PALGRAVE SERIES IN ASIAN GERMAN STUDIES

Transnational Encounters between Germany and Japan

PERCEPTIONS OF PARTNERSHIP IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES

EDITED BY JOANNE MIYANG CHO, LEE M. ROBERTS, AND CHRISTIAN W. SPANG

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Palgrave Series in Asian German Studies

Series Editors: Joanne Miyang Cho and Lee M. Roberts

Over the past twenty years, scholars have increasingly sought to place the history of Germany and Europe into a global and transnational context. While this renewed interest in German colonial and global history, most notably in Africa, has given rise to a considerable amount of new and fruitful research, scholars have recently also turned their attention to the equally rich field of German-East Asian, Southeastern, and South Asian interactions. This series contributes to the emerging field of Asian-German Studies by bringing together cutting-edge scholarship from international scholars in a variety of fields. It encourages the publication of works by specialists, globally, on the multifaceted dimensions of ties between the German-speaking world (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and German-speaking enclaves in Eastern Europe) and Asian countries over the past two centuries. Rejecting traditional notions of West and East as seemingly polar opposites (e.g., colonizer and colonized), the volumes in this series attempt to reconstruct the ways in which Germans and Asians have cooperated and negotiated the challenge of modernity in various fields; they have sought to cover a range of topics that combine the perspective of such disciplines as anthropology, comparative religion, economics, geography, history, human rights, literature, philosophy, politics, and more.

Transnational Encounters between Germany and Japan: Perceptions of Partnership in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
edited by Joanne Miyang Cho, Lee M. Roberts, and Christian W. Spang (2016)

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

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While half of the authors of this edited volume are closely linked to the recent panels in Asian-German Studies, we also would like express our gratitude to those contributors to this volume who are not connected (yet) to the German Studies Association, some of them based in Europe, others in Japan. Tragically, one of our authors died unexpectedly in 2014, leaving his co-author, Christian W. Spang, with the task of finalizing the chapter in commemoration of Hans K. Rode, who is missed by many friends and colleagues in Germany and Japan.

The editors would like to express their appreciation also to Editor Kristin Purdy and Editorial Assistants Mike Aperauch and Michelle Smith at Palgrave Macmillan for their generous assistance and accommodation. Two of the co-editors, Joanne Miyang Cho and Lee M. Roberts, are especially thankful to Kristin Purdy for her assistance with the birth of the Palgrave Series in Asian German Studies, to which this volume belongs. Finally, we must also thank Sarah Panzer for her tireless assistance with editing some portions of the manuscript.

Introduction

German-Japanese Relations from Meiji to Heisei

A Case Study of Entangled History

Joanne Miyang Cho, Lee M. Roberts, and Christian W. Spang

Scholars have debated for decades whether there has ever been any meaningful partnership between Germany and Japan. A minority of specialists rejects the idea of a significant cooperation between the two nations and points especially to various diplomatic breaches between both countries. The German participation in the Triple Intervention in 1895, the Japanese take-over of the German leasehold in the Chinese Shandong province (Qingdao) in 1914, and the Hitler-Stalin Pact in 1939, which rendered the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 obsolete, are examples of such incidents. Another reason why some contest the notion of partnership is the alleged joint world conspiracy of Berlin and Tokyo, a mistaken charge that turned out to be little more than the result of German-Japanese-Italian indoctrination and the Allied response with their own anti-Axis propaganda. That is, during the early 1940s, both sides portrayed the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo wartime alliance as a firmly anti-democratic or "fascist" bloc. After clearing the smokescreen of wartime verbiage, however, scholars have questioned the actual degree of solidarity and depth of the Axis agreements.[1] In fact, the international situation after World War I with its threefold confrontation between democracies, militarist/fascist countries, and communism played an important role in bringing about this alliance. The German-Japanese cooperation then led to the heterogeneous anti-Hitler coalition, which collapsed after the Potsdam Conference, quickly leading to the Cold War, with divided Germany as one of its foremost battlegrounds.

Conversely, the majority of scholars, including the editors of this volume, see a comparatively close and significant relationship between Germans and Japanese, but *Transnational Encounters between Germany and Japan* showcases moments of convergence between competing views in order to move toward common points of interest since the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations between Berlin and Tokyo in 1861.[2] Whether by design or mere twist of fate, Germany and Japan have found themselves repeatedly in comparable roles. Commonalities of experience include the creation of two modern nation-states with limited democratic features around 1870, a belated entry into the imperialist struggle for space in the late nineteenth century, a drive for supremacy over their neighboring countries, and ensuing joint defeat in World War II.

After 1945, both countries had to cope with their history of militarism and aggression abroad. In the immediate postwar era, they were judged similar enough to be tried before two International Military Tribunals according to roughly the same principles of international law. They both experienced years of Allied occupation. While Japan and (East and West) Germany had rejected militarism in the immediate postwar era, they soon were forced to remilitarize as a consequence of the Cold War. During the restoration period of the 1950s and 1960s, both the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan also became known as economic miracles (*Wirtschaftswunder*), which later elevated them to the status of economic great powers, although they did not attain the equivalent share of political sway.

In addition to sharing a similar fate politically, militarily, and economically, Germany and Japan have had active cross-cultural exchanges on the cultural level. Beyond the well-known Japanese enthusiasm for German classical music, one can witness something similar in Japan's warm reception of German literature. Various Austrian, German, and Swiss authors have long enjoyed a faithful following in Japan. During the early Meiji era, Goethe's *Sorrows of Young Werther* and *Faust* were widely read. Since then, Nobel laureates Thomas Mann (1929), Hermann Hesse (1946), Günter Grass (1999), Elfriede Jelinek (2004), and other authors have been well received in Japan. Conversely, over the last few decades Japan's soft power has increased considerably not only because of the well-known boom of manga and anime in many countries, but also because of growing interest abroad in Japanese authors like Nobel laureate Kenzaburō Ōe (1994)[3] as well as—particularly in Germany—Haruki Murakami and Yoko Tawada, to name but the most famous ones.[4]

Transnational Encounters between Germany and Japan presents bilateral relations as unusually close (albeit not entirely reciprocal) for a European and an Asian nation. Indeed, few countries with such different civilizational backgrounds have been compared as frequently as Germany and Japan. Of course, their relationship has also been fraught

with seeming inconsistency, and this volume reveals the manner in which these two peoples both celebrated their like-mindedness and also rejected the other in order to proclaim the particularity of their own culture. Throughout the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth century, for instance, many Germans harbored the contradictory estimation of the Japanese as both a lesser race and also the keepers of a high culture with nearly mystical power. Similarly, even after Germany's defeat in World War I and the German-Japanese War over Qingdao in 1914, the Japanese still continued to see in Germany a valuable model, especially in terms of its culture, worth adopting for Japan's own ongoing, rapid growth. They also accorded each other's national literary traditions a certain level of respect before and after 1945, even as they increasingly championed their own respective native heritage. Despite such moments of variance in their views of each other, over the course of about one and a half centuries they repeatedly have found common ground.

This introduction presents three aspects of this book's overall aim. First, since the history of modern German-Japanese relations is a prime example of entangled history (*Verflechtunsgeschichte* or *histoire croisée*), it is necessary to understand the volume's transnational framework while also taking note of its comparative features. Second, a brief discussion of the more recent historiography of German-Japanese relations highlights the ways in which our book makes its own specific contributions to this area. Finally, a summary of key arguments of the 13 chapters collected here specifies the contents of the volume.

A Transnational Framework

Transnational history questions key aspects of social history, and this volume seeks to reinterpret German-Japanese relations from such a perspective. In West Germany, social history (*Sozialgeschichte*) dominated from the 1960s. Historians like the late Hans-Ulrich Wehler began to challenge the complicity of their parents' generation during the Third Reich and became preoccupied with the question of Nazism. In their work, they articulated the idea of a German *Sonderweg* (special path), which explained National Socialism as a product of Germany's incomplete democratic development, in contrast to the fully established democracies of Great Britain and France. One result of this single-minded concern with Nazism was a paucity of work on non-Western topics. Like US social history, which "accentuated the exceptionalist interpretation of the national past,"[5] German social history also was a strongly nation-centered history. However, over the last two or three decades, various German historians of the younger generation have challenged the narrow focus of social history and *Alltagsgeschichte* (everyday history).[6] Jürgen Osterhammel and Sebastian Conrad, for instance, both criticized Wehler's

Gesellschaftsgeschichte (history of society) and advocated the broadening of topics to include non-European societies.[7] Instead of viewing the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the age of nationalism, as had been common practice prior to this shift, this younger generation detected and explained strong globalizing tendencies in this period.[8]

Since the mid-1990s, one can also find a similar development toward transnational history among German specialists in the United States. Several of them have treated Germany's relations with the non-Western world by writing about such topics as German colonialism[9] and orientalist discourses.[10] One outstanding work in this field is Suzanne Marchand's book *German Orientalism in the Age of Empire* (2009).[11] In a similar vein, German scholars have increasingly begun to work on transcultural and transnational topics. Recent edited works that deal with Germany and Asia are of particular interest in this respect: *Germany and the Imagined East* (2005, 2nd ed. 2009), *Imagining Germany Imagining Asia* (2013), *Germany and China: Transnational Encounters since the Eighteenth Century* (2014), and *Beyond Alterity: German Encounters with Modern East Asia* (2014) number among such publications.[12] These works focus on seeking interconnectedness, cultural flow, and hybridity between Germany and Asia.

Similarly, transnational history became popular among North American historians working outside the field of German history. The Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History Series has produced a number of interesting monographs. Its series editors, Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier themselves have authored informative and worthwhile theoretical works on this topic.[13] Moreover, they have contributed greatly to the field through their comprehensive volume *Palgrave Dictionary in Transnational History*.[14] Thus, transnational history has become a fruitful methodological tool for present-day scholars in the United States and Germany.

