




# H Y P E R P O L I T I C S



MAURO CALISE & THEODORE J. LOWI



**HYPERPOLITICS**





MAURO CALISE & THEODORE J. LOWI



# HYPERPOLITICS

AN **INTERACTIVE** DICTIONARY  
OF **POLITICAL SCIENCE**  
**CONCEPTS**

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS  
CHICAGO AND LONDON

Mauro Calise is professor of political science at the University of Naples Federico II. The author of several books (listed at [www.maurocalise.it](http://www.maurocalise.it)), he is past vice president of the International Political Science Association and president of the Italian Political Science Association. He currently directs the IPSA Web Portal for Electronic Sources and the Federico II Open Courseware Portal ([www.federica.unina.it](http://www.federica.unina.it)).

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## Preface

Welcome to the world's first hyperdictionary.

It is a dictionary and far more. It is a method for unpacking a dense concept by separating out its components while providing a logical relation among them. In other words, it is a method of concept analysis. As with any analysis the purpose is to break the object into its parts, to examine the parts, and then reassemble them with a clearer understanding of the object's meaning and significance.

Let's compare our purpose to that of the admirable *Critical Dictionary of Sociology* (Boudon and Bourricaud 1989), whose aims and virtues were put forward quite effectively by the Editor's Foreword. First of all, the Foreword claims that the *Dictionary* "is unlike most other sociology or social science dictionaries." Second, it is "critical" in its embrace not of the Marxist usage but of "the critical rationalism of the philosophes and their Encyclopédie ... because it forms a mode of thought which is irreverent in the best sense of that term." Third, and finally, it celebrates the Second Edition for its progress, its abridgements to make room for entries of greater interest to a wider readership.

We agree with all the claims and praise the elegance of the essays as well as their utility. However, our claims regarding *Hyperpolitics* go beyond those, in three main respects:

First, *Hyperpolitics* is a dictionary unlike any other. It is a dictionary in the irreducible sense that concepts are selected and defined one at a time. But each entry is defined in terms of other concepts related to the meaning of that entry, and all of the defining concepts are linked within a logical system: the matrix. The matrix, with its self-evident logic and user-friendly interface, serves as a metalanguage helping the reader to navigate through a complex conceptual universe.

Second, although our dictionary is also a "collection of essays," the essays are not written to stand alone. Each definition is a prose rendering of its matrix, incorporating all twelve of the defining concepts in the matrix, moving from one quadrant (property-space) to the next, of the four quadrants in each matrix. However, each entry also exists, through its matrix, in a dynamic relation to many other entries whose matrices contain overlapping concepts. This is virtually an operational definition of pre-theoretical discourse.

Third, while our dictionary also seeks to engender a "mode of thought," our aim goes beyond "irreverence" to interactivity. Definitions in conventional dictionaries tend to foreclose reality, limiting the semantic universe of a given concept. In contrast, our definitions invite for further expansion. Our matrix-based

metalanguage provides definitions covering a wide empirical and theoretical territory, and allows for more complex configurations through links to other concepts. Yet, it also enables readers to make their own contributions, by using the matrix syntax to construct variations—or alternatives—to our definitions. This is *Hyperpolitics* at its best—a living dictionary.

Thanks to these three innovative functions, the hyperdictionary guides and fosters free and yet logically controlled navigation through an expanding universe of competing meanings and observations, while also bringing concept analysis as close as possible to the system level of thinking. That is, the hyperdictionary's structure allows for constant comparison and interaction among the various conceptual units.

The systemic dimension of the hyperdictionary is built upon two main methodological foundations:

- *All definitions follow the same analytical pattern: a matrix of twelve logically interrelated keywords. The dictionary provides a definition for each concept by always placing it at the center of a matrix of twelve related keywords in dialectic with each other. As a result of the matrix methodology, definitions provide a fourfold typology of each concept, allowing for a wide spectrum of comparative empirical observations and facilitating the development of tightly linked theoretical arguments. This is the hyperdictionary.*
- *Each keyword is drawn from a list of one hundred keywords. The list was compiled through the computerized scanning and counting of all entries from ten authoritative dictionaries of political science, from four languages and five countries (Italy, France, Germany, U.K., and U.S.). As a result, the list approaches a representation of the mainstream vocabulary of the discipline.<sup>1</sup>*

The combination of these two methods produces commensurability and interactivity among all units—and subunits—of the hyperdictionary, basic attributes of systemic navigation and understanding. The logic of the hyperdictionary is movement outward to all possible cross-references from the original keyword, and backward logically toward where it began.

For example, *party* is an entry with its own matrix and definition that can be fought over on its own grounds. But *party* also shows up as an element in the matrices and definitions of several other of the entries in our dictionary, such as *agenda* and *election* (figure 1). By showing all the matrices where a given keyword is used, *Hyperpolitics*

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<sup>1</sup> As we shall argue in more detail in the *Introduction*, we are well aware that the choice of our vocabulary presents several limits and cultural biases. Our list does however remain open to individual additions through the *Web Companion* (see the *User's Guide*, which begins on page 29).




Figure 1 - Mapping concepts

offers a comprehensive overview of a keyword’s conceptual domain, making the reader aware of the complex interactions in the discipline’s vocabulary, and preparing the user for thoughts and speculations at the level of theory.

This, at the same time, opens up our dictionary to the participation—and improvement—by all interested users.<sup>2</sup> And it brings us to what we consider a key feature of our project: to restore the place of concepts in political analysis while, at the same time, making them as easily accessible and debatable as possible to the wider public.

2 This project had been long underway when Wikipedia changed the common understanding of dictionary compilation—and use. We were all the happier to see the extraordinary success of a cultural undertaking sharing the same spirit of our and other concurring efforts: to use Internet as an opportunity for open access to qualified sources of higher learning. This is an aim we have pursued through the *Web Companion to Hyperpolitics*, as we shall show in more detail in the *User’s Guide*. Wikipedia, however, also contributes—by contrast—to make it all the more clear what is specific with *Hyperpolitics*. The main virtue of Wikipedia lies in its capacity to attract experts from various cultural backgrounds to perform a strictly defined and highly specialized task: to contribute to the definition of a single particle of universal knowledge. On sheer methodological grounds, there is no difference between Wikipedia and any traditional encyclopedia. The novelty resides in the fact that access both to the drafting and the reading of a definition is an open one. However, Wikipedia’s definitions remain within the boundaries of the encyclopedic mainstream: to provide as specific a definition as possible for as wide a number of discrete items composing the universe of scientific knowledge. In contrast, the aim of our hyperdictionary is to boost the understanding and development of links among different concepts, through a logically coherent pattern calling for criticism and improvement.

We are well aware that this task calls for tough scientific guidance, as well as a good deal of self-discipline. We are trying to strike a balance between the rigorous unraveling of complex conceptual analysis and an open-ended process of critical evaluation and participation by the scholarly community. This has been the vision of our project since its very inception. There have been several attempts by social scientists to broaden concept usage and to systematize concept analysis by providing guidelines, requisites and methodologies for more consistency—i.e., to help concepts “travel” across cultures and languages. In spite of their many merits, these efforts have attracted little if any following beyond the restricted circle of methodology experts. We were compelled to ask the question: How could we bridge the gap between rules and results, by bringing concepts into a political discourse that can pass scientific requirements without reducing us to an esoteric language?

The answer had to meet two basic requirements. One is parsimony. If our method was to be applied to a great number of concepts, and by a variety of authors, it needed to be simple and intuitive. Our choice of the matrix, one of the great work-horses of social science with the two-by-two table and the axial quadrant form, grounds the hyperdictionary upon a few elementary syntactic rules. These rules belong to the common stock of any social science practitioner, and can be readily assimilated by the novice. While easy to use and interpret, our matrix-based concepts also allow for stepwise assimilation—and criticism, the best route to understanding and sharing. The second ingredient is flexibility. The matrix’s clear-cut logic serves as an anchor to the rigor of scientific inquiry. But it also works as a compass to venture into the maze of political language, with its infinite wealth of empirical observations and theoretical approaches. By applying the same modular pattern to a large variety of conceptual definitions, the matrix strikes a balance between Aristotle and Wittgenstein, combining two epistemological views which tend, most of the time, to be presented as competitive if not contradictory.

We spent several years, at the formative stage of our project, to refine our methodology and make it as parsimonious and flexible as possible. Then came the tough question: would it really work?

The first step was to take upon ourselves the burden of putting our method to test, by carving out of our matrix as many definitions as possible. We would thus taste the pudding or, better, test the oven by cooking several puddings, while also being able to perform a systematic consistency check of the hyperdictionary’s overall relational structure. At the onset, we must confess, the enthusiasm of discovery led us to underestimate the trials we were to face in such an unprecedented endeavor. Of all the authoritative scholars breaking new ground in concept analysis, none had

ventured into the maze of drafting a whole brand-new dictionary. Yet, Hic Rhodus, hic salta.<sup>3</sup>

At various moments of our journey we could easily have lost our faith, if it were not for the comfort of our mutual assistance. With all the beauty of endless theorizing, the best part came out of experiencing the many treasures of cross-Atlantic friendship. And the landing is now in sight.

However, to avoid being judges in our own cause, we have put the hyperdictionary to the test by teaching. And we have been very much encouraged by the extraordinary reception of hundreds of students who have participated in our classes, and many graduate students who have, in various capacities, contributed to the making of our hyperdictionary. For the past six years, *Hyperpolitics* has been used in the Introduction to Political Science course at the University of Naples, and by undergraduate and graduate students at the University of Florence and Cornell University, in classes varying in size from ten to two hundred. In all cases, students have greatly appreciated the possibility of approaching complex arguments in an incremental way, using the matrix's clear, logical, and self-explanatory interface. Group discussion and participation have thus been strongly enhanced and, in the cases of smaller classes, have led to the drafting and presentation of original versions and/or variants of a given concept by individual students. This has been our most rewarding experience: to be engaged in conceptual brainstorming.

Classroom teaching also proved as the best laboratory to experiment with different levels of in-depth treatment of each concept. The basic use of the hyperdictionary is to simply refer to the matrix. With its graphical representation with twelve interrelated concepts, the matrix serves as a shorthand description of each definition's content. By drawing it on a blackboard—or, through the book's *Web Companion*, on an electronic screen—one gets an overview of the matrix's core argument. This is usually accompanied by a brief oral presentation, the first step in introducing the logical relationships among the axes and the four quadrants, as well as a rough idea of the empirical evidence and/or main theorizing the matrix intends to refer to. After putting to the test the soundness of the matrix's relational structure, one can move to the more demanding task of rendering its contents into prose. It is, however, important to note that, on pedagogical grounds, the development of an original matrix is a challenging and rewarding task even at the preliminary stage of just sketching a tentative argument. Most students have little if any practice with

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3 This Latin phrase ("We're in Rhodes, jump here!"), from Aesop's Fables, is a kind of challenge to a braggart.

mapping conceptual relationships, and the matrix's elementary methodology works as a strong incentive to discover new territories. The matrix thus serves a more general commitment to a "social science methodology focusing especially on the logic of 'discovery'—research which involves a dynamic interplay between theory and data, with the primary goal of generating new insights."<sup>4</sup>

In moving to prose rendering, the first step is the drafting of an outline of the matrix's various components. Coming up with a coherent and concise written argument requires a careful check of the relationships among the four quadrants, evaluating possible alternatives, and making more explicit choices. However brief, this is, in most respects, a full-fledged definition of a concept. This is also the hyperdictionary's format, allowing for easier and yet rigorous, controlled exchange among various versions and authors. We have used this short-entry format extensively in our classroom experience, and it also is the cornerstone on the *Web Companion* platform. Inevitably, the full wealth and depth of the hyperdictionary can be enjoyed only through the reading—and writing—of full-length definitions, experimenting with complex conceptual configurations and their array of scholarly references and elaborate scientific discourse. Short, outline-only definitions do however provide the opportunity to actively participate in *Hyperpolitics*' concept-making endeavor, without the far more exacting commitment a full-length matrix's treatment requires. All the more so if one takes advantage of the benefits and powerful extensions toward the world of electronic sources offered by the hyperdictionary's Web platform.

This leads to another important factor in our development. As the title of the book implies, our dictionary shares several of the basic features of hypertext as philosophy and as practice.<sup>5</sup> From the seminal visions of Barthes and Derrida to the more recent explosion of the World Wide Web, hypertext has become the language of modern—and postmodern—communication.<sup>6</sup> It is worth repeating that hypertext is a language for organizing knowledge on a modular rather than a sequential basis. While in a conventional discourse concepts are associated through

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4 See Charles C. Ragin, *Fuzzy-Set Social Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), xiv.

5 Along the various steps of our project, several colleagues suggested that we should change the title of this book. Some thought that the prefix *hyper* had lost its original appeal as a cue for language innovation, and had become... hyperused. Others would have liked the title to bear a more direct relationship to the scientific core of our enterprise: redefining the structure of concepts to improve individual and collective efforts toward concept-making. While sharing some of these concerns, we still believe that the original title can best convey, in a single and brand-new word, the vision of this book for a fresh approach to political science language.

6 The best introduction to hypertext remains George P. Landow, *Hypertext 2.0: The Convergence of Contemporary Critical Theory and Technology* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992). See also Ilana Snyder, *Hypertext: The Electronic Labyrinth* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), especially Chapter 2, "Explaining Hypertext," 15–38.

linear steps, hypertext creates multilevel and multidirectional links between a word and its meanings, within an undetermined number of contexts. The spread of—and the access to—the World Wide Web on the Internet has greatly enhanced and facilitated the possibility of surfing from one term—or site—to another through a hypertext-like interface. Yet, hypertext's success may well turn into its own demise.

Through the millions of Web sites in the cybersphere, there appears to be no limit to the relationships between a given word and the number of related contexts. As a result, search engines have become the main gatekeepers to the Net's ever-expanding universe. By turning hypertext from a metalanguage into an infopoint, everyone can find anything on the Web, as long as they already know what they are looking for. This adds very little to our knowledge and understanding, as it provides us only with information on exactly that piece of reality we were already aware of and only needed to identify. The Net's extraordinary practical use becomes its own enemy, shrinking our need for imagination. An infinite number of experiences and contexts available at a fingertip leads to a passive mind that has yielded to the power of the search engine.

Fortunately, passive searching through the Web is only one path in the hypertext revolution. A more engaging and rewarding one is use of hypertextual links as a boost to one's own critical inquiry into the universe of human knowledge. This was hypertext's original goal, to go beyond text and its meaning, by deconstructing its traditional boundaries and redefining concepts through a much wider epistemological network. Thanks to the continuous interaction with different interpretations and authors, text could eventually become the product of a "connected intelligence."<sup>7</sup>

We may still be a long way from the rise of a Web-based brainframe, and the hypertext revolution in human language and understanding goes far beyond the scope of this book. Yet, although we deal only with a limited dimension of the expanding hypersphere, we provide a course of action and a set of guiding criteria to meet the needs of scientific inquiry. There is an inexhaustible resource of social science on the Internet,<sup>8</sup> but those who surf it without a compass are likely to drown. Our matrices offer such a compass, however inadequate, for intellectual navigation through the sea of serendipity into the power of knowledge.

Welcome aboard!

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7 See Derrick de Kerckhove, *Brainframes: Technology, Mind and Business* (Utrecht: Bosch & Keuning, 1991) and *Connected Intelligence* (Somerville, 1997).

8 See Mauro Calise and Rosanna De Rosa, "E-Research: An Introduction to On-line Political Science Sources for Beginners (and Skeptics)," *International Political Science Review* 29 (2008): 595–618.



## Acknowledgments

*This book has been in the making for almost twenty years. Its birth was volcanic, on the Mediterranean island of Stromboli, the right setting for a venturesome journey. Bonded in friendship, our approaches had traveled different paths. Calise came to political science through history, linguistics, and a mastery of information technology—enough to anticipate a change from our linear way of thinking to hypertext, a modular logic approach to the essential tool of all the sciences: concepts. Lowi came to political science through the standardized American subfields of political institutions, public policy, and public law but at a time and place—Yale in the 1950s—when there was a movement from political experience to political theory. Some called it by the oxymoron “empirical theory.” We came together by one commitment, to “bring concepts back in.” We were far from alone, in what was becoming a virtual movement within political science: qualitative methodology. But we brought our own distinct vision. Hyperpolitics is qualitative methodology, but not toward concepts one at a time. For us, each concept exists in a network of concepts, a bridge toward genuine political theory.*

*The concepts to be restored were to obey two guiding principles: the strict coherence of logic and the immense creativity of language. This also is a juncture between scientific discourse, with its tradition and constraints, and the new hypertextual parlance. A comeback of concepts should face the traps of the Internet environment, and each either drowns or comes out stronger. That’s why, from the very beginning, this book has been like Janus: one face paper, the other one byte.*

*It has not been easy to find the right balance between two worlds which, within academic practice, still remain largely separate, the more so as the pace of Internet innovation forced us to continuously revise and update our track. When we first began, with a hypertext platform in mind, the Web hardly existed. Software worked, then flourished, off-line. Students, who today take instant Internet access as their Bill of Rights, may smile at the energy we put into scanning more than five thousand APSR book reviews only to be obviated by JSTOR—a bottomless pit of knowledge in a revolutionary library without walls. Yet, that lesson taught us to put our expertise to work through the creation of IPSAPortal, the first authoritative gateway to online sources for political science throughout the world.*

*Needless to say, such a workload has required skill, sweat, and the cooperation of a number of experienced professionals, to assist us through the engineering and handling of Hyperpolitics’ platform, its data, the bibliography, and the airing of every matrix.*

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*Although much of the work has been cooperative, one person had to be manager of all the technical aspects. That person is Rosanna De Rosa, who began as an apprentice and became our executive director, aside from becoming a member of the University of Naples faculty. Tania Melchionna designed Hyperpolitics' interface, a role she kept from the first printed layout to the new online look. Gianluigi Visco created the original Hypercard platform, which was later upgraded as a Filemaker Pro relational database. Once we moved to the Web several years ago, Claudio Simeone took charge and remains in charge of the new software environment as a last generation content management system, while Enza Nigro has assisted in all DTP processes, from layout improvement to the QuarkXPress composition and continuous revisions of our chapters with their complex graphic components.*

*Moving from platform to content, Annarita Criscitiello, together with Rosanna De Rosa, conducted with generous dedication the preparation of Hyperpolitics' vocabulary backbone. This includes the compilation of the multilingual database with more than two thousand entries from ten dictionaries in four languages, from which the keywords list was selected. It also includes the drafting of several hundred concise abstracts—now available through the book's Web Companion—summarizing the content and methodology of every entry's definition in its original sources. These painstaking tasks were joined by a number of junior colleagues: from Italy, Silvia Bolgherini, Flavia Carassini, Marco Cilento, Luigi Di Gregorio, and Monica Zuccarini; and from the U.S., Erik Filipiak, Michael Harvey, Mingus Mapps, Dennis Merryfield, Jeffrey Selinger, Daniel Sherman, and Israel Waismel-Manor. All have since gone on to academic and professional pursuits.*

*In the original Hyperpolitics plan, there was another module which has since been discontinued: a directory of the main living authors cited in our definitions, coupled with an intellectual biography, with links to their books, articles, and reviews in APSA publications. Much as we owed to this research tool and its sharp mapping of our scholarly community, it became obsolete once the Web made accessible most of this information as well as its constant evolution. We feel deeply indebted to our colleague Robert Spitzer, who kindly agreed to draft a number of intellectual biographies which unfortunately could not be published.*

*At different stages of its development, Hyperpolitics has been exposed and reviewed in a number of scholarly venues. We are especially thankful to the following for their criticism and comments: Daniel Ferguson, Ada Finifter, Alexandra Ionescu, John Gerring, Robert Goodin, Bernard Grofman, Kay Lawson, Seraphim Seferiades, and the late Fred Riggs, Enrico Melchionda, and Mario Stoppino. David Collier, Rainer Eisfeld, Max Kaase, William Lafferty, Jonas Pontusson, Sidney Tarrow, John Trent, Aris Accornero, Rita di Leo, Pierangelo Schiera, and Giovanni Sartori have also provided us*

*with invaluable support and suggestions to steer and improve our project. We can only hope that the result meets their high expectations. Finally, Paul Godt has been extraordinary in guiding us with his thoughtful advice through the multiple (!) revisions of our text.*


*Seminars, with the participation of the authors, were held at PhD programs at the universities of Florence and Naples, and Cornell University. We express our appreciation to all the PhD students who played such an enthusiastic part in this project. In some cases, this has led to the drafting of original matrices which have been included as short entries in the present edition, with the name of each author reported at the end of the text. We also wish to thank Leonardo Morlino and Robert Parks, who joined us in tutoring our students on many occasions, and, we admit, often tutored us.*

*The management of such a complex project across the Atlantic has required an endless amount of correspondence. We must confess that we dare not look into our e-mail backlog, lest we find ourselves overwhelmed by hundreds of stop-and-goes. The merit of always keeping the ball—and the keyboard—moving rests with Jackie Pastore, who patiently oversaw all administrative work with thoughtful and relentless affection. Hollie Heath was an excellent assistant to Jackie and to both of us. All through the last, most demanding steps of this project, Fortunato Musella has been invaluable as an assistant to bibliographical and editorial work. Kailee Kremer kindly offered her talent for the final editing.*


*When we eventually felt that our venture was ready to be turned into a book and started looking for a publisher, John Tryneski jumped right into the job and masterfully steered our manuscript toward its final shape.*

*Making one book out of two authors is always a complex endeavor. For us, it was made much simpler by the merging of our respective families. With their cheerful love, Angele and Paola, Ann and Anna, Jason, Giulia, and Dan have been the fuel behind each and every matrix, keeping the fire in our minds.*





# Introduction





## Bringing Concepts Back In

Language serves thought. But different kinds of thought require different kinds of language, and different kinds of language influence the manner of thought. There has been an explosion of language in recent decades in political science, mostly as a consequence of its expansion on a world scale. Reactions to this explosion, and the complexity following from it, have been single-mindedly to specialize. This involves specialization of subfields and methodologies, culminating in the segmentation of concepts.

Although altogether understandable, it is nevertheless true that, as we have advanced in our ability to define specific concepts to gain more clarity in meaning, we have weakened the capacity of the field at large to engage in theory-making. Defining for clarity for one purpose (the limiting case being the operational definition) can seriously impair the applicability of a concept—and even the larger thought arising out of it—to other analyses and to other contexts and theories. The meaning of any concept depends not only on the defining words and attributes themselves, but on the choice of context. Designative words are one thing; concepts essential for a field of thought are quite another matter: they are never context free. *The essence of theory-making is control of contexts by placement of each and every concept in relation to all the other concepts deemed necessary for the endeavor.*<sup>1</sup>

No social science manifesto can disregard the quest for some form—and degree—of control over its research process, and concepts remain the cornerstone of any such purpose and effort. The definition of concepts is thus part of the routine of any scientific endeavor<sup>2</sup>. We have all become aware that meanings, for whatever concepts, are always fraught with history and linguistic diversity. One needs not go through the infinite nuances and burden of erudite *Begriffsgeschichte* to realize that most concepts have undergone deep changes through various ages and places<sup>3</sup>. And no one-sided and single-minded definition, even of the simplest term, could be sure

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- 1 A magnificent, comprehensive introduction to context analysis is now offered by Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly, eds., *Contextual Political Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
  - 2 For an updated user's guide to research design as well as a brief introduction to the vast body of literature on concept formation, see Peter Mair, "Concepts and Concept Formation," in *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences*, ed. Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
  - 3 A comprehensive English presentation of the monumental work by Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck is in Hartmuth Lehmann and Melvin Richter, eds., *The Meaning of Historical Terms and Concepts: New Studies on Begriffsgeschichte* (Washington: The German Historical Institute, 1996). An in-depth comparison of the German, French, and English traditions is in Melvin Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). A brilliant application of the conceptual history approach to several political science concepts is in Terence Ball, *Transforming Political Discourse: Political Theory and Critical Conceptual History* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1988).

# Introduction

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to meet the challenge of cultural cleavages, groupings, identities.<sup>4</sup> Meaning, to a large extent, remains an intersubjective matter.

Restoration of concepts calls for cultural pluralism, on substantive as well as methodological grounds. Concepts are the tail of the tiger. Grabbing the tail with a narrow aim may reinforce an academic citadel but starve the need of ordinary understanding. Dispute over meaning continues, because “there are clear benefits to putting aside the desire for a single answer to the question ‘What is a concept?’”<sup>5</sup> Pitting naturalists against antinaturalists over qualitative methodology yields no definitive winner.<sup>6</sup> Another metaphoric response is that we have to cope with both faces of the coin.<sup>7</sup>

To make progress among competing rules of concept formation requires humility and some boldness of vision. One needs to set aside any pretense of having the ultimate word(ing), even though such an attitude may run contrary to the objective of all lexicographers as well as the ambition of most scholars. To define a concept as an open universe, rather than a closed circle, may seem to be a contradictory, if not self-defeating, enterprise. It certainly is a commitment to an adventurous journey. We join the fray with a new compass, which we believe will prove as simple as it is effective. Our compass will help bridge the gap between the specialized approaches to political science and indeed to all the social sciences. Our confidence has been reinforced by a classic definition of concepts, all the more valuable because we encountered it at a late stage of our journey:

Concepts ... mark our paths by which we may move most freely in logical space. They identify nodes or junctions in the network of relationships, termini at which we can halt while preserving the maximum range of choice as to where to go next.<sup>8</sup>

By linking concepts together in logical fashion, beyond the logic of each, it becomes possible to enrich concepts to better serve their true purpose: theory, or theory-making, which seeks synthesis on top of analysis. The best introduction to

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4 See James W. Davis, “Of Concepts and Conceptualization,” in *Terms of Inquiry: On the Theory and Practice of Political Science* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 2005), 10–60; and Michael Freeden, “Political Concepts and Ideological Morphology,” *Journal of Political Philosophy* 2 (1994): 140–64.

5 Robert Adcock, “What is a Concept?” (Working paper 1 of the IPSA Committee on Concepts and Methods, 2005: 31).

6 Compare the exposition and discussion of Robert Adcock, *ibid.*, with the passionate and uncompromising views of Mark Bevir and Asak Kedar, “Concept Formation in Political Science: An Anti-Naturalist Critique of Qualitative Methodology,” *Perspectives on Politics* 6 (2008): 503–17.

7 In recent years there has been a growing number of authoritative efforts to combine and integrate approaches and methodologies hitherto considered alternative. See Henry E. Brady and David Collier, eds., *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004) and Charles C. Ragin, *Fuzzy-Set Social Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

8 Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing, 1964), 53.

# Bringing Concepts Back In

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this process is through three signature characters: Giovanni Sartori, Robert Merton, and Harold Lasswell.

## *Ladders, Paradigms, and Systems*

### Sartori

Among all the outstanding comparativists in twentieth-century political science, extending back through to Weber and Mosca, we chose Sartori because of his success in grounding both comparative politics and political theory in concepts and concept formation. Beginning in the 1950s, Sartori took the lead in putting concepts at the center of political science, first with a book in Italian, *Democrazia e Definizioni* (1957), and then in a series of efforts that produced path-breaking articles as well as the founding of an important international research committee. The Committee on Conceptual and Terminological Analysis—COCTA—was established as the first Research Committee of the International Political Science Association (1970), and then became a joint committee of both IPSA and the International Sociological Association and also one of the standing committees of the International Social Science Council. These institutional commitments were spearheaded by Sartori's seminal 1970 *APSR* article, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics."<sup>9</sup> It was followed by a coauthored product of COCTA, "Tower of Babel" (Sartori, Riggs, and Teune 1975). Further products of COCTA were brought together a decade later in a book edited and introduced by Sartori, from which we will draw some compelling passages that helped us define our own position.<sup>10</sup>

In his Foreword to *Social Science Concepts*, Sartori, in his usual combative style, begins with, "One good way of assessing the state of the science is to look into the state of its concepts" (9). Quoting a Nobel physical scientist, Sartori proceeds with the observation that any and all science "depends on its concepts. These are ideas which receive names. They determine the questions one asks, and the answers one gets. They are more fundamental than the theories which are stated in terms of them" (9). And, Sartori goes on, "whether concepts are theory-formed or theory-

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9 "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," *American Political Science Review* 64 (1970), 1033–53; and Giovanni Sartori, F. W. Riggs, and H. Teune, "Tower of Babel: On the Definition of Concepts in the Social Sciences" (Occasional paper, International Studies Association, 1975). For a collection and an overall presentation of Sartori's main contributions and his legacy, see David Collier and John Gerring, eds., *Concepts and Method in Social Science: The Tradition of Giovanni Sartori* (London: Routledge, 2009).

10 Giovanni Sartori, ed., *Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1984). Page references in parentheses.

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forming, in either case they are the basic units with which the social science profession actually performs” (9).

Sartori’s position is affirmed and reaffirmed in his magisterial political theory treatise, first published in 1962 and published in an extended revisit in 1987.<sup>11</sup> Although he makes no general statement of his methodology, he comes very close fairly early in Volume One with this declaration:

The quintessential point is that the difficult and precarious linkage between the outer world and the world inside our heads stands and falls on one element: its words and wording. Even the most bare empiricist cannot escape the inescapable, namely, that his data are found and cast within his concepts, and thereby via the *wording of his concepts* (italics in original). Putting it the other way around, concepts ... are “data containers.” ... The sine qua non condition that permits the assumption that an outer world somehow enters our heads is that throughout this tricky ambulation *the vehicle remains constant* (italics in original); this vehicle being the word element and, more precisely, a firmed-up correspondence between a given wording and a given concept.<sup>12</sup>

Certainly not entirely coincidentally, Sartori’s stress on concepts and concept development came at a time when pressure was being exerted on the conceptual apparatus of the whole field of political science. The pressure was coming from a new generation of political scientists whose research on non-Western and ‘Third World’ politics was not fitting comfortably into the West European–American tradition but who refused to be relegated to the status of mere ‘area studies.’

Two paths seem to have been taken in response. One was to “stretch” established concepts to fit more comfortably the experience confronting political science from the non-Western countries. The second path was to operationalize the concepts into variables defined or “indicated” by the degree to which the experiences fit the concepts. On the latter, Sartori was particularly combative, against “methodology” as a solution: “In moving from the qualitative to the quantitative science, concepts have been hastily resolved and dissolved into variables ... [and] the more the variable swallows the concept, the poorer our conceiving” (*Social Science Concepts*, 9–10).

The path largely pursued by the colleagues in COCTA was to adapt the key political science concepts one by one to the non-Western experience by redefining them—i.e., a semantic approach (16 ff.) or what Sartori elsewhere calls “concept unraveling” (22). And he lays out in this essay a set of rules or semantic guidelines as

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11 Published first as *Democratic Theory* (1962), the version relied upon here is *The Theory of Democracy Revisited* (Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, 1987).

12 *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*, 78.

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to how to be careful when extending empirical concepts to include additional denotations or referents without rendering the concept useless by ambiguity, overextension, or “stretching.” Sartori’s way out is captured best by David Collier, a prominent Latin America comparativist and one of Sartori’s younger but long-term associates in the formation of COCTA as well as, more recently, the initiator of APSA’s “Qualitative Methodology” section. According to Collier, Sartori’s approach is too “classical,” (845) in that it “assumes the clear boundaries and defining attributes of classical categories [or concepts]” (846). If the concept developed for one set of cases is extended to take into account additional cases, “the new cases may be sufficiently different [to render the concept] no longer appropriate in its original form” (846). That is the sin of “conceptual stretching” (846).<sup>13</sup> But, as Collier continues, not all concepts are “classical” and, following Wittgenstein, concepts can share a “family resemblance” even though two separate concepts may share few actual traits or referents—i.e., “a set of commonalities considered by the researcher to be analytically important” (847). Collier also holds out for a solution to conceptual stretching, and on some occasions uses adjectives to, in effect, provide subtypes.<sup>14</sup> And in other situations it might be appropriate, according to Collier, to adopt “some form of multidimensional scaling that specifies underlying dimensions for comparing cases” (848). But he immediately admits that that does not really solve the problem, since “a prerequisite for such scaling is to establish what it is that is being scaled” (848).

The main problem with the Sartori treatment of concepts and the rules for their construction is that there is no exit off or from the “ladder of generality”—or as he refers to it, the “ladder of abstraction.”<sup>15</sup> In order to maintain the integrity of a concept, especially as new experiences with the concept are being confronted from hitherto unfamiliar cultures, it is necessary to extend the concept in some methodical way. Collier has set up the problem as a genuine dilemma, as this can be done by climbing “the ladder of generality,” through “intension,” which they do by adding “meanings or attributes that define the category and determine membership” (846), or by “extension,” which means to expand “the set of entities in the world to which [the concept] refers” (846). However, it is not possible to do both. If you add cases,

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13 David Collier and James Mahon, “Conceptual ‘Stretching’ Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis,” *American Political Science Review* 87 (1993): 845–55. Page references are in parentheses.

14 David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research,” *World Politics* 49 (1997): 430–51.

15 For the difference in terminology, see David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Democracy: Conceptual Hierarchies in Comparative Research,” in *Concepts and Methods in Social Science: The Tradition of Giovanni Sartori*, ed. David Collier and John Gerring (New York: Routledge, 2009), 283n7.

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you “stretch” the concept. If you strengthen the definition, you make it more limited in its applicability. There is no hard and fast way to settle the dilemma: “Its resolution requires knowledge of the cases” (852).<sup>16</sup>

This dilemma has spurred several recent attempts to bridge the gap between intension and extension in concept analysis: whether by a min-max strategy or through a part-whole hierarchy, or by means of multidimensional and multilevel concepts.<sup>17</sup> These efforts bring us a very large step toward our own position. Concepts are the thing, for us as for Sartori and his associates. However, we consider that they may have gone too far in the effort to find rules, guidelines, methods, and linguistic/semantic devices to repair, adjust, index, or qualify concepts *one at a time* for improved use in combining and differentiating cases for purposes of analysis the only way it can be done—by comparison. Our goal is the same—to build from concepts to theory by making clear in each analytic act just what each case is *a case of*—i.e., to what concept or conceptual category does each case belong. But we try to go beyond the classical or the Wittgensteinian or any other approach advanced by efforts to perfect definitions *seriatim*. The job necessarily *begins* one concept at a time but, as we shall argue, it has to move quickly and self-consciously from discrete concepts to *relationships between and among concepts*.

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## Merton

We try to flank this task with Robert Merton’s help. Merton has provided us with promising routes of advancement—neither exit nor escape—toward development and usage of concepts that can remain practical and comfortable as receptacles for experience but can at the same time offer a chance to communicate ordinary experience without depriving us of our quest for a more theoretical discourse that can only be pursued through *cumulation* of experience. This cumulativeness has to be *paradigmatic*. That is, every sentence that uses concepts and every combination of such sentences must meet two conditions: First, the process must proceed along some logical line that can permit us to advance without losing track of how we got

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16 Collier has added significantly to the discussion of the problem elsewhere: “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research,” and with Robert Adcock, “Democracy and Dichotomies: A Pragmatic Approach to Choices About Concepts,” in *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 537–65.

17 See John Gerring and Paul A. Barresi, “Culture: Joining Minimal Definitions and Ideal Types,” in *Concepts and Methods in Social Science: The Tradition of Giovanni Sartori*, ed. David Collier and John Gerring (New York: Routledge, 2009); David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Democracy: Conceptual Hierarchies in Comparative Research,” in David Collier and John Gerring, *ibid.*; Gary Goertz, *Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 1–24; John E. Trent, “Issues in Political Science Circa Century 21: Perspectives from the *World of Political Science* Book Series” in *Participation* 2 (2008): 6–8.

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to where we are and how we can get back to where we started, if we wish to. Second, since logic has no inherent will and no ability to advance a sentence by itself, the advancement cannot be only serial but can also be stepwise, from pattern to pattern, inter-associationally, and substantively. This is not theory *as such*: we modestly call it “pre-theory” and “approach to theory”; Merton may have the better formulation with “codification of theory.” Codification entails “*discovery* of what has in fact been the strategic experience of scientific investigators.... [T]he device of the *analytic paradigm* ... bring[s] out into the open air ... the array of assumptions, concepts, and basic propositions employed in a sociological analysis.”<sup>18</sup> “Above all it should be noted that the paradigm does not represent a set of categories introduced *de novo*, but rather a *codification* of those concepts and problems which have been forced upon our attention by critical scrutiny of current research and theory in functional analysis” (50, all italics in original).

In that last quote, Merton unduly limits the applicability of codification-by-paradigm to a “functional analysis”; but it is appropriate here because the functional analysis that Merton provides is for us the most constructive way not to exit but to build upon the careful, methodical, workman-like foundation of the concept developers and encyclopedists. The functional analysis of Merton is to us an ideal solution to the problem of building theory through codification of concepts, because it can respect the inherent limits of each concept as a container of data or container of experience (without stretching). Second, it can improve on the concepts by associating them within a paradigm of logically related concepts. It can keep us close to experience *by staying at the “middle level” of abstraction*. And, since *function* is inextricably tied to *system*, the codification is theoretical without pretending to be theory. We agree with Boudon’s formulation that “if the notion of function implies that of system, it does not imply that all social systems belong to that particular category of system which involves living organisms.”<sup>19</sup>

There is a risk of ideology, teleology, and tautology in embracing the organic metaphor. And we readily concede that *system* in most if not all the sciences is a metaphor or a fiction. In the real world most physical and biological organisms are too loosely joined to meet the rigid requirement that to manipulate one component is to affect in some way all the other components. Social organisms fall even further away from qualifying as a true system. But Merton helps make *system* available to us

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18 Robert Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949 and 1957), 12–13.

19 Raymond Boudon and François Bourricaud, *A Critical Dictionary of Sociology* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 177.

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with a straightforward definition of *function* and *functional analysis*:

Functions are those observed consequences which make for the adaptation or adjustment of a given system ... (51). The entire range of sociological data can be ... subjected to functional analysis. The basic requirement is that the object of analysis represent a standardized (i.e., patterned and repetitive) item, such as social roles, institutional patterns, social processes, cultural pattern, culturally patterned emotions, social norms, group organization, social structure, devices for social control, etc. (50)

Merton also helps by recognizing that some of these repetitive actions are subjective, motivated actions of actual participants while other of these repetitive data are objective, nonconscious, unmotivated actions, and he distinguishes the two in his famous formulation of the former being *manifest functions* and the latter being *latent functions*. This distinction between manifest and latent functions has been one of the most influential single formulations in all of social science. And it is extraordinarily important as part of the constant reminder to deal with clusters of concepts simultaneously and to keep them firmly associated within the context of some kind of system. Of course, it goes without saying that the system in question is at some kind of “middle level” between the “rhapsody of sensations” and the completely disjointed abstraction of universalized theory. Merton explicitly recognizes that the distinction between manifest and latent functions is a heuristic one (64). That is more than good enough for us.

## Lasswell

To move from Merton to Lasswell is to move from codification of too few concepts back toward Sartori’s encyclopedic temptations in a conceptual Garden of Eden. But Lasswell retains more of a Mertonian awareness of the need implied by codification to maintain some logical connection to a larger system. Sartori seeks a larger context, but it is either the normative one in the tradition of canonical political theory or the empirical one of comparative political systems. For him, “system” is virtually synonymous with “regime” or “constitution” or “form of government.” For Merton and for Lasswell, “system” is not a real arrangement to be studied or theorized about but a paradigmatic device to aid in relating one thing to another.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950). Lasswell and Kaplan refer to “system” in their Introduction, but only in a limited way: “In some cases a set of variables interact [sic] ‘systematically’—they constitute a system in that they tend toward maintenance of a particular pattern of interaction” (xiv). But other problems are to be dealt with from a “developmental standpoint ... not with systems in equilibrium, but with patterns of succession of events” (xiv).

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Lasswell and Kaplan, in a book even more encyclopedic than Sartori's, provide no entry for "system" or for "political system." But, as they put it in their Introduction, "In the following chapters we introduce the major terms of political science by explicit definition [but] the differentiation of concepts and terms is proliferated into complex taxonomic structures. *Such a taxonomy is not a substitute for but an instrument of political inquiry*" (xix, italics in original). A page later, they continue: "[O]ur aim is not that of standardizing usage. It is, rather, to provide a framework for political theory" (xx).

Moreover, though the concepts Lasswell and Kaplan define are then related, respectively, to other concepts in propositional form, they immediately insist that "these are not hypotheses but *hypotheses-schema*: ... [T]he propositions are taken as regulative hypotheses ... intended to serve the functions of directing the search for significant data, not of predicting what the data will be found to disclose" (xxii, italics in original). Lasswell and Kaplan compare their effort to Max Weber's "ideal type" (xxiii, footnote 22). Like Sartori they refuse to choose between the normative and the empirical but flank it with an approach they do accept, between the contemplative and the manipulative standpoints, and proceed to embrace both. The contemplative seeks the existence of functional "relations between concepts, with Y as a function of X, while for the manipulative one must do X to produce Y" (xii). This they then call the "principle of configurative analysis ... which serves the purpose of the book ... to provide a framework" (xiii).

*Power and Society* moves methodically from concept to definition to association of that concept to another concept, or to one of their undefined concepts, which are then taken as the beginning point of their "chain of definitions."<sup>21</sup> It is this "chain of definitions," coupled with the principle of "configurative analysis" that attracted us so strongly toward Lasswell and Kaplan's formulation. We stopped short of becoming 'Lasswellians' largely for two reasons. First, Lasswell and Kaplan spread their discourse until it becomes too broad and, consequently, too thin. They defined their framework to encompass the entire society. They built up from the most microscopic units—"persons and their acts, not 'governments' and 'states' ... 'law,' 'power' ... treating political science as a branch of the study of human behavior" (3). This defies even the mighty economics, which hardly tries to incorporate microeconomic and macroeconomic into the same theoretical discourse. No

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21 One point they immediately make about their "chain of definitions" is relegated to a footnote here but will become extremely important later on, in that they confront the beginning point of that chain: "In any set of definitions some terms must be left undefined on pain of circularity. The chain of definitions must have a starting point, but no terms are undefinable in principle.... In most cases, of course, we assume that undefined terms will be understood in the sense intended, without calling attention to this assumption by labeling them 'undefined'" (3n1).

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wonder *Power and Society* failed to have the influence it was entitled to. Our second reason, which may be explained by the first, is that Lasswell in *Power and Society* or in later works never did attempt to tie together in a larger and more sustained argument the concepts that were defined so methodically and co-related, two at a time, in propositions. Lasswell does not occupy the place his talents deserve, as a great political theorist, and *Power and Society* takes its place largely as an encyclopedic work whose discrete hypotheses are much like ordinary behavioral science.

But this stresses only the limitations, which we confronted first only to prepare ourselves for the strengths of Lasswell and Kaplan for our purposes. For us, the principal contribution of *Power and Society* is to be found in the 64-cell table, “Forms of Influence and Power.” This is the first instance to be found anywhere in the literature of so ambitious an effort to deal logically with multiples of concepts within the same universe of discourse.

Their table is constructed according to a virtually self-evident (and therefore undefined) concept of *value*—a desired event or situation. It moves from the simple premise that, as in economics, politics is the pursuit of value, this pursuit being the driver of a process in which *values* of every sort are “shaped and shared,” or as Lasswell put it in the title of his best-known work: *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How?*<sup>22</sup> But just as politics is driven by the pursuit of values, the ability to succeed in attaining a valued goal depends upon those same values. The values one pursues are the scope values across the top of the matrix. The resources one already has, to be drawn upon in pursuit of scope values, are the *base values* as shown on the left margin of the table. (Note that scope values and base values are identical.) This yields sixty-four beautiful paired relationships, “the condition for the exercise of the influence in question” (83).

Each base value is cross-tabulated with a scope value, creating a space—a *property space*—that calls out for a name. The cross-tabulation, in fact, logically dictates the property in the space. How it is filled—i.e., what conceptual label is given to the space—allows for some choice, but very little choice, limited by the logic implicit in the relation of the base value to the scope value and to the experience of the political scientist using the paradigm.

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22 (New York: McGraw Hill, 1936). Lasswell even confessed, at least to his students in his 1955 seminar at Yale, if not in print, that his definition of politics in 1950 as “the shaping and sharing of values” was simply a more respectable way of say “who gets what, when, and how?”

# Bringing Concepts Back In

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Since the properties of political concepts, and how the concepts relate to each other, are our central concern, we have found it most useful to tie them to the idea of the property space, for which Allen Barton provides the first systematic treatment.<sup>23</sup> Property space is an elementary form of calculus, “indicating location in space by means of coordinates.... [But] other properties besides location in physical space can likewise be indicated by coordinates” (40). For example, two SAT scores, one on the mathematical test and one on the verbal test, can locate any individual in a property space.

These can be continuous variables, but, according to Barton, property spaces are probably more often created by discrete or qualitative properties. Examples Barton gives are place of birth, occupation, party affiliation, occupation and party of parents, and so on. Each of these can be cross-tabulated to create a property space, and these qualitative properties can be also cross-tabulated against continuous quantitative variables, such as level of education, degree of political interest, strength of party affiliation, and so on. Whether discrete or continuous, the concepts or characteristics producing the property spaces can still be assigned rough scores—such as the “political score sheets” showing how members of Congress voted on a series of bills and how they can be ranked by a composite score of degree of party discipline or liberalism versus conservatism, etc.<sup>24</sup>

For Barton, the purpose here is to characterize objects by their property; and “there is no reason why we cannot characterize objects by as many properties as we want” (42). He uses the matrix of eighty columns, each with twelve rows, on the old IBM punch card to demonstrate that “we have the possibility of locating each respondent in a dichotomous attribute space of 960 dimensions” (46). These property spaces not only permit multiples of properties to describe an object, but multiple dimensions in which to characterize the objects and their contexts. All sorts of analyses follow, far more systematically and more logically than a direct, step-wise, single-hypothesis approach, because with dimensionality comes typology. Typologies are “clusters of many different attributes” (50). For example, “the cosmopolitan leader is distinguished from the local leader by his geographical mobility, his education, his channels of becoming a leader, his interests, his communications behavior” (50).

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23 Allen Barton, “The Concept of Property-Space in Social Research,” in *A Reader in the Methodology of Social Research*, ed. Paul Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955), 40–53.

