted in it being seen as a major cause of current problems.
>
> Stricter discipline, stronger moral education and greater national pride in both schools and families were seen as the main solution.

The government-appointed National Council of Educational Reform appeals for change of the Fundamental Law of Education in this new millennium, like its predecessor the Ad Hoc Council on Education, consistently harked on the need for schools to foster patriotism and that it is the duty of education to develop students' love of one's home and country and instil in them respect for tradition and culture (Hanai, 2000; *The Japan Times*, 2001a, p 2, 2002b, p 3, 2002c, p 2; Fujita, 2003). Hidenori Fujita, professor of education at the University of Tokyo, once a member of a national commission council on educational reforms, commented on what went on in these sessions. He mentioned that the reform movement members brought up problems of an unruly youth to justify proposed revisions but that the reforms had nothing to do with youth problem behaviour (Arita, 2002; Fujita, 2003, p 160). He added that patriotism promoted by the government as a reform measure to quell youth deviance has no merit as a solution to any youth problem; rather, it merely reflects the ideology among right-wingers in the LDP (Arita, 2002; Fujita, 2003). And noticeably absent in all national reforms are the issues of most importance in the problems of youth deviance and Japanese education: class and gender inequality (Kreitz-Sandberg, 2000; Sato, 2001; Yoder, 2004).

Authoritarianism in secondary schools

The nationalistic surge of educational reforms since the 1980s has brought about alarm among Japanese scholars that education has become increasingly authoritarian or, as Yoneyama (1999, p 72) asserted, the paradigm has now shifted from a democratic to an autocratic form. Secondary schools, however, in post-war Japan have always been organised and run in an authoritarian manner with distinct hierarchical ranks and protocol, uniforms and strict school regulations. Such an organisational structure has a number of implications for youth in relation to inequality and deviance.

Schools are hierarchical and authoritarian, a chain of command that begins at the Prime Minister's office and flows downward to the Ministry of Education, then to school authorities at the prefecture level, next to school principals and then finally to the ranks of teachers. As a national educational system, escalation of state controls in educational reforms and weakening of opposition groups (for example *Nikkyōso*), the government today has gained more control over what goes on in schools. Within schools, school personnel (school principals, counsellors and teachers) have unquestionable authority over students; and uniformity and conformity are the main guidelines for accomplishing school objectives and goals. The purpose of education is to both comply with state objectives and adapt to the local educational and socioeconomic needs of students and the community.

Schools, as Sugimoto (2003, p 131) noted, impose militaristic ethics upon their students. Except for private schools, uniforms are not required to be worn in elementary school and it is only at this time where nurturing, not discipline, is the dominant feature of school management. The crackdown on students begins in middle school or during the early transition from childhood to adolescence and continues through high school. Letendre (2000, p 74) observed school life at a few Japanese middle schools and noted that the schools rationalised and practised the application of strict controls because they believed that:

> Puberty is part of a natural burst of growth and energy in the life course that signals the time has come for strict discipline and training. The concern over giving students correct guidance can be seen in the amount of effort that teachers put into student guidance or lifestyle guidance. Tremendous amounts of teacher time and energy went into organizing every aspect of the students' lives. The adolescent's life, his or her dreams, worries, hopes, are open to the teacher's inspection through a variety of interventions such as diaries, reflective essays, or home visits.

School uniforms are mandatory from middle school through high school and that is just the beginning of control measures over the dress and behaviour of students. Letendre (2000, p 55), in his field study of Japanese middle schools, made the following comment:

> Japanese schools demand tremendous conformity in external presentation. In addition to school uniforms, schools require students to behave with certain decorum coming and going from school. Any irregularities in the basic routine – whether an incorrect uniform, use of nail polish, or too much talking at student assembly – were interpreted as signaling potential problems in either individual or group routine.

Order, discipline and obedience are the cardinal rules of secondary schools. School regulations abound on how the uniform is worn, there are detailed rules on cut and style of hair, restrictions on such items as ribbons in one's hair, personal-looking hand bags and body ornaments and rigid controls over student behaviour inside and outside the classroom. There is a pecking order to following these rules: first-year students are expected to obey and show deference to second- and third-year students, second-year students are expected to be subservient to third-year students and all students without question are to respect and obey teachers and school authority.

It is not just in the schools that teachers wage complete control over students: teachers also attend to students' behaviour outside of school. Teachers patrol youth hang-outs in places such as game centres, pachinko parlours and street corners, looking to catch their students in the wrong. Students are instructed by teachers where they can and cannot go during summer holidays. And the school uniform catches the 'eyes' of the public and the police, all of whom through gestures or actions constantly remind students of their subordinate 'rank and status' in society.

Teacher violence has been reported to occur at many secondary schools, with teachers physically punishing students such as hitting, slapping or kicking them (Yoder, 1986, pp 155-6, 190, 193-4; Okano and Tsuchiya, 1999, pp 208-9; Yoneyama, 1999, pp 91-117; Letendre, 2000, p 107; Foljanty-Jost and Metzler, 2003, p 261; Yoder, 2004, pp 53, 84). Teacher violence is unpredictable: students are not sure of what kind of behaviour will result in physical punishment. Wearing the wrong-coloured socks, using an unauthorised pencil or a certain physical appearance can result in a teacher striking a student (Yoneyama, 1999, p 98; Yoder, 2004, p 83). Yoneyama (1999, pp 90-5, 166-77) noted that the consequences of teacher violence are enormous, resulting in injury, some quite serious, immeasurable psychological trauma and repercussions that lead students to do the same in copycat behaviour (*ijime*), tormenting weaker students (Yoneyama, 1999,pp 90-5, 166-77).

While secondary schools are relatively strict and teacher violence is not uncommon, a number of considerations must be taken into account. Teachers in general are not coercive in carrying out their roles and student familiarity with, obedience to and the number of school rules vary from one school to another. Also, the application, enforcement and punishment for violation of school rules may be relaxed or when broken little made of it (Rohlen, 1983; Letendre, 2000; Foljanty-Jost and Metzler, 2003). There is much variability of compliance and

conflict among secondary schools and this has much to do with class ecology, the subject we now turn to.

Class and education

Whether praised or criticised, studies on Japanese education by both Japanese and non-Japanese agree that Japanese secondary schools exert tight social controls over their students. What is missing in these works, however, are the contexts and variability of school controls and how this relates to inequality and youth deviance. That is, it is not that schools maintain tight controls over the students that ties in with student deviance, in fact, some have argued that such detailed attention and supervision over student thought, demeanour and behaviour deter non-conformity (Vogel, 1980; Kanazawa and Miller, 2000; Letendre, 2000; Foljanty-Jost and Metzler, 2003). Furthermore, since Japanese children are socialised at home and in elementary school to adapt to detailed adult attentions given to uniformity, conformity, discipline and differential hierarchical status-based relationships, school controls in secondary schools are more or less an extension of social-cultural practices (Allison, 1996, pp 135-52; Kerr, 2001, pp 282-90). The problem is, rather, that inequality structurally built into the hierarchical rank-order school system enhances deviant behaviour. Class ecology and class culture are the key components to understand conflict within schools, youth deviance and its repercussions on the social reproduction of class.

Education is based on middle-class values, school teachers and counsellors predominantly come from the middle class and those in the top positions of educational authority (predominantly dominant subculture group members such as school principals and upper-level bureaucrats in the Ministry of Education) are upper class. This is crucial since the whole gamut of education such as required courses, textbooks, expected student and teacher behaviour and student academic performance, criteria used to succeed in academics, stratification of schools and so on are based on the ideals, values and norms of the dominant subculture group and carried out by the middle class. Education is a competitive, middle-class, achievement-oriented system with an emphasis on entrance into the best schools, with little attention given to the class differential means as a way to obtain these ends.

Japan's educational system is based on six years of elementary school, three years of middle school and three years of high school with mandatory education of nine years although nearly all or around 97% of students go on to high school (Sugimoto, 2003). Students attend local public or private elementary and middle schools. Private schools cater to higher-class families, are much more expensive than public schools and the higher the status of the school the more difficult it is to enter. Private schools are interlinked; some schools are connected from elementary school through college, although most private schools co-join junior and senior high schools.

High school entrance is not automatic or based on residence. Students must qualify to attend high school and high schools are ranked (based on the *hensachi*, a school ranking measurement system) from low to high: the lower the rank, the easier it is to enter. Entrance into different ranked private and public high schools depends on teacher recommendation, middle-school grades, aptitude test(s) and high-school entrance examination: the better the results, the higher the rank of high school a student is allowed to enter. As the rank of high school is the most determinant factor for college entrance, academic preparation begins from the cradle in favour of the higher class.

As Sugimoto (2003, p 120) puts it, 'Education in Japan is an expensive business.' Only public elementary and middle schools are tuition free. Yearly costs of cram schools (*juku*) and private schools together are out of the financial reach of most working-class families; a good *juku* and private school cutting into at least one half of the average individual yearly working-class income of Japanese ¥2,929,000 (about US $29,290) (Hashimoto, 2003, p 96).

Class advantage in education shows itself very early, as children as young as three and four years old compete for entrance into costly elite pre-schools, which streamline students into expensive private schools, some all the way to college entrance. More commonly, parents pay for expensive after-school preparatory schools (*juku*) and private tutoring during their child's elementary school days, enabling their child to gain admission into private expensive middle schools linked to the same high school or to prepare them for entrance into the best public high school. Nearly 70% of all students from elementary school through high school receive what Sugimoto (2003, pp 120-21) calls 'shadow education', mostly in the form of *juku* attendance and tutoring. It is also students of the higher class whose family can afford a 'shadow education', using this extra education to their advantage. Rohlen (1983, p 130) reported that in Kobe about twice the number of students at higher-ranked schools (mostly students from higher-class families) attended *juku* or received private tutoring than students at low-ranked high schools (mostly students from lower-class families). Other studies support Rohlen's (1983) findings; in short, the enterprise of 'shadow education' is expensive, catering to families with a surplus of income and that puts working-class families at a distinct disadvantage (Woronoff, 1981; Sugimoto, 2003; Yoder, 2004).

Class differences are also reflected in the home environment. Mothers in higher-class families have a higher level of education than working-class mothers and because of a higher family income less likely to be employed outside of the home. Combined with a greater likelihood of being a housewife, higher-class mothers are better equipped to attend to their child's education than working-class mothers (Yoder, 2004).

Class disadvantage clearly comes across in the case of single-parent families, the far majority of whom are single-parent mothers. Not only do they suffer economic hardship and usually have a low level of completed education, single parents are not at home to assist in their child's education and their children are

highly over-represented among students at low-ranked high schools (Rohlen, 1983, p 130; Yoder, 2004; Spiri, 2007).

The high costs of a college education with few available and of a low monetary value scholarships further discourages working-class families from investing in their child's education (paying for *juku* or tutoring). Twenty-five per cent of universities are public universities, the least expensive but also most difficult to enter, and even tuition fees exceed 10% of the national average annual income of salary workers (Sugimoto, 2003, p 120). Private universities, the largest number of universities, are much more expensive than public universities. They have high entrance fees and tuition at some of these universities costs more than the average national annual income of salary workers (Sugimoto, 2003, p 120).

Succinctly, family income and home environment favour students of the higher class. It is predominantly students from higher-class families who gain entrance to private, expensive, higher-ranked high schools or high-ranked public high schools, virtually guaranteeing college entrance, with the top-ranked high schools consistently leading the field in their students gaining college admission to the top universities (Cummings, 1980; Rohlen, 1983; Yoneyama, 1999; Sugimoto, 2003; Yoder, 2004). It is predominately working-class students who either finish their education after middle school or attend low-ranked high schools, most going straight to work after school graduation (Rohlen, 1983; Sugimoto, 2003; Yoder, 2004).

The working class and class culture

Along with the social and economic disadvantages of the working class, class culture is central to understanding the different class 'realities' of students and their predisposition towards academic achievement. Willis (1977, p 172) gives us an insight into class cultural reproduction in England, equally characteristic of Japan and other modern democratic capitalistic societies:

> The essence of the cultural and of cultural forms in our capitalist society is their contribution towards the creative, uncertain and tense social reproduction of distinctive kinds of relationships. Cultural reproduction in particular, always carries with it the possibility of producing – indeed in a certain sense it really lives out – alternative outcomes. The main relationships which cultural forms help to reproduce are those of its members to the basic class groupings of society and with the productive process.

Class as a culture or subculture within the larger societal culture, is about family and informal groupings where personal relationships form identities, provide meaning, make clear one's place within society and give direction to future aspirations and goals (Willis, 1977, pp 172-3). Willis (1977, p 172) noted that class cultural variations facilitating class reproduction 'stretch from language to

systematic kinds of physical interaction; from particular kinds of attitude, response, action and ritualized behavior to expressive artifacts and concrete objects'. In regards to the middle-class enterprise of education, academic achievement and getting ahead in life through education are an integral part of higher-class but not working-class culture (Willis, 1977, pp 176-79, 185-92).

Hashimoto's (2003, pp 58-9, 89) Marxian classification of the working class in Japan as blue-collar, sales and service workers and part-time and temporary workers, all of whom also have the lowest levels of income and economic capital (property, financial assets and marketable goods) includes 37% of the male and 57% of the female working population; the working-class percentage of females is inflated since it includes clerical workers. The Marxian concept of working class also correlates with a Weberian class model as education and occupations of working-class members are low.

The working class share much in common: members sell their labour, they have the least amount of economic power, their lack of ownership of the means of production makes them the most vulnerable to economic downturns and their education and occupational status are at a low level. These commonalities relate to shared life situations and circumstances that set limits on opportunities and choices in the everyday lives of the working class. There are also, however, other conditions that need to be examined in order to clarify just what constitutes the working class and how class culture plays a dominant role in the lives of working-class youth.

Given that socialisation practices, supervision and expectations of academic success for their children particularly by the mother differ widely by parents' education and that the educational background of marriage partners is highly correlated (65% have the same level of education), the completed education of Japanese parents plays a vital role and stands out as a dominant feature of class culture (Sugimoto, 2003, pp 53-6). A strong social stigma in Japan is attached to a single-parent family (predominately single-parent mother) and labelling effects are detrimental to the education of and increase the proclivity towards deviant behaviour for youth in single-parent homes. Coupled with the absence of a parent at home to supervise their child's education and that the occupational status and education of single-parent families are at a low level, single-parent families are considered as a case of the working class.

Class ecology sets the surroundings for the passing on of class culture. Furthermore, parental socialisation differs by social class. From birth, a child comes into contact with relatives, friends of the family and neighbours and develops their own friendships most of whom share in the same class culture. Dress, demeanour, music, mannerisms, leisure activities, topics of conversation, reading materials and so on all reflect on class culture and become integral to a child's identity and behaviour. Early childhood experiences with the class cultural environment sets the stage for the child's adolescent and adult life. The experiences of higher-class child who has gone on family trips to art exhibitions and cultural museums, been exposed to classical music in the home, practised the piano or been read

poetry from an early age, and met their father's foreign colleagues who came to Japan on business or as visiting professors, are quite different from those of a working-class child. A working-class child is one, for example, who has learned how to chop fish and open *sake* (Japanese rice wine) bottles, lived in a home that operates a *majan* (gambling) parlour or has been the centre of attention among truck drivers or factory workers who work at the same job as their parent(s) and such class cultural differences follow into a child's adult lifestyle (Greenfield, 1994; Sugimoto, 2003, pp 53-4; Yoder, 2004, pp 58-125, 144-62).

Communities of the working class in Japan are found in urban centres often located near entertainment districts, residential areas near their place (factories, farms etc) of employment and in low-cost housing areas (Mizushima, 1973; Yoder, 1986; Sugimoto, 2003; Yoder, 2004). Concentrations of the working class are found in certain districts such as Arakawa ward, a suburb of Tokyo, in suburban neighbourhoods of industrial cities and in agricultural areas like that of Ibaraki or in traditionally poor farming districts (Greenfield, 1994; Okano and Tsuchiya, 1999; Sugimoto, 2003; Yoder, 2004). One can find in these locations a web of interrelationships among working-class members essential to the interpersonal dynamics and passing on of class culture.

Considering the above criteria relevant to social class and class culture, a conceptualisation of working-class (synonymous with lower-class) families is as follows. Working-class families consists of two-parent families where both parents' education was in high school or below, their occupations are of a low status and the family resides in an area (housing complex, urban, suburban or rural residential or work centred) occupied mainly by other working-class families. Except for the case whereby the single parent is college educated and at least of a middle-level occupational status, all single-parent families residing in a working-class area are considered working class. Although data are lacking on the number of Japanese families fitting this particular conceptualisation of working-class family, I estimate the range to be somewhere between 20 and 30% of all Japanese families (Sugimoto, 2003, p 35-59; Yoder, 2004, pp 58-60). All other family types are considered higher class.

Class and deviant behaviour

The local middle schools reflect the class background of students who live in the area. While data are limited, troubles at middle school, including gang activity, misbehaviour and student–teacher conflict, have been reported to be more prevalent in working-class areas (DeVos and Wagatsuma, 1984, pp 51-3; Greenfield, 1994; Yoder, 2004). Youth crime is higher and academic achievement lower for working-class compared to higher-class youngsters of a middle-school age (DeVos and Wagatsuma, 1984, pp 78-81; Yonekawa, 2003; Yoder, 2004). Also, lacking a surplus of income, working-class families are unable to afford getting their child out of the working-class environs of the local school by sending them to a private middle school. Deviant behaviour, school troubles and low academic

achievement for working-class middle-school students lead to most either ending their education after middle school or being sent to a low-ranked high school while the more conforming behaviour and higher academic achievement among higher-class middle-school students results in the majority going on to attend a middle- or upper-ranked high school (Rohlen, 1983; Benjamin and James, 1995; Sugimoto, 2003; Yoder, 2004).

School achievement, troubles at school resulting in counselling, self-reported rates of youth crime and official rates of juvenile delinquency tie in with high-school rank. Students at low-ranked high schools do poorer school work and truancy and drop-out rates particularly at night high schools are significantly higher than that of students at higher-ranked high schools (Rohlen, 1983, pp 32, 284; Yoneyama, 1999, p 29; Sugimoto, 2003). Youth deviant behaviour reflected in school counselling for misconduct, self-reported acts of youth crime and police guidance and arrest rates of youth delinquent behaviour are reported as higher in low- compared to middle- and upper-ranked high schools (Rohlen, 1983; Yoder, 2004).

Japan, as any large nation, has regional variations, with different dialects, customs, geography, rural and urban dimensions, ethnic and foreign migrant group concentrations, industries and so on. Cities vary from industrial to cultural (that is, Kyoto) centres and communities within cities contain the very wealthy and the very poor. Subcultural variations largely based on class ecology interconnect with the hierarchical school ranking system and that affects the actual contexts of schools, in particular teacher–student relations, student peer group formation, motivation to achieve and conformity and deviance of students both inside and outside of the schools. The dynamic interplay of class ecology and class culture with what goes on in the schools and how this affects deviance and class reproduction follows, based on a longitudinal field study this author conducted in two contrasting cities and communities in Kanagawa prefecture (Yoder, 1986, 2004).

From 1983 to 1985, fieldwork took place with a focus on deviance and class ecology among youth residing in a working-class community (given a pseudonym of Minami) and a middle-leaning towards upper-class community (given a pseudonym of Hoku). Two follow-up studies, one in 1987 and another 11 years later in 1998-99, traced the youngsters' transition into young adulthood. Both communities are located bordering the Pacific Ocean in Kanagawa prefecture about 30 minutes away from each other by train. Minami is located in an industrial city (given a pseudonym of Shonan) with a working-class population. Characteristic of a working-class population, 80% of high schools in Shonan are low ranked, leading to working-class jobs; most high schools are associated with a particular trade, and are called commercial, industrial and agricultural high schools. Hoku is located in a middle-upper-class cultural city (given the pseudonym of Kaigan). Catering to students from higher-class families, 90% of high schools in Kaigan are higher ranked, preparing students for college entrance.

All Minami youngsters attended a working-class middle school near home that had a bad reputation, known for student misbehaviour and student–teacher conflict. The student population was split along class lines. The majority of Minami middle-school students came from the working class. Working-class Minami youth joined in with a counter-school culture group and at a young age actively engaged in youth crime. Troubles at school and poor school achievement resulted in the far majority of Minami working-class students either ending their education after middle-school graduation or being sent to low-ranked high schools. Higher-class (nearly all middle- not upper-class) Minami middle-school students kept away from working-class students, few engaged in any type of misbehaviour and because of class advantages most were able to enter higher-ranked high schools.

Hoku youngsters either went to private high-ranked middle schools or attended a relatively trouble-free local middle school attended by students from higher-class families. Hoku middle-school students, all of them higher class (about an equal number of middle and upper class), were oriented towards entering a higher-ranked high school, few misbehaved and the far majority ended up at higher-ranked high schools.

The contexts of the high schools differed significantly by school rank. Teachers expected trouble at low- but not higher-ranked high schools. School rules and regulations were more strict and teacher violence commonplace at low-ranked high schools. Students at low-ranked high schools were ashamed of their school while students at higher-ranked high schools had pride in their school, aware of its high status and reputable ranking within the wider community.

Negative labelling, widespread availability of counter-school culture groups and the context of strict school rules (no purpose other than discipline and punishment) contributed to rebellion, dislike of teachers and the school, numerous cases of counselling (for troubled behaviour) and a high rate of self-reported youth crime for students at low-ranked high schools. In contrast, the far majority of students at higher-ranked high schools had good teacher relations, liked their school, few were counselled for deviant behaviour and they had a low rate of self-reported youth crime. Unlike students at low-ranked high schools where there was universal objection to school controls, few students at higher-ranked high schools objected to school rules and regulations, many of these schools quite liberal in student rules and regulations; students also realised that school controls served a purpose of preparing them for college entrance, further diminishing their objections against school controls.

Conformity in higher-ranked high schools was also enhanced by the absence of students with a troubled school background as such students are not allowed entrance. And, since class significantly related to attendance at higher-ranked high schools, group solidarity was furthered by bunching together students with similar family and class backgrounds. In short, the school contexts differed widely based on class ecology and class background of students and so did school attachment, school troubles and the deviant behaviour of the students.

The majority of Minami working-class youngsters ended up with a high-school education or below, became employed in working-class jobs, married within their own class and like their parents as young adults remained in the working class. Most Minami and Hoku higher-class youth went on to complete college, obtained higher-class jobs and married within their own class in a social reproduction of the higher class as young adults. It can be expected that class and class culture will be reproduced in their children and that the class reproduction cycle will continue on.

Juvenile delinquency

Youth have been the main target of police and official action taken against crime in post-war Japan. The percentage of youth Penal Code offenders has been consistently much higher than that of adults particularly since the 1970s. From 1976 to the latest figures in 2008, the percentage of youth to adult Penal Code offenders has been between three to five times greater (Shikita and Tsuchiya, 1992; *Hanzai Hakusho* (White Papers on Crime), 2005, 2009). In 2008, of Penal Code offences excluding traffic offences cleared by the police, the percentage of youth offenders at 8.9 (per 1,000 youth) compared to adult offenders at 2.4 (per 1,000 adults) is nearly four times greater (*Hanzai Hakusho*, 2009). Rates of pre-delinquency or status offences more than doubled from 1972 to 1983 and rates have consistently been exceedingly higher than rates of youth Penal Code offenders (White Papers on Crime, 1984; Yoder, 1986; *Hanzai Hakusho*, 1991; *Seishonen Hakusho* (White Papers on Youth, 2005, 2009). In 2008, there were 134,415 youth Penal Code offenders compared to 1,361,769 youth cited for pre-delinquent acts or more than 10 times the number of youth officially sanctioned for committing status offences than Penal Code offences (*Hanzai Hakusho*, 2009; *Seishonen Hakusho*, 2009). If rates of status offences are standardised, about 9% of the youth population in 2008 was cited for acts of misbehaviour (most youth citations of pre-delinquent acts, from high to low, were for curfew violation, smoking, drinking alcohol, unsound companionship and gang activity).

Class has not been given the attention it deserves in analyses of official actions taken against juvenile delinquency; rather, authors have alluded to a distorted version of class (that is, a loose official categorisation of class based on an index of income only) or most commonly simply ignored the issue of class altogether (Shikita and Tsuchiya, 1993; Foljanty-Jost, 2000; Yonekawa, 2003; Yoder, 2004). Yonekawa (2003), recognising both the inattention given to class and delinquency and skewed official measurements, collected data not publicised by national statistics and conducted a nationwide survey on the relation of class to juvenile arrests and detention (Yonekawa, 2003). The author found that working-class youth are significantly overrepresented in official arrests and incarceration in juvenile reformatories.

Yonekawa (2003) conducted a survey in the Kanto area and in Shizuoka, Niigata and Nagano prefectures to assess the relationship of family social class

(father's education and occupations) and youth arrests and incarceration. A high 86% of youth arrested for Penal Code offences came from a low (father's education = high school or below and mostly blue-collar worker) family social class background (Yonekawa, 2003, pp 118-20). Youth sent to detention homes (juvenile classification homes and reform and training schools) came from the lowest of low family social class background (Yonekawa, 2003, pp 118-20). Nearly 50% of youth incarcerated compared to a national average of about 3% were from a single-parent family and the number of their families on welfare relief was about 12 times greater than the national average (Yonekawa, 2003, pp 115-18).

A number of studies support Yonekawa's findings (Rohlen, 1983; DeVos and Wagatsuma, 1984; Greenfield, 1993; Okano and Tsuchiya, 1999; Dubro and Kaplan, 2003; Yoder, 2004). Official youth crime rates (Penal Code offences, both major and minor offences) and adjudication resulting in being sent to youth reformatories are disproportionately high for concentrations of working-class (single-parent families, low family socioeconomic status, working-class areas, youth gangs and at low-ranked high schools) youth.

Official youth crime rates can only tell us about police behaviour, where the police are, who they apprehend and what charges are brought against the youthful offender. The actual youth crime rate is obviously higher than the official statistics since not all, in fact most, youth who commit crimes particularly status offences are not caught by the police. The only way to know how much youth crime takes place, who is involved and reasons for committing the crimes is by observing actual youth crime in a given population, collecting data on self-reported crime rates and having sufficient information on those youth who have committed crimes.

Data on actual delinquent behaviour of youth are limited, however, the few observational studies carried out on youth crime and inferences from related studies indicate that working-class youngsters are more active in youth criminal behaviour than higher-class youngsters (Rohlen, 1983; DeVos and Wagatsuma, 1984; Sato, 1991; Greenfield, 1994; Okano and Tsuchiya, 1999; Yoder, 2004). We will begin with youth gangs.

Members of *bōsōzoku* (Japanese youth gangs characterized by high speed racing of motorcycles or automobiles) peaked to more than 40,000 youngsters in the early 1980s and, largely from a police crackdown, have steadily decreased, to a little less than 10,000 gang members in 2008 (Sato, 1991; *Hanzai Hakusho*, 2009). The majority of *bōsōzoku* members have a police record and observations of their activities have shown consistent violation of numerous traffic laws and a high degree of participation in non-traffic criminal offences, particularly drugs and violence (Sato, 1991; Greenfield, 1994; Yoder, 2004). While there are no reliable statistics on class background of *bōsōzoku*, we do know that a significant number of them come from working-class areas, completed educational levels are extremely low (most do not graduate from high school) and *bōsōzoku* have high official rates of arrests and incarceration (arrest and incarceration rates highly correlate with working-class background), suggesting that most *bōsōzoku* come from working-

class families (Sato, 1991, pp 109, 159; Greenfield, 1994, pp 19-46; Dubro and Kaplan, 2003; Yoder, 2004, pp 24-6, 157-60).

A scattering of other studies also indicates that working-class youth engage in youth deviant behaviour (including crime) more than higher-class youth. Membership in youth delinquent groups, deviant behaviour in and outside of school and self-reported rates of youth crime are significantly higher among working- than higher-class youth (Rohlen, 1983; DeVos and Wagatsuma, 1984; Greenfield, 1994; Okano and Tsuchiya, 1999; Yoder, 2004). Sources on the class background of females who enter the sex industry and some at quite a young age suggest that *enjo-kōsai* (compensated dating, meaning teenage prostitutes) come from working-class families (Mock, 1996; Louis, 2004). In short, all indications are that youth deviant behaviour and class inequality are closely related or that youth rebellion mainly occurs among working-, not higher-class, youth.

While class inequality ties in with both official rates of youth crime and youth deviant behaviour, this does not explain variance of youth deviance within the working and higher classes. Within-class variance is partially attributed to what has already been discussed or the effects of attendance at different-ranked high schools. Working-class youngsters at higher-ranked high schools and higher-class youth at low-ranked high schools, although in the minority, ended up there because of demonstrated conforming or non-conforming behaviour and are concomitantly oriented towards and susceptible to the variable conditions of conformity and deviant behaviour at these schools.

Parental attachment is not significantly different by class and has little to do with class variances of youth deviance. This is mainly due to class culture or the relative lack of expectations that working-class parents have with regard to their children's academic achievement. While certainly neglect, child abuse and estrangement from the child ties in with later youth deviance regardless of class, conflict arising from over-expectation and strictness regarding academic achievement and conformity to the status quo is more likely to occur in higher-class families (Yoder, 2004). In general, weak parental attachment diminishes a youth's commitment to conform to parental guidance, values and morals, leading to the proclivity to engage in deviant behaviour (Kassebaum, 1974; Liska, 1987).

Material recognition acts as a status symbol for working-class youth while higher-class youth are less likely to seek such recognition, given that most have a high status within society, are respected as academic achievers among their peers and, in general, are seen as students attending good schools coming from upstanding families (Barry, 2006, pp 73, 132-61). This somewhat accounts for the greater propensity towards property crimes or illegal activity (dealing drugs, prostitution etc) that brings economic rewards among working-class youth since that often is the only means to gain social recognition, appearing to be economically well off, and it elevates their 'status' among peers. Status recognition emanates from class itself, provides differential opportunities and, along with institutionalised status rankings in a hierarchical educational system, contributes to the deviant behaviour of working-class Japanese youths.

In one of the better studies on Japanese youth deviance, Mizutani (1998) attributed drug use among youth as a means of escape from parental and societal pressures to achieve in demanding academic studies. One of the few studies that looked at actual youth deviance using self-reported data (from questionnaires sent to students at high schools) and observations of drug use at local youth hang-outs in the Yokohama area, Mizutani (1998) was convinced that drug use among Japanese youth is much more prevalent than is widely believed. While, and this is so for nearly all studies of crime in Japan, regrettably Mizutani's (1998) study did not include class, still conflict was brought out as central to understanding illicit drug use or that youth rebellion occurs in reaction against stringent adult controls.

The brunt of the *nihonjinron* perspective put forth by government leaders pins the blame of unruly youth on a breakdown of traditional culture and inadequate family socialisation practices as a result of rapid social change. The main problem with this official *nihonjinron* perspective is the difficulty of measuring such concepts. Among academicians adopting a *nihonjinron* perspective, predominate use is made of comparing Japan's official crime arrest rates with the US, pointing out Japan's official lower rates and attributing this to an idealisation of egalitarianism, harmony and conformity in Japan (Bayley 1976; Vogel, 1980; Kanazawa and Miller, 2000). Not only are results questionable from the sole use of official data and there is a host of methodological problems associated with cross-cultural data and its interpretation, but also class and status offences are left out of the picture. Throughout history, regardless of political, social and educational trends of liberalism or nationalism, Japanese youth have rebelled against the status quo. As described below, the history of juvenile delinquency in Japan has largely been one of class cultural conflict, not cultural or social change nor harmony, egalitarianism and conformity.

Youth crime: past and present

Ambaras (2006), in an excellent book entitled *Bad Youth*, provided detailed and well-documented historical information about youth deviance in Japan from the 17th century up to the end of the Second World War. The author demonstrated that the history of youth deviance follows a similar pattern over time, concluding that youth deviance today in Japan is a reflection of the past. Piecing together Ambaras's (2006) historical accounts up to the end of the Second World War with contemporary works presented in this chapter, a history of youth deviance in Japan follows, focusing on similar trends of conflict between the state and its network of adult controls over youth.

From 17th-century Tokugawa Japan up to the present, youth deviance has been characterised by youth gangs and rebellion of working-class youth. Youth gangs in Tokugawa Japan, with names such as *kabukimono* (derived from *kabuku*, to deviate, and the wearing of a short kimono), *yakko* (toughs) and *wakamono* (youths), were composed mainly of lower-caste servants and peasants and they questioned the very validity of Tokugawa's social caste system. These youth gangs

took their vengeance against higher-caste members or merchants profiting from the plight of the poor (Ambaras, 2006, pp 9-29). Lower-caste youth were the leaders of the Tenmei Riots in 1787, opposing a corrupt government responsible for famines that killed nearly two million people. Violence took place, youths destroying the property of merchants who profited during the economic crises through scandalous activities (Ambaras, 2006, p 17). These and other displays of youth discontent with adult authority resulted in passing state laws outlawing youth gangs, punishing those that harbour them and imposing restrictions and punishments on youth deviance. Youth became, in criminal law, officially categorised as a separate entity from adults.

While lower-caste youth continued to cause trouble for the Tokugawa regime, deviance in its official form of juvenile delinquency as we know today came about during the early Meiji period in the latter part of the 19th century. Urbanisation and large population increase of youth in major cities led to an expansion of state intervention in the lives of the nation's youth, including adults' management, control and punishment of youth criminal behaviour.

Class cultural conflict continued from the Meiji period onwards, central to the problem of youth deviance in Japan. The first Juvenile Reformatory Law came about in 1900, not only in reaction to crimes of poverty such as stealing and extortion for the boys and unlicensed prostitution among girls, but also in an attempt to reform lower-class 'moral impropriety.' Protective measures (probation and detention in reformatories) targeted working-class youth. The Juvenile Reformatory Law allowed the state to place youngsters in reformatories for living in 'improper homes' and for pre-delinquent offences labelled as characteristic of the lower class such as vagrancy, idleness or hanging around the 'wrong people'. A precedent was set giving state authorities the legal right to apprehend and punish youth in the name of pre-delinquency that ever since has allowed for police crackdowns on youth according to the interests of the state.

From the latter part of the 19th century to the collapse of democracy in the mid-1930s, while reformers directed their attention to delinquency-prone working-class youth and police surveillance was directed towards working-class youth gangs called *yotamon*o (hoodlum), also referred to as *furyō* (no-goods), the mass media sensationalised delinquency of 'middle-class' students. Magazines, novels, newspapers, plays and even songs, along with official reports, alarmed the public with messages of 'moral decay' among teenaged middle-class students. Although student gang violence was abhorred, improper moral conduct of these higher-class students was singled out as representing the greatest threat to the wellbeing of society. *Kōha* (ruffians) student gangs brought *nanshoku* (male bonding including homosexual sex relations) back into vogue (an early practice during Tokugawa among *kabukimono*) and shocked the public by gang-raping young boys. *Nampa* (rakes) student groups hustled women and spent much of their time frequenting brothels, *sōshi* (rowdy students) gangs were violent and active political critics of the government and *jogakusei* (female students) were depicted as oversexed high-class delinquent girls.

The police conducted raids targeting areas where student misbehaviour was said to take place but class privileges protected higher-class students from official punitive actions; arrests, probation and incarceration in reformatories continued to be disproportionately meted out to working-class youths. Then, as today, the sensationalising of middle-class delinquency led to greater state control over youth behaviour, particularly clamping down on the schools, placing further restrictions over student behaviour and eventually incorporating nationalism as central to educating the nation's children and youth.

Delinquency prevention began as a reform movement and escalated over time. By the early 1920s, delinquency prevention was well established, involving a nexus of school personnel, volunteers, social workers, child protection commissioners and state agencies focusing their attention on delinquency-prone conditions of the working class. While well intended, their work with working-class youth officially marked (by arrest record) or classified by reformers as delinquents in working-class communities contributed to the labelling process of isolating, identifying, tagging and recycling lower-class youth through the criminal justice system. Social control agents looked for what was wrong with the lower class compared to what was right in a made-up version of the middle class. The cause of working-class delinquent behaviour was attributed to retardation and personality disorders, living in abnormal homes (an absence of both natural parents in the home) and that few of these youth like their parents had an elementary school education.

Labelling results are borne out by the statistics showing that from 1923 to 1932 roughly half of delinquent youths given protective measures came from these so-called working-class abnormal homes. The largest pool of court cases adjudicated by Tokyo courts from 1923 to 1937 were working-class or unemployed boys. Girls given protective measures, like the boys, came from the working-class employed in low-status occupations such as housemaids and cafe waitresses.

The reform movement during Meiji (1868-1912) and Taisho (1913-26) was unique in one regard: unlike post-war Japan, many leading reformists were Japanese Protestants advocating Christian ideals as a means of improving on the plight of the working class. Still, the model of reform or delinquency prevention in pre- and post-war Japan has largely been based on an ideal middle-class model of expected youth behaviour, with the blame of delinquency being placed on individual shortcomings, family deficiencies, academic achievement and lack of education characteristics mostly found in the working class. Neglected by the state and popular media is that class cultural conflict and class discriminate delinquency controls mainly have accounted for a disproportionately high rate of arrests and in particular punitive measures (probation and detention) dealt to working-class youths throughout history.

Militarism (1937-45) brought about extreme measures of delinquent controls centred on working-class youth on the job. Working-class youth became 'industrial warriors' replacing adults conscripted into the military. By 1943, 50 to 80% of workers in factories; mines and aircraft plants were younger workers. Class cultural conflict now shifted to the workplace.

Japan's totalitarian government utilised delinquent controls for the purpose of maximising youth productivity for the 'war machine'. Youths were housed in factory dormitories. Factory managers and special youth brigades trained by the state acted as watchdogs over youths and youths were encouraged to report delinquent behaviour among their fellow workers at the workplace. Delinquency (under the pretext of pre-delinquency) now included attitudes and behaviour at work detrimental to productivity, with youth subjected to criminal punishment for absenteeism, insubordination or even a bad 'attitude' at work.

Policing work resulted in increasing the rate of juvenile delinquency among working-class boys. Juvenile courts became more aggressive in prosecuting youths and cases were adjudicated by juvenile court officers at the factories. Protective measures against erring youth were militaristic, with punished youth being sent to military-type training centres or reformatories for the purpose of undoing the 'wrong' and getting them back to work.

In 1941, the Ministry of Education revised the elementary school curriculum to 'give the rising generations a more thorough basic training as Japanese subjects' (Ambaras, 2006, p 177). Extremely nationalistic, schools now renamed national schools (*kokumin gakkō*), had their students engage in religious rituals, visit shrines, honour military commemorations, read Imperial re-scripts and work in labour service.

In pre-war Japan, escalation of delinquent controls eventuated in strict surveillance and policing working-class youth in the factories for 'war productivity', leading to increases of youth crime because of policing itself and the criminalisation of youth behaviour and attitudes deemed detrimental to work productivity. More recently, in a similar manner, tighter enforcement of youth status offences earmarked the beginning of intrusive and accumulative state intervention in the lives of youth; this began in the 1970s, pre-delinquent rates more than doubling by the early 1980s and rates have continued to remain high ever since. This then set the trend for an escalation of further delinquent controls, restricting youth behaviour in public places, lowering the age of criminal liability, up-scaling punitive measures against youth offenders, freeing the police to conduct search and seizures in the homes of youth even if they are considered 'likely' to commit crime and placing youth under police custody for misconduct of any sort.

Similar to the build-up of militarism in pre-war Japan, the state in recent years has harked on the necessity of a more patriotic youth and a return to traditional values, patriotism said to be a cure-all for the social ills of the young. Since the formation of the Ad Hoc Council on Education in the 1980s, which paved the way for an increasingly larger state revisionist movement, patriotism has been of central concern to the education of the young. Patriotism coupled with internationalisation are now integral functions of education purported to better equip the younger generation to lead a productive and meaningful adult life. However, as in the past, patriotism has little to do with reducing youth deviance; rather, it has been used as a 'calling card' to further state controls over youth in

the interests of those in power, further diverting attention away from the root cause of youth deviance: inequality.

Since the very beginning of state intervention into youth problem behaviour from the Tokugawa era up to the present, youth deviancy has been blamed on individual shortcomings, familial and school problems, rapid social change and a breakdown of traditional values. Inequality and class cultural conflict has never received its due attention. Today, youth gangs such as *bōsōzoku*, *yankii* (Yankee), *tsuppari* (flamboyant defiance), *enjo-kōsai* and discontented student failures active in youth crime disproportionately come from working-class families as a historical legacy of class cultural conflict. Throughout the times, by their actions, working-class youths have objected to class inequality but powerless their voices have not been heard and class reproduction has been a normative outcome as a result.

Conflict and deviance at the schools: *ijime* and *tōkōkyohi*

Ijime (bullying) and *tōkōkyohi* (school refusal) are two categories of youth deviance tied in with inequality and the educational system. The inequality here lies in the authoritarian nature of Japanese secondary schools, overbearing pressures to conform and the absence of rights afforded to students. The impact of authoritarianism, including teacher violence, leaves its mark on students who either act in a like manner towards weaker students through physical and psychological coercion (bullying) to get their way or in the case of *tōkōkyohi* decide they want nothing to do with school. We will begin with *ijime*.

Ijime

Bullying in Japan is collective bullying involving physical and psychological abuse by a group of students against one student (Yoneyama, 1999, pp 160-6). It usually involves a group of three to 10 students picking on one student using violence such as hitting, kicking, burning with a cigarette, stabbing with a pencil, tripping, putting stick pins in their shoes or on the seat of their chair or circling and pushing down the student and then yelling, kicking and smashing them. Psychological abuse entails placing the student's school desk outside the classroom, hiding or destroying the student's school paraphernalia, calling the student names such as dirty, trash or death, demanding and taking the student's money, making threats and shunning that can lead to the whole class acting as if the student does not exist. Kawai Hayao, a psychiatrist who has dealt extensively with bullying in Japanese schools, has stated that bullying in contemporary Japan 'is more severe than in any other society in terms of it frequency, cruelty, and insidiousness' (Yoneyama, 1999, p 162).

Official statistics on *ijime* are misleading since they require school confirmation of such incidents and not only are teachers reluctant to report such behaviour but also students who know of it or are bullied keep quiet for fear of further reprisal by the bullies (Okano and Tsuchiya, 1999; Yoneyama, 1999). Rates also

vary over time, depending on government initiatives to report such cases: the less pressure, the fewer the number of schools reporting cases. Even so, Ministry of Education statistics indicate that from 1985 up to the latest figures in 2007, bullying has been most prevalent at middle schools, ranging from 30% to nearly 65% of schools reporting bullying at their schools (Okano and Tsuchiya, 1999, pp 196-8; *Seishonen Hakusho*, 2005, 2009). During this same time period, high schools showed the next highest rates, with a range between 20% and just over 50%, and primary schools the least, ranging from 10% to a little less than 40% of schools reporting bullying at their schools (Okano and Tsuchiya, 1999, pp 196-8; *Seishonen Hakusho*, 2005, 2009). Other studies show higher rates, all indicating that Ministry of Education statistics greatly underestimate the occurrence of *ijime* at primary and secondary schools (Murakami, 1995; Okano and Tsuchiya, 1999; Yoneyama, 1999).

The consequences of bullying are enormous, resulting for example in suicide, incredible physical pain, irreparable psychological damage even deformation, and are a main cause of leaving school (*tōkōkyohi*). Studies are in agreement that *ijime* stems from the pressures and measures taken to create conformity in Japanese schools (Okano and Tsuchiya, 1999; Yoneyama, 1999; Kerr, 2001; Sugimoto, 2003). The irony is that school socialisation through observations or direct experience of teachers' abuse of students for the purpose of conformity leads to copycat behaviour. It is precisely students who have experienced or witnessed corporal and/or psychological abuse by teachers who become bullies (Yoneyama, 1999, pp 166-9, 174). Bullies bully students they perceive as non-conformists, different from others, such as physically disabled students, students who learn too slow or too fast, students who are loners and students who have lived abroad for an extended period of time (*kikokushijo*). For example, one study reported that about two thirds of *kikokushijo* have been the victims of bullying (Yoneyama, 1999, p 169). They are bullied because their foreign ways (ability to speak English, different attitudes, weakness in Japanese and so on) make them stick out as being odd and different from other students.

Bullying by students ties in with the nature and structure of unequal power relations in society replicated and enacted in the schools. Yoneyama (1999, p 175) put this well:

> The incidence of *ijime* is unlikely to be reduced until Japanese students are freed from the oppressive classroom practices. What *ijime* represents, though, is not just the problem of corporal punishment or excessive regimentation, displaced from the student–teacher to student–student relationship. It represents the authoritarian, non-democratic, power-dominant human relationship that is so pervasive in schools and the educational system in Japan in general (including teachers, local boards of education, and *Monbusho*). Corporal punishment and regimentation are the most salient manifestations of the alienating human relationships promoted in the system.

Tōkōkyohi

Tōkōkyohi today refers to a student being absent from school during the school year without regards to illness or poverty for 30 or more days. In regards to inequality and deviance, *tōkōkyohi* mainly applies to middle-school students. School attendance is mandatory up to middle school; school-drops not *tōkōkyohi* are relevant to high-school students. *Tōkōkyohi* is different for elementary and middle-school students. Separation anxiety (usually separation from mother) or the spoiled child accounts for most cases of *tōkōkyohi* for elementary-school students while school phobia (fear of going to school) applies to most cases of *tōkōkyohi* for middle-school students (Yoneyama, 1999, pp 27-8). School phobia is not truancy. Unlike truants, phobic students stay at home from school, their parents know they are not going to school, these students experience anxiety at the thought of going to school and they are no more delinquent in their behaviour than other youths (Yoneyama, 1999, pp 27-9).

Official statistics show that there was a steady yearly increase of *tōkōkyohi* among middle-school students from 1975 to 1996, particularly a fourfold increase of slightly less than 10,000 students in 1975 who were absent for 50 school days or more during one academic school year compared to around 40,000 such students in 1990 (Yoneyama, 1999, p 187). In 1991, the official criterion for *tōkōkyohi*was reduced from 50 to 30 days of absence during one academic school year, statistically increasing the number of cases; still, using the old criteria of 50 days of absence, cases increased from 1991 to the highest ever of 62,143 cases in 1996, representing about 1% of all middle-school students (Yoneyama, 1999, pp 187-8). From 1994 to the latest figures in 2007, *tōkōkyohi* among middle-school students more than doubled from 1.32% in 1994 to 2.91% for the 2007 school year (*Seishonen Hakusho*, 2005, 2009; *The Japan Times*, 2008i, p 3). A record of over 100,000 *tōkōkyohi* cases a year have occurred from 1998 up to the latest figures in 2007 (*Seishonen Hakusho*, 2005, 2009; *The Japan Times*, 2008i, p 3). As with bullying, however, the measurement criterion of official statistics – whether intentional or not – underestimates the number of students who refuse to go to school.

Official statistics of *tōkōkyohi* do not include students who, instead of going to school, attend educational or child counselling facilities that also include special classes for *tōkōkyohi* students. Also, statistics do not report on absentees of students who refused to go to school but missed less than 30 days of school. A number of studies have indicated that the majority of students get fed up with school but most do not act on their emotions to the extent that they are absent for 30 days or more and thus classified as *tōkōkyohi* (Yoneyama, 1999, pp 188-90).

There are various perspectives of *tōkōkyohi*. The medical model sees *tōkōkyohi* as a problem of maladjustment for the student, a personality flaw, and treatment and counselling are recommended to 'heal' the student and get them back in school. The behavioural perspective shared widely among teachers, like the medical model, blames the student; however the problem is attributed to the student's character or the feigning of some problem as an excuse for not wanting to go

to school: there is nothing psychologically wrong with the student (Yoneyama, 1999, p 201). The solution lies in sending *tōkōkyohi* students to special training schools that apply harsh discipline, threats and punishment akin to military 'boot camp' as a means of re-socialisation.

A third viewpoint supported mainly by parents and medical professionals does not see *tōkōkyohi* as an illness or anything necessarily wrong with the individual student but rather blames the school and even society for the 'negative' context of the schools. The reasons they give for *tōkōkyohi* are (Yoneyama, 1999, p 212):

> *ijime*, corporal punishment, Spartan training in *bukatsu* [club activities], regimentation through minute school rules, academic competition, education which is standardized, ignores individuality and destroys friendship, which inevitably induces fear, distrust, alienation, and exhaustion on the part of the students.

This viewpoint sees the solution of *tōkōkyohi* as ridding the school of its overbearing controls over students. Proponents recommend a shift away from authoritarianism in the schools towards allowing more freedom, establishing 'human rights' for students and appreciation of diversity rather than enforced conformity (Yoneyama, 1999, pp 211-15).

Whether blaming the student or the school for the problem of *tōkōkyohi*, inequality plays a major role. Discussed earlier, *ijime* is partly learned behaviour whereby bullies pick on weak students who are perceived as non-conformists. And, an estimated 70% of *tōkōkyohi* students develop a fear of school because of being bullied (Yoneyama, 1999, pp 184-5). Sugimoto (2003, p 138) equates a step-up of authoritarianism in the schools to the increase of *tōkōkyohi*:

> The sudden increase in school-refusal cases since the mid 1970s appears to coincide with the rise of the authoritarian style of education and to show the growth of 'corporal resistance' among students against corporal control in the schools. Cases of school refusal are, in a sense, children's body language or body messages in response to school attempts to control their bodies.

Kerr (2001, p 297), more bluntly, draws a similar conclusion:

> The effect of rules, discomfort, violence both by teachers and by bullies, boring standardized textbooks, *juku*, paramilitary sports and music clubs, and sleep deprivation is just what one would expect: Japanese children hate school. They hate it so much that tens of thousands of students stay away from school for at least a month each year in a phenomenon known as *toko kyohi*, refusal to attend school.

Inequality, deviance and transition into adulthood

Transition into adulthood is a carry-over from life as an adolescent. The path towards adulthood becomes more or less set dependent on past behaviour and available choices and opportunities, mainly a product of completed education and class. At 20 years old, when a youngster officially becomes an adult, most working-class young adults are a part of the adult workforce while higher-class young adults are predominately special-school or college students. This variable early transition has a number of implications for deviance that is both class based and differs somewhat by gender.