Given the shift toward transnational history, it is important to explain here some of its main characteristics, especially in light of other interpretations. First of all, transnational history both overlaps with and also differs from international history. Whereas the former seeks "cross-national connections," for example, the latter studies "relations among nations as sovereign entities."[15] Since the 1970s, various American historians have been actively engaged in international history, which required knowledge of other countries. As Iriye points out, however, "the field of international history was still focused on the nation as the key unit of analysis," exemplified by Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (1987).[16]

The distinction between transnational history and global history is subtle. Iriye treats them as "interchangeable" and has identified two common characteristics—the exploration of "interconnections across borders" and seeking "relevance to the whole of humanity."[17] Saunier differentiates

between the two in terms of time period, explaining global history as something that applies to the last 500 years and that seeks to understand things "at the planetary level," whereas transnational history covers "a much shorter range"—approximately "the last 200–250 years." In contrast, he views world history as referring to the last 5000 years.[18] While any of these terms might be used nearly equally, throughout this volume, we prefer to use transnational history, for it emphasizes active exchange between nations more than global history does.

Finally, the relationship between transnational history and comparative history is also intricate. In contrast to Wehler, who regarded "comparison as the highest form of social historical research," some advocates of transnational history reject civilizational comparisons for their possible tendency to lead to "essentializing models or purely impressionistic observations and generalizations."[19] In partial disagreement with these scholars, the editors of this volume do not view transcultural history and comparative history as necessarily exclusive of each other, but, along the lines of what Saunier has pointed out, accept the debate as pretty much settled on the point that "both approaches can be combined with profit because they help to answer different questions."[20] After all, transnational historians "have to understand what happens to the ties and flows they follow through different polities and communities."[21] According to Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka, comparative history studies "the similarities and differences of at least two comparative cases as centrally characteristic" and entangled history "insists on relationships, transfers, and interactions." [22] Yet, comparative and entangled history are "compatible and have many points of contact."[23]

Most chapters in this volume adopt a transnational approach, but two chapters on the immediate post-1945 period primarily take a comparative approach. Such comparison is justifiable, considering that both former West Germany and Japan were subjected to similar policies by the (Western) occupying powers. Indeed, it is not surprising that these unusual similarities resulted in many works of comparative history on postwar Japan and Germany.[24]

Historiography of German-Japanese Relations

Since the end of World War II, a considerable amount of research has been conducted on bilateral relations between Germany and Japan. The founding fathers of this early postwar research boom published their results from the 1950s onward. The pioneers of the field can be said to be Frank W. Iklé (1956), Ernst L. Presseisen (1958), and Johanna Menzel Meskill (1966), in the United States, Theo Sommer (1962) and Bernd Martin (1969), in Germany, and Miyake Masaki (1968/1975), in Japan,

to name but the most prominent figures.[25] Publications of the 1950s and 1960s prepared the ground upon which most of the later research was built. Although they were the trailblazers of the modern interpretation of bilateral relations between Germany and Japan, some of their elucidations are no longer valid. Furthermore, as all research is influenced by contemporary society and politics, various questions that seem pressing today were never even discussed among the postwar pioneers. There is, for example, the question of whether the term fascism can be applied to the Japanese society of the early Shōwa era. The whole discussion above about transnational or comparative history also fits into this category of difference between the altering generations of scholars.

During the last 15 years, a host of works on German-Japanese relations has appeared, most of them focused on rather specific aspects of bilateral contacts.[26] The 2001 book by Hans-Joachim Krug and his co-authors explores German-Japanese naval relations. Nils-Johan Jörgensen's 2006 work investigates the relationship between culture and power in Germany and Japan. In scholarship on literature, Lee M. Roberts' 2010 monograph examines German-style literary nationalism brought to Japan via translation and interpretive practices in the discipline *Germanistik*. Julian Dierkes's book of 2010 probes the postwar history of education in both Germany and Japan. Sebastian Dobson and Sven Saaler's 2011 work covers the Prussian expedition to Japan in 1860–1861, and John W. M. Chapman's 2011 book deals with the role of ultranationalism in German-Japanese relations in the 1930s and early 1940s. Christian W. Spang's 2013 monograph examines the reception of Haushofer's geopolitical theories in German and Japanese politics. The list could, of course, be extended, but these examples show that recent publications have had more specific foci than earlier works.[27]

In order to situate this present volume within related scholarship a quick look at two recent edited works seems appropriate: *Japanese-German Relations, 1895–1945* by Christian W. Spang and Rolf-Harald Wippich (2006),[28] and *Japan and Germany* by Kudō Akira, Nobuo Tajima, and Erich Pauer (2009).[29] In both of these books, the Japanese point of view carries more weight than in most of the earlier works in English. Besides the Japanese authors, the majority of the German contributors were also affiliated with Japanese universities (at some time). The most easily discernible difference between these two earlier compilations and *Transnational Encounters between Germany and Japan*, however, is the chronological range. While this volume covers aspects of bilateral relations from the 1860s up to the present day, the two books used as points of comparison here end their coverage with the year 1945 and thus stress (inadvertently, perhaps) the importance of 1945, which Katō Tetsurō and others in *Japanese-German Relations* try to refute. Another limitation of the Spang/Wippich volume (2006) is its strong

focus on what its very subtitle promises "*War, Diplomacy and Public Opinion*," while Kudō/Tajima/Pauer stress economic relations.[30]

Despite all the publications discussed above, no monograph or edited volume about German-Japanese relations covers the whole period from the establishment of bilateral contacts in the late Tokugawa era to postwar relations. *Transnational Encounters between Germany and Japan* is a step in this direction, with more than one-third of the contributions devoted to the post-World War II period. Nearly half of the chapters were written by scholars who teach (or have taught) at American universities, while the other half was written by Japanese and German scholars who teach (or have taught) at Japanese universities. In short, by covering a longer period of time, adding American interpretations to those of German and Japanese scholars, and balancing the consideration of politics, diplomacy, military history, and culture, the editors of this book seek to bring together many old and new qualities in one volume.

Organization of this Book

This volume divides German-Japanese relations since the 1860s into three sections. Part I ("Ambivalent Partners in Modernization") covers a wide range of years, from the Meiji era (1868–1912) until well into World War II. A brief glance into the chapters in this section shows that in "The Myth of 'familiar Germany': German-Japanese Relationships in the Meiji Period Reexamined," Takenaka Toru rejects the stereotyped Japanese image of Germany as a "familiar country" and reexamines the degree to which this fixed image is justified by looking into such phenomena as human mobility, trade, and the reception of classical music in Japan. He also deals with the important questions of agency in the transmission of German influence to modern Japan. Takenaka concludes that the German presence in Japan before 1945 was quite limited, as the country was hardly represented in contemporary popular culture. Moreover, as an agent of cultural influence, Germany played a somewhat inconspicuous role. The image of Germany as a "familiar country" is, therefore, part of a myth nurtured mostly by Japanese elite circles.

In "Karl von Eisendecher and Japan: Transnational Encounters and the Diplomacy of Imperialism, Sven Saaler addresses the second envoy of the German Empire to Japan, Karl von Eisendecher (1841–1934). This individual did not follow the usual approach of the diplomatic representatives of the Euro-American great powers in Japan during the era of imperialism, namely to uphold the prestige and, if possible, increase the influence of the state they represented. Instead, Eisendecher expressed interest in and respect for the Japanese and their culture and supported Japan's demands for the opening of negotiations on the revision of

the Unequal Treaties, earning him great respect and starting a period that has sometimes been characterized as the "golden era of Japanese-German relations."

Joanne Miyang Cho's chapter, "Count Hermann Keyserling's View of Japan: A Nation of Consummate Imitators," examines Keyserling's distinct assessments of transnational transfer from both Asia and also the West to Japan. In fact, he praised Japan's borrowings of Buddhism from India and methods of garden-design from China but then expressed ambivalence on Japan's adoption of various forms of technology from the West. In so doing, Keyserling demonstrated a neo-conservative critique of modern technology. Indeed, while he was impressed by Japan's enterprising quality and practical adaptability, he shared a rather common Western view that Japanese were consummate imitators with no real inventiveness of their own. Cho rejects Keyserling's radical separation between innovation and imitation and interprets imitation in Japan as a stepping stone toward innovation.

In "Western Criticism of an Occidental East: A German View of the Modernization of Japanese Literature, 1900–1945," Lee M. Roberts explains that, after Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War, there was a shift in German views of Japanese national literature and language. Indeed, the developing German-language discourse conferred upon the Japanese primacy among Asian nations for what was alleged to be an authentically European-style nationalism. This chapter explains three literary features that made the Japanese appear to be the most Occidentalized of Orientals: (1) They had rejected antiquated forms of language and literature based on a Chinese model; (2) They had stayed true to their own native culture; (3) They had not only absorbed European scholarly methods but also contributed to the literature of the Western intellectual tradition.

Four chapters in Part II ("Transnational Partners between the Two World Wars") convey that Germans and Japanese saw in one another potential allies to achieve their own specific goals, which often ironically resulted in their respective efforts being at odds. In "When Jiu-Jitsu was German: Japanese Martial Arts in German *Sport-* and *Körperkultur*, 1905–1933," Sarah Panzer examines the early reception and adoption of jiu-jitsu and judo into Germany in the early twentieth century in order to offer a new perspective on the German-Japanese transcultural relationship. The German reception of jiu-jitsu, in particular, was less problematic than might be imagined, in that it tapped into a broader consensus that Japanese martial culture was, at its core, familiar and recognizable to Germans. Because jiu-jitsu was considered part of an idealized Japanese culture that resembled traditional German culture on some fundamental level, it proved easier to naturalize as part of German *Sportkultur* than other non-German sports, as the later debate about the seemingly more "foreign" judo revealed.

In "Anna and Siegfried Berliner: Two Academic Bridge Builders between Germany and Japan," the late Hans K. Rode and Christian W. Spang present a brief view of the life story of a dynamic couple who, among other things, triggered important changes within the prisoner-of-war camp system in Japan during World War I. In the early 1920s, they actively sought to make contacts between Germany and Japan by accepting work in teaching and company advising in Tokyo right after bilateral diplomatic relations had been reestablished. Siegfried published on the topic of the Japanese economy and Anna on Japanese advertisements, the tea ceremony, and psychological questions. In 1925, they returned to Leipzig and represented the German East Asiatic Society (OAG) in Germany until the Nazis came to power, when their Jewish heritage made them no longer acceptable to the then mostly pro-Nazi OAG leadership.

