The background of the cover features a light blue tint. In the center, there are silhouettes of a man and a woman standing side-by-side, facing each other. A semi-transparent world map is overlaid on the lower half of the image, with the continents in a darker shade of blue. The overall aesthetic is clean and professional.

# developing partnerships

GENDER,  
SEXUALITY,  
AND THE  
REFORMED  
WORLD BANK

KATE BEDFORD

developing  
partnerships

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**KATE BEDFORD**



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*For Dulcie Bedford and Daph Baker.  
Be Seeing You.*

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## ABBREVIATIONS

CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CNM	Consejo Nacional de la Mujer (National Women's Council, Argentina)
CONAMU	Consejo Nacional de las Mujeres Ecuatorianas (National Women's Council of Ecuador)
CORPEI	Corporación de Promoción de Exportaciones e Inversiones (Export and Investment Promotion Corporation, Ecuador)
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
GAD	Gender and Development
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA	International Development Association
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFIs	International financial institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean, a World Bank regional designation
LIL	Learning and Innovation Loan
MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
PRODEPINE	Proyecto de desarrollo de los pueblos indígenas y Afroecuatorianos (Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian People's Development Project)
PROFAM	Programa de Promoción del Fortalecimiento de la Familia y el Capital Social (Family Strengthening and Social Capital Promotion Program)

PROGEN	Proyecto de Asistencia Técnica en Género (Gender Technical Assistance Project)
PROGENIAL	Programa de Género e Innovación para América Latina (Program for Gender Innovation in Latin America)
SAPRI (or SAPRIN)	Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative
SICA	Servicio de Información y Censo Agropecuario (Agricultural Census Loan, Ecuador)
WID	Women in Development
WTO	World Trade Organization

## INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 2007 the World Bank—the world’s largest and most influential development institution—had a sex scandal. The most mainstream of commentators were talking about development institutions, sex, and money in the same sentence.<sup>1</sup> World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz was forced out of office on the grounds that he had used his influence to get his partner, development specialist Shaha Riza, a large pay raise when she was transferred out of the organization as a result of his appointment. In typically narcissistic Washington DC fashion, this scandal was known as Rizagate. Wolfowitz’s opponents—and they were many—applauded when it broke. There was, some noted, virulent anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and misogyny evident in coverage of the scandal,<sup>2</sup> and Riza had perhaps been treated unfairly.<sup>3</sup> But it was not about her. It was about him. Wolfowitz had been a neoconservative architect of Bush’s war in Iraq, and the U.S. government’s decision to put him forward for the Bank’s presidency in 2005 was understood as a sign of its disdain for world opinion. When asked to register their reaction to his appointment, 1,300 Bank employees responded within two days—92 percent expressing disapproval (Calderisi 2006, 23). Upon assuming office, he provoked further anger through uneven application of a new anticorruption drive, penalizing countries with which Bank staff had spent years nurturing good relations, and he made several unwise hiring decisions.<sup>4</sup> The scandal was a ruse to get him out; as one blogger noted, it was a classic case of nailing Al Capone for tax evasion because you could not bring him down for violent mafia activities.<sup>5</sup>

As these events unfolded, I was in autumnal Buenos Aires researching a World Bank–funded project called PROFAM, which aimed to promote family strengthening among the poor. Specifically, in the week that Wolfowitz finally resigned, I was telephoning priests.

Several gender and development specialists involved with PROFAM had informed me that religious organizations linked to the Catholic Church had received money for subprojects, and I was trying to track them down. Hence, I was calling the priests who coordinated those organizations, arranging to discuss their Bank-funded initiatives on fatherhood promotion, responsible parenting, reproductive health, and improving the resilience of the poor through family cohesion.

The disjuncture between the sites where sexuality is hypervisible in development and where it is apparently invisible was striking. The development blogosphere was full of lurid commentaries on Wolfowitz's relationship, even though most of us agreed that this was a ruse for other conversations we wanted to have, while PROFAM—wherein US \$5 million had been lent to adjust poor people's intimate attachments—drew to a quiet close.

*Developing Partnerships* aims to seize hold of that space of disjuncture. It insists on the political and intellectual value of a debate about sex, money, and the Bank, but it seeks to reframe that debate—to move it away from sex scandal to look at the sexual nature of Bank gender policy more generally, and at the sexualized politics of the Bank as a global governing body. Generally, it argues that gender and sexuality matter to international development and that international financial institutions (IFIs) are key players in the global restructuring of gender norms and intimacies. Specifically, it examines the efforts of Bank staff and their allies to create new models of loving partnership between men and women as part of a reformulated development approach. It suggests that complementary love within sharing couples is a central—but currently undertheorized—part of the Bank's push to embed markets in more sustainable ways, and it tries to ascertain what that might mean for feminist policymakers, sexuality scholars, and those interested in development.

In this respect, the book aims to do more than link Rizagate to disparate encounters with priests. It identifies the Bank as a key global actor in forging normative arrangements of intimacy, and it links that process to shifts in international political economy. It seeks to explore the role of gender and sexuality in the policy alliances on which the Bank's revised development approach rests, to better understand the sexualized politics of respectability that gender staff impose on themselves and others as they try to change mainstream institutions. It is a book about reformulated neoliberalism, knowledge production, policy entrepreneurship, and international development. But it is also about

gender, sexuality, social reproduction, and intimacy. *Developing Partnerships* looks at reform of markets and reform of masculinities; at loan agreements for export promotion and at World Bank–funded pamphlets for indigenous adolescents advising daily genital bathing; at attempts to strengthen institutions as part of a post–Washington Consensus; and at efforts to promote loving couplehood in response to economic crisis. It attempts, in short, to think through the multiple, and shifting, relationships between development and sexuality as they relate to debates about reformulated neoliberalism.

In the remainder of this introduction, I explicate the value of placing these arguments together, even though they are typically held apart. I intend this as an account of an intellectual journey, rather than an evangelical exercise in convincing the skeptical. Those who see gender and sexuality as irrelevant distractions from serious research on international political economy have remained unconvinced by scholarship far more impressive than I can offer here, and regardless the world's largest development institution already funds genital bathing advice and family strengthening work—on these grounds the relevance of gender and sexuality is established. I suggest, more modestly, that one cannot understand why the Bank's work has taken these precise forms without first connecting debates about gender and sexuality to debates about international political economy. Hence, I restage that encounter here, before explaining the methodological approach used in the research and outlining the book's major arguments.

### **Inclusive Neoliberalism and Gender Reform**

*Developing Partnerships* is positioned at the intersection of three major debates in globalization studies, regarding neoliberalism, feminist political economy, and sexuality. The first concerns the extent to which recent shifts in global governance and economic policy represent a change from the agenda pursued in the late 1980s. This earlier agenda is commonly referred to as the *Washington Consensus*, a term coined by economist John Williamson in a 1990 report on Latin America (Williamson 1990). It described what he saw as a consensus among regional and U.S. policymakers regarding the free market measures required to restore growth.<sup>6</sup> For its opponents, the Washington Consensus signified U.S. imposition of a laissez-faire agenda involving coerced structural adjustment, government retrenchment in social service provision, and the opening up of capital markets with little oversight.<sup>7</sup> The term became a synonym for market

fundamentalism, such that, as Williamson notes, “There are people who cannot utter [it] without foaming at the mouth” (2002; see also Clift 2003). Moises Naím (a former World Bank employee) put it rather more gently when he noted that the Washington Consensus had become “a damaged brand name” (quoted in Williamson 2003c, 12) by the mid-1990s.

In response, the policy advice changed. Conversations about international development now recognize a role for states in building the institutions necessary for free markets to flourish, and IFIs articulate explicit social concerns regarding inclusion of the marginalized, poverty eradication, and equity. Conditionality has been officially abandoned, replaced by an idea of country ownership and civil society partnership, and increased emphasis is placed on good governance, “prudent” capital account opening, social safety nets, and targeted poverty reduction.<sup>8</sup> As Jeremy Gould notes, “The earlier rhetoric of competition, confrontation and ideological contestation that characterized the era of structural adjustment has given way to a language of convergence and mutual complicity.” This is embedded in the trope of partnership, “the normative ideal of North–South relations . . . in the new millennium” (2005, 61).

The extent to which these changes represent a departure from, or adjustment of, 1980s–era neoliberal development models remains in dispute.<sup>9</sup> Certainly, new antipoverty initiatives have moved significant numbers of people out of indigence in some countries (Taylor 2006), and conversations about decentralization, “good governance,” accountability, and participation have created space within which progressive social movements and civil society organizations could forge change (Molyneux 2006, 431). Simultaneously, however, a range of scholars argue that these transformations are evidence of the adaptive capacity of neoliberalism. For example, geographers Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell distinguish between the 1980s process of “roll back” neoliberalism, involving the active destruction and discrediting of Keynesian welfarist and social collectivist institutions, and the emergent “roll out” neoliberalism that tries to embed and engineer a deeper, more sustainable social transformation (Peck and Tickell 2002, 380). Faced with the limits of the shallow neoliberalisms of the 1980s and confronting a crisis of legitimacy, the neoliberal project thus “gradually metamorphosed into more socially interventionist and ameliorative forms” (388). These threaten to co-opt the civil society organizations that are hailed as partners (Petras and Veltmeyer 2005,

23) and that are called upon to help administer the “skeletal welfareism” targeted on the indigent (Conaghan and Malloy 1994, 197; Tedesco 1999). Doug Porter and David Craig refer to this formulation as inclusive neoliberalism, and they too point to its system-stabilizing effects in a broader adaptation of international capitalism (2004, 387; see also Ruckert 2007).

In this deepening project, increasing critical attention is being paid to the reformulation of subjectivities. Contemporary development policy—like contemporary governance practices more generally—is distinctive in its invocation of empowerment, self-government, and responsibility, and in its attempts to engender changes at the highly intimate level of individual subjectivity as a condition for market success (Hindess 2004; Rose 1999; Valverde 1998; Higgins 2001; Dean 1999; Mosse 2005b; Cruikshank 1999). In his discussion of contemporary neoliberalism, for example, Nikolas Rose notes that ideally contemporary citizens will govern themselves in a context of reduced social services—but first they have to be “responsibilized and entrepreneurialized” (1999, 139). In this respect, as Michael Goldman argues, in its contemporary post-Washington Consensus formulations, “Neoliberalism has now become a frame of mind, a cultural dynamic, an entrepreneurial personality type, and a rule of law that penetrates the most intimate relations people have with each other, state apparatuses, and their natural environments” (2005, 8). It is “a process of subject formation as well as an economic reform regime” (Hale 2006, 20).

*Developing Partnerships* asks what that reform regime and that process of subject formation have to do with gender and sexuality. It asks what we can learn about institutional strengthening, inclusion, and civil society collaboration by taking gender and sexuality seriously. How has gender and development (GAD) policy changed in response to post-Washington Consensus concerns? What gendered subjectivities are being forged through these new modes of regulation, and how are feminist policymakers positioned in their new engagements with transnational governing institutions? And what does the new development approach mean for feminist development economics?

In this respect, it is important to underline that feminist economists and activists were early and influential critics of the Washington Consensus. They consistently argued that development studies, like political economy more generally, has a social reproduction problem, embedded in the distinctions made between productive and unproductive activity,

between labor and love. Social reproduction includes biological reproduction, the reproduction of labor power, and social practices connected to caring, socialization, and the fulfillment of human needs (Bakker and Gill 2003): child care, housework, subsistence agriculture, cooking, voluntary work to sustain community organizations, and so on.<sup>10</sup> Dominant models of growth overlook the economic value of these activities, disproportionately done by women, because they are seen to be non-productive. This leads to what many feminists regard as the systematic invisibilization of women's work.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, a key outcome of neoliberal restructuring was that women were overburdened when forced into the paid labor market to sustain families, in the absence of policies to provide for the realities of human dependency. Their working day was extended, and they were expected to pick up the slack of state retrenchment through extra caring labor. Thus in effect structural adjustment policies represented an attempt to reprivatize responsibilities on the backs of women (Brodie 1994, 48), assuming, to use economist Diane Elson's wonderful phrase, that their time was "infinitely elastic" (Elson 1996, 71). This constituted the "exhaustion solution" to the social reproduction dilemma, wherein development policymakers did nothing to resolve tensions between remunerated employment and unpaid caring work, such that women were simply overburdened.<sup>12</sup>

Given that international development organizations have mediated their free market advice, however, new questions about social reproduction arise. Are these organizations grappling with the social reproduction dilemma differently now, given their new attention to balanced development? Have the staff hired to improve work in GAD since the 1990s made any progress in this area, and what can their experiences tell us about forging change in mainstream institutions? What policy alliances and knowledge production processes explain the Bank's current approach to social reproduction, and what is the role of feminists in those processes?

In asking updated questions about political economy and social reproduction, *Developing Partnerships* also returns to a set of questions posed, and partially answered, by Mary Katzenstein and others: how protest fares in institutions, what supports it, what contains it, and what shapes its different expressions (Katzenstein 1998, 22).<sup>13</sup> Whether, and how, marginalized groups can achieve change within mainstream organizations is one of the driving concerns of political scientists interested in policy development, and of activists seeking social improvement. The extent to which organizations can really

change to accommodate new interests remains unclear given the influence of past policy decisions, the costs of shifting to a new approach, and the counter-commitments of those supporting the status quo. Moreover, those seeking change face dual pressures, since while “planning for transformation entails strategic thinking and a grounded sense of what is possible” (Kabeer 2000, 45), groups also need to “challenge structures of power that constrain what is politically possible” (Schram 1995, xxiv). Groups are thus caught between imperatives—to be grounded and strategic and to challenge the ground on which existing options are strategized. Institutionally sensitive analyses are crucial in navigating this tension, because they draw attention to the constraints within which policymakers act and to how space for contesting policy shifts in response to external and internal pressures. Or, as Sophie Bessis puts it in an analysis of the Bank, institutionally sensitive analyses can help answer the key question of “how to collaborate without being duped” (2001, 22).

These debates have assumed added import in recent years with the shift to gender mainstreaming in development lending. Mainstreaming requires that gender concerns become “an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic and societal spheres” (UN ESOSOC 1997). This will, theoretically, take gender to the heart of development. In the 1990s more than a hundred countries established state-level bureaucracies to mainstream gender issues into public policy (Radcliffe, Laurie and Andolina 2003, 398), and *femocrats*—a term coined by Australian feminists in the 1980s to describe feminist bureaucrats who are linked to both a government machinery and a social movement (Eisenstein 1995; van Halsema 1998)—have secured jobs inside many major development organizations (Prügl and Lustgarten 2006). Thus scholars and practitioners are increasingly focusing on how gender can be made to fit within existing organizational mandates and how such mandates may constrain feminist policy output.<sup>14</sup>

Specifically, according to Carol Miller and Shahra Razavi’s early overview of feminist engagement with development organizations, GAD policy advocates have largely pursued a policy of “entryism” to achieve their goals (1998, 2), in which they attempt transformations from within. These “integrationist tactics” (Kabeer 2000, 33) show how women’s advancement can serve existing institutional agendas. Thus Miller and Razavi (borrowing from Nelson Polsby) argue that insider advocates act as “feminist policy entrepreneurs” (1998, 7; see

also Goetz 1997), framing their issues in ways sensitive to institutional context. Given that the IFIs that dominate development lending are themselves dominated by growth-related concerns, feminists have overwhelmingly used efficiency rationales to justify their efforts in such spaces, arguing that growth will be endangered if gender is ignored.<sup>15</sup>

However the move to a less rigid free market development approach raises crucial questions for this debate. What new spaces—and what new constraints—are shaping gender policymaking in a post–Washington Consensus context, where there is far more space for nongrowth-based conversations and where development has been redefined as harmonious partnership? What new, non-economic knowledge claims can be made about gender when efficiency is not the only frame in town, and what effect do those claims have on attempts to resolve the social reproduction dilemma in an inclusively neoliberal era?

### **Development and Heteronormativity: The World Bank as a Sexualized Policy Actor**

Finally, and in order to answer the above questions, *Developing Partnerships* asks what the post–Washington Consensus means for sexuality. It explores the assumptions made about love and desire in current development practice, and it examines attempts to actively produce certain intimate attachments as a feature of reformulated neoliberalism. This effort is neither particularly radical nor innovative. It draws on established work, asking how capitalism generates social formations (Joseph 2002, 47–48); how the economic and the sexual are interlinked (D’Emilio 1983; Wilson 2004; Butler 1997; Duggan 2002); how social reproduction arrangements are sexualized; how “the kind of sex people have depends upon their material relations to each other” (Weismantel 2001, 136); and how family formation shifts across time and place and is shaped by economic needs. Yet placing sexuality and international development into the same sentence can still generate confusion, discomfort, and disdain—and sometimes all three in quick succession. The requirement to denaturalize commonsense assumptions about gender and sexuality appears to present an insurmountable hurdle, blocking otherwise critical analysts from taking sexuality seriously.

For example, over a decade ago, in a now-classic article linking structural adjustment to sexuality, Jacqui Alexander argued that neoliberal economic reform relied on women’s heterosexual love to

pick up the slack of state cutbacks and led to scapegoating of gays, lesbians, and sex workers for the perceived decline of national sovereignty. However, she pointed out, scholarship in feminist political economy missed many of the sexualized assumptions embedded in restructuring efforts because it was characterized by the “belief in naturalized heterosexuality, the belief that it lies outside of the sphere of political and economic influence” (1994, 21). Hence, Alexander insisted to feminists that “the urgency of a research and political agenda that continues to make the processes of heterosexualization transparent, tying them to both national and international social interests cannot . . . be overstated” (1994, 19). A decade later Jon Binnie was saying something very similar (to feminists, geographers, and critical globalization scholars)—that “debates on globalization continue to take place as if sexuality was completely marginal to economic and political processes. *We need to explore the relationship between sexual desire and political economy*” (2004, 41; emphasis added). A cursory glance at the syllabi of most international political economy courses will confirm that his advice has not been taken either.

Moreover, as Gilles Kleitz argues in a paper asking “Why is development work so straight?” when sexual desire *is* denaturalized and considered outside a normative frame, it is often assumed to be an attribute of the wealthy, or of self-identified sexual minorities. Western narratives of the poor and underdeveloped rarely “seem to cover the possibility of varied sexual identities and subjectivities. The poor simply can’t be queer, because sexual identities are seen as a rather unfortunate result of western development and are linked to being rich and privileged” (2000, 2). Thus, when “development theory and practice impose reproductive heterosexuality . . . as the only functional form of sex,” researchers may still fail to take notice.<sup>16</sup>

This failure to notice stems in part from the naturalization of reproductive heterosexuality. Questioning it, denaturalizing it, and unpacking how it works is thus an imperative for critical researchers—one that applies to many other commonsense social, political, and economic arrangements. As economist Douglass North argued in his classic formulation of institutions as “the rules of the game,” the rules are sometimes so commonsensical and taken for granted that they appear natural to the players (see restated North 1995, 23). John Williamson explicitly intended the Washington Consensus to be naturalized in this way, arguing in 1998 that it “should

become like democracy and human rights, part of the basic core of ideas that we hold in common and do not need to debate endlessly” (quoted in Cypher 1998, 47). To him, its free market message reflected a universal convergence, a common core of wisdom, and those who challenged its veracity were the equivalent of those who maintain that the earth is flat (Gore 2000, 790). Although Williamson’s model never achieved this level of hegemony, its replacement has more potential. The good governance reforms advocated in the post–Washington Consensus, along with the emphasis on donor–borrower partnership, the inclusion of civil society, and the attention to social development, appeal to a far wider constituency and are far harder to contest; they have been rapidly adopted as the new common sense of our times (Harrison 2001, 532). Hence, it is particularly important at present to denaturalize those features of social life that may appear inevitable, to mark those hegemonies that are so often naturalized into invisibility—the secular (Jakobsen and Pelligrini 2000), the White, the idealized appeals to democracy, freedom, community (Joseph 2002), and so on.<sup>17</sup> As Jacqui Alexander puts it so powerfully in her call for queer studies to take up questions of colonialism, racial formation, and political economy:

We will destabilize that which hegemony has rendered coherent or fixed; reassemble that which appears to be disparate, scattered, or otherwise idiosyncratic; foreground that which is latent and therefore powerful in its apparent absence; and analyze that which is apparently self-evident, which hegemony casts as commonsensical and natural, but which we shall read as gestures of power that deploy violence to normalize and discipline. (2005, 192)

In an attempt to contribute to that process and to *comprehensively* examine the effects of contemporary development policies on sexuality, I utilize the concept of heteronormativity. Heteronormativity refers to institutions, structures, and practices that help normalize dominant forms of heterosexuality as universal and morally righteous (Berlant and Warner 1998, 548). In this respect, normative heterosexuality is not simply a form of sexual expression; it defines a normal way of life (Jackson 2005, 107). It rests fundamentally on naturalized gender binaries, whereby the duality of sex is cast into the prediscursive domain. Despite trenchant critique from a range of scholars,<sup>18</sup> much policy debate proceeds as if the sexed subject was a fixed, biological creation, with compulsory heteronormativity its logical

destiny. Wholeness is to be achieved through functional gender partnerships, spheres are to be linked, parts of the self are to be made complete, and anatomies are framed as fitting together naturally in a biologicistic notion of complementarity. Such ideas reflect what Judith Butler (1990) has called a functionalist frame, whereby gender relies for its coherence and stability on a heterosexual (or heteronormative) matrix of intelligibility, one which “works to maintain the stability of gender, the heterosexuality of desire, and the naturalization of the family” (Butler 1997, 274). In response, a range of scholars argue that use of sexuality as an analytic concept must be extended beyond discussion of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people to consider the currently “unmarked” status of heterosexuality and the ways in which it is reproduced in changing forms by political actors.

Analysts of heteronormativity also recognize that heteronormativities change across time and space and are thoroughly racialized and class-inflected. Specific forms of normative heterosexuality become hegemonic through profoundly political interventions, and those interventions are often intertwined with empire, war, and nation-state building. Many scholars have focused on the role of states in this respect, through research both into the role of social policy in constituting sexual norms (Carabine 2004, 3) and into “how the state is constituted as a heterosexual body and how heterosexual imperatives constitute citizens” (Phelan 2000, 432).<sup>19</sup> However, there is growing interest in the supranational dimensions of these debates, in a global context characterized by intense discussions about declining state sovereignty and the increasing importance of IFIs as policy agents. For example, in arguing that “neoliberalism in fact has a sexual politics” (Duggan 2002, 117, quoted Richardson 2005, 517), scholars have examined the global commodification of sexual identities in processes such as gay tourism (Puar 2001), and they have critiqued the growing impetus of global-level policymakers to intervene in the family to secure social reproduction (Richardson 2005). In such ways scholars increasingly recognize that the norms, institutions, and structures through which sexualities are reconfigured are transnational in scope.<sup>20</sup>

Yet affirming this point is to raise crucial questions about *how* to link analysis of the profoundly intimate, bodily realm of desire, sex, and love to the seemingly disembodied level of global economic and political change.<sup>21</sup> It is a long way, analytically, from what Binnie calls the “mess and goo” (1997, 228) of sexuality to the macroeconomic

concerns of IFIs. It can be tempting to make sweeping, globalizing generalizations about sexuality and development that are inattentive to regional, national, or local issues, and it remains difficult to study the connections between processes occurring at such disparate scales (bodily, local, national, regional, global) without assuming a unidirectional causal chain that links them too neatly together. Straightforward functionalist analyses—ones that posit family arrangements as determined by economic structure or that regard desire as only, and always-already, a product of The Market—are out of step with recent work in globalization studies demanding increased attention to specific institutions, countries, interactions, projects, and “assemblages” in order to trace the complexities of political, economic, and cultural change (Ong and Collier 2005). Hence, while scholars increasingly recognize the importance of addressing state investments in sexuality within transnational formulations (Alexander 2005, 181) and of tracing how globalization and transnational capitalism affect people’s everyday intimate lives (Wilson 2004, 8–9), they also affirm the need for nuanced, nondeterministic approaches to these intersecting sites. As J. K. Gibson-Graham put it in a pioneering analysis of sexuality and globalization over a decade ago, “The question about any relationship—between, say, industrialization and heterosexuality—becomes, not did one have anything to do with the other, or how important was one in the constitution of the other, but *how do we wish to think the complex interaction between these complexities*” (Gibson-Graham 1996, 27; emphasis added).

In this spirit I explore the sexualized policy effects of the world’s largest and most influential development institution, trying to connect discussions of heteronormativity to the policy documents, loans, and research activities of the World Bank. The two organizations<sup>22</sup> that make up the Bank give loans and grants for development to middle- and low-income countries; in fiscal year 2006 the Bank approved US \$23.6 billion in such financing (World Bank 2006 AR).<sup>23</sup> The institution also provides policy and research advice.<sup>24</sup> It has been used as a key case study of how mainstream organizations respond to pressures to change,<sup>25</sup> and it is prominent in a range of research on development.<sup>26</sup> Bank staff are also widely regarded as the ultimate development experts (Birdsall and Kapur 2005, 4), and they have a remarkably expansive mission. Susan George and Fabrizio Sabelli were only half joking when they caricatured the new world order as one in which the World Trade Organization functions as the

International Ministry of Trade; the International Monetary Fund operates as the International Ministry of Finance; and the Bank is left as “the prime candidate for the Ministry of Everything Else” (1994, 161). Paul Cammack was not joking at all when he said that it aimed to be the “the mother of all governments” (2002).<sup>27</sup> Put simply, as critical development scholar Arturo Escobar notes, the prevailing wisdom in the policy field is that “if ‘the Bank’ does not have clear answers, nobody else does” (1995, 160). On these grounds it should be uncontroversial to use the institution as a case study for a project on sexuality and development.

Yet in other regards the Bank may seem a peculiar choice, even to those committed to taking international policy actors seriously as agents involved in the production, reproduction, and alteration of normative heterosexualities. The Bank can appear, to itself and many development critics, a technocratic, economistic, passionless institution concerned with narrow growth concerns—an organization wherein the “mess and goo” of sexuality seem manifestly absent. This perception belies the fact that the Bank is a leading international lender in reproductive health and is increasingly involved in HIV/AIDS work (Harman 2007). Its gay employees have also mobilized to secure important employment protections (Gosine forthcoming 2009), and, when I asked Bank staff attending the 1999 Association of Women in Development conference about sexuality, they expressed pride in the fact that some high-level gay male employees were out.<sup>28</sup> Nor can one forget the Rizagate debacle, with the global attention it focused on intimacy within the Bank’s hierarchy.

Rather than concentrate on such obviously sexual sites of policy engagement and scandal, however, I seek instead to elucidate the sexualized nature of the World Bank’s more mainstream economic activities, by examining how love and money are intimately linked in the Bank’s inclusive neoliberal development agenda, particularly in its new formulations of gender policy. Despite recognition by sexuality scholars “that institutionalized, normative heterosexuality regulates those kept within its boundaries as well as marginalizing and sanctioning those outside them” (Jackson 2005, 105), insufficient attention has been paid to “straight” people in debates about sexuality, and hence “the impact of regimes of normative heterosexuality on *heterosexuality* has largely been ignored” (Seidman 2005, 40, emphasis added; see also Jackson 2005). Hierarchies of respectability and good citizenship among heterosexuals, and their imbrication with hierarchies of race,

ethnicity, class, and so on, are thus undertheorized, particularly in development studies. In an attempt to contribute to this debate, I ask how normative arrangements of heterosexuality are changing in the post–Washington Consensus and how the Bank intervenes to produce the intimate partnerships associated with the new development era.

### **Methodological Approach**

To comprehensively trace the Bank's approach to gender, from head office debates to project-level interventions, I employed a multi-method approach that tracks lending priorities using policy texts, loan documents, interviews with employees, and project fieldwork. Firstly, I analyzed Bank policy texts emanating from its headquarters in Washington DC. I focused on high-level texts on gender produced between 1979 and 2005, using ATLAS.ti (a textual analysis software package) for coding assistance. The Bank wrote extensively on gender issues in this period, issuing two formal policy documents, evaluations of country strategies and projects, and research on women's position in the world. Gender researchers inside and outside the Bank have considered these "formally cleared World Bank documents with a gender focus" (Moser, Törnqvist and van Bronkhorst 1999, 2) good resources for policy analysis.<sup>29</sup> In addition, I reviewed speeches, presentations, and Web sites through which the Bank presents a public, official stance on gender. These include James Wolfensohn's address to the 1995 UN conference on women in Beijing, official materials produced to accompany the Bank's delegations to gender conferences, and material associated with its gender Web site. I also examined regional policy texts on gender, using the Latin American and Caribbean Gender Unit as a case study, and I analyzed loan documents for specific projects<sup>30</sup> in an attempt to compare Bank interventions at different policy levels. Thirty-three percent of Bank staff are now based in country offices,<sup>31</sup> and hence a singular focus on documents produced in Washington DC would be insufficient.

During visits to Ecuador in 2003 and 2004 and to Argentina in 2007, I also conducted semistructured interviews with gender policy-makers in the Bank (consultants and full-time staff), exploring the institutional constraints within which they operate, their approach to GAD policy, and their experiences working with the Bank on gender issues. The vast majority gave consent for the interviews to be recorded, and these were transcribed; if they refused I took detailed notes. Finally, I did case study research on three Bank gender interventions: (a) a research

project on the gendered impact of the Ecuadorian flower industry, (b) gender activities conducted in an Ecuadorian loan to promote “ethn-development” among rural indigenous and Afro–Ecuadorian people, and (c) an Argentine GAD loan to promote social capital and family strengthening. I conducted fieldwork on the Ecuadorian and Argentine loans, visiting subprojects and interviewing NGO representatives and consultants associated with project selection and evaluation. In all, fifty-two interviews were conducted for the book, with a total of thirty-six people in Ecuador and thirty-four in Argentina.<sup>32</sup>

By combining research at the global, regional, national, and local level, I aimed to trace the Bank’s arguments about gender, sexuality, and development across multiple scales. A mixed method approach was also necessary to overcome well-known methodological hurdles associated with research on development policy generally, and on the Bank in particular. As Michelle Miller-Adams notes, the complexity and size of the institution make it possible to confirm and deny almost any hypothesis about the Bank (Miller-Adams 1999, xi). To some degree the Bank is so hegemonic in terms of successfully determining the parameters within which we speak and act in the name of development that it can seem part of our everyday lives (Goldman 2005, xvii)—and yet we can find it treacherously difficult to prove that the Bank causes anything to happen in the world. It lends through states that, theoretically, request the interventions and that undertake any associated reforms voluntarily, and it increasingly partners with civil society organizations, making it very hard to ascertain the Bank’s role in any policy trajectory.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, a recent evaluation of the Bank’s gender strategy concluded that attributing results to Bank products and services was “a virtual impossibility.” Hence, it “look[ed] at how Bank assistance could have reasonably been expected to contribute to trends in gender disparities” (World Bank 2005b, EaD xii). It is also extremely hard to track change in an institution that “has trouble sticking to its *own* convictions for more than a President’s minimum term” (Harrison 2001, 529; original emphasis); as I explain in chapter 1, the Bank has experienced such inconsistency and turbulence in recent years that many of its critics are wondering whether the results they get from studying the organization will be valid next month.

In addition, Bank research is unfortunately still divided between those who follow the discourse and those who follow the money—as if those could be separate activities, as if “the economy” is not in part

constituted through economic discourse, as if development organizations do not make rules and create knowledge about the world in addition to, and while, lending money.<sup>34</sup> The Bank's role as a producer of development knowledge and as a framer of development policy is crucial to its operations, and since 1995 the organization has devoted far greater attention to how it represents itself. President James Wolfensohn's annual meeting speeches were "instrumental in shaping and communicating the changes in the philosophy of development cooperation" (Ritzen 2005, 91), and he used his words strategically for greatest effect with different audiences. As the editors of his collection of Bank speeches noted: "Often, months or years later, the same statistics and messages will show up in the speeches of others on the foreign policy and development scene" (Wolfensohn 2005, 8). Similarly, what the Bank says about gender matters, because its policy discourses help legitimize specific ways of perceiving reality and exclude others (Schoenpflug 2006, 117).

To this extent, the investigation is located in what Arturo Escobar terms an anthropological approach to policy, whereby policies are understood to be productive instruments that result in concrete practices of thinking and acting (1995, 11). As Escobar and others who focus on the productive power of development agencies argue, policy documents are central ways in which social reality is shaped.<sup>35</sup> In particular, as development scholar Gavin Williams notes, development texts "provide an over-arching framework which makes sense of current policies as a means of addressing development problems. They spell out the common sense of the development community" (1995, 175). Researchers in this tradition maintain that policy helps to construct what it claims to analyze as prediscursively given, and they pay attention to what Mary Katzenstein terms the "politics of meaning-making" within organizations (1995, 35).

More specifically, analysis of Bank policy texts and loan documents requires institutionally-sensitive reading practices, attentive to the writing codes that dominate Bank practice. Hence, I directed particular attention to the abstracts, summaries, and conclusions of Bank documents when trying to ascertain which policy framings were dominating debate. These are often the only parts read by busy staff, and considerable work is devoted to shaping them. Robert Wade highlights the immense effort that goes into producing an acceptable ten-page summary of the Bank's flagship *World Development Report* (Wade 2002, 242), for example—the arguments that make it in to

this summary are ones that Bank staff have relentlessly debated and consider central to their development work. Conversely, staff can often get dissenting arguments into Bank texts by burying them in the middle, or in footnotes.<sup>36</sup> While Bank documents can thus often be read against themselves, the location of an argument gives a clear sense of its perceived centrality, and the degree to which it is embedded in Bank narratives.

At the same time, however, most of the nearly 10,000 people who work for the Bank do far more than write policy texts. They design and enact loans and grants in specific countries, and they help produce grounded development outcomes—training workshops, altered state policy, buildings, irrigation channels, microcredit institutions, and so on. It is a huge, arguably unjustified leap of faith to assume that these outcomes neatly reflect the policy texts. As Subir Sinha (2003) argues in a critical assessment of Bank fisheries policy, texts are often incoherent and contradictory, and they do not reflect lending practices in a direct way. Furthermore, many observers comment on a schizophrenia between Bank rhetoric and the reality of lending operations (Pincus 2001, 182); Michael Goldman gives a wonderful example of the Bank writing up an Indian irrigation project as tremendously successful, when the reality was that the cement intended for channels was taken to build homes for the rich so that the irrigation water leaked. Small farmers involved in the project went bankrupt and ended up landless laborers (2005, ix).

The failure to recognize this disjuncture between policy text and policy outcome, between “exemplar of environmentally sustainable development” and “irrigation fiasco” (Goldman 2005, xii), is one of the reasons for the hostility with which some critical development practitioners have received critical development research. Development staff are often highly resistant to critique based exclusively on documents that they regard with amusement or contempt, if they read them at all. Staff know full well that promises in policy texts may change little in actual lending, and they are rightly skeptical of academic work that proceeds as if methodologically immune to this reality. They know that space may be created for innovative policy entrepreneurship within development initiatives that are framed in mainstream language, and conversely best practice exemplars of progressive development success may look like fiascos on the ground. Although dismissal of the importance of documents in creating knowledge and framing the “development problem” may be exaggerated,

based on a crude and unfair reenactment of the distinction between irrelevant ideas and real money, arguably the burden of proof is on the critical development scholar to track the links—and the breaks—between the texts and the development outcomes, rather than to assume that the connections are seamless. This context creates an imperative for research on the Bank to consider the ideas and the money together and to trace the policies all the way through, from the publicly prominent texts through regional and country-level policy research to the loans and grants themselves.<sup>37</sup>

In his recent work on aid, David Mosse has been especially critical of the “discursive determinism” that gives preeminence to texts as representations of discourse (2005a, 15) and that “is suspiciously functionalist” (2005b, 14) in its tendency to overstate the capacity of international development to objectify and control Third World people.<sup>38</sup> Although his publications came too late to shape the research design for this project, his argument that “texts have to be interpreted backwards to reveal the social relations that produced them, the future contests they anticipate and the wider ‘discourse coalitions’ (Fairhead and Leach 2002, 9) they are intended to call forth” (Mosse 2005a, 15) is pertinent to this book. Particularly compelling is his notion of an ethnography of policy and practice looking at the institutional bureaucratic practices that shape development, at who development policy ideas bring together (15), and at how international policy regimes “land” via intermediary actors and frontline staff who translate abstract global policy into their own ambitions, interests, and values (2005b, 20). This approach foregrounds compromises and contingencies, the fragility in practice of many of the policy models, the need to recruit supporters to particular representations of reality, and the interlocking intentionalities of the developers and the “to-be-developed” (Mosse 2005a, 7–10). Reading his account I realized—late, obviously—that this was what I had been trying to do with the new formulations of gender policy attached to the post–Washington Consensus: to trace how the concepts were being produced and activated and to explore who the policy ideas bring together, while paying attention to disjunctures, ideas, and money.

### **Outline of the Argument**

*Developing Partnerships* argues that concerns about men, women, partnerships, and families are central to the Bank’s current attempts to reframe international political economy. In attempting to generate

a more balanced, embedded, and socially sustainable model of development than the one pursued in the 1980s, the Bank is grappling with the social reproduction dilemma, and with gender and sexuality, differently. It no longer assumes that women's capacity to pick up the slack of social reproduction requirements while working for pay is infinitely elastic; indeed, it actively criticizes its past gender work for neglecting unpaid labor and for ignoring men. In response, post-Washington Consensus gender policy advocates sharing partnerships, male inclusion in care, and women's empowerment through employment. Poor people's intimate autonomy is hereby being reimaged in global social policy conversations that seek to cultivate particular attachments to resolve economic crises.

However, the preference for reformulated partnerships as a linchpin of the Bank's gender efforts is only in part explained by the fact that it provides a solution to tensions between paid work and social reproduction. The restructuring of normative heterosexuality has also been positioned as empowering to the poor, and a range of policy entrepreneurs within the Bank attempt to sell their gender interventions on the grounds that they will generate loving couples. This end result can be marketed as integral to global, regional, national, and local projects; to ethnic and class projects; to religious projects; and, certainly, to feminist projects. Alliances are hence generated with a range of actors interested in reforming poor men, in reviving gender harmony, and in regenerating the family. This process provides space for feminist policy making, but it constrains the use of that space in ways that reproduce power inequalities. The book provides a space to think through these varied effects.

Chapter 1 summarizes the Bank's journey to the post-Washington Consensus, and it analyzes that journey through a gender lens, considering how gender concerns figure in the transition and how gender policy is being reformulated. In so doing it seeks to link macroeconomic changes to changes in gender policy and in models of heteronormativity. The Bank's reformulated development mission was articulated through references to family and partnership, and attention to gender was used to demonstrate the organization's commitment to equity, inclusion, institutional strengthening, and balanced development. Moreover, the limitations of neoliberal approaches to development were mapped onto gender anxieties. Economic crisis was framed by Bank staff as having produced both overburdened women who work for pay while coping with family survival needs in the

absence of social safety nets, and unemployed men with wounded masculinities who act out through violence. New concerns were thus voiced about the need to deal with women's unpaid work and male exclusion, prompting new efforts to involve men in gender lending and to strengthen families. The Bank's broader emphasis on partnerships, inclusion, balance, and empowerment is hereby translated in contemporary gender policy into an institutional endorsement of—and attempts to promote—a new type of family relation.

I move on in chapter 2 to explore how this Washington DC approach affects the work of the Latin American and Caribbean Gender Unit, the regional unit repeatedly highlighted as a model for others in the Bank to follow. I hereby trace the regional manifestations of the shift to the post-Washington Consensus in terms of macroeconomics and gender and sexuality. I suggest that efforts to readjust partnerships by having poor men take on caring labor while poor women move into paid employment are (a) a central feature of regional gender texts and (b) linked to the increased social marketing of gender policy. Policymakers now "sell" gender interventions on the grounds that they can reform poor masculinities, avoid overburdening women, and contribute to the institutional strengthening imperatives of the post-Washington Consensus—all particularly pressing concerns in a regional context. The men who became visible to the Bank in these new conversations were unemployed and poor, and the policies designed to resolve their wounded masculinities were similar across the region—fatherhood promotion, family strengthening, and workshops for poor communities to raise awareness of the importance of gender equality. I also explore the research and citational practices through which this reformulation of GAD is legitimated, shedding critical light on the knowledge-production processes embedded in post-Washington Consensus gender policy in an attempt to render them more contestable.

Chapter 3 traces the organization's gender activities down to the country level, moving from analysis of policy documents to the experiences of policymakers. It asks how gender specialists in the Bank's Ecuadorian resident mission make sense of their activities, how they try to fit gender into the Bank's organizational mandates, and how such mandates constrain feminist policy output. I focus on two particularly significant constraints: the requirement that gender interventions improve efficiency and the imperative to include men to encourage complementary gender partnerships. I examine how these constraints affect Bank relations with partner organizations and domestic feminists, trac-

ing some of the conflicts and frustrations that result. I also consider how, at the national level, these dual constraints shape the claims made about gender truths in Bank texts, and I trace their material effects on policy output. Specifically, I explore how the efficiency and complementarity constraints limited policymakers' ability to argue for child care provision as a Bank priority in Ecuador, with the organization opting to instead promote shared parenting and better fatherhood.

Chapter 4 foregrounds the links between market restructuring and the reform of intimacies by using export promotion as a case study through which to analyze the Bank's gender efforts in Ecuador. Using interviews with gender staff and flower industry promoters and analysis of a Bank research initiative on gender and floriculture, I examine the sexualized claims made about work in flowers, showing how export-promotion activities are seen to generate multiple changes in men's and women's intimate behavior. I focus on four particularly salient claims: that flower employment enhances women's sexual and intimate autonomy; that it makes women more attractive to men; that it strengthens families; and that it makes men better partners by increasing their domestic labor. Again, child care drops out of these discussions, replaced by a celebration of the flower industry's success in generating loving masculinities. I consider the emancipatory potential of these celebrations, linking them to past debates about reforming men while exploring how women are positioned both as self-interested autonomous actors and as altruistically attached to others. In closing I note how these conversations resonate far beyond Ecuador, and flowers, bolstering Bank claims that trade liberalization and employment in export sectors empower women by modernizing their attachments to men. In this respect, Bank GAD debates about the intersection of markets and intimacies celebrate not only free trade, but also normative families, and the link between the two merits closer attention.

Taken together, the first four chapters of the book aim to demonstrate that the post-Washington Consensus development agenda is being articulated through gender harmony and is reliant on concerted efforts to generate loving couplehood to resolve macroeconomic tensions. As the Bank struggles to build a new hegemonic development project to replace the one discredited in the 1980s—one better able to resolve social reproduction tensions in a sustainable fashion and “marketable” to a range of stakeholders (including some feminists)—it increasingly appeals to sharing partnership among the poor. Gender

and sexuality are not distractions from its global, regional, and national work to reframe international political economy when viewed in this light. They are embedded in the very essence of that work.

The final two chapters pay far closer attention to the day-to-day processes and practices through which these policy priorities are reproduced and enacted, relying on fieldwork on Bank gender activities in Ecuador and Argentina. They show clearly that there is new space created in the post–Washington Consensus to take gender seriously, to tackle indigence, and to increase local participation. Feminists, along with other social development specialists, can maneuver in this space to get money for their projects. However, the limitations of those maneuvers warrant close attention.

Chapter 5 explores the gender interventions undertaken in an “ethnodevelopment” loan oriented to rural indigenous and Afro–Ecuadorian communities. Here I seek to examine both how the Bank’s gender model gets translated into local context and how post–Washington Consensus gender policy is articulated in intersection with race, ethnicity, and culture. I consider the reframing of gender complementarity as part of ethnodevelopment; the interventions undertaken to teach indigenous and Afro–Ecuadorian women limited market rationality; and the efforts made to teach indigenous and Afro–Ecuadorian men better loving. I focus particularly on the racialized hierarchies of sexual respectability evident in this loan, wherein Andean groups were praised for their harmonious gender relations, Amazonian communities were considered highly oppressive because of polygamy, and Afro–Ecuadorian men were criticized repeatedly for their perceived sexual irresponsibility. I also consider the counter-discourses mobilized in opposition to these hierarchies and the limited success they enjoyed. In doing so, I aim both to take gender and sexuality seriously in ethnodevelopment and to take ethnodevelopment critically as a heteronormative project.

Chapter 6 examines the Argentine PROFAM initiative, the social capital promotion and family strengthening project for which I was interviewing priests. I examine the complex policy alliance mobilized by Bank gender staff in their efforts to secure the loan, and I trace how the initiative changed as a result of the economic and political crisis experienced by Argentina in December 2001. I focus on four important changes in this respect: the increasing role of the Catholic Church; the increasing emphasis placed by the post-crisis Argentine government on family unity as tied to the recovery of Argentine

values; the increasing focus on microenterprise projects; and the attempts made to include men. The chapter provides another grounded example of the Bank's new advice on gender policy, in that PROFAM seeks to empower poor women through work, include poor men as fathers and responsible partners, and shore up poor families in order to secure economic recovery. However, I also seek to highlight the *shifting* alliances on which implementation of that policy agenda rests and to consider the impact of economic crisis thereon. I examine the space opened up for unruly, progressive, feminist use in a context of chaos, while charting the growing constraints on that space as PROFAM was reconfigured according to new allegiances with church and state actors. In this way, I aim to explore the gendered and sexualized effects of crisis on development policy, showing that while some common senses (about unfettered free markets) were damaged by Argentina's experience, others (about gender harmony and the importance of family strengthening) were reinvigorated, emerging securely entrenched as integral components of the new, post-Washington Consensus common ground.

In the conclusion I flesh out two broader concerns that link the book's six chapters—the need to trouble the commonsense nature of the regimes of gender and sexuality being produced in the post-Washington Consensus and the need to walk a line, somehow, between relentlessly negative critique of all feminist attempts to engage with the new development regime and naïve celebrations of projects and policies that render us clearly complicit in oppressive social relations. Throughout the book I critique the multiple investments that we—as feminists involved in development and as critical observers of the Bank's macroeconomic project—may make in the “common sense” that poor and racially marginalized men are especially dangerous and irresponsible, that couplehood is liberatory, or that loving fatherhood is a better, more empowering policy objective than collectively funded child care provision. However, I also note that policymakers get space within conversations about gender harmony and balanced partnership to fund domestic violence interventions, to provide condoms, and to articulate demands for (selective) indigenous values to be respected. As I explain in the conclusion (and as I was frequently told throughout the project), walking this line can annoy everyone involved—the policymakers and the critics. But it can also, perhaps, help identify less dangerous interventions from ones that securely shut down future space for seizure.

In less prescriptive terms, though, *Developing Partnerships* simply aims to generate debate about genital bathing, family strengthening, and gender sharing as central components of the post–Washington Consensus. It seeks both to denaturalize the common sense about loving partnership that is becoming increasingly entrenched in new varieties of reformulated neoliberalism and to stimulate a long-past-due discussion about alternative models of social reproduction, of sexuality, and of empowerment. I have a stake in the direction of these discussions, as I make clear in the pages that follow. Indeed, as this research has unfolded, I have become increasingly frustrated at the limitations imposed on feminist work by the requirement that policymakers appeal to partnership. Our reformulations of social reproduction are increasingly limited to attempts to privatize care within loving families, and our visions of empowerment are increasingly constrained by ideas of necessary attachment to predetermined others. However, I also have a stake in witnessing a diverse conversation about sex, money, and development that can reach beyond Rizagate and interrogate the complexities of gender and sexuality initiatives as they intertwine with political economy. The book is intended as one step in that direction.

# WORKING WOMEN, CARING MEN, AND THE FAMILY BANK

## Ideal Gender Relations after the Washington Consensus

Objects of analysis do not occur as natural phenomena, but are partly formed by the discourse that describes them. The more natural the object appears, the less obvious this discursive manufacture will be.

—TIMOTHY MITCHELL, *Rule of Experts*

We want the Bank to be an institution that cherishes partnerships.

—JAMES WOLFENSOHN, to a World Bank–NGO conference on participatory development, 1998

When the world's largest development organization moved beyond the Washington Consensus, it moved to a new gender approach as well. This chapter provides an overview of that process. It summarizes the Bank's journey to the post–Washington Consensus as laid out in prominent speeches and documents emanating from its headquarters in Washington DC, and it analyzes that journey through a gender lens, considering how gender concerns figure in the transition and how gender policy is being reformulated. In doing so it seeks to link the Bank's macroeconomic debates to its shifts in gender policy. This may appear a peculiar focus given that, with notable exceptions from feminist scholars (see especially Bergeron 2003), most research on the post–Washington Consensus has ignored gender. To the extent that the majority of research in international political economy ignores gender, this is unremarkable. However, what is different about the post–Washington Consensus, especially when viewed from the Bank's perspective, is the centrality of gender to rhetoric and practice. Indeed, in this chapter I argue that the promise of adjusted gender relations involving a new normative model of heterosexuality is a key mechanism through which the Bank attempts to prove its commitment to post–Washington Consensus concerns. The organization's new civil society work, its embrace of social safety nets, and its concern with

poverty reduction are all demonstrated through discussion of gender. Moreover, the Bank's post-Washington Consensus vision of development as balanced, harmonious, and inclusive rests on appeals to family cohesion and loving partnership between men and women. I suggest here that this shift in approach has crucially reoriented the Bank's Washington DC-based conversations about gender. As the organization assessed its past record on gender, it urged new attention to issues of women's unpaid work and male inclusion, leading to increased emphasis on working women, caring men, and family strengthening in gender documents. These policy reformulations have been targeted on the poor, successfully linked to both efficiency and empowerment objectives. Whereas subsequent chapters trace the impact of this process regionally, on policy entrepreneurship, research activities, and gender work in specific loans, here I wish to register a more general point: that reformulated couples are central to the Bank's post-Washington Consensus vision of development. In this way I suggest that the world's largest development organization is speaking a new gendered and sexualized language, with concrete effects on policy priorities.

### **From Serial Murderer to Everyone's Best Friend? The World Bank's Post-Washington Consensus Journey**

In 1994, antidebt campaigners targeted World Bank President Lewis Preston at the annual World Bank-International Monetary Fund meetings in Madrid. They unfurled a banner that read "World Bank Murderer" behind him during his opening speech while dropping fake dollar bills from the ceiling (Mallaby 2004, 63). These campaigners saw the Bank as an unequivocal enemy in the struggle for global social justice and as a key architect of the Washington Consensus. The Bank did indeed play a crucial role in that policy agenda: by 1987 it had convened forty-three structural adjustment loans with thirty-one countries to support measures such as trade liberalization, subsidy removal, and export promotion (Teichman 2001, 47). The organization hereby "became a lightning rod for those disenchanted with globalization and neoliberalism or with the perceived diktats of the U.S. Treasury" (Clift 2003, 9), and they aligned, in print and in the streets, to demand change.<sup>1</sup>

This external critique of the Bank's free market development approach coincided with a key leadership shift in the organization, in which James Wolfensohn was appointed as president in 1995.

Heralded as “the renaissance banker” by the Bank’s admittedly partial Web site on its leaders’ biographies,<sup>2</sup> Wolfensohn was determined to improve the organization’s dented image. He embarked on such a comprehensive overhaul of the Bank’s development approach that he could declare the Washington Consensus dead and buried ten years after the Madrid protest. For example, he hired several critics of neoclassical economics, including most notably Joseph Stiglitz (chief economist from late 1996 to early 2000). Stiglitz called for a post-Washington Consensus in a 1998 speech to fellow economists (1998), he publicly blamed the IMF’s free market reforms for East Asia’s 1997–1998 meltdown, and he advised the Ethiopian government to resist IMF demands for financial system liberalization (Wade 2002, 221).<sup>3</sup> Wolfensohn also expanded lower level recruitment to bring in more anthropologists (Escobar 1997), sociologists, and staff with NGO connections, and he moved more employees out of Washington DC and into country-level work. His insistence that development was not just about growth but about people’s hopes and dreams led him to expand the knowledge forms considered acceptable in Bank research—graphs were supplemented with children’s drawings as representations of development truths, for example, and the Bank undertook a qualitative *Voices of the Poor* study involving 60,000 participants, to which Wolfensohn repeatedly referred.

The effects and scope of these changes are still being debated.<sup>4</sup> Given the Bank’s apparently unstructured interest in whatever faddish development trend passed by Wolfensohn’s desk in the late 1990s, some observers alleged that the new reform agenda was evidence of relentless mission creep, unwieldy complexity (Fidler 2001; Einhorn 2001; Kapur 2002) or “fickle fashion” (Naím 1999, 17) rather than a properly thought-out alternative to the Washington Consensus. This seemed particularly apparent when, in 1999, Wolfensohn launched an ambitious plan for a Comprehensive Development Framework addressing new concerns such as corruption, civil society strengthening, HIV/AIDS, disability, and issues involving youth—former Bank staffer Moises Naím characterized it as the ultimate evidence of “goal congestion” (1994, 3).

Conversely, other critics of the Bank have dismissed much of Wolfensohn’s agenda as rhetorical window dressing on preserved neoliberal models, as “old wine in new bottles” (Cling, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud 2003, 111). They pointed out that much-publicized debt relief initiatives were still being tied to free market reform, that high-profile

consultations with civil society critics did not change the Bank's policy approach, and that explicit aid conditionalities had simply been replaced by a selectivity process whereby countries outlined acceptable free market economic policies that were subsequently validated by the Bretton Woods Institutions (Cammack 2002; Larner and Walters 2004; Petras and Veltmeyer 2005; Anders 2005; Stewart and Wang 2003; Charnock 2006). Talk of empowerment, poverty elimination, and partnership is often regarded in these circles as jargon (Paul 1996, 3), as a way to obscure power inequality and create an illusion of consensus (Porter and Craig 2004, 393). This was ironically revealed in some of the publicity stunts designed to improve the Bank's poor reputation; in one example Wolfensohn arranged to have a film made on Uganda entitled *Our Friends in the Bank*, but the Bank delayed it for three years, demanding changes in how it was being represented (Corbalán 2002, 183). Those bemoaning a lack of coherent focus were thus joined by those insisting that nothing substantively different was on offer.

However, the middle ground of this debate has become increasingly crowded as certain elements of the new development agenda have proved stickier than others, filtering down into lending priorities more (or less) coherently. Three themes emerge as particularly "sticky" in this respect, and these constitute the post-Washington Consensus to which this book refers: the Bank's emphasis on development as balance; the focus on equity and inclusion; and the attention given to strong institutions as key to market success. First, Wolfensohn was the development community's most vocal proponent of a broader, more integrated agenda, aiming to draw together the structural, financial, macroeconomic, social, and human aspects of development into a participatory, accountable process (Naím 1999, 16). As he told the Bank's Board of Governors in 1998:

We have learned, Mr. Chairman, that there is a need for balance. We must consider the financial, the institutional, and the social together. We must learn to have a debate in which mathematics does not dominate humanity. (Wolfensohn 2005, 112)

Growth remained integral to this approach, but it was only part of the development story. As Wolfensohn argued in the aftermath of the East Asian crisis:

In a global economy, it is the *totality* of change in a country that matters. Development is not just about adjustment. Development is not just about sound budgets and fiscal management.

Development is not just about education and health. Development is not just about technocratic fixes . . . Development is about putting *all* the component parts in place—together and in harmony. (Wolfensohn 2005, 114; emphasis in original)

For Nicolas Stern, who replaced Stiglitz as the Bank's chief economist in 2000, "unproductive debates" about state versus market and free trade versus poverty eradication were thus over, replaced by recognition of complementarities and commitment to the idea of development as a multidimensional, multisectoral issue (2003, 32).

Second, the Bank's post-1995 development agenda re-centered poverty in line with a broader recognition that the Washington Consensus had neglected equity concerns (Williamson 2003c, 6). When Wolfensohn discovered that Bank lending in Indonesia had been focused on macroeconomic stabilization, trade liberalization, and banking reform, he exploded at staff: "I can't tell the bloody press that these reforms are being financed by our money! I've got to tell them that we're buying medicines, food for the poor, that's what I need to say!" (quoted in Mallaby 2004, 196). In an obvious shift from previous policy, the Bank's 1999–2000 *World Development Report* asserted that growth does *not* trickle down to the poor (World Bank 1999–2000 WDR, 1), and the 2000–2001 edition embraced the most comprehensive antipoverty strategy in the Bank's history, including attention to environmental sustainability, HIV/AIDS, health, crime and violence, fear, lack of freedom of choice, and lack of self-confidence. Although providing solid advocacy for macroeconomic stability and market-friendly reforms (especially after the interventions of Bank managers in later drafts), the report also emphasized reduced inequality, debt relief, and trade reform to allow poor countries access to rich world markets. The choice it offered was a stark and moral one: "A divergent world? Or an inclusive one? A world with poverty? Or a world free of poverty?" (World Bank 2000–2001 WDR, 12). Reading this as a critic of the Washington Consensus, one feels almost redundant; the Bank has apparently gotten there first.

Third, the Bank's new approach recognized the crucial role of institutions in markets. Institutions are understood in the Bank as referring to the rules—formal and informal—structuring the action of individuals and organizations. The lesson that institutions were vital to markets was hard-learned in transition economies where lack of attention to institutional strengthening and state-capacity building was understood to have hampered growth, but it was confirmed with

the East Asian crisis, blamed in part on poor banking regulations and weak state oversight. Institutions subsequently were viewed as the missing link in development,<sup>5</sup> and new attention was focused on strengthening contracts and regulatory systems of formal law, alongside informal conventions and norms considered necessary for good development (Wolfensohn foreword in World Bank 1997 WDR, iii).

Simply put, then, the Bank has changed significantly since those protesters scaled the ceiling in Madrid. In the 1980s, support for health, nutrition, and other social services took up under 6 percent of Bank lending; these sectors received over 18 percent of the money in the 1990s (Tzannatos 2006, 19) and over 25 percent by 2000 (Wolfensohn 2005, 254). By 2000 the Bank had also committed \$1 billion to HIV/AIDS (254), and its support for community-driven development projects working directly with poor people had exploded, up from \$325 million in 1996 to almost \$2 billion in 2003 (World Bank 2005c, 46). The proportion of consultations for country assistance strategies and national policy reforms that included civil society groups rose from 35 percent in 1995–1996 to 75 percent in 1998–1999 (World Bank 2000a, 18), and a recent independent study of several international financial institutions found the Bank the most responsive for obtaining information (Musuva 2006, vii).<sup>6</sup> In this respect, it is significant that Jessica Einhorn (a former Bank manager who in 2001 had criticized Wolfensohn's reform agenda as unwieldy and directionless) summed his tenure up in 2006 positively: as having given the Bank a dream of a world without poverty, achievable through institution building, improving governance, and enhancing the participation of the marginalized (Einhorn 2006, 17; see also Stiglitz 2005).

In drawing attention to these shifts, I do not mean to exaggerate the extent to which they were evenly embedded within the organization. The Bank remained divided in key ways (see Mallaby 2004; Gilbert and Vines 2000; Fox and Brown 1998; Fox, Clark and Treacle 2003; Wade 2002), and in fiscal year 2006 only 5 percent of its lending went to the theme of social development, gender, and inclusion (World Bank 2007 AR, 56). Some of the organization's most committed reformers left in controversial circumstances, their work blocked by internal resistance or U.S. Treasury opposition,<sup>7</sup> and staff remaining inside disagree publicly about development priorities.<sup>8</sup> The appointment of Paul Wolfowitz, neoconservative architect of the war in Iraq, to replace Wolfensohn in 2005 seemed to signal a rollback of

the Bank's post-Washington Consensus development commitments, and staff were extremely divided by his appointment.

However, Wolfowitz's opponents successfully mobilized for his removal, and in his short tenure he made few drastic changes; an overview written before he resigned noted that many employees were still "waiting for the Stealth bomber to strike" (Calderisi 2006, 24). Moreover, the key disputes in his removal involved personal/personnel matters, the Bank's reconstruction activities in Iraq, and the uneven application of its corruption concerns. The organization's approach to development as holistic, as requiring a focus on poverty and inclusion, and as involving institutional strengthening remained constant. The expansion in the "rhetorics of factuality" (Porter 1995, 77) considered acceptable in Bank research also continued under Wolfowitz: the 2006 *World Development Report* had a Diego Rivera mural on its front cover. Wolfowitz's replacement, Robert Zoellick, recommitted the Bank to working on issues of infrastructural provision, financial services, and good governance to secure an inclusive globalization that benefited the poor (Zoellick 2007). In an institution as complex and turbulent as the Bank, it is unclear whether these commitments will be sustained, but the ground has now shifted to such an extent that they are, at least, liable to be loudly defended. I simply suggest, along with many others, that this mission shift should be taken seriously, not least for what changed in Bank gender policy as a result.

### **Gender and the Post-Washington Consensus Promise**

As Suzanne Bergeron and others have pointed out, poor women were rhetorically central to the Bank's claim that it was moving toward a more inclusive, balanced model of development in which it listened to the most marginalized.<sup>9</sup> They were overrepresented as participants in the Voices of the Poor study, for example,<sup>10</sup> and the opening text box to the Bank's 2000–2001 *World Development Report* on poverty, designed to demonstrate the multiple deprivations experienced by the poor, told the story of Basrabai, a poor Indian woman (World Bank 2000–2001, 1). Wolfensohn was notorious for "relay[ing] human dramas of development" through stories of people he had met (2005, 1), and many of his iconic tales of the Bank's commitment to a new development agenda involved poor women. He explained at the United Nations' Beijing conference that his "vision of a new and better world" was one centered on improving the life of a little girl he had met in Mali (Wolfensohn 1995, 1), and, in his first

address to the Bank's Board of Governors, he described a female entrepreneur he had met in Uganda, using banana peels as fuel: "She had all the pride of the chairwoman of a multinational company as she shared with me her pencil-written records" (2005, 30). He used this example again in a 1997 address to the Banker's Club in London to demonstrate the importance of training people for microcredit, following it up with: "I've seen the same thing in India, where we are teaching women to run businesses—women who can't read, who use cartoonlike figures instead of words in their account books" (62). Wolfensohn also repeatedly told the story of a woman from a Rio favela waving her utility bill at him when he visited. For him, the bill reflected the first time she had been officially recognized and included in society. This tale was so central to his talks that the editors of his collected speeches mentioned it as evidence of his legacy in transforming the Bank from a top-down institution to one that listens to and learns from its critics (7–10).<sup>11</sup>

The Bank also referenced gender concerns more broadly as proof of the need for, or success of, a new development approach focused on poverty eradication and human happiness. For example, in a 1997 address to the Bank's board, Wolfensohn urged them "to remember that educating girls and supporting opportunities for women—in health, education, and employment—are crucial to balanced development" (Wolfensohn 2005, 79). Gender was highlighted in the overview of the Comprehensive Development Framework provided in the 1999–2000 *World Development Report* (World Bank 1999–2000 WDR, 21; 13), as it was in the next *World Development Report* on poverty; there, promoting gender equity was seen as "of such pervasive significance that it deserves extra emphasis" (2000–2001 WDR, 9). Similarly, the Bank's gender staff were used to demonstrate the organization's commitment to a new agenda and to improve its public image. For example, they were highly visible in the Bank's U.S. media response to the April 2000 protests against the Bretton Woods Institutions in Washington DC, deployed to show that the Bank was working to help the poor and protect the vulnerable.<sup>12</sup>

In addition, the Bank's mission shift was expressed in heavily gendered language regarding family and harmonious partnership.<sup>13</sup> Wolfensohn's 1995 address to the Bank's Board of Governors included a section headed "The Power of Partnerships" (Wolfensohn 2005, 37), and during his tenure he invoked partnership in relation to themes as diverse as private sector collaboration, knowledge production (52),

Bank work with other multilateral lenders (47), peasant-government interaction, government restructuring (38), water privatization, environmental protection, and banking regulation. While protesters picketed the meeting of the world's leading international financial institutions in Seattle in 1999, Wolfensohn, who was there, was insisting that trade liberalization must be recognized "as part of a broader set of partnerships—partnerships for building a better future for our world's children" (190). Similar language was used by other high profile Bank staff; Nicolas Stern told assembled European development specialists in 2003 that "we have begun to recognize the need to base our development approach more solidly on partnership" (2003, 32).