24 Barton refers to such a property space as a “dichotomous attribute-space,” which is also “equivalent to a binary number system, or an ‘off/on’ system of information, as used in computing machines and in communication theory” (42n1). Perhaps without realizing it, he was making a quite accurate prediction.

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Moreover, the effort to create typologies by logically combining characteristics can produce creative serendipity—“combinations of properties which were overlooked in constructing the initial typology, and bring to light the assumptions which led to the bypassing of certain combinations or the ignoring of certain distinctions” (50–51).

Barton’s work on property spaces has enriched our appreciation and has provided some new insights, yet we will not be following him or his associates because, in our view, their work is pre-empirical. Although concepts create Barton’s property spaces, his concepts are very largely designative (not connotative), and the spaces (or boxes) in his diagrams are to be filled by numbers of respondents in the sample (or items in the news articles or references in radio propaganda). Our property spaces, instead, (as with Lasswell and Kaplan’s) seek to move us from concept to concept rather than from concept directly to data. Property spaces are for us properties of concepts, not properties of objects (or behaviors). The Lasswell-Kaplan matrix is, for us, an inspirational springboard. Just to be able to confront “power” immediately in sixty-four dimensions, for the eye to see and the brain to envision, is an extraordinary intellectual experience. And it is one that can be improved upon with fewer than sixty-four dimensions, and many more political concepts. This is the case with our matrices.

14

## *Matrix*

The matrix is a common analytic tool in the social sciences. Its main purpose is to create comparability through categorization by cross-tabulating two variables to produce four interrelated property spaces. Most often the four spaces or quadrants are filled with quantitative data—for example, Democratic/Republican, cross-tabulated with liberal/conservative voting. This is a widespread and fruitful approach, perhaps the most elementary way to visualize relationships among two quantified variables. The matrix, however, also offers great promise for qualitative methodology, as a tool to develop property spaces containing not data but concepts that contribute to the definition of the selected concept. In this case, the matrix’s core contribution consists in developing relationships among concepts toward typology construction, a tradition dating to Max Weber’s classic work and first adapted to the property space approach by Lazarsfeld’s seminal 1937 article.<sup>25</sup>

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25 Paul F. Lazarsfeld, “Some Remarks on Typological Procedures in Social Research,” *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* 6 (1937), 119–39.

# Bringing Concepts Back In

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A matrix-based conceptualization has been adopted in a number of influential theoretical schemes, leading to redefine specific disciplinary subfields.<sup>26</sup> In the hyperdictionary, we expand the matrix use and utility by two basic additions.

First, the four property spaces in our matrices are named and specified by two additional concepts, which qualify and integrate the two extremities of the axes in each quadrant. Each definition thus results in four subtypes, each comprising four concepts. Being parts of the same matrix, all subtypes are logically interrelated. They also present the same configuration. To give more clarity and coherence to this process of concept formation, we use a graphic interface with the two additional concepts in each quadrant occupying a specific position: one at the corner, serving as a link between the two concepts on the axes, while, at the same time, “closing off” the property space; and one at the center, to better encapsulate each quadrant’s properties and make more visible the differences among all four subtypes.

Second, by applying this pattern of typology construction to all our concepts, we create commensurability among definitions. The reach of our matrix methodology is not confined to the treatment of one concept discretely after another. Nor are we limited to the dictionary and thesaurus use of “see also.” The scope of each definition clearly extends to every matrix that shares at least one of its twelve conceptual components. This greatly expands the semantic universe of each concept while also inviting comparison and interaction. Conceptual links can be developed—and criticized—on a wider scale, and, thanks to the matrix’s elementary syntax, the relationships between and among concepts can be easily traced.


We take *party* as a key example (figure 1). The two central axes are drawn from the most consensual definers of political parties in the international political science literature. The first is the dichotomy of the origins of party—in the legislature and in the mass, or civil, society (Duverger 1963). The second dichotomy is the most widely used distinction in organizational patterns, contrasting the U.S. preference for individualistic machinery with the European preference for a corporate or corporatist structure. The cross-tabulation of these two analytic dimensions leads to the four property spaces, each representing a subtype of the political party characterized by four related keywords. In the upper right cell, we have chosen *representation* as the main relationship between the legislative origin and the prominence of the individual unit, and *election* as the main procedure for allocating power resources. And we begin with that upper right cell because *party* is so often virtually defined by elections. Yet, what can be made of its absence elsewhere?

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<sup>26</sup> An example is the model of policy analysis defined by Lowi in a number of articles, now collected in Theodore J. Lowi, *Arenas of Power*, ed. Norman K. Nicholson (Boulder: Paradigm Books, 2008). See also Robert Spitzer, *The Presidency and Public Policy: The Four Arenas of Presidential Power* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1983).

# Introduction

The lower right quadrant points us toward a relatively new era of postelectoral politics (Ginsberg and Shefter 1999), an outcome largely anticipated by the advent of a large-scale *market*-based economic model of democracy, first outlined by Joseph Schumpeter (1942) and popularized by Anthony Downs (1957).



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Figure 1 – The matrix of *party*

As the U.S. political parties move more and more toward *polling*, they also move that much further away from their historic legislative/representation position, even though legislative activities still take place. Movement toward polling also involves a more plebiscitary relation between individual citizens and government, a phenomenon that Europe—take Berlusconi’s Italy—seems to be experiencing even more extensively than the United States.

Additional understanding of this can be drawn with a move to the lower left quadrant of the matrix where *oligarchy* catches best the texture of political relationships. The idea of oligarchy as a driving force, if not *the* driving force, for the corporate party dates back at least to the work of Robert Michels (1915 [1911]) and is probably best represented by the Leninist and social democratic parties before and after World War I.

# Bringing Concepts Back In

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These political parties, by their location in the class structures of polarizing societies, and by ideology, were antagonistic to the state, and the most radical refused to participate in the government even when their electoral strength warranted it. By contrast, in the upper left quadrant, corporate parties exist within a governmental system, each having to contend peacefully with each other. This is what Lijphart refers to as consociational politics: whenever differences in the electorate remain frozen or otherwise attached to a substantial aggregate in the civil society and are represented through strong party organizations of a corporate type, the most likely outcome is a governing process arising out of coalitional accords with a minimum of direct electoral competition (Lijphart 1984, 53–103).

As with any theoretical argument, the party matrix, or any other matrix, can be criticized on substantive grounds. The choice of each keyword in a matrix reflects our experience and our own view of the literature, starting from the selection of the axes, by far the most relevant decision for the development of the whole matrix. The two axes may have a developmental focus, trying to map a concept's historical transformation. They may concentrate on a shorter time span. Or, they may be selected to highlight cultural and geopolitical differences. In all cases, the axes reflect each scholar's theoretical preferences or empirical areas of investigation. Other views of *party* will dictate one or more changes of related concepts within a matrix, or two different axes altogether, which will produce an entirely different matrix. These choices are not a matter of correct versus incorrect or right versus wrong. To foster the development of alternative or concurring definitions is one of the main aims of our platform, the more so as they become part of a common discourse, in which differences are cumulative. By constructing each matrix the same way, with the identical configuration of twelve concepts, we offer a system for controlling the logical consistency of conceptual links toward theoretical argument. At the same time there is ample opportunity to compare, criticize, and modify specific elements of the argument. Two competing definitions of the same concept can be easily and methodically confronted, because all matrices partake of the same logical system.

This leads to another key feature of our matrix approach: interactivity. The matrix works as a self-evident and—thanks to its graphic interface—user-friendly metalanguage to communicate the contents of each definition. This makes interaction with readers and users easier without sacrificing rigor. As every definition is constructed around the same, repetitive logical pattern, one can rapidly learn how to move from one definition to another, whether in browsing through definitions of different concepts or in comparing different definitions of the same concept by other authors.

# Introduction

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There is yet one further level of interaction among different matrices, again stemming from the original choice of using the same logical pattern for all of our definitions: interaction at the system level. Take *party* again as an example. In the definition we presented, *party* is the central concept being defined through the twelve related keywords. This represents the core argument about *party* in our hyperdictionary, in a full-length essay. Yet, *party* also appears as a definer, as one of the twelve concepts in several other matrices contained in our dictionary, either as a pole in one of the axes, or as a specification of any of the quadrants. The use of a concept as a definer can be more or less frequent, depending on the relevance each concept occupies in the literature as well as in each individual scholar's vision of the discipline. In all cases, each link to *party* in other matrices highlights the complexity of its conceptual domain, and serves as an integration of the concept's original matrix.

There are many attributes or functions of a concept that wouldn't fit in the core matrix typology, but are still relevant to a more comprehensive conceptualization. Take, for instance, the role of parties in the process of institution building, as in the case of the American nineteenth-century "state of courts and parties":<sup>27</sup> a phenomenon captured and analyzed in our *bureaucracy* matrix; or parties' crucial place in organizing the legislative agenda of all modern democracies, as illustrated in the *agenda* definition. It would be impossible to incorporate these as well as many other aspects within one single definition. Yet, the matrix metalanguage allows easy tracing of *party*'s uses elsewhere in the hyperdictionary. Figure 2 conveys a clear picture of the scope and complexity of system-level navigation through related concepts using the matrix as the compass.

Working through related matrices thus contributes to our understanding of each concept as a prismatic universe, with its wider meaning dependent on the links incorporating it with all the other matrices in which that concept appears as a definer. These are no mere cross-references, as there are in most dictionaries by use of the generic "see also" annotation. Thanks to the use of the matrix's logical pattern and interface as a common framework for all definitions, links in our hyperdictionary always refer to a specific quadrant, with all other keywords in that quadrant contributing to clarification of contexts, and in which set of relationships *party* is being used in a given matrix.

Through matrix-based system navigation, our methodology bridges the gap between two important requirements: the requirement of generalization and the requirement of context. We share the view of Robert Goodin and Charles Tilly that

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27 Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 39 ff.

# Bringing Concepts Back In




Figure 2 – Matrices linked to the matrix of *party*

“against the most reductive versions of parsimony... attention to context does not clutter the description and explanation of political processes, but, on the contrary, promotes systematic knowledge.”<sup>28</sup> *Hyperpolitics* offers a powerful platform to promote systematic knowledge, engendering investigation and development of each

28 Robert Goodin and Charles Tilly, *It Depends*, in *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis*, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 6.

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concept in a variety of relevant contexts by means of a common logical infrastructure. This is our method. This is our route toward “systematic knowledge” and knowledge of the system.

However, in order for two or more matrices to be fully cumulative and partake of the same conceptual system, use of the same pattern is not enough. Up to now, all of the various levels of interaction have been dealt with through the matrix as the common framework for definition and discourse. To promote systematic knowledge, one further step is necessary: a common vocabulary. That is, definitions need to share both the syntax—the matrix—*and* the terms that are used to form the different matrices. By drawing from the same list of keywords (selection of which will be explained below) in the construction of all matrices, interactivity among definitions is greatly enhanced. Use of the same vocabulary contributes to expanding links at the system level, as it increases the probability that one term may be used in many definitions. At the same time, differences between definitions of the same concept can easily be traced and clarified. Only with a shared vocabulary can we be confident that the use of different keywords in the definition of a concept reflects a deliberate and self-conscious choice by the author.

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In developing a matrix there is likely to be some initial discomfort in having to give up a term not in our list but more congenial to the user. It is all the more painful when our list (drawn from five countries) carries cultural biases. However, the gains from an established vocabulary far outweigh the losses, in favor of a shared semantic universe. Thanks to the common language, we can freely browse through a variety of conceptual configurations, always able to map relationships, variations, and nuances of each concept’s meaning according to changes in contexts, theories, and/or authors. By sharing the same syntax and vocabulary, concepts can clearly speak to each other.

All this said, choosing a common vocabulary is no easy undertaking. How long should the list of keywords be? Lasswell and Kaplan made it far too short, by selecting identical terms for “scope values” on one axis and “base values” on the other in their eight-by-eight table. This way, the resulting concepts in each cell would inevitably be too abstract as well as too generic. On the other side, if the list became too long we would run into the opposite problem, by coming up with overly descriptive and/or idiosyncratic definitions. With a list of, say, three hundred keywords, definitions could still share the same syntax, but a much too diversified terminology would strongly impair the probability that they also share a common language.

Our answer to the question of the keywords list comes from careful—and painstaking!—empirical investigation. We chose as our source for compiling the *Hyperpolitics* vocabulary several among the most prominent political science

# Bringing Concepts Back In

dictionaries, of five countries and in four languages. We then proceeded to make a computerized entry count, in order to produce a list of the most widely used terms in our discipline (table 1). We are aware that other languages as well as other dictionaries—not to speak of other sources—could be taken into account, and our list does not by any means pretend to be the ‘ultimate and definitive’ selection of political science’s most representative terms. This is, however, to our knowledge, the first attempt to draw a list of entries from social science dictionaries through a straightforward quantitative method. As a result, it can be considered a working representation of the discipline in five of the oldest and most advanced homes of political science.

Dictionaries	All entries	Input entries	Average length (words)	Entries occurring $\geq 6$ in the sample
<i>Dizionario di Politica</i> , ed. Norberto Bobbio, Nicola Matteucci, Gianfranco Pasquino, Torino, TEA, 1990	320	317	3660	75
<i>The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Science</i> , ed. Vernon Bogdanor, Oxford, Blackwell, 1991	590	534	540	84
<i>Dictionnaire Constitutionnel</i> , ed. Olivier Duhamel and Yves Mény, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1992	687	626	1160	64
<i>Dictionnaire de la Science Politique et des institutions politiques</i> , by Guy Hermet, Bertrand Badie, Pierre Birnbaum, Philippe Braud, Paris, Colin, 1994	298	293	540	79
<i>The Social Science Encyclopedia</i> , ed. Adam Kuper & Jessica Kuper, London and New York, Routledge, 1996 (2nd edition)	600	98	1220	53
<i>The Encyclopedia of Democracy</i> , ed. Seymour M. Lipset, Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly, 1995	417	208	2390	55
<i>Pipers Wörterbuch zur Politik. Vol. 1: Politikwissenschaft</i> , by Dieter Nohlen, München, Piper, 1985	830	701	1700	71
<i>The American Political Dictionary</i> , by Jack C. Plano and Milton Greenberg, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985	1200	219	300	63
<i>A Dictionary of Modern Politics</i> , by David Robertson, London, Europa Publications Ltd., 1993	519	467	430	87
<i>The HarperCollins Dictionary of American Government and Politics</i> , by Jay M. Shafritz, New York, HarperPerennial, 1992	5000	309	150	82

Table 1 – Frequency distribution of entries per selected dictionary

*Note:* Entries have been input according to the following criteria:

- skipping all biographies and other nonconceptual topics (e.g., countries)
- Plano and Shafritz’s entries have been considered only when considered in Bogdanor
- Nohlen’s entries have been excluded when specifically statistical (as indexes and models)

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Once the input was completed, we found that the number of entries occurring in at least six of our ten dictionaries was slightly above one hundred.<sup>29</sup> This was a number we felt we could master, on both logical and intellectual grounds. And, with few exceptions, all of these entries place sufficiently high on the ladder of abstraction. Moving below the six-dictionary threshold would have drawn us into overly descriptive terms. Indeed, this concern eventually led us to exclude some of the terms originally on the list, which, while present in most dictionaries, scored poorly on conceptual complexity. Merely designative words, such as *ombudsman* or *ballot*, were clearly outside the scope of our enterprise. Along this line, we also felt obliged to strike a compromise between our effort to select terms as objectively as possible while allowing for some influence by the founding fathers of the discipline. We were, indeed, surprised at finding that such keywords as *citizen* or *public*—perhaps the cornerstones of modern politics—wouldn't qualify by our numerical standard. We have thus added to the original list several terms which scored lower in frequency but higher in our own impression of the discipline.

Thus, although we have been loyal to our original list, we have constantly considered individual changes. We have recognized throughout that there cannot possibly be “the list” as the one and only canonized political science vocabulary. One contribution we have made is to be explicit and methodical in our choice of keywords.<sup>30</sup> But beyond that, the online version of *Hyperpolitics*—which we shall deal with in the *User's Guide*—leaves the official list of our dictionary open for users' additions, thus allowing our platform to be adapted to the interests or inclinations of individual scholars. For that matter, other authors may want to select different dictionaries from other countries or languages, or dispute our criteria of abstraction and saliency, or partially amend the original quantitative result. In the age of extensive computerized collection of full-text databases, other—more effective and

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29 In the process of selecting words, we faced a problem of standardization. Working in four languages and five cultures (American, British, French, German, and Italian), we had to translate all words into one language—English. Second, we had to transliterate, providing a single word or wording for formulations that varied from country to country but had to be taken as identical—for example: *participation*, *political participation*, *participation in politics*. Another problem we were forced to confront in the giving and taking of names is that some names are single and some occur in families. That is, some exist only in one form, e.g., *bureaucracy*, while others regularly appear both in their simple form and in compound forms that make up families of related concepts—for example, *democracy*, *industrial democracy*, *social democracy*, *participatory democracy*, *mass democracy*. Although we made a determination not to include each of these compounds as a discrete concept for definition, family words were taken into account in our weightings of concepts. That is to say, a word acquired a weight because of the pure frequency of its occurrence (*bureaucracy*), or it could take on a greater weight due to the breadth of its usage singly and in family compounds (*democracy*). Again, our choices were the “heavyweights” in each class.

30 One may be surprised to find out that, in reviewing over twenty dictionaries in the preparation of our word count, in most if not every dictionary or encyclopedia we found negligence and downright indifference toward the criteria for choosing words and the criteria for how to define them, what words to include and exclude, what limits to set on words' boundaries—in short, guidelines on concepts selection and definition.

# Bringing Concepts Back In

comprehensive—guidelines for the selection of keywords can be envisaged. We'll be happy if our contribution encourages new and more enlightened endeavors.

However, a caveat is in order. Confining the keywords list to a given set of terms remains a vital requirement to enhance interactivity. Definitions can be fruitfully compared, and links to other definitions can be multiplied and controlled only as long as all matrices partake of the same vocabulary. The main aim of our methodology is to demonstrate how an extraordinary complexity of conceptual

<b>absolutism</b>	<b>conflict</b>	<b>government</b>	<b>nation</b>	<b>regulation</b>
<b>administration</b>	<b>consensus</b>	<b>group</b>	<b>oligarchy</b>	<b>religion</b>
<b>agenda</b>	<b>conservatism</b>	<b>ideology</b>	<b>opinion</b>	<b>representation</b>
<b>alienation</b>	<b>constitution</b>	<b>imperialism</b>	<b>opposition</b>	<b>republic</b>
<b>anarchism</b>	<b>contract</b>	<b>individual</b>	<b>order</b>	<b>responsibility</b>
<b>aristocracy</b>	<b>corporation</b>	<b>institution</b>	<b>participation</b>	<b>revolution</b>
<b>authoritarianism</b>	<b>corporatism</b>	<b>interest</b>	<b>party</b>	<b>rights</b>
<b>authority</b>	<b>corruption</b>	<b>justice</b>	<b>patronage</b>	<b>rules</b>
<b>autonomy</b>	<b>court</b>	<b>law</b>	<b>people</b>	<b>socialism</b>
<b>bureaucracy</b>	<b>crisis</b>	<b>leadership</b>	<b>pluralism</b>	<b>socialization</b>
<b>capitalism</b>	<b>culture</b>	<b>legislature</b>	<b>police</b>	<b>sovereignty</b>
<b>centralism</b>	<b>decision</b>	<b>legitimacy</b>	<b>policy</b>	<b>state</b>
<b>charisma</b>	<b>democracy</b>	<b>liberalism</b>	<b>polling</b>	<b>terrorism</b>
<b>choice</b>	<b>dictatorship</b>	<b>liberty</b>	<b>populism</b>	<b>totalitarianism</b>
<b>citizen</b>	<b>election</b>	<b>lobbying</b>	<b>power</b>	<b>trust</b>
<b>civil society</b>	<b>elite</b>	<b>loyalty</b>	<b>president</b>	<b>utilitarianism</b>
<b>class</b>	<b>equality</b>	<b>majority</b>	<b>propaganda</b>	<b>utopia</b>
<b>clientelism</b>	<b>estate</b>	<b>market</b>	<b>public</b>	<b>violence</b>
<b>coalition</b>	<b>executive</b>	<b>Marxism</b>	<b>racism</b>	<b>war</b>
<b>collective</b>	<b>faction</b>	<b>media</b>	<b>radicalism</b>	<b>welfare</b>
<b>colonialism</b>	<b>fascism</b>	<b>minorities</b>	<b>referendum</b>	
<b>communism</b>	<b>federalism</b>	<b>monarchy</b>	<b>reform</b>	
<b>community</b>	<b>feudalism</b>	<b>movement</b>	<b>regime</b>	

Table 2 – The keywords list

discourse can be conquered through a metalanguage based on two basic and simple features: the matrix's syntax and a manageable common vocabulary. While the actual content of any list can be disputed and amended, the main emphasis needs to be on the tremendous opportunities of interactive theoretical discourse offered by agreeing on and sharing—at least partially—a common vocabulary. Since we used a quantitative criterion, we can deflect some of our shortcomings with the argument

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that any glaring absence in our list is more a reflection on the shortcomings of dictionary compilers and of the political science mainstream vocabulary. All this said, the relevance of our list does not consist in the selection of its entries, much as we tried our best to compile it on a statistical basis. The list's key contribution—whatever its specific content—is to make all matrices cumulative and commensurable. A common vocabulary enlarges enormously the scope of the conceptual universe.

This is the essence of interaction, whether used by information technologists, comparative politics scholars, or ambitious political theorists. Working through relational matrices and through conceptual overlays contributes to the understanding of each concept as a prismatic entity, taking its greater, richer meaning from its linkages. A “three-dimensional”<sup>31</sup> and “multi-faceted structure”<sup>32</sup> is something that no individual scholar—or definition—can alone encapsulate. But all can contribute to bringing concepts into sharper focus.

## *Only connect ...*

E. M. Forster, *Howards End*

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In the beginning of our journey toward a new conceptual dictionary, many years ago, we were moved by a number of long-neglected needs and new opportunities. A primary preoccupation was our awareness of the tendency in the social sciences to overspecialize and, therefore, oversimplify the basic vocabulary of our discipline. We think that this mainly stemmed from the legitimate need to increase accuracy and accountability of empirical investigation by breaking down its unit of measure as close as possible to the atom-by-atom description of the objects of analysis. Ironically, this is a scientific mentality that became shared by two antagonistic approaches in social science: the positivist, superquantitative, operational-definition approach, versus the qualitative, context-driven, particularized analysis. While very different in their methodological assumptions and applications, both approaches have often resulted in the tendencies to limit investigation, to freeze concepts to the immediate situation, and thus to limit the distance that concepts can travel.

*Hyperpolitics* does not pretend to be a definitive solution to these dilemmas, whether of too little context, too much context, or too extreme a reductionist bias.

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31 Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 11.

32 Freedon, “Political Concepts and Ideological Morphology,” 144.

# Bringing Concepts Back In

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It does, however, try to bring concepts back into political discourse in a way that maximizes the richness and varieties of contexts and experiences, while making them easily comparable across a wide theoretical spectrum. Perhaps the most challenging use of *Hyperpolitics* is its capacity for choosing—or reconsidering—concepts in light of their use in other matrices. This methodical confrontation of concepts involves more than an exercise in construction. Since each concept embodies empirical experience, combining experience in related concepts creates tension, and this tension is creative tension because it requires new sets of statements about these hitherto unrecognized relationships: “The construction of such a system of concepts will often involve creativity, producing novel combinations of interpretations. Political theorizing is an ongoing enterprise, and one aspect of that enterprise is drawing new conceptual maps, which logically relate political concepts in hitherto unthought-of ways.”<sup>33</sup> This kind of creative tension among competing experiences is the essence of theory-making: theory-making as its own political process.

While sharing the concern that, in social sciences, “all disciplines have lost their discipline,”<sup>34</sup> we are confident that a lot can be done to foster stronger control over the meaning and use of concepts without losing their empirical, historical, and cultural wealth. This can only be achieved through “a process of approximation: the better our concepts, the better the theory we can formulate with them, and in turn, the better the concepts available for the next, improved theory.”<sup>35</sup> *Hyperpolitics* is a modest first step in an effort which we hope will be much improved by others who share our commitment (and that of Lord Byron) that “every man [can be] his own Aristotle.”


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33 Gerald F. Gaus, *Political Concepts and Political Theories* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), 46.


34 Giovanni Sartori, *Social Science Concepts*, 50.

35 Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry*, 54.





# The Dictionary





# A User's Guide

## The Dictionary

The entries in *Hyperpolitics* are subdivided into three categories, each identified by a different format in the header:

- 1) MAIN ENTRIES
- 2) Short Entries
- 3) *Cross-Entries*

We do not provide a treatment for all one hundred keywords because we could not, in this first effort, master such a wide conceptual scope with the thoroughness and theoretical sophistication each entry deserves. However, the eighteen *main entries* plus the seventeen *short entries*, for a total of thirty-five matrices, present a comprehensive insight of the discipline's core vocabulary.

Moreover, the relational structure of the hyperdictionary offers an overview of the remaining entries through their links to the ones with a definition. In each *cross-entry* page the reader finds a list of its linked matrices and, thanks to the user-friendly graphical interface, can quickly locate that entry within the text of *main* or *short* definitions. For practical reasons, we have included in the Dictionary only those entries that present links to at least three related definitions (either the *main* or just the *short entries*), so that the reader can browse through a wide enough semantic universe. The *Web Companion* allows for access to the complete list of the hyperdictionary's keywords. This also defines the hyperdictionary as a work-in-progress, providing challenges and opportunities for improvements in our matrices and for entirely new definitions.

### 1) MAIN ENTRIES:

#### Entries with full-length definitions

Our choice of the eighteen concepts for full-length definitions was guided by a few transparent criteria. First and foremost was our shared familiarity, arising out of the classics we read from graduate studies to our preparation for our own writing and teaching. Many of these concepts—such as *legislature*, *corporation*, *bureaucracy*, *party*, *policy*, etc.—thus reflect our focus on institutions, with an emphasis on the developmental perspective. This is the common background which brought us together in the first place, though with different angles from the two shores of the Atlantic. Indeed, much of our theoretical effort through all these years has been to try to combine the Anglo-American and the continental European traditions, with their cultural and geopolitical nuances.

Another commitment was to include the normative cornerstones of political discourse: *justice*, *liberty*, *law*, *interest*, *opinion*, *liberalism*, *pluralism*, in full awareness that these were—either essentially or contingently—contested and controversial concepts.<sup>1</sup> These are the concepts where the relational and interactive structure of our hyperdictionary best serves the purpose of a confrontation with related concepts and/or alternative views of that concept. We have made, however, a few exceptions which were left undefined—such pillars of scientific and everyday parlance as *power*, *democracy*, *state*. The large number of competing approaches made it extremely hard to confine their definition within the space of one matrix. And Lasswell and Kaplan have provided confirmation and guidance: “In any set of definitions some terms must be left undefined on pain of circularity. The chain of definitions must have a starting point ... subject

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<sup>1</sup> See Walter B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 56 (1956): 167–98; John Gray, “On the Essential Contestability of Some Social and Political Concepts,” *Political Theory* 5 (1977), 331–48; and Terence Ball, *Transforming Political Discourse: Political Theory and Critical Conceptual History* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 13–14.

# A User's Guide

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only to the requirement ... that they be sufficiently intelligible without definition."<sup>2</sup> For all these terms, the dictionary does however offer a variety of cues and indirect treatments through the cross-reference modality (see below), with its links to all the definitions where such terms appear as components of a matrix.

In order to enhance standardization, in the drafting of each entry we have followed a few basic rules which apply to all definitions.

First, we have tried our best to keep approximately the same length for all definitions, as this contributes to smoother reading and cross-referencing. Second, thanks to *Hyperpolitics'* innovative metalanguage, the argument can easily be followed step by step, as the various parts are illustrated in the text through the matrix graphics segments.

Each entry chapter is divided into seven sections:

- an introduction
- a presentation of the two axes
- four sections, one for each quadrant
- a conclusion

This effort toward standardization is a virtue most dictionaries tend to disregard, by presenting a wide range of formats, from the very brief to the extraordinarily long, while not offering any rationale for the variation.

Third, all of our definitions are grounded by a page showing the matrices to which they are linked in the hyperdictionary. The links page offers an extraordinarily rich and yet synthetic overview of the wider conceptual domain of each entry. And it enables the readers to choose in which direction and through which links to pursue a more thorough understanding of a concept's universe.

## 2) Short Entries:

### **Entries with matrix and abstract**

The seventeen short entries share the complexity, coherence, and interactivity of the full-length definitions, as well as their format. Each definition is first introduced by a brief statement of the concept's main elements and historical context. Then follows a presentation of the two axes, which are cross-tabulated to develop the matrix's four property spaces. The argument thus moves to the four quadrants, and is followed by a conclusion. And, through their linked matrices presented on a separate page, their semantic universe can be enlarged according to the reader's interests. These seventeen shorter versions are thus bona fide definitions, useful in themselves; but a matrix with only an outline rendering is open more to criticism, alteration, and experimentation, and may lead to an entirely new matrix. Serendipity and creativity are byproducts.

This is the hyperdictionary's pedagogy: experience, serendipity, and creativity. The drafting of an original rendering of a matrix is an experience in political theory, with original ideas and proposed changes in the matrix. And this is only the beginning of interaction not only with other students and users but with the authors. And thanks to the matrix, variations and substitutions occur within a controlled logical environment. One of the principal aims of our hyperdictionary is to serve as a platform for conceptual investigation and development.

Indeed, some of these matrices are themselves the result of a joint endeavor with a number of junior colleagues, participating in *Hyperpolitics* workshops at various stages of our project. We are happy to acknowledge their authorship and their confirmation that *Hyperpolitics* stirs the intellect and entices critical involvement.

### 3) *Cross-Entries:* **Entries with links only**

The third category in the Dictionary consists of thirty-two entries, each on a single page, showing the matrices to which that entry is linked. Although there is no fully rendered definition of the concept, the user can get a substantial sense of its semantic scope by going to the pages where the entry appears as part of a definition, either on one of the two axes or on one of the four quadrants. Thanks to the matrix interface, the cross-references can be quickly found and easily contextualized as part of a more complex argument. Besides, browsing through the links can represent one first step for users to start working toward their own matrix and definition of that entry, using the arguments and sources found in the cross-referenced matrices as a stimulus for theorizing.

The link's basic use is to trace an entry within the context of a related matrix, one link at a time. However, to look at all the links of a concept in a single page and through the matrix's self-evident metalanguage is a novel intellectual experience, offering a commanding overview of a concept's semantic universe.

## The Web Companion

This leads to one further asset of the *Hyperpolitics* platform: its electronic version. The interactive features of *Hyperpolitics* are enhanced by its *Web Companion*, a fully developed Web site allowing users to quickly—and powerfully—browse through the various matrices, as well as offering the opportunity for compiling their own definitions after reading those in the book ([www.hyperpolitics.net](http://www.hyperpolitics.net)). The online version can in fact be accessed in two modes: *read* or *write*. The *read* mode gives access to the matrices with their

outlines (no full-length definition available), thus serving as a concise illustration of what is to be found in the book. The *write* mode is an e-learning environment where students, as well as mature scholars, can work out their own definitions, taking full advantage of two key features: hypertextual links and selected electronic sources.

In both modes, the web platform allows for a more efficient use of the hyperdictionary's relational structure. In each matrix, both in the *read* and the *write* mode, all keywords work as immediate hypertextual links to all related matrices, thus making conceptual traveling an easier—though complex—experience. In this respect, the *Web Companion* is an invitation to navigate through the entire conceptual system, while remaining aware not to lose sight of the matrix's logical compass.

The same consideration applies to the access we provide to the ever-expanding universe of electronic literature. *Hyperpolitics* cannot possibly substitute for the choice of sources for developing a scientific argument, a choice that each individual scholar will do on the basis of personal taste and availability: whether online or on the stacks of a library or on one's own bookshelves. However, we have made a conscientious effort to provide a selection of sources that can be useful for developing a concept's definition. One first ancillary source is represented by hundreds of concise abstracts summarizing the content and methodology of each entry's definition in the dictionaries used for compiling *Hyperpolitics'* basic list of keywords. This offers an unprecedented comparative overview of different cultural blends and theoretical approaches in the discipline's vocabulary, one that can be easily used to make the early steps toward framing a more complex argument.<sup>3</sup> The second ancillary source consists of a quick link to a selection of freely accessible electronic sources, such as encyclopedias or articles' repositories, directly showing the findings for the entry one is working on.<sup>4</sup>

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3 See Annarita Criscitiello, "Gli attrezzi della scienza politica. Una rassegna critica di undici dizionari," *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica* 2 (2002): 83–110.

4 This module is partly a spin-off from the International Political Science Association Portal for electronic sources ([www.ipsaportal.net](http://www.ipsaportal.net)), a more comprehensive gateway to political science electronic sources from which the Web sites' abstracts have been selected.

# A User's Guide

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Both these electronic features are mainly targeted for students, striving to find their way through a complex conceptual universe. Yet, these electronic sources can offer useful insights also for the experienced scholar, the more so as the Web environment is being transformed into the new frontier for higher education and research.<sup>5</sup>

## How to Get Started

*Hyperpolitics* can be used at various levels of complexity, depending on the user's interests and skills.

- The simplest is reading one definition at a time, as in any other dictionary. The understanding of each concept will be further facilitated by *Hyperpolitics*' user-friendly graphic layout, which allows for step-by-step explanation of each definition.
- The next step is taking full advantage of the dictionary's hyperstructure, looking for the larger conceptual domain of each entry by browsing through one or more related matrices. Again, this is facilitated by the graphic layout, offering a bird's-eye view of all related matrices.
- One further, more engaging step consists of the opportunity for each individual user to alter or replace a matrix. Through its modular methodology, *Hyperpolitics* invites controversy, changes, improvements. This is the great virtue of *Hyperpolitics*—a perpetual prompter of thought.
- The interactive features of *Hyperpolitics* are enhanced by its *Web Companion*. As with the printed hyperdictionary, the *Web Companion* also allows for different levels of complexity.
  - The online platform is ideal for classroom use, as it provides a stepwise presentation of the construction of each matrix, thus


inviting discussion and contributions from the students in the analysis of the various components of a definition: its axes and the four subtypes. Direct access to summaries from other dictionaries and on-line bibliographical sources enables the teacher to illustrate with background literature and to compare different cultural strands in each concept's definitions.

- At a more advanced level, a concept's presentation may include some or all related matrices. In this case, students are introduced to a wider and more complex argument on that concept's possible uses and empirical background. This is particularly useful when a concept becomes the topic of a seminar and/or a research assignment. On the *Web Companion* students can easily follow how all links of a concept lead to the definitions of the related matrices.
- A further step engages students in the drafting of their own definitions, after taking advantage of the ones presented in the book as well as of the online sources accessible through the *Web Companion*. The platform's user-friendly interface, with its built-in notepad, encourages tentative drafting as well as easy exchange with the teacher and/or other students. Once a matrix has been saved on the platform, it becomes visible to all interested users.
- This leads to the future use of *Hyperpolitics* as a social software, a platform open to the contribution of all those interested in developing, confronting, and exchanging their research experience in one or more conceptual domains through the form of a matrix-based definition. Much as we have tried our best to simplify this challenging endeavor, the results will, as always, depend on two basic requisites of all scientific endeavor: hard work and an open mind.


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5 See Mauro Calise and Rosanna De Rosa, "E-Research: An Introduction to On-line Political Science Sources for Beginners (and Skeptics)," *International Political Science Review* 29 (2008): 595–618.

# The Entries







## Introduction

Administration in society arises in the first place as a result of division of labor. It is not accidental that Adam Smith devoted the whole first Book of the *Wealth of Nations* (1776) to the division of labor prior to his disquisition on markets. Division of labor calls for repeated decisions converging toward a collective goal, and administration procedures are complementary to market rationality in providing an efficient balance. This is typical of the prototype form of private administration, that which takes place within a household. In the Greek *etymos*, economy stands for *nomia* of the *oikos*, laws for the household. Learning the basic rules for the efficient management of one's own household is perhaps the most widespread experience in administrative behavior, and represents a major cultural discriminant, both historically and across nations. Leon Battista Alberti's *Della famiglia* (1969 [1434]) is rightly considered the Renaissance landmark in the formation of the modern bourgeois ethos, defining principles of conduct for running family life as an orderly businesslike enterprise.

However, the distinctive character of modern administration and the main factor for its expansion consists of its association with the public sphere. This is the case to the point that, both in theory and practice, the term itself has been translated into—and perceived as—public administration.

## The Axes

Administration is conventionally defined as a process of rational adaptation of means to ends. You can call it rational decision-making, and Herbert Simon's major contribution to this area (1947) is the reduction of the concept of administration to decision-making: the decision as the basic unit of analysis. But there is no escaping the synthetic concept of administration which incorporates all those units of decision into a process oriented toward the achievement of a collective task or goal.

Administrative decisions can be more or less formalized, and can vary greatly in format. In complex

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administrative processes, there is a lot of paperwork usually involving some degree of technical skills: “letters or correspondence; memoranda, minutes, notes or other messages; printed forms or vouchers; entries in ledgers and the like” (Bogdanor 1991, 5) constitute the organizational prerequisite of any large-scale enterprise. They also contribute to the popular wisdom of administration as a separate world from the one where the real action is, a highly bureaucratized division in any organization distinct from those concerned with actually achieving the organization’s goal. Yet, the success of any operation on the field is heavily dependent on the quality and timing of administrative support.

In spite of its bulky format and routine procedures, the administrative process implies a continuous flow of critical decision. That the flow is segmented and decisions are piecemeal only adds to the importance of those variables which make for a more stable and more efficient administrative environment. This brings us to the role of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is often treated as the pejorative synonym for administration, but bureaucracy is better understood as the structural, formalized, and routinized dimension of organization, while administration can be thought of as referring primarily to the process, indeed the behavioral dimension of organization. Bureaucracy is a particular form of administration, as in the classic Weber model, characterized by size, division of labor, formal rules, written records of expenditures and internal communications, full-time staff, hierarchical relations, and self-conscious application of technology to decisions, communications, and actions. Even the term “bureaucracy” itself was not invented until the late eighteenth century, and its invention had a great deal to do with the formalization of administration in states and other corporate organizations reforming and expanding at that time. In contrast, the *-tion* suffix of administration indicates that it is a process concept. Formalization of the relation between a group goal, making it a formal agenda, and formalization of the relationship between each task and each decision with the organizational agenda indicates that administration is being bureaucratized—a process which tends to be combined with a more or less high degree of administrative centralism.

Centralism or centralization is present to a certain extent in even elementary forms of administration, first because one of the basic forms of the division of


labor is between the leadership and the membership, or the elite and the followers. Centralism or centralization does not require Prussian-like supervision by a superior of every decision made by a subordinate. Centralization is present to the extent that the authority as well as the efficiency of any organization requires that the tasks and decisions of all members must be tied somehow to the goals of the organization. Different cultural patterns and historical traditions may lead to a higher or lesser degree of centralization. The British model of local, decentralized self-administration has long been considered as a viable alternative to the centralized model of continental Europe. However, the important point here is that no one principle of centralization or decentralization can be generalized and applied throughout all the agencies of government or all the units of a private corporation.

The degree of centralization will vary according to the type of mission or agenda in private and public corporations and according to the sector or arena of state activity. For example, perhaps because they coincided with the original domain of state sovereignty, the military and financial sectors of a state tend to lead to highly centralized and authoritarian patterns of bureaucratic organization. But with the expansion of the state’s activity into new areas of regulation and redistribution, although the initial tendency might have been to generalize the centralized model, both the normal working of politics as well as policy preferences have produced different kinds of administrative organizations, all of which tend to be less centralized and more sensitive to the demands from their environment. Precisely because of the rigidity that can occur in advanced stages of bureaucratized administration, public administrations during the last decades have been experimenting with more flexible solutions. Some agencies resist, while other agencies become models of bureaucratic innovation.

## Upper Right Quadrant

The upper right quadrant of our matrix concerns public administration, the procedure by which laws are enforced and public policy is carried out. This is largely “the function of the executive” (Plano and Greenberg 1985, 237), a word originally standing for the act of executing decisions and tasks set forth by those who hold political—ministerial—responsibility. The idea of public administration as a mere (and

neutral) executive arm largely accounts for its extraordinary expansion throughout the twentieth century, as well as for its blending into and identification with bureaucracy. Bureaucracy imposes on administration the self-consciousness that gives rationality a new meaning. State administration relies on a bureaucratic corp with the specialized task of implementing public policies through obedience to a legitimate authority. The forming of a legal language for the codification and transmission of bureaucratic orders is a critical step in the development of public administration. As that part of any organization concerned with its maintenance over time and space, the administrative branch has a vital stake in its own self-reproduction.



Yet, this also contributes to bureaucratizing administration as a self-perpetuating and self-centered process, thus leading to the most vital as well as the most critical feature of public administration. The main achievement of modern administration consists of its capacity to comply with existing norms and procedures “without thought and without choice, but also, most certainly, without excitement and without compassion” (Gawthrop 1998, 766). This matches the Weberian ideal-type of public service as independent as possible from private interests as well as from political pressures, a prerequisite for full-fledged administrative legitimacy. Yet, the forming of public administration as a separate and autonomous body within the political system also raises widespread concerns about its performance as well as its democratic responsiveness, resulting in a legitimization crisis that has overtaken government, the public service, and associated fields of study (Lynn and Wildavsky 1990; Rabin, Hildreth, and Miller 1989).

The reaction can lead toward three main directions. One is a quest for efficiency, calling for the introduction of market standards into administrative recruitment and behavior. Another form of reaction consists in rejecting bureaucratic centralism and

reverting to bottom-up and more informal patterns of administrative behavior. Third, and perhaps most important, there is the more or less explicit substitution of the principle of procedural formalism with that of political responsibility: this is the alternative represented in the upper left quadrant, which we shall consider first.

## Upper Left Quadrant


A major advance in the quality of administrative behavior is achieved through tenure of office in public bureaucracies, first established in continental Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century and widely accepted in the United States only a century later. Tenure helps to attract skilled professionals and also to protect them from political interference. The idea itself of public administration thus turns out to be deeply intertwined with the existence of an administrative elite. Civil servants, especially at the top of the bureaucratic pyramid, are to display a number of very selective requisites, from managerial capacities to ethical commitment to the common good. In this view, the steering ability and the moral authority of an administrative elite become the necessary condition for the proper working of the modern state machinery.

Yet, this leaves us with two slippery questions open. The first one concerns the relationship with elected officials, and politics at large, both in theory and practice. At the onset, the establishing of a “science of administration” called for outright separation between administrative behavior and political influence (Wilson 1887). But, “in the crucible of the Great Depression of the 1930s and the war that followed, challenges to the politics-administration dichotomy began to take form ... Today, there is no controversy: no one would deny that public administration is a decidedly political process” (Eisinger 2001, 12512). This is the case to the point that one of the founders of contemporary public administration analysis could declare that “a theory of public administration means in our time a theory of politics also” (Gaus 1950, 168). Some analysts go even further, in describing the work of public administrators as largely independent from, if not conflictual with, elected officials. Partly as a consequence of the fact that administrative intervention cuts across traditional political jurisdictions, many relevant bureaucratic decisions are made with

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little if any political influence from outside administrative professional networks (Frederickson 1999). Thus, empirical research confirms that the implementation of many policy decisions is dependent upon the stewardship and coordination of the administrative elite, with its ability to counteract the so-called disarticulation of the state. Yet, it only provides very limited insight about the normative standards which ought to inform administrative behavior.

This is the second main question facing the apostles of administrative independence. The attempts to define the inner rationale of a successful bureaucratic elite stresses the institutional constraints offering clear guidelines of conduct to “achieve organizational objectives (...) that have only an indirect relation to one’s own self-interest” (Simon 1998, 6).



Organizational identification thus becomes a most effective alternative to the economically based criteria of utility maximization. This may, however, not be enough to provide the moral authority and the vision necessary to steer the bureaucratic machinery through the troubled waters of daily policy implementation. A more direct plea for the politics of public administration as an ethical stance explicitly brings into focus the “spirit of public administration” (Frederickson 1997). This inevitably calls into play the historical background and cultural legacy of administrative reform: “Progressives and their children gave birth to American public administration. These were people drawn overwhelmingly from religious and moralizing backgrounds. The idea of stewardship was deeply ingrained though never very well articulated. Their European counterparts, having the concept of the State as part of their historical intellectual baggage, could articulate it but had less need to do so” (Hecl 2002, 693). In the end, on both shores of the Atlantic, public administration as independent decision-making turns out to be explicitly grounded in the life of the modern state, in spirit no less than in substance. Without state support, the administrative process






inevitably spills over into other patterns—and quadrants—where markets and civil society play a much more active role.

## Lower Left Quadrant

Whenever public administration proves too burdensome or ineffective, the alternative to bureaucratic centralism may consist of a return to the realm of private administration, where a definite administrative process also exists. People do accomplish a great deal together by improvisation, which Dahl has called peaceful adjustment. But as soon as peaceful adjustment becomes repetitive and is aimed towards a recognized outcome, the repetition becomes a primordial form of administration.


All too often, we refer to this informal process as self-government (Dahl 1976 [1963], 71–73). Group administration as an activity carried on directly by citizens on private grounds is also a substitute for an excess of state bureaucratic intervention. Citizens’ administration relies on social bonds of trust and mutual respect, as opposed to the hierarchical model of public authority. It is diffused, thus contrasting with the tendency of state administration to uniformity and centralization. It also enjoys a currently favorable political climate, which has become more and more suspicious of big government, thus reversing what appeared fifty years ago as a general trend toward rationalization by centralization (White 1937). In many instances, citizens’ self-administration is a result of public administration retreating from direct intervention in several domains of collective life and leaving room for private associative efforts. Indeed, the growth—both in scale and size—of this form of group administration has led to the emergence of the so-called third sector, a vast area of social-minded cooperative enterprises at the crossroads between traditional state/market boundaries. Third-sector activities differ from more loosely structured group enterprises in that they have a clearly recognizable agenda and tend to transform it into policy outputs with a certain degree of institutionalization (Brock 2002). Some of this administrative activity falls in the category of voluntary associations, with an emphasis on more flexible decision-making procedures as opposed to the rigidity of public bureaucracies. One should not be surprised that, as a result, the realm of administration may appear much more fragmented than in the original unitary model of top-down public intervention.