In a smooth segue from the previous chapter, Christian W. Spang's single-authored contribution "The Expansion of Activities of the German East Asiatic Society (OAG) during the Nazi Era" analyzes the abrupt shift of focus in the OAG following the Nazi takeover. Since its foundation in 1873, the OAG was a site of semi-official exchange between Germany and Japan. During the Nazi era, however, the OAG lost its long-cherished independence when its members offered little resistance against the Nazi policy of coordination (*Gleichschaltung*). To some extent, the Society became a tool for spreading German propaganda in Japan. Spang summarizes the influence of local Nazis within the OAG and then examines the foundation and activities of OAG branch groups in Batavia (Jakarta), Shanghai, and Manchukuo, all of which were heavily affected by the ongoing warfare in East Asia during the 1930s and early 1940s.

Although Japan was known as an ally of Nazi Germany, Thomas Pekar argues in "Japanese Ambivalence toward the Jewish Exiles in Japan" that it can also be regarded as an "exile country" (*Exilland*), since it offered Jews and other emigrants from Germany and Europe opportunities for survival. This paradoxical Japanese "Jewish policy" had its roots in the unique Japanese discourse about the Jews, which included both philo- and also anti-Semitic elements. Until 1941, Japan was tolerant toward the Jews, sometimes even helping them to escape from Nazi Germany. After Pearl Harbor, however, the Japanese authorities changed their policy and expelled Jewish refugees from the Japanese archipelago mostly to Shanghai, thereby underscoring the unpredictability of their stance on the Jewish refugees.

In Part III ("Post-World War II Affinity: Pariah Nations?"), five chapters explore how Germany and Japan sought to find a new position vis-à-vis other nations in the world after World War II and to become once again "normal," especially with respect to their aggressively militaristic past. David M. Crowe argues in "The Nuremberg and Tokyo IMT Trials: A Comparative Analysis" that, while the Nuremberg International

Military Tribunal (IMT) was considered a great success because the prosecution was able to document the central role that many of the accused had played in committing some of Nazi Germany's most heinous crimes, the same could not be said for those on trial in Tokyo. In fact, the domination of postwar Japan by General Douglas MacArthur, and his decision not to indict Emperor Hirohito deeply affected the outcome of the trial. These two factors weakened prosecution efforts to prove that many of those on trial were involved in a conspiracy to commit various war crimes. Though born in the shadow of Nuremberg, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) suffered from a variety of other serious issues that led to questions about its fairness, even among some of the IMTFE judges.

On a similar theme, Franziska Seraphim's chapter, "A 'Penologic Program' for Japanese and German War Criminals, 1945–1958," examines three historiographical aspects of the American war crimes trial program in occupied Japan and Germany after World War II. Seraphim shifts the attention away from the scholarly focus on the courtroom as the site of legal judgment of crimes to the prison as a site of social meaning-making of those judgments in the interaction of war criminals and their captors. Her analysis extends also into the post-trial phase of clemency, parole, and release. Finally, the chapter explores also the German-Japanese comparison of their own agency in responding to the Allied war crimes policy to demonstrate much closer similarities in the 1950s than previously assumed.

Rolf-Harald Wippich's chapter, "Restoring German-Japanese Relations after World War II," shows that, in many respects, former Federal Republic of Germany and Japan underwent similar postwar developments toward economic recovery during the Cold War, while the German Democratic Republic remained firmly within the Soviet-led Eastern bloc. Due to different postwar experiences (i.e., integration into Western Europe vs. strengthening of bilateral US-Japanese ties), West Germany and Japan focused on different political goals, but a variety of cultural activities and institutions, among them the German East Asiatic Society (OAG) in Tokyo, helped stimulate West German-Japanese relations. In addition, cultural and economic, as well as personal, contacts provided a supporting network, which facilitated the healthy development of bilateral relations in the 1950s and 1960s.

Moving discussion of the formerly divided Germany from West to East, Volker Stanzel argues in "Peace, Business, and Classical Culture: The Relationship between the German Democratic Republic and Japan," that throughout the roughly forty years of the GDR's existence (1949–1990), Japan stood by Western positions, while the GDR was part of the Communist Bloc. Economically, the GDR was impeded by its lack of competitive products, Japan by CoCom rules, and both by the GDR's

lack of foreign reserves. Through various cultural activities in Japan, the GDR strengthened the image of a single homogeneous German culture, which, in fact, ran counter to its major foreign policy objective of proving itself a country independent of West Germany. For Japan, contacts with the GDR came to represent merely one facet of the continuation of its traditional culture-based relationship with Germany.

Finally, in the last chapter, "Transnational Communicability: German-Japanese Literature by Yoko Tawada," Birgit Maier-Katkin and Lee M. Roberts examine how Tawada, a renowned writer in German and Japanese, offers contrasting and shifting linguistic renderings of German and Japanese cultural experience in some of her works, which ultimately draw attention to an "in-between" space in cross-cultural and global exchanges. Through her playfulness with language, Tawada often sets cultural and lingual concepts into motion in ways that expose new energies in and between the two languages. In this way, her work encourages readers to think creatively and critically about transnational communicability. By reading her work through the lens of poststructuralism, translation theory, and some of Walter Benjamin's ideas, this chapter shows how Tawada reveals the vagaries of one's own language-bound sense of self and the sphere of the other and offers a curious encounter with foreignness and cultural difference.

In sum, this edited volume seeks to provide a more comprehensive analysis of German-Japanese relations by covering a range of topics from the beginning of their diplomatic relationship to the present, while also highlighting the post-1945 period, which, comparatively, has received far less treatment than the pre-1945 period so far. With its transnational perspective, this book reflects the shift from Germany-focused social history in the three decades prior to German reunification to transnational history afterwards. Moreover, it treats bidirectional exchange and cultural flow between Germany and Japan. Finally, it explores largely untouched areas in German-Japanese relations and brings together the most recent scholarship on the topics it treats. In these ways, the editors of this volume hope to connect to a broader dialog among readers throughout Europe, North America, Asia, and other parts of the world who share an interest in such varied fields of study as history, comparative literature, and political science, as well as German and Japanese studies.

Notes

1. Menzel Meskill coined the term "hollow alliance" for the wartime Axis. Johanna Menzel Meskill, *Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan: The Hollow Diplomatic Alliance* (1966; reprint, New Brunswick—London: Aldine Transactions: 2012). The original title of the book was *Hitler and Japan. The Hollow Alliance*.

2. The treaty was, in fact, concluded between the Tokugawa shogunate and a Prussian delegation headed by Count Eulenburg. Thus, official relations commenced even before the Meiji restoration (1868) and the foundation of the Wilhelmine Empire (1871).
3. Günter Grass and Kenzaburō Ōe, *Gestern, vor 50 Jahren: ein deutsch-japanischer Briefwechsel*, trans. of Kenzaburō Ōe's letters by Otto Putz (Göttingen: Steidl, 1995).
4. Throughout this volume, Japanese names appear in their native order (surname and given name), except when they are well known as authors in English or German. "Kenzaburō Ōe" refers to the Japanese author as he is known in English translation, and "Yoko Tawada" to the author known in Germany.
5. Akira Iriye, *Global and Transnational History: The Past, Present, and Future* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 14.
6. Andreas Eckert, "Germany and Africa in the Late Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. An Entangled History?" in *Comparative and Transnational History. Central European Approaches and New Perspectives*, ed. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka (New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009), 227.
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15. Iriye, *Global and Transnational History*, 15.
16. Ibid., 6–7.
17. Ibid., 11.
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19. Monica Juneja and Margrit Pernau, "Lost in Translation? Transcending Boundaries," in *Comparative and Transnational History. Central European Approaches and New Perspectives*, ed. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka (New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009), 107, 110.
20. Saunier, *Transnational History*, 5.
21. Ibid., 8.
22. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka, "Introduction," *Comparative and Transnational History. Central European Approaches and New Perspectives*, ed. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka (New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009), 2.
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Part I

Ambivalent Partners in Modernization

1

The Myth of "Familiar Germany"

German-Japanese Relationships in the Meiji Period Reexamined

Takenaka Toru

Introduction

Germany is among the countries that are more popular with the Japanese. This is not only due to its highbrow image as the country of "thinkers and poets" or as the heartland of classical music, but also because German soccer is well respected, and the country's romantic castles and churches attract thousands of Japanese tourists every year. What is striking about the Japanese attitude toward Germany is that there is relatively little ambivalence, unlike, for example, in the case of the United States. Although the United States today is doubtless the most familiar country to the Japanese, there is no denying that there are many "Americophobes" as well; in fact, even the simultaneous coexistence of love and hatred for the United States, in the same person, is no rarity. Such complexity of judgment is seldom observed in people's attitudes regarding Germany. Simply put, it is the country that (nearly) everyone likes.[1] Even taking into account the fact that Germany is a "distant" country when compared to the United States, in many respects, ranging from politics and sports to pop culture, this general and evenly affirmative posture is still noteworthy.

It is often assumed that the Japanese fondness for Germany results from the continuously close relationship between both countries throughout modern history.[2] Japanese people, it is argued, have been affectionately disposed toward Germany ever since the mid-Meiji era, which is often seen as the "golden age" of the Japanese-German relationship.[3] This conventional view assumes that this was both the reason as well as the result of many institutions and technologies being brought over from Germany to Japan during the Meiji period. Proponents of this

stance, particularly in discourse of a rather nonacademic nature, often go so far as to draw on the alleged commonality in "aptitude" or "folk character" between the two peoples.[4]

Yet for all the popularity this notion enjoys, it is highly questionable as to how much the proposition of Japanese-German intimacy matches the historical reality. It not only falls short of correctly grasping some negative aspects in the relationship between the two countries, but also exaggerates the relationship's significance in terms of social breadth. Furthermore, it overlooks the issue of agency, namely, in what way German influences were transferred to Meiji Japan. By focusing on these three points, this chapter will reexamine the German-Japanese relations in the Meiji era. In conclusion, the image of "familiar Germany" is a myth—based, to a great extent, on groundless ideas. Breaking with this myth will give us a new perspective of the two countries' relationship.