Yakuza (Japan's gangsters also referred to as mafia) recruits approximately one third of new members from *bōsōzoku* (Greenfield, 1994; Dubro and Kaplan, 2003, p 131). *Bōsōzoku* are notorious for juvenile crime. In 1999 these gangs were associated with 80% of serious crimes among youth of murder, assault, extortion and robbery (Dubro and Kaplan, 2003, p 132). They fit in well with the Yakuza who throughout the post-war period have high rates of criminal arrests (DeVos, 1973; Shikita and Tsuchiya, 1992; Dubro and Kaplan, 2003; *Hanzai Hakusho*, 2005). Latest figures in 2008 show that among arrests for serious Penal Code offences, Yakuza accounted for 45% of blackmail, 34.3% of intimidation, 19% of burglaries, 18.2% of homicide cases, 13.9% of assaults and 9.9% of rape (*Hanzai Hakusho*, 2009, p 104).

Bōsōzoku and the other two thirds of new recruits brought in by Yakuza are largely from the working class. A 1985-86 survey by the National Research Institute of Police Science (NRIPS) reported that 'most new recruits were poorly educated, nineteen to twenty years of age, and were living alone when they joined, according to NRIPS. Forty-three percent had lost one or both parents' (Dubro and Kaplan, 2003, p 131).

While youth and adult gangs are predominately male and both juvenile and adult arrests are much higher for males than for females, there is no reason to expect that class and the pattern of female deviance is not that unlike that of males; in fact, the correlation may even be greater. There are a number of inferences and indications that working-class girls are disproportionately overrepresented in juvenile crime and are susceptible to involvement in crime as a young adult.

Official actions taken against youth offenders and youth deviant behaviour show a strong relation of class and transition into an adult deviant lifestyle for adolescent females. Mentioned earlier, Yonekawa's (2003) study showed a significantly higher arrest rate for lower-class boys than middle-class boys and that adolescent boys sent to youth reformatories came from the lowest of the low social class (Yonekawa, 2003). It is reasonable to assume that the same applies to girls. Within their own gender group, adolescent females have a higher rate of crime for theft than adolescent males, such crimes associated with the working class as crimes of poverty (*Hanzai Hakusho*, 2009, p 132). Also, from the late 1980s up to most recent data in 2008, more girls than boys were sent to the family court for pre-delinquent offences (*Hanzai Hakusho*, 2009, p 137). These offences mainly

included runaway from home, bad companionship and promiscuity. Given the much greater self-reported misbehaviour (particularly bad companionship and promiscuity or sexually active behaviour) among working- than higher-class girls and inferences to girls based on Yonekawa's (2003) data, it is in all likelihood that the majority of these cases sent to the family courts were among girls from the working class (Yoder, 2004).

That within-group population arrest rates for Penal Code offences have through the years consistently been much higher for youth than adults does not differ by gender, adolescent females have higher rates than do adult females. And, all indications are that criminal arrests, guidance rates (pre-delinquent offences) and actual crime committed among adolescents is much more prevalent among working- than higher-class youths without any noteworthy gender differences. Furthermore, given gender discrimination in education and the workplace, working-class girls have less of an opportunity than boys to make it out of the working class in transition to adulthood (Fujimura-Fanselow, 1995; Anderssen and Gainey, 2002). Class and gender inequality lends itself to even greater deviant activity and a subsequent adult career in one category of deviance among working-class adolescent girls than among working-class adolescent boys: the sex trade.

In pre-war Japan, working-class adolescent girls were sold into brothels, became unlicensed prostitutes and, akin to today's bar and club hostesses, serviced men at cafe's, a popular entertainment spot (Ambaras, 2006). In recent post-war Japan, *enjo kōsai* (compensatory dating, meaning teenage prostitution) and adolescent runaways use internet sites to make connections of sex for money (Drake, 2001; Kato, 2009; Japan Today, 2010). While, the class background of *enjo kōsai*, runaways or other teenage girls involved in prostitution is not known, implications of early sexual behaviour, non-conformity and troubles with the law as class related, lends itself to the probability that teenage prostitution is greater among working- than higher-class girls.

Japan's *mizu shobai* (which literally means 'water trade', the term originating during the Tokugawa era as entertainment that took place on boats) refers today to sexual entertainment or the sex industry (Mock, 1996, p 179). Mark Schreiber, a long-term foreigner in Japan and reputable source of information on 'inside Japan', gave a description of the largeness of the sex industry (Schreiber, 2001, p 9):

> A survey for the Bank of Yokohama on the state of the underground economy in fiscal 1998, the last year data are available, estimated unreported earnings from commercial and amateur prostitution at ¥945 billion [over 8 billion dollars].
>
> *Spa!* [a popular variety magazine in Japan] estimated that the nation's 1,000 'fashion health' and 'image clubs' employed about 48,000 women, and that 1,265 'soaplands' employed 25,300. In addition, 'pink salons' employed an estimated 28,430 women, some 1,000 'delivery health' (outcall) services employed 16,000; about 75,000 women worked in

> cabaret clubs (where customer and hostess sit in dimly lit, semiprivate cubicles); and around 20,000 worked at S/M clubs.
>
> Comparing these figures with the total population, Spa! then declared that among women aged 20-24, about 1 in 16 was employed in the pink business.

Other estimates back up these claims and there is even more to the sex business than what Schreiber (2001) wrote about (Kabira, 1986; Mock, 1996; Schreiber, 1997; Louis, 2004; Botting, 2006; Factbook on Global Sexual Exploitation, 2006). There are streetwalkers, strip clubs, clubs that offer sex on the side and peep shows. In addition, there is Japan's pornographic film industry, which in 2001 was the second largest to the US in total output or number of pornographic films made in one year (Digital Journal, 2002; Factbook on Global Sexual Exploitation, 2006). The population of Japan, however, is about a third of that of the US and, therefore, ranks first in the number of films per in-country viewing audience.

Many sex workers in the entertainment district as in the past come from working-class families in rural areas (Ambaras, 2005; Louis, 2004). Mock (1996, p 180), in a longitudinal study of bar hostesses in an entertainment area called Hanayama near the central part of Suskino, a large entertainment area in Hokkaido that rivals Kabukicho in Shinjuku for its sheer size and variety of sex entertainment, found that bar hostesses in 1976 and 1991 had a very low level of completed education. In one of the few insightful and methodologically sound ethnographic studies of women working in entertainment districts, Mock (1996, pp 189-90) summed up this world of work for women as a correlate to both class and gender inequality:

> It would seem that the driving force in the migration of the Hanayama hostesses from their natal towns into the big city of Sapporo was and is economic, although there are social and political motivations as well. None of these young women had options that were economically competitive with the occupation of hostess. Nearly all of them said that they became hostesses because of the money; no one talked about the glamour of living in the big city, although some expressed a wish to live a modern lifestyle. Many were running away from their families and the social environment in which they had grown up – various tales of sexual molestation and harassment were fairly common. One might suspect that, as young women, they fit readily into the mold prepared for them by the mainstream society.
>
> If the women's choices are based on economics, so too are the external pressures on them. By discriminating strongly and effectively against women both in education and employment, Japanese society channels women with minimal education into the entertainment fields. These women have a choice, of course, but it is not an even

> one: they may choose marriage, which can mean poverty and certainly economic and social dependence and lack of freedom, or they may choose the water trades, which offer substantial economic gain and social independence. Although marriage may not mean poverty and being a hostess guarantees neither economic gain nor independence, the two choices do tend to correlate with these effects. Thus, there is a stream of young women who become professional sex objects or, at best, a sort of modern version of the ancient Greek *hetaera* – bright, attractive, competent women who are denied full citizenship but fulfill a crucial role in society. The role of hostesses reflects both the exploitation of women who become hostesses and the exploitation of women who follow the mainstream path of marriage to middle-class respectability and the various restrictions that this path entails…. By taking the alternate path, the hostesses gain considerably in terms of social and economic independence, but pay a substantial price for that independence.

Mock's (1996) work clearly points to working-class conditions that lead working-class girls to later go into the sex trade as hostesses. Teenage prostitution, mentioned above, is more likely to involve working- than higher-class girls, facilitating future adult involvement in the sex trade. In short, adolescent behaviour, class conditions and gender discrimination in education and job opportunities point to the likelihood that it is largely working-class girls who become employed as an adult in Japan's sex industry. A stigma is attached to women working in the sex industry and pornography; both considered a deviant way to make money. Such work also facilitates other criminal activity, given the context and interpersonal relations that occur in Japan's sex industry.

It is largely women of the working class that end up involved in crime. Women associated with Yakuza as sex workers in entertainment districts largely come from working-class families (Greenfield, 1994; Mock, 1996; Whiting, 2000; Dubro and Kaplan, 2003; Louis, 2004; Yoder, 2004). Many commit crime simply breaking the law against prostitution; prostitution takes place at soaplands, from dating clubs and the selling of sex among 'hookers' or 'streetwalkers'. Sex workers in entertainment districts are associated with gangsters more than any other subgroup of women and work in an environment where crime not only is a normal occurrence but also is an area closely watched over by the police.

The latest police statistics in 2008 show that 'property' (theft and shoplifting) crimes, crimes associated with the working class, account for nearly 80% of arrests among women for Penal Code offences (*Hanzai Hakusho*, 2009, p 7). Among special law offences, excepting traffic violations, in 2004 among women their highest arrest rates were for drug violation and drug dealing is associated with Yakuza whereby an estimated one third of its annual income comes from this line of work (Dubro and Kaplan, 2003, p 131; *Hanzai Hakusho*, 2005, p 64). Finally, incarceration of females highly correlates with the working class. Shikita

and Tsuchiya (1992) reported on the completed education of women inmates in Japanese prisons from 1958 to 1988. Their data (Shikita and Tsuchiya, 1992, pp 199-200), although dated, shows consistently through the years that the level of completed education is at an extremely low level among female prison inmates. For example, during the period from 1980 to 1988, 92% of the female inmates were of a middle-school education or below, 7% of women inmates dropped out of or graduated from high school and none had a higher education (Shikita and Tsuchiya, 1992, pp 199-200).

Putting it all together, involvement in crime, police arrests and punitive actions against the offender correlates with female (as well as male) social class. Working-class girls are most prone to entering the world of crime as an adult: by far the largest number of youth and adult female crimes resulting in arrests and punitive actions are crimes associated with the working class. Finally, it is largely working-class women who work in the entertainment district that puts them in the most vulnerable environmental situation of crime. All of this strongly indicates that the world of female crime in Japan predominantly is associated with the working class; the road towards female adult crime begins during adolescence, tied in with class and gender inequality.

Youth self-interest organisations

There are no organisations run, managed and controlled by Japanese youth to further their self-interests. The absolute powerless situation of youths makes them dependent on adult organisations that claim to do this and that for youngsters without much if any input from youth themselves. At the local level, Kawasaki city in Kanagawa prefecture is unique, having established a model programme where youth are active participants alongside adults in discussing municipal matters that pertain to their wellbeing such as issues relating to their education and social development. This innovative and first-time programme came about from the recent enactment of a local regulation in Kawasaki city 'to facilitate children's human rights, which is new to Japan as a whole' (Minei, 2003, p 217).

While youth are powerless as a group, there has been continual conflict over the state's increasing control over the education of youth. In hindsight predictably correct, educational leaders and opposition political parties in the early 1980s spoke out against the LDP's Ad Hoc Council of Education, fearing that it would set a trend of increased state control over education and a revival of nationalism (Yoder, 1986). *Nikkyoso* (Japan's teacher union) officials 'charged that [Ad Hoc Council of Education] … proposals to introduce "moral" instruction in schools, teacher review boards and new instructor training procedures were attempts to extend government control of the education system' (Yoder, 1986, p 293). Japan's Socialist and Communist parties criticised the Ad Hoc Council of Education's revisionist view of pre-war education. Japan's Communist Party 'charged that the [Ad Hoc Council of Education's] recommendation was clearly intended to revive what is called "prewar reactionary education" and asserted that this was

indicated in the emphasis it placed on "morals", "the intellect", "the physique" and patriotism' (Yoder, 1986, p 293).

Academicians, opposition political parties, school officials and teachers have up to the present day objected to conservative educational reforms, and are particularly critical of the state pushing forward 'moral education' and patriotism as central features of education. There have been court cases of teachers challenging state authority over textbook revisions, teachers refusing to stand during the *Kimigayo* (national anthem) and disputes over the contents of materials and the required teaching of moral education in the classroom (Bjork, 2006; Spiri, 2008a). Ever since the formation of Nakasone's Ad Hoc Council of Education, there has been continual conflict over the country's movement towards nationalism in education.

Opposition to revisionism against the Ad Hoc Council of Education in the 1980s up to the present day have failed to stem the tide of the state's expansion of authoritarian controls over youth. This then leads us to question how the dominant subculture group occupying positions of power and control over youth have been able to realise their interests even though revisionism over the years has not, as they propagated, been aimed at or produced any results of less youth deviance. I will argue that this largely has to do with a misled public and misconception of conformity and equality in Japan.

Misconceptions about youth crime

It cannot be emphasised enough that official statistics on youth crime represent the organisation of state-directed juvenile delinquent controls and do not and cannot tell us about the actual amount of youth crime. A hypothetical example of this follows.

Let us say that the number of police in a given area has been increased, with instructions to pay attention to and apprehend more youth for staying out late (curfew violation). This logistical and operative change could be political as the National Police Agency operates under the authority of the Prime Minister's office or it may be internal directives coming from somewhere up the National Police Agency hierarchy. Regardless, however, the change itself will produce an increase in the official rate of curfew violations. It could very well be that the 'actual' number (not just those apprehended by the police) of curfew violations was no different before the police began to step up their actions against curfew violators. The police crackdown on curfew violators would, however, produce a higher number of youth officially caught staying out late than the number before the crackdown. Thus, a reported increase in the official rate of curfew violations simply would come about from more police attention and action taken against curfew violation, not that there was an actual increase in the number of youngsters violating the juvenile delinquent law against curfew.

This step-up of police action taken against curfew violation would also increase the number of other youth crimes such as smoking, gang activity and so on since more youngsters are being watched, sought after and apprehended and thus

more are caught for other crimes as well. And, yet, following this example, what becomes publicised and falsely misconstrued and interpreted by the public is that based on police statistics an alarming greater number of youth are staying out late and committing more crimes than before when in reality the increase of police officers and directives to catch more youngsters violating curfew is a more valid and reliable indication of the increase in youth crimes.

Tokuoka (2003, p 110) observed that when statistical increases of police arrests for juvenile crime are reported, 'moral panic' occurs in Japan. Similarly, studies have shown that sensational reporting of youth crime by the mass media in Japan enhances the public's fear of youth behaviour, furthering their support for a crackdown on youth deviance (Fujita, 2003; Schwarzenegger, 2003; Tokuoka, 2003).

Partially in response to a dramatic murder case involving a 14-year-old boy in May 1997 (which came to be called the 'Sakibara' incident'), Tokuoka (2003, pp 111-13) observed that the number of newspaper articles on juvenile acts in a major newspaper in Japan (*Asahi Shinbun*) dramatically increased from well under 50 in 1996 before the incident to about 100 at the end of 1997 and further escalated to nearly 300 articles in 2000. Sensational and increased mass media attention given to youth crime at about the same time (1996 to 1998) affected public opinion: a number of surveys indicated that the far majority of adults came to believe that juvenile crime was on the rise and supported tougher crime control measures against juvenile delinquency (Schwarzenegger, 2003, pp 182-4). Tokuoka (2003, p 110-13) noted that such sensationalised and added mass media attention given to youth deviance influencing public opinion in favour of a crackdown on youth, had an impact on political activity, culminating in a revision of Juvenile Law in 2000, lowering the age of prosecution in criminal courts of youngsters from 16 to 14 years old.

Fujita (2003, pp 160-4) wrote that the upswing in mass media sensational reporting of juvenile delinquency, particularly a few knife attacks by youth following the 'Sakibara' incident, coincided with political talks calling for greater state control over youth behaviour and a wave of mass media and scholarly criticism of schools, teachers and education. All of this found its way into the political arena as conservative political leaders during meetings of the NCER (National Council of Educational Reform) used the 'hyped-up' juvenile delinquent problem as a reason for the need for educational reform (Fujita, 2003, pp 156-70).

The overreaction of the mass media to a few cases of violent crimes by youth was criticised by Fujita (2003, p 163): 'All of these incidents were not seriously examined covering their causes and backgrounds. But the media and education critics have always been in a hurry to repeat the same interpretation, criticise education and emphasise the urgency and necessity of radical educational reform.' The interplay between political leaders and the press and sensational mass media reports used by conservative political leaders for their own interests has much to do with increased delinquency controls and the eventual revision of the Fundamental Law of Education in this new millennium.

This leads us to other issues of neglect in the public domain and scholarly work regarding inequality and youth deviance in Japan. Two particular issues stand out: idealisation of conformity and myth of 'equality'. We begin with conformity.

Conformity has been idealised in Japan and viewed as a deterrent to conflict and deviance (see Steinhoff, 1993, for a critique on this). This perspective comes across in the cross-cultural literature on education and crime in Japan, which attributes fewer problems in schools and lower crime rates in Japan compared with the West to the importance that Japanese give to 'conformity' or the penchant for following rules, obeying authority, emphasising 'harmony' in interpersonal relations, detailed attention given to 'homogeneity' (conformity in dress, mannerism etc) and so on (Nakane, 1970; Bayley, 1976, Lebra, 1976; Vogel, 1980; Christopher, 1984; Condon, 1984; DeVos and Wagatsuma, 1984; Kanazawa and Miller, 2000). Conformity, however, also relates to youth deviance. The most common facilitator of youth deviance is peer pressure. Youngsters pressured by their peers smoke cigarettes, drink alcohol, participate in gang activities and so on, conforming to the way of their subculture group.

An even more egregious oversight in the 'idealisation' of conformity is neglecting the means used and consequences of the pressures to conform. Conformity is often obtained by extreme intrusiveness, threats, punishment, violence and exclusion. Whether it is school inspections, questioned by members of the crime prevention association on patrol in the neighbourhood or stopped by the police, youth are thoroughly examined and questioned about their dress and behaviour even when doing nothing wrong; privacy or rights are not afforded to them. Threats and punishments are used against them should they deviate from the myriad of controls imposed on them by adults such as pre-delinquent or status offences, school rules and regulations and even adult expectations of their behaviour under the auspices of preventive delinquent organisations (Yoder, 1986, pp 240-59, 267-8; Yoneyama, 1999, pp 66-72). Teacher violence as a means to punish non-conforming students is not all that uncommon and, as has been mentioned, leads to students conforming in 'copycat behaviour' using violence against students who stand out as being different. Finally, as mentioned elsewhere, exclusion is used as a means of inducing conformity, which that also contributes to deviance itself. Youth who exhibit non-conformity (poor academic achievement and misbehaviour) in middle schools are excluded from entering higher-ranked high schools. This subsequently has the effect of guarding against the influence of deviant student peer group influence at higher-ranked high schools, thus enhancing conformity while at the same creating the very optimal situation of student deviance by bunching together all non-conformists at the same (low-ranked) high schools.

It is a wonder why 'inequality' has received such little attention particularly among non-Japanese scholars in post-war writings about Japan. It is as if the very foundation of Japanese society, that of a patriarchal caste class system during the Tokugawa era (1600-1867) followed by large class differences in pre-war capitalistic Japan, was suddenly wiped away and of no consequence to understanding life in post-war Japan. In regards to youth, the myth of egalitarianism has been sustained

by appealing to the overwhelming middle-class subjective consciousness in Japan (which is also evident in other democratic capitalistic societies), disregarding the more potent and highly correlated objective (occupations, income and education) class measure. Furthermore, it has been mistakenly assumed that given a national standardised education system and that entrance into high schools and college is based on examination results, every youngster has an equal chance for academic success. The disregard for the high costs of private secondary schools, colleges and educational extras such as *juku* and *katei koshi* (tutor), class ecology and parental social class particularly parental educational background, all advantageous to the education of children from the higher class, is most regrettable.

Sugimoto (2003, p 282) aptly pointed out that class differences related to academic achievement in Japan are void in the thoughts of most Japanese. Rather, the popular belief is that those who follow the traditional Japanese values of *risshin shusse* (much effort and perseverance) and spirit of *ganbari* (determination) will achieve in academics and go on to lead successful lives. A logical extension to this popular viewpoint of academicians is that youth academic failures, disregarding class differentials, are those most likely to engage in deviant behaviour. Sugimoto (2003, pp 282-3) explains how this fantasy belief of equality keeps societal members in their place:

> This fantasy obscures the fact that opportunities are unevenly distributed across different social groups and strata. More importantly, it enables status-attainers to defend themselves as rightful winners of contests which have supposedly given everybody equal chances. It also makes it difficult for status-losers to hold grievances against successful achievers, because of the dominant myth that losers have been given an equitable opportunity but simply could not make it. Losers take the blame upon themselves and accept the supremacy and authority of those who have succeeded in climbing the ladder.

Perhaps the most neglected aspect of studies on youth deviance in Japan is a disregard for the 'meanings' that youth give to their deviant activities. A youth perspective is sorely needed and a major shortcoming of cross-cultural comparisons. Any given youth caught for smoking is not thinking 'well, in America teenage smoking is no big deal' or 'I am lucky, as anyone caught smoking in Saudi Arabia is severely punished.' The reality of Japanese youth thought and behaviour regarding deviance lies within the context of Japan and nowhere else. As pointed out throughout this chapter, meanings and reactionary behaviour are tied in with class culture and conditions confronting youth in a class-discriminate hierarchical educational system.

We now turn our attention to an even more profound case of inequality and deviance: foreign migrants. Powerlessness extends even more so than for youth as foreign migrants are non-Japanese and thus denied rights associated with

citizenship. As we will see in the next chapter, not only are foreign migrants at the bottom of the inequality hierarchy, deviance as a reaction takes on a most diverse pattern.

THREE

Foreign migrants: inequality and deviance

Foreign migrants

The myth of homogeneity in Japan is not only fictitious considering the diversity of regions in Japan with different cultures, language dialects and racial origins but that a couple of million non-Japanese citizens are an integral part of the fabric of life in Japan. They are branded as 'foreigners' although Koreans, a large group of non-Japanese, have for generations been born and raised in Japan and most speak Japanese as their first language. Other foreign migrants, migrating from countries throughout the world, represent a diversity of cultures and lifestyles in Japan. However, they are faced with numerous barriers in attempting to 'make it' in Japanese society.

Non-Japanese (synonymous with foreign residents, foreign nationals and foreign migrants) are the most powerless of all subordinate subculture groups in Japan. As foreign nationals without Japanese citizenship, they are denied political representation and are ineligible for nearly all jobs of public employment (national, prefecture and city) and numerous benefits and privileges accorded to Japanese nationals. The issue of nationality actually is the beginning of inequality since, unlike other modern democratic societies, birth-in-country does not warrant citizenship, only nationality of parent(s) does, thus children of non-Japanese parents are reproduced as non-Japanese. Foreign migrants occupy a quasi-lower caste position in Japan, a subordinate status that keeps them in their place. As a consequence, inequality of foreign migrants strongly equates with deviant behaviour.

Foreign migrant subcultures

Foreign migrant groups as subcultures are permanent and non-permanent (usually on a one- to three-year visa) residents integrally (socially and economically) tied in with Japanese society. This excludes foreign tourists, American servicemen stationed on American military bases in Japan and foreigners who temporarily come to Japan with their home country government or business and are not registered as foreign migrants at the local ward or city office. It includes, however, illegal migrants who although not registered as foreign migrants work and live in Japan independent from their home country without any set date for leaving Japan. The official number of foreign migrants registered as residents (permanent

and non-permanent migrants) in Japan in 2005 for the first time was just over two million and increased to 2,217,426 foreign registered residents in 2008 (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, 2006; *The Japan Times*, 2006a, p 2; Chung, 2010). The number of illegal foreign migrants is estimated to be quite large – near 300,000 (Komai, 2001). A rough compilation of all persons fitting the above definition of foreign migrants in Japan is about two million five to six hundred thousand or nearly 2% of the total Japanese population that in 2008 was a little over 127 million (Chung, 2010).

In post-war Japan, Asian migrants have consistently been the largest number of registered foreign migrants. By regions, in 2004, Asian-registered migrants represented 74.2% of the foreign migrant population, followed by South Americans at 18.1%, then North Americans at 3.3%, Europeans at 3% and lastly Australians at 0.6% (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, 2006). During this same time, the top 10 countries of foreign migrants in chronological order from the highest number of registered migrants to the lowest were: Koreans, Chinese, Brazilians, Filipinos, Thais, Peruvians, Americans, Vietnamese, Indonesians and British (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, 2006).

Gaijin or *gaikokujin* (a polite form) is the popular term for foreigner in Japanese and although it may be used to refer to any non-Japanese, in conversation *gaijin* connotes Westerners (Americans, Europeans, Australians and New Zealanders) or foreigners whose physical features stand out from Japanese. Koreans and Chinese are rarely called *gaijin*; rather, Japanese make reference to them using their country of origin: for Koreans, *Zainichi* (resident) *Kankokujin* (Koreans) and for Chinese, *Chugokujin* (Chinese) (Fukuoka, 2000, p xi). Japanese language aside, there are various differences among foreign migrant groups originating from their pattern of migration to Japan. Largely borrowing from Komai's (2001, pp 13-20) account of foreign migration, a brief historical background of the migration of foreigners to Japan follows.

Japan was an isolated country during the Tokugawa era (1600-1867) that except for minor trade closed off its border to foreigners until the Meiji restoration in 1868 (Reischauer, 1977). While in the late 19th century, foreigners were allowed into the country, pluralism as a mode of integration characterised non-Japanese and Japanese relations, foreign migrants mostly isolated from the Japanese public in established ethnic enclaves. With the build-up of Japan's military and foreign intervention, Taiwan and Korea became colonies of Japan and the people were given the status of Japanese although denied suffrage unless residing in Japan (Komai, 2001, p 13). Koreans, Taiwanese and mainland Chinese became the largest number of migrants in pre-war Japan, mainly working as labourers. Japan's build-up to and eventual entry into the Second World War created an extreme labour shortage, resulting in the Japanese government forcibly sending Koreans to work in Japan as labourers in construction, the mines and steel factories. After Japan's defeat in the war, about two million Koreans lived in Japan. Most Koreans (some 1,400,000 Koreans) chose to return to their homeland shortly after the end of the war but about 600,000 remained in Japan (Weiner and Chapman, 2009, p

172). In 1952, based on a directive from the Japanese Interior Ministry of Civil Affairs Bureau, Koreans, Taiwanese and other former foreign colonised subjects of Japanese nationality were stripped of their Japanese citizenship and later placed under immigration law as special permanent residents.

Strict immigration policy, Japan's internal rebuilding of the state and economy along with relatively little need for foreign workers in Japan meant that an insignificant number of foreign migrants came to work and live in Japan up until the late 1970s. And, as is well known, Japan rebuilt at a phenomenal pace. This so-called 'economic miracle' in Japan created a surplus of capital and brought forth a more leisurely way of life at home and increased travel abroad. Concomitantly, Asian entertainers and bar and club hostesses were brought into Japan's large *mizu shobai* (literarily 'water trade', called entertainment districts or the sex industry). Since the late 1970s, large numbers of Filipinos, Thais, Chinese and Korean females have legally and illegally worked in Japan's entertainment districts. More recently, a sizeable number of women from Western and Eastern Europe and South America have come to work in these entertainment districts. The number of female foreign migrant sex workers (meaning any work involving sexual enticement or sexual acts from dancers, club hostesses to streetwalkers) in Japan today is somewhere in the low hundred of thousands.

Also, in the 1970s, a quite different trend of migration took place on a smaller scale as Japan accepted a number of Vietnamese refugees although the final total number was less than an initial quota of 10,000. In a similar humanitarian vein, after diplomatic relations were established with mainland China in 1972, Japanese left behind in China after the war, their spouses, children and even grandchildren were allowed to 'repatriate' back to Japan as foreign migrants. Today, some 50-60,000 of these so-called 'overseas Chinese' reside in Japan.

Japan's economic might and wide-scale international presence brought about a large increase of foreign migrants from the latter half of the 1980s until the so-called burst of the economic bubble in the early part of 1990. The need for low-wage labour brought in men from China, Korea, the Philippines and the Middle East. A spirit of internationalisation brought tens of thousands of foreign students to Japan and foreign language instructors from Western countries mainly hired as English conversation teachers. In a somewhat different mode, South Americans of Japanese descent along with their spouses (even if not of Japanese descent) and their children were granted special residence status in Japan, allowed to work and live in Japan on a long-term basis, which more or less meant as long as they wished. Today, Latin American migrants are the third largest number of foreign migrants after Chinese and Koreans.

Koreans are the only foreign migrant group with the majority of its migrants registered in Japan as permanent residents, mainly because of the special permanent residency status conferred on them in 1952 and subsequently passed on to their children. A much smaller number of Chinese were also given special permanent resident status under the same conditions as Koreans but a much larger number migrated to Japan since that time and the majority of Chinese migrants in Japan

today have not acquired permanent residency. The majority of Vietnamese are in Japan as refugees, which allows them the same privileges as a permanent resident. Also, most South Americans in Japan are of Japanese descent, mainly Nisei and Sansei (second- and third-generation Japanese-Brazilians and Japanese-Peruvians), and granted a special visa status by virtue of their Japanese lineage and given nearly the same privileges as a permanent resident (Komai, 2001; Laszlo, 2002).

Forty per cent of all registered foreign migrants are permanent residents although this is skewed by the large number of Korean permanent residents; taking out Koreans, the proportion of permanent residents is halved to 20%. The single largest resident status for most foreign migrant groups is that of a spouse of a Japanese national or spouse of a foreign migrant of Japanese descent and granted a spouse visa that allows for three years of residency, renewal almost automatic. Children of Japanese-foreign marriages may obtain Japanese citizenship from their Japanese national parent and if they do so are not non-Japanese. A little less than half of all other registered foreign migrant residents hold various visa statuses such as professional, business, specialist, cultural, entertainer, student, dependant and trainee. Work restrictions are placed on those with a cultural, entertainer and student visa status although violations are a common occurrence.

The number of illegal migrants is quite large. Komai (2001) estimated the number of illegal foreign migrants based on the difference of the number of embarkation and disembarkation cards of foreigners entering and leaving Japan. While error in this number occurs from the more progressive municipalities in Japan registering illegal migrants and difficulty in ferreting out the number of deportees, Komai (2001) and other estimates put the number of illegal migrants in Japan somewhere in the range of 2-300,000 (Komai, 2001, p 24; Asia Media, 2004; National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, 2006).

Inequality of non-Japanese migrants

The basis of inequality for foreign migrants is that they are not Japanese citizens and thus denied the same rights and privileges as Japanese citizens. However, there are differences between permanent residents and all other foreign migrant residents. Permanent residents do not have to renew a visa having been granted permanent stay in Japan. They are also afforded many benefits and privileges not available to other foreign migrants since, except for voting and government work, they enjoy the same rights and privileges as Japanese citizens, they are more eligible for bank loans and in employment they are often given preference over non-permanent residents although this may depend on nationality and the particular occupation. Permanent residency, however, is not easy to obtain, requiring at least three years in-country if married to a Japanese person and 10 years if not, proof of stable employment and financial security and a reason for wanting permanent residency, which except for having a Japanese spouse is hard to substantiate.

Mode of adaptation

During the Tokugawa (1600–1867) period in Japan, rights, duties and occupations were ascribed and inherited through the male blood line in a caste social system. Intermarriage between castes was forbidden and strictly speaking one could not move from one caste to another, although money could buy an outcaste a commoner status and towards the end of the Tokugawa era rich merchants intermarried with samurai. There were five caste groups: upper class of rulers and samurai, farmers, artisans, merchants and outcastes.

The distinction of caste hierarchy was based on occupational status or the merit of what one did for the good of the country (*kokutai*) in preserving patriarchal order under an Emperor (considered divine) system. Thus, the highest castes were the rulers (*daimyo*) who owned land and ruled their fief and samurai, composed of two strata: the intellectual class (higher-status samurai) and those in charge of law and order (lower-status samurai). Farmers produced food and were the next highest caste group. Artisans made products of a higher-caste status than merchants, who profited from what others produced or made. After the merchants, were the absolutely lowest class, outcastes (called *Burakumin* or *Hinin*), who did what was considered in Shinto (Japan's national religion) to be 'unclean' work such as butchery, burying the dead or work deemed immoral by virtue of criminal behaviour or work as entertainers and prostitutes. Outcastes were not afforded citizen rights and were 'made to live in particular parts of the cities and were forced to walk barefooted, use straw to tie their hair, and many were required to wear a patch of leather on their clothes signifying their pollution' (Wagatsuma, 1973, p 372).

Today, foreign migrants are at the bottom of the social stratification hierarchy in Japan and in many ways resemble the status of outcastes during Tokugawa times. Schermerhorn (1978, pp 95-6, 103-4), in his prolific work on global ethnic relations, aptly observed that the remnants of a caste system for *Burakumin* (the largest Japanese minority group of two million) remain in Japan today, which creates conflict in minority ethnic–dominant group relations. Schermerhorn (1978) categorised this conflict in Japan, as well as with Tibet, Korea and India, as the 'emergence of pariahs'.

The legacy of a caste society fits with the status of foreign migrants. They have very limited rights, are considered inferior or at best different from Japanese, tend to live in ethnic enclaves or at least in foreign quarters, places where 'foreigners' are accepted because of housing discrimination, and finally each foreign migrant subculture works in ascribed occupations although not forced to by any legal means.

There are, however, obvious differences of Tokugawa's caste system from today mainly that Japan is a relatively open society based on democracy and capitalism. Except for government work, and although impeded by non-citizen legal and social barriers, social mobility is a possibility for foreign migrants, particularly for a good number of Koreans who have attained high-status occupations. Today's

situation of non-Japanese migrants has features that are a carry-over of a caste system of the past and also in a modern-day context fit into what Kitano (1985, pp 19-21) refers to as pluralism with unequal power.

Pluralism with unequal power as opposed to egalitarian pluralism (for example, Switzerland with three relatively equal ethnic groups separated and divided by cantons) or assimilation is based on the tendency of the majority group (Japanese nationals, also called the dominant culture group or dominant group) to regard minority groups (here, foreign migrants) as separate, inferior and distinct groups with different cultures, customs and way of life (Schermerhorn, 1978; Kitano, 1985). The preference of the majority group is that minority group members keep their distance so as not to interfere with the dominant group's cultural way of life and to remain in a subordinate status, minimising their threat to the dominant subculture group in the maintenance and control of cultural tradition, social order and allocation of power and privilege. Intermarriage and extensive primary group relations of members of the majority group with minority group members are not normatively acceptable. Acceptance by the majority group requires that minority group members at least on the surface acknowledge the cultural superiority of the majority group, perhaps even siding with them over their own ethnic/nationality group.

Siding with the dominant group often takes the form of passing as Japanese. Among migrants whose visible (racial) physical differences are not recognisably different from Japanese, passing (quite common among Koreans) is done by adopting or using as an alias a Japanese name to avoid discrimination and increase one's chances for social mobility. Passing, noted by Schermerhorn (1978), is one way of escaping from an ascribed minority status although it always carries the possibility of detection.

Inequality for foreign migrants is partially attributed to stereotypical categorisation. Foreign migrants are categorised by traits associated with their home country. Occupations of each migrant group tend to be stereotypical in line with what is perceived as fitting to their culture and suitable for producing results that benefit the dominant culture group. They are seen as replaceable and temporary, expectations and opportunities limited to ascribed work that any one of them is more or less assumed to be capable of doing. As a result, it is quite common to contract their labour for a limited period of time and they are expected to return to their home country once the contract is fulfilled.

The best a foreign migrant group member can do to 'make it' is to naturalise as a Japanese citizen. Naturalisation in Japan, however, represents the ultimatum of abandoning one's ethnic group. Up until the 1980s, the only way to become a naturalised Japanese citizen was to adopt a Japanese surname. And, even though changing one's last name to a Japanese name is no longer a prerequisite for naturalisation, still, given legal and social difficulties of carrying over one's ethnic name through naturalisation, and discrimination from being identified as an ethnic or foreign minority by holding on to one's original name, the common procedure today in the process of naturalisation is taking on a Japanese name. What this does,

of course, is give sole recognition of being Japanese a homogeneous ring or that inclusion into the dominant cultural group means giving up one's ethnic identity and even family history by discarding one's family name, further solidifying the distinction between Japanese and non-Japanese.

The subjugation of foreign migrant groups is more one of power and control by the dominant subculture group over foreign migrants than subjugation by the dominant culture or majority group (all Japanese). In general, prejudice and discrimination against foreign migrants occurs in the wider society by the dominant culture group, however, it stems from the power and privilege of the dominant subculture group. Also, within the larger Japanese culture, some groups are more extreme than other groups in their prejudice and discrimination towards foreign migrants. Anti-foreigner is most extreme among right-wing political leaders and revisionist academicians and on the far right are ultra-nationalists: one such large faction is called *aikoku dantai* (patriotic group), vanguards of Japanese racial purity and the emperor system. In contrast, other groups offer support for foreign migrants, for example, labour unions, non-governmental organisations, religious and citizen volunteer groups and human rights groups. Japanese women often take up the causes of non-Japanese, particularly 'comfort women' (women, mostly Asian, who were sexually exploited during Japan's war years) and many at least empathise if not side with foreign migrants against the dominant subculture group (Ueno, 2004).

Given the subordinate minority status of foreign migrants in Japan, pluralism as a mode of adaptation is characterised by class stratification or, as Schermerhorn (1978, p 128) refers to it, institutional enclosure. Class stratification is largely ascribed, partly as a result of each group's pattern of migration described above and also, tied in with economic subordination as non-Japanese in Japan's capitalistic economic structure. Discrimination takes place as foreign migrants are non-Japanese not afforded the rights of citizenship and historically placed outside the mainstream of society as different, foreign, and coming from a different culture. A detailed analysis of class stratification follows, beginning with a conceptualisation of class.

Class

Hashimoto (2003) applied a class measurement of Japanese workers based on the individual's relation to the means of production. His class analysis focused on the economic structure intertwined with income and occupations. He stated (Hashimoto, 2003, pp 88-90):

> A person's class location is the location s/he occupies in the economic structure, which determines the type and size of their income, the nature of their work, and the degree of their authority in the workplace at a particular moment. The size and type of a person's income forms the basic framework that defines and limits their life chances. The

> nature of work and the degree of authority pertaining to it greatly influences the individual's quality of life, affecting the extent and nature of their personal relationships, values and social consciousness.

Utilising the nationwide 1995 Social Stratification and Mobility Data, Hashimoto then broke down the class categories of Japanese national workers in Japan. His classification and percentage breakdown of Japanese workers was as follows: capitalist class, 9.2%, old middle class, 21.9%, new middle class, 23.5% and working class, 45.5% (Hashimoto, 2003, p 96). The relatively large percentage of working class is partially attributed to the classification of all female white-collar workers as working class.

The closest available estimate of class stratification for foreign migrants is the occupational census (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, 2000, 2004). The 2000 census covers all foreign migrants discussed below while the 2004 census includes only the 10 largest groups, leaving out smaller foreign migrant groups also covered in this chapter. Census and other compatible data are used to show continuity and change of foreign migrants' class stratification in Japan.

The 2000 and 2004 occupational censuses utilised to measure class of foreign migrants are less precise than the Social Stratification and Mobility Data of Japanese nationals used by Hashimoto (2003), mainly since it does not provide exact occupations under each occupational category nor does it include income and assets (real estate value, financial assets and home ownership). These differences result in an overestimation of the working class. Akin to Hashimoto's (2003) schema comparing his 1995 Social Stratification and Social Mobility data with the 2000 occupational census, the Japanese working class increases to 57% (see Appendix A for an exact approximation of the census with Hashimoto's measurements). Still, the basic tenets of class in Hashimoto's class schema are applied and approximate measures employed to the 2000 and 2004 censuses that along with the use of other data provide an adequate measure and description of class for foreign migrants.

Class of foreign migrant groups within Japanese society is a major component of inequality. Class inequality begins with restrictions of employment. Except for a limited number of below-managerial-level positions available for permanent residents, foreign migrants cannot be employed in government work. Foreign migrants other than permanent residents are limited by their visa status (from a six-month cultural visa to a three-year work or spouse visa) to the time they can reside and work in Japan. Their visa status also determines the work they are allowed to pursue. None can legally work on a tourist visa. There are also limitations to how many hours and type of work that can be carried out by foreign migrants on a cultural, entertainer or student visa although it is not uncommon for them to deviate from this.

With the exception of special permanent residents – descendants of former Japanese citizens, most of them Koreans – the vast majority of foreign migrant workers are hired for work in Japan on a temporary basis, employed on a limited

time period contract with unequal work status, benefits and pay compared to Japanese. Temporary or contracted labour characterises their class status. They are confronted with job discrimination comparable (although even more so) to Japanese females affecting class location. For example, Hashimoto (2003, pp 58-9) classifies Japanese male but not Japanese female administrators or white-collar workers as members of the new middle class. Japanese female white-collar employees are classified as working class since, unlike Japanese males, most females are not put on a managerial track, receive a lower income and their status as an office worker is ascribed, considered to be temporary and of a lower status than that of a male office worker. Hashimoto's (2003) class measurement takes into account the actual job condition of workers in establishing class location that in the case of Japanese females and foreign migrants is substantially subservient to Japanese males.

Hashimoto's (2003, p 57) class schema combines occupation with employment status. Ascription and the conditions of employment are central to the class location of foreign migrants. For example, Western (mainly North American, British, Australian and New Zealander) English language teachers are hired in Japan largely based on being native English language speakers. Except for the small number of foreign language schools owned and run by Western migrants, the far majority of private including the four largest foreign language school companies (NOVA, GEOS, ECC and Aeon) are owned and managed by Japanese. These private foreign language schools along with Japanese private and public elementary and secondary schools, special schools (*senmon gakkō* in Japanese, a professional, technical or trade school) and colleges (hereafter refers to two- and four-year colleges; a four-year college, *daigaku* in Japanese, is synonymous with university) mainly employ foreign English native language instructors as part-time or full-time limited-term instructors on a set yearly contract basis. Hired as temporary employees, they are denied the same promotional opportunities, benefits and power of decision making as Japanese nationals. The income of Western part-time and one-year full-time English language teachers at English or foreign language schools, these representing nearly all foreign English native language teachers, on the average is at a low level and as temporary workers they have no job security at the whims of their employer for rehiring before the end of their one-year contract. The smaller number of full-time foreign English native language limited-term instructors common to colleges are automatically let go after a yearly contract that usually lasts only two to three years. Excepting college instructors, the status of foreign migrant instructors is so low that immigration officials do not consider them worthy of approval for permanent residency status (Brophy, 2006).

The actual condition of employment for foreign English native language instructors is not that of the new middle class, defined as 'those who exercise relative control over the means of production and the labour power of others' (Hashimoto, 2003, p 59). Rather, their class position is that of the working class, characterised by relatively low incomes, few have any worthwhile assets, their work

is determined by a supervisor, they have little or no say regarding the company's business or department matters in schools and they have very limited or no chances for promotion (Hashimoto, 2003, p 110). English language conversation schools are disparagingly called 'English language sweat shops' because of the working-class conditions that the foreign migrant instructors are placed in. Other foreign English native language instructors employed at elementary schools, secondary schools, special schools and colleges, even though usually with a higher level of completed education than foreign migrant private English language school teachers, do not fare much better. Temporary employment and the realisation of little chances to find permanent stable employment partially accounts for more than 95% of foreign English native language teachers leaving Japan within three years of their arrival (Brophy, 2005a).

The census data places North American, British and Australian English language teachers and college instructors in the occupational category of professional and technical workers and they are accorded a visa status as a professional or specialist. However, the far majority of Western migrant instructors are employed as part-time or full-time limited-term instructors and their actual job condition distorts the connotation of their visa and occupational status. More consistent with their condition of employment is that of a service worker. The actual status position and working condition of their job within the service industry for most Western migrant instructors is that of the working class.

The foreign migrant also differs from Japanese nationals since except for Koreans most are not born and raised in Japan and have family and social networks left behind in their home country. Most are more or less left alone to make it in Japan. This contributes to the necessity of close ethnic ties. Foreign migrant groups have established ethnic enclaves throughout Japan. In the absence of family, relatives and social support from one's home country and widespread prejudice and discrimination, ethnic communities in Japan have been essential for the wellbeing of foreign migrants. And, ethnic businesses are a major source of employment for foreign migrant groups (Komai, 2001, pp 77-80). Networks within these communities play a major role as a source of finding work, obtaining loans, making friends and maintaining a sense of cultural continuity, social stability and providing psychological support. This, along with their ascribed occupational status, distances them from the dominant group Japanese.

Foreign migrants are employed in particular occupations. As will become apparent later, each foreign migrant group occupies a certain niche within Japanese society, employed in occupations that fit a particular demand, associate with nationality and involve work that is quite often work distained by Japanese nationals. Utilising Hashimoto's (2003) basic class schema along with ascribed occupational characteristics, their class status is roughly categorised as follows:

- *Capitalist class:* independent proprietors who own their own business and employ others. Foreign migrant capitalists often own the means of production of foreign migrant related work such as owners of ethnic restaurants.

- *Directors:* directors or executives of businesses. These top jobs are often foreign migrant group related, for example, a foreign migrant boss of labourers at a manufacturing plant or a supervisor of a business concerning trade between their home country and Japan. They mainly supervise workers of the same foreign migrant group and/or workers in their home country.
- *Old middle class:* the self-employed foreign migrant and family workers. The self-employed foreign migrant in a sense owns themselves working in a particular trade or service and thus is not subjected to exploitation by another. Family workers are family members of the capitalist foreign migrant but, since the business is in the family, they indirectly receive part of the profits. However, family workers are employed, do not employ others, receive no profits directly from the labour of others and thus are not members of the capitalist class. Work is foreign migrant group related since someone in the family, most often the head of the household, owns the business and work is most often ascribed or stereotypical by nationality. An independent self-employed worker commonly engages in work related to their ethnic community or nationality.
- *New middle class:* white-collar workers, protective workers (police, fire officers, security personnel etc; very few among foreign migrants) and professionals and specialists (technical employees) who have similar opportunities for advancement as Japanese nationals. The discriminate employment and work status of Japanese female white-collar workers applies even more so to female foreign migrant white-collar workers and thus they are considered as working class. Also, while full-time foreign migrant college instructors are of the new middle class, foreign migrant teachers and instructors on limited-term contracts are considered as working class.
- *Working class:* occupations in service, sales, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, transportation, communications, and production process workers and labourers (construction, factory and manufacturing work). These foreign migrant workers quite often are employed on a limited-term contract. In all cases, wages are paid for their labour and they are relatively powerless regarding their job condition, pay, rights and benefits. Working-class jobs for foreign migrants commonly associate with nationality; each foreign migrant group predominantly works in a particular occupational sector.

Japan's 2000 and 2004 censuses (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, 2000, 2004) are utilised as a class measurement of foreign migrant workers. The 2000 census provides a complete occupation and industrial classification of employment for all foreign migrant workers discussed below while the 2004 census provides an occupational classification for the 10 largest foreign migrant groups. Utilising both the 2000 and 2004 censuses allows for consistency in occupational stratification over time and an assessment of social mobility. Other data were also collected as a check on reliability and to enhance the validity that such data would be comparable and consistent by year and thorough in detailing the actual employment status and living conditions of foreign migrants in Japan.

Foreign migrant groups have established their own ethnic communities and engage in ethnic-related work (Komai, 2001, pp 65-90). Also, foreign migrant groups are hired as a group or the particular work they engage in relates to their nationality. The 2000 and 2004 censuses reflect on these characteristics, for example, main employment for a particular foreign migrant group is listed as in trade, drinking and eating establishments or manufacturing and so on. Industrial and occupational classifications also list particular job status such as regular or temporary employee, director, self-employed employing others, solely self-employed and family workers. These particular job statuses match well with the industrial and occupational classifications for each foreign migrant group. For example, for one foreign migrant group, main employment is indicated by a large number working in sales occupations or the trade industry. Within this occupational or industrial employment category, members are self-employed employing others (capitalists), directors (directors or executives), regular and temporary employees (working class) or family workers (old middle class). In the occupational census, three occupational groups – 'professional and technical workers', 'managers and administrators' and 'clerical and related workers' – allow for classification in the new middle class with corrections made compatible with Hashimoto's (2003) class schema (see Appendix A for exact details of the census). Given complementary sources that detail foreign migrant group members working together in the same line of work and discussion of this throughout the chapter, the census classifications are indicative of ethnic or foreign migrant specific areas of employment and class stratification.

The 2000 and 2004 censuses do not include foreign migrants who are trainees or undocumented workers. Foreign migrant trainees and undocumented workers, however, are considered part of the foreign migrant group workforce. This problem was corrected for by including Komai's (2001, pp 23, 29, 40-45) number and job situation of foreign trainees and undocumented workers at approximately the same time period as the 2000 census data and these data are used along with both the 2000 and 2004 census data. While the 2000 census data are close to Komai's 1999 data, for the 2004 census, given a four-year lapse, an approximation of trainees and undocumented workers is somewhat checked against by the trend of entries and departures in 2004 and data on the number of trainees and undocumented workers since 2000. Sources point to an actual increase of trainees and undocumented workers since 2000, thus this 1999 estimate underestimates the number of trainees and undocumented workers in 2004 (Hanai, 2008, p 16; Hoffman, 2008, p 11). Aoki's (2006) work on labourers (including foreign labourers) in Japan (discussed later) and varied sources on foreign trainees and foreign sex workers complement Komai's (2001) numbers and assessment of the work situation of foreign trainees and undocumented foreign migrants.

We now turn to the discussion of inequality for each foreign migrant group. These include all foreign migrant groups with a population of 10,000 or more and a few less than that, divided into three broad regional categories: Asian, South

American and Western countries. A class analysis follows with three interrelated parts.