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This also helps explain why the boundaries between the two left quadrants prove to be blurred, in theory as well as in practice, in a growing number of cases. This has led to a paradigm shift in public administration analysis, from government to governance, focusing on the role of “an increasing number of nongovernmental organizations, quangos, and a host of other hybrid organizational formats,” based on the “mutual leveraging of resources and the blending of public and private attributes in ways that might not be possible in more conventional structural arrangements” (Peters and Pierre 1998, 226). The




widespread adoption of the governance paradigm may be partly due to its lack of a clear-cut definitional framework (Osborne and Gaebler 1992), but also to its capacity to integrate various theoretical strands, from neoinstitutionalism to network analysis (Frederickson 1999). Eventually, the governance paradigm is also an attempt to draw a line toward the expansion of a competing, if not conflicting, approach to public administration, explicitly calling for the introduction of market standards as a guideline and a measure for bureaucratic efficiency.

## Lower Right Quadrant

There have always been some elements of administration in private organizations, but with the advance of the private corporations to larger and larger scale, articulateness and technological complexity, the administrative process is just as advanced in private as in public collective activity: “gradually, increases in the demands for, and in the advantages of, more coordination in economic activity, together with the accumulation of skills in organizing, brought into existence ever-larger corporations that begin to emulate in size the administrative organizations of the nation-states—and we were launched into the modern world” (Simon 2000, 756). As profit-oriented and market-centered organizations, private corporations

are bound constantly to check for the cost-benefit analysis of their administrative structure. Greater exposure to markets introduces the need for greater flexibility and for quicker, more informal, non-administered relationships; but this is only a matter of degree, because the repetition of functions in any organization with any degree of division of labor will disregard administration at its peril. There may be some irony in the fact that bureaucratization, once considered a prerogative as well as a necessity of the public Leviathan, is now a declining feature of many governmental administrations while remaining a key factor for many large private corporations. Huge bureaucracies prove to be increasingly important in private corporations in order to cope, through bureaucratization, with the anarchy of markets. This is what Alfred Chandler referred to as “the visible hand,” where “... modern multiunit business enterprise replaced small traditional enterprise when administrative coordination permitted great productivity, lower costs, and higher profits than coordination by market mechanisms” (Chandler 1977, 6–7; Bendix 1956).



The irony is even stronger when we consider that, in the last few decades, private administration has, in turn, become a model for running public bureaucracies. The drive for reinventing public government (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) has heavily relied on the doctrine of the “new managerialism” (Pollitt 1993) for introducing the “three Es”—economy, efficiency, and effectiveness—as the new guidelines for the public servant’s behavior. While an empirical evaluation of the managerial revolution in government remains necessarily a complex and open matter, some normative implications are nevertheless in order. In spite of its self-apologetic vision (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000), the “new public management” approach “does not provide a coherent and integrated set of propositions about running the public sector,” in contrast with the fact that “the old public administration, with all of its

apparent rigidity and seemingly outmoded assumptions (...) contained a consistent set of ideas that had proven their utility over time” (Peters and Wright 1996).

As a result, the dominant trend has become one of blurring boundaries between private and public administration. This is true in terms of organizational patterns, with large corporations incorporating the practice of public bureaucracies, as well as on normative grounds, where principles of economic efficiency are becoming the main legitimizing criteria for governmental policy-makers. The merging of these two worlds also finds a functional outcome in the recent exponential growth of outsourcing as a system for carrying on public administrative tasks directly through private companies (O’Looney 1998).

## Conclusion


The one territory, however, where the blending of public and private administration has recently been most impressive is the field of information and communications technology (ICT). Electronic government reduces the power of one of the crucial factors in the rigidification of large organizations: control of physical distance and the de-centralization of distant units by the centralization of communications and the virtual instantaneous distribution of information. Historically, advances in administrative effectiveness have been overwhelmingly dependent upon their physical situation and the limits of communication:

from the Egyptian rivers to the Roman roads, from the Spanish ships to the American post offices, organizations were characterized by their effort to deal with the natural obstacles to the distribution of information and directives from the center to the periphery.

Modern communications technologies enormously reduce the weight of physical distance: “current developments in electronics, notably the development of the World Wide Web and e-markets, and the enhanced abilities of organizations to manage geographically dispersed activities, provide new opportunities of unknown magnitude for coordination at a distance” (Simon 2000, 751). Satellite or cable circulation of messages in an electronic format allows for real-time management of a large number of administrative units across the world as well as within each separate building. Vertical and parameter representations of top-down administration give way to the modular iconography of networking bureaucracies.

Yet, ICT also further reduces the distance between public responsibility and private services, between governmental control and corporate know-how. Visible administrative architectures are substituted by the invisible hand of Internet software regulation: “Architecture is a kind of law: it determines what people can and cannot do. When commercial interests determine the architecture, they create a kind of privatized law” (Lessig 1999, 59). The new frontiers of electronic administration may well bring us back to an old democratic question: who is to be held accountable—and to whom (Castells 2001)?

# AGENDA



## Introduction

An agenda is simply a list of things to be done. Most busy people maintain a detailed daily record in a book designed for the purpose, called a diary or an appointment book or, in fact, an agenda. But agenda goes far beyond the commonplace when the context turns to collective decision-making.

This is especially true in democratic governments in which the stress on transparency, representation, and accountability requires a responsiveness to multitudes of demands that, through conflict and dialectic, become issues. A great affliction of democracy is that issues cumulate, raising the intense need for priorities, plans of action, and processes of decision-making that can tolerate discussion but can bring discussion to a close so that policy decisions can be made and administrative actions can be undertaken. Consequently, responsiveness to multitudes of demands must be associated with willingness and ability to impose con-

straints on the time, place, and manner of the conversion of issues into legitimate public policy. That can be considered the critical function of the agenda in political theory, and agenda can therefore be defined as *agreement on what to disagree about*.

Lacking a capacity to “agree on what to disagree about,” legislative assemblies are doomed. An assembly must be able to institutionalize a capacity for collective decision-making that can, first and foremost, select priorities, define them as debatable issues, and discipline debate so that it can, often enough, produce legislation. Agenda formation thus boils down to “the process of specifying alternatives, [narrowing] the set of conceivable alternatives to the set that is seriously considered” (Kingdon 1984, 4).

Although this is a widely shared definition, it leaves ample discretion as to the actors responsible and the means through which the selection of relevant issues is achieved.

## The Axes

The axes of our matrix encapsulate the constituent functions of agenda and agenda-setting, constituent being defined as “concerning the make-up of a thing”—in this case, government decision-making. The vertical axis runs the gamut from the most tentative and casual of interests—mere opinion—to interests that have been refined, rationalized, researched, and assimilated into the most formal of agendas, the calendar or *ordre du jour* of government decision-makers—in brief, fully articulated policies.

Moving up the vertical axis is a matter of moving into more articulated and more formalized communications of opinions, preferences, interests, demands.

This reinforces our definition of agenda as “agreement on what to disagree about,” and why we attribute so much of that essential function to media and party. The horizontal axis, media-to-party, captures the dimension or function of aggregation, which is a mix of communications from a variety of sources, of which the most institutionalized and most proximate to the political process are media and party.

This is also an attempt to consider the competition between parties and media for primacy in the setting of governmental and public opinion agendas, by placing in a dialectical relationship the two main institutions of agenda-setting, which tend instead to be treated, in most of the literature, as two separate domains—and subfields. The traditional understanding of agenda-formation has focused on the role of political leadership in selecting the relevant issues for public discourse and decision-making mainly through party channels and legislative procedures. Functionally, political agendas can best be understood as the aggregation of interests and the articulation of those interests as demands and then as issues appropriate for public dialectic (Almond and Coleman 1960, 3–64). Yet, with the growth of mass communication in modern society, it has become all too evident that the institutional agenda was also strongly influenced by the way issues were chosen—among a variety of events—and presented to the public by the media. The term itself of *agenda-setting* tended to be used to designate the capacity of media to determine the *ordre du jour* of public opinion, exercising “a strong influence over what people think about [and] how

people evaluate any given set of issues” (Bogdanor 1991, 15–16). In both cases, however, there are two questions which cannot go unanswered. The first one concerns the degree of success achieved by either parties or media in pursuing their own agendas. How many of the major policy decisions are the actual result of a specific and coherent endeavor by the political leadership? And how deep can media reach in our belief systems by framing the news in a way that not only determines what to think about, but also what to think?


The second question is about what is left out of the agenda—and why. With regard to the political establishment, Bachrach and Baratz (1963) were first to draw an appreciation of the elite aspect of agenda-setting which includes the power over ‘non-decisions’, the power to keep items off the agenda if they might tend to challenge elite power. The ghost of “non-decisions” was at first ridiculed by leading students of the pluralist school of power (Wolfinger 1971; Debnam 1975). The inventors of the non-decision concept (suffering unjustly from a poor selection of words) were vindicated with significant examples of fundamental issues that were kept off government agendas for fear they would weaken party or other elite controls (Crenson 1971).

On the media side, it has been argued that—true as may be the media’s “ability to keep matters out of sight and out of mind” (Bogdanor 1991, 16)—much of what is kept away from public opinion may not be the result of an explicit choice or strategy by the media establishment. According to the “spiral of silence” theory (Noelle-Neumann 1984) most people “have a psychological need to avoid the isolation and discomfort of disagreement. Thus, under conditions where certain views seem, because of the unanimity and frequency of their public repetition (especially by way of mass media), to represent what the great majority think, or ought to think, then those who hold different views remain silent, whatever the actual strength and extent of such dissident opinion” (McQuail 1992, 480). Taking into account both the mainstream and the latent dimensions of agenda-formation, the four quadrants offer a typology that does justice to the creative importance of agendas in governance as well as to what we may call the missing part of public discourse, with some of its possible remedies.

# AGENDA

## Lower Right Quadrant

The lower right quadrant is basically the laissez-faire model of government, first because it is so market driven and second because it possesses elements of self-government, so that the consensus that markets produce through the free flow of competition over preferences can be deemed to set the parameters of collective choice but also can be deemed, as it is by many, to be more rational than other deliberative methods. This laissez-faire quadrant has been treated as free standing not merely as a factor in setting the government agenda but as a superior form of government in itself.




For example, Dahl and Lindblom (1953) propose that, at least for the economic agenda (economizing), two major methods exist for creating manageable agendas: delegation, to specialists who have judgment on relative costs and benefits; and quantification, finding a common denominator to tie the many variables together. And these tend to fuse, one into the other, because proper selection and quantification of the relevant cost variables require just as much expert judgment as does the final substantive governmental policy choices. Privatization, which has become so popular as to be the hegemonic ideology in many globalizing countries, is an effort to decentralize or to devolve a maximum role of government agenda-setting and even government policy downward toward not merely the local area but to economically driven policy analysis and decision-making (Nagel 2000).

The economism of this quadrant should not, however, be taken as necessarily implying neutral self-regulation. One key feature of the market economy is to allow for the most efficient reproduction of the dominant power structure. This is, indeed, where Bachrach and Baratz's two faces of power (1962) best come into play, suggesting that the elite's role as professional managers of the policy agenda may well coincide with its role as a power elite, controlling

what alternative opinions may—or may not—come on the public agenda.

## Lower Left Quadrant

The lower left quadrant might be called the radical model because, as with the lower right quadrant, it can be the principal agenda-setter and can also be a free standing theory of government—that is, as a democratic agenda-setter and as a democracy.




The most dramatic recent example occurred during the 1960s and 1970s when the distrust of existing regimes in many Western democracies produced a widespread movement for “participatory democracy.” This refers to a situation in which all or part of the central government agenda is set directly by popular movements unmediated by the more institutionalized channels of aggregation and articulation. Even if a popular movement's demands never move from the agenda to actual policies, its goals can be met to the extent that the very effort to get its main demands on the media agenda has served to educate and mobilize the people, within and outside the movement.

Movement-centered agenda-setting has both its strength and limitation in the fact of being a single-issue form of mobilization. A movement's use of media is all the more successful if it can call the media attention upon one—possibly new—issue, as in the case of the peace movement (Rochon 1998) or in the early years of the civil rights movement (McAdam 1988). However, the fact that the media would so willingly—and extensively—join the civil rights crusade may also have been a factor for the civil rights leadership choosing a “non-economic liberalism” focus (Cruse 1987), concentrating on race-based social policies with much less consideration of the class inequalities within the black population (Wilson 1987). Managing a dual agenda (Hamilton and Hamilton 1997) may turn out to be a tough challenge even for a farsighted leadership.

## Upper Right Quadrant

It is only with the top two quadrants that we reach the conventional, and conventionally understood, half of the world of agenda and agenda-setting.

The upper right quadrant is the classic institutional model, focusing on the internal mechanisms of agenda and agenda-setting within legislatures and executive branch organizations, identifying the major role-players as legislators, career experts, outside consultants, interest groups and their lobbyists, and, above all, the major political parties. Agenda-setting in this context tends to put the legislature first but in a struggle for primacy with the chief executive (in America) and the government in parliamentary systems. The struggle between the two branches often comes down to the question of which institution controls the agenda.








Even though the modern presidency is the most important taker of initiatives in the United States, and even though the government tends to follow suit in most parliamentary systems, those initiatives still have to take their place on a yearly agenda whose real priorities are likely to be legislative issues and actual draft bills that were laid over from previous sessions and are just beginning to gain prominence as issues (Peterson 1990; Gross 1953).

The agenda and its construction is the most creative phase of the entire policy-making process. People often fall into the habit of assuming that all political discourse falls naturally into simple dialectics, with a yea side and a nay side. Nothing could be further from the truth. Most issues begin as vague and poorly defined demands; at best they are many-sided, internally contradictory constructions. The effort to refine them into two-sided, formalized adversary proceedings is long and arduous, in a word, creative. We appreciate this process in the judiciary, because legal procedure makes a virtual fetish over the

clear definition of the adversary proceeding. But this is no less necessary in the general political process. The role of the budget in the substantive agenda setting process is an excellent case in point. The budget can be defined as merely an arrangement of the agenda in monetary terms. It can also be understood as a way of keeping track of what commitments have been made, coupled with a rough approximation in monetary terms of the priorities that were agreed upon at the outset.

When America was young and its national government was doing relatively little, there was no consolidated national budget at all. Functionally, the budget was the sum total of all the appropriation bills enacted by Congress and signed by the president. After a spurt of governmental growth during World War I, Congress in 1921 recognized the need by creating a budget process and a Bureau of the Budget. Even in the 1950s William Riker was one of the rare characters who appreciated the significance of the 1921 innovation: “Legislative government cannot endure a budget. Its finances must be toted up by party leaders in the legislature itself.... [B]udgeting ... transfers financial control to the budget maker. It is no accident of idiom that we speak of the executive budget” (Riker 1953, 216–17). In 1939, budget-making became agenda-making because the draft of an executive budget was being compiled by requests for legislation arising out of administrative agencies. “Legislative clearance” had been established to protect the president by screening and prioritizing requests, and it became so important that the Bureau of the Budget was promoted to White House status, and legislative clearance was essentially redefined as “planning the president’s program.” Program sounds like socialism, and it was surely part of Republican President Eisenhower’s evidence for the campaign against “creeping socialism.” But in his second year of office, Eisenhower responded to the demands of congressional leaders in both parties to deliver his program, and one can say that at that point this practice had become institutionalized and was the beginning of what later came to be called “presidential government” (Neustadt 1954 and 1955). At no point in the ensuing fifty years did the president’s program become the entire legislative agenda. But it did become a kind of center of gravity for the ultimate policy agenda, as well as the focus of a growing number of empirical investigations.

# AGENDA



Presidential control of the agenda may vary according to the arenas of intervention, and may be more or less dependent on the president's personal stance. On economic issues, often "the president is not sufficiently prescient to determine when the economy may be a problem, and is therefore typically unable to set the economic policy agenda prior to increased news coverage of a floundering economy" (Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2005, 134), as it was dramatically confirmed in the stock-market crash of September 2008. In foreign policy choices, it may be easier for the president to successfully pursue his agenda whenever systemic attention to the issue is lighter: "lower salience issues increase presidential opportunities to influence the agendas of other institutions" (Peake 2001, 83). This may well sound paradoxical in the age of the "imperial presidency" (Schlesinger 1973), yet the whole debate about the president's ability to forcefully impose his own vision remains quite controversial. In many cases, the president seems to respond to "his own electoral incentives, to other institutions, and to other competing issues [rather than relying] on his own ideological position" (Yates and Whitford 2005, 583). And only when elected with wide electoral margins and working majorities in Congress may presidents be tempted to claim popular mandates and try to shape the national agenda (Heidotting Conley 2001). Not surprisingly, the reverse case also applies, as "the congressional majority party leadership is more assertive and autonomous in agenda-setting when it is faced with a president of the opposition party, especially if this president is relatively ideologically extreme" (Taylor 1998, 390). The picture is even more blurred when moving to parliamentary systems, where a great variety of agenda-setting devices accounts for different legislative outcomes (Döring 2001). Not to speak of the effects of coalition governments, with their tendency to pursue a largely accommodative agenda, giving priority to issues that are more attractive to all partners (Martin 2004). This brings us to a key question about the effectiveness of institutional control of the agenda, with respect to a basic tenet of democratic theory: the relationship between electoral mandate and governmental performance.

There are deep contradictions between the party—or presidential—agenda as a governing actor and the party—or presidential—agenda during electoral campaigning. Parties' roles in elections differ from those they play within legislatures. The main differ-

ence lies in the fact that campaigns remain largely unstructured events, with competing candidates trying to focus the public debate on those issues where they perceive themselves to have an advantage. The electoral agenda thus becomes mainly pollster and strategist driven, rather than reflecting a coherent set of policy priorities (Riker 1993; Owen 1991; Semetko et al. 1991).

This scenario abruptly changes after election day. Once in government, parties are able to benefit from the highly structured nature of parliamentary and cabinet routines and procedures. This enables "political leaders to utilize a combination of formal agenda control and informal debating skills to achieve their ends" (Baumgartner 2001, 289). However, the steering capacity of political leaders (Riker 1986) has to cope—and compromise—with a good deal of serendipity. In the end, proactive agenda-setting may rather turn out to be the exception, with the prevailing policy issues arising from necessary political reaction to a variety of loosely related factors.

A dramatic event—such as a natural disaster or a terrorist attack—and/or widespread popular support for a given alternative as well as quick availability of a financial or legislative solution often constitute the main—if not the only—guideline for agenda-formation (Kingdon 1984; Polsby 1984)—with a sense that the entire policy-making process may become a much more "sloppy and complicated" business (Rocheftort and Cobb 1994).

## Upper Left Quadrant


Only fifteen or perhaps even ten years ago, we would have probably chosen a different way to characterize the upper left quadrant, the one which more explicitly deals with the power of the media to orient—if not control—the public agenda.

At the center of the quadrant one could have used—and still could use—a more generic concept, like "propaganda," implicating the "fourth power" dimension conventionally attached to the role of media as agenda-setter. This choice would be perfectly consistent with a number of studies assessing the influence of media on public opinion, as well as its limitations.

Following Walter Lippmann's (1922) seminal definition of the mass media as a bridge between "the world outside and the pictures in our heads," empirical investigations had yet to admit that the agenda-setting role of newspapers and television was much

# AGENDA

more influential in selecting the issues of public concern than in actually shaping our attitudes and behaviors (Klapper 1960; Cohen 1963). Media propaganda could then be, in the end, much less effective than anticipated, to the point of raising the question “do media really matter” (Patterson and McClure 1976; Bartels 1993). More recent contributions have therefore chosen a more cautious and better focused approach to document how media may be successful at least in “framing” some of the popular attitudes, emphasizing certain attributes of the events/personalities which are the objects of mass media agenda-setting (McCombs et al. 1997; Iyengar 1991). In the end, then, this becomes an argument about the limits of media propaganda, rather than its alleged tyranny.



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By proposing polling as the core concept of the upper left quadrant, we choose to call attention to one of the most innovative features in the complex world of media agenda-setting, and a particularly crucial one in light of its evident short-circuits—and shortcomings—with regards to political decision-making (Abrams 2002; Asher 2001).

With polling as a key instrument for agenda-setting, the upper left quadrant approximates a plebiscitary model. Many authors of recent years have discovered postelectoral politics, the personal president, the personal parties, the rhetorical president, plebiscitary politics, capital-intensive versus labor-intensive politics, and, most prominently, media politics (Lowi 1985; Tulis 1987; Ginsberg and Shefter 1990; Calise 2000). Regular and frequent polls on approval of leaders are in every way a modern plebiscite.


But the rise of polling in our time has also turned into a means for determining government agendas (Baumgartener and Jones 1993). Polling solved the problem of “the masses” by providing the means of piercing through anonymous aggregates of opinions to the individuals who compose the masses. It also provided in the process a way of getting at the determinants or coordinates of opinions and choices

through simple questions on sample surveys. Systematic, scientific quantification of individual opinions (and their correlates) on the basis of mathematically sound principles of random sampling provided an acceptable and credible claim to real knowledge of public opinion—objective evidence not only regarding how citizens are inclined to vote but regarding what sorts of appeals parties and candidates might make in order to change, or manipulate voting behavior (Popkin 1991). All this means evidence on how to construct an agenda for campaigning as well as how to construct the next agenda for governing.

No matter, however, whether one chooses to stress the more indirect—and limited—role of mass media propaganda or the more diffuse—and less visible— influence of polling, a common feature remains the growing oligarchic character of media ownership and control—a phenomenon which could be best characterized by the term oligopoly. This is more and more the case with large transnational conglomerates which concentrate media power—and strategies (Ginsborg 2003; Goldman Rohm 2002). But it is also the case whenever polling is used more or less toward overt political ends, as it inevitably works as a highly hierarchical, top-down instrument for influence and control by an inner circle of stakeholders.

## Conclusion

Polling thus seems to be at the crossroad of the battle between media and parties for control of the agenda. Party as an institution survived earlier antiparty revolution and revolts—from universal suffrage to proportional representation, from the direct nominating primary to mass referenda and plebiscites. Can it survive the polling revolution? The promising sign is that political parties are learning enough about polling and are capable of learning enough about electronic articulation of the results of polling that future party leaders may displace the hierarchic polling corporations and can be their own consultants rather than submitting to the handling of the outside corporate consultants. At the same time, such a comeback may easily be turned upside-down. Berlusconi's Forza Italia has shown that a brand-new and all-winning party can be built out of its corporate polling core (Poli 2001). Whatever the outcome, the party's battle of Armageddon will be for control of the agenda, because the agenda is the ark of public opinion. The unknown is: who and what will fill the ark?



## Introduction

Authority is a companion of power and sometimes the adversary of power. Indeed, “authority ... has a normative dimension, suggesting a kind of consent or authorization, about which [power] is similarly agnostic” (Hawkesworth and Kogan 1992, 57). Sartori sharply noted, in what deserves the status of an aphorism: “[A]uthority’ explains what ‘power’ leaves unexplained” (Sartori 1987, 187). But how do we explain authority? Sartori only opened the door to one of the most complex problems of real politics and of the academic study of politics. Authority is among the oldest and most widely used concepts in political life, coinciding with its own foundation: an author is an originator of something, and all human undertakings bear the mark of authority.

Every definition couples authority with power, but power is treated as a unitary concept while authority is highly differentiated. Power comes from the Latin *potere*, “to be able,” to have capacity to affect things, to make things happen. In the political context, power, as Dahl put it so neatly, is an asymmetrical

relation between two or more actors in which A has a capacity to get B to do what B would not otherwise do (Dahl 1957). Authority is, in contrast, treated by virtually every definition as a multitiered concept. This is partly due to the fact that “power is contingent upon outcome [while] authority is less teleological, or output-focused than power” (Wolf 2001, 973).

Among all composite definitions, the consensus tends toward Max Weber’s threefold treatment, distinguishing tradition-based authority, rational-legal authority and charismatic authority. However, at least two complications flow from this tripartite conceptualization of authority. First, as Boudon and Bourricaud put it, “The authority relation is unstable to the extent that it may shift from one type to another ... [and] more frequently in cases where, as in our own societies, the three types exist simultaneously” (Boudon and Bourricaud 1989, 38). To complicate matters even further, the three Weberian types are not entirely stable as concepts, there being variants that cannot be treated as mere subtypes, but are in fact

# AUTHORITY

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worthy of being treated as fourth, fifth, or sixth types. Even in Weber's own treatment there are such candidates. For example, his authority of the "eternal yesterday" can also be more organic, through custom and habit as Burke envisions it, or can be more personified in a patriarch, priest, or prince.

The rational-legal category can also spawn other types of authority worthy of separate and equal treatment: for example, functional competence, based on credentials; jurisdictional competence, based on delegation of authority by higher-ups to exercise authority within a specified area; or the authority of more general knowledge, based on reputation or conveyed by professional or guild or other corporate association (as in, "to be an authority"). All of this makes authority a very rich concept. But it is too rich, so full of distinctions, functions and subtypes that the definition is an inventory. A balance must be struck between a unitary concept that speaks for itself (*res ipsa loquitur*) and a complex concept we treat by listing all of its attributes. In presenting our four types of authority, which is already one more than Weber's three types, we are aware that no mere addition will suffice. That's why we choose to take Weber as both our original framework and a point for criticism and departure.

## The Axes

In political discourse, authority is situated between two most prominent axes in political theory: power/legitimacy and state/individual. The horizontal axis alone provides the keywords for the definition of authority employed by most political scientists and their dictionaries.

Power is transformed by legitimacy to produce authority. Legitimacy brings to power at least three key attributes of authority: stability, consensus, and durability. Power is stabilized by legitimacy, which is why all power-holders seek legitimacy. While the outcome of power often remains unpredictable, authority implies a routinized form of influence. Indeed, in bureaucratic parlance, the term authority stands for a position or officer corresponding to a precise administrative task. Stability of a power regime may indeed be the essence of authority, from which stems its equation, both normative and practical, with the political state as opposed to the state of nature. Authority also is a form of consensual power to move people and objects regardless of opposing initial ten-

dencies. The wider the social basis of consensus, the more ample the legitimacy of a system of authority. Last, authority is a nonperishable good. While the use of power may coincide with its own consumption, this is not the case with the exercise of authority. Indeed, "the very use of the term 'exercise' in tandem with 'authority' signals the sense in which authority can be likened to a muscle, which can increase in mass and tone with use, as opposed to a checking account balance, which inevitably decreases with use" (Wolf 2001, 972–73).


The vertical axis underlies the enduring separation between personal and institutional authority. Political analysis has a tendency to focus on the impersonal machinery of setting goals, giving commands, and performing duties—the basis of a more or less legitimate orderly ensemble of people. This is, after all, the essence of politics in the plural. Yet, authority originates in the first place from remarkable, when not exceptional, individual qualities. And the making itself of the modern state is, to a large extent, the story of the transfer of authority from the king's body to the corporate body of the state. Which is only to remind us that, in many other cases, authority stays with the individual, or in the close reach of his personal influence (Flathman 1980): be it the traditional environment of his community—a religious or ethnic group, a notable network, a family circle—or the more or less rational followers of his leadership, attracted by professional expertise or visionary charisma.

## Lower Right Quadrant

In the lower right quadrant, community incorporates Weber's "traditional authority" with Burke's vision of tradition lodged in communities as the source of virtue and a link to "the great chain of eternal order." Burke, the founder of self-conscious political conservatism, answered Locke's liberal contract of temporary interest with contract as "a partnership [of] many generations . . . not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born" (Burke 1790, 368 in Sabine 1950 [1937], 614).

This is not merely a contract with the past but a virtual definition of the moral basis of authority. Conservative authority does not rest on tradition in itself but on derivations of what is the good by use of reason on tradition, history, and membership in com-

munities. This was Burke's case against the French Revolution, which was committed to creating new social institutions (therefore also authority) by reason and rationality. That was the radicalism of the French Revolution, the radicalism that Burke wrote an entire book to refute. Wisdom is lodged in established institutions: religion, property, "and a strong sense of continuity ... and a keen moral satisfaction in the loyalty that attaches its members to their stations in its various ranks" (Sabine 1950 [1937], 615).



This is also why localism has turned into such a vital factor in the reproduction of conservative authority, past and present. Small-scale social networks constitute a bulwark against the threats of unrestrained globalization, a defense for community boundaries and morality. Defense of social traditions is all the more effective if it proves to be compatible with economic change. Other than resulting in mere worship of past heritage, resistance, and resilience, conservative authority can be suitable to small-scale entrepreneurship, fostering the transformation of traditional societies. The discovery that "small is beautiful," with a strong role of families and notables, is a dominant factor in the economic development of emerging countries such as India and China.


## Lower Left Quadrant

Charismatic authority is perhaps the most controversial among the three Weberian ideal-types, as it involves differences on both empirical and normative grounds. In the wake of Hitler's advent, Weber himself was heavily criticized for having put too much emphasis and some hopes on the possibility that charismatic authority might bring new life—and order—to the staggering liberal institutions. Weber, however, could hardly have been aware of the extraordinary chances—and new territories—charismatic leadership would be offered by the spread of mass

politics, as well as mass communication (Herbst, 2003).

The combination of these two factors has made large-scale direct appeal to the people a frequent, if not easy, option for entrepreneurs with a strong vision and an even stronger rhetoric.

This is why we have chosen populism to characterize the authority regime built by—and around—a charismatic figure. Populist leadership has become a dominant feature in contemporary politics, as it cuts across various cultural traditions and different stages of democratic consolidation. From post-Soviet Russia's and Latin America's ruthless road to modernization to the media populism of Ross Perot and Silvio Berlusconi, a direct and highly personalized relationship between chief executives and mass constituencies is frequently pursued as a solution to the shortcomings of representative systems.




On institutional grounds, however, personal authority remains an unstable regime, unless control at the top is centralized in a more efficient bureaucratic machinery. Weber captures this with "the routinization of charisma," through which personal charisma, with its original doctrines and myths and messages, attracts a following, an elite of the primary carriers of the leader's virtues. This following becomes a staff, drawing its authority from the charismatic leader but adding to it a competence and continuity that gains consent on its own. This routinization validates the original plebiscitary grant of consent—"virtual consent"—to the authoritarian regime, often leading to the establishing of an absolutist state.

## Upper Left Quadrant

While an important factor in the formation of more stable institutions, routinization of charisma, however, is but one step in the forming of an absolutist machinery, a complex and highly controversial process in the light of Western as well as non-Western

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experience (Tilly 1975; Anderson 1979). This is the quadrant more clearly stepping outside Weber's typology of legitimate authority. With its emphasis on the power of the state to establish and maintain order, absolutist authority literally refers to the use of force as "legibus solutus," without the constraints of the law. And yet, even in its original Hobbesian cast, effective authority cannot rest on sheer violent power, but needs some degree of consent. Hobbes was the first to lay out a modern theory of authority. In fact, "although commonly regarded as absolutist in later times, Hobbes was in his own day often thought subversive because he derived authority not from God but from people themselves" (Minogue 1991, 35).



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The idea that people submit their freedom in exchange for protection of their lives implies some form of consent at the basis of a stabilized Leviathan. This was only a first step in the building of a legitimate statehood, and "later writers as Locke and Rousseau thought that the somewhat coerced authorization Hobbes conceived was inadequate to generate real authority" (Boudon and Borricaud 1989, 38). Yet, the Hobbesian formula of consensual authority helps explain why the historical process of state building proved so painstakingly long and hazardous. And it still remains today a recurrent challenge for many would-be new nations, going through repeated cycles of aggregation and disruption (Zartman 1995; Schedler 2006).


At the same time, absolutist authority also remains a yardstick to measure the progress of power structures and regimes in moving toward the fully legitimate status of the contemporary liberal polity.

## Upper Right Quadrant

The strongest and clearest distinction between this and the other three quadrants is that the liberal model depends upon the cogency of an argument rather than the superiority of a ruler. This is why the Weberian






ideal-type, in this case, strictly correlates legality and rationality as two intertwined principles. Weber quite properly characterizes this upper right model as authority built on "legality, ... the belief in the validity of legal statute and functional 'competence' based on rationally created rules" (Gerth and Mills 1946, 79). Rules and legality are all the more important in consideration that this type of authority stems from some more or less direct form of delegation of original rights. If all types of authority, as we have seen, imply some form of consent, authority of the legal-rational type derives its strength from an exchange between the subordinate citizen and his ruler: "an authority relation exists when there has been a transfer of control of a particular kind of resource: one's own actions" (Coleman 1980, 145). Exchange can imply some form of extrinsic benefit, and be more or less cooperative. Yet, the basis of an authority relation of the legal-rational type is that one person voluntarily subordinates himself to the will of another.

From this derives another founding trait of liberal authority: its limitation. Authority is limited in recognition of the original rights of all those who accept to be the subjects of authoritative command. This is also an important distinction from divine authority, for a long time antagonist—and an alternative—to state authority. They both share the principle of unity, as well as the idea that authority is vested in a corporate and collective personality (Laski 1919). Yet, with the move from Church to State, authority gains legitimacy through recognition of its limits.



One major problem, however, with delegation and limitation of authority, consists of the increasing proceduralization of authority versus its original substantive and purposive nature—and sources. With the rise of the bureaucratic state, authority comes to be perceived as an abstract and often hostile entity, a chain of command and red tape which is out of the control of the elected leaders who should bear democratic responsibility for the common good (Page 1985).

# AUTHORITY



# AUTHORITY

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




In this sense, the “crisis of authority” of modern society reflects the declining legitimacy of bureaucratic institutions that people cannot do without, and yet feel they cannot trust any longer (Sennet 1980).

## Conclusion


Attacks to liberal authority come both from within and from without. The liberal, rational-legal model is not a pure type. Elements of all the other three are found here, as vestiges of history as well as contaminations of everyday present life. No legal system can be effectively enforced without a consistent absolutist accumulation of state power, a lesson many newborn nations quickly learn to their own dismay—and demise. Not to speak of the fact that even the most formalized bureaucracy relies on a traditional set of informal yet widely shared routines to increase its efficiency and value. Most administrative machineries would be lost in the red tape of legal procedures, were it not for the intervention of individuals taking

responsibility—and exercising authority—to make things work.

The liberal model of authority has permeated most functions of modern social and economic systems, to the point of being taken for granted as one of the cultural landmarks of our time. Indeed, we have become so much accustomed to the idea that rationality and legality ought to govern our lives, that we tend to overlook—if not dismiss—the fact that other forms of authority continue to proliferate and thrive. Whether charismatic or communitarian, traditional or secularized, the diffusion of individual authority does however tell us the same story: that personal power has survived the process of modernization far beyond the expectations of most social theorists—past and present (Roth 1987). In the end, the hegemony of the legal-rational paradigm all through the twentieth century may turn out to be but a short-lived parenthesis in the much longer and controversial story of political authority.



# BUREAUCRACY



## Introduction

Bureaucracy could be social science’s first experience with jargon—the invention of a word to meet a specific need. Even the inventor is known. Vincent de Gournay, a French physiocrat, in a letter to a colleague dated July 1, 1764, proposed “bureaucracie” to identify a new form of government to add to Aristotle’s three basic forms of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. Two roots form the concept: *bureau*, which means “office” or “desk”; and *cracy*, which means “rule” or “government.” Bureaucracy simply means a form of government by offices and desks.

The etymology of the term also captures the negative slant that has accompanied the bureaucratization of modern societies, in public administration as well as private enterprises, in unions as in political parties. The spreading of bureaucratic rationale and routines has been feared and criticized as the advent of an all-powerful and highly centralized machinery in the service of the state, or arbitrary political power. Marx would see bureaucracy as a tool for the authoritarian rule of the bourgeoisie; Rosa Luxemburg and Trotsky

opposed it as the dominant trait of the Leninist and Stalinist party. Even worse, bureaucracy was easily perceived as a self-referential—and self-serving—corps, “a system of government the control of which is so completely in the hands of officials that their power jeopardizes the liberties of ordinary citizens” (Laski 1937). On systemic grounds, Merton’s analysis of anomie pointed out “the side-effects” of the extension of bureaucratic rationality “into all domains of social life” (Boudon and Borricaud 1989). Yet, for all fear and criticism of bureaucracy, the main question still remains to be answered: why is bureaucracy necessary?

It was Max Weber who first provided a value-free characterization of bureaucracy, defining it as a central feature of both political and economic development in modern societies. According to Weber, bureaucracy is “a specific modern solution for the more general problem of administration” resulting in a peculiar form of organization and legitimation of power (Bobbio et al. 1990). The main feature of bureaucracy is that its hierarchical structure, its procedures, and its personnel

recruitment and behavior all comply with the superior principle of a legal-rational order. In contrast with previous forms of legitimate power, like patrimonial or charismatic power, bureaucracy is highly predictable: its objectives are strictly defined by law and it operates according to the modern rules of division of labor and professional specialization.

Predictability on the basis of a legal-rational order is what accounts for bureaucracy's diffusion in so many realms of activity. Yet, it also is responsible for several of bureaucracy's shortcomings and helps explain why "while the Weberian ideal-type of bureaucracy is relevant, its field of application is limited" (Boudon and Borricaud 1989). In turning to empirical observation, Weber's bureaucracy stands as a guideline and a parameter, much more than as an ultimate achievement.

## The Axes

One first step to better evaluate Weber's ideal-type of a collective, impersonal authority is to contrast it with the monocratic nature of older forms of bureaucratic power. Early bureaucracies were essentially an extension of the monarch's household.

This is why so much of the nomenclature of bureaucracy is from regimes that were built around church and military resources. For example: from the church came clerk and minister. From the military came line/staff distinctions, as well as terms as "span of control" and "chain of command," corps and commissar.

Monarchies, in extending their court in order to administer the greater domain, to penetrate the localities, and to collect taxes, were adding elements of national organization and drawing in new classes and interests that were necessary for the regime but threatening at the same time. In fact, as bureaucracies grew larger and more stable, it became more and more difficult for the monarch to obtain direct and immediate implementation of his own will. Indeed, one main consequence of bureaucratic expansion consisted in the transformation of the ruling authority from the personal toward the impersonal, or from the monist to the collective, thus creating a permanent tension in the functioning of all bureaucracies.

A process which had originated from the sovereign's will to expand his span of control inevitably produced a corps of people which would take pride and

power in asserting its own autonomy from political interference. While this may have come as an irony in the way of primordial state-builders, it certainly struck back with a vengeance on the efforts of democratic leaders to pursue the collective good through efficient and legal means, while also taking full responsibility for their policy decisions.

As a consequence, the pendulum of democratic concern would find itself continuously swinging between two competing alternatives: to establish firmly a structural and functional divide between politics and administration, as a safeguard from arbitrary power; or to foster those systems and procedures which would enable elected officers effectively to steer the administrative process, in order to fulfill their personal mandates (Peters 1978). The same democratic dilemma can be seen from a different perspective, moving from the principles and forms through which authority and control are exercised toward the specific attributes of those in charge of bureaucratic implementation. What kind of bureaucrats is a bureaucracy made of, after all? The vertical axis of our matrix introduces two main options, and channels, through which bureaucracies can be created: patronage and elite.

Patronage is the original and easiest way to select a group of officers responsible to their own boss—be it a prince or a party leader. Patronage can thus be easily located as the early stage in the development of modern bureaucracies, in sixteenth-century France as well as in twentieth-century Nigeria (Mousnier 1945; LaPalombara 1963). It also remains the most immediate resource for any political leader striving to assert direct control on a number of key administrative posts. Yet, there are severe limitations to the use of patronage as the standard procedure for staffing the administrative process. One first limit concerns the scale of operations. If the criterion is personal acquaintance with the political leader, the number of appointees is necessarily restricted to a close circle of friends. After trying to rely on a small network born out of preexisting aristocratic bonds, French monarchs were forced to entrust the running of a fast-growing state machinery upon a larger group of people with bourgeois background. As well as from numerical constraints, the need for a new class arose out of a process of specialization of administrative functions. Indeed, these two factors were—and remain—strictly correlated. The rise of an administrative elite is a response to the growing complexity of


# BUREAUCRACY

bureaucratic tasks, which require educational qualifications and professional skills largely outside the reach of a small circle of political followers.

The road was paved for the emergence of Weberian bureaucracy, as well as for its internal and external complications. Once a bureaucratic elite was established under the firm protection of collective authority regulated by public law, how could political responsibility penetrate the administrative citadel?

## Upper Right Quadrant

The upper right quadrant captures the main characteristics—and shortcomings—of the Weberian ideal-type.




The means through which the bureaucratic elite exercises its collective authority are strictly defined—and confined—by public and administrative law. Modern bureaucracy cannot be conceived outside a coherent set of rules and obligations set forth by a legislative body. This is indeed its main linkage to that collective entity—the state—that serves as the legitimating principle for all bureaucratic behavior. The development of modern bureaucracy is, to a very large extent, coincident with the development of *Rechtstaat*, a centralized state using the rule of law as its guiding principle—a relationship to which Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* (1821) paid tribute as the first and most prominent manifesto of the new administrative order. Hegel also was the first to grasp fully the implications of the “holy union” between the bureaucratic elite and state law. He “accorded civil servants a position more exalted than they have occupied in any account, before or since. The civil servant was entrusted with the maintenance of the state’s universal interest and of legality in general” (Bogdanor 1991, 62). Because of its superior function, the administrative elite was thus to enjoy a privileged status, turning into a closed estate, with social prerogatives and esoteric language.

In Hegel’s contemporary Prussia, these were indeed the necessary ingredients for bureaucracy to develop as a cohesive corps, able to stay independent from political and economic pressures (Koselleck 1967). Yet, as democratization permeated the modern polity, the elitist nature of bureaucratic authority came under severe criticism. Even in countries like France, which had long been proud to nurture a highly skilled administrative class, the graduates of the elite National School of Administration (ENA) came to be portrayed as a self-referential network of mandarins, who had eventually become so powerful to occupy the higher echelons of political office (Coussirou 1996; Suleiman 1974). Was democracy turning into a technocracy? Where was the line to be drawn between bureaucrats and politicians (Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman 1981)? To whom, and how, was the bureaucratic estate to be responsible?

## Lower Left Quadrant

The lower left quadrant shows how democratic theory—and practice—was to confront the same issue that absolute monarchs had originally faced in their relationship with the bureaucratic machine. What is to be condemned as the intrusion of arbitrary politics into the neutral sphere of bureaucracy, according to Weberian orthodoxy, can instead be regarded as the necessary balance between popular sovereignty and administrative autonomy. American Presidents were the first to raise the issue publicly, declaring that “to the victors belong the spoils.”



They understood the futility of winning an election while leaving the state apparatus in the hands of a hostile bureaucracy. They were also the first to promote patronage on a large scale, staffing a fast-growing federal machinery with party followers (Crenson 1975; Shefter 1994).


While trust remained the main criterion for the selection for public office, the process expanded far beyond the small group of a royal coterie. With the advent of mass democracy, *party* had grown from its original meaning as a faction at the prince's court into a large-scale organization for electoral mobilization. Party bureaucracy—or a “state of parties” (Skowronek 1982)—was the first systematic response offered by the practice of democracy to the risks of bureaucratic autocracy. Yet, when Andrew Jackson promulgated his “doctrine of simplicity” manifesto in his inaugural speech to the Congress in December 1829, he was speaking to a largely agrarian society and the Federal bureaucracy he referred to had very few and elementary tasks to perform. With industrialization and economic development, the job for federal administrators became much more complex and demanding. And the United States had to go through a painstaking process of bureaucratic reform in order to establish a professional civil service similar to that of most European countries (van Riper 1958; Shefter 1977). On a longer-term perspective, however, the American democratic legacy has not proved to be only a hindrance. Elected officers in the United States—presidents, mayors, governors—have kept a considerable number of political appointments “at their pleasure” (Lowi 1964). These can now be recruited on a highly professionalized market, thus allowing American leaders to keep a steering capacity over the policy-making process that many of their European counterparts are far from possessing.

## Upper Left Quadrant

On the whole, however, the span of political control over bureaucratic behavior remains heavily constrained by both the scale of operations and the time slot available. Much as the spoil system is being reintroduced in modern governments through more qualified and professionalized channels, political patronage can reach into only a limited number of higher posts, hardly scratching the surface of the bureaucratic iceberg. Besides, individual leaders are elected for a relatively short term, while bureaucrats at all levels of the hierarchical pyramid stay in office much longer. Last but not least, the logic of administrative operating procedures often proves to be incompatible with the policy frames of elected officers and their staff. Even when administrators are willing to cooperate,




the hectic timing of the political agenda is hard to adjust to bureaucratic routine (Hooton 1997). All of this amounts to a verdict of defeat, or meager compromise at best, for most political efforts to steer the administrative machine. If leaders really want to make a more diffuse and lasting impact on the policy process, the alternative they are left with is to fight the bureaucratic Leviathan on their own grounds, launching an overarching reform campaign. In order to make bureaucracy really politically responsible, bureaucracy must be turned into a political issue.

The politics of administrative reform has been a constant for transformational leadership (Burns 1978), with a special emphasis on the creation of a new bureaucratic elite to replace the entrenched interests of the old system and push the state's intervention into new territories. From Frederick the Great to FDR, bureaucratic reform has been a recurrent strategy for bringing new social forces and ideas into the governmental process, while leaving an exceptional imprint on the institutional framework.




Nevertheless, “reinventing government” from above is a challenging task that only very few charismatic leaders are likely to undertake and successfully pursue. In most of all remaining instances, the deadlock between policy innovation and bureaucratic conservatism may well be better managed through a different strategy (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Instead of relying on presidential leadership at the macro level, administrative reform can be pushed forward through incremental changes in the microprocesses of management, by giving administrators more, rather than less, discretion over their own organizations (Wilson 1989). Given the resistance to making civil servants responsible toward policy-makers, it may be worthwhile to try to turn administrators into policy-makers, with more personal power as well as more public responsibility. This “postbureaucratic perspective” (Barzelay 1992) strongly—albeit ironically—recalling the original Hegelian ethos of the founding stage of bureaucratic power (Richardson 1997).