Bleak Diplomatic Ties

By confining themselves to a narrowly defined field, historians of bilateral relations generally tend to unduly focus on fact finding. In so doing, they often avoid the task of putting these facts into a broader historical context and analyzing their causal significance. The literature on the Japanese-German relationship proves to be no exception. While a lot has been written about this theme, in particular on its early stages, there have been a few attempts at contextualization. As a result, we are faced with a collection of piecemeal studies, each presenting its own "separate, self-contained microcosm."[5]

In order to combine the "microcosms" into a contextualized whole, diplomatic ties could possibly be a useful common denominator. The formal state-to-state relationships provide a basic setting for contacts and exchanges, even though these, developing in various channels, can naturally never be reduced to a single political level. For historians of Japanese-German relations in particular, examining diplomacy between both states before World War I proves worthwhile, though this theme is no novelty in the studies on international relations. Here many historians may be surprised to find that both countries, on the whole, were rarely on congenial terms with each other. While it is true that hardly any major conflicts can be observed in the first half of the Meiji era, this absence of conflict in no way proves their closeness. After the Meiji Restoration, Japan was absorbed in its nation-state building, while Germany also concentrated on attempts to solidify its hard-won national unity. The lack of contention in the diplomatic sphere, therefore, means little more than that there were few points of contact between two inward-looking nations. This changed substantially in the latter half of the era. Japan entered the stage of international politics in East Asia as

a major actor in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95. Germany, under Kaiser Wilhelm II, also began to blatantly claim—in its view—a fair share in colonialist expansion under the motto of *Weltpolitik* and, along with other imperial powers, set its sights on East Asia.[6] It was at this point that both countries' trajectories unavoidably crossed.

This was marked by the Triple Intervention and the Kiautschou Bay concession (with Qingdao), which had grave consequences for diplomatic relations between the two nations. In 1895, shortly after the end of the Sino-Japanese War, Russia, Germany, and France undertook a collective intervention against Japan to force it to give up its claim on the Liaodong Peninsula, which was due to be ceded from China. Japan had no choice but to grudgingly acquiesce, feeling abruptly deprived of the would-be just reward, obtained through much sacrifice. Though it was Russia who had actually taken the initiative in 1895, the indignation of the Japanese public was directed mainly against Germany. Indeed, we could argue that this was not entirely the German government's fault; rather, it was due to the incidental circumstances involving a German diplomat's untactful behavior in the affair.[7] However, three years later, Berlin's deliberate step in the form of the Kiautschou Bay concession exacerbated its already cooled relations with Tokyo. Germany's acquisition of a foothold in East Asia by forcing Beijing to lease a naval base strongly irritated Japan. "Germany," said a newspaper, "has now set out, ahead of others, in the dismemberment of China."[8]

We should not forget that the diplomatic relations, after reaching their nadir in the 1890s, did not improve until the end of World War I. In the Russo-Japanese War, Germany all but blatantly took Russia's side, despite its officially announced position of neutrality. Wilhelm II promoted the concept of a German-Russian alliance by concluding the Björkö Agreement with Nicholas II shortly before the end of the war. Understandably, Japan, for its part, was always keen to check Germany's advances. After its war against Russia, Japan improved relations with Germany and also strengthened its ties with Britain, with which it had concluded an alliance in 1902, and France—thus effectively joining the camp of the Triple Entente. It was therefore only logical that, at the outbreak of World War I in 1914, Japan declared war against Germany, attacked Kiautschou Bay, and occupied its colonies in the Pacific.[9]

Worse still, the damaged diplomatic links gave birth to anti-German sentiment among the Japanese public. In particular, the Triple Intervention had dire consequences. For the Japanese, who already felt humiliated and deprived, the behavior of the German representative only exacerbated their outrage. Fuel was also added to these anti-German emotions by the Yellow Peril discourse advocated by Wilhelm II, among others. The almost obsessive eagerness with which the Kaiser tried to propagate the fear of an alleged menace posed by Asians was received with outrage in

Japan.[10] In the eyes of most of the Japanese, Germany seemed to be the hub of all anti-Japanese conspiracies. Tokutomi Sohō, for example, arguably one of the most influential opinion leaders at the time with his very popular journal *Kokumin no Tomo*, was so deeply shocked at the news of Japan's giving in to the Triple Intervention that, by his own account, he "mentally changed to another personality." He swore that "this shame shall be avenged, whether it may take ten, twenty or even hundred years," and became a champion of energetic armament and outspoken nationalism.[11] The philosopher Watsuji Tetsurō, who explicated the ecological basis of culture with his *Fūdo* (Climate and Culture), recalled how he experienced the intervention as a child. Even as a little boy, he felt mortified "as if we were defeated in the war."[12] The most striking case, however, was Anesaki Chōfū. Anesaki, the founder of religious studies in Japan and a professor at the Imperial University of Tokyo, had been a fervent Germanophile since his high school days, but was strongly vexed by the Triple Intervention. His feelings then turned into unambiguous hatred when he himself was exposed to chauvinistic discrimination during his study in Germany. Anesaki loathed the Kaiser in particular, so much that he swore he would never tread on German soil so long as Wilhelm was alive.[13]

Usually, the Meiji era is associated with the many organizational and technological transfers from Germany. For those who are overly occupied by this kind of narrative, it may be surprising that the interstate relations in the same period were so bleak. If we take the entire span of the modern period into account, however, it turns out that the diplomatic relations remained, if not openly unfriendly, at best, sparse and futile. We could even view the Anti-Comintern Pact (1936) and the Tripartite Pact (1940) as being departures from the norm.

Stagnant Human Mobility between Both Countries

It goes without saying that the Meiji-era Japanese owed Germany a great deal for their modernization project—prime examples are the constitution and the legal system. Quite a bit has been written on this theme, ranging from the Iwakura Mission in 1871–1873, whose members were very impressed by Chancellor Bismarck's advice of *Realpolitik*,[14] to the Prussian-oriented concepts of Inoue Kowashi, who, as secretary of *Dajōkan* (Council of State), was the government's main strategist in the constitutional issue; to Itō Hirobumi's inspection tour to Europe in 1882 and his drafting of the constitution with the aid of German experts like Lorenz von Stein and Hermann Roesler.[15] The military system is another prime example. Here, it is sufficient to point out the role that the Prussian Major Klemens W. J. Meckel played in the modernization of

officer training at the military academy during his stay from 1885 until 1888. In academic and technological fields, too, the German influence made itself markedly felt. The strength of this influence is unmistakably evident when we take a quick glance at the list of German o*yatoi gaikoku-jin* (foreign specialists hired by the Japanese authorities and companies).[16] These organizational and technological transfers were enabled by efforts on the Japanese side, such as the establishment of the *Doitsu Gaku Kyōkai* (The Association of German Studies) in 1881 under the aegis of Meiji oligarchs. The high school affiliated with the association enjoyed special promotion by the government and was granted privileges and financial preference. All this might lead us to assume—given Germany's active involvement in Japan's nation-state building process—that the former appeared as "a familiar country" in the eyes of the latter.

Naturally, this pivots on the criteria for deciding how and when a country can be classified as "familiar." This examination, of course, needs to include a whole range of social aspects, or, in other words, it should take into account ordinary people's impressions of Germany rather than only the opinions of the rich and notable on special occasions. Everyday exchange is borne primarily by face-to-face contact between people. This was all the more the case at a time when communication was technologically much more restricted than it is today. There are no indisputable standards for measuring interactions between cultures, but the extent of people's movement can be used as an indicator. To first grasp the volume of the flow of people from Germany to Japan, let us have a look at Table 1.1, which shows the number of resident Westerners in Japan before World War I. There is no question that the Germans formed a small minority, accounting for just one tenth of all the Western expatriates throughout the Meiji era. In particular, there is a striking difference between the number of Germans and the number of Americans

Table 1.1 Numbers of Western residents in Meiji-era Japan (approximate figures)

Year	Westerners in total	German	British	American
1876	2,000	200	1,000	100
1880	2,000	300	1,100	500
1890	4,000	480	1,700	1,000
1900	6,000	550	2,000	1,500
1910	8,000	780	2,500	1,700
1913	–	900	–	–

Note: Michael Rauck, "Die Beziehungen zwischen Japan und Deutschland 1859–1914 unter besonderer Berucksichtigung der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen" (PhD diss., University of Erlangen-Nurnberg, 1988), 36, 38.

or Britons, who represented the biggest share. Next, let us turn to the flow of Japanese moving in the opposite direction. Since we may practically rule out the presence of unskilled Japanese workers employed in Germany, most of those who resided there are thought to have been merchants and students. Students in particular played a big role as agents of knowledge transfer. In fact, studying abroad in the Meiji era tends to be associated, above all, with Germany. This image is strengthened by the well-known accounts of Mori Ōgai, who studied medicine at German universities from 1884 to 1888, and his peers, who describe a challenging and—partly romantic—student life there. Table 1.2, which shows the destinations of the overseas students dispatched by the Education Ministry, seems to confirm our assumptions. As a destination for study, Germany was greatly preferred over Britain and the United States. In reality, however, these numbers are deceptive because they reveal only one small part of the situation, as there were also many students who were sent abroad privately without financial support from the government. In 1907 alone, for example, the number of Japanese who went abroad for the purpose of study was 3,340, which was twice as many as the cumulative number of official overseas students in nearly four decades, as shown in Table 1.2. What is interesting is that 95 percent of these privately funded students headed for the United States.[17] Unlike the official students, who, as elite bureaucrats and academics, were granted a sufficient scholarship, most of those who chose America were not financially privileged and had few opportunities for developing a career at home. Instead, they hoped that, once they managed to work their way through college in America, their efforts would be rewarded with prospects for success as *shin-kichōsha* (ex-expatriates) when they returned home. Although this success story rarely came true, there were such a large number of young career-dreamers that a new genre of guidebook, to aid Japanese students in pursuing their dreams of studying in America, became a big hit for publishers.[18] In addition, we should not forget that there was a massive

Table 1.2 Places of study for overseas students dispatched by the Japanese Education Ministry (1875–1914)

Destinations	Number of students
Germany	632
Britain	330
United States	257
France	214
Others	121

Note: Tsuji, *Kindai Nihon kaigai ryūgaku*, 50. If the same person visited two or more places, they are counted separately.

movement of unskilled labor from Japan to the United States, as America was one of the main destinations for Japanese emigrants during the Meiji era. The number of people who wanted to try their luck in the New World is estimated to have been more than 77,000, over a period of three decades, since 1880.[19] In short, America, which could sell the dream of a wonderful career and actually attracted a host of young Japanese, was certainly the country that appeared the closest to ordinary people. It is thus no wonder that Japanese tended to turn to the United States whenever it came to novelties in the West. Even from the critical standpoint of a German, Erwin Bälz struck at the heart of the matter when he noted that the Japanese, as if it were a superstition, blindly believed anything the Americans said.[20]

Limited German Presence in the Meiji Public Sphere

In a sense, the distinct divide in studying abroad in the Meiji period reflected more broadly the structure of the Japanese public sphere. It was sharply polarized between the realms of *kan* (official) and *min* (private), with the former invariably deemed to be higher than the latter. Important for Germany was the fact that the country was always associated with the *kan* realm in this binary scheme. This substantially determined the image of Germany in Japanese eyes.

