# CAMPAIGNING TO THE NEW AMERICAN ELECTORATE

## ADVERTISING TO LATINO VOTERS

Marisa A. Abrajano

# Advertising Cultures

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Culture, Representation and Identities is dedicated to a particular understanding of _cultural studieso as an inherently interdisciplinary project critically concerned with the analysis of meaning. The series focuses attention on the importance of the contemporary _cultural turno in forging a radical re-think of the centrality of _the culturalo and the articulation between the material and the symbolic in social analysis. One aspect of this shift is the expansion of _cultureo to a much wider, more inclusive range of institutions and practices, including those conventionally termed _economico and _politicalo.

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These demographic changes have important implications for the current and future state of American politics. First, Latinos are still politically "up for grabs"—they have yet to exhibit stable political and partisan preferences to the same degree as African Americans (Frymer 1999).[6] Although estimates of the Latino electorate's support for the Democratic presidential candidate have generally hovered around 60 percent for the past thirty years (Schmal 2004), many more Latinos than Anglos report being independents or uncertain about their partisan preferences (Hajnal and Lee 2008). Forty-seven percent of Latino respondents in the 1993–94 Multi-City Survey of Urban Inequality refused to answer the party identification question, responded that they "didn't know" which party they supported, or indicated that they had no preference for either of the two main political parties. The 2006 Latino National Survey similarly found that 16.6 percent of Latinos report being independent, 16.3 percent "don't care" about their party identification, and 20.1 percent don't know or do not consider themselves to be affiliated with a political party (Abrajano and Alvarez, forthcoming).

Recent elections have also revealed Latinos' lack of partisan rootedness. In the 1998 midterm elections, Republican candidates were able to secure more than one-third (36.3 percent) of the Latino electorate. And in the 2004 presidential election, the National Election Pool estimates that 53.3 percent of Latinos supported the Democratic candidate, John Kerry, while 44 percent cast their ballots for the Republican incumbent, George W. Bush. This marked the first time that Republicans captured 40 percent or more of the Latino vote in a presidential or midterm election.[7] Republicans interpreted this level of support as a sign that Latinos' political preferences are changing, whereas the result convinced Democrats that they cannot assume Latinos will automatically support their candidates.

Much of the Latino population is also geographically concentrated in battleground states and those with a large number of electoral college votes. In each of the five states of California, Texas, Florida, Illinois, and New York, Latinos constitute between 20 and 35 percent of the statewide population; these five states alone account for 168 total electoral college votes, which is more than half of the votes needed for victory in a presidential election. Latinos similarly make up a sizable segment of the statewide population in battleground states such as Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico. And in the politically important southern region of the United States, the Latino population is growing faster than in any other region of the country (Kochhar et al. 2005). For instance, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, which

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while on furlough from prison. The effectiveness of this ad was attributed to the fact that, although it contained visual images of Horton, no mention was made of "racial nouns or adjectives to endorse white prerogatives, express anti-black sentiment, represent racial stereotypes, or portray a threat from African-Americans" (Mendelberg 2001, 8). The Willie Horton ad was framed in a way that encouraged voters to associate negative feelings about race with Dukakis's presidential bid or with the weekend furlough program, and it did so without explicitly mentioning race. The frames used in such political ads can prime voters' evaluations of the candidates featured in the ads and the policies that they discuss (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar 1991), just as the Horton ad primed voters to carry prejudicial feelings with them to their polling places.

Finally, agenda-setting refers to the order in which political messages are discussed in an advertisement. If, for example, a candidate consistently emphasized education as his most important campaign issue, voters might perceive education as the issue most salient in their decision about which candidate to vote for. Extensive work by Iyengar and Kinder (1987) in this area finds that "those problems that receive prominent attention on the national news become the problems the viewing public regards as the nation's most important" (16). Both experimental work and survey data provide strong support for the argument that the issues a political ad emphasizes can influence which issues and policies individuals consider important (Herrnson and Patterson 2000).

All of these means of influencing voters help to make televised political advertising more effective than other tools at the candidates' disposal. Moreover, the content of political advertising is valuable in voter education. Political advertising can serve to reduce voters' misperceptions and uncertainty (Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin 1994; Lupia 1994; Bartels 1993; Conover and Feldman 1989) as well as to provide cues that assist voters in their decision making (Lau and Redlawsk 2006; Popkin 1994; Lupia 1994). Information is costly to attain and thus provides voters with little incentive to gather it, but information shortcuts, or heuristics, can help reduce these costs (Kahneman et al. 1982). Such heuristics can take the form of reliance on campaign messages, on experiences from individuals' daily lives, or on using information experts, such as political commentators, as sources of knowledge (Lupia 1994; Popkin 1994). Some of the most readily available cues for voters are provided by the messages in the increasing number of televised political ads. But

> makes you think, instead of being blanket-bombed with mind-less crap. Working here is like playing for West Ham ± we're a premiership team and there's huge expectation. If you can't cut it, take-up pig farming or something (*Sunday Times Magazine*, 14 May 2000: 90).

Mark Wnek's short, but extraordinary, narrative was shot through with a mixture of the banality and self-aggrandisement that often characterised the Sunday Times magazine's `A Life in the Day of' feature and the testimonies of those sections of the metropolitan elite typically represented on its pages. However, it was in other ways, a tantalising little text because of the glimpses that it offered into the personal and professional life of a creative advertising person like Wnek and the social scripts that gave direction to his life. Certainly in this latter regard, his narrative was revealing. In its detailing of his preoccupation with the latest fads in healthy living and lifestyle and his stylistic self-consciousness with regard to how he looked and dressed for work, Wnek's narrative confirmed certain ideas about the modernity of advertising practitioners and their proximity to the most contemporary signs of urban life and consumption not only in the work that they performed, but also in their own lifestyles. A competitive and combative view of the business in which he had made his name was also evident in his account, together with a mode of self-presentation in relation to work that played up the ideal of the workaholic and ruthless advertising manager.

Wnek's narrative was suggestive in other ways. It offered additional insights into his approach to the business of advertising. Notably, it presented him as someone motivated by a positive and optimistic view of the commercial practice in which he was engaged and driven by an ambition to produce advertising that added to the `colour' of life through its cleverness and style. His account also suggested that this was a commercial practice that rested upon distinctive understandings of the creative people who performed this task and the sources of their creativity ± `reservoir of life stuff' individuals or those who were `instinctively brilliant', as he put it. In fact, if we push further at this latter theme, we can see in Wnek's whole narrative a delineating of a particular model of the creative person in advertising and their distinctive habitus built around the cultivation of a flamboyant and assertive persona.

Mark Wnek's narrative is an appropriate place to start this book because creative people in advertising and their subjective dispositions and self-dramatisations are who *Advertising Cultures* sets out to examine. The book focuses on the work experiences and attributes of a group of young male art directors and copywriters working for London-based advertising agencies and a group of their female colleagues.[1] It details the identities and

tunities, and behavioral factors, which include one's interest in politics and rate of political participation. I explore each of these factors in the following section, paying special attention to any variations that may arise between Latinos and Anglos.

The demographic characteristic of race plays a particularly important role in the types of structural opportunities (for example, employment opportunities and access to quality public education) available to individuals, thus affecting the distribution of political knowledge among the U.S. population. For the overall Latino population, nativity, or place of birth, is also an especially important factor affecting their level of political knowledge. As of 2000, an estimated 45.5 percent of the Latino population was foreign born (U.S. Census Bureau 2000a).[1] The result of having such a significant portion of the population born outside of the United States is that many Latinos' acculturation and socialization into American society and politics is markedly different from the socialization experiences of those born in this country (Portes and Rumbaut 1992; García Bedolla 2005).[2] Political socialization occurs primarily through formal education and family influences (Hyman 1959; Campbell et al. 1964; Easton and Dennis 1969; Greenstein 1965; Valentino and Sears 1998). Thus, one of the strongest forms of political socialization, the acquisition of partisanship through one's parents (Campbell et al. 1964), may be unavailable to these foreign-born immigrants. Although scholars have questioned the long-term effects of pre-adult socialization (Vaillancourt 1973), especially for partisanship, its long-term stability cannot be overlooked (Petrocik 1996).

Because a majority of foreign-born Latinos (70 percent) arrive in the United States as adults (Campbell and Lennon 1999), they are not exposed to any of the civic learning that takes place in high school or college. The remaining one-third of the foreign-born Latino population is under the age of eighteen. Unfortunately, these young immigrants are more likely than native-born Latinos to drop out of high school (Fry 2007). Thus, almost half of all Latinos in the United States either lack formal U.S. education or fail to complete that education. This makes it a challenge for many Latinos to learn the concepts and ideas that are foundational to knowledge about and interest in the American political system. Moreover, having parents who were born outside the United States virtually eliminates the possibility that foreign-born Latinos can become politically socialized at home. Most foreign-born Latinos eventually do become eligible voters as they naturalize and undergo the

motivations that animated and gave direction to their working lives and also sets out to explore the informal cultures in which they worked, as well as tracking these individuals as they moved through the social networks that abutted to the advertising agencies in which they spent so much of their time. There are good reasons for wanting to document these creative cultures and the subjective identities of creative people. As a range of sociological commentators and cultural critics have argued, advertising and the wider commercial field have acquired a new centrality and salience to economic and cultural life in the last decade and a half or so. Certainly, developments within the commercial domain have been central to recent accounts of social and cultural change in Britain, together with much of Western Europe and North America. These changes have often been read in optimistic and epochal terms. Scott, for example, argued that 'the cultural economy' (those sectors that cater to consumers' demands for amusement, ornamentation, self-affirmation, social display and so on) was becoming one of the leading edges of contemporary capitalism' (Scott, 1997: 323, 1999; see also Wernick, 1991; Slater, 1997), while for Lash and Urry (1994) the commercial cultural industries were integral to a shift towards a new era of 'reflexive modernity'. For other commentators still, like Scase and Davis, these sectors of commercial endeavour were paradigmatic of wider developments in economic life that characterised a shift towards greater knowledge and information intensive forms of economic activity (Scase and Davis, 2000; see also Leadbeater, 1999). Less grandiose arguments from within cultural analysis have also confirmed the impact of the world of commercially produced goods and services upon particular social constituents and definitions of the good life through this period, and explored the interweaving of these developments with popular politics and governmental strategy (Hall, 1984; Mort, 1989; du Gay, 1996; Mort, 1996; Nixon, 1996).

Advertising has occupied an important place within these diverse accounts of economic and cultural change and represented a particularly visible marker of the dynamism of commercial society. For a sociologist like Andrew Wernick, it was central to a new phase in the rise of a 'promotional culture', in which more and more areas of life were dominated by the logic of promotion and associated processes of commodification, while for a more prosaic commentator like the business analyst and style watcher Peter Fork, advertising was an indispensable part of the matrix of metropolitan life, central to the intoxicating confidence of promotion, art, financial markets and government that characterised the recent period of commercial restructuring (Wernick, 1991; Fork, 1995: 136–44).

Recent policy initiatives have served to foreground the central role of the dynamic sectors of the commercial and associated media industries to

processes of social and economic change and renewal. In policy statements, especially those emanating from the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) in Britain, emphasis has particularly been upon the forms of creativity and cultural innovation that flow from these sectors and a concern to nurture these currents as part of a project of economic and cultural modernisation. Advertising has figured strongly within this policy rhetoric as well. As the DCMS website proudly proclaimed 'Britain's creativity is flourishing as never before, whether in creative industries like advertising or film, or in the visual and performing arts. Our art, artistry and expertise is valued all over the world' (see also Smith, 1997). Here, then, was a sector (advertising) in which Britain was palpably a 'winner' in the global economy and one which 'along with other industries like film, design, digital media, music and architecture' lay close to the beating heart of 'Britain's creativity', itself raised to an aspect of the national character.

Assessments of this order have contributed to a partial upturn in the social fortunes of advertising and specifically to the recognition conferred upon the advertising industry in Britain, with the views of advertising practitioners increasingly courted by the quality press and broadcasters[2] and some advertising people even being awarded high public honours. The cultural recognition evident in these developments is not without its historical precedents and contemporary accounts of the role of the creative and commercial industries have tended to occlude a longer history in which these sectors have been seen as pivotal to the restructuring of liberal western democracies (Mort, 2000). More significantly, the growing recognition conferred upon the industry and arguments about its new salience to economic and cultural life have proceeded with little sustained attention to the inner workings of these worlds of 'creative' work. While some attention has been given to the formal practices, institutional arrangements and types of expertise prevalent within this sector, little remains known about the social make-up of the advertising industry in Britain, its informal cultures or the subjective identities of its key practitioners (Schudson, 1993; Moeran, 1996; Nixon, 1996; McFall, 2002). In the few instances where these cultural intermediaries have been addressed by sociologists, studies have tended to foreground in a general way their role as taste shapers and to consider the social make-up of this group rather abstractly in class terms (Featherstone, 1991; Wynne, 1998; Wynne and O'Connor, 1995).

Cultural critics have also offered generally attenuated accounts of this field of commercial endeavour. Certainly the established approaches that have framed the study of consumption and commercial cultures within cultural studies have tended to privilege consumers and practices of consumption at the expense of a more expanded account of the commercial domain. More or less absent from these accounts has been attention to the

work-based cultures of the commercial industries or the cultural resources that its practitioners draw on in living out particular social scripts within this field of commercial activity. The account that I develop over the next seven chapters places these substantive issues at the heart of its concerns and, in so doing, sets out to render more specific the over-general claims about commercial society that contemporary sociologists and cultural critics have been prone to advance.

In working against these established traditions of cultural and sociological analysis, my account has been driven by the insistence that much can be gained from foregrounding these previously neglected aspects of the worlds of commercial endeavour. In fact, it is a central contention of the account that follows that opening up the informal cultures and subjective identities of advertising practitioners is an indispensable part of an adequate account of the commercial practices performed by advertising agencies. However, in insisting on this point, my intention is not to reduce the commercial practices of advertising to the subjectivity of its key practitioners or the cultures of agencies. The process of commercial cultural production in which advertising agencies are engaged is highly structured and involves a range of practitioners deploying different kinds of formal knowledge and expertise, as well as the mobilisation of a set of economic and cultural resources, in order to generate promotional materials and associated services for clients. This process, however, is clearly also shaped by more informal factors and judgments, including those bound up with the particular social make-up and subjectivities of key practitioners. It is clear, for example, that informal knowledge possessed by practitioners about the target consumer but not itself present in the market research or planning documentation, can be important in helping agencies to manage the relationship between their clients and consumers. This is especially germane in those markets where the key advertising people – essentially the art directors and copywriters – are culturally close to the target consumer. Furthermore, the cultural identifications of practitioners and the wider occupational culture in which they move will both provide resources for and set certain limits to the process of cultural production in which they are engaged. Thus, the subjective dispositions of key practitioners and the meanings, values and normative assumptions written into their occupational cultures will be important in mediating the process of reaching out to and connecting with consumers. It is this insistence, then, that has prompted me to ask: what is the social make-up of the core advertising jobs? What kind of values do these practitioners hold? What subjective dispositions and attributes animate their working lives? What kind of occupational culture do they work in?

In centre-staging these questions, Advertising Cultures is, as I have already indicated, strongly particularistic in its focus as it seeks to break

with the problems of overgenerality that have dogged recent sociological and cultural studies accounts of advertising and commercial society. In focusing on a specific set of jobs in advertising and a particular group of advertising people, I further privilege a story about gender and, specifically, masculinity. In this sense it is evident, again, why Mark Wnek's narrative was a particularly appropriate and apposite place to start this book. His account was richly indicative of a certain kind of flamboyant, combative and self-conscious style of masculinity. This surfaced in not only the extravagant tone of his testimony and its choice of wildly gendered metaphors (like 'a life commando', indeed), but was also present in his investment in a highly contemporary style of masculinity carried through the codes of dress and self-presentation. It is this link between masculinity and creative jobs dramatised in his account that the book centrally explores. Again, there are good reasons for narrowing the focus of the book in this way. One of the areas of commercial provision where advertising practitioners have played a more intensified role in recent years has been in relation to men's markets and the consumption identities of young men. In fact, the industry has been central to the dissemination of new popular representations of masculinity shaped through the repertoires of style and individual consumption from the mid-1980s through to the present. These advertising representations have been key to the consolidation of a new set of masculine identities shaped through the world of commercially produced goods and services. The most notable of these have been the figures of the 'new man' and 'new lad'. It is worth pausing to reflect on the cultural significance of these consumerist masculine scripts. Both the 'new man' and the 'new lad' were characterised by the way they opened up consumer pleasures previously marked as taboo or socially dubious for groups of men and each, in their own way, represented a distinct configuration of a more or less coherent form of post-permissive heterosexual masculinity shaped through this world of goods (see Mort, 1989; Mort, 1996; Nixon, 1996; Nixon, 1997; Nixon, 2001). As I have argued elsewhere, however, there were important differences between these social scripts, even if commentators within the commercial industries themselves typically overplayed them (Nixon, 1996; Nixon, 2001). At its most ruptural, the 'new man' embodied a partial loosening of the binary codes that regulated cultural relations between hetero- and homosexual masculinities. In so doing, it resignified these relations through a more inclusive form of homosociability carried through a blurring of the visual style of gay and straight-identified men (see also Mort, 1996). The 'new lad', on the other hand, represented a certain repositioning of these consumerist masculine scripts against the sexual ambiguities of its precursor and a more trenchant version of heterosexual masculinity shaped around the consumer pleasures of 'cars, girls, sport and

booze. In the case of the 'new lad', then, the predominant ordering of the social rituals of consumption was more exclusively heterosocial.

Both these cultural identities enjoyed a degree of popular legitimacy and recognition that suggested that they were connected with the felt movements of the culture of groups of young men over the last 15 years or so. Of the two identities, the figure and idea of the 'new lad' and its distinctive idioms have enjoyed the more prodigious currency from the mid-1990s through to the present. So-called 'loaded ladspeak', derived from the men's magazine, *Loaded*, that dominated the market for young men's magazines in the mid-late 1990s, was excitedly taken up – to be enjoyed as well as disparaged – by the broadsheet press and other parts of the media, including advertising agencies. Certainly, the idioms of 'ladspeak' and its ironic celebration of masculine juvenility provided an important shorthand for advertising agencies concerned with targeting these lucrative young male markets (see *Independent on Sunday*, 3.8.95: 10; *Guardian*, 26.2.96: 14–15; *Campaign*, 11.10.96: 40–1; 1.11.96: 27).

What is striking, given the extensive interest in these shifting masculine scripts from both popular and academic commentators from the mid-1980s through to the present, is that little remains known about the gender cultures within the commercial industries – including advertising – that have mediated the production and circulation of these new masculine identities. In fact, the gender cultures of the advertising industry and the gender identities of its key people have remained more or less invisible. Exploring these issues is especially pertinent in relation to the ad men central to *Advertising Cultures*. Art directors and copywriters occupy a pivotal place within the processes of cultural production that have underpinned the new representations of masculinity and it is clear, as I have already insisted, that their own cultural knowledge and dispositions can exert a particularly strong informal influence over the finished adverts. The art directors and copywriters whom I focus upon in the book were all aged between 25–38 years of age and had started, or were establishing their careers in the mid-1990s, at a point when advertising's interest in young male markets was at a particularly high level. As such, they were close in age to the male consumers subject to this sustained commercial interrogation and it is their relationship to these shifting codes of masculinity carried through the forms of gendered commerce in which they were involved that the book sets out to explore. In doing so, I do not detail the relationship between the advertising creatives whom I interviewed and the specific campaigns that they worked on. The book has been constrained by ethical considerations concerning the need to anonymize their testimonies and the concern to avoid including material that would make them easily identifiable. None the less, I do make some specific claims about the

relationship between the subjective identities and informal cultures of these practitioners and the advertising and promotion they were engaged in producing. To this end, *Advertising Cultures* centrally asks the following questions: What were the informal gender cultures in which these advertising men worked? What cultural resources did they draw on in living out particular gender identities at work? What scope did this field of commercial endeavour offer for living out distinctive forms of masculinity? How, in short, was gender written into the creative cultures of advertising and into the subjective identities of its creative practitioners? In Part 3 of the book, I turn centrally to these questions and explore the informal cultures of the creative departments in which the practitioners worked and detail the kinds of gender identities privileged within these cultures. I push at the social scripts the men I interviewed drew upon and elucidate some of the tensions and inner conflicts that shaped these men's subjective investments in this world of creative work.

*Advertising Cultures* is not only a book about gender. The question of creativity also looms large. Much of the reason for advertising's improved cultural standing in Britain has been bound up with assessments – or perhaps better, reassessments – of the 'creativity' of British advertising and the emergence of London as a centre of 'creative excellence' within the global advertising and marketing industry.[3] In this regard, the configuring of advertising as a 'creative industry' within the DCMSs policy statements represents but one instance of a wider celebration, dominant within the industry itself since the late 1980s, of the 'creativity' of London-based agencies. Significantly, this configuring of the industry's identity was not unrelated to advertising agencies more expanded involvement in young male markets. Style and lifestyle products aimed at young men offered scope for the development of a more image-led form of advertising upon which the industry's reputation for 'creativity' often rested. And while other markets and product fields were also implicated in these developments, the public profile of campaigns aimed at young men was not inconsequential in informing the reputation for 'creativity' enjoyed by London-based agencies.[4] The practitioners central to this book were implicated in this valorizing of creativity in very particular ways. They were often seen as an agency's most prized assets and as being the key sources of creativity within the processes of cultural production that agencies performed. Moreover, it was their expertise and skill, together with the peculiarities of their training, which was seen to lay behind the reputation acquired by the London-based industry as a centre of 'creative excellence'. In Part 2 of the book, I explore the currency of ideas about creativity within the occupational cultures in which these practitioners worked and reflect on the place of the rubric of creativity within their own sense of themselves as creative people.

Central to these chapters and the account of the occupational ethos and identity of these young ad men that I develop is a sustained reflection on the idea of creativity itself. The word, as will already be evident, looms large throughout the story I tell. Clarifying its meanings is essential to my arguments. The term figures, firstly, as a noun, creative, to collectively describe the jobs of art director and copywriter. When I talk of creatives or creative jobs or creative people, then, I am simply referring to this functional distinction. But there are also broader and more slippery conceptual issues bound up with the idea of creativity. As has been well documented, the term has emerged as something of a cant word in recent years. Its appropriation within government policy and the statements of the DCMS that we have already encountered represent only one version of its expanded currency and field of application. Particularly important within this process has been the way ideas of creativity have figured within prescriptive management literature and accounts of organisational reform. Within this body of writing, the idea of creativity has typically been bound up with the broader 'cultural turn' within management thinking and it is the links between organisational cultures and workers' creativity that has often loomed large in programmes of organisational re-engineering (du Gay, 1996). This prescriptive literature has typically deployed the idea of creativity to denote a general human capacity or disposition for invention, novelty and newness. In this regard, it forms part of a more widespread cultural process by which the idea of creativity has moved away from what Raymond Williams defined as 'exclusivist' definitions in which it was associated with a capacity for 'originality' and 'innovation' among a small group of gifted individuals, towards 'inclusivist' accounts that attribute the quality to a whole host of activities and (working) practices (Williams, 1976: 82–4). For Williams, there were dangers evident in this broadening out of creativity's semantic reach. Preeminent among these was his concern that the expanded field of application of the idea of creativity had eroded the conceptual value of the term. As he noted, a term that was once meant to 'embody a high and serious claim' about the value of particular kinds of human practice, 'has become so conventional . . . that it is applied to practices for which, in the absence of the convention, nobody would think of making such claims. Thus, any imitative or stereotyped literary work can be called, by convention, "creative writing" and advertising copywriters officially describe themselves as "creative"' (Williams, 1976: 84).

Williams' comments are instructive and prompt the kind of clearing of the ground regarding the conceptual reach of the idea of creativity, particularly in relation to advertising, that I undertake in Part 2. Certainly, the term is rendered especially opaque within the occupational cultures of advertising and exploring its currency and multiple uses within these cultures

necessities some de nitional labour. In doing so, I draw upon Keith Negus suggestive arguments about creativity developed in his work on popular music (Negus, 1995 1998). At the heart of Negus arguments is a concern to see claims about creativity (of a certain practice or cultural form) as highly context-dependent and shaped by value judgments in which recognition is conferred upon (or denied to) certain degrees of novelty or difference. Negus suggests that judgements about creativity are typically less to do with questions of absolute novelty or originality as with the way cultural practices or forms introduce some element of novelty or difference into a recognisable eld of meaning. It is this mixture of familiarity and difference that discussions about creativity typically focus on and it is the small degrees of differentness that are the subject of intense debate. This emphasis is also related to an insistence that debates about creativity are always local to speci elds of representation or domains of cultural practice and are not best thought of through the idea of creativity as the unfolding of a general human capacity that exists across all social elds or compartments of existence. More than that, debates about creativity are always informed by struggles over the authority of certain institutions or social actors to confer recognition upon a cultural practice or form and include the tensions between groups of protagonists to legitimate certain kinds of difference and novelty.

In Part 2, I explore how the practitioners I interviewed deployed the language of creativity and how it was bound up with their own attempts to legitimate the cultural practices they performed. Part 2 also explores the place of the rubric of creativity within the collective, institutional life of the industry and draws out the way the term was deployed by agencies and their corporate representatives to delineate the kinds of expertise offered by agencies to clients. Looming large here is an attention to the way a con guring of the identity of agencies as creative businesses and the wider industry as a creative industry was bound up with the moves by these businesses to consolidate a clearer sense of their commercial role. In developing this argument, I esh out a picture of the London-based industry during the mid to late 1990s. This was a period of change and uncertainty for the agency sector shaped by both the legacy of the economic recession of the early 1990s and more deep-rooted changes in the commercial environment in which they worked. Creative people were caught up in the dislocations of agency life that owed from these externals pressures on agencies in very particular ways and it is both the nature of these dislocations and their effects on the status and organisation of creative jobs that Part 2 and speci cally, Chapters 2 and 3 explore.