# BUREAUCRACY



## Lower Right Quadrant

Public responsibility—and visibility—for top administrators becomes all the more important in light of the trends in the lower right quadrant, describing changes and adjustments occurring within the administrative process in order to adapt it to social and economic pressures. This is a more and more widespread variant to the Weberian ideal-type, consisting of a contractual relationship between bureaucracy and various corporate actors as a substitute for bureaucracy's direct intervention and implementation. In its original formulation, this quadrant refers to the expansion of the state's activity outside its core business of raising revenues and securing internal as well as external policing. As new functions—from building infrastructures to providing domestic services as electricity or public transportation—were added to the modern state, the dominant trend was to contract out these new tasks to private companies. The pattern of private partnerships may vary from outright monopolies through statute charters, as in the case of post-colonial America, to the adjudication of a grant through a public bid, by far the most widespread and flexible instrument to achieve a specific aim under clear contractual conditions. In many cases, however, corporate outsourcing may easily turn into a formalized version of patronage, with bureaucrats performing the role—and prerogatives—of political authority: a modern form of clientele covering a wide spectrum of private organizations under the firm protection of a legal agreement.



This may, in turn, lead to the external penetration of the administrative process, from occasional cooperation to outright substitution. If the case of the “captive agencies” still refers to a set of informal relationships supporting the official regulatory activity (Bernstein 1955), neo-corporatist regimes, as in Germany, Scandinavia, and the Low Countries, fully legitimize arrangements in which pressure groups are “legally and officially in the process of making and administering public policy” (Peters 1978, 143).


The corporate penetration of bureaucratic behavior also refers to the spread of illegitimate practices. Aside from outright corruption—a widespread phenomenon in underdeveloped countries as well as in advanced democracies (Mény 1992)—white-collar crime can flourish through various forms of collusion: from prepackaging the contracting-out of public works, to leaving a “revolving door” open for circulation between top administrative posts and corporate boards of directors, to mere “coziness between ministerial officials and their counterparts in private industry and banking” (Schneider 1991). The latter attitude—and practice—leads into the muddy waters of the relationship between top bureaucrats and economic development in authoritarian regimes. In countries with no democratically elected officers to lead the process of change, administrators are often required to provide the necessary leadership and vision for turning state intervention into a useful subsidiary for market regulation and expansion (Hewison 1989; Laothamatas 1992), thus turning the clock of state-building back to its original mission, and contradictions.

## Conclusion

Bureaucracy has become a pejorative word in many if not all countries. It is deemed a threat to democracy and it is charged with inefficiency, formalism, redundancy, conservatism, and a host of other vices. In fact, most of the charges lodged against these administrative organizations, even when they are correct and accurate criticism, are due to not enough bureaucracy. The perfectly organized, fully bureaucratized administrative agency would display a minimum of this alleged bad conduct and poor results. This is precisely why every private business organization bureaucratizes itself to the maximum.

The threat of bureaucracy is not from its inherent weaknesses but from the strength of its unrestricted self-fulfillment. Before there were computers there was programming: the program of administrators and their units to comply with the mission of the agency. And the people and the units will continue to pursue the mission until a stronger and more rational force intervenes to alter the software. The challenge for political vision, whichever be the quadrant it may choose or be forced to enter, is to write the new code and keep the copyright (Lessig 1999).

# Charisma



In everyday parlance, charisma is often used as a colorful synonym for sex appeal or popularity. It is also invoked to explain how certain types of people become leaders. Yet, the reverse is more likely to be true: very few national political leaders selected by established party and electoral processes are charismatic. Charisma comes from the Greek *kahrisma*: gift of grace, the partaking of the divine. Weber emphasizes that charisma refers to “an extraordinary quality of a person, ... to which the governed submit because of their belief” (Gerth and Mills 1946, 52 and 295).



The vertical axis places charisma between the group which acknowledges the sign of grace and the leadership role to which the chosen or self-selected person is anointed. The horizontal axis traces the development from the originating crisis—the “charismatic moment”—toward its likely output: institutionalization.

The lower left quadrant (LLQ) covers the moment thought by followers to be the extraordinary birth. The primordial charismatic character often has a religious origin and is recognized according to how he or she appears to possess supernatural qualities and style befitting “an envoy of God, a hero—a mighty warrior”


(Boudon and Borricaud 1989, 69). The upper left quadrant (ULQ) depicts charisma in movement, arising out of crises that so often beset communities. Crisis produces a quest for a return to the foundations of the community. And when action and conflict are required, people become followers, having put their trust in a figure known for effectiveness, heroism, sacrifice, prophecy, or prayer.

In the upper right quadrant (URQ), the community is on a more rational footing, emerging as an institution whose need for leadership must be more in keeping with established rules and practices that actually define an institution and are in the process rationalized by supporting beliefs—i.e., the function of ideology. It is this quadrant that best applies to one of Weber’s most luminous discoveries, the “routinization of charisma.” The lower right quadrant (LRQ) is a still more formalized version of routinization, in which rationalization is crafted directly in terms of a monocratic authority. Charisma is here instrumental to the founding of a new political order, be it the early monarchies of the thaumaturgic kings healing their followers or the authoritarian regimes of revolutionary leaders.

# Charisma



# Choice



*Choice is all about gratification. A preference for one thing is paid for by the sacrifice of other things. This means that there are different kinds of choices.*




*The vertical axis captures the environment of choice, including the constraints on competition among the myriad claims of recognition or satisfaction by one or more sets of interests whose private preferences are being imposed on public objects. The horizontal axis is concerned with the scale of participation in the choice to be made. As Kenneth Arrow (1951) and Mancur Olson (1965) have demonstrated, the number of participants is a major if not the major determinant in the process of choice and the prospect of choices that are satisfactory to all concerned. This is the origin of the quest for 'rational choice.'*

*The ULQ is the classic situation and dilemma of the great Hobbesian liberal search for a satisfied public. Liberty as the state of nature enables individuals to make choices that will be rational for immediate gratification—until a stronger neighbor makes a choice of taking the first individual's choice. Following Hobbes and Locke, rational individuals will decide—as in a "social contract"—to give up part of their choice in return for protection from risk. This means that all three of the*

*other quadrants are types of choice that involve constraints on choice as well as on liberty. In the LLQ, constraints on selfish interests of individuals are deferred gratification imposed on the requirement of contract to implement and sustain the original choice. Choice by contract requires law (dictation) of some sort to control the future, and that has tremendous bearing on the rationality of choice.*


*The LRQ is a product of voluntary merger of individuals and groups into larger groups, with collective choice as the by product of combinations and compromises, i.e. factions built on interest. This is where Kenneth Arrow's problem of intransitivity is confirmed, but also where intransitivity can be overcome by control of the agenda, which comprises the order and priority of choices. The URQ is based on path-dependency and carries constraint of choice to the ultimate, with institution as a collective choice regulated by past traditions, habits, and beliefs perpetuating the existing order.*

# Choice



# CITIZEN

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## Introduction

For most of the history of political thought, the citizen has been considered the primordial unit of political association. Citizen is preceded only by population or people, especially in a democracy, with its emphasis on *demos*, coupled with *-cracy*, a system of rule based on *demos*. However, as Dahl (1970, 59–60) has so rightly observed, “practically all the attention has been paid to ... the meaning of ‘rule,’ and almost none to the meaning of ‘the people.’ But which people are the members of any polity, and which people in a democracy are those defined as entitled to govern?”

## The Axes

There is general agreement that entitlement to governing is limited to “membership in the city,” which is essentially the formal definition of citizen and citizenship. However, there is danger in defining citizenship as mere membership, because that tends to convey the erroneous impression that citizenship is confined to

individual membership, each citizen taken as one person. The conception of citizenship as an individual property of the private self came only, according to Sartori (1984, 285), with Christianity, as recently as the Renaissance, reinforced and given impetus by the American and French Revolutions and nineteenth-century practices. From its Greek roots all through its medieval developments, citizenship was a collective attribute, which could not be exercised as a private individual right.

This is a distinction which has survived well into contemporary debate, with “two mutually contradictory interpretations of the citizen’s role that pit the Aristotelian communitarian against the Lockean individualist” (Beiner 1995, 261).

On ideological grounds, the distinction cuts across the conventional left-right spectrum. Collective citizenship has long been a stronghold of Soviet propaganda and practice, and was introduced in the United States, at city level, by the “community action” move-

ment (Baum 2001). In more recent times, the neo-communitarian revival is but the latest testimony to the intellectual (and political) cohabitation of left and right under the same roof (Mouffe 1993; Putnam 1993). Along with a persisting tension between the collective and individual nature of citizenship, we find the age-old dilemma of participation, shown here on the horizontal axis. Membership—citizenship—means participation. The act of entering into a social contract is participation, and the protection of life and property in the state is confirmation or realization of that participation. As Walzer puts it (1983, 31), “[W]hat we do with regard to membership structures all our other distributive choices: it determines with whom we make those choices, from whom we require obedience and collect taxes, and to whom we allocate goods and services.”

But what happens as the scale of the city increases? As the scale of the *polis* went beyond the city or city-state, incorporating a whole people, defined as citizens regardless of residence, the meaning of citizenship changed, moving, as it were, on the horizontal axis.


Only a few of the most fortunate regimes were able to solve the problem caused by this transformation; and when it was solved the solution was some kind of institution that bears some relationship to what we now call representation. Behaviorally, the transformation was from direct to some type of indirect participation. Early democracies, good ones and bad ones, had no fundamental problem with citizenship, since citizenship was always a collective noun, as discussed above, and participation could be equal and direct, whether in constant town-meetings or simply in the agora: participation according to the ideal of the Greek city admired by Rousseau.

Representation is far more complex. No wonder that Rousseau insisted that “the city” must be small. Representation was not appreciated by the Greeks or the Romans: “[I]t is a commonplace that the Greek failure to build representative institutions left them helpless in the face of large-scale political orders, and that the Romans, walking in the footsteps of the Greeks, lost their freedom when Rome grew into a large territorial state” (Friedrich 1968 [1950], 269). In order for representation to become the cornerstone of citizenship, we need to move out of the ancient world, and from classicism into Christianity. Representation is a product of the Middle Ages and

beyond. According to Gierke (1987 [1900], 64–65), the political theories of the Middle Ages made considerable use of the idea of representation in the construction of the Church and the State. They borrowed from corporation law the theoretical formulation of the idea, current in the Middle Ages though unknown to antiquity, of the exercise of the rights belonging to a community by a representative assembly.

## Lower Right Quadrant

The original idea for promoting citizenship on a large scale through representation consisted of combining collective membership with social and/or economic status. At first, citizenship respected the status and class orders of the late feudal systems. Nobility, clergy, merchants, country gentry, and perhaps others would each be accommodated with their own representation.



One of the most moving yet informative accounts of the representation system is that of the estimable Marc Bloch. The passage takes on all the greater significance because it is the last passage of his classic work, *Feudal Society*: “It was assuredly no accident that the representative system ... originated in states which were only just emerging from the feudal stage and still bore its imprint. Nor was it an accident that in Japan, where the vassal’s submission was much more unilateral and where, moreover, the divine power of the Emperor remained outside the structure of vassal engagements, nothing of the kind emerged from a regime which was nevertheless in many respects closely akin to the feudalism of the West. The originality of the latter system consisted in the emphasis it placed on the idea of an agreement capable of binding the rulers; and in this way, oppressive as it may have been to the poor, it has in truth bequeathed to our Western civilization something with which we still desire to live” (Bloch 1961, 452).

# CITIZEN


The need for agreement and consent became increasingly intense as monarchs needed the continuing support of these classes and their representatives in order to spread the burden of taxation. These were the estates, and this pattern of class representation is even reflected as constraints. All were different, yet all were in some ways alike. Palmer (1959) calls them “constituted bodies.” But toward the end of his analysis he adopts “corporate” and “corporatist” as synonymous with “constituted.” His conclusions were based upon an impressive variety of accounts: “The constituted bodies did in fact often call themselves ‘orders’ or ‘estates.’ Most of them had in fact originated in the Middle Ages. Persons did have rights as members of groups, not abstractly as ‘citizens.’ In summary, and here one may agree with (...) the corporatist school already mentioned, nothing was more characteristic of the eighteenth century than constituted bodies of parliamentary or councilor type. They existed everywhere west of Russia and Turkey. They were more universal than the institution of monarchy, more widespread than the famous middle class. All defended their liberties as they understood them; there was in many places a busy political life.... No one except a few disgruntled literary men supposed that he lived under a despotism” (Palmer 1959, 28–29).

## Upper Left Quadrant

Much as several historians would share Palmer’s view (Lousse 1952 [1943]; Gierke 1987 [1900]), corporate citizenship did at last become the object of overt opposition and warfare, well beyond literary circles. From this perspective, the most important result of the “age of the democratic revolution” of the late eighteenth century was the virtual abolition of legally recognized corporate groups and the coupling, or re-coupling, of citizenship on a voluntary basis.

This was not so great a task in the new United States which, from this perspective, was truly “born free”: free particularly of most of the constituted social relations and legally protected guilds and other corporate groups that abounded in European societies. Tocqueville was much impressed by this difference and may have been the first to have articulated the idea that Americans were born equal instead of becoming so. He was particularly impressed by the propensity of Americans to form associations to meet their convenience and their immediate needs, and he

was clear and dramatic in contrasting the American propensity of association with the European practice. From a constitutional standpoint, the “age of revolution” can be considered a revolution of citizenship.



It has been referred to as the “rise of the common man,” but a truer and more realistic formulation is the rise of individual citizenship. Yet, by stressing voluntariness and the liberty of forming new groups as well as exiting them, the emphasis in citizenship had shifted back on participation and on small-size associations, while the main problem of the modern state remained one of reconciling the large scale of its operations with universal membership. How could citizens be all and equally represented within the state, on the basis of their individual will, yet without being reduced to the smaller units of voluntary associations or corporate bodies?

## Upper Right Quadrant


With the conclusion of the democratic revolutions and the Napoleonic wars, the nation-state had truly come of age. But among the many implications of that fact, the one most relevant here is stated well by Reinhard Bendix: “In the nation-state each citizen stands in a direct relation to the sovereign authority of the country.” But Bendix jumps too quickly to the next step, arguing that “therefore, a core element of nation-building is the codification of the rights and duties of all adults who are classified as citizens.” There is at least one necessary in-between step, and that is the advance in maturation of the principle of representation and the practice of representative government—even in those nation-states with poor records of respect for citizens and their rights. Out of the principle of representation came the idea and the ideal of the citizen as individual possessing rights inherent in the very meaning of citizenship itself. Representative government has a “dual nature,” as Friedrich called it: “deliberative assembly from one

nation, with one interest, that of the whole, and a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests." One could even say the legislature or parliament, like the king, "has two bodies," not "the body natural and the body politic," but the body collective and the body disaggregated. Representative government requires, as Burke insisted, deliberation as one nation. But representation, Burke notwithstanding, means "to stand in the place of" and, as the agent or delegate, to act as the person or persons represented would act. Principles and ethics of representation are designed to increase the chance that the representative will act in a responsible and accountable way. This kind of representation is open to many criticisms, but the effect on citizenship and citizen expectation is no less fundamental. Based as it is on suffrage, representative government moves the old, fictional social contract from consent toward accommodation. However, just as universal suffrage was not immediate, the accommodation basis of representation was also not immediate—nor easy.

Mosca (1939, 466) provides the perfect linkage between the individualist conception of citizenship and the rise of the nation-state: "During the nineteenth century the nations of European civilization made an effort to carry out in the political field the program that had been sketched as an ideal by the preceding century. That program may be summed up in three fundamental concepts, expressed in three magic words: liberty, equality, fraternity." As it turns out, and probably not by self-conscious plan, these three words subdivide the actual history of the nineteenth century experience with citizenship. Take for example T. H. Marshall, whose analysis is followed by other observers of the history of rights in the European context: "I propose to divide citizenship into three parts. But the analysis is, in this case, dictated by history even more clearly than by logic. I shall call these three parts, or elements, civil, political and social" (1965 [1949], 78). We can find no point at which Marshall ties his three elements back to the magical tripartite French prayer, but the connection is extraordinary.

Marshall and Bendix (1956) have demonstrated that, for European countries, these three categories of rights of individual citizens are sequential and institutional—that is, real as well as logical. First, there are civil rights, beginning in the eighteenth century and extending into the nineteenth. According to

Marshall, the civil element incorporates the rights necessary for individual freedom—"liberty of the person, freedom of speech, the right to own property ... [etc.]." Civil rights involve advancements in legal equality over legal protection of privilege, as well as protection of the independent individual, and the individual right of association to the extent this meant freedom of contract for employment but not the right to combine to control or affect the price of labor. True in all Western industrializing countries, the right was so individualized that it imposed a disproportionate burden of the Industrial Revolution on the working classes. But it applied also to entrepreneurs and innovators, especially in the most capitalistic of countries, such as the United States and Great Britain, through the highly individualized principles of tort litigation covering the explosive growth of mechanization and the risk of injury it brought with it (Friedman 1973, chapter 6; Horwitz 1977, chapter 3).




By political rights Marshall had in mind the suffrage plus the right of access to public office, including the abolition of offices as property and as part of one's inheritance. The campaign for political rights was indeed an effort that spread across all of the Western and westernizing countries. The European understanding of political rights put a stronger emphasis on positive action by governments, as in the expansion of the state machinery through the legal safeguard of civil service reform. The United States was first to establish a universalized white male suffrage by abolition of the property qualification, extending that to black males in 1865 with the Thirteenth Amendment, to all women in 1920 with the Nineteenth Amendment, and to all citizens eighteen years of age or older with the adoption of the Twenty-sixth Amendment in 1971. But again, leaving aside differences, it is clear that the nineteenth century was a century of individualizing rights and attaching them to individuals as citizens. The combination

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of these two types of rights, civil and political, is, by all means, the essence of the liberal creed as well as the main ideological drive in the process of nation-building as a universalistic goal.

## Lower Left Quadrant

A major shift occurs with the advent of social rights. Social rights come last in the sequence in all Western countries, and up to a point are part of the advancement of rights-based individualist citizenship. By social rights Marshall meant “the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full and the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (1965 [1949], 78–79). In other words, social rights are a form of what Piven and Cloward (1982) referred to as “subsistence rights,” which, according to their analysis, had existed in communal form prior to the eighteenth century but were bound to disappear with the rise of civil rights. They were back and termed as welfare rights in the latter half of the twentieth century.



But social rights constitute not only a twentieth-century effort to advance an individualist conception of rights; they are also a return to a collectivist concept of citizenship and rights. Social rights, whatever their institutional focus, started all of the Western countries back on the trail of a collectivistic construction of rights and of citizenship. In other words, social rights are rights conveyed upon citizens to make a claim on the state for social services by virtue of membership not in a large class called citizenship but by membership in a subclass labeled poor citizens, as defined by one or more criteria of comfort or subsistence. We have moved from citizenship as a universal category to citizenship composed of several categories, as defined in legislation. What makes this type-three right different is its categorical character.






Unlike type-one and type-two rights, type-three rights are not actually attached to the individual citizen by virtue of his or her citizenship. The right comes to those who have been defined externally as qualified—i.e., as members of a subcategory of citizenship.

Generally this definition is provided by statute and is based upon some criteria of dependency—the inability to subsist alone. The first two types of rights are based on criteria of universal equality—equality before the law, equality of access, equality of contract or association. The third type is based on a categorical criterion of inequality. In this respect, then, social citizenship represents a departure from the universalism of civil and political rights, thus opening the Pandora’s box of particularism, both ancient and modern.

This is why, in characterizing this quadrant, we have changed our original wording and moved to one which could better describe more recent—and controversial—developments. In an earlier formulation of this matrix, we had used *class* and *welfare* to stress the new citizenship function—to become welfare recipients—as well as its categorical nature. With *participation* and *collective*, this still makes for a very coherent, and extremely relevant, citizenship subtype. Its importance, however, comes even better into focus when put in the wider context of contemporary practices—and visions—of citizenship based on cultural linkages and identities.

The revival of particularistic citizenship in post-industrial societies may revolve around old issues of ethnicity and race or new ones of gender and human rights. Yet, in one way or another, taking into consideration “the sociological variables of citizenship is to give an advantage to the ‘thick self’ to the detriment of the ‘thin self’ upon which the classical theories of citizenship were formerly built” (Walzer 1994; Kymlicka and Norman 1994). The crisis of universalism as the cornerstone of modern citizenship also comes as a result of the weakening of nation-state structures, the trend towards transnational political unions, global standards, and guarantees of civil rights as human rights (Soysal 1994). One can only think of the changing impact of immigration on traditional Western polities. In the last forty years, there has been a shift from a conformity formula to a diversity one, in the relationship between cultural minorities and the democratic state. Rather than accepting

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the public culture of the hegemonic majority, recent immigrants have tended to rewrite the rules of citizenship, reinforcing their original loyalties and group allegiances.







However, it may be fair to argue that the crisis of political citizenship is also due to the very causes that have hindered its development for such a long time in the past. Once the drive for nation-building and the widening of state intervention has declined, the logistics of large-scale modern societies have proved a very difficult environment for effective democratic participation. This is more so as the “focus on ‘social citizenship’ makes political activism seem less important” (Smith 2001). As Amy Gutmann asks, “What does it mean for citizens with different cultural identities, often based on ethnicity, race, gender or religion, to recognize ourselves as equals in the way we are treated in politics?” (Gutmann 1992, 3).

## **Conclusion**


Over two and a half millennia after the early Greek experiments with defining membership in a community as a matter of political freedom and rights, the


dominant trend seems to have gone back full circle, with citizenship being mainly perceived—and promoted—as small-group, collective loyalty to a given cultural identity. On normative grounds, the main question may thus become one of reconciling multicultural citizenship, and its group-specific rights, with the liberal rule—and tradition—of universal protection and enforcement of equal standards (Kymlicka 1995). Yet, on empirical grounds, one may need to look further and take into consideration the possibility that, after serving for such a long time the cause of political development, citizenship may no longer be a moving force of contemporary democracies.

A more benevolent approach may go even further and recognize the decline of a liberal, state-centered idea—and practice—of political citizenship, yet only to the advantage of a more pluralistic environment. The interplay of various citizens’ loyalties—cultural, corporate, national—may imply the end of traditional political boundaries but also become a challenge to reconstitute them on a less crystallized basis. In the age of globalization, citizenship may have a future only by redefining its past.



# Class





*Clientelism is a spurious concept, crossing different disciplines. Already used by classical sociology, it has been applied in a systematic way by social anthropologists since the 1920s. During the 1970s, the concept of clientelism was brought back into political science in order to explain the persistence of personal relationships in modern political systems.*


*The horizontal axis concerns the dynamics of clientelism, contrasting a relationship based on consensus and deference typical of the traditional systems with the contractual logic of social exchange. The vertical axis refers to the type of clientelist association: from the traditional interpersonal exchange among subjects of different social status to the exchange among corporate groups, the so-called “horizontal clientelism.” Both axes reproduce the tension between backwardness and modernity. It is therefore possible to outline a developmental path beginning from the lower left quadrant and proceeding clockwise.*

*The LLQ represents traditional communities, the kingdom of the notables. The patronage relationship is direct and vertical, based on clear normative rules related to the hierarchy of status and to patrimonial wealth.*

*This is a stable political environment, with most clientelistic relationships working on a dyadic basis—one-to-one—as well as face-to-face. The ULQ refers to the diffusion of political machines in modern democratic systems, especially during the phases of economic and industrial development. The key institution is the party, which develops functions of socialization (as outlined by Merton, 1957) and integration in complex and heterogeneous societies. Distributive policies prevail, as they can be allocated piecemeal and in a discretionary way. There is also a move from local to larger, national networks.*

*The URQ is typical of contemporary politics. After the decline of the mass party, interest groups began protecting their corporate interests by lobbying the decision-makers. The LRQ is the hidden part of the clientelist iceberg, where individuals stipulate contracts in a context of free market trying to avoid legal procedures and sanctions. Here the clientelist dynamics are turned into outright corruption.*

# Coalition



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*In politics, coalition is commonly used to describe the coming together of a number of individuals or groups to pursue a certain end. They are alliances of “parties, persons or states without permanent incorporation into one body” (Oxford English Dictionary). Coalition is considered the most peaceful of outcomes in the struggle for power, but how peaceful depends upon the institutional context and the decision rules for resolving the conflicts among individuals and their coalitions, in the form of informal agreements, arbitration, or constitutional procedures.*

*This is clarified by distinguishing among coalitions formed within civil society or the legislature, by groups or political parties.*

*Coalition became one of the central concerns of twentieth-century political science (as well as for practical politics) because “the interest” was adopted as the atomic unit of political analysis. It is the interest that is played out through conflict and accommodation in the political process (LLQ).*





*The American version of coalitions, which concentrates on their emergence out of civil society, culminates in the exertion of influence on the legislatures or other authoritative institutions through direct demands (by “lobbying”) and through the expansion of influence by constructing*

*still larger coalitions with other interest groups outside the government. With respect to parliamentary coalitions, emphasis in the United States has been on coalitions of groups formed to pressure (or lobby) governments toward preferred policies (ULQ), concentrating largely on one type of coalition—the “logrolling coalition,” which is an accumulation or aggregation of participants who have nothing whatsoever in common but can agree to support each other in a series of overlapping, pairwise agreements.*





*As the focus shifts from the United States to Britain and Europe, it also shifts from a concentration on groups outside the government to parties whose objective is to become the government. This is the basis of electoral coalitions, referring to the efforts by political parties to conduct campaign appeals in such a manner as to attract voters from various communities or class surroundings to provide a base for representation (LRQ).*

*Party coalitions can be turned into “coalition governments,” in parliamentary systems where the government (cabinet) must command an absolute majority but no single party has such a majority (URQ). This often results in the forming of minimum winning coalitions, with high efficiency costs for multiple accommodations.*


# Coalition








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







# Community





# Consensus





*Conservatism joins liberalism and socialism as the third of three rival ideological movements spreading throughout the Western countries following the American and French Revolutions.*

*The conservatism matrix has to be constructed around the organic society and the relation of each individual to it. The vertical axis is concerned with the reaction of conservatism against rationalism, secularism, and the romance with individualism. The horizontal axis concentrates on the nature and character of social cohesion. At one extreme is order, so important as to be canonic, transcendent order. On the opposite point of the horizontal axis is trust. Once there is established order, change can be accepted, if there is demonstration that it has already become a part of the community. This is the essence of trust.*

*The LLQ is the preconservatism quadrant, an ideology in the making. Converting loosely joined, primitive populations into an integrated society with hope of order could not wait for prescription, usage, history. Primitive governments needed trust in order to spread trust. And this required appeals to the transempirical worlds of mystery and charisma. The ULQ is the essence of Burkean conservatism as a recognized body of political thought.*



*Burke rejected as radical such Lockean, Rousseauian formulations as natural right and natural law in favor of law as governance itself, resting on established and proven earthly authority. Thus, on the basis of trust born of convention, tradition, and prudence, a hierarchy would govern and its regime would be aristocracy.*


*The URQ has been for two centuries the quadrant of organized, self-conscious conservatism. The doctrinal-educational emphasis was the strength and the weakness of the conservative parties. While Socialist parties combined doctrine with parliamentary control, conservatives, including Catholic conservatives, resisted explicitly organized politics because of restraints on their organizational life coming from religious centers, especially the Catholic church.*

*Although a tendency or culminating point in all four quadrants, conservatism comes closest to genuine radicalism in the LRQ. The purpose or goal of conservative thought in this quadrant is to build a nation. Nation becomes nation-state whenever the components of nationalism (folk as race and folk as nation; Roman culture as nation; heroes and sacrifice as nation) legitimize the claim to rule. In its most radical form, this type of conservatism has been known as fascism.*

# Conservatism

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## Introduction

A *constitution* is a body of rules defining and limiting power relationships within a political community. The use of the term to indicate a written document stating the fundamental laws of a nation is relatively recent, and is perhaps the most important contribution of the American founding fathers to constitutional thinking (Matteucci 1976, 125–26; Friedrich 1968 [1950], 30–31). Yet, the word *constitution* had already begun to circulate as early as the first half of the seventeenth century with a specific reference to two basic ingredients of its modern use. The first consisted of “the application of analogies from nature to politics” (Stourzh 1988, 38) using the physical body as the equivalent of the political or corporate body to introduce the idea that a political community can be better or worse off depending on the state of health of its constitution, and that remedies can be provided to improve it. The second innovation concerned “the rise in importance (...) of the legal term ‘constitutions’ (always used in the plural form),

which ultimately can be traced back to the *constitutiones* of Roman and canon law” (Stourzh 1988, 38; Sartori 1962a, 853). This implied a shift in hierarchy as well as distinctiveness of constitutional law.

The emergence of the constitution as a unitary body, if not necessarily a single document, was closely related to the rise of the modern state as a centralized authority. While setting limitations upon the monarch’s absolutist rule, the constitution also stood as a clear recognition of the unity of the state and a protection against all sorts of disruptive forces. This became apparent in the effort to set constitutional prerogatives above parliamentary rule. The attempt failed in England, where Cromwell’s epoch-making statements that “in any constitution there is somewhat fundamental which ought not to be subject to change by Parliament” (Friedrich 1968a, 322) were eventually defeated on military grounds, thus giving way to the British practice of parliamentary supremacy. Yet, in most other countries, the idea of the con-

# CONSTITUTION

stitution as a fundamental law above legislative intervention has become a landmark of all political movements striving for a more liberal as well as a more stable regime.

## The Axes

The vertical axis describes the tension between liberty and state, the core feature of any constitution. Most contemporary constitutions clearly distinguish between one set of norms regulating the state organization and another part defining citizens' rights. This also remains the main divide between the constitution as a formal description of the working of the state's institutional branches—the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary—and the normative dimension embodied in the principles of constitutionalism, that is, individual liberty and limitation of power. To most liberal and democratic thinkers, a constitution is only such as long as its actual working serves the purpose and scope of constitutionalism (Sartori 1962a, 855; 1994, 197–98).


This distinction also serves as a watershed between ancient and modern constitutional theory and practice. All through the Middle Ages, there was widespread agreement on Bracton's clear-cut divide between *gubernaculum* and *jurisdictio*. The former concerned “matters of state,” or the “transforming of the Commonwealth,” which are things “neither pertaining to them nor within the capacity of their understanding.” The latter are a part of “the Prerogative Imperial,” which is and ought to be “absolute” and “not disputable.” (McIlwain 1947 [1940], xx). The latter covered the domain of private law, and remained under the administration and protection of courts and parliaments. Well into the Elizabethan Age, the principal aim, and concern, of constitutional debates and struggles was to avoid the king's infringement upon traditional judicial safeguards of private liberties (Maitland 1913 [1908]). With modern constitutionalism, the promotion and protection of liberty expressly confronts the issue of state organization, through two distinct though often complementary strands. The first is the idea of the separation of powers, with the principle of checks and balances as a guarantee that no institutional branch may disrupt the other two. The second is the upgrade of individual liberties from private to public law, by fixing them directly in the constitutional

charter, as with the path-breaking example of the Bill of Rights in the American Constitution.

The horizontal axis relates to the constitutional actors at play, depending on historical epochs and political arenas. Ancient constitutionalism was mainly concerned with collective liberties, as the privileges enjoyed by a number of corporate groups such as townships, estates, or assemblies. While defended on political grounds as a group prerogative, privileges would be administered through courts on an individual basis. With the advent of modern constitutions in the nineteenth century, individual rights become the hallmark of universal citizenship and the cornerstone of each country's fundamental law. Contemporary mass democracies bring the pendulum of constitution-making back towards collectivism, with basic charters incorporating wider social demands and more controversial values (Fioravanti 2000; McIlwain 1947 [1940], xx). This evolution thus transforms constitutional law into a dynamic arena for the more or less effective implementation of a vast array of norms, and pressures.

## Lower Right Quadrant

In spite of its symbolic meaning as a prototype of modern constitutions, Magna Carta is one among several examples of ancient constitutional law: a written document signed by a number of contracting parties, spelling out various privileges and provisions as well as the way for them to be respected and enforced.




The duration and application of such documents varied greatly, as a distinctive tract was the continuous attempt, on both sides, to redefine the terms of agreement. By the end of the thirteenth century, however, the early feudal hierarchy had been replaced all over Europe by a system of dual governance: “from England to Hungary, from Spain to Poland and Sweden, we find charters, resembling Magna Carta, which provide for restraints upon the princes and

division of governmental power between several states, i.e. groups or classes, in the community” (Friedrich 1950, 129). In this respect, early constitutionalism was pluralist and diffused, a marked difference from the centralized and monist pattern which was to emerge late in the eighteenth century (Poggi 1978, 36–71). Statutes may focus on strictly dynastic matters, as in the “leges fundamentales” where the “the most prestigious and politically powerful estate of the Reich, the electors, reaffirmed and expanded these rights during every new election of the Kaiser through new electoral capitulations” (Schmitt 2008 [1928], 100). Or they deal with the overall empowerment of administrative and economic functions, which we find in the corporate charters regulating the conquest and development of colonial America (Kellogg 1971 [1904]). The extreme variety of constitutional deals reflects the multitude of collective actors engaging in some form or another of judicial discourse and practice. And this variety helps explain why a major strand of constitutional history and theory, mainly though not exclusively German, has kept two separate concepts and terms. This distinction contrasts *Verfassung*, or the living and material constitution encompassing norms and traditions of a given people, with *Konstitution*, a fixed text embodying the universalistic principles of liberal individualism (Schmitt 2008 [1928]; Gierke 1958 [1934]).

In both cases, however, a common trait is represented by the quest for freedom as an original right, perhaps the decisive ideological factor for turning ancient constitutionalism into a platform for the modern one: “There grew up—or rather, there was intensified and renewed—a habit in many countries of appealing to ‘the ancient constitution,’ of seeking to prove that the rights it was desired to defend were immemorial and therefore beyond the king’s power to alter or annul. Hotman in Francogallia asserted the antiquity of the assembly of the nation; Coke in England that of parliament and the common law; Pietro de Gregorio in Sicily that of baronial privilege and the *parlamento*; Vranck in the Netherlands that of the sovereign and independent Dutch towns; Erik Sparre in Sweden that of the nobles in their *riksrad*.... By 1600 or thereabouts there was hardly any constitutional movement without its accompanying historical myth: no man granted us this liberty” (Pocock 1987, 16–17).

## Lower Left Quadrant

In moving from the lower right to the lower left quadrant, we move from constitution-making as a political, collective confrontation to its daily administration in courts. Whatever the principles and liberties defined by a constitution, their safeguard and implementation rests upon the judicial system each country has been able to develop. The court is the place where the distance between the formal enunciations and the actual working of a constitutional text can best and more readily be measured. This is why many liberal thinkers give no constitutional credit to those countries which present a full list of civil and political rights in their fundamental charter, but fall short as to the means and procedures to secure them for their citizens.




In this respect, the greatest English contribution has been the weaving of individual liberty into the constitutional fabric, as the produce of cultural and religious, no less than political, forces. This is best exemplified by the influence of Locke and Montesquieu on the drafting of eighteenth-century constitutions, with the former emphasizing private property as the bulwark of individual freedom and the latter stressing the independence of the judiciary as the state branch responsible “for the execution of the civil law” (Jennings 1933, 18). The English lesson was—and still is—that a working constitution results only from a painstaking process of judicial interpretation and enforcement of individual rights. This may also be an answer to the often quoted paradox that the motherland of constitutionalism never had a constitution as a unified text. As the great Maitland put it over a century ago, “[H]ere in England that part of the law which we call constitutional has no special sanctity. (...) [T]he demarcation of the province of constitutional law is with us a matter of convenience” (Maitland 1913 [1908], 536). This observation serves as an ultimate reminder that “the genius of constitutions, written and unwritten alike, lies in usage” (Hamilton 1935, 258). This is a perspective shared by

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most Verfassungslehre historians maintaining that the living or real constitution of a country should be found in the customary practices, including the dominant judiciary arrangements with their ethical, ideological, or religious constraints, rather than in some abstract universalistic principle fixed in a single document (Brunner 1939; Böckenförde 1961).

## Upper Left Quadrant

This is the quadrant of classic modern constitutionalism, as it emerged out of the cultural climate of the Enlightenment and the political upheavals following the American and French revolutions (Friedrich 1968 [1950]). At the core of all nineteenth-century constitutions is the idea that the power of the state is limited through two main devices: the safeguard of a number of individual rights, equal for all citizens, and the curbing of executive power through some form of legislative control and judicial review. The English example, as popularized through Montesquieu's writings, served as a model, though more on ideological than practical grounds. With few exceptions, the drafting of constitutional charters closely followed national judicial patterns and reflected power relations among the main political actors (Sartori 1994, 202–3; Mortati 1975, 35–36; Bogdanor 1988).



Written constitutions of sovereign states grew rapidly in number, showing to belong to different constitutional “families” (Finer 1988, 24–26). Even the American constitution, the prototype of all written basic laws, found many more admirers than followers, and remains exceptional for both its simplicity and longevity. Indeed, the American constitution is unique in its successful attempt to separate powers effectively in three distinct institutions, while escaping the danger of a constitutional crisis. In other cases, too clear-cut a division between the government and the legislature, and/or the overarching role of the Constitutional court, would easily lead to political deadlock or collapse, as in the tragic short-








lived experience of the Weimar Republic (Kirchheimer 1982).

For this reason, classic constitutionalism's main concern remained to ensure proper mechanisms for the working of the state apparatus. With all due emphasis on the protection of individual rights, the main challenge of any new charter consisted in finding the proper balance between the clashing interests of governmental stability and representative demands. The extraordinary achievement of the American founding fathers rested on their full awareness that “the position which independence had occasioned required orderly resolution without delay” (Friedrich 1968, 323). Much as their vision was inspired by the ideas of Locke and Montesquieu, their action was instructed “by their knowledge that concrete and unprecedented problems were facing them. As a result, they discovered a number of highly significant institutional solutions which past constitutionalism had failed to bring about, notably federalism, judicial review of legislation, and the process of constitutional amendment” (Friedrich 1968 [1950], 323), “in their double effort to draw up a structure of government which could serve to protect people from government” and “to protect people from themselves” (Bogdanor 1988, 3). In retrospect, this combination of intellectual boldness and political wisdom has proved a lot easier to praise than to imitate.

## Upper Right Quadrant

There is a more general lesson, however, to be learned from the fact that, while a few basic constitutional principles have become widely accepted, none of the trend-setting constitutional charters has been successfully replicated in other countries. Throughout the golden age of constitutionalism, constitutions have remained a national affair, mainly dictated by local cultural and political constraints. As long as constitution-making directly impinged on the distribution of state power, preexisting national variations in the state structure made the final difference. Ironically enough, constitutions started to look more similar as they moved away from the original core mission of limiting state power and ventured into the wider domain of mass constituencies and ideologies (Klug 2001). The move from the upper left to the upper right quadrant is one from liberal to democratic politics, and it radically altered the classic constitutional scheme. Post–World War II fundamental charters cel-


# CONSTITUTION



# CONSTITUTION

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embrated the advent of the mass party as the new collective actor representing the sovereign will of the people. Parties carried along a set of values and demands which went well beyond the task of protecting individual rights. As a consequence, constitutional charters became much more lengthy and detailed, in the attempt to spell out explicitly a number of social and economic goals to be fulfilled. This deeply altered the traditional working of constitutions in two basic respects.





The first change concerns the judicial scope of constitutional regulation. Democratic constitutions have self-consciously invaded what was once considered as the sacred territory of civil law. Key aspects of social life, as family linkages and labor relations, as well as the economic sphere of private property and market enterprise, have been incorporated as part of the overall constitutional design, and are regulated through a number of provisions setting more or less precise standards to be met (Fioravanti 2000). Well beyond securing the liberty of their citizens, constitutions took upon themselves the much more ambitious task of providing for their welfare.

This has led to a second major change, the transformation of basic charters from a static and strictly

regulatory text to a dynamic assemblage of loosely defined aims. While classic constitutional norms could be enforced with little if any ambiguity through legislative or judiciary acts, democratic constitutions have explicitly delegated a number of institutional and political actors for discretionary implementation. The legal execution of the constitution has thus been upgraded—and diluted—into its political fulfillment.


## Conclusion

All this should not however lead to declare the end of constitutionalism. Democratic constitutions may have not achieved all the goals they so adamantly proclaimed, yet they have served no lesser a function in anchoring mass politics—and conflicts—to a set of shared values wider than the mere rules of the game. At the same time, “although constitutionalism is apparently weakening in its heartland, it has been a factor of considerable importance in the emergent nations. To most of them, the fashioning of a constitution for their political order has been significant as a symbol of their newly won freedom” (Friedrich 1968 [1950], 325). These two factors together help explain why constitution-making has steadily grown worldwide, in intensity if not necessarily in effectiveness: during the past fifteen years, there has been “fundamental constitutional reform in half the world—in approximately 104 of the 188 members of the United Nations. Of these, a staggering 78 percent, or approximately 81 countries, adopted completely new constitutions” (Klug 2001, 2644). Constitutions may perhaps have become less necessary, yet only as long as there is one to rely upon.



# CORPORATION

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## Introduction

The concept of corporation, in its original formulation and use, dates back to the Gregorian reformation in the second half of the eleventh century (Berman 1983). The primary definition of *corporation* in the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) is “a number of persons united, or regarded as united, in one body.” It then immediately shifts to corporation as defined in law: “A body corporate legally authorized to act as a single individual; an artificial person created by royal charter, prescription or act of legislature, and having authority to preserve certain rights in perpetual succession.” With such a wide-ranging normative and organizational scope, it comes as no surprise that the invention of the corporation brought a veritable revolution in the fabric of political power. Corporate authority stood for the possibility of separating power from individuals, regulating it by legal rules, and perpetuating it across time. Through the corporation, political authority could be asserted on collective grounds rather than by the personal linkages of feudal society (Maitland 1987 [1900]; Kantorowicz 1957).

Yet, in spite of the corporation’s tremendous impact on early Western political development, its recent history seems to be confined to economic reality—and theory.

When Peter Drucker (1946) set out at writing his seminal book on the concept of corporation, the term had long lost the universality of its medieval foundations. Whereas through the past millennium a corporation could be an abbey or a university, a king or a pope, a town or a colony, to twentieth-century America the corporation stood for nothing other than an economic organization. Drucker’s contribution consisted in providing the first systematic treatment of how that type of organization actually worked. In Drucker’s wake, Alfred Chandler (1977) established the role of the corporation as the “visible hand” regulating the American system. For American institutional theory—and ideology—the primacy of corporations stemmed out of their prominence in the economy (Bunting 1987). It was the natural outcome of a process of concentration of resources resulting from

free-market competition in the world economy. The large scale of mass production and consumption had nurtured the emergence of giant organizations bound to rule the world according to the law of modern times: the law of economics.

How is then the contemporary picture of the business corporation to be confronted—and reconciled—with its medieval origins? Are these two separate phenomena, only sharing a terminological root? Or is there a common institutional pattern accounting for the emergence and dominance of multinational corporations? The focus of our definition will consist in the reconstruction of the historical and conceptual ties between ancient and modern corporations: a story of successful transplantation from the old to the new world. In moving to the challenging environment of colonial America, corporations succeeded in preserving the quasi-public format they had been developing through their European past (Calise 2002). Out of their public status came a number of privileges and functions which would be exploited in fostering economic development. The industrial growth of corporate power could be possible only thanks to a political engine—indeed, a very ancient and powerful one.

## The Axes

The axes were determined by our awareness that the corporation is in every respect a public institution. Even those economists who embrace the corporation as a private sector construction cannot avoid its public character, which they tend to soften with a “quasi-.” Take, for example, the sophisticated economic analysis of Berle and Means, writing during the darkest moment of modern capitalism: “Corporations have arisen in field after field as the myriad independent and competing units of private business have given way to the few large groupings of the modern quasi-public corporation” (Berle and Means 1932, 2). The horizontal axis tries to capture this by the continuum running from the civil society of voluntary associations to the state of involuntary and privileged associations. The public nature of corporations had a far older genesis than the mergers Berle and Means refer to. The original corporation was a product of state sponsorship through a charter granting a privilege (usually a monopoly) of an area, a function, a product, or service. This was the traditional model by the late eighteenth century that Adam Smith labeled,

pejoratively, mercantilism, in which the business corporation was “a unique entity created by the state for a special purpose.... State involvement was preserved for the very act of incorporation” (Hovencamp 1991, 12). But there was already available in 1620 a full and accurate definition of such corporations as the Massachusetts Bay Company, which provided the organizational and financial capacity for the *Mayflower* voyage, using the newly developed innovation—introduced by the Dutch before 1600—of raising revenue by selling shares (Caffrey 1974).

The relationship between state and corporation often went well beyond one of sponsorship and protection. In many cases, corporations developed into a full-fledged functional equivalent of the state. This pattern had appeared in medieval Europe, with corporations working as a substitute for state authority, especially at the local level. This became all the more the case with the rise of the United States as the first modern “stateless society” (Nettl 1968). Be it a cultural, administrative, or economic enterprise—the running of a college; the building of a canal, a turnpike, or a railroad; the administration of a municipality; or the establishment of a manufacture—the corporation was soon turned into the most successful organizational device in the forging of the first new nation (Goodrich 1972 [1961]; Chandler 1965), to the point of suggesting that “a corporation is in fact not something different from a state with interesting similarities. It is a state, with a few unimportant differences” (Jay 1967).

The vertical axis describes the texture or character of the corporation as an institution. Between contract and constitution, there is not a continuum but rather a competitive and mutually dependent relationship, and a dynamic one at that. Contracts are agreements between individuals, groups, or firms, controlling one or a series of transactions. A constitution is an act regulating the observance or consummation of contracts. At first, the tension between these two poles mainly concerned political liberties, as corporations needed sound statutory footing to be able to enjoy all privileges of their quasi-public status. This inevitably implied a conflictual relationship with the state as the ultimate constitutional authority. Ernst Freund, a German-educated jurist and a close student and translator of Otto von Gierke, stated the problem this way: “The corporation has always presented the same problem of how to check the tendency of group

# CORPORATION

action to undermine the liberty of the individual or to rival the political power of the state. The somewhat vague theory of the later Middle Ages that communal organizations not sanctioned by prescription or royal license were illegal was at least from the fifteenth century on supplemented by the technical doctrine, developed under canonist influence, that there is no capacity to act as a corporate body without positive authorization” (Caffrey 1974, 48–88).