That being said, we should be careful in evaluating how essential the German influence was to the Japanese official sphere. Even with the constitution, which represented the centerpiece of Japanese-German relations, recent research warns against overestimating the German influence. It suggests that the impression that Prussia made on the Iwakura Mission should be qualified. Equally, in the process of drafting the Meiji Constitution, the active role of the Japanese side has come to be emphasized more.[21] In addition, we should be reminded that hardly any German proponents played a major role in Meiji public discourse. Fukuzawa Yukichi, no doubt the most influential journalist of the day, was a fervent advocate of liberalism in the Anglo-American mold. Based on his own overseas experiences, he described Western civilization vividly in his immensely popular works. In particular, *Seiyō jijō* (Introduction to the West), which sold as many as 250,000 copies, is said to have firmly established the view of the British Empire as the world's hub with the Japanese.[22] Tokutomi Sohō, who was a close second to Fukuzawa in terms of popularity—with his widely circulated newspaper *Kokumin Shinbun*—essentially held the same political allegiances.[23] Meanwhile, it is difficult to name a single publicist who had a German-oriented background. Fukuzawa's counterpart Katō Hiroyuki, a political scientist and the first president of the Imperial University of Tokyo, could perhaps be seen as fulfilling this role, as he

is generally credited with founding German studies in Japan. However, he never became as popular a figure, perhaps because, unlike Fukuzawa, he wrote no accessible introductory book for the general public.[24] In journalism, in addition, the Popular Rights Movement-affiliated liberal press maintained the upper hand. It influenced the younger generation so much that, as the oligarch Yamagata Aritomo, who along with Itō greatly influenced the political process during the latter half of the Meiji era, once deplored, students "unanimously praise and long for the British system of government, which they are keen to realize in our country."[25] There were comparatively fewer voices that favored Germany. Bismarck, although admired by some as the hero of national unification, never reached a level of fame equal to that of Napoleon or George Washington. Instead, the Chancellor of Iron and Blood was often criticized because, as the radical liberal journalist Nakae Chōmin, who had been particularly inspired by Jean Jacque Rousseau, put it, "his ideal is no doubt based on authoritarianism."[26] All this makes us conclude that the position Germany occupied in the Meiji political sphere was far from preeminent.

Meanwhile, higher education has been seen as a stronghold of German-oriented discourse. Compared with journalism, academia lacked broad access to the general public, but its association with the government and ministerial bureaucracy, as well as the authority of the state-run university with its imperial aura, was enough to offset its relatively narrow readership. However, we should not be too hasty in coming to any conclusion regarding the validity of these impressions.

What is particularly of interest to us here is the relatively minor role Germany played in intellectual life. Given the great German influence in science and technologies, we tend to assume German's ascendency as an academic language had already happened at an early stage. Actually, at Nankō or the Southern College, one of Japan's first institutions of higher education, German courses were established, but cancelled soon after in 1873 due to insufficient enrollment, leaving English as the single language of instruction. This state of affairs did not change much with the founding of the University of Tokyo in 1877. Most classes were given in English, and English textbooks and references were widely used. At its foundation, of the 16 foreign professors in the faculties of sciences, law, and letters, 7 were Americans, 5 were Britons, and just 2 were German.[27] English continued to be used as the primary language of instruction for a relatively long time. The case of Ludwig Rieß exemplifies this, as he taught at the Imperial University of Tokyo from 1887 until 1902 and laid the groundwork in Japan for the establishment of modern historiography as conceptualized by Leopold von Ranke. Rieß always taught in English because his students could not understand German.[28] The same was true for the Austrian musician Rudolf Dittrich. He ran the Music Academy of Tokyo for six years, beginning with its foundation in 1888, and made a

decisive contribution to its German-oriented musical culture. Yet the circumstances of his employment already betray much about how teaching was conducted at the academy. When the Japanese Education Ministry began searching for a music professor for the newly founded academy, it required that candidates have a high level of proficiency in English as an indispensable qualification. Principally due to this condition, the selection process dragged on until they finally found Dittrich.[29] As a field that holds a particularly pronounced German influence, music stands out beside military science and medicine—these disciplines are therefore called the "Three M's"[30]—but even there it was not until the later Meiji years that German language education was institutionalized. At the Music Academy, English was the only foreign language designated in the curriculum since the foundation of its predecessor, the Research Institute of Music, in 1879. Only in 1906 was German offered as an elective subject, and was then upgraded to a mandatory foreign language along with English a few years later.[31] Students who were sent to Germany after graduation for further study were hence faced with significant difficulties owing to their lack of command over German.[32]

As a medium for knowledge transfer, language determines not only the form of the transfer, but its direction and contents as well. It is only natural that the wide diffusion of English language proficiency in Meiji society entailed a vast flow of knowledge from the Anglo-American world. As a result, most of the books on the history of the West published in early Meiji years were translations of history textbooks used in Britain and the United States.[33] Similarly, most of the books on the Western literature were, as Sansom noted early on, translations of English originals.[34] Considering these points in combination, we can conclude that Meiji intellectual life was overwhelmingly dominated by English.

Anglophone Agency in Conveying German Influences

Given the marked prevalence of English in Meiji Japan, we should then ask how the extensive influence of Germany came into being. The answer has already been hinted at above: German thought was taught in English. Let us take a detailed look at how this process developed, using examples from the field of music.

To begin with, we will look at an article published in 1893 in a specialized music journal. Titled "Ongaku taika" (Great Musical Artists), it lists the ten best Western artists as follows:

> Paresutorina, Handeru. Jon, Sebaschian, Baha. Heiden. Mozāto. Bītōben. Kārumaria, Bon, Uebā. Furazu, Shuberuto. Menderusōn. Robāto, Shūman. Richiyādo. Waguneru-shi[35]

As we immediately notice, all of them, with the exception of Palestrina, are German-Austrian musicians. This proves that the Meiji-era Japanese already had clear opinions regarding the central role of the German-speaking region in art music. The list is also interesting because it appears to indicate a certain level of musical knowledge. The author is confused about the identity of the artists; for example, he obviously thinks that Palestrina and Händel are the same person. Most interesting about this list is its method of transcription. It was unquestionably based on English pronunciations. For the author, Haydn is "Heiden," that is, "ay" was taken as *ei* instread of *ai*, as in original German. He similarly grasped Mozart as "Mozāto" and took "ar" as a long vocal, which has been a rule in English transcriptions into Japanese. Moreover, "von" and "Richard" are written as "bon" and "Richiyādo," not in accordance with the original German *fən* and *rɪça:ʁt*. It is also striking that Bach's first name is listed as "John" instead of "Johann." All of this forces us to conclude that the author, obviously possessing no German proficiency, owes his knowledge to Anglophone literature. Significantly, the English style of transcription was not confined to this article. "Heiden" and "Mozāto" were rather common usages at the time.[36] "Waguneru," which is an anglicized form of Wagner with *u*-sound instead of "*v*" for "W," was commonplace as well—this, by the way, is still found to date in Japan.

In this context, we are reminded of Keiō Gijuku Waguneru Sosaietei, which was founded in 1901 by students of the Keiō Gijuku private school and has remained one of the most prestigious university student musical societies. It was founded as a result of a Wagner boom among young intellectuals.[37] Despite its outspoken commitment to German music, interestingly, the organization named itself "Waguneru sosaietei," the second term being a phonetic transcription of *society*. Similar examples can be easily collected from among general music terminology. The piano was usually called "piano" or "piyano," unless the translated "yōkin (literally: Western zither)" was used. Similarly, the Meiji-era Japanese spoke of "vaiorin" or "teikin (handy zither)," but there were no words phonetically traceable to the German *Geige*.[38]

All of this clearly shows that, first, there was already an established notion in Japan during the Meiji period that Germany was the heartland of art music and that, second, this notion was transmitted from English speaking areas, most probably from the United States. It may seem odd that this German influence did not come directly, but instead made a roundabout journey via America even in the age of a direct connection by sea between Yokohama and Hamburg or, later, by the trans-Siberian railway. Nevertheless, we should take two points into account here. First, Western music in Japan was the domain of the Anglophone world from its outset. The first *oyatoi* was an American, Luther Whiting Mason, who laid the groundwork for Western musical instruction in 1879–1882. Isawa

Shūji,[39] a ministerial official and the founder of the Music Academy, had studied in the United States for years. The same was true of his close aide at the academy, Kōzu Senzaburō, as well as his successor as the academy's director, Takamine Hideo. The academy's first graduate, Kōda Nobu, sent in 1889 to the West for further study, chose Boston for her place of study, although she later transferred to Vienna. Within this context, it was no wonder that English remained the sole compulsory foreign language at the Music Academy for such a long time. Additionally, as far as art music was concerned, America had little music culture of its own before World War I. Instead, it also experienced an overwhelming German influence, as one researcher notes, "In the United States, music became synonymous with Germany. As the nineteenth century drew to an end, to be German meant to be musical."[40] The most that America had to offer when the Meiji-era Japanese turned to it for music culture was, therefore, what had been imported from Germany.