The following first part of this class analysis details and describes the class status of the 10 largest foreign migrant groups in Japan. These ten foreign migrant groups represent nearly 92% of the total registered foreign migrant population. Given the greater availability of information particularly 2004 occupational census an assessment of social mobility during this new millennium is able to be discerned. Also, foreign national regional (South East Asia etc) similarities approximating a 'caste' occupational status is discussed including smaller foreign migrant groups from the same foreign geographical region. The second part of the class analysis includes smaller but significant foreign migrant groups. While there is not much data available for these smaller foreign migrant groups, still group characteristics support regional and 'ascribed status' characteristics of foreign migrant groups. The final and third part of this class schema consolidates and brings together the larger and smaller foreign migrant groups, elaborates on the ascribed occupational status of foreign migrant groups and equates and charts the class stratification of foreign migrant groups into ascribed occupational categories.

Part One: Ten largest foreign migrant groups

Asian foreign migrant groups

Koreans

In 2008, there were 589,239 registered Koreans, representing 27% of all foreign migrants. Koreans are the only foreign migrant group whereby the majority of registered migrants are permanent residents (Population Statistics of Japan, 2006; Chung, 2010). Until recently, the population of Koreans was the largest among all other foreign migrant groups in post-war Japan. As an older foreign migrant group, death rates and compared to other foreign migrant groups a larger number of naturalised citizens, their numbers decreased and in 2007 the population of Chinese migrants overtook Koreans as the largest foreign migrant group in Japan (Chung, 2010, pp 5, 45).

Koreans have a long history of migration to Japan dating back to early history, however, migration patterns most relevant to their situation today concern Japan's pre-war colonising of Korea (Komai, 2001, pp 13-4). Under Japan's colony rule of Korea from 1910 until the end of the Second World War, Koreans were made second-class Japanese citizens and migrated to Japan mostly as labourers. The largest migration pattern took place at the outset of the Second World War, as Komai (2001, p 5) tells us:

> Then came the war, and with it a wave of involuntary migration as the Japanese government subjected its Korean colonial subjects to forced labour in mines, munitions factories, etc. (Park 1965). As is

> well known, many Korean women were rounded up and forced into prostitution as 'comfort women' to the imperial army (Takagi 1992, Yoshimi 1995). There are varying estimates of how many Koreans were in Japan when the surrender finally came in 1945, but a figure of 2.3 million would probably be close to the mark.

After the war, given the option, most Koreans in Japan returned home to Korea. In 1952, the San Francisco Peace Treaty established Korean independence from Japan and about the same time, the Interior Ministry's Civil Affairs Bureau in Japan revoked Japanese citizenship for colonial subjects (Fukuoka, 2000, pp 9-12; Komai, 2001, p 14; Weiner and Chapman, 2009, pp 175-6). Koreans and other former colonial subjects (mainly Taiwanese) in Japan were eventually given the status of special permanent residents (such a status also passed on to their descendants) and they were placed under the legislation control of the Alien Registration Law and Immigration Control Law (Komai, 2001, p 24; Weiner and Chapman, 2009, pp 175-6, 182). Some of approximately 600,000 Koreans who remained in Japan after the war were forced to go to Japan as migrant labourers while others had settled in Japan before that time, however, this now first generation of Korean migrants (non-Japanese migrants) were predominately of the working class (Fukuoka, 2000; Komai, 2001; Weiner and Chapman, 2009).

Korean migrants continue to face problems of employment with limited occupational choices. They are eligible for only a few below-managerial positions of public employment and because of their foreign status find difficulty being employed by private Japanese companies. 'Most Koreans have been limited to low-level occupations like day-labourers, or self-service jobs such as pachinko (pinball) parlor managers, Korean barbecue house proprietors, scrap collectors, and small family subcontractors' (Fukuoka and Tsujiyama, 2006, p 3). Throughout the post-war period, however, upward social mobility has been more noticeable in recent times.

In reaction to restricted job opportunities in mainstream Japanese society, a high proportion of Koreans are self-employed. Recent estimates place the figure anywhere from a quarter to a third of the Korean workforce, or more than two to three times the national average (Tamura, 2003; USJP, 2006). The top three occupational areas of self-employment are in chronological order from highest to lowest: construction, restaurants and the entertainment industry (USJP, 2006, p 15).

Subordination of foreign migrant groups is characterised by placing barriers against them to work in occupations that are directly involved in the socialisation and wellbeing of societal members. In order to maintain the legacy of superiority and righteousness of the dominant culture group, occupations directly responsible in forming the minds of the young, nurturing and healing the population, protecting societal members from harm and interpreting and upholding the rights of the individual and punishing those who threaten are overwhelmingly reserved for Japanese only. A marginal number of Koreans are employed as public primary

and secondary school teachers, tenured college professors, police officers, nurses, doctors, lawyers, judges and all bureaucratic and political positions of power.

Excepting a decrease of workers due to age and naturalisation, there has been little change in the Korean working population in this new millennium. A Korean working population that includes workers aged 15 years and older totalled 314,782 workers in 2000 and 278,312 workers in 2004. Capitalists in 2000 represented about 8% (26,068 Koreans) and executives (also called directors and managers) 9% (27,624 Koreans) of the total working population. In 2004, the capitalists dropped slightly to 7% (18,558 Koreans) and directors remained the same as in 2000 at 9% (24,224 Koreans) of the working population.

Korean independent proprietors and executives are closely connected with ethnic group related businesses. The top industry is wholesale and retail trade, drinking and eating establishments, followed by the service industry and then construction. The capitalists (owners) and executives (managerial class) are largely found in ethnic group businesses such as Korean restaurants and Korean-associated (trade, travel, entertainment etc) businesses. In the service industry alone, it is estimated that about 70% of 15,000 to 18,000 pachinko parlours are headed by Koreans (O'Connell and Mitsuya, 1996; Japanorama, 2003; Shimizu, 2007). Korean owners and managers also provide an avenue of employment for Koreans particularly females in the entertainment world owning and operating bars, clubs and other such shops that provide entertainment services. Finally, Korean independent proprietors are the main employers of Korean construction workers in the construction industry (Gill, 2001; Aoki, 2006).

The old middle class in 2000 represented 14% (45,074 Koreans) of the Korean working population dropping down slightly to 13% (37,148 Koreans) in 2004. These individuals include the solely self-employed and family workers. Family workers most often work in ethnic businesses, particularly Korean restaurants owned by the head of household or a relative. While the old middle class among Japanese nationals includes a fairly large number of self-employed farmers, although much on the decline in recent years, an insignificant number of Koreans are employed in this line of work. Self-employed Koreans work in a variety of jobs such as tutoring, money lending, stone dealing, scrap metal trade, shoemaking and various other independent services and trades, often catering to the Korean community.

The new middle class working population in both 2000 (23,216 Koreans) and 2004 (21,947 Koreans) at 8% is a little more than two times below the national average among Japanese workers. While a few prefectures allow Koreans to teach at public schools and work in public jobs, they are ineligible for promotion at the managerial level. There are a limited number of full-time Korean college instructors, only about 3% of full-time college instructors in Japan are foreign nationals and more than half of those are not tenured (McVeigh, 2002). The most common teaching jobs for Korean teachers are instructors at the more than 100 Korean elementary and secondary schools and one Korean college in Japan.

The two largest categories of Koreans in the new middle class are professionals and specialists and male white-collar workers; mentioned above, female office workers in Japan are classified as working class and in both the 2000 and 2004 censuses there were more than twice the number of Korean female than Korean male white-collar employees. Professionals are mainly instructors in the educational field while specialists cover a wide variety of jobs in an ever-increasing technological world. Discrimination in hiring Koreans by large Japanese firms where documentation is required that would reveal their Korean nationality, as many Koreans attempt to pass as Japanese, prompts Korean males of the new middle class to predominantly work for small (nationality documentation not required) Japanese firms. Many Korean males are white-collar workers for Korean businesses such as banks, trading firms and various ethnic service oriented businesses in real estate, employment agencies or the Korean Youth Organization in Japan (Sugimoto, 2003; Tamura, 2003; USJP, 2006). The Korean new middle class also are involved in businesses involving trade between Korea and Japan, working for Korean and Japanese companies.

In both 2000 (192,800 Koreans) and 2004 (176,435 Koreans), the majority (61% in 2000 and 63% in 2004) of employed Koreans belonged to the working class. A large number work as labourers in construction, at factories and in mining. The Korean working class drive taxis and lorries, are cooks, waiters and dishwashers in Korean restaurants, are employed as workers in scrap metal, as carpenters, wood cutters and bookbinders, work as cashiers and in sales at convenient and department stores, are dock workers and stevedores, service others in the entertainment world and are part-time workers in various jobs. And, mentioned above, quite a few Korean females are office workers and represent about 8% of the working class.

Komai (2001, p 23) listed more than 60,000 Koreans as undocumented workers in 1999 and that number has remained high ever since (USJP, 2006). The majority of undocumented male workers work as construction and factory workers while the largest number of females work in the 'sex trade' (Komai, 2001, p 42).

North and South Korean migrants

While Koreans hold a subordinate occupational status in Japan, there is also a significant class and ethnic divide among Koreans themselves. Lifestyles differ between South and North Koreans in Japan. Because of Japanese internal politics and strong diplomatic and business ties with South but not North Korea, over time the shift of allegiance and citizenship among Koreans in Japan has changed from predominately North Korean to South Korean (Fukuoka, 2000, pp 22-3). North Korean migrants in Japan are more likely to speak the Korean language and lead a more ethnic Korean way of life than South Korean migrants. Nearly all Korean schools in Japan are run by Chongryun, a Korean ethnic organisation that represents and supports North Korea. In the 1990s, 81 elementary schools, 57 middle schools, 12 high schools and one university were North Korean ethnic

schools with instruction in all of these schools conducted in the Korean language (Fukuoka, 2000, p 25). Only four Korean schools, all four schools tracked from elementary through high school, are operated by South Koreans with a South Korean student population and even then instruction is given in the Japanese language (Fukuoka, 2000, pp 25-6).

The implications of this wide disparity of ethnic schools by North and South Koreans in Japan are twofold. First, given that all tenured full-time public teaching positions are blocked from Koreans, North Korean compared to South Korean migrants have a higher level of professional occupations in the field of education, a large number being full-time tenured teachers and school counsellors and holding upper-level (vice-principal and principal) school positions at North Korean-run schools. Second, since the Japanese government does not officially recognise Korean high schools, making it difficult for graduates to enter Japanese colleges and universities, and since instruction at North Korean schools is given in Korean, fewer North Korean ethnic people are prepared to enter into mainstream Japanese society than South Korean migrants. Although statistics are not available, since nearly all South Korean migrants graduate from Japanese high schools facilitating a much easier path towards college entrance, it would seem most likely that South Korean migrants would have a higher level of college education than North Korean migrants, advantageous to a higher-class position.

Class barriers

The class divide between all Korean migrants and Japanese nationals is furthered by past and present structural impediments blocking access to benefits afforded Japanese nationals. Not until 1980 after Japan ratified an International Human Rights Covenant were Koreans eligible for public housing or public housing loans. Up to 1982 when Japan revised social welfare laws, foreign migrants were excluded from basic social welfare such as a national pension, national health insurance and a pension for disabled people (Komai, 2001, p 17). The problem of receiving a national pension (akin to social security in the US) at an old age, however, has carried over into this new millennium since it requires 25 years of paying into the system by the age of seventy. Thus, for example, in 1982 when eligibility of the national pension for foreign migrants began, Koreans forty-six years of age and older at that time could not enrol in the national pension since by the age of 70 they would not have been able to acquire the twenty-five years of paying into the national pension system necessary to receive payment. The end result is that today most older Koreans and all those over 70 years old as of 2007 do not receive a national pension.

Koreans, like all foreign migrants, are confronted with discriminate barriers for enrolment in private and public pension plans available for full-time employees. Pension programmes of Japanese government agencies, public and private schools and universities and most Japanese companies cover full-time employees whereby automatically both the employee and the employer pay into the pension plan. As

foreign migrants, few government jobs are open to Koreans, limiting their access to public pension plans. Private pension programmes require a sufficient amount of available capital and many small enterprises do not have a pension programme. Job discrimination has prompted most Koreans to be self-employed and work in family businesses without a pension or work for small companies that do not have a pension programme, meaning that many do not have the luxury of retiring at 65 years old (USJP, 2006).

The large number of older Koreans without any pension not only creates an impoverished elder working class of Koreans but also has placed a heavy financial burden on the Korean family. This burden is accentuated by the instability of the main line of work open to Koreans – that of self-employed, family businesses and employees of small businesses – that simply repeats the same cycle in a similar manner when working Koreans become older. While younger and middle-aged Koreans today can benefit from the national pension programme when they decide to retire, the average national pension monthly payment is much less than public and private pensions for full-time employees. Furthermore, the Korean working class has suffered most from discriminatory occupational barriers for stable employment. In recent years, compared to Japanese nationals, about twice the percentage of Koreans have been unemployed and about a three times higher percentage have been on social welfare (Tamura, 2003; USJP; 2006).

Chinese

There are a number of similarities between Chinese (includes Taiwan, Hong Kong and mainland China) and Korean migrants in Japan. Although far fewer in number, Chinese colonial subjects residing in Japan, like Koreans, had their Japanese citizenship revoked shortly after the Second World War, later replaced by a special permanent migrant resident status. Similarly, Chinese migrants work in various ethnic group-related jobs. Chinese migrants are involved with the growing number of Japan–China import and export businesses. In the Chinatowns of Yokohama and Kobe there are many Chinese family-run restaurants, various Chinese-owned shops and Chinese migrants working as cooks, barbers and tailors (Komai, 2001). There is, however, one major difference. While the Korean population has decreased in recent years from naturalisation, intermarriage with Japanese and mortality rates from an ageing population, the Chinese migrant population is younger and has rapidly increased, surpassing Koreans as the largest foreign migrant group.

The 1990s (and continuing in this new millennium) witnessed a rapid increase of Chinese migrants. In 1992, there were 190,538 registered Chinese migrants, this jumped to 218,306 in 1995 and then further increased to 267,881 by the end of 1998 (Komai, 2001, pp 21-3). With steady increases from 1998, by 2008 the population of Chinese migrants more than doubled, reaching 655,377 Chinese migrants, now the largest foreign migrant group representing 30% of the total registered foreign migrant population in Japan (Chung, 2010, p 5).

Using official figures for the Chinese migrant population in Japan in 1999 and 2005, in chronological order from high to low, Chinese migrants during both periods of time were mainly registered in Japan as (a) spouses, children or grandchildren of Japanese, many of whom were the children of Japanese soldiers or civilians left behind in China after the Second World War, (b) college and pre-college (includes language school) students and (3) trainees, Chinese labourers employed by Japanese firms (Komai, 2001, pp 26-7; Zha, 2006, p 93; Liu-Farrer, 2009, p 122-3). A large group not included as officially registered are approximately 45,000 Chinese who have overstayed their visa or entered the country illegally.

Most Chinese migrants do not have permanent resident status although the percentage has been increasing in this millennium. In 2004, 21% of registered Chinese migrants were permanent residents, rising to 29% in 2007 (Ministry of Justice, Japan, 2006; Chung, 2010, p 38). Mentioned earlier, permanent residency has many benefits, and allows for better job opportunities. Compared to Koreans whereby the majority are permanent and long-term residents, Chinese are relative newcomers, much less established dampening their social mobility.

A major source of work for migrant Chinese came about when the Japanese government established the Japan International Training Cooperation Organization (JITCO) in 1991. Under this programme, mainland Chinese were brought to Japan, recruited for work through JITCO by Japanese small- and medium-sized companies. The numbers of trainees steadily increased over the years, reaching 21,036 JITCO Chinese trainees in 2000 (Zha, 2006, p 103). Recent data show that in 2006 more than 83,000 trainees, most of them Chinese, were brought into Japan under the supervision of JITCO (Reynolds, 2007).

The main function of JITCO has been to supply foreign workers to Japanese small- and medium-sized businesses with a labour shortage, especially those businesses in remote areas of Japan. Although technically the programme aims at training a Chinese worker for one year and then sending them back home, loopholes in business and immigration laws have allowed trainees to extend their stay for up to seven years (Zha, 2006, p 102). Most trainees jobs are those of the so-called '3 ks' (*kitanai*, dirty, *kiken*, dangerous and *kitsui*, exhausting hard labour), work that a limited number of Japanese are willing to do.

Using the 2000 census and Komai's (2001) estimate of Chinese undocumented workers, in 2000, 178,671 Chinese worked in Japan. In 2004, the working population increased to 234,626 Chinese. While official unemployment among Chinese is about 4.5%, approximately the same as the national level, given a large number of illegal migrants and an estimated 14% unemployment rate among them, actual unemployment of Chinese migrants is about one and a half times higher than the national average (Komai, 2001, pp 41-5; Tamura, 2003).

Capitalists and directors (executives) have represented a small proportion of the working population: capitalists 2% (2,670 Chinese) in 2000 and 1% (2,671 Chinese) in 2004, directors 4% (6,991 Chinese) in 2000 and 3% (7,919 Chinese) in 2004. While there has not been any noticeable increase in the percentage of executives to the total working population, the numbers have grown larger

concomitant with the population increase of Chinese foreign migrants in Japan and a rise in Chinese business investment in Japan (Komai, 2001; *Asia Times*, 2004; Zha, 2006). The Chinese capitalist and director class along with the new middle class are mainly employed as entrepreneurs and corporate employees with what Liu-Farrer (2009, pp 123-4) calls the transnational economy or economic globalisation in business between Japan and China. Together with successful Chinese entrepreneurs and shop owners, this capitalist and director class although small is quite successful.

The percentage of the old middle class to the total working population has remained the same at 3% both in 2000 (6,228 Chinese) and 2004 (7,440 Chinese). The new middle class has not changed much, representing 8% (14,635 Chinese) in 2000 and 7% (16,502 Chinese) in 2004 of the Chinese migrant working population. The old middle class largely consists of the self-employed in ethnic-related work such as tailors and barbers serving the Chinese community and family workers of Chinese ethnic businesses. The new middle class is composed of a fairly large number of professionals, including full-time college instructors (although the far majority of Chinese as with all foreign college instructors are not tenured) and educated Chinese, many of whom are male college graduates of Japanese universities who become employed in the transnational economy between Japan and China.

The working class represented 83% (148,147 Chinese) in 2000 and 85% (200,094 Chinese) in 2004 of the Chinese migrant working population in Japan. The three largest groups of the working class are trainees, undocumented workers and overseas (repatriated) Chinese. Members of these groups work in the lowest occupations, and pay and working conditions are at the bottom of the class stratification hierarchy. Chinese female office workers represent a small (about 2%) of the working class.

Trainees work as unskilled labour mainly in the textile, manufacturing and construction industries. They receive very low wages and their monthly pay from 1995 to 2000 actually went down. In 2000, nearly 90% of Chinese trainees received an average monthly pay below ¥90,000 (less than US $900), substantially lower than the minimum wage of most prefectures at ¥140,000 a month (Zha, 2006, pp 102, 103, 109). Undocumented Chinese workers are mainly employed as unskilled labour working in factories, construction and service-related work (largely in the entertainment world). Like trainees, wages paid to unskilled labourers decreased in the 1990s, and by the late 1990s they received a very low daily wage of ¥7,000 (about US $70) or less and that is if they could find work for the day (Komai, 2001, pp 40-1). Without any benefits and high unemployment, undocumented labour workers just do make it from one day to the next.

There are numerous cases of employers' abuse of Chinese migrant workers in Japan (Zha, 2006, p 105). Undocumented workers are very vulnerable to exploitation such as not being paid, being denied compensation for a job-related injury and being harassed on the job, since as illegal aliens any objections can result in being turned over to the authorities.

A lawsuit case involving Chinese trainees gives an insight into how employers take advantage of transitory foreign labour with limited human rights. A lawsuit by Chinese trainees supported by Bright International Cooperative Society located in Tokyo was brought against All-Japan Fresh Food Logistics Cooperative in Chiba. The cooperative sent the trainees to work at food processing companies and had their pay from these companies sent back to the cooperative. The cooperative made unreasonable pay deductions and the Chinese broker that brought them over to Japan deducted money from their pay check on the promise that the money would be given back after they returned to China. From a below minimum wage monthly salary of ¥96,000 (about US $960) a month, the trainees, after deductions, received only ¥37,000 (about US $370) a month. After returning to China they never received the money promised (after one year ¥288,000, about US $2,880) by the Chinese broker. They won their case against corrupt practices by their employer and some of the money was returned to them.

Chinese trainees are powerless to do anything about their work situation and it was only through the benevolent offices of Bright International Cooperative Society that one lawsuit was able to take place. They are often unaware of graft taken against them by their employers and brokers and even if they suspect 'wrongdoings' are hesitant to act for fear of damaging their chances for extended employment. Employer exploitation of Chinese trainees is common and often becomes headline news in Chinese language newspapers in Japan (Zha, 2006).

Overseas Chinese refer to the second and third generation of Japanese left behind in China after the end of the Second World War who were repatriated to Japan after normal diplomatic relations were established with China in 1972 (Komai, 2001, pp 60-4). By 1999, some 50-60,000 overseas Chinese lived in Japan; a small number became Japanese citizens and, therefore, are no longer Chinese migrants (Komai, 2001, p 62).

Overseas Chinese have not fared well in Japanese society, located at the low end of the social stratification ladder. Komai's (2001, pp 95-9) 1995 data revealed a bleak picture of their social economic status in Japan. The average household income of overseas Chinese in 1995 was ¥183,000 a month, nearly four times below the average Japanese household monthly income (¥683,000) and slightly more than three times below the average household monthly income (¥569,000) of Japanese working-class families. Individual incomes were also very low compared to Japanese. The average monthly individual income of overseas Chinese at ¥147,000 was nearly two and a half times lower than the average individual monthly income (¥344,000) of Japanese and about 1.7 times lower than the average monthly income (¥244,000) of working-class Japanese.

Most overseas Chinese in the 1990s worked in manual labour with a high 12% unemployment rate, nearly three times the national average. Furthermore, about 50% of overseas Chinese have at one time been recipients of social welfare. This coincides with a low level of completed education. Among overseas Chinese who received their schooling in Japan, there is more than two times the number of middle-school than high-school graduates. And, while about 29% of overseas

Chinese graduated from technical schools, less than 8% are two- or four-year college graduates (Komai, 2001, p 98).

The most economically successful working-class Chinese are employed in the entertainment world. They work as hostesses, bartenders, female masseurs in massage parlours (a front for prostitution), prostitutes and gangsters. Because many Chinese migrants work illegally either in violation of their visa status or have overstayed their visa and because of the illegal activity that takes place in the entertainment world, it is difficult to know how many Chinese migrants work in the entertainment industry. Varied sources puts the percentage of Chinese migrants connected to the entertainment world anywhere between 5 and 10% of the total Chinese migrant population (Komai, 2001; Dubro and Kaplan, 2003; Zha, 2006).

South East Asians

There are five South East Asian migrant groups in Japan with 10,000 or more migrants: Burmese (Myanmar), Indonesians, Malaysians, Thais and Vietnamese. All five of these foreign migrant groups share much in common, mainly working in unskilled jobs and jobs associated with their ethnic communities. There are, however, differences in residency status, gender population and working-class occupation.

The commonality among South East Asian migrants that is similar to all foreign migrant groups, except Korean migrants, is that most are recent arrivals to Japan confronted with a language barrier. Along with limited job opportunities, this has prompted the formation of ethnic communities where concentrations of foreign migrant group members live and work (Komai, 2001, pp 77-84). In large cities throughout Japan, there are numerous South East Asian ethnic restaurants. Within sectors of cities where concentrations of South East Asian migrants live, there are ethnic restaurants and shops that sell home-country ethnic foods, sundry goods and discount airline tickets, a hodgepodge of shops such as beauty parlours, ethnic-run offices that assist in finding employment and so on. Newspapers and magazines not only are imported from the home country and sold in ethnic shops but also South East Asian migrants in Japan publish their own ethnic magazines and newspapers in their native language.

The bulk of legal South East Asian migrant workers come to Japan as trainees or through work connected with a joint venture between their home country and a Japanese company (*Asia Times*, 2001; Migration News, 2001; Japan Economic Newswire, 2005; Bailey, 2006; *International Herald Tribune*, 2006; *Kyodo News*, 2006). Usually, trainees go to Japan through JITCO although to a lesser extent other various government and private enterprises also act as agents for trainees. Trainees, as mentioned before, are not trained to improve on their skills for future long-term employment in Japan; rather, they are hired as temporary low-paid unskilled workers in working-class jobs. The South East Asian trainee's average salary at about ¥70,000 (about US $700) a month is below the poverty line (*Migration News*, 2004).

The different migration pattern of each South East Asian migrant group to Japan is reflected in their resident status and population characteristics. Thais have the largest population of South East Asian migrant groups with over 30,000 registered migrants in 2004, the largest proportional difference of female to male migrants and along with Malaysians a high number of undocumented workers. Thais also have fewer trainees and the highest percentage working in the entertainment world than other South East Asian migrant groups (HRW, 2000; Komai, 2001; Ministry of Justice, 2006). Vietnamese have the largest number of refugees and thus the highest percentage of long-term residents. Indonesians have the greatest proportional difference of males to females, reflecting on their Islam religion and that a large number of Indonesian males were brought to Japan as trainees. However, while there are different resident group characteristics between South East Asian migrant groups, these foreign migrant groups in Japan are at the low rung of the social stratification ladder.

The class stratification of the three largest South East Asian migrant groups and in the top 10 of the largest foreign migrant groups – Thais, Vietnamese and Indonesians – is described here. Later, in Part Two of this chapter, the class stratification of the two smaller South East Asian migrant groups – Burmese and Malaysians – is covered.

Thais

Consistently through the years there has been more illegal than legal Thai migrants in Japan although the proportion has recently decreased. The proportion of illegal to legal Thai migrants were, in 1992, 5 to 1, in 1995, 2.68 to 1 and in 1999, 1.28 to 1 (Komai, 2001, pp 21-3). However, the actual number of illegal Thais is an underestimation as, for example, in 1995 about 30,000 statistically unreported illegal Thai migrants entered Japan on Singaporean or Malaysian passports or illegally came in by boat (HRW, 2000).

In 2006, there were 39, 618 registered Thai migrants in Japan, with 25% of registered Thais having permanent residency (Ministry of Justice, 2008). The total migrant population is at least twice that since undocumented Thais are not included in the census. A better estimate of the total Thai foreign migrant population in Japan is based on Komai's (2001, pp 23-29) data. Among 52,998 Thais residing in Japan in 1999, 57% (30,065 Thais) were illegal residents. There are a significantly greater number (33,234 to 20,393) of Thai females than Thai male migrants: a 1.63 to 1 proportion of females to males in 1999 (Komai, 2001, p 29). Discussed below, this gender imbalance is largely due to a very high percentage of Thai female sex workers.

Komai's (2001, p 23) data in 1999 shows that the largest percentage of registered Thais are spouses (nearly all Thai females) of Japanese; 46% (10,762 Thais) of registered Thais reside in Japan on a spouse visa. The next three largest categories of registered Thai migrants in Japan are: 4,584 Thais (19%) on a temporary visitor visa, 1,865 Thais (8%) on a trainee visa and 1,622 Thais (7%) on a student visa. While

in 1999 only 4% of registered Thais were permanent residents, this increased to 25% in 2006, most likely a result of the large number of Thai spouses of Japanese men obtaining permanent residency.

Based on the 2000 census and Komai's (2001) estimate of Thai undocumented workers, the Thai working population in Japan in 2000 was 41,337 workers. In 2004 the Thai working population increased only slightly to 42,728 Thais. Capitalists in 2000 and 2004 represented about 0.5% (201 and 272 Thais respectively) and directors for these same time periods 0.3% (125 and 154 Thais respectively) of the total working population. The Thai migrant capitalist and director class are mainly the owners and managers of ethnic businesses such as Thai restaurants. Self-employed Thais and family workers or members of the old middle class also mainly work in ethnic-related businesses; particularly family workers in Thai restaurants and in both 2000 and 2004 represented 2% (773 and 930 Thais respectively) of the Thai working population. A student (college and pre-college) population of slightly more than 1,500 Thai students in Japan in the 1990s has contributed to a number of male Thai graduates of Japanese universities and Japanese language schools becoming white-collar workers in Japan. Along with a small number of professionals, such as college instructors, specialists (computer technicians, engineers etc) or researchers, the new middle-class population came to 0.5% (242 Thais) in 2000 and 1% in 2004 (505 Thais) of the total Thai working population (Komai, 2001).

The Thai working class has been extremely large in this new millennium at 97% (39,996 Thais) in 2000 and 96% (40,867) in 2004 of the total Thai working population. About 30,000 of the Thai working class are undocumented workers. Working-class Thais mainly work in manufacturing, construction, trade and services. Thai working-class male migrant workers like all South East Asian migrant male workers do the jobs that Japanese find distasteful and dangerous and at a lower wage. They do the heavy work in construction, work on the assembly lines in the production of goods, clean up the factories and dig holes in manual labour. A minority or about 25% of Thai male migrant workers work in the service industry as cooks, waiters, shop workers, or work in the entertainment world and so on. Nearly 65% of Thai migrants are females but only 0.3% is office workers. Thai females are heavily overrepresented in the entertainment world. According to a reputable human rights organisation (HRW, 2000, p 17): 'An estimated eighty to ninety percent of [Thai] female migrants work as sex workers in Japan, typically as hostesses or waitresses who also perform sexual services for their clients.' This large number of Thai 'sex workers' quite often comes about from the trafficking of sex workers.

Trafficking of foreign females to work in the sex trade in Japan is an illegal operation. It is large scale and includes females from all Asian countries and recently women from South America and Eastern Europe. Trafficking of Thai females as sex workers was stepped up in the late 1980s and continues to this day although tougher Japanese laws and intervention has reduced the number of all foreign

women trafficked into Japan for the purpose of working in the sex trade and provisions are now in place to assist exploited female sex workers.

Most often, trafficking of females from Thailand (as well as other countries) to work in the sex trade in Japan involves recruiting (usually a Thai recruiter although working with a Japanese who sometimes is in Thailand) Thai women for employment with a club or bar in Japan, although the Thai woman may be unaware that the job involves sex. The recruiter or assistant helps with legal matters (obtaining a passport etc) and makes travel arrangements. The Thai female is then met at the airport in Japan by a broker or employee of the entertainment establishment she will work at and taken to the place (usually a dormitory or apartment complex located very near or even in the same building structure of the bar, club etc) where she will work. Immediately, the Thai sex worker is in debt from services rendered, mainly travel expenses and fees of those that have set up her employment (recruiters and brokers), which can run over US $10,000. This debt must be paid off until she can earn any pay and even then the amount of pay she receives for her services is decided by the club, bar and/or pimp that she works for (HRW, 2000).

Vietnamese

The 2006 census indicates that 32,485 Vietnamese were registered as living in Japan in 2006 (Ministry of Justice, 2008). Vietnamese differ from other South East Asian groups in that their migration began as refugees in the late 1970s, an aftermath from the Vietnam War. Japan under international pressure agreed to accept Vietnamese refugees, most resettlement taking place in the 1980s, effectively ending in 1989 (Komai, 2001). By 2003, 7,700 Vietnamese had obtained refugee status in Japan, a very small number compared to the approximately 1,250,000 Vietnamese resettled in other countries (Yoshida, 2002; USCRI, 2006).

Vietnamese refugee status is temporary: refugees are given one- to three-year resident permits allowing them to work and live in Japan. These resident permits do, however, allow for long-term residency, normally extended indefinitely (USCRI, 2006). After five years, refugees may apply for permanent residency although the process may take as long as 10 years. By 2006, 7,462 Vietnamese or 23% of the Vietnamese migrant population in Japan had obtained permanent residency.

The class breakdown of Vietnamese is similar to that of other South East Asians except that the working population has grown significantly as more refugees have come of working age. The total working population of Vietnamese was 6,256 workers in 2000 increasing to 10,822 workers in 2004. There are few capitalists: only 0.7% (46 Vietnamese migrants) in 2000 and 1% (60 Vietnamese migrants) in 2004 of the total Vietnamese working population. The capitalists and family workers are mainly found in trade and eating and drinking establishments. Vietnamese restaurants are often family-run (an independent proprietor or capitalist and family members or old middle class) businesses in large cities and

the suburbs of Japan. Directors represented 2% of the total working population in 2000 (158 Vietnamese) and 2004 (218 Vietnamese) and are found in the manufacturing industry, the industry that most Vietnamese work in. The old middle class was 4% (236 Vietnamese migrants) in 2000 and 3% (303 Vietnamese) in 2004 of the Vietnamese working population, comprised of family members working in family-run businesses, mainly restaurants and the solely self-employed independently employed in sales and as production process workers and labourers. The new middle class at 3% in both 2000 (174 Vietnamese migrants) and 2004 (348 Vietnamese) are representative of higher-educated Vietnamese males having acquired Japanese language skills working in companies as white-collar workers or both males and females working as professional and technical workers.

Ninety per cent of working Vietnamese migrants in 2000 (5,642 Vietnamese) and 91% in 2004 (9,893 Vietnamese) belonged to the working class. Most work in the manufacturing industry mainly as plant and machine operators, many assisted through job placement as refugees (Refugees Assistance Center, 2004). Although small in comparison, after manufacturing the next largest group of Vietnamese migrants work in trade (including sales) and eating and drinking establishments, this work often associated with the ethnic community particularly employed as waiters, waitresses, cooks and dishwashers in Vietnamese or South East Asian restaurants. Female office workers represented less than 1% of the working class in 2000 and 2004. Finally, it is noteworthy that there are an insignificant number of Vietnamese undocumented workers and they are not known to have any noteworthy connection with the entertainment world.

Indonesians

In 2006, 24,858 Indonesians were registered migrants in Japan (Ministry of Justice, 2008). Only 8% of registered Indonesians hold a permanent residents status (Population Statistics of Japan, 2006). The working population is relatively small, indicated by a large number of Indonesians on student, cultural (studying Japanese culture or engaged in Indonesian cultural activities) and spouse visas. While Komai (2001) reported that in 1999 the number of undocumented Indonesians was insignificant, this has changed in just a few years. Indonesians ranked 8th on the list of foreign migrants in Japan who stayed beyond their visa time limits (illegal migrants) in 2002, with 6,393 undocumented Indonesians an increase of 30% from 4,947 illegal Indonesian migrants a year earlier (*Asia Times*, 2003).

As with all foreign migrants from Islamic countries, most registered Indonesian migrants are males, a three to one ratio of registered males to females (Komai, 2001, p 29). Indonesians are closely tied to Islamic communities well established throughout Japan, ethnic communities providing work and networks for work, financial and emotional support.

The total working population of Indonesians was 13,859 workers in 2000 and 16,159 workers in 2004. The Indonesian capitalist and directors class has been extremely small in both time periods, capitalists at 0.2% in 2000 and 2004 (26 and

32 Indonesian migrants respectively) and directors at 0.2% in 2000 and 0.5% in 2004 (33 and 73 Indonesian migrants respectively). Like other South East Asians, Indonesians capitalists and family workers are linked together in trade and eating and drinking businesses, Indonesian independent proprietors mainly owners of ethnic-oriented trade companies in a transnational economy and restaurants employing family workers (old middle class) and other Indonesians. The old middle class at less than 1% in both 2000 and 2004 (80 and 145 Indonesians respectively) partially is a result of the predominantly single male population or husbands who came alone to Japan and thus there are a very small number of family workers. Executives or directors of companies although small in number are largely found in the service industry associated with cultural activities and travel-related businesses to Indonesia, particularly to Bali, a popular tourist spot among Japanese. The new middle class at 3% in both 2000 and 2004 (341 and 508 Indonesian respectively) of the total working population come from the fairly large student population whereby upon graduation Indonesian males are employed as white-collar workers in Japan's corporate and transnational business world and a small number as professionals and specialists.

The Indonesian working class at 96% (13,379 Indonesians) in 2000 and 95% (15,401 Indonesians) in 2004 of the total working population is extremely large. Few or less than 0.4% in both 2000 and 2004 are female office workers. Trainees (3,709 Indonesians in 2000 and estimated to be about the same in 2004) and temporary workers (3,101 Indonesians in 2000 and 3,856 Indonesians in 2004), mostly males, accounted for about half of the working-class population in 2000 and 2004. Discussed earlier, the pay and work situations of trainees along with temporary workers are at the bottom of the low strata of the working class. The majority of registered Indonesian regular employees in the working class work as labourers in manufacturing.

One example of Indonesians contracted to work as labourers takes place in Oarai, a rural area located in Ibaraki prefecture. A large (about 1,000-member) Indonesian community lives in there, working in seafood processing plants (Mission Connections, 2006). Throughout Japan there are many food, textile, lumber and chemical manufacturing plants, often located in rural areas, which employ Asian migrants as labourers. This then facilitates, as in Oarai, ethnic communities and ethnic businesses.

The recent increase of undocumented Indonesians includes a rising number of female Indonesian sex workers. For example, in 2005, the highest number (44) of victims of sex trafficking were Indonesian female sex workers; the next two highest groups were Filipinos and Thais (Orient expat, 2006). While it is not known how this statistic was obtained and the actual number of female sex workers is much higher among Filipinos and Thais than Indonesians, still those Indonesians (and more so for Thais and Filipinos) found to be victims of sex trafficking are much lower than the actual number of Indonesian female sex workers.

Filipinos

Between South East Asian and East Asian countries lies the Philippines. Filipinos after Koreans and Chinese are the third largest migrant group among Asian countries in Japan. Population statistics for 2006 show that there were 193,488 registered Filipinos in Japan (Ministry of Justice, 2008). Thirty-one per cent (60,264 Filipinos) of registered Filipinos are permanent residents. There are also a large number of undocumented Filipinos. Komai's (2001, p 23) data in 1999 estimated that 40,420 Filipinos illegally reside in Japan.

There are two main characteristics of Filipinos in Japan: a large number of Filipinos arrive in Japan on an entertainment visa and about half of registered Filipinos are spouses of Japanese men. An entertainment visa covers work as a singer, dancer or other types of entertainment but has also been used as a front for working as a bar or club hostess, which may involve prostitution. At three different time periods (1991, 1995 and 1998) during the 1990s between 17 and 32% of Filipinos were registered in Japan on an entertainment visa (Komai, 2001, pp 21-3). During this same time period, 50 to 60% of Filipinos were registered in Japan on a spouse visa (Komai, 2001, pp 21-3). Intermarriages with Japanese men in Japan have continued to be high, 'a record 12,150 Filipino-Japanese couples took the vows in 2006 – eclipsing Chinese-Japanese pairs for the first place among international marriages' (Yoshida, 2008, p 2). Marriages with Japanese men have been facilitated by the large number of Filipino females in the entertainment world. Increasingly, large Filipino communities act as a seabed for intermarriages with Japanese men, for arranged marriages with Japanese men for purposes of work in Japan (called paper marriages) or for Japanese men who live in remote areas of Japan and cannot find a Japanese spouse.

The large number of marriages with Japanese men and the fact that most Filipinos on an entertainment visa are females are reflected in the gender imbalance of registered Filipino migrants in Japan. In 1999, among 145,728 registered Filipino migrants in Japan, 115,343 were females compared to only 30,385 males, a nearly 4:1 ratio gender difference. Also, undocumented Filipino migrants are largely women, most becoming illegal residents from overstaying their entertainment visa (Komai, 2001, p 29; CATW, 2006).

There are a large number of fatherless Filipino-Japanese children without Japanese citizenship living in the Philippines. An estimated 120,000 'Japinos' (children of Japanese men and Filipino women without Japanese citizenship) were born in Japan but as a result of a failed marriage or illegitimate relation returned with their mothers back to the Philippines (*The Japan Times*, 2008c, p 3). The majority of Japinos live in poverty, and, while assisted by the Shin-Nikkeijin Network Association in the Philippines, only a few have been able to establish contact with their fathers in Japan. Establishment of paternity for illegitimate children can lead to Japanese citizenship. The Nationality Law in Japan was revised in December 2008, allowing citizenship for children of Japanese men and foreign women even if the couple never married (*The Japan* Times, 2008l, p 18).

There is a distinct religious difference between Filipinos and other Asian migrant groups in Japan. Most Filipino migrants are Catholics. Large concentrations of Filipinos attend Catholic mass together every Sunday throughout Japan, maintaining close interpersonal relations. They have a tight ethnic community and not only help one another out but also maintain close ties with the regions in the Philippines they came from, often bringing over relatives and friends from these regions to Japan.

In 2000, 84,080 Filipinos worked in Japan, this number increasing to 103,698 in 2004. The capitalists in 2000 (428 Filipino migrants) and 2004 (644 Filipino migrants) and directors (359 in 2000 and 570 in 2004) were a very small part of the total working population, each about 0.5% in both time periods. Filipino capitalists, directors and family workers (old middle class) are interconnected, working together in ethnic establishments involving trade in the transnational economy and owning and operating places such as restaurants, beauty parlours and clubs and bars in entertainment-related businesses, and most are females. The old middle class represented 3% in both 2000 (2,419 Filipino migrants) and 2004 (2,998 Filipino migrants) of the total Philippine working population, mainly family workers. The new middle class at 2% (1,621 Filipino migrants) in 2000 and 3% (2,731 Filipino migrants) in 2004 of the Philippine working population are a small group of Filipinos, mainly employed by companies in Japan as investors, researchers, technical specialists and other business-related workers in today's transnational economy.

Ninety-four per cent (79,253 Filipino migrants) in 2000 and 93% (96,755 Filipino migrants) in 2004 of the total Philippine migrant working population were from the working class. Aside from the overwhelmingly large number of females and a good number of males (bartenders and even hosts) working in the entertainment world, about 15% of working-class Filipinos are labourers in the manufacturing industry. Filipino female office workers represented a little less than 1% of the working class in both 2000 and 2004. Undocumented workers make up about half of the Philippine working class, most of them females.

Japanese-Brazilians and Japanese-Peruvians

In the late 1980s, the Japanese government provided special resident visas that allowed South Americans of Japanese descent to live and work in Japan as descendants of Japanese (*nikkeijin*). The far majority of these South Americans were Japanese-Brazilians and Japanese-Peruvians and, including their spouses and children; they were given a long-term or dependent resident visa status. Their numbers accelerated reaching 358,211 by 2004, most or 80% of them Japanese-Brazilians (Population Statistics of Japan, 2006).

Given their *nikkeijin* status, the gender ratio is fairly even among South American migrants with only a slightly higher percentage of males to females. Over the years, more South American migrants have become eligible for permanent residency and by 2004 about 22% had obtained permanent resident status in

Japan. Resident status in Japan, however, differs somewhat between Brazilian and Peruvian migrants.

Since the late 1980s, most South Americans have come over to Japan on a long-term visa; however, some have arrived on a temporary visa and then claimed Japanese descent while in Japan, requesting a visa change to that of a long-term resident. This has been done primarily by Peruvian migrants. Many Peruvian migrants have had difficulty proving their Japanese descent and some have made false claims. Consequently, during the 1990s, between 17 and 29% of Peruvian migrants in Japan overstayed their temporary visa and remained in Japan as illegal migrants.

The Japanese government's granting automatic long-term residence to South Americans of Japanese descent was partially based on the assumption that their Japanese heritage would make for a smoother transition into Japanese society than other foreigners. Keita Takayama, assistant education professor at the University of New England in Australia, called this a mistake:

> Tokyo believed Japanese descendants are not complete 'foreigners' and that cultural friction could be kept to a minimum. But that was wrong, their cultural background are of South Americans. Most of the present problems surrounding the Japanese-Brazilian community stemmed from this erroneous premise. (Yasumoto, 2008, p 3)

Problems began with employment (and, discussed later, deviant behaviour), a solid sense of Brazilian or Peruvian ethnic identity and, consequently, the establishment of ethnic communities. Furthermore, there has no been notable progress in their Japanese language skills or any solid efforts by corporations or the government to provide and assist in language training. A prefecture-wide survey of 2,000 Japanese-Brazilians noted that poor Japanese language skills was partially the reason for a large number (60%) of Japanese-Brazilian respondents working as temps (temporary workers), most (over 80%) labourers in manufacturing, a step down from their previous employment as white-collar workers in Brazil (Yasumoto, 2008). While labour work in Japan pays much better than white-collar jobs in Brazil, although one must also take into account Japan's high cost of living, adult Japanese-Brazilian labourers are relatively well educated as most of them had been of the new middle class in Brazil (Yasumoto, 2008; Tsuda, 2009, p 208).

Japanese-Brazilians

According to the 2000 census, 126,664 Japanese-Brazilian migrants worked in Japan. Among the total Japanese-Brazilian working population, a miniscule 0.3% (369 Japanese-Brazilians) were capitalists and a small 1% (1,174 Japanese-Brazilians) were old middle class, and they mainly owned and ran shops catering to ethnic Japanese-Brazilian communities located near their main line of employment

working for Japan's large car industry in Gunma and Aichi prefectures. The capitalists owned the usual variety of shops found in shopping areas such as computer, video and DVD shops, grocery stores, restaurants and so on. Many of these family businesses also employed other Japanese-Brazilians.

Only 0.5% (691) of the Japanese-South American (*nikkeijin*) working population belongs to the director class. Most work in the manufacturing industry, having moved up the work chain ladder, put in charge of or at least assisting management over their fellow Japanese-Brazilians working in lower-tier jobs as machine operators and labourers. The new middle class at 1% (2,093 Japanese-Brazilians) of the Japanese-Brazilian working population is equally divided between professional and technical workers and administrators or male white-collar workers. These more educated Japanese-Brazilians work as researchers, engineers, technicians, consultants and male office workers.

The working class is very large: 97% (122,337 Japanese-Brazilians) of the Japanese-Brazilian working population belong to the working class. Less than 0.5% of the working class are Japanese-Brazilian female office workers. The working class is concentrated in the manufacturing industry. By occupational classification, 92% are production process workers and labourers for large Japanese industries, particularly carmakers. Komai (2001, p 88) lists the most prominent manufacturing companies that employ the bulk of the Japanese-Brazilian working class: Sanyo Electric Company, Fuji Heavy Industries (a major carmaker), Honda, Yamaha and Toyota Motors.

Japanese-Brazilians have formed their own ethnic communities in Japan. As Tsuda (2009, p 209) states:

> Although they are not residentially segregated, prominent Brazilian immigrant communities have developed in cities such as Oizumi and Hamamatsu; these areas have an expanding array of ethnic businesses, including Brazilian restaurants, food stores and supermarkets, clothing stores and even boutiques and discos, as well as nikkeijin churches and other organizations.

Close ethnic ties, language barriers and pride in maintaining a Brazilian identity are not the only barriers to assimilation for Japanese Brazilians. Their marginal job situation and the fact that social mobility is largely limited to ethnic group-related work keep them at a distance from mainstream Japanese society. Tsuda (2009, p 222) explains:

> Since they remain dependent on the labour-broker system for jobs, they continue to be confined to the informal and marginal sector of the Japanese working class, and very very few have been given permanent jobs with the possibility of regular promotion. In fact, even the social mobility of the assimilation-minded, Japanized nikkeijin has been restricted thus far to jobs as mini-supervisors in the factory, ethnic

liaisons in local company and government offices, and owners of small ethnic businesses. Even assimilated nikkeijin are likely to face greater employment and institutional discrimination if they attempt to enter mainstream Japanese society by competing with native Japanese for jobs, housing, education, and other social services and opportunities.

Japanese-Peruvians

The Japanese-Peruvian working population is much smaller than the Japanese-Brazilian working population, with 29,997 Japanese-Peruvians working in Japan in 2000. The same pattern of work as that of Japanese-Brazilians is seen among Japanese-Peruvians as employment opportunities available in Japanese firms are for South Americans of Japanese descent regardless of whether they are from Brazil or Peru and, like Japanese-Brazilians, this contributes to the formation of ethnic communities near their place of work. The minute capitalist class at 0.2% (57 Japanese-Peruvians) and small old middle class at 0.7% (204 Japanese-Peruvians) are interconnected as owners and family members operating ethnic businesses catering to *nikkeijin*. Just like Japanese-Brazilians, a very small director class at 0.5% (163 Japanese-Peruvians) is concentrated in the manufacturing industry overseeing the labour or assisting in the management of other *nikkeijin* in manufacturing plant operations. The new middle class is equally small at 0.7% (230 Japanese-Peruvians) and like Japanese-Brazilians divided evenly between professionals, technicians and male white-collar workers.

While the working class is very large at 98% (29,343 Japanese-Peruvians) of the Japanese-Peruvian working population, many in fact are not Japanese-Peruvians. There were some 10,320 undocumented workers in 1999 called 'fake *nikkeijin*' (Komai, 2001, pp 23, 99). These fakes buy false documentation in an attempt to qualify as *nikkeijin* and either are discovered as frauds by immigration authorities or remain in Japan as irregular workers. Discussed earlier, irregular workers are at the bottom of the working class strata, with high unemployment, the lowest level of pay and the worst of all jobs. The majority (over 75%) of the so-called 'real' working-class Japanese-Peruvians find employment in the same manufacturing industries as Japanese-Brazilians, working in production processing and as labourers. As with Japanese-Brazilians, less than 0.5% of working class are Japanese-Peruvian female office workers.

Class status of Japanese-South Americans in 2004

The 2004 census joins together all South American migrants in Japan, putting them in one category, the vast majority Japanese-Brazilians and Japanese-Peruvians, with Japanese-Brazilians alone representing close to 80% of all South American migrants in Japan. The class status of South Americans in 2004 is nearly identical to the class status of Japanese-Brazilians and Japanese-Peruvians in 2000. The

working population of South Americans in 2004 was 146,442 workers, with 22% of these registered migrants permanent residents. The capitalist (469 South Americans) and director (1,145 South Americans) class is small: combined it is 1.1%. In 2004, the old middle class at 1% (1,454 South Americans) and new middle class at 2% (2,659 South Americans) remained miniscule while the working class at 96% (140,715 South Americans) again was extremely large.

The 2004 census showed the same pattern of work as the 2000 census. Working-class South Americans were mainly employed by the car industry in manufacturing and labour, capitalists and old middle-class proprietors and family members in the trade and service industry and new middle class a limited number of professionals, technicians and male white-collar workers. Finally, female white-collar workers in the 2004 census just like in the 2000 census represented only about 0.5% of the working-class population.

Western migrants

Seiyo in Japanese means the West or Western countries and refers to North American and European countries; *seiyō-jin* is translated as a Westerner. The term *gaijin* (foreigner) is also widely used to mean Westerners. The popular image of a Westerner among Japanese is that of a Caucasian although obviously not all Caucasians are Westerners and not all Westerners are Caucasians. The largest number of migrants from Western countries comes from North America and the UK. Australians are not Westerners but are commonly mistaken as such given a similar culture and the fact that the far majority in Japan, like other Westerners, are Caucasians, thus for convenience sake they are considered here as Westerners.