The family unit was the most typical reference point for these discussions of partnership. Wolfensohn—renowned for his highly personal approach to development issues (Fidler 2001)—made frequent references to his own family, and he repeatedly extended the family metaphor to the Bank, to the United Nations (Wolfensohn 2005, 128), and to the IMF as a sister institution (130). His first memo to Bank staff when he took over in June 1995 was entitled "Working as a Family," and he closed it by saying:

I should add only that I have a very strong sense of family, not only about Elaine, Sara, Naomi and Adam, but about each one of you. You can count on me to act fairly towards you, and notwithstanding our size, I expect that each of you will care about one another. (15)<sup>14</sup>

His first open house address to staff a day later repeated calls for family unity, by which he meant not voicing critique outside the Bank given that gossiping with intimate family could undermine the Bank family (18). He urged, "I ask first that, as a family, we recognize that, yes, there may be problems, but that they can be resolved, by having an open system with you and by being available" (19). This availability rested fundamentally on his (and his wife Elaine's) commitment to family values, since in return for loyalty from his staff he promised: "You can count on our desire to be part of a family that it's fun to come to work with every day" (22). This commitment to family made it into the Bank's revised mission statement, the last section of which lists as part of "our Values" "enjoying our work and our families" (i).

These family values were universal, a global reference point from which to assert a commonality of interest between global north and global south. In a key 1997 address mapping out his vision of inclusive

development, Wolfensohn claimed: “I have learned that people are the same wherever they are—here in this room or across the world. We all want the best for our children and our families” (2005, 74). Two years later he summed up the findings of the *Voices of the Poor* study, involving 60,000 people in sixty countries, as follows: “They are talking about security, a better life for their children, peace, family, and freedom from anxiety and fear” (157). These aspirations, of course, “are no different from our own” (157).

What *is* different, however, is the ability of the world’s poor to realize such dreams of a secure family future and to be included in the global family represented by the major development lenders. Closing his 1997 Challenge of Inclusion speech, Wolfensohn summed up the key lesson he had learned from the poor people he had met in his development journey:

The look in these people’s eyes is not a look of hopelessness. It is a look of pride, of self-esteem, of inclusion. These are people who have a sense of themselves, a sense of tradition, a sense of family. All they need is a chance. (2005, 84)

Hence in asserting that “culture is the base of development” at a 1999 conference, he assured the audience: “We are working in places . . . all over the world to try and give people the sense of identity, the sense of belonging, the sense of family” (174). Likewise, his remarks at a 1999 meeting on the World Trade Organization (WTO) opened by thanking President Michael Moore on the grounds that “I share his conviction that this must be ‘one family, where everyone has a seat at the table.’ Today I want to speak for those family members who are not always the first to be heard at this table: the poor countries and peoples of the world” (190). The post-Washington Consensus Bank hereby figures itself *both* as the spokesperson for the global family *and* as an agency entrusted with ensuring the poor can realize their dreams of family.

Finally, family was framed as a crucial ingredient of poverty alleviation and social safety net provisioning in the Bank’s new conversations about inclusion and protecting the vulnerable, an issue to which this book will repeatedly return. In a 1999 address Wolfensohn spoke of the importance of social safety nets, emphasizing that they did not need to look like the U.S. or West European models—“It can be based on family. It can be based on tribe. It can be based on past history. But there is a need for some social safety net” (Wolfensohn 2005, 142). Specifically, the poor world had cultures of family that were to be

respected and that could be built upon to craft these new safety nets. As he put it in a 1997 address to the Banker's Club in London, "I have become very humble about what there is to be learned from the cultures of developing countries. We could all learn from the culture of family in Africa" (62). Families are also key to the Bank's more recent conversations about social capital and informal institutions (see chapters 2 and 6), and the 2000–2001 *World Development Report* asserted the need to strengthen the ties connecting family members as part of its effort to improve institutions and hereby reduce poverty (World Bank 2000–2001 WDR, 128). The family was *the* crucial site invoked by the Bank when demonstrating its commitment to a kinder, more inclusive, more human approach to growth, then, and reformed gender relations were hereby positioned as key to the creation of a new common sense about development.

### **Walking the Walk: The Increasing Support for Gender and Development**

Importantly, heightened rhetoric about poor women and gendered partnership was linked to increased Bank action on gender and development (GAD) priorities. The organization dedicated itself to gender in a way it had not done before 1995, devoting greater attention and more money to GAD concerns and reinvigorating its own gender specialists.<sup>15</sup> Wolfensohn started his tenure by leading the Bank's delegation to the United Nations' Fourth Conference on Women—the first time a Bank president had headed the team—and he was unequivocal in his support for core GAD goals there. He opened his speech in characteristically personal form by noting:

I need no persuading that women are absolutely central to sustainable development, economic advance, and social justice. Like so many others, I owe a huge debt to my own mother for her guidance and support. My family tradition and cohesion are built around the role of women. I know its strength—for myself, and for my children. It is no abstract concept. (1995, 1)

He claimed later in a conference entitled *Gender Equality: The Right Thing for Business*, "There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that the single most important issue in most of the countries we are dealing with is the enfranchisement of women" (quoted in World Bank 2005b, 1).

With such commitments, Wolfensohn was regarded as "a tremendous positive resource for change" by gender staff (O'Brien

et al. 2000, 53). Greater attention to gender issues (particularly in the arena of women's education) was a key policy change associated with his leadership (Wolfensohn 2005, 5; Tzannatos 2006). Between 1995 and 2001 the proportion of projects that included some consideration of gender issues in their design almost doubled to nearly 40 percent (Long 2003, 7), and by 2000 gender staff were proudly announcing that "close to half of the Bank's assistance strategies for member countries now include actions designed to promote gender equality" (World Bank 2000a, vii). In short, as a 2005 evaluation neatly summarized, "Today, gender equality is explicitly recognized as essential to achieving the World Bank's poverty reduction mission" (World Bank 2005c, 7).

The Bank also repositioned itself internally to take gender issues more seriously. After Beijing the Bank established a committee on gender to report quarterly to the president, and the organization developed closer relations with NGOs and outside experts dealing with gender issues (Murphy 1997, 13). Karen Mason, an economist respected as a peer among Bank staff, was hired as head of the Gender Sector Board (Piercy 2000, 68). In 1997 a GAD unit was created as part of the new Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network (World Bank 2005b, 2–3), and the Bank's six regions appointed gender coordinators in an attempt to mainstream gender throughout operational activities (World Bank 1997d, 2). By 2005 over seventy country gender focal point staff had been appointed in the Bank's country offices (World Bank 2005c, 57). The organization also moved forward on its equal opportunities agenda; between 1995 and 2004 the percentage of women in key professional grades rose from 31 percent to 42 percent, and those in key management and senior technical grades rose from 13 to 25 percent (51).<sup>16</sup>

Importantly, then, stories of individual poor women, references to families as safety nets, and gendered examples of balanced development were linked to increased attention to GAD concerns after 1995, and the results were in many respects impressive.<sup>17</sup> Between 1995 and 2000 the Bank lent more than US \$3.4 billion for girls' education, and it was the single largest lender in the world for health, nutrition, and population projects—75 percent of which included gender-responsive actions (Tzannatos 2006). All of the July 2003–June 2004 poverty assessments reviewed for an internal evaluation analyzed the gender dimensions of poverty and proposed gender actions (World Bank 2005c, 60), and in 2006, under

Wolfowitz, the Bank hosted a conference on the Millennium Development Goal of gender equity. Indeed, in its most comprehensive policy paper on gender to date, *Engendering Development*, the Bank positioned itself as the disseminator of “good practice” on gender in the development community (World Bank 2001a, 273).<sup>18</sup> Critics and supporters alike recognize this report as a major achievement (Kuiper and Barker 2006, 2). Such developments are truly remarkable for those who have studied the Bank for any length of time—the same organization that Kathleen Staudt considered a “dinosaur” on gender issues (2002) and that Bergeron identified as having a “historically dismal record with regard to women in developing economies” (2003, 404) organized a gender workshop in 2000 that included contributions from Noeleen Heyzer, executive director of UNIFEM; Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, then vice president of the Philippines; and Susan Moller Okin, a prominent feminist political theorist (World Bank 2000d). Unprecedented space was hereby opened up for gender policy entrepreneurs as part of the post–Washington Consensus mission shift. The question was, what could they do with it?

### **Changing the Direction: The Importance of Unpaid Work and Male Inclusion**

Crucially, acting as the disseminator of good GAD practice in the new development era required a self-reflexive critique of the Bank’s past work on gender. In this respect the Bank’s post-1995 approach to gender was a distinctively post–Washington Consensus one, based on a clear challenge to the 1980s model. This challenge was made on two grounds: that the old model had overburdened women by failing to take into account unpaid household labor and that it had ignored men. I trace the growing consensus about these errors in this section, before considering Bank attempts to correct them as articulated in formally cleared gender documents.

The Bank’s gender policy continues to rest fundamentally on the notion that women need to be included in labor markets for development to succeed and for women to be empowered.<sup>19</sup> As Maxine Molyneux notes, “Empowerment has come to mean that the poor are to be trained and educated to prepare them for employment” (2006, 430). Work is seen as a commonsensical development good for women, even as documents footnote or fudge inconvenient data showing the opposite.<sup>20</sup> Labor force statistics are by now so obviously an indicator of gender progress that they can be listed with statistics

on schooling and mortality as “our usual development markers” (World Bank 2001a, 27); getting women into work is as unquestioned a development good as keeping women alive or making them literate.<sup>21</sup> Thus, the Bank’s recommendations for “the way forward” in its *Beijing Plus Ten* report encouraged women’s greater participation in the formal labor force (World Bank 2005c, 67), highlighting projects that promoted female entrepreneurship and income-generating opportunities for women. The report also included several photographs showing women working as evidence of their empowerment.

This continues the assumption made under the Washington Consensus and before—that women are empowered through paid employment. Whereas scholars in the liberal feminist tradition, such as Ester Boserup (1970), advised development agencies to encourage women’s participation in wage labor, others have challenged the conflation of work with empowerment (Sen and Grown 1987; Barker 2005; Zein-Elabdin 2003; Charusheela 2003; Chant 2006), and as Frances Cleaver notes, “Policy and research suggest some confusion over whether paid work is empowering or oppressing for men and women” (2002, 16). In Latin America, where female labor force participation rates have increased dramatically,<sup>22</sup> women workers are in increasingly precarious jobs, and wage inequality between men and women is decreasing due to males’ income contraction, not because of the growing economic power of women (Hite and Viterna 2005, 73). As Argentine feminist Rosa Geldstein notes, “In this context, increased labor participation by women from the lower and middle social strata should be understood not as an option for individuals to pursue personal growth—an argument better suited to a minority of highly educated, upper middle class women—but rather as a survival strategy among families threatened by poverty” (1997, 546). The Bank has long been criticized by feminists for its refusal to acknowledge this fact and for its associated failure to deal with the tensions between paid and unpaid work that result from its advice that women enter the formal labor market.<sup>23</sup>

However, I would suggest that the Bank’s contemporary gender policy *is* now cognizant of feminist scholarship on the value of unpaid labor, and it criticizes the Washington Consensus for its neglect thereof and its associated tendency to overburden women. Bank gender documents have long been full of references to “the ‘double burden’ on women of production and reproduction” (World Bank 1990, 13); the Bank’s first *Women in Development* pamphlet, written in 1979, opened

its discussion of employment and income-generation activities by noting that “women in many developing countries tend to be economically invisible” (World Bank 1979, 11). However, the Bank’s post-1995 gender documents have intensified this critique of dominant growth models for ignoring the importance of reproductive labor, and these objections have begun to filter into mainstream conversation. For example, the Bank texts prepared for Beijing criticized official statistics on labor force participation for showing “exaggerated” gender differences because they “fai[l] to capture many aspects of women’s work,” and hence for being “deceptive” (World Bank 1995c, 15). As gender staff explained in *Advancing Gender Equality*,

Since the centrality of women in economic production is largely invisible, evaluations of economic outcomes are incomplete. They fail to account for women’s contributions and mask critical linkages within the economy, especially between the paid and unpaid activities in which women are engaged. (World Bank 1995a, 15)<sup>24</sup>

The triple role framework, looking at productive, reproductive, and community management roles and their gendered nature, came to be used as the defining feature of good gender analysis in the Bank at this time, and the academic who developed it, Caroline Moser, was brought onto the Bank’s gender staff. The framework required measurement of unpaid labor, and thus time-use surveys—a key methodological intervention in development pioneered by feminists—became a standard tool of Bank GAD work. Moser used the triple role framework as a starting point for her attempt to get the Bank to “agree on common concepts and language” to achieve the “systematic clarification” required of good gender analysis (Moser, Törnqvist and van Bronkhorst 1999, 18). Staff could hereby increasingly rely on concrete GAD technologies with which to quantify unpaid work, crucial for success in an organization wherein numbers still constitute the ultimate “rhetoric of factuality” (Porter 1995, 77).

Moreover, gender policymakers in the Bank extended this general attempt to disrupt dominant framings of work and productivity to a specific critique of structural adjustment policies for their failure to take into account the social reproduction problem. Critics had been arguing for decades that the Bank’s neoliberal reform effort rested on exhaustion of women and super-exploitation of their labor,<sup>25</sup> and, when invited to speak at a gender workshop at the Bank, Susan

Moller Okin said bluntly: “By putting in place adjustment policies without taking gender into account, the Bank has done harm [to women], and it has a duty to fix it” (quoted in World Bank 2000d, 53). But the Bank’s gender staff already agreed. They too argued that economic restructuring had caused a social reproduction crisis, one that had fallen largely on women as a result of their responsibility for family survival. The 1996 *World Development Report* on transition cited Bank gender experts to argue that women had been forced into the labor market due to rising poverty, with inadequate provisions for their caring labor (1996 WDR, 80), and the Beijing reports prepared by the organization were explicit that “women share less in the benefits of successful reform” (World Bank 1995a, 15). Wolfensohn’s Beijing speech promised a shift in approach:

A priority concern must be to ensure that women are not hurt by structural adjustment programs. I am well aware of the wide criticism of the Bank on this subject . . . I will be vigilant and more sensitive to arguments which relate to disproportionate adverse social impacts on women. (1995, 4)

A starker recognition of the problem was contained in a 2000 report on Bank GAD policy, based on staff feedback; this asserted unequivocally that:

Structural adjustment hurts poor women more than it hurts poor men. Under structural adjustment, governments cut the budget to achieve fiscal equilibrium, but savings in the *productive* sector create more work in the *reproductive* sector, where women are overrepresented. (World Bank 2000f, 3; emphasis in original)

*Engendering Development* argued, more mildly, that women can be overburdened if pushed into the labor market without account being taken of social reproduction needs, and it referred to the need to avoid “adding excessive hours to women’s work” (World Bank 2001a, 186). But mild or not, all of these documents made the criticism of restructuring policy found in much feminist literature—that it assumes the infinite elasticity of women’s time and (re)privatizes social reproduction labor.

Second, Bank gender staff criticized pre-1995 policy within the organization for ignoring men. This trend was underway before Wolfensohn’s arrival. By the early 1990s gender advocates perceived that their concerns had been marginalized, languishing in under-

funded, women-only projects and disconnected from the Bank's overarching development activities (Murphy 1995). In response, staff embraced a move from women in development (WID) to gender and development (GAD), differentiated in part on the basis of male inclusion. As outlined in the Bank's 1994 policy paper on gender:

The World Bank's early "women in development" programs tended to treat women as a special target group of beneficiaries in projects and programs. The policy framework is now broadening to reflect the ways in which the relations between women and men constrain or advance efforts to boost growth and reduce poverty for all. This focus characterizes the "gender and development" approach—which the Bank will promote to enhance women's contributions to development. (World Bank 1994, 12)

This policy shift drew on Moser's key 1993 text on gender planning, wherein WID was seen as focusing on women in isolation, whereas "the GAD approach maintains that to focus on women in isolation is to ignore the real problem, which remains their subordinate status to men . . . [It] emphasizes a focus on gender relations" (1993, 3). Moser intended GAD to generate transformative interventions that countered women's subordination (4), but through a relational lens that highlighted microsocial male-female interactions.<sup>26</sup>

The distinction between women-only WID and relational GAD became increasingly central to Bank gender policy as it garnered high level support after 1995. References to men increased in Bank gender documents, and male inclusion became a defining feature of successful gender policy. Keyword counts for the terms *men* and *husband/s* conducted on a sample of the most visible, important Bank documents published between 1979 and 2001 show that the hits—simply in raw terms—went up dramatically (Table 1). The sentences in which these words were embedded also took up a higher percentage of the total text in later documents—from 0.2 percent in the 1979 *Recognizing the Invisible Woman in Development: The World Bank's Experience* to 0.6 percent in the 2001 *Engendering Development*. To give just one example, the Bank used the word *husband/s* seventy times in the GAD texts analyzed between 1979 and 2001. Fifty-seven of those seventy references were in *Engendering Development*, the Bank's most important policy document on gender to date.

Close reading of Bank gender documents and leadership speeches confirms this trend toward greater male inclusion and greater empha-

Table 1. The Deployment of Male Inclusion Terms in World Bank Texts, 1979–2001

Document	Keywords			Total	Total Hits	% of Total Text
	MEN	HUSBAND	HUSBANDS			
1979: Recognizing Woman The Invisible woman : in Development The World Bank's Experience	26	0	1	27	10765	0.3%
1990: Progress Report on Women in Development	12	0	1	13	10741	0.1%
1994: Enhancing Women's Participation in Economic Development	73	1	4	78	22833	0.3%
1995: Gender Issues in Bank lending: An Overview (Murphy 1995)	46	0	0	46	40837	0.1%
1995: Wolfensohn's speech to the Beijing Conference (Wolfensohn 1995)	7	0	0	7	2440	0.3%
1995: Towards Gender Equality	83	0	6	89	22801	0.4%
1995: Advancing Gender Equality	36	0	1	37	15904	0.2%
1997: Mainstreaming Gender in World Bank Lending (Murphy 1997)	27	0	0	27	24561	0.1%
1999: Mainstreaming Gender and Development in the World Bank: Progress and Recommendations (Moser, Tornqvist and von Bronkhorst)	55	0	0	55	15066	0.4%
2000: Advancing Gender Equality	29	0	0	29	9784	0.3%
2001: Engendering Development Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources, and Voice	595	25	57	677	115982	0.6%
Totals	989	26	70	1085	343607	0.3%

sis on men and women working together in balanced unity to achieve development goals—a departure from past work wherein women were the central figures of gender lending. Effective gender analysis was defined as “looking at both men’s and women’s roles” and ensuring that “both men and women in equal partnership take the responsibility to define the development agenda, set the vision and goals, and develop strategies” (Murphy 1997, 43). A 1999 evaluation cowritten by Moser and intended to help “create a Bankwide consensus” on gender analysis (Moser, Törnqvist and van Bronkhorst 1999, v) praised El Salvador’s country gender strategy, which aimed to “[create] a more gender equitable division of labor in the household” (26), while criticizing projects that ignored men (8). It also criticized the

widespread tendency to “mix,” or confuse, approaches. For example, the World Bank’s 1994 Gender Policy starts by identifying GAD as its framework, but frequently refers to *women* as a separate target group, rather than identifying women’s priorities or needs in terms of men’s . . . The accompanying Operational Policy identifies policies in terms of *gender*, but target groups in terms of women as a separate group . . . Similarly, it proposes “*gender-sensitive*” policies, but as a means of improving *women’s* access to assets and services. (6; emphasis in original)

Male inclusion and attention to relationships between men and women were required to correct this error. In addressing the United Nations’ Committee on the Status of Women in 2005, the acting sector manager of GAD activities claimed that the Bank had learned a key lesson concerning male inclusion—that “unless both women and men change their views on gender equality, and work in partnership to achieve it, we will not make progress” (Ofosu-Amaah 2005, 3). This interest in men culminated—at least so far—in a 2006 Bank book entitled *The Other Half of Gender*, in which staff critiqued the one-sided, unbalanced nature of GAD work focused on women. Arguing that “serious attention to the issue of men and gender in development is long past due” (Bannon and Correia 2006, 245), the book framed a “men-streamed” approach as a move toward a “more holistic gender framework,” as the “third major evolution in the gender paradigm, following on WID and GAD” (xix). This framing is in line with the increasing tendency among nonfeminist observers to see sexism as a symmetrical relationship that hurts men as much as

women (Gavanas 2004, 12) and that involves no essential power relationship.<sup>27</sup>

The evolution to men-streaming was prompted in large part by the economic crises to which the Bank's new, more balanced development approach was responding. Economic crisis and the restructuring that ensued were understood to have led to a crisis in gender relations, particularly a crisis in masculinity in which men had been stripped of their socially valued role as breadwinners. Their masculinity thus wounded, poor, unemployed men were an increasingly dangerous threat to women and children. For example, *Engendering Development* claimed that

During economic shocks, such as those in the transition economies of Eastern Europe, rapidly worsening unemployment has produced such high anxiety (especially among men) that alcoholism, suicide, domestic violence, and the dissolution of families have risen considerably. These, in turn, have their own impacts on women and children. (World Bank 2001a, 73)

The claim was extended to all regions and became a trope of economic crisis in general; I trace its Latin American manifestations in subsequent chapters. However, in universal terms Wolfensohn maintained that “gender issues and stereotypes also affect men” by highlighting male unemployment and its link to alcoholism and male mortality (World Bank 2000a, iv). Several chapters in *The Other Half of Gender* argued that men were being excluded from the benefits of development, marginalized from employment and education opportunities; hurt through disproportionately high burdens of disease, violence, and substance abuse; and increasingly struggling to fulfill their traditional role as providers. Unemployed men were thus trying to affirm their masculinity in other, more destructive ways—through unsafe sex and violence (Bannon and Correia 2006, xix).

In these ways the Bank linked family breakdown to economic crisis, a connection that rested *both* on women being overburdened with work *and* on harm to men's masculinity. Several documents—including the 1996 *World Development Report* focused on transition—expressed concern over the dissolution of families as men responded to the stress of unemployment (World Bank 1996 WDR, 72), and the 2001 policy research report claimed that for men a “sense of emasculation and failure often leads to a host of physical ailments and sharply increasing mortality, alcoholism, physical abuse of wives

and children, divorce and abandonment of families” (World Bank 2001a, 77). Bank gender staff also began to increasingly comment on the breakdown of the family. Nancy Birdsall, a consultant included in a 1996 review of gender issues in the Bank, argued that “female headed households, where there is no nurturing father, are only the most extreme signs of a pathology that needs to be addressed” (quoted in Buvinic, Gwin and Bates 1996, 92), whereas Sven Sandstrom (a Bank managing director) noted at the Bank’s Association of Women in Development forum in November 1999 that there had been an increase in domestic violence and family breakdown as women had taken jobs outside the home. In response, he promised that the Bank would look at all projects with regard to their impact on the family, by expanding economic opportunities for women “while seeking to keep women and families whole.”<sup>28</sup> The family, and the crisis into which it had allegedly been plunged, hence became an increasingly central concern of gender policymakers. As former Polish Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka put it in a Bank gender workshop conducted in Warsaw in 2001, “Why are individuals the unit of analysis? The family should be the unit for analysis, and the [gender] policy should aim to ensure equitable resource allocations within a strong family unit” (quoted in World Bank 2005b, 62).

In these ways, then, the limitations of Washington Consensus approaches to development were mapped onto gender anxieties as the Bank underwent a mission shift. Economic crisis was framed as leading to a crisis in gender relations, with women increasingly overburdened and men increasingly violent and destructive given the undermining of their breadwinner role. Such gender-related impacts of economic crisis had been overlooked in past Bank policy, however, because it had ignored women’s unpaid work and failed to give balanced attention to men. The policy forged in the post–Washington Consensus era would have to overcome these problems—and in the process the Bank’s gender approach would fundamentally change.

### **Post–Washington Consensus Gender Policy: Producing Efficient and Empowering Partnerships**

Specifically, the crisis in gender relations and family was to be resolved in the post–Washington Consensus era of balance and harmony through adjusted partnerships between men and women. The organization no longer assumes a breadwinner–housewife model of social reproduction wherein men “work” and women provide unpaid

social reproduction labor, but neither does it endorse a default exhaustion solution that implies that women should simply take on extra burdens. Instead, it advocates a two-partner, sharing model of love and labor in which women work more and men care better, hereby attempting to (re)privatize responsibility for social reproduction by adjusting the way in which love is expressed in the family. As Wolfensohn explained at Beijing, the challenge of gender equality was a dual one:

It will require a change in behavior on the part of men—in the households in which we live, in the societies we build, and, may I say, in the institutions in which we work. It is crucial that this be a two-sided change, a change not only in the opportunities for women but also in the response of men who play their part. (2005, 26)

Playing their part meant taking greater responsibility for caring labor, since men need to change “in their thinking, attitudes, and willingness to take a fairer share of the responsibilities and workloads that women carry on their shoulders” (Wolfensohn 1995, 3). As one staff member explained in a discussion of how to *Promot[e] Gender Equality among Shareholders*:

Equality works both ways. Gender equality implies that women should be given access to all that men traditionally have, be it jobs, health, education, influence, careers, et cetera. But the roles of men . . . must also change. It is a double issue. . . . And I think this is a struggle which has to be kept on. (World Bank 1995b, 7)

Specifically, men should “be given the opportunity to be part of the traditionally feminine sphere of being loving, considerate, participatory, listening, having patience, understanding, learning, caring” (6–7). In this sense, the vision of partnership on which the Bank’s post–Washington Consensus gender policy rests requires a transformation of men, such that they become more caring and committed to the family.

In many respects this policy preference is justified on standard efficiency grounds, as is to be expected in the Bank. The organization’s charter forbids it from engaging in activities that do not have economic development as their objective, and its internal culture is professional, technocratic, economic, and statistics-driven (O’Brien

at al. 2000, 47). This context results in well-known pressures for efficiency framings of gender policy, focused on how attentiveness to gender enhances productivity and growth.<sup>29</sup> Indeed, Bank staff and consultants are notorious in development circles for “stressing the business case for gender equity” (45)—in recent years they have researched the economic effects of rape, domestic violence, illegal abortion, and HIV/AIDS; the returns from investment in women’s health and education (World Bank 2000a, 5); and the bargaining disparities manifest in dowry murder (Bloch and Rao 2000).

In turn, efficiency language was central to the Bank’s conversations about male inclusion and better partnership. As the 1994 gender policy paper understood it, Bank efforts should focus on: “link[ing] the activities of men and women more effectively within the project with a view to ensuring optimum overall project benefits” (World Bank 1994, 66). In relation to population policy:

If long-term change in the conditions of women is to be achieved, the actions and attitudes of men must change, and it is important that men be brought along in the process of change. For example, family planning information campaigns should be aimed at men as well as at women because it is when men and women are able to make joint informed decisions on family size, child spacing, and appropriate methods of contraception, that these programs are most successful. (15)

In keeping with this emphasis on increasing project effectiveness through partnership between men and women, the Bank’s 1996 gender evaluation gave favorable mention to a pilot project in the East Asia and Pacific region entitled *Men and Women Working Together* (World Bank 1996b, 16), a scenario that was understood to increase efficiency and generate win-win gains for all involved. Similarly, the 2001 policy paper promoted “a policy approach that focuses explicitly on both men and women” in antiviolence initiatives, arguing that treatment programs for men complement efforts to protect women (2001a, 265) and that “if the partnership between men and women were to increase in politics and society, politics would better meet the needs of society” (96).

Moreover, policymakers argued that restructuring gender relations would benefit the market. As Danny Leipziger (Bank vice president and head of the Poverty Reduction Network) put it in his remarks to the United Nation’s Commission on the Status of Women

in 2005, “Gender equality is good for growth and poverty reduction” (Leipziger 2005, 1), increasing the labor force participation rate and leading to a more efficient allocation of resources (2). With traditional gender roles seen as inefficient, “arising from convention rather than from comparative advantage” (World Bank 1995c, 29), the Bank argues persistently that gender divisions of labor harm growth, and thus that altering them will enhance productivity and the efficient use of development resources. This point was made most clearly and consistently in the Bank’s 2001 gender policy paper, which claimed that households that fail to pool resources or share risk generate inefficiencies, in turn “impos[ing] high costs on household production and income” (World Bank 2001a, 162).

In the post-Washington Consensus World Bank, however, productivity arguments need to be complemented with rationales grounded in social development concerns to generate support, and thus recent documents also link gender equality to nonmarket goods such as better health, increased happiness, and peace. The language of empowerment—“a chimera that lets everyone feel comfortable—a ‘motherhood’ term with a warm, cuddly feeling” (Parpart 2002, 52)—is particularly important here. As Wolfensohn put it:

The definition of poverty has broadened to address empowerment, security, and opportunity as well as income growth. In this development environment, the empowerment of women—and of men—has become a central element in the World Bank’s strategy for poverty reduction and growth. (World Bank 2000a, iv)

In this light, the achievement of sharing partnership between working women and caring men has been framed as empowering and liberatory to both parties, and graphics of coupled men and women have become ubiquitous signifiers of the Bank’s new inclusive gender approach. These images—a small sample of which are included here as figures 1 through 4—depict success by showing individual men and women together, partnered in a complementary fashion that not only increases productivity but that symbolizes human wholeness, harmony, and liberation more broadly.<sup>30</sup> The first, taken from a Bank toolkit on gender and sanitation distributed at the 1999 Association of Women in Development meeting, shows a man and woman together growing Africa. The second, taken from a Bank report prepared for Beijing, depicts a White woman holding a shaded baby to her breast, standing in front of a darker figure with muscled arms that

appear to signify manliness (World Bank 1995c, 7). The image is, I believe, in reference to a well-known GAD saying that women hold up half the sky; the man behind her is holding up the other half. The third graphic, the logo for the Bank's internal equal opportunities office, shows a woman supporting a heteronormative partnership of globes in her hand. A fourth image is the front cover for the Bank's 2004 operational memorandum on integrating gender issues into HIV/AIDS work, a new area of Bank concern associated with Wolfensohn and his shift to social development (World Bank 2004g). This shows symbols of a man and a woman together within an HIV/AIDS ribbon. These images of gender harmony did not disappear after Wolfensohn left the Bank. In a 2006 Bank-hosted conference on the Millennium Development Goal of gender equity, Wolfowitz gave an opening speech containing a segment entitled "A Cart with Two Wheels," explained thusly:

During my visit to Pakistan this past summer, one poor woman told me that development is like a cart with two wheels—one man and one woman. If one of the wheels isn't moving, the cart won't go very far. (Wolfowitz 2006)



Figure 1—A graphic on gender and agriculture from a World Bank handout distributed at the Association of Women in Development meetings in Washington DC in 1999 (World Bank 1999b).




Figure 2—A graphic from *Towards Equality*, prepared for the Beijing conference (World Bank 1995c, 7.)

The Bank's gender Web page illustrated this conference with a graphic of a set of scales balanced by a male and female figure on each side<sup>31</sup>—a perfect visual representation of how central male-female partnerships are to the world's largest development institution.

Several of the Bank's recent texts also include photographs of men and women working alongside each other as evidence of successful gender balance. Consider, for example, a photograph depicting entrepreneurship included in *Advancing Gender Equality* (World Bank 2000a). It features two women and one man working together, and the male-female couple is made central to the image, their working together representing balance, partnership, and mutual empowerment through equal participation in labor.

Given that men are understood to be empowered through caring responsibilities, they are increasingly depicted with children in Bank reports. Hence, Bank staff asserted in the concluding chapter to *The*




Figure 3—The logo for the World Bank's internal equal opportunities office, from the cover of *At a Turning Point: New Opportunities for Gender Equality in the World Bank Group* (1997)




Figure 4—World Bank graphic from the cover of *Integrating Gender Issues into HIV/AIDS Programs: An Operational Guide Prepared by Gender and Development Group, World Bank, November 2004.*

*Other Half of Gender* that “men themselves are likely to be the greatest beneficiaries of their involvement as fathers” (Bannon and Correia 2006, 257), and that the Bank should nurture this positive social energy in its gender interventions (257). This advice is also evident in the Bank’s images. For example, *Advancing Gender Equality* (World Bank 2000a) included a photograph in the opening chapter of an adult man with three children, and the Bank’s most prominent publication on men in GAD has an intimate father-child dyad on the front cover (Figure 5). As these images make clear, increased male involvement in family care is to be celebrated not simply for its efficiency benefits, but also for its empowering effects on humanity more generally.

### Targeting the Poor for Partnership Promotion

Importantly, these dual rationales of efficiency and empowerment are linked through the claim that the market generates liberatory progress in gender relations. In this sense sharing, loving couples are a market development, allowing the Bank to depict its own role in forging them as nonpolitical and uncontroversial. As *Engendering Development* explained it:

Economic development introduces incentives and opportunities that can break down entrenched gender roles in the economy—allowing females to participate as males do in the market economy (and not just during economic recession) and males to share in care activities. Economic growth can lighten women’s work burden at home, giving them more leisure time and the choice of engaging in market work. And it can allow men to lighten their own market work and induce them to engage in more nonmarket activities. (World Bank 2001a, 183)

Hence, through getting women into work and inducing men to share unpaid household labor more equitably, growth will “slowly but surely chang[e] gender roles and relations” (204). This process will then contribute to more growth, empowering everyone involved. The virtuous cycle works its partnering magic with the market at the center, both generating and benefiting from sharing male-female couples that are integrated into the productive and reproductive spheres.

A logical consequence of this framing is the Bank’s now standard claim that poor countries and communities are more oppressive to




Figure 5—An intimate father-child dyad on the front cover of *The Other Half of Gender*, the World Bank's most prominent publication on men in Gender and Development.

women and more unequal in their partnerships than those with higher incomes—a fact that in part explains why they are poor. To see how the organization's approach has changed in this respect, note that the Bank's first WID pamphlet highlighted the ambivalent impact of markets on gender relations, since "changes in traditional systems of social organization and of production have frequently disrupted a complementarity between the roles of the two sexes and a sharing of responsibilities between them" (World Bank 1979, 1). Such discussion has all but disappeared from Bank gender texts, replaced by an increasingly vehement insistence that poor countries and communities are more sexist than rich ones, and that markets transform gender relations in unequivocally efficient *and* empowering directions. As the 2000 *Advancing Gender Equality* text bluntly stated:

Societies that discriminate on the basis of gender tend to experience more poverty, slower economic growth, and a lower quality of life than societies in which gender inequality is less pronounced. The effects are especially strong in the poorest countries, where the quality of life is often the lowest. (World Bank 2000a, 3)

Likewise, using data that excludes labor force participation rates (see footnote xx), *Engendering Development* argued that "as incomes rise, gender equality tends to increase," and that "gender disparities are more pronounced in poorer households than in nonpoor ones" (World Bank 2001a, 63). Hence the policy paper operates "by interpreting the gender gap as a measure of economic backwardness" (178).

As a result, the Bank argues that it should target its partnership promotion activities on the poor, marked as an especially vulnerable population in terms of gender inequality. As *Engendering Development* explained:

Because the combined effects of institutional reform and economic development usually take time to be realized, active measures are often warranted in the short to medium term. . . . Such measures accelerate progress in redressing persistent gender inequalities and they are useful in targeting specific subpopulations, such as the poor, for whom gender disparities can be particularly acute. (World Bank 2001a, 22)

In particular, policymakers invoke the classic problem of market failure through shirkers to justify their interventions. Put simply, poor

men are the ultimate free riders. As a text box on gender in a Bank text prepared for Beijing explained it:

“In North Sumatra where I was born,” reminisced Dr. Washington Napitupulu, the father of Indonesia’s literacy campaign, “when you plant the rice, the women do that. When you clean the rice fields, the women do it. They also build the roads, the houses, and carry stones from the river. The men are in the shops playing chess, drinking beer or coffee. The women, especially in North Sumatra, in Java, in Bali, often work harder than the men in the rural areas.” “We found that the girls are smarter than the boys,” says Romo Mangun, an Indonesian Catholic priest and advocate for the poor. “In our society boys are princes, so a boy can do anything. But girls have all sorts of duties—they have learned responsibility from early childhood. The work’s done by the women.” (World Bank 1995a, 27)

This generic argument that men shirk work merges with the aforementioned claim that poor, unemployed men act out wounded masculinity through violence and drunkenness (World Bank 2000a, iv; 2001a, 73), making them particularly irresponsible and unloving. Bank gender policy documents make frequent references to poor men draining family income through purchases of alcohol and cigarettes (World Bank 2001a, 159) and through gambling and womanizing, such that Barbara Hertz, former head of the Bank’s WID unit, said in a 2000 gender review, “I would like to see the Bank zero in on key messages econometrically that women do not spend their money on beer and other women” (World Bank 2000d, 88). As other scholars have pointed out in relation to GAD policy more generally, such framings unpleasantly echo colonial conversations about lazy natives and barbaric brown men (Jackson 2001; Cleaver 2002; Cornwall 1997; Sweetman 1997; Baaz 2005).<sup>32</sup> They have been recently extended into discussion of terrorism, with Bank staff arguing in *The Other Half of Gender* that Mohammed Atta, Adolf Hitler, and Timothy McVeigh were failed men acting out wounded masculinity through violence, and positioning Islamic terrorism as a gender war aiming to restore a primitive warrior masculinity (Bannon and Correia 2006, 252).

Sometimes men can appear unredeemable in these discussions, and the Bank’s preferred solution is to transfer resources to more

responsible women. Thus the 2001 policy paper suggested that the Bank should “increas[e] women’s share of cash income in the household” in order to “significantly increas[e] the share of the budget their households allocate to food and reduc[e] the share spent on alcohol and cigarettes” (World Bank 2001a, 81). However, that option is not particularly prominent in Bank texts, because it does not include men and thus does not appear in keeping with the definition of good gender policy as encouraging equity through complementary partnership. More typically, the Bank suggests “tak[ing] active policy measures” (249) that attempt to increase poor men’s involvement in the family in order to resolve free rider problems, use development resources efficiently, and empower men through domesticity. Measures suggested in prominent Washington DC–generated Bank texts include the following:

- Requiring that “husbands . . . purchase a joint annuity when they retire or . . . withdraw their savings over their own expected lifetime plus that of their wife” in pensions reform (World Bank 2001a, 268).
- Making exit from marriage harder for men, because “if enforcement of alimony and child support payments makes divorce more costly to men, women should have more power within marriage” (World Bank 2001a 156).
- Increasing employment choices for women so that they can contribute to productivity growth while “also increas[ing] choices for men—for example, by allowing paternity leave” (World Bank 1996 WDR, 72).
- Involving men in family planning (World Bank 2001a, 251; 23–24; World Bank 1995a, 32; Bannon and Correia 2006).
- Changing the tax system to encourage women into the labor force and to convince couples to share responsibility for childcare (World Bank 1995c, 49).
- Mandating the use of joint land titling for couples (World Bank 2000–2001 WDR, 121).
- “Strengthen[ing] male participation and involvement in caring for families” and for people living with HIV and AIDS (World Bank 2004g, 9) in order to avoid imposing extra care burdens on women.
- Replicating current “examples of good practices in gender” such as a 1989 Tanzanian population, health, and nutrition sector

review that aimed for men to “increasingly share the burden of family chores” (World Bank 2005b, 27).

I devote the rest of the book to explicating some of the concrete policy measures, research activities, and project interventions that stem from this milieu and to navigating the complexities of a feminist response. Suffice it to say that the world’s largest development institution is now involved in a range of efforts to encourage more sharing among male-female couples, particularly among the poor.

Whether that shift has any broader relevance is a vital question. Although *Developing Partnerships* focuses on the Bank’s approach to gender and sexuality within the post–Washington Consensus, it is not the only institution in which sharing couples and gender balance have become central. There is ample evidence elsewhere of the global spread of ideologies of love, romance, and companionate marriage (Wilson 2004; Padilla et al. 2007) and the theme for the 2009 meetings of the United Nations’ Commission on the Status of Women was “The equal sharing of responsibilities between women and men, including caregiving in the context of HIV/AIDS.”<sup>33</sup> Romanticized commentary about gender partnerships and appeals to include men in GAD are indeed widespread in development circles. The advantage of the Bank—for my purposes—is that it self-identifies as the most important player in development and that its interventions must be explicitly linked to growth concerns. Thus it is the prime site in which to consider the links between new approaches to gender and sexuality and new approaches to political economy. However, the new directions in which the Bank is moving, with regard to gender/sexuality *and* development, are hardly idiosyncratic, and hence the findings presented here should resonate with several other players in the development arena.

## Conclusion

I hope to have demonstrated here that shifts in norms and common-sense understandings about gender are integral to the post–Washington Consensus. It is not simply that talk of empowered women and happy families is a central mechanism through which support for the new development model is generated; it is also that the gender regime being promoted has changed. It now reflects interests in male-female complementarity and a relational approach to gender, one in which couplehood is seen to produce empowering harmony and development efficiency. Women’s unpaid work and men’s need for inclusion are of

considerable concern to policymakers in this model, one which explicitly contests the Washington Consensus common sense about women as infinitely able to pick up the slack of restructuring and which—as I detail in subsequent chapters—creates important space for feminist policy entrepreneurship.

At this point, however, I simply suggest that these developments represent a significant shift in the Bank's approach to political economy and to gender. While liberal modalities of capitalism were imagined to function through breadwinner-housewife wages, neoliberal, Washington Consensus ones worked (or, for feminists, did not work) through exhausting women. Post-Washington Consensus formulations need to be sustainable, more embedded, and more inclusive. Hence, the emphasis is on partnerships, not individuals, and on empowerment through sharing harmony. To adapt Nikolas Rose's claim that citizens have to be "responsibilized and entrepreneurialized" (1999, 139) before they can govern themselves inline with contemporary neoliberal mandates, I would suggest that in the Bank's new gender model poor women are targeted for the entrepreneurialism, understood to gain empowerment through employment, whereas poor men are increasingly targeted for responsibilization. As later chapters show, Bank money, research energy, and policy advice were redirected to help generate the partnerships associated with this shift, making reformulated couples central—practically as well as discursively—to the organization's post-Washington Consensus development approach.

## THE MODEL REGION REMODELS PARTNERSHIPS

### The Politics of Gender Research in Latin America and the Caribbean

In an organization such as the Bank, demonstrating the value of gender through solid empirical research has . . . been a key success factor

—MARIA CORREIA, then head of the World Bank's  
Latin America and Caribbean Gender Unit

This chapter explores how the Washington DC approach outlined in chapter 1 affects regional policy. What did the Bank's journey to the new development model look like from a regional perspective, and how should the connections between macroeconomic shifts and changes in gender policy be understood regionally? I focus on the work of gender staff in the Bank's Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region to answer these questions, since this is a key site for debates about the need for a post-Washington Consensus dealing with inequality, poverty, and institutional reform. In particular, the Bank's LAC staff invoked the notion of a regional "institution gap," encompassing both the formal and informal rules considered necessary for markets to flourish, and policymakers gave advice in several realms on how to strengthen informal networks and change social conventions. Gender staff associated with the region were hence well-positioned to pioneer the Bank's new approach to gender policy—one that strove to mitigate the double burden of paid and unpaid work on women while including men. In fact, the LAC Gender Unit was at the forefront of Bank debates about a reformulated gender policy, and the region is the testing ground for a range of new gender loans, some of which will be explored in subsequent chapters. Here, I consider *how* men are made visible in these new regional policy conversations, along with the lending priorities that emerged as a result. Specifically, I suggest that efforts to readjust partnerships by having poor men take on caring labor are now a central feature of regional gender policy texts.

Finally, attention is given to the research and citational practices through which this regional reformulation of GAD is legitimated, shedding critical light on the knowledge-production processes embedded in post-Washington Consensus gender policy in an attempt to render them more contestable. This discussion is not intended to discredit Bank gender research, much of which is nuanced, careful, and complex. It is, however, to point out the selective erasure of certain types of nuance, care, and complexity as one moves up the organization's hierarchy of texts. This trend is particularly clear in the Bank's work on the relationship between poverty, masculinity, and gender inequality. By focusing on this issue, I aim to not only regionalize the link between political economy and gender and sexuality initiated in chapter 1, but also to connect that conversation to discussions about development and knowledge. Bank research occupies a crucial place in national, regional, and global circuits of knowledge production about gender; more sustained attention to its mechanics is long overdue.

### **Latin America, the World Bank, and the Post-Washington Consensus**

If the World Bank is the crucial organizational test case for any research on the post-Washington Consensus given Wolfensohn's and Stiglitz's prominence as pioneers of the approach, Latin America is the key regional case study. In fiscal year 2006, 25 percent of the Bank's US \$23.6 billion in lending went to LAC (World Bank 2006 AR, 56), but the region received 40 percent of IBRD lending, more than any other (62). It is thus a key source of middle-income lending, crucial to the Bank's sustainability.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, recall that the Washington Consensus was a term coined by economist John Williamson to describe a Latin American free trade policy package supported by the U.S. Treasury, certain regional economists, and international financial institutions (Williamson 2003c, 11). The region "pursued the Washington Consensus policy agenda to its fullest" (Santiso 2004, 829), in part helped by the endogenous example of neoliberal restructuring provided by Pinochet's Chile in the late 1970s (Teichman 2001; Taylor 2006). In the 1980s, Latin American countries undertook an average of six adjustment programs each with the assistance of the Bretton Woods Institutions; some undertook up to fourteen (Cornia 2001, 1). Reform commitments associated with the Washington Consensus thus went furthest in the region, with privatization, tariff reform, export reorientation, and inflation-control measures pursued across the zone.

Although there was wide variability in the follow-through (Geddes 2003; Teichman 2004; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Stallings 1992; Weyland 2002), the Bank's regional vice president acknowledged that "no other area of the world is taking so many initiatives to open and integrate its economies with world markets" (Shahid Hussain, quoted in Green 2003, 73).

In part, because the restructuring experience was so intense in the region, protest against it was also virulent. Widespread social unrest occurred throughout the 1980s and 1990s as governments battled to implement unpopular reform in the face of entrenched opposition from a range of forces (Walton and Seddon 1994; Green 2003). A 1984 government decision to raise food and medicine prices in response to IMF pressure led to riots in the Dominican Republic that left 112 people dead (Green 2003, 39). At least 300 were killed in the Venezuelan version of the IMF riot five years later (40). Reliant for implementation on strong executives, secret negotiations with international financial institutions, and riot police, the Washington Consensus agenda was hence associated with a democracy deficit wherein economic policy was increasingly insulated from popular participation or support. One observer called this the "Pinochet/Chicago boys option" (Carrière 2001, 147) after the union of authoritarianism and neoclassical economics used to secure reform in Chile (see also Klein 2007), although many democratic governments also attempted to carve out "an authoritarian bubble" where economic policies could be hived off from normal politicking (Conaghan and Malloy 1994, 168).

However, those interested in restructuring also learned key lessons about sustaining reform from Latin America, which were used to inform the advice given to governments by international financial institutions. For example, a range of authors noted that "technopols" who mixed technical savvy with the ability to get measures through the political process were central to reform (Domínguez 1997; Teichman 2004; Centeno and Silva 1998; Huneus 1998); that strong executives could push through early stages of restructuring but that sustainability relied on broader party support and social consensus (Haggard and Kaufman 1995); that democratically elected governments could, in certain circumstances, enact austerity measures and remain in power (Weyland 2002); and that populism could be redefined to include neoliberal economic ingredients (de la Torre 2000; Demmers, Fernández Jilberto, and Hogenboom 2001).<sup>2</sup> The Latin American experience was hence central to the conversations

about sustainability and government ownership that characterized the post–Washington Consensus.

Finally, much of the self-proclaimed post–Washington Consensus literature emerged from Latin American scholars, policymakers, and activists concerned about disappointing growth in the 1990s, lack of progress on poverty reduction and inequality, and the volatility of economic development in the region (Portes and Hoffman 2003; Gore 2000; Murillo et al. 2006; Naím 1993). Between 1994 and 2002, twelve middle-income countries experienced serious financial crises, and Latin America was particularly affected, with three of its major economies hit by crises linked to neoliberal free trade measures and the weakness of regulatory institutions (Santiso 2004, 829).<sup>3</sup> After two decades of austerity measures and over twenty social fund programs launched since 1986 to deal with the social costs of restructuring (Cornia 2001, 12),<sup>4</sup> the gap between reform expectations and performance was stark; the region remained the most unequal in the world, and 2002 saw another round of riots against government austerity and privatization plans in Uruguay, Peru, Bolivia, and Paraguay (Green 2003, 7). Further evidence of the regional rejection of neoliberalism by electorates was later provided by Venezuela, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and (perhaps) Mexico. Not surprisingly, then, in 2003 John Williamson laid out “an agenda for restarting growth and reform” in Latin America that required going beyond the Washington Consensus. This agenda urged the completion of many unrealized reforms, particularly around privatization and labor market flexibilization, but it also included many explicitly different measures such as greater attention to institutional strengthening, inequality and crisis-proofing, and regulatory measures to reduce economic volatility (Williamson 2003c; see also Williamson 2000).

The World Bank’s LAC regional unit was central to these debates. In the early 1980s, after a staff shakeup stemming from the Mexican debt crisis, a pro-reform consensus had emerged within the organization’s LAC unit. Staff lobbied openly for restructuring, “engaging in a concerted campaign to convince officials of the client country of the necessity of policy reform” (Teichman 2001, 60). In 1986 the Bank’s adjustment lending to Latin America tripled to \$2 billion (Teichman 2004, 42), representing 40 percent of its loan commitments to the region that year (Teichman 2001, 52). However, the Bank’s first regional development conference in 1995 identified the Mexican peso crisis as a key “wake up call,” demonstrating the need for a reformed

approach (Burki and Aiyer 1995, 2), and the Bank subsequently put out two key reports outlining a new development agenda that would move the organization past the narrowly-framed neoliberalism of the 1980s and early 1990s: the 1997 *The Long March: A Reform Agenda for Latin America and the Caribbean in the Next Decade* and the 1998 *Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter* (see also Walton 2004; Burki et al. 1998). The first noted that the early 1990s “euphoria” surrounding reform prospects in the region had been replaced with “gloom, anxiety, and uncertainty” (Burki and Perry 1997, ix) following crises in Mexico and Argentina, and a recognition that even optimistic predictions of 4–5 percent growth rates would be insufficient to significantly reduce poverty or income inequality (x). *Beyond the Washington Consensus* argued that, although past policies had helped ensure the resumption of economic growth in the 1990s (particularly by reducing inflation), poverty and inequality had not been addressed in sufficient depth, and economic insecurity for the poor and middle class had increased (Burki and Perry 1998, 1). A new, post–Washington Consensus was thus called for by regional Bank staff, one that would complete the first generation of reforms while addressing issues of equity, public-sector restructuring, and institutional design and that aimed to assemble a pro-poor coalition for reform. This revised agenda was nicely symbolized on the front cover to *Beyond the Washington Consensus* by a set of scales, representing judicial strengthening and a broader concern with development balance and harmony highlighted in chapter 1. Wolfensohn referred to this as a “Santiago consensus” (Burki and Perry 1998, 7) on the importance of financial, judicial, and public-sector restructuring, in an important regional marking of the post–Washington Consensus; indeed, Greig Charnock asserts that the Bank’s global restructuring agenda in the 1990s was spearheaded by the Office of the Chief Economist for the LAC (Charnock 2006, 74).<sup>5</sup>

In particular, the Bank’s regional staff aimed to focus attention on institutions, understood in the Bank as referring to the rules—formal and informal—structuring the action of individuals and organizations. As Wolfensohn explained in a 1999 address:

There can be no doubt that strong institutions at the local level are the real key to effective poverty reduction. It takes more than changing formal rules to build these institutions. It means changing the informal rules and norms. It means building people, building values, and building skills and incentives that can

support peoples committed to change. (Wolfensohn 2005, 161–62)

This is a complex undertaking, because, while changes in formal laws can be legislated relatively easily, “Developing market-supporting institutions can take years, even decades, because it involves such a fundamental change in skills, organizations, and attitudes” (World Bank 1996 WDR, 9). For example, the 1996 *World Development Report* on transition paid particular attention to education as a mechanism for transmitting the values necessary for market economies (World Bank 1996 WDR, 123) and the need for reformed school systems to “emphasize personal responsibility, intellectual freedom, and problem-solving skills” (124). The 2000–2001 *World Development Report* laid out a more comprehensive strategy for building social institutions that could combat poverty, a category seen to include kinship systems, community organizations, and informal networks that can help poor people to “get by and get ahead” (World Bank 2000–2001 WDR, 117).

The Bank’s LAC staff have been central to these debates. In 1998 the region’s vice president announced that “the underestimation of the importance of institutional aspects has proved to be one of the key missing elements of the original Washington Consensus” (Shahid Javed Burki in Burki et al. 1998, 6). Specifically, the LAC was understood by Bank staff to suffer from an “institution gap” relative to other developing countries, creating obstacles for business (Burki and Perry 1998, 24).<sup>6</sup> The gap included both formal institutions, such as judicial systems, and informal ones, such as trust and respect for private property. Much of the Bank’s advice for the region focused on the former, but regional specialists also addressed the relationship *between* formal and informal institutions, looking at how to link change in formal rules to change in conventions and norms. For example, in arguing that “Institutions Matter for Development,” *Beyond the Washington Consensus* highlighted the importance of informal institutions such as trust, ethics, values, and political norms (Burki and Perry 1998, 12), and it asserted that social engineers need to look deeply into the factors reinforcing undesirable behaviors in order to successfully change the pressures and incentives that shape individuals’ actions (113). The report thus urged reform of credit and bankruptcy laws to inculcate responsibility, and it devoted considerable attention to the need to change taken-for-granted conventions about matters such

as corruption, absenteeism, and the “culture of non-payment” understood to explain debt default (13). The Bank’s LAC region has also gone furthest in reframing crime and violence as development issues linked to the paucity of informal institutions and trust (see, for example, Ayres 1998; Burki and Perry 1997, 83), and when the Bank discusses this issue more broadly, LAC examples are often used. The 1997 *World Development Report* mentioned an initiative by the mayor of Cali to reduce the murder rate by re-educating citizens to obey traffic laws, banning alcohol and guns at public events, and improving services in squatter areas (World Bank 1997 WDR, 44), for example.

Finally, the LAC has been the key site of Bank work on social capital, a concept central to its new development agenda. The organization became increasingly interested in social capital under Wolfensohn as a way to sustain communities and restore the social fabric given the dislocations of economic restructuring.<sup>7</sup> Relying on Robert Putnam,<sup>8</sup> the Bank understands social capital as “norms of reciprocity and networks of civil engagement” (quoted in Burki and Perry 1998, 124), without which opportunities for mutually beneficial collective action are squandered (Woolcock 1998, 153; World Bank 1997 WDR, 114; World Bank 1999–2000 WDR, 22). Bank initiatives around social capital went furthest in the LAC and were central to the region’s embrace of the post–Washington Consensus; as Maxine Molyneux notes the Bank took the lead in applying social capital ideas in Latin America and was followed by the United Nations, rather than vice versa (Molyneux 2002, 167). For example, the Bank sponsored the 2001 ECLAC conference entitled *Social Capital and Poverty Reduction in LAC: Toward a New Paradigm*, in which speeches were given by Jimmy Carter, Francis Fukuyama, Hernando de Soto, and the Bank’s senior social scientist for the region, Michael Woolcock (who spoke on links between institutions and markets). In pioneering such new concepts, the Bank’s LAC staff became central players in the new development agenda.

### **The LAC Gender Unit and the Post–Washington Consensus: The Social Marketing of Equality**

In turn, the Bank’s LAC gender staff are among the most important players in the organization’s gender policy. To some extent this reflects the fact that Latin America is a particularly vibrant site for feminist debates about neoliberalism. The Bank’s LAC Gender Unit is thus

operating in an especially conducive feminist climate for path-breaking work. For example, critique of the Washington Consensus was particularly well-developed in Latin America,<sup>9</sup> and feminist networks in the region are greatly concerned with macroeconomic policy; the Latin American arm of Women's Eyes on the World Bank, a feminist monitoring group set up in the 1995 UN conference in Beijing, is the only one still in operation.

Similarly, as Sonia Alvarez et al. (2002) note in their history of the regional "encuentros" that have been bringing women together since 1981, participants have long debated feminism's relationship to national and international political institutions (also Mendez 2005; Nari 2002; Castro 2001; Herrera 2001a; Alvarez 1999). By 1991, thirty-three Latin American countries had government bodies to promote women's interests from within the state bureaucracy (van Halsema 1998, 166). However, this "ambiguous process" of translating gender policies into terms legible to the state raises well-known risks of "neutralización e instrumentalización" (Herrera 2001a, 85). More autonomous segments of the feminist movement have viewed participation with state or international financial organizations as "collusion with global neo-liberal patriarchy" (Alvarez et al. 2002, 547), and hence claims that "the revolution will not be funded" have been prominent in the region for decades (with all due respect to the U.S. activists currently working under that banner; see INCITE! 2007). As Amy Lind and others point out, this tension is related to the neoliberal imperative to strengthen civil society as a way of cutting back state provision of services, because women's groups are increasingly invited to participate in government development projects (Lind 2005, 66–67). Many have accepted, attempting to avoid co-optation, but this dual insider-outsider location can lead to what Lind terms a "crisis of identity" for women activists and bureaucrats (65). Some opportunities are available for women who work for the state or the development community to be empowered as policymakers, whereas other women are targeted as recipients of neoliberal development policies (60). This can increase class (and ethnic) distinctions between experts and clients, and it "places organized middle class women in the contradictory position of working for social change, often with a critical vision, yet also finding themselves implicated in the web of power relations that the restructuring process has helped to institutionalize" (76).

In turn, poor women see their "coping strategies" increasingly instrumentalized; they took on collectivized responsibility for

community survival in the face of crises provoked by irresponsible macroeconomic policies and bad governance (Molyneux 2002, 179), but they are increasingly positioned as “administrators of their own poverty” (Delphino 1990, 68). As Lind’s research on Ecuador shows, while many women who participated in community organizations felt that they benefited from learning new skills, sharing their experiences with other women, and so on, they remained poor, and “their own survival strategies have converged well with one of the goals of structural adjustment. . . . to redistribute the responsibility and management of social welfare to private sectors” (Lind 2005, 110). In this regard, trenchant critique has been made at the regional level of *assistencialist*<sup>10</sup> initiatives that further burden women, through institutionalization of their roles in securing community and family survival (Alvarez et al. 2002; Molyneux 2002, 2006; Alva, Asalde y Ospina 2003; Nari 2002). Women are the majority of participants in the community projects being heralded as evidence of the move to include the poor in development; for example, mothers are called upon to work in anti-indigence projects such as the Oportunidades initiative in Mexico, which relies on (unpaid) maternal altruism for success (Luccisano 2006), and Argentina’s government-supported poverty-assistance program, Plan Vida, was administered by 22,500 unpaid residents, most of whom were women (Molyneux 2002, 178; Auyero 2001; Dinatale 2004). One study of a community child care project in Lima, funded by the Inter-American Development Bank, found that poor female participants worked up to fourteen hours a day, using their homes and belongings to provide the services (Alva, Asalde y Ospina 2003, 89). Classified as volunteers, they got no social security benefits and earned 23 percent of the legal minimum wage (94–95). Although the women who mobilized in the 1980s to address economic and social crisis have thus gained increased visibility, their demands for state provision of services have been circumvented (Lind 2005, 94). If women were “the invisible army who bore the costs of adjustment to ensure household survival,” the new poverty agenda has rendered them newly visible but no less poor (Molyneux 2006, 432), and perhaps even more overburdened with demands that they participate and take on co-responsibility for family welfare. This raises crucial questions, addressed by many others, about the extent to which new poverty programs are reliant on the naturalization of women’s normative gender roles and “female altruism at the service of the state” (Molyneux 2006, 437).<sup>11</sup>

This chapter, like this book, is focused on the Bank's new gender policies, not its new anti-indigence efforts. Although these can overlap, there is an important distinction to be made regarding the degree of control that gender staff have over projects, policies, and research operations. An advantage of focusing on the LAC Gender Unit (as opposed to, for example, regional social development employees who may have a gender sensibility) is that it provides a key case study of how regional gender staff within a key IFI respond to regionally prominent debates about gender, economic policy, and poverty eradication. How have they articulated the inclusion of gender into the new development agenda, and what does this imply for the critique of *assistencialismo* articulated above? Are their proposed solutions to the social reproduction dilemma the same overburdening nonsolutions we see operating in other participatory development initiatives?

The LAC Gender Unit is widely cited, internally and externally, as the most effective of the Bank's regional gender initiatives (Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2002, 368; Long 2003, 9; Zuckerman and Qing 2003, 27; Piercy 2000, 68). After Wolfensohn's 1997 decision to appoint regional gender coordinators to mainstream gender concerns throughout Bank operations, the LAC region established a separate gender unit with a motivated manager, Maria Correia, heading a team of twelve staff and consultants (World Bank 2000d OED, 26). Its activities were described in-depth in the Bank's 2005 gender evaluation, and it was hereby positioned as a best practice example for others to follow (World Bank 2005, 34–35; see also Moser, Törnqvist and van Bronkhorst 1999, 8). Under Correia, Bank budgets for direct gender work in the region more than doubled to \$600,000 in fiscal year 1999–2000, and the Gender Unit established a critical mass of gender specialists who sought credibility with operational staff through empirical research and technical advice. It also piloted the country gender review, which maps out gender issues in a particular country and attempts to establish dialogue between Bank gender staff, country clients, and country Bank staff in order to increase demand for gender interventions (World Bank 2000d, 26). Country gender assessments subsequently became central to the Bank's revised GAD policy (World Bank 2001a; World Bank 2005c, 58, 54); by the end of fiscal year 2004, they had been completed for thirty-eight of ninety-one active client countries (Leipziger 2005, 4). Hence, when summing up the Bank's gender policy achievements between 1994 (when the organization adopted a new formal commitment to gender policy) and 2000,

the Bank's U.S. board member remarked that although overall results were "rather weak," "some progress has been made over the past years in the LAC Region" (Piercy 2000, 68).