The German intellectual influence on Japan during the Meiji period especially intensified around the turn of the century. In philosophy, for example, German schools of thought took the place of Anglo-American thought and French Enlightenment philosophy beginning in the 1890s and gripped Japanese scholars, so much so that one contemporary observed, "nothing [in the research of philosophy] can begin without German one."[41] In jurisprudence, likewise, the legal positivism of the German mold became firmly rooted in the mainstream of academia. These academic tendencies were borne by the emerging intellectual trend, *Kyōyōshugi,* which can roughly be translated as human cultivationism. Its worldview, which was nurtured, above all, at the elite liberal arts-oriented high schools, held that man should pursue the intellectual and moral fulfillment of the individual and that this ultimate goal of life could be achieved by cultivating oneself through culture and art that was, mainly, from the West.[42] It is certainly not hard to recognize here an affinity with the specifically German ideal of *Bildung*.[43] Interestingly, the German influence apparently again here did not necessarily arrive straight from its point-of-origin. A case in point is Takayama Chogyū. The writer and star publicist in the 1890s of the influential journal *Taiyō* was one of the trend's leading proponents. He had a significant impact on the reading public, in particular, by introducing Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy. Takayama, however, could not read the original text because of his lack of German proficiency; rather, he relied mainly on British literature on Nietzsche.[44] Likewise, for Hozumi Nobushige, who, as dean of the School of Law, introduced the German school of jurisprudence to the University of Tokyo, engagement in German study happened via Britain. He first underwent legal training at the Middle Temple in London and then made an intellectual reversal, convinced of Germany's superiority in the field.[45] Similar cases could probably be collected that would equally

indicate that the transfer of German cultural and intellectual products proceeded on a winding road via the Anglophone world.

CONCLUSION

In history, a view that, at first glance, appears accurate beyond any doubt often evolves into a myth over time. Once established as myth, it is so taken for granted that it rarely returns as the subject of scrutiny. The "familiar Germany" is among such historical myths. As this chapter has shown, the historical reality of the relationship between Germany and Japan in the Meiji era deviated in many respects from what this myth claims. As for German-Japanese diplomatic ties, indifference or even a mutually hostile posture was the norm. On the popular level, human exchange between both countries always remained rather limited. Moreover, there was no vision emitting from Germany that appealed to the ordinary Japanese's fancy. Even in the scientific and high-cultural fields, where the German influence has been said to be especially pronounced, we must remember that German cultural artifacts reached Japan more often than not through Anglophone intermediaries.

This article meant to challenge the myth of Japanese-German intimacy. A myth, once demolished, always stimulates new questions. In our case, for example, *Why did Germany, despite providing Meiji-era Japan with such a number of organizational and technological innovations, fail to produce a sense of familiarity? How did the attempt come about to bridge the gap in familiarity through constructing a myth? Why and how did this myth find a broad acceptance among people? What subtext did the myth contain in the contemporary socio-cultural constellation?* To attempt to deal with these questions would be beyond the scope of this chapter, and they, along with other possible ones, must therefore be left to future research. These kinds of questions will, however, certainly help us to widen our perspectives and deepen our understanding of the history of Japanese-German relations.

NOTES

1. *Nihon ni okeru Doitsu no imeji* [Image of Germany in Japan], (Düsseldorf: GfW Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2003).
2. In fact, as a commemorative publication on the occasion of an anniversary of the historical link between the two countries says, "It has been repeatedly said that the ties between Japan and Germany were very special ones." Cf. Angelika Viets, "Vorwort," in *Brückenbauer: Pioniere des japanisch-deutschen Kulturaustausch*, ed. Japanisch-Deutsches Zentrum Berlin and Japanisch-Deutsche Gesellschaft (Berlin: Iudicium, 2005), 15. Christian W. Spang and Rolf-Harald Wippich however, warn the readers to not hastily assume continuous benevolent relations between both countries. Christian W. Spang and Rolf-Harald Wippich, "Introduction—from

'German Measles' to 'Honorary Aryans': An Overview of Japanese-German Relations until 1945," in *Japanese-German Relations, 1895–1945: War, Diplomacy and Public Opinion*, ed. Christian W. Spang and Rolf-Harald Wippich (London: Routledge, 2006), 15.

3. Regine Mathias-Pauer, "Deutsche Meinungen zu Japan: Von der Reichsgründung bis zum Dritten Reich," in *Deutschland-Japan: Historische Kontakte*, ed. Josef Kreiner (Bonn: Bouvier, 1984), 117.
4. According to the head of a local branch of the Japanese-German Association, for example, logical thinking, sincerity, and so on, are shared features of the national character between Japanese and Germans. Cf. Hayase Isamu, "Goaisatsu [Greetings]," *Yokohama Nichi-Doku Kyokai Kaihō* 1 (2011), 1.
5. Tajima Nobuo, "Japanese-German Relations in East Asia, 1890–1945," in *Japan and Germany: Two Latecomers to the World Stage, 1890–1945*, ed. Akira Kudō, Nobuo Tajima and Erich Pauer, Folkestone: Global Oriental 2009, 37.
6. On the diplomatic relations between both countries besides Tajima, "Japanese-German Relations," in *Japan and Germany*, cf. Frank W. Iklé, "The Triple Intervention: Japan's Lesson in the Diplomacy of Imperialism," *Monumenta Nipponica* 22, nos. 1–2 (1967), and Iklé, "Japan's Policies toward Germany," in *Japan's Foreign Policy 1868–1941: A Research Guide*, ed. James W. Morley (New York and London, 1974); Rolf-Harald Wippich, *Japan und die deutsche Fernostpolitik 1894–1898: Vom Ausbruch des Chinesisch-Japanischen Krieges bis zur Besetzung der Kiautschou-Bucht: Ein Beitrag zur wilhelminischen Weltpolitik* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1987). On the policy shift from Bismarck's cautious colonial politics to the assertive expansionism by Wilhelm II cf. John C. G. Röhl, *Wilhelm II* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2013), 52–59.
7. The representatives of the three powers in Tokyo were supposed to separately present the announcement to the Japanese authorities, whose wording was exactly the same after elaborate coordination. The German minister, Felix Frhr. v. Gutschmid, however, added a memorandum that Berlin had given him as a background briefing and was therefore not meant for publication. Cf. Hans Schwalbe and Heinrich Seemann, eds., *Deutsche Botschafter in Japan 1860–1973* (Tokyo: OAG, 1974), 49, 55–56. In the memorandum, some passages were so provocative, alluding to possible military confrontations, that the vice foreign minister, Hayashi Tadasu, who received it from Gutschmid, took it as verging almost on an ultimatum to Japan. Cf. A telegram from Vice Foreign Minister Hayashi to Foreign Minister, Munemitsu Mutsu, of April 25, 1895, *Nihon gaikō bunsho* (Tokyo: Gaimushō, 1955–), 28–2–12–701.
8. Anonymous, "Tōyō ni okeru Doitsu no kōdō [Germany's Actions in Asia]," *Yomiuri Shinbun* July 23, 1898, 1.
9. For further detail, see Charles Stephenson, *Germany's Asia-Pacific Empire: Colonialism and Naval Policy 1885–1914* (Woodbridge etc.: Boydell, 2009).

10. Heinz Gollwitzer, *Die gelbe Gefahr: Geschichte eines Schlagworts, Studien zum imperialistischen Denken* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962); Iikura Akira, "The 'Yellow Peril' and Its Influence on Japanese-German Relations," in *Japanese-German Relations,* eds. Spang and Wippich, 87.
11. Sohō Tokutomi, *Sohō jiden* [Autobiography of Sohō] (1935; reprint, Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Sentā, 1997), 225–226.
12. Watsuji Tetsurō, "Jijoden no kokoromi [A Preliminary Autobiography]," in *Watsuji Tetsurō zenshū* (1961; reprint, Tokyo: Iwanami, 1963), ed. Yoshishige Abe Vol. 18, 187.
13. Anesaki [Chōfū] Masaharu, *Waga shōgai* [My Life] (1951; reprint, Tokyo: Daikūsha, 1993), 93.
14. For example, Kido Takayoshi, the leader of the Chōshū clan, noted after returning home, "The basic principle of statehood cannot be anything but despotism." Cf. Kido's entry into his diary on November 20, 1873, *Kido Takayoshi nikki* [Diary of Kido Takayoshi], ed. Nihon Shiseki Kyōkai (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1967), Vol. 2, 453.
15. For more information, cf. Ando Junko, *Die Entstehung der Meiji-Verfassung: Zur Rolle des deutschen Konstitutionalismus im modernen japanischen Staatswesen* (Munich: Iudicium, 2000).
16. A detailed list of German *oyatoi* from the initial Meiji years until the beginning of the Taishō era can be found in Miyanaga Takashi, *Nichidoku bunka kōryū shi: Doitsugo koto hajime* [A History of Japanese-German Cultural Exchange: Beginning of German Language Learning] (Tokyo: Sanshūsha, 1993), 420–431.
17. Tsuji Naoto, *Kindai Nihon kaigai ryūgaku no mokuteki henyō: Monbushō ryūgakusei no haken jittai ni tsuite* [Changing Objectives of Study Abroad in Modern Japan: Detailed Account of Overseas Students Sent by the Education Ministry] (Tokyo: Tōshindō, 2010), 117.
18. Ibid., 117–121.
19. Robert A. Wilson and William K. Hosokawa, *East to America: A History of the Japanese in the United States* (New York: Morrow, 1980), 35.
20. Bälz's statement of November 26, 1904 in his diary *Berutsu no nikki,* trans. by Ryūtarō Suganuma (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1979), Vol. 2, 259. Oddly, this day's statement can be found neither in the first nor the third edition of the German edition. Cf. Erwin Bälz, *Das Leben eines deutschen Arztes im erwachenden Japan: Tagebücher, Briefe, Berichte*, ed. Toku Bälz (Stuttgart: Engelhorn, 1930 [1st ed.]; 1937 [3rd ed.]).
21. Tanaka Akira, *Iwakura Shisetsudan, "Beiō kairan jikki"* [Iwakura Mission, *Report on the Round Trip to America and Europe*] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 2002), 159–160. Takii Kazuhiro, *The Meiji constitution: The Japanese experience of the West and the shaping of the modern state*, trans. by D. Noble (Tokyo: I-House Press, 2007).
22. Andrew Cobbing, "Early Japanese Visitors to Victorian Britain," in *Social and Cultural Perspectives,* ed., Gordon Daniels and Tsuzuki Chūshichi (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 55.