Most North American migrants in Japan are from the US. In 2006, there were 51,321 American-registered migrants compared to 11,893 Canadian-registered migrants in Japan or a more than 4:1 ratio of American to Canadian migrants (Ministry of Justice, 2008). There were 17,804 registered British and 11,433 registered Australian migrants residing in Japan in 2006 (Ministry of Justice, 2008). Among all Western migrant groups there is a higher male to female population: more than 60% of Western migrants are males. Britons have the highest percentage of permanent residents at 32% while Australians have the lowest at 10%; 21% of American- and 14% of Canadian-registered populations hold a permanent resident status. The number of illegal Western foreign migrants is low; very few overstay their visa although quite a few teach English illegally on a tourist visa.

While Western migrants work and socialise together, the tendency is to form and maintain close friendships with others of the same country. Throughout Japan there are many American, British, Canadian, Australian and Japanese settings and drinking and eating places that serve as separate national ethnic networks of friendship and places to make contacts for jobs. Some firms are strictly American, British, Canadian or Australian and SHANE, one of the top five English language schools in Japan with branch schools throughout the country, is owned by a British national and preferences are given to hiring Britons as English language instructors.

The far majority of American, Canadian, British and Australian migrants are native English language speakers and the most common means of employment for them in Japan is as English language instructors. They teach English at Japanese elementary schools, secondary schools, special schools and colleges or at private language schools. The foreign language industry is worth a huge ¥670 billion (about US $7 billion) with more than 90% of classes centred on English language learning (Otake, 2004). Western foreign migrant language instructors are mainly employed part time or on a limited-term full-time contract as temporary English language instructors, such work fitting that of the working class. There are even companies whose business is sending out native English language instructors to secondary schools and colleges as part-time instructors and, in turn, the company receives a percentage of their pay.

The overwhelming majority of Western English language instructors at private language schools, Japanese elementary and secondary schools and in higher education are put on a limited-term contract. Part-time contracts at all schools are for a limited number of classes, ranging from one day of classes a week to just under a full-time load (and thus no benefits) for one year although usually renewable. A second type of contract at elementary and secondary schools, special schools and at colleges is a full-time limited-term, usually two- or three-year contract with automatic termination of employment at the end of the contract time period. A third type of contract common to private language schools is a one-year full-time teaching contract that may or may not be renewed. Part-time and full-time limited-term contracted English language instructors represent the far majority of Westerners employed at private language schools and in Japanese lower and higher education.

For Western instructors, there is no promotion tracking for part-time or full-time English instructors at a private language school to higher managerial levels or for part-time or limited-term contract instructors at elementary, secondary schools, special schools and colleges to a full-time tenure-tracked or tenured position. The hiring of a small number of Westerners as full-time managerial staff at English language schools or full-time tenure-tracked or tenured elementary school, secondary school, special school or college instructors is decided by upper-level staff at private language companies or tenure committees at elementary schools, secondary schools, special schools and colleges. Decision makers are predominantly Japanese, particularly tenure committees at elementary schools, secondary schools, special schools and colleges where it is not uncommon for all decision makers to be Japanese given the small number of tenured foreigners although consultation with a foreign faculty member may be sought after.

Westerners employed at the managerial level at private language schools and full-time tenured Western instructors at elementary schools, secondary schools, special schools and colleges are usually (with instructions coming from the top downward) in charge of part-time and full-time limited-term contracted Western instructors in coordinating (class schedules, course objectives, overseeing teaching performance, hiring and firing etc) the language programme. The net result is a

minimal amount of contact and involvement between Western language teachers and Japanese upper-level management at private language schools or between Western instructors (nearly all language instructors) and full-time permanently employed Japanese teachers or tenured Japanese instructors at elementary schools, secondary schools, special schools and colleges.

The pay of full-time English language instructors at private language schools varies, depending on size and reputation, with a range of about ¥240,000 to ¥280,000 a month with an average of ¥260,000 a month (Jarvie, 2007, p 18; Spiri, 2008b, p 16). This comes to an average yearly income of ¥3,120,000, which is below the national middle-income average of ¥4,141,300 and is much closer to the average yearly income of the working class of ¥2,920,900 a year (Hashimoto, 2003, p 96). Most foreign English language teachers do not receive any benefits such as health insurance and bonuses and their work is very unstable, subjected to a limited contract time period with a high turnover rate (Carlet, 2004b; McNicol, 2004; Nakamura, 2004; Brophy, 2005a, 2005b). The high turnover rate is reflected in an estimate by the Ministry of Justice that between 96 and 97% of foreign migrant English conversation teachers stay in Japan for three years or less (Brophy, 2005a, p 14). McNeill (2004, p 16) gives one reason for this entrance into and soon exit out of Japan for foreign migrant English language teachers at *eikaiwa* (English conversation) schools:

> "The largest eikaiwa school has a staff turnover of seventy percent a year," says Denis Tesolt, vice-chair of the General Union, which represents hundreds of teachers in Japan. "They have guys whose job is to go to the airports just to pick up new teachers. And that's because the teachers have a grueling schedule of eight lessons a day, with a 10-minute break between each. It's worse than a factory."

Many native English language conversation teachers lose their job as the company folds. Shoddy business practices contributed to Nova, the largest English language school chain, to close all of its schools in September 2007 and a few months later become bankrupted. As a result, some 4,000 English language teachers did not receive any pay for months and all were left without a job (Takahara, 2007, p 3; *The Japan Times*, 2007d, p 1, 2007h, p 16; Yoshida, 2007, p 1). Through the years there have been many cases whereby native-speaking English language instructors have lost their jobs from folding language companies and not been paid; and discriminate firing of Western language instructors is a common occurrence (Carlet, 2004a; McNeill, 2004; Brophy, 2005a; see also Appendix B).

There are a very limited number of tenure positions for non-Japanese at Japanese colleges: estimates for the past 11 years up to the latest figures in 2007 indicate 3% as full time and less than 2% as tenured (McVeigh, 2002, p 267; Bueno and Caesar, 2003, p 19; Ministry of Education, Culture and Labour, 2008). With fewer college students in this new millennium from a decrease in the youth population

and cutbacks in English language programmes it is unlikely that the situation will improve in the foreseeable future.

The census classification misleads one to believe that the occupational status of Western foreign migrants is of a higher-class status than it actually is or as Komai (2001, p 30) stated: 'The overwhelming majority of Americans are classified as working in professional or managerial jobs, but in fact most are English language instructors.' The reality is that Western English language instructors occupy a low socioeconomic status, largely employed on limited-term contracts without benefits or job security; it is estimated that 90% of foreign migrants are non-regular employees, meaning that they are not employed full time and they are ineligible for all (health insurance, pension, bonus) benefits and promotion (Hassett, 2008b).

The 2000 and 2004 foreign occupational censuses both classified employed Western (American, Canadian, British and Australian) English language instructors under the occupational category of professionals and specialists (teachers are considered professionals). To correct for this misconception, an estimate was made of the number of full-time (even though more than half are not tenured) college instructors and they were classified as new middle class (see Appendix A). All other Western employed professionals and specialists excepting those classified as independent proprietors, directors or family workers were regarded as working class.

While the vast majority of employed Western migrants classified in the occupational census as professionals and specialists are English language instructors, some are teaching other subjects. Indications are that the number of full-time Western professionals and specialists receiving full benefits and the same promotional opportunities as Japanese at elementary schools, secondary schools and special schools (thus not included in the data on full-time college instructors) is very small. Checks were also made to further clarify the misleading census classification of Western migrants as professionals and specialists.

The occupation census differentiates regular and temporary employees from independent proprietors (employing others or only self-employed), directors and family workers. The largest number of independent proprietors, directors and family workers of Western migrants are classified as professionals and specialists, which coincides with the many small- to medium-sized English language companies owned by Westerns migrants and the fact that the most accessible and occupied higher-status positions for Westerners are as directors (synonymous with managers) of foreign and English language companies. Consistent with occupational classification in this chapter, these independent proprietors if employing others are classified as capitalists, directors if directors or if family workers or solely self-employed as old middle class. Only regular and temporary employees with an employment status as professionals and specialists are put into the working class and among these an estimated proportion of regular employees who are full-time college instructors is taken into account and classified as new middle class (see Appendix A). Second, the industrial census that classifies teachers in the service industry was cross-checked to collaborate on like numbers and

the far majority of Westerners were classified as employed in the service industry. Finally, a number of Western migrants teach English illegally in Japan on tourist visas who would find it next to impossible to be employed full time with benefits and the same opportunities for promotion as Japanese at any school; they are not in the census and thus an underestimation in the number of working class foreign migrant instructors.

A characteristic of the large working class of Western migrant groups is status inconsistency. A Bachelor's degree is required to teach at private language schools and elementary and secondary schools and an increasing number of Western English language instructors at these schools hold a Master's degree as well. A Master's degree is usually required to teach at special schools and colleges and many Western English language instructors at these schools also have a PhD. However, in spite of a high level of education, the bulk of Western English language instructors are working class, hired part time or on a full-time limited-term contract with a low income and, discussed in detail later, of a low social status.

The two largest foreign migrant groups of Westerners – Americans and British – are included in the top 10 of the most populous foreign migrant groups and are presented here. The two smaller Western foreign migrant groups – Canadians and Australians – are covered in Part Two of this chapter along with other significant but smaller foreign migrant groups.

Americans

There has been little change in the American working population and class status in this new millennium. The 2000 census reported that 21,690 American migrants were legally working in Japan and the 2004 census indicated nearly exactly the same, with an American migrant registered working population of 21,210. During both time periods, 2% (480 in 2000 and 454 in 2004) of American working migrants belonged to the capitalist class. These independent proprietors employing others are mainly located in the service industry under the occupational classification of professionals and specialists. Throughout Japan, Americans own small English language schools and employ other native English language speakers and they represent the largest number of Americans in the capitalist class. The old middle class of Americans has been fairly large at 8% (1,808 American migrants) in 2000 and 10% (2,043 American migrants) in 2004, most of whom were solely self-employed; in 2000, only 299 and in 2004 just 337 American migrants were family workers, many connected with a family English language school. While a good number of American migrants in the old middle class are solely (meaning by oneself) self-employed work in the English language industry as independent English language teachers, copywriters, English language editors and translators, others are self-employed as technicians or involved in cultural, artistic or music related work.

Many of the directors at 6% (1,371 American migrants) in 2000 and the same percentage in 2004 (1,249 American migrants) of the American migrant working

population were employed as directors and managers of American corporations and American–Japanese joint venture corporations in Japan in the food industry (McDonald's, Mister Donuts etc), financial institutions (for example, security companies, banks) and large (Nova, Geos, Eon, ECC, Berlitz) English language schools. The new middle class at 14% (2,902 American migrants) in 2000 and 12% (2,538 American migrants) in 2004 mainly included full-time college instructors and male white-collar workers for Japanese, American and joint venture companies in Japan's transnational economy.

In both 2000 and 2004, 70% (15,129 in 2000 and 14,926 in 2004) of the American migrant working population in Japan belonged to the working class. Most were part-time or full-time limited-term contract (usually one-year) English conversation teachers at English language private schools and part-time or full-time limited-term contract English language instructors at elementary schools, secondary schools, special schools and colleges. A small number or a little less than 3% of the working class in 2000 and 2004 were American female office workers and quite a few American females also worked in the entertainment districts as bar or club hostesses.

Lisa Louis (2004, pp 4-6), an American who was once a bar hostess in Kyoto's Gion entertainment district, describes one scenario suggestive of how North American, British and Australian females end up as bar and club hostesses in Japan. Ms Louis came to Japan right after college graduation and found employment as an English conversation teacher in a Japanese-owned English conversation school. Soon, thereafter, for no substantive reason, the school cut her pay and threatened trouble with immigration if she made an official complaint. Without any other way to earn an income, Ms Louis had no other choice but to remain at the school until another teaching job became available. After leaving that school, however, she had trouble again, this time with an American English language school, as the author explains (Louis, 2004, pp 5-6):

> Six months passed and I found a job at a different language school, this one run by an American couple that seemed sympathetic to my horror story about the last boss and his lack of regard for contracts. Within the first month, however, I realized that not only was this couple not going to give me the working hours I'd been promised, but they also didn't pay on time. I waited for more than two weeks past payday to get the little bit of money they did owe me. I was already without much of a reserve fund, and it got to the point where I would cry myself to sleep wondering how I was going to pay my rent, my college loan, and still be able to eat. I had heard other Western women talking about jobs as hostesses, the usual description being that they were paid the equivalent of a hundred dollars an evening for doing nothing but pouring drinks and making conversation. Not only would a job like that help my finances, but it also seemed as if working as a hostess could be the international adventure I was seeking.

Britons

The 2004 census puts the English migrant working population in Japan at 6,756 British nationals, slightly less than than 7,189 registered workers in 2000. In 2000 and 2004, 2% (147 English migrants in 2000 and 144 in 2004) of the working population belonged to the capitalist class. The English language market is roughly divided between American English and British or the Queen's English. The largest percentage of capitalists are those classified in the service industry and with the occupational classification of professionals and specialists largely entail British independent proprietors of English language schools catering to Japanese who prefer to learn British English. The second largest industry, although about twice as small as English migrants in the service industry, is British migrant independent proprietors in trade and eating and drinking establishments. Foreign owners of trading firms are part of Japan's transnational economy and foreign migrant owned and managed shops, restaurants and drinking establishments in Japan are ethnic oriented and places of gathering particularly British pubs are a popular meeting place for British migrants in Japan.

British migrant executives at 5% both in 2000 (392 British migrants) and 2004 (365 British migrants) of the working population like Americans are mainly listed as directors and managers of companies and corporations. England is second to America in the number of Western or joint venture companies in Japan, with a number of British executives acting as corporate leaders. Also, as with all Western migrants, a small number of British migrants are directors in large English language schools. The fairly large new middle class at 13% (902 British migrants) in 2000, down somewhat at 11% (738 British migrants) in 2004, of the British migrant working population includes British male migrants in white-collar positions working in Japan's transnational economy and British nationals employed as full-time college instructors. The old middle class at 7% (486 British migrants) in 2000 and 9% (594 British migrants) in 2004 of the British migrant working population lists few family workers with most of the British old middle class engaged in a hodgepodge of self-employed jobs as rewriters, translators, computer specialists, artists, tutors, accountants and so on.

Seventy-three per cent in both 2000 (5,262 British migrants) and 2004 (4,915 British migrants) of the British migrant working population belonged to the working class; the majority of working-class members are English language teachers at private English language schools or part-time and limited-term contract English language instructors at elementary and secondary schools, special schools and colleges. A small proportion (less than 2%) of the working class in 2000 and 2004 were English female office workers and like other Western females quite a few British females worked as bar and club hostesses in Japan.

Part Two: Smaller populated foreign migrant groups

Malaysians

In 2006, 7,902 Malaysians were legally registered as foreign residents in Japan (18% permanent residents) (Ministry of Justice, 2008). Malaysians, like Thai and Burmese migrants, have a greater number of illegal than legal migrants; Komai (2001, p 23) lists 9,989 Malaysians in 1999 as undocumented workers. However, in contrast to Thailand, most Malaysian migrants are males – 55%.

Most Malaysians, like Bangladeshis, Indonesians, Iranians and Pakistanis are of the Islamic faith and came to Japan as a short-fix to the labour shortage in the 1980s. Mosques have been erected throughout Japan and Malaysians have formed ethnic communities near these mosques, particularly in the Tokyo metropolitan area. Here, ethnic networks and businesses provide social support, employment and a means of maintaining a religious and cultural way of life in Japan.

Utilising the 2000 census combined with Komai's (2001) estimate of undocumented Malaysian workers, in 2000 there were 12,935 Malaysian migrants working in Japan. Of the working population, few or only 0.1% (18 Malaysians) were capitalists and only about 0.5% (81 Malaysians) worked as directors. Capitalists as independent proprietors often along with family members (old middle class) own and operate small businesses catering to the ethnic community or are involved with the transnational economy. Directors occupy high positions in the industries that employ Malaysians, acting as a liaison with Japanese management, or hold executive positions in with Japan's transnational economy. The old middle class consists of less than 1% (0.6% or 82 Malaysians) of the working population, mostly involving family workers of Malaysian independent proprietors.

The new middle class at 2.5% (324 Malaysians) is nearly twice as large as the capitalist, director and old middle class combined. Many Malaysians of the new middle class completed their higher education in Japan or acquired Japanese language skills at Japanese language schools while others came to Japan as professionals and technicians. This group of Malaysians have acquired Japanese language skills through their education in Japan, prior education (for example, study of Japanese at universities in their home country) or learned Japanese on the job (as technical advisors etc) and are furthest removed from the ethnic community. Most are male white-collar workers in Japan's transnational business world.

The Malaysian migrant working class is large at 96% (12,430 Malaysians) of the total working population. They are predominately male labourers working in manufacturing and construction and workers in sales. Malaysian working class females are mainly employed in the manufacturing, trade and service industries. A small number (63 Malaysian females) are office workers representing only about 0.5% of the Malaysian working-class. The large numbers of Malaysian illegal workers (9,989 undocumented workers) scrounge for work on a day-to-day basis as construction and factory workers and at low-level service jobs at the bottom of the pay scale.

Burmese

Myanmar (also called Burmese) migrants have the lowest registered population among South East Asians, a number so low that it is left out of the 2004 foreign migrant population census. However, the number of undocumented Burmese in Japan is large, a higher number than registered Burmese migrants. The rather large number of undocumented Myanmar migrants is partially attributed to political dissent among Myanmar migrants against their home country, living in Japan as refugees.

Myanmar refugees in Japan have formed the 'Burmese Association in Japan' (BAIJ), calling for a democratisation of their country, a direct confrontation and threat to the autocratic military rule in Myanmar (Komai, 2001, pp 52-3). While the number of undocumented Myanmar refugees involved in dissent against their government through involvement with the BAIJ or by other means is unknown, many suspect that they may be on the Myanmar government's list of dissidents and arrested should they return home. However, it has been difficult to support their claims as political refugees and only a few have been given refugee status.

In 1999, among a total of 9,985 Burmese migrants residing in Japan, 5,487 (55%) were undocumented migrants (Komai, 2001, p 23). Even more than Malaysian migrants, Burmese have a greater proportion of males to females: males represent 66% of the Burmese migrant population. The proportion of permanent residents and those on a spouse visa (meaning spouse or child of a Japanese national) are very low. In 1999, among registered Burmese, only 58 Burmese migrants (1%) had permanent residency and only 8% resided in Japan on a spouse visa. Temporary visitors at 52% and students at 21% are the largest registered groups among the official registered Burmese migrant population.

The 2000 census puts the total working population of Burmese in Japan at 7,718 workers. The percentage of capitalists is extremely small at 0.2% (17 Burmese migrants). Directors are few with only 1% (70 Burmese migrants) employed as directors of businesses often related to their home country or ethnic group. Both the new middle class and the old middle class are also very small, each at 1% of the total working population. Burmese capitalists own ethnic/national-related businesses in trade and ethnic eating and drinking establishments and employ family workers and contract the solely self-employed of the same ethnic group; family workers and the solely self-employed represent the old middle class (56 Burmese). The new middle class at 1% (97 Burmese) of the working population are the most assimilated in Japan; many are former students at Japanese language schools, special schools, colleges and universities, mostly male white-collar workers.

The working class of Burmese is extremely large at 97% (7,478 Burmese migrants) of the total working population. Registered Burmese mainly work as contract labourers and trainees; female office workers represent an insignificant 0.3% (26 females) of the working class. The largest number of the Burmese working class are undocumented workers or, as Komai (2001, pp 40-45) refers to, irregular workers who occupy the lowest of the low strata of the working class.

Already mentioned, irregular workers are easy to exploit because they are illegally in Japan and work on a day-to-day basis with high unemployment.

Middle East Asian migrants

Japan's rapid ascension to a world economic power in the 1980s, relatively relaxed immigration policies regarding foreign workers and labour shortage brought an influx of Middle Easterners to work as labourers in Japan. Through legal and illegal means, mostly males from Bangladesh, Iran and Pakistan obtained work in Japan and established Middle Eastern communities. The intent, however, of Japanese immigration law was not aimed at assimilation of Middle Easterners into Japanese society; rather, the labour shortage simply provided a limited fixed-term opportunity for foreign labour during the economic boom. Many came to Japan on a tourist visa valid for 90 days, found work and overstayed their visa. The result was a larger than expected increase of Middle Easterners living in Japan. By the end of 1992, there was more than four times the number of illegal migrants from Bangladesh, Iran and Pakistan in Japan than legal migrants (Komai, 2001, p 21).

The large number of illegal migrants from the Middle East (as well as other Asian countries), along with the eventual collapse of the economic bubble, brought about a change of immigration law in the 1990s to crack down on illegal migrants and placed restrictions on bringing foreign labour into Japan. For example, the Japanese government cancelled tourist visa exemption agreements (meaning a short stay in Japan without a visa was now prohibited) with Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1989 and Iran in 1992 (Bailey, 2006, p 20). Still, a large number of illegal migrants from the Middle East remain in Japan.

Middle Eastern migrants have always been under close inspection by Japanese police and immigration authorities, being suspected of being illegal migrants, and this has been stepped up even more as a result of the hype of terrorism. With a large number of illegal migrants, Middle Eastern migrants occupy the lower rung of the working class.

Bangladeshis

There were 11,329 registered Bangladesh migrants in Japan as of 2004, a 45% increase from 6,421 registered Bangladesh migrants in 1999 (Komai, 2001; Population Statistics of Japan, 2006). Data that include undocumented workers show that in 1999, 44% (4,936 of 11,357) of Bangladesh migrants were undocumented or illegal residents in Japan. The vast majority (90%) were males. Throughout the 1990s, there has been consistently a fairly large Bangladesh student population ranging from 38% in 1992 to 20% in 1999 of the total registered Bangladesh migrant population in Japan. Temporary visitors are the largest number of registered Bangladeshis at 2,452 representing 38% of the registered Bangladeshi population in Japan. A little over 8% of Bangladesh migrants intermarried with

Japanese and are registered on a spouse visa. Only 1% of Bangladesh migrants in 1999 were permanent residents in Japan.

The total working population of Bangladesh migrants in 2000 was 8,319 workers. Less than 1% (0.7%) (58 Bangladesh migrants) belong to the capitalist class although unlike most migrant groups there are few (14) family workers and thus only a very small number of family businesses. Capitalists as independent proprietors employing others, and directors (76 Bangladesh migrants or about 1% of the Bangladesh working population) managing businesses are mainly located in the trade and eating and drinking industry and similar to other foreign migrant groups involved in the transnational economy and ethnic-related businesses such as ethnic restaurants and various wholesale and retail shops catering to the ethnic community. The old middle class at about 1% (72 Bangladesh migrants) of the total working population are also found in the trade and eating and drinking industry, including a small number of family workers in family-owned businesses and Bangladeshis working as sole independent proprietors.

The new middle class of Bangladesh migrants is larger than the capitalist, director and old middle class combined. Two hundred and thirty-three Bangladesh migrants or 3% of the total Bangladesh working-class population in Japan belong to the new middle class. This coincides with the large Bangladesh migrant student population since the early 1990s in Japan. These Bangladesh migrants having acquired Japanese language skills and on graduation from a Japanese university or language school go on to work as professionals, technicians and white-collar workers in Japan's transnational corporate and business world.

Ninety-four per cent (7,880 Bangladesh migrants) of the total Bangladesh working population belong to the working class. More than 70% of registered Bangladesh migrants are blue-collar workers in manufacturing and construction. Only two (0.02%) Bangladesh females are office workers. And, at the bottom strata of the working class, a little more than 60% (4,936 Bangladesh migrants) are undocumented workers.

Iranians

In 2004, the number of registered Iran migrants in Japan was so low that they were not included in the 2004 foreign migrant population census. However, the actual number of Iranian migrants in Japan is higher than foreign migrants from a few other countries reported on in the 2004 census because of a large number of illegal Iranian migrants. Komai's data (2001, p 23) show that about half or 7,304 of the total number of 14,516 Iranian migrants in Japan in 1999 were illegal migrants. This proportion of undocumented Iranians to registered Iranians was even higher in earlier years. In 1992, there was a more than a 7:1 (32,994 illegal to 4,514 legal) and in 1995 a nearly 2:1 (14,638 illegal to 8,642 legal) proportional rate difference of illegal to legal Iranian migrants in Japan (Komai, 2001, pp 21,22). A crackdown on illegal Iranians in the 1990s (and continuing ever since) has reduced their number, however a sizeable number has remained in Japan.

As with other migrants from the Middle East, the gender population of Iranian migrants in Japan is predominately male; in 1999, 94% of registered Iranian migrants were males (Komai, 2001, p 29). Illegal Iranian migrants are nearly all males; in 1999, there were 7,024 undocumented Iranian males compared to only 280 undocumented Iranian females in Japan (Komai, 2001, p 29). In 1999, the largest resident status category of Iranian migrants was temporary visitor (4,802 Iranian migrants) followed by Iranians on a spouse visa (1,103 Iranian migrants), predominately Iranian males marrying Japanese females. Only 227 Iranian migrants were permanent residents of Japan or less than 2% of the total Iranian migrant population.

According to the 2000 census and Komai's (2001) 1999 data on undocumented workers, the total working population of Iranian migrants was 10,143 in 2000. The number of capitalists (109) and directors (114) represent a very small combined 2% or 1% each of the total working population. These are independent proprietors and managers mainly in the trade and eating and drinking industry, the same industry that includes the largest percentage of the old middle class composed of the self-employed and family workers that combined represent 2% (195 Iranian migrant workers) of the total working population.

The Iranian new middle class is small compared to other Middle Eastern migrant groups, representing only 1% (133 Iranian migrants) of the total Iranian working population. Partially this is a result of a small student population, for example there were eight times fewer Iranian students in Japan in 1999 compared to Bangladesh migrants even though the resident Iranian migrant population is slightly higher (Komai, 2001, p 23). Foreign college students in Japan acquire Japanese language skills and an education that leads to white-collar employment in Japan with Japanese, foreign or joint venture firms, a main avenue of joining in with the new middle class. The bulk of the Iranian migrant new middle class are professionals and specialists, not administrative or white-collar workers employed in various professions from college instructors to engineers and technicians.

The working class of Iranian migrants is large, with 95% (9,592 Iranian migrants) of Iranian migrants belonging to the working class. Nearly 70% of legal Iranian working-class members are blue-collar workers employed in the manufacturing and construction industries. Only three Iranian females (0.03%) in the working class are office workers. Undocumented workers represent the largest number of the Iranian working class.

Iranian undocumented migrants are concentrated in large cities. In the 1990s, large congregations of Iranian migrants would gather together at large parks in the Tokyo area. Although more scattered in urban areas today, most Iranian working-class migrants find work through ethnic group networks, one study estimating that a little more than 70% of Iranian workers were able to find jobs through contact with other Iranians (Komai, 2001, pp 83-4). Studies have found that about half of the Iranian undocumented working class were unemployed or engaged in unstable employment, meaning they worked for 20 days or less a month and many were homeless (Komai, 2001, pp 99-100). Given a dismal

working-class life for Iranian migrants, many have turned to crime as a means to make money, often connected with Japan's underworld. Komai (2001, p 103) attributed crime by Iranians to their illegal status and poor living conditions. He gave details on the crimes they commit: 'some Iranians, albeit a minority, have become involved in the production and selling of forged telephone cards, trading in narcotics and firearms, or in pimping. As many as 1,000 individuals are involved in drug peddling' (2001, p 103).

Pakistanis

In 2004, there were 8,610 registered Pakistan migrants in Japan. There are also a fairly large number of undocumented Pakistani migrants: Komai (2001, p 23) estimates that some 4,307 Pakistani migrants illegally resided in Japan in 1999. Komai's data (2001, p 23) show that in 1999, among 5,999 registered Pakistani migrants, the largest number (2,700 Pakistanis) were in Japan on a temporary visa and the second largest number (1,347 Pakistanis) married Japanese and obtained a spouse visa. Given the small female population (less than 6% of the Pakistan population in Japan), most intermarriages have been between Pakistani males and Japanese females. In 1999, there were few (less than 2% of the Pakistani migrant population) Pakistani students studying at Japanese universities or Japanese language schools and 5% (282 Pakistani migrants) of the Pakistani migrant registered population held permanent residency (Komai, 2001, p 23).

Pakistani migrants have played a central role in establishing places of worship for those of the Islamic faith. The Islamic Centre in Tokyo is mainly under the management of Pakistanis as are several other mosques throughout Japan in places as far away as Sendai and Hiroshima. The Isezaki Mosque in the Tokyo area, the largest mosque in Japan, is under Pakistani control. Like the Filipinos and the establishment and maintenance of ethnic networks at Catholic churches, the same applies to Pakistanis gathering together at Islamic mosques.

The Pakistani working population in 2000 totalled 6,841 workers. The far majority of capitalists at 3% (181 Pakistanis), directors at 3% (215 Pakistanis) and old middle class at 7%, which includes family workers (34 Pakistanis) and the self-employed (460 Pakistanis), are concentrated in the trade and eating and drinking industry. The strong ethnic network and personal ties among Pakistanis has contributed to the establishment of ethnic businesses, particularly many Middle Eastern restaurants, located throughout Japan. Ethnic businesses owned and run by Pakistanis then employ fellow Pakistanis as shop clerks, salespersons, cooks, waiters, dishwashers and so on. The new middle class at 2% (131 Pakistanis) are mainly professionals and technicians such as college instructors, specialists and male white-collar workers in Japan's corporate and business world.

The working class represents 85% (5,820 Pakistanis) of the Pakistani migrant working population. Most are plant and machine operators and labourers in the manufacturing and construction industries. A very small number (only five Pakistani females comprising a miniscule 0.08% of the working-class population)

are office workers. A sizeable number (4,307 Pakistanis) are undocumented workers or irregular workers who like all illegal migrants fare the worst in finding jobs and are at the bottom of the pay scale.

Canadians

The working population of Canadian migrants in Japan according to the 2000 census was 5,301 workers. The capitalist class represents 2% (84 Canadian migrants) of the working population that along with the old middle class at 5% (270 Canadian migrants) is concentrated in the service industry mainly in professional and specialists occupations. As with American migrants, Canadian independent proprietors have established small sometimes family-run English language schools throughout Japan. There is, however, a main difference in the class composition of Canadians and Americans, most notably far fewer Canadian executives and directors of large and medium-sized companies in Japan.

While the American migrant working population in Japan is about four times larger than the Canadian migrant working population, the number of executives and directors is 11 times greater or about three times larger controlling for working population difference. The overall director class difference is twice the percentage or 6% of the American migrant working population compared to 3% (179 Canadian migrants) of the Canadian migrant working population. Canadian executives are mainly managers of firms in Japan's transnational economy or managers of English language schools. The new middle class at 10% (518 Canadian migrants) like all Western migrants hold full-time teaching positions at colleges while others are male white-collar workers.

Eighty per cent (4,250 Canadian migrants) of the Canadian working population are working class. The large majority of Canadians are English language teachers at private English language schools and part-time or limited-term contract English language instructors at elementary and secondary schools, special schools, colleges and universities. A little less than 2% of the working class is composed of Canadian female office workers and a small number of Canadian females work as hostesses in Japan's entertainment world.

Australians

The working population of Australian migrants in Japan is smaller than each of the other three Western (Australia, geographically, is not Western and simply considered as such given the Western racial/ethnic connotation of Australians in Japan) foreign migrant working populations in Japan. There were 4,273 Australian migrants living and working in Japan in 2000.

Like Canada, compared to Britain and the US, fewer Australian big businesses operate in Japan, reflected in a comparatively small director class at 4% (181 Australian migrants) of the Australian working population. The director class includes Australian migrants in charge of English language schools and Australian

executives in Japan's transnational economy. The capitalist class is very small at 2% (67 Australian migrants), the majority placed in professional and specialist occupations, the same category as employed English language instructors but listed as independent proprietors and as with other Western migrant capitalist this often involves owning an English language school. The old middle class at 5% (199 Australian migrants) includes only 20 family workers, often married couples with one being the owner of an English language school or ethnic/national-related work while the far greater number of old middleclass members are self-employed working independently in the English language market or various other trades and services. The new middle class is fairly large at 10% (440 Australian migrants) of the working population. About half are full-time college instructors, the others are mostly male white-collar workers, particularly in the trade and food industry, finances and securities and manufacturing in Japan's transnational economy.

Seventy-nine per cent (3,386 Australian migrants) of the Australian working population are working class. Australian female office workers comprise a small proportion (less than 3%) of the working-class population. Most of the Australian working class work as English language teachers on a part-time or limited-term contract basis in the same working class conditions as other Western migrant English language instructors. And, as do all Western females, a number of Australian women work as bar and club hostesses.

Class characteristics of foreign migrant groups

Class stratification within each foreign migrant group points to both disparity and continuity of class composition. The disparity is the contrasting life situation of capitalists, directors, old middle class and new middle class from the working class. The working class, particularly undocumented workers, have the most unstable work with little hopes for any improvement in their life situation, and legally or illegally do not or perhaps cannot stay very long in-country. Their higher-class counterparts not only do not face the same hardships but also have secure employment or at least the possibility of it, limited social mobility and a similar standard of living as Japanese nationals in the same class.

The continuity in class composition lies in the preponderance of ethnic and transnational businesses and concentrated employment in the same occupational and industrial categories. Independent proprietors and directors mainly are involved in ethnic and transnational related work and they employ or are managers of migrants of the same nationality. The old middle class of family workers employed by one's spouse is a common make-up of family ethnic businesses. The new middle class is more diverse still, work mainly centres on nationality characteristics among professionals and specialists or trade and service related activities of male white-collar workers between their own country and Japan in a transnational economy. The large working classes of foreign migrant groups are employed in particular industries and occupations stereotypically characteristic of their nationality and status in Japan. In short, each migrant group is concentrated

in certain occupations and industries that serve in the interest of dominant group Japanese and relate to the nationality of each foreign migrant group. That is, in Japan's economy today, foreign migrant groups occupy ascribed occupational categories in a subordinate position within Japan's class hierarchy.

Foreign migrants and Japan's tiered economy

Japan's economy has been characterised as a two-tier economic system, with a small number of large firms at the top subcontracting and controlling a larger number of smaller firms for their goods, services and labour (Sugimoto, 2003, pp 86-8).

Large banks and big business within Japan are the major players of the two-tier economic system. Major Japanese banks such as Sumitomo and Mitsubishi are conglomerates, a large bank at the centre working in unison with a range of large-scale companies from manufacturing to life insurance. Some 18 big business combinations such as Toyota and Daiei dominate particular industries and along with bank conglomerates subcontract smaller companies (Sugimoto, 2003, p 89). The subcontracting begins at the top and flows downward as Sugimoto (2003, p 89) explains: 'In a sequence of subcontracting arrangements, higher-level companies give contract jobs to companies lower in the chain, who may in turn give contracts to still lower companies.'

The two-tier economic system works in favour of large firms able to accumulate capital in their control and exploitation over small businesses dependent on contracts from above. Lifetime employment (meaning regular employees remain at the company during their entire business career and receive numerous company benefits) only applies to large firms although no longer a guarantee (Sugimoto, 2003, pp 86-8; Hashimoto, 2003, p 210). There are other insecurities in Japan's two-tier economic system, for example market downturns after Japan's boom years have resulted in an increase of part-time workers from less than 7% in 1970 to nearly 22% by 1999 (Hashimoto, 2003, p 210).

Large firms or firms with 300 or more employees represent only a small proportion of all firms; about 11% in 1999 (Sugimoto, 2003, pp 86-7). Also, obviously, not all small businesses are subcontracted by large firms: there is a range of diverse businesses from small family-owned shops to innovative and self-serving new technology businesses independent of the two-tier economic system. Furthermore, today there is the world economy involving a number of various economic tie-ups that take on various multinational forms.

Foreign migrant groups are not essentially tied in with the two-tier economic system. While there are foreign banks and wealthy foreign migrant entrepreneurs, this largely has to do with the transnational economy and involves a small number of foreign migrants (Komai, 2001; Liu-Farrer, 2009; Weiner and Chapman, 2009). Overall, foreign migrants can be considered as a third tier located at the lowest part of the economic structure. While job insecurity exists among Japanese workers, it is not as extreme as that of foreign migrants. Very low pay and harsh working conditions are prolific among undocumented workers and for legal

foreign migrants; the far majority work part time or are employed on limited-term contracts. Described in detail later, occupational discrimination sets barriers against foreign migrants for stable employment, putting them in a subordinate status to dominant group Japanese even when engaged in and fully qualified to do the same work.

There are, however, occupational stratification differences among foreign migrant groups from successful Korean entrepreneurs and their family businesses to the large working class of Japanese-South Americans. Variability exists both with dominant group Japanese and between the foreign migrant groups themselves.

Leaving aside undocumented workers, a class stratification breakdown of among registered or legal foreign migrant groups is consolidated and presented. This is the 'social politically' recognised class stratification and 'approved' placement of foreign migrants through immigration policies. While all 'legal' foreign migrant groups are in occupational niches befitting their nationality, working-class compositions differ widely.

Utilising census data of the same year (2000) and based on Hashimoto's (2003) class schema already discussed, Table 3.1 presents a comparison of the proportion of the working class to higher classes for Japanese nationals and all registered 'legal' foreign migrants by nationality. Stratification of foreign migrant groups based on the proportion of the working class is arranged on an ordinal scale ranging from upper to lower strata. A 1:1 proportion means that the percentage of working class is the same as for the higher class (old middle, new middle, executives and capitalists) combined; or, for example, a 2:1 proportion difference indicates that there are twice as many working-class members as those in the higher class. Also, the percentage of workers belonging to the working class in the working population for Japanese dominant group and all foreign migrant groups is given next to the proportion of the working class.

Looking at Table 3.1, one can clearly see not only the much larger working-class composition of foreign migrant groups compared to dominant group Japanese but also significant differences in the proportion of the working class among foreign migrant groups. For example, only the upper strata and that comprising only two foreign migrant groups have approximately the same working-class proportion to that of dominant group Japanese. Comparing the highest proportional difference among foreign migrant groups – Koreans and Japanese-Brazilians – the proportional difference of the working class is nearly 30 times higher for Japanese-Brazilians. The table clearly shows both the subordinate economic status of foreign migrant groups compared to dominant group Japanese and wide stratification differences among foreign migrant groups themselves.

Table 3.1: Japanese and foreign migrant proportion of working class

	% working class	Proportion working class to higher class
Dominant group		
Japanese nationals	58	1.38:1
Foreign migrant groups		
Upper strata		
Koreans	52	1.08:1
Pakistanis	60	1.5:1
Upper-middle strata		
Americans	70	2.33:1
British	73	2.7 to 1
Middle strata		
Chinese	77	3.35:1
Australians	79	3.76:1
Canadians	80	4:1
Iranians	80	4:1
Malaysians	83	4.88:1
Lower- middle strata		
Bangladeshis	87	6.69:1
Thais	88	7.33:1
Burmese	89	8.09:1
Filipinos	89	8.09:1
Vietnamese	90	9:1
Lower strata		
Indonesians	96	24:1
Japanese-Peruvians	97	29.09:1
Japanese-Brazilians	97	32.33:1

Data based on Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication 2000 census and then applying the data to Hashimoto's (2003) class schema.

Part Three: Foreign migrants: subordinate status

Subordinate minority status

While Japan today is a democratic modern capitalistic society, the livelihood of foreign migrants is characterised by pluralism with a subordinate status and limited-term accommodation. There are mainly three societal conditions that place foreign migrants in a subordinate minority status. First, foreign migrants are blocked from assimilating into Japanese society except for through naturalisation. Naturalisation though requires a large and detailed amount of paperwork, five continuous years in-country, financial stability, no involvement in subversive activity and, subject to the authorities' interpretation, a record of 'good behaviour' (Yosha Research,

2006). The many barriers to assimilation and long-term residence further impede naturalisation as it is difficult to obtain stable employment to remain in-country long enough to apply for naturalisation. In fact, yearly naturalisation rates in post-war Japan are very low, consistently below 1% of the foreign population and one of the lowest rates among other comparable democratic societies that apply citizenship based solely on *jus sanquinis* (citizenship by descent) (Chung, 2010, pp 44-7).

Naturalisation also, in effect, covers up one's ethnic heritage. Mentioned earlier, only recently has naturalisation not required by law a change of one's family name to that of a Japanese name. Still, even today, since changing a foreign name to a Japanese name facilitates the customary use of Japanese kanji character(s) for one's family name on a *hanko* (signature stamp) for official business and legal affairs and discrimination from being recognized as a foreigner by name, most naturalised take on a Japanese name. This does not mean that naturalisation is a negative experience; to the contrary, naturalised citizens are often the most loyal and proud members of their citizenry. However, the far majority of naturalised Japanese have, at least by name, turned away from their ancestral and ethnic heritage. The end result is that naturalisation does not threaten the myth of 'racial homogeneity' as the foreign heritage of naturalised citizens is hidden by name.

The myth of racial homogeneity is reinforced since birth in-country does not bestow citizenship: only children born of Japanese citizens become Japanese. The only means of a foreign parent's child becoming Japanese without naturalising is marriage with a Japanese, the child then taking on the citizenship and name of the Japanese parent and even here blood or race is the defining characteristic of that child. Children of Japanese-foreign parents are labelled, stereotyped and called half (*hafu*): not fully Japanese (Strong, 1978; Hemphill, 1980; Yoder, 1983).

Defining blood or race or more generally, parent(s) citizenship as the sole qualification for being born a Japanese national prevents the establishment of ethnic group subcultures from ever being an integral part of Japanese society, effectively blocking inclusion into mainstream society and eventual positions of power. This contrasts with other modern democratic capitalist countries in North America, the UK and Australia and patterns of assimilation and pluralism that allow foreign migrants to become members of ethnic subcultures or assimilate, facilitating social mobility and access to positions of power and privilege since citizenship is established by birth in-country regardless of nationality. In these countries, children born of foreign migrants in that nation's territory are bestowed nationality and retain their ethnic name at birth. It is recognised that citizenship includes people of different nationalities, races, ethnic origins and religions. The second generation of immigrants can either assimilate through intermarriage or marry within their own ethnic group, building up ethnic communities and retaining their ethnic way of life as equal participants in society. Over time, ethnic group networks and organisations are formed, protecting against societal prejudice and discrimination, furthering access to higher-echelon positions in education, government and business. Ethnic groups then assist and protect the rights of

new foreign migrants in the process of integrating within society. National laws become established protecting the rights of citizens and foreign migrants that along with ethnic, religious, gender and national human rights groups keep a watch out and take action against discrimination based on nationality, ethnic origins, race, gender and religion.

The second reason why the subordinate minority status persists today and a correlate of the first reason is that there is not much protection under the law against job or any kind of discrimination based on race, ethnic origin or nationality in Japan. There also is at best a very weak organisation of human or ethnic rights groups in Japan. Employers are given a wide discretion in setting the conditions for employment, or who they hire, fire and promote. Real estate offices and landlords frequently refuse to rent to foreign migrants so much so that special real estate offices exist for the sole purpose of finding places that do rent to foreigners. Thus, foreign migrants even trying to live among Japanese face difficulties doing so, often finding that the only rentals available to them are segregated foreign migrant apartment complexes.

All foreign migrants must carry with them an alien registration card subject to arrest should they not have it in possession when asked by the police and random checks asking foreign migrants to produce their alien registration card for no particular reason are not uncommon (see Appendix B). Finally, and a further reminder of their subordinate status, Japan is the only country that photographs, fingerprints and scans the computer for evidence of any wrongdoing of not just all travellers (excepting diplomats, children, foreign guests and special status foreign residents) but also foreign migrant residents of Japan including permanent residents upon re-entering Japan after a trip abroad (Hongo, 2007b; Schreiber, 2007; Wallace, 2007). These data then also become available for any further official use against the foreign migrant population.

The lack of mass media attention in Japan to the prejudice and discrimination against foreign migrants and little protection from the law allows for public discrimination to occur on a daily basis. Foreigners are snubbed in public, for example, Japanese purposefully avoid detectable (of different physical appearance, that is, non-Asian) foreigners. In just about any setting where 'visible' foreigners are gathered in the same place as Japanese, it is not uncommon for Japanese to move away from or upon entrance to locate themselves far from 'visible' foreigners. For example, 'visible' foreign migrants on many occasions experience getting on a train and upon sitting down being singled out as some kind of freak by the Japanese passenger next to them, who gets up and sits elsewhere or the foreign migrant finds that every seat on the train is taken except the one next to them. Of course, discriminate displacement from and avoidance of 'visible' foreigners varies according to familiarity with outsiders, personality and subcultural traits, for example Japanese who have spent some time abroad are least likely to display such behaviour while Japanese nationalists are most likely.

Foreigners are refused service by establishments in the entertainment districts (often there is a sign posted 'no foreigners allowed'). Throughout Japan, drinking

establishments (bars, clubs and karaoke type of clubs called 'snack shops'), massage parlours, dating clubs or any type of enterprise that offers potential intimate mixing of foreign migrant males with Japanese women (the quartered foreign-ascribed district of *Roppongi* in Tokyo being an exception) commonly refuse to service foreigners. Although not quite as universal, bath houses (*sentou*), *ryokans* (Japanese Inns), hotels, retail (for example, computer, mobile phone and video and DVD rental) shops, delivery service (pizza, sushi shops etc) and banks (to acquire loans and credit cards) have refused service to foreigners.

A third reason why foreign migrants experience a subordinate minority status in Japan is what Schermerhorn (1978, pp 72-3, 81-3, 142-8) calls cultural congruence coupled with centrifugal tendencies of migration. While this differs somewhat for each migrant group, the least for Koreans and the most for Westerners, foreign migrant groups are culturally and socially different from Japanese nationals in language, religion, gender relations and mannerisms and so on. Both dominant group Japanese and foreign migrant groups have tended to favour a separate or pluralistic intergroup relation, each foreign migrant group maintaining its cultural way of life in Japan with little encouragement (emphasis placed on temporary not permanent residence, limited-period contracted employment and minimal assistance towards assimilation) by Japanese nationals to assimilate within Japanese society. The foreign migrant group's subordinate status, cultural incongruity and tendencies of separatism further contribute to occupational limitations or work more or less assigned based on the perceived and often stereotypical attributes of the foreign migrant group members in the interests of dominant group Japanese.

Powerless, foreign migrant groups are largely limited to certain occupations ascribed to them by virtue of their nationality. An ascribed-like division exists between Japanese nationals of a higher status and foreign migrant groups as lower status. There are, however, class distinctions among foreign migrant groups. While all foreign migrant groups are restricted in pursuing their life chances by exclusionary nationality laws and legal and social barriers, class stratification varies from relatively successful Korean migrants to extremely low class levels of South East Asians, Middle Eastern and Japanese South American migrant groups. Further class variability exists within each foreign migrant group itself and both the between and within-group class differenced are partly attributed to resident status, time in-country and Japanese language ability.

Within each foreign migrant group, there is a distinct difference (and quality of life) between the higher and working classes. For most foreign migrant groups, this is somewhat accounted for by legal resident status. Undocumented foreign migrants are at the bottom of the class hierarchy. Here, time in-country and Japanese language ability make little difference. Undocumented foreign migrants working as labourers and sex workers are one of the better subgroup speakers of Japanese. Being 'illegal' alone keeps them in their place, effectively blocking social mobility.

Among foreign migrants with permanent residency or long-term easily renewable visas, Japanese language ability and time in-country are advantageous

to class status and social mobility. This shows itself in the large entrepreneur class of Koreans, some third- or fourth-generation in Japan and fluent in the Japanese language. For Vietnamese refugees, and Japanese-South Americans, Japanese language is crucial to succeeding as entrepreneurs although mainly in ethnic-related occupations such as restaurants or directors overseeing the work of their fellow migrants. The same applies to permanent residents and those on spouse visas for all foreign migrants, Japanese language ability and long-term residence opens the door for better employment. While there are cases of success in mainstream Japanese society, still, social mobility largely is limited to foreign migrant ascribed occupations.

The problem with foreign migrants without permanent residency and a long-term easily renewable visa is the barrier to long-term residency. This applies to those on temporary work visas and particular work-restricted visas such as cultural and student visas and trainee visas. As will become more apparent later, most foreign migrants are put on limited-term contracts and job discrimination results in high turnover rates and job insecurity, resulting in non-extension of the migrant's visa or simply not much choice but to leave Japan. Furthermore, the children of foreign migrants born in Japan do not acquire Japanese citizenship, further encouraging a limited-term stay.

While language ability and time in-country are important, this depends on nationality and occupation. Native English language speakers teaching English overwhelmingly from North America, the UK, Australia and New Zealand are not necessarily encouraged to gain Japanese language proficiency: the better they speak Japanese the less likely they will speak English to others including at the job. While some universities require at least a workable knowledge of Japanese for a full-time English teaching position, job discrimination results in a small number of available full-time English language teaching positions at Japanese universities for foreign migrants (also see Appendix A). Finally, English language is often the language of business in the transnational economy. Speaking Japanese may not be required and, particularly, foreign migrants in higher-level job positions lead a privileged secluded life in the high-price areas of the major cities, do not stay long in-country and many do not speak Japanese well.

Ascribed minority status of foreign migrants

The ascribed subordinate minority status of foreign migrants is reflective of their class stratification and mode of integration in Japan. The migration of foreigners to Japan has taken place based on the availability and demand of certain 'spheres' of work in the Japanese economy. Foreign migrants have filled this void and remain in nationality assigned occupations or occupations that serve the interests of Japanese nationals. These are modal class categories, ascribed category groupings of foreign migrant groups. In Box 3.1, based on information presented in this chapter, foreign migrant groups are subdivided into five categories characterising their ascribed-like status in Japan.

Box 3.1: Ascribed traits of foreign migrants

Group 1: former colonies

- *Foreign migrant groups:* Chinese and Koreans.
- *Occupational traits:* merchants of ethnic businesses.
- *Particular group traits:* special permanent resident status, highest percentage of naturalisation, large class differentials between successful business leaders and working-class labourers and many undocumented workers.