This progress was based on a distinctive approach to gender policymaking. LAC Gender Unit staff consulted with a broad range of specialists, including those critical of the Bank,<sup>12</sup> and they avoided mandating the incorporation of gender, recommending instead a gender-based approach to social marketing that reached out to operational staff and provided them with support (Correia in World Bank 2000d, 26). Gender specialists in several countries became involved in country-based technical assistance activities to provide support directly to projects (World Bank 2005b, 35), aided after 2000 by a Japanese grant to study the impact of gender in Bank work (see chapters 3 and 6). Substantial research was also undertaken to prove the importance of gender to the Bank's poverty-reduction mission, because "in recognition of the culture of the Bank, [the Unit] set off to generate as much economic evidence of the relevance of gender in the Bank's work as possible" (35). As one otherwise critical analysis of Bank gender work noted:

Encouragingly, LAC Country Gender Assessments have not become shelf documents but have been used to engender Bank operations. *This has been the result of the LAC gender unit proactively selling its gender expertise to Country Departments by promising to add value to Bank investments.* (Zuckerman and Qing 2003, 46; emphasis added)

The reasoning behind this approach was as follows: operational staff were key to gender policy implementation, and they needed to learn why commitment to gender was important; the region lacked resources to monitor mandatory policy; mandating was incompatible with the Bank's new emphasis on decentralization and country ownership; and staff were confident that the gender program could be developed on its own merits without the need for mandates (World Bank 2005b, 35). Hence, in 1999 the Gender Unit produced a leaflet for other LAC Bank staff as part of an effort to "sell" their operational, analytic, and research skills. A year later, in a 2000 regional workshop on gender issues, the Bank's LAC gender team "explained how commercial marketing techniques could be used to advance gender issues" (World Bank 2000e, 1). This approach to gender policymaking— involving outreach to critics, blending of business rhetoric and social

concerns, and efforts to generate staff ownership of the gender mandate—is the archetypal post–Washington Consensus one, and it positions the region as a key case study of contemporary gender policy.

In addition, the Bank's LAC gender staff seized space created in broader regional debates about institutional strengthening to argue that gender relations needed restructuring as part of the post–Washington Consensus. The Bank's regional vice president had identified families and kinship groups as examples of informal organizations (Shahid Javed Burki, in Burki et al. 1998, 6), and the 1997 *World Development Report* drew attention to the key role of extended families in Latin American business transactions, because they were seen to increase trust in the absence of well-developed judicial systems (World Bank 1997 WDR, 44). *The Long March* had also recommended programs to strengthen social capital, especially in poor neighborhoods (Burki and Perry 1997, 84), on the grounds that poverty had undermined the ability of families and schools to socialize children and increased alcohol and drug addiction (87). These references made their way into gender work. The Bank's 2001 policy research report on gender included extensive discussion of “reforming institutions to establish equal rights and opportunities for women and men” (World Bank 2001a, 231)—although this was focused mostly on formal institutions, other reports gave more attention to the informal rules through which gender inequality was reproduced. As explained by Robert Picciotto (then director general of the Operations Evaluation Department) at a 2000 workshop, “Mental constructs screen information about the real world and are therefore critical to the creation and adaptation of social institutions—that is, their rules, norms, conventions, and organizations” (World Bank 2000d, 5). “From this perspective,” he went on, “eliminating gender discrimination is part of the institutional adjustment process needed for poverty reduction” (6). Participants in the Bank's 2000 regional gender workshop put it slightly differently: they needed to catalyze a change in value systems that lay at the root of the gender problem (World Bank 2000e, 10).

Finally, LAC Gender Unit staff linked up analysis of social capital, households, and gender, hereby drawing attention to women's hitherto ignored roles in sustaining community networks. The Bank, through its concern with social capital, was trying to “get the social relations right” for development (Woolcock 1998, 187), and LAC gender staff were arguing that *gender* relations needed particular attention. For example, Maria Correia wrote a report, intended for

Bank staff, on the gendered effects of Hurricane Mitch that identified the household as the most important institution for dealing with shocks. It argued that women had responded to the disaster by “mobilizing formal and informal social networks and organizing women’s groups to meet needs, organize emergency shelters, and coordinate relief efforts. They also used kin networks to take in affected family members” (World Bank 2001b, 2). Men, conversely, responded by substance abuse, gambling, crime, risky behavior, and violence, hereby undermining household networks, harming reciprocal relations within families, and eroding social capital (3). This framing linked the Bank’s gender work to the regional concern with strengthening the informal institutions necessary to sustain communities and increase trust, *and* it recognized women’s work in this realm. In a connected way, gender staff shed light on what the 2000–2001 *World Development Report* termed the “dark side” of social capital, whereby obligations to family members and pressures to fulfill community expectations could lead girls and women to sacrifice opportunities (World Bank 2000–2001 WDR, 129). Gender Unit employees hereby tried to tap in to existing debates about country ownership, policy marketing, institutional strengthening, and social capital to get support for their work, a strategy that influenced their policy advice in concrete ways.

### **Overburdened Women and Ignored Men: New Regional Gender Priorities**

The LAC Gender Unit played a key role in forging the critique of the Washington Consensus outlined in chapter 1. First, it was firmly cognizant of feminist debates about the invisibility of women’s labor, and it repeatedly referenced these debates in its policy documents and public presentations. Certainly staff highlighted women’s labor force participation as a key marker of empowerment, and in fact gender lending in the LAC was more concerned with employment and labor issues than elsewhere: a 2000 study of sixty-nine Bank poverty assessments found that only thirteen referred to gender and labor issues, nine of which were in LAC (World Bank 2005b, 22). In 2003, the Gender Unit issued a report on *Challenges and Opportunities for Gender Equality in LAC*, which positioned women’s employment as both a marker of success and a remaining policy priority, and women’s higher labor force participation was presented as a commonsense indicator of development progress alongside reduced fertility and improved education

(World Bank 2003a, 1). However, the LAC Gender Unit also expressly articulated the dangers of overburdening women by failing to take into account their unpaid work responsibilities. The Bank's 2000 regional meeting on gender included a session on gender-sensitive budgeting that highlighted the importance of the unpaid economy (World Bank 2000e, 6–7), and a 2003 report from the Gender Unit highlighted research on Argentina showing that girls were abandoning school to take on caring roles as their mothers moved into paid work (World Bank 2003a, 9). This point had, of course, been made years earlier in reference to Ecuador by Caroline Moser (who had by then been hired by the Bank), and country gender assessments made similar arguments regarding the dangers of overburdening women and girls.<sup>13</sup> In such ways, the Gender Unit demonstrated its awareness of debates about the invisibility of women's labor, the social reproduction crisis engendered by neoliberalism, and the need to connect reproductive to productive spheres of the economy.

LAC gender staff also led the Bank's push to incorporate men. They carried out or sponsored a number of studies on the issue, and staff made the inclusion of men and the connections between wounded masculinity and economic crisis central to their definition of the Gender Unit's unique approach. Correia championed and cowrote the most important Bank text on male inclusion in GAD to date, *The Other Half of Gender*, and five of the ten regionally-specific chapters in that book are on the LAC. Indeed, the book is the culmination of years of regional support for male inclusion. For example, the 1999 leaflet describing the Gender Unit's activities, for the purposes of selling them to Bank staff, foregrounded its work on men. It was headed by a version of an oft-used graphic showing two faces merging to make one (Figure 6),<sup>14</sup> and the section entitled "Are There Male Gender Issues to Consider?" answered definitely yes (World Bank 1999c, np). The 2000 LAC gender workshop included a session on masculinity, led by Bank staff; this was the only time that men's issues were explicitly programmed into the Bank's 2000–2001 regional meetings on gender.<sup>15</sup> In summing up what had been learned in this workshop, participants emphasized that men need to be included in gender work and that "The World Bank's LAC region, in fact, has been focusing on problems specific to men in gender relations" (World Bank 2000e, 13).

Maria Correia was committed to the inclusion of men in gender policy, and she had a crucial personal role in forging ahead with this



Figure 6—The header on a 1999 leaflet describing the LAC Gender Unit’s activities for the purposes of selling them to World Bank staff (World Bank 1999c)

agenda in the early years. However, the agenda continued after she had been promoted out of the LAC Gender Unit, and arguably would not have succeeded were it not tapping into broader trends underway in the Bank. For example, regional attention to men was in part linked to the attention given to gender and education in the millennium development goals; men have lower education levels than women in several countries in LAC and thus are foregrounded when gender work is focused on that issue (World Bank 2003a, 5). Male inclusion was also explained as important because economic crisis in Latin America had had a profound effect on gender roles (World Bank 2000e, 9) and because “giving men an equal voice in gender policy design and program implementation is essential if programs for women are to be successful in moving toward gender equality” (10). As the 1999 Gender Unit leaflet explained it, “Addressing gender can be a win-win situation for both men and women” (World Bank 1999c, np).

Moreover, male inclusion was part of the Gender Unit’s attempt to frame itself as offering a corrective to policy imbalance caused by feminism. The report on the regional GAD workshop argued that “excluding men from gender policies—an approach often embraced by the feminist movement—has seriously compromised the objective of enhancing gender equity, because it has left no room for changing certain male behaviors that are the root causes of many cases of inequity” (World Bank 2000e, 9). By “adopting a broader ‘technical’ approach to gender analysis that identified and considered male gender issues” (World Bank 2005b, 35), the Gender Unit thereby aimed to depoliticize GAD, to render it more technical and neutral and

hence less objectionable and more marketable to different stakeholders. Thus Correia and another Bank colleague argued in *The Other Half of Gender* that

The impetus to address men's gender issues in development is unlikely to come from the gender community. The political capital invested in gender in terms of women and the levels of mistrust and fear over male dominance will likely be too much to overcome . . . Rather the interest, drive, and energy to address men as men will likely come from the broader-based social development community with its focus on social exclusion and conflict and violence prevention—or even the security sector in its quest to understand the root causes of conflict, violence, and terrorism. (Bannon and Correia 2006, 259)

In these ways the interest in men was intimately connected to the Gender Unit's aforementioned social marketing approach to gender, grounded in the idea that "the key to instilling a gender perspective in Bank projects in Latin America is to spur demand at the country level" (World Bank 2000e, 13). The session on "social marketing/masculinity" held at the regional gender workshop was *one* session, in which:

World Bank staff panelists, working on gender issues in the LAC region, expressed that they have adopted a "social marketing" strategy to integrate a gender dimension into projects. They defined social marketing as applying commercial marketing principles to programs or projects to encourage changes in behavior of a target audience in order to achieve social goals. (9)

Participants were informed that two lessons had been learned from this process, both of which increased the importance and visibility of men in Bank gender work. "One, is that the family is the best place to work on gender relations," on the grounds that "family-centered interventions" reshape gender roles most effectively (9). Second, it was necessary to understand the interests and motivations of different client groups and to target scarce funds to those groups that offer the best prospects for success (9). Men were prime candidates here, because they were identified as being at the root of the region's gender problem. Male inclusion was thus not only about offering a more technically sophisticated, neutral vision of GAD; it was also part of an effort to build alliances, bring new stakeholders on board, and effectively target interventions into the core realm of gender inequality: the family.

### **The Politics of Male Visibility: Wounded Men and the Inclusively Neoliberal Policies to Fix Them**

As a result of this process, the male gender issues that emerged as significant to regional policymakers were linked to the Bank's understanding of economic crisis as having generated a crisis in masculinity for poor men. Poor men were considered particularly irresponsible and lacking in commitment to the family, and poor women were especially disempowered. Several country gender assessments argued that women who do not earn money are more vulnerable to abuse; that domestic labor is shared less equally among poor couples; and that poor men are more aggressive due to their wounded masculinity (Correia/World Bank 2002; Pena and Correia 2002). In answering the rhetorical question "Are there male gender issues to consider?" the gender team's leaflet argued that

the adverse effects of gender roles and stereotypes, which are well-documented in the case of women, can also have negative consequences on men. Emerging research suggests that the privileged position of men . . . can be a double edged sword. . . . Low income men, in particular, have difficulties achieving the image and expectations of the "real" man. And links have been made in the Region between increased male unemployment and declining earnings and the growing incidence of male depression and suicide, substance abuse, aggression (including domestic violence) and reckless behavior. Violence is particularly problematic among male youth in LAC. (World Bank 1999c, np)

Later, in defining men's issues in development more broadly, Bank gender staff foregrounded poor men's wounded masculinity and the danger it posed to the region's development progress through "issues such as alcoholism, drug use, gang violence, and unemployment" (Correia in World Bank 2000d, 26).

"Absent fathers and unstable family environments" (Correia/World Bank 2002, x) were a frequently discussed policy problem in this regard. Countries in the Caribbean were particularly visible in these conversations, marked by Gender Unit staff as especially afflicted by problems of irresponsible men, overburdened women, and family structures that were both disempowering and inefficient. For example, the gender assessment for the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica highlighted "unstable home environments and parenting problems" (2) as a problem for all three countries, and the executive summary argued that reform of households in each nation was a key GAD priority:

The household institution—how households are formed, the types of unions that are acceptable, and the corollary relationships between partners, parents and children—is critical to understanding gender and socioeconomic outcomes in the countries studied here. In Jamaica, for example, the fact that most children are born out of wedlock and do not have registered fathers means that children are, for the most part, raised without their biological fathers . . . In Haiti, while the largest proportion of the population is in a stable union, men are typically involved in several unions at one time or have multiple partners. (ix–x)

The report documented the latter problem in a table entitled “Types of Unions in Haiti, by Order of Stability” (40). That title would have been confusing, if not unintelligible, in Bank GAD policy prior to 1995. Indeed that the term *union* is now understood to refer to families rather than worker associations confirms that the Bank’s new gender policy represents a broader reformulation of its approach to safety-net provisioning. However, the table, containing a meticulous list of local terms for partnership forms, also reveals the extent to which family trouble is marked as a geographically-bound concern, associated with particular countries, classes, and ethnic cultures.

In this respect it was perhaps to be expected that the Jamaican case study offered the most extended discussion of “men’s roles in the family . . . relevant to understanding a range of social problems affecting Jamaican society today” (Correia/World Bank 2002, 58). Jamaican family formation has long been marked as problematic by international (and colonial) policymakers, and the English-speaking Caribbean is the geographical center of debates about male marginalization in development and the decline of the nuclear family (Barriteau 2003; Safa 1999). In turn, the LAC Gender Unit highlighted *as Jamaican* problems of unstable home environments, lack of parenting skills, high levels of female headship, and high rates of child sexual abuse “due to the preponderance of multiple, live-in common-law relationships and the large proportion of children being reared by men who are not their biological fathers” (Correia/World Bank 2002, 58). The Bank’s gender staff also identified poor parental guidance and broken homes as the leading cause of violence and gang activity in Jamaica.

Furthermore, the LAC Gender Unit pioneered the production of gender-aware research on alcohol and development in the Bank, with Correia coauthoring a discussion paper on *Gender Dimensions of Alcohol Consumption and Alcohol Related Problems in Latin America and the*

*Caribbean* (Pyne, Claeson, and Correia 2002). The report not only argued that alcohol consumption is a public health issue, linked to diseases and unsafe behaviors,<sup>16</sup> but also that it is a gender problem because “men are more likely to drink heavily and excessively than are women” (v). Indeed, the foreword, written by the chief economist of the LAC region, stated that the report was written in part “to create awareness of the importance that gender roles play in the lives of men” (vi). Poor men drink especially heavily because they are affected by “gender role stress” and cannot otherwise live up to their gender identity (23, 16).

Men were to be included in development in ways that addressed these problems, with the aim of making them more responsible, temperate family members. Couplehood is hereby promoted as the ultimate antipoverty strategy, to use Gwendolyn Mink’s pithy summary of U.S. welfare reform (Mink 1998, 78), and policy measures to secure it can appear coercive. Thus the gender review for the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica included a section on “The Role of Fathers in the Family” (Correia/World Bank 2002, 76), which suggested several “attitudinal changes” necessary “if men are to play more central roles in the lives of their children” (66). The report also praised legislation put in place in the Dominican Republic to introduce “penalties for desertion of family” (7), and it foregrounded NGOs dealing with fatherhood in discussions of civil society interventions on gender issues (60). Policy recommendations included “promoting the active participation of men in childrearing and domestic tasks” (82), targeting fathers in government programs for parents (85), and supporting at-risk families using models pioneered in the urban United States (84). A Bank consultant who studied the issue of male marginalization in Argentina, Brazil, and Costa Rica (and who found that overall men were not being marginalized) concluded his report with the following policy advice:

Increasing and persistent unemployment and barriers to high quality employment have likely affected the capacity of some young men and displaced older workers to effect a “breadwinner” role in their current or prospective families (Barker 1998). The potential link to increasing violence and criminality in the region calls for policy interventions such as progressive programs that help these and older men reflect “about what it means to be men” and find new ways to reaffirm their roles as fathers and partners (Barker 1998). These may include public support to counseling and mentoring community services and to the creation of spaces

for discussions about fatherhood and domestic violence in community organizations. (Arias 2001, 25–26)<sup>17</sup>

Fatherhood promotion—a complex agenda hailing a range of progressive and conservative actors<sup>18</sup>—was advocated alongside broader antipoverty measures that focused on family strengthening. For example, in 2005 the Bank approved financing for El Salvador’s Red Solidaria a la Familia (Family Solidarity Network), targeted to the poorest, and it also funded extension of Colombia’s Familias en Acción (World Bank 2006 AR, 48). In fact, efforts to forge more equal coupling involving greater sharing, greater male responsibility, and explicit interventions to strengthen the family are mentioned so often in country gender assessments and workshop reports as to constitute a piece of GAD common sense in this region (World Bank 2007; Pena and Correia 2002), one that subsequent chapters on country-level implementation aim to trouble.

### **Producing Knowledge about Gender in the Post-Washington Consensus**

Here, however, I wish to highlight the processes of knowledge production through which this vision of male gender issues in the region is legitimated. The Bank’s role as a producer of knowledge about development has come under increasing scrutiny since the organization repositioned itself as the global “knowledge Bank” under Wolfensohn, trumpeting its role in development research in an unprecedented way (Broad 2006; Wade 2002; Banerjee et al. 2006). The Bank’s Development Economics Vice Presidency had a \$50 million budget in 2005, making it “the research powerhouse of the development world” (Broad 2006, 397). Several critics have detailed the political constraints shaping output from this powerhouse, and there have been a number of high-profile fights within the organization, whereby researchers producing knowledge that did not fit particular growth paradigms were muffled, while those whose work “resonates” with neoliberal approaches—even if it is of questionable quality—is heavily publicized (Broad 2006; Goldman 2005; Harriss 2002). For example, Robin Broad (2006) recounts how the Bank promoted David Dollar’s research (which argued that countries wedded to free trade policies experience higher economic growth rates), despite serious concerns about the validity of the findings, while shelving work by Brando Milanovic (which argued that integration with the global

economy often incurs inequality and does not necessarily stimulate greater growth) (399–400). Michael Goldman (2005) explores similar themes in project-level work, looking at consultant research on a proposed dam project in Laos. The researcher who argued that fish species would be made extinct by the dam had his consultancy (and his visa) cancelled and his work suppressed; a report by two anthropologists that recommended substantial change to Bank resettlement plans was not circulated (164–167).<sup>19</sup> Moreover, the data used by the Bank to support its claims about development has been contested by a range of critics (Reddy and Pogge 2005; Moran 2006; Mitchell 2005), not least because these claims often rely on unpublished Bank research as evidence (Goldman 2005, 132; Sindzingre 2005). Indeed, Nicolas Stern, former Bank chief economist, wrote that “many of the numbers [on which Bank research relies] come from highly dubious sources or have been constructed in ways which leave one skeptical as to whether they can be helpfully used” (quoted in Goldman 2005, 131).

Unfortunately, however, this process of tracking the footnotes and highlighting the biases and erasures of Bank research has not been extended systematically to its work on gender.<sup>20</sup> Yet this task is of particular importance given the organization’s positioning at the forefront of global GAD efforts. Moreover, research was a key realm of the LAC Gender Unit’s activities. In an attempt to prove the relevance of GAD to the Bank’s mainstream economists, the unit took the lead in research linking gender to pension reform, social safety-net restructuring, and export sector employment, for example, and the region pioneered the gendered study of alcoholism and violence as development problems. I concentrate here on three examples of research undertaken as part of those activities: relating to the Gender Unit’s sponsorship of research on male inclusion; the citational practices used to support its claim that poor men are particularly violent to women; and the knowledge production processes used to validate arguments about absent fathers and family breakdown in the Caribbean. In this way this chapter is intended to draw attention to the selective politics of publication and citation through which Bank gender policy priorities in the LAC are justified.

In the late 1990s the LAC Gender Unit commissioned two prominent academics to conduct a study of male inclusion in development. Sylvia Chant (a GAD specialist whose research contests assumptions that female-headed households are by definition disempowered) and Matthew Gutmann (a leading scholar of Latin

American masculinity whose research contests stereotypical depictions of Latino machismo) produced a report based on interviews with forty-one people (six from the Bank itself) from thirty organizations specializing in GAD. Given the divergent views expressed by respondents, the report did not argue for inclusion of men (Chant and Gutmann 2000, 4). It repeatedly urged a cautious, gradual approach to the issue and recognized the lack of solid models upon which to build. While all but three or four respondents expressed a strong desire for involving men in GAD work, fewer than ten could describe any actual gender work done by their organizations with men (30). Chant and Gutmann also highlighted the continued presence of gender gaps to women's disadvantage, alongside the danger that women's initiatives would be undermined by male inclusion, and they bluntly stated that the idea of a crisis in masculinity is "overblown" (16).

The report also included comments from individuals who were highly suspicious of the Bank's new undertaking, with one respondent arguing: "It's taking us back a step to a more biologically reductionist notion of what gender was meant to move us away from" (quoted in Chant and Gutmann 2000, 32). The Bank staff interviewed were hardly united themselves. Two (Shaha Riza, a Middle East/North Africa gender specialist who would later be forced out of the Bank because of her relationship with Wolfowitz, and Vijayendra Rao, a Bank economist) were supportive, one drawing attention to male educational disadvantage and the other criticizing a microcredit project that focused on women when better-educated men may have used the credit more productively (35–36). However, other staff were more guarded. Karen Mason (director of GAD) said: "I think there is still a need for WID-type programs, and we aren't ready to move into a MID (Men in Development) phase. Women are still comparatively disadvantaged" (43). Christine Jones (principal economist for Eastern Europe) cautioned:

We need to distinguish what our objective is, which may be to improve the lives of women, versus how you go about achieving that, which may be to involve men in a way that improves the lives of women. If we start to make the improvement of men's lives a goal—moving beyond just involving them as a means to an end—then all kinds of things may become confused and the needs of women could get left by the wayside. (43)

The authors made no attempt to impose unity on these responses.

Finally, the report is of note for its recommendation that the inclusion of men in GAD proceed along explicitly feminist lines. Citing Oxfam's Ines Smyth that GAD self-censors on its feminist commitments and needs to "come out of the closet" in this respect (Chant and Gutmann 2000, 15), the concluding chapter offered suggestions for initial efforts that might incorporate men and male gender issues "in a fashion that furthers the feminist goal of equality between men and women" (40). It advocated starting work in the reproductive health sphere because it has a long-standing and secure feminist orientation, while holding back in employment and credit policy due to the absence of same (41). The authors concluded unequivocally:

It is clear that a certain reassertion of feminist rationales and approaches is needed to put the inclusion of men in development work on the best footing . . . *Involvement of men-as-men in GAD should be couched within a clear feminist political agenda.* (43; emphasis added)

The LAC Gender Unit would not publish this research. It was, for some involved, too feminist; for others, it was insufficiently rigorous or unhelpful to the Bank's gender policymakers. It was put out instead by Oxfam, whose gender specialists have also been central to conversations about male inclusion (see, for example, Sweetman 1997; Ruxton 2004). Although the report is sporadically cited by the Bank, it was sidelined in *The Other Half of Gender*. Bannon and Correia's introduction noted that it had "generated considerable interest," stimulating the Bank to commission a series of papers on men in the LAC region and then in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bannon and Correia 2006, xix), but the only mention of its actual findings repeated the fact that most of the interviewees wanted to focus on men (Jacobsen 2006, 24). The report is cited, somewhat inaccurately, in the *Colombia Gender Review* to "underscore the importance of promoting effective and involved fathering" (World Bank 2007, 42). Conversely, the fears raised by some of Chant and Gutmann's respondents that women's initiatives would be hijacked and subverted if men were given increased control over GAD agendas (Chant and Gutmann 2000, 19) were minimized or ignored in subsequent regional Bank gender texts. For example, the Gender Unit's 2003 regional report on gender issues framed men's assaults on their pregnant partners as issues

of ignorance, amenable to knowledge-promotion solutions targeted on men:

Men are important decision-makers in the household so it is often they who decide when and how the wife or daughters will receive medical care. Their lack of knowledge can have negative consequences for women's health. For example, in the state of Guerrero, 75% of indigenous women suffer from domestic violence while pregnant, resulting in miscarriages or birth complications. (World Bank 2003a, 4)

The report proceeded to appeal for "integrated" health and family-planning programs to tackle men's and women's reproductive needs (17), as if those needs were self-evidently harmonious and the context in which individuals struggled for them was devoid of inequality. Similarly, the notion of a crisis in masculinity was foregrounded in several chapters of *The Other Half of Gender* (Olavarría 2006, 38; Chevannes 2006, 87), contra Chant and Gutmann's findings and contra a Bank discussion paper that examined evidence from Argentina, Brazil, and Costa Rica and that concluded that there is "no evidence of a general trend of male economic marginalization . . . we must look elsewhere for the roots of the increase in socially dysfunctional behavior" (Arias 2001, np).

It is not hard to understand why this sidelining occurred. Chant and Gutmann's approach to male inclusion ran counter to the LAC Gender Unit's attempt to frame itself as offering a corrective to policy imbalance caused by feminism, and their attentive reporting of the *lack* of consensus around male inclusion disrupted the unit's assertion that there was regional, indeed global, agreement on the issue. In these ways, the burying of Chant and Gutmann's research is a useful case study of the ways in which epistemic authority gets deployed in debates about gender in the post-Washington Consensus World Bank, a process in which the development community's research powerhouse is a far-from-neutral player.

The boundaries within which the inclusion of new research takes place in Bank circles are also evident in the Gender Unit's claims that violence against women can be explained through poor men's wounded masculinity and poor women's lack of bargaining power. Such claims are not limited to this region—they are made throughout formally-cleared Bank gender texts. However, LAC evidence is often used to justify them. For example, a 1997 Bank-wide progress report on GAD highlighted an antipoverty initiative in Jamaica that argued:

For young males, no work, frustration and idleness often result in gang involvement, violence and encounters with police. For women, lack of income tends to increase female dependency on males (often in the form of pregnancy) which in turn results in domestic violence directed at both partners and children. (World Bank 1997d, 4)

Likewise the 2000–2001 *World Development Report* argued that the incidence of domestic violence is often higher in poor households, using Andrew Morrison and Maria Loreto Biehl's report on domestic violence in the Americas. This found that abuse was suffered by 46 percent of poor women and 29 percent of wealthy women in Santiago, and 54 percent of poor women and 45 percent of wealthy women in Managua (World Bank 2000–2001 WDR, 137). Regional Bank policy texts repeatedly made the same link between poverty, wounded masculinity, and violence (for Colombia see World Bank 2007, 41; for Central America see Correia y Pena 2002, x).

It is essential to track the footnotes and read closely for the contested evidence used by the Bank's LAC Gender Unit in this respect, because a more complex portrait of violence emerges. For example, the 2003 regional gender report also cited research showing that women's independent income correlates with an increased risk of abuse (World Bank 2003a, 6). The study, on Colombia, found that working increases women's likelihood of experiencing domestic violence by 6 percent, and of serious domestic violence by 4 percent (cited in World Bank 2003a, 6). Another study on Nicaragua, cited in the *Central America Gender Review*, confirmed that women who work outside the home are more likely to be abused (Correia y Pena 2002, 10), while research on Kenya, cited in *The Other Half of Gender*, found that

women who were wealthier encountered higher levels of physical violence . . . women with higher education suffered more physical violence . . . women with limited education . . . women in gainful employment encountered more physical than emotional abuse . . . violence was high for women who were employed. (Amuyunzu-Nyamongo and Francis 2006, 233)

This is a far more messy, or nuanced, analysis of the links between violence, poverty, employment, and gender than evident in the Bank's standard assertions that working women are empowered and poor

men act out wounded masculinity through assault. I draw attention to this messiness (or nuance) to suggest that the research available to the Bank—including that conducted by Bank staff—is heterogeneous and often very meticulous. It is also often impelled by a desire to contest pathologizing portrayals of poor men, even as it takes women's victimization seriously as a policy concern. As research travels up the internal hierarchy of texts, though, this nuance tends to get lost, as the findings that resonate with certain framings of the gender-policy problem become increasingly prominent.<sup>21</sup>

This point is confirmed when considering the fact that the LAC Gender Unit's country-specific publications tend to highlight work that confirms the Bank's approach to female-headed households as victimized and to poor men as acting out wounded masculinity through irresponsibility and violence, while misreading or ignoring work that presents a more complex position. Consider, for example, the citational practices required to sustain the claim made (repeatedly) in the gender assessment for the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica that "poverty [is] linked to household structure and single parent families, unstable home environments, absent fathers and lack of parenting skills" (Correia/World Bank 2002, 87). The discussion of female-headed households drew on a 1991 paper written by World Bank staff (63). The claim that "violent offenders are likely to have experienced neglect or absence of supervision throughout childhood, conflict or abuse, erratic discipline, or lack of emotional warmth in the family" (71) cited an unpublished report from a Bank consultant. The report also referenced an independent study by early child psychologist Maureen Samms-Vaughn (2001) that argued that "serial father figures and serial mother figures were equally distressing to children"; that broken homes led to attention problems, delinquency, and aggression; and that more aggressive boys are more likely to have a mother in a common-law union, a mother who had never been married, or a lack of a father figure (Correia/World Bank 2002, 71). There were no references to work on this issue from researchers who dispute the Bank's broader claim that female headship is the epitome of disempowerment.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, the emphasis on female-headed households as a gender policy problem in these three countries persisted despite the fact that Bank research itself showed that female headship had a "tiny" effect on the probability of being poor, and no significant effect on the probability of children having diarrhea, or on their nutritional status

(65). Likewise, despite extended discussion of the problem of male underachievement in education, the fact that boys from female-headed households were more likely to be in school than those in male-headed households received no elaboration (74).

Importantly, the scholarship being cited and promoted in these conversations subsequently gets resonance more broadly, in part because it is framed as authoritative research coming out of the world's development powerhouse. Thus, the LAC Gender Unit cited an unpublished paper written by a Bank consultant to support the claim that in Jamaica

unstable home environments and parenting problems, which place children and youth at risk, are related to the high incidence of out-of-wedlock births and single female parent households, social attitudes and peer pressures vis-a-vis pregnancy among teenage women, the expectation that men have multiple partners and children with more than one mate, the irregular presence of fathers in the household and the use of extended families to raise children (Blank 2000). (Correia/World Bank 2002, 2)

Lorraine Blank's Bank-funded research can also be found referenced in NGO reports, in the blogosphere, and in Jamaican newspapers. For example, her work was cited in a NGO report on a project, funded by US AID and the Jamaican Ministry of Health, on male survivability in Jamaica, aiming to resocialize young men (Gayle 2002). It is also cited on the government of Bahamas Web page, in a piece entitled "Minister's Concern with Teenage Pregnancy." In this, the youth, sports, and housing minister calls for a national strategy to combat adolescent pregnancy and school failure.<sup>23</sup> Bank-sponsored research on gender not only informs Bank policy advice on Jamaica, then—it is cited by national actors with their own interests in absent fathers and family reform. Similarly, a critical feminist overview of gender policy in the Bank cites *The Other Half of Gender* to argue in a section on masculinity that: "The pressures of proving their manhood without any means often leads men to destructive and sometimes violent behavior against themselves and their families" (Dennis and Zuckerman 2006, 2). That claim is empirically contested, at least to the extent that it frames poor men as more violent than wealthy men, yet it is increasingly cited as a "fact" about GAD, even by Bank critics. The uncontested nature of Bank gender expertise means that the

messy politics of research disagreements are erased, and selected Bank gender work is positioned as authoritative both inside and outside the institution.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter sought to explore Bank gender priorities as articulated at the regional level, in part to see whether Washington DC concerns with male inclusion and partnership promotion filter down (they do—and they filter up from the LAC too), and in part to see how post–Washington Consensus debates are being linked to gender in the region perhaps most associated with the new policy agenda, especially as it relates to institutional strengthening concerns. I suggest that the regional interest in the post–Washington Consensus is matched with a regional interest in the inclusion of men in gender lending, and a recognition that policymakers must concretely deal with the tension between paid and unpaid labor if GAD interventions are to avoid the errors of the past. Regional gender policy was thus redirected to resolve two newly relevant problems: exhausted women and wounded, destructive men. This reformulation had a contested relationship to feminism, because the move to include men was part of a broader effort to make gender policy more marketable to the Bank, and hence more distanced from the perceived imbalances of feminism, yet policymakers were taking feminist literature and activism on women’s labor burden more seriously than ever. The prioritization of poor men’s involvement in families emerged out of this messy nexus, because it could be marketed as balanced common sense and as addressing a key GAD policy concern.

Space was certainly opened up for policy entrepreneurship here, but it was heavily– and newly–circumscribed space. Gender activities had to include men, and they had to be socially marketable to target groups based on their potential to generate loving, sharing couplehood. They also had to be expressly delinked from feminism, with its divisive, unbalanced interests in one side of the gender equation. Thus policy went in directions that some may find disturbing. The men who became newly visible were unemployed and poor, and the policies recommended to resolve their wounded masculinities were similar across the region—fatherhood promotion, family strengthening, and workshops for poor communities to raise awareness of the importance of gender equality. Research that resonated with these policy priorities was sponsored, published, and cited; work that did not was

sidelined. Subsequent chapters pay far closer attention to the grounded ways in which these policy priorities were reproduced and enacted; suffice it to say that Bank research plays a crucial role in shaping what we know about gender in development and in shaping our understandings of how gender is linked to international political economy. Paying closer attention to its knowledge-production processes is thus one way in which to unpack its interconnected vision of gender harmony and development progress.

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## FORGING PARTNERSHIPS, SIDELINING CHILD CARE

### How Ecuadorian Femocrats Navigate Institutional Constraints in World Bank Gender Policy

It's not like you can do everything, right?

—Interviewee associated with the Bank's GAD work in Ecuador

This chapter traces the World Bank's gender activities down to the country level, moving from analysis of policy documents to the experiences of policymakers. It aims to shed light on the *implementation* of the Bank's gender interventions, exploring how staff make sense of their work, how they try to fit gender into Bank's organizational mandates, and how such mandates constrain policy output. I focus on policy entrepreneurs working in the Bank's Ecuadorian resident mission, an important site for debates about LAC gender policy. I suggest that the Bank's Ecuadorian gender staff are positioned as neither insiders nor outsiders, occupying a liminal space that renders their activities marginal and institutionally vulnerable. They make a distinction between themselves and "the economists," and they are heavily conscious of and reflexive about the institutional constraints within which they operate. Two constraints are particularly prominent: (1) the pressure to frame gender policy in terms of productivity, rigor, and quantifiable efficiency and (2) the pressure to frame gender policy in terms of loving complementary partnership. Although feminists have identified the first constraint in past research on the Bank, current scholarship is silent on the second. I thus focus this chapter on the complementarity constraint, providing examples of how policymakers were pressured to adhere to it by the Bank and tracing its concrete impacts on gender policies. Specifically, I argue that the institutional pressure to define gender policy through a complementary focus on couples provoked conflict with feminist partner organizations and intensified concern with poor men's irresponsibility, alcoholism, and violence. I close the chapter with a case study of how the efficiency and complementarity constraints influenced the Bank's

solutions to the caring labor dilemma in Ecuador, showing that child care fails to resonate with both efficiency and “empowerment read as partnership” rationales and gets only lukewarm support from policy-makers. Instead, staff endorse fatherhood promotion and shared parenting. This comparison provides a clear example of the material consequences stemming from the dual efficiency–complementarity constraints, while helping to explain why child care—in so many ways the obvious priority for GAD staff interested in getting women into work without overburdening them—has failed to emerge as the Bank’s favored gender intervention. On this basis, then, the chapter argues that constraints on policy possibilities and research agendas stemming from the definition of empowerment as heteronormative complementarity need to be taken far more seriously by feminist scholars. Put differently, it suggests that we need to take heterosexuality far more seriously in development if we are to ensure that fatherhood promotion stops trumping child care in Bank policy advice.

### **Ecuador, the Bank, and Gender**

Ecuador is an interesting site for closer interrogation of World Bank policy for several reasons. A country with an unenviable reputation for recent economic and political chaos,<sup>1</sup> it has been deeply divided by conflicts over restructuring (Fretes-Cibils and López-Cálix 2003; North 2004; Whitten 2003; Yashar 2005; Naranjo 1999). These conflicts are hardly uncharacteristic of the contemporary Latin American development experience. Indeed, the Bank uses Ecuador as a showcase of “a country with structural problems of low growth, regional divides, and social and ethnic fragmentation made more acute by a severe currency and banking crisis in the late 1990s” (Beckerman and Solimano 2002, ix), while country specialist Norman Whitten considers it a “microcosm of South American conflict and contradiction in its modernity” (2003, 20).

More specifically, Ecuador’s experiments with development have been characteristic of broader regional approaches. The country followed an import-substitution approach to economic growth during the 1960s, imposing high tariffs on imported goods and seeking to restrict international trade in order to nurture domestic industry (Colloreado-Mansfeld 1999; Cockcroft 1996; Black 1999; Conaghan and Malloy 1994; Sawers 2005). However, the discovery of oil in the Amazon in the late 1960s led to a dramatic export-led economic boom, an influx of foreign-exchange earnings (which leapt from \$43 million

in 1971 to \$350 million by 1974) (Kyle 2000, 18, 28), and a substantial expansion of state borrowing from private banks and international financial institutions in order to finance public spending. This boom came to an abrupt end when oil prices slumped and new sources of international credit dried up. Ecuador found itself in the classic Latin American situation during the “lost decade” of the 1980s when it was trying to consolidate its recent shift back to democracy—it was massively indebted, with a 19 percent debt service ratio by 1980 (Conaghan and Malloy 1994, 111), and facing increasing poverty and inequality rates alongside low or negative economic growth.

Thus began the contentious era of attempts to implement economic restructuring. Ecuador started formally implementing structural adjustment under an IMF package in 1983, and reforms were consolidated by León Febres Cordero (1984–1988), who launched what one observer termed “Andean Thatcherism” in the country (Carrière 2001, 141). Using executive power to neutralize Congress, his government issued twenty-six “urgent” economic decrees encompassing a range of neoliberal reforms, including reduced public spending, restrictive monetary policies, intensified trade liberalization, reduction of state subsidies on basic food items, and limitations on minimum wage increases (Conaghan and Malloy 1994; Treacle 1998; Ferraro 2000). These measures were continued, although in a stop-and-go fashion, under subsequent administrations (Lane 2003; Whitten 2003; Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley 2003), and they often relied on nondemocratic means of implementation.<sup>2</sup>

As a result, the state redefined its role, particularly in relation to social sectors. Between 1995 and 2000 public spending on social services and programs fell by over one-third (Parandekar, Vos and Winkler 2002, 129), while education spending fell from 6 percent of GDP in the 1980s to 2.7 percent in 2000 (Fretes-Cibils and López-Cáliz 2003, liv). NGOs increasingly stepped in to pick up the slack; between 1980 and 1994 the number of formally registered NGOs in Ecuador working on development grew from 51 to 376 (Uquillas and Larreamendy 2006, 16). This did little to alleviate growing poverty and inequality, however; in 2001 the highest income quintile controlled 65 percent of the national wealth (an increase from the 52 percent they had in 1990), whereas the bottom quintile controlled 1.71 percent (Vásconez 2005, 250).

Moreover, in 1999 Ecuador experienced a dramatic fiscal crisis, with the collapse of banks holding 40 percent of deposits (World

Bank 2003b)—another far from atypical Latin American experience.<sup>3</sup> Poverty increased to 56 percent of the population (López-Cálix 2003, 4), and infant mortality rates and malnutrition levels also worsened (Fretes-Cibils and López-Cálix 2003, xxxiv). In response, in January 2000 President Mahuad announced that the country would dollarize. He was forced to resign shortly thereafter due to an attempted coup (see chapter 5), but dollarization and the restructuring efforts understood to underpin it continued.

These efforts continued to prove unpopular, and protests against reform measures were prominent in both of my fieldwork trips to Ecuador. In the summer of 2003 I was teargassed by police while trying to interview faculty at the Universidad Central in Quito, where students were protesting government spending cuts. Throughout the summer of 2004, pensioners occupied social security offices and launched hunger strikes in protest at a plan to pay off the national debt using pension reserves.<sup>4</sup> Lucio Gutiérrez, elected to replace the interim government that had in turn replaced Mahuad, was overthrown in 2005, in large part for failing to alter the country's restructuring program as promised, and the election of leftist Rafael Correa in 2006 confirmed that Ecuador had caught the regional wave of opposition to neoliberalism.

The Bank has played a significant role in this development trajectory. The organization has committed some US \$3.25 billion to Ecuador over the last fifty years, funding a vast range of development initiatives.<sup>5</sup> It initially supported state-led industrialization efforts and large-scale infrastructural provision, but, as Ecuador entered the debt crisis, the Bank began lending through large structural adjustment loans intended to alter the policy environment, and its advice to the country prioritized market reform. Its 1996 *Ecuador Poverty Assessment* urged elimination of subsidies for electricity, cooking gas, and education (Rama in World Bank 1996a, 324), reform of “cumbersome labor legislation” that made it difficult and expensive to fire workers (World Bank 1996a, 44), “rationalization” of minimum wage policies by reducing government intervention (Cox Edwards in World Bank 1996a, 300), and better targeting of social assistance to prevent “leakage” to non-poor groups. More recently, the Bank required passage of the 2000 Economic Transformation Law as a condition of future restructuring lending. This aimed to limit the fiscal deficit and increases in public spending; privatize the telecommunications, electricity, and hydrocarbons industries; and allow workers to be hired at

a minimum salary of US \$0.50 an hour (López-Cálix 2003, 6). The Bank's advice for the post-dollarization future, articulated in both the 2002 *Crisis and Dollarization in Ecuador: Stability, Growth, and Social Equity* (Beckerman and Solimano 2002) and the 2003 *Country Assistance Strategy* (CAS),<sup>6</sup> centered on reform of the pension system, decentralization, privatization of key industries, improved banking supervision, tariff reduction, and reform of "highly inflexible . . . anachronistic" labor markets to increase flexibility (Beckerman 2002, 119). However, the CAS also recognized the importance of strengthening institutions in Ecuador, of providing safety nets for the vulnerable, and of securing broad social support for reform initiatives rather than trying to force them through with executive heavy-handedness (World Bank 2003b). This is, of course, the classic post-Washington Consensus policy package.

In this regard, it is significant that the Bank's resident mission in Ecuador,<sup>7</sup> located in the flashy World Trade Center towers in the new part of Quito, has made particular efforts to engage civil society. In April 1999, just after the CAS preparations had been postponed, the Bank published a bleak diagnosis of the country's development problems, concluding that "the unsatisfactory record of Bank assistance to Ecuador highlights the risks of adjustment lending where there is no social consensus for reform" (World Bank 1999a, 1). Measures were thus taken to reach out to civil society, to educate community groups about the pro-poor benefits of reform, and to build stronger connections between Bank staff and NGOs, including those critical of structural adjustment. Ecuador was already one of two LAC participants in the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI, sometimes SAPRIN), a tripartite civil society-government-Bank review of adjustment policies launched in 1996 in six countries.<sup>8</sup> Ecuador's civil society component was coordinated by an NGO that works on local development projects and tries to democratize public debate around economic policy, running critical workshops to explain structural adjustment, for example. Many independent scholars were also involved in generating research for SAPRI, much of which showed the negative consequences of adjustment.<sup>9</sup> The Bank's accounts of these sometimes-fraught consultations were central to the 2003 CAS, used to demonstrate its post-Washington Consensus outreach to civil society (for example, World Bank 2003b, 75). Such measures are even more important under Rafael Correa who, within a year of taking office, had threatened to expel the World Bank's

country director, in a rejection of the economic model he was understood to embody. The Bank has been left scrambling for a continued role in the country, and it increasingly tries to distance itself from 1980s-style neoliberal reform. In these ways, then, the Bank's development approach in Ecuador is broadly representative of its regional priorities.

Moreover, Ecuador is an excellent site for research into Bank *gender* policy. The country has long been marked as important for Bank gender policymakers, because it was the site of Caroline Moser's well-known research into gender and household-coping strategies under structural adjustment. From 1978 to 1988 while an academic researcher, she conducted a pioneering study on household responses to poverty in Cisne Dos, a low-income housing settlement in Guayaquil. This study was later extended as part of a larger project on household vulnerability to economic change, partly funded by the Bank's Urban Poverty Management Program. Moser was subsequently hired to work in the LAC Gender Unit, but her scholarship is often used by critics of the Bank to demonstrate the negative social costs of adjustment. For example, Duncan Green's damning indictment of the Bank's LAC policy states that Moser's Guayaquil findings "are a microcosm of the human cost of adjustment, above all on women" (2003, 87). More recently, the Bank funded a study on gender and time use focused on the Ecuadorian flower industry (see chapter 4), and the Bank's office in Ecuador put out one of the most comprehensive gender reviews of all countries in the LAC region, highlighted as a best practice example in several Washington DC Bank reports (World Bank 2000a, 27; World Bank 2005b, 24).

Ecuadorian feminists have also been involved in a range of Bank activities in recent years.<sup>10</sup> Ecuador has a vast range of women's groups spanning all ideological positions, from trade unionists to indigenous groups, from microcredit advocates to lesbian separatists, from those working to secure reforms in collaboration with state and international institutions to those advocating autonomy (Prieto 2005; Lind 2004, Müller). Bank gender specialists have worked closely with the more institutionalized currents of this movement, and they have supported public events for Women's Day. With the state's women's council, CONAMU, the Bank supported an education project to reduce curricula stereotypes and provide gender-equitable training for teachers (CONAMU 2001, 26), and it funded publication of a guide to Afro-Ecuadorian women's groups (Coordinadoras de Mujeres

Negras [Ecuador] 2003). The Bank has also incorporated gender activities into its justice loans, its rural development loans, and its indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian development loans (see chapter 5), using domestic femocrats as consultants in all cases. For example, Ecuador was the site for a pioneering Bank project on gender and judicial reform, in which US \$10.7 million was given to support NGOs providing free legal services to poor women (World Bank 2005c, 39; Ruiz-Abril nd). The positioning of the loan in Ecuador was explained by the strong confluence of Bank staff interested in gender and of domestic actors active in women's rights (Ruiz-Abril nd, 1).

A final important feature of this country case study is that the Bank's gender work in Ecuador was significantly strengthened through the support of the LAC Gender Unit. Quito was chosen as the site for a regional Bank conference on gender in 2000, and Ecuador was a prominent participant in PROGENIAL, an initiative established by regional staff in 2000 to study the impact of gender in Bank activities and to support gender mainstreaming in interested projects (Long 2003, 9; Törnqvist 2004; Herrera 2001a). PROGENIAL funds paid for two Ecuadorian project coordinators, a series of consultants, and several loan-specific gender activities such as training workshops, production of videos and manuals, and so on.<sup>11</sup> These activities were mentioned in the 2003 CAS as evidence of the Bank's commitment to civil society partnership (World Bank 2003b, 9).

In short then, the Bank's resident mission in Quito has been a key site for feminist policy entrepreneurship. The Bank has put out several important studies and documents on gender in an Ecuadorian context, and its collaborations with domestic feminists are noteworthy. In 2003 and 2004, when the interviews for this chapter were conducted, several self-identified feminists were also working for the resident mission, either as full-time Bank staff or as consultants brought in to help specific projects incorporate a gender focus. The case study hence allows a close look at what happens when gender staff gain space and at the constraints within which they operate, even in relatively friendly environments.

### **Institutional Location: Liminal Spaces, Salaries, and Hopes for Change**

The gender policy entrepreneurs who worked for the Bank in Ecuador at that time occupied liminal spaces as dual insiders and outsiders, feminists and bureaucrats, activists working for social change

and staff employed by an organization seeking to reform Ecuador's economy in free market directions. They did not speak like technocrats, and most were not economists by profession. Before working for the Bank they had worked for indigenous development organizations, for national violence prevention efforts, and for campaigns to legalize Ecuadorian immigrants abroad. They still taught university courses on gender and ethnicity; they were still invited to academic discussions on gender and asked to give feedback on feminist book manuscripts. When interacting with other Bank staff, one gender employee thus commented, "Some people saw us a little as foreigners, as strange." These were largely James Wolfensohn's people, his cadre of progressive, non-economist recruits who felt in part accountable to "outsiders" in the feminist and NGO community. They were not necessarily supportive of the Bank's macroeconomic restructuring program, and they all wished to open the organization's operations up to greater civil society participation. Many were known personally and respected professionally by activists otherwise harshly critical of the Bank, including those involved in SAPRI.

These individuals were also *institutionally* positioned as insider-outsiders. Many of Ecuador's gender activities were initiated by the LAC Gender Unit, bypassing the country's resident mission and often using non-Bank money.<sup>12</sup> For example, the regional PROGENIAL initiative to study gender in Bank projects was established with Japanese grant money. In Ecuador the project was at first run out of the Bank's Quito office, but consultants had to later move outside in a perfect spatial illustration of their liminal position. The project also had a special status inside the resident mission, and staff reported to the head of the LAC Gender Unit in Washington DC rather than to country Bank managers.

Moreover, most of the Ecuadorian feminists with connections to the Bank had contacts with state bureaucracies. Typically they worked for the state women's council CONAMU (or its predecessor DINAMU) although, as the Bank integrated indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian concerns into its lending in the later 1990s, feminists with connections to less mestiza-dominated domestic agencies were also drawn in as consultants. CONAMU, founded in 1997, is an autonomous entity under the presidency of the republic; its main goal is to institutionalize public-sector policies for gender equity and to promote women's participation in development (Correia 2000; CONAMU 2001). Although CONAMU staff

initially helped manage and facilitate community-based projects, by 2003 such activities had been delegated to other bodies. CONAMU staff increasingly acted more as “state interlocutors,” helping to define how women were integrated into development but distanced from grounded interventions (Lind 2004, 65). Amy Lind thus identified them as “feminists within and against the state” (2005, 119). The Bank’s *Ecuador Gender Review* study was conducted in collaboration with CONAMU, as was the flower study, and almost all of the consultants hired by the Bank to work on the PROGENIAL initiative had connections to CONAMU. One interviewee stated that the LAC Gender Unit “always saw CONAMU favorably,” while another felt that CONAMU’s work was a key reason the PROGENIAL initiative was grounded in Ecuador: “[Bank staff] found that it was possible to do the work in Ecuador because CONAMU was there, basically—because there was a women’s movement.”

One reason feminists associated with this manifestation of the women’s movement ended up working for the Bank was money. Several GAD professionals became involved with the Bank’s efforts because CONAMU was caught up in the state’s budgetary crisis and employees had their salaries cut, despite efforts by Bank gender staff to protect the agency from the restructuring advice of macroeconomic staff.<sup>13</sup> These consultants (some of whom were single parents or the sole wage earners in their household<sup>14</sup>) could not support their dependents on state feminist salaries. Bank consultancies paid four times more, and they described the choice of employment as an easy one to make. Individuals were hence hired away from poorly-paid state jobs to work as Bank consultants, as one interviewee explained in relation to an education loan that included a gender component:

The people who worked in [the loan] were people who worked with good salaries. The people who work in the ministries have some very bad salaries, right? So there was a sort of competition, of resentment between the authorities. I don’t know how to explain it to you, but it generated certain discomforts.

The interviewee went on to argue that the best employees from the education ministry “were co-opted by [the loan], so the ministry was left weaker.” In another example, an accountant in a World Bank gender and microcredit initiative took that job after the Ecuadorian bank with which she had been employed was closed to comply with an IMF

standby agreement. Many gender staff thus ended up working for Bank projects because of the instability and poor salaries of other jobs—a situation in part caused by the state retrenchment policies advocated by the Bank.

In addition to being drawn to Bank jobs because they paid well in a context of economic upheaval, these individuals also genuinely believed that they could seize space from which to forge more gender-friendly policies. This sense of ability to forge change through the Bank was related to the perception that possibilities were limited in state-focused efforts, given the weakness of CONAMU, instability within ministries, and so on. One individual explained her decision to leave CONAMU to work as an independent consultant thusly:

I am being honest with you . . . work inside the state is hard, and in a state like ours that has been falling to pieces for years—we changed Minister three or four times in a year, and it was a different policy with every minister—it was a little frustrating. It's work that wears you out, I tell you.

In this respect, work with the Bank could be a welcome relief.

Several policymakers also claimed that the Bank was open to female staff and to indigenous participation, and many enjoyed their colleagues and were proud of the work they had done—the gender-disaggregated data collected as part of the agricultural census loan (due to PROGENIAL intervention), the translation of the *Ecuador Gender Review* into Spanish so that Ecuadorian feminists could access it (also an initiative of PROGENIAL staff), and the launch of a Quichwa-language Web page on the Bank's Ecuador site. Some gender advocates were thus content with their jobs and felt they could achieve positive change through their engagement with the institution.

Yet without exception, all interviewees delineated clear constraints within which that change could be forged. As one individual noted, "It's not that you can do everything, right? Because the Bank is very rigid." I draw attention to two manifestations of this rigidity in the following section, concerning pressures to increase efficiency and pressures to improve male-female partnerships, before moving on to consider the consequences of these dual constraints on policy output and knowledge production. I seek to foreground the complex navigations undertaken by these policymakers in this respect, to understand better how they operate at the interface of global, regional, and

country-level policy advice and how they attempt to forge change within the world's development powerhouse.

### **Predictably, Insider/Outsiders Navigate the Horrible Frustrations of the Efficiency Constraint**

Importantly, many gender policymakers sought to explain their engagement with the Bank in ways that distanced them from its macroeconomic lending, to which they were sometimes personally opposed. One interviewee, noting the hostility of researchers in SAPRI to the Bank, added, "And to be honest with you I was not happy to work with the World Bank." When asked why, he replied that:

I accepted this work because in any respect I was going to be doing very similar work to what I had been doing for years in CONAMU and with possibilities of having an influence and, for me, I was in agreement with the objectives of *my* work. I don't want to say that I agreed with all the work of the Bank . . . I believed in the work that *I* was doing, do you understand? Because I was not making the macroeconomic policies! [Laughing.] *That* is where I have differences. (Original emphasis.)

Several policymakers invoked this same distinction between their work and the Bank's macroeconomic initiatives, one that was crucial to their vision of themselves as insider-outsiders.

Indeed, this was expressed as part of a feminist common sense that I was assumed to automatically share (as I did). For example, an interviewee responded to a question regarding the lack of gender analysis in a prominent country document by rolling her eyes, smiling, and saying, "You know how the macroeconomists are." This persistent differentiation between gender work and macroeconomic restructuring was a crucial part of feminist engagement with the Bank, one that several interviewees wanted critics to understand far better.

That said, however, as much as they felt—and wanted to be seen as—distanced from the Bank's macroeconomic reforms, without exception these policymakers claimed that their activities were heavily restricted by the dominance of efficiency concerns. As one interviewee framed it, "The World Bank has an absolutely technocratic vision of gender" in which gender interventions had to have a measurable impact on development outcomes, understood narrowly as growth. Sometimes this requirement simply shut down room for maneuver;

when there was no data linking gender to growth, the issue was simply ignored. One policymaker explained a failed effort to insert gender into the 2003 CAS thusly, arguing that gender staff had no chance because of the lack of data:

We made an attempt but the people who formulate the Country Assistance Strategy, they are very hard economists. It was very difficult—the majority of them have a very neo-liberal vision—very strong.

This situation resulted in a predictable pressure to produce economic, quantifiable results, one to which several other Bank scholars have drawn attention<sup>15</sup> and which I have explored in previous chapters. Here I wish to focus on quantification specifically, rather than the more general push to link policy efforts to productivity or growth. Bank staff are notorious for their attachments to narrow statistical data, and they have resisted many attempted policy innovations on the grounds that they employ what are considered inappropriate methods. William Ascher noted in 1983 that Bank staff were simply refusing to gather statistics required to do social pricing on their projects because they saw the effort as lacking rigor (425).<sup>16</sup> As Anne Marie Goetz notes, “the politics of personal bureaucratic survival dictate that the political project of the GAD agenda be underplayed, as this is seen as an unprofessional, non-technical personal bias” (1997, 54), and in the Bank these survival politics also dictate that GAD be countable, particularly given that many of the most committed gender staff are not economists. As Josette Murphy noted in her 1995 evaluation of Bank gender policy, “Early attention to WID in project design was the work of a few committed individuals, including several anthropologists and sociologists” (35) or the wives of Bank staff.<sup>17</sup> This created a problem of outsider status for many GAD staff and helped drive the perceived need to frame arguments in quantified terms that the Bank’s economists could understand and would respect. In this sense, preference for quantification confirms Theodore Porter’s analysis of how some accountants and engineers found themselves pressured to replace personal judgments with measurements due to their vulnerability to pressure from powerful outsiders during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (1995, xi). For example, the Bank’s second WID advisor focused on building a statistical basis for WID demands because WID was marginalized inside the Bank and its advocates were suspected of bias; to legitimize it as a professional

(rather than political) concern, she tried to prove the need for Bank intervention using “objective” numbers. As Porter summarizes, “Quantification lends authority to officials who have very little of their own” (1995, 8).

In this regard, the PROGENIAL initiative reflected a sense among gender policy entrepreneurs in the LAC Gender Unit and in the Bank’s Quito office that projects needed concrete results, tools for implementation, and indicators if they were to effectively integrate GAD into their day-to-day work. As summarized by one interviewee:

PROGENIAL was an attempt to operationalize gender in a context in which it is very difficult to include gender. The people who work in the World Bank are in general economists, they are in teams that do not really value social themes or discrimination, although their discourses are very focused on combating poverty and all this. It has been a real struggle to get them to accept . . . themes of sexual difference etc. Their ways of working, mechanisms and procedures are very focused on measurable results.

Thus one policymaker argued that the regional Gender Unit, through PROGENIAL, was trying “to convince people that gender can work, that it is not only a question of propaganda, that it is not only a banner, but that if inequities can be measured they can be accepted . . . As you see, it is a quite positivistic field.” Hence, one of PROGENIAL’s most lauded successes was the gender-disaggregated data collected as part of Ecuador’s agricultural census loan.

The imperative to prove gender’s value in quantifiable terms also influenced the advice given to domestic partners. In a discussion of lessons learned from an attempt to integrate gender concerns into a rural development loan, for example, the *Ecuador Gender Review* concluded:

According to project staff, the gender approach promoted by the project was perceived as a feminist orientation, which led to rejection and resistance. The approach to gender was also criticized for being too ideological—gender staff were unable to translate concepts into concrete actions. Experience from other projects demonstrates that a more convincing argument is to show how applying gender analysis contributes to project goals. (Correia 2000, 80)

The shift from a feminist, ideological orientation to a technocratic, instrumentalist one grounded in project efficiency was thus recommended as part of Bank best practices. Indeed, the Bank’s support

for CONAMU was in large part due to the enthusiasm with which the latter was seen to embrace efficiency rationales, particularly in terms of quantifiable results and gender databases. The *Gender Review* remarked that “having made technical competence an explicit and priority objective, CONAMU clearly values technical excellence, in contrast to focusing on lobbying or implementing politically motivated token projects for women” (Correia 2000, 8). CONAMU’s executive director agreed, affirming the need for the agency to measure and evaluate gender indicators in order to chart the state’s progress in meeting its international obligations around gender equity (Lola Villaquián de Espinosa foreword, CONAMU 2001, np). Of course, CONAMU’s reliance on external money influences the ideas it normalizes about gender and development; Lind uses its pervasive emphasis on women’s integration into free market activities as evidence of such constraints (2004, 67). But Bank–CONAMU staff also highlighted pressures to quantify their work and to use “technical” framings that would increase project efficiency and ensure results could be sold to the Bank’s mainstream staff.

Sometimes these institutional pressures for efficiency led to anger at those who were understood to jeopardize the tentative space secured for feminist influence by producing poor-quality work that could not be defended to the macroeconomists. In this sense, feminist policy entrepreneurs imposed a technocratic “politics of respectability” on themselves. As several authors interested in questions of race, imperialism, and sexuality have noted, marginalized actors often constrain their own behavior and harshly penalize members of their own community for a perceived failure to self-monitor in line with how their actions will be perceived by dominant groups. Whether understood through Fanon’s sense that colonized subjects may view themselves through a White gaze (1967), Cohen’s claim that Black HIV/AIDS activism in the United States has been shaped by discomfort over discussing drug users and sex workers for fear of reinforcing racism (1997), White’s analysis of the factors that may silence debate about lesbianism within African American feminism (2001), or Alexander’s argument that neocolonial state managers may try to comply with heterosexualized morality in an effort to demonstrate their fitness to rule (2005), these debates about the politics of respectability all recognize that some marginalized actors may anxiously attempt to abide by dominant racialized, sexualized, class-

based, and gendered norms.<sup>18</sup> Bank gender policy entrepreneurs harshly judged other feminists in this light. One policymaker relayed that he had to pressure colleagues to produce quantified research that fit institutional definitions of rigor, and in some cases he had to personally train them how. He acknowledged that this made him unpopular because people felt he was interfering in their work, but he feared that if they produced poor research his own position would be damaged, along with the broader national and regional gender efforts of the Bank.

On other occasions the demand for efficiency-based discourses led staff to feel ashamed of their accomplishments when they were reduced to terms the Bank considered legible. Consider the following comments on working at the Bank:

Look, for me it was a very big learning period that I value greatly. I learnt how the Bank functions from inside, to understand that inside such a large structure they can make these policies with good intentions like those of gender and so on, but if the policy in general and the system in general march with different logics, then what you can do in reality is crushed, and it is not crushed only from outside but it is crushed from our own gender unit, because [a colleague] put demands on us for achievements of a World Bank type.