At the heart of the account that I develop in Advertising Cultures , as will already be clear, are the testimonies of the group of young ad men

whom I interviewed and their female colleagues. Weaving my account of the creative cultures of agencies around these narratives has raised a specific methodological question that is worth commenting on briefly. This concerns the status of their narratives and how I have read them. My primary concern throughout has been to pay close attention to the language and metaphors they used and the associated modes of expression that they deployed, as much as it has been to document the directly factual content of their statements.[5] These former dimensions were revealing in terms of their subjective identities. In many instances, then, the practitioners said more than they intended to when talking about colleagues, working partners and the mundane routines of the job. These dimensions of their accounts were especially important in offering ways into the kinds of masculinity lived by the men I interviewed. It was how their gender identities showed themselves when they were substantively talking about something else that interested me. I have also attempted to be attentive to those moments in their accounts where certain things were not said (could not be said), as much as what was said and it is the absences in their testimonies that I also read in terms of what this might tell us about their gender identities.

The interviews were not, however, only revealing in terms of the talking that took place. The non-verbal dimensions were also important and I have been attentive to how the practitioners interacted with me more broadly through ways of sitting and other corporeal dispositions. Their gender also showed itself in how they dressed and presented themselves in visual terms and I registered this aspect by keeping a photographic record of the men and women I interviewed.

There is a further dimension at stake here in the interpretation of the practitioners' narratives and associated forms of self-presentation. This derives from the social relations of the research process. What the practitioners said and how they presented themselves was palpably produced in part by my promptings and their relationship to me was inevitably a key part of the dynamic that shaped what they said and how they expressed themselves. As is clear from the testimonies that animate the arguments of the book, the conversations that I had with the practitioners were often the setting for a sustained process of self-reflection by them. In this sense, the interviews often exemplified Pierre Bourdieu's contention that 'respondents see interviews as opportunities to explain themselves, that is, to construct their own point of view both on themselves and on the world. Thus, we might speak of an induced and accompanied self-analysis' (Bourdieu, 1996: 24). A recurrent element of this self-analysis was a concern to defend themselves and their work (their jobs) from a denigrating view of advertising that they appeared to read off from my status as an academic researcher. In this sense, their perception of me as potentially hostile to, or at the very least

condescending towards, advertising sharpened and prompted a particular set of self-reflections organised around the cultural standing of advertising. It is this question of the cultural standing of advertising, in fact, that looms large throughout this account. This had both occupational and gendered dimensions for the practitioners and how they handled these forms a central, recurring theme of the book. In this sense, it is the subjective consequences for these practitioners of working in this commercial field that connects Parts 2 and 3 of the book.

Before turning in detail to the occupational culture and the subjective identities of these creative people, however, it is appropriate to spell out further the conceptual arguments that have shaped the distinctiveness of the book and to delineate how its approach to advertising differs from other influential accounts of advertising and commercial society. It is to these arguments that I want to now turn.

# 3 Campaigning to Ethnic and Racial Minorities in the U.S.

**THE GOAL OF THIS CHAPTER** is to examine the historical circumstances that have led to the conventional wisdom regarding ethnic political advertising. The end of the nineteenth century brought a massive wave of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, and the political machines employed numerous strategies to gain the support of these groups. It is useful to examine the appeals that were made to them in order to assess how these efforts compare with those aimed at Latinos, our nation's largest immigrant group today. These past efforts also help to place the theory of information-based advertising into a broader context.

Candidates, particularly at the local level, have competed for the votes of immigrants since the 1800s (Erie 1990; Dahl 1961; Katznelson 1981). Perhaps the most infamous political machine of all, Tammany Hall, led by William Marcy "Boss" Tweed, pioneered numerous efforts aimed at persuading immigrants to join the powerful Irish machine. These newcomers arrived in droves to the port city of New York, and by 1930, Jews and Italians made up 36 percent of the population of New York City. Party bosses appealed to these groups by offering them party posts and providing "coal, food and rent money to needy Jews and Italians on the Lower East Side" (Erie 1990, 102). Other actions were less substantive in nature; for example, Tammany's "Big Tim" Sullivan "shamelessly 'recognized' the new immigrants with symbolic gestures and donned a yarmulke to solicit Jewish votes" (103). Tammany bosses were also known to eat "corned beef and kosher meat with equal nonchalance" (McNickle 1993, 17) and to advertise in the Yiddish press to reach out to these new immigrants. To gain the support of Italian immigrants, the Irish sponsored

# 1 advertising and commercial culture

Recent accounts of social and cultural change across the industrialised West generated from within the human and social sciences have made much of the increasing centrality of consumption and the consumer economy to the ordering of economic and cultural life. Within the sociological literature this process has often been characterised in epochal terms as variously marking the birth of a _consumer societyo, _postmodern cultureo or the passage to an era of _liquid modernityo (inter alia, Jameson, 1984; Baudrillard, 1988; Harvey, 1989; Featherstone, 1991; Wernick, 1991; Slater, 1997; Bauman, 2000). Other sociologists and sociologically-informed commentators have cast these processes in more prosaic terms, preferring to describe the emergence of more information and knowledge intensive forms of flexible accumulation and economic activity (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1991; Leadbeater, 1999; Scase and Davis, 2000). Whatever the formulation, commercial expertise and the world of commercially produced goods and services are seen to have acquired a new centrality and salience. At the same time, an extended attention within historical and cultural studies to the symbolic meanings of commodities and commercial texts, together with their place within the cultures of consumption of particular social groups, has served to draw attention to the worlds of commerce and to the institutions and social actors that constitute this area of cultural and economic endeavour.

In this chapter, I want to reflect quite selectively on some of these heterogeneous arguments. There is good reason for this. Taken as a whole, this body of work has provided a major impetus for the account of the informal workplace cultures of advertising developed in this book. At its best this range of work has furnished us with impressive accounts of the impact of commercial society and commercial players at both the level of societal organisation and at that of more intimate subjective desires. Significantly, however, my own account has been as strongly shaped by disagreements with some of the substantive foci and broader conceptual frameworks of much of this work, particularly as this has borne upon the analysis of advertising, as it has by more positive engagements. At the heart of this are two principle lines of disagreement. First, the over-general and

epochal nature of the models of cultural change into which advertising (and commercial culture more broadly) have frequently been inserted, particularly in sociological and historical work, has been a major stumbling block for my arguments. Second, the dominant narratives on consumption within cultural studies have been problematic. These have tended to either subsume the particular ensemble of institutions making up 'commercial society' into the general rubric or idea of 'consumption' or else privileged studies of acts of consumption and the identities of consumers at the expense of a more expanded account of the commercial field.

Getting beyond the limitations of both these sets of arguments has prompted me to consider the conceptual frames through which advertising might be better understood. Drawing upon my earlier work and the suggestive insights of others, I propose that advertising can be profitably conceptualised within the more general framework or idea of 'commercial culture'. The term draws upon the closely related notions of 'consumer culture' and 'consumer society', but can be differentiated from them in the way it seeks to downplay the overly synthetic and epochal bias of those terms and the singular logic of commercialism with which they work. In place of this the idea of 'commercial culture' as I deploy it emphasises the differentiated and multiple forms through which commercial relations and cultures are articulated. It proposes, in other words, that there is no general, universal logic of consumer culture or commercial society (despite the universalising tendencies of commercial relations), but instead only specific commercial cultures. In doing so, it directs us towards the potentially diverse array of institutions, forms of knowledge and expertise making up this social field and the subjective processes constituted through the world of commerce and commodities. The idea of 'commercial culture' also insists on the importance of grasping the generative relations with wider economic, political and cultural formations into which commercial processes are drawn within particular historical settings. Above all, the aim is to establish 'commercial culture' as a discrete object of analysis, one through which advertising might be more effectively explored.

In the first part of the chapter, I reflect on a number of influential accounts drawn from contemporary sociological analysis. I focus on three ambitious analyses in particular: Scott Lash and John Urry's *Economies of Signs and Space* (Lash and Urry, 1994), Scase and Davis's *Managing Creativity* (Scase and Davis, 2000) and Featherstone's *Postmodernism and Consumer Culture* (Featherstone, 1991). I then move on to consider the way advertising and consumption have figured within cultural and historical studies and discuss some of the general features of this work. Finally, I conclude by elaborating further on the idea of 'commercial culture' that informs the arguments that I develop throughout the book.

## advertising and the end of industrial society

One of the most widely cited and ambitious accounts of contemporary social and cultural change produced over the last decade is Lash and Urryos *Economies of Signs and Space* (Lash and Urry, 1994). The book offers a bold vision of the role to be played by a re-invigorated sociology shorn of the narrow preoccupations of its classical past and focused upon the mapping of global ☒ows of information, commodities and people. Lash and Urry take as their starting point the dynamic impact of the more intensive processes of commodi☒cation associated with the emergence of _disorganised capitalismo. This is a capitalism increasingly organised on a global scale in which commodities, capital and human subjects circulate over greater distances and at greater speed, underpinned in large part by new information and communication structures. Alongside these global ☒ows, Lash and Urry also identify a set of countervailing tendencies that have contributed to the distinctiveness of contemporary social formations. These derive from the increased possibility for human agency and re☒exivity thrown up by the new social order ushered in by _disorganised capitalismo. It is this mixture of both high speed global ☒ows and new forms of re☒exivity that form the lynchpin of their account and which lie at the heart of their ambition to develop a _sociology of ☒owso and _re☒exivityo. Both these concerns are brought together in the central idea that drives their account. This is the idea of _re☒exive modernisationo. Lash and Urry derive the term from the work of Ulrich Beck and share with him a concern to periodise a new phase or stage of modernity ☒ what Beck calls _re☒exive modernityo or what Giddens de☒nes as _high modernityo (in Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994: 91) or sometimes _late modernityo. In fact, it is Lash and Urryos recourse to and elaboration of the concept of re☒exive modernisation that does much to distinguish their account from other contemporary arguments about economic and cultural globalisation with which it otherwise shares much common ground (Robins, 1996).

For Lash and Urry, re☒exive modernisation refers to those social processes that are dissolving the contours of industrial society. Re☒exive modernisation in this sense represents the progressive deepening of modernityos corrosive powers and, in Beckos terms, the _radicalisation of modernity, the creation of a new modernityo (Beck, 1994: 75 cited in Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994). A notable feature of this process is the way social subjects ☒ individuals ☒ are freed from the collective structures of industrial society; freed, that is, from the structures of class, family and work-based forms of collective organisation (Lash and Urry, 1994: 37). It is this _freeingo of social subjects from _social structureo that forces individuals to take more responsibility for the conduct of their lives and to re☒ect upon the contingency of their social existence. In other words, it is the _freeingo of individuals that provides some of the necessary conditions for re☒exivity. [1]

Lash and Urry have most to say about how this process of reflexive modernisation works in relation to economic life. Their attention to what they call the progressive freeing of agency from structure within this domain is especially germane for my arguments. This is because they give the cultural industries, and advertising in particular, a paradigmatic role in the emergence of new forms of reflexivity at work. At the heart of these changes within economic life lies the consolidation of what they call reflexive accumulation. Reflexive accumulation refers to the increasing dominance within Western economies of more knowledge and information intensive forms of economic activity both within the manufacturing sector and within the burgeoning service sector.[2] They use the term to distinguish their claims from similar arguments that have described the same kind of transformations within economic life under the rubric of flexible specialisation or post-fordism. For Lash and Urry these other conceptualisations are limited because they fail to grasp both the increasing importance of services to Western economies and, more importantly, the defining feature of reflexive accumulation: the increasing penetration of economic life by culture. As they emphatically put it, reflexive accumulation refers to the way 'the economy is increasingly culturally inflected and that culture is more and more economically inflected' (Lash and Urry, 1994: 64). Underpinning this claim is an assertion that economic activity (including manufacturing processes) are more design and research and development intensive, and more concerned with the production and deployment of knowledge, images and aesthetic symbols. One consequence of these developments is that workers within key economic sectors are required to be more innovative and creative, able to initiate ideas rather than be guided by rigid rules and divisions of labour, required, in a word, to be more reflexive. Whilst Lash and Urry do acknowledge that this process is not universal and that there are reflexivity winners and losers, they see increased reflexivity at work as characteristic of the leading edge of economic activity. In further exploring the distinctiveness of these forms of reflexivity at work, Lash and Urry devote a good deal of space to the cultural industries. These sectors are important to their argument because they represent the most advanced cases of individualisation and reflexivity at work and provide the model upon which other sectors are developing. Thus, they argue that the cultural industries have long been innovation and design intensive and the sectors in which the labour process has been most rapidly reconstituted around the ideas of flexibility and individualisation. This is evident in the way these industries have led the way, they contend, in developing organisational structures that have broken from the forms of vertical integration and bureaucratic organisation that characterised earlier forms of industrial organisation. Further, they argue that the cultural industries are increasingly organised around the ownership

and control of intellectual property rights and less around control over the production of cultural forms. Their economic success derives from the packaging and presentation of a portfolio of assets: artists, images and sounds. In this sense, Lash and Urry contend, the cultural industries are becoming less like 'industrial commodity producing firms . . .' and 'more like post-industrial firms such as business services' (Lash and Urry, 1994: 137). More like, in fact, as they suggest, the advertising industry. It is this expertise in packaging, promotion and branding that gives the advertising industry its new exalted position within the political economy of 'disorganised capitalism'. For Lash and Urry, the advertising industry not only contributes to the increasing 'culturalising' of goods and services characteristic of reflexive accumulation (and through this the wider aestheticisation of everyday life), but is paradigmatic of trends occurring within the cultural industries and the wider economy as a whole in which control over knowledge and information are more central to economic success. There is also an inference in Lash and Urry's account that advertising agencies represent models of business organisation and ways of working that are themselves emblematic of wider organisational restructuring, though their comments on agency structures are, as I suggest below, eccentric.

In privileging the role of advertising and the cultural industries more generally in their account of a transition from the epoch of industrial society to 'reflexive modernity', Lash and Urry's argument chimes with a range of other contemporary sociological accounts in which the consumer and cultural industries have loomed large. Like these other accounts – particularly of Baumann, Wernick, Harvey, and Scott – the strength of their book lies both in its ambitious sweep and in the more mundane descriptive fit between its account of changes in economic life and widely reported trends in ways of working, workplace organisation and the growing importance of the media and cultural industries to Western economies (see Pratt, 1997; Smith, 1997; Leadbeater, 1999). However, there are significant problems with both the general account of reflexive modernisation that Lash and Urry advance and the particular argument that they develop about the cultural industries. Let us take the idea of reflexive modernisation first. Lash and Urry deploy the term in part to distinguish their work from the closely related debates about modernity and postmodernity. As Lash acknowledged, it was out of a sense of frustration with this latter debate that they were prompted to find a different language and conceptual framework for making sense of contemporary cultural and social change (Lash in Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994). Their recourse to the idea of reflexive modernisation, however, represents only a very partial break with the tropes of the modernity–postmodernity debate in that the term (reflexive modernisation) follows the same epochal model of change. The style of argument and

conceptualisation is similar in both cases. The account is structured around a 'before' and 'after' dualism in which the characteristics of competing eras or epochs are captured by recourse to a limited range of defining features. As Thomas Osborne has argued in relation to other kinds of epochal change theories, such accounts 'tend to overdramatise the characteristics of social change and reduce such change to one or two fundamental elements' (Osborne, 1998: 19). He suggests that ideas like 'postmodernisation' or the 'information society' or 'I would add 'reflexive modernisation'' are 'gestural categories' not amenable to sustained empirical evidencing. Certainly, Lash and Urry's argument in *Economies of Signs and Space* is poorly evidenced and tends toward the use of illustrations rather than sustained evidence. Their argument is repeatedly couched in terms of generalisations and a reductive model of social and cultural change.

These problems are particularly acute in relation to the central idea of reflexivity itself. As we have seen, the term functions in their argument as an integral component of a new epoch of human social organisation. However, in casting reflexivity in these terms, Lash and Urry are guilty of over-generalising some rather specific (if undoubtedly widespread) processes of cultural change. Thus, if we take the area of economic life, it is clear that the increasing importance of 'reflexivity' at work (for some managers and groups of workers at least) is a product of particular processes of organisational reform that have sought to shape workers as autonomous, self-regulating individuals (du Gay, 1996; 2000: 64). These are moves distinct from those employed to open up personal relations and family life, for example, to a greater degree of choice and ethical reflection. In no way can these distinct developments across discrete social domains be reduced in an *a priori* way to some general notion of reflexivity. As Paul du Gay's work on organisational reform has demonstrated, these developments are the product of specific technologies and practices. The extent to which they are generalisable within the limited arena of economic life is also open to question. The depth and extent of the impact of these moves to foster 'reflexivity' at work needs to be tested and may vary from sector to sector and between organisations within the same sector. This is certainly the case, as we will see, in relation to advertising.

These problems with the idea of 'reflexive modernisation' are further compounded by some of the specific, concrete things Lash and Urry have to say about trends in the media and cultural industries. We have seen how they want to place great store on developments in these industries as prefigurative of wider processes of economic restructuring, particularly as regards ways of working and the 'outputs' of this work (information, knowledge, cultural representations). While these developments correspond to their arguments about reflexive modernisation within economic life, they also make use of

the notions of fordism and post-fordism to explain changes in these sectors. Their deployment of these terms is a little confusing given that elsewhere they problematise them in favour of the idea of reflexive modernisation. None the less, they are emphatic in deploying the terms indicatively to refer to changes in the structuring of organisations and production processes within the cultural industries and suggest, for example, that the 'culture industries were post-Fordist *avant la lettre*' (Lash and Urry, 1994: 122–3; see also 113 and 134). The deployment of the terms Fordism and post-Fordism to these sectors couldn't be more unhelpful. Neither the model of Fordist mass production nor that of post-Fordism are directly applicable to the media and cultural industries. The film industry is the sector that has been most frequently fitted into these boxes (Lash and Urry, in fact, draw heavily upon Christopherson and Storper's well known account of Hollywood (Christopherson and Storper, 1989). Even Hollywood film production in the era of the studio system is not best understood through the model of industrial organisation derived from the manufacture of consumer goods. While the studio system may have displayed many of the features of vertical integration characteristic of fordist enterprises, film as a cultural form was not (and indeed, is not) amenable to the kind of product standardisation associated with mass production. Further, film production was not caught up in the drive to produce ever more complex machines that defined the classic Fordist sectors. The Hollywood studios may have worked to produce a relatively stable set of genre films and broadly conceived of its audience within the rubric of the mass market and in both senses been drawn into a wider culture of 'mass production', but film production was not, *per se*, Fordist. This is an important distinction to hold onto.

Similarly, contemporary developments in film production do not neatly fit the claims that it has become post-Fordist. As Helen Blair has shown, the persistence of semi-permanent film production work groups within the UK forces a recasting of general claims about the impact of 'vertical disintegration' within the sector (where vertical disintegration is seen as classic evidence of post-Fordist organisation). The peculiarities of the domestic film industry – which historically had a more fragmented production base than Hollywood and was made up of a large independent sector alongside studios like Rank – also problematises the idea that the UK film industry can be fitted into the model of a transition from 'Fordism' to post-Fordism. Furthermore, some of the most distinctive features of recent changes within this sector do not neatly follow this pattern of economic change. These include the increasing dominance of large companies over the distribution of film (despite the rise of independent production) and their transformation into global conglomerates that act as 'image empires' across a range of media (Blair and Rainmie, 2000: 191).

The general problems with these models of economic restructuring are additionally compounded by some specific shortcomings with Lash and Urry's account of advertising. In a dizzying formulation they claim that 'advertising in effect evolves from a free-professional type business service to, in Fordism, an industry and, in post-Fordism, to a fully-fledged 'culture industry' (Lash and Urry, 1994: 138). The British industry, they contend, became from the late 1970s 'simultaneously Fordist and neo-Fordist' (ibid: 139). Such formulations do great damage to the organisational structures and institutional forms that have historically characterised the advertising industry in Britain. As I suggest later, the advertising industry in Britain is a distinctively bifurcated sector split between a smallish number of large, often multinational, businesses and a larger number of small enterprises. This is a pattern of sectoral diversity that goes back to the inter-war years at least. The business forms that have dominated throughout this history among the great swathe of agencies (and which continue to be important) are the partnership and limited company. These represent forms of commercial organisation that have a long history, both being legally consolidated by the Companies Act of 1862. Many contemporary advertising agencies in this sense would not have looked out of place in nineteenth century London. Alongside these small scale enterprises, the big agencies have typically developed by building bureaucratised organisations, with well defined ways of working (often embodied in organisational handbooks). While in this sense large agencies were, and remain, bureaucratic in structure, they are not (and were not) 'Fordist' or neo-Fordist, unless the terms are expanded to meaningless limits. Moreover, the large global agency networks that have emerged from within the British industry in the last twenty years have recurrently organised themselves as holding companies, itself an old business form dating back to the establishment of the first multinational companies. In many ways, then, the advertising industry in Britain does not 'fit' into the models of industrial change that Lash and Urry deploy. Their account offers an unhelpful characterisation of the sector that cuts across a more nuanced sense of the institutional and organisational structures of the industry.

Some of the shortcomings of *Economies of Signs and Space* are addressed in a book that could not be more different from it in terms of style of argument and approach. Rooted in the tradition of empirical sociology, Scase and Davis's *Managing Creativity* develops a more grounded account of trends within what they call the 'creative industries'. It too, however, has ambitious claims to make about the place of these sectors in wider processes of economic change' claims that, in this regard, echo strongly Lash and Urry's general arguments despite the differences in approach between the two books. Similarly to Lash and Urry, Scase and Davis are interested in

How well do these past advertising efforts support the theory of information-based advertising? These descriptive accounts show that there is some reason to believe that candidates use culturally based appeals when communicating to the Latino electorate. Moreover, Connaughton and Jarvis's (2004) content analysis of the Spanish-language ads produced by the presidential nominees from 1984 to 2000 finds that the ads primarily focused on the Latino community as opposed to the candidate's policy positions or personal qualities. In particular, they observed Latinos being portrayed as a group that "happily stood side by side with other Americans . . . depicted as a fully assimilated pan-Latino community" (51). The Spanish-language ads also were largely positive in tone and contained messages that were verbally empowering, as Latinos were told that they are a growing force in politics, and visually empowering, because Latinos, rather than the candidate, were the main focus of the ads (Connaughton and Jarvis, 48). They also found that the use of American symbols (for example, the U.S. flag) was a recurring theme in these ads. Of the thirty-six Spanish-language ads produced from 1984 to 2000, 39 percent contained American symbols. It is not clear, however, how this percentage compares with that of American symbols used in English-language ads, because the analysis focused only on Spanish-language ads. Moreover, whether the Spanish-language ads contained more or fewer policy messages than did English-language ads, and the degree of policy complexity in the ads, was beyond the scope of their research. Overall, it is likely that the content of presidential Spanish-language ads is skewed in the direction of cultural and symbolic appeals. Such a possibility is an indication that the theory of information-based advertising could explain the campaign strategies for targeting Latinos and non-Latinos during these presidential races. Whether or not this is true for other election settings remains to be seen.

## Campaigning to Latinos in Statewide Races, 2000–2004

Numerous U.S. gubernatorial and Senate races took advantage of Spanish-language media in the 2000–2004 election cycles. Table 3.1 summarizes those elections in which at least one candidate advertised in Spanish; it also provides information on the content of these Spanish-language ads, along with some contextual information about the competitiveness of the election and the percentage of Latinos in a given district. Previous research has demonstrated the importance of electoral competitiveness in candidates' advertising strategies (Kahn and Kenney 2001); demographic targeting is another strategy that candidates have grown to rely on (Shea and Burton 2006). As such, both of these

associated with the performance of everyday social routines and the active and innovative process of identity formation integral to social life. Arguing, contra to the thrust of contemporary sociologists that for most people, work (paid employment) now offers limited scope for creativity and innovation, Willis contends that it is in the realm of leisure, and particularly through the active, not passive consumption of commercially produced goods, that creative processes of individual and collective self-fashioning occur (Willis, 1990: 18–19).

The book has been criticised on a number of counts, most notably for the romantic conception of human creativity that it unashamedly employs (Frith, 1996). Further, it has been charged with seeking to merely celebrate commercially produced commercial culture and of falling prey to the more general tendency towards cultural populism that Jim McGuigan, most notably, has identified as a persistant feature of a wide body of cultural criticism (McGuigan, 1992). Other commentators have rightly argued that acts or practices of consumption need to be more carefully differentiated. Thrift and Glennie, for example, attempt to develop an account of shopping and the familiarisation with commodities associated with this practice, which emphasises the inculcation of a consumerist disposition as something which is embodied and inhabited, through routines of 'being and doing' (Thrift and Glennie, 1993: 37).

While there continues to be much that is instructive in this reworked attention to acts of consumption, my own work has been strongly shaped by a concern to open up different aspects of the commercial field. In this regard, it shares something with the moves of other writers to turn to the previously neglected areas of cultural production and circulation in a way that circumvents the recourse to political economy. An early version of this move was signalled by Angela McRobbie in a critique of subcultural analysis. In a suggestive essay, 'Second-hand dresses and the role of the ragmarket' (McRobbie, 1989), she insisted that the focus of subcultural studies upon the transformation of already bought commodities neglected a whole host of commercial activities and forms of entrepreneurship that were integral to the subcultural experience. While she did not take the argument very far in that article, it marked out an attention to the 'cultures of production' that has emerged more strongly in her recent work and also figured in the work of other cultural critics (du Gay, 1996; Nixon, 1996; Mort, 1996; McRobbie, 1998; Negus, 1992, 2002; Jackson et al., 2000). Frank Mort's recent work has been particularly important in developing this approach in relation to the study of 'commercial society'. In his book *Cultures of Consumption* (Mort, 1996), he suggested that the study of the consumer economy might be profitably approached through the idea of the 'commercial domain'. For Mort, the idea of the 'commercial domain'

represented a way of conceptualising a distinct and identifiable field of institutions, moral and intellectual entrepreneurship and related conceptions of personhood that were analogous to the field of the social identified by historians like Donzelot and Rose (Donzelot, 1977; Rose, 1991). In *Cultures of Consumption* these pre-occupations emerged not only in the way Mort explored in detail the forms of identity produced through particular systems of provision and the spatial embeddedness of these commercial cultures, but also in his insistence on situating this analysis within a broader project of cultural history. This involved locating discrete studies like his own within a wider set of histories of this domain and its distinctive dynamics.