With the advent of the modern business corporation, the tension between contract and constitution turned into an economic one. During the past two centuries, corporations repeatedly moved from one pole to the other, depending on which one would provide the greatest and/or most stable benefits. At first, the granting of a public statute, or charter of incorporation, was a prerequisite for corporate development. Thanks to the public authority delegated through statute charters, corporations enjoyed a privileged access to the most relevant sectors of American life. Then, as corporations consolidated their economic power, it became all the more important to place corporate privileges under the protection of contract law (Horwitz 1977). Maitland (1987 [1900], xxiv–xxv) could ironically point out that one should not be surprised that “contract, the greediest of legal categories, which once wanted to devour the State, resents being told that it cannot painlessly digest even a joint-stock company.”

## Upper Left Quadrant

This quadrant refers to mainstream corporate life in Europe through its medieval origins and well into the eighteenth century, as a pluralistic pattern of self-governing bodies with different public functions: from townships to cathedral chapters and charities, from guilds to colonies and trading companies (Black 1984; Michaud-Quantin 1970; Lousse 1952 [1943]). The spread of corporations as a dominant form of organization in both the ecclesiastical and the secular domain of social activity stemmed from the new possibilities they offered to regulate conflict and competition among social groups (Yeazell 1987). Each corporation posited a boundary which defined its internal life as well as its external limits. These boundaries would be strengthened through the sanction of legal rules (Tierney 1982).

Corporate power was grounded on strict legal premises. In fact, it can be argued that the spread of corporations was the main force in the renaissance of the legal mind which followed the discovery of the Justinian code. The founding of the first modern universities was but one episode in a much wider process of intellectual awakening which swept the territory of Christianity. The great majority of the new intellectual profession belonged to the religious orders. For the first time in the history of Western civilization, intellectuals became a key factor in institution-building, thanks to their monopoly on the legal codification of power (Pizzorno 1987). The renaissance of legal studies, however, amounted to much more than a mere reproduction of the Roman framework. At the core of the corporate idea lay the principle that a group of people could associate and compact to perform public functions, that is, tasks concerning a community at large.


Statutes became the legal format through which the new public status of corporations would be regulated.



The diffusion of written statutes framed according to legal principles rather than to mere precedents was a turning point in the diffusion of corporations. The granting of a corporate charter became the formal act of incorporation, endowing the association with a number of assets and powers which could be employed on a collegial basis. There was, however, one basic requisite upon which the legitimacy of the corporation rested: that the ultimate goal of corporate activity would be the pursuit of the common good. The public nature of the corporation thus came to stand for both the domain and the aim of its intervention. Corporations were engaged in a range of activities which went beyond the narrow scope of private interests, and were expressly meant to foster the *bonum commune*. To borrow from modern parlance, corporations had a public mission (Tierney 1982).

## Upper Right Quadrant

The move from the upper left to the upper right quadrant brings corporate development to the core of state theory. All through the sixteenth century, corporations could practice some form of self-government without directly confronting the power of a centralized state. To be sure, their autonomy could never be taken for granted and the struggle for statutory liberties and privileges was a constant of medieval politics (Schneider 1966). Yet, to a greater or lesser degree, corporations could be independent in performing a wide range of activities. With the rise and strengthening of the modern state the corporations' constitutional status was explicitly redefined as a subordinate one to the state's monopoly of legitimate authority. This was dramatically sanctioned by the French Revolution, when the Le Chapelier Law put an end to the legal existence of intermediary bodies between the citizens and the state.



As far as continental Europe was concerned, it seemed that, with the decline and fall of the *Ancien Régime*, the state had eventually succeeded in subduing corporate autonomy. This is, at least, the picture conveyed by the official historiography celebrating the triumph of the monist state, condemning the corporations—to use Hobbes's definition—as “the worms to be eradicated from the womb of the human polity.” Ironically enough, the same picture is found in the minoritarian strand of antistatist *Korporationslehre*, defending an alternative model of public authority as a “plurality of corporations” (Gierke 1987 [1900]; Bowen 1947). In fact, both views shared the conviction that the historical record was unquestionable: the state had won; the corporations survived only as an ideological legacy of the past.

Paradoxically enough, the idea of public authority as a plurality of corporations was being relegated to the rank of a European heresy (Lousse 1952 [1943]) at the very time it was becoming in America the dom-

inant institutional pattern. In fact, as “the first corporation came to America aboard the *Mayflower* and most states began their existence as corporations” (Lustig 1982, 46), the corporate form proved most influential in shaping political and cultural institutions throughout the colonial era. On the eve of revolution, corporations were already important in compensating for the lack of a strong state intervention in public life and by the early nineteenth century they had gained a dominant institutional role, “broadening the concept of public service” (Seavoy 1982).

The key to the corporations' success was the possibility—granted through statute charters—of *directly* exercising public authority: “in 1800 the corporate form was used in America mainly for undertakings involving a direct public interest: the construction of turnpikes, bridges and canals, the operation of banks and insurance companies, and the creation of fire brigades” (Berle and Means 1932, 10). Corporations could make an extensive use of a legal status which put them well above ordinary citizenry: be it on a basis of *eminent domain* or *limited liability*, courts would willingly concede that corporations were acting as a public authority (Horwitz 1977).


## Lower Left Quadrant

The move to the lower left quadrant is—to use Sir Henry Maine's famous quote—one from statute to contract: from the fixity of constitutional provisions to the flexibility of contractual opportunities. After enjoying for several centuries the protection—and limitations—of the state, the corporation at last develops into an outright economic actor (Horwitz 1992). The drive toward privatization first arose from the attempt of legislatures to modify franchises in the controversial political climate of the Jacksonian era. Daniel Webster's defense in the Dartmouth case is considered the inauguration of an instrumental conception—and use—of corporate charters (Miller 1969). Webster's winning argument was that “it will be a dangerous, a most dangerous experiment, to hold these institutions subject to the rise and fall of popular parties, and the fluctuations of political opinions” (*ibid.*, 61).

By contrast, by allowing franchises to become the private property of a corporation, the reach of legislatures was confined to the initial moment of the granting of a charter. Thereafter, corporate assets would be

# CORPORATION

regulated on a private-law basis. Such a momentous transformation, however, was inevitably at odds with the democratic mind of the time. How could corporations benefit from their quasi-public status while at the same time demanding to behave as a private firm? The upsurge in the number of corporate franchises which took place in the early decades of the nineteenth century soon became the most controversial issue in contemporary American politics (Blau 1954 [1947]). Party alignments themselves reflected the repeated attempts to control corporations by reinforcing the procedural instruments through which they could be held accountable: “no constitutional convention met without considering the problem of the corporation. This was a nineteenth century constant; it changed its form, its proponents, its antagonists, its format, but retained a numbing sameness of theme” (Friedman 1973, 44).



In order to understand how the proliferation of corporate bodies could resist and eventually overcome so strong and diffuse a political opposition, one has to look at a major transformation, both cultural and juridical: the change in the leading principle for legitimacy. If the American political tradition “demands that all forms of power be legitimated by criteria of utility or responsibility” (Hurst 1970, x), the spreading of corporations brought a dramatic shift from the latter to the former principle. Responsibility was rooted in the American creed of the right of the individual always to exert a certain degree of control over whatever institution had the authority to effect the course of his life. Yet, “to structure power for responsibility called for continuing, close attention and investment of resources of mind and energy which we begrudged. We begrudged the investment because we felt that it subtracted from our primary interest in the economy, which was the main area in which we pursued utility” (ibid., 59). The shift from political responsibility to economic utility changed the traditional legal basis of





corporate power. Within a few decades, the procedural guidelines gave way to a more instrumental conception of legitimate authority, one based on the exceptional contribution of corporations to economic development and to the overall welfare of the new nation.

Economic development did in fact take place at a tremendous rate of growth, basically through—and thanks to—corporations: “In 1780 the thirteen colonies which were still struggling for their independence had a population of less than 3,000,000, most of whom were engaged in agriculture, hunting, fishing, or in seafaring in wind-driven vessels. There were no banks, no insurance companies, no factories, no canals or railroads, no telegraph lines, no steam-propelled vessels, no gas-lighting, not even a reasonable good road system or bridges across the larger rivers. By 1860 the country, which had become a nation of over 30,000,000 persons, had all of these things in abundance.... It was the business corporation—practically nonexistent in 1780—which had been the medium by which all these things had been supplied. Practically all of the banking and the insuring of property, most of the factory production, all of the railroad and telegraph lines and gas-lighting plants and all or most of the large steamship lines were carried on by privately owned business corporations, which also constructed and for some years maintained most of the canals and many of the longer roads and bridges” (Dodd 1954, 7). In the end, the modern business corporation emerged as a mix of public virtues and private vices. Its relationship with economic welfare was, at least in part, a legacy of its original quasi-public status, the obligation to pursue a public function in exchange for a number of privileges or franchises. Yet, it would be difficult to imagine the ruthless rate of economic development of mid-nineteenth century America had corporations not been set loose to match perfectly and exploit the laissez-faire market opportunities.





## Lower Right Quadrant

The phenomena in this quadrant are to be distinguished from those of the upper right by an equal but different relation to the state. While in the upper right quadrant corporations tend to be an administrative substitute for the state, in this quadrant they move one step further, by merging into the state through a system of regulations which create a mixed regime. This is the quadrant of corporatism.

# CORPORATION




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# CORPORATION

The *ism* in corporatism implies a belief in the goodness of corporations as social institutions and in the obligation or good sense of the state to sponsor their formation and to recognize their value to the state as well as to the economy and society (Elbow 1953). The terms *corporatism*, *corporativism*, and *corporate state* are essentially synonyms defined by Schmitter in a memorable and widely quoted formulation, as a system of “[i]nterest intermediation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories ... Licensed (if not created) by the state, and granted a deliberate representational monopoly ... in exchange for certain controls on their ... leaders and [on the] articulation of demands” (Schmitter 1997 quoted in Lustig 1982, 13; Schmitter 1979).






Corporatism came into its own with the policies of the authoritarian fascist countries in the 1930s, namely Italy, Portugal, and Austria, with lesser but significant elements in France, Ireland, and the Low Countries (Landauer 1983). It also bears a strong resemblance to the “market socialism” in Britain and other social democratic or presocialist countries. Lindblom, the inventor of the term “market socialism,” defines it as a policy to: “merely remove top management from all existing corporations and put government officials in their places. Or put the same managers back in their jobs, but make them government officials” (Lindblom 1977, 95–96).


The United States experimented with this in Franklin Roosevelt’s emergency “Hundred Days” legislation, especially in one of his first major New Deal programs, the National Industrial Recovery Act, in which the U.S. government sponsored the formation of trade associations in each major sector of the economy, composed of the major corporations in that sector. Each was empowered to establish standards for prices, wages, and working conditions; and, once the standards were agreed upon, they were adopted as “codes of fair competition” to be enforced as though they had been adopted by Congress and promulgated by the president. Such cooperative mixing of public and private was limited in the United States and in fact declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court (Hoover 1952, 408 and chapter 37–39). In the aforementioned countries, policies of that sort were common practice. In fact, “national economic councils” officially incorporating sponsored corporations and trade associations as participating members of economic policy were not only common practices but were established techniques of converting authoritarian regimes into totalitarian systems (Friedrich 1968 [1950]; Katzenstein 1985, 30–37).


## Conclusion

Of all concepts in political science, corporation is perhaps the one with the most controversial pedigree. Partly because its lifetime spans over a millennium of juridical and social struggles, partly because it covers such a wide territory with its perpetual swing of the pendulum between state and market, the concept of corporation has come to stand for quite different and often opposing meanings. Yet, this is a case where historical reconstruction clarifies and brings together threads that have long ago departed. That the private power of multinational corporations is grounded in their former public status serves as a reminder that capitalist economics remains a political economy.




# Decision





# Election



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The term election originates from the Latin verb *eligere*, which translates as “to pick out.” Etymologically, this verb is very close to *seligere*—to select, to choose. The term elite also derives from *eligere*; thus a democracy is an “elective polyarchy” in a descriptive sense and a “selective polyarchy” in a normative sense.

On the vertical axis, we find the continuum which goes from the individual voter to voters as an aggregate, defined as citizens and people. On the horizontal axis, there are party and leadership, the collective and the individual actors who play relevant roles in structuring the competition and the voters’ choice in a democratic political system.





The matrix aims at creating a typology of the four dominant categories of voting in democratic systems. It derives from a comparative diachronic analysis of electoral behaviors. Three of these types have been mainstream reference in the literature: the ideological vote, the issue vote, and the exchange vote (Parisi and Pasquino 1977). The fourth category—the populist/charismatic vote—can be seen as the emerging feature of electoral behavior in many Western—and non-Western—countries.


The ULQ describes mass parties or integration parties, which yield a sense of identification and loyalty toward the party through ideological socialization. In the LLQ, the concept of policy refers to all the public policies that a given party wants to implement, after winning the election. The type of vote which arises from this quadrant is “opinion voting” or “issue voting” based on a rational evaluation of policy alternatives in the parties’ manifestos. The LRQ refers to “exchange vote” (give-and-take vote). Party leaders, as well as individual candidates, stipulate informal agreements to provide benefits in exchange for votes, often through clientelist networks.





Last, the URQ refers to the populist or charismatic vote. The personalization of politics, favored by widespread use of television and new media, has been mainly a consequence of the “end of ideologies” and the crisis of the mass party, often leading to the rise of “personal parties” (Calise 2000). This new type of voting is, then, based on a new kind of identification, no longer with the party but with the leaders.

Luigi Di Gregorio


# Election







# Federalism




The concept of federalism as a type of regime was literally invented in the eighteenth century, and it is a worthy addition to Aristotle's taxonomy of "cracies." Federalism is a constitutional principle providing for two layers of government: a central government, and a lower level of government—provinces, regions, republics, or states—with some kind of chamber to represent the lower units in the central government, and usually some provision for guaranteeing the integrity of the lower levels of government.

The vertical axis is concerned with the distinctions between federal systems based on strong unitary political actors—states—and those whose lower units—nations—are more loosely assembled populations. Nation has to do with birth, being born, and becoming a human community of creed or race or any other cultural grouping that has or is evolving a sense of common past and common destiny. Just as nation is born, so state is made—by conquest—with military force where necessary, followed as quickly as possible by legitimizing control over the territory and population.

The horizontal axis specifies the level of formality in the relationship among components of a federal union,

ranging from a highly institutionalized set of constitutional requirements to the minimal recognition of a higher power, or authority, to keep the units together.

Historically, the LLQ represents the earliest as well as the most recent experience of federal unions, ranging from the Hanseatic League and the Zollverein to the European Economic Community, based on the contractual regulation of custom and market relations. The ULQ refers to the political alliances among regional communities during the process of state-building, from medieval parliamentary assemblies to the confederal agreement in the first American constitution. The pioneer example of the URQ as a genuine federal system is the Swiss constitution in which the local units yielded a more substantial part of their powers to the central government. This model became established and popularized with the founding of the United States of America as the prototypical federal system. The LRQ is a unitary yet unstable assembling of different nations, brought together by a charismatic figure through a process of centralization to compensate for a weaker political structure, as with Tito's Yugoslavia.



*The concept of government can be used in two ways. In a broader sense, it may refer to the overall system of government and the relationships among the various institutional actors. Or, it may focus on the working of the executive branch. This matrix is an attempt to incorporate—and bridge—both approaches.*

*The vertical axis highlights the competition for governmental control. One key feature of presidential systems is the autonomy presidents enjoy with respect to both majority and opposition parties. On the other pole, party government relates to the leading role of political parties in forming cabinets and setting the governmental agenda. The horizontal axis refers to the basis of governmental legitimacy, whether through the legislature or directly from the people.*

*The LRQ is the quadrant of party government par excellence, the Westminster model, where a party controls the executive thanks to its majority in the legislature, with a “fusion of powers” between the two branches, and effectively directs the policy-making process through a cohesive cabinet.*







*A different regime of party government is depicted in the LLQ, where a PR electoral system protects minorities’*









*representation and maximizes the search for consensus in the forming of coalition cabinets (Lijphart 1984).*

*The URQ describes the classical U.S. system of separation of power, in which the governmental agenda often results from the aggregation of different political interests, through a process of legislative logrolling. Despite their direct electoral mandate, presidents depend on congressional support to carry on their program, the more so when their party has no majority in either chamber and the resulting balance of power is one of “divided government” (Shugart and Carey 1992).*








*In the last quadrant (ULQ) presidential government becomes fully presidentialized (Tulis 1987, Poguntke and Webb 2005). By reviving the popular mandate through permanent campaigning, presidents take full advantage of their direct relationship with the electorate asserting their leadership on the decision-making process. In the age of mass communication, this may lead to an emphasis on issues with a wide and dramatizing impact, whether in the international or national arena, often setting presidents’ action loose from constitutional constraints (Lowi 1985).*




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


# Ideology





# INTEREST



## Introduction

In modern parlance, *interest* is an expression of a personal preference. As a *concept*, interest belongs to a family of preferences which can be placed on a continuum of degree of inclination or commitment, ranging from *opinion*, the weakest of commitments, over to an opposite extreme that may be delineated as *passion*.

The concept of interest has quite a history but entered political discourse relatively recently. In the Middle Ages, well before Machiavelli and Hobbes, the term was “pressed into service as a euphemism...to make respectable...the taking of interest on loans...contrary to divine law and known as the sin of usury” (Hirschman 1986, 35). Stigmatized by the Catholic Church, interest was an important factor in the vilification of Jews (e.g., Shylock), whose religion did not consider lending a sin of any sort. Interest was even slower to come into its own because, on the more positive side, it was linked to the regime collectively with such usages as “reason of the state,” “interest of England,” and eventually “the public interest” and “national interests,” which were guidelines of obliga-

tions applied only to “princes and statesmen.” But “gradually...the term acquired respectability” (Gunn 1969, 35–36).

It was only in the eighteenth century that the secularizing influences of the Renaissance and eventually the rise of the “common man” produced individualism with its pursuit of self-interest. The first to sing the praises of the capacity of all individuals to engage in rational choices for themselves was surely Bernard Mandeville (1670–33), beginning with a poem published in 1705 followed by his infamous book *The Fable of the Bees* (Mandeville 1988 [1714]). The odious moral to the story was, in effect, to copy the bees, whose activities turn “private vices [to] public benefits” (this was actually the subtitle of his massive two-volume book). The moral may best be captured in his 1705 poem: Fraud, Luxury and Pride must live / Whilst we the Benefits receive (Mandeville 1996 [1705], 21–22; Hurtado Prieto 2004).

Mandeville was only one of several authors (the first perhaps being Guicciardini) anticipating Adam

Smith, but Smith deserves to be credited with having brought together the various streams of individualism into a new paradigm combining *micro-* and *macro-* into a self-regulating political economy. This change was soon to be elevated to “classical” status and complemented on the political side. One of the very few world-class contributions to the interest paradigm by an American is James Madison’s theory of competition among interests (“factions”) as the dynamic solution to an enlightened constitution (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1999 [1787]). Both a synonym for the rise of economics as the backbone of modern society and a very influential factor in shaping the pluralistic polity, interest became the term in all political vocabulary which bound most strongly together democracy and market.

## The Axes

In the vertical axis, the main emphasis is on the range from singular, autonomous interest toward how an interest can change through associations with other individuals and, as David Truman puts it, “through overlapping membership” (Truman 1951, 336–43).

The rise of individual interest is by far the most notable and contrasted change, as it stood against both moral and political premodern views—if not practices. Interest first began to be considered as a proper rule of conduct in opposition to the principles guiding the aristocratic ethos (Hirschman 1977). Passions for honor and glory made for highly irrational as well as unpredictable behavior. Individual interest, to the contrary, introduced a world of careful calculation and peaceful interactions, where the maximization of one’s own welfare became the engine for a new social order. Different ideologies—or paradigms—served this cause in various epochs. Property as the indivisible unit of self-interest was the Lockean cornerstone for the rise of the *homo oeconomicus*, but it was only with merchantistic and physiocratic doctrines that interest would be acknowledged as the visible hand of a new regime, a creed which would be strengthened and popularized by Adam Smith’s manifesto pledging the universalistic virtue of a market society. Nineteenth-century liberalism definitively established individual interest as the basic requisite of both freedom and welfare.

The liberal idea of human beings as rational maximizers of their own interest also paved the way to a

modern conception of group interest, one which reflected a more general move from status to contract. One of the major obstacles to the advent of individual self-interest was the fact that interests enjoyed an established and entrenched corporate life. All through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the new idea of self-interest coexisted with the old practice of hereditary group aggregates. For Saint-Lambert in the *Encyclopédie*, as for Sieyès in his famous speech on the Third Estate, individual interests went hand in hand with the corporate interest of the community, or nation (Ornaghi 1984, 42–44). It was only with the democratization of political life that groups started to proliferate as freely formed associations representing the diversified interests of an industrialized country. Full legitimization arrived when “factions,” an unpopular name in 1787, was eventually sanitized as “pressure group” and then “interest group.”

The horizontal axis brings to the matrix the means and processes by which interests are aggregated, in the polity as well as in other, less formalized social and economic activities. *Public* refers to the fact that interest is only an inclination or a sentiment until it is to some extent formulated/translated into a demand on other individuals—or in the words attributed to Harold Lasswell, private demands imposed “on public objects rationalized in terms of the public interest” (Lasswell 1950 [1930], 261–62). The nature of the public interest has varied largely across time and disciplines. It can be more or less state centered, conveying a more or less explicit normative bias. In all cases, however, the emphasis is on the fact that the public interest is a collective good, one which cannot be distributed to a limited number of individuals. A collective conception of the public interest implies that “an act or policy is in the public interest ... because it promotes an interest of the public, i.e., an interest of anyone who is a member of the public” (Benditt 1973, 306).


*Market* needs little explanation, as it is rightly considered as the natural environment for all theories predicating the free circulation and interaction of individual interests as a requisite for the common welfare. Yet a market-centered view of interests regulation does not necessarily imply that markets can substitute for all forms of institutional intervention. Although classic *laissez-faire* liberalism would leave most public choices to the aggregation of interests through market mechanisms, Adam Smith himself supported a long

# INTEREST

list of government functions which could not be adopted and maintained through the market alone (Heilbroner 1996, 104–05).

## Lower Right Quadrant

There is little wonder why the fathers of the liberal tradition, Hobbes and Locke, grounded their theories here. Contract is the purest means available to individuals to come to terms with each other by use of their capacity (their natural right) to choose, guided by their own interests (Parks 1982). Contract is a product of individual choice, between two individuals seeking net gain. But it has social consequences. The contract form of aggregation among individuals becomes a rational format for civil society. Contract is the ultimate peaceful resolution of competition between two individuals or two ‘sides’ based upon the willingness of each side to reduce its claim until both sides can agree on the rational basis of net gain. This also is the link turning the classic market model into the paradigm of rational choice.




Few shifts have been more influential than the one from market to choice as the framework for self-interested behavior. The shift was anticipated by Kenneth Arrow (1951, 5) when he stated that “in the ... discussion of the consistencies of various value judgments as the mode of social choice, the distinction between voting and the market mechanism will be disregarded, both being cases of the more general category of social choice,” but the shift only became evident when rational choice was able to fully incorporate the logic of economic action, and make it the new dominant paradigm for all political science (Lowi 1992). Rational choice offered a direct link between individual interest and the public welfare, one that classical economics had only been able to infer as a result of self-centered action. One of the major accomplishments of rational choice research was the fact that public institutions could at last be studied as a product of

the same logic applying to the individual actor, thus helping to bridge the gap with a century-old distrust in the behavioral studies toward the state as “soul stuff.”

However, the enthusiasm in the reception of the rational choice paradigm was not complemented with adequate empirical results. While in a few outstanding cases complex institutional behavior could be successfully explained by coherent rational choice assumptions (Tsebelis 1990), the prevalent conclusion was that “the further from the stark institutional environment of a competitive market or a similarly constraining institution, the more apparent are the limits of a narrowly focused model of rational choice” (Ostrom 1991, 241). This conclusion partly grows out of the consideration that complete information about one’s interest is a much rarer condition than the rational choice paradigm would imply. It is also, to an even larger extent, derived from the awareness that self-interest cannot not be considered as the one and only motivation of human conduct.

## Lower Left Quadrant

This leads to to the vast moral and social territory spanning beyond self-interest (Mansbridge 1990). At the time when Mandeville and Smith were attempting to nail individual action down to economic greed, most moral and political treatises would still describe individual behavior as driven by a multitude of attitudes and sentiments. A survey of seventeenth and eighteenth century literature adds to a list of no less than twenty-four most frequently discussed antonyms—i.e., opposite causes—of individual interest (Holmes 1995, 57–58).



Needless to say, none of such antonyms could be used as a systemic key, which helps to account for the success of self-interest as the rationale of individual behavior as well of a new social order. This is the very challenge to be met by the revival of altruism as an outright alternative principle to the market paradigm.


After having long been neglected as a normative concept unfit for scientific argument and empirical investigation, altruism has been redefined as a utility-based phenomenon (Margolis 1984). With a paradigm shift originating from sociobiology and moving, through economics and social psychology, into political science, the altruistic impulse has come to be acknowledged as a relevant part of human nature. Leading to the conclusion that “altruism—or at least the willingness to consider others in our overall calculations of our own interests—is natural to the human species. Whether this ‘naturalness’ is encoded in the genes, inculcated through socialization, or based in social norms, ... the typical person finds a need to participate in cooperative social endeavors that benefit others or the community at large” (Piliavin and Charng 1990, 58). This also is, in its simplest form, what makes an interest legitimate in the eyes of a wider public.

The rediscovery of altruism brings back into the foreground older conceptions of civic behavior, where the public interest could be attained thanks to some form of self-abnegation. From the “Machiavellian moment” (Pocock 1975) blending together Renaissance republicanism and Puritan equalitarianism, to Weber’s emphasis on value rationality as a noninstrumental type of choice, political theory has been constantly in search of ways to reconcile individual action with the needs of collectivity. Neoinstitutional approaches stress the fact that the individual pursuit of some form of common good is more likely to be successful to the extent that it is firmly grounded in regulatory mechanisms (March and Olsen 1989). Be it a free choice or a free rider, the cause of the public interest is best served by some kind of rule-governed behavior, as in Pendleton Herring’s seminal definition: “The public interest is the standard that guides the administrator in executing the law. This is the verbal symbol designated to introduce unity, order, and objectivity into administration. This concept is to the bureaucracy what the ‘due process’ clause is to the judiciary. Its abstract meaning is vague, but its application has far-reaching effects” (Herring 1936, 23).

## Upper Left Quadrant

This leads into the upper section of our matrix, where group politics becomes a substitute for individual

action. That interests could be best served through some form of aggregation has become such common sense in mainstream political science, that in many a dictionary the concept of interest itself is only listed under the collective heading of *interest group*. And few handbooks would nowadays dispute that “those myriad organizations—ranging from business and professional associations to labor unions to environmental and consumer groups to groups concerned about issues as diverse as abortion and nuclear power—that link the individual to public institutions and seek to influence public policy, are a feature of every functioning democracy” (Schlozman 2001, 7700). Given the tremendous variety of group interests organized across—and behind—the various steps of the governmental process, one should not be surprised that even the more selective analyses tend to reflect the atomization of their research field (Berger 1981; Petracca 1992).



However, it was not until the end of the nineteenth century that interest group politics became a legitimate and stable feature of the governmental system (Clemens 1997; Puhle 2001). Part of the delay and contrast is due to the ambivalence and ambiguity of the group, a term encompassing a wide and often incompatible range of phenomena. To the traditional, preliberal polity, *group* stood for a nonvoluntary, often hereditary form of association among people with some type of common interest on the basis of kinship, religion, craft, trade. Corporate interests of this sort were a basic component of the *ancien régime*, and, for this very reason, became the target of open controversy from all supporters of the liberal creed, as they were in overt contrast with the basic liberal assumption that no permanent organization should stand in between—and interfere with—the individual citizen and the state (Pizzorno 1981). The rise of the modern interest groups could, however, only be possible once the ties with the past had been severed and groups had become a product of individuals

# INTEREST


forming—and quitting associations on a free and independent basis. Or, better, with the very purpose of overcoming, according to Tocqueville, the weakness of their independence: “They all ... become powerless if they do not learn voluntarily to help one another” (Tocqueville 1966 [1835]).

The key to the modern group is the spirit of coalition. Coalition is as competitive a process as contract, but the rationality of choices among interests in coalition formation is much more likely to focus beyond the individual calculus, toward a broader sense of community or “the public interest.” This is why coalitional institutions tend to rely more on representation—i.e., the delegation of individual interests or stakes to a few agents who presumably can serve members better than the members can serve themselves. Another reason for moving above the model of pure individualist competition is that coalitional strategies share a sense that pure competition (the market) does not provide its own solution. In other words, the requirements of coalition formation move self-interest to another level. Tocqueville and many others before and after him embraced interest but had to add “rightly understood.” Although that can be interpreted in many ways, the most important, as readily seen in coalitions, is the rationality of “the rules of the game” (Truman 1951, 168), or, as a prominent sociologist put it in his study of childhood socialization, “play, the game, and the generalized other” (Mead 1934). This is also, perhaps, the only feature of group politics on which most empirical as well as theoretical studies converge. The one common and most outstanding character of interest groups politics remains their constituent role for a pluralistic polity.

## Upper Right Quadrant









This role can come at a high price when social and economic groups confront each other on the open market with a clash of competing interests. This quadrant is the exceptional phase of interests—from aggregation of interests to globalization of interests—a turn toward what Hirschman would call passion. But that may be too big of a jump. It is more accurate to say that, here, relations in the civil society tend to move from opinion step by step to stronger and stronger commitments, through interests, to beliefs and perhaps then to passion; we prefer to call it ideology.

Obviously, whenever conflict is the means and method of aggregation of interests, the end product tends toward violence. This does not necessarily imply civil war; it does, however, mean injury to the established methods of peaceful aggregation and dispute resolution. Conflict tends to displace accepted and prescribed means of dispute resolution because the stakes are too high and because the prescribed methods have been tried and failed. To put this another way, the established methods of dispute resolution fail because the stakes are principles, moralities, and other zero-sum games that cannot be measured as well as economic issues; therefore negotiation is not possible through the normal processes of negotiation—processes which move from increment to increment. Radicalism is then inevitable.



The culminating adjustment to conflicts tending toward radicalism is the social movement itself. Since the 1960s there has been a growing interest in the study of social movements and that interest was revived during the 1980s, with globalization and economic contention spreading throughout the West and even more intensely the Middle East as well as eastern Europe (McAdam 1982, Tarrow 1994, Tilly and Tarrow 2006). Social movements do indeed arise, usually quite spontaneously, over discovery of a common irritant. Their emergence can be spectacular and more often than not their emergence produces results. However, these same social movements have a quite short life expectancy. Their rise is often their success—because governments (local as well as national) are quick to respond to threats of instability, and they are usually quick to placate by concessions and co-optation, which are always far cheaper than police control and suppression. Social movements begin in contention; their very existence is radical, and a very considerable number of political reforms in every democratic country (as well as some undemocratic ones) are attributable to social movements that at least put the reform on the agendas of the government's

# INTEREST



# INTEREST

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
policymaking bodies. But social movements tend to disappear rather quickly even when government's efforts to suppress them are absent. Social movements either disintegrate and disappear, or they morph into interest groups. To put this another, more interesting way, many of our largest, most successful, and most active interest groups *are the cold remains of movements*. Labor movements in the industrial countries became trade unions—hierarchical organizations with personnel, representation, research, and legal staffs to engage in “collective bargaining” to make the contracts and later to implement them. It was from his study of trade unions and their political parties that Robert Michels developed his thesis of “the iron law of oligarchy” (Michels 1915 [1911]). And this is the phenomenon that inspired George Bernard Shaw's angry epigram: “Trade Unionism is not Socialism: It is the Capitalism of the Proletariat” (Shaw 1984 [1928], 186). As with Michels, Shaw's observation was a generalization intended to apply to all the industrialized and industrializing countries. Syndicalism is the end of social movements by incorporation and representation (Kramnick and Sheerman 1993).

In fact, the rise of collective bargaining as a pillar of modern industrial relations seems to revive the strife between individual interest and the group. In

spite of repeated attacks, it looks as if corporate groups did not disappear. After a period of strong antagonism and ideological crisis, they have come back with a vengeance and redefined, in many countries, the system of interest intermediation as neocorporatist (Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979).

## Conclusion

Ending this essay on corporatism is a proper alert to the tendency of interests to differentiate or pluralize a society and then to attempt to avoid conflict and the instabilities produced by conflict through a menu ranging from state suppression to state co-optation and pacification by various forms of inclusion, representation, and patronage. For interests to be satisfied and to be a supporting dynamic for democracy, interests must be given the full play for aggregation and organization. That takes tremendous energy—which is why pluralism and polyarchy are generally admired. But there remains a simple but grave threat to democracy: a running down of organized politics into organized conservatism, ending in a modern version of “functional federalism,” running the narrative backward and turning Sir Henry Maine on his head, from contract to status.



## Introduction

Justice can be defined as an ideal or a legitimized distribution of valued goods, symbolic or material. The Lipset (1995) encyclopedia's principal definition is not of justice but of "social or distributive justice," referring to it as the appropriate distribution of benefits and burdens. Bobbio's definition (1990) prefers to treat justice as "just or unjust conduct," which is to be understood as acceptance or defiance of norms which distribute benefits or burdens to individuals. Justice, then, refers to the application and observance of these norms in particular cases, and the ultimate concept is distributive justice, which refers to the distribution of prestige or material goods "among members of the community."

This leads to Michael Walzer's opening proposition in his *Spheres of Justice* (1983, 3) that "distributive justice ... draws the entire world of goods within the reach of philosophical reflection." Walzer's magisterial effort is to bring theorizing on justice within the reach of political science discourse.

"Human society," Walzer adds, "is a distributive community," but one which employs a "multiplicity of distributive procedures, agents and criteria." It is Walzer's pluralism of the "spheres of justice" and the pluralist complexity of equality that produces the proper linkage between impractical abstractions and actual sociopolitical experiences. This linkage is, however, itself subject to overt criticism and limitations once it is called upon empirically testing the diversity of justice practices (Miller and Walzer 1995).

A good beginning is then to recognize that "distributive justice" is a pleonasm—a redundancy, a use of unnecessary words. Justice is distributive (Shklar 1990). Justice refers to normatively defined allocations of rights and duties, appropriate divisions of social advantages, and the balancing of competing claims in the entire world of goods. What then remains to be seen are the principles and rules governing the distribution of justice.

# JUSTICE

## The Axes


The axes try to capture both the proximity and the variations of four models of justice which basically reflect four distinct—albeit not necessarily contradictory—political systems and regimes for the distribution of justice. The vertical axis runs from rules to equality, and vice versa. This is a permanent tension for most moral philosophy as well as in the practice of justice (Sandel 1982; Barry 1973 and 1989; Dworkin 1977). The emphasis on equality is a belief in—or search for—a moral standard sanctioned by either God or nature as both the basic content and the legitimizing criteria for the distribution of justice. Rules, on the other side, stress the need for shared procedures and terms of discourse which (should) make the use of substantive standards unnecessary. John Rawls's major achievement is his attempt to strike a middle ground—or compromise—between the social basis of justice, with its moral equalitarian implications, and the rules, both procedural and rational, necessary to make justice a working political principle. He begins with a conception of justice that “generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau and Kant ... principles that free and rational persons ... would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association ... principles which are to assign basic rights and duties and to determine the division of social benefits” (1971, 11). This is Rawls's “justice as fairness” that has become almost as famous an opener as Rousseau's “man is born free and everywhere he is in chains” (Kukathas and Pettit 1990).

On the horizontal axis, we find law and rights, two concepts which bind justice with the types of substantive criteria by which distribution of valued things is validated or legitimized. Law is the most formalized criterion, the positive, instrumental decision rule, while rights are derived from more informal, moral, natural (as in natural law) configurations.

## Lower Right Quadrant

The lower right quadrant is taken first because it most closely approximates the classic Anglo-Saxon/U.S. tradition, with its stress on procedure,


while tied to elements of majoritarianism. This is essentially the “mixed regime” of numbers competing with proceduralism or “rule of law.” Justice in the liberal tradition is virtually defined by the constitutionally provided means of meting out justice. In many respects, justice in this quadrant can be considered the by-product of good procedure. In the courts, it is called “the administration of justice.” (Picture the blindfolded goddess of Justice holding up the scale in balance.) Does the adversary proceeding in court produce justice? Yes. But only by definition. No one believes that two sides telling lies produce the truth. But in the Anglo-Saxon judicial tradition, truth and justice are not identical. Justice is a by-product of procedure or process. Procedure or process—prescribed in advance and not subject to the convenience or whim of the implementers—is the *sine qua non* of justice. The best epigraph to this conception is possibly the words in a letter by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: “I have said to my brethren many times that I hate justice, which means that I know if a man begins to talk about that, for one reason or another he is shirking thinking in legal terms” (Luban 2001, 8043).



Though no one can specify what justice is, the Anglo-Saxon model can claim that it identifies or points to, or designates what justice is not. In this respect, liberalism may well have the advantage over all other forms of the pursuit of justice, because substantive justice is trumped by a procedural solution. This could also be called a political solution, inasmuch as procedure is an effective form of co-optation—in Rawls's parlance (1993), the agreement of rational people on shared principles. It is virtually a universal “rule of the game” that when you agree to participate in a game and accept the rules of conduct, you are also committed to the substantive outcome: if the decision rule was just, then by agreement, the outcome is also just.

## Upper Right Quadrant

This is exactly the point—and conclusion—which is questioned and criticized in the idea of justice we find in the upper right quadrant—an entirely different realm, or sphere. This is the democracy model—a pronouncedly more European conceptualization of justice, one that is far more emotionally satisfactory and also much more likely to produce revolutionary instability.



The democratic conceptualization of justice puts a far more prominent emphasis on equality—the equality of all members of the “distributive community.” Equality is never absent from the liberal discourse on justice, but is more a matter of shame than of right. Equality, instead, becomes the cornerstone of the democracy model, with one basic measure for the administration of justice: the welfare of the community. The democratic ideal equates justice with social justice as the moral right of each individual to his share of the common good (Ackerman 1980; Brandt 1962).


This is also why the democratic model is, by its own nature, a pluralistic one, with pluralism referring not only to the differences among the various spheres in which justice is administered but—even more—to the variety of religious or ethnic groups with their context-based (and biased) cultural perspectives (Elster 1992). In this quadrant, compared to the liberal one, rights are different—or are understood differently. Here, the rights are much less procedural, and are far more substantive in nature. The substantive equality prominent in democratic regimes permits substantive rules recognizing social types and the recognition of past injuries that call for “retributive justice” to those who were descendants of injustice rather than direct victims of it (Laslett and Fishkin 1992; Loewenstein and Elster 1992). There is an element of this in the liberal model, recognized in law as a legislated rather than a constitutional right.

Referred to in recent years in the United States as “entitlements,” the legislated right is a type of right of a much lower and less compelling nature than the genuine, constitutional, or absolute right that is more prominent in the democracy model. Rights are trumps. Rights trump laws. This is why most rights in the liberal model of justice are procedural rights (due process) and political rights—constitutional rights giving priority to the decision rule rather than to the substantive outcome.

In contrast, the democratic emphasis—particularly in the European view—is much more likely to stress substantive and positive “rights to,” in which rights become social rights and justice becomes social justice, with greater emphasis (though not exclusively) on equality of condition (rather than of opportunity) as the *sine qua non* of justice (Marshall 1965 [1949], chapter 4).

## Lower Left Quadrant



On the whole, however, the liberal and the democratic models of justice share more than they differ when it comes to one guiding principle, the principle of impartiality (Barry 1995).



This is the common belief which makes it possible for the holders of individual rights in the liberal tradition to construct a mutually binding set of rules, as well as the moral cement of equality, whenever it is used as a sword against the privileges and abuses of power. Impartiality is also the criterion which cuts a dividing line between the liberal and the democratic models on one side and the utilitarian model of justice, based as it is on the principle of mutual advantage: “From the point of view of everyday morality, mutual advantage is an alternative to justice, not an alternative account of justice” (Kymlicka 1990, 103). In fact, “historically speaking, the tradition conceiving of justice as impartiality has a broadly Kantian source and that of conceiving of justice as mutual advantage has a Hobbesian

# JUSTICE

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source.... [T]hese two traditions are in conflict, a conflict of such a sort that they cannot be reconciled” (Nielsen 1992, 86).

The utilitarian or *laissez-faire* model of justice is the most individualistic of the models, inasmuch as participation with the expectation of justice is limited to a contractual agreement among self-interested individuals (Walster, Walster, and Berscheid 1978). Self-interest can be assumed in a more radical vein, with the state restraining from interfering with the market regulation of individual opportunities—and resources (Nozick 1974). Or a moral criterion can be introduced to make the pursuit of one’s own advantage possible through a system of “constrained maximization,” turning utilitarianism into a contractual agreement (Gauthiers 1986 and 1990).


In the end, however, the only rules that can be invoked—and enforced—are those falling within the category of contract. Anyone can play, and all players share equally in this particular “sphere of justice,” or “distributive community.”

Yet, all participants are presumed equal by—and only by—the very definition of contract, which provides that any exchange defined clearly by choice—by choice made non-coercively between any two parties—is binding and can be enforced through the state laws. Contract carries the explicit limitation that mere moral obligations, or “gratuitous engagements” or “previous intentions” cannot be made part of a contract and cannot affect the obligations of contracts made; and no state (in the United States) can *ex post facto* pass any “Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” The contract, properly entered into, is, in the market model, justice itself.

## Upper Left Quadrant

To be loyal to history, the upper left quadrant should have been treated first, not last. This is the aristocracy model, or, to the sociologists, the status model that preceded the contract model. This is the traditional world governed by the personal discretion of those deemed worthy of rule. Not the elite but the elect, anointed by the gift of grace from a higher than human authority, endowed with wisdom and superior morality which renders their allocation of valued goods, and their “distributive community,” inherently just—or, just by trust.

The wisdom of Solomon made each of his decisions just for each dispute put before him; and cumulatively, this made his community an ideal of distributive justice. This trust in the authority of the ruler resided in each individual decision made by the ruler. Trust, like its contemporary descendent, credibility, exists in each human being.



There is no group mind or group heart. However, there is collective memory, and it is called tradition, particularly as understood by the great master of the traditional, Edmund Burke, to whom tradition is to be studied and revered because it is the embodiment of all the virtues. And this is what makes the other three quadrants appear to be so radical a break with the past (MacIntyre 1988). As Kai Nielsen (1992, 81) puts it, “Aristotle’s conception of a proper social order, a best regime, is that of a hierarchical world in which magnificent and magnanimous aristocrats rule and in which slaves do everything else.”

## Conclusion


This “aristocratic, hierarchical social order which Aristotle and the Medievals rationalized, would, as Marx saw it, gradually be replaced by [a] more egalitarian order” (Nielsen 1992, 82). However, some Marxists, many post- (and neo-) Marxists and hosts of non-Marxist thinkers on the right as well as the left, have continually attempted to modernize and keep the upper left quadrant. In Aristotle and some of his successors, there was a traditional understanding of justice that comes very close to what so many modern thinkers have called social justice, as identified earlier. Since the concept of social justice has been too closely attached to the European—and American—left (Moore 1978), and therefore stigmatized in many other circles, the same goal has been pursued by others without using that terminology.

# JUSTICE

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These are efforts to conceive of justice at the institutional level, or as “distributive communities,” or as benign forms of communal association in which altruistic motives prevail. There has been, for example, a tremendous effort in the past twenty years to disprove the theory of Mancur Olson (1965) in his *Logic of Collective Action* that large groups cannot form and prosper without material, contractual ben-

efits—“side payments”— to discourage backsliders and free-riders. Cases by the dozens have demonstrated altruistic, ideologically based social movements whose solidarity is in fact a communal, altruistic form of voluntary social justice not imposed by the state. These hopes transcend established ideological territories and muddy the whole distinction between Left and Right.



### Introduction

The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines law as “something fixed,” or “something placed,” or “in place.” Law is thus concerned with regularity, predictability. In the hard sciences all laws have at least one common feature: statements about patterns that are invariant, or that vary in predictable ways.

They can be statements about causal relations or statistical correlations; they can be statements about sequences or about “universal features of types of things.” They can be deemed necessary or purely accidental sequences. But if they are lawlike, they must be regular and predictable (Bynum et al. 1984, 229–30). The concept of law is unusual in that it first developed in the softest of sciences—government—before it was part of what became the hard sciences: “Not till the seventeenth century did the modern concept of law become disassociated from its theological and prescriptive connotations” (Bynum et al. 1984, 229).

Hayek picks up on the same theme: “It is no accident that we still use the same word ‘law’ for the invariable rules which govern nature and for the rules which govern men’s conduct.

They were both conceived at first as something existing independently of human will ... The creation of some supernatural being, ... regarded as eternal truths that man could try to discover but which he could not alter” (Hayek 1973, 73).

The separation of law from theology coincides not only with the dawn of modern natural science but with the dawn of a positivist view of law in society as a product of human will, whether a command by a sovereign or an order by a court or a bureaucracy (both of which are mere extensions of the sovereign), or a rule in a statute adopted by a legislature in a republic (Friedrich 1958, 57–66). This is where the matrix begins, by unpacking the various components of law.