Specifically, this individual claimed that the Bank arrived with “its little drawer of obvious approaches,” and it wanted everything to correspond to that drawer—one grounded in technical arguments that gender enhanced efficiency. This led to conflict “because what were achievements for us, for them were worthless.” When staff tried to present these achievements at a workshop, they saw their efforts converted into “a worthless formula . . . It embarrassed us that our achievements were presented in this manner.” To sum up this issue, the interviewee relayed a conversation with a person “with good intentions” from the Washington team:

“You have good things,” she told us, “yes, you have good things, but they are not well packaged, do you understand?” It was terrible . . . I didn’t know how to do the packaging. It was horrible, horrible I swear to you—the biggest frustration.

The good things *were* legible to DC staff here, but they knew the packaging had to change to secure broader success in the Bank. In this sense they passed the pressure for efficiency framing downward, fully

aware that the success of their own efforts rested on such coerced acts of translation.

However, in other regards Ecuadorian staff were pressured *from within* to “sell” their results up to regional staff. As David Mosse notes, development consultants are frequently called upon “to mediate at the interface between project operations and donor policy, interpreting each to the other” (2005a, 134). In the Bank’s gender policy, Ecuadorian consultants were positioned precisely at this interface. As one interviewee put it:

Well in reality they [D.C. staff] read the national reality with an interlocutor . . . so if the people in the project are very good at selling themselves, then they [D.C. staff] believe the film and they go and buy it and they find the project golden . . . They are always sellers, those who sell these products.

Technical efficiency was again the key language of policy entrepreneurship here, one that translated local realities into terms legible to DC staff looking for model projects with which to bolster their own activities. Pressures to prove that gender policy adds to growth are thus not experienced by staff in a simple, linear, top-down manner; they appear from both inside and outside, from Ecuadorian project staff, Bank macroeconomists, and the LAC Gender Unit in the middle. Such findings confirm the continued salience of efficiency constraints in a post-1995 context and the multiple levels on which those constraints shape policy entrepreneurship.

### **The Complementarity Constraint and Its Consequences for Gender Policy: More “Achievements of a World Bank Type”**

However, there was also a second policy constraint evident in the Bank’s Ecuadorian gender efforts, one that has received far less attention in the critical GAD literature. Staff also identified the pressure to include men and to redefine gender in a complementary way resting on male-female balance as a key limit on their work. According to one interviewee, gender was seen by some in the Bank and in the projects with which PROGENIAL was trying to work as an external imposition and as synonymous with feminist or “almost lesbian.”<sup>19</sup> In part to counter such perceptions, *and in a clear manifestation of the sexualized politics of respectability*, several employees said that the Bank wanted men included in gender work. As defined by one consultant, the official policy was: “We don’t believe that there should be projects for women and projects

for men; there should be projects with a focus on equity for men and women.” Likewise, in policy texts, attention to men and organizing in mixed groups were identified as key elements distinguishing an “ideological women in development approach over a true gender perspective” (Correia 2000, 76). The *Ecuador Gender Review* recommended male inclusion and the organizing of men’s groups as one of the lessons learned from a rural development loan, discussing the “Limitations of a ‘Women in Development’ Approach” thusly:

Project experience demonstrates the importance of a true gender approach as opposed to one that treats women as a segregated group. For example, staff indicated that women’s projects were often rejected because community members did not understand the rationale for organizing women on their own. Also, changes in women’s roles imply that men’s roles must change too, thus the need to work with men alongside women. For example, the involvement of men and other community members needs to be established at the outset of an intervention prior to forming women’s groups. (Correia 2000, 80)

Similarly, the chapter on gender in the Bank’s report on Ecuador’s dollarization lamented that literature on gender and macroeconomic crisis “focuses almost solely on women to the exclusion of men” (Correia 2002, 178), and a 2002 Gender Unit visit to Ecuador included discussion of “themes relevant to men in Bank-funded projects.” The questionnaire sent out to projects in advance asked whether the incorporation of gender had generated positive effects for both men and women.

This approach to gender analysis had several concrete consequences for Bank activities in Ecuador. First, it caused serious conceptual problems, confusing staff and the projects with which they worked. It also produced tensions with domestic partner agencies that were unenthusiastic about male inclusion. Some policymakers remarked that gender was being defined so broadly—as requiring a focus on men, the youth, the elderly, and so on—that it had become a synonym for all social lending and thus had lost its focus, whereas others had trouble maintaining the official position that gender refers to men and women when “I was always focusing more on women . . . Really, it was a little of a clash.” Moreover, pressure was put on CONAMU to include men, and the Bank hereby intervened to change the approach of the organization it regarded as the most

authentic representative of the national women's movement. Consider this account of Bank–CONAMU interactions in PROGENIAL:

Initially this project [PROGENIAL] was going to have strong involvement from CONAMU, but there was a misunderstanding between [the people involved]. The misunderstandings have to do basically with conceptual themes such as how to conceive gender . . . For CONAMU although they speak of gender, they have a strong focus on women. In contrast the World Bank, as you may have seen, makes an effort towards gender because gender takes into account the theme of men . . . CONAMU refused very firmly to work like this, that men would be beneficiaries of their activities, and their argument was this—"we women are those who suffer discrimination, so as a result it is absurd, unjustifiable to invest in men" . . . This provoked a very strong disagreement . . . The relationship turned very *very* bad, very bad, and this affected all types of personal relations. But it was very ugly, this polemic—very ugly.

This individual clearly sympathized with CONAMU's position and felt that gender staff had been pressured into a complementary focus on men by the Bank, a move that significantly damaged personal relations between feminist colleagues.

This is not to argue that the Bank caused these fights; many stemmed from CONAMU-era disputes and personality clashes. But the pressure on marginalized staff to justify their efforts in the Bank's terms certainly made them more acute. In particular, CONAMU, a classic liberal feminist organization whose work was grounded in the notion that women suffer discrimination and need equality in the public sphere, was poorly equipped and, to a certain extent, resistant to repositioning its activities in accordance with a balanced focus on men and women. CONAMU was thus distanced, or distanced itself, from Bank gender activities. The consultants who were receiving Bank salaries began to increasingly recognize that they were not simply doing the same work they had been doing at CONAMU for more money; they were doing different work, requiring far greater attention to men. This suggests that Bank alliances with liberal feminist organizations like CONAMU can be unsettled by the focus on sharing couples so central to the Bank's current gender policy and that the complementarity constraint, alongside the efficiency constraint, can be experienced by Bank partners as an attempted interference.

In addition to confusing staff and causing conflict with domestic allies, the vision of ideal gender analysis used in the Bank—of including men to produce complementary relations within loving couples—also influenced how men became visible to policymakers. Poor men were again framed as unreliable, lazy, irresponsible policy problems who failed to adhere to a model of good partnership. Discussions about alcohol and violence became particularly prominent. As in the LAC Gender Unit's conversations more broadly, poor men's drinking was identified by Bank staff as a key gender policy problem in Ecuador. The issue was raised in several interviews, with gender staff typically understanding the problem as involving poor, rural, depressed men who go into cities, drink their wages, and put women at risk of violence. These conversations are not new; Moser's study, *Confronting Crisis*, contained several references to poor men's alcoholism and substance abuse as significant drains on household resources (Moser 1996, 13), and her report on Cisne Dos devoted a section to "male drinking and drug use" in which she explored "the role of drinking as a form of male release from despondency associated with economic and job difficulties" (1997, 77). However, concern with poor men's irresponsible drinking as a key cause of Ecuador's gender problems and as a reaction to wounded masculinity is more sustained in recent texts. The abstract of the *Ecuador Gender Review* asserted that "alcoholism and substance abuse are a serious social concern" (Correia 2000, iv) for Ecuadorian men,<sup>20</sup> and the issue took up half of a four-page section on health—far more space than cancer, sexually transmitted diseases, occupational health and hazardous work, or smoking (Correia 2000, 17; see also 49, 55). Likewise, Maria Correia's chapter on gender in the Bank's discussion of Ecuador's dollarization foregrounded substance abuse and alcoholism as problems affecting poor and unemployed men responding to hopelessness (Correia 2002, 185). Alcoholism took up three quarters of the space in a two-page discussion of male health vulnerabilities.

The Bank's Ecuadorian gender policymakers also argue that gender-role stress leads poor men, and particularly unemployed men, to be more violent than other men. Moser, like many other feminist critics of structural adjustment (Sparr 1994, 28; Alexander 1991), claimed that economic stress may lead to increased domestic violence (Moser 1997, 77), and she noted that women in Cisne Dos identify links between the bad economic situation and their sons' increased violence and public drinking (1996, 14). However, the implied policy solution

here was to improve the economic situation. In later documents, the solution became to change poor men. For example, increased male violence was proof of the gendered impact of economic restructuring for the *Ecuador Gender Review*, because “for men, unemployment threatens their role of family provider and creates problems of self esteem and depression—which may have other possible negative effects such as violence” (Correia 2000, 50). Violence was linked to alcohol abuse, leading to suggestions that drunk men should be detained by the police as a violence-prevention strategy, but both violence and alcoholism were understood to be caused by wounded masculinity. Thus, using a citation to a conference paper,<sup>21</sup> the report argued that

low income young men, who may lack other, more mainstream ways of affirming their identity or of achieving manhood—in the workplace, or in school, for example—may use shows of force, fights and other forms of violence (including violence against women), experimentation with drugs, or acting recklessly to gain prestige within their peer group and to affirm a sense of self (Barker 1998). (Correia 2000, 16–17)

The Bank’s chapter on gender in its 2002 dollarization report went further in this negative portrayal of poor masculinity, claiming directly that increased domestic violence correlates with low education and belonging to a low socioeconomic group (Correia 2002, 186). The gender chapter also predicted an increase in “dangerous behavior, violence, and substance abuse among men” during economic crisis “given the frustrations that unemployed and underemployed men face when unable to meet the societal expectations of being providers and protectors” (186). Emphasis shifted from economic problems to the problem of poor men themselves, such as the “socialization processes, which inhibit men from expressing their feelings” (Correia 2002, 201). Again, poor men were particularly affected by such destructive tendencies, because “aggression among men has been associated with male gender roles and expectations, and in particular the inability of men earning low incomes to live up to societal and familial expectations of being full income earners” (189). Moreover, men’s inability to meet these expectations is framed as a *result* of their *preexisting* problems of “alcoholism, violence, delinquency, or depression” (188), rather than a clear-cut manifestation of wounded masculinity associated with lack of work. Thus, Ecuador’s *Gender*

*Review* asserts that research on alcoholism, violence, irresponsible family behavior, and delinquency should be conducted to correct “information deficiencies on men” (Correia 2000, vii).

This positioning of poor men—not economic crisis—as the country’s core gender problem persisted despite the availability of contradictory evidence, some of which is actually cited in Bank texts. Poor boys in Ecuador drop out of school to start work earlier than nonpoor boys (World Bank 1996a, 74; Correia 2000, 5; World Bank 2003a, 14). Many regions of the country are demographically female-dominated as a result of poor men’s migration for work, and migrants’ remittances have sustained families in the country’s economic crisis (see chapter 5). One study of domestic violence in Ecuador, cited in the *Ecuador Gender Review*, found *no* significant relationship between domestic violence, rural origin, male education, or family income. Instead,

women’s independent source of income was found to be the only statistically significant factor influencing domestic violence. About 71 percent of women with their own income declared having been physically abused compared to 47 percent of women without their own source of income. (Correia 2000, 22)

A similar study in Lima, also cited in Ecuador’s *Gender Review*, found “that employed men inflict more physical and psychological violence than unemployed men, most probably because men are more dependent on female earnings” (22). Here working women were *more* likely to be victims of violence than nonworking women, and unemployed men were *less* dangerous than employed men. Such findings clearly challenge the portrayal of poor masculinity and poor women’s empowerment through employment central to the Bank’s writing on gender violence, yet neither receives elaboration.

In many respects then, the Bank’s focus on issues of male alcoholism and violence is a perfect example of Arturo Escobar’s observation that the development gaze seeks to include new populations as objects of intervention, as problems to be resolved “but according to interests defined by others” (1995, 190).<sup>22</sup> Making groups legible requires turning those who do not fit the frame into pathologies or anomalies that need to be transformed (Bergeron 2004, 31). Thus, poor men become targets for development intervention to correct their excessive drinking and violence, an agenda that hardly emerged from the articulated needs of the group itself.

Yet this policy focus *did* in part emerge from the attention to men's irresponsibility given by poor Ecuadorian women. To this extent, the policy must be read as an example of the Bank's new, participatory approach to development *and* as a skewed incorporation of poor people's voices. Policymakers frequently invoke poor women's experiences to explain their concern with men; for example, the successful examples of social marketing provided by the Bank's LAC Gender Unit included a Peruvian gender equity project in which women wanted their husbands to take part in awareness-raising seminars, because they felt that male behavior would not change otherwise (World Bank 2000e, 10). The composite sketches of poor women's lives provided by Bank researchers also direct attention to problems of male drunkenness, financial recklessness, and abandonment. Moser's gender chapter in the Bank's 1996 *Ecuador Poverty Report* (based on her Cisne Dos research) included several text boxes that highlighted personal stories of community members; these overwhelmingly featured women who had been deserted, abused, financially exploited, or mistreated by men (World Bank 1996a, 126–127; see also Moser 1997, 44; Correia 2002, 186). These representations are no doubt mediated by Bank staff, but they are hardly invented by the organization; Moser's research is confirmed by others who indicate that poor women across Latin America express considerable frustration with male drinking and irresponsibility (see especially Tinsman 2000). Any comprehensive analysis of the imperative to include men must grapple with this fact.

To clarify, then, in discussing these concerns I seek neither to romanticize anyone's masculinity nor to deny problems of irresponsibility, alcoholism, and violence—ones to which poor Ecuadorian women repeatedly draw attention. Neither do I launch this critique to, as George and Sabelli put it in their book, “bash” (1994, 3) the well-meaning efforts of progressive, often feminist-identified Bank staff. I seek, more simply, to demonstrate how men are made visible in, and targeted for inclusion through, Bank gender policy—a complex, mediated process of listening to the voices of the poor and foregrounding certain research on their condition while sidelining other work. Put bluntly, poor men were made visible in narrow ways, and they were targeted to correct their perceived irresponsibility and their failure to adhere to a model of normative couplehood considered empowering by the Bank. This agenda emerged in a complex interplay between the institutional pressure to include men, the institutional definition of

gender lending as requiring complementarity, and the concerns of poor women about male irresponsibility. I hope there is space to trace that process *without* denying gender inequality and *while* remaining generous to the efforts of marginalized gender staff acting within constrained contexts.

### **Child Care Provision versus Fatherhood Promotion: The Fate of Different Policy Solutions to the Tension between Paid and Unpaid Work**

I wish to close this chapter by examining how the efficiency and complementarity constraints influenced the Bank's preferred solutions to the caring labor dilemma in Ecuador, in an attempt to track the consequences of the policy frames identified above. Unsurprisingly, getting women into paid employment is a priority for the Bank's gender policymakers in Ecuador, as it is throughout Latin America. Employment was seen as part of a broader empowerment initiative, with the abstract of the *Ecuador Gender Review* using women's increased labor force participation as proof that "Ecuador has made considerable strides in addressing gender issues" (Correia 2000, v).<sup>23</sup> In gender texts, work was framed as a way to increase productivity and growth, to achieve other development goals such as poverty reduction, to help "break the culture of dependency" (Correia 2002, 206) affecting poor communities, and to empower women, "enhancing their economic independence and reducing their vulnerability" (205). These arguments also feature in the Bank's mainstream policy texts. The 2003 CAS recommended "faster, labor-intensive output growth" to "includ[e] . . . the poor (*especially women*) in the development process" (World Bank 2003b, 22; emphasis added), and work was mentioned first in the CAS section on gender, before lack of prenatal care or the high maternal mortality rate. One key finding of the Bank's civil society consultations was that "gender roles have been transformed due to unemployment and male migration, and due to women joining the labor force; women are more empowered while men's self-esteem has plummeted" (10).

That said, however, gender policymakers attempting to influence Bank initiatives in Ecuador are also fully aware of debates about the social reproduction dilemma.<sup>24</sup> This is most evident in Moser's *Confronting Crisis* study, which remains noteworthy within GAD circles for its recognition of the importance of caring labor. For example, Moser noted that adult women delegated care to their daughters when

economic crisis forced them to work outside the home, and that women took on the burden of “expenditure-minimizing” strategies that increased their shopping and cooking times and made them worry persistently about household survival (1997, 32). Similarly, the *Ecuador Gender Review* contained a section on the “division of labor in the household and housework” (Correia 2000, 35–36), and it noted that increased female labor force participation caused by macroeconomic crisis and adjustment policies can lead to “greater pressures on [women’s] time given that adjustments in the division of household work have not taken place” (50). One of the lessons learned from a recent loan attempt to integrate gender was “the need to address women’s reproductive and domestic time constraints in conjunction with supporting their productive activities” (76; see also Correia 2002). Awareness of the social reproduction dilemma also made its way into more mainstream texts on the country, with a 2003 report on postdollarization advice containing multiple references to caring labor and the dangers of overburdening women through paid employment (see especially Ortiz 2003). In short, the Bank recognizes that unpaid caring labor is important and that policy measures to resolve tensions between paid and unpaid work are required if efforts to get women into employment are to be successful—this is as true in Ecuador as it is in the institution’s formally cleared DC documents and regional discussions.

The point I wish to emphasize in this chapter is that the measures proposed to resolve this problem were shaped by both the efficiency and complementarity constraints. The winning solutions utilized appeals to productivity and to empowerment read as complementary partnership. Losing policy solutions—ones that failed to gain ground in the institution—lacked that framing. To demonstrate that point it is useful to compare how child care and fatherhood promotion initiatives fared within Bank debates about gender policy in Ecuador. Child care provision is in many respects the obvious policy preference for those interested in increasing women’s labor force participation without overburdening them, and thus unsurprisingly the issue was repeatedly mentioned by Bank gender staff. Several interviewees identified the lack of nurseries as a key gender problem in the country, for example, and one consultant said this was a core demand of women with whom she worked in community projects. Moser’s work on Guayaquil had always identified child care provision as necessary for women to enter the paid labor force without being overburdened, and

she was heavily critical of the Ecuadorian government's 1993 decision to end—with one-month notice—support for a network of child care centers on which poor women relied (see also Lind 2005). Her chapter on gender in the 1996 *Ecuador Poverty Report* urged the Bank to “support local community-based and community-supported childcare” (134), and her *Confronting Crisis* report identified better provision of child care as a “priorit[y] for action” (Moser 1997, 13, 86, 18). Child care was also mentioned as a priority in the country's *Gender Review*, on the grounds that it facilitates female labor force participation (Correia 2000, 24) and is “associated with positive outcomes such as improved school and labor market performance, lower crime rates, and more stable personal relationships as adults.” The discussion concluded that “the positive externalities of ECD (early childhood development) programs justifies [sic] their relatively modest costs” (24), an argument repeated in the gender chapter of the Bank's dollarization report (Correia 2002, 199–200). Indeed, one of the lessons learned from the attempt to integrate gender into a rural development loan was that

to be effective, productive endeavors for women must be accompanied by measures to help them decrease their domestic workload, such as improved technologies to reduce time spent on fuelwood and water collection and childcare. Early on, the project entered into an arrangement with the Ministry of Education and Culture to provide childcare services in rural communities. (80)

There is thus no doubt that gender staff within the Bank consider child care provision to be a key priority.

However, this concern with child care is not sustained in mainstream Bank texts on Ecuador, particularly not in recent documents. Although Correia mentioned child care in her chapter on gender, the Bank's 2002 report on dollarization did not raise the issue elsewhere. Child care was not highlighted in the 2003 Bank report on Ecuador's postdollarization development agenda, and it appeared nowhere in the 2003 CAS, indicating definitively that it is not a policy priority for the Bank.

This can be explained, in large part, by the institutional constraints that influence policy preferences within this organization: the need for interventions to increase efficiency and complementary sharing partnerships between men and women. Paid child care provision

causes multiple problems to a narrow cost-benefit analysis, because currently unremunerated labor becomes visible, and hence costs are generated. Policymakers attempted to justify these costs on efficiency grounds, especially in the *Ecuador Gender Review*, by arguing that women will get into work; girls will stay in school; children will grow up more stable, more productive, and so on—therefore the “modest” costs are justified. However, they are fully aware that other options exist. Getting men to care more for their children in order to pick up the slack of restructuring is a free policy option, especially if unemployed men are not considered viable workers with serious chances of full-time labor force participation. In a trade off between these options, child care keeps losing. Moser, for example, noted that although women have taken on paid work in many households, men have not taken on more domestic responsibilities, and “neither has there been compensatory adjustment on the part of the government or the local community through the additional provision of childcare provision” (Moser 1997, 68–69). Faced with the choice of correcting these failures, the Bank is institutionally inclined to opt for getting men to take on responsibility within the privatized household, because this is free. Likewise, consider this list of policy options provided by the *Ecuador Gender Review*, in an attempt to support child care provision:

**DAY CARE/EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION.** Early childhood education programs are associated with improved school performance and hence should be a priority over the long term. A more immediate benefit is that child day care allows women or their daughters—who have traditionally been the primary care providers—the chance to participate in income-generating activities or stay in school. In a complementary way, the market for child care provision also creates additional employment opportunities, primarily for women . . . To the extent possible, programs should also attempt to promote fathering. (Correia 2000, 57)

The last sentence seriously harms the policy rationale for child care provision, because, if fathers can do it for free, publicly-funded services are simply inefficient. The same choice is provided in the LAC Gender Unit’s regional discussion of gender policy priorities; the same sidelining of child care results. This listed several recommendations to ensure that “employment policies . . . concentrate on reducing barriers for

women, and particularly for poor women, to access the labor market” (World Bank 2003a, 17). These included increasing child care facilities and restructuring parenting. The latter is promoted on the grounds that “a precondition to reducing gender-related inequalities is to redress the gender imbalance in the division of household work so that men and women share parenting, care giving and domestic chores, thus freeing women to participate in the workforce and advance on the job” (17). This win-win scenario appears costless, inclusive, and empowering to both sides of the heteronormative whole, and child care provision struggles to compete.

Furthermore, child care is associated with excessive government regulation of the labor market that, to the Bank, is inefficient and disempowering to women because it denies them access to employment. Despite its persistent references to the importance of child care, the *Ecuador Gender Review* is concerned that (unenforced) labor laws requiring firms with over twenty-five employees to provide child care “act as a double-edged sword, causing women’s labor costs to rise and thus causing a disincentive for employers to hire women” (Correia 2000, 24–25). Similarly, Bank staff express unease about child care because it is framed as a conservative policy, facilitating men’s neglect of social reproduction responsibilities. Public provision is thus not only potentially damaging to women because it makes them more expensive to employ, but because it lets their husbands off the hook. Consider, for example, this discussion of domestic employees in the *Ecuador Gender Review*:

Domestic service remains a very important source of female employment, which is both good and bad. On the positive side, it enables poor women—and in particular young women with low educational levels and no previous work experience—to enter into the paid labor force and represents a stepping stone to finding other jobs. The availability of domestic service has also paved the way for middle and upper-class women to enter the paid labor force. *On the downside, it remains one of the lowest paid occupations and does little to encourage men to assume household responsibilities. In this sense, domestic service performed by women works to reinforce traditional gender roles.* (Correia 2000, 33; emphasis added)

Although focused on domestic service rather than public child care, this discussion demonstrates a Bank preference for men to take over

caring responsibilities in privatized arrangements rather than to provide for them by hiring others. This reasoning sits uneasily in a document that repeatedly tries to argue *for* child care provision, indicative of much broader tensions in Bank gender policy around the issue. These are by no means insurmountable tensions—public child care provision need not replicate traditional gendered divisions of labor, and loving fatherhood may still require child care services—but such options are not explicated in the *Review*. Instead, one is left with a messy, patchy rationale for child care provision that is ultimately unconvincing to mainstream Bank staff. With gender policymakers uneasy about its cost and its failure to include men, child care is not successfully framed as a policy priority, a failure that extends far beyond Ecuador and has been noted by several critics of the Bank's gender policies.<sup>25</sup>

Conversely, shared parenting and better fatherhood emerge as unequivocal policy priorities. Getting women into work and getting men into parenting classes are considered complementary strategies, persistently framed as mutually supportive, equally necessary, and empowering to both parties. As the executive summary to the *Ecuador Gender Review* put it: “First, both female and male gender issues need to be considered when designing and implementing social safety nets and emergency assistance programs, so that, inter alia, programs strengthen the role of fathers and provide income generating opportunities for women” (Correia 2000, xii). This priority to make women into workers and men into responsible loving family members was repeated word for word in the summary to the report (53). Specific, suggested interventions included “programs to promote men as fathers,” which, although “still very new in the Region and elsewhere . . . could be piloted in Ecuador,” given models that exist elsewhere (xi). Indeed, one of the key successes of the Bank's pilot attempt to integrate gender into its judicial reform loan was that women had gained increased child support from their former husbands (on average \$10 a month) (World Bank 2005c, 39), “keeping poor families afloat” and “help[ing] promote responsible parenting by both parents” (Ruiz-Abril nd, 7–8). The *Gender Review* also mentioned the need for reproductive health programs that include men not merely to ensure safe sex but “to promote more active male participation in childcare and parenthood” (Correia 2000, 54), and it advised involving adolescent men in “responsible parenthood programs” (16). Later, the report recommended teaching parenting skills to boys and girls as part of its

health sector reform (57), and a discussion of rural development advised “training men to share domestic chores and childcare” (59).

This policy is preferred because it appears a costless solution to the caring labor problem. Policymakers can promote greater efficiency through drawing on previously untapped development resources, yet without generating obvious costs (i.e., they can get women into work without paying for the caring labor they currently do). The option also includes men and is framed as empowering to everyone, because “broadening male gender roles could benefit men as well as women and their families, given that substance abuse, violence and depression among men have been linked to gender roles and the limited ways men have to affirm their identity” (Correia 2000, xi). To a large extent the policy priority is thus framed as simply common sense, and the ideals it invokes—of happy, sharing couples and men reforming their masculinities to care more about others—appeal to a range of actors, including feminists. As Anna Gavanoas points out in her account of the U.S. fatherhood promotion movement, “Who could say that responsible fatherhood is a bad idea? Who is going to disagree if someone says that everybody should love his or her children?” (Gavanoas 2004, 21). Conversely, many people object to child care provision, including some in the Bank—it costs too much, it looks too much like special treatment for women, it offers little in terms of promoting partnership between couples, and it may undermine men’s commitments to the family. Loving fatherhood, though, is the ultimate social marketing success, to which no reasonable person could object.

That said, the need to liberate men from restrictive masculinity does not apply equally. It is targeted on poor, unemployed men, explicitly intended to “promote men’s roles as fathers and caregivers, particularly among unemployed men” (Correia 2000, xi), because:

Men are often underemployed or off work during economic downturns and therefore could share the burden of household responsibilities. In contrast, women often enter the workforce to compensate for household income losses during periods of economic crisis and have less time to engage in domestic chores. (xiv)

Here the productivity rationale mixes with the empowerment one; poor men are not only hyperoppressed by gender role stress, but they are also sitting around with time on their hands, the perfect candidates for an easy resolution to tensions between unpaid care and

remunerated labor. The Bank's Ecuadorian gender specialists hereby seek to teach poor men how to be responsible family members—how to love their families in a committed, sustained way, in order that they can help pick up the slack of unmet care needs as their wives move into paid employment.

Indeed, the Bank wants to know for certain how unemployed men are spending their time in order to know how to restructure it. A footnote to the discussion of strengthening social safety net programs by promoting unemployed men's roles as fathers and caregivers stated: "The World Bank is contemplating a study to determine how unemployed men spend their time, with a view to learning if men are taking on new tasks in the household, if they are engaging in non-productive activities such as drinking" (Correia 2000, 44). Engagement with unpaid caring labor responsibilities thus becomes productive time use, whereas consumption of alcohol (which does, actually, add to the GDP so long as it is not home-brewed) is nonproductive. This simply makes no sense in a narrow, neoclassical economic model. It resonates instead with the Bank's complementary gender register and is indeed proof of successful feminist policy entrepreneurship. It is also a further illustration that poor men are visible as irresponsible drunks, targeted for inclusion in policy in order to ensure they love better when women move into work. The suggestion thus represents an interesting merging of the efficiency and complementarity constraints. The Bank wants quantified research on time use to ascertain productivity levels, but what counts as productive has been reconceptualized by pressures to include men and ensure gender policy produces "empowered" couples who privatize caring responsibilities.

In a further demonstration of the value of focusing on the knowledge-production processes embedded in these claims, it is worth emphasizing that the material cited to support this Ecuadorian policy priority privileges U.S. researchers or U.S. examples advocating a privatized solution to tensions between paid and unpaid work resting on the redistribution of caring labor within loving couples. For example, Maria Correia's chapter on gender and economic crisis recommended using family resource centers to help strengthen the family; these

have been established in poor latino communities in the United States to target mothers, fathers, adolescent boys, and adolescent girls in dealing with issues such as responsible fathering, male alcoholism, women's economic opportunities and empowerment,

pregnancy among teenage girls, and gang violence and drug abuse among male adolescents. *In particular, these centers have played an important role for men by broadening their roles as fathers.* (2002, 206; emphasis added)

Furthermore, the *Ecuador Gender Review* asserted that because “the problem of the gender division of labour in the household is universal and is not limited to Latin America or to Ecuador” (Correia 2000, 36), the work of U.S. social psychologist Francine Deutsch would be relevant to the country. Deutsch’s work epitomizes the attempt to resolve tensions between paid work and unpaid care by restructuring heteronormativity. Arguing that “equality in parenting is achieved in the details of everyday life” (Deutsch 1999, 3), she interviewed U.S. parents to ask who wipes noses, who fries bacon, and so on, seeking out “equal sharers . . . ordinary people simply inventing and reinventing solutions to the dilemmas of modern family life” (11). Invoking the common sense that “it is simply easier for two devoted parents to meet children’s needs than for one to do it” (228), her policy advice centered on encouraging complementary sharing among mothers and fathers, such that they could “buffer each other” (228) and parent more effectively. On the last page of her book, she raised the need for “generous family-friendly policies,” “a childcare system in which every family had access to high quality daycare,” equal pay, and so on (240), but overall the study is focused on privatized adjustments by loving couples as the core solution to tensions between paid and unpaid work. This is precisely the solution to the domestic labor burden being advocated by the Bank. Thus, the *Ecuador Gender Review* closed its discussion of household labor with the following policy argument:

According to Deutsch’s seminal research on how shared parenting works in the United States, three conditions need to be in place if gender equality in the household is to be achieved: (a) men need to learn new skills; (b) women need to give up the control they have had over the household; and (c) men and women need to have flexible work schedules. Short-term efforts in Ecuador should focus on the first two conditions, which can be promoted by civil society organizations working at the local level, for example, through youth programs, community water programs, adult education programs etc. The last condition—which involves the reorganization of work—would be a long-term

objective given the pressing nature of unemployment in Ecuador today. (Correia 2000, 58–59)

There was no mention of child care provision here; the household labor issue was framed as focused on shared parenting, men learning caring skills, and women giving up caring monopolies. Thus, the Bank's LAC gender policymakers ended up endorsing a privatizing solution to the social reproduction dilemma and erasing child care provision as a priority, using U.S. gender experts advocating similar policies.<sup>26</sup>

### **Conclusion: Best-Case Scenarios?**

This chapter sought to assess the Bank's gender activities in a country context, considering how policymakers make sense of their work, how they forge relations with state agencies, and how they navigate the spaces available to them within a post-Washington Consensus development model. Ecuador is a helpful site for such analysis, precisely because feminists have been relatively successful there. I thus do not situate the case study as a "world in a teacup" (Geertz 1973, 23) representation of all Bank work on gender. Instead, I understand it as offering an example of what happens when things go well. Given that gender staff have been gaining space more broadly at the Bank since 1995, Ecuador's experiences may be, or become, of wider relevance.

On this tentative basis, then, the chapter suggests that the Bank's feminist staff are both inside and outside the state, given their connections to a marginalized state agency, and inside and outside the Bank itself, given their assessments of its institutional culture and their marginal location therein. It also suggests that feminist policy entrepreneurs were pressured to produce work that resonated with efficiency concerns and that included men while navigating counter-commitments to state-level feminist agencies and to their own GAD priorities. I draw attention to these issues to highlight the institutional constraints within which staff operate in a post-Washington Consensus environment and to critique the prevailing common sense about gender harmony and poor male irresponsibility that these policymakers help to reproduce. Output was shaped by both the efficiency and the complementarity constraints, and thus the lack of attention given to the latter is, bluntly put, a problem. Debate and dispute rightly ensue when the Bank justifies its gender policies through references to productivity and growth, but there is currently no equivalent discussion

when the Bank legitimizes interventions through references to empowering individuals by partnering them up with prespecified others. This remains true even when, as in this example, the complementarity approach causes ugly fights with feminists unenthusiastic about male inclusion in these terms.

Moreover, I suggest that the failure of child care to gain ground within the Bank in Ecuador is due not only to the cost-benefit conundrums caused by integrating previously ignored work into the market but is also linked to an unease associated with any policy that seems to ignore men. Promotion of responsible fatherhood—which is free (so long as it is targeted on unemployed men) and which empowers both sides of the heteronormative whole (but particularly poor men given their heightened gender role stress)—emerges as the key alternative. This *is* a zero-sum game in terms of which policy gets prioritized by the Bank, and it is one that child care keeps losing. We can only understand that outcome, and start to construct alternative policy framings, by tackling both constraints.

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## ROSES MEAN LOVE

### Export Promotion and the Restructuring of Intimacy in Ecuador

Far more than sex goes on within heterosexual couples, who “do” heterosexuality (and simultaneously do gender) as much through divisions of labor and distributions of household resources as through specifically sexual practices.

—STEVI JACKSON, *Sexuality, Heterosexuality, and Gender Hierarchy: Getting Our Priorities Straight*

There is no pure, untarnished local “identity” waiting to be mobilized against the global monster “outside.” Once and for all we need to understand that globalization is both “out there” and “in here”—in our localities, which it transforms and indeed produces.

—RONALDO MUNCK, *Globalisation: Deconstruction and Beyond*

I suggested in previous chapters that better links need to be made by researchers between the Bank’s macroeconomic agenda and its gender policy if we are to more comprehensively understand the complex interaction between market-restructuring processes and the reform of intimacies. Here I turn to the gendered and sexualized nature of the Bank’s policy-based lending in Ecuador, focusing on export promotion in general and the flower industry in particular. Although trade liberalization and export promotion loans are usually analyzed as gender neutral, there is a clear awareness within the Bank that both are connected to gender concerns through their effects in increasing female labor force participation. I consider this link between export promotion and gender through a focus on floriculture, an industry with a high proportion of female employees and on which the Bank’s gender staff have conducted research. In this research, employment in flowers is seen to empower women through giving them access to wages and through changing the behavior of men. Indeed, the flower industry is heralded for representing the Bank’s preferred policy solution to tensions regarding paid and unpaid labor: getting men to love better, and to turn that love into extra unpaid work in the family. This chapter

concentrates on the multiple and contradictory links made by Bank staff between work in flowers and changes in the sphere of sexual and intimate relations, drawing attention to four particularly salient claims: that flower employment enhances women's sexual and intimate autonomy; that it makes women more attractive to men; that it strengthens families; and that it generates modern, caring masculinities. I consider the emancipatory potential of this desire to reform men, both by exploring the extent to which Bank conversations rely on, and depart from, previous regional debates and by considering the concrete policy recommendations that stem from the researchers' discussions. I return again to child care in this regard, tracing how nursery provision drops out of Bank advice to the flower industry as men's household labor is increasingly celebrated. However, I close by exploring the broader impacts of the Bank's Ecuadorian flower study on debates about gender and structural adjustment, because the research is resonating loudly in conversations linking trade liberalization to gender reform. The chapter throws into sharp relief the links between Bank gender policy and the promotion of free markets, alongside the links made by critics between critique of floriculture and opposition to women's paid work. I also seek to interrogate the Bank's celebration of wage-earning as leading to women's erotic autonomy and its simultaneous disquiet about "family breakdown." In this way I aim to separate the numerous, alleged links between market restructuring and reform of intimacies to consider how they are being mobilized by the world's most important development institution.

### **Ecuador, Exports, and the Bank**

Although Ecuador's economy has been export-dependent for centuries,<sup>1</sup> emphasis on exports increased in the early 1990s in line with broader shifts involving critique of import-substitution policies and renewed faith in export-led growth. Trade reforms undertaken since that point have eliminated export taxes and licenses, reduced tariffs (from an average of 30 percent to 9 percent), and increased the role of private industries in sectors such as petroleum.<sup>2</sup> By the mid-1990s Ecuador's trade regime was one of the most open in South America (Sawers 2005, 41).

These trade reforms were in part reliant on World Bank pressure. The Bank claims, in Ecuador and elsewhere, that local integration with the global economy accelerates growth, reduces poverty, and mitigates the negative effects of restructuring on employment by

shifting workers to more dynamic, productive sectors (World Bank 1998 WDR, 3, 8; see also World Bank 2004e, xxxvi). In line with this reasoning, the Bank was a key player in Ecuador's first generation of trade reforms in the early 1990s, and structural adjustment loans throughout the decade included pro-export measures as conditions. The organization also attempted, in alliance with export industries and sympathetic government reformers,<sup>3</sup> to alter the policy environment through specific export promotion loans. For example, in 1995 the Bank proposed the Export Development Project (later renamed the International Trade and Integration Project), lending US \$21 million to increase international competitiveness through export promotion and trade reform (World Bank 1997b, 1997c).<sup>4</sup> In 1998 the Bank lent US \$20 million to the Ministry of Agriculture for SICA, a project intended to create a new agricultural census, increase producer access to agricultural information (in part in order to aid export efforts), and support agribusinesses. In 2003 it lent US \$50 million to the Ministry of Trade in a Fiscal Consolidation and Competitive Growth Adjustment Loan aimed at furthering trade reform, increasing labor market flexibility, and "deepening competitiveness" through changes to pricing and regulatory policies (World Bank 2004d, np).

The Bank also supported specific export sectors throughout the 1990s. When the state-owned petroleum company was restructured in 1989, the Bank successfully pushed for increased collaborations with private investors such as Texaco (Mayorga 2003, 144), and the 1993 Law on Hydrocarbons (passed in part due to Bank pressure) allowed greater private participation in the sector (117). In 2001 the government (again in part responding to Bank pressure) authorized the construction of a privately-funded pipeline from the Amazon to the coast; Bank staff calculated that it would double oil exports by 2003 (Beckerman and Cortes Douglas 2002, 118).<sup>5</sup> The Bank has also lent to increase exports in mining, prompting complaints to its inspection panel about environmental destruction and damage to indigenous communities (World Bank Inspection Panel 2001). Between 1993 and 2003 the International Finance Corporation provided US \$45 million in financing to Favorita Fruit, one of the country's leading banana exporters (World Bank 2003b, 20), and investment in Dole's US \$30 million banana terminal in Guayaquil was guaranteed by the World Bank-affiliate MIGA (Summitt Communications 2004, 12). As noted by a Bank consultant, "Agricultural

industries and nontraditional products have grown in direct response to trade and macroeconomic reforms recommended by the World Bank and other institutions” (Newman 2002, 375).

This progress notwithstanding, the Bank continues to prioritize export promotion; it was listed as one of the “Foundations of Ecuadorian Development” (Hachette 2003, 168) in an extensive 2003 diagnosis of the economy. The preface, by the vice president of Latin American and Caribbean affairs, outlined a “competitiveness agenda” that would correct the “glaringly absent” failure to promote private investment in the oil industry (De Ferranti 2003, xl), enact reforms to promote nontraditional exports (xlix), and secure further measures to overcome anti-export bias and complete the trade-liberalization process. On these grounds, it is uncontroversial to analyze export promotion activities in Ecuador as, in part, Bank policies.

### **Gender, Export Promotion, and Floriculture**

It remains, however, to explain why this area of lending is relevant to a project focused on gender. Most obviously, feminist scholars have paid critical attention to export industries because of the crucial role of female labor therein (Barker 2005; Barndt 1999; Ong 1997; Razavi 1999; Safa 1999). The International Labor Organization estimates that 90 percent of the 42 million people employed in free trade zones are women (Mendez 2005, 3), and in Latin America, “Several countries with export-oriented policies that pursue comparative advantages in low-wage labor exhibit the highest relative increases in women’s proletarianization” (Hite and Viterna 2005, 69). Women employed in exports are hereby central manifestations of the model “economic woman” associated with the contemporary development order, understood to be liberated through work (Benería 1999, 61). Indeed, Drucilla Barker notes an increasing convergence of certain feminist interests with the interests of global capitalism, cautioning against our potential complicity in promoting export-led growth strategies reliant on cheap female labor in the name of women’s empowerment (Barker 2005, 2202; see also Razavi 1999).

The efforts of Bank macroeconomists to promote exports intersect with the organization’s GAD activities on precisely these grounds. As one team of Bank gender consultants noted: “Employment opportunities for women in Latin America have increased dramatically in the last 20 years as a result of the growth of non-traditional agro-export industries” (Newman, Larreamendy, and Maldonado 2001, 11;

see also Newman 2001, 2). Similarly, in interviews several Bank staff mentioned high levels of female employment in export sectors such as broccoli,<sup>6</sup> and the Bank has introduced gender concerns into specific export-promotion loans. For example, the Project Appraisal Document for the Trade and Integration Project linked the initiative to the CAS on the grounds that the latter aims to “pursue a poverty alleviation strategy, in part by promoting sustained labor-intensive growth which generates strong and stable demand for labor, *and facilitates increased participation of women in the market labor force*” (World Bank 1997b, 26; emphasis added).

The intersection of interests in exports and gender on the grounds of women’s work is particularly evident in the flower industry, a key sector of the Ecuadorian economy and one that, for the Bank, “has served as a model for other attempts to develop non-traditional export products” (Newman, Larreamendy, and Maldonado 2001, 15).<sup>7</sup> Ecuador is the world’s third-largest flower exporter, specializing mainly in varieties of roses. Between 1985 and 1997 the value of flower exports grew from \$0.5 million to \$120 million, reaching US \$207 million by 2003,<sup>8</sup> and the industry constituted one of the few bright spots in the country’s otherwise “dismal” economic performance during the 1990s (Sawers 2005, 41). Plantations are concentrated in mountainous areas north of Quito that have a conducive climate and good transport links out. Flower production is the most important agro-industry in this region.<sup>9</sup> In addition to those directly employed in plantations—estimated at 36,000 in 1998 (Colloredo-Mansfeld 1999, 11; Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores Del Ecuador/CORPEI 2004, 21)—flowers generate indirect employment through transport needs, infrastructural requirements, and so on. ExpoFlores, the industry’s export association, claims that 450,000 workers are associated with the industry in these ways.<sup>10</sup>

World Bank policies have greatly aided this sector, one it regards as “an excellent example in Ecuador of successful export entrepreneurship” (World Bank 1996a, 3). In general terms, the flower industry has been a key beneficiary of the restructured economic environment promoted by the Bank (Breilh and Beltrán 2003; Mena 1999; Palán and Palán 1999; Korovkin 2003a; Sawers 2005). For example, Febres Cordero cut loans for peasants while increasing those for larger farmers producing new export crops such as strawberries, asparagus, and flowers (Cockcroft 1996, 445). Floricultural industries were listed as one of the main beneficiaries of the funds given by the

Trade and Integration Project to promote competitiveness and quality certification (World Bank 2003c, 9, 13), and CORPEI, the Export and Investment Promotion Corporation that administered this part of the project, gave US \$2 million to flower companies to promote their export activities. The Bank has also aided floriculture through its more recent SICA project, which promotes agribusinesses through advisory councils, giving producers, exporters, and investors a forum to discuss concerns and present recommendations. Floriculture has its own advisory council under this program.<sup>11</sup>

For their part, Bank gender staff have taken an interest in flowers because of high levels of female employment therein. In the late 1990s women accounted for two-thirds of employees in flowers (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001), and, although this proportion has since dropped, women still constitute at least half of workers in flowers. In contrast women make up just 30 percent of employees in the agricultural sector overall (CONAMU 2003), and under 25 percent in bananas (Striffler 2002, 201). The relative overrepresentation of women in flowers is due to lower wages, male migration from the area, and a “nimble fingers” discourse familiar to feminist scholars of exports (Ong 1997; Talcott 2003) in which women are seen as better suited than men for delicate planting, weeding, and packaging operations. In contrast, men are overrepresented in tasks considered dangerous and physically demanding, such as the construction of greenhouses and irrigation channels, and in fumigation—it is believed that they are better able to tolerate toxic chemicals than women (Newman, Larreamendy, and Maldonado 2001, 16, 28; Friedemann-Sánchez 2006). Seen as “a classic example of a growing agricultural export industry in Latin America and one that has a large demand for female labor” (Newman 2001, 2), Ecuadorian floriculture is thus a key site for Bank gender intervention. The 2004 *Ecuador Poverty Report* contained a text box on “women and the flower industry in Ecuador” (World Bank 2004e, 87), and the industry was discussed prominently in the *Ecuador Gender Review*.

In addition, in 1999 the Bank commissioned a study into the impact of women’s employment in agricultural exports in Ecuador, focused on flowers. Undertaken by Constance Newman (a DC-based economist affiliated with the U.S. Department of Agriculture) and two Ecuadorian gender specialists then employed by CONAMU, this was a quasi-experimental study in two similar regions of northern Ecuador, one with flower plantations (Cayambe) and one without

(Cotocachi). In studying these communities the Bank intended to isolate the effects of women's work in flowers, to address debates about whether the industry exploited women and particularly whether it increased their work burden.<sup>12</sup> Research involved a survey of 562 households, 37 interviews with individuals, 9 focus groups, 7 participatory workshops, and 4 life histories. The study resulted in two publications:<sup>13</sup> an English-language World Bank discussion paper written by Newman entitled *Gender, Time Use, and Change* (2001), and a Spanish-language report written by all three consultants entitled *Mujeres y floricultura: cambios y consecuencias en el hogar* (*Women and Floriculture: Changes and Consequences in the Home*) (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001). I refer to the former as the discussion paper and the latter as the Bank–CONAMU report. The discussion paper has more formal institutional weight than the report and was used to inform *Engendering Development*, the Bank's most important DC text on gender policy to date. However, the two documents can be usefully read alongside each other, because they illuminate different elements of the research. For example, Newman's discussion paper relied heavily on economic argument and statistics, while more space existed in the Bank–CONAMU report for incorporation of interview data.<sup>14</sup>

Methodologically, I supplemented analysis of these texts with interviews with Bank staff and consultants, NGOs campaigning on flowers and academics allied to their cause, and staff in CORPEI and ExpoFlores. Because I did not conduct interviews with women working in flowers, I limit my analysis of participants' responses to Bank gender lending to the remaining two chapters. Here I focus more on how participants' voices were manifest in published Bank documents and in staff debates about gender, intimacy, and flowers.

Specifically, I concentrate on the links made in these texts and interviews between work in flowers and changes in the sphere of sexual and intimate relations. I realize that this may appear a puzzling focus. The floriculture industry is more prominent in debates about workers' rights, child labor,<sup>15</sup> environmental standards,<sup>16</sup> and global commodity chains than in debates about sexuality, and, although flowers have been analyzed as globally salient symbols of romance, these links have been made at the consumer end. Moreover, while historians have examined how botany is connected to erotic representations of women and to colonialism and the imperative to control nature,<sup>17</sup> it is far from self-evident why flower *production* should be a

sexualized site. However, taking my lead from the Bank, I examine the claim that “floriculture has stimulated radical changes in gender roles” (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 12). I draw attention to four particularly salient claims about flower employment in this respect: that it enhances women’s sexual and intimate autonomy; that it makes women more attractive to men; that it strengthens families through giving wages to altruistic women who share money with loved ones; and that it domesticates men, making them more loving partners and more willing to share in unpaid household labor. I address these purported links between floriculture, gender, and sexuality in turn, explicating the Bank’s position and exploring some of the empirical messiness involved therein, before considering what this debate might reveal about masculinity, markets, and current GAD policy priorities more broadly.

### **Women’s Emancipation through Intimate Autonomy or Happy Couplehood?**

In some respects the Bank’s gender staff argue that women gain power in their intimate lives through work in flowers, a claim resting on standard neoclassical models of household bargaining whereby self-interested individuals navigate personal relationships using available resources to press for preferences. On this basis, employment empowers women because it gives them access to wages that improve their bargaining power in all realms, including the sexual. The Bank–CONAMU report repeatedly affirmed the link between “economic autonomy and changes in status” (Newman, Larreamendy, and Maldonado 2001, 40), or between earning money and increased self-esteem and power as women gained independence from families and husbands. This position is nicely articulated in the text box on women in the flower industry contained in the Bank’s 2004 poverty report on Ecuador; this concluded that “employment in the flower sector allowed women to view themselves, and their relationship with men, in a different light” (World Bank 2004e, 87). The Bank–CONAMU study included several quotations from workshop participants to reinforce this connection, such as, “a women who is earning money can now impose her conditions, because she has become a little more independent,” and “Now I earn money, and I give the orders, and I do what I want” (quoted in Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 41).

Working in a modern, export-oriented sector was understood to boost women’s autonomy more than generic wage work. The Bank–CONAMU

report claimed that women in non-flower regions were dependent on husbands to provide income; they participated in activities considered compatible with housework and child care (26); they accepted that their space was inside the home, that men bring in money, and that their movements should be approved by men; and “they could not imagine a life where they do not have total responsibility for their children” (61). In contrast, women working in flowers often went into the industry against family wishes because their labor breaks traditional norms regarding women’s position in the home (32).<sup>18</sup> One female greenhouse worker was quoted as saying: “He [her husband] told me no, but the decision was mine” (31). The experience of working in the industry was also framed as a liberatory one; women came to see themselves as having the same labor rights as men and as being equal workers (40–41), and they formed NGOs to demand better equipment, better wages, uniforms, and so on.<sup>19</sup>

The implications of this increased bargaining power—one resting both on access to wages and on participation in a nontraditional, export industry—were clearly understood to extend to sexuality. The report claimed that women in the flower region were more likely to demand respect from men, by which they meant the right to have sex when they wanted to rather than as an obligation (40). These women were also identified as having more control over contraception and fertility (81), as being more likely to confront traditionally sexist behavior, and as refusing to tolerate violence (83).

Put bluntly, the evidence for many of these claims linking economic to erotic autonomy is far from conclusive. For example, the Bank–CONAMU report stated that women in the flower regions were less likely to tolerate violence “at least in principle” (83), because they had no evidence linking wage earning to lower abuse. In contrast, the research found considerable evidence that women employed in flowers did not consider their work empowering. The women of Tabacundo—a flower region—complained that men did not treat them with respect even though they earned money, that work had not increased their prestige, and that there were cases in which men had forced women to work in flowers (Newman, Larreamendy, and Maldonado 2001, 42). Workers also voiced concerns about sexual harassment (28). None of these findings received elaboration in the report. When asked to list the most negative aspects of working in floriculture, both men and women foregrounded the work with dangerous chemicals (34), the uncomfortable and painful nature of the

job, and the fact that it was bad for family life. Women put more emphasis on the long hours, whereas men highlighted the low salaries (34), but both feared the impact of the work on their health (72–73). None of this information was made central to the Bank's discussion paper.

These data confusions aside, however, what is most interesting about the Bank's comments on flower employment leading to intimate autonomy is their contested status. Were the Bank an unambiguously neoclassical institution, conversation about sexuality would be dominated by the claim that paid work leads to individual erotic empowerment. However, that claim is a partial one, existing in unresolved conflict with a parallel but contradictory discourse regarding the positive effects of the industry in generating loving partnerships and happy families. In part, this latter argument is a response to the fact that flower production is commonly associated with a range of negative sexual-social consequences in the region, including drugs, gangs, family problems, and brothels (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 30). Women employed in flowers are often locally viewed as sexually promiscuous, given the mixed labor force in the plantations, leading to assertions that the industry is no place for women "of good manners" (31) (respectable women, in other words). Likewise, plantations are seen by many as a cause of divorce and separation, facilitating affairs that destroy marriages (43)—an ironic contrast with how roses, especially, are viewed by the people who purchase them in the global North. Mothers are also seen as overburdened with work, such that their ability to properly raise their children is compromised (60). In these ways flower employment is understood to undermine normative family formations and sexual moralities, by granting women excessive autonomy. This argument is linked to broader discourses that women's labor force participation will lead to destroyed families, abandoned children, and ruined societies — discourses that many feminists criticize, whatever their position on export industries (Haurie Ibarlucía and Sanchís 1990, 74).

Bank gender staff have a complex relationship to these debates. They unambiguously support women's right to work, and in this respect counter some conservative critics of floriculture who endorse almost hysterical visions of imminent social collapse stemming from women's employment. I never heard from a Bank employee that employment in flowers caused abortions, that the industry was destroying the family, or that work in it caused women to throw their children in the rubbish—those comments were limited to (some)

critics of the industry. Moreover, the Bank–CONAMU report was concerned with disproving the belief that there is more family breakdown in flower regions, showing that separation rates are the same for both areas (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 44).

That said, however, concerns about family breakdown certainly caused unease among Bank gender staff, such that policymakers offered two counter-discourses: (1) that the flower industry stimulates partnerships because women who work in it are attractive to men in the community and (2) that it keeps families together. In a one-page discussion, the Bank–CONAMU report (with less formal institutional weight than Newman's discussion paper) claimed that women working in flowers became more attractive to men because they mixed family love and independent wage earning. It argued that young men in the flower region "have higher esteem for women who work for money [and] contribute to the house," and that they like "the appeal of having a stronger and more independent woman" (79). Men are thus enthusiastic to court such female workers (79). These comments clearly reinforce the sense that the autonomy on offer to women in floriculture is one that relies on, and reproduces, their commitment to male partners and hereby shores up normative intimate relations.

Yet far more central to the Bank's GAD conversation about flowers is the argument that the industry keeps existing families together. This argument rests partly on the claim that floriculture reduces male out-migration and enables poor people from other regions to move with their families intact (Newman, Larreamendy, and Maldonado 2001, 16).<sup>20</sup> Moreover, floriculture is understood to help families for the same reason that any industry employing women helps families—because women, always-already connected to those families, will act altruistically to maintain them when they have access to wages. Herein lies the core tension in the Bank's vision of empowerment through employment: on one hand regarding women as self-interested autonomous actors enabled through wages to pursue their own erotic destinies, and on the other regarding them as necessarily attached, by enduring love, to specific others with whom they will altruistically share their income. The latter rests on an image of women as responsible and caring (M. León 2005, 81–82; Molyneux 2006), and their autonomy is imagined within a couple rather than as embodied by a "masculinist" rational actor with no ties to dependents, in a perfect illustration of Wendy Brown's point that "women's right to be an individual is curtailed by her identification with the family" (Brown 1995,

160). Thus the Bank–CONAMU report noted that women’s wage earning in flowers has improved food availability and altered family spending habits, with more resources devoted to house repair, education, saving, and investing for the future (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 76). Similarly, the study claimed that in Cayambe (a flower region) family planning “is a shared and consensual decision” (70). Assertions of women’s increased power to control their fertility and to have sex when they want to hereby morphed into conflict-free assumptions regarding shared male-female decisions about intimacy. Incompatible preferences disappeared, replaced by a notion of harmonious complementarity.

To make this argument, researchers had to underplay conflict in the home, a key consequence of women’s work in flowers identified by many respondents. The Bank–CONAMU study included more references to conflict than the discussion paper, acknowledging, for example, that marital discord could result from “the rapid change of relative power in the home” (Newman, Larreamendy, and Maldonado 2001, 78), and that the industry could cause family strife through its long hours during peak demand periods (11, 28). However, these conflicts were subsequently minimized. The study argued that, although most family members were opposed to women’s work in the industry, “once they were working, the family discovered the importance of their economic contribution” (29) and became supportive. The family benefited from the increased resources while women achieved more independence, and used it to support their loved ones (81); in essence everyone won. The chapter devoted to the effects of wages on women’s status and the family included only one quotation from a workshop participant relating to the negative effects of the industry; eight were included for positive effects. The finding that more money was spent on clothes and desirable personal items for women in the flower region received no elaboration.

Moreover, the claim that floriculture strengthens families rests on a naturalization of the nuclear unit, one that is hard to sustain in this case. As Tanya Korovkin notes in her study of the same region, single mothers and extended families are common in the flower sector (Korovkin 2003b, np).<sup>21</sup> Her time-use surveys found that women working in flowers did not have to cope with an intense double day in terms of reproductive tasks because they relied on extended family ties (Korovkin 2003a, 28). In this arrangement, some women work

for pay, others cook for the family, others provide child care, and so on (Korovkin 2003a, 29; see also Talcott 2003).

However, unmarried women, extended families, and reciprocal bonds forged by women to facilitate labor in flowers receive no coverage in the Bank reports. Instead, the Bank wrongly assumed that all women in the industry are married. Consider, for example, Newman's claim that

married women's participation in paid labor has risen rapidly around the world, especially in export niches like that of Ecuadorian flowers. In Ecuador, the flower industry is only ten years old. Before it developed, women in these same rural areas had little if any paid employment. (Newman 2001, 3)

This slippage between married women and women in general helps the argument that employment empowers women, because Newman's research found that while men are paid more than women in flowers, married women earn more than married men. But the slippage is empirically suspect, and it may conceal a key effect of floriculture employment on intimate relations—that it stops women from marrying. The Bank's own research showed that floriculture regions are home to disproportionately high numbers of single people and female-headed households. Marriage rates are lower in the flower region, in part due to the generally younger age of the population, but, as the Bank–CONAMU study recognized, “marriage rates are even lower for women who work in flowers. In addition there are more single women in Cayambe, and more working in flowers” (Newman, Larreamendy, and Maldonado 2001, 19). Neither study asked why.

Space is hereby curtailed for examination of floriculture's more complex effects on gender and sexuality—on how it may help generate divorced women, single mothers, and women who orient their erotic desires otherwise. Considerable research points to the varied and contested effects of women's employment on their intimate attachments in this respect, confirming that global capitalism can reshape family bonds and individual expressions of sexuality in complex ways (D'Emilio 1983; Wilson 2004; Mills 2005; Weismantel 2001; Padilla et al. 2007). Much of this research highlights the limitations of analyses that posit women workers as passive victims. For example, Heidi Tinsman notes that Chilean women employed in the fruit export industry had less reason to endure the inequalities of the “patriarchal

pact” in the family; in the region she studied, female-headed households increased from 3 percent of all households in 1970 to 33 percent in 1986, despite fierce rhetoric from the military government glorifying family values (in French and James 1997, 13). Mary Weismantel’s ethnography of market women in Cuenca, Ecuador, concludes that:

On the whole, vendors are more likely than other women to terminate relationships that are abusive, to seek transitory rather than permanent alliances, or to insist upon more egalitarian relationships with husbands and lovers. Furthermore, the market enables women to reject heterosexual partnerships with men completely. (2001, 68)

Similarly, in an analysis of structural adjustment and the marriage market in the Dominican Republic, Helen Safa argues that employment in free trade zones has led working women to assume more control over the family budget and over their own intimate choices. Young women often get sterilized and are increasingly ending relationships they find unsatisfactory, and women in female-headed households often resist marriage, preferring to support themselves if they can not find a good provider (Safa 1999, 300; see also Chant 2006). Although these authors are careful not to frame these examples as success stories of women’s empowerment, given impoverishment and poor working conditions, Safa is clear that “patriarchal authority is declining as the man’s role as sole or principal breadwinner weakens through these changes in the gender composition of the labor force” (Safa 1999, 299).

Other researchers are unequivocally supportive of export industries, in ways one would expect to see in Bank work as well. For example, Greta Friedemann-Sánchez’s highly positive account of the empowering effect of flower employment on Colombian gender relations celebrates the fact that women use their wages “to avoid the dependence and submission that marriage represents to them” (2006, 59). She interviewed women who used flower wages to leave abusive men, to raise children alone, and to enjoy sex with men without having to do the work of looking after them that cohabiting would entail (158–159). This neoclassical analysis is unapologetically complicit in promoting export-led growth strategies reliant on cheap female labor in the name of empowerment (Barker 2005, 2202), but its sexuality politics are at least solidly libertarian as well—a refreshing moment of consistency in a debate littered with references to the imminent destruction of “the family” through women’s work.

Bank staff, of course, can not celebrate *these* types of intimate rearrangements. In the Bank's imagination, women in flowers are altruistic lynchpins of family stability and survival. They are also, contradictorily, autonomous actors who gain power over their relationship choices through wages, but the bounds within which celebration of that autonomy plays out are heavily circumscribed. It certainly does not extend to cheerleading the industry's apparent effects in reducing marriage rates or increasing numbers of female-headed households. This tension is indicative of a deep unease within the Bank that the market may undermine normative relationships, one that prohibits positive recognition of women's decision to remain single. This is not to assert that the flower industry *is* a site for women's erotic empowerment; my research did not address this question. It is rather to note that the Bank's conversations about the issue take place within limited contours, wherein the libertarian celebration of trade liberalization is reworked when normative intimate attachments appear to be deregulating.

### **Flowers and the Market Generation of Modern Masculinity**

Aforementioned institutional constraints instead lead Bank research on flowers to celebrate a very different facet of the industry's gendered impact: its ability to generate more loving men. Bank gender staff foregrounded men in their work on flowers, arguing that "the presence of flower employment opportunities has had more of an impact on men than on women" (Newman 2001, 22). Specifically, they argue that the flower industry has increased the involvement of men in housework, and that it hereby offers a solution to tensions between paid and unpaid labor. In fact, this was the most important finding of Newman's research, emphasized in the opening summary, the abstract, and the overview of the report provided by the Bank in publication materials (Newman 2001, np—abstract; see also Newman 2002, 375). For example, the first finding mentioned in the conclusion to the discussion paper was as follows:

The most compelling evidence of the industry's impact [on gender relations] is on married men's increased participation in housework. Married men in the treatment group [the flower region] spend double the time in housework, and this is clearly related to women's increased participation in the labor force. (Newman 2001, 24)

Specifically, the study found that men with working wives in the non-flower region worked thirty-two minutes a day in housework, whereas men with working wives in the flower region worked an hour (12). Moreover,

Married male household heads who work in flowers do more housework than married male household heads who work in other sectors, 69 compared to 47 minutes . . . Married and working male household heads do the most housework of any group of men when they work in flowers and their wives do too, 77 minutes. When men work in flowers and their wives work in another sector or not at all, their time in housework goes down to 36 minutes. Overall, these data suggest that participation of either one or both of the spouses in flower employment increases men's time in housework significantly more so than work in other sectors of the economy. (12–13; emphasis added)

The CONAMU–Bank report repeated all of the above figures. It also included quotations from workshop participants stating that men help more in flower regions to wash clothes, to care for children, and so on; that young children in flower regions do not consider domestic labor women's work because they see their fathers doing it (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 58); and that social norms defining men as family providers have been changed by women's employment, leading women to question their home obligations and leading men to start to share, "little by little," in domestic work (82–83). In these ways Bank staff assert that floriculture helps generate responsible men and new types of partnership involving dual-worker, dual-caregiver couples.