Mort's comments are suggestive and have considerable strategic value in consolidating the commercial domain or commercial cultures as a discrete object of study. They underline, again, the importance of attending to the particular forms taken by commercial endeavour at specific times and in specific places; the changing kinds of technologies and expertise that are deployed in the enacting of commerce and the need to grasp, above all, the way the world of commerce and goods acts upon social experience and subjectivity. As such they hold out the possibility of revising those general narratives on the expansion of consumption, whether that be in relation to debates about the coming of the mass market in the post-war decades or the transition to an era of 'postmodern culture' or 'reflexive modernity'. Moreover, this approach to the commercial domain reinforces the importance of holding together the mutually constitutive relationship between cultural and economic processes within this field of endeavour – what Mort has described as an understanding of 'culture and economic as reflexively interrelated in ways which are neither pre-determined or mono-causal' (Mort, 2000: 12). Such an approach is distinct from earlier forms of anti-economism within cultural analysis in which the 'relative autonomy' of cultural practices was emphasised while retaining a conceptual ranking of social practices furnished by the notion of determination by the economic in the 'last instance'. It is also distinct from a return to political economy in which economic practices and identities retain a primary and foundational character. My own thinking on this matter has been informed by Ernesto Laclau's work and his emphasis on the contingency of all identities (including the economic) and with it the possibility of reconceptualising the relations between the incompletely formed fields of culture and economy through the notions of imbrication and mutual constitution rather than direct determination by, or interaction between, fully constituted domains (Laclau, 1990: 24).

Such a reconceptualisation is particularly important in relation to the study of advertising. Despite the fact that advertising is widely acknowledged to bring together both 'cultural' and 'economic' practices and calculations in

very obvious ways, its study has been dogged by a separation of these components of its practice. The idea of commercial culture as I deploy it builds upon the insistence that these components of advertising practice need to be grasped in their dynamic interdependence. Commercial culture, in this sense, is used to capture the 'cultures of commerce' – the cultural meanings and values that cohere within and set the conditions for business and commerce to be enacted. In relation to the study of advertising as a commercial practice, this understanding draws attention to the way the business forms, practices and relations integral to the practice of advertising depend for their performance upon sets of cultural meanings and values. This interfusing is most evident in the way agencies manage the commercial relations between consumers and their clients. While agency practitioners often speak about these markets as if they existed independent of their actions, it is clear that agencies play an active role in helping to constitute and articulate the economic relations between consumers and clients through techniques like planning and market research that they mobilise. In other words, agencies, through the representations of the consumer they deploy, provide some of the necessary (cultural) conditions of existence of these commercial (or economic) relations. This is a process that works in a number of different registers. It includes not only market research knowledge, but also the elaboration of these commercial relations through the promotional forms themselves (such as advertisements). What particularly interests me here, in relation to the concerns of Advertising Cultures , is the way the management of these commercial relations depends upon not only formal knowledge (market research data, sales figures, consumer feedback, pre-testing of adverts), but also upon more elusive informal knowledge and dispositions. Information about consumers not known to the client or market researcher, but known to the art director or copywriter, together with their own cultural identifications, can be crucial in helping to clinch these commercial linkages. Furthermore, the informal cultures inhabited by theses practitioners will both set limits upon and provide resources for the performance of the creative execution in which these practitioners are engaged. It is this insistence that informs my contention about why the subjective identities and informal cultures of advertising practitioners matter so much.

There is a further conceptual theme associated with this revisionist kind of analysis of commercial culture that is worth reinforcing. As many cultural critics have argued, the world of commercially produced goods plays an important role in shaping particular consumerist conceptions of identity and social rituals among those populations successfully targeted by commercial practitioners. In fact, there has been a persistent insistence that commercially produced goods and services have the capacity to intervene in and shape particular lived cultures through their capacity to mould

subjective identities and shape social habits and routines. Commercial enterprises – be they advertising agencies or retailers – can be thought of in this sense as articulating cultural projects or missions every bit as transformative in their ambitions towards specific populations as those pursued by social reformers and policy makers. As Janice Winship's work on Marks and Spencer in the inter-war years suggests, here was a business with ambitions not only to sell its goods, but also to establish certain norms of lower-middle class femininity around the ideals of the 'nice and neat' body and restrained, but modern consumption (Winship, 2000).

Winship's works is not unique. As I noted earlier in this chapter, there are many examples of concrete studies that have foregrounded the role of commercially produced cultural goods and services in helping to shape the cultural identities and expectations of particular populations. Such an analytical focus, in fact, is the *sine qua* of recent cultural studies of consumption. What has been less well explored, is the subjective consequences of these commercial strategies upon the practitioners who populate the consumer institutions. It is a central contention of *Advertising Cultures* that the subjective consequences of the world of commerce and its consumerist understandings of identity can also be fruitfully explored through the identities and subjective choices made by practitioners like those central to this book. It is this most neglected aspect of these commercial circuits of provision – the informal cultures and subjective identities of commercial practitioners themselves – that I privilege. In this sense, the ambition of the book is to 'fill out' our understanding of the way subjectivity is constituted through the world of commerce – not, in this instance, of those consumers targeted by the consumer industries, but the subjective consequences of commercial processes upon the identities of practitioners themselves.

# Work area

part 2

indicating just how important this mode of political communication has become. The cost of broadcasting Spanish-language ads varied over these three election cycles, and appears to have been more expensive in nonpresidential election years. A similar pattern is also evident in the costs associated with broadcasting English-language ads. Of course, these comparisons are all relative, as the price of broadcasting these paid political ads is staggering, exceeding more than half a million dollars for a mere 30-second spot. The length of these ads remained fairly constant across the three election cycles as well as across language type.

These comparative statistics indicate a notable shift in which programs candidates decided to broadcast their Spanish-language ads on; whereas approximately a third were broadcast on news programs in 2000 and 2002, half of all Spanish-language ads were broadcast on such programs in 2004. This jump can perhaps be attributed to candidates adopting an advertising approach more similar to the one used in their English-language campaigns, in which the tendency was to broadcast ads on news programs. It is also worthwhile to note that, over time, candidates have begun to spread out their Spanish-language ads across the campaign seasons. In 2000, 68.7 percent of the Spanish-language ads were broadcast less than a month before the general election, yet in 2002, 42.3 percent of Spanish-language ads were aired less than a month before, and in 2004, this figure dropped even further to 39.3 percent. Candidates in 2000 may have perceived Latinos to be largely undecided a month before the general election and thus decided to broadcast their Spanish-language ads closer to the general election in hopes of influencing Latinos' votes. And candidates seemed to prefer broadcasting their Spanish-language ads much closer to the general election than they did their English-language ads. Only in the 2002 midterm elections did candidates broadcast their Spanish- and English-language ads at somewhat comparable rates.

Across these three election cycles, there was not much overlap in where candidates directed their advertising efforts. For example, in the 2000 election cycle, the greatest number of Spanish-language ads was broadcast in California, but in the next presidential election year, the majority of Spanish-language ads was broadcast in Florida. This shift in advertising strategy could be a result of the pivotal role that Florida played in the 2000 presidential election, particularly with respect to the Latino electorate. Recall that Gore's Latino outreach campaign spent a minimal amount of resources on Spanish-language ad buys in Florida, and as discussed in Chapter 1, such a decision may have cost him the presidency. In the midterm election year, and the

# 2

## _purveyors of creativityo: *advertising agencies, commercial expertise and creative obs*

dramatis personae

Campaign

Campaign

Campaign

Lears, 1994), shifts in some of the underlying principles that guided agency practice in the 1980s had done much to strengthen the position of creative people as an agency's key human assets. Looming large in this was the move among a group of agencies to realign the commercial and creative dimensions of advertising practice. Associated with a so-called 'creative revolution' in British advertising, agencies like Saatchi and Saatchi, Collowhammer and Bartle Bogle Hegarty (BBH) had sought to shift the terms of what counted as effective advertising and to develop a more aestheticised style of promotion. They argued that the commercial fortunes of their clients could be enhanced by a long term process of brand building and a defence of 'brand values'. Railing against short-term measurement of advertising effectiveness and more prosaic traditions of persuasion and selling, they promoted advertising that worked to a greater degree through establishing an elaborated set of emotional meanings and values around products, enticing the consumer through desire (see Mort, 1996; Nixon, 1996).

While these techniques were not entirely new and drew upon precedents from earlier forms of commercial culture, the advocates of 'creative advertising' were distinctive in the way they introduced representational techniques previously marginal to press and, particularly, television advertising. These included the turn to forms of pastiche in the use of retro-imagery, the self-conscious use of black and white film stock, cinematic forms of lighting, very fast editing and jump cuts, and the deployment of new typefaces for the copy that accompanied the visual image. For the agencies most associated with these innovations, the creative department acquired a new centrality as they sought to apply the tenets of 'creative advertising' to their clients' marketing needs. John Hegarty, for example, creative director at the agency Bartle Bogle Hegarty (BBH), reflecting on his newly established department in 1983, suggested that 'the creative department is the powerhouse of an agency, the motor that makes it all work. In the end advertising is all about the leap from brief 'the marketing proposition' to creative execution' (*Creative Review*, December 1983: 19–20). For Hegarty, then, creatives were the practitioners able to bring to bear the necessary imagination that could turn the terse terms of the marketing strategy into an advert that connected with audiences and lifted the product through its style, look and feel. The commercial success of agencies like BBH and Saatchi and Saatchi during the 1980s contributed to the wider take-up of these representational techniques in advertising and to a new privileging of creatives in the advertising development process.

The creative people central to this book were drawn into a job that was, in the mid-1990s, still marked by the transformations of the 1980s. Moreover, they worked in an industry whose reputation as a centre of 'creative excellence' continued to be shaped by the enduring impact of the

creative revolution upon what counted as effective advertising. But they were also entering a sector that was much less confident of its standing and of its commercial role. The end of the boom in advertising expenditure at the end of the 1980s, greater demands from clients for agencies to be more accountable in the money they were spending and the deep recession that affected the sector in the early years of the 1990s, contributed to a more uncomfortable period of change and flux for agencies and their core employees. The wider political project of Thatcherism that had been important in enhancing the symbolic role of advertising and associated commercial sectors was also unravelling through the early 1990s and this changed the context in which the industry found itself operating. The uncertainty generated by this set of developments impacted on creative jobs in contradictory ways, both helping to reinforce their privileged position while also disrupting some of the taken for granted assumptions about the kinds of work creatives did and the kind of skills and dispositions they needed to possess.

Precisely what the nature of these broader changes was and how they impacted on the organisation and performance of creative jobs forms the focus of this chapter. In the first part I begin by sketching out some of the local conjunctural factors and more deep-seated structural changes that reshaped the commercial and media environment in which agencies found themselves operating during the mid-1990s. These changes posed both challenges to established ways of working within agencies and also offered commercial opportunities.

In the second part, I explore how agencies responded to this moment of crisis and opportunity. In doing so, I focus upon two exemplars of the wider shifts in the sector. These were the agencies Bartle Bogle Hegarty (BBH) and Howell Henry Chaldecott Lury (HHCL). Both companies are instructive because they sought to protect their status (and income) in the face of external pressures on the agency sector by positioning themselves as the trusted business partners of clients and attempted to resist the very different constitution of their identities as the mere suppliers of adverts. This business partner model of the agency was important because it cast agencies as consultants able to operate across the full range of their clients commercial needs and to intervene, if necessary, in areas outside of advertising. In stressing this new role, both agencies made much of the unique kinds of expertise and know-how that they could bring to their clients. Central to this was a presentation of agencies as, above all, the purveyors of creativity and a unique source of creative know-how for clients. Delivery of this expanded service also required both agencies to implement major programmes of organisational reform. Detailing these changes forms a key aspect of part two of the chapter.

Getting to grips with these organisational and strategic changes and the wider institutional developments within the London-based advertising industry of which they were a part is important for the broader argument of the book. Not only do they provide an account of the institutional setting in which the practitioners that I interviewed were starting and establishing their careers, but they shed considerable light on the status and standing of creative jobs and the business and organisational strategies within which creative people worked. As we will see, their jobs emerge as central to the internal life of agencies as they deepened a sense of their identities as creative businesses, while at the same time creative jobs remained not entirely foursquare with the main organisational logics that governed other key employees. It is this exceptional status that is key to understanding the place of creative jobs within the social relations of agency life. And what structured this position were assumptions about the 'creativity' they possessed and the limits upon its organisational regulation.

contemporary challenges In May 1996 *Campaign* offered an upbeat commentary in its weekly leader column on the rather vexed question of advertisers' relationships with their advertising agencies, under the headline 'Accountability benefits both agency and client' (*Campaign*, 3/5/96: 27). The leader had been prompted by moves by the body representing UK advertisers, The Incorporated Society of British Advertisers (ISBA), to make available to its members a common standard for assessing the performance of their advertising agencies. The standard had been devised following research carried out by the ISBA into its members views on the service they received from agencies and, in particular, their views on whether agencies delivered (in that most contemporary phrase) value for money. The researcher, Dr. Ian Cheston, summarising his findings in the press coverage that accompanied the publication of the proposal, noted that 'the high expenditure days of advertising are gone. Clients are looking for people to make their marketing programmes more successful. It's the agencies that are most professional that will survive' (*Campaign*, 26/4/96: 7).

*Campaign*'s response in its leader to Cheston's findings and the ISBA's proposal was to take both firmly on the chin. While it wryly acknowledged that 'it's almost inevitable that when advertisers start to talk about greater accountability, mutinous mutterings emerge from agency boardrooms and creative departments', it went on,

**Table 4.3** Broadcast of policy and character advertisements, by type and language of television show

| *Content of advertisement* | *Policy (total)* | *Complex policy* | *Explained policy* | *Simple policy* | *Character ad* | *Targeted Latino ad* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *English: Type of show* | | | | | | |
| Local or network news | 45.7 | 45.6 | 44.8 | 46.5 | 45.4 | 45.4 |
| News program or talk show | 18.5 | 19.2 | 19.1 | 19.9 | 20.6 | 19.4 |
| Entertainment | 28.4 | 27.9 | 28.1 | 26.4 | 26.3 | 27.5 |
| Soap operas | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.6 |
| Sports | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
| Game shows | 4.3 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 4.2 | 4.2 |
| *Spanish: Type of show* | | | | | | |
| Local or network news | 41.0 | 49.6 | 41.9 | 39.8 | 36.0 | 41.9 |
| News programs or talk shows | 14.1 | 11.6 | 13.5 | 12.3 | 17.8 | 17.6 |
| Entertainment | 36.1 | 31.4 | 30.1 | 39.3 | 40.1 | 32.4 |
| Soap operas | 2.2 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 1.9 | 1.4 |
| Sports | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.8 | 1.5 |
| Game shows | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.3 |

SOURCE: 2000–2004 Wisconsin Advertising Project data.

NOTE: Cell entries denote the percentage of ads aired for the given type of show. A difference-of-means test was conducted for each relationship, and each test statistic was significant at the $p < .01$ level.

who are inattentive to politics. Programs such as *Entertainment Tonight*, sitcoms, and dramas were categorized as entertainment shows.

Looking first at Spanish-language policy ads, one can see that 41 percent were aired on the local news, 14.1 percent on news programs and talk shows, and 36.1 percent were broadcast on entertainment programs. The remaining ads were broadcast on soap operas, sports programs, and to a much lesser degree, game shows. Thus, while it is indeed the case that a larger percentage of policy ads were advertised on the news than on entertainment programs, the difference is fairly moderate, at approximately 5 percent. In examining broadcast rates based on type of ad, the same general trend emerges, with some exceptions. Half of the Spanish-language complex policy ads (49.6 percent) were broadcast on the news, whereas fewer than one-third (31.4 percent) were broadcast on entertainment programs. A similar distribution is seen with explained policy ads—42 percent were broadcast on the local or network news

quiet areas for individual thought. All these spaces are linked via a central, circular walkway where you find people walking and talking . . . In the course of their working week employees could work in a number of different places. This is deliberately designed to induce different emotional states as the environment chances, to constantly change office neighbours, and to expose people to many different ideas. As a result you find out things that you didn't think you wanted to know (HHCL.main.html).

Although there remain big questions about how effective in practice HHCLos organisational reforms were in changing established ways of working, these initiatives demonstrated its conviction to restructure the way the agencyos core staff worked in order to improve its effectiveness as an organisation. What was particularly striking about these moves is that they sent out a strong signal about how the agency saw all its key workers – not just art directors and copywriters – as a potential source of _innovationo and _creativityo. Project team working, in this sense, sought to liberate the _creativityo of all the core practitioners involved in the advertising process.

BBH took a similar approach to matters of organisational change and the pursuit of ways of working that could improve the conditions within the agency under which advertising work was generated. The agency hired the industrial psychologists Nicholson McBride in 1993 to help it bring about these changes. At the heart of the restructuring that followed this consultation was the introduction of cross-disciplinary project teams. Martin Smith, the agencyos chairman, explained the logic of this move and, in doing so, strongly echoed the arguments made by HHCL:

Project teams are very different from how it used to be. Now we have teams who have a set number of pieces of business. There's a symbolic oval table in the middle with more chairs than there are people because we want there to be, if its relevant, somewhere for Motive (BBH's free-standing media department) to sit, Limbo (BBH's direct marketing subsidiary) to sit . . . somewhere for the client to sit, somewhere for the creative department to sit. It's about developing . . . Flexibility is what its all about. What we're trying to do increasingly is to get people to think more broadly, think more interestingly, more creatively. We're supposed to be a very creative business, and yet most of our practices stultify creativity (Smith, 1996).

While on the face of it, BBHos decision to restructure itself along these lines put in on common ground with HHCL, BBH introduced a significant – and highly symbolic – modification to the project team structure, when the teams were established in May 1996. In setting them up, BBH explicitly excluded art directors and copywriters – the advertising creatives – from them. In

doing so, the agency maintained the integrity of the creative department and the established system of pairing art directors and copywriters.

This system of creative teams (a copywriter paired with an art director) had been pioneered by the New York agency, Doyle Dane Bernbach (DDB) in the 1960s and quickly became the norm in Britain by the mid-1970s. Prior to this, copywriters had usually sat together in a separate room from the visualisers, the preferred term for those who illustrated or laid-out copy before 'art director' became commonplace. The pairing of art directors and copywriters was unique to creative jobs and was one of the features that gave these jobs their distinctive character. Explaining the logic behind maintaining both the system of creative teams and, particularly, the integrity of the creative department, Martin Smith argued:

> it is important to strike a balance between a kind of openness, where . . . everybody works in a tight group and the fact that there is no doubt about it that creativity works best when there is a controlled tension. There has to be some kind of tension between the business needs that are being articulated by account management and planning and the creative solution which is being offered by the creative department. If it is all too nice and straight line, you end up with Switzerland. You know, something wonderfully efficient and neutral and extremely dull. What you have to maintain is that tension, you have to get a creative tension going. And you still have to have the fevered argument, the temperaments . . . that's important to get good work, because you have to get people feeling emotionally something is right, and someone fighting them and changing it and bettering it. And that's important within a creative organisation. So we've got to maintain the tension where it's relevant, and I think it is relevant between the people who are the primary connection with the client and the people who must be the ones who sprinkle pixie dust on the idea and create something which is a leap from where I and others like me would have got logically (Smith, 1996).

Elsewhere he made the same point more succinctly. He suggested, 'advertising ideas are usually the product of 2 creative people, a closed door and a great brief. Everything else we add to that very simple concept is done to help the creative team perform its task' ( , 25 3: 31). Smith's views were echoed by the agency's head of planning, Nick Kendall. He argued that while project teams were useful in making possible the cross-fertilisation of ideas, there were risks:

> The danger is [creatives] become so much part of the team, so client-focused, that they lose their . . . annoying outside subjectivity's Because we can logic our way to anything, but sometimes the creative process does need to be just like that [able to

make creative leaps☒ . . One side of the team are trying to put order into something, and creative teams are non-linear, emotion-based, instinct-based and come from a perspective which says how can I do something different . . . Whereas we ☒planners☒ want to do something different, but we want it to be relevant and to the purpose . . . The creative department, though, has a ☒ring of guards☒around it☒(Kendall, 1996).

Both menos defence of the separateness of creative teams and the concern to provide the working conditions under which they could generate the necessary imaginative leaps to bring a clientso brief to life was centrally tied in with BBHos vision of itself as a _creative agencyo and the producer of _creative advertisingo. Thus, while BBH attempted to _free upo the creativity of all its core workers, it retained a sense that creatives were a special case and the privileged source of creativity. This was different, as we have seen, from HHCLos approach. It attempted to give scope to other practitioners to becomes the source of creativity more broadly conceived and to erode the division of labour within the creative development process ☒ though, it should be noted, that HHCL still effectively paired creative teams within this more open structure. These different approaches carried discrete messages about the relative status and standing of creatives in each agency and were intimately bound up with the broader understanding of the kinds of commercial expertise each agency primarily saw itself as supplying.

*conclusion* The organisational reforms pursued by both BBH and HHCL and the positioning of creative jobs within the creative development process that was central to this were not unique to these two agencies. Similar initiatives were evident across the industry and effected even in established, multinational agencies. The WPP Group, for example, introduced project teams into its two venerable agencies, Ogilvy and Mather and J. Walter Thompson. As with the approach taken by BBH, creative teams were exempted from the project teams established by WPP because of the felt sense ☒ expressed by WPPos Chief Executive, Martin Sorrell ☒ _that creatives need to spark off each othero (WPP, 1996: 55).

Other agencies, conversely, more closely followed the model set down by HHCL. Perhaps the most noteworthy was St. Lukes, another iconoclastic and high-pro☒le _communicationso agency. Like HHCL, St. Lukes deployed project teams and emphasised the creative contributions of all its key staff. The agency even refused to enter its advertising work for the industryos creative awards because these exclusively recognised art directors and copywriters as the producers of campaigns.

The practitioners central to this book worked in agencies where the old departmental system, project teams and revised versions of project teams were all operating. All of them, however, performed a job that remained a privileged one within the structure of agencies, but also one that was subject to a certain fix in relation to its boundaries with other core jobs, as agencies sought to establish their identities as all round marketing consultants. It was also a job, whatever the organisational dynamics of the agency, which entailed coming to terms with new expectations about the kinds of creativity that clients were purchasing from agencies. Certainly, the broad promotional and consultancy role that agencies saw themselves as providing prompted an adaptation of conventional art directing and copywriting skills. As we have seen, these moves encouraged the use of promotional techniques and 'creative solutions' to clients' business needs that displaced the 30 or 60 second television advert, in particular, from its preeminent position in the repertoire of promotional forms deployed by agencies. As Robert Campbell, founding partner of the agency Rainey Campbell Roalf, succinctly suggested, 'I hope creative people will get satisfaction from different things – other than press and television work – but I have to start giving rewards for ideas, not craft' (*Campaign*, 27/8/93: 36). We will see later how creatives themselves responded to these challenges. I will also have cause to return to the internal organisational processes of agencies in Chapters 5 and 6 and reflect further on the characteristics of agencies' ways of working. However, in the next chapter, I want to consider further the peculiarities of creative jobs by beginning to explore their distinctive social make-up.

# 3

# déclassé and parvenus ? the social and educational make-up of creative jobs

Commenting in his mammoth book Distinction on the `new professions', particularly those associated with cultural production (`radio, television, marketing, advertising, social science research and so on' [Bourdieu, 1984: 151], Pierre Bourdieu famously suggested that these jobs were marked by the openness of their modes of entry and career structures and were especially amenable to `creative rede®nition' by their occupants. As he put it, `jobs and careers [in the new professions] have not yet acquired the rigidity of the older bureaucratic professions and recruitment is generally done by co-option, that is, on the basis of `connections' and af®nities of habitus, rather than formal quali®cations' (Bourdieu, 1984: 151). Bourdieu's comments on these occupations were prompted by a wider discussion of the impact of what he called `diploma in¯ation' associated with the opening up of educational access in post-war France and by the tensions that this had created in the correspondence between the social and educational backgrounds of individuals and the social make-up and standing of a range of occupations.

Bourdieu was particularly interested in the consequences of the `democratising of schooling' and the associated rede®nition of jobs for the established trajectories and inherited social positions of both middle-class and working-class individuals. While he argued that the former had to increasingly deal with the problem of downclassing, whereby their educational quali®cations failed to guarantee them the assumed social position in the division of labour that an earlier alignment between education and jobs would have delivered, the latter had to manage the limits upon their social aspirations as the new quali®cations they had achieved failed to produce the social mobility they felt was their due. These structural tensions bore upon the new professions in especially acute ways. Bourdieu contended that the openness of these jobs made them the preferred destination for those middle-class individuals seeking to protect their social standing against `downclassing', while the same occupations were appealing to those aspiring working-class individuals seeking to overcome the inertia of established class divisions that structured access to occupations.

**Table 4.8** Factors influencing a House candidate's targeted ethnic and racial ads

| | *Type of advertisement* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Spanish-language ad* | *Latino in ad* | *African American in ad* | *Asian American in ad* |
| | Estimated coefficient (standard error) | Estimated coefficient (standard error) | Estimated coefficient (standard error) | Estimated coefficient (standard error) |
| *District characteristics* | | | | |
| Distance | −.11* (.04) | −.58* (.03) | −.26* (.02) | −1.20* (.05) |
| Percent with high-school degree | −.01* (.001) | −.03* (.004) | −.01* (.003) | −.02* (.001) |
| Percent Latino | .01* (.001) | .04* (.005) | .03* (.004) | .01* (.001) |
| Percent African American | .01 (.04) | .004* (.001) | .02* (.003) | .01* (.001) |
| Percent Asian American | .01* (.004) | .11* (.002) | .05* (.002) | .09* (.003) |
| Competitiveness | .01* (.004) | .01* (.002) | .01* (.0002) | .02* (.004) |
| South | .03 (.02) | −.51* (.01) | .14* (.01) | −.47* (.02) |
| *Candidate specific* | | | | |
| Democratic candidate | .52* (.02) | .21* (.01) | .09* (.01) | .63* (.02) |
| Constant | −2.70* (.07) | .20* (.05) | −.68* (.03) | −1.20* (.07) |
| *N* | 418,376 | 338,574 | 333,967 | 331,194 |
| Log-likelihood | −18,659.11 | −45,130.17 | −129,129.78 | −15,447.41 |

NOTE: Estimates are for the 2000–2004 House elections. Entries not in parentheses are the probit coefficients; entries in parentheses denote the corresponding robust standard errors to the probit coefficients. The dependent variable is coded as *1* for the content listed in the column, and *0* otherwise.

*$p < .01$

in a district goes from its average level to a one-standard-deviation increase (from 4.6 percent to 19 percent), candidates are 12 percent more likely to include African Americans in their ads. The same size increase in the Latino population, however, has a much smaller impact on the decision of political contenders to create ads featuring Asian Americans.