Group 2: special recognition

- *Foreign migrant groups:* Japanese-Brazilians, Japanese-Peruvians and Vietnamese.
- *Occupational traits:* labourers in manufacturing.
- *Particular group traits:* granted long-term residence because of Japanese descent for Brazilians and Peruvians and refugees for Vietnamese; over 90% are working class in spite of insignificant number of undocumented workers.

Group 3: female entertainers, brides

- *Foreign migrant groups:* Filipinos and Thais.
- *Occupational traits:* entertainers, bar and club hostesses.
- *Particular group traits:* brides of Japanese men, gender imbalance with high percentage of females and over 90% are working class; Filipinos are predominantly Catholics and Thais have a large percentage of female undocumented workers.

Group 4: male labourers

- *Foreign migrant groups:* Bangladeshis, Burmese, Indonesians, Iranians, Malaysians and Pakistanis.
- *Occupational traits:* male labourers in construction and manufacturing.
- *Particular group traits:* Islamic religion except for Burmese (largely Buddhist) and a gender imbalance with a high percentage of the male population; excepting Indonesian foreign migrants, over 40% in each foreign migrant group are undocumented workers; aside from Pakistani foreign migrants, over 90% of the working population for each foreign migrant group are working class.

Group 5: Internationalisation

- *Foreign migrant groups:* Americans, Australians, Britons and Canadians.
- *Occupational traits:* limited-term English language instructors; high-class female bar and club hostesses.
- *Particular group traits:* large income and job security class differentials between the higher class (capitalists, executives and new middle) and the working class; status inconsistency, with well-educated foreign migrants in a working class, ranging for these foreign migrant groups from 70 to 80% of their working population.

Prejudice and discrimination

An entire book would be needed to adequately describe and document Japanese prejudice and discrimination against foreign migrants (see Appendix B on cases of prejudice and discrimination). Reasons for prejudice and discrimination are also inherent to *nihonjinron* as described throughout this book, a belief in racial and cultural uniqueness that while not necessarily espousing superiority divides Japan from the rest of the world. Reischauer (1977, p 401) wisely put it as:

> The barrier I have in mind is the Japanese sense of being somehow a separate people – of being unique. The line between the 'we' of the Japanese as a national group and the 'they' of the rest of mankind seems to be sharper for them than for most people who participate much in international life. They appear to have a greater feeling of group solidarity and a correspondingly stronger sense of their difference from others.

Prejudice and discrimination tie in with history, a carry-over in today's ascribed-like status of foreign migrant groups. Japan's long history of exclusion of foreigners, myths of racial purity, homogeneity and uniqueness, colonisation of Korea and occupations of Asian countries, the Second World War and the aftermath of occupation by the allied forces all have an affect on 'images' and 'stereotypes' of foreign migrants. Discrimination, however, is more tangible than prejudice: actions speak louder than words. Discrimination though may go unnoticed for a long time as history has shown us and when it does receive attention usually it is because the situation has improved as the oppressed have become organised and at least have some support from the dominant group. Here, I will present two cases of institutionalised discrimination against foreign migrants that have not received much attention taken place in institutions where one would least expect discrimination to be an issue: education and professional baseball in Japan.

Foreign migrant instructors in Japanese schools

Elementary and secondary schools in Japan get a large number of foreign English language instructors from JET (Japan Exchange and Teaching Programme), a Japanese government-sponsored programme that brings college educated foreigners to Japan as full-time 'assistants' to Japanese teachers for up to three years. They are hired as assistant language teachers (ALTs) working under Japanese permanently employed teachers who usually teach English. ALTs bring a 'native English language voice' into the classroom and help to improve on the oral English language skills of Japanese students at public and private elementary, middle and high schools. JET ALTs are not tenure tracked nor do they have any say in department matters and usually return home after their contract position is terminated.

The number of JET ALTs has declined over the past few years, dropping from 5,676 native English language foreign instructors in 2002 to 5,057 in 2006 (Takahara, 2008). They are being replaced by non-JET ALTs who in 2006 outnumbered JET ALTs, nearly doubling in number from 3,090 instructors in 2002 to 5,951 instructors in 2006 (Takahara, 2008). Non-JET ALTs, called private ALTs, like JET ALTs, are college-educated native English language foreign instructors, most from Western countries and, akin to JET ALTs, assist in teaching English at Japanese elementary and secondary schools. Unlike JET ALTs, however, private ALTs are not hired as full-time employees under a Japanese government-sponsored programme. Instead, local boards of education subcontract the work of private ALTs to Japanese companies who then hire these instructors as contract workers instead of full-time employees.

The teaching load of private ALTs is set by companies at less than three-fourths of a full-time employee or less than 30 hours a week, saving the companies the obligation to enrol and pay into benefit plans for these foreign migrant instructors. Their job situation is very poor: they are hired on contracts for less than a year, receive a low wage, do not get paid during school holiday periods, are not given benefits such as health insurance, unemployment insurance and bonuses and are not entitled to any kind of pension. Furthermore, their job is very unstable, shuffled from one school to another and given a minimum amount (about seven days annually) of sick leave. David Ashton, head of Nambu Foreign Workers Caucus of the Tokyo Nambu Union, commented on the bleak in-and out-working situation of private ALTs (Takahara, 2008, p 3): 'If they get fired for some invalid reason, they go from one low-paid, poor-condition ALT job to another one. There are always more (teachers) ready to take the job because they just left another job.'

The JET ALT programme does provide an inexperienced college-educated native English language speaker, usually young, single and from a Western country, an opportunity to live in Japan for a few years with full-time employment. Even private ALTs and other foreign migrant native English language instructors who teach at Japanese elementary and secondary schools have work allowing them an opportunity to experience life in Japan even though the pay is low without benefits and work is unstable. Still, for both JET and private ALTs the job is 'temporary' and 'subordinate', young, single inexperienced college-educated Japanese instructors are given permanent employment as elementary or secondary school instructors and are in charge of the classes they teach while ALT foreign migrant instructors are not. Foreign migrant native English language instructors assist Japanese teachers not so much in the teaching of English but in improving on students' listening and oral communication skills; Japanese English language teachers usually are not fluent speakers of English. The method used to teach English, run English language programmes, supervise students and give permanent employment is reserved for Japanese instructors. The situation of foreign migrant college instructors is not all that different.

Foreign migrant college instructors represent an insignificant small fraction of tenured faculty at Japanese colleges. Tenure for foreigners is a rarity at national

and public colleges and not much better at private colleges (Ardou, 2006, p 2). And, although Japan has the second largest college system among the 30 country members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), it has the lowest number of tenured foreign educators (Ardou, 2006, p 2). There are more tenured foreign instructors at George Washington University in the US than the total number of tenured foreign instructors in all of the 87 Japanese national universities combined (Ardou, 2006, p 2; Japan's Association of National Universities, undated). Consistently through the years tenure has been difficult to attain for foreign migrants, with tenured foreign migrants representing about 2% of all tenured faculty at Japanese colleges (McVeigh, 2002, pp 171-5, 267; Bueno and Caesar, 2003, p 19).

Foreign college instructors are hired differently from Japanese instructors. As previously mentioned, the far majority of foreign instructors in higher education are hired on a one-year contract as part-time non-tenured instructors or on a limited usually two- or three-year non-renewable and non-tenured full-time contract. As one former tenure-tracked college professor in America unable for years to obtain tenure in Japan put it: 'As anyone who teaches in Japan will verify, tenure track here is for Japanese. Traditionally, foreigners have been employed almost exclusively either on a fixed term or on a part-time basis' (Bueno and Caesar, 2003, p 127). Or, succinctly, as McCrostie and Spiri (2008, p 14), both of whom have been employed on full-time limited-term contracts stated, 'most Japanese receive automatic tenure and most foreigners receive a capped contract'.

Japanese colleges make permanent appointments based on an inside relationship between the instructor candidate and the college or the staff of the department. Since tenure does not involve an apprenticeship or peer review, only a connection matters; foreigners are at a distinct disadvantage since very few are connected to the 'Old Boy's network' (Bueno and Caesar, 2003, pp 16-17). Getting on the tenure track or being hired as a tenured faculty member highly favours Japanese, especially those who have a personal relation with a tenured faculty member and more so if they graduated from the same college (Chenoweth and Pearson, 1993; Bueno and Caesar, 2003).

There is a vast difference between how the Japanese college staff treat visiting foreign professors or foreign scholars temporarily in Japan and permanent resident foreigners or foreigners who plan to settle down in Japan and work as college instructors. The former receive extremely courteous and bountiful attention, the higher their status the more lavish they are doted upon. Wordell (1993, p 146) states: 'Typically, they are greeted at the airport upon arrival, honored at welcoming parties, chauffeured to speaking engagements, treated to banquets, and, of course, rewarded with generous honorariums.' Visiting foreign professors usually are connected with a Japanese college involving faculty and student exchange programmes with their home college. They leave Japan with a favourable impression, furthering inter-college ties and later academic writings are likely to reflect on their red carpet treatment.

It is quite another type of experience for foreign migrants who wish to stay long term and become an equal and integral part of the college department. Subordinate pluralism equates with temporary accommodation, with an expectation to leave; the longer the foreign migrant instructor stays often the more suspicious and less welcoming their treatment by the college. The sentiment expressed by a Japanese professor at Kitakyushu University is not an anomaly: 'native speakers who have lived in Japan for more than ten years tend to have adapted to the system and have become ineffective as teachers – this is also partly because their English has become Japanized and is spoken to suit the ears of their Japanese students' (Ardou, 2007d, p 16). Foreign English language instructors have actually been let go from their colleges from having taught too long in Japan even though well below the retirement age. There is also a history of getting rid of older foreign instructors because their pay scale is higher than younger teachers although in actuality such dismissals make a small dent in department finances given the high salaries of tenured Japanese professors (Bueno and Caesar, 2003; McCrostie and Spiri, 2008).

The ludicrousness of not wanting long-term foreign instructors to teach at colleges can be clearly seen if we were to apply the same logic to assess the situation of the large number of Japanese-tenured faculty at colleges in North America. It would mean in an absurd way that something is definitely wrong as Japanese college instructors of Japanese language, sociology, history, literature, physics, chemistry, mathematics and so on have obtained tenure by improving their English, teaching many years at colleges in North America and adapting to North American students and the North American system of education – this has made them ineffective as college professors.

Hall (in Bueno and Caesar, 2003, p 16) depicted Japanese college departments as follows: 'a snugly ingrown Japanese faculty, riddled with personalism and factionalism in the absence of peer pressures to perform, jealously guards its lifetime security-cocoon against outside intrusions'. Foreign college instructors are seen and treated as mere limited-term temporary visitors, their situation resembling 'a ghettoized expatriate professoriate speaking only to one another, remote from the pressing issues of Japanese education, viewed by their students as a bit of fashionable exotica and by Japanese staff as a token of *kokusaika* (internationalization)' (Bueno and Caesar, 2003, p 17). Others (Kelly and Adachi, 1993, p 165) concur: 'foreign instructors as a group are held in low esteem by the Japanese faculty. Politically, they are outside of the hierarchy; scholastically, few have the kind of expertise Japanese admire; and socially, most operate outside the boundaries of "civilized" Japanese behavior.'

There are, of course, variable situations of teaching pertaining to Western instructors depending on the college and the people who work there. In any job, how one is treated mainly depends on the organisation, the department one works in and the interpersonal dynamics among people working together. In more than 20 years of teaching on full-time limited-term contracts and part-time contracts at numerous colleges in Japan and from hearing many stories from my colleagues,

I have been amazed by the extreme college and department differences in how Western non-tenured faculty are treated.

At one college in the department I taught at, our time of entering and leaving the classroom was closely watched over, we were told exactly how to teach and what textbooks to use, the students' work had to be put in a portfolio for close inspection by tenured faculty and warnings of being fired were given to instructors who did not meet ambiguous department expectations. Unannounced observations were made in the classes we taught, followed by a critical evaluation of our teaching style and method. Our two days of teaching was changed two years in a row and as part-time instructors, all of us had to try and rearrange our work schedule elsewhere or quit. There was an air of uncertainty regarding continuation of our one-year part-time contracts; among us, contracts had not been renewed under dubious circumstances. All 14 of us part-time non-Japanese English language instructors were isolated from full-time faculty and distanced from matters pertaining to our own teaching programme. Fear of being fired was the motivating factor to teach and the turnover rate through the years was high.

Quite different from the example above, at a different college in the department I taught at, part-time non-Japanese English language instructors chose their textbooks, were allowed to teach courses the way they saw fit, proposed a few of their own courses, felt free to voice complaints and their voice was heard and office space was provided for all part-time instructors in two spacious rooms with staff assistants providing any needed help. Unless they made a serious mistake, there was no fear of being fired and turnover rate throughout the years was low.

Regardless, what is common for part-time and full-time limited-term Western English language instructors is that they are not considered at any time during their contract period for tenure; in exceptional cases, full-time limited-term instructors may be told of a possibility of tenure after their contract expires. Instructors are also hesitant to make complaints about discrimination to the union as it has little power to do much and complaints can lead to one's dismissal from the job.

Full-time limited-term non-tenured contract positions and the very few tenured college positions open to foreigners also have an age limit either explicitly or implicitly: that the candidate must be under 40 years of age and in fewer cases under 50; it is a rare case when applicants over 50 are considered for a limited-term full-time or tenured position. Candidates are carefully scrutinised and quite often have some kind of connection with the college, recommended by a Japanese professor in the department or in some way privy to the inside network. When selecting a token foreigner, let us say a Western male candidate for a tenure-track position as an English language instructor, careful attention is given to them 'looking the part', well dressed and well groomed and particularly demonstrating an agreeable demeanour towards Japan and department policy. The more that the candidate's publications reflect well on Japan and the more willing they appear to go along with the status quo, the greater the possibility of being hired.

While there are variations, for example some are hired directly as associate or full professor, when considered for tenure the foreign instructor begins with a

limited-term full-time contract or as a full-time lecturer (*sennin*) and is carefully watched over by the Japanese staff. A publication with the college journal that makes the department and college look good furthers the possibility of tenure for the carefully selected non-Japanese candidate. Finally, a vote for granting the foreign migrant instructor tenure is held by the 'hiring committee' composed of full professors although the decision often has already been made on a factional power basis.

There is a wide difference of pay and benefits between part-time and full-time tenured instructors at Japanese colleges. Tenured instructors receive retirement pay, health insurance, a yearly research allowance somewhere in the range of ¥300,000 to ¥600,000 (US $3,000 to $6,000) and a bonus that ranges from nine to 12 months' salary. With a monthly pay of anywhere from ¥400,000 to ¥800,000 a month (roughly US $4,000 to $8,000 dollars) plus the bonus and research allowance, the yearly income of tenured faculty ranges from about ¥9,000,000 (about US $90,000) to ¥19,800,000 (about US $198,000).

On average, tenured faculty teach about six or seven courses a term. A part-time instructor receives absolutely no benefits – nothing but a salary –and makes in one month from ¥20,000 to ¥30,000 (about US $200 to $300) per one course. If they were to teach the same number of courses a week as tenured faculty, the part-time instructor would receive from ¥140,000 (about US $1,400) to ¥210,000 (about US $2,100) a month and a yearly income in the range of ¥1,680,000 (about US $16,800) to ¥2,520,000 (about US $25,200) or approximately on average a seven times lower yearly income and without any benefits at all. The only way for part-time instructors to make a living is by teaching as many courses as possible a week at different colleges, secondary schools and private English language companies.

Research funding, in-roads for publication, guest speaker fees and so on highly favour the tenured instructor, particularly full professor. There is much less money, time and support for foreign migrant part-time instructors to engage in research and publish than full-time faculty although their academic credentials are often just as good and in some cases better than full-time tenured instructors.

Foreign languages especially English are a major part of Japanese colleges and not only do colleges have rather large foreign language departments but also nearly every major department has an English language programme. Colleges are able to offer a large number of foreign language courses, the majority English language, while still strictly limiting the number of foreign-tenured professors. The way this is done is quite simple. Foreign limited-term full-time instructors teach 10 to 12 courses (and in some departments there are no foreign limited-term full-time instructors) and a good number of part-time foreign instructors teach from one to six (two days a week) courses and this covers all or at least the far majority of foreign language classes. Tenured (Japanese, and if there are any at all, foreign) faculty teach either no foreign language courses (in departments not related to foreign languages or literature) or six to seven courses, many of those being seminars (see Appendix A for examples of this). This, of course, is economically feasible and allows the department to meet its goals while maintaining the

dominance, power and control of Japanese-tenured faculty. Wadden (1993, pp 16-17), in an excellent documentation and discussion of the role, status and conditions of employment for foreign English language instructors at Japanese colleges throughout Japan, stated:

> Most departments will hire only one or two full-time foreign professors and then employ part-time teachers to handle the bulk of the English language classes, which allows a university to have a significant number of native speakers on the teaching staff without the burden of having to give them full-time salaries.

The hiring of foreign instructors as part-time and full-time limited-term instructors and limiting their number as tenured faculty is characteristic of subordinate ascribed pluralism among foreign migrants groups. This follows from a historical precedence going back to the Tokugawa era in the isolation of the few foreigners allowed in Japan for trading purposes, limited-term contracts of foreign instructors in pre-war Japan and a continuing separate subordinate treatment of foreign migrants in post-war Japan (McCrostie and Spiri, 2008, p 14; Reischauer, 1977, pp 68, 401-21). Relative to Western English language instructors, it fits in with what Sugimoto (2003, p 183) noted as:

> the persistence of the doctrine of *wakon yosai* (Japanese spirit and Western technology), the dichotomy which splits the world into two spheres, Japan and the West, and assumes the spiritual, moral, and cultural life of the Japanese should not be corrupted by foreign influences no matter how much Japan's material way of life may be affected by them.

While part-time and full-time limited-term contracts at Japanese colleges allow for the employment of Western college instructors of English in Japan, being relegated to a subordinate position minimises their cultural influence on students. Part-time foreign instructors are left out of department academic affairs altogether, having minimal contact with full-time faculty. The predominant use of full-time limited-term foreign instructors rather than granting tenure minimises cultural exchange and effective English language teaching, not only hurting the students but also creating stress and strain for these instructors who along with part-time instructors are constantly in a frenzied rush to find other teaching jobs. McCrostie and Spiri (2008, p 14) explain this based on their own experiences as limited-term full-time instructors at colleges in Japan:

> The limited-term contract system essentially guarantees that students get short-changed. An instructor starting a new contract takes their first year getting accustomed to students and creating teaching material. During the next year or two a teacher can refine and improve their

> lesson plans and teaching. Then, just when a teacher starts becoming a more productive and effective faculty member, they are forced to largely ignore their teaching and research duties and devote their final contract year to assembling extensive application packages in response to job ads that omit crucial details like salary, and then find the time and money to attend job interviews. Forcing out experienced instructors for new recruits means students often don't get the best classroom instruction. It also reduces the chances of foreign instructors starting clubs, doing volunteer work with students, or applying for multiyear research grants.

In recent times, the situation of foreign instructors at Japanese colleges has become worse. Up until the past 15 years, many foreign instructors were hired on a one-year full-time yearly renewable contract but that hiring practice more or less ended after the Ministry of Education stipulated that such instructors would eventually have to be considered for tenure. Noticeably, in this new millennium a decrease in the number of college-aged students has led to budget cuts at colleges, making matters even more tenuous for foreign instructors. Employment subcontracting companies have sprung up offering colleges part-time foreign instructors at a cheaper rate. Colleges have begun to hire part-time foreign instructors through these subcontracting companies, resulting in a profit for the company, cost cuts for the college and a lower-paid foreign instructor than that of foreign instructors hired by the college. This has resulted in reducing the number of limited-term full-time instructors and loss in the number of courses and sometimes jobs for part-time instructors who have been directly employed by the college.

Colleges have restructured their departments in other different ways, cutting costs by getting rid of foreign instructors. Changing objectives of the English language programme and replacing it with a different name, colleges have reduced the number of English language classes, resulting in non-renewal of part-time one-year contracts among foreign English language instructors. One department at a major college cut costs by replacing all of its part-time Western instructors with young Western English conversation teachers from a private English conversation school, contracting them at a cheaper rate. Colleges throughout Japan have cut the pay per course and number of courses in the department that part-time foreign instructors are allowed to teach. The gap of pay and privilege between full-time tenured instructors and part-time foreign teachers has widened with no foreseeable end.

Using a fictitious name, Mary S. gave details on the futility of Western migrant English language instructors to obtain tenure at Japanese colleges. She also wrote about her own experience of being the recipient of an insidious form of deception by a major university that gave foreign migrant instructors false hopes for tenure (Bueno and Caesar, 2003). The university tricked foreign migrant instructors into believing they would be tenured when, in fact, there was no tenure track position available for them (Bueno and Caesar, 2003, p 131).

This university lured in highly qualified foreign migrant English language instructors by advertising a tenure-track position every year and chose the best candidate. The trick was that the advertising and hiring for the same and only one tenure-track position proceeded for five years. Then, at the beginning of the fifth year, the university fired each of the previous four candidates (each year one was brought in so after four years, four candidates) and started all over again. No foreign migrant was ever given a promised tenure-track position.

It has been my experience from over 20 years of teaching at Japanese colleges, that it is not just discriminate hiring, other discriminate conditions also make the work situation of foreign migrant college instructors highly unstable. Many if not most foreign college instructors who have taught for any considerable numbers of years in Japan have experienced any one or more of the following situations:

- suddenly being dismissed through some kind of rearrangement of English language courses or simply all foreign instructors being let go of in a closing of the English language section;
- being fired for no substantive reason;
- having courses or days of teaching cut;
- having their teaching day or days during the week changed and since they are working part-time elsewhere, unless a rearrangement can be made at the other place of work (usually another college), being left with no other option but to quit one of the jobs;
- having a reduction in pay;
- being the recipient of broken promises on number of courses to be taught, possibility of tenure and tenure itself.

The setting of a rather young age (often advertised and certainly implicit) for foreign instructors to be eligible for a full-time limited-term or foreign tenure-tracked position relegates non-tenured foreign migrant instructors older than 40 and certainly 50 years of age to a part-time college teaching career. The cumulative effect of few available full-time positions, age limit and insecurity of one's job or relative ease that college departments dismiss foreign instructors ironically dampens the ability of foreign migrant instructors to become organised and oppose the discriminate policies of Japanese colleges. Younger foreign migrant college instructors are kept in line still hopeful for possible tenure knowing that their years of eligibility are not that many. Those over 40 needs to secure as many part-time positions as possible with almost no hope for a full-time position and dare not make any waves. That is, fear and insecurity play a major role in quieting dissent and outward conflict. There are other social psychological mechanisms as well that 'keep the foreigner in their place'

'Don't rock the boat' is a rule of survival among foreign migrant college instructors. This means no criticism, no involvement with a union and even being careful of conversation when Japanese instructors are within hearing distance. Foreign instructors talking among each other have been later admonished for

making a critical remark about Japan overheard by a Japanese staff or faculty member. While it is common for foreign instructors in private to voice their discontent, it is considered a mistake to either inform the teacher's union of one's problem or voice a complaint to the full-time faculty as it is known that this puts one's job in jeopardy. Quiet submission becomes a 'psychological norm' as a result.

Quite often a non-Japanese full-time college instructor is given the task of admonishing a part-time foreign migrant instructor on their wayward behaviour and brings the bad news of 'firing', Called 'hatchet person', the full-time non-Japanese instructor defends department policy and often makes it look as though something is wrong with the erring foreign part-time instructor, shielding Japanese full-time professors and the department from any blame or responsibility. The label once attached to the 'wrongful' non-Japanese instructor usually becomes acknowledged by other instructors, isolating the 'deviant' from others, putting an end to support and easing the way for dismissal.

The sheer insecurity of one's job and absence of rights or viable support groups means that the only way to minimise the possibility of losing one's job is to outdo the other foreign migrant part-time instructors. Keeping in line, demonstrating a positive attitude about Japan, the students, Japanese faculty and department as well as 'looking and playing the part' of a foreigner is one's best bet to stay around longer than the other non-Japanese instructors. A further incentive is the only alternative to part-time teaching at colleges for most foreign migrant instructors – that of teaching at private language schools, dropping even lower down the working-class ladder. This breeds mistrust in a 'prisoner's dilemma' type of game whereby a lack of trust leads to looking out for self although one would gain more by cooperating with others, working together for a more fair and 'humane' solution to a discriminate job situation.

There is a variety of reasons for discriminate employment and treatment of foreign migrant instructors at Japanese colleges. On the conflict level, department policy including hiring and setting conditions of employment and promotion is maintained and carried out by the dominant subculture group in their own interests. Decisions are made by a committee of full professors involving a network of ties and connections within the department and in the academic community at large. Final say is often under the jurisdiction of a board of trustees composed solely of dominant subculture group members. Foreign instructors have a weak base of support among key persons involved in these matters and foreign self-interest organisations or anything resembling 'affirmative action' programmes do not exist. And, although there is a teacher's union available, it has little power to do much.

On the interpersonal level, cultural incongruity and selective perception serve to justify discriminate policies. Stereotyping and the selective perception tendency are, among Japanese professors, instructors and staff, to identify and pay attention to instances (and disregard those to the contrary) whereby the foreign instructor is 'different', not capable of 'fitting in' or understanding how things should be done as a member of the faculty. Foreigners are also stereotyped and perceived as

temporary residents, not as trustworthy as Japanese instructors, reinforced by many leaving Japan after a few years of teaching and instances of foreign instructors who have suddenly left Japan before the completion of their contract. This then justifies the part-time or limited full-time contract period of hiring foreign instructors and relative ease of dismissal. Conversely, at the same time, foreign instructors come to experience discriminatory treatment and realise their limited or no opportunity for full-time employment status influencing them to, if given the opportunity, not renew their one-year contract at the end of the academic year to return to their homeland or opt for a better opportunity at another school or different line of work. In a revolving circular pattern of events, suspicion, mistrust and animosity are built up on both sides, making it improbable that a solution to the dilemma will be reached by both parties.

While there is a wide divide between Japanese tenured and foreign migrant college instructors, there is one occupation where Japanese and foreigners must coordinate their activities together as a team: Japanese professional baseball. In any line of work, baseball would seem to have the least problem of language or cultural complications – it is an international sport based on one's ability to athletically perform well.

Japanese professional baseball and foreign players

Baseball has become an international sport, 2006 marking the first World Baseball Championship Series and Japan won. In 2008, 29% of the professional baseball players on American professional baseball teams were from foreign countries, coming from various parts of the globe such as the Dominican Republic, South America, Canada, Australia and Far East Asia (Japan, Korea and Taiwan) (Lapchick, 2009). Of all professional-level occupations, cultural and language barriers are of the least consequence to performance and interpersonal relations in the world of professional baseball. Thus, one would expect minimum prejudice and discrimination against foreign ballplayers.

Whiting's *The Chrysanthemum and the Bat*, published in 1977, was the first noteworthy book in English on Japanese professional baseball (also referred to as NPB – Nippon Professional Baseball). As the title suggests, the author emphasised the 'unique' cultural way that Japanese approach, train and play baseball. Whiting (1977, pp 160-1) also criticised the mass media and Japanese fans for having prejudicial views against foreign people (at that time nearly all foreign players were Americans) playing in Japanese professional baseball teams:

> While Japanese are becoming more accustomed to 'foreign' import the unpleasant image perpetrated by weekly comic books and the popular animated television series of the 1960s *Kyojin no Hoshi* (Star of the Giants) still lingers. There, the former [foreign] major leaguer was often portrayed as hairy-chested, unshaven, dirty, and vicious. He was a combination villain/fall guy who time and time again went down to

> defeat in the face of pure hearted Japanese perseverance and fighting spirit – animated enactments of the fantasy many Japanese fans have of the day when they will *rule* the world of baseball.
>
> The average fan tends to view the American on his favorite team simply as a yardstick. If a Tiger [Hanshin Tigers, a Japanese professional baseball team] fan, for instance, watches his team's American right fielder strike out, he may be unhappy but he is consoled by the thought that it was a *Japanese* who struck him out. This demonstrates that Japanese pitching is improving. If an American pitcher gives up a game-winning home run and his team loses, the loss is disappointing but it shows that Japanese batting is improving. And if a former big-league star comes to Japan and cannot make the grade, that is even better – Japanese baseball is catching up.

There has been trouble between 'visible' (White and Black) foreign ballplayers and team managers and discriminatory actions taken by opposing teams when 'visible' foreign ballplayers perform too well (Whiting, 1977). Teams in the past were reluctant to sign non-Asian ballplayers, preferences on some teams to even field 'ethnically' pure Japanese professional baseball teams (Whiting, 1977). Discrimination has been set by a fixed limit (in the past two and today only four foreign players are allowed on each team's active 25-player baseball roster) on the number of foreign players allowed to play Japanese professional baseball.

Discrimination in Japanese professional baseball

While discrimination against foreign ballplayers has been alluded to, the subject has not received any in-depth or substantive attention. Through a review of the literature and gathering statistics of foreign and Japanese baseball players, I decided to focus specifically on discrimination against foreign ballplayers in Japan. And, as Whiting (1977) suggests, discrimination contains a nationality/race component, thus nationality and race among foreign ballplayers are included in this analysis.

While nationality is easily known, race is a biological component, a phenotype and, by itself, it means very little. There is a host of methodological problems in categorisation of race and inevitable error in whatever method(s) used. Furthermore, while race has been associated with ethnic such as Black culture, ethnic is not the same as race. Ethnic refers to a cultural affiliation and identity with it, American White people, for example, identify with ethnic cultures in Europe and beyond. Hispanics have a variety of ethnic cultures. To make matters simple, and since the focus of attention is on treatment of non-Japanese in Japanese professional baseball, 'race' is used in reference to a sociocultural recognisable category that carries with it stereotypes by dominant group Japanese. For foreign migrant non-Asian baseball players, race also is a 'visible' category, such ballplayers physically recognised as non-Japanese. Murphy-Shigematsu (2003, p 198) explains:

> The Japanese word *jinshu* refers to conventional categories of race and is not used to describe Japanese groups but is reserved for blacks and whites, or to contrast 'Japanese' and whites. It is used especially in labeling racial problems of other countries as *jinshu mondai*. The word *minzoku* is a confusion of race, nation, peoples and ethnic group, and, while *jinshu* is clearly based on inherited physical characteristics, *minzoku* includes psychological, social, cultural or linguistic factors. Its usage has been marked by overtones of communal solidarity and ideology, or a set of beliefs that make one 'Japanese' or a member of another ethnic group.

Both the nationality and 'race' of foreign migrant ballplayers were taken from baseball biographies in Japan that also included a photograph in a yearly series of Japan Pro Baseball handbooks (Graczyk, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002a, 2003, 2004, 2005a, 2006a, 2007, 2008a; see also Appendix A). While error is inevitable, both in identity and that all races are mixed or that there is no definite line between one colour of skin and another, not to mention other mixtures of physical features characteristic of race such eye and hair colour and texture of skin, a racial approximation was made for each foreign ballplayer (see Appendix A). To somewhat check on the ambiguity of 'race', nationality is also included in the upcoming analysis of foreign professional baseball players to assess discrimination in Japanese professional baseball.

Valid and reliable information was obtained on all Japanese and foreign professional baseball players on Japanese pro baseball teams for the period from 1996 up to 2008 or the most recent 12-year span (Graczyk, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002a, 2003, 2004, 2005a, 2006a, 2007, 2008a; Miyama, 2007; *Ofuisharu beesubaru gaido*, 2008). These data were utilised to examine whether or not discrimination against foreign migrant baseball players occurs and if so why.

Professional baseball in Japan today is similar to the US, baseball players coming from all over the globe, particularly from countries where baseball is popular such as Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Taiwan and the US. And, like the US, foreign baseball players in Japan hope to make baseball their career or at least play as many years as they can in Japan (Gracyzk, 2006c). Thus, foreign professional baseball players in Japan, like Japanese professional baseball players, not only are competitive athletes but also do their best with the realisation that a substandard performance will jeopardise continuation of their baseball contract for the next year; excepting star Japanese ballplayers, ballplayers are signed on a one-year contract.

One would expect that management of Japanese professional baseball teams decide whether or not to release their baseball players based on baseball performance, not nationality or 'race'. If this is so then there should not be any significant differences between foreign and Japanese baseball players' performances related to their release rates and playing career.

Playing career and release rates

Following the most recent career over 12 years (1996-2008) of every player on each of the 12 professional Japanese baseball team rosters, among 1,061 Japanese professional baseball players who have ended their baseball career they averaged 9.09 years of professional baseball in Japan. During this same time period (1996-2008), among 325 foreign ballplayers that have ended their baseball career in Japanese professional baseball they averaged only 2.05 years of professional baseball in Japan.

By nationality, players from the US and the Dominican Republic had the shortest playing careers in Japanese professional baseball, lower than the average of 2.05 years among foreign ballplayers, while ballplayers from Asia (Korea and Taiwan) had about a two times longer playing career than this average. Looking at 'race', Caucasians, nearly all of them Americans, at an average of 1.79 years, had the shortest baseball career followed closely by Black-Hispanics (Dominican Republic) players, with an average baseball playing career of 1.89 years. Hispanic ballplayers and Black-American ballplayers played near the average number of years among foreign ballplayers, at 2.13 and 2.23 years respectively. Asian migrant ballplayers (includes all foreign ballplayers of Asian descent, Japanese-Brazilians, Koreans and Chinese, nearly all Chinese from Taiwan) had the longest playing career among foreign ballplayers, with an average of 4.1 years, although still more than two times shorter a baseball playing career than Japanese ballplayers. In short, the baseball career of Japanese ballplayers was on the average about four times longer than non-Asian and two times longer than Asian ballplayers.

Age and baseball playing experience did not relate to the extreme differences of playing careers in Japan between Japanese and foreign ballplayers. The average age of foreigners when released by their Japanese baseball club was an age when ballplayers are at their prime or peak age of performance. Foreign ballplayers when released from their Japanese baseball team were at an average age of 30.34 years old, with a median age and modal category of 31 years of age.

Baseball playing experience was not significantly different between foreign and Japanese baseball players. Most foreign ballplayers' professional baseball experience was in the US as minor league players or sub-par major league players and a smaller number were professional ballplayers in another country below the American and Japanese major league level. In total, the level and experience of playing baseball for all foreign ballplayers before arriving in Japan was about on the same level as Japanese professional baseball players in Japan (see Appendix A for details).

The significant differences in the playing careers of foreign and Japanese baseball players were reflected in yearly release rates – the percentage of ballplayers released from their baseball teams after the end of the baseball season. Consistently from 1996 to 2008, yearly release rates of foreign compared to Japanese ballplayers in Japanese professional baseball teams were between three and six times higher. The ages of the players, baseball experience and salaries were not significantly different but yearly release rates were.

There was no significant difference between the two professional Japanese baseball leagues (Pacific and Central) or a progressive increase or decrease in release rates over the years. The percentage of foreign and Japanese players released in each league for each year from 1996 to 2008 did not show any significant difference. There also was no particular trend of yearly release rates increasing or decreasing during the 12-year period. For example, the largest differences of yearly release rates between Japanese and foreign ballplayers were in 1997 and 2005. In 1997, 55% of all foreign ballplayers compared to only 11% of all Japanese baseball players were released from Japan's professional baseball teams (or a five times higher release rate for foreign ballplayers) and in 2005, a very high 68% of foreign players compared to only 11% of Japanese players were released from their Japanese baseball teams (a more than six times difference). The two lowest differential yearly rates were in 2002 and 2006 but even then, release rates of foreign ballplayers for these two years were each more than three times higher compared to Japanese ballplayers. In total, on the average for each year during the 12-year period, among 8,102 Japanese ballplayers, 1,022 were released for an average 13% yearly release rate while among 644 foreign ballplayers, 320 were released for an average yearly release rate of 50%. That is, the average release rate of foreign ballplayers at the end of the baseball season from Japanese professional baseball teams was nearly four times higher than that of Japanese ballplayers.

The largest average yearly release rate differences during the 12-year time span was that of ballplayers from the US at a 56% average yearly release rate and ballplayers from the Dominican Republic at 54%. This equates to an average yearly release rate of ballplayers from both countries that is more than four times higher than the average yearly release rate of Japanese ballplayers (13%). The lowest average yearly release rate differences of less than three times greater than that of Japanese ballplayers (whose average yearly release rate was 13%) were ballplayers from countries in the following descending order: Venezuela (32%), Taiwan and China (25%), Korea (24%) and Brazil (22%).

'Racial' group differences and average yearly release rates show that ballplayers with the most physically noticeable racial differences (hereafter referred to as 'visible' foreign ballplayers) from Japanese ballplayers had the highest release rates. Table 3.2 shows that the highest proportional difference of average yearly release rates compared to Japanese ballplayers were that of Caucasian, then Black-Hispanic, then Black ballplayers, all above the foreign ballplayers' average yearly release rate of 50%. Finally, Asian migrant ballplayers racially indistinguishable from Japanese ballplayers had by far the lowest average yearly release rate and smallest proportional difference compared to Japanese ballplayers among all foreign ballplayers, a more than two times lower average yearly release rate difference than the three racial groups that stand out the most.

Table 3.2: Racial difference of average yearly release rates, 1996-2008

Race	Average yearly release rate % (n)	Rate difference compared to Japanese ballplayers
Caucasian	57% (173)	4.38 times higher
Black-Hispanic	54% (44)	4.15 times higher
Black	53% (40)	4.08 times higher
Hispanic	41% (43)	3.15 times higher
Asian	25% (20)	1.92 times higher

Source: Data compiled from Japan's Pro Baseball Handbooks (Graczyk, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008).

First-year ballplayers and release rates

There are two types of first-year ballplayers on Japanese professional baseball teams: rookies and ballplayers traded. Rookies are ballplayers playing their first year of Japanese professional baseball. Other ballplayers are traded from one Japanese professional team to another and, therefore, are first-year ballplayers on a new team. Japanese rookies are much younger than foreign rookies as first-year foreign ballplayers are composed of a mix of young and older foreign ballplayers with varying baseball experience before being signed to play professional baseball in Japan. To control for age and playing experience, release rate comparisons were made between Japanese rookies and young foreign rookies and between Japanese ballplayers traded to a new team and older foreign ballplayers, mostly rookies with a smaller number traded from one Japanese professional team to another.

Young foreign rookie and Japanese rookie ballplayers

The first comparison of release rates during the baseball seasons from 1996 to 2008 was between Japanese rookies and young foreign rookies. Based on the age range of Japanese rookie ballplayers, all first-year foreign ballplayers aged 18 to 26 years old were selected. The age range of all 963 Japanese rookie ballplayers from 1996 to 2008 was from 18 to 30, with an average age of 21.56 and a median age of 22. Since fewer foreign rookies were 18 years old, the average age of 55 young foreign rookies was a little older than Japanese rookies, with an average age of 23.84 and a median age of 25.

Even though Japanese and young foreign rookie ballplayers' past baseball experience was in different countries, comparatively, one group had no significant advantage to perform better than the other group (see Appendix A). And, while young foreign rookies were usually paid a higher salary than Japanese rookies, Japanese rookies received a signing bonus while young (as well as older) foreign rookies did not. Young rookie ballplayers received less than the average salary of Japanese professional baseball players and, overall, combining the signing bonus of

Japanese rookies, the pay of Japanese and young foreign rookies was approximately the same.

The release rates of foreign compared to Japanese rookie ballplayers were astonishingly different from what one would expect. From 1996 to 2008, among 914 Japanese rookie ballplayers only 11 were released after their first year of professional baseball in Japan, with an average yearly release rate of 1%. Among 55 young foreign rookies during the same 12-year time span, 20 were released after their first year of baseball, with an average yearly release rate of 36%. So first-year release rates for foreign rookies were 36 times higher than those for Japanese rookies.

Older first-year foreign and Japanese players

The next release rate comparisons were made between first-year foreign ballplayers 27 years of age and older and Japanese ballplayers traded from one Japanese professional team to another. Both groups of ballplayers were playing baseball for the first year in a new team; the foreigner in the majority of cases (a small number from trades) his first year of professional Japanese baseball and the Japanese player his first year after being traded to that team from another Japanese professional baseball team. The average age of the two groups of ballplayers was almost the same. From 1996 to 2008, among 286 older foreign first-year players, the average age of 30.16, just slightly younger than the average age of 30.25 for 463 first-year Japanese players by trade; the median age for both groups was 30. Salaries for both groups were approximately the same and past baseball experience did not differ significantly (see Appendix A for details).

The release rates of these ballplayers, like the rookie players, indicate whether or not the ballplayers were released from the team after their first year of playing baseball in that team each year from 1996 to 2008. The difference was not as dramatic as for Japanese rookies and young foreign rookies although again first-year foreign ballplayers had a higher release rate. Nearly twice or 1.9 times more of these foreign ballplayers were released from their Japanese professional baseball teams after their first year of baseball than their Japanese professional baseball player counterparts. Fifty-five per cent or 157 of 286 older foreign ballplayers compared to 29% or 134 of 461 older Japanese baseball players traded to another team were released after their first year of playing baseball for that team.

Total baseball comparisons: release rates and baseball performance

Baseball comparisons of release rates and the relation of release rates to baseball performance were made between all foreign and Japanese baseball players who were first-year players in a Japanese professional baseball team in Japan from 1996 to 2008. This combined the above two datasets of young (26 years of age and younger) foreign and Japanese rookies and older Japanese players traded with older (27 years of age and older) first-year foreign players; separate tables of each dataset

are given in Appendix A. As mentioned above, the ages and playing experiences of young foreign and Japanese rookies and older foreign and Japanese players traded were similar, thus, combining the two datasets controlled for age and playing experience differences. No distinctions were made by age; both Japanese rookie ballplayers and older Japanese ballplayers traded (in total representing all first-year Japanese ballplayers) were referred to as first-year Japanese ballplayers and both the younger and older foreign ballplayers (in total including all first-year foreign players) were referred to as first-year foreign ballplayers.

Previously mentioned, the average yearly release rates from 1996 to 2008 of all the foreign ballplayers (not just first-year foreign ballplayers) were about four times higher than that of Japanese baseball players. Release rates of first-year foreign ballplayers compared to first-year Japanese ballplayers were even higher. There was nearly a five times difference in the average first-year release rates from 1996 to 2008 of all first-year foreign and first-year Japanese ballplayers that played professional baseball in Japan. Fifty-two per cent or 177 of 341 first-year foreign ballplayers were released from their Japanese professional baseball teams after their first year of baseball compared to only 11% or 145 of 1,375 Japanese first-year ballplayers.

Among 'racial' groups, Caucasian (nearly all Americans) first-year ballplayers had the highest release rates at 58% and Asian (Japanese-Brazilians, Koreans and Chinese) first-year ballplayers the lowest release rates at 9%, more than a six times difference. The other 'racial' groups' release rates were close to the average release rate: Black-Hispanics (55%), Black-Americans (54%) and Hispanics (47%). Thus, first-year release rates pointed to discrimination based on 'race'; high release rates only occurred for foreign ballplayer 'racial' groups physically distinguishable from Japanese ballplayers and was not universal by nationality.

Baseball comparisons of release rates and baseball performance were made between all foreign and Japanese baseball players who played their first year in a Japanese professional baseball team in Japan from 1996 to 2008. Comparisons were only made between ballplayers with a similar past history of baseball experience, of approximately the same age and between players in the same team, same position (outfielders, infielders and pitchers) and same year. Baseball performance was based on statistics that indicated how well the players played baseball (baseball performance) during the baseball season. Baseball performance indices were: foreign ballplayer had a significantly better performance, performance in the same range and Japanese player had a significantly better performance (see Appendix A on performance scales). Release rates referred to whether or not the ballplayer was released from his team at the end of the baseball season. If resigned to play another year of baseball, the player was referred to as resigned and if released simply referred to as released.

If there is equality in Japanese professional baseball, regardless of nationality or 'race', baseball players with the best performances should be resigned at the end of the baseball season to play another year (all these ballplayers signed on a one-year contract). Succinctly, if one of two ballplayers were to be released, it should

be the ballplayer with the significantly poorer baseball performance. In a perfect association with no discrimination or that baseball performance not nationality or 'race' is the sole basis for being resigned or released from the team, foreign and Japanese ballplayers would have a released/resigned hypothetical configuration as shown in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Hypothetical perfect association of baseball performance and release rates

	Baseball performance		
Nationality and released/resigned	Foreigner better	Same range	Japanese better
Foreign player released/Japanese player resigned	0%	50%	100%
Japanese player released/foreign player resigned	100%	50%	0%

The actual data are presented in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4: Baseball performance and release rates by nationality, 1996-2008

	Baseball performance			
Nationality and released/ resigned	Foreigner better % (n)	Same range % (n)	Japanese better % (n)	Total (n)
Foreign player released/ Japanese player resigned	58% (57)	82% (56)	95% (59)	(172)
Japanese player released/ foreign player resigned	42% (42)	18% (12)	5% (3)	(57)
Total % (n)	100% (99)	100% (68)	100% (62)	(229)

Source: Data compiled from Japan's Pro Baseball Handbooks (Graczyk, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008; Miyama, 2007; *Ofuisharu beesubaru gaido* (official baseball guide), 2008).

Looking across the rows and comparing a hypothetical perfect association in Table 3.3 with the actual data in Table 3.4, one can clearly see the discrepancy in baseball performance and release rates. While Japanese ballplayers playing the same position in the same team and in the same year were resigned, the majority of foreign players were released even when they played better baseball. Also, when foreign and Japanese ballplayers had the same range of baseball performance, four times the percentage of foreign ballplayers were released while their Japanese teammates were resigned. The only expected relation that held was that when Japanese ballplayers played better baseball they were nearly always resigned while their foreign teammates were released. In short, based on nationality, when a ballplayer was released while his teammate was resigned, regardless of baseball performance, the majority of foreign ballplayers were released while for Japanese ballplayers the majority of ballplayers were resigned. The total numbers in the rows indicate the higher release rate of foreign ballplayers while the column totals show that foreign ballplayers played better baseball than their Japanese teammates.

All of this points to a strong degree of discrimination in Japanese professional baseball against foreign ballplayers.

As previously indicated, first-year release rates for ethnic Asian ballplayers were low, about the same as Japanese ballplayers. With low release rates there were few (only six) cases of baseball performance and released/resigned rate comparisons between ethnic Asian ballplayers and their Japanese teammates and the results were insignificant. The discrepancy of baseball performance and released/resigned rates solely applied to 'visible' foreign ballplayers. While there was slight variation, the pattern of foreign ballplayers being released and Japanese ballplayers being resigned when the foreign ballplayer played better baseball and the pattern of very high release rates while their Japanese teammates were resigned when they played baseball in the same range was approximately the same for Caucasian and Black ballplayers (all except one were Americans), Black-Hispanics from the Dominican Republic and Hispanics from various countries. And, the same expected relation applied for all 'visible' foreign ballplayers in that when Japanese ballplayers played better baseball, nearly all Caucasian, Black, Black-Hispanic and Hispanic ballplayers were released while their Japanese teammates were resigned.

Baseball performance comparisons were also made when both foreign ballplayers and their Japanese teammates were resigned. In proportion to other racial groups, given low release rates, ethnic Asian ballplayers had a significantly higher proportional number of cases whereby both they and their Japanese teammates were resigned compared to released/resigned cases. While all racial groups played better baseball than their Japanese teammates when both were resigned, the difference was greatest for Hispanic and Black ballplayers where nearly all played better, then Caucasians with more than five times the number that played better baseball and lastly Black-Hispanic and ethnic Asian ballplayers with just over twice the number of ballplayers having played better baseball than their Japanese teammates when both were resigned to play another year of baseball.

Summing it all up, from 1996 to 2008 in Japanese professional baseball, release rates were much higher and playing career much shorter for foreign national than Japanese ballplayers although outstanding differences applied only to 'visible' foreign ballplayers. Looking at first-year ballplayers, 'visible' foreign ballplayers had significantly higher release rates than first-year Japanese ballplayers and this did not relate to their baseball performance; they were released regardless if most played better baseball. All of this indicates racial discrimination since only foreign ballplayers with noticeable racial differences (Caucasian, Black, Black-Hispanic and Hispanic ballplayers) from Japanese regardless of nationality stood out as targets of discrimination. Non-Japanese players of different nationalities but of ethnic Asian descent and not racially distinct from Japanese were much less discriminated against than 'visible' foreign ballplayers in regards to release rates and playing career. Also, for first-year ethnic Asian ballplayers, discrimination did not occur or there was no notable difference compared to Japanese ballplayers of release rates and the relation of baseball performance to release rates. There is a history to this.

History of discrimination in post-war Japanese professional baseball

In the post-war period, foreign ballplayers first came to Japan to play Japanese professional baseball in 1951. Excepting one Cuban, from 1951 to 1960 all 43 ballplayers were from America. Nearly half or 20 of 42 American players were Japanese-Americans from Hawaii; the other 22 were 15 White-Americans and 7 Black-Americans, nearly all from mainland US.

Japanese-American ballplayers had lower first-year release rates and a longer playing career than White- and Black-American ballplayers. Fifty-five per cent of White- and Black-Americans (with no significant difference between them) were released after their first year of Japanese professional baseball compared to only 25% of Japanese-Americans, a more than two times higher release rate. Japanese-American ballplayers averaged 4.5 years of professional baseball in Japan compared to only 1.68 years for White- and Black-Americans. The lower release rates and longer playing career of Japanese-Americans, however, did not relate to their baseball performance. Compared to Japanese-American ballplayers, Black- and White-American players had a higher batting average, hit twice the number of home runs and pitchers' earned run average was more than one run lower (see Appendix A for an explanation of baseball terminology).

From 1960, ballplayers from Latin America, the Dominican Republic and Asian countries, mainly Taiwan, came to play professional baseball in Japan. Still, most (more than 85% of) foreign ballplayers during the period 1960 to 1996 were from America, mainly White and Black ballplayers. Korean (foreign migrants in Japan) players hid their foreign identity by taking on a Japanese name and their number is not known (in recent times, a number of Korean ballplayers have come from Korea and their Korean names are known). Ten players from Taiwan played during this time period and, like the Japanese-Americans before them, release rates were lower and playing career longer than non-Asian ballplayers. From 1960 to 1996, Taiwanese ballplayers had an average low release rate of 10% after their first year of professional baseball compared to a high release rate average of 49% for first-year non-Asian ballplayers and a more than two times longer playing career of five years compared to 2.22 years for non-Asian ballplayers. And, like Japanese-Americans before them, their baseball performance compared to non-Asian ballplayers did not warrant a lower release rate and longer playing career.