Once again, conflict is generally ignored in these discussions. For example, the Newman study found that *men's* beliefs about women's ideal roles in the home played a role in determining *their* time and *their* participation in housework, but "for women expressing the belief that their role is to stay home, there is no significant effect on participation or on shares of housework" (2001, 19). This suggests either that women have no choice about their time use because economic need forces them to take jobs they do not want (an explanation that contradicts the Bank's insistence that employment is empowering), or that men and women are in unequal power relationships wherein desires and beliefs are not mutually respected. However, the finding receives no explanation. Instead, the insistence that men will adapt with equanimity to

women's increased empowerment through labor and that loving partnership in the household will successfully resolve the social reproduction dilemma endures.

This approach understands shifts in gender roles and in normative forms of couplehood wherein men share caring work to be a result of modernization and the market. As in the Bank's broader GAD conversations, poor world countries are framed as more sexist than rich world ones, because market integration is understood to promote more egalitarian gender relations (Newman 2001, 3). In particular, men in poor countries are understood to contribute less to domestic labor than men in richer nations (Newman 2001, 10; see also Newman, Larreamendy, and Maldonado 2001, 52), and poor men within all countries are framed as more sexist than their better-off brothers. This is a key reason why involvement in floriculture is understood to generate such welcome changes in intimate attachments: because it offers poor women jobs and hereby alters the attitudes and familial behaviors of poor men, a group already seen by Bank gender staff as in particular need of change. Although the men and women who work in flowers are, as one Bank employee emphasized, hardly the poorest of the poor from the *páramo* (the Andean mountain ecosystem, considered barren by mestizos), they are nonetheless seen to be afflicted by the same problems that many development professionals attribute to rural people, indigenous people, and the poor. I was repeatedly told—by Bank and non-Bank flower experts—that flowers had a positive gender impact in the region by giving money to women, crucial because men there drank their money rather than investing it lovingly in the family. As one floriculture specialist put it:

What is interesting is the subject of gender, how when the woman receives the salary she shares it with the family, because another problem in the lower classes is that when the man receives it he simply wants to get himself drunk, going drinking.

Such conversations are further evidence of Gioconda Herrera's observation that gender and development interventions can be deployed as part of a civilizing discourse in Ecuador, wherein the modernizing influence of the state and market is required to modify the backward values of poor, rural men and women (2001a, 87).

Given these claims about poor men as particularly sexist, it is worth briefly noting that the Bank's research on flowers found men in

better-off families did *less* housework (Newman 2001, 21). Likewise, the report found that

single men in the control group [the non-flower region] do more housework on average than single men in the treatment group [the flower region], so the average housework for men as a whole is slightly lower in the treatment than in the control. This is probably due to the fewer job opportunities in the control group. (14)

Unemployed men were *more* likely to participate in domestic labor here, a finding that received no elaboration.

The empirical messiness of the research project notwithstanding, I wish to focus here on the insights that these discussions about men provide into the perceived connections between masculinity, markets, and intimacies in the Bank's imaginary. The organization's work on flowers involved a series of negative assumptions about backward masculinities being linked to levels of development, ones central to the argument that floriculture would help produce more caring men through modernizing their attachments to their families. These assumptions have a long history in the region, with a range of political actors attempting to spur national development by reforming poor men. For example, the Bank's current policy priorities have clear parallels with Karin Roseblatt's research on the efforts of Chilean popular front organizations to eradicate immoderate drinking among working class men in the 1930s and 1940s. In that context, alcoholism was linked to abuse, improper spending, bad work habits, men failing in their role to provide for their families, and poor fatherhood, with invocation of a eugenicist attempt to better the Chilean "race" and enhance national development by regulating men's drinking (Roseblatt 2000a, 273; see also 2000b, 4). Similarly, Heidi Tinsman argues that the rebuilding of rural society under Eduardo Frei involved an effort to reconstitute campesino masculinity, to transform men from servile laborers into productive breadwinners and responsible family members who symbolized national modernity (2000, 4, 85). This imperative of uplift was linked to the perceived moral backwardness and brutish machismo of rural men, reflective of an upper- and middle-class idea that the rural poor were a primitive, racially inferior class "whose lack of morality and rationality put them on the margins of civilized society" (55). In contrast, state-supported efforts to build appropriate

manliness rested on appeals to the civilized, modern family, one in which the “ideal of gender mutualism—the harmonious conception between men and women” was central (128).<sup>22</sup>

Export industries occupy a central place in these debates, arriving with the most modern technology and the most modern ideas about production relations, in all their forms. As Steve Striffler’s account of United Fruit’s plantation on the Ecuadorian coast powerfully demonstrates, “From the very beginning, United Fruit equated a stable and disciplined labor force with a married one. The nuclear family, as sustained and supported by the company, was a form of labor control” (Striffler 2002, 45). United Fruit preferred married male employees, having learned its lesson from pre-1945 Central American plantations that were staffed by single men and were associated with violence, drunkenness, prostitution, and labor unrest (48). The company also bolstered women’s claims on their husband’s wages, homes, and benefits—a man could not get a house without a wife, and he then needed a wife to keep it to the high standard of cleanliness demanded by the company, as well as to secure food from the company store. “If a male worker did not maintain his family, he faced the possibility of losing his job or home; if he abused his wife or children, he was visited by the company police, company priest, or administration” (46). Male drinking and gambling were also strictly controlled (45), in a further effort to create family men with appropriately channeled desires.<sup>23</sup>

In the light of these analyses, the Bank’s conversations about flowers are both continuations of and departures from old debates. The focus on the “problem” of irresponsible men, the need to modernize rural masculinities, and the emphasis on domestic harmony as a basis for campesino empowerment (Tinsman 2000, 137) have numerous regional precedents, as does the sense that export industries are at the cutting edge of family reform. What has changed, clearly, is the model of normative intimate attachments. The breadwinner-housewife ideal is no longer dominant, no longer modern, and it has been replaced with a dual-earner, dual-caregiver model of the ideal family, reliant upon sharing partners integrated into both the productive and reproductive spheres of the economy. To reiterate, the partners are not *equally* integrated into such spheres—women’s altruistic love for dependents is still assumed to outweigh men’s. But nonetheless the resolution of tensions between paid and unpaid labor, between productive employment and family

survival, rests on the fact that floriculture is seen to produce sharing couples consisting of always-already altruistic women and newly domesticated men.

### **Another Best-Case Scenario?**

#### **Policy Recommendations from the Model Industry**

As I have suggested in previous chapters, this ideal is inflected with feminist debates in that it recognizes the importance of unpaid work and the dangers of overburdening women. Both studies on flowers recognized that social reproduction issues and time devoted to care work are legitimate concerns for economists interested in development; indeed this awareness structures Bank conversations about floriculture to a remarkable degree. However, the Bank's gender staff argue that social reproduction tensions have been successfully resolved in this site, because men have taken on extra domestic labor. The industry's role in stimulating men's move into the domestic realm is hereby the lynchpin on which its positioning as a model for gender equality rests.

It bears asking directly: what emancipatory potential does this model contain? In assessing the answer, it is helpful to recall the debates waged over the previous model. As Tinsman notes, the breadwinner-housewife version of gender harmony contested the most overt forms of campesino male dominance, legitimized state support for birth control, and offered a definition of masculinity that emphasized male responsibility (2000, 142). Many women supported this vision, as it validated their domestic work, created new spaces for family-based activism, and gave them grounds on which to oppose male violence (167–68). For Striffler, United Fruit's support for the breadwinner ideal resulted in wages that were up to four times higher than for agricultural labor in other parts of Ecuador (Striffler 2002, 48). Although women's economic dependence on men grew, because most women who moved to the plantation had worked for pay before (46), they got new grounds on which to demand services from employers. When the company withdrew its support for those services, women clashed with bosses to demand food, they organized communal kitchens, and they took over running schools (59). Similarly, as United Fruit cut jobs and reduced wages, men mobilized to protect the ideal of providing for their families, using this discourse as legitimation for their invasion of the plantation in 1962 (45). The nuclear family was thus *both* a form of labor control *and* a crucial source of resistance and solidarity (60, 45).

A glass half-full reading (Gibson-Graham 2006) of the Bank's work on flowers might highlight similar themes: that feminist work on caring labor is taken seriously; that men's need to change is acknowledged; and that reformulated visions of complementary, sharing couples will give women grounds on which to contest gender inequality. Consider, for example, the trajectory of ideal globalized masculinity traced by Lourdes Benería in 1999, from Chatham House man to Davos man. The former (the old-fashioned colonial British diplomat) gave way to the latter (the competitive individualist) as neoliberalism gained influence, but Benería suggests that recent crises in global capitalism may have brought Davos man to a turning point, with his selfish excesses increasingly contested (Benería 1999, 77). Is the Bank's flower study offering a new man to replace him—a post-Washington Consensus masculinity model that does the dishes and cleans the noses, and if so what is the problem?

To answer these questions, the policy recommendations that stem from the Bank's work on flowers need close attention. The empirical messiness of the research notwithstanding, the policy recommendations were unambiguous and focus on further trade liberalization and export promotion. Shifts in gender roles are framed as a result of the market, with changing time-use explained by the relatively higher wages for married women in the flower industry. The fact that married women earn more than married men in floriculture encourages men to divert activities to domestic labor, because "as their wives' paid labor becomes more valuable, the men shift some of their own relatively less valuable time into housework" (Newman 2001, 13). Thus, the conclusion to Newman's discussion paper asserted that:

In the analysis of outcomes in the two sample areas, we saw that employment in the flower industry itself—rather than simply in the treatment area—was linked to even higher levels of men's time in housework. This seems to be related to lower relative wage differences between men and women in the flower industry, though this is not tested directly. (24)

Thus tensions between paid and unpaid work do not actually require concrete policy solutions, because, once married women's labor time is made more valuable, their husbands will automatically pick up the slack resulting from women's move into employment. Although this little-by-little process is acknowledged to be very slow, the only mention of policy interventions to deal with the problem is located outside

the main text. In a footnoted reference to a study on domestic labor in Finland and Australia, Newman recognized that rich world gender differentials in housework are declining *so* slowly that “a complete renegotiation of the division of domestic labor is not realistic in the short term, and that public policies are needed to redress the gender imbalances” (Newman 2001, 3). No further discussion is provided. With conversation about public policy interventions hereby sidelined, responsibilities for caring labor are in effect reprivatized, and one is left with a vision of labor patterns shifting automatically due to changing patterns of profitability and productivity. The social reproduction dilemma is ultimately resolved—exceptionally slowly—by the market.

If we try to fill in the possible policy options erased from these discussions, we find the intervention most logically consistent with Newman’s analysis would be to ensure that married women are paid more than married men. However, one can confidently assert that this is a non-starter in the Bank, given its consistent objections to interventionist policies that differentiate labor rights based on gender. One is thus left, again, with child care, and hence I wish to briefly consider how this issue fared in the research project. Both reports devoted sporadic attention to child care and the importance of children in men’s and women’s labor market experiences. For example, a highlighted—but not particularly surprising—finding of Newman’s report was that the presence of children in the household significantly, and positively, influences the time men and women spent on domestic labor (Newman 2001, 20). Moreover, several women interviewed in the study mentioned the child care facilities offered by their employers, mainly to criticize them for their limited hours, and their comments were included in the Bank–CONAMU report.

There is also a long debate in floriculture over child care provision, with several scholars and activists recommending better services. For example, Tanya Korovkin’s research on Ecuadorian floriculture concluded that the prevailing practice of leaving children in the care of overburdened relatives creates a situation “bordering on child neglect” (2003a, 29) and that a good child care system was necessary to alleviate the problem (see also Korovkin 2003b, np). Nurseries are available in some plantations, often offered alongside benefits such as subsidized lunches, transport, and company sports clubs (Korovkin 2003a, 23; see also Friedemann-Sánchez 2006; Palán and Palán 1999), and the industry’s export association notes that 12 percent of flower companies have child care facilities (EXPOFLORES 1997, 3;

cited in Korovkin 2003b, np), a figure it is trying to raise. Indeed, the existence of nurseries is frequently cited as proof of the industry's benevolent effects and social responsibility. It was mentioned in every single interview I had regarding flowers and gender, without exception, by Bank staff, CORPEI staff, ExpoFlores staff, and NGOs critical of the industry. Child care services are also part of the industry's promotional materials. Consider, for example, Figure 7, from a leaflet in English and Spanish designed to promote "The Farms of Tabacundo" (a key flower region north of Quito where the Bank's research was conducted). The industry and all those involved in promoting and criticizing it thus recognize the provision of child care services by plantation owners to be an important issue related to women's labor force participation.

Moreover, the Bank's gender staff have previously addressed the issue of child care in floriculture. As Molly Talcott's study of the Colombian flower industry noted, women's labor there was linked to that of "community mothers" who provided informal child care in homes. Community mothers were paid a stipend as part of the Community Homes Program, funded by the Bank from 1990–1997 (Talcott 2003, 478) and mentioned in several formally cleared DC policy texts on gender in the 1990s (i.e., World Bank 1990, 27; World



Figure 7—A leaflet in English and Spanish designed to promote childcare services in the floriculture industry (Corporación de Floricultores de Tabacundo, nd).

Bank 1994, 48). Talcott analyzes the community mothers program as a new form of outsourcing that enables female employees to work up to thirteen hours a day; hence her claim that “embedded in the value of an export-quality flower lives the labor of community mothers” (479). The arrangement reproduces the poverty of the community mothers, classified as voluntary workers by the state and thus denied access to formal labor contracts, minimum wages, and legal protection. Talcott’s research demonstrates that connections between women’s employment in flowers and debates about child care are made in several countries, and that in some cases the Bank has funded informal child care provision. Hence, one would expect the issue to be addressed in the Bank’s Ecuadorian research on the industry.

However, the Bank’s researchers did not systematically collect (or at least did not publish) data on child care provision in plantations. There is no way to know whether women reporting more satisfaction with their employment were in plantations with good services; whether the industry’s claims that its nurseries are crucial to employee well-being are true; whether *this* factor helps explain the reduced hours of women in floriculture in domestic work. When the issue of childcare surfaced, as it did often in the Bank–CONAMU study (which included more of the qualitative data than Newman’s discussion paper), it was minimized. For example, information from the focus group interviews revealed that “one of the important changes stemming from the presence of the plantations has been the gradual acceptance of the search for strategies to substitute for mothers’ care for children” (Newman, Larreamendy, and Maldonado 2001, 59). Specifically, “We discovered that the women who work in flowers, because they can not do all their household tasks, have found various forms of reorganizing and distributing domestic work, including childcare” (57). Elsewhere the report found that:

One source of family conflicts is the inability to delegate childcare, or the inability to pay for this service. *This problem is one of the most important that women confront to be able to work in flowers.* (47; emphasis added)

Yet the remainder of this section focused on *alcohol* and its connections to conflict and violence. Moreover, the women interviewed identified the lack of nurseries as a problem and as a key reason why they delegate child care to older children or other female relatives (59). As the report acknowledged, “According to the greater part of the interviews,”

women claim that “although there are childcare facilities, given that these do not offer 8 hours of service, it is a better option to leave their children at home, paying for their care” (60). The consultants interpreted this information to argue that women prefer to pay relatives as a way to redistribute wages within the family and to ensure that children will be raised in line with family and cultural customs.<sup>24</sup>

Although one cannot prove any conclusive results regarding child care from the Bank’s data then, one can certainly recognize that the issue merited far more attention than it received in the study. Indeed, I would argue that the Bank’s work on flowers is an excellent—or egregious—example of the damaging effects that certain definitions of gender analysis can have on research priorities and policy advice within this organization. Tiny shifts in time devoted to household labor were dissected by gender staff in their celebration of the industry’s potential to restructure intimate attachments, while collective support for social reproduction labor was barely mentioned. Policy-makers hereby sacrificed an opportunity to push for increased child care services in an industry that is already open to the idea, that already accepts nursery provision as part of corporate responsibility, and in which women are demanding better services.

In the context of this broader project, I suggest that this failure is not an isolated, frustrating example of incomplete research but is reflective of the Bank’s current approach to gender analysis—one that encourages privatization, that reinforces necessary connections to the family, and that persistently sidelines public child care provision as a solution to social reproduction tensions. The caring labor dilemma is resolved here because it is heteronormalized onto the backs of men and women who are then framed by gender staff as liberated. This is, surely, alarming for all those committed to securing people’s rights to control their intimate lives. What, we can ask, happens to single people in this model? How are they to juggle paid and unpaid labor demands? What happens to those who choose non-normative intimate attachments? What happens when those *in* normative partnerships are widowed, divorced, abandoned, fired from their jobs, or abused? How can policymakers work to enhance women’s autonomy by enabling them to break coerced intimate attachments in this environment, one in which people’s survival is understood—by gender specialists—to be legitimately contingent on their adherence to a purportedly empowering model of heteronormative partnership? That floriculture may not actually produce the intimate rearrangements celebrated by these texts is in

many respects beside the point in this regard; the Bank's desire for this outcome is a troubling one that warrants contestation.

Bearing these concerns in mind, I would suggest that the potentially emancipatory elements of the Bank's new celebrations of loving masculinity, working women, and sharing couplehood are heavily circumscribed. Not only are there a very limited range of women's erotic choices open for celebration, but the model rests wholly on the market's positive gender impacts, and thus leaves little space for policy mobilization. There is, in effect, nothing to *do* here, other than to liberalize trade. There are no services to be provided, no new targets for demands to be created. The feminist *politics* has been severed from the feminist *economics*, in a neoclassical teleology of market liberation that offers few venues for intervention. With the state and the employer no longer the sites to be pressured by those demanding mediation of the work-care dilemma, one assumes that poor women are supposed to pressure poor men if the market does not work its complementarity-inducing magic. The grounds for mobilization using these scant resources seem, unfortunately, precarious indeed.

### **Conclusion: Tracing the Echoes of the Flower Study**

This chapter sought to explore the intersections between export promotion, gender, and sexuality in development by examining how World Bank gender staff understand the role of the Ecuadorian flower industry in the reformulation of normative intimacies. To reiterate, the Bank's vision of women's intimate emancipation through flower employment is a profoundly confused one. References to women going against family wishes, controlling their own fertility, and choosing their own erotic destinies exist in tension with a notion of women's autonomy resting on necessary attachments to specific intimate others. Straightforward neoclassical arguments about individual empowerment through wages are, overall, less prominent than arguments celebrating the role of floriculture in strengthening families, with women's love as the crucial conduit. However, Bank staff also link flowers to the market generation of modern masculinity whereby caring men are reattached to their families. Sharing couplehood is hereby valorized as the ideal solution to the crisis of caring labor provoked by women's entry into paid employment, a definition of success that is immune to data about diminishing marriage rates in the area.

Moreover, the neoclassical argument that floriculture restructures masculinity through wage differentials decenters discussions about pub-

lic policies and reinforces the reprivatization of caring work. Hence, the Bank's conversations about flowers do not recommend fatherhood promotion activities or workshops teaching men domestic skills, because those interventions are understood to be redundant. They recommend instead that women move to the flower region, so their men will work an extra twenty-eight minutes a day in the home, or best yet get themselves and their husbands jobs in flowers so their husbands will work eight minutes more than men in other employment. Once more, the Bank ignores the most obvious policy solution—child care—despite the attention given to it by the floriculture industry and its female employees. Getting men to share housework becomes more visible than getting employers to provide child care, in a profoundly inadequate solution to the tension between paid work and caring labor.

To close, I wish to briefly signal the broader relevance of this research on flowers, to show how it is being used in conversations about gender, development, exports, and trade liberalization. Newman's study has had considerable impact, in large part because its findings contest feminist criticisms of export employment. As the conclusion put it:

Women are not working more time per day in the flower area, dispelling a frequent criticism of agricultural export development which maintains that women are unduly burdened by the work in the industry. Women work much more than men, but this is apparently a result of their culturally-assigned housework responsibilities and not a result of the availability of employment for women. There may be other reasons to criticize the flower industry (such as in its environmental impacts), *but the gender impacts are arguably positive on balance given that the employment for women itself leads to cultural change. By extension, the trade liberalization policies that led to the growth in this employment should be recognized as an important component in the expansion of opportunities for women.* (Newman 2001, 25, emphasis added)

This argument, linking export growth to progressive gender change, is the one that has resonated outside the Bank, with the study being referenced by those who see in trade liberalization a source of women's empowerment through employment. For example, Newman's report is cited frequently in Greta Friedemann-Sánchez's study on the Colombian flower industry, one also aiming to "dispel the notion that export-oriented industries impose an extraordinary burden on

women” (2006, 52). Arguing that “the floriculture industry improves women’s lives through promoting gender equity” (5), Friedemann-Sánchez uses Newman’s data to argue that women’s work in flowers stimulated increases in men’s housework (162, 52, 54).

Similarly, consider how the study surfaced in *Engendering Development*, the Bank’s most important policy paper on gender to date. In a discussion of whether structural adjustment had hurt or benefited women, the report noted:

One study, of a low-income neighborhood in urban Guayaquil, Ecuador, concludes that cuts in government expenditures on public services forced mothers to increase their time on household and community care activities at the expense of leisure (Moser 1989). Daughters were similarly compelled to reallocate time, taking away from their schooling. The conclusion is that adjustment harmed women and girls. The second study, of the cut-flower industry in rural Ecuador, credits an adjustment-induced boom with expanding the demand for female labor, raising women’s incomes relative to men’s, and increasing women’s leisure time (Newman 2000). *Men in cut-flower producing areas increased their time in home maintenance and care activities compared with men in other areas. The study concludes that adjustment has benefited women.* (World Bank 2001a, 206; emphasis added)

Aside from confirming the centrality of Ecuador to the Bank’s gender policy conversations, this comparison makes the Bank’s preference for privatized solutions to the social reproduction dilemma, based on men loving better and women working harder, crystal clear. Adjustment is recognized as a problem if it overburdens women by withdrawing state support for social reproduction activities such that their workload increases. However, it benefits everyone if it gets women into work through the promotion of export-oriented agriculture and encourages men to step in and pick up the slack of caring labor. The flower study is hence being used internally and externally to bolster much broader arguments that adjustment benefits women by empowering them through work and by domesticating their men. This does not, by a long way, make it the David Dollar paper of the GAD staff,<sup>25</sup> but it does draw our attention back to the high visibility of certain research on gender and development, showing certain causal links between restructured markets and adjusted intimacies.

## CULTURES OF SAVING AND LOVING

### Ethnodevelopment, Gender, and Heteronormativity in PRODEPINE

Fetishizing community only makes us blind to the ways we might intervene in the enactment of domination and exploitation.

—MIRANDA JOSEPH, *Against the Romance of Community*

Indigenous people are different, and taking this into account means not imposing non-indigenous values.

—GEORGE PSACHAROPOULOS AND HARRY PATRINOS,  
*Indigenous People and Poverty in Latin America*

Between 1998 and 2004 the World Bank lent US \$25 million to the Ecuadorian government for PRODEPINE, a loan oriented to indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian communities. In this chapter I use PRODEPINE as a case study of how gender, sexuality, and race and ethnicity intertwine in a Bank-supported project, hereby aiming both to take gender and sexuality seriously in ethnodevelopment and to take ethnodevelopment critically as a heteronormative project. Put bluntly, sexuality saturates PRODEPINE. The loan is a site for mestiza feminist investment in an idealized, authentically indigenous sexual equality; a site for defense of male dominance read as gender complementarity; a site of fascination with unruly masculinity and native desires for polygamy; and a site of multiple, competing claims about indigenous respectability. I focus on three themes of particular interest in this regard: the framing of gender complementarity as part of the recovery of ethnic identity; the interventions undertaken to teach indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian women limited market rationality; and the efforts made to teach indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian men better loving. More simply, I examine how indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian rural women were understood to need socializing into a culture of savings and a market mentality in order that their incorporation into productive activity succeeded as an empowerment strategy. Meanwhile, men needed to be taught “family love” and

encouraged into monogamy so that they would pick up the slack of caring labor. The project invoked and reproduced a clear, racialized hierarchy in this respect, resting on the extent to which communities were seen to approximate ideals of sharing and exclusive partnership. Andean groups were praised for their allegedly harmonious gender relations, Amazonian communities were considered highly oppressive because of polygamy, and Afro-Ecuadorian men were criticized repeatedly for their perceived sexual promiscuity.

By devoting attention to the racialized problematics of GAD intervention evident in this loan and the sexualized distinctions made between more and less respectable manifestations of indigenous difference, I seek to examine both how the Bank's gender model gets translated into local context and how gender and sexuality shape debates about cultural authenticity. I do this in a project held up as a best practice example of participatory ethnodevelopment and gender mainstreaming within Ecuador and the LAC region more generally. To echo Amy Lind's crucial questions regarding Ecuadorian state feminism, I ask: who benefited from the acquisition of this institutional space, and which women (and men) were targeted as new constituents of development (2005, 20)? What were the gendered and sexualized terms of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian people's inclusion into development, and how was their difference understood in relation to gender and sexuality? And what might this tell us about post-Washington Consensus gender policy as it is articulated in intersection with race, ethnicity, and culture more broadly?

### **Development with Identity: Ethnodevelopment in Ecuador**

To the Bank, ethnodevelopment "builds on the positive qualities of indigenous cultures and societies—such as their sense of ethnic identity, close attachment to ancestral land, and capacity to mobilize labor, capital, and other resources for shared goals—to promote local employment and growth" (Uquillas and Larreamendy 2006, 25; see also van Nieuwkoop and Uquillas 2000). Although the organization's interest in ethnodevelopment preceded Wolfensohn's arrival,<sup>1</sup> it gained ground under his leadership as poverty eradication, social inclusion, and participatory approaches increased in importance post-1995. Ethnodevelopment subsequently became a key regional manifestation of the Bank's post-Washington Consensus commitments.

Specifically, for the Bank and others ethnodevelopment represented a significant shift from past attempts to facilitate Latin

American modernization—and to tackle indigenous poverty—by erasing cultural difference (Uquillas and Larreamendy 2006, 16; Davis and Partridge 1994, 38; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 1994). Under state policies of *mestizaje* (sometimes translated as “blending,” but involving a coerced Whitening process), European culture was explicitly positioned as superior, and assimilation was an antipoverty strategy. Development initiatives associated with this approach commonly framed indigenous groups as dirty, lazy, irrational, and backward. Progress hinged on turning them into mestizos, curing their perceived backwardness through exposure to Spanish-only schooling, education in hygiene and Western medicine, and introduction of chemically-intensive farming methods. Such measures led to a widespread sense that development agencies were “neocolonial and ethnocentric” (Healy 2001, xiii).<sup>2</sup> Indigenous communities have mobilized to contest this development vision, demanding bilingual education, incorporation of indigenous healers into health policy, farming and natural resource management policies that recognize and recuperate indigenous knowledges, and so on. In this way *mestizaje* has been challenged by emphases on multinationality, cultural difference, participation, and respect for tradition, alongside the need to tackle the entrenched poverty of indigenous communities.<sup>3</sup>

These trends are clear in Ecuador. Although categories of ethnic affiliation are contested and unstable there (Collins 2004, 39; Pallares 2002; Yashar 2005), with anywhere from 7 percent to 43 percent of the population classified as indigenous,<sup>4</sup> high levels of racialized poverty are undeniable. Indigenous poverty rates are around 86 percent, compared to 46 percent for the population in general (World Bank 2003f, 4), and, in some rural provinces dominated by indigenous people, the death rate is double the national average (Egüez Guevara 2005, 37). As the government summarized in a 2003 report for the Bank, “Indigenous and afro-Ecuadorian people have the worst living conditions, the lowest schooling levels with inappropriate educational systems, serious unemployment levels, minimal access to health services, and severe social and economic discrimination” (Government Implementation Completion Report in World Bank 2003f, 32). Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian people also experience daily overt racism, whereby mestizo bus drivers do not stop for indigenous people or where they are forced to travel on the floor; whereby clubs in Quito (including the “progressive” gay ones) deny entry to Black men, and whereby Black women are targeted for street harassment by mestizo men.<sup>5</sup>

The Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian People's Development Project (PRODEPINE) emerged out of this context of racialized inequality. Proposed in 1996 and closed in 2004, it was a joint project between the government of Ecuador, the Bank (which loaned half of the \$50 million project costs), and several umbrella organizations representing indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian communities. It was believed that those communities offered the potential for a new, decentralized, ethnically sensitive approach to development grounded in solidarity networks and cultural traditions that could be used productively as a resource for rural improvement. For the Bank,

The identifying vision of "ethno-development" challenged the conventional approach to the misconceived regional "indian problem." It was a ground-breaking attempt to use indigenous culture's positive qualities to promote local employment and growth . . . a unique opportunity to address local development issues in a completely new context. (World Bank 2003f, 13)

Specifically, the project was intended to alleviate indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian rural poverty, to strengthen local ethnic organizations, and to improve the capacity of the state's implementing agencies.<sup>6</sup> It was targeted on three populations: indigenous groups in the Sierran highlands, indigenous groups in the Amazon, and Afro-Ecuadorians on the coast. Rural investments were the largest component of the loan, taking up 53 percent of costs at appraisal. These small-scale subprojects required matching contributions from municipalities and communities, in the latter case usually through collective work projects known as *mingas*. Support was also given to scholarships, books giving "cultural profiles" on certain groups, cultural events, and capacity training for ethnically-affiliated organizations. The project reached around 815,000 indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian people in 180 second-tier organizations (Uquillas and Larreamendy 2006, 26)<sup>7</sup> with such activities.

PRODEPINE was run out of a national office in Quito and (in keeping with the post-Washington Consensus emphasis on decentralization, as well as with Ecuador's sharp sense of regional divisions<sup>8</sup>) seven regional offices. It employed seventy staff, fifteen of which were in Quito. I focused research in the capital, the Sierra, and the coast, where the loan was administered by professionals drawn from the state's indigenous development council, the education sector, and NGOs. They were a mix of mestiza, indigenous, and Afro-Ecuadorian people, some with decades of experience in indigenous development issues.

The Ecuadorian state was originally supportive of PRODEPINE due to pressures stemming from indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian mobilizations against neoliberal reform, poverty, and racism.<sup>9</sup> However, government support for the project faltered after the country's 1999–2000 economic crisis, and again after the 2001 coup. By the end, the counter-part funds provided by the state for PRODEPINE amounted to just 18 percent of those promised at appraisal (World Bank 2003f, 15). When I first visited in 2004, the accountant in one regional office was drafting legal letters to the state to get money for the electricity and water bill, and the office could not afford to buy disks on which to back up its records.

Given the waning support of the Gutiérrez administration, the Bank took a central role in PRODEPINE, and project staff repeatedly claimed that it—not the government—provided the most consistently supportive role.<sup>10</sup> Recognizing “the unconventional aspects of the project,” the Bank also “assigned the region’s most qualified staff and consultants, with an emphasis on social and anthropology skills” (World Bank 2003f, 13). These individuals were treated as highly respected insiders in PRODEPINE’s national office in Quito and were known by many small subprojects in the loan. Although it failed to secure government support for a follow-up project (Uquillas and Larreamendy 2006, 31), the Bank evaluated its role in PRODEPINE very positively—as “double A” according to one staff member.<sup>11</sup> It was the organization’s first foray into ethnodevelopment, and a project of which staff associated with social development concerns were very proud.<sup>12</sup> It was positioned as an example of the Bank’s LAC commitment to build pro-poor forms of social and human capital and operationalize community participation (Uquillas 2004, 53) and as “a case study of Anthropology in Action” (Uquillas and Larreamendy 2006, 24). It was mentioned in Ecuador’s 2003 CAS as evidence that the Bank was responding to civil society recommendations and “[taking] into account cultural values tied to ancestral traditions that may differ from those of the majority population” (World Bank 2003b, 30). PRODEPINE was also featured in a recent Washington DC publication, *Faces of Inclusion*, as evidence of the Bank’s commitment to participatory social development (World Bank nd).<sup>13</sup>

Other commentators have been far less enthusiastic about the loan and the broader ethnodevelopment project of which it is a part. Several critics consider PRODEPINE proof that ethnodevelopment represents “an adapted neoliberal social development policy model” (Radcliffe,

Laurie and Andolina 2003, 388), epitomizing the sort of localizing antipoverty interventions that draw on community labor to camouflage state withdrawal (Tom Morton, cited in Gibson-Graham 2006, 85). One opponent of PRODEPINE—a member of a left-leaning NGO with thirty years of experience defending the rights of indigenous groups in the Sierra and Amazon—argued that the project had diverted protest into bureaucracy and led to groups being co-opted by the state through a technocratic vision of development as service provision. This view that was also reflected in the Bank praise for the loan's success in “[convert]ing a general protest mentality within the target groups to genuine concern for development” (World Bank 2003f, 10).<sup>14</sup>

The project has also been analyzed as proof that ethnodevelopment offers limited cultural recognition while promoting economic policies that deepen indigenous structural poverty. For example, James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer use PRODEPINE to argue that NGOs and community-based organizations are “a Trojan horse for global neoliberalism” (2005, 4), being used by international financial institutions to douse revolutionary ferment in the countryside (9). In their account, the Ecuadorian government and the Bank used PRODEPINE to encourage class-based organizations demanding land reform to turn toward a less threatening focus on gender equality, environmental protection, and the valorization of ethnic identity (163–167), hereby dividing the indigenous movement and diverting energy away from “confrontation with the power structure and substantive social change” (228). Likewise, Víctor Bretón (2007) argues that the project deepened divisions within indigenous groups and between them and other campesinos, while diluting the radical politics of the indigenous movement.

Finally, PRODEPINE has been critiqued by those interested in debates about cultural authenticity and “representativity” in indigenous politics (Lucero 2006, 33). As Charles Hale has noted, intense attention is now focused by dominant groups on marking the boundaries between appropriate and inappropriate indigenities as part of what he and others call the global shift to neoliberal multiculturalism (Hale 2006, 11; see also Bretón 2007). As he puts it when writing of ladinos in Guatemala:

We respect indigenous culture, they regularly proclaim, but we must draw a distinction between healthy, forward-looking cultural difference, and its destructive or dysfunctional counterpart . . . Suddenly, the move to empowerment and equality has become highly conditional: as if to say, “We respect cultural difference, but within limits.” (Hale 2006, 31)

Hence:

Governance takes place not through the distinction between forward-looking ladinos and backward Indians, but rather between authorized and prohibited ways of being Indian . . . The authorized Indian has passed the test of modernity, substituted “proposal” for “protest,” and has learned to be both authentic and fully conversant with the dominant milieu. Its Other is unruly, vindictive, and prone to conflict . . . Governance proceeds by proactively rewarding the authorized Indian, while condemning its Other to the racialized spaces of poverty and social exclusion. (220)

PRODEPINE—and ethnodevelopment interventions more broadly—are understood in these terms to function as the reward.

I focus, though, on what PRODEPINE tells us about gender. This is not because I am uninterested in how the project functions as an adapted neoliberal social development policy model, in distinctions between authorized and unauthorized cultures, or in the relationship between projects of recognition and redistribution. I want to examine the role that gender and sexuality play in those models, distinctions, and projects—and PRODEPINE is a good site for this examination. Although few analyses of ethnodevelopment have taken gender as a central category of analysis, the key exception—the research by Sarah Radcliffe, Nina Laurie, and Robert Andolina—takes PRODEPINE as its main case study. As they summarize, in general “ethnodevelopment has not grappled with gender difference within indigenous populations and hence has had only patchy benefits for indigenous women” (Radcliffe, Laurie and Andolina 2003, 403). Consequently, many ethnodevelopment projects rely on—and reinforce—women’s role as the key defenders and transmitters of cultural values (395).<sup>15</sup> Likewise, literature on the indigenous movement has often been blind to the gendered aspects of the struggle and to women’s participation therein (Prieto et al. 2005, 156). However, staff involved in PRODEPINE aimed to change this, recognizing, as one employee put it, that the project was “very gender biased” at the start and insisting on increased attention to gender in the midterm review. They were supported in this by local activists and development agencies, in a context of increased mobilization by indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian women.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, they were supported by the LAC Gender Unit, which had already secured space for gender entrepreneurship through the

PROGENIAL initiative to help projects incorporate a gender focus (see chapters 2 and 3). PROGENIAL received a US \$232,100 technical assistance grant from the Japanese government to fund gender activities in PRODEPINE, used to establish gender-disaggregated development indicators, develop annual operational plans with a gender perspective, and prepare and deliver gender capacity-building activities for indigenous leaders and project staff (World Bank 2000g, 2). More concretely, the money funded activities such as workshops, case studies of gender roles in indigenous communities, and a study of the impact of a microlending initiative directed at women. A “consultant on cultural heritage and gender” was also appointed in Quito,<sup>17</sup> and later the project hired a consultant on Afro-Ecuadorian gender issues using the grant.

This collaboration was largely judged to have been successful, as providing “a model for the construction of capacity-building in gender in the Bank” (World Bank 2000g, 6).<sup>18</sup> The proportion of women granted scholarships through PRODEPINE increased,<sup>19</sup> and a range of organizations debated how to increase their number of female leaders. PRODEPINE also produced a video on ethnodevelopment and gender equity and a large amount of written work on gender.<sup>20</sup> Gender was integrated from the start into planning for phase 2, using the approach pioneered in phase 1.<sup>21</sup> In short, the gender activities carried out in this loan—itsself a best practice example for project lending—were understood to have worked (Törnqvist 2004). Thus assessing them critically is important, given that they are likely to be replicated in other Bank interventions.

### **“Understanding the Unity of the Genders”:**

#### **Gender Analysis as Encouraging Authentic Complementarity**

Not surprisingly the definition of good gender analysis used in PRODEPINE rested on ideas of empowering, harmonious complementarity, wherein wholeness was to be achieved through gender partnerships, spheres were to be linked, anatomies were to fit together naturally, and parts of the self were to be made complete. In one of the first gender workshops organized by PRODEPINE in 2000, the head of the Bank’s gender initiatives in Ecuador stated that, while men and women had different roles, each was of equal value and complemented the other (Velásquez 2000, np). The 2001 document prepared to provide PRODEPINE staff with an

overview of gender and a regional history of gender analysis claimed that

decades of work have shown that work for and by women does not solve problems of inequity that affect men as much as women. A focus on gender attempts to avoid unilateral development interventions, to consider men as well as women as actors and beneficiaries of projects. (PRODEPINE 2001a, 2)

Similarly, a 2002 report on participatory gender planning in PRODEPINE insisted that “men and women must participate equally” (Aulestia 2002, 40). It criticized development plans that included gender but ignored men and recommended better training to reduce “the prejudice of considering gender as a problem of women” (14). A gender workshop in the Amazon asserted simply that “men and women must share the same ideals, in order to progress with the project” (Aulestia and Quintero-Andrade 2001, 7). It framed gender roles as impeding both men and women from expressing liberty as human beings: “From men [they take] the right to cry, and from women the right to participate in public life.” “Understanding of the unity of the genders” was needed to overcome such limitations.

The definition of GAD as focused on loving, sharing partnerships was particularly central to a booklet on sex education for indigenous adolescents produced by PRODEPINE (Conejo 2002–2003). The booklet used a biological two-sex model, with multiple diagrams of male and female bodies, and teenagers were taught about hygiene and genital cleanliness.<sup>22</sup> Within this approach, however, a complementary model of gender relations was endorsed in which responsible sexuality was particularly important. Walking a difficult line between representing heterosexuality as biological destiny and attempting to stop young people with apparently “ready” bodies having intercourse, the booklet advised adolescents that biological readiness does not equate with psychological or social readiness and that teenagers should complete their studies “and get a job that assures them stability before having children” (31). Each chapter opened with a quotation from the Lacanian psychoanalytic theorist Françoise Dolto, and many of these waxed lyrical about love and its ability to unite men and women. For example, the chapter on sexually transmitted diseases opened with the claim: “What happens in a relationship of authentic love is mysterious and incommunicable” (37). The chapter on family planning began: “True love is one of the most powerful forces that exists, stronger than time,

death, or law. It is found identically in all places and all times” (46). The continuation of the human species depended on the male-female unity brought about by this love; consequently, adolescents must take care of their bodies to prevent sterility, with boys protecting their testicles when playing sports (29). There was one mention of homosexuality, in relation to how to catch AIDS (Figure 8); the “extra” male floating dangerously about the diagram made it clear that this condition was not understood to apply to women.

# SIDA

(Síndrome de Inmuno Deficiencia Adquirida)

## Contagio del SIDA




Figure 8—HIV/AIDS Awareness in Indigenous Sex Education, PRODEPINE. (Conejo 2002/3, 44).

Although monogamous love was identified as universal here, discourses of sharing and male inclusion were also crucially framed as culturally authentic, reflecting indigenous principles of reciprocity, complementarity, and balance. Indigenous feminist activists have made frequent reference to these principles (Vásquez Arcón 2005; Ana María Guacho in Prieto et al. 2005, 182), as have some male indigenous leaders<sup>23</sup> and external researchers.<sup>24</sup> For example, Sarah Hamilton's research on an Andean community, described in her book *The Two Headed Household*, found an "extraordinary degree of economic, social, and political gender-egalitarianism" (1998, 8) in which husbands and wives "learned (or are learning) to capitalize on one another's strengths and to compensate for one another's weaknesses in matters of economic survival" (76).<sup>25</sup>

I do not seek to intervene in the complex debate about these discourses, although I note along with many others that they can be both sites for struggle and sites for strategy.<sup>26</sup> Charles Hale relays a wonderful experience in which he and two Maya friends "laughed until our stomachs hurt" about a leading married Maya intellectual explaining sincerely to a Scandinavian journalist that "in Maya culture there is no adultery" while carrying on an affair with his secretary (Hale 2006, 43). My own (slightly less amusing) version involved being sexually propositioned by a married mestizo man who had spent the previous hour on tape explaining how PRODEPINE has taught him that gender complementarity—defined as loving monogamous partnership—was a crucial feature of development work. Rather than focus on these debates, however, I wish to simply register the way in which complementarity and family harmony were positioned as markers of indigeneity within PRODEPINE's gender initiatives. Family-based solidarity was marked from the start as a distinctive feature of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian communities, part of the "rich cultural heritage" (Government Implementation Completion Report in World Bank 2003f, 33) that PRODEPINE sought to protect and use as a basis for rural development. Bank gender staff wrote that one of the aims of PRODEPINE's gender workshops was "to recuperate the principles of 'equality' 'duality' [and] 'harmony' of Andean culture and to enact development with identity" (Hernández nd, 2). Likewise, the letter sent by the head of PROGENIAL to PRODEPINE's gender consultant in January 2002, as PROGENIAL was closing, ended by stating, "In all we are sure that a focus on gender will contribute to a restoration of the identity of peoples and nationalities, and the rescue of men's

and women's knowledges, practices and spheres, without which it is impossible to successfully strengthen bonds of duality and complementarity.<sup>27</sup> In short, then, one of the key manifestations of indigenious people's difference was understood to be their strong commitment to partnership, and hence ethnodevelopment involved the promotion of apparently "authentic" traditions of sharing complementarity. As I seek to demonstrate in the remainder of this chapter, however, these appeals had different implications for men and women and for the different communities involved in the loan; close attention to their gendered and racialized dynamics is thus critical.

### **The Attempt to Inculcate Limited Rationality in Loving Women: Ethnicity, Gender, and Market Mentalities**

First, PRODEPINE involved an explicitly racialized effort to increase women's rationality as workers, although in limited ways. Getting women into paid work was a core objective of the project's gender activities, and several staff claimed that giving women access to income through engaging them in productive activity empowered them.<sup>28</sup> However, women were still understood to be necessarily and altruistically linked to the people they loved in this model of changed gender relations.<sup>29</sup> This trope was particularly evident in the microcredit program *Cajas Solidarias*, the emblematic "women's project" to which I was always directed when I told people I was researching gender in the loan.<sup>30</sup> This program offered small loans to members—98 percent of whom were women—for productive projects intended to increase efficiency and empower people through access to work, income, and work-related responsibility.<sup>31</sup> A key aim of the program was to improve family well-being, based on the assumption that women would share the benefits they gained through productive activity with those they loved. One evaluation stated that the initiative aimed "to promote family and communal integration, strengthening solidarity and self-help" (Guaman 2003, 5), with no concern that self-help and family integration may clash. In this respect, the loan's gender activities rested on a tension-ridden definition of empowerment for women as autonomy with necessary attachment, a theme also evident in the flower study and symptomatic of how microcredit interventions can rely on the naturalization of women's normative roles.<sup>32</sup>

However, the *Cajas Solidarias* initiative was also linked to a conversation within PRODEPINE about the need to introduce market

mentalities to ethnically marginalized groups.<sup>33</sup> As Marisol de la Cadena argues, the process of *mestizaje* still involves ideas of “learning to work” (1995, 340), and Bank and PRODEPINE staff made frequent references to teaching market, administrative, and business culture to indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian communities (van Nieuwkoop and Uquillas 2000, 12).<sup>34</sup> Market rationality was hereby culturalized, and capitalist failures were attributed to attitudinal inadequacies. For example, the Bank’s Jorge Uquillas attributed some of the problems that arose in PRODEPINE to lack of “a culture of fulfillment of duties and obligations” (Uquillas 2004, 58), one that the Bank needed to correct by insisting that communities *had* to comply with certain obligations, apply given methodologies, ensure quality products, and so on. Doing so would “disciplin[e] local leaders and technicians and promot[e] a culture of planning, programming, and responsibility on the job” (58). Or, as the Bank put it when praising the project’s “institutional development impact”:

It created linkages to local governments and introduced many people to these political processes. The Project provided GOE [the Government of Ecuador] with a timely response to public protests and unrest, while developing or reinforcing a culture of administration of resources with accountability, controls, and deliverables. In short, the Project helped separate political discussions from technical ones. (World Bank 2003f, 10)

There was, however, a distinctly gendered dimension to the discussion of market, business, and administration culture. As Bank staff explained in a 2006 account of PRODEPINE, notwithstanding the “strong positive attributes, particularly [the] high level of social capital” characterizing indigenous communities, “There are also some negative traits embedded in indigenous culture such as political and religious factionalism and particular forms of gender inequality” (Uquillas and Larreamendy 2006, 27). Thus the loan had to extend new forms of social capital to those communities, “contiguous with the type needed in modern administrative/economic and . . . social infrastructural management . . . (*e.g., women’s solidarity credit associations, which have no equivalent in traditional Andean communities*)” (27; emphasis added). The “very positive impact” associated by staff with the Cajas Solidarias Program was due in part to the sense that it was imparting these new, empowering market cultures to ethnic women. As one Cajas Solidarias coordinator explained:

I am very satisfied because I have seen that people's self-esteem has been greatly elevated, of the women especially, of the directors, not only because they have a responsibility to look after and take care of the money, but also because the Project has built their capacity. There were many people who before barely knew how to read and write and who now know how to add and subtract and multiply and divide and make a percentage and calculate, they know how to do bookkeeping, so they say "good, I have not wasted my time" . . . So I believe that we have covered a lot with this . . . Not only to teach people how to do bookkeeping but also to make them understand that this person is worth a lot, right? Not just because the money is in her hands but because she has to distribute and administer this money properly—it's a very big responsibility.

Similarly, an employee in one of the coastal offices stated that PRODEPINE had "changed the panorama of the compañeras of Esmeraldas a little" by empowering them through paid work and contact with the market. Or consider this summary of the project's success from one regional staff member:

Our Cajas Solidarias became conscious that they did not have to wait all the time with their hand extended, waiting for the World Bank or FIDA [International Fund for Agricultural Development] or whatever organism to come and give them money. No. What we did in the capacity-building workshops was make sure that they realized that if they wanted something they have to make an effort themselves and make sacrifices themselves. You have to be able to be animated and make an effort and not just be like this: "I am a poor little woman, I need," only with complaints—no. These women here need solutions.

Empowerment was hence understood to involve exposure to cultures of responsibility and self-reliance that contested women's assumed passivity.

PRODEPINE also perceived a need to teach market rationality to women in order that their empowerment through work would benefit those they loved, confirming David Williams's (1999) analysis of Bank attempts to actively reproduce market behavior. These efforts were not so prominent in formally-cleared Bank documents, nor in the Bank's research on floriculture—there it was more often assumed that the limited rationality women needed as altruistic workers would automatically appear with their integration into the market.<sup>35</sup> However, at the project level, this assumption disappeared. For example, staff felt

that they needed to help women develop successful microenterprises by suggesting ideas to them; contrary to assurances in evaluations that “there was no technical intervention that helped the producers to promote their initiatives” (Camacho 2002, 44), these activities rarely seemed to be community-driven. After being asked three times who suggested the productive projects carried out by the Cajas Solidarias in his region, one coordinator of the microcredit initiative finally replied with a smile that most of the time he did. In one failing Caja I visited, a PRODEPINE gender employee suggested first baking and selling bread to generate income. When the members pointed out that none of them knew how to do that, she shifted to selling fish to places where prices were higher, selling juice, and selling ice cream. Another PRODEPINE staff member tried to get a Cajas president to embark on a venture buying cheap sheets and towels from Quito to sell back in the community, using a car that took her ailing relative to the capital for hospital treatment to facilitate the business.<sup>36</sup>

Furthermore, women marked by their poverty, rural location, and ethnicity as particularly backward were understood to need socializing into a culture of savings so that their incorporation into productive activity succeeded as an empowerment strategy. One regional report on the microcredit program insisted that PRODEPINE must help communities promote a culture of savings (Guaman 2003, 5), “understanding that saving is one of the fundamental pillars for the development of families, companies, and nations” (25). A more extensive national evaluation noted that the Cajas Solidarias had achieved poor results in the Amazon, due to a perceived lack of savings culture (Camacho 2002, 34). The consultant thus underlined the importance of *requiring* savings as part of the project, arguing that, although it would take time, this rule would eventually help women learn market principles (38).

Field staff shared these opinions. One Caja Solidaria coordinator told me that many women were confused over the meaning of credit, not understanding that they were expected to pay the money back. Thus she needed to help socialize people as part of her work, by forcing them to save. Similarly, I visited a Caja Solidaria initiative with a PRODEPINE staff person wherein cooking stoves had been given to women to start productive activities. The meeting degenerated into a general fight over who had received money, who had attended meetings, who had defaulted on loans, and so on.<sup>37</sup> In response, the staff member made the women promise to meet every week, and she gave the defaulters one month to pay before PRODEPINE would take

their stove back, throw them out of group, and report them to the police. She also reiterated that they needed to save small amounts to get accustomed to the practice, and she urged them not to get depressed. Similar problems surfaced in a nearby meeting of another Caja Solidaria: people had not paid, the group was not meeting, and women complained that the initiative was costly and unsustainable. Again, the PRODEPINE staff person tried to both rally and threaten them, insisting that they *could* pay, albeit little by little (a standard World Bank position, on micro and macro levels of debt), and reminding them that the money had been given by PRODEPINE for work and productive activity, “not a community *fiesta*.” She also threatened to report defaulters and ensure that they did not get other credit. At a workshop for a third Caja Solidaria, understood to be very successful within PRODEPINE, the staff member had to deal with several questions regarding what to do about people who could not pay and women lacking the time and money to invest in productive activities. In addition to drawing tables and flow charts on interest rates, she promised that the office would send an official letter to threaten defaulters.<sup>38</sup> No one in PRODEPINE believed that getting women into productive activity would achieve all it was supposed to unless development agencies intervened in these ways first, to promote a savings culture, a mentality of work, and the ability to force debtors to pay up.

Some perhaps obvious inconsistencies warrant mention here, albeit briefly. It was curious to claim that people did not understand the market, as staff did when discussing the failure of PRODEPINE’s productive interventions. Microcredit programs have been in operation in the Sierra for decades, and the region has been tied to capitalist market activity for centuries (Meisch 2002; Kyle 2000; Colloredo-Mansfeld 1999). People did not seem confused about the principles of compound interest to me; they had stolen the money, or they could not pay it back. This was perhaps not surprising—in the Amazon Caja Solidaria interest rates could reach 30 percent a month, leading one dissenting PRODEPINE employee to refer to the initiative as acting like a loan shark. Moreover, assertions regarding the need to get women into productive activity as a way to overcome their ethnically-marked relegation to the home persisted against the claim by women in many of these communities that they already worked. For example, when asked to define masculine and feminine characteristics in a gender workshop in the Sierra, women identified themselves as

*trabajadoras* (workers) (Muñoz Consejal 2002, 5). Similarly, when asked to identify what defined her as an Afro-Ecuadorian woman, one participant stated: “I identify myself as a struggling woman, a worker. I say I am a Black woman because I struggle, because I know how to work” (Vallejo Real 2002a, 70). These were the same women that PRODEPINE’s coastal office felt needed integration into market activity in order to be empowered.

### **Including Men, Generating Balance?**

Importantly, however, men were also addressed within PRODEPINE. This was often manifest in a generalized desire to include men in a balanced way, as evident in PRODEPINE’s ubiquitous references to including men in reproductive health initiatives,<sup>39</sup> or in the *Cajas Solidarias*’ celebration of men’s involvement. Although men were only 2.1 percent of the members in *Cajas Solidarias*, they were a far larger percentage of loan beneficiaries—staff in one region read me a list of names of loan beneficiaries from one *Caja* that included over 50 percent men, for example. Another staff person stated:

I understand for myself that gender is not only to speak of women but to speak of the family, right? So I’ll tell you that the majority of our clients now in the *Cajas Solidarias* are men and women. It is a mix now in this region—it’s not only women, it’s also men.

This tension-ridden framing of the project as one aimed at women, at men, at families, and at communities was also evident when one of PRODEPINE’s *técnicos* told a community meeting that he wanted the unified participation and integration of men in the initiative, so that men and women would make consensus-based decisions, and loans would benefit everyone. Men did most of the speaking at this meeting and outnumbered women in the room, and the *Caja Solidaria* president was the daughter of the barrio’s male president; her father held the accounts for the *Caja*. I also visited a *Caja Solidaria* project in which the leaders were all men and the female “president” said she had been appointed because they needed a woman for the forms. This project was connected to a local political organization in which the male treasurer and male accountant were both active; they set up the *Caja Solidaria* and got funds for a local shop, run by their female relatives. None of these women would talk to me about the project—they all directed me to the men who had made the application.<sup>40</sup> Such

outcomes did not prompt a response from PRODEPINE staff, in part because they regarded the inclusion of men to be a goal of the Caja Solidaria initiative.

In other respects, though, PRODEPINE's approach to male inclusion was far more thoughtful. Indeed, men were understood to be the major problem to which the loan's gender efforts were directed, as one gender consultant noted:

We're not working with women here, right? We're working more with men, because the problem is the men. [Laughing.] The problem isn't the women, the problem is the men. You have to be working with them.

Men were a problem for PRODEPINE for a variety of reasons. Like women, men sometimes had to be taught to be good rational workers, and thus they were also occasionally targets for efforts to inculcate market mentalities. These efforts to reproduce work skills in men were not nearly as prominent as those directed to women, and they did not surface in the Sierra, but they were evident on the coast. As a staff person there explained, "Not everyone in the world is a businessman." Specifically, he claimed that Afro-Ecuadorian male workers in nearby palm plantations were not genuine proletarians: they lacked factory discipline and showed up at work when they felt like it, leading companies to contract workers from elsewhere. On a visit to a failed productive project, this person spent several hours advising men to establish management teams, specialize in certain tasks, make lists of who was working when, plan how much was to be produced, and so on. He later explained that the campesinos involved did not have "the logic of profitability" required to run a factory; they were risk-averse, and producers not businessmen, and starting microbusinesses was hereby very hard in this region. Furthermore, Afro-Ecuadorians lacked community sentiment, because clan ties prevailed that were focused on interfamilial relations. Thus men needed to be taught not only to work, but to work in a community-oriented fashion. These are, of course, rather ironic objectives given PRODEPINE's claim that it was building on preexisting community sentiment and work habits.

Most commonly, however, men were a problem for PRODEPINE because they were not sufficiently integrated into the domestic sphere. More specifically, they did not do enough housework. Getting women into productive work thus required a parallel effort to get men

into family care, to tackle the exclusion of men from reproductive responsibilities (PRODEPINE 2001a, 2).<sup>41</sup> This was particularly evident in the case studies on gender and ethnicity put out by PRODEPINE. Despite references to broader social and economic contexts, these case studies ultimately became descriptions of micro-level gender roles, focused on the need to make men work more in the domestic sphere. For example, the case study on the Chachi (an indigenous group in the northwest) identified several social and economic challenges faced by the community, including clashes with Afro-Ecuadorians over land and natural resources, deforestation, poor health, and high illiteracy (Eguiguren, Maldonado and Marchan 2002, 16–18). However, the report focused on who did what within the household, and on the fact that “men . . . must assume reproductive tasks that permit them to fulfil new roles within the home” (36). Identical framings were evident in the loan’s case studies of Afro-Ecuadorian and Sierran gender relations (Vallejo Real 2002a, b).

Male migrants from these communities were also criticized for having abandoned their family responsibilities.<sup>42</sup> For example, the case study on the Kichwa of Toacazo (a Sierran group) noted that women had been left to run credit services when men migrated, causing problems when the men returned and drank the money intended for community saving and investment (Vallejo Real 2002b). These framings persisted despite the fact that men claimed, in the workshops on gender, that “they migrate to get money” (Muñoz Consejal 2002, 6) out of a sense of family responsibility that they apparently fulfill—in 2000, remittances became Ecuador’s second most important source of foreign currency, representing about 10 percent of GDP (North 2004, 203; see also Carrillo 2005, 104). Similarly, in a discussion of gendered spaces in an Afro-Ecuadorian community, PRODEPINE staff identified women’s spaces as shop fronts, porches, river sites where they wash clothes, and mangroves where they collect shells to trade (Vallejo Real 2002a, 20). Men’s spaces, in contrast, were bars and porches where they play cards. The case study made it clear that men worked mainly in male-only spaces in the oil and wood industries.<sup>43</sup> However, those working spaces were not identified as male spaces. One was instead left with a sketch of poor racialized men drunkenly gambling while women oriented their activity to productive work.

Again, though, PRODEPINE was involved in attempts to reform the behavior of such men. During a period of widespread festivals throughout the Sierra, a PRODEPINE staff member told a group of

indigenous men gathered at a meeting to celebrate the community's Caja Solidaria program that they should give love to their children, that they should not come home and fight with their wives, and that they should not drink too much during the fiesta period. Of course these discussions of alcohol are embedded in a broader cultural and historical context in which indigenous men have been pathologized for centuries as drunks, making the comments at best insensitive—they were received in silence by the community.<sup>44</sup> However, what interests me is the sense that they were considered relevant to PRODEPINE gender activity in the first place, because this reveals much about the perceived need to teach poor men of color temperate, loving responsibility. Similarly, a workshop on gender in the Amazon identified the fact that men were outside of reproductive responsibilities as one negative consequence of existing gender roles, and it suggested men's cultivation of "family love" in response (Aulestia and Quintero-Andrade 2001). Meanwhile, a 2002 report on participatory gender planning stated that PRODEPINE should try "to incorporate men into domestic work" (Aulestia 2002, 45). A frequently cited (but nowhere rigorously documented) success of the Caja Solidaria program was that it *had* integrated men into the home in this way, with one PRODEPINE staff person joking that "men are cooking in the houses of Caja Solidaria projects." On this basis several policymakers affirmed that the Cajas have had "a very positive gender impact."

In short, in a pattern that should not be surprising by this point, men were targeted for reform in an attempt to create dual-earner, dual-caregiver models of partnership wherein they were taught to love their dependents better while their wives worked with limited rationality in the productive sphere. In this way reformed couples could navigate the complexities of the work-social reproduction nexus in a neoliberal context. PRODEPINE is hereby a classic post-Washington Consensus gender project, a grounded attempt at implementing Wolfensohn's advice at Beijing that gender equality be "a two-sided change" that offers market opportunities for women while ensuring that men take on more caring responsibilities (1995).

### **Racialized Heteronormativity: Sex, Love, and Ethnodevelopment**

I wish to focus the remainder of this chapter on a theme *not* central to Wolfensohn's Beijing talk: the interaction between gender policy, sexuality, and ethnicity. At this point it is important to reiterate that

PRODEPINE was oriented to three categories of people: indigenous groups in the Sierran highlands, who constitute 90 percent of Ecuador's indigenous population (Uquillas and Larreamendy 2006, 22); indigenous groups in the Amazon; and Afro-Ecuadorians concentrated on the coast. Figure 9 should make these distinctions easier to understand. PRODEPINE produced this graphic, in which a map of Ecuador was overlaid with faces representing the target groups of people.

These three communities have been integrated into Ecuador's developmentalist project in distinctive ways. There has long been a distinction made between "model (Highland) Indians" who were seen as hardworking, neat, and sober, and "savage" Amazonians (Meisch 2002, 29; Yashar 2005). Some Highland communities were chosen by Ecuadorian elites to represent noble, progressive Indians; they were consciously used by "nationalist image makers" to represent the new nation (Kyle 2000; Colloredo-Mansfeld 1999; Weismantel 2001).



Figure 9—The faces of PRODEPINE. (PRODEPINE 2002, 2).

Conversely, Amazonian groups were framed as being more traditional and backward than Highland groups and less able to integrate themselves into national ideologies of development. In turn, Amazonian communities often frame themselves as more authentic than Highland communities, criticizing the latter for abandonment of their heritage (Yashar 2005), and the Amazon is commonly considered the site where the “real” natives live (Lucero 2006, 35). The quest for indigenous cultural authenticity and the boundaries marking “appropriate Indianness” (Crain 1996, 136) from inappropriate savageness have hereby affected these two communities in distinctive ways.