23. For Tokutomi, cf. Sinh Vinh, *Tokutomi Sohō (1863–1957): The Later Career* (Toronto, ON: Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies of the University of Toronto and York University, 1986). In the interwar era, Tokutomi occasionally spoke highly of Germany, but his intellectual foundation was grounded in liberalism. Cf. Peter Duus, "Whig History, Japanese Style: The Min'yūsha Historians and the Meiji Restoration," *Journal of Asian Studies* 33, no. 3 (1974), 415–436.
24. Katō's *Seiyō kakkoku seisui kyōjaku ichiran hyō* [A Table about Powers of the Western Countries] (Tokyo: Chūgai, 1869) could perhaps be compared to Fukuzawa's *Seiyō jijō,* but it was little more than a translation of the following German statistical overview: Maurice Block, *Die Machtstellung der europäischen Staaten* (Gotha: Perthes, 1862).
25. Yamagata Aritomo, "Hensoku Doitsu gakko wo mokuru no gi" [Proposal to Establish a Special School of German Studies], January 1883, in *Gakumon to chishikijin,* ed. Sannosuke Matsumoto and Shinichi Yamamuro (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1988), 174.
26. Nakae Chōmin, "Gaikō wo ronzu," [On Foreign Policy] in *Nakae Chōmin hyōronshū,* ed. Matsunaga Shōzō (1882; reprint, Tokyo: Iwanami, 1993), 122.
27. *Tōkyō Daigaku hyakunen shi* [One-Hundred Years of Tokyo University], 10 vols. ed. Tōkyō Daigaku (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1984–1987), Vol. 1, 161, 286, 478.
28. Kanai Madoka and Shūko Yoshimi, *Waga chichi ha oyatoi gaikokujin* [My Father Was a Oyatoi] (Tokyo: Gōdō, 1978), 32. For Rieß and his influence on Japanese historiography, cf. Margaret Mehl, *History and the State in Nineteenth-Century Japan* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998).
29. A letter from the Minister in Austria, Toda Ujitaka, to Foreign Minister, Ōkuma Shigenobu, September 18, 1888, in *Tōkyō Geijutsu Daigaku hyakunen shi* [Hundred Years of Tokyo University of Arts], ed. Tōkyō Geijutsu Daigaku (Tokyo: Ongaku no Tomo, 1987), Vol. 1, 512.
30. Wolfgang Schwentker, "Barbaren und Lehrmeister: Formen fremdkultureller Wahrnehmung im Japan des 19. Jahrhunderts," in *"Barbaren" und "Weiße Teufel": Kulturkonflikte und Imperialismus in Asien vom 18. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert,* ed. Eva Maria Auch und Stig Förster (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1997), 118.
31. Ishikura Kosaburō, "Kaiko sanjū nen" [Looking Back at the Past Thirty Years], part 3, *Dōseikahō* 216 (1938), 41.
32. Yamada Kōsaku, *Wakaki hi no kyōshikyoku* [Rapsody of the Youth], in *Yamada Kōsaku chosaku zenshū,* ed. Nobuko Gotō et al. (1951; reprint, Tokyo: Iwanami, 2001), Vol. 3, 94.
33. Miyaji Masato, "Bakumatsu Meiji zenki ni okeru rekishi ninshiki no kōzō," [Structure of Historical Perception at the End of the Shogunate and in the First Half of the Meiji Era] in *Rekishi ninshiki,* ed. Miyaji Masato and Tanaka Akira (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1991), 527.
34. George B. Sansom, *The Western World and Japan: A Study in the Interaction of European and Asiatic Cultures* (London: Cresset, 1950), 401.

35. Anonym, "Ongaku taika," *Ongaku Zasshi* 39 (1893). This list, translated exactly including punctuations, is as follows: "Palestrina, Händel. Johann, Sebastian, Bach. Haydn. Mozart. Beethoven. KarlMaria, von, Weber. Franz, Schubert. Mendelssohn. Robert, Schumann. Richard. Mr. Wagner."
36. The title of the following newspaper article speaks for itself. "Mozaruto Sosaichi hakkai shiki" [Inaugurating Ceremony of the Mozart Society], *Tokyō Nichinich Shinbun,* January 14, 1906. In a concert by the Tokyo Music Academy, a song composed by "Hēden was performed." Cf. *Tōkyō Geijutsu Daigaku hyakunen shi,* 220.
37. Takenaka Toru, "Wagner-Boom in Meiji-Japan," *Archiv für Musikwissenschaft* 62, no. 1 (2005). Its leader, Akiba Junichirō, was a devoted Wagnerian. Cf. Akiba Junichirō, "Waguneru no kaiin shokun ni tsugu," [To All the Members of the Wagner Society] in *Keiō Gijuku Waguneru Sosaietei 65 nen shi,* ed. Keiō Gijuku Waguneru Sosaietei (Tokyo: Keiō Gijuku, 1968), 299.
38. That was often the case, too, with the name of musical pieces. A professor of the Music Academy of Tokyo referred to a chaconne by Johann Sebastian Bach as "Chakōna." Tachibana Itoe, "Aikawarazu no mukashi banashi de gozaimasu" [An Old Story As Usual], *Dōseikaihō* 174 (1931).
39. About Isawa cf. Takenaka Toru, "Isawa Shuji's 'National Music': National Sentiment and Cultural Westernisation in Meiji Japan," *Itinerario* 34, no. 1 (2010).
40. Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, *Sound Diplomacy: Music and Emotions in Transatlantic Relations, 1850–1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 16.
41. Inoue Tetsujirō, "Meiji tetsugaku kai no kaiko [Looking Back at the Philosophical Circles in the Meiji Era]," in *Iwanami Tetsugaku kōza* (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1931–1933), Vol. 11, 8.
42. Takeuchi Yō, *Risshin shusse shugi: Kindai Nihon no roman to yokubō* [Careerism: Dreams and Desires of Modern Japan] (Tokyo: Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai, 1997), 115.
43. In fact, one of the representative figures of *Kyōyōshugi* was the German lecturer at the Imperial University, Raphael Koeber. Cf. Kiyotada Tsutsui, *Nihon gata "kyōyō" no unmei* [Destiny of Japanese "kyōyō"] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 2009), 99.
44. Sugita Hiroko, "Nīche kaishaku no shiryōteki kenkyū," [Source Studies on Reception of Nietzsche] *Kokugo to Kokubungaku* 43, no. 5 (1966), 21–34; A letter by Takayama to Anesaki Masaharu of January 1, 1901, in *Chogyū Zenshū*, ed. Anesaki Masaharu et al. (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1915), Vol. 7, 663.
45. Hozumi Shigeyuki, *Meiji ichi hōgakusha no shuppatsu: Hozumi Nobushige wo megutte* [Birth of a Jurist in the Meiji Era: Hozumi Nobushige] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1988), 213–223.

2

Karl von Eisendecher and Japan

Transnational Encounters and the Diplomacy of Imperialism

Sven Saaler

Introduction

The tasks required of diplomatic representatives of the Euro-American powers in Japan during the era of imperialism were relatively simple: to uphold the prestige and, if possible, increase the influence of the state they represented. Until the end of the nineteenth century, this also involved dealing with Japanese demands for revision of the so-called Unequal Treaties imposed on Japan in the 1850s and 1860s, which gave the Euro-American powers far-reaching privileges such as extraterritoriality, consular jurisdiction (both abolished at the end of the nineteenth century) and most-favored-nation status.[1] In general, Western diplomats insisted on the preservation of these provisions and justified them in terms of the alleged "inferiority" of Japanese culture and its "uncivilized" legal system, which did not (yet) conform to Western standards. This was common practice in European dealings with non-European powers until the twentieth century. Of all subject nations, Japan most actively demanded the reform of the unequal treatment meted out to it by the Euro-American powers and, in order to achieve "equality" with them, initiated a massive modernization program in the late nineteenth century; this was not limited to technological and legal matters, but also included the large-scale appropriation of European "civilization."

However, for European diplomats during the era of imperialism, there was little point in contemplating *mutual* cultural exchange. Europe was superior, not only in military strength, but also in terms of "civilization," and indeed the two concepts were often used interchangeably. The imperialist zeitgeist scarcely allowed diplomats to consider non-European

cultures as worthy partners in cultural exchange, and diplomatic missions lacked anything resembling the cultural attachés of modern embassies. The very term "cultural exchange" was virtually nonexistent at the time. European civilization set the standard in cultural affairs as well as in diplomacy, and even countries like Japan and China, with their longstanding cultural traditions, were considered, at best, "second-rate powers." Diplomatic representatives of the European powers made no secret of their disregard (or contempt) for non-Europeans and their cultures. As late as 1900, the German *chargé d'affaires* in Japan, Count Botho von Wedel (1862–1943), stated that "no Japanese will even get a cup of tea in my residence."[2]

In this chapter, I introduce a German diplomat who took a somewhat different approach from von Wedel and his peers—the second envoy of the German Empire to Japan, Karl von Eisendecher (1841–1934). Eisendecher expressed interest in and respect for the Japanese and their culture and supported Japan's demands for the opening of negotiations on the revision of the Unequal Treaties. Although Eisendecher was an important figure in Imperial Germany, he has received little attention in previous research.[3] In this essay, I first sketch Eisendecher's biography with a particular focus on his connections with Japan, from his participation in the Eulenburg mission of 1860/1861 (the Prussian mission to China, Japan and Siam) as a naval cadet to his tenure as Germany's diplomatic representative in Japan (1875–1882). Second, I assess his significance in the wider context of the development of Japanese–German relations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Eisendecher came to be highly regarded by the Japanese and has to be considered as one of the influential figures who laid the foundations of what has been called the "Golden Age of Japanese–German relations"[4] in the 1880s and early 1890s, despite ongoing areas of friction between the two nations. Lastly, I discuss Eisendecher's role in the revision of the Unequal Treaties in the early 1880s and show that he was a rare example of a European diplomat who expressed real sympathy for the Japanese claim for equality and translated it into action.