Candidates also take into consideration the size of their African American and Asian American electorates in their minority ad campaigns. Of course, the larger the size of the African American and Asian American populations

suggested that, in the lush advertising years after the war, JWT had . . . earned a reputation for hiring Etonians with carnations rather than brains. Sandy Mitchell-Innes (himself an Etonian and one of JWT's two deputy chairmen) retorted that the only Thompson JWT man he could remember wearing a carnation was a Harrovian, but the reputation stuck' (Pearson and Turner, 1965: 41). [6] Other agencies, such as Robert Sharp and Partners, deliberately set out to hire Cambridge men. As Pearson and Turner noted, they even put a series of adverts in the Times asking for young men with Firsts (ibid: 122). And other key protagonists in Pearson and Turner's account – such as John Hobson and John Metcalf of the agency, Hobson Bates and Partners – were both Cambridge men, with degrees in classics and English respectively (ibid: 133).

Contemporary evidence indicates the continuing preference for individuals of this educational provenance among agency recruiters, particularly as this bore upon those destined for the upper echelons of the industry. Around half of all senior agency personnel (chairman, chief executive and managing directors) that I surveyed were graduates with a wide variety of degrees from elite universities – Oxford, Cambridge, London School of Economics, Warwick and University College London. 50 per cent of these senior figures, moreover, had been to Oxford or Cambridge. Individuals from private school backgrounds continued to be well represented.[7] Among those employed at lower levels within agencies, the percentage who were graduates was high. Among the core jobs, in fact, the overwhelming majority were graduates, with the jobs of account handler, account planner, media buyer and planner explicitly identified by the IPA as graduate jobs (see IPA, 1995). A survey of media buyers and planners, for example, revealed that they all had generalist degrees from a range of old (pre-1992) universities.[8] Perhaps most striking were the figures, again, for creative jobs. They emerge as less overwhelmingly graduate dominated in their make-up. Among the creatives I surveyed, 63 per cent had honours degrees, while 19 per cent counted an HND as their highest educational qualification. The subjects studied by creatives were also markedly different from their professional colleagues. While 44 per cent had taken a generalist degree, the remaining 56 per cent had studied either art or graphic design degrees. In fact, they were five times more likely to have studied a degree or HND in art or graphic design than any other subject. Those who had studied generalist degrees typically had additionally taken a further postgraduate diploma in art direction and copywriting, or else been through the D&AD creative workshop, which offered technical training in the same skills.

These different educational routes were bound up with assumptions within the industry about the kinds of technical or craft skills required to perform these jobs. In a moment, I want to explore further these institutional

processes, particularly those driven by the sectors leading corporate bodies, and consider what further light they shed on creative jobs. It is clear that the educational experiences of creative people, together with their generally more subaltern backgrounds, combined to socially distinguish them from their colleagues working in the other core jobs. Equipped with more technical and quasi-vocational training and more likely to come from lower middle class or working class backgrounds, they formed a distinct social grouping within the industry. As Paul Holt, the executive creative director at Klein and Hart, romantically put it, "tell people in my department that we're the C1s, we're the skilled workers, the skilled artisans".

This educational and social mix was reflected in the group of practitioners that I interviewed. The following examples give a flavour of this. Teresa Walsh, for example, a 36-year-old art director, came from a lower middle class background. Her father had run his own small business, while her mother was a care-worker. She went to the local secondary school, leaving after completing her 'A' levels. After initially training as a nurse, she eventually went to a northern polytechnic to study animation and left with a degree in graphic design. Phil Chantler, a 31 year old art director, came from a skilled working class family, where his father was an electrician working on the North Sea oil rigs and his mother was a hairdresser. He too went to the local comprehensive and took 'A' levels. He then spent 4 years at the local art college, doing first a graphic design course and then an HND in advertising. Chris Bradshaw, a 35 year old art director, came from a lower-middle class family. His father worked in the motor-trade as a salesman and his mother was a housewife. He took 'A' levels before completing a degree in graphic design at St. Martin's School of Art. Dylan Wrathall, a 32 year old art director, was from a comfortable middle class background, growing up in Hampstead with his father a psychiatrist and his mother a journalist. He attended Westminster public school and read a degree in History and Philosophy of Science at Cambridge. He then did an MA in graphic design at St. Martin's School of Art. Mark Stephenson, a 38 year old copywriter, also came from a secure middle class background. His father was in the armed forces and Stephenson became a boarder at Dulwich College. He then went to Cambridge University, completing a degree in English. He took the D&AD workshop before getting his first creative job. Murray Wright, a 35 year old copywriter, was from a working class Norwich family. His father was a school caretaker and his mother had done a variety of ancillary jobs, including cleaning and kitchen work. He won a scholarship to the local grammar school, before reading Modern and Medieval Languages at Jesus College, Cambridge.

As I have already suggested, institutional processes within advertising played a central role in reproducing this distinctive social make-up of

creative jobs and the class divisions within advertising employment of which they were a part. These institutional processes were brought sharply into focus by the modernising of agencies ways of working and the wider dislocatory effects upon agency life that I detailed in Chapter 2. I want to reflect further on these developments now. Opening up these processes is important because they reveal attempts to formalise recruitment and selection within advertising that Bourdieu's conception of the new professions tends to underplay.

## raising the standard

> *Most agencies realise that advertising is under pressure to become a more professional profession . . . Agencies within the IPA are in the vanguard of this move towards a new professionalism. They'll continue to set the standards, and their clients will be the first to reap the rewards (IPA Information Pack, 1988: 10).*

Throughout the 1990s, in the wake of the recession that effected the advertising industry in Britain and bound up with the commercial changes that bore on the sector, a concern emerged among the industry's corporate bodies about the levels and standard of training and career development within the industry. This was particularly evident in the initiatives of the two preeminent corporate organisations, the IPA and the Design and Art Directors Association (D&AD). The IPA, in particular, was preoccupied with the professional standing of the industry. Agencies had a poor record on training and professional development and many leading figures in the IPA and beyond were especially concerned about the disparity between the amount of training advertising people received and that typically received by marketing managers of client companies. In addressing this problem, the IPA set itself the goal of elevating the standing of advertising by positioning it as a sector with high standards of training and professional ethics. For example, in 1998 it relaunched its programme of continuing professional development, the IPA 7 Stages programme. Stage 1 was aimed at trainees while Stage 7 catered for senior managers (AA, 4 Mar a). Deploying the language of professionalism, the IPA saw the programme as contributing to its central objective 'of developing and helping to maintain the highest possible standards of professional practice within the advertising business' (IPA, 1998: 9). It also sought to bolster its bi-annual awards, the IPA Advertising Effectiveness Awards, in order to (as it put it) 'promote advertising accountability and the continuous improvement in professional

standards (IPA, 1998: 12). At the same time the Institute consolidated its guidance to its members on best practice in relation to the process of pitching for client accounts and laid down models of business contract for agencies to follow. Through these moves, the IPA sought to codify a set of professional ethics (ibid).

Maintaining the industry's ability to attract high quality graduates and sustain its profile as an attractive graduate career on a par with competing professions formed a further key element of the IPA's mission. Through the period from 1993-8, evidence suggested that advertising remained a popular career choice for many graduates. Larger agencies, for example, regularly received 2,000 applicants for the handful of graduate training programmes that they ran (Campaign, 20 May 1994: 5; Independent, 24 May 1994: 19; Independent on Sunday, 20 March 1996: 19; Campaign, 2 October 1998: 4). A nagging concern surfaced amid the popularity of advertising as a career choice to university leavers. This centred on the felt sense that advertising was losing out to other occupations – variously, accountancy, the City, the civil service, law and management consultancy (Campaign, 29 January 1990: 33; 6 May 1995: 5; 11 July 97: 18; 19 Independent, 24 May 1995). Thus, while the industry remained inundated with graduate applicants, the top graduates were in many instances bypassing the sector and being scooped up by occupations with better starting salaries and more well-established professional career structures.

The IPA was certainly concerned that the age-profile of the industry gave the impression that advertising offered only the possibility of a short career (IPA, 1995). The Institute's own figures did appear to support this supposition. They revealed that 50 per cent of those employed in IPA agencies were less than 30 years of age, with 80 per cent under 40 (IPA, 2000: 11). The publication 'Graduate careers in advertising agencies' produced by the Institute attempted to allay such fears by insisting, 'An oft-punted fallacy has it that advertising people reach burnout at thirty. Not true. The industry offers lifetime careers. Healthy progress, professionally and financially, comes with the territory' (IPA, 1995: 6). The fact that the IPA needed to labour this point, however, suggested that there was a deep-seated problem with the structure of the career when compared to more established professional occupations.

The IPA increasingly saw its role as helping to redress this perception and improve the quality of graduate applicants. It attempted to put in place mechanisms that would filter out weak applications and raise the standard of those who applied to agencies. This included developing stronger links with universities, in particular those elite institutions that had traditionally supplied the sector with its top people.[9] The IPA also established a graduate 'clearing house' in 1995 to formalise a notoriously informal set of labour markets. As the IPA conceded, 'getting a job in advertising has traditionally

been more of an art than a science: personal contacts, luck and a dash of eccentricity were once the pre-requisites (, 24–5).

If these moves to formalise recruitment practices and training were recurrently glossed in the language of professionalism, it is clear that there were some conspicuous limits to the IPA's embrace of a professionalising project. The Institute certainly tended to see its training initiatives – like the IPA 7 Stages programme – as complimentary to the training provided by agencies themselves. As such, the IPA conceived of its role as filling in the gaps left by the limited training and career development provided on the job by agencies. In this regard, it subordinated its embrace of professionalism to a model of 'practical education' and, in so doing, placed itself at some remove from the conventional role played by a professional qualifying association.[10] In fact, while the IPA attempted to bolster the standing of the industry through recourse to the language and some of the trappings of professionalism, it mixed this with a more business-orientated model of advertising and the increasingly dominant understanding of advertising as a 'creative industry'. Thus Chris Powell, the IPA's high profile President in 1993, set specific limits on the pursuit of professional status. While he emphasised the importance of raising the standards of conduct within the industry and saw the IPA playing a key role with regard to training and staff development (as well as propagandising for the industry), he suggested, 'I don't think we can do this – raise the standing of the industry – by creating an exclusive pre-entry club, an impractical route in a trade where anyone can, thank goodness, set up and challenge the orthodoxies' (, 23–3: 30). Elsewhere he repeated the same point, insisting, 'advertising is a trade. By definition it is not a profession in its literal sense, and if it were people wouldn't be able to start an agency and have a crack at everybody else's' (, 2–4: 22).

Powell's commitment to an entrepreneurial model of advertising – one that emphasised its dynamic, small business ethos – was indicative of a deep-rooted commitment from many agency people to the world of commerce and entrepreneurship that cut across the moves towards professionalism. Other IPA insiders combined this faith in commercialism with an emphasis on advertising as a creative business. For example, Nick Phillips, the IPA's Director, questioned the value of the industry attempting to follow the model of the established professions and instead emphasised the autonomy of advertising agencies as creative businesses in which 'creativity' was allied to, not antithetical to, the commercial needs of clients. He contended that:

> We shouldnot spend too much time looking at accountants, barristers and architects. A much closer and more helpful role model is Michelangelo. He was committed to the

clients needs (though not necessarily his first stated brief), original in conception and passionate about standards of production, prepared to work in all media and orientated to the effect of the finished work ( Campaign , 2004: 23).

[illegible] advertising [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

applied these limited professionalising initiatives across the industry's core jobs. Conspicuously outside its programmes were art directors and copywriters. Thus, in developing a course to extend the professional standing of the industry, the IPA placed creative people outside this exercise. The decision to do this sprung from the unstated assumption that there was something exceptional about creative jobs, and creativity itself, that resisted moves to systematise advertising training. I'll come back to this point in a moment. The IPA's approach to creative jobs further arose in part out of the different educational pathways, which the majority of creatives followed en route to a career in advertising. As we have seen, the most important feature of this was that creatives tended either to have a specialist degree or else not have followed undergraduate studies at all. In both cases, they did not neatly 't into the IPA's graduate training model. As the IPA's publication 'Graduate careers in advertising agencies' openly acknowledged, its advice was not centrally aimed at creatives: 'It is the other core jobs that opportunities for graduates principally exists. Creatives may be graduates, but they are equally likely to come from other educational backgrounds' (IPA, 1995: 18).

Being outside the training and career development programmes run by the IPA generated its own problems for those industry insiders concerned with the training and skills levels of creatives. If the industry was generally critical of much of the vocational advertising training provided by HE and FE institutions, then its views on the specialist training provided for art directors and copywriters was even less sympathetic. The D'AD, the IPA's sister organisation that represented creative practitioners, was especially vocal in its comments, suggesting that much of the education offered by colleges was poor: 'To call it lamentable would be polite. Too often we've had students from colleges . . . who were well short of any idea about what it takes to create an advert because they've been taught by people who have never practiced advertising or practiced it badly' (*Campaign*, 16/9/93: 22). For some commentators these problems stemmed from the fact that 'creativity' could not be taught beyond the acquisition of basic craft skills. Certainly, formal qualifications in art directing and copywriting were seen of little value given that creatives were judged by their last piece of work. As Barbara Nokes, creative director of CME KHBB argued, 'the trouble with the creative area is that it is more of an art than a science. People exist on their track record rather than by virtue of a certificate issued ten years ago' (*Campaign*, 4/9/93: 24). Other leading industry figures like Dave Trott, former creative director at GGT, contended that it was the working environment of agencies, which forged creative skills. As he suggested, 'It is the agency environment which provides the spark. CDP in the 1970s was a world away from anything a college could teach' (*Campaign*, 16/9/93: 22).

> The assumption that creativity is an innate talent which develops naturally on the job is ripe for challenge, and D&AD will do so with a research project into the training needs of creatives to be launched in the autumn (D&AD Student Awards, 1998: 1).

[illegible] [11] [illegible] *Campaign* [illegible]

[illegible] *Campaign* [illegible]

# 4 the cult of creativity: advertising creatives and the pursuit of newness

> I want this industry to catch up with areas like music, fashion, design and ®lm. In dance music alone you have techno, handbag, garage, trance, trip-hop, swing, gangsta, rap and on and on. There is so much originality. In advertising you are called original if you thieve something ®rst (Dave Buonaguidi, St. Lukes,Guardian, 26/2/96: 14)
>
> There is a new school of creative, I suppose, because there's a lot of young teams giving two ®ngers to the industry. [. . .] People are communicating in so many different ways that the old mainstream ideas and means of communicating are becoming irrelevant. [. . .] You can reach people through clubs, through records, through the Net ± and that's just the beginning. The old school of ads, all the gentlemanly press work and re®ned messages, don't work and the old boys of advertising don't like that idea. . . . It's time for a change (Mark Taylor, Cogent, ibid).

Dave Buonaguidi and Mark Taylor's comments appeared in a pro®le of a group of young advertising creatives published in the Guardian in February 1996. The group, who worked across a range of agencies, had gained notoriety through their association with a set of controversial adverts produced in the mid-1990s. The adverts included work for the television channel TNT, for Holsten pils lager, for the leisure operator Club 18±30, the jewellers Great Frog and the motorcycle manufacturer Harley Davidson. The campaigns were certainly striking. In the most talked about ± Saatchi & Saatchi's poster and press campaign for Club 18±30 ± the adverts deployed explicit sexual puns to sell the holidays as opportunities for young male heterosexual adventure, with one poster leading with the immortal copy `Beaver Espania'. In another campaign ± Viv Walsh and Jo Tanner's advert for the Great Frog jewellery ± the promotion ended with the telling line `If you don't like our jewellery, fuck-off!'. [1]

Industry grandees reacted with consternation to the campaigns. For example, Adrian Holmes, chairman of the agency Lowe Howard-Spink and the `doyen of London's creative establishment' (Campaign, 24/3/95: 11)

used his speech at the prestigious Monte Carlo television event in 1995 to challenge what he called the 'new unpleasantness, the new brutishness, the new yobbishness' that he saw as characterising the communicative ethos of these adverts (*Campaign*, 17/8/95: 8). Other practitioners at the upper echelons of the industry similarly balked at the campaigns and rallied to Holmes's side. For Chris Powell, President of the IPA, and Frank Willis, director of advertising and sponsorship at the ITC, the highly targeted nature of the adverts threatened not only to offend the wider public, but also to damage the standing of the advertising industry at a time when it was trying to promote itself as a responsible and business-like sector (*Campaign*, 24/8/95: 6, 11 and 24/31/8/95: 26/7/8/95: 26/21/8/95: 22).

While the exchanges between these rather differently placed practitioners registered some enduring questions confronting advertising practice, including its sometimes fraught negotiation of the dominant codes of public discourse relating to taste, decency, propriety and politeness, the debate was telling in other ways. Buonaguidi's and Taylor's comments in particular point us towards models of creativity and accounts of the creative process that circulated widely within the London-based advertising industry. Running through both men's comments was an assumption that producing new and original work was the central goal of advertising creatives and, moreover, that this work had to be produced in the face of those constraints set by 'mainstream' advertising and the dominant communicative ethos of the sector. Thus, both Buonaguidi and Taylor marked out their ambition to produce challenging and innovative work that pushed at the boundaries of advertising convention. At the same time, they allied themselves with broader innovative currents within the culture, including, in Buoanaguidi's case, what he saw as more dynamic and creative areas of cultural production. In asserting this vision of the kind of work they strove to produce, Buoanguidi and Taylor were drawing on a well-worn critical analysis of cultural production that counterposed 'authentic creativity' with the restricted, formulaic or instrumental forms of commercial practice. Significantly, however, both men reworked this opposition as a division *within* advertising practice. Thus, Buonanguidi, for example, offered an analysis of the sector in which he worked that closely echoed familiar critical commentaries upon advertising. Like Raymond Williams's haughty dismissal of the ascription of the term 'creative' to the kinds of cultural production that took place within advertising, Buonaguidi spoke of advertising as guilty of producing only second-rate, imitative cultural products and as devoid of the dynamic creativity of a cultural form like dance music (Williams, 1976: 84). The implication of his comments, though, was that he was precisely interested in pursuing 'authentic creativity' within the commercial framework in which he found himself. Mark Taylor similarly sought to ally his own

ambition to use advertising and marketing techniques that were distinct from dominant advertising forms (notably long-copy press advertising) with the production of genuinely innovative and creative work.

Buonaguidi and Taylor's comments are an appropriate place to start because they were not alone in drawing on this opposition between 'authentic' and 'second-rate' creativity. Similar oppositions loomed large in the accounts of the practitioners that I interviewed. In this chapter, I want to explore their accounts of the creative process. As we will see, there was no consensus among them on how the work they performed should be understood within the rubric of creativity and it is the divisions between the competing models of creativity that they held, as much as common themes that united them, that I want to explore. While their accounts of the creative process were clearly distinct from the actual performance of their jobs, that is, from the phenomenology of cultural production itself, the models of creativity that the practitioners deployed surfaced with subjective force in their accounts and are revealing about the occupational identities they inhabited. In fact, what we can see in the recourse they make to competing models of creativity is a handling of a central occupational dilemma: was it possible to produce authentic creativity in advertising or were they merely commercial hacks? As we will see below, in taking up different positions on this question, individual practitioners attempted to centre their identities as creative people within this world of commercial work with rather different effects.

Attending to the links between the rubric of creativity deployed by the men and women I interviewed and the occupational standing of their work, however, does not fully explain the rhetoric of creativity that flowed freely from these practitioners and the place of this trope in their accounts. In pushing further at their ideas of creativity and the creative process, I want to engage with Keith Negus's suggestive arguments about creativity developed in relation to his work on popular music. Negus's work is shaped by a number of concerns. One overriding insistence is his ambition to move beyond the opposition between 'commerce' and 'creativity' that has dogged critical discussions of commercial cultural production. To this end, he has argued that music corporations (the embodiments of commercial and business calculation) play a key role in according recognition to certain kinds of musical creativity and in shaping the context in which claims about the 'creativity' of particular kinds of musical production can be made (and contested) in the first place. Underpinning this contention is a broader argument about creativity. Drawing on well-established precepts within cultural analysis, Negus suggests that creativity is not best thought of as being about sudden bursts of originality or invention, but rather consists of working with established genre codes, conventions and expectations. It involves the introduction of some element of novelty or difference within a

recognisably familiar constellation of meaning. As he succinctly puts it, what is usually at stake in identifying some cultural practice as creative is the combination of both newness and familiarity to which audiences and other practitioners themselves respond. It is this slight different-ness, rather than absolute novelty, which is usually at stake in debates over creativity. However, Negus also acknowledges that these critical discussions about the value of a particular cultural form or practice can also be driven by a struggle over the genre worlds themselves and the genre hierarchies within these worlds (Negus, 1995⊠1998⊠Negus and Pickering, 2000). [2]

These observations, despite being derived from the study of popular music, are pertinent to my arguments about advertising and creativity. They allow us to conceptualise the forms of cultural production in which art directors and copywriters are engaged as involving tightly de⊠ned, if not static, representational genres. Press and television advertising, most clearly, are characterised by a well established and relatively limited set of genres. Individual creative teams conventionally work with these genres, introducing or attempting to introduce elements of novelty or difference within the frameworks of well-established rules and expectations. Thus, despite the grandiose claims often made about the work they did or would liked to have done, we might pro⊠tably interpret the rhetoric of creativity mobilised by creatives as an extrapolation of quite small differences or degrees of different-ness. In this sense, their cult of creativity was partly bound up with a ⊠narcissism of minor difference⊠in which creative teams sought to differentiate themselves from other practitioners in the advertising that they produced.

The valorisation of creativity was tied up less, in this sense, with making a client⊠ product stand out ⊠the manifest commercial reason for ⊠nding new ways of communicating with consumers ⊠so much as with drawing attention to the creative teams in an intensely competitive occupation. Moreover, as Taylor and Buonaguidi⊠ comments suggest, the pursuit of newness often came to be bound up with struggles over genres and genre hierarchies and further coded in generational terms, with the young creatives whom I interviewed allying themselves with ⊠newness⊠in order to steal a march on more established colleagues. In this latter sense, we might read into this pursuit of newness and creativity a form of social fantasy in which the striving for difference was bound up with ⊠making it⊠in the industry.

## commerce and creativity

> Its [advertising] one of those businesses that's a little bit like . . . at worst, it's a little bit like making a car. If you tick all the right boxes, then you will create a car. Whether it's

> a very good one is irrelevant half the time. And so what I'm always trying to do is find a style. I mean, I want to make Ferraris, or I want to make something that's a little bit more extraordinary than just a car.

Paul Cantelo was a 33 year old art director working for Serendipity, a smallish but rapidly expanding agency in central London. He occupied a central role in the shaping of the agencyos creative work and was evangelical about the direction in which the agency ought to develop. At the heart of this was a general antipathy towards the rest of the industry in which he worked and an elaborated concern to produce genuinely creative and original advertising. While the taking up of an anti-advertising position was not uncommon within the industry, his comments on these issues defined him as the most enthusiastic exponent of the cult of creativity among the practitioners I spoke to. Integral to this was an almost doctrinal conviction that only low levels of _creativityo currently existed within the London-based advertising industry. As his comments, above, indicate, he saw the industry as organised around standardised production procedures in which the making of adverts was as devoid of individual creativity as the mass production of motor cars.

Echoing familiar critiques of mass society Cantelo identified this malaise within advertising as part of a wider process of cultural standardisation in which the innovative currents in contemporary culture were being subsumed by mediocrity and conformity. This was a world in which the search for the _winning formulao meant that _all cars look like Austin Montegos, all homes look like Barratt homes, and everyone dresses in denimo. Advertising was, for Cantelo, a guilty partner in this process of _levelling downo. As such it was an industry that prompted his contempt. Adding to his earlier comments, he vented his spleen about advertising mixing together a moral Puritanism with an emphasis on the pursuit of authentic creativity:

> I loathe the business, I can't stand the business. I think its full of shit. I don't like the fact that a lot of business has just been grown out of money, because I think that's the biggest, that's the dirtiest thing. And you know, it should be a creative business, and people kid themselves it's a creative business. And I can't think of an ad that I've ever seen on TV that I've really liked. . . . I used to find that really worrying. But then you think, 'well that's good because it sets me apart'. I think you just have, in the end, to challenge everything.

This aggressive, moralistic attack on the industry in which he made his living served to underpin his own sense of himself as a dissident or outsider

I like really angry people whoove got a problem, people who are never satisfied with doing things the expected way. I donot like professional creatives. You get painters whose whole life is painting. But in advertising you can do it on a part-time basis. You know, make a living out of it and then go home and eat sushi all the rest of your life.

Yes, go and see as many galleries and all those kind of things as you want to do, but when you start working on your own stuff [ads], then make sure it comes from you rather than Damien Hirst or someone else, because otherwise youove let someone else do the hard work. Originality is the only thing that matters . . . creativity is all about originality.

that necessarily worked through cultural appropriation rather than outright innovation. As Trevor Beattie, executive creative director at GGT, argued, ‘advertising is a world of magpies and we steal sparkling things. . . . We go to a club and steal a trend and go on to appropriate whole chunks of youth culture. . . . Advertising never sets trends, it only follows them’ (ibid).

This view was some distance away from Cantelo’s lofty vision of creative originality as something that was not culturally founded but sprung from deep within the individual. Cantelo saw his task as stripping away cultural influences to allow his authentic ‘voice’ to come through. However, other practitioners whom I interviewed, despite often sharing his ambition to produce inventive advertising, conceptualised the sources of creativity in terms closer to Beattie. This saw creativity as emerging not so much in sudden bursts of absolute originality, as coming out of the manipulation and reworking of cultural influences. Generating ‘creative solutions’ in this sense was a craft that could be learnt. Murray Wright, a freelance copywriter, echoed Beattie’s analysis in spelling out clearly this model of creativity:

> You’ve got to have a magpie eye for shiny things. Creativity in relation to campaigns is not about picking ideas out of the air and coming up with something original. Not least because the deadlines are so tight . . . what you need to have is the sort of mind that stores all sorts of bits of information – that can be a song you’ve heard, programmes or films you’ve seen, pieces of art or whatever. And suddenly you have a brief to work on and somewhere in the back of your mind you think, ‘Ah, that’s relevant, I can use that. The job is really problem solving.