Moreover, Afro-Ecuadorians fit awkwardly and partially into the ethnodevelopment framework being used by PRODEPINE, as they did to the *mestizaje* framework that predated it. If *mestizaje* was inherently aimed at the erasure of indigenous existence, albeit within a notion of blending that saw Indians as ancestral contributors to the new hybrid nation (Hooker 2005, 301), it denied the possibility of Blackness. Afro-Ecuadorians appeared to be, as Jean Muteba Rahier notes, “the ultimate Other, some sort of historical accident, a noise in the ideological system of nationality, a pollution in the Ecuadorian genetic pool” (2003, 300; see also Hooker 2005). In PRODEPINE’s graphic, the two indigenous communities targeted are represented in culturally specific dress, a perfect visual confirmation of the fact that they have gained space for political claims-making within Ecuador on the grounds of cultural difference. The Afro-Ecuadorian man featured is wearing a white shirt. This signals the fact that, as Juliet Hooker (2005) and others point out, Afro-Latin social movements have found it more difficult to articulate their communities’ needs within dominant conversations about multiculturalism. They are not seen as representing authentically different groups with distinctive cultures that should be valued as part of the nation’s preconquest heritage, they are often urban-based,<sup>45</sup> and they lack ties to ancestral land articulated in ethnic terms. Their mobilizing frame of contesting racism has had far less salience with dominant groups than demands grounded in recognition of cultural difference. Some communities have adapted strategies used by the indigenous movement in response, demanding territorial rights and protection of cultural identity (Sánchez 2007, 239).<sup>46</sup> Rural Afro-descendent communities have been best able to “fit” their struggle into these terms because of their perceived isolation and their links to land stretching back to escaped slaves, and they are included in PRODEPINE on this basis. However, they are included

awkwardly. As the Project Information Document makes clear, they are seen to lack the community solidarity of Amazonian and Sierran groups, and their organizational base is far weaker (World Bank 1997f, np). Conversely, their interfamilial ties were critiqued by the Bank's anthropologists—and by some of PRODEPINE's coastal staff—as too strong (van Nieuwkoop and Uquillas 2000, 7), preventing community-oriented development from prospering. From the start, then, Amazonian and Sierran indigenous people were positioned distinctively, and the fit between rural Afro-Ecuadorian communities and PRODEPINE's ethnodevelopment framework was a troubled one.

These divisions were replicated in the project's gender activities. Specifically, when dealing with men in gender interventions, staff made crucial racialized and sexualized distinctions between the three communities. Gender relations in all communities were assessed based on their approximation to an idealized norm of loving, sharing partnership, and nonmonogamy was framed as a marker of ethnic identity; it was the yardstick by which gender relations in a community were measured. More equal communities, wherein women were more empowered, were ones in which men were monogamous. Sierran communities, it was argued, represented this ideal. There was thus a clear hierarchy operating within the project's gender efforts whereby Sierran groups were positioned as the acceptably authentic model for others to follow, based on the widely cited presence of sharing couples there. For example, the Bank's policy texts on Ecuador repeatedly argued that Sierran households were more egalitarian with respect to domestic work (e.g., Correia 2002), and the Bank's *Ecuador Gender Review* used Hamilton's book to claim that the Sierra is characterized by gender equality (Correia 2000, 40). Meanwhile, the Bank's case study on gender in a Kichwa community in Cotopaxi identified complementarity, reciprocity, interchange, and internal cohesion as key characteristics of the Andean social structure (Vallejo Real 2002b, 19). The appeal to complementary balance as a model for gender policy was thus a racially differentiated one, embedded in a long history whereby Sierran communities are seen to represent the authorized version of indigenous difference.

In contrast, Amazonian men were framed as polygamous and Afro-Ecuadorian men as serially unfaithful, with both regarded as particularly oppressive to women because they violated the monogamy understood to characterize sharing complementarity.<sup>47</sup> Although PRODEPINE did not overtly criticize polygamy in its gender workshops in the Amazon—a

sign that Amazonian culture is secure in its status as worthy of respect within ethnodevelopment conversations—Amazonian men’s non-monogamy was identified as the region’s core “gender problem” in several conversations I had with staff (a mixture of mestizos and indigenous people from the Sierra). I was repeatedly told that gender relations in the Amazon were particularly complex or complicated, and this always hinged on the fact that men there were polygamous. As one employee put it when speaking of the difficulties of PRODEPINE’s gender work among indigenous groups in the Amazon: “Their culture is more, er . . . [pause] . . . *cultural*” (original emphasis). Polygamy was the key manifestation of this culturality. As another interviewee explained, gender work was hard in the Amazon because:

**X:** Of the socio-cultural, geographical, and educational situation basically, because they are a little isolated geographically, the populations, and there is no permanent social contact . . . And above all it is a machista society. Well, machismo is very complicated in the Amazon. . . For example in the Shuar and Achuar nationalities in the South of the Amazon there they have polygamy. You know what polygamy is, yes?

**Bedford:** Yes

**X:** A man with lots of women. Well in this sense to develop the theme of gender is very complicated.

The same point was made by several others—ultimately, as one PRODEPINE employee put it, the biggest problem in the Amazon was that men have two or three wives.

In other conversations, men’s “serial polygamy,” unfaithfulness, and promiscuity were repeatedly framed as a problem of Afro-Ecuadorian gender relations, linking to a racialized “common sense” about gender and sexuality in which Black men and women are hypersexualized (Rahier 2003, 297). Unlike with Amazonian communities, these discussions were relatively open and were sometimes conducted in the presence of men from the marked ethnicity. The lack of a perceived need to be subtle or delicate about the issue confirms the awkward status of Afro-Ecuadorians within the loan, their ethnic identity not sufficiently or appropriately “cultural” to warrant the same gestures of respect granted to Amazonian communities assumed to be practicing polygamy.<sup>48</sup> For example, while discussing ethnicity and gender relations with me on a coffee break during a meeting, a PRODEPINE consultant (a Quichwa-speaking person from the Sierra) turned to two Afro-Ecuadorian men

sitting at the same table, laughing, and said that the *compañeros* on the coast just needed to keep to one wife (they smiled politely).

Concerns over Afro-Ecuadorian men's nonmonogamy also made it into printed texts, with the Bank's *Ecuador Gender Review* calling for more research on "the implications of these types of unstable and multiple unions for economic activity patterns and income distribution," given that

it is relatively common for rural men in the Costa to simultaneously maintain more than one common law union (*compromiso*). So-called "visiting unions", in which the male partner resides only temporarily with one or several women . . . are a frequent residential pattern in this region. (Correia 2000, 41)

PRODEPINE's case study of Afro-Ecuadorian gender relations also focused heavily on the fact that most couples did not formally marry, that "both men and women engag[ed] in various conjugal relationships throughout their lives" (Vallejo Real 2002a, 84), and that women were attached to numerous men, while in between they head families alone (18). Men thus engaged in "serial polygamy," having two or three women sometimes in the same village, "in the same neighborhood or even in the same house" (18). Women tolerated this behavior "to get a roof, food, and protection for children" (34), but the system was understood by gender staff to lead to negative consequences for children, because "in a structure of female family headship, the mother assumes a strong character. She takes the place of . . . a masculine authority figure for her children" (26).

This critique of nonmonogamy did not appear to follow the articulated needs of project participants who, at least in the case studies referred to by PRODEPINE, raise concerns about low wages, food shortages, and ecological destruction from the shrimp industry and palm plantations, rather than about men's serial unfaithfulness or overly masculinized mothers. Neither is there any attention paid to the intersectional approach to gender that has defined analysis and activism by indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian women in Ecuador, wherein discussions of respect, violence, and discrimination are understood as referring to indigenous Afro-Ecuadorian–mestiza relations, as well as to intraethnic relations between men and women (Prieto et al. 2005, 187). As women in Ecuador's main indigenous rights organization explained: "Our struggle is not only to obtain equity between man and woman, it is to ensure that *respect* exists, and to end the problem of

*discrimination* and *violence* that exists from woman to woman” (quoted in Prieto et al. 2005, 186; original emphasis). However, the potential space available in PRODEPINE to have these intersectional conversations about respect, discrimination, and violence between women was crowded out by a redefinition of the core gender problem as about racialized sexual irresponsibility—men of color’s inability to be faithful and to properly love their families.

To this extent the loan confirms Hale’s sense that, to occupy the category of *indio permitido* (authorized Indian) in the new conversations about development, one has to “swallo[w] the bile produced by the insult of the persisting racial hierarchy that discourses of cultural equality ignore and are not meant to challenge” (Hale 2006, 220). Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian women also have to swallow the bile of losing their intersectional analysis of gender, replacing it with a model that focuses attention narrowly on reforming men in their communities. This is a very high price to pay for inclusion in the conversation about GAD.

In sum, then, these trends in PRODEPINE underline that “mestizo racisms . . . are multiple” (Edmund Gordon, quoted Hooker 2005, 300), as are the racialized models of gender and sexuality operative in ethnodevelopment interventions. Put differently, they demonstrate the *gendered and sexualized* nature of the ever more vital distinctions being made between appropriate and inappropriate indigenities as part of the shift to neoliberal multiculturalism (see Povinelli 2002 in particular). The “high-stakes distinctions between those cultural rights that deserve recognition and those that do not” (Hale 2006, 35) are ones in which gender and sexuality are central, making racialized heteronormativity a key mechanism through which appropriate, authorized difference is ascertained in the loan.

Of course, my aim in articulating this critique of PRODEPINE’s racialized celebration of loving partnership is not to stake a frankly silly counterclaim that polygamy is necessarily more liberatory than loving monogamy or that it provides a more culturally authentic basis from which to contest existing gender relations. I simply wish to generate pause over claims that the biggest problem in the Amazon is men who have two wives; or that Afro-Ecuadorian *compañeros* just need to support their families responsibly for ethnodevelopment interventions to generate gender equity. Those men and their perceived sexual excesses are hypervisible in this loan, and that should generate, at least, serious pause.

## Against Authentic Gender? Irrelevance, Failure, and Contestation

That said, however, PRODEPINE's entry into these conversations about authentic gender relations and normative sexuality had complex and uneven effects, and I do not intend to overstate their success. On one hand, appeals to authentic complementarity helped gender staff—mestizo, indígena, and Afro-Ecuadorian—walk the difficult line between respecting the culture of ethnic communities and ensuring that gender workshops aiming at empowerment and changed roles were carried out. As one PRODEPINE policymaker put it:

Well, it's not a question of going in a community and saying, "Here the men are this and the women are this other thing, now the men have to cook and the women have to go with the machete in the Amazon or in the coast." They would lynch us.<sup>49</sup>

Gender was seen by some as an external imposition in this way and as breaking indigenous principles of reciprocity by encouraging a focus on individual women. For this reason, staff described the experience of the project as "very complicated and hard," one made easier by arguing in gender workshops that the loan aimed at harmony and restoration of ethnic values.

However, deployment of this strategy was far from trouble-free, even in the Sierran communities understood to most closely approximate ideals of sharing partnership. There was a key temporal tension evident in the project between the claim that gender complementarity *had been* a principle of Sierran social organization and should be recuperated and the sense that it *currently was*, and hence that gender efforts were irrelevant. This was clear from the start, with disagreement emerging at the Bank's 2000 LAC gender workshop over the scope of work with indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian groups. Representatives of these groups—drawn from PRODEPINE's orbit—visited the workshop and explained that

indigenous peoples approach life on the basis of complementary roles for both men and women, rather than on equality of sexes; thus, the introduction of approaches based on individual rights and gender equality is creating social tensions. Women agreed, on the other hand, that although gender equity in terms of individual equality was an alien approach, the traditional practices of equitable participation of women in community affairs had given way. They had no choice, therefore, but to seek equity through

these new approaches unless men would credibly change their attitudes towards these issues. (World Bank 2000e, 8)<sup>50</sup>

However, staff who were critical of the loan's gender activities claimed that they were not necessary given reigning, intact cultural ideals. One interviewee replied to a question about PRODEPINE's gender activities by stating:

Well, the first priority of PRODEPINE isn't necessarily the focus on gender, because in the indigenous world there is not this discrimination against women like you see in the mestizo sector. Here, rather, the nuclear family is very united.

Another PRODEPINE employee was equally critical of its gender activities, stating that workshop coordinators had certain "feminist tendencies" to push for women's independence, causing fights and resentment, rather than focusing on reconstructing gender from an authentic base in the indigenous world view. This was defined as one involving mutual respect, family circularity, sharing, and unity.

Second, although associated by PRODEPINE staff with Andean communities, the ideal of culturally authentic gender relations involving sharing reciprocity was also invoked by some groups in the Amazon when interacting with the loan's gender efforts. Reference to complementarity hereby became a trump card demonstrating the uselessness of gender analysis, and it was used by people in communities considered by PRODEPINE staff to be on the *outside* of sharing models of partnership. This reveals the complex interactions at play in debates about representativity in indigenous politics (Lucero 2006, 33), regarding how different actors use claims of authenticity. In a report on what appears to have been a disastrous gender workshop in the Amazon in 2001, male participants refused to accept figures provided by facilitators on gender differences in Ecuador in relation to wages, literacy rates, and so on, arguing that they reflected an urban, mestiza, feminist bias, and did not take into account Amazonian reality. This reality was characterized as based on complementary relations between men and women, meaning "that the display of charts of men and women paves the way to the division of families and does not respect cultures" (Aulestia and Quintero-Andrade 2001, 2). The first suggestion given for how to improve the workshop was thus "to start the analysis [of gender] from the principles of Amazonian philosophy—complementarity, reciprocity and binarity" (7). The facilitators argued that men and women share roles in the Amazon, and that

*gender relations . . . are complementary, therefore they are neither inequitable nor discriminatory.* To build capacity [about gender] and discuss issues of equity between men and women is not useful for these nationalities. (Emphasis added.)

I raise this issue not merely to register—albeit briefly—a counter-hegemonic appropriation of dominant development discourse that I trace in far greater depth in chapter 6 but also to preemptively address an assumption that the complementarity approach to gender dominated the Bank's ethnodevelopment practice because, on a simplistic level, it works in a project context. In many ways it does not, and its strategic utility is thus worthy of critical assessment. By defining policy success as balanced inclusion of men and women, shared roles, and complementary partnerships, GAD policymakers found themselves confronted by hostile men arguing that complementarity was an always-already defining feature of their ethnic identity, and staff found those very arguments difficult to navigate.

They could of course argue that the subset of men who claimed to speak for those communities were wrong. The report on the Amazon workshop hinted at this possibility when noting that, although “the Shuar and Achuar” say a gender focus is not necessary because roles are complementary, three women in those communities present in the workshop said that inequalities *did* exist regarding political participation and decision making in PRODEPINE (Aulestia and Quintero-Andrade 2001). In another case study gender consultants repeated community assertions that marriages are sacred, families are stable, and divorces do not exist, only to note that there are some cases of separated couples (Eguiguren, Maldonado and Marchan 2002, 39). These are variations of Hale's “laughing until our stomachs hurt” response: attempts to disrupt homogenizing claims about indigenous difference in order to create space for contestation and to interrupt the romanticization and fetishization of “community” on which conversations about ethnic authenticity can rest (Joseph 2002).

However, this is a perilous approach for femocrats to take, not only because it laughs at sincerely treasured principles. It also appears to silence community self-definition and impose external “expert” diagnoses on indigenous problems in ways that run counter to principles of ethnodevelopment. And, of course, it undermines the common ground on which PRODEPINE's gender interventions rested, in

that it complicates the appeals to complementarity made by the Bank, the government, PRODEPINE staff, and some of the indigenous organizations with which they worked. More commonly, then, gender efforts simply floundered when confronted with counterclaims that complementarity existed in sites where female workshop participants saw inequality. These failures, in turn, became further evidence of how difficult gender work was in traditional cultures. Hence, staff referred me to the Amazonian workshop example as proof that women there are hyperoppressed and that Amazonian men are virtually impossible to work with. Failure did *not* lead to a fundamental questioning of the core gender model at issue, and the racialized common sense of complementarity emerged unscathed.

This outcome redirects our attention to the way that PRODEPINE's authorized conversation about gender in part structures the counter-conversations forged in response. In contesting the project's racialized hierarchy of appropriate gender relations, Amazonian communities were reversing PRODEPINE's presumed relationship between sexuality and savagery, framing themselves as legitimate keepers of the complementarity flame. This move has been theorized extensively in other instances. For example, Jacqui Alexander has argued that neocolonial state managers may try to "Manag[e] internal ruptures by using heterosexuality in defense of nation" (2005, 12), using appeals to normative sexuality as evidence of their fitness to rule at the same time that they are being positioned as sexually degenerate by their old imperial rulers. Hence, "Heterosexualization occup[ies] a civilizing nexus in the neocolonial state's imperative of distancing itself from tradition in order to be counted as modern, that is, 'civilized,' and accorded the 'benefits' of modernity" (193). Similarly, Neville Hoad has tracked the developmentalist imaginary that linked the alleged retardation of the Western homosexual with the sexual savagery of the colony and that shapes the occasional reinvestments made by some colonized groups in a "traditional" sexual morality. As he argues, "Anti-imperialist attacks on homosexuality can be seen as refusals to carry the imputation of primitiveness, and to counter-project the racist charge of retardation and/or degeneration onto its western source, by scapegoating the west's own sexual deviants or what these attacks perceive as their local proxies" (Hoad 2000, 151). PRODEPINE—and resistance to it—can be analyzed as examples of these processes. The loan involves constituencies who are both distancing themselves from tradition-read-as-savagery and appealing to an idealized precolonial

gender past; both deploying normative sexuality to be counted as modern and counter-projecting sexual degeneration outside the community to divorced women who only exist in the mestiza world. Heteronormativity structures debates about representativity to such an extent that resistance to PRODEPINE's gender efforts is *also* expressed in the language of authentic gender harmony and sharing partnership—a highly circumscribed terrain on which to operate.

### **Conclusion: Global Visions, Local Projects?**

PRODEPINE is the key case study of gender and ethnodevelopment in the Bank, and as such it directs our attention to the complex interplay between local and global gender discourses. The organization's post-Washington Consensus gender model was not dropped from Washington DC onto Quito, which in turn dropped it into PRODEPINE. Yet gender policy in the loan was not made locally either, with staff fumbling to invent a whole new approach. As previous chapters have demonstrated, the language of complementarity and balanced gender was not an entirely local language—it was a transnationalized one already central to Bank research and policy texts. Hence, the loan is an interesting example of how apparently local conversations about gender, in terms of Andean visions of reciprocal gendered universes, are plugged into broader policy frameworks, seen as colorful, specific manifestations of discourses already central to Bank work, and reinforcing those discourses as universal truths. In turn, those local conversations about authentic gender are shaped strategically to resonate with national and international ears in a process of highly selective talking and listening.

There *is* space generated here for enhanced community participation, and there is clearly power to be had in having the conversation about gender staged in language that resonates as local. Moreover, in important respects ethnodevelopment explicitly contests the approach to gender, culture, and development used in much previous policy, wherein women from the south were framed in modernization discourses as passive victims in need of liberation from their cultures, “as dominated by the grip of ‘traditional practices’” (Narayan 1997, 49; see also Mohanty 1991). Conversely in PRODEPINE “progressive” elements of indigenous “culture” were used instrumentally to promote women's greater participation in remunerated economic activity and to demand equal rights for women in scholarship programs funded by Bank money. Beneficiaries also claimed veto power over how

languages of complementarity were deployed, sometimes to resist PRODEPINE's obviously racialized hierarchy of appropriate, authentic gender relations, sometimes to maintain men's power over women, sometimes to do both. These are significant shifts, and they suggest the need for more research into how issues of sex, gender, culture, and development policy are currently intertwined.

However the already apparent limitations of this project also need to be thoughtfully considered, especially given PRODEPINE's positioning as an ideal model of ethnically sensitive gender intervention. Like other Bank gender work, PRODEPINE appealed to gender balance to intensify the privatization of social reproduction. In addition, the loan required multiple interventions to teach supposedly natural market mentalities to women already marked by their rural location, poverty, and ethnicity as particularly backward, and it invoked sometimes pathologizing portrayals of certain poor men of color. Appeals to normative sexuality were also central to its debates about indigenous authenticity, eclipsing a range of non-normative behaviors and re-entrenching the use of sexual respectability as a legitimate mechanism of judging whether indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian communities are fit for inclusion in development. This is, again, a very high price to pay for entry into the conversation about GAD. It is not simply that the model failed, in limited terms, to work in that it left gender policy entrepreneurs unable to contest men who denied the existence of gender inequality. It is that the terms of inclusion are, to appropriate Hale, bile-inducing, grounded in explicitly racialized hierarchies of appropriate gender relations. Balanced thinking through of these realities is an imperative for any assessment of PRODEPINE and the ethnodevelopment approach it represents.

To reiterate, however, these problematic project characteristics did not emerge because the loan was a disaster, because staff were mean-spirited, or because the Bank failed to listen to its gender specialists. PRODEPINE was run by committed staff with excellent social development skills, and it is held up as a good practice example of ethnodevelopment and gender mainstreaming within Ecuador and the region more generally; it is precisely the sort of project liable to be cited by the Bank when it is criticized for the negative social consequences of its macroeconomic lending. Rather, the limitations embedded in PRODEPINE are the limitations of the Bank's post-Washington Consensus approach to gender analysis—an approach that rests on racialized (and class-inflected) appeals to sexual

respectability and that hails gender balance to privatize caring responsibilities among the poor. As I argue in the concluding chapter, but as is also evident in *PRODEPINE*, these appeals can help explain the sometimes curious alliances on which post-Washington Consensus gender interventions rely and the difficulties encountered when trying to forge an alternative.

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## HOLDING IT TOGETHER

### Family Strengthening in Argentina

Deep crises . . . offer the opportunity for bold changes and we can only hope that the Argentine society grabs the chance to construct stronger institutions than those of the past and a more resilient economy, free of the major vulnerabilities and harsh dilemmas that characterized the one that just collapsed.

—GUILLERMO PERRY AND LUIS SERVÉN, *The Anatomy of a Multiple Crisis: Why Was Argentina Special and What Can We Learn from It*,  
Chief Economist Office of the LAC, World Bank

In November 2001 the Bank approved a US \$5 million loan to Argentina for a social capital promotion and family-strengthening project entitled PROFAM. This was another manifestation of the Bank's new advice on gender policy, in that PROFAM sought to empower poor women through work, include poor men as fathers and responsible partners, and shore up poor families in order to secure economic recovery. In this chapter I explore how the loan was developed and implemented, paying particular attention to how it *changed* as the Bank and the state responded to the economic and political crisis experienced by Argentina in late 2001. I focus on four important changes in this respect: the increasing role of the Catholic Church, the increasing emphasis placed by the postcrisis Argentine government on family unity as tied to the recovery of Argentine values, the increasing focus on microenterprise projects, and the attempts made to include men. I examine the space opened up for unruly, feminist use in a context of chaos, while charting the growing constraints on that space as PROFAM was reconfigured according to new allegiances with Church and state actors. In this way I aim to explore the gendered and sexualized effects of crisis on development policy, showing that while some common senses (about unfettered free markets) were harmed by Argentina's experience, others (about gender harmony and the importance of family strengthening) were reinvigorated, emerging securely entrenched as integral components of the new, post-Washington Consensus common ground.

### Gendered Crisis and Heteronormative Bricolage

As I have suggested in previous chapters, the Bank plays a key role in the construction and reproduction of the gendered frames through which a range of actors understand and respond to the shift from a Washington to a post-Washington Consensus. It sells the latter—and its continuing role as a crucial interlocutor of development policy—on overriding values of gender balance and harmonious couplehood that everyone appears to accept, from the macroeconomists to the gender staff, from Wolfensohn to Wolfowitz. In this sense the organization operates as what Neil Fligstein has termed a skilled strategic actor, “provid[ing] identities and cultural frames to motivate others” (Fligstein 2001, 106). Such actors often sell their ideas to groups on overriding values that all accept (114), ones taken for granted as part of the naturalized social environment. They rely on a combination of already available and legitimized concepts, scripts, and models to articulate new ideas—a process that Mary Douglas (1986) referred to as bricolage. In this understanding, “Change results from the deliberate modification and recombination of old institutional elements in new and socially acceptable ways” (Campbell 1998, 383), and “In many policy arenas the programmatic ideas that become most influential are those that experts, advisors, and others frame in ways that most closely coincide with or seem to protect central cultural values” (394; see also Parsons 2002).<sup>1</sup> In this respect, as Douglas so trenchantly demonstrated, the conventions and rules being promoted seem to be common sense or natural (1986, 45), such that their legitimacy appears to rest

on their fit with the nature of the universe. A convention is institutionalized when, in reply to the question, “Why do you do it like this?” although the first answer may be framed in terms of mutual convenience, in response to further questioning the final answer refers to the way the planets are fixed in the sky or the way that plants or animals naturally behave. (47)

Gender and heteronormativity are, of course, crucial to this process. They are central cultural values to be protected, and a broad range of policymakers can mobilize support by promising to defend the family, marriage, motherhood, fatherhood, and so on.<sup>2</sup>

My question in this chapter is how this process works in a context of crisis. As Fligstein has noted, “Under conditions of crisis formation, it is possible for institutional entrepreneurs to create entirely

new systems of meaning” around some issues (2001, 106), taking advantage of turbulence and uncertainty to redefine the rules and shared meanings that define social relationships (107–108). Many others agree that opportunities for otherwise marginal policymakers to gain influence increase during periods of institutional flux,<sup>3</sup> and these concerns are central to work on the post–Washington Consensus for obvious reasons: the new development approach emerged out of financial crises and a perceived meltdown in social sustainability (Campbell and Pedersen 2001; Naím 1999). Debate continues to rage over whether these crises provide opportunities for further economic liberalization or indicate the need for a fundamentally new approach.

However, little attention has been devoted to gender and sexuality in these discussions of crisis. Certainly it is clear that backlash can ensue when marginalized groups are held responsible for economic, political, and social chaos, and that threats to the nation state may be filtered through gendered and sexualized anxieties about national virility, sovereignty, and integrity. Hence gays, lesbians, transgender people, sex workers, single women, and so on may be scapegoated for the effects of crisis, attacked as evidence of the degeneration and decay understood to have provoked it (Alexander 2005; Tadiar 1998). But a unitary concern with backlash and scapegoating overlooks the creative potential of crisis and the opportunities it may provide for marginalized actors to seize space. I ask, then, what we can learn about policy-alliance building in crisis conditions by taking gender and sexuality seriously. What effects does crisis have on gendered and sexualized bricolage strategies? Which spaces are opened up for gender policy entrepreneurs in crisis conditions, and which are closed down? And how might attention to those issues inform our efforts to generate comprehensive analyses of international development?

### **Argentina, the Post–Washington Consensus, and Gender Reform**

Argentina is a key case study in which to consider these questions for several reasons. It exemplifies the crisis-induced shift from a Washington to a post–Washington Consensus approach to development, since the country was a model adherent of the former under Carlos Menem (1989–1999). Hyperinflation created space for Menem and his U.S.-educated finance minister, Domingo Cavallo, to enact one of the most stringent reform packages in the region<sup>4</sup>—it is hard to imagine how that could have occurred in a non-crisis-afflicted

era (Corrales 1997). Importantly, this package was widely heralded as a success. Strict austerity measures were associated with a 10 percent rise in GNP in 1991 (Paraje 2005, 382), and a substantial fall in inflation; one supportive observer even claimed that Cavallo had homogenized economic thinking in Argentina, forging a consensus about the benefits of free trade, privatized public services, and fiscal austerity (Corrales 1997, 51). In 1998 the head of the IMF invited Menem to join U.S. President Clinton in opening the Fund's annual meeting in Washington, DC, in "the ultimate pat on the back" from the Bretton Woods Institutions (Green 2003, 10).

This context made the country's economic collapse in 2001 devastating to faith in neoliberalism. Menem's opponents had highlighted the heavy social costs of the restructuring agenda in terms of growing inequality and unemployment since the early 1990s,<sup>5</sup> but the dramatic nature of the descent back "from poster child to basket case" (Pastor and Wise 2001; see also Tommasi 2003, 156; Levitsky and Murillo 2005b, 1) was shocking to all. When the government of Fernando de la Rúa froze accounts to prevent a banking collapse in late 2001,<sup>6</sup> a diverse show of popular dissent forced the resignation of four presidents in ten days and left the entire political elite discredited.<sup>7</sup> With the government forced to abandon the peg to the dollar that had underpinned Argentina's economic stability in the 1990s, the peso lost 70 percent of its value in early 2002, and GNP fell almost 12 percent. The country enacted the largest default on external debt in modern economic history (Paraje 2005, 387), and over 50 percent of its population—once famed as the most middle class in Latin America—were plunged into poverty. Unemployment peaked at 18.3 percent in late 2001 (World Bank 2006, 18), and by 2003 more than half the population subsisted thanks to emergency state social programs or food assistance (Dinatale 2004, 13).

Not surprisingly, then, Argentina's experience was recast as the exemplar of what to avoid. Its meltdown prompted widespread disillusionment with the free market model and fury at the politicians and international financial institutions held responsible. Economic collapse signified the need for a new approach, one that took social policy seriously, that protected people from the ravages of the free market, and that aimed at social and economic sustainability. Rubén Lo Vuolo, key economic advisor to one of Argentina's many 2003 presidential candidates, summed up the impetus for a reformed approach succinctly: "Argentina was the best pupil of the Washington

Consensus, and see where we ended up. We have to change the model” (quoted in Tommasi 2003, 155).

The 2001 shock also disrupted Argentina’s settlements around gender and sexuality issues. The meltdown intensified the sense, common among critics of neoliberalism, that economic crisis had had contagion effects on communities, families, and social organizations more broadly (Cesilini 2002; Risley 2006). In this regard, postcrisis Argentina was alarmingly full of nostalgic calls to remasculinize a Peronist working class that had lost influence under Menem.<sup>8</sup> However, the crisis also disrupted conservative gender ideologies and opened space for mobilization by women and sexual minorities. As Elisabeth Borland and Barbara Sutton note in their analysis of “how periods of crisis can interrupt and transform gender relations” (2007, 701), women played key roles in the 2001 protests and the later factory takeovers.<sup>9</sup> The crisis also aided those struggling for reproductive and sexual rights, because it unsettled the conservative state-Church pact put in place by Menem. Supporters of reform were thus able to secure civil unions for same-sex couples in Buenos Aires (2002) and to get the country’s first national reproductive health policy in place (2003). Pedro Paradiso, legal advisor for the former campaign, noted that, although activists were cautioned against demanding civil unions given the crisis, “at the same time, the year of protests has really brought out in Argentina the idea of social justice. The middle class, with their savings vanishing in the banks, understood how the state can meddle in your private life in a way that gay people have been living with for years” (quoted in Bunn 2003, np). The Church, reeling from a child abuse scandal, proved unable to stop these changes (Barrancos 2006). In broad terms, then, crisis contributed to a sense that national gender ideologies were in peril, and it simultaneously opened up space for activists pressing for reform. As Borland and Sutton argue, it was a moment of both continuity and rupture in this regard (2007, 702).

### **The World Bank’s Role: From Menem’s Best Friend to Kirchner’s Scapegoat**

I focus this chapter on the World Bank’s response to this context. Argentina’s crisis had a particularly important impact on the Bank, because it was held partially responsible for Menem’s neoliberal restructuring package.<sup>10</sup> Throughout the 1990s the Bank funded labor market reform initiatives, state-restructuring interventions, and privatization of provincial banks (Corbalán 2002, 87–91),<sup>11</sup> and it

tried to influence public opinion about the indispensability and positive impact of reform (189–191). As one senior Bank official put it, “The World Bank was never as involved so closely in policy as it was in the Argentine case” (quoted in Teichman 2001, 107).

Given the understanding of Argentina as “a star student of World Bank-style adjustment” (Auyero 2000, 100), people are understandably furious with the teacher. The 2006 CAS notes somewhat too mildly that “the Bank suffers from an image problem as a result of its association with the policy orientation of the 1990s” (World Bank 2006, 49; see also 41), and staff were told bluntly during 2005 civil society consultations that the Bank should support an Argentine development agenda rather than imposing its own from Washington DC; that it should abandon policy lending all together; and that its strong advocacy for any idea—even a good one—would discredit it (50). On hearing that I was in the country to research the Bank in 2007, people either laughed (because it was so discredited) or scowled (because they assumed I worked for it), but either way they held an extremely negative view of the institution. Some Bank staff conceded that this view was shared by their own families.<sup>12</sup>

This distrust, resentment, and anger led to very tense relations between the Bank’s Argentina office and the government of Néstor Kirchner, elected in 2003 on an expressly anti-Washington Consensus platform. Kirchner publicly criticized the Bank’s country director, and his government paid off its IMF loans early as part of an attempt to sever ties to the international financial institutions. His administration also oversaw a remarkably successful recovery project, based on commitment to fiscal discipline, reduction of the debt burden, job creation, tackling poverty, and combating income maldistribution (Annex A in World Bank 2006, 71).<sup>13</sup> The Bank, along with other international lenders, has supported some of the social initiatives associated with this approach. For example, it funded the Heads of Household Program (*Jefes y Jefas*), providing a minimal safety net for the indigent through workfare (World Bank 2006, 31; Dinatale 2004, 38; Ridao-Cano 2002; Cesilini 2002).<sup>14</sup> However, it has been critical of other components of the recovery effort,<sup>15</sup> and several loans were cancelled for lack of compliance with structural reform.<sup>16</sup> In 2004 the Bank took the exceptional step of truncating Argentina’s CAS from five years to twenty months due to anxiety over the country’s commitment to reform (World Bank 2006, 9), and the organization was only involved in short-term, nonpolicy lending when I conducted

fieldwork (153). As the 2006 CAS noted, the Bank was by then a far smaller player in Argentina's development agenda, and it needed to both keep the government happy<sup>17</sup> and to seek partners for its efforts to make any impact (41).

### **World Bank Gender Policy: PROFAM's Context**

Gender staff have seen their scope for intervention in the Bank's policies wax and wane across these shifts in development approach. Argentina was the first Bank office to request a gender audit of its operations, undertaken in collaboration with civil society and government counterparts and leading to the publication of the *Gender Portfolio Review* (Correia 1999). Argentina was also the site for a broader Bank assessment of its gender activities through a Japanese grant-funded project entitled PROGEN, and the country director offered stable support to gender initiatives in the late 1990s. However, staff turnover in recent years has severely affected the presence of feminist policy entrepreneurs in the Argentina office, and Bank GAD staff and consultants have had to contend with a difficult domestic environment, particularly around reproductive rights. Menem made Argentina the Vatican's most loyal ally in Latin America in his opposition to reproductive rights during UN conferences in Cairo and Beijing, and he even declared a national holiday in defense of the fetus (Barrancos 2006, 141; Human Rights Watch 2005, 13; Waylen 2000). In the late 1990s Argentina lacked any national reproductive health policy, information on contraception was unevenly accessible, and unsafe abortion was—and still is—the leading cause of maternal mortality (Barrancos 2006, 141; Cesilini and Gherardi 2002; Human Rights Watch 2005, 2). When the Bank reached out to feminist civil society organizations in the 1990s for advice on where to target lending, then, reproductive health was identified as a key priority. But it was one that the government did not support.

These constraints—of an especially tense relationship around reproductive rights and a government especially influenced by the Church's position on gender—were *in addition* to those already identified as structuring the Bank's LAC gender work: the pressure to generate efficiency and to include men. Hence the *Gender Portfolio Review*, written by the then-head of the LAC Gender Unit, used all of the arguments identified in previous chapters about the need to increase women's labor force participation, the importance of a "true" gender perspective requiring attention to men, and the benefits to be

gained—in terms of both efficiency and empowerment—from encouraging partnership (Correia 1999).<sup>18</sup> However, it also devoted extended attention to reproductive health as a key GAD priority (e.g., 16). Furthermore, the Bank funded a number of reproductive health interventions toward the end of the 1990s,<sup>19</sup> and it collaborated with Argentina's National Women's Council (the Consejo Nacional de la Mujer, henceforth the CNM) to produce material on reproductive health issues.<sup>20</sup> At this time staff were looking for a project to reflect the Bank's commitment "to incorporate gender more explicitly in Bank financed-projects" (World Bank 2001c, 4), and it was clear that this would have reproductive rights as a central theme.

The Family Strengthening and Social Capital Promotion Project, PROFAM, emerged out of this context. This was a US \$6.72 million initiative involving a US \$5 million loan from the Bank. It was administered by the CNM and ran between November 2001 and December 2006. PROFAM aimed to facilitate the launch of gender equity and family-strengthening initiatives involving local governments, NGOs, and community organizations (World Bank 2001c, 8). It pledged to "strengthen family cohesion [and] solidarity between male and female members" of households (World Bank 2000b, 1), to "test the hypothesis that the promotion of a more cohesive and less segregated family life will positively impact the ability of families to face challenges posed by poverty" (3). Its key performance indicators included: "a) improved awareness among beneficiary families about the importance of gender equity and cohesive family practices as means of reducing their vulnerability," a decrease in domestic violence, and "improved evidence of responsible parenthood among beneficiary families . . . through: i) increase in father's involvement in childcare and support" (World Bank 2001c, 2).

PROFAM—like PRODEPINE—was a learning and innovation loan (LIL), a designation that allows for fast-tracking through the Bank's extensive bureaucracy. The theory is that a small project can be launched quickly and scaled up afterward, used as a learning experience to inform the Bank's larger loans. LILs are hence important manifestations of policy entrepreneurship around new issues in development to which the Bank is paying attention. PROFAM was intended to contribute to the Bank's learning about social capital promotion, links between poverty and gender segregation, and advocacy for a new role for the public sector in "foster[ing] a stronger sense of family and community at local levels" (World Bank 2000b, 5–6).

Moreover, “Since there is limited operational experience with an integrated approach to families focusing on both male and female perspectives, the LIL would provide a learning opportunity for mainstreaming gender in future operations” (6). Thus, although PROFAM was a very small loan, dwarfed by the US \$300 million provincial roads project approved by the Bank in 1997, for example, it was intended to have a large impact, and it is a critical case study for the Bank’s current gender work.

### **Framing PROFAM, Constructing a Project Alliance**

According to a range of interviewees involved at the start of the project, PROFAM was an attempt to support reproductive health projects and serve civil society groups working in gender. The Project Information Document cited findings from the *Gender Portfolio Review* regarding poor women’s lack of access to reproductive health information and high rates of teen pregnancy (World Bank 2000b, 2), and reproductive health concerns were central to the social assessment annex in the project appraisal (2001c, 24). Improved reproductive and maternal health were also listed among the desired development outcomes in the Bank’s online project description,<sup>21</sup> and reproductive health was the first subtheme mentioned in the project’s appraisal, before domestic violence, maternal and paternal responsibility, child welfare, or education (2001c, 22).

However, Bank staff and their domestic feminist allies recognized that this could generate controversy, and that a collaborative stance was necessary to overcome potential objections (World Bank 2001c, 16). The emphasis on collaboration was in keeping with the Bank’s broader approach to encouraging country ownership of the GAD agenda and its belief that “a clearly focused, relatively uncontroversial, flexible strategy that fits with prevailing national values may be more successful than a direct challenge to vested interests” (World Bank 2005b, 16–17). However, it was considered to be particularly important in PROFAM, because staff knew that they had to pitch the project to a government heavily influenced by the Church and to a CNM that had been divided and seriously weakened by controversies over reproductive rights.<sup>22</sup> Hence, PROFAM was shaped preemptively to avoid conflict and to bring potential opponents on board as allies.

In particular, PROFAM used the language of family strengthening because it was associated with the Church and its concerns with family breakdown and disintegration of gender roles. As one

interviewee put it when asked where the emphasis on family strengthening came from in PROFAM, “That was a way of utilizing a word that was acceptable to all the sectors that might react badly to a discussion of reproductive health.” Or as another explained when asked what the language of family strengthening meant in Argentina:

It has to do with powers associated with the Church, which is very strong in Argentina. Although Argentina is constitutionally a secular state, it sustains the Catholic religion. It sustains Catholicism economically, and the Catholic religion sustains the Argentine state . . . The gender stereotypes linked to Church’s conceptualization are very strong. The discussion of family has to do with this way of thinking, and *the notion that the family is in crisis stems from this conceptualization.* (Emphasis added.)

When Bank staff promised the government lessons on how to recuperate damaged family relationships (World Bank 2001c, 6) in a project entitled PROFAM, they were thus speaking a policy language intended to appeal to an organized religious constituency.

Furthermore, the *Gender Portfolio Review*—written up while PROFAM was being formulated and intended to advocate for it—concluded with a list of recommendations for future gender interventions that clearly reflects an attempt at alliance building with *Cáritas*, the main vehicle for Catholic welfare service provision in Argentina. Work on the theme of “family capacity, gender relations, and household structure” was the first “priority action” in the report, described thusly:

The fragility of poor families is a salient problem in Argentina, affecting men and women . . . Programs to strengthen and develop the capacity of the family and improve the quality of life of its members should be fundamental priorities in Argentina. Specifically, those programs should try to strengthen family capacity, increase equity between the genders in decision-making and family responsibilities . . . promote responsible maternity and paternity, and help youth to face life decisions, among other things. A precedent for this type of activity exists. For example, *Cáritas* parrochias in the NOA [Northwest] are carrying out integrated family development projects through community kitchens. Through capacity-building activities, assessment, informational and promotional activities the projects have generated positive changes in family members’ self esteem, values,

behaviors, addictions, and in the division of labor in the home. Specifically, there has been a change in men's role in childcare and child rearing and in their participation in community activities, with important implications for the lives of working women. These results have had an important impact on family stability and well-being. (Correia 1999, 25–26)

Cáritas representatives were also cited in the report to support the position that poor men's higher rates of violence, depression, and suicide were due to their inability to support their families.

Of course, a range of other actors *also* argue that the family is in crisis because of neoliberal reform; I was told this by some feminists, by some NGOs expressing hostility to feminists, by some community-based organizations, *and* by some of those associated with the Church. As the conclusion and recommendation section to the *Gender Portfolio Review* summarized, many “sources in Argentina working at the community level . . . recognize a crisis in family structure, particularly among the poor” (Correia 1999, 23). The Bank's PROGEN consultants also convened a workshop with the CNM in November 2002 on *Familia y género: aportes a una política integral* (Family and Gender: Support for an Integrated Social Policy), bringing together feminist activists and academics to share perspectives on family policy. They asserted from the outset that “it is essential that policy and program design incorporate perspectives regarding the democratization of gender roles and the equitable distribution of rights and responsibilities in the family sphere” (Abán at al. 2003, 9). This language was also being used by the United Nations in projects on democratization of the family (Di Marco, Faur, and Méndez 2005).

As I have argued in previous chapters, family strengthening is also a distinctively *Bank* language, and Bank gender staff could draw on well-rehearsed *internal* arguments about families as key social safety net mechanisms, and about a crisis in gender relations and poor men's irresponsible behavior when framing the project. For example, PROFAM intended to “avoid prolonging clientelistic relations among [the] poor” (World Bank 2000b, 4), “mov[ing] away from client-oriented solutions that may foster dependency . . . and toward innovative interventions that foster the active participation of families themselves in the design and implementation . . . of programs” (World Bank 2001c, 5). In this way “full responsibility” would be given to beneficiaries (14), ensuring their empowerment—a classic model of inclusion as

increased reponsibilization. Similarly, staff claimed that PROFAM would provide economic benefits through

important lessons on how to identify and overcome obstacles that segregated gender roles pose to reducing the vulnerability of poor families. These obstacles may be overcome with actions such as providing access to reproductive information and responsibilities to women *and* men or promoting a more balanced division of intra-household work, thus improving women's opportunities in the labor market. (World Bank 2001c, 6; original emphasis)

These benefits included supporting heads of family affected by high unemployment in adapting to new roles (7)<sup>23</sup> and improving income-generating opportunities for women (10). Indeed, the CNM was sought out as a partner for PROFAM by the Bank<sup>24</sup> on the grounds that it used

a gender perspective to address disparities and/or inequities between men and women, rather than only focus on women's issues. The policies it has adopted have the common aim of promoting shared responsibility among men and women within the concept of citizenship. In practical terms, this has meant a response to poverty based on a strategy that emphasizes the inclusion of men in household chores and child care, the expansion of opportunities for women in the labor market and public decision-making and, for the couple, more conscious reproductive and health choices. (World Bank 2001c, 4)

The Bank's preference for partner agencies that linked women's increased labor force participation to men's integration into caring is very clear here, as it was with CONAMU; such deliverables appealed within the Bank as well as outside, because the organization had its own priorities concerning male inclusion and balanced partnerships.

Finally, PROFAM was framed within the Bank in terms of social capital promotion. Like "family strengthening," "social capital" is a vague phrase, and some feminists saw it as a savvy strategic term.<sup>25</sup> As the project information document explained: "Work conducted in the Bank demonstrates that a community with a high level of social capital is more likely to organize itself, defining and pursuing common goals" (World Bank 2000b, 3).<sup>26</sup> Specifically, a 2000 Social Capital Survey in Argentina showed that the diversity and frequency of networking among the poor was lower than among the rich; 32.8

percent of those in the lowest income quintile socialized with friends, as opposed to 59.5 percent of those in the highest (3). Participation in family activities was also lower. However, the poor who did participate in organizations were more likely to be involved in philanthropic or religious groups. For the Bank's PROFAM designers:

These results indicate that generosity may be a characteristic of the poor, and that there is a need for actions that mobilize and expand this generous characteristic of their social capital by: a) supporting civil society organizations which are community based and able to enrich family and community life; and b) supporting actions that bridge gaps between poor families and community and service organizations. (3)

In these ways, PROFAM clearly demonstrates that the Bank's work on gender, poverty reduction, social capital promotion, and family strengthening is tightly interconnected and that its partnership promotion agenda hails a broad but very robust policy alliance. More importantly, however, PROFAM provides a crucial site in which to analyze what the languages of family strengthening and social capital promotion meant in *implementation* and to study the alliances generated in practice. How are projects reliant on ideas about gender crisis affected by macroeconomic crisis? How will work to strengthen the family "be translated into policy, and how will it would square with the efforts of women's organizations whose work departs from rather different assumptions" (Molyneux 2002, 184)? Put more directly, "Who decides what particular forms of social capital need strengthening, which associations to support, which norms and principles of co-operation are to be upheld, and through the intervention of which external agencies?" (176). PROFAM is an excellent place to start looking for those answers.

### **Chaotic Seizures of Space: From Design to Implementation**

A key critical assumption of the PROFAM's design matrix was "no major economic and social crisis" (World Bank 2001c, 18). When this assumption proved spectacularly wrong one month after the loan was approved by government, the project had to be rethought. PROFAM had convened a meeting in 2001 for interested organizations and had approved subprojects, but the initiative was stalled as a result of the economic crisis. The state was left scrambling to implement emergency social safety net provisions through whatever channels were already in place, leading to redesignation of funds in some

international projects and abandonment of other initiatives. PROFAM was in fact classified as unsatisfactory by the Bank in 2002 due to irregularities and problems with disbursement of funds, but the project was revived after the election of Néstor Kirchner in 2003. He appointed a new president to the CNM and relocated it within the National Council for Social Policy Coordination, headed by his sister Alicia. This meant that PROFAM was increasingly linked to the state's social development agenda and was given a far higher profile. PROFAM's project parameters were already slack—the appraisal document made it clear that organizations “that lack experience in the incorporation of a gender approach” (World Bank 2001c, 21) could be funded if their ideas met other requirements (such as offering to improve community networking)—but they were expanded particularly widely after 2003. A new administrative team was brought in to execute the initiative, whose peso funding had now tripled,<sup>27</sup> and femocrats exhausted themselves in resurrecting it from the dead. A new call for projects was issued in 2003, and PROFAM ended up funding 238 projects reaching 140,000 families, or 700,000 individuals. This was a substantial upscaling from the 100 subprojects promised in the 2001 appraisal (World Bank 2001c, 19), and it left many staff burnt out. Due to staff turnovers and its own waning influence over the government, the Bank took a very limited role in project supervision, except with respect to reimbursement and



Figure 10—Women involved in a leather microenterprise display their work (from PROFAM DVDs).

accounting standards.<sup>28</sup> Bank staff had no direct role in choosing which organizations received money, and—unlike with PRODEPINE—they rarely interacted with local-level grant recipients.

Innovative seizures of space were made possible in this context, and there were a vast range of projects funded using PROFAM money, including workshops on women's leadership and women's rights as citizens and training for community health promoters (see figures 10 through 13 for the range of projects supported). I interviewed activists in the fight to legalize abortion who had used PROFAM money to run reproductive health seminars and women who had deployed the language of "family strengthening" to facilitate survivors leaving abusive men. Organizations that were highly critical of the Bank were also involved in the project. As one interviewee put it:

It caused us to have a lot of ideological discussions, to work with World Bank money. It wasn't easy for us or for many gender organizations . . . It was difficult, but if we hadn't accepted it, others would have, and would have spent the money badly, so one can't be so narrow-minded [*uno tampoco puede ser tan puro de pensar*].

Or consider the words of another (working for a different organization), when asked whether there was anything else she would like to say about PROFAM at the close of an interview:



Figure 11—Women participate in a hairdressing project funded by PROFAM (from PROFAM DVDs).

I'd like to tell you about this conflictual and difficult relationship that existed between women's organizations and the World Bank. The majority of us work in social and political organizations. We are against neoliberalism. We have participated in Latin American spaces, such as the World Social Forum that took place in Porto Alegre and that criticized these types of policies. So the relationship that existed with this project was not easy, because it was an ethical question as well. But I believe that what we achieved through this conflictual relationship was that the funds we obtained could be used in the way we felt they should be used, and towards the ends we felt they should be used for. If it had been otherwise I believe that we would not have done it. If we had had conditions on what we could do, or what we could say, we would not have done it.

The project also created space for a range of organizations to interact and to learn from one another. Often they took solace from learning that others also had to fight constantly for reimbursements, but the interactions could be more substantive, as explained to me by a woman working in a Church project with the mothers of young drug addicts:

**Bedford:** Could you tell me about your experiences at the meeting of projects in 2006?

**X:** For me it was extremely interesting. I'm going to tell you a nice little moment: I went with two other women in the project,



Figure 12—Women attend a reproductive health workshop sponsored by PROFAM (from PROFAM DVDs).

there was a table where two girls were sat, we asked if we could sit with them, and they said yes. They introduced themselves, and one of them said to me “[her name]” and offered me her hand, and said “sex worker.” And I said to her “Oh, so you are a social worker?” “No, no, a *sex* worker.” (Original emphasis.)<sup>29</sup>

She was laughing at herself as she relayed this interaction with her tablemates (representatives of a union of sex workers that had received PROFAM funding for sex education work and initiatives to counter-act police violence), but she closed by saying, very seriously, that she had learned the following from it:

Definitely, we spoke of the same thing. Of the marginalization of women, of the space that women simply don’t have. Really, we spoke of the same thing. It was very nice.

Others confirm that women got space to come together and share experiences through PROFAM, in classic consciousness-raising form. For example, one group that organized workshops giving women the opportunity to participate in nondomestic space reported back to the CNM that women’s attitudes had changed substantially as a result of their involvement. Before, they were ashamed of talking in front of people they did not know, but by the end they



Figure 13—Women gather for a domestic violence discussion group funded by PROFAM (from PROFAM DVDs).

were giving community workshops on gender equity and participating in radio programs. The DVDs produced by PROFAM contain many moving testimonies by women who had their dignity and self-worth affirmed in the project in these ways. I was directed to these DVDs by several interviewees, including those at the Bank; when asked about PROFAM's impact one person responded:

When you see the videos you are going to understand what I'm saying. There are women who say "I didn't know that I could do that; I didn't know that that existed; I didn't know." These women are never going to be the same; now there has been a break in their life. And I think that this is very important.

One woman featured repeatedly in the DVDs, Gladys, spoke of overcoming her shame at speaking of sexual health and of her pride in learning about her body. She subsequently became a community health promoter, sharing knowledge about contraception with others. Another woman, Angela, passed on the reproductive rights leaflets that she had received from PROFAM to her niece, so that she would know her rights regarding pregnancy and domestic abuse (PROFAM 2006, DVD 1, Cortos). She also relayed the following conversation with her husband:

I told him that I had formed a work team with the other women. He said "but I told you not to do that," and I said to him "No, you told me *your* opinion, but it's *my* decision. [Chuckled, along with other women.] "Ah well, if it's like that, it's like that." And, well, he accepted the decision. (DVD 4, *Apoyo a la producción: testimonios*; original emphasis)

I mention these examples to *start out* analysis of PROFAM's implementation by recognizing that it provided space for diverse interventions that deserve generously spirited analysis. Moreover, these are the stories PROFAM is telling about itself. The sex workers mixed with the self-described Church ladies,<sup>30</sup> community-based organizations mixed with middle-class NGOs, everyone got to participate, and the Bank took a back seat, funneling money to a state women's agency to use in response to community need. On these grounds the project is positioned as a model for client-led GAD interventions, and the Bank appears to have played a benevolent, unobtrusive role.

I want to suggest that PROFAM is more interesting and more complicated than this reading suggests, however. Specifically, notwithstanding the diversity of initiatives funded and the space created for

progressive seizure, there were other commonalities present in the project that warrant critical attention from those interested in crisis, gender, and political economy. These commonalities raise crucial questions about the policy alliances underpinning family-strengthening lending, and they direct our attention to the multifaceted ways in which crisis affects gender interventions.

### **The Increasing Role of the Catholic Church**

One key crisis-related shift in PROFAM was the increasing influence of the Catholic Church in the subprojects approved. The Catholic Church's influence over reproductive rights policy, HIV/AIDS policy, and sexual justice issues in Argentina has been much critiqued.<sup>31</sup> PROFAM was framed in this milieu, and, as mentioned, the Bank's gender staff ran the proposed project past *Cáritas* before they submitted it for formal approval. A local *Cáritas* office also got a project approved in the first round to prevent teenage pregnancy and to provide services for teenage mothers and fathers. Organizers submitted an application to PROFAM because they already worked in family strengthening, and "90% of our volunteers are women, and 90% of the beneficiaries of our activities are women, so we have been working with the theme of gender for more than a decade." The project tried to encourage male partners to attend pre- and post-birth health sessions, and it facilitated reproductive rights workshops using curriculum designed in *Cáritas*'s headquarters in Spain. The workshops included discussion of the influence of "post-modern society on youth and sexual values."

Many self-identified feminists involved in the early stages felt that involving the Church in these ways was a savvy move. As one interviewee put it:

This is the thing: any organization could take part in PROFAM, and in fact there were many organizations related to the Catholic Church that presented projects. . . . In fact the Church never complained about the loan . . . Because it was so open, an ultra-feminist organization could present an ultra-feminist proposal, and a Catholic organization could present a proposal oriented towards Catholicism.

Some feminist NGOs agreed, saying that they simply used the project's Church-based language to do what they wanted to do anyway, such as teach women their rights to prosecute abusers or to distribute condoms.

However, others were concerned at the Church-influenced framing of PROFAM, worried it could backfire if the project's leadership changed. As one interviewee (involved from the beginning) explained:

**X:** Strengthening the family could be to change gender roles, or not. Herein lies all the ambiguity of these formulations . . . I always found this formulation quite risky, even the name of the project, pro-family, PROFAM. It was from one point of view, if you like, risky.

**Bedford:** In what way?

**X:** Because the formulation could be a strategy, part of a formula that could be very progressive, in the sense of incorporating reproductive rights, but in the hands of another person who wanted to turn the text around and take a more religious or traditional approach, it's an extremely risky instrument or tool.

Economic and political crisis altered the environment within which these risks played out, changing the uneasy equilibrium between progressive and conservative visions of family strengthening evident in the design phase and giving the Catholic Church far more power in the project than it had at the start (when, we should recall, it had veto power). The Church had already been reinvigorated during the 1990s as Menem allied the state to the Vatican in his opposition to reproductive rights and as church-based organizations became increasingly central to social service delivery given the neoliberal emphasis on localization and self-help (Dinatale 2004, 186).<sup>32</sup> This previous expansion in the Church's role facilitated the extension of its influence over social policy after the 2001 meltdown, when it was given a formal part to play in the state's emergency response. In 2002 President Duhalde set up *la Mesa de Diálogo Argentino*, involving the National Executive, the United Nations, key union leaders, and the Catholic Church (37, 50). The Church was thereby given a key role by the government in redesigning the state's emergency assistance policies, and it was a pivotal supporter of the Heads of Household Program. From 2002 on, then, the Church became more directly involved in the development of social plans (186), and *Cáritas*, with a presence in 3,371 *parroquias* nationwide and able to mobilize some 30,000 volunteers, has been a particularly attractive conduit for the delivery of state services to the poor. This had led to concerns that it is being drawn into clientelistic relations with the

state and is at risk of cooptation (187–189; Auyero 2001, 87–89). Its leaders deny this, with one *Cáritas* priest working in a poor neighborhood telling a researcher: “The whole world knows that I’m not involved in politics and that the Church doesn’t involve itself in politics” (Dinatale 2004, 187; citing Auyero’s ethnography).<sup>33</sup>

At the same time, however, the whole world also knows that the Catholic Church in Argentina is heavily involved in *gender* politics. As one NGO representative explained:

The Church has a strong presence, so there are issues, like the question of reproductive health, that are difficult to touch on. . . . For example, we can’t use or publish leaflets which address the question of contraceptive methods openly in the community . . . We do it in much smaller workshops, directly with women and families. But in a project description, to say, “We’ll work on contraceptive methods through massive campaigns”—it couldn’t be done.

Kirchner’s government walked a fine line in this respect between advocating an increased state role in reproductive health provision, while trying to avoid a direct confrontation with the Church over abortion.<sup>34</sup> However, in 2003, in what appeared to have been a conciliatory move toward conservatives, Kirchner gave control of the CNM to María Lucila (“Pimpi”) Colombo, a woman with strong links to the Catholic Church who had opposed the reproductive rights legislation brought to the floor when she was a Buenos Aires senator. She belonged to the Nueva Dirigencia Party, created by conservative activist Catholic Gustavo Beliz (Lopreite 2006, 15). She was also a key activist in the housewives’ movement, SACRA, which advocates for recognition of women’s unpaid work and pensions for housewives. When I visited the CNM office in 2007, I was given a leaflet explaining SACRA’s work, containing quotations from those considered key supporters of the housewives’ cause: it included Eva Perón,<sup>35</sup> University of Chicago economist Gary Becker, and the Pope (SACRA nd).

As a result of these changes, Church-based organizations were far more prominent in the second *convocatoria* (when Colombo was running the CNM) than in the first. The self-described Church ladies got their initiative for discussion groups with mothers of drug addicts; this was an extension of a long-running Church project working with disadvantaged youth. SACRA got money for a microenterprise project in

which women sewed baby clothes; this was featured on the DVDs put out to celebrate PROFAM. The DVDs also highlighted a project with youth carried out in a Catholic church; footage shows the facilitator sitting in front of a notice about the catechism while explaining how young people designed gender equity materials (PROFAM 2006 DVD 4, Salud).

I note these shifts not to impugn projects carried out by Church-affiliated organizations, many of which have played a key role in providing services to the poor. The people managing these projects repeatedly affirmed that they were nonjudgmental in their approach and that they did not impose a narrow definition of what counted as “family.” Rather, I note them in part because the increasing involvement of such organizations in PROFAM caused consternation among self-identified feminist groups involved at the start—they are, perhaps understandably, hypercautious about the role of the Church in gender work given their experiences in the struggle to legalize abortion, and some of their representatives expressed considerable anger about the issue.

Most importantly, however, I draw attention to these shifts because they were *not* considered a problem by the Bank, despite the fact that PROFAM was—like all Bank work—expressly forbidden from funding religious activities. This disjuncture is in part explained by the fact that the Catholic Church’s role as a social service provider has been so normalized in recent years that it may not be marked as a religious institution, a fact that causes resentment among evangelicals as well as those demanding a stricter separation of all religions from the state.<sup>36</sup> But it also reflects the fact that the directions in which PROFAM was being steered through the Church’s participation were not marked as religious directions. To the Bank, it is secular common sense that gender was about sharing balance, that the family had been destroyed by economic crisis and needed strengthening through the encouragement of loving couplehood, that poverty policy was a space for advice on responsible parenting and promotion of fatherhood. The fact that these conversations have been central tenets of the Catholic Church’s teachings in Latin America escapes comment (except by feminists). As a result, the links between the Bank’s efforts to generate inclusive, balanced development through forging new loving partnerships between men and women, and the re-Catholicization of social service provision in Argentina escape scrutiny, because the common sense about partnering harmony is not marked as religiously inflected.

## **PROFAM and the Restoration of Argentine Values: State Projects of Family Strengthening and Resilience**

Second, the wide range of meanings attached to the term *family strengthening* narrowed during the course of the project, as a result of the Kirchner government's investment in an approach to gender policy as about restoring family unity in response to economic crisis. There already existed widespread concern from a range of actors that neoliberalism had harmed the family. PROFAM's preparatory documents cited research showing the decline of the breadwinner-housewife unit,<sup>37</sup> for example, and they argued that the poor had not shared in Argentina's progress on gender issues, because their families were too large and were being plunged into crisis (World Bank 2000b, 2). However, the 2001 crash intensified alarm about gender crisis, and Kirchner's government appealed to this heavily in its conversations about recovery. In the 2006 CAS the government described its development approach as focused on repairing and rebuilding the social fabric (Annex A in World Bank 2006, 72), and social programs were reorganized into a federal network with three core plans: food security, local development and social economy, and family and community. The CNM's mission was redesigned in accordance with the latter plan, "focused on the need to strengthen the role of the family in a context of economic and social fragmentation, while reforming traditional gender roles" (Lopreite 2006, 15). For example, Kirchner's foreword to a PROFAM-funded booklet (bearing the World Bank's logo) on the Inter-American Belem Convention on Violence Against Women argued that the state's work in ensuring equal rights requires "a common effort to strengthen our cultural identity . . . to recuperate, in the interior of every Argentine family, genuine values of solidarity, hope and respect for others" (Kirchner 2005, 4). Meanwhile, Alicia Kirchner and Pimpi Colombo explained in their section of the leaflet: "Our work today takes place in an Argentina that, over a period of decades, was economically devastated and had its cultural identity damaged by a neoliberal model that has erased the concept of work in the foundations of many families" (Colombo and Kirchner 2005, 5). In this context:

To advance in the construction of family ties free of violence means the construction of a new model of social contract based on the full and equal participation of men and women in the social, political, economic and cultural life of the country. It means, in addition, recuperating the vanguard role that our

country had at one time, with women's vote and social rights, since it expresses the continuity of a national project, in constant transformation, reconstructing the culture of work and strengthening Argentine families. (6)

These themes were made central to PROFAM after 2003. Alicia Kirchner, who features prominently in the DVDs put out to celebrate the project's achievements, described PROFAM as part of broader reconstruction of the social fabric, strengthening the social links that connect people to each other:

Within this work in our communities, the key is the family, of this there is no doubt . . . If one wants to change reality, one has to work together with the family, *together* with the family, *with* the family. (PROFAM 2006 DVD 2; original vocal emphasis)

As she explained in the DVD on support for production, this was a national project linked to the revival of Argentine values, which had been hurt after years of neoliberalism. Reform "made us believe that others are worth more than argentinos, it made us lose our values. This project is part of a reconstitution of values" (PROFAM 2006 DVD 3, *Apoyo a la producción*).