It was during the time period extensively covered in this writing, from 1996 to 2008, whereby a significant larger number of ballplayers came from different countries to play baseball for Japanese professional baseball teams with the percentage of American ballplayers dropping to 70%. And, as has been looked at from many angles, during this time period the largest visible group of foreign players – Caucasian Americans – like the past, have had high first-year release rates and short playing careers. Today, they are joined by a larger 'visible' foreign baseball player group from the US and many other countries than in the past. And as we have seen, 'visible' foreign ballplayers have much higher release rates and

shorter playing careers than Japanese baseball players even though their baseball performance does not warrant such discrimination.

Marty Kuehnert, a long-time expert on foreign ballplayers in Japan, noted that in this new millennium the situation of foreign ballplayers is at its worst (Kuehnert, 2001, p 22): 'We are also seeing foreign players used in a revolving door fashion more than ever before, and if they don't produce immediately, they are labeled *dame* [no good, useless] and put on the next plane back home to be forgotten quickly….'

Throughout the history of post-war Japanese professional baseball, discrimination has been strongest against non-Asian ballplayers. And, it is not because of the smaller numbers of ethnic Asian ballplayers, as about the same number of Dominican Republic players and even fewer players from Venezuela, Puerto Rico, Mexico and Panama have higher release rates and shorter playing careers than ethnic Asian ballplayers. In total, from 1951 to 2008, 52% of non-Asian ballplayers were released from their Japanese professional baseball team after their first year compared to only 15% of ethnic Asian players. Non-Asian ballplayers in post-war Japanese professional baseball have averaged 2.08 years of playing professional baseball in Japan compared to 4.27 years for ethnic Asian players. And, this wide racial gap difference is not based on baseball performance.

While race is not an issue for ethnic Asian ballplayers, nationality shows discrepancy as the playing career of ethnic Asian ballplayers is not as long as Japanese ballplayers. Korean players through the years, to protect against discrimination, have hidden their 'foreign' identity by using a Japanese name. Ethnic Asian ballplayers, who included Japanese-Americans in the beginning of post-war baseball, followed by Chinese and Koreans and recently Japanese-Brazilians have been more accepted in Japanese professional baseball than non-ethnic Asian players; still they are not treated as equals and do not last as long in Japanese professional baseball as Japanese ballplayers.

Foreign ballplayers after the first year of professional baseball in Japan

Release rates in post-war (1951 to 2008) Japanese professional baseball among foreign ballplayers resigned after their first year continued to be at a high rate. Examining these release rates shows how very few foreign ballplayers who made it past their first year ended up with a playing career as long as Japanese ballplayers. Except for the early period (1951-60) because of the longer playing career of Japanese-American ballplayers, release rates of second-year foreign ballplayers from 1960 to 2008 were around 50%. Taking all foreign ballplayers that played two or more years, during the time period of 1951 to 1960, they averaged 4.52 years, from 1960 to 1996, 3.31 years and from 1996 to 2008 only 3.19 years of Japanese professional baseball. In total, from 1951 to 2008, among all foreign ballplayers who made it past their first year of Japanese professional baseball and remembering that only about 50% made it past the first year, they averaged only 3.34 years of Japanese professional baseball.

Foreign ballplayers during the most recent time period (1996 to 2008) had the highest release rates and lowest average number of years played in the history of post-war Japanese professional baseball. An insight into how this contrasts with much lower release rates and a significantly longer baseball career of Japanese ballplayers follows by comparing release rates between Japanese and foreign ballplayers from their very first year of Japanese professional baseball to the end of their playing career.

The playing career of all Japanese and foreign ballplayers in Japanese professional baseball who ended their baseball career during the years of 1996 to 2008 were compared. This analysis starts with their first year of professional baseball in Japan and follows them through until their career ended. Release rates and cumulative number of years played, point to an extremely different baseball career for foreign and Japanese ballplayers.

We begin with the first year of playing professional baseball in Japan, here, a career ended for 52% of foreign ballplayers after their first year compared to 1% of Japanese ballplayers. The second year showed 76% of foreigner ballplayers having their careers end compared to 4% of Japanese ballplayers. After three years of professional baseball, 85% of foreign ballplayers ended their career compared to 7% of Japanese ballplayers. After four years of baseball, 94% of foreigners completed their career compared to 8% of Japanese ballplayers. Cumulative percentages up to eight years of professional Japanese baseball showed that 99.4% of foreign ballplayers ended their career compared to 44% of Japanese ballplayers. The Japanese ballplayers' career average of nine years of professional baseball compared to two years for foreign ballplayers was reflected in that the playing career of only 0.5% or 2 of 342 foreign ballplayers from 1996 to 2008 lasted long enough to play nine or more years of professional Japanese baseball compared to 56% or 494 of 964 Japanese ballplayers. This equates to a whopping 112 times comparatively longer difference of playing nine or more years of professional baseball in Japan for Japanese ballplayers.

Reasons for discrimination against foreign ballplayers

While sources have indicated that foreign ballplayers have wanted to remain on the team but were released, the circumstances of release for each foreign ballplayer are not known (Whiting, 1977; Kuehnert, 2001; Small, 2001; Graczyk, 2002b, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, 2005e, 2006b, 2008b, 2008c). Also the exact number who decided not to remain on the team or expressed a desire to stay on the team before being released is not known. And yet, a leading source integrally tied in with Japanese professional baseball in Japan for over 30 years, particularly having close ties with foreign ballplayers, conveyed to this author that over 90% of foreign ballplayers on Japanese professional baseball teams did not want to be released after the baseball season (Graczyk, 2006c). Succinctly, the data suggest that foreign ballplayers, particularly those who stand out by their visible physiological difference from dominant group Japanese ballplayers, have not been treated fairly in Japanese

professional baseball. A different standard, a standard that expects foreign ballplayers to play baseball better than Japanese ballplayers, has made it more difficult for foreign ballplayers to remain on the team compared to their Japanese teammates characterises their high release rates and short playing careers.

Foreign baseball players, and this mainly applies to non-Asian ballplayers, in Japanese professional baseball teams are expected to play baseball at a higher level than Japanese ballplayers and yet, at least in most recent times, there is no reason to expect that they would immediately perform better given that the baseball experience of foreign national and Japanese players is approximately the same. When the foreign ballplayer fails to meet an arbitrary high standard they are released, released even when they play better baseball than their Japanese teammates. About half of them do not make it past their first year and for the other half, the same high baseball performance level plus at least as good a performance as the year before applies each year thereafter or they are usually released. These very high drop-off rates mean that only a minuscule number last nine years, that being the average playing career of Japanese ballplayers. With extremely higher release rates and far shorter playing careers for foreign ballplayers compared to Japanese players from the very beginning of post-war baseball with no improvement over the years, one simply has to ask why.

A first and widely misconceived notion is that foreign ballplayers receive a much higher salary than Japanese ballplayers and thus it is profitable to release them. While there may be some merit to this argument in the past and overpaid foreign ballplayers have flopped in Japan, in recent times there is no significant salary difference between star Japanese and foreign ballplayers. Second, it is not profitable to release a ballplayer that has performed well because of a high salary, in fact, simple logic points to a greater possibility of losing money. Pressures are on the team should they release a ballplayer who has performed well to find another of equal ability and that means paying just as much money to get such a player and a player who has not yet proven himself with that team.

While release rates of foreign ballplayers were higher than those of Japanese ballplayers on each of the 12 professional baseball teams, there were variations among the teams themselves. One team had an extreme high average yearly release rate of 79% among foreign migrant ballplayers during the 1996 to 2008 baseball seasons while another team had a comparatively much lower average yearly release rate of 35%. While both of these teams had the same low average yearly release rate of Japanese ballplayers at 12%, the team with the highest average release rate of foreign national ballplayers was more than twice as high as that of the team with the lowest average yearly release rate. The range of foreign player release rates for the other 10 teams was between a low of 42% to a high of 65%, demonstrating different management policies towards foreign baseball players.

A very simple reason why discrimination against foreign ballplayers occurs in Japanese professional baseball is that baseball management finds that it can. The mass media, baseball players' associations and so on have not made much of an issue of discrimination against foreign ballplayers. Within Japan, it simply has

become accepted, just not considered to be anything important at all that foreign ballplayers do not last long in Japanese professional baseball. This contrasts greatly with the situation of Japanese ballplayers.

Baseball management is under pressure not to release Japanese players. The Japanese player is connected to a number of baseball and social networks (including his fan club), solidifying his standing within the team and the Japanese baseball world, all part of obligations that go back and forth between the player, these networks and his professional Japanese baseball team. The Japanese player develops more intimate close relationships with other Japanese professional baseball players, coaches and managers than do foreign ballplayers, escalating close ties within Japanese baseball the longer he plays, gluing together the player within the whole realm of Japanese professional baseball. And, the Japanese player's family, relatives, close friends from as far back as his childhood days, his former high-school baseball (extremely popular and powerful in Japan) teammates, manager and high school itself and people from his home town, they are all supportive, acting as a pressure valve against baseball management not to release the Japanese player from the team.

Among first-year ballplayers, the greatest difference of release rates and baseball performance was between Japanese rookies and the younger comparable age group of foreign rookie ballplayers. This is partly due to different contracts and expectations for foreign and Japanese rookie ballplayers. Japanese rookie ballplayers must play for the team that signed them for nine years, unless the team decides to trade them and that trade only to another Japanese professional baseball team. Ineligible for free agency for nine years, Japanese rookies do not have the option of playing for another team both in Japan and overseas. Only a very proven star such as Daisuke Matsuzaka, now a star with the Boston Red Sox, can find a way out of the nine-year commitment to play American baseball but even then, the American baseball team must pay a very large amount of money (US $51 million dollars for Matsuzaka) to the Japanese team to secure release of the player. Japanese rookies also are groomed to play many years on the same Japanese team and not expected to perform well immediately. In contrast, foreign ballplayers are expected to play well immediately and free to leave their team after their first year.

By far the least discriminate, if any at all, treatment of foreign ballplayers is towards ballplayers of Asian descent. Foreign ballplayers of Japanese descent are considered racially and culturally Japanese and relatives however distant live somewhere in Japan. Different from 'visible' foreign ballplayers, Chinese and more so Korean ballplayers are often permanent residents and many are or plan to be long-term residents. Also, compared to 'visible' foreign ballplayers, Asian ballplayers are racially and culturally closer to Japanese, are better speakers of Japanese and part of long-established ethnic communities within Japan. All of this leads to an expectation and selective perception of Japanese management, Japanese ballplayers and Japanese baseball fans that, regardless of the actual behaviour, ballplayers of Asian descent compared to 'visible' foreign ballplayers are more loyal and agreeable members of the team, less of a threat to cause disruptions and less likely to leave the team from a desire to return to their homeland.

We now turn to a different problem of inequality, extremely harsh working conditions and poverty among foreign migrant labourers. Racial/nationality stratification exists here as well with dominant group Japanese labourers at the top and variable stratification levels among foreign migrant labourer groups based on race, nationality and resident status in Japan. Discrimination characterises the work condition and situation of foreign migrant labourers although the main actors involved represent quite a different subset of foreign migrants far removed from the spotlight of the public's fascination with and entertainment by foreign baseball players.

Labourers

The far majority (about 90%) of foreign migrant workers in Japan are employed on a limited-term contract or work as day labourers (meaning that the period of employment is less than a month) (Komai, 2001; Aoki, 2006; Hassett, 2008b). Aoki (2006, pp 115-16) gives us a background to the influx and work situation of the largest single category of foreign migrant workers – those working in unskilled labour.

The number of legal and illegal foreign workers in Japan rapidly increased from the 1980s, reaching over 700,000 workers in 2000 (Aoki, 2006, p 115). The demand for foreign labour began from a dire labour shortage in small- and medium-sized manufacturing businesses during the economic upsurge in the 1980s. Japanese workers could not keep up with increased labour demands of manufacturing and other related industries, leading to recruiting foreign workers particularly for work at the bottom of the labour market in unskilled labour. Also, during this economic boom, the service industry expanded, increasing unskilled jobs in that industry. Japanese labourers turned to more lucrative and less physically demanding work in the service industry, creating an even larger vacancy in labour and low-rank service jobs that could only be filled by bringing in foreign workers.

Given a sporadic market, the labour need was for temporary workers and workers with a flexible work schedule, working during times of market demands and then through no choice of their own having hours reduced or let go during times of market downturns. The need called for unskilled, temporary, cheap waged and 3D (demanding, dirty and dangerous) work and foreigners fit the bill. In 2002, among 141,285 foreign workers directly hired by businesses, it is estimated that 72% were engaged in the so-called 3D physical work (Aoki, 2006, p 123). Furthermore, all of about 45,000 detected (and perhaps just as many if not more undetected) undocumented workers worked in physical labour; men laboured as construction or factory workers while the women worked in a dubious category of customer service or as waitresses, dishwashers and cooks (Aoki, 2006, p 123).

Foreign migrant labour is cheap, profitable for Japanese businesses. Most legal foreign labourers with a work visa and all ineligible (without a work visa or undocumented) workers are hired as temporary workers or on a part-time basis.

Companies save money not having to provide for and pay into benefit plans or pay for overtime (Aoki, 2006, pp 125-7).

There are stratification levels of labour employment among foreign migrant groups. The first criterion that sets them apart is their resident status in Japan. Koreans, Chinese and Japanese-South Americans have an advantage over other foreign migrant labourers. Koreans and Chinese have the largest proportion of foreign migrant groups with permanent residency. *Nikkeijin* (Japanese-Brazilian and Japanese-Peruvian) are officially granted special status as ethnic Japanese and given a residence visa without limitations of job employment. This allows for flexibility in employment since without permanent residency or a resident visa one cannot work in unskilled labour by law although, of course, many do. Still, permanent resident Koreans and Chinese and *Nikkeijin* labourers are at a lower stratification level compared to Japanese employed in labour as unskilled workers either as self-employed or contracted labourers in construction, manufacturing, transportation and service-related work.

Stratification of all foreign migrant labourers, documented and undocumented, relates to resident status, ethnic ties and networks in Japan, visible appearance, skills, cultural affinity (similarity of ethnic culture with Japanese culture) and cultural flexibility (willingness to adapt to Japanese culture). Based on these attributes, Aoki (2006, p 139) delineated a hierarchical stratification order among day labourers in the construction industry as follows: Japanese labourers are at the top followed in descending order by East Asians (Koreans and Chinese), South East Asians (Filipinos and Malaysians), West Asians (Iranians) and South Asians (Bangladeshis and Pakistanis). This stratification of day labourers results in variable job statuses and differences in income, as Aoki (2006, pp 138-9) noted:

> In the case of Japanese workers, although there are some differences depending on job categories, construction workers are usually employed in San'ya, Kotobukicho, Kumagasaki and other places by labour arrangers acting for the lowest-level subcontractor. Their work sites have a system under which they are treated as skilled workers and placed in positions superior to Koreans and Filipinos, below whom Iranian workers – who are effectively the lowest stratum – are used as general workers. The wages of Iranian workers are between 1,500 and 1,700 yen per day. Considering that Japanese workers earn at least 50,000 to 200,000 yen per month, the gap is astounding (these wage figures are from the 1980s and are considerably lower than present wage levels).

Foreign migrant day labourers also find it difficult to find any work at all. Particularly when work is thin on the ground, they are resented by Japanese day labourers that their jobs are being taken, and they are cut off from work contacts. Regardless, all day labourers foreign national or Japanese, are an underclass at the very bottom of the social, economic and occupational stratification ladder, work

and live in slum areas and are looked down upon as 'drifters', 'failures' or no-goods' although most are there through no fault of their own (Gill, 2001).

The sex trade and foreign female migrant sex workers

Given the large number of undocumented sex workers and the very 'shadowy' nature of the sex trade, no one is sure of the number of foreign female migrant sex workers, however estimates put the number somewhere in the region of 100,000 to 150,000 (Dubro and Kaplan, 2003; Bailey, 2006; Factbook on Global Sexual Exploitation, 2006). The work situation of the foreign female migrant sex worker is similar to that of the foreign migrant day labourer in that many work illegally. Most sex workers like day labourers also come from developing Asian countries, and both groups are extremely vulnerable to exploitation by their employer.

Foreign migrant female sex workers work in '*mizushobai*' districts and other smaller suburban and rural places of entertainment throughout Japan. They are associated with the underworld and engage in the same sex work as Japanese female sexual workers. They differ from Japanese female sex workers in that most work illegally, subjecting them to lower pay, harsher treatment and inferior work and living conditions. Foreign migrant female sex workers are the most exploited of all foreign migrant subgroups.

The foreign migrant sex trade in Japan has received wide attention by human rights groups. Particularly, trafficking of foreign women into Japan's sex trade has caused alarm in the international community and pressured the Japanese government to crack down on those involved and to offer assistance and protection for victims of trafficking. Trafficking of foreign sex workers has taken place from many foreign countries, most being brought into Japan from Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Columbia. While there are variations in the trafficking of sex workers, it is not known just how many women are trafficked and little is known of what becomes of them (see Roberts, 2003).

Stratification of sex workers

The work stratification of sex workers is similar to that of labourers, based on nationality and residence status. One should, however, keep in mind that foreign migrant female sex workers, like Japanese female sex workers, are largely from working-class families or relative to others in their own society they come from disadvantaged families. The Japanese female sex worker has rights of citizenship, numerous advantages (language, family, friends, protection etc) and is afforded a higher status than female foreign migrant sex workers and is the least exploited. In a descending stratification order from the least to the most exploited, Japanese female sex workers are followed by Koreans, Chinese, Filipinos and Thais. Koreans and Chinese have their own gangs in Japan and more established ethnic roots than sex workers from other countries. Filipinos are privy to entertainment visas and have a large number of intermarriages with Japanese men. Thai female sex

workers are at the bottom of the stratification order with the largest percentage of illegal sex workers and being most powerless over their fate.

There are sex workers of other nationalities but far fewer in number and relative newcomers to the sex trade compared to Korean, Chinese, Filipino and Thai sex workers. South American female sex workers, excepting those of Japanese descent, particularly a growing number of Columbian sex workers, are in a similar situation as sex workers from the Philippines and Thailand and engage in the same type of sex trade. Western and Eastern European women mainly work as club and bar hostesses, far fewer engaging in streetwalking or behind-the-scene prostitution than other foreign migrant sex workers. There are foreign migrant sex workers from Mexico, Indonesia and Malaysia but little is known about them.

The stratification of foreign migrant sex workers is based on conditions of their sex work and a somewhat difference in the type of sex trade they are involved in. It is not absolute and not necessarily separate as sex workers often work in the same clubs and bars although there tends to be a separation by nationality. Connections with the underworld also may cross Japanese and foreign gang lines, involving prostitution, scams and other illegal activity. An insight into the similarities and differences of their sex trade is briefly described below.

Korean and Chinese sex workers

Korean and Chinese sex workers ply the same sex trade as Japanese sex workers, many connected and protected by their own ethnic group gangs. There are both illegal and legal (permanent resident or having a visa and working as a hostess or masseur, the sex work itself disguised) sex workers and sex workers working alongside sex workers of different nationalities as well as working out of their own sex markets. While large entertainment districts in the major cities of Japan have been the focus of attention of foreign migrant sex workers, Korean and Chinese sex workers also ply their trade in the suburbs of Japan.

Korean and Chinese sex workers like all foreign migrant sex workers are 'foreign friendly': more accessible and willing to sell their services to foreign migrants than Japanese female sex workers who may be restricted by orders from pimps or employer to a 'Japanese-only' clientele. In the large entertainment districts, pimps offer 'visible' foreigners sex services in the guise of massage parlours with Korean and Chinese females. There are numerous such massage parlours with Chinese 'sexual massage workers' throughout Japan, and outside these places, Chinese female sex workers may approach prospective customers, including 'visible foreigners'. Korean and Chinese bars and clubs with hostesses are plentiful, with sexual services often available after the shop closes. There are concentrations of Koreans, Chinese as well as Thai, Filipino and Columbian streetwalkers not only near hotels in or close to entertainment districts but also located in various clandestine-type places throughout Japan.

Filipino sex workers

From the 1990s, somewhere in the range of 50-100,000 Filipino females each year have come to Japan on an entertainment visa, usually good for six months. Other Filipino females, as with all foreign migrant sex workers, come on a student, cultural or tourist visa although their purpose of stay in Japan is that of a sex worker (Bailey, 2006; Louis, 2004). Filipino females are particularly popular working as hostesses at karaoke drinking establishments, young attractive females with beautiful voices bringing in many customers. Quite often they hook up with a 'sugar daddy' and many marry Japanese men.

While some Filipino entertainers work as musicians, cultural dancers and in other forms of entertainment, most on an entertainment visa end up as sex workers, the far majority working as hostesses. Many also overstay their visa and end up undocumented sex workers, putting them in a precarious and exploited position.

Thai sex workers

While trafficking of sex workers in Japan involves women from the Philippines, Columbia, Taiwan and China, South Korea and more recently Indonesia and Eastern Europe, Thailand has long been a primary source for the trafficking of sex workers to Japan (*Columbia Daily Tribune*, 2005; Silver, 2006). About 50% of Thai females in Japan are undocumented or illegal migrants, most of whom are sex workers (Komai, 2001, p 29; *Columbia Daily Tribune*, 2005). The proportion of Thai female sex workers to the total number of Thai foreign female migrants in Japan is much greater compared to the same proportional difference of any other foreign migrant group. Thai sex workers can be found not just in the large cities but also in suburban and rural areas working and living within the confines of a bar and club owned and operated by Japanese staff.

Western and Eastern European sex workers

Lisa Louis (2004), a former American hostess in Japan for many years, observed that while Western hostesses are treated as 'foreign play things', they have it much better than *japayuki-san* (women from poor countries, mostly Asians working in Japan's entertainment districts). The hiring of Western hostesses is also more upfront than sex workers from other countries, advertisements for Western hostesses placed in the job advertisement section of English language newspapers in Japan. And, as in the case of Lisa Louis, they freely choose to work as hostesses as it offers more money and opportunity to get ahead than teaching English conversation.

Both Western and Eastern European women work as hostesses in the high-class clubs located in such areas as Roppongi in the Tokyo area, a hot spot catering to foreigners and up-scale Japanese, although increasingly more are finding work in suburbia Japan. In fact, any city with a sizeable population in Japan today is likely

to have Western and Eastern European women working as hostesses in clubs and bars. The *mizushobai* is increasingly becoming more international.

An insight into the internationalisation of the *mizushobai* is presented here based on observations of a *mizushobai* district in a suburban city a little more than an hour's express train ride south of Tokyo (also see Yoder, 2004). Down the backstreets of the *mizushobai*, clubs advertise their Western and Eastern European hostesses, signs and sometimes photographs of the foreign hostesses placed near the club entrance. One club has photographs advertising their Russian hostesses and two blocks away a billboard with exotic drawings of Eastern European women advertises these women as dancers and available hostesses for a given price. There are both small and large Filipino bars and clubs in different parts of the *mizushobai*. According to a Japanese hostess in the area, the Filipino bars and clubs are 'foreign friendly', foreigners are not allowed into bars and clubs with Japanese hostesses and instead are directed to Filipino bars and clubs. There are Korean bars and numerous Japanese bars, clubs and various sex shops such as voyeur shops in which for a certain price a customer is allowed to take near total nude photographs of advertised young women in costumes of various sorts and disguised massage parlours or bars that actually provide sexual services.

Louis (2004) pointed out that the sex trade is no more exploitative than the other main line of work open for Western women in Japan – that of teaching English conversation – and the money is much better. Quite a few foreign migrant club hostesses particularly from the Philippines, Korea, China and Western countries are educated beyond a high-school education. However, given little opportunity for women particularly foreign migrant females to make a good living in Japan and exploitation in any line of work, the sex trade appears not to be such a bad choice. Louis (2004, p 172) summed up the situation of such available work:

> As long as Japan has a powerful economy and an entertainment business, there will be hostesses and entertainers from abroad crossing over to its shores. Japan's odd mixture of xenophobia and fascination with foreigners has made a sometimes tragic but important addition to its *mizu shobai* culture.

Intermarriage and assimilation

Assimilation through marriage is quite frequent among Asian female sex workers and Japanese males. While a number of Asian women, particularly Filipino women, are mail (and now email) order brides many Asian women meet their Japanese man through the sex trade – and that insures they can legally remain in-country. Over 100,000 Asian females mainly involving Filipino, Chinese and Thai females are on a spouse visa in Japan by intermarriage with Japanese men, many of these marriages able to take place because of the sex trade.

The comparatively high intermarriage with Asian women not just at home but also in Asian countries by Japanese males contrasts to the opposite whereby

Japanese females have a higher intermarriage rate with Western men. This reflects on inequality in general and is but another means of reinforcing the myth of 'racial homogeneity'. Japanese male marriages with Asian foreign females usually result in the spouse and their children living in Japan while in the case of Japanese females marriages with Western men most commonly she and her children live in her husband's country. Since children of Japanese men and Asian women blend in by 'physical appearance' with Japanese and the children take on his name, the child passes as Japanese. This is not so for Japanese female marriages with Western men. In these marriages, the children recognisably stand out in physical appearance as of a different phenotype and are labelled as 'half.' Discrimination against these marriages and their children partially accounts for the decision not to live in Japan, further contributing to the myth of racial homogeneity since most of these children are not in-country.

Inequality of Western-Japanese children

The post-war history of so-called '*hafu*' (half breed), more appropriately called American-Japanese, French-Japanese or even Western-Japanese children, in Japan is a sad story. Outside of the entertainment world where quite a few have made it as singers, dancers, television and movie actors there are few success stories for this subordinate subcultural group in Japan. Up until the 1960s, most of these children were the result of sexual liaisons between American soldiers and Japanese females. During the early post-war years, thousands of American-Japanese children were abandoned in Japan and ended up in secluded orphanages (Hemphill, 1980). From 1946 through the 1960s, over 1,500 Western-Japanese children were put up in the Sander's home, a segregated orphan community of Western-Japanese children located in Oiso, Kanagawa prefecture (Hemphill, 1980, p 125). Soon these children were met with hostility by the Japanese community. In 1952, when the first children became of school age, the Oiso PTA objected to their attendance at the local public school, forcing Miki Sawada, the matron who established and ran the orphanage, to build her own school for them within the confines of the orphanage (Hemphill, 1980, p 96). Widespread prejudice and discrimination against Western-Japanese children throughout Japan and feeling they would never be accepted in Japanese society, led to displacement mainly through adoption overseas, the largest number placed in American families (Strong, 1978; Hemphill, 1980; Yoder, 1983). In 1962, Miki Sawada bought 350 acres of land in the Amazons of Brazil, where a community of Western-Japanese was eventually established (Hemphill, 1980, pp 140-3).

In post-war Japan, there are cases after cases of Japanese rejection and humiliating treatment of Western-Japanese that have led to identity problems, deviant behaviour and even suicide (Strong, 1978; Hemphill, 1980; Yoder, 1983). While the situation of Western-Japanese children has improved over time, mainly in that from the 1970s few of these children have been abandoned by their parent(s) and spouses are mainly from the middle class, Western-Japanese children are still

called '*hafu*' or even '*gaijin*' (visibly recognisable foreigner), singled out as 'different' from Japanese children. The preference for most parents has been to send their children to international schools in Japan or even back to their home country for education and/or leave Japan.

Inequality and education

Inequality of education among foreign migrant groups is a reflection of subordinate pluralism. Inequality ties in with nationality because compulsory education does not apply to foreign migrants, only to Japanese nationals, freeing the state from the burden of insuring that foreign migrants get at least a basic nine-year education. Ethnic schools have sprung up in an attempt to preserve 'ethnic culture' but have not been recognised as 'official' schools, making it difficult for graduates to transfer into Japanese schools. And, while foreign migrants are encouraged to attend Japanese schools, because there is no obligation that they do attend school and the state does not have responsibility for it, not much has been done to assist their integration into Japanese society through education. These and other problems of education facing foreign migrants differ in degree and kind for each foreign migrant group. We begin with Koreans.

Koreans

Koreans nearly match the Japanese average of close to 12.5 years of completed education (Sugimoto, 2003, p 201). However, Korean parents wanting to maintain their Korean heritage and language through the education of their children at Korean schools have not been supported by Japanese school officials. Korean schools are not officially recognised as bona fide educational institutions in Japan, blocking state educational assistance and making it difficult for Korean students to transfer to Japanese schools.

Mentioned earlier, nearly all ethnic Korean schools are operated by the General Association of Korean residents in Japan, or Chongryun, with close ties to North Korea. There are more than 100 elementary and middle schools, 12 high schools and one university operated by Chongryun, with a student population estimated to be somewhere in the range of 10 to 20% of all school-aged Korean residents in Japan (Fukuoka, 2000, pp 25-6). All classes are conducted in Korean, focused on instilling an appreciation and awareness of and identity with Korean culture among students. Koreans schools, however, are not accredited by the Japanese Ministry of Education, making it difficult for students to transfer to Japanese secondary schools. Students who graduate from Korean high schools in Japan are not allowed to take public and national university entrance examinations, effectively blocking their entrance and even some private universities close their doors to graduates of Korean high schools.

Korean students at Korean schools have been the target of psychological and physical abuse in Japan. One survey at a Korean secondary school indicated that

about 20% or 522 of 2,700 students had been harassed by Japanese (Hankyoreh, 2006). Particularly, Korean females are vulnerable targets since they wear the traditional Korean dress, the *Chima Chogori*, to their Korean schools. Called the *Chima Chogori* incidents, Korean female students have been targets of verbal abuse and even knife attacks ripping their Korean dress in public places (*The People's Korea*, 1997; Hankyoreh, 2006). It is not uncommon for them to be stared and laughed at when wearing the *Chima Chogori* (Williams, 2007b).

The mass media contributes to violence against Korean students. Sensationalised top-story headlines in print and numerous programmes on the television have extensively covered past abductions of Japanese by North Koreans and recent test firing of nuclear missiles. This has created a very negative image of North Korea in Japan, with repercussions against Korean schools and the students who attend them. Following exaggerated negative reporting on North Korea, there have been hundreds of attacks on Korean students, threatening telephone calls and flagrant damages to the schools (Hankyoreh, 2006; *The Japan Times*, 2006c, p 3; Williams, 2007a).

Korean students at Japanese public schools are confronted with problems of identity. The Commission on Human Rights (2006) reported that among Korean students at Japanese schools, 86% of elementary-school and 91% of secondary-school students use a Japanese name to avoid discrimination. Fukuoka (2000) wrote in detail about identity problems confronting young Koreans in Japan, the shame of hiding one's Korean identity and fear should their Korean identity be discovered at school. Some eventually come out and disclose their Korean nationality while others never do, fearing that disclosure will hurt their chances for a successful job career. All are conscious of their Korean heritage, with conflicting feelings and identification of self as being 'Korean' or being 'Japanese'. Upon graduation from high school or college, they are also confronted with whether or not to naturalise, naturalisation offering a better chance to integrate into Japanese society. Partially, from the relative ease of naturalisation for Koreans given that most are permanent residents, Koreans have the highest rate of naturalisation among all foreign migrant groups even though that means distancing themselves from the Korean community and its heritage.

Japanese Brazilians

As recent migrants to Japan, Japanese-Brazilian students are deficient in Japanese language skills and, many parents, wanting their children to maintain a Brazilian way of life, send their children to attend Brazilian schools in Japan (Yamanaka, 2003; Kamiya, 2008c). There is about an equal split among Japanese-Brazilian school-aged children who attend Brazilian and those who attend Japanese public schools (Kamiya, 2008c). However, while about half of approximately 100 Brazilian schools in Japan are accredited by the Brazilian government, few are given official school status by the Japanese government, disallowing official completion of compulsory education and making them ineligible for local and state assistance and funding

(Kamiya, 2008c; *The Japan Times*, 2009a, p 14). Without public subsidies, costs at these schools are expensive, contributing to a high rate of children who do not attend school at all (Ardou, 2007b; Kamiya, 2008c).

Predominately of the working class, Japanese-Brazilian parents find it financially very difficult to send their children to Brazilian schools. Given little government help in providing Japanese language and educational assistance and financial aid to attend Japanese public schools, Japanese-Brazilians experience high drop-out rates and a young population who cannot speak Portuguese or Japanese very well (*The Japan Times*, 2007a, p 3). Ardou (2007b, p 16) stated that 'Between 20 and 40% of [Japanese-] Brazilian children in Japan are not attending school at all. More than 10,000 [Japanese-] Brazilian kids are estimated to have dropped out of school, or never entered in the first place.' The result is a low level of completed education and class reproduction: children like their parents end up as factory workers, some as young as 13 years old (*The Japan Times*, 2007a, p 3; Ardou, 2007b; Kamiya, 2008c).

Chinese

Similar to Koreans, although on a smaller scale, there are Chinese schools from kindergarten through high school catering to established Chinese migrant communities in Yokohama and the Kansai area. Lessons are taught in Chinese; the school brings about an appreciation of cultural heritage and bolsters identity as Chinese. While these schools face the same problem of accreditation as Korean schools, to my knowledge, students have not been harassed in public nor have there been any attacks on the schools.

Most Chinese migrants attend Japanese private and public schools and Chinese students from longstanding permanent resident families have attained an educational level on a par with the Japanese. The main problem facing Chinese migrants is education of the most recent migrants, the overseas Chinese, given the family's working-class condition and little public educational assistance for their children. Class reproduction through education, characteristic of Japanese-Brazilians, occurs here as well because children of overseas Chinese are of the working class; along with poor Japanese language skills and cultural incongruity they attain a low level of education, thereby continuing a family working-class cycle.

International schools

In Japan, there are 58 listed international schools from kindergarten through high school, some quite expensive catering to the children of the more wealthy foreign migrants (International Schools, 2007). Most of these schools are conducted in English based on an American model of education, and students from all nationalities including Japanese, many who have lived overseas, attend these schools. There are also a few universities, the most notable International Christian University and Sophia University, where courses in special departments within

the university are taught in English and foreign migrants may major in a number of degrees comparable to an American university. Students at these international schools and universities represent a small minority of foreign migrants, most are not long-term residents and for the most part live a life outside of mainstream Japanese society.

Foreign migrants at Japanese schools

The majority of foreign migrant students attend Japanese schools. They face many problems of adaptation, particularly language. Foreign students have been bullied, standing out as being different from Japanese (Fitch, 2005). Koreans, however, have avoided discrimination at Japanese schools: by adopting Japanese names and being fluent in Japanese they have been able to pass as Japanese.

There is an inadequate amount of funding or assistance in acquiring Japanese language or help with adjustment problems for children of foreign migrants (Fitch, 2005, Burgess, 2006; Ardou, 2007b). The high costs of an international education are beyond the means of most foreign migrants and so are the high costs of private schools, tutoring and cram schools. Many foreign migrant parent(s) are not much help in assisting their children in their studies, having a low level of education and/or not being proficient in the Japanese language. Foreign migrants occupy the bottom of the social stratification hierarchy and, with little public and private help in education for their children, fall below the national average of completed education, contributing to a social reproduction of class.

Human Rights Commission report on discrimination in Japan

Discrimination, an indicator of inequality, received main attention in the most publicised writing on minorities in Japan, a report to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights by special envoy Mr Doudou Diene. Mr Diene, with local support, conducted an in-depth survey of Japanese national minorities Burakumin and Ainu and foreign migrants in Japan during different time periods in 2005 and 2006.

Based on his findings, Diene concluded that: 'All surveys and indicators point to the fact that minorities live in a situation of marginalization and economic and social vulnerability, in the fields of employment, housing, marriage, pensions, health and education' (Commission on Human Rights, 2006, p 18). Minorities in Japan are discriminated against from a lack of political representation at all levels of government, the public's ignorance about Japanese xenophobia and racism against minorities and powerlessness of minorities to do anything about racial discrimination because there are no specific laws against it (Commission on Human Rights, 2006, pp 18-19). A list of 24 recommendations was submitted to the Japanese government to improve on the inequalities of minorities. These recommendations called for:

- passing a national law against racism, discrimination and xenophobia;
- establishment of a national commission for equality and human rights of minorities;
- revision of school textbooks along with greater coverage by the media to accurately portray in an objective and accurate manner the history, condition and problems facing minorities and the multicultural contribution of minorities to Japanese society.

The report also recommended that minorities be given political representation and that Korean schools should receive public funding and assistance and be accredited.

Supportive of Mr Diene's report, there have been numerous accounts of racism, nationalism or whatever appropriate discriminatory term against all foreign migrant groups in Japan (Ardou, 2004, 2008a, 2008b; Murphy, 2007; Weiner, 2009; see also Appendix B). Asians and Japanese-Brazilians speak of exclusion and visible minorities of racism and both cite xenophobia as the basis of discrimination. While there is disagreement as to what foreign migrant group is discriminated against the most in some form of nationality or racial stratification order, there is agreement among foreign migrants that the subject is taboo among Japanese and that Japanese deny that racial or any other form of discrimination takes place in Japan.

A main problem of Mr Diene's report and other works addressing the problem of minorities in Japan is that discrimination also has a class dimension, the working class of all foreign migrant groups the most affected and the least heard. Furthermore, discrimination in public places, housing and services rendered often depends on the foreign migrants' 'visibility' and cultural incongruity, particularly Japanese language ability. Finally, aside from legal discrimination or to use a more neutral term 'legal impediments', discrimination varies widely throughout Japan, some places and people more 'foreign friendly' than others.

Counterargument

Dr William Wetherall, a prolific writer and long-term resident of Japan, whom I consider to be without a doubt the world's leading authority on minorities in Japan, wrote a 'counter report' to the much-publicised *Mission to Japan* report submitted to the Commission on Human Rights (Wetherall, 2006). Wetherall's work contrasts if not in opposition to Debito Arudou. Mr Arudou, a former American naturalised as Japanese, is well known among the foreign community in Japan as a minority rights activist with a great deal of writings and a prolific website. Arudou assisted Mr Diene with his United Nations report during his time in Japan. While I disagree with some of Wetherall's criticisms, he clearly identifies important counter points and gives a different perspective of discrimination against minorities in Japan than that of the United Nations report.

In the *Mission to Japan* report, constant reference was made that Japan did not have a law against racial discrimination. Wetherall noted that while Article 14 in

the Japanese constitution does not outlaw racial discrimination, it does prohibit it and is a law that can be acted upon. Discrimination such as signs in front of establishments barring foreigners from entering is a clear sign of racial or as Wetherall prefers to say 'national' discrimination in violation of Article 14. If someone contested against this discriminatory practice it would be upheld in a court of law.

Wetherall agrees that an anti-discrimination law is needed in Japan but his report differs from Mr Diene's report in how such a law should be worded. An anti-discrimination law should be based on nationality, not race or ethnic group. Being Japanese, for example, is a civil status, not a racial one, race is not annotated on the family register that, like a birth certificate in the US, validates a person's nationality and anyone who naturalises becomes Japanese national, a civil status with no official record indicating race or ethnicity. Race today has become 'politicised' internationally and race politics itself is discriminatory since race makes no sense: all races are mixed. Wetherall suggests that an anti-discrimination law should state that no person be allowed to use race or ethnicity for the purpose of obtaining preferential treatment.

Wetherall argues that a mass media bias neglecting subcultural diversity of minorities stated in Mr Diene's report is erroneous, wondering just what newspapers, magazines, books, television programmes and movies were based on this assumption. To the contrary, Wetherall noted that the mass media in Japan is quite diverse, providing the public with many viewpoints about people in different countries and of a pluralistic way of life among minorities in Japan.

Many of Wetherall's (2006) criticisms against the *Mission to Japan* report concerned Korean foreign migrants. Diene reported that two million Koreans were forced to work as war-time labourers in Japan. This is wrong since about half of the pre-war two million Koreans voluntarily came to Japan. Voluntary Korean migrants decided to remain in Japan after the war while most of the forced labourers returned to Korea. Today, the majority of Koreans and their descendants in Japan were not brought to Japan involuntarily as labourers.

Wetherall pointed out, unlike Diene's report, that Koreans do not use Japanese names solely to avoid discrimination, they adopt them for a variety of reasons such as wanting to identify as Japanese. Contrary to the report, bullying of Korean students is not endemic to just Korean students: Japanese and other foreign migrant students are bullied as well. The same mistake was made in the United Nations report, which cited past discrimination against Koreans in the national pension system; that system applied to all foreign migrants. Finally, in regards to discriminate treatment in education regarding non-accreditation and denial of government funding of Korean schools, Wetherall questions why the government should give accreditation and fund schools that identify with North Korea and teach its students an anti-Japanese view of history.

While I disagree with Wetherall on job security in that job security seems to be just as much if not more of a nationality/race issue than non-permanent residency, still his point is well taken in regards to work and the residency status

of foreign migrants in Japan. In response to the United Nations report that the majority of foreigners working in Japan have no job security, Wetherall (2006, p 72) stated: 'Since the vast majority of foreigners in Japan are not permanent residents, they have yet to establish Japan as the place where they intend to live permanent. Why should they have job security – when many Japanese do not have job security?' Lost in the both Diene's report and Wetherall's counterargument is the significance of Japan's past caste society. Before minority ethnicity was an issue at all, Tokugawa Japan featured much the same subordinate structural constraints on its own people as that faced by foreign migrants from the Meiji era up to the present day. In post-war Japan the large influx of foreign migrants from a multitude of countries whereby most upon arrival in-country do not speak Japanese nor are they familiar with the culture poses a difficult problem of adaptation. The precedence is a pluralistic subordinate class position or finding a niche for foreign migrants given these circumstances and needs of Japanese society. Certainly, government's policies and dominant cultural group treatment of foreign migrants are discriminatory but the problem lies within the framework of a pluralistic subordinate minority status and limited-term accommodation and solutions perhaps are better approached in a cultural relativistic manner within that framework.

Discussion so far has shown that sources after sources point to the same problems of inequality confronting foreign migrants in Japan. Before proceeding to deviance as a consequence of inequality, an encapsulation of the subordinate minority status of foreign migrants is summed up.

Barriers to adaptation

The fate of foreign migrants is under the jurisdiction of the dominant culture group, particularly the dominant subculture group. The dominant subculture group occupy and control the top positions in government, business, education, the legal domain, social and cultural affairs and so on that sets the tone, opportunities and conditions for life among foreign migrants in Japan. The mass media is heavily influenced by dominant subcultural group officials and leaders, a mass media that has sensationalised foreign crime, influencing public fear and creating a negative image of foreigners. Numerous featured articles in *The Japan Times*, scholarly reports and even a website have written about the distortion of official statistics and sensational reporting of crime by foreign migrants in the mass media, misleading the public into believing that foreigners are prone to criminal behaviour (Kerr, 2001; Botting, 2003; Ardou, 2004, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007f; Joseph, 2006; Kobayashi; 2006; Zha, 2006; Hassett, 2007, 2008a; Schreiber, 2007).

Botting (2003, p 14) gives us an insight on the sensationalization of foreign crimes by the Japanese press.

> The National Police Agency (NPA) had released report on crime statistics for 2002, a large part of which stressed crimes committed

> by foreigners. The report was picked up by nearly all the major news organizations, many of which printed stories and editorials to the effect that: "A surge in crime committed by foreigners helped push up Japan's crime rate to a record level."

Botting (2003, p 14) then examined the actual number of criminal cases among foreigners for 2002. Not only was the number of crimes inflated by including visa violations as a crime, a crime only foreigners are liable for, but that foreigners actually only accounted for 1.2 percent of all crimes.

While methodologically it is difficult to assess the direct and long-term effect of the mass media on public opinion, one identifiable problem is that the mass media marks 'foreign crimes' as a separate entity from that of Japanese crimes. The crimes are reported as crimes of a Peruvian, Chinese, an American Marine, illegal entrants, or more generally 'foreign crimes' (*The Japan Times*, 2005c, p 2, 2005d, p 2, 2008a, p 1, 2008b, p 2; Zha, 2006; Ardou, 2007a, 2007c; Wallace, 2007). This contributes to xenophobia, fear and expectations that crime is more likely to occur by foreigners than Japanese.

Tight social and legal controls over foreign migrants have persisted throughout the post-war era, courts upholding the status quo. Institutionalised discrimination of foreign migrants is most evident in employment and education and at the social level is seen in refusal of services afforded to Japanese and differential treatment in interpersonal relations.

Inequality and subordinate pluralism create for lack of a better term a limited-term accommodation of foreign migrants. Discrimination against foreign migrants exists in all job categories from Japanese professional baseball to labour. In whatever field of work, foreign migrants occupy a subordinate position to dominant group Japanese regardless of how well they do their job. They are put on a tight leash, expected to stay in Japan for a limited time period. Difficulty in obtaining long-term employment and visa work restrictions contribute to a large number of undocumented workers.

Educational opportunities of foreign migrants are subordinate to dominant group Japanese. Compulsory education does not apply to foreign migrants, severely limiting state support and financial assistance, particularly needed given the language barrier and working-class conditions of foreign migrants. Very few ethnic schools are recognised or accredited and the far majority of these schools receive no state support, inhibiting transition into Japanese society and preservation of ethnic culture. On the interpersonal level, psychological and physical abuse of foreign students, particularly Korean students at Korean schools, is a constant reminder to foreign migrant children of their subordinate position in Japanese society.

Acquiring statehood protects the notion of 'racial homogeneity' separating foreign migrants from Japanese nationals. Children of foreign migrants born in-country are not given Japanese nationality, reproducing foreign migrant status. Intermarriage of Japanese males predominately is with Asian females, their

children taking on the father's name, racially indistinguishable from Japanese. Overwhelmingly, children physically recognisable as non-Japanese in appearance are the result of intermarriage between Japanese women and Western males. A disruption to the idea of racial homogeneity, these children are labelled as 'half', an oddity, and most of these children reside in their father's homeland.

Naturalisation not only is difficult to obtain, requiring long-term residence and other stringent requirements, but given that the far majority of foreign migrants are employed on limited-term contracts along with other barriers to assimilation, it limits the pool of qualified applicants. The one group least affected by barriers to naturalisation are Korean migrants, most either former citizens or descendants of parents, grandparents or now great grandparents who were once Japanese citizens only to lose that status in post-war Japan in exchange for a special permanent residence. Koreans, by far, are the largest number of naturalised Japanese citizens. Physically indistinguishable from Japanese, proficient in the Japanese language and socioculturally the most assimilated of any foreign migrant group, naturalised Koreans easily blend into Japanese society, their heritage unknown to the public as most take on a Japanese name.

Identity

Discrimination reinforces the stereotypical 'image' of foreigners among the dominant cultural group. Whether it be an English language instructor or labourer, the foreigner is seen as different and a temporary resident of Japanese society. That legal barriers and job discrimination contribute to the foreign migrant's temporary resident status is hidden from the public, not a cognisant reason for their early departures; foreigners come and go that is just the way it is. Foreign migrants' work status and occupations are outside of the mainstream, they more or less live and maintain close ties among themselves and outside of Koreans and less so Chinese and Filipinos, they do not speak Japanese well, furthering a stereotype of them as different incapable of assimilation into Japanese society.

Identity is influenced by the roles we play in everyday life (Deutsch and Krauss, 1965, p 181). For the working population of foreign migrants, identity changes come about from expectations of how others perceive their occupational roles and the inculcation of that perception by the acting out of the job itself (Henslin, 2004, pp 96-7; see also Bueno and Caesar, 2003, on role playing by native-speaking English language teachers). Ironically, the ascribed occupational roles assigned to foreign migrants become a part of their self-image in Japan. They are encouraged to 'play their role' as an English conversation teacher, foreign hostess, factory line worker or ethnic food cook; that is who they are and in a dramaturgical manner, the better they play out their role the more acceptable they become essential to protecting their livelihood in Japan. Playing the role well and 'siding with the dominant group' offer the best potential for moving up the social mobility ladder within one's prescribed occupational category.

Foreigners holding middle-level job positions as administrators in language schools, tenured college instructors, senior hostesses, factory managers, chief ethnic cooks and so on act as role models, diverting attention away from inequality. That those in charge, the dominant group, allow but a minimum number of foreigners to ever reach a middle-level position of authority is obscured by the conscious recognition that, as played out by their foreign role models, 'getting ahead' requires obedience to authority, going along with the status quo and acting in one's own interest and that often means siding with the dominant group over other foreigners.

Stereotypes of foreigners differ in degree and kind but at the least create an awareness of how self is viewed by dominant group others. The English language teacher immediately becomes aware of 'being identified' as an American, a Brit, an Aussie, someone who is different than Japanese (McVeigh, 2003). The opposite occurs for Japanese-Brazilians who are seen and expected to be Japanese by virtue of their 'blood' or 'lineage'. All foreign migrants are stereotyped based on nationality/race and 'stereotypical' work, with Thais and Filipino females viewed as working in the entertainment world, Middle Easterners seen as 'illegal's' and labourers and so on. Also, the effect of stereotyping on self-identity depends on their 'visibility' and thus ability to pass whether or not they wish to. There is a fascination and interest in foreign migrants among dominant group Japanese for various reasons but stereotyping creates animosity and estrangement although individuals vary in the way they react to and inculcate that 'label' on to their identity.

The link between inequality and deviance

We now turn to the link between inequality and deviance. Discrimination as one measure of inequality equates with deviance. Discrimination also is a feature of subordinate minority status, embedded in laws and practices. The most publicised deviant behaviour is crime closely related to inequality.

Consistently in this new millennium about half of the crimes of foreign migrants are violations of immigration law, mainly overstaying their visa or working without a 'working visa'. Deviance here is directly attributed to inequality or that 'unskilled workers' are not permitted a visa to work in Japan and yet there has been a dire need for 'unskilled labour' in small- and medium-sized service, manufacturing, construction and agricultural companies.

The labour shortage since the 1980s has prompted training programmes to bring large numbers of foreign unskilled labourers to Japan, not for training as advertised but to work as unskilled labourers. Trainees through the years have become undocumented workers; more recently from 2002 to 2006 about 10,000 trainees overstayed their visa, illegally working in Japan (Ardou, 2007d).