## The Axes


Both of the main axes are composed of concepts concerned with the sources of law. On the vertical axis, state incorporates the most positivistic laws, laws produced for defined disputes or privileges, creations by act of will, whether by the single sovereign or by his representatives or by institutions and processes that produce laws. At the other end, charisma captures the supernatural, mystical sources of law. Charisma, much misused in scholarly and popular political discourse, actually means “partaking of the divine,” or, as Weber conceived of it, “gift of grace,” the stuff of religion and prophets and prophetic leaders. State and charisma here are treated as antinomies but also as correlatives. Weber caught this in his famous characterization of the bureaucratic phenomenon as an aspect of the “routinization of charisma” (Gerth and Mills 1946, 246–47). This process is true also of the state and all modern regimes; although the laws they make are genuinely positive laws, rulers resort to the charismatic, the mysterious, divine ancestry, myths, and prophets for justification and legitimization. While the vertical axis deals with principled sources of law, the horizontal axis is concerned with the institutional sources of law.

On the left extreme, law emanates from individuals and offices to whom or to which the power of making laws has been delegated by some higher authority. That is, the ultimate authority does not make the law—in fact the ultimate authority would be God or some revealed document or an ordained inheritor or, in the modern regimes, a broad delegation from a legislature or from a duly constituted chief executive by commission to a lower official or office to make the laws to suit specific occasions or needs. On the other extreme, rules are obligations imposed on conduct made directly by the ultimate law-making institution, whether the legislature, the executive, or the judiciary (Schauer 1991).

## Lower Left Quadrant

The two lower quadrants show two different legitimizing processes that arise out of philosophies of natural law—that is, a “higher law” that existed before society and state, from which all the more particular principles of conduct are deemed to be derived or “discovered” (George 1992).

Hayek provides an operational distinction between the two with a simple and neat dichotomy of two kinds of order—organism versus organization, or, we would prefer here, spontaneous versus deliberate, which is captured by the terms *justice* versus *rights* (Hayek 1973, 52–54). Justice stands for those principles so far beyond society and beyond the reach of the state that they must be “discovered.” Rights stand for man-made higher principles put out of reach by a due process requiring super-majorities or other extraordinarily difficult decision—rules that put adoption of laws beyond the convenience of the powerful.



The prominence of the charismatic factor makes the lower left quadrant the place of divine law, the type of law with origins and mystery, requiring the search for and discovery of laws that already exist and are beyond alteration by human will. Court is the appropriate institution here.

First, court is the direct offshoot of absolute rule, having taken its name from the place where the monarch sat and articulated general principles of order and also made judgments that settled individual disputes. The justice of this original court was based on the wisdom of the ruler’s judgments, and these judgments were law or had the force and the legitimacy of law. Second, as the domain expanded, dispute resolution passed from the monarch or was delegated by the monarch to alter egos, who maintained as much of the monarch’s symbolism and paraphernalia as possible—the royal costumes with robes and wigs and bonnets, the obscure language, the mystery—including the name itself, court. Much of this process continues to exist, not only in the common law of the Anglo-Saxon world but in the civil law of the Roman origin, which, until quite recently and despite Justinian codification, was one of “declaring what had always been the law” (Stein 1966, 21).


The charismatic origin of the court is in contrast with the positivist idea of courts as merely applying a

preexisting set of rules, while it turns out to be more consonant with a proactive role of the judiciary, and its growing autonomy in the adjudication process. The authority of the courts is becoming a function of their capacity in responding to pressures from the political system (Shapiro 1981) at large as well as from their communities in particular (Eisenstein, Flemming, and Nardulli 1988).

As a consequence, the idea of the court's impartiality in the distribution of justice is more and more often associated with courts as one among several policy-making actors, with their legitimacy mainly depending on their efficacy in conflict-resolution or, if you prefer, effective distribution of justice.

**Upper Left Quadrant**

The upper left quadrant has freed itself of much of the charismatic, divine origin, becoming increasingly demystified—a product of human will. However, this should not be allowed to mask its absolutist origins, the far older and longer experience of administrators operating under law-making authority delegated to them by their chief executive, the monarch.




Thus, we get positive law before assemblies became legislatures. Rulers (executives) could make current law that repealed a past law, and rulers also “could make law for the future without disturbing the past .... It was only then that statutory law became an avowedly different kind of law from existing customary law” (Stein 1966, 21).

The practices of this quadrant were modernized in the twentieth century and became “administrative law,” an authority and legitimacy to make law based upon “delegations of power” from the legislature. This is a fundamental shift in the role—and scope—of administrative law. Its earlier meaning was confined to the execution of administrative rules legitimized by having been developed through a duly constituted chain of command, or commission.

In the contemporary process of administration of law through delegation, the domain of law has tremendously expanded while also redefining—if not losing—its original link with the “rule of law” principle. The execution of laws is thus often turned into a bargaining process, with the “processes of authoritative decision-making turning in fact to revolve around negotiation” (Edelman and Galanter 2001, 8540). What once constituted the more strictly defined—and confined—domain of executive authority is now the moving frontier of a shadow government (Axelrod 1992) operating under the shadow of law (Mnookin and Kornhauser 1979). And it is in striking contrast with what we find—or are supposed to find—in the two remaining quadrants.

**Upper Right Quadrant**

The upper right and lower right quadrants are the most recent juristic phenomena and, roughly speaking, can be said to have emerged or evolved in parallel. But since the first constitutions were actually efforts to compile and codify the laws, thus leading the way toward a clearer sense of positive law as made in assemblies (becoming legislatures), the upper right quadrant should be treated first. The task of the legislature is captured in its first term, *legis-*, and with the legislature there is an increasingly clearer distinction in positive law, that it is something actually made, by human beings, that did not exist before, that it is an effort to determine some aspect of the future, and that it may do so by changing past law (of whatever source) or simply ignoring it.



This is, in the most explicit terms, the quadrant of positive law—the product of human will rather than community, history, nature, or divine inspiration. And majority is an institutional validator, indicative of a variety of ways that rules are legitimized by having been formulated and adopted by due process.

Consequently, since then, the concept of law, in the context of government and politics, can be defined simply as an obligation imposed on human conduct by a recognized legitimate authority, backed by a sanction designed to improve the probability that the obligation will be observed.


John Austin (1790–1859), author of one of the classics of modern law, boiled the concept down to a statement of a command, “criminal in form.” He distinguished between “a law” as a command and “the law” as a system of commands; clearly understood in all of this was that each law was embodied in a statement or proposition by a recognized authority identifying an obligation and the appropriate sanction (Austin 1954; Fuller 1968; Dworkin 1986, 33). Laws, then, are rules specifying proper conduct, stating authoritatively what people are allowed, prohibited, or entitled to do. H. L. A. Hart (1961), a century after Austin, made an important amendment to Austin’s classic formulation by adding a second category of rules to Austin’s substantive category of rules or propositions of law. We can call this a ‘second-order’ rule, which imposes no substantive obligations on conduct but nevertheless qualifies as a rule of law.

Hart calls this category a “rule of recognition,” which specifies the particular person, office, or agency that has the authority to make the law. We could call this second-order category of rules “constitutive rules” or “rules about rules”; and these rules are of vital importance because rules of recognition identify the source of the law and go a long way toward justification of the law. Although the sources and grounds of law must never be confused with the first-order substantive rules of law themselves, sources and grounds of a law determine its status and to a large extent govern its legitimacy and effectiveness (Dworkin 1986, 4–6). This is why and how sources of laws—such as a constitution—may also have an important influence on what kinds of laws there are.

## Lower Right Quadrant

Indeed, the lower right quadrant, constitutional law, is no longer a mere compilation (and possibly codification) of existing law, but is a ‘higher law’ that allocates and distributes state power among existing (or new) institutions and also sets standards for “the formal properties which a law must possess in order to be valid” (Hayek 1973, 135). These properties are concerned not only with substantive but also with

procedural aspects of law. In effect, a constitution, properly understood in this quadrant, is “higher law” in two respects. First, it is higher law because its rules cannot be changed except by an extraordinary decision process far beyond the convenience of the powerful: e.g., a two-thirds rule, a long judicial review procedure, a massive referendum process, a multiple-year multiple passage by the legislature. Second, it is higher law because it is law of laws, law about laws, law about the limits of laws (Kelsen 1992). Some constitutions embody ordinary laws, i.e., actual rules of conduct. The constitutions of the American states are filled with examples of ordinary law; they can be as long as two hundred pages. But these practices should not muddy the distinction between constitutional law and legislative or administrative law.











Constitutional law remains the closest reference and link to the foundation of the Western legal tradition, with the fundamental law, or basic norm, representing the positive—albeit faint—resemblance of the original belief that natural rights arise out of a superior order merging human needs and values with God’s providential ruling (Clinton 1997).

## Conclusion

The four quadrants identify four logically distinct types of law, which can be useful for normative as well as scientific and purely utilitarian purposes. However, such distinctions may be washing out with the displacement of the concept of law by the concept of public policy, or just policy. Policy was not in the matrix at all, because it has become a synonym for law. But more. As already alluded to, policy is replacing law as the reference of preference because it seems to be more democratic, more reciprocal, more responsive to changing social forces.

Second, the vast expansion of the apparatus of government has virtually wiped out the distinction between and among the sources of law—the legisla-






tive, the executive, and the judicial. There is instead, especially in the language of political science, the use of process models of law-making—which produces a seamless web in which law is an aspect of every stage of governing, from demand, through formulation, adoption, delegation, implementation, and feedback. Law is not only substantive rule but the entire policy-making process. Many years ago a long-serving police commissioner of New York City coined the popular phrase, “There’s a lot of law at the end of the night-stick.” While such a reference to the police officer or to any other administrator is loyal to the notion of the seamless policy-making process, it does a tremendous disservice to the integrity and autonomy of law.

The transformation from law to policy is more advanced in the United States than elsewhere, if we can judge by the fact that there is not even a word for policy or public policy in the languages of other developed nation-states. But it is only a matter of time before law loses its substantive distinctiveness and its autonomy everywhere (Lowi 1969 and 1979). With the degradation of law by policy, the development of law may have come full circle. In the past, law suffered by its inability to escape history and the mythology of law-discovery. Rule of law was nothing but a mask for brute authority.


Without freedom from history, law could not be sufficiently independent of authority to apply equally to rulers and the ruled. Democratization, positivism, and constitutionalism humanized law and gave it a means of escape from the past and therefore an exit to autonomy in what came to be called “the rule of law” (Hutchinson and Monahan 1987).

But this seems to have been only a transitory phase rather than a genuine exit, because with policy as an all-encompassing political construct, the autonomy of law is once again in peril, this time not by the past but by the future. The orientation of policy toward goals, efficiency, and rational choice in pursuit of the future makes law *qua* policy a servant of government rather than the other way around, drawing law away from its own language toward the language of economics. When law is used to ordain the future, it merely conveys authority to administrators and a false sense of entitlement to citizens. Future-oriented laws empower administrators without clearly defining the limits of agency jurisdiction or the rights and obligations of the regulated (Lowi 1995, 71–79, and 1990, 17–40; Schoenbrod 1983, 740–828).

While becoming all the more the target of extensive policy-making, citizens will inevitably feel they are citizens without law.



# LEGISLATURE



## Introduction

Legislatures (or parliaments) are considered a basic ingredient of modern democracies. Both as representative bodies and as the main depositories of the legislative function, parliaments are a requisite of the governmental process. The term “parliament” derives from the French *parler* (to speak), suggesting one of parliaments’ important tasks: promoting public debate; popular representatives monitor, question, challenge, and support or reject the governing body (Wilding and Laundry 1958). Last but not least, parliaments play an important role in the selection of political rulers, a task once performed by social elites through co-optation and now carried on mainly through parties and popular elections. With such a wide array of critical functions, one need not be surprised that legislatures are not uniform, but have emerged out of a variety of historical trends, all the more controversial since most features of contemporary legislatures are grounded in the predemocratic era. While one could hardly conceive of

democracy without parliaments, the history of legislatures is, to a very large extent, a predemocratic one.

## The Axes

The horizontal axis highlights the evolution of parliaments from the loosely defined assembly of privileged groups representing class and territorial interests toward a highly institutionalized body responsible for selecting and enacting legislation. This was quite a lengthy evolution, covering ten centuries. Indeed, while the history of representative assemblies goes back further than Magna Carta, the legislature as a law-making body is a modern institution—one which breaks continuity with its medieval past:

When [law] was looked upon as the expression of the will of the people, it could no longer be considered as declaring what had always been the law ... It was only then that statutory law

became a validly different kind of law from existing customary law. (Stein 1966, 5.21)

All through the Middle Ages, rulers used public assemblies wherever the legitimacy or the treasury of the regime was weak, in order to placate serious grievances by providing a channel for addressing the sovereign while co-opting local elites for the taxation necessary to support the large armies required for nation-building. It is a process that S. E. Finer tried to capture in his “extraction-coercion cycle” (Finer 1975, 92–102). Assemblies of some sort figured in the menu of most enlightened sovereigns. Charles Tilly provides before-and-after shots of those deliberative assemblies, which

... were acting at all levels ... from the village council to the Electors of the Empire ... [but building] strong royal power meant co-opting, subordinating or destroying these institutions; that program absorbed a large part of the energy of seventeenth century kings, and its outcomes strongly affected the next phase of political history. (Tilly 1975, 22)

In most cases, curbing the power of local estates turned out to be a long way from transforming territorial assemblies into law-making institutions. With the exception of the United States, for brief periods after 1776, assemblies did not share in the *pouvoir constituant* until well into the nineteenth century, and not significantly until after 1918 (von Beyme 2000, 31–37; de Rezende Martins 2001). And, in spite of the cultural influence of Montesquieu’s tripartite scheme assigning parliament the legislative function, this was a much later achievement even in trend-setting England. In 1848, Lord Russell could note that the task of enacting general legislation had only recently come upon the King’s Cabinet as a consequence of the Reform Bill: “I must remind the ... House that the supposed duty of the members of a government to introduce a great number of measures through parliament in a session, is a duty which is new to the government of this country. Let me call the attention of the House to the fact that the Ministers of the Crown are chiefly appointed to administer the affairs of the empire” (Parris 1969, 168).

The vertical axis confronts the major dilemma in all forms of government by assemblies. The conceptual amalgam, representative government, is an oxymoron: representation requires maximum feasible

discourse and debate to enable the assembly to approximate what there is to “represent,” as in to put oneself in place of. Yet, talk must eventually be shut down in favor of the decisions, in the form of law, required for government. The relationship between the representative and the governmental function is a most controversial issue in all studies tracing modern legislatures’ historical roots (D’Agostino 1980).


Since parliaments, all through the Middle Ages, mainly collected grievances and demands from territorial estates opposing the centralizing efforts of princes or kings, one thesis goes that strong parliaments were a key factor against the rise of a strong state (Lousse 1943; Böckenförde 1961; Marongiu 1968; Dietrich 1971). On the other hand, it has been argued that, once a state had been successful in its quest for the monopoly of military territorial control, the increase in financial expenditures for order enforcement would lead toward consolidating the role of representative assemblies as a revenue-collecting body (Tilly 1990; London Fell 1991; Downing 1992). In fact, historical evidence shows different patterns of state-building, with parliaments playing a more or less cooperative role (Battagazzore 2007).

The same picture applies to the contemporary scene. Many theories of parliamentary supremacy hold that the strength of a legislature resides mainly in its autonomy as a representative body vis-à-vis the executive branch, and that the main role of a parliament consists in promoting and protecting the constitutional rights of its citizenry (Kelsen 1945). This objective can best be served by a proportional electoral system, securing adequate representation to all political and ethnic minorities (Huber and Powell 1994). Others, to the contrary, maintain that strong legislatures are such only inasmuch as they are able to control and exercise fully the governmental function. This is best exemplified by the British “Westminster model,” where the cabinet has been conceived as “the common executive committee of the two Houses” (Von Mohl 1860), and parliamentary supremacy is seen to be coincident with its governmental function (Katz 1987; Birch 1964). In this view, Montesquieu’s division of powers between the executive and the legislative branch has been replaced by a system of ‘fused powers,’ with the political party acting as the vehicle through which a majority of the representative body exercises the governmental function (Blondel 1973; Döring 1987).

# LEGISLATURE

## Lower Left Quadrant

This quadrant is the foundational experience of all parliamentary assemblies, where liberty began to be defined as a pearl beyond price, as a set of privileges to be acknowledged to a few, then defended against sovereign authority, by appeals to a standard of justice higher even than the sovereign (Brunner 1970; McIlwain 1947 [1940]). Access to the idea and then to the realization pass slowly from nobility to clergy and the “third estates,” which would ultimately include the bourgeoisie, as the common and the House of Commons with early precedents dating as far back as the Italian cities in the thirteenth century (Koenig 1986). Monarchy yielded by its willingness to participate. And assemblies became, to varying degrees, constraints on monarchy, taking away some of its absoluteness. In fact, ironic as it may seem, “the progression to [representative] government needed an absolute system.” Von Beyme attributes that to the strength of the corporatist estates to which many monarchs became captive, after which “the regime eventually collapsed and never developed parliamentary government ... Dominance by the estates ... in the eighteenth century was marked by a lack of the concentration of powers that even a parliamentary government needed” (von Beyme 2000, 5). This is supported and extended by de Rezende Martins (2001, 11059), who observed that “parliaments maintained an indirect corporative dimension [supporting the sovereign] until the institution of universal suffrage.”




Elements of the early legislatures persisted even as evolution brought new forms and functions (Hintze 1929; Blockmans 1978). Many European parliaments kept their original role as the supreme court of justice (McIlwain 1979 [1910]), and the strength of natural law, contract, citizenship, and power based on representation gave legislatures a new constitutional base as the check on absolute monarchy.

Montesquieu’s great idea of the “mixed system” was taken literally (and erroneously) by the United States and its separation of powers (Jenning 1933).

## Lower Right Quadrant

It is no exaggeration to say that this quadrant is a break with the past, making the nineteenth century the Golden Age of the legislature and of representative government. Although elements of genuine monarchical dominance remained, it was most likely to be a “constitutional monarchy” in a written or at least a formalized constitution, with recognition of balance between monarchy and representation.



Far and away the best case study in this quadrant is the United States during the entire nineteenth century and a good part of the twentieth. The U.S. Constitution created a regime of a mixed separation of powers, in which all the powers of the national government (“the state”) were assigned in Article I to Congress. It was the “First Branch,” coming first in Article I but also intended to be the superior branch, superior in power. To emphasize the point, there was no provision anywhere in the Constitution for the recognition of “the state” in the Preamble or in a substantive Article. Article I, Section 1 provides explicitly that “all legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States”; and “legislative Powers” meant powers of the government, since “rule of law” to the drafters meant *no power* except when authorized by legislation. The executive is provided in its own separate branch in Article II. However, except for the power to convene and adjourn Congress (on extraordinary occasions), he has no legislative authority other than to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Legislative superiority was intended by the framers, and their intent was respected, with few exceptions, until the

“Roosevelt Revolution” of the 1930s. In 1883–84, Woodrow Wilson, while still a professor of political science, wrote the first bona fide American politics textbook, and he gave it a very accurate title: *Congressional Government* (1885). After 1945, comparable books would be called *Presidential Government*, or some variation thereof.

Successful as it was, the system of legislative government in the United States was far from unique, because it was, as referred to earlier, only part of a larger revolution of “new law”—law that was declared (and by majority principles) to be distinguished from “old law” that had long been the law waiting to be discovered. “Old law” continues in the common-law countries (England and its former colonies), but the gap between common law and civil law (Napoleonic) countries has been shrinking for many decades, due more to changes in the common-law than in the civil-law countries (Sohm 1871; Jellinek 1905 [1892]; John 1989). And the dynamic in that development was the statute: law made by legislatures, and by majority rule. This brings on the modern legislatures, their task being representation of citizens bearing basic civil and political rights, generating demands and expectations of legislative intervention within the framework of written—or at least formal—constitutions. The principal factor driving this development was surely the industrial-commercial-technological-agricultural revolution of the second half of the nineteenth century. Although “the sheer volume of work done by legislatures ... is growing by leaps and bounds” in every deliberative assembly in the world, one example from the United States will suffice:

... there was a vast body of law ... on industrial accidents in the 19th century; the courts created and developed almost all of the rules. Around the time of the First World War, the states began to pass worker’s compensation laws, which covered most of this field and basically changed the rules of the game. (Friedman 1998, 111)


This transition from courts to legislatures demanded a new concept, legisprudence, to recognize the statute as the principal source of law. Such a transition was not so noticeable in the civil-law tradition on the European continent because, as early as Blackstone, legislation was already preminent; judges “appl[ied] statutes, not because they reflect principles of natural order but because they are dic-

tates of sovereign will.” This European idea was echoed in 1917 by the uniquely American authority Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., who referred to “common-law formalists” and their “judge-made law” sarcastically as a “brooding omnipresence in the sky” (Holmes 1929).

Codification seems to move American legislatures closer to a European understanding of the principal sources of law, while, at the same time, paving the road for the next step. This is a new type of compromise between the need for generalization and the pressure for ad hoc intervention and implementation, a compromise between law and policy.

## Upper Right Quadrant

In this quadrant the legislature is transformed into a policy-making arena. Laws are still made in statutes by the legislature, but policy replaces law as the “reference of preference,” and a law made by legislature becomes one step in the “policy-making process.” Once the legislature becomes the principal source of law—and is recognized as such—*rule of law* becomes unconscionably burdensome. More and more demands are made on the legislature to adopt rules not only appropriate but timely for the big kaleidoscopic modern industrial/commercial/ heterogeneous society. Still another burden is science, in particular the requirement of science that good law/policy must be supported by solid research, called policy-analysis.



When this becomes the *sine qua non* of good law, the legislature moves further and further away from the ideal of the deliberative assembly, which is based upon the amateur knowledge gained through sensory experience, communicated in the language of citizens and constituents.

How can legislatures cope with the information—and pressure—overload of conflicting policy demands? Majority is one first principle, and means,

# LEGISLATURE


to steer the legislative process. Yet it functions only when firmly grounded in the machinery of party control. Kenneth Arrow (1951) in *Social Choice and Individual Values*, unearthed the tendency of collective decision-making to produce a series of policy decisions that are logically inconsistent. To avoid or minimize instances of the “Arrow paradox,” collective choice requires leadership, hierarchy, the division of labor, and rigid rules imposing observance of agendas, rules of order, and other procedural devices. Even the U.S. Senate, which prides itself on being the most important deliberative body on earth, imposes rules of procedure, rules of salience, rules providing for “cloture.” And John Aldrich, one of the leading authorities on rational choice theory and the Arrow paradox, is optimistic that party systems, or “partisan institutions,” can “solve the problem of collective choice [by] attaining . . . and maintaining partisan majorities” (Aldrich 1995, 23; Shepsle and Weingast 1982).

If party rule is not available—or strong enough—the tendency of legislatures in coping with policy overload is to delegate their power—and sovereignty. The legislative function has always required “input” from the civil servants as well as from the higher political levels, including the cabinet, in the form of draft legislation and in “white papers” from government commissions as well as from the private interest groups (Mackintosh 1977). However, as demands for laws increased, the legislative function was turned on its head: the legislature waits for the president (in the separation of powers) or the cabinet (in a fusion of powers) to propose legislation in an already drafted form (Pious 1979; Jennings 1959). And beyond that, the legislature increasingly makes final drafts of legislation so incomplete, so vague, and so empty of standards that the implementing agency or president or premier is given quite literally *carte blanche* to determine the content of the law (Loewenberg 1971).

In other words, the power of policy-making was delegated to the executive. The most explicit illustration of the consequences of broadly delegated legislative power is its impact on the U.S. Supreme Court: over 30 percent of its caseload is occupied with “statutory interpretation.” And there are casebooks and treatises and law school courses on statutory interpretation (Eskridge et al. 1994). Although legislative power remains formally in the legislature, the substance has drained from the First Branch to the Second. The U.S. Congress—the classic legislature—has become a shadow of its former self.

## Upper Left Quadrant





The upper left quadrant is not to be considered a culmination of the evolution of representative government in a linear fashion through the three previous quadrants. For example, von Beyme reports that “parliamentary control is the function of legislatures that has declined the most rapidly” (von Beyme 2000, 81 and Table 4.5, 86–87), and yet it is widely assumed (as we have done in the upper right quadrant) that the power to install and remove cabinets (governments/executives) is essential to that institution. What Americans called ‘legislative oversight of the executive branch’ has also declined, giving the impression that there has been a drainage of legislative/parliamentary control in all systems of representative government. This has been confirmed in studies of the larger, majoritarian states and apparently also in smaller states with “plural societies . . . sharply divided along religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, or racial lines” (Lijphart 1984, 22).



However, to a number of distinguished observers, there is a redeeming feature in many democratic regimes “that emphasizes consensus instead of control” (ibid., 33). Lijphart’s rendering of the consensus model comes in ten elements directly opposed to the majoritarian “Westminster model.” The following is a brief version of his model, including the four principal and most compelling items: coalition cabinets, elimination of votes of confidence, a multiparty system with PR, and interest group corporatism (ibid., 37). The first three of these items appear to be self-evident, in that they are organic, within the parliamentary institution; they are patently more inclusive and less divisive, and they foster, in fact demand, coalition politics that cuts across party boundaries, with those boundaries becoming more and more permeable due to the multiparty environment.

The fourth element, “interest group corporatism,” is another matter altogether. The two scholars most optimistic about the saving grace of corporatism are

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
Arend Lijphart and Philippe Schmitter. A third, Peter Katzenstein, accepts corporatism as a positive factor but is less optimistic due to his appreciation of the “concealed costs” of “corporatist arrangements” (Katzenstein 1985, 9; Schmitter 1981, 307; Krasner 1978). These corporatist compromises and adjustments to democracy may pay off, but they come at a price. Calling it “democratic corporatism” does not lighten the burdens and costs of the compromises.

Just as there has been a drainage of the law-making powers of representative government assemblies and legislative systems, there has also been another kind of drainage in the parliamentary regimes: although a commitment to engage in consensus or consociational politics can result in “social corporatism” in which labor unions (and not always capitalists!) predominate, both corporatisms produce (as Lijphart concedes in a wonderfully suggestive phrase) a “cartel of elites.” Katzenstein completes Lijphart’s thought with the observation that “‘Consociationalism’ and ‘Amicable Agreement’ are terms that observers have used to capture the distinctive political structures and practices ... where groups are held together by pragmatic bargains struck by a handful of political leaders” (ibid., 34–35). Katzenstein goes on, in a critical vein, to argue that consociationalism is a “[c]ompromise across main social cleavages [that] assures political quiescence and, equally importantly, reinforces political control within each camp” (ibid., 35). But he did not go far enough. Just as the adversarial politics of majoritarian regimes runs the risk of stalemate borne of divisiveness, so does the consensual system of “unitary” politics have a decadent tendency characterized by the crystallization of groups, classes, and professions that become guilds sponsored by the state in a kind of functional or syndical feudalism.

## Conclusion

There are recognizable lines of evolution beginning in the lower left quadrant, moving counterclockwise to the upper left. But there are far stronger patterns of development beginning with the lower left, extending to the lower right quadrant and thence a pattern of vacillation, discontinuous change, between or together with characteristics of both upper quadrants. The upper right shows the majoritarian pattern, with legislative superiority as the law-giver had its golden age in the twentieth century, aided and abetted by the two-party system and the cartel of party elites that used state laws to protect the all-important single-member district system of elected representatives. The two-party system that made the legislative regimen work ultimately decayed, giving way from the “legisprudence” of the legislative statute to the “policy-making process” of agencies in the executive branch—not by an executive *coup d’état* but by the active consent of the legislature, euphemistically called the “delegation of powers,” statute by statute, each one so broad with so few guidelines that the cumulative result of this kind of delegation amounts to *legiscide*—not by abdication but by the drainage from a thousand cuts (Lowi 1994).

Parties can no longer make clear rules in statutes that have integrity because their constituencies cannot give any clear sign of a mandate. The only consensualism in the parliamentary regime that can produce policies would seem to arise out of *plural societies* with their multiparty systems and their PR method of election. But this brings parliamentary government all the way back to its medieval roots as a *Staendestaat*, when strong corporate estates would share sovereignty with a weak monarch. Or, as we say in modern democratic parlance, president.



Legitimacy serves power by enlarging and stabilizing its domain. It empowers commands which are obeyed and actions which are performed without use of force.

The vertical axis is a continuum of power from the most informal to the most formalized. Whereas Weber defined legal-rational authority as the main form of legitimacy in complex capitalist and bureaucratic societies, the axis reminds us that there is a vast territory of legitimate power outside the direct influence of the legal system. Legality and legitimacy, while highly correlated, do not necessarily coincide. The horizontal axis captures the source of legitimacy. Religion on the left indicates the sphere of the supra-empirical, that is, belief in something which does not require evidence of its truth. Interest, on the opposite pole, designates the most rationally based beliefs, as an appeal to legitimacy based upon the results of a given governmental action.




The LLQ is the one where historically—and perhaps logically—legitimacy originates and does for a long time linger. This is the realm of traditional authority, mainly exercised by a person with some form of exceptional reputation—a king, a religious leader. In the ULQ, state refers to those historical cases, in both earlier Western and contemporary Middle Eastern countries, where religion has served as the main ideological apparatus for establish-


ing a legitimate power. Note that law constitutes an important aspect of these authoritarian regimes, as it is a no less important dimension of the legitimizing process. This quadrant incorporates governments which work through laws in the modern sense but rely upon more traditional, even ancient forms of legitimacy (traditional Jewish, Muslim, Marxist, etc.).

By contrast, the secularization of power depends upon its capacity to impose (self-)interest as its legitimating force, one to be regulated through positive law, thus moving into the URQ, where law is essential but not self-validating. “Rule of law” depends upon processes by which laws are seen as by-products of successful resolution of conflicting interests. The golden age of the legislature was the nineteenth century, and although it continues as a source of legitimation of control, it became only one of several sources of law, including administration, the return of the judiciary, and plebiscite based on mass opinion and referenda.

This draws us into the LRQ, the populist and most volatile source of legitimacy. Polling is the most recent institution of democracy, after people began to accept random sampling as a true measure of public opinion, with media as the main channel for its dissemination.

# Legitimacy





## Introduction

*Liberal* came into use as early as the fourteenth century to designate “a class of free men” and to characterize their conduct as “worthy of a free man.” Its use expanded to apply to those purely intellectual pursuits of persons of higher social position—as in “liberal arts”—to be distinguished from the learning of skills appropriate for the lower classes and associated with those who would restrict learning to matters ancient, sacred, or divine. And it was applied across the spectrum of social experience as an adjective denoting tolerance—as in liberal Christian, liberal or charitable disposition—and avoidance of absolute doctrine and *a priori* judgment (Williams 1983, 148–49; Sartori 1987, 370). In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, “liberal” often suggested “licentious,” “as when in *Othello* Jago is called a ‘liberal villain’” (Fyfe 1928, 14). During the struggle between religion and politics, it came to arrive as a political term, meaning favorable to reforms in the direction of more freedom (Manent 1995).

Yet, liberalism gained currency only after the French Revolution, and mainly in England after the Reform Bill and the replacement of Whig with Liberal as the name of the party of reform, with Conservative becoming the new name for the traditional Tory party.

Political success, however, did not coincide with a clearer ideological platform. Quite to the contrary, liberalism kept—and still keeps—different meanings in different national cultures and political systems. In countries such as Great Britain and Germany, it stood for parliamentary moderation, a position which in Italy and France would move further right of the center. On the contrary, in the United States, “liberal,” in political parlance, refers to a progressive, if not radical, stance on most social issues. The variety of liberal politics reflects its wide philosophical scope, ranging from the quasi-anarchic libertarian refusal of governmental intervention to the quest of Democratic liberals for the state’s substantial involvement through a policy of social welfare.

# LIBERALISM

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Indeed, this may be the primary factor behind liberalism's enduring success vis-à-vis a host of enemies and competitors, from the old communitarian and conservative ethos to the more recent totalitarian threat. While sticking to its unlimited faith in the virtues of individual initiative, liberalism has proved capable of adjusting to changing historical conditions and open to all sorts of developments. Today, it has become a catchword for too many seasons, which makes it all the more necessary that liberalism, with all its accumulated weight as a concept, be unpacked in its various components. It also explains why, in our matrix, there is no trace of individualism, which may at first blush appear to be contradictory. Indeed, the core of the concept of liberalism is that the individual, not the society, is the unit of primary value; in other words, society exists for the individual. But individualism is absent for a good reason. To borrow from Jonathan Swift, individualism is "like a suit of clothes that invests everything." Or, to draw from the law, individualism is the jurisdictional fact that locates the whole matrix within the universe of discourse of liberalism without taking part in the internal dialectics. In the context of liberalism, individualism has no antonym.

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## The Axes

The horizontal axis, capitalism/state, puts the individual in play. Toward the capitalist end, the individual is driven to compete for the purpose of acquisition. Many critics of capitalism refer to it as a 'philosophy of avarice.' But to Max Weber, business is far more than avarice: it is an ethos, in which Benjamin Franklin's slogan "time is money" is "an equally colored maxim for the conduct of life" (Weber 1987 [1904], 51). Whether a Protestant ethic or not, this is a distinctly modern point of view arising out of Hobbes and Locke and brought into focus by Adam Smith, with the argument that unrestrained, free individuals following their own selfish interests will compete on an equal basis in such a manner as to produce the highest good for the society.

Toward the state end of this axis, liberalism virtually turns the ancient Greek view on its head. The public is a derivative of free, private association. The state, indeed, exists only to allow for—and protect—the free interplay of individual wills. This is often considered as the most innovative political trait of the liberal philosophy, to set clear and strict limitations to

the expansion of the state's activity. Yet, the roots of state's containment are premodern, spelled in a centuries-old tradition of medieval constitutional theory. This also accounts for the fact that, in the end, the liberal attitude toward the state is more ambivalent than the American mind would concede. To most European liberals, all through the nineteenth century and beyond, the idea of state's containment was by no means antagonistic to a strong state, as a bulwark against external threats and internal turmoil.


The vertical axis, rights/constitution, tends to capture the dynamics of liberalism, much as the horizontal one is concerned with its environment. Almost every political dictionary definition of liberalism includes reference to "limited government." But how is it to be limited? Limitations on conduct can be built into the system, as in a constitution, above and almost entirely beyond the convenience or discretion of the players. Although the constitutional principle of separation and division of powers is older than Montesquieu, his writing helped guide the construction of institutions with limitations on power along these lines. Constitution thus refers to a variety of formal arrangements through which the individual is brought into play within these separated institutions, set against each other as Newtonian constraints on power, known in the United States as "checks and balances" and, in other formulations, as "mixed government" and "mixed regimes" (Friedrich 1968 [1950], chapter 10). The rise of liberalism as a political creed in the wake of the French and American revolutions was marked by the attempt to establish constitutional charters in all monarchical absolutist regimes.

On the other end, limitations on power can be methodological, or procedural, avoiding the specification of ends while providing individuals with approved methods of access to power and rules to govern the manner of that access. In this case, the emphasis will be on individual rights, considered as the natural and most sacred property of every man and woman. This is the source of liberalism as a contractual dimension, where citizens can choose the terms of their relationship according to the environment of action—be it the politics of the social contract, or the economics of a free market.

## Upper Right Quadrant

This quadrant is taken up first because it defines the classic cases of the two most stable and durable liber-

al regimes—the United States and Britain. The essence of liberalism here is determined by law, and the ultimate public place where collective decisions for the entire community are made is deemed to be the legislature—indicating a rule-of-law system, where the process of aggregation of individual demands is made through representatives of citizens. The main concern is to provide a constitutional framework enabling a legislative body to effectively curb and balance executive power. All throughout European history, this was a lengthy and controversial process, with different constitutional experiments being carried on, and dismantled, in the liberal attempt to establish legislative supremacy.




This helps explain why, with the notable exception of the French revolution, there was little if no emphasis at all on citizens’ rights. One just needs recall that a Bill of Rights only came as a later addition to the American Constitution. In the classic liberal construction, the rights of citizens are limited largely to procedural rights, political rights in an institutional setting in which equality of citizenship is confined almost exclusively to the concept of negative liberty, with limitations on government creating a private sphere. Thus, in the upper right quadrant, the individual is a citizen as a matter of law, where citizenship can be regulated and limited, with various specified rights and obligations. And in this private sphere, the equality of citizens means the right to equal opportunity to participate, not the right to equal outcomes (Marshall 1965 [1949], chapter 4; Berlin 1969 [1958]).

## Lower Right Quadrant

In this quadrant, the individual is defined in more absolute terms. The status of citizenship is derived from natural law. The upper right quadrant is more American, considered by Europeans as “to the right of center” whereas the lower right quadrant is more

European, considered by many Americans as “*il*-liberal,” because it is more radical, precisely in the sense that the rights of citizens in this quadrant are deemed to come from something much more fundamental than mere laws and governmental institutions, from something absolute, immutable. Historically, this long remained a minority strand in the liberal thought. It is only by the end of the nineteenth century that liberalism takes on a more radical quality, having to confront the issue and challenges of democratization. The main change concerns the relationship with the state, from containment of arbitrary power to demand for universal provisions. The history of the twentieth century is marked by the deep transformations undergone by the liberal state in its attempts first to oppose, then to incorporate and govern the pressures of popular demands. The strains and tensions of this process are marked by the tragedy of World War I and the rise of totalitarian regimes all over continental Europe. It was not until the New Deal’s response to the great Depression through activist Keynesian policies and the adoption of welfare programs from most European nations that the liberal state eventually turned into the modern liberal-democratic regime.




This also implied a major switch in the liberal philosophy, through a number of seminal works. The main contribution came from John Rawls, who would go back to the social contract of Locke, but at “a higher level of abstraction” (Rawls 1971, 11), thoroughly reformulating the terms of liberal discourse in the English-speaking countries. The attempt to establish political liberalism beyond mere procedural norms, however, fell short of meeting the more radical requirements of democratic theory, as it stuck to the understanding of politics framed by the contract theorists, “one in which the meaning and scope of politics is to be settled beforehand, that is, before conflict and controversy among social groups and the alignments of classes is recognized” (Wolin 1996, 98).

# LIBERALISM

This tension between regulation of conduct and redistribution of outcomes is only to grow much bigger once we move toward the left-hand side of the matrix, where economic liberalism is at play.

## Lower Left Quadrant

Both the lower left quadrant and the upper left quadrant are distinguished from the two quadrants on the right by how the individual is defined: we move, conceptually, from status to contract. Beyond that, the contracting parties move from the collectivity of citizenship to the collectivity of market. On this left-hand side of the matrix, the lower left quadrant comes first because it is the closest in history and logic to the very fount of liberalism. This is where the contract between individual and collectivity actually began, with Hobbes and Locke, and matured with Smith. The central institutional arrangement came to be called capitalism, but that is a term that does not appear until a half-century later. The *Oxford English Dictionary* takes 1848 as its first use, suggesting that capitalism itself is a concept first formulated and named by critics of the practices that go back recognizably to the seventeenth century “joint-stock companies.” This helps clarify the relationship between liberty and rights. The issue of rights arises in all discourses on liberalism.



But liberty is the most radical (i.e., most fundamental) variant of rights because liberty resides in the one right that precedes all others: the property right. All property comes from the irreducible fact that individuals own their own life, including their body and the labor produced by their body.

For Locke, rights begin when individuals mix their labor with nature. Thus, the property right is outside the state, beyond the state, prior to the state, trumping all state actions. All other rights come as a result of the social contract in which individuals render up

part of their property in return for the protection of that portion of their property they have retained.

This lower left quadrant is thus the true and unadulterated liberalism—the liberty of individuals to use their labor and to enjoy the fruits thereof. Whether granted in the scripture of the Calvinists or in the more secular natural law of the philosophers, the rights of man came from labor, and labor trumps all interference. This is why Max Weber could be so emphatic in his assertion that liberalism is avarice and more; it is to Weber an ethos, the bastion of individualism (Weber 1987 [1904]).



And the great articulation of that connection is the invisible hand of Adam Smith, through which the maximum wealth of nations and the closest approximation of the public interest come naturally from the individual pursuit of selfish interest. This quadrant is the pure, virtually anarchic, most radical *laissez-faire* liberalism, or, more recently, libertarianism (Hayek 1973; Nozick 1974).

## Upper Left Quadrant

Much as they both partake of the acquisitive drive of liberal economics, the libertarian quadrant stands in sharp contrast to the corporatist one. This is the quadrant where national and international private corporations accept the centralized state and write their own social contract—through special statutes or constitutional provisions—in which corporate power agrees to serve the state in return for state sponsorship that amounts to loans and outright grants of privilege and of sovereignty for monopoly power, other protections from competition, privileged access to government purchases and contracts, and privileged access to state secrets and the protection of state security apparatus (Schmitter and Lehbruch 1979). To some authors, this is not a separate category at all but a corruption of elements of all of the other three.

Yet it is still liberalism, at least until state sponsorship becomes not only official but compulsory, and when, like socialism, it breaks out of the liberal boundaries altogether. Where “private sector” loses its meaning for capitalism, privacy loses its value for individualism, and the most liberal regimes can be subverted into fascism with relative ease. The classic case is of course Germany. The Weimar Constitution, one of the most enlightened constitutions in history, produced a liberal regime which was rather quickly


# LIBERALISM



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subverted by the Nazis with the full cooperation of pre-capitalist aristocratic *Junkers* and the complicity of prominent German capitalists. Other less extreme cases of the same move from liberal corporatism to fascism would include prewar Italy, France, Ireland, and Japan. The United States in fact took corporatism to the edge of the matrix with several of its New Deal programs that were predicated upon corporate/state partnership (Brand 1988).




In a strict historical sense, the URQ could also be properly defined as “the end of liberalism” (Lowi 1969). Nevertheless, it has its own logical integrity, which has been thoroughly analyzed even by some of its severest critics, from the left or the right of the ideological spectrum. The denunciation of corporate liberalism is a viewpoint coming largely from the left; one of the most prominent critics is C. B. Macpherson, a prominent neo-Marxist Canadian philosopher (MacPherson 1969; Lustig 1986). Yet, MacPherson is joined in very much the same type of

view, albeit more abstract, by such luminaries of the right as Leo Strauss (Drury 1988, chapter 7; Kirk 2001, 487–501). But possibly the most frequent and definitely the most intense criticisms of the upper left quadrant are from the lower left quadrant, the pure *laissez-faire* perspective. One of the most inspirational was from Ayn Rand, novelist and essayist, who took the lead in denouncing any and all contractual partnership arrangements between private firms and the state. The most evil characters in Rand’s highly stylized novels are the big corporate capitalists who have made their peace with power to form a league of plunderers. A more truly objective critique came from F. A. Hayek and Ludwig von Mises, and their critique is shared by many who write from the perspective of the upper right and the lower right quadrants (Brady 1943).

## Conclusion

Liberalism is a protean ideology. It is not so much a story of the past as it is a condition of the present—making liberalism more social science than philosophy. But in trying to *make* history instead of study it, liberalism is in the process pulled in many contradictory directions. To some, this causes liberalism to lose its liberal identity. Others would, quite to the contrary, conclude that this is, in the end, the only way to keep liberalism alive.



### Introduction

Western languages have two words for the most widely desired condition of mankind, the absence of external restraint and the power over one's own domain: *liberty* and *freedom*. Even the most thorough of all dictionaries, the *Oxford English Dictionary*, provides identical definitions of each concept, without any indication as to their identity. In fact, each concept is defined in terms of the other concept. Although the author of one of the major contemporary sources of political theory, Giovanni Sartori, is meticulously explicit in all matters of definition and concept-formation, in the index of his comprehensive work *The Theory of Democracy Revisited* (1987), his single entry for *liberty* is "see freedom." The same is true for George Sabine's great *History of Political Thought* (1950 [1937]). We will therefore use *liberty* and *freedom* interchangeably.

There is general consensus among political theorists and empiricists that liberty is inherently dialectic, an incomplete and impermanent condition resting on an "[unequal] relation of forces between citi-

zens and the state" (Sartori 1987, 305). Yet, instability only adds to the fact that liberty is perhaps the most controversial as well as contrasted issue in the history of civilization. While everyone would agree with Hegel's most famous quote that "the History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom" (Hegel 1900 [1837], 63–64), the interpretations of freedom have varied greatly across nations and cultures. One of the most successful attempts to split the matter into two halves is the distinction between negative and positive liberty, or "freedom from" and "freedom to." This scheme was popularized by Isaiah Berlin (1969 [1958]), and largely drew from Benjamin Constant's differentiation between "la Liberté des Anciens comparée à celle des Modernes" (Constant 1988 [1819]).

Negative liberty is an essentially Anglo-Saxon liberal approach stressing the absence of external restraint. Positive liberty, or "freedom to," has a more continental, communal, and collective character, stressing outcomes such as equality and welfare

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rather than individual opportunity made available through equal access to processes and rules (Berlin 1969 [1958]; Reid 1988). In fact, as we shall see, these two concepts of liberty are harder to separate on empirical grounds than in the ideological debate. Berlin's and Constant's pamphlets were produced in the aftermath of exceptional events—World War II and the French Revolution—and mainly served the purpose of reassessing a moderate view of freedom against the ruinous excesses of history. However, fifty or two hundred years later, liberty remains the hottest as well as the most open game in the polity. The matrix's four subtypes, far from offering any final solution, will hardly scratch the surface of our civilization's prominent ideal.

## The Axes

The vertical axis, state/autonomy, is a rendering of Hobbes's and Locke's state-of-nature: a dialectic between autonomous individuals mixing labor with nature to create value, versus a state to which they contractually yield part of their absolute property right in return for protection of what remains. The extreme case can be characterized as a dialectic between state and anarchy or anarchism. Ideologically, the relationship is treated as an antinomy; in reality, the relationship between the two poles is correlative, albeit adversarial.


The horizontal axis—individual/collective—captures the two main valences of liberty, negative liberty and positive liberty, the former stressing the Anglo-Saxon liberal liberty and the latter stressing the more radical, European, associational, democratic liberty. Consequently, the two quadrants on the right-hand side of the matrix see liberty as a private sphere created by effective constitutional restraints or limitations on state power.

The classic case is the American Constitution and its Bill of Rights, which more accurately should be labeled a bill of liberties, because each and every provision in that document is expressed in the negative as a limitation on state power. In contrast, the two quadrants on the left see liberty as a public sphere created by constitutional guarantees of particular outcomes through affirmative government policies or, in a more recent wording, affirmative group action.