While it is tempting to read this as a nostalgic reinvestment in conservative gender ideologies, the administration's gender project also rested centrally on Argentina's past commitment to women's equality. Argentina has positioned itself as a vanguard nation in this respect, and Eva Perón is frequently deployed as an emblem of the country's progressive gender stance. Hence, one PROFAM-funded leaflet on the CNM identified Argentina as a "forerunner in the promotion of equality," in part due to Evita's work on social and political rights for women (CNM 2005, np). Although Evita is a contradictory and complex figure for Argentine feminists,<sup>38</sup> women's role in Peronist networks is legitimized through her example, and throughout the 1990s the state's social programs were administered by women who consciously invoked her image. This is so common that Javier Auyero writes of female Peronist party brokers "performing Evita," with the dyed blonde hair and the assertions of loving the poor as their children, providing a "bridge of love" between the party and its people (Auyero 2001, 141–149). Indeed, the president of the CNM performed Evita well in the DVDs put out to celebrate PROFAM (Figure 14). In footage shot in the CNM headquarters, Colombo presented PROFAM's achievements sitting in front of a large portrait of Evita (hanging above a nativity scene placed on the



Figure 14—President of CNM reports on PROFAM (from PROFAM DVDs).

sideboard). In some shots Colombo's head covered Evita's face, with the blonde hair of the image poking out behind (PROFAM 2006, DVD 2).

In addition to turning to *Evita*, PROFAM's new administrators also introduced the concept of resilience to the project, absent from discussions in the planning stages. An example of a project that used this language to get funding was one proposed by an organization that aimed to resolve problems of women's low self esteem "because history repeats itself: single mother, addicted youths, prostitution, women without decision making power over their children's welfare, etc." The organization got money through PROFAM to work with groups of young people, including a high number of single mothers, in workshops on reproductive health, responsible maternity and paternity, and resilience. The workshops on resilience aimed "to rescue and strengthen the human potential of participants, to enable them to orient themselves to new paths and change their attitudes towards the future." It was hoped that participants would learn responsible parenthood and the importance of raising children within a family environment; that single mothers would learn how to avoid unwanted pregnancy and how to offer their children the love and care they deserve; and that all those involved "would be capable of surviving and overcoming adversity, utilizing the creativity and potentiality hidden in their spirit, leaving them strengthened and able to face life."

The language of resilience was also used by projects aiming to restore the principle of family meals to poor households. One such initiative, in Misiones, received considerable coverage in the DVD on “Impacts”; it was the only example given of PROFAM’s long-term results. The local coordinator explained:

One of the things that we realized when we made the visit [to the community] . . . is that the table as an object had disappeared from the homes; a decade of community kitchens meant that the mother did not cook, that the table was not used as a communal space, where family and social and community problems were discussed . . . So what we proposed was how to go back to eating as a family. (PROFAM 2006)

The project ensured that women got access to fresh vegetables, so they could cook nutritious meals for their families. State-funded community kitchens were closed, changed into family gardens. In this way, the project aimed “to recuperate the family table, as a space of dignity. And the people wanted that: they wanted to recuperate their dignity.” I encountered another version of this project in a Buenos Aires suburb, launched by a well-established NGO that had not previously done work dedicated to gender. It too initiated an effort to restore the principle of family meals, considered to have been undermined by the community kitchens that had sustained poor neighborhoods since the 1990s. Such interventions were enabled in the second phase of the project, once family restoration had been articulated as a national project of Argentine recovery in the aftermath of crisis.

### **The Increasing Emphasis on Microenterprise**

A third, and connected, crisis-related shift in PROFAM was the increased emphasis on microenterprise projects evident in the second phase. While the first projects approved were dominated by reproductive health initiatives, gender capacity building, and domestic violence interventions, many of those successful in the second *convocatoria* focused on productive activities, although this arena of activity was barely mentioned in project preparation materials. Microenterprise projects also featured heavily in the DVDs produced by the CNM to document the project’s achievements; two of the nine were focused on “support for production,” and large sections of others included footage of microenterprise projects or interviews with participants (see Figures 10 through 12). The first short on the DVD,

designed to provide an overview of the project, was on microenterprise; this opened with Colombo explaining: "Everyone knows that one of the CNM's main objectives is to improve women's standing in the labor market" (PROFAM 2006 DVD, Cortos). A woman named Angela was featured on five of the nine DVDs; a mother who had suffered depression when at home with her children, she was involved in a group working in leather production (Figure 10). The DVD of shorts featured her crying, stroking her son's head, and explaining that the microenterprise project had given her not simply the tools she needed to work but also the tools to wake herself up, to face things in her life: "I didn't just learn how to work with leather; this workshop gave me back the dignity of being a woman."

This shift toward productive projects reflected increased state interest in microenterprise as a crucial component of Argentina's reconstructed social safety net. Although microenterprise initiatives had long been part of the state's repertoire of social programs,<sup>39</sup> Duhalde's government turned to productive projects intently after the crisis and asked that PROFAM's parameters be altered to permit this focus. Kirchner's social development council also championed this type of intervention, and many of PROFAM's productive subprojects were done in conjunction with the government's Hands to Work (Plan Nacional Manos a la Obra) Program, under the control of Kirchner's sister. For its part, the Bank had long urged social fund lending to move away from income-maintenance programs, toward efforts to incorporate the poor into productive activity (Cornia 2001).<sup>40</sup> Therefore, although there was no mention of microenterprise in early project documents, the Bank offered no resistance to the change in focus.

The civil society organizations able to take advantage of this new space, because of their experience in microenterprise, had typically not worked on gender before PROFAM. Thus the project's productive interventions were overwhelmingly gender normative, focused on cooking, handicrafts, hairdressing, sewing, and so on. They aimed largely to support and value women's existing roles.<sup>41</sup> As the CNM's president explained, PROFAM aimed "to recuperate those skills that women already have in their everyday lives, in work that is not recognized but in which all of us are involved" (PROFAM 2006 DVD, Cortos). In turn, the DVD on support for production opened with a voiceover affirming that "the majority of women do their work silently, in their homes and families. Many of them need an opportunity to discover their strengths and potential" (PROFAM 2006

DVD 3, *Apoyo a la producción*). Women's economic autonomy was sought within this frame. Hence, one project featured on the DVDs organized women to work in handicrafts, knitting, clothing, and crochet, because these were arenas in which they were understood to already have skills, while another (not featured) trained unemployed female heads of household in textile production.

Many of these initiatives were criticized by organizations that had received money in the first round for providing inadequate solutions to poverty and for further overburdening women. As one interviewee put it, furiously:

How many bakeries run by the poor can you put in place to sell bread to the poor? Listen to me: how many? And how are they going to work, in a neighborhood where you have five bakeries run by the poor selling to the poor? It's madness.  
*[Es una cosa de locos.]*

In these ways debate about women's participation in PROFAM's microenterprise initiatives is linked to a much larger discussion about the emancipatory potential of women's inclusion in community antipoverty initiatives (Lind 2005; Molyneux 2006). Such debates are particularly important in Argentina given the crucial role of poor women in sustaining state social programs in the 1990s and the complex ways in which informal networks have been mobilized to secure survival. As Auyero points out in his ethnography of clientelist networks in Buenos Aires, there has been an institutionalization of "survival problem solving" through personalized political mediation in a broader context of increased unemployment, poverty, and state retrenchment (Auyero 2001, 27). Women are hailed for inclusion in such networks, securing benefits for family members through participation in state programs, and they are often key Peronist brokers in poor neighborhoods. For example, Argentina's government-supported poverty assistance program, Plan Vida, was administered by 22,500 unpaid residents, most of whom were women (Feijóo 2001 in Molyneux 2002, 178; Auyero 2001; Dinatale 2004). PROFAM's microcredit initiatives were seen by some to epitomize the *assistencialist* and gender-normative tendencies of such efforts to include the poor, and they were frequently criticized for adding yet further burdens to already exhausted women.

However, PROFAM did, to some extent, attempt to grapple with this problem. After all, concerns about women's work burden

and the need for the family to draw together to face adversity were central to the loan from the start. Hence, several of the projects involving youth aimed at restoring family harmony by teaching young people to support women's involvement in income-generating work. One community organization described its workshop activities with youth thusly:

To work with the family in relation to the role of women who leave to go to work or who want to set up their own business . . . We did workshops with kids: how do they feel when their Mum leaves? How can they understand that this same mother, who until they were 10 years old was always at home, now has to go out and work for eight hours, or she has to set up her own business, and she is occupied by other things now and can not be there as much? How do the man and the children cope with this woman's new role? . . . The workshops had children doing learning activities that permitted them to understand and help their mother. So that you didn't end up with a battle ground in the family because the mother wants to go to work.

In contrast, there was no systematic effort made within PROFAM to provide child care services for women working in microenterprises, and the women featured in the DVDs on productive work were interviewed with their children sitting on their laps. I interviewed an NGO that had used PROFAM money to train women to take care of children during community workshops, but the money was only for the training—the actual provision of care was done by women as volunteers. As PROFAM got more involved in productive activities, then, it responded to the ensuing tensions between paid and unpaid care by promoting family responsibility and voluntary work, not nurseries.

### **Male Inclusion: Visible Partners, Invisible Rapists, and Contested Space**

Finally, it is worth considering the complex ways in which men were both included and made invisible in PROFAM, because the involvement of adult men in family-strengthening activities had been a priority from the start. Early project documents affirmed: "It is important that the LIL target males as well as females because gender is a relational category" (World Bank 2001c, 26), and they suggested

initiatives such as domestic violence programs targeting men and women; after-school programs for children with learning disabilities involving both parents; and discussion groups for men and women on reproductive health and responsible parenthood (7). Framing the project as “a large umbrella,” under which any conception of family was viable, one interviewee also noted that the emphasis on male inclusion was a particular Bank priority:

**X:** The project wanted to support a conceptualization of gender not in terms of women-only subprojects, but of projects that actively incorporated men; so in this sense the “umbrella” of family incorporated both genders.

**Bedford:** Where did this idea of including men come from?

**X:** This was the Bank’s gender unit’s idea, one I also shared. All the Bank’s documentation on gender . . . has this bias. I can tell you where that came from as well—basically the strategies that are put in place without attention to men are unsuccessful.

The projects chosen to represent PROFAM reflected this definition of family strengthening as one grounded in male-female partnership. For example, the DVDs repeatedly featured a couple working on a garden plot, Angelina and Lorenzo, as posterchildren for the loan’s success (Figure 15). They were included not only in the DVDs



Figure 15—Angelina and Lorenzo in their family garden (from PROFAM DVDs).

on microenterprise but also in those on rights and citizenship and project impacts.

However, male inclusion was a far from trouble-free imperative in PROFAM. Some NGOs were put off applying because they thought they had to promise 50 percent male participation to get money, and project administrators felt sufficiently concerned about this that they explicitly refuted the assumption in order to get proposals submitted. Nonetheless, one established feminist organization in Buenos Aires felt obliged to promise that its reproductive health workshops would target men in the community, despite having tried to do this before and failing miserably. It thus tried to do so again, again failing miserably (by its own evaluation). Men proved extremely hard to mobilize and, although some initiatives involving youth approached gender parity, adult male involvement was nowhere near 50 percent. Organizations that were attracted to PROFAM because of its emphasis on gender balance hence ended up working predominantly with women. For example, representatives of one NGO explained that they had applied for PROFAM money precisely because they agreed with its aim of working on gender issues from a family perspective that did not separate women from men and that favored community integration. Yet females constituted 80 percent of those who attended its workshops, and most of the males involved were children. What came out of their workshop conversations with poor families was a debate about women being overburdened, given that “the family consisted of women and children, and in many cases the situation in the family is that there are no men, or that the men come and go.” Another NGO stated that “our focus on gender should be seen more than anything as part of our work with the family, gender within the family, how the role of women and men plays out within the family.” Yet it identified the inclusion of adult men to be one of the biggest obstacles in their project, such that the organization had to try to “trap men with leisure or family days, or activities carried out by children to which their families were invited; in this way it was possible to establish contact with men and convince them to come to a talk.” The group’s use of PROFAM money to take families on recreational outings in order to restore their unity stemmed in large part from this outreach effort to adult men.<sup>42</sup>

Moreover, women involved in PROFAM did not necessarily share the project’s views on the way in which men should be included. This was particularly evident around the issue of men’s involvement in antiviolence projects. Early PROFAM documents expressed an

intention to include men in domestic violence initiatives and to keep existing families in tact by treating abusers (e.g., World Bank 2001c, 7). This position angered some feminist NGOs, and in criticizing PROFAM one interviewee claimed that a domestic violence project proposed by an organization with over twenty years' experience was rejected on the grounds that "it was discriminatory, that it approached violence only from women's point of view"—reasoning she regarded as preposterous.

However, several other women-focused domestic violence initiatives were funded, and the three DVDs devoted to intrafamily violence overwhelmingly concentrated on women. One featured a woman, Eusebia, who had been abused by her husband and his family; they told her that they could kill her and throw her in the nearby canal and that no one would even come to reclaim her body. Now, she says on the DVD:

I know that if something happens to me, if they do something to me, I have many *compañeras* who know me. They will do something for me, at least they will reclaim me. [Smiling.] It's easier to do things between all the girls. (PROFAM 2006 DVD 2, Rights and Citizenship)

The Tucumán-based group of women with which Eusebia was connected gave sanctuary to a survivor of domestic violence from Buenos Aires who arrived "with nothing but her clothes and her two children." They got her a house and furniture and accompanied her to the local courthouse to protect her from her abuser. Another survivor interviewed on the DVDs seemed equally disinterested in family reconciliation; she was instead very angry that her violent husband had only been jailed after assaulting someone else. The same DVD on family violence also included an interview with a well-known feminist activist commenting on the need for women to take space for themselves and to take control of their lives—her version of including men was to boost women's confidence such that they would leave abusers and that men would hence be facing the prospect of dying alone with no family contact unless they changed. Finally, PROFAM's DVDs included film of a community theater project aiming to raise women's awareness of family violence. All of the people in the performance and the audience were women, and the project showed a woman's experience of getting support from other women. She reported her husband to the police to get him arrested, not to get him treated. Yet again, the local actors involved were not pushing for male inclusion.

Significantly, however, the DVD's narrator spoke over these images, trying to summon a reformable male presence absent from the footage:

Not all cases of violence imply the separation of the couple. In many cases, if the aggressor manages to recognize the problem, he can ask for help and modify his attitude. Argentine law facilitates women filing a complaint in order that the aggressor can get access to treatment. (PROFAM 2006 DVD 6, *Violencia intrafamiliar*)

Immediately after this comment was made, a man was interviewed about his participation in a community discussion group on family (attended by fifty women and three men, including himself). He was included on the grounds that he had learned, through the project, how to relate better to his family, and to no longer use corporal punishment on his children. This interview also took up the first seven minutes on the disk entitled *Testimonios de violencia intrafamiliar* (PROFAM 2006 DVD 7)—a far-from-representative use of the testimonies available.

This man's hypervisibility notwithstanding, however, in other respects male violence was so disruptive to PROFAM's emphasis on family unity and male-female partnership that it was unspeakable, particularly around issues of rape. This was clear from the start, when the project information document cited research on teenage pregnancy showing that the fathers of children born to girls aged nine to thirteen are on average ten years older than the mothers (World Bank 2000b, 2). One interviewee claimed that the message here was clear—these girls had been raped, typically by older family members. However, the PID framed the issue of teenage pregnancy as one about responsible parenting, not male sexual violence, and projects addressing the issue taught contraception. In another example of PROFAM's silence on male sexual violence, a survivor of abuse had her testimony edited to remove reference to her experience of being raped as a child—about which she said she refused to be ashamed and of which she spoke openly, in front of the camera and a group of other women. In the uncut version, she says, "I was never ashamed. [Starts to cry.] I always get upset when I speak of this. [Pause.] I had been raped as a child." She then went on to speak of being physically abused by her husband. The short version cut the reference to the rape, making it appear that her tears, and resistance to shame, were about her husband's abuse. The Bank did not edit the DVD, of course, but it had a key role from the start in framing the

project such that sexual assault was being edited out of conversations, even though women's successes in this arena were clear.

### **Feminist Spaces, Shifting Alliances**

These four shifts in PROFAM altered the alliances between domestic feminists and the Bank evident in 2001 and led to the selective strengthening of certain actors—with certain visions of gender equality—over others. Although feminist NGOs continued to be involved, several interviewees expressed concern at the direction taken in the project as it was upscaled. As one woman put it:

In our first *convocatoria*, the projects that won [funds] were those that we women's organizations consider to have more feminist points of view, those aiming at strengthening women, women's citizenship, female leadership. The second *convocatoria* aimed to strengthen the family and what the Bank called "social capital." In reality those involved were mostly community base organizations, or community projects of organizations that didn't target women as exclusive beneficiaries of their projects, as part of their principal objectives, but rather poor populations, low income and marginal populations. So there were projects like community centers, or social centers; there were projects with children in general, that had some foot in a gender perspective, but it wasn't the principal focus. This was very noticeable between the first and second *convocatoria* . . . In the first, we were all organizations of women and feminists, and in the second stage there were generally territorial organizations, neighborhood organizations, and organizations linked to Argentine structures, like various political parties and Church organizations.

This sense of a shift in PROFAM toward more conservative organizations was noted by several other respondents.

Of course, others gained space for new work with poor communities through PROFAM, and several NGOs working with ideas of family strengthening preferred the language of restoring values and reviving unity among the poor to feminism, understood narrowly as about quotas to benefit richer women. The shift away from funding Buenos Aires-based feminist NGOs (some of whom readily admitted that they had little experience doing community-level work) toward groups with solid grounding among the country's most vulnerable

populations was also interpreted by some administrators as a democratizing move: rather than paying to fly consultants out to do gender training with community groups, money would be given to support those groups directly, in accordance with their needs. In turn, others objected that the “base” NGOs that got funding were hardly neutral representatives of poor women’s interests and reflected sometimes highly conservative gender ideologies. These disputes echo long-standing tensions between mass-based community organizations and self-identified feminist groups that received funds in the first *convocatoria*. My interest is less in who operated as a true interlocutor of Argentina’s gender needs here and more in what sort of networks and organizations were strengthened through PROFAM. As one critic involved in the loan explained, this is a vital question:

I’m a feminist, and I’ve struggled my whole life for women’s rights. The first call [for projects] was a call to women’s organizations, and they really were organizations of women. . . . After, in the second call, whatever random thing came in. For example: children’s homes, the boy scouts, projects managed by a group of women but where there was no gender perspective. This is what I criticized in the second call. . . . And [project administrators] responded to me that I should take this into account, “it’s a way of ensuring those groups can start to have a gender perspective.” Fine, well I’d like to see now if they went back to being what they were before, in a totally *assistentialist* way . . . where the money was used. I’d like to see these women today, and hopefully I’m wrong. It would be a good thing to know what happened today with those organizations.

In keeping with this line of thinking, it is crucial to ask about the broader sustainability of the seizures of space made possible in PROFAM, and the longer-term impact of its successful policy coalition—to ask who benefited in a comprehensive way.

Generally, established NGOs that received project support in the first phase continued to find funding, although not necessarily through the state. Thus, the NGO working on reproductive rights that had felt obliged to include men in its project received further international funding from a major U.S. donor; an NGO doing capacity-building training on women’s leadership received money from Spain. PROFAM did not seem to have affected their strength or weakness in any significant manner. However, some organizations

that were less well-established at the start of the project got a considerable boost through PROFAM—if their activities easily fit PROFAM’s family-strengthening, male-female partnership frame or if they worked on microenterprise. These organizations have since received new funding through much larger social development interventions using the principles of family restoration pioneered in the LIL. For example, a provincial NGO that received money from PROFAM for a HIV/AIDS project and workshops on gender with women and youth to “facilitate the exchange of opinions on gender inequalities and the need for dialogue about sexuality and emotions and feelings [*afectividad*]” subsequently received money from a provincial antidrugs program. The NGO produced leaflets warning that drug abuse was linked to chaotic and disorganized family life, and the abdication of family responsibility to care for children. The self-described Church ladies—who said they had never received international funding before PROFAM and who, like many others, struggled valiantly with the Bank’s accounting requirements to administer their small project with the mothers of drug addicts—are now involved in the Ministry of Social Development’s *Programa Familias por la Inclusión Social* (Families for Social Inclusion Program).<sup>43</sup> In contrast, I was told that the sex workers union with which they sat and talked at the PROFAM *convocatoria* was defunct.

Moreover, the lessons learned from PROFAM were less likely to provide future space for sex workers than they were to strengthen the Church. A key lesson learned by participants—especially those working with the poor—was that family-focused interventions were the way forward in a post-crisis context. As one group of NGO representatives put it:

**X:** I think that as a result of PROFAM we had a “click” moment, where we stopped working with this idea of raising flags for women’s issues. We realized that we couldn’t flag-wave because those same women threw rocks at us, as if to say “Don’t try to raise me up anymore, because I’m dying of hunger, of cold, of need, my husband suffers, and I’m crying constantly because he doesn’t have work” . . . This project allowed us to link ourselves up with many more actors and organizations, and to tackle reality in another way. That is what it allowed us to do—to enter into the question of the family, and women’s role, from a different perspective. From the perspective that she was sustaining a family group that was destroyed, that was in a deep crisis and

deteriorating, that had to be recuperated not just from a radical and hard-core position, of the men on one side and the women on the other, but from a much more dynamic perspective.

**Y:** From the family.

Another group working with the poor in Buenos Aires, with a history of radical Left opposition to neoliberalism, summed up its experiences of PROFAM thusly:

**X:** When we applied for this project, we saw the need to think in terms of the family, not of feminism and the rights of women as sometimes conceived in the policies of the World Bank or from a more liberal conception, or, if you like, from First World countries, where it is possible to speak of women's quotas in politics or in company management . . . We departed from another distributive inequality, a different condition, in which the man was also a victim, and where it was very difficult to analyze inequality between man and woman in a family that suffers from all the inequities together. That's where we started to have a debate with other *compañeras* . . . we tried to construct a focus, a way of tackling the problem that permitted us to strengthen the family . . .

**Y:** *Donde no eran ellos y nosotras, sino que éramos todos.* [Where there wasn't a male them and a female us, but where we were all together.]

**X:** Right, it allowed us this, to work in an integrated way.

Similar themes were raised in the official lessons learned from the project. PROFAM was being written up as a best practice model of family capacity building when it had barely started; the *Brazil Gender Review* stated in 2002—in the executive summary—that “Projects and programs that work with families could also begin to promote changes to gender roles in the household, following the model of the new ‘family capacity building’ program being proposed for Argentina” (Pena and Correia 2002, xi). Its section on recommendations positioned PROFAM as a model that “would provide unemployed men with new skills in fathering and care giving and make it easier for their female partners to seek work opportunities and excel on the job” (Pena and Correia 2002, 45).

Without meaning to erase the experiences of those who used PROFAM resources for emancipatory ends, then, the space opened by the project seemed precarious and short-term, and feminist NGOs

were not necessarily the most significant beneficiaries of the intervention. It proved difficult to celebrate the feminist space that *was* secured around male violence, in part because of the project's emphasis on family reconciliation and male inclusion, and women's successes in this arena were hard to mobilize around. The organizations invigorated at the community level were not those liable to replicate early transgressive approaches to family strengthening, and room for contesting normative visions of the family in fact narrowed as PROFAM developed. Conversely, what became wholeheartedly reinforced was the Bank's new common sense about encouraging more balanced responsibility within couples to sustain a reformulated neoliberalism that relies on working women and caring men. The Church also emerged stronger from PROFAM, and the Kirchner government advanced its national project of strengthening the family.

In noting these patterns, I do not intend to dismiss the ways in which PROFAM transformed some participants' lives. I seek to ascertain the sustainability and replicability of those transformations and to decipher what effects PROFAM is likely to have if upscaled from a learning and innovation loan to a model for others to follow. In this respect it is worth asking some difficult questions about family strengthening and partnership promotion, notwithstanding the way staff and participants have used these frames to secure increased attention to gender. For example, which other groups—especially religious ones—are already fully signed up to ideas that gender is about sharing balance, that the family has been destroyed by economic crisis, and that poverty policy is a space for advice on fatherhood promotion? What will it mean for feminists if leftist critics of the Bank endorse partnership promotion and resilient families as poverty reduction strategies? Which feminist policy priorities are being made unspeakable here? Child care? Rape prevention? Projects that allow women to sever coerced ties with intimate others? Poverty eradication strategies that decenter sexual “respectability”? How will these fare in the postcrisis recovery project, and how might feminist mobilizations to defend them require a challenge to the very common senses about gender harmony upon which their successful policy entrepreneurship has thus far depended?

### **Conclusion: Living Happily Ever After in a Post-Crisis Era?**

PROFAM does not, of course, reflect all Bank gender work. Family strengthening is a new and relatively underdeveloped arena of Bank gender lending, and it is far more important in the LAC region than

elsewhere. It is not the Bank's only attempt to resolve social reproduction tensions, nor the one receiving the most money—the anti-indigence initiatives widely critiqued for instrumentalizing women's crisis-induced struggles to maintain their families offer a very different approach, for example. But nonetheless PROFAM is a crucial site, raising key questions about the Bank's new interests in male-female complementarity and its operationalization of gender concerns in a crisis context.

On these grounds PROFAM clearly demonstrates that the economic crises to which the Bank's new, more balanced development approach was the purported cure were linked to a crisis in gender relations, with women understood to be overburdened through multiple responsibilities and men's roles thrown into tumult. The Bank is a key actor here, with investments in the idea that good gender policy rests on generating loving partnerships, that gender roles (especially for poor men) are in crisis, that families are key safety net mechanisms, that poor people need better connections (including connections to kin) to achieve development, that private provision of care within families is an efficient and empowering way to resolve tensions between paid and unpaid labor. However, its policies of family strengthening, male inclusion, and partnership promotion have proved so successful because they have hailed other actors with their own investments in these themes: NGOs trying to sustain poor communities in the face of the state's retreat, the Church, the Kirchner government, and some feminists. The Bank was thus able to draw together a range of other actors around a common understanding of development problems as requiring gender balance solutions.

This is a Janus-faced process, both forward- and backward-looking, in which the Bank and its partners embrace new arenas of activity while appealing *both* to ideas of recuperating gender harmony *and* to teleologies of progress and vanguard notions of Argentina as at the forefront of gender equity. PROFAM became a launching pad for a highly ambivalent national approach to gender policy, one grounded in ideas of restoring lost Argentine values and overcoming family disintegration but also containing space for progressive seizure. New work was undertaken to revive family eating, to teach men to listen to their families, and to teach youth to support their mothers' work, and these initiatives were framed as both traditional and progressive—traditional enough to hail the potential opponents, progressive enough to hail the feminists and NGOs who are highly critical of the

Bank. This was a classic bricolage strategy (Douglas 1986), modifying and recombining already available and legitimized concepts, scripts, and models to articulate new ideas (Campbell 1998, 383).

Assessing this process as it unfurled in PROFAM suggests both more grounds for optimism and more pause in our celebrations than may otherwise be present in our discussions of crisis, gender, and sexuality. In Argentina, as in many other countries in Latin America, economic crisis has reinforced rejection of the savage varieties of austerity associated with Menem and generated a consensus that reconstruction processes need to be sustainable and decided through democratic, sovereign means. It has also opened up space for feminists and for gays and lesbians to press new demands; these communities have not, overall, been subjected to backlash and scapegoating. But postdisaster capitalisms are surviving, in adjusted form, through the artful combination of old and new. Moreover, this is a deeply gendered and sexualized process. Unfettered free markets might be denaturalized through the post-Washington Consensus emphasis on the need to craft institutions and explicitly recognize “the need for a ‘visible hand’ in capitalist economic development” (Cameron 2004, 99), but gender binaries are renaturalized, and adjusted, normative families are repositioned as the ultimate marker of good development. PROFAM suggests, in short, that inclusive varieties of neoliberalism are being embedded through models of gender and sexuality that hail feminists and leftists in complex ways. Unless we critically interrogate these processes, we risk romanticizing the gender and sexuality narratives currently central to the Bank’s postcrisis bricolage strategy and further entrenching the links between normative sexuality and survival for the poor.

## CONCLUSION

*Developing Partnerships* opened with a disjuncture between effusive commentary about sex in terms of Paul Wolfowitz's removal and widespread silence about the use of development resources to actively reconfigure poor people's intimate attachments. I intended to intervene in that space, to extend our debates about how sexuality is relevant to development. I asked what we might learn about international political economy by looking at how intimacy is governed by the world's largest development organization, hereby seeking to interrogate the scope and nature of recent changes to development hegemony through a gender and sexuality lens. To conclude, I wish to briefly reiterate the book's main arguments with respect to that overall goal. I then consider two broader questions stemming from the research, regarding the range of responses available to development critics when engaging with this new model of heteronormativity, and the type of critique that may prove most fruitful. I am conscious that policy entrepreneurship is a skilled art, and that academic advice on its form is rarely taken seriously. The book has aimed to generate debate about gender sharing as a central component of the post-Washington Consensus, rather than to prescribe the form that debate should take, and the conclusion does not proffer policy templates. Nonetheless, I have stakes in the direction of this debate, and I lay them out here in an attempt to draw together the book's potentially broader implications.

First, *Developing Partnerships* confirms that sexuality is remarkably easy to find in the new work undertaken by the "chief arbiter of development" (Goldman 2005, viii). The Bank can be effusive about sex, funding booklets that teach indigenous adolescents about daily genital bathing and the universal nature of romantic love, for example, while offering sustained commentary on the benefits of sharing partnerships. The former material, admittedly, was acquired during a field trip to the Andes, but the latter is plastered all over the Bank's Web site and formally cleared documents. In this light, it is untenable

to deny that sexuality is within the scope of critical work on the wannabe “mother of all governments” (Cammack 2002).

Sexuality may not be hard to find in development, then, but it can be helpful to look for it in unexpected places. In particular, to comprehensively interrogate the links between gender reformulation, intimate attachments, and international political economy, one does not need to look only to institutions that are explicitly targeting sexual minorities, nor to examine lending only in sectors that are always-already marked as sexual sites. This book has focused on export promotion, ethnodevelopment, and microcredit, not HIV/AIDS or reproductive health, and queer folk are nowhere explicitly targeted in these dimensions of the Bank’s work. However, seeking out such unmarked policy sites where multilateral institutions address people assumed to be straight can shed light on policies that aim to reinforce normative arrangements of intimacy and name them explicitly as sexual interventions. This, in turn, confirms that we need to take international policy actors seriously as agents involved in the production, reproduction, and alteration of normative heterosexualities; in a global world order, states are not the only actors producing policies that reward certain expressions of intimacy or penalize non-normative arrangements of sexuality. Although research on self-identified LGBTQ populations, HIV/AIDS interventions, reproductive health, and so on remains crucial, then, there is a parallel need to look beyond the usual suspects of sexuality analysis and beyond the “mess and go” (Binnie 1997, 228) of obviously erotic acts to generate a fuller discussion of sexuality and development.

Second, conversations about sexuality within development remain in large part severed from debates about reformulated neoliberalism, the post–Washington Consensus, market restructuring, and the new directions being taken by the Bank. I have suggested in the preceding pages that such severing is a mistake, because it conceals the centrality of gender and sexuality to post-1995 changes in the Bank’s approach to social reproduction. Not only was the post–Washington Consensus articulated through reference to gender harmony, but the forging of reformulated partnerships became a key feature of the Bank’s gender interventions. This was in part because the new development model rests on a revised approach to social reproduction, based on new links between markets and intimacies. This is not the breadwinner-housewife model of the postwar welfare state, but neither is it the 1980s model in which women’s capacity to take on paid work while carrying social reproduction burdens was simply taken for

granted. The post–Washington Consensus articulates links between paid and unpaid work differently, hailing balanced partnerships not individuals and paying far greater attention to men. It advocates a two-partner, sharing model of love and labor in which women work more and men care better, hereby attempting to reprivatize responsibility for social reproduction by adjusting intimate attachments.

On these grounds, I suggest that the Bank's concerns with fatherhood, family, and the crisis in gender relations allegedly sparked by neoliberal restructuring reflect—at least in part—a concern with the gendered forms of inclusion and arrangements of social reproduction required for markets to function. PROFAM, PRODEPINE, and many other Bank gender initiatives rest on and reinforce a definition of good gender analysis as requiring sharing couplehood, and this profoundly privatizing conceptualization leads to privatizing policy solutions fixated on microadjustments in loving partnerships. In other words, it hails gender balance to intensify the privatization of social reproduction. Women are targeted for entrepreneurialism, men for responsabilization, and international financial institutions assume new roles in cultivating particular attachments in order to resolve neoliberal economic crises. Gender and sexuality do not appear as distractions from serious critical debates about adapted neoliberalism when seen in this light. Rather they are embedded in the terms of that debate. They constitute, in part, the very grounds on which critics and policymakers engage with the new face of development, because inclusive neoliberalism involves a heightened reliance on policy formulations involving love, care, and adjusted heterosexuality to ensure survival of the poor.

Third, however, the Bank's new gender regime has proved so successful because the benefits it appears to offer are framed as uncontroversially desirable in their own right, in addition to being necessary for a new model of social reproduction. Certainly the organization's emphasis on family strengthening and male inclusion appealed in part because it reprivatized caring labor in a more sustainable, balanced way than in the 1980s, and it could thus be framed as efficient within the Bank. But it also worked because it promised the production of loving monogamous couples, the healing of poor men's wounded masculinities, and the empowerment of poor women through market skills. It offered a critique of the Washington Consensus for provoking a crisis in gender relations, and it held out the promise of recovering gender complementarity. In this way change in the family and

in poor men's masculinity has become the ultimate success story of gendered social marketing, sold to a diverse range of groups and able to unite some of the Bank's fiercest critics.

*Developing Partnerships* is, in this regard, a tale of gender policy entrepreneurs and the revised constraints within which they operate in the new development era. Staff sell the post-Washington Consensus—and the Bank's continuing role as a crucial interlocutor of development policy—on overriding values of gender balance and harmonious couplehood that “everyone” accepts, and gender policies are increasingly constrained by the requirement that they reflect those values. Happy couples are redefined as a new “achievement of a World-Bank type,” to use the term employed by one Ecuadorian interviewee, and they are touted as evidence of the Bank's benevolent, empowering impact across Latin America and the Caribbean. Indeed, empowerment now mixes with productivity as a justification for development intervention, leading to a merger of discourses wherein Bank gender policy appeals to market-based emancipation and couple-based efficiency.

In this regard, I hope to have charted the spaces that this new terrain makes available to staff and their domestic feminist allies, while also highlighting some of the horrible frustrations and limitations that result. In particular, I hope to have identified the latter in a nonaccusatory spirit. By focusing on policy entrepreneurs and the day-to-day mechanics through which rhetorics of gender sharing are translated into project reality, I do not intend to blame marginalized staff, struggling within constraints, for the sometimes pernicious effects of Bank policy. Those employees and consultants sometimes expressed frustration at the limitations of gender balance as a frame for policy intervention. I intend, rather, to encourage debate and contestation of complementarity talk using the approach that feminist analysts have taken to efficiency rhetoric within development—there is no sense that to critique the use of efficiency framings is to attack the femocrats who employ them. Likewise, by critically interrogating the knowledge-production processes involved in post-Washington Consensus gender policy I do not intend to “bash” the Bank's researchers.<sup>1</sup> Rather, in seeking to identify which arguments about gender filter up the organization's hierarchy of texts and which citational practices are used to justify those arguments, I aim to see how GAD actually works and to identify the parameters within which permissible policy arguments play out.

That said, however, some of the Bank's most persistent and frequently accepted claims about gender, sexuality, and development warrant contestation. It is not a proven development truth that poor men are more abusive than rich men; that gender emancipation and trade liberalization are correlated; that gang problems in Jamaica are best understood through a trope of irresponsible fatherhood; that employed women are empowered; that "the biggest gender problem in the Amazon is men who have two wives." Such claims deserve to be debated, both because they are empirically suspect and because they can reinforce inadequate policies. In the flower study, for example, Bank policymakers insisted that employment equates with women's empowerment and they sidelined child care. Their research also celebrated working women, caring men, and export industries in ways that resonate far beyond flowers and Ecuador; the parameters within which those policy preferences are forged need contesting.

Fourth, and finally, the book highlights the complex interplay between local, national, regional, and global gender discourses. It tries to pay explicit attention to the interactions between differing scales of policy implementation and research, highlighting continuities and disjunctures. The first four chapters show clearly that the gender balance approach evident in PRODEPINE and PROFAM was not made locally. Rather, the language of complementarity was a transnationalized one, and it was regionalized in crucial ways through the LAC Gender Unit. Indeed this gendered common sense is central to the work of the world's largest development institution as it struggles to build a new hegemonic development project to replace the one discredited in the 1980s, able to better resolve social reproduction tensions in a sustainable fashion and to mobilize support from a range of stakeholders. It can be fruitful to draw out the similarities between these diverse sites of policy production, to trace their mutual imbrication and their interconnections.

Simultaneously, though, the organization's post-Washington Consensus gender model was not dropped from Washington DC onto Quito and Buenos Aires, which in turn dropped it into PRODEPINE and PROFAM. The coalitions that sustained a focus on gender balance in each case had to be made anew and the specificities of the encounter between and within sites shaped the experience of the gender model. The debates within PRODEPINE about indigenous authenticity and gender sharing are not the same as the debates within Argentina about family regeneration as a nationalist

project of postcrisis recovery. Those debates reveal distinct dimensions of the complementarity approach—its reliance on racialized models of sexualized respectability that resonate deeply in a local, national, and postcolonial frame, and its links to national-religious debate about the decline of the family. The debates over microcredit as central to women's empowerment were also divergent across these two projects—the way in which heteronormativity was articulated in relation to race, class, rurality, and national identity was distinctive. Hence, policy advice and practice varied significantly across the organization, and certain debates were far more salient in some spaces and in some parts of Bank operations than in others.

Likewise, the disjunctures, messiness, and fragility of the Bank's gender approach are far more apparent at the local and national level, given that regional and Washington DC–based policy texts remove, or at least footnote, conflict. In interviews, policymakers spoke openly about the fights provoked with national organizations by the Bank's insistence that men be included in gender projects, and no one in PRODEPINE believed that getting women into productive activity would achieve all it was supposed to unless development agencies intervened first to promote a savings culture, a mentality of work, and the ability to force debtors to pay up. Meanwhile, participants engaged in fierce disputes over stolen money, the wisdom of various entrepreneurship strategies, and the irrelevance of gender as a category. In turn PROFAM hosted church ladies and sex workers, and everyone bonded together far more in mutual resentment at the Bank's accounting procedures than in mutual agreement over the meaning of family strengthening. The spaces opened up were contested and unpredictable; the project was littered with accusations of assistencialism and the wry smiles of domestic violence activists securing money to, apparently, encourage gender harmony. There was resistance in all these sites, but it was not the same resistance, and the textures and specificities involved are genuinely intriguing.

Methodologically, the case for multisite, multilevel research that combines document analysis, interviews, and fieldwork is thus compelling, but it does not produce mounting evidence of the same point. It illuminated, in this project at least, different aspects of the Bank's gender model, making visible different links between local, national, regional, and global scales. The interaction and flux involved here is similar to that involved in analysis of sexuality itself, in its imbrications with class, nation, political economy, race, and so on. Neat,

global models about globalization and sexuality are not liable to be produced by this approach, but neither are ever-more intricate accounts of the uniquely fascinating nature of the purely local. The contribution of the approach is to highlight the connections and breaks between the scales involved, and to remain attentive to how apparently macroeconomic processes intertwine with apparently microlevel intimacies.

In sum, the book aimed to seek out sexuality in unexpected places, to link it to debates about both political economy and the politics of policy making with organizations, and to do so through attentiveness to the dynamic interplay between different scales of policy analysis. Having laid out this argument and traced its variations across the Bank, I wish to close by considering the implications that the Bank's changed policy may have for development scholarship and critical development practice. I focus on two broad themes in this respect, regarding what the Bank's experiences may teach critical development scholars and practitioners about the role of common sense in restructured neoliberalism, and what the balancing act of critique and celebration of space-seizure may yield in a more general assessment of the post-Washington Consensus.

### **Against Loving Couples, Seriously**

One of the most difficult tasks in stimulating critique of the model of gender sharing being promoted in contemporary development is its apparently uncontested nature. To some extent the Bank's celebrations of loving partnership are simply invisible, because they appeal to normative family formations and loving couples. Hence, its new policy initiatives are *not* being marked as sexualized interventions, and there is a danger that they will be left out of cutting-edge debates about sexuality in development. It is worth recalling the Bank's definition of successful mainstreaming in this respect. As Bank gender policymakers understand it,

Something is said to be mainstreamed when it is so routine that it provokes neither conflict nor comment. Computerization of office work, the numbering of streets, and sending six-year-olds to school are all illustrative of the concept of mainstreaming. (World Bank 2000f, 2)

Hence, "Success often renders the issues less visible" (2). In this sense the promotion of adjusted partnerships in which women work more

and men love better has become a piece of GAD common sense—it has been mainstreamed into invisibility as a policy intervention.

Moreover, when made visible, it appears benevolent and uncontroversial to a range of actors. Many feminists, for example, understand gender sharing positively; after all, we also wanted men to stop shirking domestic work; we wanted masculinities reformed; we wanted IFIs to take women's caring labor seriously. Faced with this reality, as Gayatri Spivak argues, we must “engage in a persistent critique of what one cannot not want” (Spivak 1999, 284, quoted in Baaz 2005, 176)—an unsettling and profoundly difficult task. Who can possibly disagree with the idea that fathers should love their children (Gavanas 2004, 21), and what better way to build support for a new development model than by promising that it will produce loving harmony between men and women? If the new language of empowerment gives us all “a warm, cuddly feeling” (Parpart 2002, 52), how much more cuddly is the newer language of loving fatherhood, reformed masculinity, and sharing couples of loving men and working, empowered women? One may as well be against puppies.

In the post-Washington Consensus, however, puppies are not quite as urgent a deconstructive task as couples. Appeals to newly normative expressions of loving attachment are, as Foucault suggested of sexuality more generally, “capable of serving as a point of support, as a linchpin, in the most varied strategies” (1990, 103), and it is here that they require contestation. Adjusted heterosexuality is a linchpin of the Bank's current attempts to secure the continued provision of caring labor, and it is also deployed to further entrench racialized hierarchies of sexual respectability. Conflict and comment *should* ensue when Bank staff assert that family cohesion is a poverty-eradication strategy or that transnational institutions should publicly assume new roles in teaching the poor how to privately juggle tensions between market and nonmarket labor. On the most basic level, the approach renders many efforts to enhance women's autonomy through enabling them to break attachments to men unspeakable, and its constant emphasis on good policy as benefiting both halves of the heteronormative whole is inherently depoliticizing, making power relations and benefits of inequality invisible. Conflict within the family becomes harder to talk about; feminist domestic violence organizations begin to think they have to include abusers in their remit to get development money; and child care becomes even harder to argue for. The policy also reproduces class- and race-based inequalities, legitimizing

coercive attempts to tie poor men into families, and making them culpable for development outcomes that should be analyzed—and resolved—completely differently.

To put it bluntly, then, there are serious problems with the Bank's gender-sharing model, and if feminists and other critical development observers are to roll it back, we must question deeply-held common senses about happy families, loving couples, and empowered partnerships. Unless and until that space is opened up, effective policy critique is unlikely to gain ground. Indeed, the Bank's policy preference itself may fail to register, even to the organization's fiercest critics, due to a general failure to accept that initiatives playing with normative family formation are sexualized interventions aiming to produce real-world effects. By overlooking apparently commonsense references to normative sexuality, we thus miss a key policy solution to the social reproduction dilemma enacted by the world's most influential development institution, and we fail to oppose it.

Consequently, I suggest that contesting the social reproduction arrangements being put in place in the post-Washington Consensus era will require troubling the commonsense nature of multiple core assumptions—regarding both markets *and* intimacies—that are being presented as obviously uncontestable and asking how they are interlinked, how they draw on each other for support, and how we can imagine alternatives. In this sense the act of denaturalizing the common sense of gender sharing and the common sense of reformulated neoliberalism is an attempt to render other arrangements thinkable, one tiny step in helping to make them actionable. This tiny step may yet be unsettling, because it requires feminists and other progressive development scholars and activists to critically interrogate their own potential investments in “comfortable” assumptions about poor men, human sexuality, and ideal gender relations. Moreover, it will trouble years of work inside the Bank that has advocated for happy families and has built alliances, with feminists and others, on this basis. It will hopefully mark the beginning of the end of the Bank's ability to invoke sharing love and labor between men and women as a marker of human happiness, and it will upset Paul Wolfowitz's two-wheeled cart of normative progress, in balanced markets and balanced couples. But, unsettling or not, those are all urgently necessary processes.

Of course, I may be wrong in this. There may be radical potential in sharing models, and we may be able to advocate for them

without blaming poor men for women's poverty, without erasing non-normative sexualities, without hitching feminism to a reprivatization agenda. However, to develop that potential, we still have to talk explicitly about the dangers—which returns us to troubling the commonsense nature of the “good” on offer. There is, I hope, no way out: we have to denaturalize the intimacies along with the markets they are supposed to be supporting.

### **Toward a Different Type of Balance: Between Prozac and Denial**

In pursuing such attempts at disruption, however, one cannot sidestep a crucial related issue regarding the purpose of policy critique in contemporary development formulations, and the potential for our radical critical intentions to shut down space for experimentation and counter-hegemonic mobilization. Part of the lesson that we, as development critics and activists, learned from the Washington Consensus was that our own conversations about the economy were limiting our ability to imagine and enact alternatives. As J. K. Gibson-Graham (1996) so brilliantly explicated, when we imagined “the global economy” as a singular, homogenous, totalizing force, resistance seemed futile. Some social movements and critical thinkers accepted the mantra that “there was no choice” to neoliberal globalization, accepting a teleological, economistic account of the world that left us all fumbling for the Prozac. To undo the Washington Consensus, we had to proceed differently, to first challenge “natural” readings of the economy that were being used to silence dissent, and to recognize that “respect for the economy’s essentialized actors and structural dynamics has become a form of unfreedom, a discursive enslavement, a refusal to explore economic power as unstable and situated (Allen 2003)” (Gibson-Graham 2006, 105; also Bergeron 2004). In this context, the shift in theory and practice to a sense that we *could* build something different, that every intervention was not always-already over-determined to pathetic failure in the light of “global capitalism,” was a profoundly liberating one. As Irene León notes, the World Social Forum took form just as neoliberal globalization was being legitimized as irreversible destiny, and as natural to humanity, boasting that its institutions were the only mechanisms capable of generating global changes (León 2005a, 11). Globalization and neoliberalism had been coined as terms beyond debate, as ends in themselves, and as absolutes; to their supporters, anything outside this hegemonic

formulation was simply absurd (11–12). The seed of “another world is possible” thus fertilized a political process of opening up space, allowing a cacophonous discussion of alternatives.

Moreover, as we recognized that a key part of the power of international organizations is their role in fixing meanings and “naming or labeling the social context [to establish] the parameters, the very boundaries, of acceptable action” (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 711), we could begin to unfix those meanings and boundaries. We could, as Gibson-Graham puts it, see nonfunctionalist, nondeterministic links between economic and noneconomic spheres that we had too long ignored, and we could begin “the task of denaturalizing the Economy and its capitalist forms of subjection; this provides a breathing space for fugitive energies of caring, social concern, and collectivity to be directed toward new performances of economy” (Gibson-Graham 2006, 51). We could see the economy as a space of negotiation, and we could undertake to “bring into visibility the great variety of noncapitalist practices that languish on the margins of economic representation” (xxxii). Finally, as we noted that markets needed constructing—in the minutiae of subjectivity and the profoundly local level of practice—we saw their fragility, their ruptures. We saw the moments where the all-powerful megaliths of the international development apparatus failed to control the scene, having their HIV/AIDS money allegedly subverted into parties for gay men (Cohen 2005), their staff impersonated by tricksters sporting roll-out gold penises (Olman, Price, and Smith 2003). Performing such parodies and reveling in the construction of such alternatives was central to the creation of a more hopeful political vision in which we could, actually, build something better.

However, in the current development environment, the alternatives we imagined are increasingly being funded by the very megaliths we mocked. In part because our critiques had impact, a new common sense has been forged around a post-Washington Consensus that takes poverty seriously, that sustains NGOs, that supports microcredit and participatory local development, that wants men to share housework. We are left fumbling for a collective response. NGO critics of the Bank were awkwardly muted when right-wing U.S. politicians attacked Wolfensohn for being insufficiently enthused about free markets; as one activist put it: “It’s embarrassing to have Jesse Helms’s office asking you to join forces to gut the Bank” (quoted in Miller-Adams 1999, 88). Protesters who were not confined in

Washington DC jails for the April 2000 protests against the Bretton Woods Institutions heard Bank staff interviewed in the U.S. media who were speaking their language of civil society engagement and poverty reduction, who criticized the IMF, and who had sometimes worked for NGOs themselves.<sup>2</sup>

Some observers are profoundly pessimistic in this moment, casting NGOs as the new agents of imperialism for their role in sustaining the new poverty agenda (Petras and Veltmeyer 2005) and demanding a return to grand visions of revolutionary change. One can work hard to be “included” in the system, exploiting the small openings created by participatory rhetoric and the need for popular legitimacy, but these are “adhesive appendages” that will make insufficient difference (Porter and Craig 2004, 417–418), they argue. Faced with the apparent pervasiveness of adjusted neoliberalism as a system of diffused power, now morphing into ever-more insidious forms (Peck and Tickell 2002, 400), we must avoid complicity with increasing care.

Others, ever attentive to the political impacts of our critiques, worry that this returns us to a functionalist metanarrative wherein the economy constitutes the ultimate arbiter of possibility (Gibson-Graham 2006, 53) and where we homogenize reality rather than chart the unruly nature of the diverse economic landscape (77)—a move that only increases the power of dominant actors who argue that there is no choice but to go along with “the market.” It leads us back, they fear, to Prozac. As Gibson-Graham explicates, we reaffirm that global capitalism really *does* cause everything; that any alternatives are part of the neoliberal order; that local initiatives would only foster fragmentation and state withdrawal; and that our attempts at change are always-already naïve and co-opted (3). “Fearing implication with those in power, we become attached to guarding and demonstrating our purity rather than mucking around in everyday politics” (6), and this negativity is inspired by nostalgia, paranoid fear of an inability to control contingency, and melancholic attachments to past wounds. The sort of person, and movement, who embraces it is angry, hyperskeptical, ungenerous, and frankly unpleasant. Gibson-Graham wants instead to celebrate potentials and to recognize new opportunities to seize space in order to see them blossom, judging that a glass-half-full reading is less politically dangerous at present than a soul-crushing dismissal of all efforts to construct alternatives. Hence, they celebrate small savings groups, “focused on individual self-transformation as the foundation

on which alternative economic interventions are built” (xxv), and large-scale cooperatives that attempt to build sustainable regional economies (102). To those critical of microcredit and the fragmented localizing of resistance, this reads like denial of the ways such formulations are implicated in reformulated neoliberalism.

Throughout this book, I have found myself located awkwardly in the middle of this debate. I have been relentlessly returned *both* to the spaces for contestation that emerge in current Bank development practice *and* to their limitations. I have tried to balance a glass-half-full reading that acknowledges successful policy entrepreneurship within constraints and that refuses relentless negativity with its paralyzing political consequences and stubborn refusal to recognize subversions of official project objectives with a glass-half-empty one that pays attention to the dangers of the new common sense we are naturalizing about gender, sexuality, class, and race and to the way that common sense impacts the policy environment in which we continue to act. Feminist development specialists are insider-outsiders in new ways now, and there are new possibilities, as well as new risks, attached to that location. Not only do “all spaces carry the potential for corruptibility” (Alexander 2005, 5), given the fact that ordinary people carry out—and can thus subvert—the work of international financial institutions and “global capitalism,” but the space opened up in the Bank in recent years, in particular, was a vibrant and dynamic one, in which a range of people—including those who do not work for it but whose meetings relied on its funding—got the opportunity to talk about and contest gender relations. PROFAM—a project whose title causes many critics to cringe or roll their eyes—gave money to prevent domestic violence, to distribute information about contraception, and to help sex workers protect themselves from police abuse. And to some extent it may matter less what the DVDs choose to say about the project than what it actually funded and the “under the radar” spaces it provided for women to share experiences about gender and support each other. Rape may have been unspeakable on the DVD shorts, but it was talked about between women; family strengthening may have meant the sanctity of marriage to the church, but it also meant fifty people were in a workshop on domestic violence.

On the other hand, there are risks in what we celebrate. The Bank is constantly positioning particular projects, or industries, as models for the future, and we might pause to consider the implications of that positioning before joining the party. Metaphorical parties have been

thrown for floriculture for generating loving men, for ethnodevelopment for recuperating authentic gender harmony, for microcredit for teaching rural indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian women cultures of saving, and for PROFAM for creating a broad tent that could accommodate feminists and the church. I am wary of the political impacts of these celebrations, aware that what is wrenched out of context as a success story of progressive politics may look very different from other perspectives. Whether it is the empowering success of the Cajas Solidarias, the family-strengthening success of PROFAM, or the involvement of men in housework invoked in floriculture research, these acts of celebration have no less potential to render us complicit in the structures we are trying to change than the act of dismissing intervention as always-already ineffective. Especially in the medium-to long-term, those celebrations may actually shut down space for feminist contestation. Hence while, as Alexander notes, “We cannot afford to be continually, one-sidedly oppositional” (Alexander 2005, 6), we cannot afford to have our struggle for space proceed via entrenching profoundly conservative gender ideas either. In short, we need a different approach to balance, wherein we talk frankly about how appeals to gender harmony help us in our organizing and how they hurt us; how they represent our successful seizure of space in transnational governing structures and how they place limits on our use of that space; and how the costs and rewards of those complex consequences are distributed.

This vision of sexuality and balance is, I would suggest, a better bet for feminist politics than the approach we have at the moment, and it need not be relentlessly depressing. By remaining attentive to both policy entrepreneurship and macroeconomic debates, we can—perhaps—avoid overly determined, generalized despair that the world’s largest development institution is pursuing a new model of social reproduction reliant on coupled harmony. There is space to be seized here, strategic arguments to be deployed better, and vital battles to be won over the specific forms in which that model is implemented. And we can imagine alternative, better arrangements of social reproduction and of sexuality than the ones on offer at present. We can cultivate better balance between intimate autonomy and economic survival in policy debate, we can mobilize policy alliances on different grounds, we can redouble our efforts to speak of rape, child care, happy single women, miserable employees, and non-normative sexualities because we know the stakes involved. We

can also get smarter about contesting the common sense of partnered empowerment, and we can do a more effective job at weighing up short-term gains in policy entrepreneurship and the long-term sustainability of progressive struggle. This is, I think, a cautiously hopeful moment rather than one filled with doom, wherein there is considerable purchase in pursuing new approaches to sexuality and political economy.

In sum, over the course of this project I have been returned many times to patterned links between restructured intimacies and restructured markets, but any sense that there was a deterministic connection between these spheres, generated by an evil globalization machine that hoodwinks feminists by appealing to their false consciousness about sharing couplehood, has been ruptured. There are good people struggling for space within the Bank—and within many other organizations in the development mainstream also appealing to gender balance—and top-down analyses that attribute causation to “global capitalism” cannot account for their agency within constraints and the policy alliances they manage to secure. If the Bank is framed as a homogenous evil empire, the feminist staff it employs are either lying or delusional, and the NGOs and development progressives who work with them on projects like PROFAM or PRODEPINE are simply falsely conscious. We make it too easy for Bank supporters to show that it is not, in fact, an agent of uniform evil, and we lose the potential for a textured critique, able to account for both the sex workers and the church ladies, the scholarships for indigenous women and the booklets on universal romantic love.

I do not pretend that this project has succeeded in that textured critique; that is a collaborative, long-term goal requiring far greater resources. I suggest instead that, in the course of this research, the tensions I have found most productive were those that arose when I tried—or was forced—to straddle Prozac and denial, functionalist economism and overinvestment in individual agency. When colleagues, inside or outside the academy, cajoled me to better balance generously spirited assessment of the policies forged by well-meaning people operating within constraints with attention to the pernicious effects of the Bank’s reformulated gender policy, or when I was reminded to keep macroeconomic concerns in mind while looking at local manifestations of Bank action, I was enabled to ask the questions that proved the most helpful in this project. Of course, that juggling act was also frustrating, and it will irritate those who see more to

celebrate in this gender policy framing than I do, along with those who want a more unequivocal condemnation of Bank gender staff and the NGOs that work with them than I provide. But in an increasingly polarized debate about how development policy critique should best proceed to open up possibilities for counter-hegemonic mobilization, juggling might be, temporarily, a productive way forward.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

*Developing Partnerships* seeks to put sexuality and international development into conversation. Staging that conversation can be, unfortunately, difficult, especially in political science where the book started. I left the discipline to finish it. I thus wish to acknowledge my debt to those scholars still there who continue to insist that sexuality matters to politics in their research, their courses, and their lunchtime conversations with colleagues. This book is indebted to their professional integrity.

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## Introduction

1. See, for example, the piece entitled “Sex, Money, and Neocons” in *The Guardian* (Adams 2007) and a similar piece in *The Independent* (Cornwell 2007).

2. See Hitchens 2007 for reference to the anti-Semitic nature of the debate about Wolfowitz. Riza was variously described in development blog posts as his secretary, his lover, his main squeeze, an Iraqi Shi’ite, a Saudi Muslim, a Libyan hawk who had influenced Wolfowitz’s support for war, a potential spy, and “the most powerful Muslim in Washington.”

3. Riza desperately wanted to stay in her Bank career, and, as she pointed out, several other couples were working there together at that time, perhaps allowed to stay because they were married to each other (which Wolfowitz and Riza were not). There was also evidence that the Bank’s ethics board had been aware of, and approved, her transfer, even as they insisted to Wolfowitz that he arrange it personally.

4. See Economist 2007.

5. <http://watchingtheherd.blogspot.com/2007/05/like-nailing-al-capone-for-tax-evasion.html>. Accessed 2 December 2007.

6. These were: fiscal discipline; redirecting public expenditure to fields offering high economic returns; tax reform to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base; interest rate and trade liberalization; a single competitive exchange rate; elimination of barriers to foreign direct investment; privatization of state-owned enterprises; deregulation of market entry and competition; and ensuring secure property rights. See Kuczynski and Williamson 2003 for an overview.

7. Caufield 1996; Sparr 1994; Bakker 1994; Rich 1994; Danaher 1994. To be fair, Williamson never advocated rapid capital market opening and later described it as reckless (2003c, 323).

8. See overview by Dani Rodrik, [www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html](http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html). Accessed 11 October 2006.

9. See, for example, Fine, Lapavistas and Pincus 2001; Mosse and Lewis 2005; Tussie 2000.

10. Paid domestic labor and sex work also need to be included in debates about social reproduction (see Glenn 1992; Bakker and Gill 2003; Gill 1994; Agathangelou 2004; Bernstein 2001), although that issue is outside the scope of this project.

11. Perkins-Gilman 1970/1898; Waring 1988; Folbre 1994; Boyston 1990; Gibson-Graham 1996; Charusheela 2003; Sen and Grown 1987; Cook and Roberts 2000; Prügl 2002; Peterson 2003.

12. Sparr 1994; Moser 1993; Benería and Feldman 1992; Bakker 1994; Kligman and Gal 2000; Léon 2001, 2003; Lind 2005; Rittich 2002. See Bedford 2005 for more on the once-dominant exhaustion solution to social reproduction in the Bank.

13. See also Norton and Morris 2003; Keiser et al. 2002; Ferree and Martin 1995; Weldon 2002; Risley 2006.

14. Staudt 2002; Kabeer and Subrahmanian 2000; Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2002; Waylen 2004; Jacqueline and Staudt 2006; Moghadam 2005; Hirschmann 2006; Saunders 2002.

15. Rathgeber 1995; Kuiper and Barker 2006; Wood 2003; Long 2003.

16. For a concerted effort to foreground sexuality in development scholarship, see the work of the Sexuality and Development Programme at the Institute of Development Studies (<http://www.ids.ac.uk/go/sexualityanddevelopment>). See also Cornwall and Jolly 2006; Adams and Pigg 2005; Lind and Share 2003; Gosine 2004; Haney and Pollard 2003.

17. See also Finnemore 1996; Larner and Walters 2004; Mitchell 2002; Gibson-Graham 2006; Puar 2007.

18. Laqueur 1990; Fausto-Sterling 2000; Butler 1990; Terry 1999; Wittig 2000; Delphy 2000, Guillaumin 2000, Hawkesworth 1997.

19. See also Cooper 1995; Stevens 1999; Smith 2007; Carabine 1996; Cohen 1997.

20. See also Altman 2001; Adams and Pigg 2005; Stoler 1995, 2002; Briggs 2003; McClintock 1995; Puar 2007.

21. See Binnie 2004 and an overview in Bedford and Jakobsen 2009 for more on scale and sexuality.

22. The World Bank Group includes five organizations: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. It is customary to refer to the first two agencies—the most prominent ones in the group—as “the World Bank” or “the Bank.” The IBRD was the original incarnation of the Bank when it was designed, alongside the International Monetary Fund, at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. Whereas the Fund aimed to stabilize economies in crisis, the IBRD was intended to contribute to peace and post-war reconstruction, both by lending to poor nations for modernization projects and by prompting recovery in the industrialized First World countries to whom its development contracts were (and largely still are) awarded. It raises money on international bond markets and makes loans to countries considered creditworthy—US \$14.1 billion worth in fiscal year 2006, for 112 projects in thirty-three countries (World Bank 2006 AR). The IDA was created in 1960. It gives money on easier terms to countries with poor creditworthiness, and it raises money through contributions by member states. IDA financing reached US \$9.5 billion in fiscal year 2006, for 167 projects in fifty-nine countries (World Bank 2006 AR).

23. References to *Annual Reports* and *World Development Reports* are prefaced by AR or WDR throughout.

24. In 2002 the Bank delivered 560 “learning activities” to 48,000 participants in 150 countries through collaboration with 400 partner institutions (Goldman 2005, 226).

25. For example, William Ascher used the Bank in a 1983 attempt to better understand what types of institutional reorientation are “doomed to failure” (1983, 415). See also Wade 2002 and Miller-Adams’s analysis of how different initiatives have been incorporated into Bank operations (1999).

26. It has been described as the “foremost international development agency” (Payer 1982, 15); the “flagship” (Yunus 1994, ix) and “pace-setter” (Hancock 1989, 57) of development policy with an influence that is “total and global” (Yunus 1994, x); the “chief arbiter of development” (Goldman 2005, viii); and “the ‘throbbing heart’ of development cooperation, in the sense of the political, intellectual and financial leader among the agencies involved” (Ritzen 2005, 5).

27. See also Deepak Nayyar, who argued that the IDA and IBRD are “seeing themselves more and more as a world government” (quoted in Caufield 1996, 196).

28. Personal notes from Association of Women in Development Conference, November 1999.

29. See, for example, Murphy 1995 and 1997 and Kuiper and Barker 2006.

30. Bank loans go through several stages between proposal and board approval, and they require certain key documents as part of the preparation, proposal, approval, review, and final evaluation process. Project information documents involve descriptions of proposed projects; project appraisal documents are latter-stage evaluations of further advanced but still unapproved projects, and implementation completion reports are end-stage evaluations of closing/recently closed projects.