Labour jobs are needed and foreign labour is cheap, much cheaper than Japanese labour, with many foreigners willing and available to do it. The result is that students, mostly Chinese working illegally either in violation of their student visa status or from overstaying their visa, trainees and foreign migrants from

developing countries illegally work in unskilled labour. Without the availability of such work, few would violate their visa provisions and if a visa status was available for 'unskilled labour', particularly if transferable from any visa status in-country, there would not be nearly as many violations of the immigration law. Since these violations are crimes, without such violations the number of crimes committed by foreigners would be reduced by about half.

Komai (2001, p 104) recognised that crimes in violation of immigration law are an institutionalised feature of inequality, denying the right to work for individuals such as undocumented workers who have settled in Japan. He (Komai, 2001, p 104) stated: 'the phenomena of foreign crime serves to underline the importance of granting some form of phased legality, based on the degree of settlement'.

Crime statistics

There is a host of methodological problems in comparing crime between foreign migrants in Japan and Japanese. First, there are no reliable self-reported rates of crimes by Japanese or foreign migrants. Second, crimes reported to the police have the inherent flaw of the person or persons reporting the crime not knowing if the person reportedly committing crime was Japanese (Koreans or Chinese for example can pass as Japanese) or if they thought it was a foreigner, not knowing the person's nationality. Finally, the number of reported crimes ending in arrests has dropped considerably in recent years, well below 50%, further putting in doubt the authenticity of the crimes reported to the police as well as police efficiency. Given these problems and limited availability of accurate crime statistics, leaves us with police arrests as an indicator of foreign crime. One should keep in mind, however, that police arrests reflect more on the politics and logistics of the National Police Agency than any actual crime rate, given that the police are instructed to pay attention to certain crimes and not others and are stationed in certain areas of the population and not other areas.

There are other problems aside from police arrests when comparing crime between foreigners and Japanese. First, what exactly is the population of foreign migrants? Excluding traffic offences and special offences (mainly violations of immigration law), if we include estimates of undocumented foreign migrants and foreign visitors to Japan along with foreign residents, this being the total number of all foreigners in Japan, the foreign criminal arrest rate using statistics in 2004 at 2.6 (per 1,000) is lower than the Japanese criminal arrest rate at 3 (per 1,000) (Japan Reference, 2004; *Hanzai Hakusho*, 2005; Population Census, 2005). Taking away undocumented workers and visitors and including only foreign registered residents of Japan, the foreign criminal arrest rate at 5.8 (per 1,000) is higher than the Japanese rate. However, in 2008, the crime rate for Penal Code offences among registered foreign migrants went down from 5.8 (per 1,000) in 2004 to 3.7 (per 1,000) while the Japanese rate went up slightly at 3.2 (per 1,000) (*Hanzai Hakusho*, 2009). And, what about age differences between the two populations since youth

have higher arrest rates than adults? Regardless, there is little if any significant difference of police arrests for criminal acts between foreigners and Japanese.

A main difference of crimes committed equates with inequality. There is a significant difference of the types of crime people are arrested for. Dominant group Japanese are more likely to be arrested for white-collar crime (crimes of the higher class) while foreign migrants are more likely to be arrested for property crimes, crimes associated with the working class.

The very limited power of foreign migrants equates to a real difference of white-collar crime or the old adage that 'power corrupts' applies mainly to dominant group Japanese, not foreign migrants. While the mass media highlights white-collar crime of Japanese government officials, actual arrests represent an extremely small number of white-collar crimes committed by those in positions of power. Particularly overlooked are white-collar crimes of high-level bureaucrats. Kerr (2001, p 141) stated this well:

> The sad reality is that the Japanese bureaucracy thrives on shady money; in small ways by cadging extra expenses with falsified travel reports; in larger ways by accepting bribes from businessmen and as favors from organized crime. Shady money is the oil that greases the wheels of Japan's smooth-running relationship between the bureaucracy and business, and that features in the expensive practice of *settai* [corporate wining and dining of public officials to gain favors that may involve gifts of money, free golf membership etc].

Class differences are reflected in official crime rates. Comparing criminal arrests in 2004 and 2008 of major offences for foreign migrants and Japanese indicates the types of crimes most likely to end in arrest for both groups (*Hanzai Hakusho*, 2005, 2009). There are no substantial differences in murder, blackmail, fraud, swindling and rape. Both Japanese and foreign migrants have approximately the same proportion of arrests for these major offences and they are of a low proportion within their own groups. However, 86% of crimes in 2004 and 83% in 2008 resulting in arrests for foreign migrants were property crimes compared to only 62% in 2004 and 51% in 2008 of arrests for these same crimes among Japanese (*Hanzai Hakusho*, 2005, 2009). Conversely, 31% of arrests in 2004 and 19% of arrests in 2008 for major offences among Japanese involved embezzlement, a white-collar crime, compared to only 8% in 2004 and 5% in 2008 among foreign migrants (*Hanzai Hakusho*, 2005, 2009). Succinctly, looking at major offences and arrests within the two groups, foreign migrants have higher arrest rates for crimes attributed to the lower class (property crimes) while Japanese have higher arrest rates associated with the higher class (white-collar crimes).

Particularly telling among foreign migrant groups are high arrest rates of Chinese foreign migrants in 2004 and a high rate of youth offences being sent to the family court; adjudication represents a serious disposition following an arrest or guidance, for Japanese-Brazilians. In 2004, among all foreign migrants,

Chinese migrants accounted for 41.4% of criminal arrests excluding traffic and public morals offences, a high rate given a population of only 24.7% among registered foreign migrants (*Hanzai Hakuso*, 2005, p 140). In 2004, Japanese-Brazilians accounted for 36.6% and in 2008 28.2% of youth offences sent to the family court, the highest rate among all other foreign migrant groups, and more than twice the proportion expected given a population of about 14% (in both time periods) of all foreign migrants (*Hanzai Hakusho*, 2005, p 192, 2009, p 167; Chung, 2010, p 5). Quite a few other sources also point out troubles with the law among Chinese foreign migrants and Japanese-Brazilian youth (Clark, 2004; Japan Reference, 2004; *Hanzai Hakusho*, 2005; Zha, 2006; Ardou, 2007a, 2007b; McNicol, 2007; *Hanzai Hakusho*, 2009).

The comparatively high Chinese criminal arrest rate is attributed to crime among the lowest-class segment of Chinese migrants in Japan that includes the second and third generation of Chinese returnees, illegal Chinese in-country and pre-college students (usually studying Japanese language) either working illegally while enrolled as a student or staying in Japan after finishing their studies. The second- and third-generation Chinese returnees arrived in Japan with an extremely low level of completed education, about half of them a middle-school education or below, all of these Chinese migrant subgroups (returnees, pre-college students and undocumented workers) are poor, have difficulty finding work in Japan, many work illegally and quite a few turn to crime in connection with organised Chinese and Japanese gangs (Komai, 2001, pp 95-9, 102-3; Zha, 2006).

Japanese-Brazilian crime also relates to a very low class condition. Estimates vary but perhaps about a quarter of Japanese-Brazilian children do not attend school, drop-out rates are high and most have less than a high-school education. These youth with a low level of education and coming from working-class families living in ghettos have been reported as active in crime and closely watched by the police, resulting in arrests (Clark, 2004; Ardou, 2007b). Furthermore, police arrests of Japanese-Brazilians have been predominantly crimes of the working class or property crimes (theft, burglary and robbery) (Komai, 2001).

Aside from class inequality, the relatively high crime rate (keeping in mind the limitations in interpretation of police arrests) of Chinese foreign migrants and Japanese-Brazilian youth is tied in with inequality of education or that compulsory education does not apply to foreign nationals. This then is associated with an already working-class family condition and an early entrance into the world of crime (Komai, 2001; Clark, 2004; Ardou, 2007a, 2007b; *The Japan Times*, 2007a, p 3).

Class differences tie in with ecological features of criminal arrests among foreign migrants. Western (North American, British and Australian) migrants in Japan are well educated with most holding at least a four-year college degree, nearly all are legally employed mainly as foreign language instructors, predominantly are short-term residents, come from higher-class family backgrounds than most foreign migrants and have a low arrest rate. Furthermore, not only does a 'legal work status' prevent them from violating immigration law but they are also less vulnerable to police arrests since compared to most other foreign migrant groups

they are not as localised in particular ethnic/nationality confines such as foreign migrant ghettos, reducing the possibility of concentrated police efforts to 'catch them in the wrong'.

Inequality as a deterrent to crime and deviance

While other modern nations have praised Japan for its low official adult crime rate, even more praise should be given to foreign migrants in Japan whose crime rates are at about the same rate as Japanese nationals. Leaving aside all the inadequacies associated with criminal arrests as a measure of official crime rates, the irony is that inequality actually keeps crime and external conflict at a rather low level and this has absolutely nothing to do with harmony. A main deterrent of crime and other forms of deviance takes place by limiting its potential to occur.

Limited-term work contracts for foreigners get rid of the bulk of foreign migrants before they can settle down and have a family whose children born of the working class would later be most susceptible to becoming involved in crime. Along the same lines, Japan is more restrictive than other modern industrial democracies (in North America, Oceania and Europe) in accepting refugees and approving applications for refugee status in-country (Bailey, 2006, pp 8-16; Ito, 2007a, p 3). An increase of refugees would also mean an increase of children from working-class families and again the potential of crime. This is borne out by the relatively high rates of crime among two impoverished groups – overseas Chinese and Japanese-Brazilians.

That immigration does not allow unskilled labourers to work in Japan results in a high number of undocumented workers but then also protects against the lowest of the working class and their families from attempting to make Japan their home, leading to an even larger underclass susceptible to criminal activity. Furthermore, while undocumented workers are committing a crime in violation of immigration control law, being illegal is a strong deterrent to getting into trouble since any contact with the authorities (including the police) would result in incarceration for some time and then deportation.

Applying the principle of *jus sanguinis* (parental citizenship determines the child's nationality) avoids a chain reaction of increased migration and an eventual policy of assimilation. Japanese parentage being the sole requisite for a child to obtain citizenship discourages long-term settlement and emigration to Japan of foreign couples hoping to make a better life for their children who if citizenship was bestowed by birth in-country would gain Japanese citizenship. As the history of nations that grant citizenship to all those born on their soil and territories (*jus soli*) has shown, this has brought about ethnic group social movements challenging inequality, leading to conflict with the dominant culture group, a major form of deviance that is avoided in Japan by maintaining the principle of *jus sanguinis*.

The history of rebellion and social movements of minorities is that they tend to occur as their situation improves and that they enjoy at least some support from indigenous nationals (Spencer, 1985, pp 520-3). It requires a consciousness

that change is possible, available resources to become organised and backing from dominant group members. Without these conditions it is unlikely that any notable conflict will occur and the status quo will continue as is.

Excepting Koreans and less so Chinese, the high turnover rate of foreign migrants in and out of Japan makes any form of in-group solidarity regarding a consciousness, not to mention concerted action against discrimination for foreign migrant groups, unlikely. And, while there have been protests against fingerprinting of foreign migrants, job discrimination and deportation of undocumented foreign migrants, these have been small scale with little backing from dominant group Japanese. There are support groups assisting foreign migrants, however, the number of people involved is small, those supporting human rights are outside of the mainstream and they have a very limited amount of funds and a weak political power base. As it stands now, the absence of any form of solidarity among foreign migrant groups themselves, little support among dominant group members and a public largely unaware of discrimination against foreign migrants, make it improbable that any noteworthy social movement regarding human rights of foreign migrants will occur in the near future. Labelling also assists in toning down conflict.

Whether fired on the job or under suspicion by Japanese for some wrongdoing, other foreign migrants tend to keep a distance and avoid contact with the foreign migrant so labelled. This occurs because of an absence of power and influence; associating with the other foreign migrant so labelled runs the risk of suffering a similar fate or at least being identified by others with the deviant, inviting suspicion. The isolated labelled deviant then tends to blame self and take on the tagged label onto their identity. That is, the consensus against and isolation of the erring foreigner furthers the possibility that they will view self in the wrong, whatever that wrong may be. Continual isolation and often financial difficulty from loss of job commonly is followed by leaving Japan, further validating the very label itself and gets rid of the source of conflict. This serves to keep the foreign migrant in place and weakens the possibility of questioning and challenging discriminate action.

Foreigners as victims of crime

The police have been criticised by the foreign community in their investigation of the murder of three Western women in Japan by two Japanese male suspects (Hongo and Prideaux, 2007; Larkin, 2007; Prideaux and Hongo, 2007a, 2007b; *The Japan Times*, 2007b, p 4, 2007c). Joji Obara was convicted of raping eight Japanese women and the rape and manslaughter of Australian Carita Ridgeway, although questionably acquitted of the rape and murder of Britain's Lucie Blackman, and is serving a life sentence (Hongo, 2007a). Tatsuya Ichihashi escaped from the police, finally got caught and arrested for the rape and murder of England's Lindsay Ann Hawker after being on the loose for more than two and half years (*The Japan Times*, 2009b, p 1, 2009c, p 1).

Complaints have been made that the police do not take foreigners seriously as victims of crimes. To the contrary, foreigners are discriminately singled out as 'suspects' of crime (such as overstaying their visa), stopped, questioned and asked to show their foreign registration card. All registered foreigners must carry with them a foreign registration card and failure to do so is a crime; if not registered, a passport is required as identification that will show whether the individual is legally in-country, and, of course, without any identification at all the foreigner becomes suspect as an illegal (Haynes, 2003; *The Japan Times*, 2005a, p 16; Ardou, 2007e).

While some criticism of the police regarding crimes committed against foreigners is warranted, much of it is not because the police are restricted by law regarding questioning, search and seizure and arrests of suspects although this seems to apply less so when foreign migrants are suspects. The problem of foreigners as victims of crimes is of a different nature. The feeling among long-term foreign residents is that foreigners are perceived by the dominant culture group as the victimisers not victims when anything goes amiss between Japanese and foreigners. When something goes wrong, Japanese tend to side with their fellow Japanese, not the foreigner. While I could fill a book about this based on years of stories and my own experiences, foreigners shy away from reporting the crimes committed against them, believing they will have no support among Japanese and fearing a later reprisal of the person or persons who committed the crime against them. Furthermore, should word get around that they were involved in crime even though as a 'victim' somehow the foreigner is thought to be in the wrong and that could mean the loss of their job.

This fear comes from insecurity, knowing the relative ease with which foreigners come to be held in disdain, even threatened with violence against them and their family and turned against or they lose their jobs for the slightest of reasons such as being critical of their work or treatment in Japan. That there is such a fear is perhaps best substantiated in a recent book on native English language instructors teaching English in Japan (Bueno and Caesar, 2003). The editors of the book had difficulty in finding experienced native English language foreign instructors who were willing to contribute to the book since they did not want their name and place of employment to be known by the Japanese public. The only way the editors could assemble articles from reputable native English language instructors teaching in Japan including many university instructors was as follows (Bueno and Caesar, 2003, p 19):

> [T]he following essays would have been impossible to collect if we had insisted that the author of every one give his or her real name and real institution. Although the personal reasons for this to those who have chosen to give pseudonyms or unidentifiable institutions might vary, the more general reasons are worth some considerations. Foremost among them is security.

It is not known how many cases of crimes against foreigners are unreported or if reported not recorded, but the number is probably large. Already discussed, graft has been committed against foreign migrant trainees and undocumented workers and a host of crimes has taken place in the trafficking of foreign migrant sex workers. Korean students that attend Korean schools, particularly females, being visible targets by wearing the *Chima Chogori* (Korean dress) have been harassed, threatened and physically attacked by Japanese. These instances of 'victimisation' are associated with inequality, the foreign victims vulnerable to illegal economic exploitation and/or the object of prejudice and discrimination. And, while little is known about the consequences of 'victimisation' among foreigners in Japan, one can assume that the effects have had devastating consequences on their physical and mental health.

Other types of deviant behaviour

There is a dearth of information about inequality and the physical and mental health of foreign migrants. Socially and economically disadvantaged minorities in other countries have lower life expectancies and higher rates of serious mental disorders than the dominant group and one would expect the same for foreign migrants in Japan. Statistics on life expectancies of foreigners are unavailable. The only reported link of inequality and mental instability is among foreigners held in detention centres who have been reported as suffering from serious mental maladies as a result of being incarcerated in extremely harsh, confined conditions (Makino, 2004).

Mental health resources throughout Japan are located in urban centres and common mental health disorders of depression, anxiety/panic attacks as well as substance abuse are said to be as common among foreign migrants as they are among the general population (International Mental Health Professionals, Japan, 2007; Meguro Counseling Services, 2007). However, foreign migrants able to receive mental healthcare represent foreigners who can afford it and one can only imagine the dire needs of mental health assistance for foreign migrants who do not have the capital or from fear of being detected as illegal cannot receive it.

Inequality and other types of deviant behaviour such as deviant fetishes, extremely unusual although legal dress and behaviour and so on are difficult to assess given a lack of information and not knowing anything about the foreign individual before coming to Japan. For instance, I have known of and witnessed very strange behaviour among foreign migrants. As one example, I knew an American who would induce himself to vomit on Japanese passengers in a crowded train as retribution to what he felt was their very distant and cold behaviour towards him. However, I knew little about his life before he came to Japan and have seen the opposite reaction of Americans and other foreign migrants who are over-polite and a sycophant to Japanese although they as well are treated as 'outsiders'.

Many long-term foreign migrants have a marginalised personality, feeling as an outsider to their own society and although identifying self with life in Japan are

not treated as insiders by Japanese, creating a certain sense of alienation. An absence of any substantial data on marginality among foreign migrants and its relation to inequality (for example, effects of stereotypes on wellbeing, self-confidence etc) or deviant behaviour precludes any more to be said about it.

Support groups

Foreign migrant groups do have access to a number of human rights groups such as Japan's civil liberties union, a foreign associated labour union, non-governmental organisations, ethnic or foreign group organisations and so on (see Roberts, 2003). Also, particularly among Korean migrants, foreign migrants have formed their own self-interest groups (see Chung, 2010). Most outside support takes place at the local level, ranging from Japanese community groups assisting in language and counselling for foreign migrants to other foreign migrants providing contacts for jobs, and housing, legal matters and so on. While some of these organisations do support foreign migrants in discrimination cases, most notably involving political refugees and their right to stay in Japan, little has changed because of weak legal protection and little national support.

There is not a set of national laws that provides adequate rights and resources that allow foreign migrants to take action against discrimination whether related to one's work or the refusal by real estate agencies to rent a place of dwelling to the foreigner. Furthermore, foreign migrants do not have popular support among Japanese to improve on human rights or bring about a more fair treatment of foreigners. The way it stands now, inequality of foreigners is accepted even among many foreigners themselves and there are no signs that national support will shift in their favour in the near future.

Summary

The subordinate 'ascribed' minority status of foreign migrants has been central to understanding inequality and deviance of foreign migrants in Japan. A main feature of pluralism has been shown to be that of limited-term accommodation and rigid social controls. Kerr (2001, p 352), a long-term foreigner in Japan, stated it well: 'the lack of foreigners in Japan is not accidental; it results from laws and social framework especially designed to keep them out; or if they are allowed in, to hold them on a very short leash'. And, in a dialectical manner, such restrictive laws and controls have both facilitated and inhibited deviant behaviour.

The subjugation of foreign migrants is pragmatic, serving the interests of the dominant group. It allows for accommodation of outsiders to fill a needed occupational 'niche' while at the same time protects against their competition for the better jobs. Social mobility is constrained by official and non-official job restrictions and limited-term contracts and intergenerational mobility effectively blocked by restricting nationality at birth to only the children of Japanese parent(s). The subordinate pluralistic minority status of foreign migrants is far from a

multicultural or assimilation approach to the integration of foreign migrants in Japanese society, it is tied in with a past history of caste and separation of non-Japanese from Japanese.

One must be careful, however, to avoid any 'moral or righteous' argument against foreign migrant–dominant group Japanese relations in Japan. The Japanese state and wider society give priority and preference to its citizens and have every right to do so. Foreign migrants came to Japan on a visa knowing of restrictions placed on them in accordance with their visa status and if they did not know they should have. Most of the foreign migrant working population arrived on a limited-term contract. Language and cultural differences are partially responsible for preference by both Japanese and foreign migrants to maintain a given distance from each other. For foreign migrants legally residing in Japan there is available work within a particular 'ascribed niche' suitable to one's nationality, social mobility possible within ascribed occupations. Without this nationality-ascribed job availability, given centrifugal tendencies and preferences among foreign migrants for their own sociocultural way of life and inadequate Japanese language skills among most members of foreign migrant groups excepting Koreans, foreign migrants would find great difficulty finding work competing against Japanese nationals. And, for those illegally residing in the country, they are in violation of immigration law, regardless of the circumstances, thus are outside of the subordinate pluralistic structural arrangements set up to assist valid and legal limited-term accommodation within Japanese society.

Historically, assigning individuals to a certain occupational caste by virtue of heredity and the preponderance of class reproduction throughout Japanese history have been a logical extension pragmatically applied to foreign migrants. Racial homogeneity, although a myth, has throughout the times been a mainstay of Japanese society, not racial mixing, and tantamount to the whole process of citizenship and naturalisation.

In short, separate and unequal subordinate minority status of foreign migrants is not a malevolent concoction designed to exploit and take advantage of foreigners. Foreign migrants fare no better or worse in Japan than foreign migrants in other modern democratic capitalistic societies, there are simply advantages and disadvantages to any form of societal adaptation. At the same time, however, it should be recognised that harmony and egalitarianism are no more a characteristic feature of Japanese society than other industrialised societies as this and previous chapters have suggested.

It is in the interests of the dominant subcultural group to maintain the status quo. The restriction on 'rights' and 'equal opportunities' of foreign migrants is parallel to that of youth: power finds a way whether through law or informal means to contain and minimise the influence of those with little power but a threat to the status quo in order to protect their own interests. The theoretical dimension of this, equally applicable to the interrelationship of inequality and deviance for Japanese youth and foreign migrants, is the subject we now turn to.

FOUR

Labelling conflict theory: inequality and deviance

A labelling conflict perspective

Throughout this book, conflict has been discussed central to understanding inequality and the link between inequality and deviance. The focus of attention, however, has not been uniform given somewhat different situations and conditions that confront youth and foreign migrants. Here, labelling conflict theory is adopted to piece together the commonality shared by these two subordinate subcultural groups to gain a wider perspective of the link between inequality and deviance for subordinate subcultural groups.

Inequality and deviance will be described as a process whereby these two subordinate subcultural groups (applicable to other subordinate subculture groups as well) enter into a position of inequality that then relates to deviant behaviour through participation as members of a subordinate subcultural group. Finally, the continuity of inequality and deviance is viewed as a prolonged feature of the labelling conflict process. This application of labelling conflict theory proceeds in a time-ordered sequence utilising the concepts of 'entry' and 'participation' (Steinhoff, 1984; Yoder, 2004). Replication is the final sequence of labelling conflict theory pertaining to the persistence of labelling and conflict over time.

Labelling theory focuses on the outcome of labels (also akin to stereotypes) that are attached to an actor and the extent to which such labels are influential to the actor's identity and behaviour (Lofland, 1969; Schur, 1971; Liska, 1987). Conflict theory often applied to class inequality is about power and privilege and how they are exercised by a dominant group over subordinate groups for the purpose of maintaining legitimacy, sustaining individual and factional power and privilege and enhancing the interests of particular objectives (Gelfand and Lee, 1973; Schermerhorn, 1978, pp 23-24; Krauss et al, 1984; Hashimoto, 2003). A labelling conflict theory combines labelling and conflict as a means to understand both the social psychological dimension of human thought and action along with the structural elements that influence the labelling process to begin with. Entry and participation represent stages to unravel the process of labelling and conflict applied to the dynamics of inequality and deviance for our two subordinate subcultural groups. 'Replication' is a methodological concept referring to interrelationships that remain relatively the same when controlling for a third variable (Babbie, 1989). The term is borrowed here as a descriptive device to explain how labelling and

conflict proceed over time for our two subordinate subcultural groups in spite of social change. We begin with entry.

Entry

Members of youth and foreign migrant subordinate subcultural groups enter the condition of inequality through ascription: by age and nationality. Conditions of inequality were already set prior to entrance. Youth are confronted with a new set of criminal laws particularly pre-delinquency, stifling middle-school rules and regulations and based on family social class put into a school environment that will set the course for future school success and proclivity towards deviant behaviour. Foreign migrants at birth or on arrival in Japan are restricted by immigration laws and controls and are faced with institutionalised discrimination against foreign nationals. This sets the stage for variable situations and conditions that tie in with deviant behaviour.

Entry: Japanese youth

Adolescence is a time of rebellion and idealism in search for a better tomorrow and a struggle of identity with who one is and what one wants to do with one's life (Erickson, 1978). There is no other time period in a person's life where they question the way things are and believe that change can make life better. Adolescence represents a distance from family, with one's peer group becoming the dominant influence on identity and behaviour. Entry into adolescence and the strong influence of one's friends (peer group) on youth deviance is well supported, as Barry (2006, p 69) states: 'Research on childhood interactions with others suggests that friendships have the most influence and impact during adolescence, and particularly on adolescent-limited anti-social behaviour'.

Adolescence also marks a time when adults bring forth strict controls over the behaviour of young Japanese. Entering adolescence marked by compulsory attendance at middle-school education signals a major transition: a change from a relatively egalitarian elementary school life to a class-oriented strict disciplinary middle-school life and from being a child not responsible for one's erring behaviour to a juvenile accountable for a myriad of wrongdoings. No longer considered an innocent child, youth are watched over carefully in the community, at school and in public by adult social control agents (mainly teachers, adults associated with delinquency prevention and the police).

Youth are a threat to the status quo by their very 'newness', being of a different breed, a way of thinking and behaving unlike any other generation. They are powerless but highly feared, with a history of non-conformity quite diverse from the student movement in the 1960s, *bōsōzoku* (literarly, in English, 'speed tribes', Japanese youth gangs characterized by a wild life style and reckless racing of motorcycles or automobiles) in the 1980s and *tōkōkyohi* (school refusals) in the new millennium. Youth and foreign migrants have this common element: powerless and

yet a threat apt not to go along with tradition, youth seeking change and foreign migrants by their very presence of a different culture both suspect because of their unpredictability, the very seed for conflict (Lofland, 1969, pp 13-16). The state's response is to try and dupe the 'public' into believing that something is wrong with their lifestyles sensationalising their actions, particularly crime. Youth and foreign migrants are often tied together as a threat to the wellbeing of society, authorities calling for a step-up of controls against them. For example, the National Police Agency justified an increase of police officers in this new millennium for the purpose of 'investigating crimes committed by foreigners and juveniles, as well as street patrols, and measures to combat stalking' (*The Japan Times*, 2001c, p 1).

The entry into adolescence marks a major beginning of a class divide. Middle-school attendance is a critical time period, influential to high-school entrance and later college entrance. Students from higher-class families are sent to elite private middle schools connected to higher-ranked high schools. Class ecology influences the school environment at local public middle schools, student anti-school subcultures more likely formed at middle schools in working- than higher-class areas. And, within local public middle schools in working-class areas, student groups tend to be built along class lines. Class privileges favour higher-class students with a home environment (the norm being educated parents, two-parent family and a mother at home) and family economic surplus that can afford educational extras (*juku* [cram or preparatory schools] and tutor) conducive to school achievement, guarding against the potential to join in with an anti-school student subculture that tends to be formed by disadvantaged working-class students.

Class separation of youngsters upon middle-school attendance has a profound effect on circumstances that set into motion taking on a deviant identity and involvement in deviant behaviour. In tandem with class separation, teachers are likely to have different expectations regarding student achievement and behaviour: high achievement and conforming behaviour are expected for students at elite private middle schools or at middle schools in higher-class areas, which is in contrast to the trouble that is expected from working-class students at middle schools located in working-class areas. Class ecology also ties in with delinquency prevention: a higher level of adult surveillance and punitive controls is more likely to be concentrated in working- than higher-class areas, with adult social control agents more suspect of youth deviant behaviour, increasing the potential of 'tagging on a deviant label' to erring youngsters. The possibility of entering into an anti-school student middle-school culture and being labelled as a 'misfit' connects with class ecology, inequality setting the stage for the labelling of students and the onset of deviant behaviour among adolescents.

Entry: foreign migrants

Excepting a large number of Koreans and smaller number of Chinese and other foreign migrants born in Japan, all other foreign migrants enter a condition of inequality on arrival in Japan. Inequality is both universal for all foreign migrants

as they are foreigners, not citizens, and differs widely based on the country they came from, visa status, connections with others in Japan and expectant work, study or other particular purpose of stay.

'Right off the boat' is a common expression that applies to a foreigner who has just arrived in Japan. Newly arrived foreigners have a stereotypical image of Japan ranging from a 'Hollywood image' among Americans to 'a rich country' among Bangladeshis. Over time this image will change depending on many circumstances, however it is noteworthy in that the newcomer has also yet to experience actions of Japanese based on their 'stereotypes' of the foreigner that may be particularly shocking for foreign males from dominant culture groups in their own society experiencing for the first time life as a minority. The unfamiliarity of language, culture, society, food and so on also marks an entry for foreign migrants except those born in Japan, notably a large number of Koreans.

The foreign newcomer also begins life in Japan under an extreme variation of life circumstances, from a 'visiting professor' on a professional visa to 'illegal sex worker' on a tourist visa. Regardless, however, the foreign newcomer is not expected to remain long in Japan and faces many obstacles should they attempt to 'assimilate' within Japanese society.

Participation

The commonality of Japanese youth and foreign migrants is that they had no other recourse except to enter into interpersonal relations and group life within predetermined conditions of inequality. They have limited choices and opportunities tied in with both their subordinate status and within-group class status. Class differences among youth largely depend on whether the male head of household is of the higher class and for foreign migrants their class status in a caste-like stratification hierarchy based on nationality, residence status and among working migrants their occupation. The link between inequality and deviance comes about from participation or interactions, relationships and group affiliations after entering into their ascribed status.

Humans are the most dependent of all animals on others of the same species for survival. Succinctly, after total dependence on others during infancy and early childhood it would be extremely difficult for any person alone with no assistance and having nothing to begin with to acquire food, shelter, water and warmth or relief from heat. This coupled with the human sexual drive and needs for affection, protection, security and identification, means quite simply that the human needs to belong to a group. However, humans are not in charge of what group they can belong to. There are restrictions on group membership based on family lineage and relations, age, gender, nationality, race, class, occupation or selective admittance combining a number of distinct qualities and conditions. The choice, therefore, of belonging to a group is often outside of the capability of the person alone: others must be willing to accept them.

Participation is the key to understanding the conditions that predispose and therefore allow for an individual to join a particular group and the subsequent influence of the group after entrance on the individual's identity and behaviour. Furthermore, self is identified by others outside of the group by the group(s) they belong to in a pecking order of subcultural group stratification, with an elite subcultural group at the top and mainly responsible for the stratified pecking order to be as it is. These dynamics affecting participation within a group, limitations set on what group members can and cannot do within the stratification of groups in a subcultural group stratification order and subsequent effects on identity and deviant behaviour, are central to understanding the ongoing interrelationship between inequality and deviance.

Participation: Japanese youth

The child-like egalitarian atmosphere of elementary school is gone upon entrance into middle school. Students are confronted with strict school regulations prescribing wear of the school uniform, hairstyle, mannerisms, codes of conduct and schools even prescribe that teachers watch over student behaviour outside of school. Middle schools resemble the military – authoritarian, disciplinarian and highly regulated – with rights and responsibilities based on a rank and file order from top to bottom.

Higher-class students grouped together at upper-ranked private all-girls' or all-boys' middle schools tracked on to the same high school are most likely to join conformist student groups; students having been well prepared to enter (through examination) the school from a young age, some as early as three or four years old. A similar school setting and peer group formation occurs at local middle schools in higher-class residential areas, although co-educational and class backgrounds are more varied than those of students at private same-sex high-ranked middle schools. Quite different from both school settings are public middle schools in working-class areas. Here lies the greatest potential for the formation of anti-school student subculture groups by working-class students.

A student's predisposition towards conforming to adult expectations of youth behaviour and the context and availability of student peer groups are essential to the student deciding what peer group to join in with. Most students from working-class families soon realise that due to family class circumstances they have little chance to compete academically with higher-class students and are less prepared for and not as oriented towards academic achievement. Most of them are destined to either finish their education after middle-school graduation or be sent to low-ranked high schools. In reaction and out of defiance, anti-school student subculture groups are likely to be formed; education offers little for their future life.

Social control agents (teachers, adults in delinquency prevention, the police) are less concerned with the conditions that pre-empt youth deviant behaviour than with monitoring, controlling and catching youth in the wrong. Surveillance

activities are concentrated in those areas where it is expected that youth will deviate from adult expectations of youth behaviour. These tend to be working-class areas. In the community and at the local public middle school, there is an atmosphere of adult mistrust, taking the form of extensive delinquency prevention controls and discriminate strict school controls targeting troubled students who more than likely are of the working class. Adult social control agents 'tag' the label of deviant on academic underachievers and rebellious youngsters caught misbehaving. The very likelihood of this occurring is enhanced by the magnitude and punitive nature of these adult controls and that the 'targets', erring youth, isolated from conforming students, defy higher-class adult authority. Stigmatised as 'failures', blame for non-conformity is directed toward individual shortcomings or problems at home not class disadvantages, increasing the likelihood of viewing oneself as different from others and taking on an identity as a 'misfit', 'failure' or simply a 'no-good'. Seeing oneself as others have so labelled, and isolated within a deviant youth subculture group, lead to an escalation of rebellious activity or at best apathy towards higher-class social norms.

Imagery guides our interaction with others. Categories assigned to humans such as old, female, student, housewife, foreigner and so on, carry an image or stereotype that influences our thoughts and actions towards these others. Often, one category stands out from the other categories, a pivotal category (Lofland, 1969, pp 124-6), thoughts, actions and judgement of one person based on a stereotypical image of persons who belong to that one category. Expectations are brought to bear on persons who occupy that 'pivotal category' or that such people because of being female or male or 'sex worker' think and act this way and not another way.

Working class is a 'pivotal category', a category that stands out among all categories (girl, boy, farmer's son, etc) and is associated with youth deviance at an early stage of adolescence – middle-school entrance – creating expectations by adult others of trouble with working-class youth. The opposite, or a pivotal category of conforming academic achievers, is associated with higher-class youth: they come from good families, and are prevalent among middle-school students at elite private high-ranked same-sex middle schools and students who attend public middle schools in a higher-class community environment. This early labelling of youth becomes accentuated in the sorting out of middle-school students to different-ranked high schools.

As mentioned above, most working-class students either end their education after middle-school graduation or are sent to low-ranked high schools while the majority of higher-class students attend higher-ranked high schools. Given that all troubled students are put in the same low-ranked high schools, the schools themselves become a pivotal category associated with deviance tagged on to students in attendance. With each incremental rise in rank of high schools, the greater the expectations of conformity and academic achievement, students in the top bracket being categorised as 'the brightest and the best', a pivotal category

in sharp contrast to the negative stigma assigned to students at low-ranked high schools.

The public is perfectly aware of high-school rankings and along with adult social control agents tend to label students according to the rank and reputation of these schools. Within the schools, students at low-ranked high schools are susceptible to being treated with suspicion, with expectations by adult school personnel (particularly teachers and school counsellors) that they will not do well in their studies and be prone to get into trouble inside and outside of school. The public and social control agents join in the labelling game, students identified by their school uniform (each school has its own distinct school uniform) enhancing potential adult suspect, reinforcing the stigma of attending a low-ranked high school. These students are prime candidates to be labelled as 'misfits' and confined within a school atmosphere characterised by student dislike for the school and its rules, student apathy and rebellion, and that most students are oriented towards either dropping out of high school or just doing enough to graduate, enhances the proclivity to misbehave.

The opposite situation occurs at higher-ranked high schools: conformity and obedience to authority are commonplace, particularly among high-calibre students at private upper-ranked same-sex high schools. Surrounding these students are expectations of academic achievement and upstanding behaviour by teachers, parents, neighbours, local shop keepers and students themselves. Classes are geared towards university entrance examinations, students are well prepared, further assisted by shadow education. Students are proud of the school uniform as it signifies achievement and conformity to adult standards of youth behaviour, while others are constantly aware of the high status accorded to that student by the visible reminder of the school uniform, influencing positive interpersonal activity, which furthers a sense of self as an achiever and conformist on the right path towards college entrance. Guarded against potential student troublemakers (problem students not allowed entrance), attending schools where students take pride in academic achievement and conformity with characteristically good student relations with teachers, students like the school, are treated well by the school and public and are busy preparing for college entrance – all are strong deterrents to deviant behaviour.

Parent(s)–child interaction, particularly the mother who is usually assigned the task of supervising her child's education, is essential to the child's academic achievement and conformity to higher-class values and norms, the basic foundation of the educational institution. The home environment for working- and higher-class families differs in that a comparatively larger percentage of working-class families are single parents and the single parent, most often the mother, works with no one at home to help her child with their school work. In two-parent families, family economics makes it necessary for working-class mothers to work, more so than mothers in higher-class families. Furthermore, working-class parents have a lower level of completed education than higher-class parents, are less capable, are not as oriented to assisting their child in the rigours of

secondary-school education and also have less income to afford 'shadow education' extras. All of this, however, does not lead to conflict at home since working-class culture is different from higher-class culture: parents do not have the same high expectations as higher-class parents for their child to achieve academically and, realising that they can do little to help their child to get ahead through education, are not likely to blame them for not conforming.

Ironically, conflict at home is just as much if not more likely to occur in higher-class families. This is particularly so for girls in a generational conflict with their mother who in a contradictory manner pressures their daughter to do well in her studies but expects that she will be a housewife in spite of preparation for a college education. Working-class mothers, many single parents, not only spare their daughter the pressure to succeed academically but also are more flexible in regards to a future job career, realising that her future husband will likely be of the working class and both will need to work to maintain a live-able family income especially after the birth of a child.

Parental–child attachment does not differ substantially by class, and has little bearing on youth deviant behaviour. The main effect of class on youth deviance is that the class cultural environment and less economic resources of working-class families put them at a distinct disadvantage to enable their child to compete with higher-class children. Youth deviance follows as a product of a class bias educational system that sets forth a labelling process containing and minimising higher-class youth deviance at the expense of furthering working-class youth deviance, facilitating class reproduction and preservation of the status quo.

Participation: foreign migrants

Foreign migrants are regarded as participants in Japanese society either from the time they are born in Japan in a foreign migrant family or when they arrive in Japan. Obviously, being born and raised in Japan versus first arriving, for example, as an adult makes a difference in adaptation and orientation towards Japanese society. The barriers to assimilation and each foreign migrant group's ascribed position are also different by nationality and other conditions as has been discussed. The commonality, however, is that unless the foreign migrant is able to pass oneself off as a Japanese and even then posing as a Japanese is limited to those racially undistinguishable from Japanese and fluent in Japanese, largely long-term resident Koreans and Chinese, the dominant culture group view and react to the foreign migrant as of a different breed and culture. A minority, the label non-Japanese is attached to foreign migrants in the public domain, at school and on the job subordinate to the dominant culture group. Participation in Japanese society occurs on 'unequal grounds', denied the same rights, benefits and opportunities as the dominant culture group.

Foreign migrants born in Japan (hereafter, called in-born foreign migrants) come from all nationalities and are raised in very different family environments ranging, for example, from newly arrived American missionaries to fourth-generation

Koreans. Class and nationality are key differences in childhood socialisation and participation in Japanese society. Visibility also comes to play as non-Asian children are unable to pass as Japanese even if they so desire and have to cope with standing out and being labelled a 'foreigner' regardless of whether in every other way they are Japanese. Still, all are denied citizenship and the only road to 'citizenship' is naturalisation, which means abandoning their nationality and in essence ethnic heritage. Without a viable national ethnic group like Korean-Japanese, French-Japanese and so on, since citizenship at birth is based on parent(s) nationality, not territory (being born in Japan), ascribed subordinate minority status characterises social integration and participation in Japanese society.

While a good deal of attention has been given to Koreans and problems of identity, particularly the difference between Koreans identifying as Korean and Koreans who pass as Japanese, identity and participation in Japanese society applies to all foreign migrants. For children who physically stand-out as non-Japanese, the issue is largely class: the better-off families usually send their children to international schools (and friendships are formed there) whereby identity and behaviour as a national of one's country or some sort of 'international identity' comes to define who they are. These foreign migrant children later most often leave Japan, contributing to the reproduction of the status quo.

The extreme disadvantaged are in-born foreign migrants and young foreign-born (called out-born) children in working-class families whereby the parent(s) are not accustomed (by language, customs, values etc) to life in Japan. Children in these families are the most susceptible to participating in deviant behaviour at a young age, not only because of class disadvantages but also there is little state and private intervention to assist in their adaptation, such as in education or language, further distancing them from identifying with and assimilating into Japanese society. Deviance more or less becomes entrenched within the foreign migrant group itself since the root of the problem, class and foreign migrant disadvantages, is not addressed; rather, blame is placed on nationality, the family and the erring child. Labelling as 'something is wrong' with the foreign migrant and often isolated in working-class ethnic ghettoes with a low level of acculturation furthers the propensity to deviate, taking on the identity as an 'outsider' to Japanese society. Deviance is characterised by property crimes characteristic of the working class and a good number are susceptible to end up on a career path of crime or deviant lifestyle in *mizu shobai* (entertainment districts).

Adult out-born foreign migrants confront a number of adaptation problems once arriving in Japan although this differs depending mainly on Japanese language fluency before arrival and the purpose (visiting professor, trainee, entertainer and so on) of their stay. Most, however, are unaware that dominant group expectations are that they do not reside in Japan for very long, with accommodation arrangements set up for a limited time period. The often polite, courteous and seemingly positive interest taken in them by Japanese, particularly by those who have a direct connection with them such as fellow employees or employer, is often mistaken as meaning that people care and will help them to

assimilate in Japanese society. These, coupled with the out-born foreign migrant's own image and stereotypes of Japan and the Japanese, lead to conflict later once the realisation sets in that one is a foreigner, an outsider who either receives little assistance and encouragement to assimilate or is expected to learn the language, customs and ways (especially for male labourers and females associated with the sex trade) in a subordinate status.

Some out-born adult foreign migrants immediately participate in deviant behaviour that in most cases involves violation of work under the immigration law while others over time become deviant by overstaying their visa, working and living in Japan 'illegally'. The need for labour and services offers the opportunity for work among these foreign migrants while conflict with immigration law creates the deviance. The 'label' of criminal becomes attached to these violators of the immigration law in disregard to the circumstances of the violation, furthering the 'hype' of foreigners as criminals. Sensationalising crimes of foreigners enhances the dominant group's suspicion and mistrust of foreigners, furthering the labelling process of treating foreigners as potential deviants, validating discriminate social controls over them, increasing the probability of arrests and having various ramifications on the identity and behaviour of the foreigners themselves.

Limited-term work contracts, discriminate treatment on the job and in the wider society, cultural incongruity and inability to accept one's subordinate status lead to most out-born adult foreign migrants leaving within a few years in a revolving door entrance in and departure from Japan. This, of course, limits long-term participation, weakening solidarity and the ability to form social movements, thus such social conflicts as protests and demonstrations are effectively minimised and contained, creating a 'false' misperception that foreigners are well treated and accepted in the wider society.

Replication

Replication is concerned with and examines the continuation of the interrelationship between inequality and deviance for these two subordinate subcultural groups over time. While social change in post-war Japan accounts for variation in the make-up of youth and foreign migrant groups, both subordinate subcultural groups have remained powerless. Social control measures have been in flux and the social condition of both groups has undergone changes, however, these have been orchestrated by the dominant subcultural group in their own interests with youth and foreign migrant groups outside of the decision-making process. Class reproduction (structural mobility or the rapid increase of white-collar jobs accounts for much of social mobility and is irrelevant to upward class mobility) has been the norm in post-war Japan although compared to pre-war Japan both subordinate subcultural groups have had a better opportunity for social mobility. Still, subordinate status and social structure are institutionalised, replicating in a conflict labelling manner the interrelation of inequality and deviance for both subordinate subcultural groups. Ironically, deviance tied in with inequality plays

a major role in supporting the validity and power stronghold of the dominant subculture group in the reproduction of the status quo, facilitating replication.

Replication: Japanese youth

In post-war Japan, while notable types of deviance among youth have varied over time, their deviant activity has represented a threat to those in power. Different times have brought with it varied youth reactions in the form of deviant behaviour against adult social controls. Youth have questioned power directly in the large student movement in the 1960s, through rebellious behaviour of *bōsōzoku* in the 1970s and *enjo kosai* and *ijime* in the 1990s or in apathy as *tōkōkyohi* (school refusals) in this new millennium. The student movement called into question the rights of the government to impose its will on students and the public at large, ranging from restrictions placed on student protest activities to the government's support of the war in Vietnam. *Bōsōzoku* and *enjo-kosai* threatened power by their very decisive rebellion against adult-expected youth behaviour, questioning the very morals of society that supposedly is under the management and control of the dominant subculture group in preserving tradition and a Japanese social cultural way of life. *Ijime* has presented a threat to the control and authority in the schools while *tōkōkyohi* has brought to question the debilitating effect of the schools themselves. Whatever the particular deviant behaviour may be, it has represented a threat to the validity and credibility of the dominant subculture group having power and control over a powerless group, youth, questioning their ability to act as leaders and guardians of Japanese cultural values and norms. Consistently, the state's reaction has been a clamp down on youth, blaming the problem on youngsters, their families, teachers and negative effects of social change. The issues of youth inequality (class and rights) and its relation to deviance have not been addressed, contributing to continued subordination of youth and preservation of the status quo.

The interpersonal dynamics of labelling act on the identity of the 'erring' youngster, escalating the propensity for further deviant behaviour. The deviant label separates youth so labelled from other youth, the magnitude of the label varying depending on the perceived severity of the inappropriate behaviour followed by commensurate sanctions taken against the offending youth, from being scolded and reprimanded for incorrect wear of the school uniform to police arrest for criminal act(s). Regardless, once youths are labelled as a deviant, adults increase suspicion and supervision over them, making it more likely that they will be caught again for inappropriate youth behaviour. Once labelled, that youth is viewed and treated as a different person than before the labelling, leading to a change of identity or the inclination to view self as that type of person that others say they are, furthering the susceptibility to engage in deviance. The more intense the adult crackdown on youth deviant behaviour and the larger the number of youth caught up in the labelling machinery the greater the increase in youth deviant behaviour.

State-directed reform measures and changes in the law carried out by adult social control agents actually contribute to youth deviance. In the extreme, a new identification of what was previously not labelled as deviant creates the very deviant act itself such as *tōkōkyohi* and *ijime*, adding a new category of deviance and number of youth deviants. Creating special laws or applying and reinterpreting dormant laws furthers the number of persons to be labelled as deviant, increasing the possibility of arrest and deviant status. This has occurred at various times, by re-enacting the enforcement of anti-subversive laws against student protests in the 1960s, special juvenile delinquent laws against *bōsōzoku* from the 1980s and lowering the criminal age of liability and allowing search and seizure by the police for suspected criminal acts for youngsters in this new millennium. The irony is that the state and adult social control agents become recognised and further validated as working in the best interests of society, having identified and taken charge of problem behaviour among these now 'labelled youth deviants' when in fact by defining new categories of youth deviance and creating new or reinterpreting old laws and directives for enforcement, they have instigated and contributed to the very problem itself. Inequality and deviance are linked together, remaining constant with those in power acting in their own interests orchestrating definitions and controls of youth deviance in spite of social change.

The preservation of the status quo is enhanced by replacement of those in power by similar others. This replacement proceeds in an institutionalised manner through the educational system. The educational system is a higher-class institution reflecting the goals, aims and objectives of the state that is headed, supervised and implemented by the dominant subculture group and carried out by school officials and teachers. Socialisation of children and youth at schools centres on allegiance to tradition, conformity to state-directed expectations of academic achievement and student thought and behaviour and incorporating a national identity for the purpose of carrying out one's present and future responsibilities as a citizen. The ability to conform to these objectives, however, relates to privilege that gives advantage to children of the higher class.

That class privilege relates to success in the educational system and class disadvantage ties in with deviance, particularly troubles at school and youth crime, these being main determinants of one's future class position as an adult, have not received there due attention reflects on the power and privilege of dominant subculture group members to divert attention away from inequality; class conflict a very threat to the maintenance of the status quo. The end result is class reproduction replicating the same cycle of inequality and deviance in the change-over of power and privilege.

Replication: foreign migrants

The threat of foreign migrants is that they are 'foreign', of a different culture, language and way of life, and, therefore, considered unpredictable and difficult to control. Foreign migrants are the antithesis of a 'homogenised' Japan, a belief of

one culture, one race and one language. Foreign migrants, however, are necessary for the wellbeing of Japanese society, providing skills and labour that bolster the economy, and are vital to the so-called internationalisation of Japan, serving as a 'showcase' for acceptance in the international community. As has been the case throughout Japanese history, the aim of those in power, the dominant subculture group, has been to progress through the use of foreign ideas, skills, practices and labour while at the same time maintaining Japanese culture as a separate entity from that which is foreign. The dominant subculture group is confronted with the task of attaining this balancing act.

Strict immigration policies limit the number of foreign migrants of non-Japanese origin (for example, this does not apply to Japanese South Americans given special residency permits because of their Japanese blood or origin) with the greatest potential for remaining in-country for a long period of time. Japan falls far at the bottom among all modern industrialised societies on acceptance of refugees from abroad and approval of refugee status once in Japan. There are no legal provisions to obtain a work visa as an 'unskilled labourer' even though such work is direly needed for the economy. The way around this, as we have seen, is bringing in cheap unskilled labour on a restricted heavily supervised time-limit basis from developing countries and calling it a training programme. All of this guards against the potential of mass immigration and assimilation of non-Japanese into the fabric of Japanese society.

The vast majority of in-coming foreign migrants arriving in Japan to work either are on an agreed upon fixed limited-time period contract or will find themselves on one once they find employment. The possibility of eventual full-time employment is slim and occupational choices limited. After the initial 'honeymoon' period, many become disillusioned and most foreign migrants voluntarily or not leave within three years. The revolving door is a continual sequence, new arrivals in and short-term one's out, ensuring a minimal amount of foreign cultural influence. This pragmatically also limits competition for the better jobs and secure employment whether it be professional baseball, education or labour, reflecting well on the dominant subculture group, furthering a consensus for reproduction of the status quo.