This view of liberty values equality and welfare over choice and rules. It is also thought to be a more substantive view of liberty, implied by “freedom for” and “freedom to” rather than “freedom from.” It is mainly developed as an associative form in which liberty is hardly conceivable outside a group. This is in fact the case with the so-called social liberties, bearing upon class or working or ethnic bonds. It is reminiscent of the “defense of ancient rights to subsistence, in defense of the complex rights to the forest and the commons and the local food supplies that had guaranteed people resources” (Piven and Cloward 1982, 50). This would be a communitarian conception of liberty, in the social-democratic tradition as well as in the views of many conservatives and even conservative parties.

## Upper Right Quadrant

We begin with the upper right quadrant not because it has the oldest pedigree but because this is probably the first form of liberty to receive an explicit, written, constitutional recognition as a sphere of individual integrity drawn out of limitations imposed, or self-imposed, on the monarch or other public authority. Many would agree with Sir Ernest Barker's contention that this quadrant is one of “political and civil liberty” and that it is “a negative quantity,” to which the continental writers added the affirmative, majoritarian, Democratic (his capitalization) dimension (Barker 1942, 3–5). This is not offered as a premise on which to base a developmental thesis.




There is, however, a major premise in the prominence of state in this quadrant, underlying not only liberty but also rights. Liberty here is that “negative quantity” to which Barker refers, because it exists as a series of triumphs over tyranny, with limitations on state power expressed as rights—indeed rights of each individual. And these rights are specified by rules defining those areas of conduct in which individuals

can engage with a minimum of fear of encroachment. Thus, the most sacred property right enables individual owners to use their property freely and without fear of trespass by state or other individuals; and this is a right that cannot be denied except through an extraordinary decision rule (beyond the discretion of the government agent, beyond majority rule, etc.). The negative element here is dual: removal *from* the state of some of its powers over individual conduct, and removal *by* the state of some of the powers of private individuals to dominate other individuals. This is a highly *procedural* approach to liberty, a matter that will be more fully appreciated by comparison with the quadrant on its left.

### Lower Right Quadrant

The lower right would hardly exist except for the historical advances of the upper right quadrant, as citizenship and capitalism are built on exactly the same system of liberty and its state-supported rights. Note also that contract is itself a bundle of rules. The difference here between the lower and the upper quadrant is that the rules in the lower quadrant are entered into voluntarily by the contracting parties “in the market” rather than imposed on all parties by the state. Besides, citizenship in the upper right quadrant is a system of equality, “a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community ... [who] are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed” (Marshall 1965 [1949], 92). There are unequal outcomes but the status of equality remains and in fact historically has advanced.



In contrast, again following Marshall, citizenship in the lower right quadrant is a system built on inequality. Although contracts assume the equality of parties entering into contracts, the system is built on equality of opportunity but inequality of outcomes. Marshall contends that this has put capitalism and

citizenship historically at odds. In this quadrant, society exists to permit individuals to pursue their own personal wants or goals. The socialist critic Macpherson (1969) defines this form of liberty as “possessive individualism.” It contemplates a society built on greed; a more positive statement of the same thing is the great American phrase “the pursuit of happiness.”

In this form of liberty, anarchism is virtually utopia (Nozick 1974). Individuals are linked to each other not by communal patterns or solidarities, but by mutual interests. The ideal environment for such a liberty is a market environment, with contract as the primary form of human linkage. In such a context, a great emphasis is laid upon the capacity of each individual for self-determination. Individuals are free in that they enjoy full autonomy over their own decisions. There are, however, two sides to the principle of self-determination. The immediate—and most obvious—one is to master one’s own private sphere and enjoy the fruits of one’s own labor. Here self-determination is equal to the capacity of protracting and defending what Locke called “the state of nature,” with as little intrusion as possible from the state or any of its agents. In this libertarian tradition, there could hardly be any difference between “liberty as the wish to be one’s own master and the wish to be subject to no one’s command” (Reed 1980, 367). Self-determination alone does not qualify for positive freedom. In order for negative liberty to be transformed into positive, the principle of self-determination must move from individual autonomy to collective decision-making—a most controversial move, both on historical and philosophical grounds.


### Lower Left Quadrant

The distinction between negative and positive liberty does not rest upon a mere distinction between liberty as noninterference and liberty as self-government. Lurking within the latter category is the potential existence of a rational or “real” will distinct from an individual’s expressed will, the content of which may be interpreted and imposed by an individual or group claiming a monopoly on its “correct” understanding (Pelczynski and Grayn 1984). The idea of a metaphysical liberty deriving from the collective interpretation of one’s own authentic needs is rooted in Rousseau’s philosophy of the general will and, through Hegel and Marx, became prominent in

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many nineteenth-century ideologies. Whether framed by class consciousness or through the state's paternalistic guidance, collectivist conceptions of freedom have been shared by revolutionary movements as well as by authoritarian regimes.

These conceptions thus become the natural target of the liberal restoration of individual negative freedom in contemporary philosophy. Yet, for all of its historical failures and shortcomings, there is more to this type of freedom than the liberal dominant ideology would be nowadays prone to concede. Both on logical and anthropological grounds, collective liberty is mankind's foremost experience in several fundamental respects.




Contrary to the fictitious representation of natural rights and freedom as an individual property, original liberty arises out of belonging to a group. This is most evident in the tribal tradition of belonging to an ethnic stock or being member of a kin, and marked the sharpest distinction in the prototype Greek case between the free members of the polity and the strangers or slaves who enjoyed no admission to that collective constituency (Finley 1960). This is also indeed the case where the term *freedom* bears clearest its linguistic genesis, through counterposition to serfdom. A free man is, in the first place, one who is not a slave. This observation leads to another corollary of liberty as a group experience, the role of conflictual action. A collectivist conception of liberty is fundamental not only because “most of our wants are satisfied, most of our goods achieved, through cooperative action” (Rice 1940, 379) but, even more, because it is only through collective action that most basic liberties—civil, political, social—have been acquired. This also puts into proper focus the fact that “what is central about the process of becoming free is the experience of having liberated oneself as part of a collective effort” (King 1992, 334) and, more generally, the fact that “freedom is not only a status but an activity—something that involves *doing*

as well as *having*; ... like any art, being free takes practice” (Reinhardt 1997, 30).

This brings us to the wider territory of freedom as a practice of the self: whether in the older—if recently much too neglected—tradition of the republican ethos (Skinner 1998; Viroli 2002), or in Arendt’s “elementary republics” committed to constitute democratic spaces for individual action (Arendt 1963). Or, last but not least, in the Exodus narrative of liberation, where it took a strong political community and forty years of wandering to unlearn slavishness and learn how to be free (Walzer 1985).







## Upper Left Quadrant

Turning now to the upper left quadrant, liberty in this collective environment, with its emphasis on equality, necessarily pursues some universal principle of welfare that puts this version of liberty at a great distance from the individual liberty of the upper right quadrant. The distance is so great that the late Judith Shklar, an eminent political theorist, has criticized the concept of “positive liberty” as “not relevant to the history of the United States”; and beyond that, even “the smallest concession to positive liberty is already on a slippery slope toward the hell of totalitarianism” (1998, 112.115). Shklar’s experience as a refugee from the European radicalism of the 1930s surely produced this extreme reaction to the egalitarian democratic “positive liberty.”



Yet, her fears have proved to be unfounded. Most post–World War II liberal governments have adopted a number of significant policies aiming at securing welfare services on a collective and universal basis, establishing social citizenship without moving beyond the safeguards of traditional freedom. This is not to deny, however, that the two upper quadrants show that democracy and liberty are to a very large degree contradictory.

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The upper right quadrant puts the weight on individual rights to pursue individual goals (wants, interests) *against* the goals freely pursued by other individuals. This stress on individual rights is innately juridical: rights claims trump majority rule. This is why Tocqueville noticed that “scarcely any political question arises in the U.S. that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question.” As a consequence, “the American aristocracy ... occupies the judicial bench and bar ... [and] the courts of justice are the visible organs by which the legal profession is enabled to *control the democracy*” (1966, 289–90, emphasis added). The best case in point is the tortuous progress of liberty for black U.S. citizens.






As long as slavery existed, the United States could not truly consider itself a liberal state in any sense of the word. The United States finally abolished slavery by war but continued to withhold liberty from an enormous class of newly minted citizens. The remedy was supposed to follow in 1868 with ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, yet most of this was negated by a Supreme Court decision in 1873 (*Slaughterhouse Cases*, 83 U.S. 36). But the Court conceded one point that was to be a time bomb, not exploding until the next century: “It is not difficult to give a meaning to this clause. The existence of laws in the States, where the newly emancipated Negroes resided, *which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against them as a class*, was the evil to be remedied.”

Thus, even the conservative nineteenth-century American Supreme Court could not avoid the conclusion that when an entire class of persons is denied liberty, no individualist (upper-right quadrant) approach is appropriate, constitutional rights notwithstanding. The 1873 principle was at least revived as active constitutional doctrine by the


Supreme Court in the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision of 1954. However, the principle had already been applied in the 1930s with the programs that composed the American welfare state, much later to be labeled (sometimes proudly, sometimes with derision) the “safety net.” Through such constitutional and programmatic steps, even the individualist liberal American system had stepped through the looking glass toward a social-democratic position, eventually sitting astride the vertical line logically separating the individualist (negative) liberty systems from the collective (positive) ones.

## Conclusion

Liberty, whether negative or positive, is a public phenomenon and a public good. In this sense, it is inextricably related to our belonging to—and participating in—a collective polity. No freedom can be asserted or defended outside the boundaries of a commonwealth. This is the original as well as an enduring experience of any people whenever liberty is at stake. In fact, in most cases, public and individual liberty simply coincide, as with sovereign freedom and civic freedom which long remained the dominant, if not exclusive, types of liberty available to the ordinary citizen. It is only with the rise of modernity that personal freedom became a recognized and most sought-after value (Patterson 1991). First as a moral aspiration, then as a religious creed, eventually as a political right, personal freedom has become the hallmark of Western civilization. Whether through individualist acquisition or by means of affirmative group action, as a retreat from state’s interference, or as a pressure towards redistributive policies, liberty is today defended as the most sacred prerogative, the one which makes politics our personal concern.



# Majority



Majority is a decision rule. In a democratic, or democratizing regime, it is the dominant aspect of every policy decision. Majorities can be strong or weak, stable or unstable, organic or procedural. Moreover, majorities can be absolute or relative (plurality). The type of majority depends upon the criteria and rules chosen for selecting a majority.

The vertical axis arises out of the contrast between a focus directly on rules that facilitate decisions and reduce the cost of decision-making versus a prevalent concern for taking all views—represented interests—into account. The horizontal axis rests upon the distinction between two majoritarian environments, one real and highly procedural, the other virtual or organic. This is perhaps one of the main changes in the so-called post-electoral democracies, with majorities often being formed outside their original institutional environment as a result of volatile pressures largely determined by and through the media.

The URQ is the classic Westminster model of majoritarian government, where electoral rules and party-systems tend to produce highly cohesive parliamentary majorities, thus strengthening the role of the executive







both as a political authority and as a channel for bureaucratic implementation.

While this remains a strongly admired and largely pursued model for majority-building, its successful application remains limited to a small number of countries. More often, the only way of forming parliamentary majorities is through weaker and unstable majorities (LRQ), made up by the temporary aggregation of a more or less vast array of minority interests. Parties are the main agent of coalition-building.


The LLQ is concerned with the engineering of consensus through media, which set the agenda of public opinion demands and influence its choices. Media activism serves the need of elites for mass support through the creation of virtual majorities.


The ULQ refers to the trend toward plebiscitarian democracies, where majorities coalesce around presidential leadership through a referendum type of election—whether by a formal ballot or through “permanent campaign” with popularity polling.

# Majority



# Market





To political science, media are the people and the institutions that produce and distribute information, mostly about and for others. In recent decades, the role of media has enormously increased in all political systems, as a result of two concurring factors: the spread of television and internet in every household and the rise of monocratic leaderships in the executive branch spurring the personalization of communication.

The vertical axis places media as an intermediary between people and the state. While media also channel information within these two units, much of the traffic is between the state and its citizens. The horizontal axis captures the media environment. Democracy refers to the way journalists see their role within the state, as democracy's facilitators. With all their good intentions and ideals, journalists are nevertheless well aware that they operate within the constraints of a business whose mission is providing information to the people while also selling it to them.


In the LRQ, socialization captures the most common meeting place between the people and the media, for news organizations not only exist within a market, but also are the generators of one—a market of ideas.




However, experiments conducted over the last fifteen years clearly demonstrate that media can shape and alter people's opinions. This power is all the more dangerous when media ownership is heavily concentrated, as with the URQ.

Until the second half of the twentieth century, many news organizations, especially newspapers, were small independent businesses. In 1983, fifty corporations dominated the media market and the biggest merger was worth \$340 million. Today, after deregulation, we are down to six corporations and the biggest merger is worth \$350 billion, thus enormously increasing the agenda-setting power of giant business conglomerates.


The ULQ indicates the role of government agencies to counteract business monopoly through regulatory provisions which guarantee pluralist access to media sources and contents. The LLQ stresses the growing role of polls as a substitute for democratic participation and the most widely used channel to give citizens a voice between elections.

# Media





# Movement



*Movements are aggregates of people making claims about a new order of life. They possess four basic empirical properties: collective challenge; common purpose; social solidarity; and sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities (Tarrow 1994).*

*The vertical axis refers to a fundamental divide in social movement analysis. The European approach asks “why” movements arise, focusing on crises erupting from major structural “strains” (Smelser 1963) in the society. The American approach asks “how” social movements develop, concentrating upon conditions which favor the creation and success of collective action. The horizontal axis indicates the relationship between collective movements and political order. While most movements challenge existing authorities, they only rarely seek to overthrow them and may have a more or less overt tendency to institutionalize their activities.*


*The URQ describes the Marxist tradition of social movements as “the organized collective behavior of a class actor struggling against his class adversary” (Touraine 1981), a conflict which is often in the name of—and may lead to—revolution. The focus of the ULQ is on “new social movements,” expressing new cultural identi-*

*ties or defending—reconstructing—old ones. Castells describes this phenomenon (1996, 22) as “the construction of social action and politics around primary identities, either ascribed, rooted in history and geography, or newly built in an anxious search for meaning and spirituality.”*





*In the LLQ, market and lobbying stress similarities between social movements and interest groups in the “resource-mobilization theory” (McCarthy and Zald 1977), analyzing the material resources that various movements use to garner membership support.*




*The LRQ points to the shifting institutional structure and the ideological disposition (McAdam 1982), as well as policy responses, of those in power to account for the timing and fate of insurgency movements. Rather than from socioeconomic differences or regional variations, fluctuations in collective protest depend on the “political opportunity structure,” such as the strength of a sympathetic political party, a competitive party system, or high levels of voting turnout.*

# Movement




# Nation





# OPINION



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## Introduction

All human beings who possess a language have opinions on anything they have experienced, through direct sensory contact or through the words conveyed by others. Walter Lippmann, drawing on the psychology of William James, may have put the phenomenon of opinions in its most graphic form. Since people are “the creature[s] of an evolution who can just about span a sufficient portion of reality to manage [our] survival,” we try to compensate for our limitations by “learning to see with [our] mind[s] vast portions of the world” that we could never directly experience with our senses. “The pictures inside the heads of these human beings, the pictures of themselves, of others, of their needs, purposes, and relationship, are their public opinions” (Lippmann 1922, 29).

But Lippmann makes a mistake shared by most other students of the subject—a premature jump from opinion to public opinion.

Opinion has a history as old as mankind, in the most primitive as well as the most advanced and sophisticated societies. Conceptually, there may be only a short step from individual opinion to aggregates of opinion. But historically, the step is quite a giant one, because before the nineteenth century, aggregates of opinion appeared only rarely in history. The “new belief in the common man” (Friedrich 1942) had to emerge before there could be a regular place for public opinion in the affairs of government and for common individuals in history. Also, too quick a jump from individual to public opinion tends to imply an identification between these two terms, which is misleading on both methodological and substantive grounds (Noelle-Neumann 1979; Joslyn 1997). Individuals may speak public—or they may not. And it is a matter of conceptual clarification and empirical observation to assess whether and how opinions perform a public function.

## The Axes

The vertical axis sets the distinction between the individual as a private actor and her transformation into a public, collective actor. Public opinion is a complex development, requiring that “the term ‘public’ does not indicate only the subject (of the opinion) but also the nature and domain of the opinions in question” (Sartori 1987, 87). The advent of public opinion grows out of major changes in the structure of the governmental apparatus constituting the public sphere, as well as from the rising of a new class of people determined to influence the public sphere with criticism and open-minded discussion (Habermas 1989). In Europe, this was a long-term process dating back to the early circulation of information on a systematic basis in the mid-seventeenth century and culminating, by the eve of the French revolution, with the diffusion of newspapers and salons as the main network for the formation of a “reasoning public” advocating political control (Speier 1950).

England set the path, with over three thousand cafés open in the first decade of the eighteenth century and a booming literary and artistic environment where the social and intellectual habits of controversy and public discourse could be nurtured. This in turn spurred adaptation in the upper governmental echelons. Charles Fox was the first, in a speech to the Commons in 1792, to refer explicitly to the role of public opinion, considering it as the proper judge of his course of action. The process was completed by Robert Peel with the Tamworth Manifesto in 1834, for the first time submitting a party program to the evaluation of the electorate.


The advent of an enlightened middle class would be strongly rooted in its economic autonomy, a phenomenon Europeans would refer to as bourgeois predominance, while Americans would prefer to call it the emancipation of the common man. In all cases, individual independence was based on two key revolutionary beliefs: first, the recognition that all individuals are capable of reason and, second, the assumption that everyone had endowments from nature, or natural law, indistinguishable from endowments inherited by persons of higher status and calling.

The second axis draws into a quite controversial debate, contrasting the active role of an informed elite with the much more passive presence of people as a mere aggregate of generic and often inconsistent atti-

tudes. The first ones to criticize openly the risk of the tyranny of unqualified mass beliefs were liberal philosophers such as John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville, who feared that conformity to prevailing values rather than a critical approach would become the guideline for the majority of the people. This concern would be at the heart of the books which set the standard for public opinion research in the twentieth century. Lippmann (1922, 5), in the best Burkean tradition, writes that “the notion that public opinion can and will decide all issues is in appearance very democratic. In practice it undermines and destroys democratic government. For when everyone is supposed to have a judgment about everything, nobody in fact is going to know much about anything.” Converse (1964, 245) concluded his groundbreaking research by stating that “large portions of an electorate do not have meaningful beliefs, even on issues that have formed the basis for intense political controversy among elites for substantial periods of time.” Forty years after, the rationality of public opinion as a statistical aggregate remains an unsettled issue, on theoretical as well as on empirical grounds.

## Upper Left Quadrant

To most early supporters of public opinion, as well as to many of its present nostalgic critics, the upper left quadrant may well be the only one properly to qualify for the term, at least on normative grounds. Here we find two key factors which account for the development and consolidation of a vigilant public opinion: strong and pluralistic media as both a source of information and a tribune for discussion, and the rational choice of individuals as the basic parameter of free and responsible judgement (Habermas 1989[1962]).



The role of an independent press as the innovative communication channel of public discourse can hardly be overestimated, the more so in light of its

painstaking historical development. For a long time span, private commercial networks remained the sole depositaries of relevant news across towns and national borders. As early as at the late fourteenth century, a regular flow of information existed among relevant trading posts, and lengthy and detailed weekly “news reports” became by the mid-sixteenth century an established feature of European capitals. However, circulation remained a private business (Reynié 1998), with only a small section of available information slowly reaching out to a wider public through irregular written channels, most often a single-page collection of heterogeneous natural and political events.


It is only with the “age of enlightenment” that the diffusion of news becomes a public affair. The pioneer experiment of the *Tatler*, edited by Addison and Steel in 1709, rapidly surged to four thousand copies, setting the stage for influential journals such as Defoe’s *Observer* and Swift’s *Examiner*. The success among a wider public also triggered a major change in the approach from state authorities. The dominant trend, through the seventeenth century, had been one of using the press as the herald of official documents and stances. This would remain the pattern in most continental Europe well into the nineteenth century, and the main aspiration of all contemporary authoritarian regimes. In England, by the first quarter of the eighteenth century, the liberalization of the press short circuited with the rise of party politics. This turn became evident when the Tory opposition first established political journalism as an outspoken antagonist to the government, inaugurating what would soon become the mainstream of the “fourth estate” in the young republic of the new world.

The strict relationship between political propaganda and the diffusion of the press was one of the key features for the development of democracy in the United States. By reaching a mass audience through overtly political channels, public opinion creates the conditions for the self-fulfillment of its normative mission: the widespread mobilization of an informed citizenry to discuss openly and evaluate the running of governmental affairs (Jacobs and Shapiro 1996). Yet, this also becomes the point where public opinion inevitably spills over into new directions—and quadrants—only partly coincident with the original ideal-type: first, the expansion of the voting franchise, which leads to alternative forms for representing individual orientations, through elections and referenda; second, the cultural massification of pub-

lic opinion, which tends to be more and more perceived as—and reduced to—the sampling of a mere statistical aggregate.

## Lower Left Quadrant

Ginsberg captures the enfranchising of modern electorates best, beginning with his observation that “in essence, rulers were compelled to seek popular support because they lacked other means to curb disorder, bring their foreign and domestic foes to heel, and retain a grip on the levers of national power” (Ginsberg 1986, 25–26). Where ruling classes were able to maintain control, voting rights were not granted—for example, in Italy, Spain, and Portugal during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For the others, especially those directly affected by revolution, “rulers have little choice but to attempt to acquire popular support for obtaining revenues, maintaining internal order, and dealing with foreign foes” (ibid., 26).



But it would be a grievous error to conclude that the right to vote and to take part in representative government was the result of a long period of struggle in which the people demanded representation and voting participation as a matter of right. Such demands were not absent, but in fact the extension of the suffrage and of formal mechanisms of representation tended to come after public opinion had achieved its place in public affairs and the people had achieved a certain degree of influence. As Schattschneider put it for the American experience, “It is hard for Americans to believe how easy it was because they have a hopelessly romantic view of the history of democracy which attributes a revolutionary significance to the extension of the legal right to vote” (Schattschneider 1960, 100).


Ginsberg makes this generalization for all Western democratic nations in his observation that “the difficulty with which voting rights were actually secured

has often been overrated” (ibid., 11). He goes on to make a startling but true observation about the consequences: “With the introduction of formal mechanisms for the expression of opinion, popular influence and rulers’ power were no longer inversely related but could instead coexist” (ibid., 27).

This is a kind of contemporary scientific confirmation of Rousseau’s view of public opinion, sentimentalized as the General Will. Yet, this also is a way to shift the weight and influence of public opinion from the virtual arena of mediated discourse to the actual counting of individual ballots, with their direct influence on the selection of the political class. Once individuals can express their preferences through a viable representative system, the role of public opinion as an independent actor becomes inevitably controversial (Bryce 1921). The contrast will become most evident with the development of European mass parties, when political elites will assert their right to be considered as the true “voice of the people,” legitimized through democratic mechanisms, vis-à-vis the arbitrary role of a media establishment with its proprietary, market-driven interests.

## Lower Right Quadrant

However, even the most meticulous mechanisms of election fall woefully short of genuine representation of opinion. The public opinion oracle does not speak in policy instructions. This fundamental shortcoming in the representation of opinions by elections is often met by a kind of policy plebiscite, which Americans prefer to call the referendum (Magleby 1984).



Whereas the classic plebiscite is the expression of popular opinion or confidence about a particular ruler or constitution or regime, the referendum is a mechanism for taking the measure of public opinion on a particular policy alternative. In 1969, Charles de Gaulle combined a modern referendum to reform the French Senate (and give constitutional status to

French regions) with a classic plebiscite, tying the referendum to an actual vote of confidence in his presidency. The referendum failed, and President de Gaulle resigned from office and went into obscurity.

But ordinarily, the referendum is restricted to passage or failure of a specific policy proposition. It is a form of direct democracy, where public opinion actually determines a policy decision. And the practice of the referendum grows in importance and frequency as political parties weaken or as trust in representative government declines (Butler and Ranney 1994). It is probably not a coincidence that the practice of the policy referendum took hold in the states of the western United States, and the frequency of their use is limited to those states. (In fact, it is close to impossible to get a referendum on the ballot in most of the states east of the Mississippi.)


## Upper Right Quadrant

The referendum is likely to remain a mechanism of limited utility not only because of its difficulty and costs but, more importantly, because the world has developed an extraordinarily less expensive and more efficacious alternative—polling. *Poll* means “head,” of human or beast; polling is simply the counting of heads. And there has been polling of one sort or another since public opinion made history (Herbst 1998). The first recorded effort to use sampling for measurement of public opinion was probably in 1896, by Republicans in the U.S. presidential election. This was roundly denounced in public print, not only by the opposition party: “Polling the voters before the election is an infamous, contemptible conspiracy in this glorious, free republic” (quoted in Jensen 1969, 228–29).

The promise of polling was, however, soon recognized by the new economic realm of consumer economics—polling for consumer tastes and predispositions. The advantages of polling reached the advertisers and then the newspapers serving the advertisers. All of this established public opinion polling as a valuable and powerful tool, and at the same time established opinions as phenomena that can be classified for purposes of defining populations from which samples can intelligibly be drawn. Public opinion polling, however, remained largely in the commercial realm on through the 1930s, and it was only after World War II that it established itself as a source of political knowledge. The sweeping success of polling



as the main indicator of public opinion was certainly due to the fact that it provided, at last, a method for measuring an otherwise much too ambiguous phenomenon (Blumer 1948). For the first time, there was a way to find out exactly what the people wanted with respect to the major issues on the political agenda. As a consequence, public opinion studies tended to concentrate on the empirical evidence offered by the growing number of polls which proliferated across various sources and targets.



These developments led to three main methodological and substantive questions which have been—and still are—debated within the discipline (Dalton and Klingemann 2009). One first question concerns the reliability of polls: how representative are samples with respect to the “phantom public” of nonrespondents (Brehm 1993) and—for those who respond—do people’s answers reflect their actual beliefs? A compromise solution could be found in the argument that most people do not have fixed positions, especially on issues which are not particularly salient to their daily life.

The ordinary citizen rather carries “ambivalent attitudes” which draw on a complex and often contradictory range of considerations (Zaller 1992). Answers to the surveys thus result from the unstable combination between a specific context and a number of competing frames. This leads to the second question of the rationality of opinions as reflected through mass surveys. The latest empirical findings seem to contrast the pessimistic view of the irrationality of crowd behavior, leading to the more problematic notion of “rational ignorance.” A newer wave of revisionist scholarship argues that “ordinary citizens make sense of the political world despite their lack of detailed information about ideologies, policies and candidates” (Bartels 1993). Often through unorthodox methods such as information shortcuts and gut reasoning (Popkin 1991) or through more sophisticated channels such as “deliberative polls” (Fishkin 1996), public opinion seems to be able to meet the

three Rs criterion: reasonable, responsible, and rational (Page and Shapiro 1992).





These methods also shed a more optimistic light on the last key question concerning the efficacy of public opinion, as measured through polls, with respect to major policy choices (Key 1961; Page and Shapiro 1992). Here, the main problem is represented by the difficulty of extracting conclusive empirical evidence from much too heterogeneous data-sets across a long enough time span.

However, the prevailing view is that there is a relatively high level of consistency between policy outcomes and the preferences of public majorities, one which becomes greater on issues of highest public salience (Monroe 1998). This helps explain the overall continuing support for government as a stabilizing factor of contemporary democracies (Kaase and Newton 1995), especially in citizens with high levels of cognitive mobilization, in response to widespread policy changes (Klingemann and Fuchs 1995).



## Conclusion


The meaning of most relevant concepts varies across a wide spectrum of empirical experiences and normative stances. This complexity is, indeed, what the matrix methodology tries to capture at its best. In the case of public opinion, differences reflect a tension inherent in the term itself, a name compound of two words which can and do often live a life of their own. Thus, tension may easily turn into exclusion. To many social theorists, the aggregate of individual opinions can acquire public meaning only by going through some form of collective structure, which polling cannot substitute for (Shamir and Shamir 2000). On the contrary, from the perspective of methodological individualism, the idea of public opinion as a corporate entity which cannot be measured, while any elite can suit it to its own liking, is reminiscent of the concept of the state: “soul stuff,” to use Bentley’s epithet (Lundberg 1930; Korzi 2000). Yet, in looking back at the quasi-millennial history of spirited struggles to turn individual attitudes into the fourth estate of modern democracies, compromise between these competing representations sounds wiser—and more meaningful—than confrontation. The fact that public opinion remains a bifurcated research field (Price 1992, 72–73) may more simply reflect the fact that we remain, after all, a bifurcated public self.

# Order



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Participation encompasses a series of activities related to political life, aimed at influencing public decisions in a more or less direct way—legal, conventional, pacific, or contentious. Definitions can vary, depending on whether one focuses on individual or collective actors, on the social or institutional environment, or on the means and procedures of participation (Barnes and Kaase 1979).








On the horizontal axis, we see the shift from individuals to collective aggregates as discussed by the sociology of collective action. A single individual entitled with her own rights, personal means, resources, and identities (Milbrath 1965) is opposed to organized aggregates of people, which can count on organizational resources such as membership, finances, strategic position in the society or in the political system, know-how, better access to information and to channels of expression (Bentley 1908; Olson 1965; Almond and Powell 1966).


On the vertical axis, the legislature represents the institutional arena legitimizing the existence of a democratic political system and, in turn, legitimized by the possibility of political participation. Civil society is the arena where economic and social conflicts are developed

and then conveyed to the institutional sphere via various forms of participation.

In the ULQ, election represents the classic and most widespread means for an individual to choose freely to participate (or not), by exercising her basic citizenship rights through expressing her own preferences. There is, though, a more elementary and less demanding form of participation, as in the LLQ, through opinions which can be easily changed. Media are the main channel through which opinions can be expressed, but also influenced to the point of manipulation and induced participation. Quite the opposite, the LRQ indicates intense political engagement on contentious issues and through radical forms of mass mobilization, falling within the category of social movements (Tilly and Tarrow 2006; Touraine 1981). The URQ refers to participation within the political system. Organized actors and lobbies play the role of gatekeepers to most institutional resources, usually by building more or less overt coalitions to maintain their monopoly as the power elite in the participatory game (Berger 1981).

# Participation





**Introduction**

It is proper to begin with Edmund Burke’s definition of party because it is the best known, the simplest, and was formulated at the dawn of the institution itself: “Party is a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed” (1871, 151). This was echoed even more simplistically a generation later by Benjamin Constant, as parties were taking on forms and roles with which we are familiar today: “A party is a group of men professing the same political doctrine” (Quoted in Duverger 1963, xiv). These definitions, so simple and innocuous on the surface, reveal on further reflection the reasons why parties were treated with such fear and loathing by so many constitutionalists and reformers, including the American founders. In his Farewell Address, George Washington warned gravely and at length against “the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally.”

In James Madison’s most famous essay, he leaves no doubt that he has party in mind when he expresses grave fear of “factions” which become majorities (Federalist #10). It was much later in the nineteenth century before political parties achieved recognition, for better or worse, as occupying a fundamental “place in the state” (Duverger 1963, xv) and, as Schattschneider put it, when parties were recognized as having “created democracy” and “that democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties” (1942, 1). Nevertheless, even after developing a clear institutional integrity, political parties have been hard to pin down with a consensual definition.

Duverger (1963, xxii) opens his classic treatise with a confession: “We must not be misled by the analogy of words. We use the word ‘parties’ to describe the factions which divided the Republics of antiquity, the troops which formed round a *condottiero* in Renaissance Italy, the clubs where the mem-

# PARTY

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bers of the Revolutionary assemblies met, and the committees which prepared the elections under the property franchise of the constitutional monarchies as well as the vast popular organizations which give shape to public opinion in modern democracies. There is some justification for this identity of name. ... Obviously, however, they are not the same thing.”

Duverger's concerns are echoed in Lijphart's efforts. Observing that those who study political parties have not been able to agree on the term's definition, he provides a definition that he immediately rejects: “organizations that try to win public office in electoral competition with one or more similar organizations” (Kuper and Kuper 1996, 589). This narrow definition, he suggests, excludes certain organizations that are generally considered political parties—yet, he confesses, if we broaden the definition to include those, we risk making the definition too broad to be useful. One way to skip too-narrow or one-dimensional definitions is to move on to classifications and typologies, an exercise which, in the case of parties, has proved to be quite popular with several outstanding scholars. From Ostrogorski (1964) to Michels (1911), from Weber (1922) to Neumann (1956), from Duverger (1963) to Kirchheimer (1966) to the most recent contributions such as those from Panebianco (1988), Lawson (1980 and 1994) or Katz and Mair (1994), political parties have been the object of intensive categorization, mainly with a developmental emphasis on the continuous transformation of both the organizational and institutional dimensions. Our matrix will try to capture most of these variations by pinning the analysis of party down to two mainstream dimensions of its nature and development: one which concerns the party's organization, along a continuum from the corporate party to the individualistic political machine; and another which refers to the origins of political parties, whether within the legislative body or from without, in the civil society.

## The Axes

Along the first axis, corporation/individual, corporation refers to the corporate party, best exemplified by the European socialist party tradition, which stresses the role of tight bonds within its organization—militancy, in other words—and in the electorate through doctrinal or ideological consistency (von Beyme

1985). The individualist party, in contrast, tends to arise out of the liberal tradition of a coming together of elites, notables, and other activists for a limited number of common purposes which might be realized through electoral and other public appeals and eventual legislation. This suggests that the individualist party is programmatic rather than doctrinal, but even program may be quite loose, inconsistent, and often merely a by-product of keeping the group together for the next election.


The second differentiation, civil society/legislature, looks to origins and organizational features. On the civil society side, parties arise out of social cleavages and social movements; on the legislature side, parties are products of elites with links to state institutions, who tend only afterward to reach out for social bases. Note well that the differentiation between civil society and legislature is not to be considered a permanent one. Origins matter, but origins are not nature. While parties may differentiate according to their origins (Duverger 1963), they nevertheless tend toward convergence. For example, parties whose origins are in the legislature eventually tend strongly toward grounding in the civil society.

The so-called Jeffersonian revolution, culminating in the overwhelming victory of 1800, actually shows how quickly and thoroughly this can happen (Calise 1989; Chambers 1963; Charles 1961; Cunningham 1957). And, on the other side, the so-called external parties—whose origins are not only outside state institutions but in antagonism to them—may later proceed to integrate themselves along with their electorates and their class and mass habitats into the state machinery (Rokkan 1970).

## Upper Right Quadrant

These patterns are better understood as we move into the second part of the matrix, focusing on the relationships developed by the cross-tabulation of the first two pairs of concepts. It is effective to begin with the interaction between the legislative origins and the individualist base. This is the so-called legislative party which arises out of the process of representation and is concerned largely with the process and functions of representation. Until the advent of parties, representation had largely remained within the realm of administration—tax-collection, military preparedness, patronage—enabling notables to bargain with

the monarchy and to maintain balances between bureaucracy and civil society (Friedrich 1968 [1950]). In order for representation to be transformed into a vehicle for the modern process of genuine law-making, the parties proved to be essential.




Yet at the same time, the relationship between representation, individuals, and legislature does here convey the fact that parties of this kind were and still remain basically oriented to satisfying the needs of citizens seen as individual actors. While this constituted a very narrow and limited constituency at the early stage of party development, it has now in many cases moved on to encompass what, in terms of its scale, can only be called a mass constituency. Nevertheless, parties of this type remain individualistic in their ideology and in their organization structure. The early type of notables' parties fits into this category just as do those modern parties which have maintained a low level of organizational centralism. In most respects, contemporary American parties still offer the best example of this type of relationship between the parties, the electorate, and the legislature, with an emphasis on the representative process (Bogdanor 1984).

Note now that election appears in the property space defined by the four concepts of this quadrant. Party is so often virtually defined by elections because so many parties in the Western-type democracies have utilized elections as their official avenue to power and influence. Yet, when compared with the other types of party emerging from the matrix, it becomes clear that elections, while still important on formal grounds, can be overshadowed by other factors—and logics.

## Lower Left Quadrant

This is clearly the case if we look at the lower left quadrant. Here the social aggregates best understood as class act as the main catalyst for the development of the corporate party. One may wish to substitute the more specific concept of class with the more general

idea of cleavage, which would more readily incorporate such other social aggregates as ethnicity, religion, territoriality—in which case, “class” can be understood as “classification” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Additional understanding of this can be drawn by considering the role of oligarchy, which catches best the texture of political relationships in this quadrant. The idea of oligarchy as a driving force, if not *the* driving force, for the corporate party dates back at least to the work of Robert Michels (1911) and is probably best represented by the Leninist and social democratic parties all through the interwar and postwar era. But in our definition, oligarchy includes a wider logic of party behavior well beyond the original ideological boundaries of social democracy and communism. Oligarchy stresses the continuity which mainstream parties of a corporate type tend to present both in their organizational and in their ideological reality, especially once a class (or classification) basis is established.







Yet, oligarchic parties need consent like all parties, but it must come in a different way. Political scientists often refer to the “engineering of consent.” But it is not a universal generalization; in fact, it applies best in this lower left quadrant. That is, lacking the broad base in a mass or a representative system, the oligarchy party must create an appearance of consent, usually by forms of internal procedure and organizational representation that are ultimately co-optative rather than genuinely representational. We call it engineered consent; we could also call it virtual representation (Truman 1951; Selznick 1949).





## Upper Left Quadrant

This leads us to the upper left quadrant, where we can say that consent is organized through a coalitional—or consociational—logic (Lijphart 1977 and 1994). As parties take on a more corporate form, they remain oligarchic, and they may very well remain strongly attached to a class or ethnic group or religion or other social classification in a society, but they exist in a gov-

# PARTY




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ernmental system composed of several corporate parties, each oligarchic, but each having to contend peacefully with each other.

Again, we find here a limitation to the role of election as the ultimate procedure for allocating resources among parties. The coalitional or consensual party is not likely to lead to “party government”—i.e., to alternation among parties fighting each other in the electoral arena for outright majoritarian control of the government; instead they are limited to a set of more formal institutional arrangements within an ongoing parliamentary process. In other words, whenever differences in the electorate remain frozen (Bartolini and Mair 1990) or otherwise attached to a substantial aggregate in the civil society and are represented through strong party organizations of a corporate type, the most likely outcome is a governing process arising out of coalitional accords with a minimum of direct electoral competition. This is what applies with particular accuracy and poignancy to certain linguistically or ethnically plural systems.




When confronted with the parties in the upper right quadrant, we can see that participation is a more weighty link than representation to the party of the corporate type. While participation and representation are not by definition antagonistic, they often present very competitive alternatives in terms of institutional development. Corporate parties, by the very nature of their origin, their ideology, and their organizational machinery, have been led to emphasize the role of mass mobilization and direct participation in political life. In this respect the relationship between corporate parties and the legislative arena has been historically mediated by the process and the consequences of mass mobilization. These phenomena can be best understood through the major political crises eventually culminating into the World War I breakdown, originating from the difficulties in moving from the societal basis of the corporate party toward and into the legislative arena while maintaining a high level of mass mobilization and direct participation.

## Lower Right Quadrant

There is yet another option for maximizing consent, beyond consociational coalition-building. For parties of the individualist type, the fastest—although not necessarily most stable—way to enlarge their electorates is to turn into catch-all parties (Kirchheimer 1966). This however implies a shift from political representation to marketing—and polling—as the core business of the modern party.

The concept of market captures both by definition and historically the economic or hedonistic (Benthamite) understanding that individualist parties bring to their relationships to the society and to representation of the economic arena in particular. According to a line of interpretation running through Joseph Schumpeter (1942) to Anthony Downs (1957), parties become market-oriented and market-centered because they tend to act in the form of entrepreneurs maximizing profits—in this case offering offices and policies in return for consent—by offering to society, composed of individual citizens, the political goods that best satisfy their demands.

While in the upper right quadrant the concept of representation emphasizes the process of transforming individual needs into acts of legislation, in the lower right quadrant this same process manifests itself as the reaching of balances between demands, consent, and returns through government. As political parties move more and more toward market and polling, they also move that much further away from their historic legislative/representation position, even though legislative activities still take place. Movement toward polling also involves a plebiscitary relation to individual citizens (Asher 2001; Abrams 2002).



As parties move toward the maximization of citizen consent, they tend to be transformed from elec-

toral machines into polling agencies, including a tendency to abandon whatever original ideological base the party may have been built upon. The polling party is also strongly—if not necessarily—correlated with the rise of strong personal leaderships as the driving force for its electoral success. Starting as early as Schattschneider in 1942, political scientists have increasingly recognized the plebiscitary aspect of the American presidency, and the dominant role played by personalization and mass communication (Lowi 1985; Tulis 1987).







Yet, presidentialism may not be the only hospitable environment for the ascent of the polling party. As in the case of Silvio Berlusconi's personal party, *Forza Italia* (Calise 2000), parliamentary regimes can be quite rapidly transformed—and conquered—by the intensive and highly professional use of mass communication and marketing strategies (Poli 2001; Owen 1991; Calise 2005).

Indeed, the process itself of presidentialization can be pushed forward, rather than through overt constitutional engineering, by more political means, as strong executive control over existing parties and outright personalization of electoral campaigns. This is more and more the case with several European countries (Poguntke and Webb 2005), thus showing that the future of party may go beyond institutional constraints and ideological legacies.


## Conclusion

Through their long-term historical development and a vast array of classifications and typologies, political parties have maintained the basic character of a collective enterprise. Whether the emphasis was on common principles or social roots, the search for offices, or the attempt to overthrow existing institutions, parties have been conceived—and used—as a unitary body. The capacity to pull together and organize a large number of people in a sustained effort has been their major element of strength, to the point of establishing political parties as the major actors in the process of mass mobilization of contemporary regimes, both democratic and authoritarian.

The recent twist toward the personalization of political power represents a major threat to the party's role. While personal parties in a strict sense still represent a small—if rapidly growing—portion of the overall parties' population, personalization is deeply affecting the main factors of political parties' environment. From the extraordinary weight of media—old and new—in the pursuit of electoral consent to the growing quest for executive leadership in response to international crises, the party game is more and more becoming a personal affair. This has severe implications for political parties' legitimacy, stability, and effectiveness, not to speak of their capacity to bring about the change most parties still claim as their original mandate.



# PLURALISM



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## Introduction

Pluralism, in its contemporary usage, is a theory of a political process in which individuals use their freedom to organize into voluntary associations, groups, or factions to pursue their goals collectively, through the state and independent of the state. In its original formulation, the concept was developed as a reaction to the advance of monism and the concentration of sovereignty in the nation-states (Self 1985).

Pluralism came into common usage among intellectuals in the early twentieth century. One source was William James (1909), who applied his newly developed pragmatic philosophy toward a more relativist system of thought opposed to “monism,” a system of thought with only “one ultimate principle” (Ellis 2001, 11517). Other sources were the German Otto von Gierke and the Briton Sir Ernest Barker.

Gierke’s contribution (1900 [1887]) was a revival of “the idea of representation [through] corporation law” (Friedrich 1968 [1950], chapter 14). Barker’s was his 1914 formulation of the term “polyarchy” in

appreciation of federalism and of Montesquieu’s conception of the mixed regime. All this was brought together by Harold Laski (1917 and 1919), a student of Barker, who “politicized” pluralism as part of a critique of and an alternative to the “monistic state,” stressing the importance (empirical and normative) of alternative forms of human association, including religious associations (from the more conservative viewpoint) and the worker associations in trade unions or in guild and syndical associations (from the left).

In the United States, Laski’s approach to pluralism as an alternative to the state was altogether too radical and too normative (Eisenberg, Cerny, and Eisfeld 2006). This version of pluralism was displaced by a self-consciously empirical approach originating in Arthur F. Bentley’s seminal work of 1908, *The Process of Government*. Bentley elevated “the group” as the unit of analysis that was required for a systematic, objective, scientific study of politics and government. “The state,” with its “sovereignty” and other “soul

stuff,” was considered a useless abstraction. Government, not the state, exists as a process driven by the “pure activity” of what came to be called “pressure groups” or, more sanitized, “interest groups.” Although Bentley did not explicitly refer to himself or his approach as “pluralist,” he has to be considered the father of political pluralism (Seideman and Harpham 1985, 67–93). Bentley’s extraordinary work lay virtually dormant for over forty years until rediscovered and revived by David B. Truman, whose 1951 book provided empirical grounding with case after case of group dominance of the political process.

Yet, it was for Robert Dahl (1956 and 1982) to upgrade pluralism to the full status of both a normative and an empirical theory. In his seminal case study of a local community power structure (1961), he argued that economic and political influence was dispersed among several competing groups, thus contrasting the oligarchic thesis of a compact power elite by C. Wright Mills (1956) and his school.

Group competition, however, did leave most of the pluralist dilemmas unanswered: How far should groups go in substituting for several of the state’s functions? And how much of their autonomy would serve the causes of their membership rather than the interests of their self-perpetuating elite (Eisenberg 1995)? How could, in the end, a pluralist system be protected from the danger of being reduced to the oligarchic interplay of a limited number of actors? As we shall see in our matrix, one of the ironies of pluralism is that, once the state’s monopoly of political power is set loose, it becomes hard to impose normative limits upon the growth of groups—and their influence, both within their original constituency and outside in the public domain.

## The Axes


This is why we begin our analysis with the definition of various types of groups in their relationship to the state. All of politics is concerned with the relation of the individual to the collectivity. To the Greeks, for example, the life of the household was the world of economics, and everything else was politics. But pluralism is an effort to identify (and to favor) a particular form of politics—politics through association. Consequently, the vertical axis represents an attempt to provide locations or status to associations close to or distant from the state. From antiquity to the pres-

ent, there are spontaneous and formal associations oriented almost exclusively toward their members—from churches to Tocqueville’s voluntary associations. Their politics is inchoate (toward the bottom, civil society). At the other extreme are the interest groups, factions, parties, guilds, etc., that have an identity independent of the state, but are oriented toward influencing or controlling the state.