31. <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTANNREP/EXTANNREP2K7/0,,contentMDK:21508322-isCURL:Y~menuPK:424524~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:4077916,00.html>. *World Bank Annual Report 2007*, online. Accessed 6 June 2008.

32. Several interviews were attended by more than one person.

33. Thus the Bank insists that it “has never made an adjustment loan conditional on the reduction of social expenditures” (World Bank 1996b, 5; see also 1997 WDR, 19), a claim that is simply laughable to its critics. They point to Bank policies to charge user fees for education and health and to promote state “divestiture” from higher education spending, health insurance, social security, and child care, and they question the state’s ability to make sovereign policy decisions in the context of debt-related pressure, even absent explicit conditionalities. See, for example, the footage in Black 2003.

34. See Sikkink 1991; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Best 2003; Barker 2005; Barrett and Finnemore 1999; Boas and McNeill 2005; and Goldman 2005 for a counter-argument.

35. See also Williams 1999; Gibson-Graham 1996; Shore and Wright 1997; Crush 1995; Schram 1995.

36. Likewise, as Robin Broad notes, “The Bank crafts, and even manipulates, the executive summaries and press releases of reports” to foreground arguments that may not actually be supported by the document in question. For example, the executive summary of a 350-page Bank report on NAFTA stated that real wages in Mexico had recovered from the 1995 collapse, a fact contradicted in the actual text (Broad 2006, 410).

37. In this respect projects are still crucial sites for investigation, notwithstanding the fact that they have been declining as a proportion of Bank lending. Non-project lending was more than one-third of total lending by 1998, for example, leading Jonathan Pincus to assert that “the project focus, weakened by structural adjustment lending in the 1980s, is now largely defunct” (2001, 185). However, projects remain vital research venues, and they inform policy advice in crucial ways. See Mosse 2005a; Goldman’s account of how World Bank environmental knowledge is produced and “localized” (2005, 15); and James Ferguson’s early account of Bank lending in Lesotho (1994).

38. See also Goldman’s critique of the deterministic vision of development as “a steamroller running roughshod over the Third World” (2005, 23). Likewise, Gould argues: “While the BWIs (Bretton Woods Institutions) are obviously the single most powerful player in the aid domain, it is risky to simply assume that they constitute the source of a transnational regime of governmentality that systematically ensnares southern governments in its web of complicity” (2005, 67). Both suggest the need for research on the actual production of development hegemony to show its specific historical conjunctures, its sites of interaction, and its ruptures and discontinuities (Goldman 2005, 24–28). See also van Gestel and Nuijten 2005; Carruthers and Halliday 2006.

## 1. Working Women, Caring Men, and the Family Bank

1. Caufield 1996; Sparr 1994; Bakker 1994; Walton and Seddon 1994; Green 2003; Danaher 1994.

2. <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/PRESIDENTEXTERNAL/0,,contentMDK:20083965~menuPK:232070~pagePK:139877~piPK:199692~theSitePK:227585,00.html>. Accessed 13 September 2008.

3. With respect to their role in reform efforts, the Fund focuses on short-term stabilization in emergency conditions, whereas the Bank sees its mandate as implementing longer term structural reform in order that economic problems do not reoccur. However, the boundaries between the two organizations were increasingly blurred in the 1980s, and cross-conditionalities ensured that lending by either required adherence to the same set of reform measures.

4. Nelson 2000; Walton 2004; Porter and Craig 2004; Kumar 2003; Gill and Pugatch 2005; Gilbert and Vines 2000; Benjamin 2007; Pincus and Winters 2002; Marquette 2003; Harrison 2001; Tussie 2000; Young 2002; Soederberg 2004.

5. Fine 2001, 138; Naím 1994, 1999; Campbell and Pedersen 2001; Williamson 2003d, 309; Cameron 2004; Harriss, Hunter and Lewis 1995; Rodrik and Subramanian 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 2004.

6. See also Ricco, Granada and Pereira 2006, 9.

7. Stiglitz resigned in 1999 after his public criticism of the IMF; several reports linked his departure to disapproval by the U.S. Treasury (Ritzen 2005; Wade 2002). Ravi Kapur, chief architect of the Bank's 2000–2001 *World Development Report* focusing on empowerment and participation, left after Bank authorities insisted the report be toned down (Parpart 2002; Ritzen 2005). Wolfensohn also brought in antiapartheid activist Mamphela Ramphele as a Bank managing director; she left in 2004 (Ritzen 2005, 109).

8. The Bank's poverty specialist, Martin Ravallion, has engaged in a fierce debate with a former Bank researcher who argued that Bank statistics exaggerate global inequality and underplay the role of growth in reducing poverty (Zettelmeyer 2003). Conversely, in 2004 the Bank's internal evaluation unit criticized the organization's social development approach to poverty as ineffective, and it urged more attention to growth (Einhorn 2006, 17).

9. See also Magdalena León 2005, 80, on the increased visibility of women within new conversations about social development, a point also made by Lind (2005) and Molyneux (2006).

10. In Ecuador's *Voices of the Poor* studies, 646 people participated in discussion groups: 268 women, 148 men, and 176 youths (Martínez Flores 2000, 397). In Argentina, 714 people participated: 368 women, 132 men, and 186 young people (Cichero, Feliu and Mauro 1999, 4).

11. See also Bergeron 2003, 404; and Dingo 2005. The three of us were working on the Bank with a gender sensibility, and we all remarked on the prominence of this Rio example, without knowing what the others were doing.

12. See for example the Bank staff interviewed by National Public Radio, April 16, 2000, 8:00 PM.

13. See Gould 2005 and Baaz 2005 for more on partnership as a trope of current development work, and for further evidence that partnership discourse cannot be dismissed as mere rhetoric by development critics (Baaz 2005, 7).

14. Note that the editors of Wolfensohn's book of speeches did not tell the reader who these people were (his wife and children), although they provided asterisks to explain other, non-family references. Thus one is, perhaps unnecessarily, given an asterisk to explain that Michael Moore heads the World Trade Organization (Wolfensohn 2005, 190), but the reference to Patsy in an early speech honoring Lew Preston is simply unexplained—she was his wife (29). See Wolfensohn 2005, 17–22, for further failures to give Elaine an asterisk.

15. For overviews of the Bank's gender and development policy since the 1970s, see Murphy 1995; Moser, Törnqvist and van Bronkhorst 1999.

16. That said, the Bank was hardly a model of gender parity in the upper ranks under Wolfensohn; in 2001 the U.S. representative noted that its twenty-four-member board of directors had never had more than three women serving at one time (Piercy 2001).

17. I accept that some of these measures have been criticized as public relations exercises. For example, the feminist monitoring organization Women's Eyes on the World Bank criticized a Bank–NGO consultative group on gender for the rarity of its meetings and the Bank's failure to share

information with its NGO members (1997, 3). They claimed that the group “represents a public relations exercise rather than a means of serious dialogue on the issues” (4). However, this effort to woo feminists was not something other architects of the global economic order, such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Trade Organization, bothered to emulate.

18. See Kuiper and Barker (2006) for a comprehensive discussion of *Engendering Development*.

19. I trace the emergence of this policy preference, and the institutional factors that explain it, in Bedford 2005.

20. For a critique of *Engendering Development* in this respect, see Bergeron 2006, 135; and Bedford 2005. Moreover, the equation of work with independence, empowerment, and autonomy is not necessarily supported by the Bank’s own research. *Engendering Development* conceded in a paragraph buried on page 210 that evidence on the issue is mixed in East Asia, because “newly found work opportunities did not necessarily give young women greater personal autonomy” (World Bank 2001a, 210; see also 228). Data on female labor force participation rates is not used to support the Bank’s persistent claim that gender inequalities are greatest among the poor; data on education access and health care is used instead (World Bank 2001 WDR, 118). Indeed Haiti, with 62 percent of women classified as economically active, has one of the highest female labor force participation rates in the world; it also has the worst maternal mortality rates in the Western hemisphere and the highest HIV infection rate in the LAC region (Correia/World Bank 2002, 5).

21. For further examples see World Bank 2000a, 1; World Bank 2005a, np; World Bank 2005c, 11.

22. Between 1980 and 2000 the male economically active population in Latin America grew by 0.84 percent to a rate of 72 percent. The women’s rate rose by 32.5 percent, to 37.2 percent in 2000 (Hite and Viterna 2005, 50).

23. Wood 2003; Dennis and Zuckerman 2006; Kuiper and Barker 2006; Rittich 2002.

24. See also Josette Murphy’s 1997 internal evaluation of gender policy, which highlighted the finite nature of women’s capacity to work (21).

25. Sparr 1994; Moser 1993; Brodie 1994; Elson 1996; Benería and Feldman 1992; Bakker 1994; Kligman and Gal 2000.

26. In this respect her approach is distinct from the more macro understanding of GAD used by those feminists aiming to contest neo-colonialism and capitalism (see, for example, Sen and Grown 1987; Kabeer 1994).

27. See Sánchiz (2005) for similar concerns about microcredit; see Zalewski for analysis of neo-feminist work in international relations that “reworks the ‘wound of gender’ as ‘equivalent entitlement’” in ways that function to endorse and reproduce conventional heteronormative gendered arrangements (2007, 310).

28. Notes from the Association of Women in Development Conference, November 1999.

29. Prügl and Lustgarten 2006; Goetz 1997; Buvinic, Gwin and Bates 1996; Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2002; Zuckerman and Qing 2003; Staudt 2002; Rathgeber 1995; Kuiper and Barker 2006; Wood 2003; Long 2003.

30. See Gavanas for an analysis of similar framings in discussions about fathers' rights—ones in which men and women are seen as different but equal, in which the different parts make a whole, and in which mother-father duality is a necessity (2004, 44).

31. [www.worldbank.org/gender/](http://www.worldbank.org/gender/). Accessed 15 November 2007.

32. For example, the male Western development workers interviewed by Baaz constructed an idea of a gender-aware progressive masculine self in opposition to the alleged backwardness and extreme sexism of the Tanzanian men with whom they were working, just as most Western women identified themselves as more progressive than Tanzanian women (Baaz 2005, 106; 118–120).

33. <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/critical.htm#implementation>. Accessed 18 May 2008.

## 2. The Model Region Remodels Partnerships

1. The Bank makes a profit from IBRD loans; IDA funds need to be constantly replenished because the loans are given on concessionary terms.

2. The background to this was that electorates had often been misled about the reform intentions of candidates. Of the forty-four governments elected in Latin America between 1982 and 1995, thirty-three chose neoliberalism once in office; only seventeen of them sent clear campaign signals of an intent to liberalize (Stokes 2001, 55).

3. Mexico (1994–1995), Brazil (1998–1999), and Argentina (2001).

4. Bolivia's Emergency Social Fund, launched in 1986, was used as a global model. By July 1994, the Bank had supported nearly thirty social funds, 47 percent of which were in Latin America (van Dijk 1998, 119).

5. See also Urzúa's account of changing Bank–Mexico relations (1997).

6. See also Walton 2004, and critical reviews of literature on institutionalism in the region by Adelman (2001) and Philip (1999).

7. For in-depth analysis of this shift, see McNeill 2005, Woolcock 1998; Ritzen 2005; Fine 2001, 2002; Molyneux 2002, Edwards, Franklin and Holland 2003; Harriss 2002, Mayoux 2001. For exploration of a gender project using social capital formulations, see chapter 6.

8. The work of Putnam, along with Francis Fukuyama, and James Coleman, is central to the Bank's approach. Conversely that of Pierre Bourdieu, who approaches social capital from a structuralist approach far more attentive to power inequality, is generally marginalized (Harriss 2002; Edwards, Franklin and Holland 2003; Adkins 2005).

9. As one analyst summarized it: "No one suffered the perverse effects of the neoliberal model as much as the women of Latin America" (Sánchez 2005, 107). Women spent hours shopping for cheaper food when prices were deregulated and currencies were devalued, cooking more labor-intensive meals (Benería and Feldman 1992, 95), and queuing for goods. Women also took on extra paid jobs to feed their families, they cared for the sick and elderly when the state stopped doing so, and their daughters cared for younger children when mothers had to work outside the home and state-funded child care centers were closed in line with Washington Consensus advice (Moser 1993). See León 2005a, 8; Müller 1994, Delphino 1990; Hite

and Viterna 2005; Avin 2006; Vásconez 2005; Lind 2004; León 2005; Ferraro 2000; Molyneux 2006.

10. This term is widely used in Latin American feminist debates. It refers to the sense that women are being drawn in to assist poverty-management efforts, rather than engaging in genuinely transformative, empowering struggles. See, for example, Herrera 2001a, 82.

11. Note also the roundtable entitled *Feminisms in the Americas after the Washington Consensus*, organized at the 2007 Latin American Studies Association conference by Verónica Schild and Amy Lind.

12. For example, the regional gender workshop, held in Quito in 2000, included Virginia Vargas (Peruvian feminist academic and activist), Laura Frade (regional coordinator of Women's Eyes on the World Bank, a critical external monitoring group), and Ariruna Kowi (coordinator of an Ecuadorian commission involved in constitutional reform proposals on the collective rights of indigenous people) (World Bank 2000e, 20).

13. For the Dominican Republic, see Correia/World Bank 2002, ix; for Ecuador, Correia 2000; for Central America, Correia y Pena 2002, v.

14. For example, this image was also used on the front cover to Argentina's *Gender Portfolio Review* (Correia 1999).

15. See the overview of regional workshops at [http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/gender\\_workshops/](http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/gender_workshops/). Accessed 10 June 2007.

16. The precise nature of the problem is unclear here—the study defines “excessive drinkers” exceptionally broadly, as including “those who drink habitually (more than 3 days a week)” or “who experience 12 or more episodes of drunkenness a year” (Pyne, Claeson and Correia 2002, 15).

17. See chapter 3 for a discussion of these frequent references to Barker's work in Bank gender policy.

18. See, for example, Gavano's (2004) analysis of the fatherhood movement in the United States, and Miranda Joseph's analysis of a U.S. Ford Foundation-funded project called Partners for Fragile Families that attempted to support men in employment so that they could fulfill their perceived family responsibilities (Joseph 2002, 92–93). In her assessment, “The partners for fragile families project simultaneously produces and fulfills not only the desire of poor young men for marketable job skills but also for fatherhood, and while fatherhood might be accounted in some part as a form of individualized and privatized capitalist subjectivity, it also carries connotations of communal obligation, especially where it is capitalism that has apparently prevented them from being ‘fathers’ in the first place” (117).

19. See similar work on the experiences of William Easterly (who faced disciplinary action after he failed to get clearance for publishing an article based on a book he wrote while at the Bank arguing that aid financing did not alleviate poverty [Broad 2006, 410] yes thanks), Hernan Daly (an ecological economist who was muffled when on the Bank's staff), and Ravi Kanbur (chief architect of the Bank's 2000–2001 *World Development Report* on empowerment and participation, who resigned after Bank authorities insisted the report get toned down) (Parpart 2002; Mallaby 2004; Wade 2002). See also Johnston and Garcia-Downing (2004) for a report on Bank

attempts to censor anthropologists researching the affects of a dam on indigenous communities in Chile.

20. Although see the Kuiper and Barker collection (2006) in relation to *Engendering Development*, and especially Elson 2006.

21. In this respect, the work cited to support Bank positions may not necessarily argue what the Bank claims it argues. For an interesting comparison, see Mark Mizruchi and Lisa Fein's analysis of the highly selective readings of DiMaggio and Powell's classic 1983 article on institutional isomorphism by certain U.S. academics (1999).

22. For example, Chant's research notes that lone-parent women experience less violence, and, although they have lower incomes, they find it easier to plan budgets and manage money because they control it. They feel better off and less vulnerable (Chant 2006, 94). See also Helen Safa's 1999 analysis of structural adjustment and marriage in the Dominican Republic, which concludes that "our Eurocentric emphasis on the nuclear family as the norm and the embodiment of modernity and progress leads us to view the female headed household as pathological, rather than as an alternative form of family organization with its own legitimacy. The assumption is that the family is centered on marriage or the conjugal bond, whereas in the Caribbean conjugal bonds are weak and unstable in comparison with consanguineal relationships between a mother, her children, and her female kin. . . . This type of consanguineal household may be more supportive for low income families under stress than a nuclear family where all responsibility rests on the male breadwinner" (303).

23. See <http://www.bahamas.gov.bc/bahamasweb2/homensf/vContentW/GOV—Links—Minister%>. Accessed 14 February 2007.

### 3. Forging Partnerships, Sidelining Child Care

1. Ecuador had five different presidents between 1988 and 1999, and two of its recent leaders were overthrown in coups—one of them after announcing (without consulting the U.S. Federal Reserve) that the country would dollarize in the midst of an economic crisis. See North 2004 for a concise overview.

2. See Susan Stokes's discussion of Alberto Dahik, Sixto Durán Ballén's vice president. This is the only one of her forty-four cases (of governments elected in Latin America between 1982 and 1995) wherein outright bribery was attempted to get politicians to support liberalization (Stokes 2001, 80).

3. Made worse by economic problems in Asia, Russia, and Brazil, this crisis was caused in part by poor regulation of the banking sector, which allowed massive offshore holdings due to 1990s reforms. It was also promoted by a growing trade imbalance, caused by the rapid increase in imports stemming from neoliberal trade reforms (World Bank 2003c; Hachette 2003). See chapter 6 for the Argentine crisis.

4. Ecuador's debt had quadrupled between 1980 and 2000 to \$15.7 billion (64 percent of GDP) by 2003. When I was conducting research, net debt service consumed about 35 percent of the government budget (Tinsley 2003, 67). The country had the second-highest public debt burden in the

region when measured as a percentage of GDP (Fretes-Cibils and López-Cálix 2003, xlv), and the heaviest debt burden of Latin America's ten largest economies.

5. This figure includes loans that were dropped or cancelled and loans in which money was not lent from the IDA/IBRD— for example some environmental projects use funds from the Bank's Global Environmental Facility and are included here. See Table 6 of Bedford 2005 for a more detailed breakdown.

6. The CAS is a master plan for a country's short- and medium-term development. It is the most important document in the Bank's country-specific activities, involving consultations with government, other donors, and civil society.

7. Resident missions are not full country offices, but they establish a Bank's presence in a country—smaller countries usually have them.

8. SAPRI was a high-profile Wolfensohn initiative to reach out to Bank critics, involving several prominent civil society opponents of the Bank, including DEVGAP and groups involved in the 50 Years Is Enough Campaign—over 1,000 NGOs signed up to participate. See O'Brien et al. 2000, 30; Green 2003, 60–65; SAPRI nd. For examples of the critical research generated by SAPRI, see Universidad de Cuenca 2000; Naranjo 1999.

9. I trace the interactions between the Bank and civil society actors involved in SAPRI in Bedford 2005. Those I interviewed with connections to SAPRI felt angry and betrayed that the Bank had ignored their research, which showed that flexibilization policies hurt workers and offered no increase in productivity, and that adjustment had led to more informality and poverty and less consumption. Several participants considered the effort part of a Bank attempt to draw civil society actors into restructuring efforts as service providers, demobilizing them as protest agents.

10. Ecuador has a vibrant women's movement. It was the first Latin American country to grant women suffrage, and it currently has one of the most successful feminist issue networks in the region. Between 1995 and 2000 more than twenty gender-based legislative actions were passed, on issues such as violence against women, quotas, and health care during pregnancy (Lind 2005, 9–10). See also Herrera 2001a, 2001b; Prieto 2005, Müller 1994.

11. See chapter 5 for more on PROGENIAL's activities in a specific loan.

12. The "paltry resources" (Murphy 1995, 34) allocated to WID/GAD from the Bank have often been supplemented by external funds in this way. The consultants who worked on a 1999 gender report for the Bank were funded by money from the Netherlands and Sweden (Moser, Törnqvist and van Bronkhorst 1999, vii), and *Engendering Development* was in part funded by money from Scandinavian governments (World Bank 2001a, xix). Gender policy entrepreneurs have criticized this situation for years (Murphy 1995, 5), and the Bank has pledged several times to change it (World Bank 1997d, 31). However, as can be seen in the LAC Gender Unit, reliance on non-Bank, grant funds from specific countries to finance GAD activities is still common within the organization, again contributing to the liminal, insider-outsider location inhabited by gender policy actors.

13. See Correia 2000, 8, and Correia 2002, 192. PROGENIAL also included funds to strengthen CONAMU.

14. The clear irony here—that these women went to work in an organization valorizing partnerships yet were using their salaries to facilitate non-normative intimate choices—should not go unnoted. See Wilson for an extended discussion of how income from corporations promoting normative heterosexuality and femininity (in her case Avon) can “enable participants’ deviations from the very idealizations that underwrite the success of those corporations” (2004, 187).

15. O’Brien et al. 2000; Goetz 1997; Buvinic, Gwin and Bates 1996; Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2002; Zuckerman and Qing 2003; Bessis 2001; Wood 2003; Kuiper and Barker 2006.

16. See also Miller-Adams 1999.

17. Likewise Miller-Adams notes that “collaboration with NGOs also depended on personal contacts between staff members and friends or colleagues—or even husbands or wives—in the NGO community” (1999, 75). The role of erotic ties in development policy entrepreneurship—especially around GAD—seems important in this respect.

18. See Beverly Skeggs (1997) for an ethnography of gender and class in this respect. The gender staff I met did not appear anxious concerning their class backgrounds in the Bank; they appeared to fit in seamlessly with the organization in this respect. The only resonance of a class conversation that emerged was evident in a resentment toward what were perceived to be unfairly harsh critiques from more privileged academic researchers, and to a lesser extent from people in NGOs, because they were imagined to have personal wealth such that they did not actually rely on their salaries for sustenance, and hence they did not recognize that Bank employees were from backgrounds whereby they had to make compromises to make a living.

19. See Rothschild 2000 and Rosenbloom 1996 for more on lesbian-baiting as a way to counter women’s international organizing.

20. Again, the precise nature of the problem varies enormously—sometimes the Bank refers to statistics on alcoholism, sometimes to people who “stated that they had drunk in excess the month prior to being surveyed” (Correia 2000, 17).

21. The conference paper—by a researcher on LAC male youth who positions his work as opposing pathologizing portrayals of poor men—was developed into a peer reviewed book. But the prominence of this conference paper in Bank work on gender in the LAC again highlights the politics of reading and of citation, by which certain work on men is visible to the Bank, even if unpublished; for other references to it, see World Bank 2007; Arias 2001. There were no references in the *Ecuador Gender Review* to researchers such as Carlos de la Torre (who highlights President Bucaram’s decision to “[present] his own virility as a form of resistance to ‘effeminate’ elites, affirming the masculinity of the poor” (2000, 109) in his research in Ecuadorian neopopulism) or Michael Uzendoski (who demonstrates redefinitions of masculinity among evangelicals in the Ecuadorian Amazon) (2003). See Melhaus and Stolen 1996; Krohn-Hansen 1996; Pantelides and López 2002; Gutmann 2003; Ferrándiz 2003;

Fuller 2003; Milanese 2005; Andrade 2003; and Olavarría 2003 for more on Latin American and Ecuadorian masculinities.

22. See also Mitchell's (2002) discussion of enframing and Scott's (1998) discussion of legibility.

23. The female labor force participation rate went up from 38 percent in 1990 to 55 percent in 2001 (Vásconez 2005, 266).

24. Ecuadorian feminists have devoted considerable attention to this issue, particularly in a structural adjustment context. See Herrera 2001b for an overview; also León 2001; Ferraro 2000; Brito, Fernández and Samaniego 1999; Cuví Ortiz 1995; León 2005a.

25. See several essays in Kuiper and Barker 2006, especially Orgocka and Summerfield 2006, for more on the marginalization of child care in *Engendering Development*; see also Bedford 2005.

26. This was a selective reading of Deutsch, to be fair. Although her sample was hardly representative of U.S. parents (it was 96 percent White, 100 percent English-speaking, and in half of her couples both husbands and wives had graduate degrees) (1999, 240), she wrote on a group of working-class parents who worked opposite shifts in order that one was present for child care. Fathers in these families spent more overall time with their children than middle-class fathers (173), *and* they did more housework when looking after their children than middle-class fathers did (173). The Bank's Ecuadorian gender staff noted this finding (Correia 2000, 36), but it did nothing to mediate their argument that poor men were afflicted with wounded masculinities, that gender inequalities were greatest among the poor, and that interventions to restructure masculinity should be targeted toward the lower class.

#### 4. Roses Mean Love

1. As a colony Ecuador was a source of gold, textiles, and food for Spain, and since independence the country has experienced multiple export booms, in sectors such as cocoa, bananas, petroleum, shrimp, and flowers. See Conaghan and Malloy 1994; Kyle 2000; Striffler 2002; Sawyer 2004. The petroleum sector is Ecuador's most important source of exports, accounting for 15 percent of GDP and 40 percent of total exports in 2003 (Fretes-Cibils and López-Cáliz 2003, 115), but the country is also the world's largest exporter of bananas, and the third-largest exporter of flowers. Other important sources of export earnings include wood, textiles, handicrafts, shrimp, cocoa, and coffee. Nontraditional exports grew from 8 percent of Ecuador's total exports to 29 percent between 1991 and 2001 (Hachette 2003, 165). When this research was being conducted, efforts were underway to promote exports in new sectors, with fourteen products identified by the government as having great export potential. These ranged from mangoes to software, from medicinal herbs to Panama hats (which originated in Ecuador) (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores/CORPEI 2004).

2. I trace this process in Bedford 2005, but see also World Bank 1997b, Treacle 1998; Carrière 2001; Ferraro 2000; Cox Edwards in World Bank

1996a; Beckerman and Solimano 2002; Sawers 2005; Sawyer 2004; Conaghan and Malloy 1994.

3. As Conaghan and Malloy note, it is a “gross oversimplification” to suggest that the IMF and Bank forced neoliberal experiments onto Central Andean countries; this was a process in which domestic business elites were crucial (1994, 216–217; see also Cypher 1998; Green 2003; Teichman 2001). Exporters were particularly staunch allies (Gwynne and Kay 2000, 144; Conaghan and Malloy 1994, 73).

4. I examine this loan in-depth in Bedford 2005, drawing attention to the state-industry-Bank alliances on which it was based and the controversies over corruption it generated.

5. Its construction prompted protests by environmental groups and local communities.

6. See also World Bank 1996a, 39; Correia 2000, 37; World Bank 2003a, 3.

7. Ecuadorian flower production started in the mid-1980s as a result of Colombian producers shifting location due to internal disruption, although companies from several other countries, including Holland and the United States, also operate plantations. For more on the Ecuadorian flower industry, see Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores/CORPEI 2004; Mena 1999; Breilh and Beltrán 2003; Colloredo-Mansfeld 1999; Palán and Palán 1999; Korovkin 2003a, 2003b. For Colombia, see Rangel 2003; Talcott 2003.

8. <http://www.sica.gov.ec/ingles/indicadores/docs/ex-agropi.htm>. Accessed 28 June 2006.

9. The head of Ecuador’s flower exporters’ association insisted that it was the only export industry in the area, but producers of textiles, handicrafts, music, and so on may disagree (see Meisch 2002).

10. See [http://www.expoflores.com/contenido.php?menu\\_2=8](http://www.expoflores.com/contenido.php?menu_2=8). Accessed 9 July 2007. Ninety percent of adults working in flowers are under thirty-five (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001). These workers are mostly mestiza and indigenous people from the surrounding area, although a large number of displaced Colombians are working in plantations illegally, and Afro-Ecuadorians have also moved to the area to work in flowers.

11. One can access the project’s reports and advice on improving competitiveness in flowers at [http://www.sica.gov.ec/agronegocios/consejos\\_consultivos/consejos/flores/principal.htm](http://www.sica.gov.ec/agronegocios/consejos_consultivos/consejos/flores/principal.htm). Accessed 2 July 2007.

12. See Mitchell for more on how academic economics looks to the world as a laboratory, seeking out national experiments to test its theories (2005, 297). In his example a Bank report discussing an Urban Property Rights Project in Peru was used as evidence of the neoliberal “truth” that private property rights were necessary for development and that the poor would work harder if they had security of tenure. His critical analysis of the data on which these claims rest is particularly relevant to this chapter.

13. Newman also put out an article in the World Bank’s *Economic Review Journal* (Newman 2002), but it was a condensed version of the 2001 discussion paper and thus I do not analyze it separately here.

14. A methodological note is in order regarding the legitimacy of using these texts as evidence of Bank policy. The discussion paper was funded by

the Bank's Gender and Development and the Gender and Poverty Thematic Groups, and the World Bank Research Committee. It was intended to influence the upcoming policy paper on gender, *Engendering Development*. The description of the background research papers states: "The papers are preliminary and carry the names of authors and should be cited accordingly." Thus Newman's paper can not be read as a formally cleared Bank text reflecting official policy endorsed by regional or DC-based managers, as the *Ecuador Gender Review* can. However, the Newman discussion paper *is* a site from which to analyze gender policy entrepreneurship within the institution, and it is included on this basis. The Bank-CONAMU text can be read in the same way—it was a report on Bank research written by Bank consultants.

15. The ILO estimate that 15 percent of floriculture workers in the Ecuadorian Sierra are under eighteen (OIT 2002, 75). One-fourth of those are under fifteen, and their researchers found a nine-year-old in the plantations (78). While researching this chapter, I was shown photographs by an NGO as part of a project in which flower workers were given cameras and asked to document their jobs. One showed a young female child, certainly under ten, tending plants in a greenhouse. Similar scenes are documented in a video on floriculture put out by the Ecuadorian NGO IEDECA.

16. Mena 1999; Breihl and Beltrán 2003.

17. George 2005; Moore 2005; Guelke and Morin 2001.

18. Flower employment breaks gender norms far more than domestic service, which is the main employment alternative in the area (Sawers 2005, 47).

19. There is no mention of unions here, perhaps not surprisingly; in 2005 only 4 of Ecuador's over 400 flower farms had unions (Korovkin and Sanmiguel-Valderrama 2007, 127).

20. Cynical observers may note that family employment is also a feature of the industry, which has long struggled with allegations of child labor—see note 15.

21. An Ecuador-wide demographic overview generates similar pause about the extent to which people's lived realities fit the ideal of the nuclear family. Of women of fertile age in 2004, 36.6 percent were married; 30.3 percent were single; 22.6 percent were in unmarried relationships, and 10.4 percent were divorced or separated (Egüez Guevara 2005, 49). Since 1989, there has been a growth in the percentage of women in unmarried unions (from 15.9 percent), a growth in divorced women (from 7 percent), and a fall in marriage (from 44.1 percent). The Sierra, where the Bank's research was conducted, had the country's highest proportion of single women (35.5 percent).

22. Noting that the United States used tropes of "failed nuclear families" as a justification for imperialist intervention in Puerto Rico, Laura Briggs also links construction of a "modern" society to the restructuring of sexuality, because "modernity required 'modern' families" (2003, 42), requiring efforts to promote marriage and regulate sex workers. See also Milanese's discussion of Peronist efforts to enlist housewives to reduce consumption and tame the working class through critique of gambling and alcoholism (2006, 95), and Lind's account of the attention paid to the regulation of family as part of national development in Ecuador (2005, 32).

23. See also Thomas Klubock's discussion of the decision by a post–World War I mining company in Chile to avoid labor unrest and problems with disorder by giving preference to married men in stable family units (French and James 1997, 7).

24. See chapter 5 for more on appeals to tradition and culture as explanations for Bank gender policy.

25. David Dollar's work on aid effectiveness being related to Bank policy advice is the most notorious example of internal research being highly publicized by the Bank on the grounds that it supports their position—see Broad 2006 as discussed in chapter 2.

## 5. Cultures of Saving and Loving

1. The Bank had launched an Indigenous People's Development Initiative in 1993 in anticipation of the UN International Decade of the World's Indigenous Peoples (Uquillas and Larreamendy 2006, 25), and an anthropologist and sociologist were writing on the Bank's need to *Promot[e] the Development of Indigenous People in Latin America* in 1994 (Davis and Partridge 1994; see also Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 1994). These measures were undertaken after extensive critique of the Bank's record in violating the rights of indigenous communities—see Fox, Clark and Treacle (2003) and Ulloa (2005) for an overview. For example, the Bank lent massively for Suharto's "transmigration" policy in East Timor, widely criticized for violating indigenous rights (Caufield 1996, 206), and between 1986 and 1993 the Bank approved 200 projects that dislocated an estimated 2.5 million people (262), including a disproportionately large number of indigenous people.

2. Hendricks 1991; Colloredo-Mansfeld 1999; Larson 1995; Archietti 1997; Harris 1995; Meisch 2002; Radcliffe and Westwood 1996; Whitten 2003; Saldaña-Portillo 2003; Yashar 2005.

3. For critical approaches to the increasing focus on culture in development, see Hale 2006 (especially 37); Benjamin 2007; Almeida Vinuesa 2005; Baaz 2005; Yúdice 2003.

4. The 2001 census claimed that 7 percent of people were indigenous and 5 percent were Afro-Ecuadorian, but indigenous organizations claim that they represent a third or more of the population (World Bank 2004e), and the International Labour Organization lists Ecuador's indigenous population as 43 percent of the total (Van Cott 2003, 64). As Yashar summarizes, "The simple question: 'how many Indians are there?' leads to rather complex answers, all of which boil down to: 'we do not know (and cannot know) for sure'" (2005, 19).

5. See also the Bank's report on Ecuador for the Voices of the Poor study, which documents similar incidents (Martínez Flores 2000, 404–405).

6. Originally the National Council of Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Development, CONPLADEIN, replaced in 1998 by the Development Council for Ecuadorian Nationalities and Pueblos, CODENPE, and the Afroecuadorian Development Corporation, CODAE.

7. Second-tier organizations were preferred by the Bank because they were understood to have a pragmatic agenda focused on service provision rather

than political representation (Uquillas and Larreamendy 2006, 26). Given the reduced involvement of the state in rural development in the 1980s (Yashar 2005), NGOs with more participatory development agendas had emerged to fill in the gaps—there are over 2,500 grassroots indigenous organizations in Ecuador operating at the community level in this way (Uquillas and Larreamendy 2006, 24). These were central constituencies in PRODEPINE.

8. Roughly half of Ecuador's population lives in the Sierran highlands, in which the capital Quito is located, while 46 percent of Ecuadorian people live in the coastal region, home to the country's largest city, Guayaquil, and to most Afro-Ecuadorian people. Three to four percent of the population lives in the Amazon, a region that covers over half of the country (Kyle 2000, 18); they are a mixture of indigenous groups and mestiza settlers drawn there mainly since the discovery of oil in the 1970s.

9. Macas 1992; Yashar 2005; Zamosc 1994; García 2003; Albo 2004; Lucero 2003; Black 1999; Collins 2004; Brysk 2001; Burt and Mauzeri 2004; Macas, Belote and Belote 2003; Pallares 2002; Selverston-Scher 2001; Treakle 1998; Sawyer 2004; Burbano de Lara 2001. For example, indigenous groups protested at a proposed 1994 land reform (negotiated with the Bank), prompting the Supreme Court to dilute it by removing private control of water and recognizing collective land claims (Treakle 1998). Indigenous communities also successfully pushed for important changes in the 1998 constitution, which celebrates the pluricultural and multiethnic character of Ecuador and which recognizes the collective rights of indigenous people who define themselves as a nation (Albo 2004, 26). Indigenous movements were key to toppling presidents in 1997 and 2001, and the head of the country's largest indigenous organization was temporarily integrated into the Gutiérrez government, although without the backing of his former movement colleagues—see Lucero 2006. Although Gutiérrez was thus reliant on the indigenous movement, his support for PRODEPINE was largely rhetorical, and he was widely decried by former indigenous allies for betrayal. See Ibarra 2003; Almeida Vinueza 2005. One interviewee, with whom I spoke in 2004, claimed that the administration had reneged on its commitments to indigenous communities, concerned at strengthening them for fear of another uprising. The interviewee considered this another manifestation of state racism.

10. The Bank claims that it was seen as an honest broker and intermediary between the state and the indigenous movement, and indeed CONAIE wanted to interact only with the Bank, settling eventually for the project being administered by a managing committee with equal representation from the state and the indigenous movement (van Nieuwkoop and Uquillas 2000, 10). See Baaz 2005 for more on how access to resources translates into a sense that certain partners are trustworthy in development work.

11. See also Uquillas 2004; Uquillas and Larreamendy 2006; World Bank 2003f; Redwood 2000.

12. Specifically, the Bank pointed to successes in “improve[ing] the quality of life of many poor rural indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian communities”; in promoting participatory planning; in increasing the capacity,

confidence, and public visibility of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian organizations; in promoting community work and rescuing the *minga*; in “encourag[ing] the democratic inclusion of Afro-Ecuadorian and indigenous peoples in the state”; and in delivering social services cheaply and efficiently to remote areas (World Bank 2003f, 4). See also World Bank 2000c.

13. See also <http://www.worldbank.org/faces/>. Accessed 8 June 2008.

14. See also van Nieuwkoop and Uquillas 2000, 16, and the Bank’s belief that PRODEPINE 2 would help the government respond to a “restive indigenous movement” opposed to its longer-term reform measures by drawing civil society actors into restructuring efforts as service providers (World Bank 2004h, np).

15. See also Lind’s claim that ethnodevelopment aims to use women’s roles in preserving cultural heritage for economic benefit (2005, 60). Mary Crain (1996) has made a similar point about tourism, noting that some Andean indigenous women have been incorporated into tourist markets in Quito as residual icons of Indianness, as folkloric relics (144) who demarcate their community’s “difference” from dominant national society, representing an “authentic” indigenous identity uncontaminated by colonization, hybridization, and displacement (136). See also Weismantel 2001.

16. Radcliffe, Laurie and Andolina 2003; Prieto et al. 2005; Salguero 1998; Prieto 1998; Sánchez 2007.

17. PRODEPINE archive, 9 May 2001: “Informe de asistencia técnica de género al proyecto PRODEPINE” May 2000–February 2002: 3–4.

18. Certainly some national staff were skeptical, and regional offices varied in their support for the workshops and capacity-building events. Gender staff also faced difficulties within PRODEPINE’s Quito headquarters; one observer claimed that the national gender consultant experienced discrimination and resistance and that gender was not taken seriously. PRODEPINE gender staff in turn clashed with each other over the prioritization of indigenous versus Afro-Ecuadorian needs. Yet overall those involved saw the collaboration positively and argued that problems had diminished over time. The efforts to integrate gender into PRODEPINE were mentioned in both the *Ecuador Gender Review* and the *Country Assistance Strategy* as proof that “the Bank has built greater gender consciousness into its portfolio of investment projects” (World Bank 2003b CAS 10; Correia 2000, xii).

19. In 1998—before gender was an explicit component of PRODEPINE—women received 29 percent of the higher education scholarships given by the loan. In 2001 they received 40 percent (Törnqvist 2004, 87).

20. These included nine case studies, reports on workshops and capacity-building events, evaluations of microcredit initiatives and local development plans with respect to gender, guides for gender indicators, and so on. Indeed the Project Information Document for PRODEPINE 2 cited twenty-two studies and evaluations from PRODEPINE 1 in its bibliography; ten were to do with gender (World Bank 2004h, np; see also Larrea et al. 2002; Silva Delgada 2004).

21. The Project Information Document for PRODEPINE 2 included targets for women’s groups involved in subprojects as one of its “key performance indicators” (World Bank 2004h, 2), and it promised that “intercultural

relations, gender and other equity issues will be incorporated systematically in all these programs.”

22. For a comparison see Dorothea Hillhorst’s account of how Filipino NGO development professionals treat indigenous peasant women; one told an elderly lady to wash her vagina every night so that she would be clean when her husband wants to sleep with her; to bathe and wear a clean dress (2003, 98).

23. For example, in a 2004 speech at the Social Forum on the Américas on gender and diversity, a male representative from a key Ecuadorian indigenous political organization claimed that indigenous communities (he was speaking of Quichwa-speaking groups) aimed at reciprocal, harmonious, complementary gender relations.

24. See the overview of this scholarship in Weismantel 2001.

25. See also Meisch 2002; Radcliffe, Laurie and Andolina 2003; Apffel-Marglin and Sánchez 2002.

26. For example, Marisol de la Cadena (1995) has challenged ethnographic work claiming relations of complementarity between Andean men and women; see also Herrera 2001b; Weismantel 2001; Barrig 2006; Prieto et al. 2005; and especially Prieto 1998.

27. PRODEPINE archive 2002, from World Bank 9 January 2002.

28. The case studies of gender conducted by PRODEPINE argued also that getting women into work would ensure they were inserted into decision making processes (Vallejo Real 2002b, 22; Aulestia 2002, 11).

29. For example, the proposal for PROGENIAL’s collaboration with PRODEPINE stated that “experiences in Ecuador show that [putting] economic resources in the hands of women leads to greater investments in family well-being and children’s welfare” (World Bank 2000g, np).

30. See also Uquillas and Larreamendy 2006; Tene 2004; Törnqvist 2004; Camacho 2002; Tene, Tobar and Bolaños 2004.

31. The initiative emerged in 1999 as an emergency safety net program funded by the International Fund for Agricultural Development to provide flexible credit to vulnerable people at risk due to the economic crisis. Seed capital was given to small associations of rural indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian women to stimulate rural savings and investment in productive activities. In 2006 the Bank claimed that 547 community banks had been created, benefiting 14,022 members (Uquillas and Larreamendy 2006, 29). Although most of the money for this initiative came from FIDA and the Bank’s relatively tiny PROGENIAL grant, it was prominent in all of the conversations I had with Bank and PRODEPINE staff. As one PRODEPINE staff person put it, “When people in the project think about gender they always think of the Cajas Solidarias.” The Afro-Ecuadorian gender specialist (funded by PROGENIAL) devoted much of her short time with PRODEPINE to working with Caja Solidaria groups, and several regional offices hired full-time staff to coordinate Caja Solidaria activities. These individuals emphasized to communities that proposed projects needed to be for productive activities, not consumption or health (see also Guaman 2003, 25; Camacho 2002, 5). The centrality of the Caja Solidaria Program to PRODEPINE’s gender activ-

ities thus provides further evidence of the broader centrality of efforts to get women into work in the Bank's project-based GAD lending.

32. As Katherine Rankin puts it in her critique of microcredit, "The new agents of development are gendered as women entrepreneurs with cultural propensities to invest wisely and look after their families and communities" (Rankin 2001, 20). Women are seen as agents to improve family well-being (Sánchez 2005, 100), rational administrators of budgets who are used to making ends meet (Milanesio 2006, 93). For further feminist discussions of microcredit, see Cosgrove 2002; Hirschmann 2006; Tinker 2006; Joseph 2002; Williams 2004; Gibson-Graham 2006; Villarreal 1996.

33. In an Indian context, see Mosse's discussion of how development interventions project the lives of remote tribal beneficiaries onto metropolitan imaginations (2005a, 36), drawing on stereotypes of Bhil tribals as isolated and "uncivilized" (48). In his critique of a self-help group organized initially as a savings and credit institution, he notes that "nothing symbolized the transformation from tribal 'hand to mouth' underdevelopment better than the 'moral discipline' of saving" (119).

34. Business culture was defined as involving high levels of respect and tolerance, having direct, frank, and transparent communication, a drive for high-quality results, and a willingness to learn from mistakes and accept criticism.

35. See also van Nieuwkoop and Uquillas 2000, 16, and the Bank's belief that PRODEPINE 2 would help the government respond to a "restive indigenous movement" opposed to its longer-term reform measures, by drawing civil society actors into restructuring efforts as service providers (World Bank 2004h, np).

36. See also Rankin 2001; Williams 2004.

37. See also Avin's claim that *Engendering Development* ignores issues of class, race, and ethnicity (2006, 65), a critique that can in no way be made of PRODEPINE.

38. I found many other examples of PRODEPINE staff trying to convince Caja Solidaria members to undertake certain microenterprises, including bingo, community dances, community shops, gambling on volleyball matches, and—in an interesting moment of inconsistency—selling alcohol at football matches.

39. See also Williams's account of the fraught reality of microcredit efforts in Canada, and her extensive discussion of default problems (2004, 151).

40. It bears noting that such failures were by no means limited to GAD projects. I visited numerous projects associated with PRODEPINE intended to generate income, many of which were deserted. I visited several greenhouses that were completely destroyed, with the plastic torn and on the ground. The men working in one area told me that people in the community were in debt to PRODEPINE because they had taken out a loan for the greenhouse that they could not pay. The project was a failure, and PRODEPINE now wanted them to take out another loan to repair the greenhouses—they said they would not, because they would go further into debt (see also Silva Delgado 2004). This sketch of communities littered with failed development projects is one with which all critical development scholars are

familiar—it was the same portrait painted of Lesotho by James Ferguson (1994) and of several essays in the recent Pincus and Winters anthology (2002). See Bedford 2005 and Tindall and Wilkinson 2004 for more examples within PRODEPINE.

41. For example, the 2001 basic guide to gender insisted that men and women should be included equitably in all activities, meaning that along with projects to further women's rights over their physical autonomy, body, and sexuality, there was a parallel need to promote "masculine co-responsibility in sexuality and reproduction" (PRODEPINE 2001a, np; see also World Bank 2000g, 9).

42. To clarify, women from the same ethnic group in other Cajas happily spoke to me about their projects—this was not a 'cultural' issue of deferring to men but a political issue of who controlled the money.

43. References to child care were sparse in PRODEPINE, and the issue rarely surfaced in written material or in interviews conducted with staff. When it did, it was not defined as a priority for the project itself. For more on the erasure of child care as a policy priority within PRODEPINE, see Bedford 2005.

44. Some estimates suggest 25 percent of the country's people have emigrated in the last two decades, most frequently to Spain, Italy, and the United States (North 2004, 203)—by the early 1990s New York was Ecuador's third-largest city by population (Weismantel 2003, 331). Highland indigenous and coastal Afro-Ecuadorian communities have experienced particularly high migration rates since the 1999 economic crisis, and men have been more likely to leave than women in the former, although the gap is closing (in 1995 a third of those who left were women, but after 1997 it was almost a half) (Carrillo 2005, 101). More women than men migrate in the coast (102–103). See also Martha Ruiz's (2002) study of Ecuadorian immigrants, particularly her discussion of women's reasons for leaving and her work on a group of gay and trans. individuals who left Ecuador to work in the Dutch sex industry.

45. Day labor in oil palm plantations is also male dominated.

46. See also Hale 2006, 21, on racist stereotypes about drunkenness. See also Dorothea Hilhorst's ethnography of NGOs in the Philippines; in one example a local mayor is invited to celebrate the graduation of a group of elderly women from a literacy project, and he congratulates them on now knowing how to clean their houses and bathe, before advising them all to avoid drinking and gambling (2003, 93). After the ceremony the dignitaries passed into an adjoining room and started heavily drinking (93–94).

47. Of the Afro-Ecuadorian population, 68.3 percent is urban (Sánchez 2007, 238).

48. In 1998, the Unión de Organizaciones Negras de Esmeraldas, in alliance with indigenous groups, demanded creation of a Black territorial area in Esmeraldas. It was opposed by a key Afro-Ecuadorian politician, in part on the grounds that the language of ancestral peoples with claims to land did not resonate with urban Afro-Ecuadorians (Hooker 2005, 295).

49. In this respect see Laura Coleman's analysis of how development produces diverse sorts of "savage" spaces, differentiated according to their rela-

tionship with the hegemonic masculinity that is understood to define the civilized spaces (Coleman 2007, 207).

50. Note also that Afro-Ecuadorian men were criticized—to their faces—as lacking appropriate worker cultures; there was no perceived need to be delicate around these racist framings.

51. Note the rather perverse use of the term *linchar* (to lynch) here, to signify a sense of threat posed to gender staff by Amazonian and Afro-Ecuadorian communities.

52. See Barrig 2006; Prieto et al. 2005; Prieto 1998 for similar arguments.

## 6. Holding It Together

1. See also Kjeaar and Pedersen's work on the introduction of neoliberal polices into Denmark, showing that Danish leaders utilized already well-institutionalized discourses about social cooperation and consensus building to "translate" neoliberal concepts into grounded form (2001). Likewise, Mark Blyth argues that ideas gain salience and become institutionally embedded if they are congruent with the beliefs and common interpretations actors already share about the structure of normal politics (1997, 232).

2. See, for example, Campbell's analysis of the way that supply-side advocates in the United States mobilized support for tax cuts on the grounds that high taxes undermined the traditional American family, forcing wives into the labor market and fueling higher divorce rates (1998, 395). See also work on how marriage and parenthood have been central to recent debates about U.S. welfare reform (Gavanas 2004; Smith 2007).

3. Hay 1999; Torfing 2001; Blyth 1997; Alexander 2001, 254.

4. See Teichman 2001; Paraje 2005; Corrales 1997; Tussie 2000; Green 2003; Levitsky and Murillo 2005a and 2005b; Svampa and Pereyra 2004; Schamis 2002; Etchemendy 2005. The measures enjoyed early public support due to their success in ending hyperinflation, although implementation was also reliant on "clientelism, wide discretion, and personalism" (Teichman 2001, 98), and on extensive use of presidential powers to override domestic opposition.

5. Domestic manufacturing declined (Auyero 2000, 101), income distribution became more unequal, and unemployment increased rapidly, from 6.7 percent in 1992 to 18.6 percent in 1995 (Auyero 2001, 31). Public sector employment as a percentage of total employment was cut by nearly one-third under Menem (Levitsky and Murillo 2005b, 11). In 1974 the richest 10 percent of the country's population held 28.2 percent of its GNP; by 1999 they held 37.3 percent. The holdings of the poorest 30 percent fell from 11.3 percent to 8.1 percent (Auyero 2000, 101; see also Guano 2004, 72; Paraje 2005).

6. Argentina's economic crisis was predominantly caused by the unsustainability of pegging the peso to the U.S. dollar, a peg enacted by Cavallo to restore faith in the currency and combat hyperinflation. See Perry and Servén for a standard Bank explanation of "what went wrong" (2003).

7. Schuster et al. 2005; Green 2003, 187; Chejter 2003; Sardá 2007; Torre 2005; Svampa and Pereyra 2004.

8. Witness the ubiquitous calls for the country to reindustrialize, to stand up for itself, to regain its prestige as a regional leader in manufacturing, science, and so on. A popular film of 2007 entitled *Argentina Latente* (Latent Argentina), showing in Buenos Aires while I was conducting fieldwork, epitomizes this attempt to rally the country around a past that hinged on the male worker ideal (Solanas 2007). It is full of footage of working-class men taking back their country from outsiders and building ships and rockets and oil refineries. Women are virtually absent (with the exception of the naked ones decorating the men's lockers). See James (2002) for more on masculinity and Peronism.

9. See also Sutton 2007; Brown 2002; Sardá 2007; Chejter 2003; Svampa and Pereyra 2004.

10. The Bank was far more closely tied to Menem's restructuring program than the IMF, and it provided the key support and advice to the Cavallo team. See Teichman 2001; Tussie 2000; Acuña and Tuozzo 2000; Corbalán 2002; Murillo et al. 2006.

11. See table of all Bank projects and programs funded between 1988 and 1995 in Argentina (Corbalán 2002, 88).

12. This assessment is perhaps unfair, understating the role of domestic elites in the Argentine crisis and ignoring the Bank's increased emphasis on social development concerns in the late 1990s. See the Bank's US \$15 million loan for HIV/AIDS prevention (World Bank 2004f) and its attempt to replicate Ecuador's PRODEPINE among indigenous communities in Argentina (Cesilini, Tomadin and Eltz 2004). See also the Bank's report on Argentine poverty for the Voices of the Poor study (Cichero, Felio and Mauro 1999), and the findings in a recent independent study on accessing information from IFIs that praised the Bank's Argentina office (Ricco, Granada and Pereira 2006, 35). That said, the Bank's perceived arrogance at lecturing Argentina on how the country needs to *now* take its advice in a *post*-Washington Consensus direction, after the last debacle, is much resented. This is particularly true around Bank comments on the need to tackle corruption, given that the Bank was blamed by many for facilitating corruption under Menem.

13. Between 2003 and 2005, GDP growth averaged 9 percent. The social development budget increased by 90 percent between 2003 and 2004 (World Bank 2006, 188), and poverty rates fell from 57.5 percent in 2003 to 34 percent in 2005 (17). Measured as a percentage of GDP, public debt fell from 126 percent in late 2004 to 85 percent in 2005 (83).

14. Some consider these social programs a way to buy off dissent, extend clientelism, and prevent the radical change that seemed imminent in late 2001. The Kirchner government has responded selectively to the thousands of self-help and protest groups that emerged in the crisis, and some have become administrators of the new programs (especially the work plans), dispensing benefits in a less-than-transparent fashion. See Petras and Veltmeyer 2005, 41–45; Dinatale 2004; Sardá 2007; Levitsky and Murillo 2005b; Wolff 2007; Svampa and Pereyra 2004.

15. The Bank concedes that Kirchner's government pursued a prudent recovery path, improving tax collection and external competitiveness, tack-

ling corruption (to some extent), and rebuilding reserves (World Bank 2006, 15). Indeed the 2004 primary surplus targets defined in the country's IMF program were overfulfilled (182). The Bank objected to what it considered his "regime of national capitalism," particularly the government's involvement in infrastructural provision (21), its price control measures, its taxes on exports and financial transactions (26), its lack of an active IMF program, and its refusal to implement labor market reform (29).

16. In FY 2005 62 percent of projects in the Bank's development policy portfolio were classified as unsatisfactory, and in March 2005, three provincial reform loans were closed, with their remaining tranches cancelled (World Bank 2006, 51). A \$500 million Economic Recovery Support Structural Adjustment Loan was distributed to the Bank's board for consideration in December 2003 but was withdrawn on advice from the Bank's executive directors and renegotiated with the government in an attempt to strengthen commitments to reform (154). It remains unsigned. See also Dinatale for discussion of two social projects ranked as unsatisfactory by Bank staff (2004, 239–240).

17. In his analysis of corruption in Argentina's antipoverty programs, Martín Dinatale cites an anonymous interview with a Bank employee to argue that clientelism in Bank-funded social programs is well-known, but that the Bank is reluctant to act because it wants to avoid conflict with the government.

18. See, for example, the remarks in the report on the stigma experienced by men unable to fulfill their provider role, and the claim—backed by a cite from Barker—that this leads them to affirm masculinity through violence and destructive behavior (Correia 1999, 24). The report also expressed concern at an increase in single-parent families headed by women on the grounds that "the absence or transitory nature of a paternal figure (biological or not) increases the probability of a lack of material, social and psychological resources needed for children's identity development (Johnson 1997)" (23). The cite is to Deborah Johnson's *Father Presence Matters*, published by the U.S.-based National Center on Fathers and Families.

19. See, for example, the Bank's support for a HIV/AIDS prevention program, (documented in World Bank 2004f). The Bank's social development staff also produced a report on reproductive health in Argentina entitled *Los Límites de la Ley* (The Limits of the Law), aiming to facilitate discussion and implementation of public policies to promote reproductive rights (Cesilini and Gherardi 2002, 9).

20. The CNM was then directed by a woman sympathetic to feminist projects, and it collaborated with PROGEN to produce a series of booklets on HIV/AIDS, violence, contraception, reproductive and sexual health, shared procreation, and safe maternity.

21. PROFAM project details, World Bank Web site. <http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=64290415&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P070374>. Accessed 5 September 2006.

22. Menem created the CNM by decree in 1992 to enact the country's CEDAW obligations and as part of a regional process of installing women's

state machineries (Lopreite 2006; Waylen 2000). Initially under the control of Virginia Franganillo, a long-standing member of the Peronist women's movement, the CNM had close links to women's organizations and was a key player in several legislative victories improving women's status and opportunities (Lopreite 2006, 12). It also worked to develop the country's first ever national plan to address reproductive rights, and it thus was increasingly opposed by Menem. Franganillo opposed his 1994 attempt to introduce an antiabortion clause into the constitution (13), and she resigned when he sent an antiabortion advocate to Beijing. A prolifer was appointed to replace her, and the CNM was delegitimized for much of the women's movement. See Weathers 2004 for a detailed overview.

23. In a cut-and-paste version of the claim made in Bank work throughout the region: "For adult men, despite continued economic growth, high unemployment is an emerging problem, which has led to high incidences of depression, substance abuse, and violence among men. This appears to be due to social norms and systems governing male roles, the stigma men face when they are unable to fulfill their primary role as family provider, and the fact that male roles tend to be narrowly defined" (World Bank 2001c, 25). Project documents also noted that unemployed men were responsible for 30 percent of domestic violence cases, "indicating that frustration and economic uncertainty spur violence" (13).

24. This is the reverse of what is meant to happen in loan procurement. One individual, who had not been involved at the beginning, maintained the official position that "the Bank, in general, responds to the request of the client, and if Argentina wanted to have a gender project, of course the Bank would respond to this need . . . I suppose that the project resulted from a request of the Government, of the Council [the CNM]." However, several others who had been involved at the start told me explicitly the reverse.

25. See, for example, Javier Auyero's discussion of the depletion of networks of reciprocal help and social capital in a Buenos Aires slum, drawing on the critical work of Loïc Wacquant (Auyero 2000, 2001). That they use the social capital language also employed by Fukuyama and Putnam is indicative of the broad utility of the term.

26. See also the loan agreement, which stated that "the objective of the Project is to test and monitor a community social capital approach to address the vulnerability of the poor population in the Borrower's territory by targeting families, as a comprehensive group of individuals, and promoting gender equity within said families" (World Bank/Government of Argentina 2002, 20).

27. The Bank had committed US \$5 million to PROFAM when the peso was pegged to the dollar; it tripled its peso funding to reflect the new exchange rate.

28. The Bank's gender staff pressured the CNM's team to abide by extremely strict reimbursement standards, a pressure they in turn passed down to local organizations. This was the biggest complaint NGOs had with the project. For example, the CNM demanded receipts for all expenditures, irrespective of the informal nature of economic exchange in many poor com-

munities. This demand prevented one community organization from using a nearby cooperative kitchen for catering services (because it could not issue official receipts), and it prevented several others from using public transport (because buses do not give official receipts). Several organizations had their reimbursement requests denied when these conditions were not met, and they reported losing money. Were this chapter focused on NGO voices, it would be 90 percent taken up with complaints about disbursement.

29. “Me da la mano y me dice: ‘Trabajadora sexual’. Y yo le digo, ‘¿Así que sos trabajadora social?’. ‘No, no, trabajadora *sexual*.’”

30. Although there was no mention of the sex workers group on the nine DVDs produced by the CNM to celebrate PROFAM’s achievements, they were the iconic group used—arguably with good reason - to show the project’s radical, unruly edge, and they were mentioned in a range of interviews by project administrators.

31. The Church delayed passage of a divorce law until 1987, opposed sex education and HIV/AIDS prevention activities, forestalled free access to contraception, and continues to block the legalization of abortion (Barrancos 2006; Cesilini and Gherardi 2002). It has also opposed civil rights legislation for LGBTQI communities (Barrancos 2006; Brown 2002). All NGOs and government officials interviewed for a recent Human Rights Watch report on reproductive rights in Argentina mentioned the influence of the Church (Human Rights Watch 2005, 17), and organizers of the 2004 annual women’s meeting alleged that conservative Catholic groups had tried to disrupt activities with violence and vandalism (17). Suffice it to say that relations between feminists and the Church can be tense.

32. As Javier Auyero notes in his ethnographic account of survival in a Buenos Aires slum in the 1990s, 90 percent of the funding for the Catholic soup kitchen in one district was provided by the local municipality (Auyero 2001, 87), and the first neighborhood meeting for a provincial project to provide emergency food supplies was held in the community’s Catholic church (Auyero 2001, 103).

33. See also an interview with Jorge Casaretto, a *Cáritas* bishop, quoted in Dinatale 2004, 191.

34. Kirchner’s health minister, Ginés González García, publicly advocated the decriminalization of abortion, a move that over half of the country supports (Sardá 2007, 31), and in 2004 the government nominated Carmen Argibay to the Supreme Court (she also supports decriminalization). However, abortion rights remained off the state’s legislative agenda.

35. Eva Perón proposed a wage for housewives, and the bill was debated in Congress but never approved (Milanesio 2006, 105). In 1952 the Peronist Association of Housewives was founded, part of a state effort to increase women’s responsible budgeting and household management, and, when Eva died, it named her the patron of homemakers. This image of her sits uneasily with the fact that she was childless and publicly admitted her inability to perform domestic tasks (106).

36. See Dinatale 2004, 189, on evangelical resentment at being frozen out of social service provision.

37. Between 1980 and 1994 the proportion of families with one income earner in Buenos Aires fell from 68 percent to 52 percent, while families with two income earners increased from 23 percent to 38 percent (World Bank 2001c, 13). In this respect Argentina's gender trends mirror Ecuador's: a decline in marriage rates and a rise in new family forms due to increased divorce, separation, and cohabitation (Geldstein 1997, 552).

38. Associated with women's suffrage and right to serve in elected office, she also worked to aid the poor through her charity foundation. She championed the rights of illegitimate children and was despised by the Church hierarchy and the country's anti-Peronist elite, including by those feminists allied to it.

39. These microcredit programs were sometimes subject to the sort of clientelist manipulations for which Argentina became notorious in the 1990s. See Teichman (2001) on Menem's manipulation of social funds; see Dinatale (2004) on the Heads of Household Program; see Auyero (2000 and 2001) for an ethnography of clientelism in a Buenos Aires slum, which includes discussion of microcredit (e.g., Auyero 2000, 95). See also Green 2003, Guano 2004.

40. For example, the Bank repeatedly advised the Argentine government to halt growing enrollment in the Heads of Household Program and to make it a genuine work program, rather than a virtually universal income maintenance program. Its US \$600 million loan to Jefes y Jefas came with the condition that it be converted into a targeted program, and in May 2002 the beneficiary list was arbitrarily closed, excluding more than one million potential beneficiaries (Dinatale 2004, 247).

41. Exceptions occurred, such as the masonry project highlighted in Figure 12, but the overall pattern was to fund gender-normative initiatives.

42. This is an interesting stretching of the Bank's mission and should be compared with the moment in which PRODEPINE staff felt obliged to warn rural women that Caja Solidaria money had been given for work and productive activity, "not a community *fiesta*." A community *fiesta* was a perfectly legitimate object of PROFAM funding, on the grounds that it could get men involved in gender lending.

43. Many organizations sought follow-up money from the Programa Familias, an initiative launched by the Ministry of Social Development to serve the vulnerable. See <http://www.desarrollosocial.gov.ar/Planes/PF/default.asp>.

## Conclusion

1. See George and Sabelli's (1995) reference to the sport of Bank-bashing.

2. See, for example, the Bank staff interviewed by National Public Radio, April 16, 2000, 8:00 PM.

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