Andy Hanby, a creative director at Paul ‘Rogers, made a similar point:

> I am a consumer. I take influences from everywhere. Being a passionate consumer really does help. Just seeing and absorbing things. . . . And then just storing all the images and replaying them when you’ve got an appropriate brief. . . . It’s about keeping yourself up to speed with what’s going on in real life. If I don’t know who’s in Coronation Street, then I’m pretty much out of touch. If you’re constantly in touch with what happens in the real world, then you can hopefully try and give it back to people in the form of some kind of advertising. And talk to them in their language.

While the notion that being ‘au fait’ with Coronation Street is the same as being in touch with real life is a rather extraordinary claim to make, Hanby’s comments emphasise the need for creatives to be fully immersed in the widest possible set of cultural currents. It is out of this immersion that creatives could draw inspiration and channel these influences into inventive advertising. Phil Chantler, an art director at Rowlands ‘Partners, made a

similar point. His comments were additionally interesting, however, because they revealed how both an emphasis on the cultural sourcing of creativity could be combined with an understanding of creativity as something that emanated from within the individual. Thus, having suggested that it was important to be a □cultural omnivore□(echoing Hanby and Wright□ comments), he claimed,

> Being fascinated by everything is really important. Like tuning into something thatos already there. Being receivers for that. Being interested in everything, culture, aeroplanes, books, □lms, everything. And then eventually, if you let yourself, i□□ □ □□□□ in the work (emphasis added).

What is signi□cant in Phil Chantler□ comments, then, is the way he sees creativity as something that is essentially internal to the creative, as something that □comes through□him, while simultaneously understanding the process of creation as dependent upon the cultural resources available to him. Such a heterodox understanding, which was also hinted at in Hanby□ comments, pointed to an understandable di□culty among the practitioners I interviewed of marrying critical understandings of creativity with their actual experience of generating ideas and executing adverts. As with the musicians that Negus discusses, there was almost inevitably an unbridgeable gap between the way these men formally talked about the creative process and the lived, phenomenological experience of □being in□the act, in the moment of cultural production. Hence, the recourse made by Chantler to both culturally sourced and more mystical understandings of the creative process.

The competing models of creativity that could be applied to advertising and the porous boundaries between them, however, were not only the product of this phenomenological distance between the act of creating and the subsequent process of describing these practices through language. The tensions thrown up by the contrast between mystical and culturally-sourced conceptions of creativity in their testimonies was itself the product of tensions built right into the kind of training these practitioners had received en route to becoming advertising creatives. Looming large here was the in□uence of art and design education. As discussed in Chapter 3, the majority of art directors and copywriters had entered advertising via degree, HND or diploma level studies in either □ne art or graphic design. The remainder, who had entered via generalist humanities degrees, had typically encountered elements of this kind of art and design training through taking either postgraduate diplomas in art direction and copywriting or the D□D workshops.

# gett□□ rea□□□a□ □ea□□ □□

part

3

**Table 6.3** The impact of Spanish- and English-language ads on the political knowledge of English-dominant Latinos

| | *2000* | | *2004* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Variable* | *Estimated coefficient* | *Standard error* | *Estimated coefficient* | *Standard error* |
| Constant | 5.45*** | 1.25 | .31 | .46 |
| *Demographics* | | | | |
| No high-school degree | −1.31*** | .74 | −.02 | .34 |
| High-school degree | −1.24*** | .41 | −.30 | .22 |
| Income | .22*** | .10 | .14*** | .05 |
| Age | −.02 | .01 | .02*** | .01 |
| Married | .60*** | .36 | −.44*** | .18 |
| Women | −.37 | .34 | −.13 | .17 |
| U.S. citizen | 1.94* | .49 | −1.11 | .22 |
| Democrat | 1.30*** | .54 | .10 | .19 |
| Republican | .23 | .68 | .14 | .64 |
| *Media/campaign exposure* | | | | |
| Watch TV news daily | .05 | .09 | .02 | .03 |
| Read newspaper daily | .19** | .09 | −.12 | .09 |
| Contacted by a campaign | 1.57 | 1.04 | —[a] | —[a] |
| *Advertising exposure* | | | | |
| Complex policy | 1.13*** | .39 | .37* | .22 |
| Explained policy | −.53** | .19 | −.38 | .34 |
| Simple policy | −.85** | .29 | −.09 | .29 |
| Targeted Latino ad | 2.98 | 3.04 | 1.13 | .82 |
| *N* | 269 | | 548 | |
| $R^2$ | .19 | | .07 | |

SOURCE: 2000 and 2004 NAES.

NOTE: Cell entries are OLS estimates. The sample is restricted to Latino respondents who interviewed in English. The dependent variable was knowledge of factual political questions.

[a]Campaign contact question was asked only in a small portion of the 2004 NAES, and did not include enough Latinos to estimate this model.

*$p < .10$

**$p < .05$

***$p < .01$




**Figure 6.3** Rates of political learning in 2000, by racial and ethnic group. The difference in means for each racial and ethnic group is statistically significant at the $p <$ .05 level. *N* (Anglos) = 10,197; *N* (African Americans) = 591; *N* (Spanish-dominant Latinos) = 143; *N* (English-dominant Latinos) = 505. The political knowledge scale in 2000 ranged from 0 to 24. *Source:* 2000 NAES General Election Panel Survey.

their knowledge levels on each of the questions, as evidenced by the increase in the number of correct responses from the pre- to the post-election survey. Gains in knowledge also occurred for English-dominant Latinos and African Americans on all three questions, but the percentage of Anglos providing the correct response in the post-election survey was higher than it was for the other groups. So, the results from the 2004 panel are identical to the findings from 2000: Anglos tend to be the most politically knowledgeable ethnic and racial group both before and after a presidential campaign.

It is also remarkable to note that, in the 2004 survey, on none of the questions did a majority of Spanish-dominant Latinos correctly identify the policy position of Bush or Kerry; this is true in both the pre- and post-election interviews. In fact, Spanish-dominant Latinos are the only ethnic and racial group that exhibits such a pattern. These findings further reaffirm just how much they would benefit from more-informative campaign messages. Furthermore, a higher percentage of Spanish-dominant Latinos in the 2004 NAES panel study offered more nonresponses to the political knowledge questions than did the other ethnic and racial groups, just as was true in the 2000 NAES

The association between masculinity and creativity signalled by Tiger Savage in her D&AD piece recurred within the fabric of the departments in which the group of men central to this book worked. This was despite the formal ambition of these agencies to open up creative jobs and their often strident claims that they were concerned to recruit the best people regardless of gender. Certainly the creative directors who ran the departments in which the practitioners worked – and who were primarily responsible for recruiting them – strongly held to the view that creative recruitment was especially open and based upon conspicuous talent. As one of the creative directors I interviewed angrily and defensively argued, in response to a question that there did not seem to be very many women in the department that he ran, 'I'd hire a dog with a spanner up its arse if the work was good enough'. Another creative director, again underlining the way they had been sensitised to the question of gender bias by the contemporary trade debate, claimed – in response to a question about the qualities he sought in a potential employee – that what he looked for in the candidate was 'that they were a woman'.

This assertive tone was often coupled with claims that they (creative directors) saw very few women among those applying for jobs in creative departments and, hence, were not to blame for the bias. There was some truth in this claim. Certainly the available evidence suggested that women were under-represented on the more specialist training routes into creative jobs and among the body of practitioners signed up with headhunters and within the placement system. Figures from 1996 for the intake on the well-known postgraduate course in art direction and copywriting run by West Herts College, for example, revealed a gender split of 8 women to 27 men (*Campaign*, 9 August 1996: 31). This bias was confirmed by the headhunters Canna Kendall who revealed that only 24 of the 108 practitioners they had on their books in 1992 were women (22 per cent), while Andrew Cracknell, a senior creative director, claimed that only one eighth of those who applied for creative placements were women (Dougary, 1994: 25). However, among those students taking degrees in subject areas that were important feeders for employment in creative jobs, the figures suggested no obvious pattern of gender bias. UCAS figures for the period 1995-9, showed that those undergraduates accepted onto courses within the subject field of design studies were split 45 per cent male and 55 per cent female.[9] This headline figure did obscure potential differences in the gender composition of particular degree programmes. The UCAS subject field of design studies certainly included subject areas with rather different traditions of recruitment. Fashion and textiles, for example, had long been a female-dominated enclave (McRobbie, 1998), while industrial and product design were overwhelmingly male-dominated with only 2 per cent of students being female. Graphic design was

performed by young men who possessed the appropriate irreverence, naïveté and unreasonableness to create effective advertising. This link between inventiveness, irreverence and masculinity was more explicitly stated and elaborated upon by David French. Understandably cautious about voicing his views, French none the less offered a sustained argument about the links between masculinity and the attributes of a good creative:

> I think within the nature of men is the ability to think inventively more so than in women. Women are about preserving things and keeping the home and . . . you know that all sounds terribly chauvinistic and I donot mean it to but, you know, actually women are from Venus and men are from Mars – it isnot to say that one is better than the other . . . maybe its that [imaginative] leaps are made by, by this irreverence, by breaking things down. Womenos attitude is about homemaking, creating security. Men are about breaking boundaries down, thatos where great creativity comes from. Maybe itos all to do with the absolute individualism that is required and that is less a trait of women than of men. It seems to me that the male species is able to focus on one thing and not care about anything else and thatos what you want. You want that total absorption in trying to resolve the problem. Yes, being open to other things around you, but not trying to always assuage them.

Frenchís analysis offered a powerful sense of the essential links between masculinity and the dispositions required by the effective creative. His contentions drew much of their authority from wider cultural scripts about gender and about creativity. On the one hand, his arguments were informed by popular ideas about sex and gender derived from socio-biology.[10] On the other, they owed much to those longer established cultural repertoires that I have already noted. Such conceptions certainly informed the way the creative directors I interviewed most clearly thought about the ideal creative. These gendered meanings were explicitly present in Frenchís and Holtís comments and were implicitly invoked in Ian Hardingís emphasis on the unreasonableness and quirky insights of creatives.

It was not only in the approach to recruitment pursued by creative directors that these representations of the creative person surfaced in departments. They were also active in the cultures that developed within creative departments. Certainly there appeared to be some descriptive ëbetween the attributes of the ideal creative and the culture of masculine immaturity and juvenility given free rein within creative departments. We have already seen that the trade debate on gender bias in creative jobs had pointed up the privileging of laddish forms of masculinity. The experience of the practitioners I interviewed reaffirmed this. Teresa Walsh, for example, an art director at CTRL, complained about the juvenile behaviour of the men she worked with. She suggested, ëthis departmentís very laddy. When theyíre

on their own they're really nice, but when they're together they don't even speak to me. . . . It's like they're 16 [the men were in their 30s] and they have things like a Barbie doll tied up by her arms and legs on the office door. And I used to make cakes . . . I made a cake for everyone when it was one of their birthdays [and one of them shouted], 'what's in this, nipple milk?'

Two other young women creatives at Direct Arts, Samantha Jones and Miranda Harris, while they were more phlegmatic about this kind of culture, revealed that they were known in their department by the derogatory titles of the 'Kampon twins' or, alternatively, 'Beaver' and 'Pussy'. Paul Holt also complained about the manifestation of this laddishness. As he suggested, 'When I arrived here the atmosphere was unbelievably boysy and macho, and the manifestations of that culture were not terribly pleasant. . . . For example, the Christmas tree was hung with tampax and condoms'.

Evidence of this kind pointed to a certain dovetailing of the attributes of the creative person sought by creative directors and these particular forms of masculine culture. Not that these cultures of masculinity were reducible to the conceptions of the creative as juvenile and irascible that we have looked at. Clearly, the forms of masculinity privileged within these departments were shaped by other factors. In particular, the young male creatives were able to draw on wider cultural resources in living out their gender identity at work and these cultural scripts [particularly that associated with the cult of laddishness within popular culture] were not reducible to ideas about the creative person. None the less, there was a degree of assonance or 'fit' between these forms of subjectivity. Understanding this linkage, however, means reflecting further on the internal life of creative departments. Why was it that 'laddishness' was able to 'flourish'? Why did these forms of masculinity become dominant? Why were the cultures of departments gendered as masculine in this specific way? Answering these questions means looking at the role of creative directors in the management of departments and opening up their contribution to the cultures that developed.

## managing creative people

> You have to flatter their egos. Its an enormous process of charming them, persuading them, treating them a bit like naughty schoolchildren (Tim Bell, in Fletcher, 1990: 67).

> Because outstanding creative ability is so rare, the creative manager who finds and employs talented people must learn to live with their whims and tantrums (Winston Fletcher, in Fletcher, 1990: 32).

> Creativity isn't a science. It's an art. It's blood sweat and tears. It's about throwing expensive televisions through plate glass windows. Its about doing nothing for two weeks and then drinking unfeasible amounts of vodka before coming up with a brilliant idea two minutes ahead of the client meeting, and expressing it in a crayon drawing on the back of a bank statement. You can't distill that. You can't manage that. You just have to find brilliant people and let it happen (Campaign Creative Conference advert, 2001: 19).

*How creative departments ought to be managed and how creative directors should get the best out of creative people were central preoccupations for the advertising industry. They had even generated a small literature of their own.* [11] *Approaches to these problems were typically bound up with those conceptions of the creative person that I discussed in the previous section. As the quotes from Tim Bell, Winston Fletcher and the* Campaign *advert suggest, there was a collective wisdom within the industry that a good creative director had to somehow create the conditions within which the temperamental, irrational, childishness of creatives could flourish. We have already got a sense from Chapter 2 what this tended to mean in organisational terms. Many agencies created a protected space within the structure of the business where creative teams were partly shielded from the commercial and bureaucratic logics that drove the organisation. Free (in the words of Martin Smith) to make the necessary imaginative leaps to bring clients' briefs to life, creatives often existed within a sequestered space within the internal structure of the agency. This didn't mean that they were totally outside organisational logics and creative directors played an important role in linking creative departments to the wider demands of agency business. More than that, the generally loose organisational structure of agencies and their weakly bureaucratised processes gave creative directors particular influence and authority over the departments they ran. Like many other so-called 'creative businesses', the main constraints upon the running of agencies tended to be set by the external demands of clients. Moreover, the management of work, as Scase and Goffeee have suggested, was shaped by project deadlines rather than by highly bureaucratised work routines (Scase and Goffee, 1989: 88). The role of creative directors, then, involved not so much bureaucratic control over the creative labour process, so much as inspiring and stimulating creatives and overseeing the quality of their work. As such it rested upon a form of charismatic rather than bureaucratic authority. For the creative directors I interviewed, a central part of this role was to protect and reinforce the separateness of the creative department from the rest of the agency. Geoff Rowlands, creative director at Rowlands and Partners, expressed this view particularly forcefully. He suggested,*

it out amongst themselves to try and be better than the one team who've cracked it. I will take them off it, which is a kind of psychological trick to say your work isn't good enough. That will generally make the teams stay behind later and see if they can get something better. And it works on some occasions.

This ruthless system of competition over briefs was given added piquancy by the fact that Hanby and his partner were also involved in the competition. Explaining the reason for this, Hanby argued,

The creative department consists of 5 teams (including myself). That's one of my philosophies. . . . If the creative director isn't seen to be producing work that everyone else wants to have done, then there's no sense of competition. The department becomes terribly lethargic. I want them to get my job. I want them to beat me.

Mark Stephenson, though he ran a slightly larger department consisting of eight teams, placed similar emphasis to Hanby on competition over briefs and used the fear of losing out on a brief in order to motivate teams. The aim, as he succinctly put it, was to _get them staying an extra two hours at worko in the hope of coming up with the goods. Geoff Rowlands again developed a similar approach. He felt strongly that creative people needed competition and recalled one of the forms he had used in the past to foster this:

We (GR and another creative director) oversaw between 12 and 20 teams. And we set them against each other. We hothoused them. It was called the 'playpen'. Part of me thought it was cruel and a very negative system. But they didn't. Every Christmas they used to take me and Mark out. 'You know, it was a bit like Uriah Heep. It was hard in that it expunged people who . . . were not as good. But I found it really enjoyable, working with them in that hothouse atmosphere. So I feel creatives need competition. They tend to need competition. They manifestly need competition. The people that are the 'foot' soldiers, the writers and the art directors, will tend to compete and will be very aware of what the others are doing . . . I've even had 'ghts. Creatives literally 'ghting over briefs. It's like school.

This emphasis on competition and robust styles of management was also evident in the comments from Steve Buckland.

I'm not convinced that the right way to run a creative department is to have a nicesy-nicesy department, where everyone gets on and its all lovey-dovey and 'ower-power. Some competitive edge and a little bit of angst going round 'this bloody person got

their Spanish-language ads. The most recent arrivals to the Latino electorate may need to seek other information outlets that could help them learn about politics.

## Latinos as Issue Voters

Another consequence that may result from an information-based theory of advertising is that individuals may be less able to use their issue positions and ideological beliefs when making political decisions (Carmines and Stimson 1980; Jackson 1975; Key 1966; Page and Brody 1972; Page and Jones 1979; Pomper 1972). Several strains of research in the field of political science document the effects that issues and political ideology have on vote choice. The spatial proximity model suggests that voters will choose the candidate closest to their own position on the issues (Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Alvarez and Nagler 1998; Alvarez and Nagler 1995), whereas the directional model of issue voting finds voters supporting candidates who are on the same side of issues that they are on (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). The salience of issues is also believed to affect one's vote intention (Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1989). A key assumption of these theories of issue voting is that individuals possess preexisting values and beliefs that enable them to adopt a position on abortion, school vouchers, and so on. But if voters are relatively new to the political process, as are Spanish-dominant Latinos, they may have yet to formulate precise opinions on these topics. Moreover, their issue positions and political beliefs, as captured by their self-reported ideology, may not be strongly correlated if they have yet to organize their beliefs according to the left-right ideological continuum that characterizes American politics (Abrajano and Alvarez, forthcoming). And as the previous results indicated, Spanish-dominant Latinos had greater difficulty than other Americans in identifying the ideological positions of the presidential candidates in both 2000 and 2004. This difficulty is just one indicator of the challenges that Spanish-dominant Latinos face in using their policy and ideological preferences in their vote choice. As such, it may be the case that issues and ideology will play a less prominent role in the vote decisions of Spanish-dominant Latinos than in those of English-dominant Latinos.

One issue that could have played an important role for Latino voters in these two elections was abortion (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003). The social conservatism that characterizes many Latinos led Bush and the Republicans to emphasize this topic in their campaign, in hopes of making further inroads

with this electorate. The issues of school vouchers, federally sponsored health insurance, the economy, and Social Security could have also affected the way Latinos cast their ballots, given the prominence of these four issues in the 2000 and 2004 election cycles. Candidates also held distinct positions on these issues (Abrajano et al. 2008; Abramson et al. 2002). In addition, Latinos' perceptions of their own personal finances can help to shape their vote decisions (Abrajano et al. 2008), just as these concerns can significantly affect the rest of the public's vote intentions (Page and Brody 1972; Carmines and Stimson 1980; Alvarez and Nagler 1995; Alvarez and Nagler 1998; Abramson et al. 2002).

Because the Democratic contender in both 2000 and 2004 favored government assistance in providing health care, Latinos with a similar position should have been more likely to support Gore or Kerry rather than Bush. But Latinos who are in favor of restricting abortion should be less inclined to vote for the Democratic candidate, given that both Gore and Kerry are pro-choice; instead, those holding a pro-life stance should have been supporters of Bush. School vouchers is another issue that would give an advantage to Bush. Because this policy finds favor among Republicans, we should expect Latinos who like the idea of a school-voucher program to cast their ballots for Bush rather than for the Democratic candidate.

As the literature on economic voting finds (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Hibbs 1982; Erikson 1989; Alesina et al. 1997), those who view their personal finances and national economic conditions favorably should reward the current presidential administration. As such, individuals who perceived their finances and the economy to have improved would have been more supportive of Bush in 2004 than of Kerry. But individuals who felt that their personal finances and the national economy had worsened should have punished the current administration and lent support to the candidate from the nonincumbent party.

Along with the specific issues that rose to prominence in these two presidential races, the demographic characteristics and political dispositions of Latinos could also have shaped their vote decisions. It is therefore important that the model of vote choice accounts for characteristics such as age, gender, education, income, religious affiliation, and marital status. Finally, no model predicting individual voting would be complete without some measure of party identification and self-reported political ideology, given the critical role that both factors play in one's vote choice (Campbell et al. 1964).

To determine how all these factors influenced Latino voting behavior in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, I estimated a multivariate model of vote choice in which the dependent variable is the probability of voting for the Democratic candidate (in 2000, this is the likelihood of voting for Gore, and in 2004, the likelihood of voting for Kerry).[9] The explanatory variables, as described earlier, account for numerous factors that can influence one's vote decision—demographics, political attitudes, and issue positions.[10] To determine whether variations exist in the roles of issues and ideology in Spanish- and English-dominant Latino vote choice, I estimated a separate model of vote choice for each of these Latino groups. The estimates from the 2000 model of presidential vote choice are presented in Table 6.6, and the estimates for 2004 are presented in Table 6.7.[11]

In both of these presidential races, the policy positions and ideological predispositions of English-dominant Latinos played a somewhat larger role in their vote decisions than these factors did for Spanish-dominant Latinos. Note that of the six issue questions in the 2000 model of vote choice, only one affected the vote decision of Spanish-dominant Latinos, but three impacted the vote choice of English-dominant Latinos. Spanish-dominant Latinos in favor of restricting abortion were 23 percent less likely to support Gore.[12] This issue also significantly affected the vote choice of English-dominant Latinos in 2000; those supporting a ban on abortion experienced a 20 percent reduction in their probability of voting for Gore. English-dominant Latinos' attitudes toward federal spending on health care also affected their vote decision. Those who favored greater efforts by the federal government in these two policy domains preferred the Democratic candidate over the Republican candidate. The magnitude of these effects was fairly substantial, ranging from 9 to 23 percent in both elections.

The vote-choice estimates from the 2004 presidential election correspond fairly well to those from 2000. Overall, a greater number of issue attitudes entered into the vote calculus of the more-acculturated Latinos. The national economy was the only issue that influenced the voting behavior of Spanish-dominant Latinos, but health care, school vouchers, and abortion all factored into the decision-making process of English-dominant Latinos. As discussed in Chapter 2, language use among immigrants could be viewed, to some degree, as a proxy for political knowledge. Thus, the fact that Spanish-dominant Latinos' issue positions did not play such an influential role in their vote choice could be attributed to their lower levels of familiarity with American politics in general and with the context of these two elections specifically.

**Table 6.6** Latino vote choice in the 2000 presidential elections

| | *English-dominant Latinos* | | | *Spanish-dominant Latinos* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Variable* | *Estimated coefficient* | *Standard error* | *Estimated change in probability of vote*[a] | *Estimated coefficient* | *Standard error* | *Estimated change in probability of vote*[a] |
| Constant | −.14 | .57 | — | 1.01 | 1.27 | — |
| *Demographics* | | | | | | |
| No high-school degree | −.06 | .25 | −.02 | −.30 | .38 | −.12 |
| High-school degree | −.14 | .18 | −.05 | −.01 | .40 | −.00 |
| Income | −.06 | .05 | .02 | .06 | .10 | .02 |
| Age | .00 | .01 | .00 | −.00 | .09 | −.00 |
| Married | −.23 | .17 | −.07 | −.09 | .26 | −.03 |
| Women | −.06 | .15 | −.01 | .02 | .28 | .01 |
| Catholic | .13 | .20 | .05 | −.68 | .57 | −.26 |
| Protestant | −.00 | .24 | −.00 | −.45 | .63 | −.18 |
| *Political dispositions* | | | | | | |
| Democrat | 1.05*** | .18 | .37*** | 1.00*** | .31 | .37*** |
| Republican | −.89*** | .21 | −.34*** | −.78*** | .34 | −.30*** |
| Liberal | .24*** | .09 | .09*** | −.10 | .13 | −.04 |
| *Issue positions* | | | | | | |
| Economy fair | −.13 | .19 | −.05 | −.36 | .29 | −.14 |
| Economy poor | −.39 | .27 | −.16 | .66 | .50 | .24 |
| Personal finances fair | −.18 | .18 | −.07 | .06 | .33 | .02 |
| Personal finances poor | .45 | .32 | −.16 | −.11 | .41 | −.05 |
| Restrict abortion | −.52*** | .17 | −.20*** | −.58** | .26 | −.23** |
| Pro-vouchers | −.07 | .16 | −.02 | −.40 | .30 | −.16 |
| More/same spending on Social Security | .56* | .30 | −.22* | .53 | .63 | .21 |
| More/same government spending on health care for uninsured | .23* | .13 | .09* | .10 | .33 | .04 |
| *N* | | 417 | | | 139 | |
| Log-likelihood | | −185.31 | | | −74.71 | |
| Baseline | | 58.77 | | | 50.23 | |
| Percent correctly predicted | | 64.62 | | | 54.09 | |

NOTE: The dependent variable is the probability of voting for Gore.

[a]Reports the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables.

*$p < .10$

**$p < .05$

***$p < .01$

**Table 6.7** Latino vote choice in the 2004 presidential elections

| | *English-dominant Latinos* | | | *Spanish-dominant Latinos* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Variable* | *Estimated coefficient* | *Standard error* | *Estimated change in probability of vote*[a] | *Estimated coefficient* | *Standard error* | *Estimated change in probability of vote*[a] |
| Constant | −.83 | .56 | — | −.20 | 1.35 | — |
| *Demographics* | | | | | | |
| No high-school degree | −.19 | .26 | −.07 | −.13 | .34 | −.05 |
| High-school degree | .06 | .17 | .02 | −.23 | .37 | −.09 |
| Income | .01 | .04 | .00 | −.07 | .07 | .02 |
| Age | .00 | .01 | .00 | −.01 | .01 | −.00 |
| Married | −.17 | .16 | −.07 | −.34 | .27 | −.12 |
| Women | .04 | .15 | .02 | −.36 | .23 | −.13 |
| Catholic | −.24 | .18 | −.09 | −.08 | .35 | −.03 |
| Protestant | −.22 | .21 | −.09 | −.48 | .41 | −.18 |
| *Political dispositions* | | | | | | |
| Democrat | .91*** | .16 | .37*** | .72*** | .27 | .25*** |
| Republican | −1.09*** | .21 | −.34*** | −.83** | .33 | −.32** |
| Liberal | .16** | .08 | .09*** | −.02 | .12 | −.01 |
| *Issue positions* | | | | | | |
| Economy fair | .38* | .20 | .15* | .52* | .28 | .18* |
| Economy poor | .49** | .23 | .18** | 1.27*** | .43 | .34*** |
| Personal finances fair | −.09 | .17 | −.04 | .30 | .33 | .11 |
| Personal finances poor | −.18 | .24 | −.07 | −.19 | .41 | −.07 |
| Restrict abortion | −.61*** | .17 | −.24*** | .11 | .24 | .04 |
| Pro-vouchers | −.30** | .15 | −.11** | −.03 | .35 | −.01 |
| Favor investing social security in stock market | .16 | .18 | .07 | .39 | .32 | .13 |
| More/same government spending on health care for uninsured | .58* | .33 | .23* | 1.09 | 1.00 | .41 |
| *N* | | 484 | | | 179 | |
| Log-likelihood | | −203.88 | | | −89.11 | |
| Baseline | | 56.70 | | | 64.9 | |
| Percent correctly predicted | | 58.19 | | | 67.54 | |

[a]Reports the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. The dependent variable is the probability of voting for Kerry.