Among foreign migrants who intend and are in the position to make Japan their home, the question becomes whether or not to naturalise, the only way to obtain Japanese citizenship. Naturalisation is also central to the wellbeing of children born of married foreign migrant couples living in Japan since unless one of them becomes naturalised their child cannot obtain Japanese citizenship, only children of Japanese citizens can obtain Japanese citizenship, not birth in-country. Naturalisation brings social and economic advantages at a cost of giving up one's home country citizenship and most often abandoning an ethnic heritage since out of convenience and to avoid discrimination the usual practice in the process of naturalisation is to adopt a Japanese name. In either case, the myth of homogeneity is not threatened, only Japanese can pass on citizenship and one is either a foreign migrant, a non-Japanese or naturalises and becomes Japanese,

preserving the myth of homogeneity and validating the power of the dominant subculture group as guardians of tradition and Japanese values in a reproduction of the status quo.

The official crime rate among foreign migrants is inflated because visa violations are a crime. The public not only mistakenly associates police arrests with an indication of criminal behaviour but also does not realise that visa violations are a main reason for official rates of crimes by foreigners to appear larger than Japanese nationals. Other crimes of foreign migrants are sensationalised; blame being put on their nationality and not on the conditions of inequality, which closely relates to the majority of crimes they are arrested for – that of property crimes. The government taking stern measures to deal with this hyped-up foreign threat serves to reinforce a sense of cultural superiority and solidarity among the people reinforcing the status quo.

There have been numerous legal and social changes in post-war Japan regarding foreign migrants. Legal changes have had positive and negative effects on the lives of foreign migrants. For example, the livelihood of permanent residents was improved with a revision of social welfare laws in the early 1980s, granting them the rights to national benefits, while in this new millennium fingerprinting of foreign residents including permanent residents upon re-entry to Japan from a trip abroad has added to their exclusionary status and limited rights from that of Japanese nationals. The socioeconomic condition of foreign migrants also has seen changes through the years. Permanent resident Koreans and that includes the majority of all Korean migrants have reached approximately the same level of completed education and higher-class status level as Japanese. On the other hand, the socioeconomic situation of Western native English language instructors and labourers from developing countries has worsened since the collapse of the so-called Japanese bubble. Regardless, of these and other changes, replication of inequality and deviance has remained constant, largely from the persistence of subordinate pluralism remnant of a caste society.

Ascribed subordinate pluralism as a mode of adaptation for foreign migrants is characterised by legal and social barriers that make it difficult for foreign migrants to become an integral part of Japanese society and hence have a significant influence on a Japanese way of life. The nationality provision of *jus sanguinis* (nationality determined by parent(s) citizenship) disallows the formation of foreign ethnic Japanese national subcultural groups such as Korean-Japanese or French-Japanese. Legal restrictions, social norms, the availability of and access to particular occupations and qualifications of foreign migrants themselves contribute to modal subordinate ascribed occupations for foreign migrant groups, furthering the stereotype of foreigners as different from the dominant cultural group. In a dialectical manner, this also serves as a preventive means to reduce deviance in Japanese society.

Rules (formal and informal norms) and punishment in violation of rules are necessary to maintain social order; without rules and punishment there would be chaos. Social order is also dependent on social solidarity or agreement within a

given population concerning these rules and means of punishment under which they are held accountable, that, in a sizeable population, comes under the authority of the state. Labelling persons as deviants facilitates social solidarity. Lofland (1969, p 303) states: 'The very existence of deviant types provides a common enemy against which otherwise-conflicting groups can unite – a function served also by the existence of chronic international conflict, especially war.' Subsequently, labelling in this way acts as a deterrent to deviance in the wider population. In regards to foreign migrants in Japan, the constant proclivity, through the mass media or simply word of mouth, to point out deviant behaviour of foreign migrants and that they are more inclined to such deviant behaviour because of race, nationality or culture than the dominant cultural group, reinforces social solidarity and adherence to the status quo. It also has contributed to the replication of inequality and deviance.

The ascribed subordinate status of foreign migrant groups along with preoccupation of labelling foreigners as different and sensationalising their deviance are unlikely to change, replaced by a 'new' mode of adaptation. That is, a change to *jus soli* (nationality obtained by birth in-country) as in the case of other modern democratic societies or other means of assimilating foreign migrants runs counter to the very fabric of a perceived homogenous Japan and would weaken social solidarity along with increasing competition for the better jobs or in short would not serve in the interests of the dominant cultural group and would threaten the very power of the dominant subcultural group. Regardless of social change, it is unlikely that ascription as a feature of subordinate pluralism will be replaced by a more egalitarian mode of adaptation and the interrelation of inequality and deviance among foreign migrants will remain fairly constant.

Concluding remarks

From the beginning of a nation-state in Tokugawa Japan, foreigners and Japanese youth have been singled out as major threat to the status quo. The state's reaction has been thorough and swift. Christianity, an antithesis to Japanese religion, introduced by Saint Francis Xavier in the 16th century, spread rapidly and was severely dealt with by the early Tokugawa shoguns in martyrdom of Japanese believers (Reischauer, 1977, p 221). Youth rebellion against the inequality of Tokugawa's 'caste society' was countered by the state outlawing their dress and behaviour and even prosecuting those who 'harboured' offending youth. Subordination of foreign migrants in an ascribed pluralistic manner has persisted over time in spite of social change minimising the assimilation and influence of foreign cultures to the core of Japanese society. Nationalistic educational reforms in pre- and post-war Japan have been implemented, harking on the necessity of maintaining traditional Japanese cultural values to safeguard against, contain and re-socialise a propagated increasingly rebellious young population that has strayed away from traditional Japanese values. Inequality has persisted in the guise of the state's power and crackdowns against Japanese youth and foreign migrants. This

has facilitated the legitimacy, preservation and maintenance of power and privilege by the dominant subculture group amidst conflict in a replicating manner.

FIVE

Conclusion

Short summary of deviance and inequality in Japan

Inequality and deviance was looked at focusing on two quite different subordinate subcultural groups in Japan with one crucial similarity: Japanese youth and foreign migrants were relatively powerless, subordinate to the dominant subcultural group. The degree and extent of inequality between and within both subordinate subcultural groups differed somewhat, still inequality was central to understanding the limited choices, opportunities and rights available to group members to realise their present and future life chances. Class stratification (and nationality for foreign migrant groups) within each subordinate subcultural group related to variations of inequality and different patterns of deviance. Special interest groups, acting on behalf of these subordinate subcultural groups, did not have any significant impact on changing the course of inequality nor did they make any difference in regards to their deviant behaviour. Conflict labelling theory was applied to elucidate on these observed patterns of inequality and deviance. Members of both subordinate subculture groups have invariably entered into an ascribed subordinate status that has affected participation and hence deviant behaviour in a replicating manner regardless of social change.

The study of conflict in Japan

The first in-depth study of conflict in Japan came out 26 years ago aptly titled *Conflict in Japan* (Krauss et al, 1984). The authors began by describing the study of conflict in Japan at that time: 'A book that examines Japanese society and politics through the study of conflict will strike some as an unusual, and even perverse, approach to adopt, given most previous English-language studies of Japan' (Krauss et al, 1984, p 3). While studies of conflict in Japan have received more attention since the early 1980s, the tendency remains to treat Japan as unique.

As this study proceeded, the ubiquity of power clearly showed itself. Issues after issues confronting youth and foreign migrants constantly came across with similar results. Power of the dominant subcultural group proceeded along rather unabatedly, with a march towards nationalism in educational law and fingerprinting of not just all new arrivals in Japan but also permanent residents. These crackdowns were justified by highlighting 'deviance' of youth and foreign migrants. Vulnerability to being labelled and treated unfairly was equally matched by working-class youngsters and working-class among all foreign migrant groups. All of this does not mean that power necessarily escalates in its control over the

'powerless'. It does, though, point out that the fate of the subordinate groups constantly remains under the authority of those that hold power.

Noticeably lacking in the scholarly literature is the very subject of this book, deviance and inequality. The mainstream approach in the study of youth deviance has been to group all youth together, disregarding class. In a similar manner, variable class differences within and between foreign migrant groups and subsequent consequences on behaviour have been overlooked. In short, inequality takes on many forms, with differential effects on the lifestyle and behaviour of youth and foreign migrants and it is best understood within the context of Japanese society, not in some contrived cross-cultural comparison.

While certainly inequality does not explain all deviant behaviour, deviance is multidimensional and a complex phenomenon; however, it does shift our attention away from focusing on the so-called 'culprit' breaking the rules of a powerful party in whose interests such rules were made in the first place. It also leads us to ask what individuals and groups are most vulnerable to breaking the rules and why. Much more work is needed to further our understanding of the interrelation of inequality and deviance or, in general, conflict in Japan; it seems time for a shift in that direction.

Critique of *nihonjinron*

Sugimoto (2003, pp 4, 17) summed up the main characteristics of the *nihonjinron* model. A *nihonjinron* perspective assumes, first, that all Japanese regardless of class, region of the country, gender and so on share the same cultural attributes or behavioural tendency without any noteworthy variation. Second, group orientation, group harmony, mutual cooperation, unity with nature, egalitarianism and racial uniformity are considered inherent features of Japanese society. Finally, Japanese culture is considered to be unique, particularly different from Western culture.

The term *nihonjinron* (theories of being Japanese) is a clumsy concept and, to give more clarity, I will refer to the term as a Japanese cultural perspective. A Japanese cultural perspective is not just a body of writings but also a way of thinking about Japan. It has been espoused by political leaders in calling for social reforms. Beliefs in a Japanese cultural perspective vary from very conservative elements such as Japanese rightists to liberal interpretations. There is also a counter to a Japanese cultural perspective in the internationalisation of Japan, a belief that Japanese are intricately tied in with and share a commonality with the rest of the world. Further complex interpretations regarding a Japanese cultural perspective come about from many Japanese having spent part or even the majority of their lives living in a foreign country. And, there is a good degree of variability among a wide range of subcultural groups in Japan in regards to perspectives on Japanese culture.

In an ironic sense, contradictory to harmony, unity, mutual cooperation and egalitarianism, conflict comes about because there is no nationwide understanding or beliefs in 'being Japanese' and Japanese and non-Japanese alike from all different

walks of life have been critical of *nihonjinron*. Furthermore, a Japanese cultural perspective is not at all unique to Japan as every country has some kind of patriotic calling card that espouses a unique cultural superiority.

Conflict over social policies

Conflict has been an inevitable outcome of social policies brought forth by those in power that have utilised a Japanese cultural perspective as a rationale for change since not all agree with that perspective. The problem, however, has been a rather meek public unwillingness to join in with those who object to nationalistic policies. In recent years, there has been little public support for academicians and teachers against nationalistic educational revisions and for lawyers and foreign migrants opposing a host of discriminate measures against foreigners. Furthermore, in the absence of what C. Wright Mills referred to as a 'sociological imagination' (Robertson, 1981, pp 5-6), and falling into the trap social psychologists call 'group think' (Aronson, 2007, pp 15-19), the public and academia as well get caught up in joining in with opposing camps of ideology or viewpoints rather than taking a closer look at where the problem lies. The 'blame game' proceeds in the interests of the 'parties' involved in a vacuum of methodological attention given to pertinent issues that lay outside of the ideologies and interests themselves.

This book was not written to support or oppose any ideology, interests or political and social objectives. The main purpose was to demonstrate that inequality and deviance are an integral part of Japanese society and no less deserving of attention than what has been the mainstay of writings on Japan, that of egalitarianism, group solidarity and harmony. While it may come across as idealistic, the purport has been to bring up class inequality and conflict that occurs as a result not only because this subject has too long been neglected in academia but also because both those in favour of the status quo and opposing camps somehow have overlooked the very complexity of life itself among a diverse subcultural grouping of people who live in Japan. In regards to any issue, all deserve attention whether they are rich or poor, male or female, Japanese national or foreign migrant.

Future research

The perspective of this book has taken the viewpoint of two subordinate subculture groups but at the same time focused on variability within each subordinate subculture group, particularly class, which divides subcultural group members from each other with a profound bearing on deviance and their life chances. This work is far from complete and there are numerous rough edges throughout the book given time and cost constraints and a piecemeal of available information. Much more work is needed. Suggestions are made for future research.

Japanese youth

Educational reform has been the single largest issue regarding Japanese youth in the past three decades. Since the early 1980s, conflict has characterised revisionist-led state reforms in education. Opposing political parties, academicians, education experts, high-ranking school officials and teachers have voiced their dissent against these revisions, fearing a return to nationalistic state controls characteristic of Japan's militaristic years (Yoder, 1986, 2004; Yoneyama, 1999; Kreitz-Sandberg, 2000). Regardless, the culmination of state revisions of and controls over education has created a snowball effect, escalating to the point where today patriotism has become a central function of education (Nakamura, 2007a, 2007b).

Just before the revisionist fundamental law of education was passed by the Upper House in the Diet, teachers, students and other dissidents gathered in front of the National Diet building, holding up signs that read 'we are against forcing patriotism' and 'we are against state control of education' (*The Japan Times*, 2006d, p 2). The futility of their efforts to stop the eventual passage of the Bill was summed up by one of the protestors: 'Even though we try to draw to the public's attention the dangers of this bill, the influence … [for example of state imposed patriotism] may be invisible. I think that is the scary part' (*The Japan Times*, 2006d, p 2).

Future research would benefit by exploring dissenting viewpoints and failure to stem the tide of state revisionism in education. Particularly, questions need to be raised challenging the Japanese cultural perspective that educational reforms have been necessary because of a breakdown of youth morals and increased youth deviance. That is, while there has been continual conflict over the accumulation of state controls over all facets of youth behaviour from crime to education, the arguments against it have not brought up social class as an issue of importance. Crackdowns appear to have mainly affected working-class youth and reforms have not addressed the issue of class inequality nor youth crime.

Aside from class and youth deviance, educational reforms also need to be looked at to assess whether or not educational reforms are creating a more patriotic young population. A longitudinal study could follow the same children or young adolescents over time to see the impact that these reforms have on their national and world view. And, a long-term longitudinal study could tell us about youth and adult generational changes. Such research is important in order to understand nationalistic trends that may develop out of the revision of the Fundamental Law of Education.

Foreign migrants

The Japanese cultural perspective that espouses Japan as a homogeneous nation with one culture, one race and one language is in itself a seed of conflict for foreign migrants. Not only does such a viewpoint dampen assimilation for foreign migrants but also it has been attributed to 'uniqueness' that in turn has been equated by both Japanese and non-Japanese writers with Japan's success in

business or combating social problems. The myth of homogeneity and uniqueness has relegated the study of foreign migrants as something of an aberration not significant to understanding Japanese society. This neglect along with extreme inequality has hampered the ability of foreign migrants to become organised and voice their discontent, bringing to the public's attention a plethora of issues regarding their caste-like status and deviance as a consequence of inequality.

The largest and most organised foreign migrant group – Koreans – have received the most public and academic attention in conflict with the dominant culture and Japanese cultural perspective. However, emphasis has been put on conflict of nationality, not class conflict. The breakdown of Koreans by class and subsequent different lifestyles and conflict with the dominant culture group deserves attention.

Aside from Koreans, little attention has been given to the problems that other foreign migrants face in Japan. The various issues of conflict confronting foreign migrants that have been brought out in this book, from discrimination in Japanese professional baseball to the plight of undocumented workers and the importance of class to understanding deviance within each foreign migrant group, introduced a few of many neglected issues of inequality and deviance for foreign migrants. These need further attention.

Other areas in need of research

Cross-cultural comparisons, many adopting a Japanese cultural perspective, have been popular in writings about Japan. Links are made directly from culture (a vague and abstract concept) to specific human behaviours. Subcultural particularly class variations are ignored and sweeping cultural value and normative generalisations come about most often comparing Japan with the US, focusing on the family, business, schools, crime or even contrasting psychological states of mind (Bayley, 1976; Vogel, 1980; Christopher, 1984; DeVos and Wagatsuma, 1984; Kanazawa and Miller, 2000; Weiten, 2004).

It seems that for whatever reason, much of the post-war research on Japan has tried the impossible, like trying to run before one can walk. That is, before understanding the diversity and dynamics of Japan with a focus on its many component parts such as social class, regions and subcultural groups, researchers have been preoccupied with how Japan as a whole fares in comparison to the rest of the world. It is even more baffling why comparisons have been made with Western societies that are far different from Japan than neighbour countries such as Korea and China. Future research would do well by taking a closer look inside Japan before considering cross-cultural comparisons and if comparisons are to be made, begin with countries close by in order to at least have some control over historical, sociocultural, subcultural and geographical differences.

The field of conflict, inequality, deviance and subordinate subcultures in Japan is wide open. I cannot think of any other study area that is so important to understanding the dynamics of everyday life in Japan and yet has received such little attention. The list of subordinate subculture groups is long and diverse such

as women, working class, student failures, single-parent mothers, physically disabled people, and people with learning difficulties, welfare recipients, ethnic and religious minority groups, gays and lesbians, day labourers and so on. Inequality simply breeds deviance and we need to know much more about features of inequality, how it is justified and maintained and the commonalities and diverse forms of deviance among subordinate subcultures that result as a consequence.

I would argue that part of the reason for an overabundance of writing about Japan on political and corporate leaders, efficacy of big business, and middle-class society, and works that emphasise conformity, harmony, egalitarianism and uniqueness, while little attention has been given to studies of conflict particularly class and subordinate subculture groups, is the lack of diversity in researchers. It is hoped that more future research be based on research in-country and from a more heterogeneous set of researchers. Research opportunities should be extended to more Japanese women from many walks of life, to Japanese and foreign migrant educators regardless of their status position, to freelance writers, to minority groups in Japan, to Japanese who have lived a considerable part of their lives outside of Japan and to long-term foreign migrants of all nationalities in Japan.

Final words

It is often assumed that social disruptions (such as riots, protests, demonstrations and marches) are strong indications of worsening inequality while their absence reflects social harmony and equality. Yet, visible conflict does not equate with an increase of inequality; in fact, the relation may even be just the opposite since the more powerful a particular group is the easier it is to control other groups in the competition for scarce resources (Schermerhorn, 1978). It is only by being organised, having reasonable expectations for improvement and with at least some support in the wider society particularly among those with power, that subordinate subcultural groups are able to take action and voice their discontent in an appreciable manner.

The relation of inequality and deviance shows a similar dialectical relationship that while it portrays conflict in society, it also points to the avoidance of conflict. That subordinate subcultural group protests and demonstrations have not gained widespread public support in post-war Japan has nothing to do with harmony and is far from being egalitarian; rather, it reflects on how inequality and deviance of subordinate subcultural groups has, ironically, worked in the interests of those with power and privilege to the detriment of the powerless.

No set of values and standards of any society should be imposed on another society or in the larger sense an 'international' dictum of the same. Outside pressures on Japan to change in whatever way must consider the repercussions of such changes within the context of Japan itself. Inequality and deviance are problematic in Japan, no better or worse than any other modern democratic capitalistic society. The subject is a relative matter; each society has its own way of managing and controlling human affairs. Power and privilege are universal

to all societies and favouring certain groups over others leads to inequality and deviance. I would argue that a more fair treatment of individuals regardless of age and nationality would benefit Japan. Still, any longlasting change can only come about from the people living in Japan; it is their choice and at present democracy is an integral and valued way of life in Japan that allows the opportunity to make a difference in the quality of life for the less fortunate.

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APPENDIX A

Notes on methodology

Getting started: conceptualisation

Research begins with an interest, ideas and a plan of what to look for. I started this research interested in the link between inequality and deviance for subordinate groups in Japan. At the beginning, Japanese women were included along with Japanese youth and foreign migrants as subordinate groups. In research, however, things do not always go as planned. Japanese women represent more than half the population and the complexity of adequately covering inequality and deviance for them became too large and beyond what this one writer could do. Having already collected a good deal of data on Japanese women, it was then decided that some of this information could be included as a transitional phase of inequality and deviance for Japanese females from adolescence to adulthood in the chapter on Japanese youth.

It was essential to set up a design that allowed for a meaningful, consistent and compatible inquiry. Initially, the main concepts such as inequality, deviance, Japanese youth and foreign migrants were defined and time-ordered relationships set forth such as deviance to be explained by or dependent on inequality. The study proceeded in an inductive manner. Unlike the traditional deductive method where hypotheses are deducted from theory and then tested, induction proceeds by collecting the data and matching the data with an appropriate theory. Given that little had been done on the subject of inequality and deviance in Japan, particularly the link between the two concepts, induction seemed to be a more suitable method than a deductive approach.

While data gathering and inductive interpretation characterised the research, data gathering proceeded based on a conceptual schema that lent itself to a conflict interpretation. Inequality as a mainstay concept needed a common conceptual link for youth and foreign migrants and that was done utilising the concept of subcultures. Conflict theory with its emphasis on power and privilege differentials in society was applicable to the conditions of inequality and, subsequently, deviance. Both youth and foreign migrants are in a subordinate status to adults with the power and privilege to maintain and control societal affairs, the dominant subculture group. In regards to human rights, youth are subordinate to adults and foreign migrants secondary to Japanese nationals. Realising within-group inequality, class stratification for each subordinate subculture group was also considered relevant to power and privilege differentials and variations of deviance. These theoretical and conceptual concerns served as guidelines for collecting the data.

There was no preconceived notion of just what would turn up in regards to indicators of inequality or the relation between indicators of inequality and indicators of deviance. I had done previous research on Japanese youth, class and deviance (Yoder, 1986, 2004) and borrowed somewhat from that, still for this research, inequality and deviance were conceptualised and indicators collected in a manner appropriate and applicable to both Japanese youth and foreign migrants. In regards to foreign migrants, I knew little about their situation before this research and the data brought forth many surprises. For one, the high degree of ascription relative to occupations was an unexpected finding that came from the data. If occupations were more diversified for each foreign migrant group, a different interpretation would have occurred.

Observations and secondary data

The experience of living in Japan covering four decades and 30 years in-country that began in 1972 as a college student at Sophia University in Tokyo certainly has had an influence in the research and writing of this book. There are both advantages and disadvantages to this. Weber's (Coser, 1977, pp 221-2) discourse on 'value free' and Lofland and Lofland's (1984, pp 11-19) words of advice to researchers intimately tied into the setting point to 'cautionary' points of consideration. As an academician non-Japanese but long-term resident, the advantage is a relative ease in conducting research in-country and from many years of experience but not part of the dominant culture group able to distance myself and take a rather critical observation of what is going on in everyday life. The disadvantage is as an outsider and from personal experiences the tendency is to identify with other subordinate subculture groups, making it difficult to be 'value free.' Keeping this in mind, efforts were made to be as objective as possible in data collection and interpretation although subjectivity is unavoidable in any research.

After organising the basic flow plan of the research, the study progressed in a cumulative manner, beginning with the first chapter. Observations and use of secondary data proceeded focusing on one subordinate subculture group at a time, which began with Japanese youth. Data gathering while writing on each chapter continued constantly from the very start of the research in the summer of 2005.

Data gathering aimed to collect a variety of sources and as many sources that were credibly reliable to enhance validity and check on reliability. Sources ranged from a widely read mass media source, *The Japan Times*, to scholarly works. Internet sites were also screened for relevant information. At the same time, eyes and ears were open for talks with others and observations made relevant to the two subordinate subculture groups whenever possible.

As Lofland and Lofland (1984, p 8) aptly put it: 'The concerns you bring to the doing of social analysis may also arise from accidents of remote biography and personal history – of residence, ethnicity, gender, sexual preference, past identities or experiences, family customs, class of origin, religion and so forth'. That is, each

has a personal history that leads to exploring this social problem in a particular way and not another.

Admittedly, concerns with youth deviance and in general social class are no accident. Subtly, this author has from an early age identified 'self' with the working class and, in particular, troubled youth behaviour. Realising this, careful attention has been given to details rather than subjective commentary or value judgements regarding class and behaviour. The advantage, however, of familiarity with the working class has been simply considering class as an essential part of human behaviour.

Drawing on past experience with entertainment districts, more attention was paid to the on-goings there once the study began in 2005. Through the years, a good deal of time and familiarity has come about frequenting the largest entertainment in Japan located in the *Kabuki-cho* district in the Shinjuku area of Tokyo and other although smaller entertainment districts in the suburbs of Japan, mainly in the Kanagawa area. Acquaintances with Japanese and foreign migrants from an array of nationalities that work in these entertainment districts has brought home an awareness and inside perspective of their jobs and working-class situation. Also, natural observations have been carried out in other places where foreign migrants gather, for example at parks in the Tokyo area, Chinatown in Yokohama, places of worship, various ethnic restaurants in Tokyo and Kanagawa prefecture and so on. Conversations were done in the Japanese language with Japanese and most Asian foreign migrants; usually, talks with Filipinos were done in English.

Observations have always been made alone and naturally. There has been no attempt to interview anyone, observations pick up one thing, follow it for a while, notice consistencies and changes and so on. People, whether at an ethnic restaurant or working in an entertainment district, are adept at knowing your presence, and the more times you go, the more likely others will open up to you. Careful attention has always been made to keep with the law and cause no harm. Things do happen, however, respect for others and a sincere interest goes a long way to being accepted.

While familiar with teaching in Japan, once this study began, I paid particular attention to the role, status and hiring and firing of foreign migrant instructors in private language schools and in lower and higher education. Aside from collecting various data through many means, numerous informal conversations have taken place with educators' particularly part-time foreign college instructors, all of this part of a network of interrelationships that this author has been a part of for many years.

Class measurements

For class measurement, in Japanese, I utilised an occupational and industrial census. The occupational and industrial census lists the same categories of employment status. There are six employment statuses: regular employee, temporary employee, executives (or directors), self-employed employing others, solely self-employed

and family workers. As mentioned elsewhere, compatible with Hashimoto's (2003) class schema, those self-employed employing others were considered capitalists, executives (or directors) as executives or directors, solely self-employed and family workers as old middle class, regular workers, depending on occupational category, new middle class or working class, and temporary employees as working class.

The occupational census listed four categories of the new middle class (professional and technical workers, managers and officials, clerical and related workers and protective security) and five categories of the working class (workers in sales; services; agricultural, forestry and fisheries; transportation and communication; production process workers and labourers). One category, defined as not classifiable, included a very small number and was not included in class measurement. The census also classifies occupations by gender and following Hashimoto's (2003) schema, female clerical and related workers were put into the working class.

Discussed earlier, the census distorts the actual working situation of Westerners by placing part-time and limited-term contract English language instructors at private language schools, elementary schools, secondary schools, special schools, colleges and universities in the professional and technical workers occupational category. A proportion of these professional and technical workers are full-time instructors at two-year colleges and universities who receive full-time benefits and they were classified as the new middle class based on an estimate of the number of full-time Western college and university instructors.

The number of all full-time foreign migrant college and university instructors was taken from McVeigh (2002, p 267) for the 2000 census while similar data from the Ministry of Education, Culture and Labour (2000, 2001) was applied to the 2004 census. McVeigh's (2002) information is based on educational data in 1996, a few years earlier than the Ministry of Education, Culture and Labour's data, and both datasets are three to four years earlier than the census data they were applied to. Although McVeigh's (2002) data and the Ministry of Education, Culture and Labour (2000, 2001) data are both a few years earlier than the census, there were no indications that the number of full-timers had changed significantly.

An estimation in the 2000 census (and the same for the 2004 census) of the number of American, Australian, British and Canadian full-time college and university instructors was done by taking all regular employees listed under professional and specialist categories among foreign migrants, that number being 55,775, and then the number for each Western country professional and specialist as a proportion of that total. For example, in the 2000 census, 10,364 Americans are listed as regular employees in the occupation of professional and specialists. The proportion of these 10,364 of the total 55,775 is 19%. There are 4,854 full-time college and university positions held by non-Japanese. Thus, 19% of the 4,854 full-time college and university positions, or 922 Americans, were considered full-time college or university instructors and put into the new middle class. The others, or 9,442, were considered working class, most of them English conversation teachers at private English language schools and less so part-time

and limited-term contract instructors at special schools, secondary schools and colleges without full-time benefits.

The misleading census classification of including a large number of limited-term Western native English language instructors as professionals and specialists is quite evident when compared to Korean migrants, also a well educated foreign migrant group. While the Korean migrant working population is 14.5 times greater than the American migrant working population, the number of professional and specialists is not that different, 14,279 Korean migrants to 10,364 American migrants. Using the above estimate of full-time American migrant college instructors and controlling for working population differences (14.5 times 922), the number of American professional and specialists at 13,369 would be approximately the same as the number of Korean professional and specialists. For British migrant professional and specialists (3,890), with an estimated 340 full-time college instructors, and a forty-four times lower working population than Korean migrants, the number of British professional and specialists compared to the same for Korean migrants would even be higher at 14, 960. In short, the estimate in the number of professional and specialists for Western foreign migrants is on par with other foreign migrant groups by correcting for the misleading classification of a large number of limited-term Western native English language instructors as professionals and specialists.

Baseball: interest, concepts and measurements

Having played organised baseball from Little League through high school in California and a baseball fan from my childhood, I immediately took to Japanese professional baseball as a college student in Japan in 1972. It soon became apparent to me that foreign baseball players didn't last long in Japanese professional baseball and I wondered why. Over the years I came across articles in the newspapers that criticised the early release of foreign ballplayers from Japanese professional baseball teams and became suspect of discrimination against foreign ballplayers. This prompted data gathering to further look into discrimination against foreign migrant baseball players.

Conceptualisation and measurement

Many years ago, I did independent research on trades, performance and race in American professional football and adopted a similar schema for the baseball analysis of foreign migrant ballplayers on Japanese professional baseball teams. Information on Japanese professional baseball was largely taken from handbooks (Graczyk, 1996 to 2008) on all Japanese and foreign baseball players covering the past baseball seasons or baseball statistics of the baseball seasons from 1995 to 2007 and baseball rosters from 1996 to 2008.

Release rates referred to the percentage of ballplayers released from their team after the completion of the baseball season. The team roster of about 70 players

lists the names of all players signed to play for that year. If a player's name, for example, appeared on the 1996 team roster but not the 1997 roster, it meant that the player was either released or traded to another team. Trades are also listed on each team's roster. If the player, for example, was listed on the 1996 team roster but not the 1997 team roster and had not been traded, then he was considered to be released from the team.

The baseball-playing career of all baseball players on Japanese professional baseball teams was calculated by using the team rosters and averaging how many years a foreign migrant and Japanese ballplayer played baseball at the finish of his baseball career. The roster lists the number of years each ballplayer has played professional baseball in Japan and thus a Japanese ballplayer, for example, who was listed on the team roster in 1996 as having played eight years but was not on any team roster in 1997, had a playing career of nine years. Each ballplayer was followed over their entire baseball career covering the time period from 1995 to 2007.

Baseball performance referred to how well a baseball player played baseball during the baseball season. The two most critical performances for professional baseball players are pitching and batting. Pitchers are judged by the number of runs the opposing team scores against them, the fewer the runs allowed the better the pitcher. Fielders (catcher, infielder and outfielder) are judged by how well they hit the ball based on batting average and power performance, mainly home runs. The higher the batting average and the more number of home runs, the better the player is. Thus, baseball performance of pitchers was measured by their earned run average (ERA) or the average number of runs the pitcher allows the opposing team to score over nine innings (excepting a tie game, nine innings complete a baseball game) and for the other position players their batting average and number of home runs.

Based on my own baseball-playing experience and as an avid fan of baseball, an index of baseball performance was devised that measured baseball performance. Each foreign player was compared to all other Japanese players that played the same position, on the same team and in the same year to assess whether their baseball performance was better, in the same range or worse. A pitcher with a lower ERA of 1.5 or more than another pitcher was considered to be a significantly better pitcher. A fielder with a batting average of 50 points or higher or within the same batting range (49 points or less) but 10 or more home runs than another fielder of the same position was considered to be a significantly better player. If two pitchers had an ERA that did not differ more than 1.49 ERA, they were considered as being in the same range of baseball performance. For batters who had a batting average no different than 49 points and neither had 10 or more home runs than another batter, their baseball performance was considered to be in the same range of baseball performance.

First-year ballplayers: young rookies and older ballplayers

Total baseball comparisons were made combining the datasets of Japanese and young foreign rookies with first-year Japanese ballplayers traded and older foreign rookies (a few traded). The two datasets are presented below. While the discrepancy of baseball performance and release rates for rookies was stronger than with older ballplayers, still, in both datasets foreign ballplayers were unexpectedly released even though they played better baseball.

Table A1: Baseball performance and release rates by nationality, Japanese and young foreign rookies, 1996-2008

	Baseball performance			
Nationality and released/ resigned	Foreigner better % (n)	Same range % (n)	Japanese better % (n)	Total (n)
Foreign player released/ Japanese player resigned	91% (29)	100% (18)	100% (12)	(59)
Japanese player released/ foreign player resigned	9% (3)	0% (0)	0% (0)	(3)
Total % (n)	100% (32)	100% (18)	100% (12)	(62)

Source: Data compiled from Japan's Pro Baseball Handbooks (Graczyk, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008; Miyama, 2007; *Ofuisharu beesubaru gaido* (official baseball guide), 2008).

Table A2: Baseball performance and release rates by nationality, older Japanese and older foreign first-year ballplayers, 1996-2008

	Baseball performance			
Nationality and released/ resigned	Foreigner better % (n)	Same range % (n)	Japanese better % (n)	Total (n)
Foreign player released/ Japanese player resigned	42% (28)	76% (38)	94% (47)	(113)
Japanese player released/ foreign player resigned	58% (39)	24% (12)	6% (3)	(54)
Total % (n)	100% (67)	100% (50)	100% (50)	(167)

Source: Data compiled from Japan's Pro Baseball Handbooks (Graczyk, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008; Miyama, 2007; *Ofuisharu beesubaru gaido* (official baseball guide), 2008).

Baseball career of first-year ballplayers

The baseball careers of first-year ballplayers were comparatively quite similar. Even though Japanese and young foreign rookie ballplayers' past baseball experience were in different countries, comparatively, one group had no significant advantage to perform better than the other group. Japanese rookie ballplayers have the advantage of being groomed in Japanese baseball from an early age and having

had the experience of being the top Japanese ballplayers in Japan during high school, college and playing for independent league teams in Japan. The advantage for foreign rookie ballplayers is that more of them have had experience playing baseball in an American professional baseball organisation. Before playing their first year of baseball in Japan, most North and South American rookies played major or minor league baseball (each American professional baseball team has four minor league teams, rookie, A, AA and AAA). While about half (11 of 21) played on the major league team, the others on the minor league teams, most of these players on the major league team were not starting position players and only one had some success. Most rookies from Asian countries played college baseball in their home country or professional baseball in Taiwan or Korea. A few Chinese and Japanese-Brazilian rookie baseball players lived in Japan and were signed as free agents. Finally, one Japanese professional baseball team runs a baseball camp in the Dominican Republic and most Dominican Republic rookie baseball players came from that baseball camp. Overall, the advantages of each group seems to balance out so that on average Japanese rookies and young foreign rookies have about an equal chance of performing well in their first year of playing professional baseball in Japan.

For Japanese ballplayers traded and older foreign first-year (27 years of age and older) ballplayers, their baseball careers matched quite well. Japanese ballplayers traded were not star players before the trade although some were at one time but played fairly regularly before being traded. Foreign ballplayers had similar experience in professional baseball albeit outside of Japan. The majority (62%) played on American professional baseball teams before their first year of professional baseball in Japan but 73% of these players were not starting players and none were star players. Twenty-four per cent of foreign players played minor league baseball in America, 12% played on professional baseball teams in Taiwan and Korea and 2% played in the Mexican baseball league before their first year of professional baseball in Japan. While the experience of having played professional baseball in Japan for a number of years was an advantage for Japanese ballplayers, this was balanced by most foreign ballplayers having played at a higher (American professional baseball) level of baseball although not bona fide star players.

Foreign migrant English language instructors at Japanese colleges

The hiring of foreign migrant instructors at Japanese colleges (two and four year) is not based on any set criteria. Each department and college has their own way of hiring foreign migrant instructors. The largest number of foreign migrant instructors hired by Japanese colleges is English language instructors, most native English language speakers from America, Canada, the UK, Australia and New Zealand. The hiring procedure and role of the native-speaking English language instructor at Japanese colleges is described below.

English language programmes at Japanese colleges are set up in three general ways. First, English language is a department. Next, English language is one of the languages taught and usually the largest faculty in a foreign language department. Finally, English language courses are taught in a department that has nothing to do with foreign languages, for example, an English language programme in a social science department.

The attraction of students to study English at a Japanese college is the opportunity to learn from native-speaking English language instructors largely since English language teaching in secondary schools is dominated by Japanese instructors. How college departments are able to meet the students' desire for native-speaking English language instructors while limiting the number of tenure foreign migrant instructors follows.

The college system is set up in a way that the far majority of tenured and tenure track positions are only open to and held by Japanese. Japanese with a graduate degree from an English-speaking country, preferably America, the UK or Australia, usually a Master's degree and fewer with a PhD as well as an undergraduate degree from a top university in Japan are at the top of the list for tenure as an English language instructor. Only a token number of tenure track positions in a college department are open to foreign native-speaking English language instructors even though most hold a Master's degree and increasingly more a doctorate degree. Conversely, a disproportionately large number of foreign native-speaking English language instructors are hired part time on a one-year contract with absolutely no benefits in an English language or foreign language department.

The replacement of tenured English language instructors is done on an exclusionary nationality basis. Tenured Japanese professors leaving the university (usually retirement) are usually replaced by a Japanese national. The only possibility of an English language foreign instructor to attain tenure is an opening of the much less number of tenured slot(s) allocated to English language foreign instructors. However, since tenured English language foreign instructors plan to stay on until they retire or in unusual circumstances (illness etc) are forced to leave, there is little hope for the part-time English language foreign instructors of a full-time position and that is even dependent on whether the department considers part-time instructors for tenure.

English language programmes in non-language departments usually separate the English language instructors from all other instructors in the department. Often given a name, such as special English language programme, students in the department are required to take a given number of English language courses and are placed in English language levels appropriate to their English language ability, ranging from low to high. A common range is to have from 10 to 30 part-time Western English language instructors. Some English language programmes only have part-time Western English language instructors while others have as many if not a few more Japanese part-time English language instructors. There may also be a small number of full-time limited-term (commonly from two to three years) Western English language instructors who are not rehired after the end of their

contract. In an all-Western English language programme there may or may not be one and less so two full-time tenured or limited-term full-time instructor (s) in charge of the English language programme. If there is not a full-time Western migrant instructor in charge of the programme, the part-time Western English language instructors are placed under the supervision of a Western or Japanese tenured instructor in the main department.

A variant to English language programmes in a non-language department is to hire only native English language speakers as part-time instructors under the direction and supervision of the department. The number of exclusively only part-time native (most from North America and the UK) English-speaking language instructors varies although a number ranging from 10 to 20 is not unusual. There may be one full-time limited-term Western or Japanese fluent English language speaker (from years of living abroad) instructor acting as a liaison between the department and part-time Western instructors but all decisions and actions lies within the department itself. There is no possibility of tenure for all of these part-time Western instructors since there are no positions of tenure in the English language programme, they are not considered for full-time employment or tenure in the department itself and they are distanced from all matters regarding the department.

The recent role of dispatch companies hiring and sending Western English language instructors to college departments as part-time instructors has upped discrimination against Western college instructors. Dispatch companies hire and pay native English language instructors by the hour as temporary employees, a salary lower than part-time instructors hired directly by the college department. These companies contract their teachers with college departments, making a profit, as what the colleges pay out for the contract is greater than the wages the dispatch company pays to their employed instructors. College departments also save money as what they pay to the dispatch companies for part-time instructors is lower than what they would have to pay for part-time instructors hired directly. This then further lowers the status and pay of part-time college instructors and reduces the number of part-time instructors directly hired by the college, all at the expense of well-educated Western English language instructors for the profit of dispatch companies and college departments.

APPENDIX B

Issues and cases of inequality and deviance

Readers in Council and cases of inequality and deviance

Two days a week, letters sent from the readers of *The Japan Times* are printed in the Readers in Council section of the newspaper. These letters are screened by the newspaper staff for credibility and contributors have to include their full name and address to the newspaper. While there are problematic issues of validity and reliability regarding the content of these letters, the letters printed show reasonable consistency with other letters regarding the same issue.

Once this research began, I collected on a daily basis letters from the 'Readers in Council' relevant to inequality and deviance in Japan. These letters connect well with the secondary literature on related topics and most writers appeared knowledgeable about the particular subject they wrote about. The letters represent personal experiences and subjectivity regarding matters of concern from non-Japanese living in Japan. In this regards, they are the 'reality' of the writers and give us a good insight into life in Japan from their point of view.

Nationalism and Japanese youth

Increasing nationalism in Japan has been a topic of concern by readers of *The Japan Times*. Quite a few letters wrote about a step-up of patriotism in the schools and its effect on teachers and the students. One letter from a foreign migrant teacher conveyed a prejudicial nationalistic attitude in an overheard conversation that took place between three Japanese high-school teachers regarding Japan's war-time occupation of Korea and China:

> It breaks my heart that there are still teachers teaching students extreme and unfounded facts today. Recently a conversation exchange among a few Japanese high school teachers where I also work caught my attention. These were teachers in their 20s teaching social studies, Japanese language and English. Here is part of one conversation:
>
> SS [social science teacher]: Koreans should appreciate the fact that Japanese occupied them and educated them 50 years ago. Also, the Koreans owe their economic growth today to the Japanese.

> JL [Japanese language teacher]: I don't understand why the Koreans and Chinese are upset. When Japan led troops to their countries, they were barbaric, living on bare ground. We gave them everything.
>
> EL [English language teacher]: Do you all know that Chinese and other countries lie about the number of people killed in the Nanjing massacre?
>
> JL: They do! What's the number?
>
> I finally cut in to ask if they truly believed what they were talking about and they answered affirmatively. They also said they would pass on information they accept to their students. (Readers in Council, 2005, p 12)

Sensationalising of the mass media

Many readers complained against the sensationalising of foreign crime by the mass media contributing to Japanese prejudicial views of foreigners as criminals. Crimes by foreigners are blown up, crime statistics distorted and foreigners considered 'guilty before innocent' by the mass media. One such example follows:

> The TV coverage of the Dec. 14 shootings at a Sasebo sports club was deplorable. A reporter from one TV channel implied on many occasions that a 'gaikokujin' (foreigner) was most likely the shooter. I imagine his guess was based, at best, on an erroneous interpretation or, at worse, willful misrepresentation of reports by eyewitnesses indicating that the shooter was between 170 and 190 cm tall, that he wore camouflage attire (suggesting he might be a member of US military forces based in town), and that the crime was conducted in a violent, rampage style that only foreigners are assumed to be capable of.
>
> That idiotic reporter managed to get my Japanese wife (and probably thousands of other TV viewers) to believe without a doubt that the culprit must have been a foreigner. Imagine my wife's face when I told her that I thought the murderer was probably a regular Japanese man, and not yakuza. The crime happened in an area of town where US military don't go, in a sports club that neither foreigners nor yakuza would ever patronize, and that the weapon was a shotgun. From a tactical angle, a military person or yakuza would have used a pistol, which is easier to conceal. But then I'm no Sherlock Holmes.
>
> The media must stop brainwashing Japanese people into believing that only foreigners commit crimes in Japan! They should do their research before saying or printing something. Their words can cause a lot of damage. How would Japanese feel if every time they visited

> a foreign country, the locals there automatically suspected them of being criminals!? (Readers in Council, 2007c, p 10)

Prejudice and discrimination against foreign migrants

Many letters have been written about discrimination against foreign migrant English language teachers in Japan. The ALT (Assistant Language Teachers) programme in Japan that hires foreign English native language (mostly North American, British and Australian) teachers to teach English in elementary and secondary schools has come under criticism by foreign migrant instructors as this letter points out:

> I've worked as an ALT here for a few years and, while I've been generally fortunate in the support from the company and at the schools I've worked at, the sheer number of horror stories that teachers swap among themselves boggles the mind.
>
> The rate of turnover at dispatch companies is a testament to the inconsistent (and blatantly illegal) manner in which they treat employees. The refusal to insure employees or provide leave as required by law and the frequent writing of contracts in varying language (one for government, one for us) are really frustrating.
>
> As someone who genuinely enjoys the work that I've put in at each school, it's saddening to realize that teachers who want to commit to education here are shunted aside in favor of whatever is cheapest for the budget. (Readers in Council, 2008a, p 10)

An abundant number of letters were sent to the Readers in Council regarding the Nova downfall, bringing out the horrid condition of teaching English in Japan for foreign migrants, most native English language speakers from Western countries. One such letters is as follows:

> I am happy that the government is helping out students who lost so much money after the chain of Nova language schools closed last fall. But I have seen few signs of the government caring for the teachers who were left out in the cold.
>
> Many students could go home in their cars and complain to their families about their problems. For some ex-teachers, there was little outlet, and the landlords who wanted them out of apartments tossed them out like garbage. Students got angry with teachers and staff even thought the Nova crash wasn't their fault. For some teachers, there was no way back home to their respective countries. I personally waited and waited for the government to help out in some manner before Nova crashed. Instead it just let Nova fall. (Readers in Council, 2008b, p 10)

And, here is another letter responding to the Nova fiasco:

> This scenario is nothing new, or is it surprising to foreigners who have lived here for a few years, such as myself. Greed and dishonesty know no bounds with those Japanese employers who regularly engage in shortchanging their employees and sidestepping their contractual agreements. Of the five English schools I've worked for since I've been here, four have not paid my salary in full or have attempted not to do so. (Readers in Council, 2007a, p 14)

Feelings of being shunned or simply not accepted have been seen as a problem of living in Japan, leading non-Japanese to return to their homeland (*The Japan Times*, 2008g, p 16, 2008h, p 16). One visitor to Japan felt that such avoidance was racist:

> I would like to address the racism I was faced with on a recent visit to Kyoto. I am a well-dressed, educated professional woman who was in Japan recently to visit my son who was studying there. People would not sit next to me on subways or trains, pulled their children away if I sat down, and jumped up when they sat next to me not knowing I was a foreigner until I turned in their direction. It tainted my entire visit to Japan.
>
> I could not appreciate the beauty or culture of a city whose inhabitants made it quite clear that I was something to be shunned. I have been a high school teacher for 34 years and have faced many trying times, but I have never felt the disgust I felt from the citizens of Kyoto. I have traveled to Europe every year for the last 20 years and never have I felt so bad about visiting another country. My son would not be studying Japanese if I had filled him with the same hatred and dislike that the people of Kyoto have obviously taught their children. I felt very bad about leaving him behind in such a place. Why did the citizens of Kyoto act the way they did? (Readers in Council, 2006, p 12)

Quite a few letters complained about being randomly stopped by the police and asked to show their alien registration card, required by law to be 'on person' at all times. Here is once such letter:

> I just want to say I understand the reasoning behind the gaijin card checks but think the number of times that some of us are stopped is unfair and just a way to embarrass and harass us.
>
> The best place to meet in Nagoya, for instance, is the 'golden clock' in front of Takashimaya. A particular female police sergeant must have a bad memory because she has stopped me the most. I don't want to use the 'race card' here, but being black doesn't help in this country. I've been stopped in front of Takashima about 13 times and have lived

> in Japan for only six months. I am pretty tired of it, and have started to take pictures of the officers who stop me with my phone and shown them every time they decide to stop me.
>
> I have tried asking the officers for their ID card before handing mine over but I'm greeted with threats, or what seem like threats, the walkie-talkie microphone held in my face. It's unfortunate I can't go to Takashimaya to meet my friends now. (Readers in Council, 2007b, p 10)

This final letter reflects on sanctions meted out to non-Japanese instructors should they make an issue of any 'wrongdoing' against them:

> In my first time teaching a given homeroom, I divided the class into groups to play an introduction game. Two friends were put on different teams. They showed their displeasure by overturning their desks, kicking out the room, sliding doors, then assaulting me with punches and kicks outside of class. A few weeks later at the same school, a Japanese teacher was attacked for trying to break up a quarrel between a very big student and his ex-girlfriend. That incident brought two police cars and two city hall vehicles to the school and resulted in a one-week suspension for the student. My incident did not even result in the offending students being brought into the principal's office. The only thing that came of it was that my contract was not renewed the following year since there was opposition to my wishing to have the police called if I was attacked again. The students in question stalked me in the halls and repeatedly kicked in the doors in the rooms where I was teaching. Later I happened to work with a teacher who had been at the same junior high school the semester before me. It turns out he, too, was attacked and the woman who came after him quit after two weeks of harassment. I later learned that the person who had followed me was soon hospitalized for a stress-related disorder. It seems that along with baseball and soft tennis, the most popular club at this school was foreign-teacher beating, yet nothing was ever done. Do the good people of Japan really want their junior high school students graduating with the lesson that violence is fine, as long as it is directed at non-Japanese? (Readers in Council, 2009, p 12)

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"In this groundbreaking work, Robert Yoder details Japan's diversity by examining 17 groups, illustrating the linkages among inequality, deviance and migration."
Brian McVeigh, Department of East Asian Studies, University of Arizona

"Yoder's unique contribution to the growing literature on inequality in Japan links the marginalisation of working-class Japanese youth and the treatment of foreign workers, including intriguing analyses of discriminatory treatment of foreign professional baseball players and the class and occupational hierarchy among foreign workers."
Patricia Steinhoff, Department of Sociology, University of Hawaii at Manoa

Japanese youth and foreign migrants face stringent institutionalised controls in Japan. This book questions the efficacy of such social controls, focusing on the interrelation of inequality (powerlessness, discriminate controls and class inequality) and deviance (largely derived from power and the violation of informal and formal norms). It provides a comprehensive detailed description and explanation of inequality and deviance of Japanese youth and 17 foreign migrant groups. The book is aimed at individuals, students and academicians interested in Japan area studies.

ROBERT STUART YODER is a long-term resident of Japan and has taught at a number of universities including University of California, Irvine and Sophia University in Tokyo. He has undertaken extensive research on deviance and inequality in Japan. Today, Robert is Adjunct Professor of Psychology and Sociology at Japan Branch, Lakeland College in Tokyo and instructor at several Japanese universities.

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