The horizontal axis locates associations as types of collectivities—that is, how individuals relate to each other in pursuing their needs and goals. The two poles suggest a differentiation according to the degree of formalization of relationship. Group is the concept most appropriate for associations constituted by the highest degree of “rational choice,” of affiliation primarily in terms of shared values and objectives. Corporation refers to associations constituted by the highest degree of “determined choice,” of affiliation primarily in terms of the place of individuals in relation to the market or to preexisting social or cultural hierarchies. Corporation is an institutionalized group, within which individuals take on perspectives more probably inherited and ascribed than acquired.

## Lower Left Quadrant

We begin with the lower left quadrant of community or communal life, estates, castes, and consociations in a presovereignty, pre-monist social pluralism, and, perhaps more accurately, a prestate pluralism as small states within society or nation.



We need to go back in history as far as feudalism to find the origins of most modern societies and politics, and this is especially true of the concept of pluralism. Feudalism was its own kind of pluralism. But feudalism—or practices and textures prominent in feudalism—did not end with the consolidation of nation-states. Feudalism was in many respects the bridge between antiquity and modern society and politics,

# PLURALISM


and a great deal of this quadrant is alive today in varying degrees in different parts of the world. The more durable of these prestate associations—from local guilds to regional and national estates and castes—were sustained through a set of institutional norms which often reached the status of constitutional regulation, through corporate charters. Palmer (1959, 28–29) calls them “constituted bodies,” to signify the high level of autonomous self-regulation corporate groups enjoyed through several centuries of preindustrial development. Corporate charters are also the juridical link between the older type of community-based groups and the modern United States format of the business corporation. Originally, the state licenses, called charters, were a regulatory device specifying what the particular corporation was set up to do. This feature was eliminated as the number of corporations expanded (Friedman 1973, 166–78), thus giving way to the modern form of the business corporation.

However, this should not mask the original face of corporate reality which, from a political standpoint, is a state within the state, in which citizens as employees must look for most of their substantive rights to the corporate employers. Earlier, but well into the twentieth century, we would appreciate this better as the “company town,” in which virtually all aspects of life were matters strictly between the employer and the employee. There are numerous traces of the company town today. And more of this is developing as more corporations become multinational corporations without any fidelity to any nation-state (Huntington 1973; Lowi 2001; Schmitter 1991).

## Lower Right Quadrant

The lower right quadrant is in an important sense a discontinuous move, from community to society, *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*, but with emphasis also on the movement from communalism to individualism—in effect, liberalization and secularization. Dahl (1961, 85–86) sums it up neatly in his definition of political modernization as a movement from “cumulative inequalities” toward pluralistic status structures characterized by “dispersed inequalities.” Impressed as Tocqueville was by America’s communal pluralism in villages and neighborhoods, he was equally impressed by what we might now call “rational-choice pluralism,” which Madison had captured in his definition of

“factions” as a grouping based entirely on selfish interest “adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community” (Federalist #10). These were “voluntary associations,” not ascribed or determined products of communal life, tradition, and inheritance.




The lower right quadrant is classic social pluralism—a civil society that is diverse in the way Tocqueville saw American communities and in the way any civil society is likely to develop if ‘freedom of association’ is permitted.

Ethnic, religious, linguistic, and other kinds of natural diversity are likely to make the society more plural to the point where civil society as a whole lacks integration. This problem was the origin of the “melting pot,” which originated as the title of a play by a Jewish immigrant in New York, who recognized the hyperpluralism in American society and imposed on it a hope, a sentiment and expectation embodied in the great American slogan *e pluribus unum*, which would come to pass as those diverse elements were melted into one great alloy, the American (Zangwill 1909). This type of pluralism has great political consequences with a minimum of goal-oriented political action. This is in contrast to the upper right quadrant, where groups orient themselves toward gaining political influence.

## Upper Right Quadrant

The upper right quadrant is precisely the Madisonian type of pluralism, where all groups of this type are consciously goal-oriented, having turned to the state for favorable policies or for defense against the success of competing groups—a function David Riesman (1950) creatively labeled “veto groups.” It is at this point, logically and developmentally, that we get the pluralism that modern political science embraces.

This is the pluralism of “interest groups.” Political parties are strong and continue to internalize (coally) as many groups as possible. There is an established and well-confirmed doctrine in political science that is summed up in “strong parties, weak interest groups, and the converse,” a phenomenon that occurs out of the relative independence of parties and interest groups. In the real world, we have the one or the other to the extent that groups break the party monopoly of access and deal directly with government.




In a genuine pluralist democracy, interest groups continue to penetrate parties as a strategy of access to government. But much more frequently, having broken the party monopoly of access, interest groups seek more and more successfully to gain and maintain direct access to the legislature as well as to the relevant agencies and actors in the executive, in order to participate directly in the policy-making and policy-implementation processes. Here we can note the classic statement of David Truman (1951, 264) that “the common feature of all [interest group] efforts is the attempt to achieve effective access to points of decisions.” Dahl and Lindblom in 1953 defined pluralism, in effect, as competition between and among leaders or elites of private groups, with mutual adjustment through bargaining. Lindblom added in 1977 (178–79) that business held a “privileged position ... with respect to the care with which government satisfied business needs in general but also in privileged roles as participants in policy deliberation.” There are, he continues, “conflicts among businessmen [but that] is not usually a barrier to their occupying a privileged position” because there is “an extreme degree of mutual adjustment and political pluralism.”

## Upper Left Quadrant

This quadrant could take its title from “the iron law of oligarchy,” the most famous finding in Robert Michels’s 1911 book on political parties. The empha-

sis here is on “contestation” between “hegemonic interests” and other interest groups and corporations, which through their more autonomous and relatively permanent corporate existence act directly upon the state and all the layers of government. Processes of this kind of independently operating pluralism also function independently of state controls and state patronage. In this quadrant, groups take on a genuinely corporate character: they become not only permanent but immortal, having an existence above and beyond individuals, be they employees or affiliates. Such corporate groups become states-within-the-state. That is, they can and do interact with the state as interest groups, but in their corporate character they are governmental to the extent to which they provide certain services to their members, with or without government subsidy.

This becomes one of the major sources of criticism of pluralist theory (upper right quadrant) because it does not recognize that the policy-making process and the power structure are going to be different in this quadrant; that is, most of the cases describing the upper left quadrant have to be treated as exceptions to the pluralist theory of the upper right quadrant. This quadrant also bears some resemblance to the feudal pattern of estates and sponsored corporations operating as private governments (Brady 1943). But the upper left quadrant is in other respects quite a distance from the feudal ancestor by being a sort of “functional feudalism” instead of a class, caste, communal, or other derived or ascribed type of feudalism.



This resemblance between the modern functional feudalism and the traditional one is probably the secret of its attraction to people like the young Harold Laski because it had a certain communal quality that might be grafted onto modern rational choice types of associations. When these contractual groups act directly on the state, they come to resemble the picture of polyarchy painted by Dahl not only in the

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
United States and other democracies but also in a great number of states whose expansion of participation did not actually achieve democratization. On the other hand, this stress on polyarchy neglects the still greater likelihood of polyarchic regimes in the upper left quadrant moving toward corporatism: the “functional feudalism” of contractual groups that become constituted, that is, sponsored by the state, doing state service in return for the “privileged position” Lindblom emphasizes, but beyond that, actually sharing or borrowing the sovereignty of the state—true corporatism.

Corporatism was stigmatized by its association with pre-World War II fascist regimes of Germany, Italy, Spain, France, Portugal, and Austria, as well as Ireland and some smaller countries in Northern Europe. But this modern corporatism has been making a comeback in recent decades, with the recovery and growth of postwar European states and even more so with the emergence of the European Community as it moves the European Union toward a federated system of Europe. “Interest group” and “pressure group” have been sanitized as “non-governmental organizations” (NGOs), which are already gaining official recognition by taking on many kinds of essentially governmental functions. Other words also add legitimacy to these corporatist practices: partnerships, outsourcing, privatization, devolution,

and “democratic corporatism” (Schmitter 1979; Katzenstein 1985; Thelen 1991). All of them, however, just add to the conclusion that this may well be still a “corporate millennium” (Lafferty 2000).

## Conclusion

Pluralism may be even more protean than any of the other protean political concepts. As an “ism,” it is something many people believe in and embrace as the criterion for design of the good polity. As an “ism,” it is also a theory about what politics is about in a society free enough to allow diversity to organize and express itself. But here is also where the trouble begins, because pluralism is so many things to so many people. This emphasis on the plurality of pluralism should not overshadow the unity of the normative dimension (Graziano 1996). Pluralism has been embraced in one form or another by philosophers and state-builders as an essential, possibly the essential, requisite of achievable democracy (Walzer 1983). In that sense, it implies citizenship—and democracy—without the state: the promise of a withering away of the state without a revolution. But what, then, of the individuals who have no group or corporation to join?



**Introduction**

Policy, or public policy, as we now use it, is of quite recent origin. Today, policy and law are virtually synonymous, interchangeable. But until well into the twentieth century, policy was a soft synonym for general will, or consensus, or public opinion. Oliver Wendell Holmes captured that distinction in his monumental book *The Common Law*, published in 1881 after at least twenty years of writing it:

In substance the growth of the law is legislative ... I mean, of course, consideration of what is expedient for the community concerned. Every important principle which is developed by litigation is ... *the result of more or less definitely understood views of public policy.* (Holmes 1881, 35, italics added)

The distinction between policy and law was maintained well into the twentieth century. “Public policy” was employed in public discourse as a halo word for public opinion, as it is clearly the case in this pre-World War II European perspective:

The “unruly horse” of public policy ... is but another name for the fundamental ethical, political and social principles which guide legal evolution ... [T]he concept of public policy ... exposes some, but by no means all, of the ... ideological assumptions underlying the administration of the law. (Friedmann 1944, 479)

But all along public policy was morphing into something more precise than public opinion or ideology. One of the first to try a fusion of policy and law had been Woodrow Wilson, upon his return from Germany with his doctorate in political science. Wilson insisted on a distinction between “two functions of government”: the first function is *politics*, the policies or expressions of state will; the second is *administration*, defined as “the execution of those policies” (Wilson 1887, 204, 207, 220; Goodnow 1900). This is, to the best of our inspection, the first conjoining of policy as “what legislators do” and administration as “what governments do.” And as the twentieth century wore on and governments became

more powerful and differentiated, (1) the politics/administration dichotomy was rejected in favor of a sustained “political process” or “policy-making process,” and (2) the law/policy divide was erased, with the two of them, for all practical purposes, becoming one.

The law/policy tie-in went beyond fusion toward a confusion in which policy displaced law as “the reference of preference” in political science as well as in public discourse. And we can provide several instructive reasons why. First, the *substance* of law gave way to *process* in the movement toward a behavioralist and economic (rational choice) definition of social science. Second, democratization was strongly biased in favor of policy and the policy-making process because policy and process appeared to be reciprocal and never-ending, whereas law appeared to be unilateral, hierarchical, authoritative. Law seems fixed and final; legislation and administration are *-tion* words, indicating a state of constant becoming.

Third, and in sum, as legislatures took on more law-making, there was a parallel (and probably unavoidable) recognition that the legislative agenda was too full for law makers to make laws with sufficient clarity to be “faithfully executed” by administrative agencies, not only in the United States (whose Constitution mandates “faithful execution of the laws”) but in any modern government. Delegation of discretion to interpret the laws was so close to illegitimacy in “rule of law” regimes that democratic theory was amended to include a myth of “participation in the policy making process” as a way of making government “closer to the people” by enabling them to bargain with power before coercion is applied.

For all of these reasons, policy remains a slippery concept in its role as a replacement for law, as it seeks to incorporate the substance of policies as well as the process of making the policies. Our task here is to provide a means by which the two usages can be compatible but also clearly distinctive, while remaining logically related.

## The Axes

The policy matrix must be constructed around the innate coercive character of all policy. After all, policy shares DNA with *police*, reaching back to the Greek *polis*—the source of sovereignty and the authority to

govern. Central to any political theory is the question of how the polis imposes its power toward a collective contribution to the good life. But power for what?

The vertical axis denotes the dimension of the *substantive* character of policy. At one extreme is the use of state power to impose obligations backed by sanctions. Regulation can be more or less direct. It can imply the forceful intervention of the state authority, the bottom line of Weber’s definition of the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims *the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory” (Gerth and Mills 1946, 78; italics in original): a monopoly of legitimate coercive power. Yet regulation can also be carried on in a more indirect way, by setting rules and provisions—laws—for all those institutional bodies directly carrying the burden of the governmental process. At the other end of the vertical axis are policies seeking to expand alternatives or to provide facilities, what H. L. A. Hart (1961, 91) referred to as secondary rules. Welfare is not a novel concept. The *Oxford English Dictionary* traces it back at least to the fourteenth century, and it was definitely enlivened as a synonym for the Greek objective of politics as “the good life” in the two great American constitutions, the Articles of Confederation of 1777 and the Constitution of 1789. Welfare thus becomes a relevant—if not exclusive—aim of legislation enacted by and for the people. As opposed to regulation, welfare policies aim at providing or redistributing benefits, rather than restraining or sanctioning conduct.

The horizontal axis is concerned with the scope and focus of policies: individual/class. The individual certainly occupies an immense area of state jurisdiction, aimed at stability by altering and restraining individual conduct. This is often considered to be the totality of government intervention into society (especially by conservatives and libertarians seeking to place restraints on government power), but that is far from exhaustive. Of equal importance, and growing in importance, in the most modern states, is class. In all the social sciences, class has been weakened as a concept by restricting its use since Marx to socioeconomic categories. But class means classification, the sorting of individuals or other units according to a particular shared characteristic deemed relevant and important to the observer. All units so classified are identical for the purpose of the classification. Gender is a class. Ethnicity or national origin is a class. Income brackets, levels of education, etc., are classes. Examples most rel-

evant to this dimension of our matrix are the entire social system, or all investors, or the market, or consumers, or the poor and dependent, each as a class. Even Marx, in “A Note on Classes” (Bendix and Lipset 1966, 5–6), violated his own scheme of “three great social groups” based on “the identity of ... sources of revenue ... [whose] members ... live on wages, profit, and ground-rent respectively.” But immediately he breaks down his threesome: “However, from this standpoint, physicians and officials, e.g., would also constitute classes [and] the same would also be true of the infinite fragmentation of interest and rank.”


The generic term most appropriate for this end of the horizontal axis is “the environment of conduct,” whereby policies aim at manipulation of the whole system in question; that is to say, the probable conduct of the units of a given class are affected *without regard to the identity of any particular individual in that class*. All who are in a particular classification are treated equally, without regard to any aspect of identity other than the characteristic(s) defining *a priori* that class. We can characterize this type of policy as altering conduct by “manipulation of the environment of conduct.”

## Lower Right Quadrant

Following conquest of the territory and population of a newly emerging nation-state, there has to be a period of transformation from martial law (a profound oxymoron) to a level of domestic control worthy of *de facto* and eventually *de jure* sovereignty: recognition by the domestic population that there is a duly constituted government (à la Weber), plus recognition of its monopoly possession of legitimate force by all or most other sovereign nation-states. And at least since the post-Revolutionary era, following the United States and France, there has to be a set of written constitutional principles. Constitutional conventions, and constitutional assemblies, and legislatures have to provide those principles by adopting what we have to call “constitution policies” or “constituent policies.”

Constitution and constituent are synonymous, to be defined as ‘concerning the makeup of a thing.’ The concept has integrity as the first among policies because they are state-building policies. Constituent policies do not touch the public directly; they are concerned with the architecture of the state, including the distribution of powers, the specification of jurisdic-

tions, conditions of rights (claims against the state). Constituent policies are policies toward the state, without directly touching the private sector.



The distinction between constituent policies of the lower right quadrant versus the other three quadrants can be clarified by the military distinction between line and staff units: line units deal directly with the enemy while staff units (also called overhead or auxiliary) serve the line units. Constituent policies are rules about rules; rules about jurisdictions; rules about budgets and accountability, personnel recruitment and qualification, ending with provisions concerning the accountability of the users of power.


These examples surely belong in a category apart from the other three. Constituent policies construct (and reconstruct) the “environment of conduct,” the system within which all other policies are made and applied. And that very uniqueness gives constitution or constituent policy its own, distinct political process. It is elitist but, unlike the “power elite” of C. Wright Mills, this elite is internal to the government bureaucracies, operating in a public opinion vacuum. It is a technocratic elite; they are the masters of information, process, procedure (Beer 1993; Lowi 1972; Machin 1989).

## Upper Left Quadrant

Patronage policy is almost as old as constituent policy in the history of state maintenance. Patronage has been fueled by the ability of people, with surplus resources in government and outside of it, to purchase loyalty and support by subdividing their resources and dispensing them on a personal basis to needy and greedy claimants.

Licensing is the most familiar example and is of immense value because licensing is a resource that can be expanded to meet the needs of the state. A license is a permission by the sovereign to do something that is

otherwise illegal. For example, the practice of law or medicine is illegal unless a certificate of some sort has been granted. The original corporations were grants of privilege by charter from the sovereign to carry out some kind of service or commercial or exploratory venture (Caffrey 1974). Running out of privileges? Declare something else illegal!



Patronage as policy was stigmatized during the nineteenth century as party democracy replaced autocratic states and as the major parties became dependent on job patronage for the maintenance of the governing party coalition. In the United States, President Andrew Jackson in the 1830s redefined patronage as the emptying of all governmental offices to make places for the party faithful. He made a virtue of it by defining it as an instrument of reform, with a euphemism: rotation in office, and with a law that limits appointments to four years. The duties of public offices, he argued were, “or at least admit of being, so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify. ... [R]otation ... constitutes a leading principle in the republican creed” (White 1958, 308–12). The stigma of patronage was never lifted; it remained stigmatized by the popular reference “the Spoils System.” But patronage policies remain an important type of policy in all governments.

Examination of case studies in the politics of patronage policy reveals that the ‘policy-making process’ is dramatically unlike the processes of the other three categories. It is worth repeating that there is no single “political process” or “policy-making process”; there are at least four, one for each of the four policy categories (Lowi 1972). Thus, where the policy-making process (or “power structure”) for *constituent* policy is highly elitist, dominated by high-ranking officials and specialists in government, the politics of patronage policy is captured best by the single, vulgar concept “logrolling.” This process is the least conflictive of the four categories, and its arena is characterized

properly as “distributive,” in which the participants build their majority coalition for each patronage policy by agreements to exchange support without any need of getting into the substance of the issue or the ideologies or special interests of the other participants in that coalition. Properly defined, logrolling is a relationship between two or more persons who have nothing at all in common and who need no information about each other, except when to support each other.


The United States has always been the paradigm case because it was a new state with few common traditions and some very serious sectional, racial, and economic divisions that regularly threatened to tear the country apart, ending in two or more sovereign states. As a consequence, the national government restricted itself almost exclusively to patronage policies. Throughout the nineteenth century and on into the “Roosevelt Revolution,” the U.S. Congress was very busy providing legislation in the area of services (post offices, patents, copyrights, surveys) and subsidies (coastal trade, land grants to states, universities, and corporations), and infrastructure (post roads, canals, standards of weights and measures, the common currency, rights of way). Regulation and welfare (redistributive) policies hardly entered the national government except for a flurry between 1910 and 1914 and then from 1933 onward (Lowi 1995).

## Lower Left Quadrant

Regulation is the classic representation of government, especially as seen by orthodox libertarians and by theocratic conservatives, which is why *police* (derived from *polis*) occupies the lower left corner of the matrix. Regulatory policies are directly coercive. Each regulatory policy imposes an obligation on all persons within the jurisdiction of the authority—in the form of restraints or prescribed actions. And punishment follows for failure to obey.

Thus, due to its coercive action on specific individuals, regulatory policies have gotten and deserve to have gotten special attention. What makes regulatory policies so distinctive is not only the directly coercive techniques of government control that are involved but also because the government has to have maximum information on virtually all the members of its state. As Scott (1998, 2–3) puts it, the populace must be legible: “[Legibility is] a central problem in state-

craft. [It begins with such practices] as the creation of permanent last names, standardization of weights and measures, ... population registers, the invention of freehold tenure ... [ultimately creating] a standard grid whereby [society] could be centrally recorded and monitored.” These state developments to make the society more and more legible to the state contribute to the special character of the regulatory policy quadrant, but it goes beyond that in its contribution to the special texture and dynamics of the politics of regulatory policy.




There is still another defining feature of the substance of regulatory policy and of the politics of regulatory policy which makes regulatory policy the most conflictive of the four types. This is the question of rights. Every regulation seeks to restrain X in order to protect Y, where X may be a few individuals and Y could range from a few individuals to the entire population, rationalized in terms of the public interest. But restrictions on personal privacy and autonomy, restrictions on property and its use, and reduction of wealth, not by taxes but as personal punishments for the alleged wrongdoing of individual citizens—all of these and more come within some of the highest and most precious rights whose deprivations excite not only the most sensitive of ingrained values but also the highest and most sensitive constitutional protections of individual interest (Thurow 1979). All of this helps explain why the political process of regulatory policy is so conflictive.

## Upper Right Quadrant

As we stress in the Introduction to this matrix, class is not a socioeconomic phenomenon but an application of the act of classification, in the sense that for any class all the units included are, by definition, identical. Thus, the policies in this quadrant do not require information on the identity of each individual in the









class. Nor do these policies require knowledge of the conduct of each individual who comes within the classification. Literally, welfare policies, tax policies, fiscal policies, and monetary policies all belong in this quadrant because these policies “work through” classes of persons, as they are defined, *a priori*, by legislation. For the same reason, *equality*, the far corner of this quadrant, is essential, because all members of this defined class must be treated by policy as equal.

Welfare is actually a form of fiscal policy, therefore one of several forms of “system policies.” *Fiscal*—drawn from *fisc*, pertaining to treasury—includes taxation policies, monetary policies, budgetary policies (deficit and surplus). From the fiscal (system) standpoint, welfare is a Keynesian technique, a bundle of policies to manipulate “aggregate demand.” In this context, welfare benefits are “automatic stabilizers,” just like income taxation, automatically counterbalancing downward and upward sides of the business cycle, checking the downward side with budget deficits, lower interest rates, etc., and against the upward side, with higher taxation, higher interest rates, to head off inflation. For one example, a tiny fraction of an interest rate hike can have an instant effect on investment and consumption behavior, without government intervention aimed at individual investing and consumer behavior. This is where we can say that such policies are system policies, controlling behavior by manipulating the “environment of conduct” rather than intervening into the conduct of identified individuals.



As a direct consequence of the class and systemic character of welfare/fiscal policies, this quadrant tends strongly toward “class politics,” in the sociological, Marxist sense. This also explains why most attempts to redistribute wealth on a large scale have been made through this type of policy. The politics of reform requires a systemic vision as well as systemic policy instruments to implement change.

# POLICY



## Conclusion

Policy has been successful in its replacement of law because it holds out hope that government will be more participatory, not only at election time and not only in Congress where only the wealthy and the organized participate, but all along the line. Policy satisfies the need to eliminate the formality of government, as implied by the hope of making government “closer to the people.” Americans have always put a lot of stock in not being fooled or put off by the formal, seeking to pierce through to the informal, the real—as in being able to bargain with power before power is applied. Law is formal; policy is real. The ultimate expression of this comes out in an apocryphal story about President Grover Cleveland, who refused to support the bill of a certain lobbyist on the grounds that it was unconstitutional. To this refusal the lobbyist replied, “What’s the Constitution between friends?” (Fisher 1978).







All of this is true and has been widely endorsed, especially by moderates of all ideological and partisan persuasion. We accept this fact, but it draws us to the opposite conclusion, that policy, thus understood, is a


danger, not a boon. Tocqueville put the case too well for anyone to offer an alternative formulation:

Men living in democratic ages do not readily comprehend the utility of forms. . . . Forms excite their contempt and often their hatred; as they commonly aspire to none but easy and present gratifications, they rush onwards to the object of their desires, and the slightest delay exasperates them. This same temper [carries] with them into political life. (Tocqueville 1966 [1835], 346)

This permits us to conclude with dispatch. There will always be some degree of distance between the formal and the real—in bureaucracies public and private, in families and all other forms of contractual obligations, in sports and other contests, including elections, and all aspects of governing. But in all those matters, most of all in democratic government, the distance between the formal and the real can be turned into an operational definition of illegitimacy. Policy is the informal side of government, the real statement of what government actually does. But policy should be tolerated, not embraced, and even so, tolerated only as long as it knows its place: as the servant of the formal rule of law.

# Polling





*In spite of its sound historical roots, populism has become a catch-all word, applied to many different ideologies, movements, governmental experiences. Once confined to countries undergoing deep social and economic transformations, it is now applied also to define tensions within well-established democratic regimes.*

*The vertical axis, ideology to government, takes into consideration two aspects of democracy—redemptive and pragmatic—as described by Margaret Canovan (1999), while also underlying the fact that populism is no longer limited to the ideology of opposition movements but has become, in many instances, an instrument of governmental power. The horizontal axis distinguishes the traditional populist environment, based on communitarian and ethnic linkages, from the individualistic mobilization typical of contemporary media-driven and charismatic populism.*

*In the URQ, populism appeals to people through specific class interests, if not boundaries. Populist identity can be based on a common economic cause, as in the case of late nineteenth-century U.S. agrarian populism, or on shared traditional values, as in the village-based narodnik revolutionary movement in Russia. In most of these cases, populist ideology tends toward a violent, revolutionary upheaval. In the LRQ we move to populism as a*



*cultural phenomenon, where communities are identified by their ethnic and/or territorial dimension (nation, language, race). Here the main populist target consists of alien cultural groups, perceived as a physical or economic threat and necessitating outright political mobilization to restore law and order.*




*The LLQ refers to populist governments led by strong leaders, a phenomenon first developed in Latin American countries and now spreading into several newly established democracies, especially in the post-Soviet bloc. The quadrant stresses the individualist aspects of the populist regime: the personal power of the president, with his main mission consisting of protecting citizens' safety through discretionary decisions. The ULQ shows the rise of media populism, also called telepopulism (Taguieff 2002), which brings together ideology and propaganda through intensive use of all sorts of media. People are, to a large extent, a substitute for—and transformed into—public opinion. Deep-rooted and complex cultural values are replaced by sudden changes in opinion moods concerning oversimplified issues, conveyed through highly emotional and partisan TV shows. Democracy is thus turned into videocracy (Sartori 1989).*

Annarita Criscitiello


# Populism



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














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







# Revolution





# Rules





Although socialist ideas can be traced back to the seven-teenth century and even before, socialism as ideology and movement of the working class did not develop until the early nineteenth century. From the late nineteenth century onward, the socialist movement was divided into two rival camps: revolutionary versus reformist socialists (horizontal axis). Each of these camps was in turn crossed by cleavages along the state-class divide (vertical axis).

In the ULQ, the goal of revolutionary socialism was the abolition of private-enterprise economy (to be replaced with common ownership) and of state power (to be replaced with people's direct self-government). The most influential representative of this brand of socialism was K. Marx, whose political theory provided the foundations for twentieth-century communism. Marxist theory, claiming the need to conquer state power and to establish a "dictatorship of the proletariat" as the most appropriate means to achieve the socialist goal for economic equality, was developed and implemented by Lenin through the revolutionary experience of Soviet communism.









Another wing of revolutionary socialism (LLQ) emphasized rather the autonomy of the working class in forcing changes to the organization of the capitalist system, independently from trade unions or political parties.






After the split between the followers of Bakunin and those of Marx within the First International, many minority movements (from anarcho-syndicalists to the so-called autonomists) in the course of time rose against "orthodox" Marxism.

Reformist socialism, influenced mainly by the ideas of the German social democrat "revisionist" Bernstein, differed from revolutionary socialism not only in its methods (a peaceful and gradual transition to socialism), but even in its aims, as it promoted the integration of the working class into capitalist society through the improvement of working conditions and the growth of trade unions and mass political parties. In Western Europe, these reformist trends became predominant over revolutionary aspirations, and social democratic and labor parties, with the active support of trade unions, governed their respective countries for lengthy periods.


The reformist action can be limited to the representation of class interests, where organized labor shares the pluralist process of interest articulation and intermediation (LRQ), or it can be extended to welfare state provisions, giving rise to a corporatist system where workers' organizations are integrated into the policy-process (URQ).

# State





# Terrorism



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Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, terrorism has become a catchword, but its origins are much older. The term stems from the bloody phase of the French Revolution known as the Reign of Terror. Historically, terror has been a strategy used by the state itself or the dominant class under stress, to suppress opposition and gain or regain control by fear. The extreme methods are the trademark of totalitarianism—the politicization of every aspect of life.

However, terror is also a strategy available to non-state actors who have neither legitimacy nor police. In fact, terrorism is probably the only effective strategy available to a weak group or movement against an overwhelmingly stronger adversary.



The vertical axis opposing government to group distinguishes between enforcement of state terror, practiced on behalf of the state to shore up the control of the people, and sociopolitical terror, an antistate activity carried out by rebel groups in order to topple the government. As for the horizontal axis, terrorism may be ideologically driven or it may simply be a means employed respectively by the incumbents in order to retain power or by the opposition to wield it. The ULQ incorporates the repressive type of terrorism, by inculcating the norms of the system

in each and every individual and by controlling behavior through mechanisms of fear and anxiety, the ingredients of terror.


The URQ is best characterized as counterinsurgent, that is, oriented toward maintenance of the regime through physical power by employing mercenary groups, goon squads, and eventually more formalized but freely operating groups, such as the Brown Shirts and the Black Shirts—to intimidate individuals, groups, and neighborhoods whenever necessary to atomize the population.


The LLQ perhaps best epitomizes the common thread of terrorism as acts of extreme symbolic violence—the assassination of a monarch or president, or spectacular media events as crashing planes into the World Trade Center. Yet anarchist attacks on authorities seldom are an isolated enterprise. They are more often connected to a tightly organized group, with a wider community basis—bound by religion, class, or nationalism—and a strategy for conquering power (LRQ). In fact, the combination of individual sacrifice and community values may well be the factor turning contemporary terrorism into an outright political actor.

Flavia Carassini



# Trust






Violence is use of force with the probability of bodily harm, to gain submission or elimination from the field of play. Violence is present at the creation, beginning with “the state of nature,” the individual defending right against might. The horizontal axis captures the larger context in which violence runs the gamut from individual to collective but also from spontaneous to planned and from emotive to utilitarian. The vertical axis places a strong emphasis on the public character of violence, not only because the state is a participant in so much of the violence in any society but because even the most private and hidden act of violence quickly moves into the jurisdiction of agencies of the state. And state jurisdiction has expanded significantly during the past century.

The URQ shows that, for any state, the most important type of violence is international violence because this is a threat to its sovereignty, the very essence of the state. International violence is also most important to the state because the world system of states is anarchic, and violence represents a highly probable danger. The ultimate in violence is interstate war, and war has in fact been defined as politics by other means.

In the ULQ, the state is defined as that institution in society which possesses the monopoly of the legal means of violence. This is based on awareness that there is internal war as well as external war. Internally, the state is an employer of violence and also the object of violence because its monopoly of legal violence eventually engenders illegal actions against its own regime or political class—action which is violent or becomes violent as result of state reaction through its armed arm, police. In the LRQ, civil society, so often treated as merely a passive target of state authority, is also the source of mass action against precisely that authority and the regime governing in its name. Violence directed by ideology in a collective or social movement against state authority is called revolution.

This contrasts with a category (LLQ) which also arises out of civil society or private group action but is characterized not by a goal-oriented ideology but by terror for its own sake: no agenda or no plan to take over or reform the state, but just for vengeance, or “revolution for the hell of it,” as Abbie Hoffman expressed it during the relatively moderate radicalism of the American 1960s.

# WELFARE



## Introduction

Until the nineteenth century, *welfare* was commonly used to indicate happiness or prosperity, and was strictly associated in economics with a utilitarian, individualist philosophy (Riley 2001). As a concept denoting organized care as a community phenomenon, *welfare* came into common usage only in the twentieth century, and it was not until the 1940s that *welfare state* became an established designation for a new type of public policy. However, even the famous Beveridge report (1942), that was to set the welfare state as the new goal—and standard—for post-World War II democracies, was titled *Social Insurance and Allied Services*. This more restricted title reflected a widespread preoccupation with the “Santa Claus connotations”—that the state could be perceived as a dispenser of unlimited subsidies and services.

In spite of later pressures to foster and generalize the expansion of the welfare state, the origins of welfare as a public policy bore the clear marks of a mixed regime, one where civil society also played an important role. In fact, all through premodern times, fami-

ly and church were the main provider of welfare for the needy, mainly children and sick or elderly people. Workers’ mutual aid societies also contributed by setting up funds to care for their injured or sick colleagues. In the early stages of industrialization, factory and mine owners occasionally managed such funds as well, and even hired doctors. Sometimes they were just generous or caring; but it was good policy to ensure that workers were in good condition to be more productive. This paved the way, on both ideological and organizational grounds, to the rise of market-based welfare policies, where welfare care developed as a set of risk-protection provisions, mainly in the form of private insurance related to work or entrepreneurship.

This helps explain why pioneer analyses of the welfare state tended to find a common pattern among industrialized countries, as a function of economic growth and as an effort from the state to redistribute surplus revenues to counteract “capitalist commodification” (Wilenski 1975; Flora and Heidenheimer

1981; Esping-Andersen 1985). Yet, later investigations have shown that path dependency proved important to steer national experiences along each country's own policy legacy (Pierson 1994). This thinking has led to several attempts to distinguish welfare practices according to cultural traditions, with one widely influential formulation proposing a three-fold categorization of the concept, based on the actual policies or practices of three distinct "regime-types" (Esping-Andersen 1990, 26–27). The first is the liberal regime, typical of the United States, Canada, and Australia, characterized by means-tested "social insurance usually limited to working-class dependents, driven by liberal work-ethic norms, guaranteeing a minimum so as not to discourage the work ethic" (ibid., 26–27). The second is a corporatist regime granting welfare as a right not tied to the market but attached to "class and status" and "the preservation of status differentials." The best examples of this regime-type are Austria, France, Germany, and Italy (ibid., 26–27). The third type is the Scandinavian social-democratic regime, based on "principles of universalism [that] promote an equality of the highest standards, not an equality of minimal needs..., guaranteeing workers full participation in the quality of rights enjoyed by the better-off" (ibid., 27).

Esping-Andersen's formulation proved extremely helpful to transcend a unitary concept of welfare. Yet it soon fell prey to criticism that these geopolitical boundaries were too narrow or too loose. Britain, for one, the harbinger of the welfare state, found no place in this classification. Putting Italy and Germany together in the corporatist mold overlooked the determinant role played by family in Italy as a welfare collector, especially in the southern part of the country (Ferrera 1987). Also, where state intervention was limited, excellent results could be obtained by other means. In Australia, for example, rather than deploying costly social programs, low inequality and high job security were reached through indirect provisions such as tariff, minimum wage, arbitration laws, and immigration policy (Baldwin 1992; Castles 1989).

Thus, while historical and cultural differences do matter, it remains difficult to attribute a country as a whole to one or another type of welfare. Different nations have experimented, at various stages in their history, with different welfare patterns, showing higher or lesser degrees of convergence at critical junctures. This becomes all the more evident as the list of

benefits and services comprised in the category of welfare still shows, in most classifications, a broad range of inclusiveness: from health care, unemployment, accident and sickness benefits to social services, child-care policies, family allowances, poor relief, and even, in some cases, education (Flora 1987; Hicks 1999; Huber and Stephens 2001). Much as it is useful to differentiate welfare types on historical as well as normative grounds, in the end most countries incorporate features of more than just one model.

### The Axes

The horizontal axis, which distinguishes among recipients of welfare benefits and services, is the main watershed between ancient and modern practice. Providing assistance to the needy was the task of a variety of institutions, from charities to hospices, all through the Middle Ages (Ritter 1989), with family standing out as the natural and most widespread agent for accumulating and distributing welfare. In all of these cases, care-taking—whatever its content—would be on an individual basis. Obvious as this could be in the small familial environment, community assistance preserved a strong individualist bias also on the much larger scale of poor relief intervention. Indeed, this was the simplest and most direct way to discriminate between deserving and undeserving recipients, on the basis of moral standards which set the agenda of welfare debate and policies from Victorian England to neoliberal America.


The collectivization of welfare only arrived when the modern state took upon itself the function of protecting its citizens from the uncertainties of the market economy. Collective services and benefits covered a wide range of categories, from general health care and pensions for salaried workers to social programs for unemployed youths and women with dependent children. The range extended all the way to the radical social-democratic vision and practice, with welfare generously distributed to all citizens on the basis of universal rights.

One way to distinguish among different strategies for coping with welfare recipients is to look at the way collective and individual actors came to be aggregated, whether through specific classes/categories or on a more systemic scale. On the vertical axis, class includes socioeconomic class but goes beyond that, to the original idea of class as classification, as in the

functional aggregation of war veterans or disabled people. On the opposite pole is order, distinguished by the fact that the collective or individual units are of no concern as such but are significant in their mass interactions without regard to the conduct of each unit but stochastically with regard to their conduct as a whole. Order, in this respect, stays both as a moral stance and as a type of regime.

## Lower Left Quadrant

Historically, public welfare first developed out of the elites' concern for coping with the poverty of the underclass as a social and political threat. The earliest tradition belongs to English Poor Law, a system of relief based on the parish as its administrative unit. Originally formulated in 1601, this set of legal provisions was put under severe stress by the advent of the industrial labor market, at the end of the eighteenth century. The attempt to strengthen and relaunch the old scheme through the Speenhamland Act, which called for unlimited support by parishes to needy workers, was wrecked by the mass dimension of unemployment resulting from *laissez-faire* market economy (Polanyi 1944). The new Poor Law which ensued in 1834 bore the key mark of modern poor regulation: benefits, whether pecuniary or in food, could be allotted only to individuals in exchange for their labor. The proliferation of workhouses testified to the close connection created between welfare and workfare, one that would easily propagate to the territory of criminal law (Davey 1995; Howard 1997).



This is also the most direct link to modern welfare as regulation—or welfare as regulatory policy—to be found in the United States, where “regulating the poor” came in spurts and phases (Mink and O’Connor 2004). The pattern was first captured by Piven and Cloward, who saw it emerging especially in the United States but repeated in many other welfare states: “During transient periods ... political protest provoked by mass unemployment sometimes forced

the governments to provide relief. Then, as disorder subsided, relief was cut back, thus restoring the economic insecurity that has been the driving force in the operation of labor markets” (Piven and Cloward 1971, x). Their focus here is on the cyclical pattern at the macro level of general expenditure in relation to societal circumstances and mass behavior. However, regulation must be understood jurisprudentially—as a body of rules imposing obligations on *individual* conduct, enforced by sanctions of the appropriate agency of the government.


The original U.S. Social Security laws beginning in 1935 possess some areas of regulation, in the form of separation of eligibility by means tests, separation by gender and marital status, and restrictions on how welfare payments are spent. These and additional regulatory provisions were made more severe by devolving implementation to the states, such that the number and variety of restrictions varied from state to state. The regulatory practices, especially the segregation of gender and racial status, were diminished during the 1960s with nationalization of standards, but then returned with a vengeance by bipartisan adoption of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). This was a major turn in setting the vision of poverty regulation back on its moral feet, the original Anglo-American—and neoliberal—creed that you can “make the poor less poor [only] by making them more virtuous” (Schwartz 2000, xv).

This vision of a “moral citizenship” (Munger 2003) rests on a solid, if underlying, class motivation of using welfare/workfare provisions to repress social conflict and exert systematic surveillance (Peck 2001; Gilliom 2001). Statistics show inexorably that “the American incarceration rate is the highest in the world, roughly five times the rate of most industrial democracies. The prison population tripled between 1985 and 1997 ... with most American prisoners doing time for nonviolent crimes” (Morone 2003, 140). Welfare as regulation may perhaps be in the end successful in preserving social order, but only at a very high human price.

## Upper Left Quadrant

The move from the lower left to the upper left quadrant is one from conflict to consensus and from order to class as the yardstick of welfare provisions.

Individuals still hold center stage as recipients of subsidies or incentives, but they qualify as belonging to a group or category. And the logic of welfare policies is consensus-building rather than the repression of conflict.




Perhaps the first large-scale case of welfare as public patronage is to be found in the U.S. pension administration for veterans. Note that this type of federal machinery was rooted in a long-established tradition of using governmental spoils to cultivate a mass clientele, perhaps the most original contribution from American political parties to the engineering of democratic consensus (Crenson 1975). Yet, with the establishing of a federal office for providing pensions to the Veterans of the Civil War, patronage became a large-scale and fully bureaucratized practice of the modern state (Skocpol 1992). This early American precedent was to become a dominant pattern in many developed welfare states, especially in those southern European countries where ruling parties made extensive use of selective patronage incentives. In post-World War II Italy, so-called invalidity pensions were granted by the millions mostly to indigent southern peasants, as a substitute for the social security benefits available for the northern factories' working class. This form of state intervention turned particularly helpful toward the construction of a mass electoral base for party clientelism (Tarrow 1977).

## Upper Right Quadrant

However, class does not only refer to a category of welfare recipients, the more or less preposterous assemblage of individuals united only as objects of *ad hoc* legislation. Class may also stand much closer to its sociological meaning of a highly cohesive group sharing the same working conditions and values. The most notable case in point was the establishment of compulsory insurance for workers by the German empire under Bismarck in the 1880s as a measure of





consensus-building. The relevance of this precedent can hardly be overestimated. Bismarck himself made it explicit that the reason for such an unprecedented program was eminently political: "The action of the state is the only means of arresting the Socialist movement" (Taylor 1967, 162). However, by addressing the industrial working class as its main target for compulsory insurance, Bismarck also founded the first modern system of social policy (Rimlinger 1971), one where contract would play a central, if not exclusive, role.

Whether as a result of paternalist consensus-building or as the outright product of conflictual class struggle (Korpi 1983), the corporatist welfare state "was built up on a new linkage characteristic of 'wage earning society,' between the dependent status as wage earner and an extensive system of protection against risks" (Guillemard 2001, 16417). This is the signature Social Security quadrant. Particularly in the United States but also in Britain and France, it was euphemistically called social insurance.






It resembles insurance inasmuch as it was based upon contributions to an "insurance trust fund," the premiums being paid by payroll taxes on the employee and a more or less proportionate tax on the employer. At an age specified by law, the American "ensuree" is eligible for a monthly retirement check that elsewhere is called a pension. Nevertheless, social security is not true insurance because it is not "actuarially sound": premiums are not pegged to or adjusted to risk, and the employee cannot increase premiums in order to increase the size of the retirement support. Even more, the rise of life expectancy rates would soon make it much more difficult to match the amount paid during the working activity with the pensions each worker was to receive until his death. This is a problem which could only be tackled by moving to a different welfare model, with contracts being turned into rights and classes being replaced by a new collectivistic order.

# WELFARE




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### Lower Right Quadrant

This is the quadrant so often mistaken for socialism, but closer to the truth it is welfare as fiscal policy. This is directly out of Keynes, who insisted that Keynesianism could save capitalism, not kill it. It took a while for policy-makers to embrace this new creed wholeheartedly (Hall 1989). Yet, many of the best minds coming out of World War II were at last convinced that Keynesianism had provided the lever by which the Archimedes of today could “move the earth,” rendering socialism obsolete before its time.

The most distinct feature of this lower right quadrant is the idea of system. This became especially suitable because of the rise of statistics, the computer, and the ability to think of society not as a community but as a system (Ewald 1986; Porter 1986). Welfare policies could escape the individualization, the categorization, and the classification of human needs that require discretion about welfare bureaucracies by contriving to handle welfare matters automatically, without giving government bureaucracies the power (and responsibility) to use their discretion on each client/citizen. Citizens and their families would have rights inherent in their citizenship, not their labor, and without elaborate proof of need. In all of these respects, and by virtue of all of its achievements, the welfare state could be eventually and more properly termed as a *social state* (Ritter 1989).



T. H. Marshall was the first to herald publicly the advent of a social citizenship, arguing that the “claim of the individual to welfare is sacred and irrefutable and partakes of the character of a natural right” (1949, 258). But he retreated immediately to a position more akin to all welfare states: “the claim of the individual must always be defined and limited so as to fit into the complex and balanced pattern of the welfare of the community, and that is why the right to welfare can never have the full stature of a natural right” (ibid., 259).

Kathi Friedman (1981) has located a better formulation by adding Weber to Marshall in order to get a

“gratuitous/rights” continuum. Gratuities are grants of patronage to identified clients. At the other extreme, there would not be natural rights (which do not actually exist) but constitutional rights. The fact is that a substantial portion of the space between gratuities and rights is in fact occupied by a type of right that Americans call *entitlement*. *Entitlements*, especially in welfare and related social policies (including education and many other public and nongovernmental services offered to the public), are rights created by legislation (or by agencies with legislative authority) and *these entitlements can be terminated by repealing the legislation*. An entitlement is a lower order of right, but one that is equal to a constitutional right as long as the legal authority exists. This case put the United States on terms almost identical to welfare states in the more social-democratic countries, but only up to the point of a legislative rather than a constitutional sanctuary (Bussière 1997). Further distancing of the U.S. from social democracy was provided by the PRWORA in 1996, when Congress virtually carved out half of the American welfare state (the means-tested, noncontractual half, called AFDC—Aid to Families with Dependent Children) and terminated it.


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### Conclusion



Euphoria for Keynesian capitalism fulfilling socialism’s utopia only was a short-lived parenthesis (Pontusson 1992; Jones 1993; Pierson 1994). The trend toward a social model of welfare state did not outlive the economic post–World War II boom. By the early 1970s, the fiscal crisis of the state (O’Connor 1973) was already eroding the financial basis of many redistributive policies, and bringing old conservative wisdom back in as neoliberal arrogance.

This is not to say that the clock was turned backward everywhere. Rather, the map of regional variations looked again as one of differences and controversial trends. This was due partly to the reemergence of history’s enduring legacies, as with America’s ideological preference for self-interest over equality, and personal responsibility over collective redistribution. But also, each country’s direction was the outcome of the clash among competing political actors, with party mobilization in defense of—or against—the welfare state becoming a decisive factor (Huber and Stephens 2001). It may not, after all, come as a surprise that, for the future of the welfare state, politics does again matter.





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









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

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