*$p < .10$

**$p < .05$

***$p < .01$

**Table 6.8** Descriptive statistics for variables presented in Tables 6.2–6.3 and 6.5–6.6

| | *2000* | | | *2004* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Mean* | *Standard deviation* | *Range* | *Mean* | *Standard deviation* | *Range* |
| *Political dispositions/media exposure* | | | | | | |
| Liberal ideology | 2.83 | .94 | 1,5 | 2.81 | 1.00 | 1,5 |
| Democrat | .28 | .45 | 0,1 | .32 | .48 | 0,1 |
| Republican | .25 | .43 | 0,1 | .30 | .46 | 0,1 |
| Interested in government | 2.02 | .99 | 1,4 | 1.90 | .91 | 1,4 |
| Watch TV news daily | 4.22 | 2.69 | 0,7 | 4.06 | 2.75 | 0,7 |
| Read newspaper daily | 3.78 | 2.89 | 0,7 | 2.33 | .96 | 1,4 |
| Contacted by a campaign | .06 | .24 | 0,1 | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| *Demographics* | | | | | | |
| No high-school degree | .09 | .28 | 0,1 | .07 | .26 | 0,1 |
| High-school graduate | .26 | .44 | 0,1 | .25 | .44 | 0,1 |
| Some college/beyond | .16 | .36 | 0,1 | .18 | .38 | 0,1 |
| Income | 4.94 | 2.07 | 1,9 | 5.33 | 2.10 | 1,9 |
| Married | .57 | .49 | 0,1 | .57 | .50 | 0,1 |
| Women | .55 | .50 | 0,1 | .55 | .50 | 0,1 |
| Age | 46.09 | 16.57 | 18,96 | 47.99 | 16.59 | 18,97 |
| U.S. citizen | .04 | .20 | 0,1 | .62 | .49 | 0,1 |
| Catholic | .13 | .33 | 0,1 | .28 | .45 | 0,1 |
| Protestant | .27 | .45 | 0,1 | .62 | .49 | 0,1 |
| *Issues* | | | | | | |
| Economy good | .26 | .44 | 0,1 | .25 | .43 | 0,1 |
| Economy fair | .13 | .33 | 0,1 | .43 | .49 | 0,1 |
| Economy poor | .04 | .19 | 0,1 | .28 | .45 | 0,1 |
| Personal finances good | .27 | .44 | 0,1 | .40 | .49 | 0,1 |
| Personal finances fair | .15 | .36 | 0,1 | .35 | .48 | 0,1 |
| Personal finances poor | .04 | .20 | 0,1 | .14 | .35 | 0,1 |
| Restrict abortion | .35 | .48 | 0,1 | 3.59 | 1.66 | 1,5 |
| Pro-vouchers | .22 | .42 | 0,1 | .50 | .50 | 0,1 |
| Social Security | 1.49 | .63 | 1,4 | 2.83 | 1.59 | 1,5 |
| Health insurance | 1.43 | .73 | 1,4 | 1.39 | .75 | 1,4 |
| *Advertising exposure* | | | | | | |
| Complex policy | .17 | 1.43 | 0,117.18 | 2.55 | 7.32 | 0,59.91 |
| Explained policy | .33 | 2.47 | 0,179.28 | 2.31 | 6.47 | 0,51.38 |
| Simple policy | .39 | .77 | 0,2 | 1.48 | 4.20 | 0,35.99 |
| Targeted Latino ad | .001 | .01 | 0,.13 | .02 | .70 | 0,1.13 |

The estimates from the vote-choice models also indicate that political ideology influenced the voting behavior for only one group of Latinos. How one defined oneself on the left-right ideological scale had no bearing on the voting decisions made by Spanish-dominant Latinos in both 2000 and 2004. In contrast, political ideology was a significant predictor of vote choice among English-dominant Latinos for both elections; those identifying with a liberal ideology increased their likelihood of voting for the Democratic candidate by 9 percent in 2000 and 2004. Given that Spanish-dominant Latinos are still in the process of becoming acquainted with American politics, the concept of political ideology, at least in the U.S. context, may still be in its formative stages. This could partly explain why ideology plays a less meaningful role in the vote decisions of Spanish-dominant Latinos.

In addition to one's issue beliefs and political dispositions, these models considered a Latino's demographic characteristics to be potential explanatory factors in their vote decisions. But as the estimates from Tables 6.6 and 6.7 reveal, age, education and income level, religious affiliation, marital status, and gender all failed to have any significant impact on the voting behavior of both English- and Spanish-dominant Latinos. The one other factor that did significantly affect Latino decision making is partisanship. For both groups of Latinos, identifying as a partisan (either Democrat or Republican) influenced voting behavior in the predicted manner. That is, Latino Democrats were more likely to support the Democratic candidate, and Latino Republicans were less likely to vote for the Democratic candidate. In both of these scenarios, the baseline category is Latinos who consider themselves Independents. Partisanship, as expected, has a substantial impact on vote choice; identifying as either a Republican or a Democrat affects one's decision to support the candidate of one's party by about one-third. The fact that party affiliation is such a strong and influential predictor of vote choice for Spanish-dominant Latinos while ideology is not presents a rather interesting puzzle. Earlier, it was suggested that ideology failed to be salient for Spanish-dominant Latinos due to the variation in the political socialization process between this group and the native-born population. But a similar argument could be made about the acquisition of the use of partisan labels in the U.S. It may be that Spanish-dominant Latinos can more easily distinguish the terms *Democrat* and *Republican* because presidential candidates seem to emphasize party labels to a much greater extent than they do political ideologies in their campaign ads, particularly in their Spanish-language ads (Connaughton 2005). Thus, even

without a significant degree of familiarity with the American political system, Spanish-dominant Latinos may be able to more easily infer from these campaign messages what it means to be a Democrat or Republican as opposed to liberal or conservative. Although the analysis here cannot determine whether this is the case, subsequent work in this area could reinforce the existing studies on information shortcuts (see Kahneman et al. 1979; Popkin 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). It may also be that because these party labels are identical in meaning whether they are used in a Spanish- or English-language ad, it is unlikely that they will be interpreted differently among Spanish- and English-dominant Latinos. The same cannot be said, however, for terms pertaining to American political ideology.

Understanding the components that factored into the vote decisions of Spanish- and English-dominant Latinos in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections offers just one glimpse of the effects that different advertising strategies can have on this growing segment of the American electorate. The models of vote choice indicated that political ideology played an insignificant role in determining who Spanish-dominant Latinos supported for president in both of these elections. In contrast, political ideology was a strong and important predictor of vote choice for English-dominant Latinos. Because the relationship between political ideology and voter decision making serves as one of the cornerstones of American political behavior, it is somewhat unsettling to find that such a relationship is absent for many of our recent newcomers. This pattern was also echoed in the difficulty that Spanish-dominant Latinos experienced in correctly identifying the ideological positions of the Democratic candidates and, to a somewhat lesser extent, of Bush. Perhaps candidates need to do a better job of communicating in their Spanish-language ads exactly what political ideology they identify with. By doing so, they could help Spanish-dominant Latinos learn more about the issues, ideals, and values that go along with being liberal and conservative, and this group of Latinos could be more sure that they are casting their ballots for the "right" candidate (that is, the candidate who is most closely aligned with their own beliefs and values). It is important to keep in mind, however, that partisanship was an important predictor of vote choice for Spanish-dominant Latinos in both presidential elections. This finding suggests that partisanship carries more weight than does ideology in the vote decisions of the recently arrived segment of the Latino population. Thus, although it would not be accurate to conclude that political predispositions had no affect on the voting behavior

of Spanish-dominant Latinos, only one out of the two key political indicators were significant.

## Summary

This chapter examined the consequences of adopting an information-based strategy of campaign advertising on the political well being of the Latino electorate. I discussed two main effects that could result from candidates advertising less substantively based policy messages in their Spanish-language ads than in their English-language ads. First, although English-dominant Latinos' levels of political learning were positively influenced by exposure to the most sophisticated and informative policy messages, exposure to such ads did not provide the same educational benefits to Spanish-dominant Latinos. In fact, being exposed to political ads had no influence whatsoever on their rates of political knowledge. Instead, in the 2000 presidential election, other information sources available during a campaign, such as newspapers and personal contact from a campaign worker, positively impacted Spanish-dominant Latinos' rates of political knowledge.

In both the 2000 and 2004 presidential races, Spanish-dominant Latinos also knew less about candidates' issue positions, ideological orientations, and personal backgrounds when compared with the rest of the electorate. This was the case both before and immediately after the general election. A more in-depth examination of the responses to the factual political questions also showed that Spanish-dominant Latinos provided a larger percentage of non-responses than did other racial and ethnic groups. Perhaps one reason why so many Spanish-dominant Latinos responded in this manner can be attributed to the types of political ads that they were exposed to. These ads provided little in the way of substantive policy information about the presidential candidates. As a result, it appears that many of the nation's most recent newcomers could not take advantage of the educational benefits associated with televised political ads.

Another consequence associated with these advertising strategies is that Spanish-dominant Latinos are less influenced in their vote decisions by their issue positions and ideological beliefs than are English-dominant Latinos. One implication from this result is that Spanish-dominant Latinos' vote intentions may not entirely reflect their true issue preferences (Lau and Redlawsk 2006). This is of particular concern since one's positions on issues play an integral role in the vote-decision process (Page and Brody 1972; Carmines

and Stimson 1980; Alvarez and Nagler 1995; Abramson et al. 2002). Other possible repercussions from adopting an information-based strategy of advertising may include low levels of political interest, trust, and efficacy among Spanish-dominant Latinos, as some might find Spanish-language campaign messages to be much too simplistic and, perhaps, even somewhat condescending. It could even backfire among bilingual Latinos, leading them to react negatively to Spanish-language ads.[13] Although providing such evidence would require further research and analysis, these possibilities highlight the fact that candidates' advertising decisions have a wide range of consequences, some of which may have been unintended or even unexpected on the part of politicians. The way candidates target specific groups influences not only who these groups end up voting for, but also how they behave in a variety of political arenas. Unfortunately, these ramifications happen to disadvantage the political and civic voice of a growing and increasingly influential segment of the American electorate.

# 7 The Future of Ethnically Targeted Campaigns

**AS A NATION COMPRISED OF IMMIGRANTS** from vastly different cultures and backgrounds, *who* and *what* we consider to be the American electorate has constantly been in flux. At the beginning of the twentieth century, those of Irish, Italian, German, and Jewish ancestry made up the majority of entrants to the political process. Most of these people settled in the large urban centers of the American northeast. In the mid-1960s, newcomers arrived from as far as East and Southeast Asia and from nearer locales in Latin America. The rate of immigration from Latin America since then has been so continuous that Latinos are now the largest racial and ethnic group in the U.S.

Although the ethnic composition of our nation's newcomers has fluctuated over the decades, the strategies that politicians have used to appeal to these immigrant groups have remained relatively unchanged. The political machines active at the beginning of the twentieth century won the support of immigrant groups via symbolic gestures and the provision of jobs and social services. Of course, the goal of these efforts was to signal a candidate's interest and concern for these groups, and, in turn, capture their electoral support. At the core of this strategy is the belief that a group's shared ethnic identity translates into shared political beliefs and preferences (Erie 1988). According to this view, an ethnic group should behave as a monolithic voting bloc and therefore care about the same issues and share similar concerns. A key assumption of this belief is that one's ethnic identity is correlated to one's political behavior and actions. Such a perspective has led to the conventional wisdom—that when candidates are campaigning for elected office, they target ethnic minorities in a different way from the rest of the electorate. The strate-

gies used for ethnic minorities could include campaigning to them using ethnic-specific appeals or emphasizing issues that the candidates perceive to be important to these groups. In the current era of ethnic and racial campaigns, presidential candidates spent more than $3 million on Spanish-language media buys in 2000 and more than $8.7 million in 2004 (Segal 2006). In just one presidential election cycle, then, the amount spent on Spanish-language advertising more than doubled.

Because politicians, particularly those competing for the U.S. presidency, cannot afford to reach out to potential supporters individually for lack of time and resources, a more efficient way to campaign to the electorate is to target those who are like-minded, and one way to do this is through group affiliations. A shared culture, race, ethnicity, or to a lesser extent, occupation or gender can closely tie individuals together and can also translate into shared political views and concerns. This is why micro-targeting has become the preferred campaign strategy among today's top political consultants (Shea and Burton 2006). And as Bishin's (2009) subconstituency politics theory points out, politicians intentionally make group appeals in order to activate their group-based identities. The research on consumer-based advertising strategies toward ethnic and racial minorities further documents the benefits of ethnic-based appeals, made through visual images or language, in generating positive reactions to the product being advertised (Whittler 1989; Dimofte et al. 2003/2004).

The goal of this book was to systemically determine whether this conventional wisdom on ethnic and racial campaigns holds true and what repercussions it may have on the political well being of the ethnic or racial group being targeted. Part of the explanation for these distinct campaign strategies is that candidates perceive ethnic identity to be a salient factor in the political decisions that ethnics make; the other primary factor in the explanation pertains to variations in a group's familiarity with politics. That is, the extent to which groups participate in and are interested in politics, and the frequency with which they follow political campaigns and politics in general all play into candidates' advertising strategies. These two factors serve as the basis for the theory of information-based advertising and help to explain the differences in the content of the Spanish- and English-language political ads used in the 2000–2004 election cycles. In examining the primary form of campaign communication used to target the largest immigrant group today, Latinos, one can see how the Spanish-language ads developed for presidential, congressional,

and gubernatorial races had a greater tendency to emphasize nonpolicy and simplistic policy messages than did the English-language ads created for these elections. The content of these English-language ads focused on informative policy messages to a greater extent than did that of the Spanish-language ads. For example, the total percentage of Spanish-language ads featuring symbolic and character messages was almost one and a half times the percentage of the ads created in English. But the total number of explained policy and complex policy messages in English-language ads outpaced those in Spanish-language ads by a margin of 5 percent and 11 percent, respectively.

In an additional test of the theory of information-based advertising, I examined on what types of programs these different commercials were broadcast. Based on this theory, candidates would be expected to broadcast the most informative policy messages on television news programs, which have more politically sophisticated audiences that would be likely to respond to them. One would expect simple policy messages, however, to be broadcast on more entertainment-focused programs. Only partial support for this argument emerged, and that support was for candidates' broadcasting decisions about their Spanish-language ads. The bulk of the English-language spots aired on the news regardless of their content. Because candidates spend a much larger amount of their advertising budget on English-language spots than on Spanish-language ones, they have an incentive to air these spots on programs with audiences composed of likely voters, and studies have shown that those who watch the news are also those most likely to vote (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996).

At the micro level, congressional and statewide candidates also considered the ethnic composition and political knowledge levels of their intended audience. Candidates competing in districts with a large percentage of politically informed Latinos were more likely to advertise policy messages in Spanish than those representing a less politically informed Latino electorate. The competitiveness of the election also played a role in advertising choices; close elections increased the chances that candidates would broadcast policy messages that could differentiate themselves from their competitors. In developing targeted ethnic appeals, candidates once again took into account the demographic composition of the electorate. Candidates were more likely to advertise in Spanish and feature a Latino in their commercials as their share of the Latino electorate increased. The same held true in their decisions to feature other ethnic and racial minorities in their ads; for example, a sizeable

African American electorate resulted in an increased probability of an African American appearing in a commercial. Altogether, these analyses demonstrate how candidates do consider their target audience when crafting their political ads.

As the conventional wisdom predicts, Latinos were affected by these televised campaign ads in their political behavior. But the extent to which a Latino is incorporated into American society determines which types of political ads affect their vote decisions and likelihood of voting. Among Latinos who are still in the process of becoming politically and socially incorporated, only those commercials that tap into their ethnic identity play an important role in deciding which presidential candidate they will support. Politically incorporated Latinos, however, are persuaded in their vote choice more by informative policy ads than by targeted Latino ads. Exposure to these ads also generated an indirect effect—that of encouraging Latinos to vote on election day. But again, this indirect effect varied based on a Latino's level of political incorporation. Only those ads that specifically appealed to Latinos influenced the more-incorporated English-dominant Latinos to turn out and vote. Yet, Spanish-dominant Latinos who were exposed to both Spanish-language ads and general ads were positively influenced to vote.

Although these distinct advertising efforts provided support for the commonly held belief that candidates advertise differently to easily identifiable groups in the electorate, in this case ethnic and racial minorities, this strategy has several negative repercussions for the political well being of our nation's largest immigrant population. Given that one of the benefits associated with political advertising is its ability to assist in voter learning and promote increased levels of knowledge (Geer 2006; Jamieson 1996; Joslyn 1980; Patterson and McClure 1976), can Latinos who are exposed to Spanish-language ads learn anything from them, despite their lack of policy content? Unfortunately, among the Spanish-dominant segment of the Latino community, the answer to this question is no. Exposure to political ads did not contribute to the political knowledge of Spanish-dominant Latinos. English-dominant Latinos did learn from these ads, but only from the ones containing informative policy messages. Spanish-dominant Latinos had to rely on other information sources, such as newspapers and personal contact by a campaign worker, to learn about the candidates and their policy positions.

It was also the case that both during and after the campaign, Spanish-dominant Latinos knew less about candidates' issue positions, ideological

orientations, and personal backgrounds when compared with other ethnic and racial groups. A more-detailed examination of the responses to the factual political questions also revealed a greater tendency among less politically incorporated Latinos than among other racial and ethnic groups to provide nonresponses. Spanish-dominant Latinos also exhibited some difficulty identifying the ideological positions of the 2000 and 2004 presidential candidates. As this group is already disadvantaged in their familiarity with and knowledge of politics when compared with other Americans, they would stand to gain the most from the educational benefits that come from exposure to political ads. But given that the content in Spanish-language policy ads favored style over substance, it is not surprising that these ads provided no assistance in political learning.

Another potential consequence of these different advertising strategies concerns the role that a person's issue and political beliefs play in his or her vote intention. Perhaps one reason why political ideology failed to factor into the vote decision of Spanish-dominant Latinos is because of the types of political ads that they were exposed to. Although the issues of abortion and the national economy mattered to all Latinos, the topic of government-sponsored health insurance factored into the vote decisions only for English-dominant Latinos.

## Research Implications

Political strategists who believe that campaign ads impact the Latino electorate equally may wish to reevaluate this belief. Although all Latinos are influenced by targeted ethnic appeals in their vote intentions, exposure to informative policy ads plays a larger role in the vote decision of those who have incorporated into American society and politics than does exposure to targeted Latino ads. But less-incorporated Latinos are persuaded only by ethnic-specific appeals when casting their ballots. Assuming that all Latinos will respond equally to these cultural messages implies that personal ideological and issue stances and candidates' issue positions have no bearing on their decision-making process. Such an assumption incorrectly depicts Latinos as a cohesive and homogenous political group, but as this research and previous research on Latino political behavior demonstrates (Abrajano and Alvarez, forthcoming; Alvarez and García Bedolla 2003; de la Garza and DeSipio 1992), this ethnic group is highly heterogeneous in their political preferences and behaviors. Strategists are not incorrect to create campaign messages that

are culturally and symbolically based, because Latinos do respond to them. But it is important to note that the vote intentions of English-dominant Latinos, who constitute the segment of the Latino electorate most likely to vote, are guided to a greater degree by substantive, policy-oriented messages and less so by cultural ones.

Moreover, because candidates are targeting Spanish-dominant Latinos primarily with simple policy appeals and nonpolicy messages, these Latinos are less likely to behave as "completely informed" issue voters when compared with the rest of electorate (Lupia 1994). In deciding which candidate to support, Spanish-dominant Latinos may be limited in their capacity to evaluate the contenders based on the contenders' policy positions and proposals. After all, how can voters differentiate between two candidates from simple policy messages promising "better schools" or "a stronger economy"? Such messages not only fail to reveal how candidates plan to effect improvements but also fail to provide voters with enough information about the candidates' specific positions on important issues. The dearth of informative policy messages in Spanish-language ads also means that Spanish-dominant Latinos may lack the necessary information to participate in the political arena in an influential way (for example, by letter writing or lobbying). In turn, Spanish-dominant Latinos may be less able to hold their elected representatives accountable. This concern is especially relevant for a socioeconomically disadvantaged group such as Latinos, given that the costs associated with interest group participation are fairly high (Bishin 2009). Also note that partisanship was more important for Spanish-dominant Latinos than was ideology.

As it stands now, Spanish-dominant Latinos' lack of familiarity with politics is likely to persist because of the structural inequalities that plague the educational opportunities of many ethnic and racial minorities in the United States (Orfield and Lee 2006). Changes in the high-school curriculum could help alleviate this problem (Niemi and Junn 1998). If public high schools systematically incorporated a greater number of civics and current events classes into their curricula, African American and Latino students could learn more about politics and increase their stored levels of political knowledge. Of course, implementing this kind of change would require more funding from the government at both the federal and state levels. The passage of the No Child Left Behind Act makes the chances for such reform seem slim, because public schools nationwide must now focus their efforts on adequately preparing students for national achievement tests that emphasize reading and

math proficiency if they wish to retain their funding. As Wong (2006) and others (Bloemraad 2006; DeSipio 2001; Wong et al. 2008) have documented, churches, community groups, labor unions, homeland associations, and ethnic businesses are alternative avenues through which immigrants can become incorporated into the political process. Although many of these groups are not political in nature, they can still serve as important resources from which immigrants can develop valuable political skills and gain exposure to the different functions of government. Bloemraad (2006) also notes the importance of family and friends in teaching newcomers about the ins and outs of their newly adopted country and encouraging them to become politically involved.

Candidates and their respective parties may also want to reconsider their current advertising strategies if they wish to build party loyalty among Spanish-speaking Latinos and potentially win the votes of this highly coveted segment of the American electorate. This is by far the most pressing concern that Democrats and Republicans have today, as Latinos continue to be an important—perhaps the most important—swing group in the nation. Capturing the support of these Latinos would translate into winning the allegiance of almost a quarter of the population nationwide, and of an even greater number in the next several decades. In addition, recall that when Latinos are compared with the rest of the American electorate, more of them see themselves as Independents or "don't know" their party affiliation (Abrajano and Alvarez, forthcoming; Hajnal and Lee 2008). This lack of strong partisan rootedness can likely be attributed to Spanish-dominant Latinos' uncertainty about the ideological positions of the major party candidates, and to their lack of familiarity regarding American politics. Candidates could reduce this uncertainty by communicating their issue positions and ideological beliefs as clearly as possible in their political advertisements. Candidates should also be careful how they translate these ideological concepts in their Spanish-language ads, and do a better job of linking issue positions with political ideology.

If future presidential campaigns follow the current pattern of broadcasting mainly targeted Latino appeals to Spanish-dominant Latinos, this group will have little choice but to search for other avenues of information. The responsibility of providing substantive and relevant information during an election year may shift to independent organizations and advocacy groups, because the content of television ads as it is currently conceived will not help to reduce the information gap that exists between Spanish-dominant Latinos and the rest of the electorate.

The lessons learned from the campaigns of the 2000–2004 elections also have important implications for the second largest immigrant group in the nation—Asian Americans. Their steady rates of immigration to the United States over the past thirty years have increased their share of the total U.S. population to 4.5 percent (U.S. Census Bureau 2000b). By 2050, Asian Americans are projected to make up 8 percent of the U.S. population (U.S. Census Bureau 2000b). As in the Latino population, high levels of socioeconomic, cultural, and generational heterogeneity exist within the Asian American community (Lien et al. 2004; Espiritu 1992). Asian Americans' political interests and orientation to politics thus vary significantly from one ethnic subgroup to another (Lien et al. 2004). Moreover, a large share of the Asian American population is foreign born, which means that their political socialization takes place outside the United States. But unlike Latinos, Asian Americans do not share a common language. So if candidates and politicians intend to target Asian Americans through specialized media outlets, they will not be able to communicate to the entire community as easily as they can to Latinos.

How, then, should candidates and politicians communicate to racial and ethnic groups? This study has shown that emotional and affective appeals based on Latino culture influence the voting behavior of Latinos but do not contribute to the political learning and political knowledge levels of Spanish-dominant Latinos. Candidates may therefore be better off advertising both ethnic appeals and more-informative policy messages in their Spanish-language ads. The same may also be said of the advertising decisions directed toward other immigrant groups, such as Asian Americans. Because many immigrants are newcomers to the American political process (Lien et al. 2004), they should also benefit from ads containing both types of messages. The findings in this book thus have implications not just for Latinos but also for immigrant groups more broadly.

As mentioned earlier, another reform that candidates ought to consider is advertising a greater number of campaign messages that clearly state their policy positions. They should also pay special attention to distinguishing their positions from those of the opposition candidate. Such a shift could help Latinos learn which issues Democrats "own" and which ones Republicans "own" and how this relates to political ideology. Furthermore, if candidates want to gain the allegiance of Latinos, they have to start taking the necessary steps to encourage party loyalty based on shared issue and policy concerns. Like other Americans, Latinos are concerned about the issues that impact their daily lives: health insurance, jobs and the economy, and education. Latinos

generally tend to be fiscally liberal but socially conservative (DeSipio 1996), which makes it difficult to categorize them as solidly liberal or conservative. Candidates need to take a definitive and concrete stand on the issues, however, if they want to win Latinos' support and allegiance not just for one election, but also for years to come.

Exposure to more-informative political ads in Spanish would also enable Spanish-dominant Latinos to learn something substantive about the candidates, the political parties, and the greater U.S. political system. This would make the latest newcomers feel welcomed by the political parties, and such feelings may motivate Latinos and other immigrants who have not yet naturalized to do so. A shift in candidates' Spanish-language advertising strategies could also increase Spanish-dominant Latinos' levels of political efficacy, rates of participation, and overall levels of political knowledge. Whether or not current and aspiring politicians have fully realized it, Latinos and other racial and ethnic minorities will become a sizable part of the American electorate, so it is in candidates' best interest, and in the interest of concerned citizens, to enable Latinos to become active and informed participants in an essential part of the democratic process.

# 8 Epilogue: The 2008 Campaigns

*"Nobody can make it to the White House without Univision."*
**—Jorge Ramos, anchorman for *Noticiero* Univision[1]**

**THE QUOTE FROM LONG-TIME NEWS ANCHOR JORGE RAMOS** succinctly captures one of the central arguments of this book. As America's most watched Spanish-language broadcast television network, Univision is the gateway through which politicians can communicate to the millions of Spanish-speaking voters in the United States. This form of political communication enables candidates to tailor very specific messages to this group of voters, with very little risk that non-Spanish speakers will be exposed to them. Without such a medium, candidates would miss out on the opportunity to target an increasingly important segment of the nation's electorate. To be sure, the 2008 presidential campaigns took full advantage of this media outlet. Univision Communications estimated sales of approximately $37 million on paid political advertising.[2] Moreover, then-Democratic-candidate and now-president Barack Obama is estimated to have spent approximately $20 million on Latino outreach efforts, which is more than twice the combined amount spent by Kerry and Bush in 2004.[3] These resources were used primarily to broadcast Spanish-language ads in the battleground states with sizeable Latino populations—Colorado, Florida, New Mexico, and Nevada. Some of these funds were also directed at the grassroots level; Obama's team emulated outreach efforts created by John F. Kennedy's 1960 presidential campaign and established "Viva Obama!" clubs across the country. The goal of these organizations was to provide information about the candidate and, of course, to get Latinos to the polls in November.

Such strategies proved to be a wise move on the part of Obama and the Democrats; he not only secured two-thirds of the Latino vote but also won

more than a majority of the popular vote (53 percent). Obama's share of the popular vote translated into 365 electoral votes, which is considerably more than the 270 electoral votes needed to win the presidency. According to most media reports, the fact that the crucial swing states of Florida, Nevada, Colorado, and New Mexico all went from "red" in 2004 to "blue" in 2008 can be attributed largely to the Latino vote (Preston 2008). Indeed, with Latinos in Florida constituting 11 percent of registered voters and those in Nevada and Colorado constituting 9 percent of registered voters in each state, they had the numbers that could have tipped the election in either direction. As Chapter 1 discussed, a Democratic victory in Florida is no small feat, as only two other Democrats had managed it since 1968.[4] Although in 2004 the majority of Florida's Latino population cast their ballots in favor of Bush, in 2008 the majority (57 percent) supported the Democratic candidate. Thus, it is likely that Obama's campaign efforts played some role in the shifts in political preferences among Latinos in Florida and other states. This epilogue briefly reviews the campaign tactics used to target Latino voters in the primaries and caucuses as well as in the general election. Comprehensive advertising data, akin to that used throughout this book, is yet to be available for the 2008 elections. As such, the following discussion is unable to compare the content of Spanish- and English-language ads in a manner consistent with the analysis presented in Chapter 4. Nonetheless, information does exist on the Spanish-language ads created by the 2008 presidential candidates, which makes it possible to draw some inferences about any overarching themes or messages.

## The Primary Elections

The importance of the Latino electorate was understood from the onset of the presidential campaign season, particularly among the Democratic contenders. September 9, 2007, marked the seventh in a series of nineteen Democratic Party debates, and the first ever nationally televised bilingual debate. The questions and answers of each of the participants were instantly translated from English to Spanish.[5] The fact that this debate was broadcast in both languages is likely due to one of its sponsors, Univision. Many political observers viewed this debate as a historic moment, and according to Maria Elena Salinas, Univision anchor and co-moderator of the debate, the format of the debate was a "a sign of respect" to the Latino electorate (Garvin 2007, A1).

Although it is not new for presidential contenders to begin their Spanish-language ad buys during the primaries and caucuses, the 2008 campaigns

witnessed a significant increase in the resources devoted to such efforts. According to Segal (2008), more than $4 million went toward Spanish-language advertising in the 2008 primaries and caucuses. This figure exceeds the amount allocated to televised Spanish-language advertising in the past two presidential primaries combined. One key reason for this increased attention is that many states with large Latino populations decided to hold their primary elections earlier on in the season. It was Obama and former Democratic contender Bill Richardson who aired the first Spanish-language ads in the summer of 2007. These political spots were intended for Latino voters participating in the Nevada caucuses scheduled for January 19, 2008, because that was the first state on the primary and caucus calendar with a sizeable Latino population. In December 2007, then-senator Hillary Clinton launched her Spanish-language campaign by airing a radio spot in both Iowa and New Hampshire. Clinton also reached out to Spanish speakers before the Nevada caucus with a Spanish-language televised ad titled "La Voz de los Que No Tienen Voz" (The Voice of the Voiceless), in which she is depicted as an advocate and friend of Latinos. She is portrayed as someone who has "worked in favor of the interests of [their] community for decades and she always delivers." [6] Republican candidates also began their Spanish-language campaigns early in the primary and caucus season. Three of the contenders vying for the Republican nomination, Rudy Giuliani, John McCain, and Mitt Romney, produced Spanish-language television or radio ads aimed at Latino voters in Florida, which had its primary election scheduled for January 29, 2008. Because the majority of Latinos in Florida supported Bush in 2004, the decision to target this group very early on in the campaign seemed quite reasonable.

As mentioned before, several states with sizeable Latino populations, including Arizona, California, Connecticut, Colorado, and New Mexico, were holding their primaries on Super Tuesday, which was moved up a month earlier in that election year, from March to February. In light of the fierce competition between Clinton and Obama for the Democratic Party's nomination, their Spanish-language ad buys increased considerably. Clinton's Spanish-language ad "Nuestra Amiga" (Our Friend) was broadcast in Arizona, California, Connecticut, and New York. As in the ad broadcast in Nevada, "Nuestra Amiga" portrays Clinton as someone who understands Latinos and "respects [their] culture and understands the problems that affect [their] community."[7] This particular ad would fit squarely within the framework of identification theory (Connaughton 2005; Connaughton and Jarvis 2004; Benoit 2000).

Recall that this theory expects that candidates will craft their political messages by associating themselves, either through symbols or personal experiences, with the group in question. But as the main findings from Chapter 6 highlight, a downside to such ads is that many Spanish-speaking Latinos do not learn much from them, especially compared with how much voters learn from policy-focused ads.

Based on the best information available when this book went to press, Obama produced three Spanish-language ads for the Super Tuesday primaries, "Hope," "El Nos Entiende" (He Understands Us), and "Gutierrez." In the ad titled "Gutierrez," Illinois congressman Luis Gutierrez, who is of Latino origin, speaks about Obama's involvement as a community activist in Chicago and of his participation in the immigration rallies of May 2006. The congressman goes on to mention Obama's commitment to immigration reform. The "Hope" ad also featured an endorsement from an elected official very prominent in the Latino community, Massachusetts senator Edward Kennedy. In "El Nos Entiende" (He Understands Us), Obama attempts to connect to Latinos based on their shared minority status. The ad states that Latinos "know what it feels like being used as a scapegoat just because of [their] background and last name. And no one understands this better than Barack Obama!"[8] These ads are further reflective of identification theory, because the messages in Obama's ads emphasize the commonalities between him and the Latino community.

An independent effort aside from the official campaign also emerged in support of Obama. Particularly successful in its reach, a web music video titled "Viva Obama" featured a mariachi band singing about Obama's background as a community organizer and about his proposed health care plan. The video, produced by Nueva Vista Media, Inc., gained immediate popularity on YouTube and was viewed approximately 500,000 times by February 2008 (Segal 2008). [9] The creator of the video, Miguel Orozco, wanted to produce a video that was "well thought out" and contained an "uplifting message [as well as one mentioning] issues." Orozco also aimed to develop an ad that differed from the typical Spanish-language campaign, which he described as "sterile," with a "deliberate strategy to play it safe" and that does "just enough to show [that candidates] care."[10]

The outcomes from the Super Tuesday primaries and caucuses produced no outright winner for the Democratic nomination, so the next big battle, especially for the Latino vote, was the primary election in Texas, held on

March 4, 2008. It is estimated that the Clinton campaign spent approximately $730,000 and that Obama allocated $970,000 for Spanish-language ad buys in Texas. Obama's campaign produced the Spanish-language ads "Oportunidad" (Opportunity), "Demostro Caracter" (Showed Character), and "Como un Padre" (Like a Father) for this election.[11] The ad "Como un Padre" begins with the statement, "As a father, his thoughts, naturally, are focused on the future," and continues that he therefore intends to open doors for the future of Latino children. The ad goes on to mention some pertinent issues for families—health care for all children, financial aid for students, and a new law that will enable families to retain their homes. Although the ad does include policy-related messages, in no way does it actually reveal how Obama would provide all children access to health care or specify the manner in which the federal government would assist in the housing crisis. As such, these policy messages can be characterized more as simple policy statements than as explained or complex policy messages. Even in the final days of the Democratic primary and caucus season, Latinos remained a visible and important voting group to the presidential contenders. The fact that Puerto Rico was scheduled second to last on the Democratic primary and caucus calendar is the likely reason for this sustained interest. Thus, both contenders for the Democratic party nomination made several campaign stops in Puerto Rico and targeted Spanish-speakers there with television and radio ads (Grunwald 2008). Although Puerto Ricans overwhelmingly supported Clinton by a margin of more than 2 to 1, Clinton was still short of the necessary 2,118 delegate votes. In the end, it was the last two primary races that ultimately decided the 2008 Democratic presidential nominee. On June 3, 2008, Obama clinched the party's nomination by winning in South Dakota and Montana.

## The General Election

The best information available as this book went to press shows that Obama and the Democratic National Committee produced six Spanish-language ads for the general election, whereas John McCain, the Republican presidential nominee, and the Republican National Committee created thirteen Spanish-language ads.[12] Independent groups, such as the National Rifle Association (NRA), Born Alive Truth Organization, and the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), also joined in the efforts to target the Spanish-speaking electorate. McCain took advantage of both Spanish-language radio and television ads, broadcasting them in the battleground states of Nevada, New

Mexico, and Colorado. The content of these ads included information about immigration, Latino service in the armed forces, and the Colombia Free Trade Agreement. The ads presented biographical information about McCain as well. Several of these commercials also featured Frank Gamboa, who is Latino and was McCain's Naval Academy roommate. McCain also produced several attack ads, one of which questioned Obama's experience and another that accused Obama and the Democrats of supporting a tax on small business. The second negative ad goes on to accuse Obama of voting against immigration reform efforts that included a guest-worker program, a pathway to citizenship, and securing the nation's borders.[13] The use of negative ads is relatively new to Spanish-language advertising, as most previous presidential candidates opted to convey their messages in a positive manner. Several recurring themes emerged among the positive ads used in the 2008 presidential campaign—military service, families, children, and the issues of immigration and education.

Obama's two television ads, "No Hay Mayor Obligacion" (There is No Greater Obligation) and "Dos Caras" (Two Faces), were also crafted in a negative fashion. The former attacked McCain for claiming that the "fundamentals of [the] economy are strong" and criticized him for making such a statement in light of the current economic hardships that faced the nation.[14] The latter, a response to McCain's attack ad, has Obama finding fault with McCain's decision to abandon immigration reform. The ad also contains a visual image of conservative radio talk show host Rush Limbaugh expressing the following sentiments: "Mexicans are stupid and unqualified" and "shut your mouth or get out" (O'Keefe 2008). Obama's other ad, "Un Mensaje de Barack Obama" (A Message from Barack Obama), focused on the theme of the American dream, which, according to the commercial, voters would be one step closer to achieving if they cast their ballots for him.[15]

In the final days of the campaign, Obama aired his 30-minute infomercial, "Barack Obama: American Stories," not only on several network television stations (CBS, NBC, and FOX) but also on the largest Spanish-language network, Univision. The decision to broadcast this ad on Univision speaks to the importance of Latinos in this election. As Manny Diaz, Democratic mayor of Miami, expressed, "This ad buy is historical. The fact that it will air on Univision is a testament [to] the campaign's outreach to the Hispanic community" (O'Keefe 2008). Overall, the content of both candidates' Spanish-language ads strayed little from that of those used by previous presidential contenders,

although the use of negative and untruthful advertising was more prominent in their Spanish-language campaigns

In addition to these advertising efforts, McCain and Obama reached out to Latinos by participating in several Latino-specific events. The two presidential contenders addressed the nation's Latino political leaders at the National Association for Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) conference in June 2008. Obama's opening and closing remarks emphasized his immigrant background and his experience working with the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) and other Latino leaders as a civil rights attorney in Chicago. Obama also spoke about the need to reform immigration policies so that they will "secure our borders, and punish employers who exploit immigrant labor; reform [will] finally [bring] the twelve million people who are here illegally out of the shadows by requiring them to take steps to become legal citizens . . . that is a priority that I will pursue from my very first day."[16] Moreover, Obama discussed the need to end the housing crisis, create new jobs, improve schools, and provide health insurance to millions of uninsured Latinos. Finally, he emphasized the critical role of the Latino vote, stating that "this election could well come down to how many Latinos turn out to vote." In McCain's speech at the NALEO conference, he too recognized the importance of Latinos, but only in terms of their military service and their contributions "to the culture, economy and security of the country."[17] Unlike Obama, McCain did not talk about the significance of Latinos in the political arena. McCain also discussed tax policy, and the business tax rate in particular, because there are "two million Latino-owned businesses in America." In addition, he mentioned the need for reforming education, lowering barriers to trade, and decreasing the nation's dependence on foreign oil. Regarding comprehensive immigration reform, McCain recognized the need to "secure our borders first, while respecting the dignity and rights of citizens and legal residents of the United States." He made no mention, however, of immigration reform being a priority in his administration, which sharply contrasted with Obama's position.

Both candidates also spoke at the annual conferences of the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), the nation's largest and oldest Latino organization, and the National Council of La Raza (NCLR), which is the largest Latino civil rights group in the U.S. Obama's speech at each of these conferences reverberated many of the themes from his NALEO address—making immigration reform a main priority in his first year in office, provid-

ing affordable health care, reforming the education system, and addressing the mortgage crisis. He also introduced his small-business plan that would provide a tax credit to employers who offered health insurance to their employees. Moreover, Obama reemphasized the importance of the Latino vote in the upcoming election. In his NCLR speech, he stated, "If you have any doubt about whether you can make a difference, just remember how, back in 2004, 40,000 registered Latino voters in New Mexico didn't turn out on election day. Senator Kerry lost that state by fewer than 6,000 votes . . . In 2008, an estimated 170,000 Latinos in New Mexico aren't registered to vote. I know how powerful this community is. Just think how powerful you could be on November 4th if you translate your numbers into votes."[18]

McCain's address at the NCLR conference also overlapped with the speech he gave at the NALEO conference. He once again emphasized the need to create more jobs, offering economic incentives to small businesses, and he proposed a health-care plan that would provide households with a $5,000 tax credit in order to make their own health-care decisions. McCain also outlined his "HOME" plan that "allows families who need help to apply—either at their local post office or online—for a new, guaranteed, fixed-rate, thirty-year mortgage that will allow them to remain in their home and raise their family with dignity."[19] Although these speeches included the policy plans and proposals of both candidates, they were not being communicated to the vast majority of the Latino electorate. Instead, those attending these events were mostly members of the media and community and business leaders.[20] Nonetheless, the candidates' appearances at the conferences of the major Latino civil rights organizations further demonstrates the importance of the Latino vote. In the last days of the campaign, in what has become a tradition for presidential nominees, Obama and McCain appeared on Univision's longest-running variety program, *Sabado Gigante*. Both candidates provided pre-taped interviews that aired on November 1, just days before the election.

Much like the outreach efforts we saw in the 2000 and 2004 presidential campaigns, both Obama and McCain focused on several symbolic and nonpolicy messages in their ads as a means to connect with Latinos. Among McCain's and Obama's Spanish-language ads that are publicly available, a total of approximately 54 percent feature a Latino. Moreover, 29 percent of these ads focused on the favored candidate's personal qualities, whereas a significantly larger number (54 percent) chose to emphasize the qualities of the opposing candidate. McCain emphasized his service in the military as the common thread between him and the many Latinos who serve in the armed

forces. Recall that this strategy is much like the one developed by Kerry in his Spanish-language ads. Obama also highlighted part of his personal background as a way to connect with Latinos. Along with his shared status as a racial and ethnic minority, he emphasized in several of his Spanish-language ads that his father was an immigrant from Kenya. Obviously, the fact that Latinos are largely an immigrant population makes this particular theme salient and relevant to them. Symbols such as the American dream and themes related to it (that is, opportunity and hope) were, as in past elections, key fixtures in the presidential candidates' political ads. And consistent with the Spanish-language ads used in presidential, congressional, and gubernatorial races from 2000 to 2004, McCain's and Obama's ads included endorsements from prominent Latino elected officials.

Education, health care, and jobs appear to be the topics most frequently mentioned in the candidates' Spanish-language ads. How these messages were expressed and the extent to which they conform to the theory of information-based advertising cannot be determined without a complete content analysis of both Spanish- and English-language ads.[21] One notable trend in this campaign, however, was the number of fraudulent claims made by the two candidates in their televised Spanish-language ads. Recall that one of McCain's negative ads criticized Obama and the Democrats for not passing the immigration reform bill proposed in 2006. This statement was false, because Obama favored immigration reform and a pathway to citizenship, which was one aspect of the reforms that McCain did not support. Obama was guilty of the same crime; his attack ad, "Dos Caras," falsely links Rush Limbaugh with McCain. In reality, Limbaugh berated McCain for supporting a less restrictive immigration bill. Although both the print and television media alerted the public to these inaccuracies, candidates may nonetheless continue to use this strategy in their Spanish-language ads.

As the Latino electorate has solidified its role as a key constituency in American politics, candidates and political leaders must decide whether they want to continue to appeal to this electorate based primarily on the ethnic and cultural identity of its members, or whether they will incorporate into their political ads more-informative messages about their policy proposals. A decision by politicians to expound on their policies in their Spanish-language ads would contribute to the political well being of a significant portion of the Latino population. From a broader perspective, such a decision would also help to uphold the democratic values that we as a nation hold so dear.

# Appendix A: Coding the Advertisements

## Method

Four undergraduate research assistants coded the advertisements using the questions that follow (in the next section) and the storyboards provided by the Wisconsin Advertising Project for 2000 and 2002 (Goldstein et al. 2002; Goldstein and Rivlin 2005, 2007a, 2007b). Three graduate assistants coded the 2004 ads. Each storyboard was compiled as a pdf (portable document format) file. Intercoder reliability was calculated using Cohen's κ test statistic, which has a scale that ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating perfect reliability and 0 indicating almost no agreement (Stemler 2001). This measure accounts for the probability that agreements between the coders occurred intentionally and by chance. I coded 10 percent of the sample in order to calculate the κ score. This technique is considered standard practice to determine reliability (Stemler 2001). The following equation was used to calculate Cohen's κ test statistic:

$$\kappa = \frac{P_a - P_c}{1 - P_c}$$

where

$P_a$ is the proportion of stories in which there is agreement between the coders, and

$P_c$ is the proportion of stories in which there is agreement by chance.

For the advertising data, $\kappa = .66$. Landis and Koch's (1977, 165) scale to interpret this test statistic is as follows: 0.0–0.20 indicates slight agreement,

0.21–0.40 fair agreement, 0.41–0.60 moderate agreement, 0.61–0.80 substantial agreement, and 0.81–1.00 almost perfect agreement. Because a κ test statistic reveals that the strength of agreement is substantial, I am confident in the reliability of the data and the coding scheme used.

Research assistants were asked to go through each question and code it as a *1* if the ad contains the item and *0* if not. They were also told that an ad could contain more than one of the items from the questionnaire. Moreover, they were informed that an ad could be coded as a *1* for question 2, parts a–d. These questions are not mutually exclusive, so they were told that an ad could contain multiple types of policy content. If they were unsure or unclear about whether an ad contained the item, they were asked to code it as missing data.

## Codebook Used for Content Analysis of Ads

1. Does the ad contain any policy/issue statements? If yes, go to question 2; if not, go to question 3.
2. If so, how are the policy/issues discussed in the ad?
   a. Policy/issue is phrased so that it requires the viewer of the ad to know what the status quo (current legislation or the current status of an issue) is in order to have an opinion on the issue (e.g., Candidate X favors an increase in minimum wage, Candidate X supports prayer in schools).
   b. Policy/issue is explained or described in the ad, so the viewer knows what the issue is about from the text in the ad (e.g., natural gas is safe, effective, and more cost efficient than electricity).
   c. Policy/issue is one that the viewer would immediately be familiar with; it would be considered a "simple" policy message (e.g., Candidate X is pro-life, believes in safe schools).
   d. Policy/issue is stated in way that would benefit everyone. Policy/issue is stated in a normative, positive way (e.g., Candidate X is fighting for smaller class sizes, clean schools, better education, protecting Medicare, reduced crime, cutting unemployment, increased jobs).
3. Does the ad make any references to specific bills or pieces of legislation (e.g., HR 463, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, The Patients' Bill of Rights)?
4. The ad discusses the favored candidate's personal qualities (a list of qualities was provided based on those used in the Wisconsin Advertising Project codebook).

5. The ad discusses the opposing candidate's personal qualities (refer to list below).
6. Latino in the ad, no speaking role
6a. Latino in the ad, speaking role
7. African American in the ad, no speaking role
7a. African American in the ad, speaking role
8. Asian American in the ad, no speaking role
8a. Asian American in the ad, speaking role
9. Rural images / farmers in the ad, no speaking role
9a. Rural images / farmers in the ad, speaking role
10. Someone carrying a gun in the ad
11. Ad mentions the phrase "American Dream"
12. Senior citizen in the ad, no speaking role
12a. Senior citizen in the ad, speaking role
13. Disabled individual in the ad, no speaking role
13a. Disabled individual in the ad, speaking role
14. Military images/anything relating to war in the ad
15. Students (in a classroom setting) featured in the ad, no speaking role
15a. Students (in a classroom setting) featured in the ad, no speaking role
16. Blue-collar workers in the ad (e.g., construction workers, factory workers, maintenance workers), no speaking role
16a. Blue-collar workers in the ad (e.g., construction workers, factory workers, maintenance workers), speaking role
17. Sports images in the ad (e.g., children playing soccer)
18. Children in the ad
19. A woman in the ad, no speaking role
19a. A woman in the ad, speaking role

Examples of issues/policies (based on the 2000 Wisconsin Advertising Project codebook: Taxes; Deficit/surplus/budget/debt; Minimum wage; Other economic reference; Suicide; Gun control; Other reference to social issues; Attendance record; Crime; Drugs; Death penalty; Other reference to law and order; Ideology; Education; Lottery for education; Child care; Other child-related issues; Personal values; Defense; Veterans; Foreign policy; Bosnia; Other defense/foreign policy; Special interests; Environment; Immigration; Health care; Social Security; Medicare; Welfare; Civil rights/race relations; Campaign finance reform; Government ethics; Tobacco; Affirmative action; Gambling; Farming; Business; Employment/jobs; Poverty; Trade/NAFTA; Political record; Abortion; Homosexuality; Moral values.

**Table A.1** Descriptive statistics for variables presented in Tables 4.4–4.8

| | *Mean* | *Standard deviation* | *Range* |
|---|---|---|---|
| *District characteristics* | | | |
| Percent with a high-school degree | 81.48 | 6.55 | 29.1, 94.1 |
| Percent Latino | 6.29 | 13.18 | .01, 77.7 |
| Percent Black | 5.81 | 10.52 | .003, 65.9 |
| Percent Asian American | 1.08 | 1.77 | 0.01, 28.8 |
| South | 0.37 | 0.48 | 0, 1 |
| Competitiveness | 22.89 | 23.85 | .28, 94 |
| Distance | 0.31 | .17 | 0, .90 |
| *Candidate specific* | | | |
| Democrat | .51 | .50 | 0, 1 |

# Appendix B: Constructing the Ad Exposure Variable

$$(\text{Ad_Exposure}_{m}) = \sum_{a=1}^{a,m} \text{CostPH}_{a,m}$$

where

$\text{Ad_Exposure}_{m}$: a measure that indicates the number of advertisements a respondent in the $m^{th}$ media market was exposed to.

$\text{CostPH}_{a,m}$: cost per television household of airing the $a^{th}$ ad in the $m^{th}$ media market.

$_{a.m}$: Number of advertisements aired in the $m^{th}$ media market.

The cost per household of airing an ad serves as a proxy for the likelihood that a given household watched the ad when it aired, because television stations usually charge based on audience size. The cost of broadcasting each ad should be directly proportional to the number of people who saw each ad. I calculated the per household cost to advertise an ad by taking the estimated cost of broadcasting each ad, which is provided in the CMAG data set, and dividing it by the number of television households for the particular media market.

CMAG estimated the cost of airing an ad by relying on the media market in which the ad aired and the average cost of airing an ad in a particular time slot. I then merged this ad exposure variable with each observation in the NAES, based on the respondent's media market. I was able to determine which media market the respondent belonged to because the data set includes the county in which the respondent resides.

I then merge this measure of ad exposure with the NAES data by match-

ing the respondent with advertisements that were broadcast in his or her media market. The respondent's media market was determined by the county that the respondent lived in, represented by the FIPS code. It is likely that some measurement error exists, because this measure does not capture the actual number of advertisements a respondent was exposed to. All measures of ad exposure, however, suffer from shortcomings and measurement errors.

## Details of the 2000 and 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES)

The Annenberg School of Communication and the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania conducted the NAES. Schulman, Ronca and Bucuvalas, Inc. and Princeton Survey Research conducted the data processing. The interviews were conducted in the continental United States and Washington, D.C. Each interview lasted for approximately 30 minutes. The following questions were used in the construction of the variables for the probit model.

*Vote choice*. For president, did you vote [in the general election] for George W. Bush, the Republican; Al Gore, the Democrat; Pat Buchanan of the Reform Party; Ralph Nader of the Green Party; or someone else? 1 Bush; 2 Gore; 3 Buchanan; 4 Nader; 5 Other; 6 Did not vote for president; 998 Don't know; 999 No answer.

*Education*. What is the last grade or class you completed in school? 1 Grade eight or lower; 2 Some high school, no diploma; 3 High-school diploma or equivalent; 4 Technical or vocational school after high school; 5 Some college, no degree; 6 Associates or two-year college degree; 7 Four-year college degree; 8 Graduate or professional school after college, no degree; 9 Graduate or professional degree; 998 Don't know; 999 No answer.

*Party ID*. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or something else? 1 Republican; 2 Democrat; 3 Independent; 4 Verbatim; 998 Don't know; 999 No answer. My measure of partisanship is captured by two dummy variables, one indicating Democrats and the other Republicans. They are coded as a *1* if the respondent identifies with his or her respective party, and *0* otherwise. The baseline category is respondents who are Independents.

*Political ideology*. Generally speaking, would you describe your political views as very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, or very liberal? 1 Very conservative; 2 Conservative; 3 Moderate; 4 Liberal; 5 Very liberal; 998 Don't know; 999 No answer.

*Restrict abortion*. Make it harder for a woman to get an abortion—should the federal government do this or not? 1 Yes; 2 No; 998 Don't Know; 999 No answer.

*Social Security*. Social Security benefits—should the federal government spend more money on this, the same as now, less, or no money at all? 1 More; 2 Same; 3 Less; 4 None; 998 Don't Know; 999 No answer.

*Watch news*. How many days in the past week did you watch the national network news on TV—by national network news, I mean Peter Jennings on ABC, Dan Rather on CBS, Tom Brokaw on NBC, Fox News, or UPN News? Range 0–7; 998 Don't Know; 999 No answer.

*Government interest*. Some people seem to follow what is going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there is an election or not. Others are not that interested. Would you say you follow what is going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all? 1 Most of the time; 2 Some of the time; 3 Now and then; 4 Hardly at all; 998 Don't Know; 999 No answer.

Following is how I coded the variables used in the vote choice and turnout models. Demographics: Gender is coded as a dichotomous variable, with a *1* indicating that the respondent is a woman, *0* indicating that the respondent is a man. The same is true for one's marital status, with a *1* indicating that the respondent is married, and *0* otherwise. Income is a categorical variable, ranging from those who make less than $10,000 annually to those who earn $150,000 or more annually. A respondent's age is a continuous variable, ranging from 18 to 96 years of age in 2000 and 18 to 97 years of age in 2004. Finally, education is measured as two dummy variables, one denoting those with a high-school degree and the other those with less than a high-school education. Education at the college level and beyond is the omitted category. The three variables that capture a respondent's ethnicity are all treated as dichotomous variables. Each ethnicity variable is coded as *1* if the respondent is from that ethnic group (for example, Mexican), and *0* otherwise. The baseline category comprises respondents from South or Central America.

# Appendix C: Voter Learning and Vote-Choice Model Specification

See Tables 6.2, 6.3, 6.6, and 6.7 for more information.

## Dependent Variable

*Vote Choice*: I created a dummy variable that is coded as *1* if the respondent voted for Gore, and *0* if they voted for Bush.

*Political Knowledge in 2000*: I created an index of political learning and relied on responses to twenty-four factual political questions from the 2000 NAES. For all the questions, with the exception of questions 15–19, the answers available to respondents were *Bush, Gore, both, neither, don't know*, or *no answer*. The more questions that a respondent identified correctly, the higher his or her level of political knowledge. Following are the questions used to construct the political knowledge variable: (1) Bush or Gore favors biggest tax cut; (2) Bush or Gore favors paying down debt most; (3) Bush or Gore favors using Medicare surplus to cut taxes; (4) Bush or Gore favors biggest increase for Social Security; (5) Bush or Gore favors investing Social Security into the stock market; (6) Bush or Gore favors school vouchers; (7) Bush or Gore favors universal health care for children; (8) Bush or Gore favors right to sue HMOs; (9) Bush or Gore favors restricting abortion; (10) Bush or Gore favors death penalty; (11) Bush or Gore supported concealed handgun law; (12) Bush or Gore favors soft-money ban; (13) Bush or Gore favors gays in military; (14) Bush or Gore favors $3,000 tax credit for health care; (15) Does Bush favor selling strategic oil reserve for winter heating? (16) Does Bush favor a soft-money ban?

(17) Does Gore favor a soft-money ban? (18) Does Bush favor handgun licenses? (19) Does Gore favor handgun licenses? (20) Bush or Gore is governor; (21) Bush or Gore is a senator; (22) Bush or Gore is the son of a former senator; (23) Bush or Gore is a born-again Christian; and (24) Bush or Gore spoke at Bob Jones University.

*Political Knowledge in 2004*: The political knowledge variable in 2004 is based on a respondent's ability to correctly identify the presidential candidate's issue position on eleven questions. Respondents were asked whether Kerry or Bush favors (1) reducing the number of frivolous law suits; (2) an assault weapons ban; (3) making abortion more difficult; (4) investing Social Security in the stock market; (5) reimporting drugs from Canada; (6) eliminating overseas tax breaks to cut taxes for companies that create jobs; (7) eliminating the estate tax; and (8) making Bush tax cuts permanent. They were also asked (9) whether Bush or Kerry was a former prosecutor. Finally, interviewees were asked whether Bush or Kerry favors (10) government health insurance for children and workers, and (11) cutting the deficit in half. The responses available were *Bush, Kerry, both, neither, don't know*, or *no answer*.

## Independent Variables

*Political Dispositions*: Two dummy variables were created to measure partisanship. For the Democrat variable, a *1* indicates respondents who identified as Democrats, and *0* otherwise. The Republican variable was coded in the same manner, with a *1* indicating that a respondent identified with the Republican party and *0* otherwise. The omitted category is respondents who identified as Independents. Ideology is treated as a continuous variable, with a *1* denoting those respondents who are very liberal and a *5* those respondents who are very conservative.

*Issue Variables*: Abortion is treated as a dichotomous variable, with a *1* indicating respondents who are in favor of restricting abortion and a *0* indicating respondents who are against restricting abortion. School vouchers is also coded as a dummy variable, with a *1* indicating those respondents who support the use of school vouchers, and a *0* denoting respondents who are against school vouchers. The variable on federally sponsored health insurance is a categorical variable, ranging from *more, some, less, or no government spending on health care for the uninsured*. The variable for Social Security was coded as a dummy

variable, with *1* indicating those favoring more or the same amount of spending on Social Security, and *0* indicating those favoring less to no government spending. The three variables measuring national economic indicators are dichotomous, with the omitted category being those respondents who perceive the national economy as excellent. The variables capturing evaluations of one's personal finances are also dichotomous, with the baseline category being those individuals who perceive their personal finances as excellent.

*Demographics*: Two dichotomous variables measure a respondent's level of education. The first education variable was coded as *1* if a respondent has no high-school degree, and *0* otherwise. The other education variable was coded as *1* if the respondent has a high-school degree, and *0* otherwise. The baseline category is respondents with some college education or beyond. Income was treated as a categorical variable, ranging from those who earn less than $10,000 to those earning $150,000 or more. Age was also treated as a continuous variable, and ranges from 18–97. Two dummy variables capture a respondent's religious affiliation. The first was coded as a *1* if the respondent identified as a Catholic, and *0* otherwise. The other religion variable was coded as a *1* if the respondent identified as a Protestant, and *0* otherwise. A respondent's citizenship was treated as a dichotomous variable, with a *1* indicating that the respondent is a U.S. citizen, and *0* otherwise.

*Media/Campaign Exposure*: There were two variables capturing a respondent's self-reported levels of media exposure (watching local television news and reading the newspaper) in a given week. Thus, the variables range from 0–7, so that *0* means the respondent did not watch television news or read the newspaper in a given week, and *7* means the respondent watched television news and read the newspaper on a daily basis. The campaign contact variable is treated as a dichotomous variable, with a *1* indicating that the respondent was personally contacted by a campaign, and *0* otherwise.

*Advertising Exposure*: The variables measuring a respondent's exposure to political ads were constructed in the same manner as the political advertising variables in the models of vote choice and turnout.

# Notes

## Chapter 1

1. This quote is from Adam J. Segal's 2002 report, "The Hispanic Priority: The Spanish-Language Television Battle for the Hispanic Vote in the 2000 U.S Presidential Election."

2. This is especially true considering that Clinton won Florida in 1996, marking only the second time that a Democrat has won that state. Part of the victory was attributed to the inroads that Clinton had made with the Latino electorate.

3. Moreover, as Adam J. Segal, director of the Hispanic Voter Project at Johns Hopkins University, notes, the insufficient advertising funds spent on the Miami Latino community was "an error that surely cost more than 537 votes there and the entire national election" (2006, 2). Likewise, Stephan Dinan made the following observation in a July 24, 2008, article in the *Washington Times*, "It's become almost axiomatic among campaign consultants that if Democrat Al Gore had put more effort into Hispanic vote outreach in Florida in the 2000 presidential race, he would have won the presidency."

4. The terms *Latino* and *Hispanic* can be used interchangeably; throughout this book, I will use the term *Latino*.

5. Puerto Rico is a protectorate of the United States.

6. As a point of comparison, from 1992 to 2006 African Americans consistently supported the Democratic candidate in both presidential and midterm elections at rates of 80 percent or more, according to national election poll estimates.

7. These exit poll estimates have been disputed by the William C. Velasquez Institute, which conducted its own exit poll in 2004. The institute estimates the Latino vote for Bush to have been much lower, at 35.1 percent. The *Los Angeles Times* also conducted an independent exit poll, finding that 45 percent of Latino voters supported Bush. Finally, the National Annenberg Election Survey estimates that 41 per-

cent of Latinos supported Bush in 2004. Regardless of the precise numbers, the exit polls demonstrate a considerable shift to the Republican Party.

8. It is important to keep in mind that the term *Latino* is a panethnic label that encompasses a diverse group of individuals who vary based on national origin, culture, region, and reasons for immigrating to the U.S. Thus, these socioeconomic and political indicators are reported for the total Latino population, although variations certainly exist by ethnic groups, generational status, language proficiency, and so on.

9. Refer to West (2001), page 52, for a detailed breakdown of the content of advertisements from 1952 to 2000.

10. This strain of research is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.

11. Latino surname lists are more accurate than relying on census bureau data alone.

12. According to U.S. Census Bureau estimates (2007), *Garcia* and *Rodriguez* are the eighth and ninth most common surnames in the U.S.

13. The number of Spanish speakers is based on Census 2000 estimates (Guzman 2001) of the Latino population (35.3 million).

14. The storyboard of the ad is available from the University of Wisconsin Advertising Project dataset (2000). File name: gore_national_anthem_spanish.pdf.

15. The storyboard of the ad is available from the University of Wisconsin Advertising Project dataset (2000). File name: gore_veteran.pdf.

16. The advertising data is from the University of Wisconsin Advertising Project (Goldstein et al. 2002; Goldstein and Rivlin 2005, 2007a, 2007b). Each advertisement is compiled as a storyboard, such that its visual images and corresponding text are presented. Advertising data from 2002 and 2004 was obtained from the University of Wisconsin Advertising Project and includes media tracking data from TNSMI/Campaign Media Analysis Group in Washington, DC. The University of Wisconsin Advertising Project was sponsored by a grant from The Pew Charitable Trusts. For the 2000 ads, the data was obtained from a joint project of the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law and Professor Kenneth Goldstein of the University of Wisconsin–Madison. The Brennan Center–Wisconsin project was sponsored by a grant from The Pew Charitable Trusts. The opinions expressed in this book are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the University of Wisconsin Advertising Project or The Pew Charitable Trusts.

## Chapter 2

1. The percentage of the foreign-born population has continually increased from 1970 to 2000. In 1970, 19.9 percent of the Latino population was foreign born. The figure was 28.6 percent in 1980 and 35.8 percent in 1990.

2. Although the percentage of foreign-born Asians in the U.S. is also quite high, their economic indicators are much higher than those for Latinos.

3. The amount of political interest and knowledge in the foreign-born population may be lower than it is for Latinos born in the U.S., but since the foreign-born population makes up almost half of the U.S. Latino population, they also drive down the political knowledge rates of the entire group.

4. For the specific questions, see Niemi and Junn (1998, 111).

5. Even when Niemi and Junn controlled for a student's home environment (e.g., structure of household and parents' education level) and individual achievement (e.g., plans of going to a four-year college), the school's civics curriculum remains the most robust predictor of political knowledge.

6. Of course, these are the average rates for Latinos, with variations based on generational status, ethnicity, and so on (Telles and Ortiz 2008).

7. U.S. Census Bureau 2007 estimates.

8. Although I have focused only on the structural inequalities that I believe are most significant in influencing Latinos' rates of political knowledge, other structural factors, such as differences in household configuration, levels of wealth, and occupation, also exist. These factors are important but are closely linked to education levels and nativity.

9. For the exact questions used, refer to Verba and colleagues (1995, 553–556).

10. These percentages are consistent with past presidential voting patterns broken down by ethnic and racial groups (DeSipio 1996).

11. Noncitizens are allowed to vote in several cities and towns across the U.S. (e.g., Takoma Park, Maryland). See Hayduk (2006) for an in-depth discussion of this issue.

12. This type of ad would be considered a policy ad, not a character ad.

13. Based on author's analysis using the 2000–2004 Wisconsin Advertising Project data.

## Chapter 3

1. Television advertising was first used in the presidential election of 1948 (Jamieson 1996). Congressional ads followed two years later in the 1950 campaign of Senator William Benton of Connecticut. Thus, the creation of televised ads that cater to minority groups is a relatively novel practice.

2. This ad is titled "Mrs. JFK" and is available at http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1960.

3. ABC Evening News, November 5, 1984.

4. CBS Evening News, November 4, 1984.

5. Television News Archive, Vanderbilt University.

6. ABC Evening News devoted 2 minutes and 10 seconds to discussing the Latino vote on June 29, 1996.

7. Pew Hispanic Survey, "Changing Channels and Crisscrossing Cultures: A Survey of Latinos on the News Media," April 19, 2004, http://www.pewhispanic.org.

8. The title of this ad is "BUSH/I'm a Young Latino" and is available in the University of Wisconsin Advertising Project dataset (2000). File name: BUSH_I'm_A_Young_Latino.pdf.

9. The title of this ad is "Bush/Speech Spanish" and is available in the University of Wisconsin Advertising Project dataset (2000). File name: BUSH_Speech_Spanish.pdf.

10. The Latino population in these cities is 65 percent in Miami, 19.3 percent in Tampa, 39.9 percent in Albuquerque, and 23.6 percent in Las Vegas (U.S. Census Bureau 2007). Media markets are designated based on the county one lives in. For more information about media markets, refer to http://www.nielsenmedia.com.

11. Some of Kerry's Spanish-language ads were "Oportunidades" (Opportunities), "Cultures," "Honor," "Hospital," and "Memorial Day Ad." Examples of Bush Spanish-language ads are "Más Seguros, Más Fuertes" (Safer, Stronger), "Diferencias" (Differences), "Aceptar Responsabilidad" (Accountability), "Prioridades" (Priorities), "Nuestro Pais, Nuestro Presidente" (Our Country, Our President), "Agenda Nacional" (National Agenda), "Dos Planes" (Two Plans), and "Plan Más Trabajos" (Plan for More Jobs).

12. This ad is available in the University of Wisconsin Advertising Project dataset (2004). File name: PRES_KERRY_HUSBAND_AND_FATHER_SPANISH.pdf.

13. This ad is available in the University of Wisconsin Advertising Project dataset (2004). File name: PRES_KERRY_CULTURE_SPANISH.pdf.

14. This ad is available in the University of Wisconsin Advertising Project dataset (2004). File name: PRES_BUSH_ACCOUNTABILITY.pdf.

15. This ad is available in the University of Wisconsin Advertising Project dataset (2004). File name: PRES_BUSH_OUR_COUNTRY_OUR_PRESIDENT.pdf.

16. Keep in mind, though, that the Latino voting eligible population (VEP) for a given state is lower than the state's total Latino population.

17. In "Nuestra Comunidad" (Our Community), the current Los Angeles mayor, Antonio Villaraigosa, is speaking on behalf of Davis, emphasizing Davis's efforts to improve education in California by providing "more resources to keep the best teachers teaching in our neighborhood schools" (Kinnard 2002).

18. The Wisconsin Advertising Project data set contains no information about the content of this ad.

19. *The Almanac of American Politics* (2000–2004), by Michael Barone and Richard Cohen (2004), considered this district to be competitive in each of these election cycles. In 2000, the vote share was 50 percent to 43 percent. In 2002, the vote share was 55 percent to 45 percent. And in 2004, the vote share was 54 percent to 46 percent.

## Chapter 4

1. See Chapter 3 for a more in-depth discussion of the advertising expenditures associated with this election.

2. The difference is statistically significant at the $p = .01$ level.

3. These percentages are also from the Wisconsin Advertising Project dataset, but they are not presented in Table 4.2.

4. While the Wisconsin Advertising Project data includes which show each ad was broadcast on, it does not include a category for the type of show. It was therefore necessary to conduct separate coding for these categories. Nielsen does not make the data on the demographics of a show publicly available, so these categorizations of show types were the next best alternative.

5. In particular, Markus finds that the personal traits of honesty, trustworthiness, and morality are the most important to voters.

6. The universe of cases used for the multivariate analyses are all non-open-seat congressional elections in 2000–2004, including cases in which candidates broadcast Spanish-language ads and those in which they did not. To be sure that there are no systematic differences between races that advertise in Spanish and those that do not, I also estimated a model that included a dummy variable coded as *1* for those races in which neither of the candidates advertised in Spanish and *0* for those races in which one or both of the candidates advertised in Spanish. The results remain unchanged.

7. Each of these variables is coded as *1* if the ad contains the specific policy of interest, and *0* otherwise.

8. For character ads, the variable is coded as *1* if either the favored or opposing candidate's personal qualities are mentioned, and *0* otherwise.

9. Descriptive statistics and the coding of these variables are available in Appendix A, Table A.1.

10. Although this measure does not fully encapsulate all the factors that make up political familiarity, this is the best available data at the congressional and statewide levels.

11. These education statistics are from the U.S. Census Bureau. Even though education is regressed as a function of the distance measure, education and the distance measure are not highly correlated when I control for both variables in the multivariate model.

12. I used Nominate scores to measure candidate ideology (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). To estimate the distance between a candidate's ideological position and that of the median voter in his or her district, I first estimated a predicted Nominate score for each district as a function of the Democratic share of the two-party vote in the 1996 presidential election, the household median income of the district, the percentage of the district's voters with a high-school degree, and whether the district is in a Southern state. I then took the absolute value of the predicted value of each estimate and subtracted it from the candidate's actual DW-Nominate score. This results in the distance measure. The variable ranged from 0–.90, with a mean of .32 and a standard deviation of .17.

13. To capture the percentage of Latinos, Asian Americans, and African Ameri-

cans in a district, I use population data from the U.S. Census Bureau. Although the advertising images from the Wisconsin Advertising Project are still shots taken every 3 to 4 seconds, thus allowing for the possibility that some individuals pictured in an advertisement may be omitted from the screen captures, the researchers involved in the Project included numerous variables pertaining to the visual images in the ads. Thus, I follow the coding practice of the Wisconsin Advertising Project, keeping in mind that some individuals may be omitted.

14. This variable is coded as *1* if it is a Southern district, *0* otherwise.

15. I present these predicted probabilities as first difference estimates and compute them by holding the independent variables at their mean or mode and shifting the variable of interest from its mean to its maximum level for the district characteristics (King et al. 2001). For a candidate's personal attributes, I calculate a hypothetical scenario in which the candidate changes from being a Republican to a Democrat.

16. Estimates of senate and gubernatorial candidates' English-language advertising decisions are similar to House candidates' English-language advertising decisions and are available, by request, from the author.

17. These estimates were computed in the same manner as the predicted probabilities presented in Table 4.7. Estimates are available, by request, from the author.

## Chapter 5

1. See Goldstein and Ridout (2004) for a comprehensive review of this literature.

2. At least 50 interviews were conducted daily, and as many as 300 interviews took place each day at important points in the campaign, such as the days just before and after presidential debates. In 2004, an average of 150 and 300 interviews were conducted daily.

3. For a detailed explanation of how the exposure variable was estimated, refer to Appendix B.

4. For more detailed information on this data set, refer to Chapter 4.

5. Unfortunately, I was unable to estimate a vote-choice model that specifies the particular type of policy in the Spanish-language ads because there was too much collinearity among these policy message variables. In other words, there was not enough variation in the policy messages contained in the Spanish-language presidential ads to allow me to account for the specific type of message.

6. All individuals in the United States live in a designated market area (DMA). The respondents' media market was determined by the county that the respondent lived in, represented by the FIPS code. For a more detailed explanation of media markets and DMAs, refer to http://www.neilsenmedia.com.

7. In the models that look at the impact of Spanish-language advertising on vote choice and turnout, I interact the language in which the respondent took the survey with the advertising exposure variables. Since the interview language variable is

coded as *1* if the respondent took the survey in Spanish, and *0* if he or she took the interview in English, the interaction terms can be interpreted as the impact of the specific ad in question on the likelihood of voting for Gore or Bush among Spanish-dominant Latinos.

8. In 2000, respondents who voted for Nader were excluded from the sample because they constituted only 3 percent of the sample. Given the dichotomous nature of the independent variables, I estimated the vote-choice and turnout models using probit analysis.

9. These estimates are presented in Table 5.3 and were calculated based on a hypothetical respondent (one that contains mean or modal characteristics from the set of explanatory variables) who goes from being exposed to the mean number of the particular ad of interest to an increased number of that particular ad equal to a one-standard-deviation increase in spending.

10. I calculated several counterfactual scenarios in which the amount of advertising exposure is varied, from its mean level to a one-standard-deviation increase, for a hypothetical Latino voter. The hypothetical Latino voter possesses the modal or mean characteristics on each of the independent variables. The calculations were performed with the CLARIFY package in STATA. See King and colleagues (2001) for details.

## Chapter 6

1. The questions used to construct this variable are available in Appendix C.

2. Given that the dependent variable, voter learning, is coded as continuous, I use ordinary-least squares (OLS) regression to estimate this model.

3. The model specification and coding of these variables are available in Appendix C.

4. I constructed a similar variable to measure self-reports on television news-watching. Both of these measures ranged from *0*, meaning that a person does not watch any television news or read the newspaper in a given week, to *7*, indicating that the respondent watched the news or read the newspaper daily.

5. These measures of advertising exposure were calculated in the same manner as in Chapter 4.

6. The 2000 and 2004 NAES are national, rolling cross-sectional (RCS) surveys. Because the surveys were rolling, the pre- and post-interviews did not all take place on the same date. In 2000, the pre-interview surveys were conducted from January 3 to November 6, and the post-interview surveys took place anywhere from November 11 to December 7. In 2004, the pre-election poll took place from July 15 to November 1, and the post-election poll was conducted from November 4 to December 28.

7. Given that the sample of Asian respondents is so small, I did not include them in my analysis.

8. Of course, the ideal situation would be for interviews that are conducted in

Spanish to avoid having literal translations of political terms that are likely to be more meaningful to native-born Americans than they are for the foreign born. See Abrajano and Alvarez (forthcoming) for more discussion on this subject matter.

9. Because the dependent variable is a binary outcome, I estimated the model using probit analysis.

10. I estimated the vote-choice model using survey data from the 2000 and 2004 NAES to remain consistent with the analyses presented in this chapter and those presented in Chapter 4.

11. The descriptive statistics of the variables used in this model are presented in Table 6.8.

12. In 2004, the impact of abortion on the voting behavior of English-dominant Latinos was nearly identical, at 24 percent.

13. Dimofte and colleagues (2004) found this effect on consumer-based ads, but such an effect has yet to be found for political ads.

## Chapter 8

1. *Noticiero* is the news program for Univision. The quote is from "Sabado Gigante for Obama, McCain," by John Eggerton, *Broadcasting & Cable*, October 30, 2008.

2. "Politics pays off for Spanish TV," by Daniel Roth, *McClatchy Newspapers*, October 27, 2008.

3. "Democrats to Spend $20 Million to Woo Latino Voters," by Michael Falcone, *The New York Times*, *The Caucus: The Politics and Government Blog of the Times*, July 29, 2008. http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/29/democrats-to-spend-20-million-to-woo-latino-voters/.

4. Bill Clinton won Florida in 1996 (48 percent versus 42 percent) and Jimmy Carter won it in 1976 (51.9 percent versus 46.6 percent).

5. Candidates were not allowed to speak in Spanish, even though New Mexico governor Bill Richardson was fluent in Spanish. He was required to adhere to the format.

6. The ad and its script are available at the Political Advertising Resource Center, a program of the Center for Political Communication and Civic Leadership at the University of Maryland, http://www.parc.umd.edu/Campaign2008ProjectDems.htm.

7. The ad can be viewed at http://www.parc.umd.edu/Campaign2008ProjectDems.htm.

8. The ad is available at the Political Advertising Resource Center, a program of the Center for Political Communication and Civic Leadership at the University of Maryland, http://www.parc.umd.edu/Campaign2008ProjectDems.htm.

9. Orozco also produced another Spanish-language song, "Come Se Dice," which was used at campaign events targeting Hispanics (Jordan 2008).

10. Phone interview with Miguel Orozco, October 19, 2009.

11. The ads, "Demostro Character" and "Como Padre," are available at http://www.parc.umd.edu/Campaign2008ProjectDems.htm.

12. These estimates are based on the campaign advertising database of Stanford University's Political Communication Lab, http://pcl.stanford.edu/.

13. This ad is titled "Which Side Are They On?" and was aired on 9/12/08.

14. The ad is available at http://pcl.stanford.edu/campaigns/2008/bogen.html.

15. The ad is available at http://pcl.stanford.edu/campaigns/2008/bogen.html.

16. The transcript of Obama's speech is available at http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/06/obamas_remarks_to_naleo.html.

17. The transcript of McCain's speech is available at http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/06/mccains_speech_to_naleo.html.

18. The transcript of the speech is speech is available at http://www.nclr.org/content/viewpoints/detail/52978.

19. The transcript of the speech is speech is available at http://www.nclr.org/content/viewpoints/detail/52978.

20. In addition, these events were not free of charge and therefore not open to the public.

21. 2008 campaign data from the Wisconsin Advertising Project was not publicly available at the time this book went to press.

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