KARL VON EISENDECHER—FROM OLDENBURG TO JAPAN

Karl von Eisendecher was born on June 23, 1841 in Oldenburg, the capital city of the Grand Duchy of the same name.[5] His father was appointed head of the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1849 and socially and politically was well connected, among others, with the family of Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898), later Chancellor of the German Reich. Partly as a result of such connections, at the age of 16, Eisendecher joined the nascent Prussian Navy as a cadet. Although his father had a political career

in mind for his son, young Karl had been enthusiastic about joining the navy from childhood.[6] Following deployments in the North Sea and the Caribbean, he was assigned to the Prussian East Asian Expedition (1859–1861). The task of this mission under Count Friedrich Albert zu Eulenburg (1815–1881) was to establish diplomatic and trade relations with China, Japan, and Siam.[7] More than ten years after the completion of the mission, Eisendecher returned to Japan, this time as the diplomatic representative of the German Reich, a post he held from 1875 to 1882.[8]

Thus, not only did Karl von Eisendecher play a small part in the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and Germany in 1861, he also witnessed the revolutionary social, political, and economic transformation of Japan in the 1870s. As the diplomatic representative of the German Empire, he observed and reported regularly and extensively on events in that country. Apart from carrying out his diplomatic duties as minister resident of Germany in Japan, he developed a genuine interest in the country and its people. During his first visit in 1860/1861, he had plenty of time to devote himself to one of his hobbies—painting–and produced dozens of watercolors and sketches of Japanese landscapes.[9] Eisendecher also produced detailed descriptions of Japan, for example in a series of letters to his family, which were published in 1941 by the Japanologist Friedrich Trautz in the German journal *Nippon*.[10] As these letters show, Eisendecher felt almost "at home" in Japan—although he was somewhat mystified by the contours of Mount Fuji, this "perfectly regular cone,... a very strange mountain."[11] He noted approvingly that there was "nothing tropical" about the country and, in fact, was reminded of his home when travelling in Japan: "The countryside around Yokohama is very beautiful; everything is cultivated and inhabited, rather hilly with charming patches of forest interspersed. Our path was quite interesting: leading through woods, paddy fields, tea plantations and small villages, all bearing a remarkably German character—I was truly struck by the similarities. Houses with thatched roofs, just like the farmhouses in Oldenburg."[12]

After the Eulenburg mission's return to Germany, Eisendecher continued to attend the Naval Academy in Berlin, graduating in 1862. During this time, he strengthened his links with the Bismarck family, paying them visits "almost daily."[13] In 1871, Eisendecher received his first overseas diplomatic posting at the German legation in Washington DC, with the task of studying the development of the United States Navy. Two years later, in 1873, he was appointed naval attaché to the German legation in Washington DC.

On New Year's Eve 1874, Eisendecher was informed of his appointment as minister resident in Tokyo. Following a few months' preparation in Germany, he passed the consular examination in July 1875 and then set sail for Japan by way of the United States. Bismarck's sole

instruction to him was, "Keep the peace!"[14] a remark which encapsulated the Chancellor's reluctance to pursue an active colonial policy for the German Reich. Bismarck opposed "colonial adventures," whether in Africa or East Asia, and maintained this position until 1884, when the Berlin government declared a number of territories in Africa and New Guinea to be "protectorates." German colonial policy—and foreign policy in general—was to undergo a more drastic change with the ascension to the throne in 1888 of Emperor Wilhelm II, who promoted a "global policy" (*Weltpolitik*) for the Empire.

Throughout his years as diplomatic representative of the German Reich in Japan (1875–1882), Eisendecher used his leisure time to travel throughout the country, establishing networks beyond his diplomatic circles and experiencing Japanese society and culture at first hand. He was president of the German East Asiatic Society (OAG) for several years and, according to the minutes of the society, frequently attended lectures on Japanese subjects.[15] A series of photo albums, compiled by Eisendecher during his years in Japan and preserved in the archives of the University of Bonn, testify to his diverse activities in the country.[16] Not only do leading Japanese politicians and foreign diplomats figure in these photographs, as one might expect, but they also depict ordinary Japanese as well as land- and cityscapes from the areas that Eisendecher visited during his stint as minister resident. Although foreigners were allowed to visit only a limited number of places, due to travel restrictions unilaterally imposed by the Japanese as part of the Unequal Treaties, Eisendecher travelled to Kyoto, Osaka, Nikkō, Mt. Fuji, Nagasaki, and even Hokkaido, in some cases with a special permit from Japanese authorities. In 1879, he toured Japan for several months with Prince Heinrich von Hohenzollern, the grandson of the German Emperor, during the latter's visit to Japan, accompanied by Hachisuka Mochiaki (1846–1918), the last daimyo of Tokushima feudal domain (see below for details). The photographs that document Eisendecher's trips give the impression of an envoy who was not exclusively concerned with diplomacy, but one who demonstrated an active interest in Japanese culture and society.

After six years in Japan, in 1882 Eisendecher was transferred once again to the German legation in Washington DC, this time representing the German Empire as envoy. He remained in office until early 1884. Following this interlude, Eisendecher returned to Germany where he was appointed the representative of the Prussian King and German Emperor Wilhelm I to the court of the Grand Duke of Baden in Karlsruhe. He retained this position after Wilhelm I's death in 1888. Although this move to Baden might have appeared as a demotion, considering Eisendecher's international career up to that point, it was in fact the opposite. Positions as envoys to the states of Southern Germany were considered highly prestigious and influential, as Wilhelm II's biographer John Röhl emphasizes.[17]

The importance given to these posts reflected fears in Berlin regarding the fragility of the Empire with its federal structure. According to Röhl, the political leadership in Berlin considered the break-up of the Empire to be a serious possibility until as late as the end of the nineteenth century.[18] On the flipside, Eisendecher's appointment in Baden also demonstrates that Japan and the United States were not considered major international players in late-nineteenth-century European diplomacy. Vacant positions in Tokyo and Washington were usually filled by "outsiders" in the German diplomatic service, while high-profile posts in Paris, London, St. Petersburg, or Rome were dominated by a small number of influential aristocratic families.

Although Eisendecher was not based at the political center of Germany, he remained an authority on policies and politics relating to Japan. Diplomats, military officers, and politicians frequently sought his advice. In 1884, for example, Major Klemens Jacob Meckel (1842–1905) travelled to Karlsruhe to ask Eisendecher whether he should accept a commission as a military advisor to the Japanese Imperial Army. Eisendecher "strongly urged him to accept" the post.[19] Former colleagues from his time in Tokyo kept him up-to-date with Japanese affairs and maintained contact with him after their departure from the legation. The former German consul in Yokohama, Edward Zappe (1843–1888), as well as two of Eisendecher's former aides, Theodor von Holleben (1838–1913) and Kurt Freiherr von Zedtwitz, frequently wrote to him.[20] Prussia's representative in Baden actively expressed his views on Germany's stance toward East Asia. For example, he criticized the "prejudices of His Majesty [Kaiser Wilhelm II]" as "unfair and unfortunate" and described "the image of Japan" held by the Kaiser as "dangerous and inappropriate."[21] Here Eisendecher was referring to the specter of the "Yellow Peril" (*Gelbe Gefahr*)—the fear of an attack of "yellow Asian peoples," led by Japan, on Europe.[22] The Kaiser had been a major advocate of this notion since the late nineteenth century. According to Eisendecher's records, he had tried "to correct His Majesty's views repeatedly," but without success; he concluded that "the Kaiser expressed as a *fin mot* of disdain [the opinion] that 'the Japanese are just not Christians.'"[23] As these recollections show, although Eisendecher directly confronted Wilhelm II with what he perceived as a prejudiced and hostile attitude toward Japan, he was unable to change the Emperor's views.

Eisendecher's critical attitude toward Wilhelm II was partly motivated by his close ties to Bismarck. Eisendecher lamented the growing rift between the Emperor and Bismarck[24] and remained loyal to the latter, whereas he criticized Wilhelm repeatedly up until World War I,[25] at times even describing the Kaiser's behavior as "embarrassing."[26] With regard to Germany's stance toward Britain, Eisendecher sought to counteract the Emperor's policies and to defuse the growing tensions between the

Empire and Britain. Although declining the post of ambassador to Great Britain in 1912 due to advancing age and poor health, he maintained close links with London during the early years of World War I.[27] With the demise of the German Empire, the Kingdom of Prussia and the Grand Duchy of Baden in 1918/1919, Eisendecher retired from public service. He spent his remaining years in Baden-Baden until his death in 1934.

GERMANY AND JAPAN IN THE 1870S AND 1880S

Although Karl von Eisendecher has never figured prominently in academic studies of the German Empire (1871–1918) or Meiji-era Japan (1868–1912), seen in the light of the developing framework of Japanese–German relations, his role is of utmost importance. His tenure as minister resident and envoy during 1875–1882 coincided with the expansion of German influence in Japan, although the period was not free of diplomatic conflict, as we will see below. The rise of German influence in Japan during this period, seen by other powers as a threat,[28] brought about the "Golden Age of Japanese–German relations." According to the German advisor to the Imperial Household Ministry of Japan (*Kunaishō*), Ottmar von Mohl (1846–1922), this development came about partly as the result of Eisendecher's skills as Germany's representative in Japan: "Under the tactful and amicable direction of the second German envoy, Eisendecher, himself a product of the Imperial Navy, Japanese circles were brought into ever closer contact with German ideas."[29]

Eisendecher's positive impact on the attitudes toward Germany of the Japanese elites can also be seen in a report of the legation's First Secretary, Felix von Gutschmid, to the German Foreign Office, dated January 23, 1879. In the report, Gutschmid confirms that the Japanese government had decided to recruit German specialists for a number of advisory positions:

> In the report of the Prime Minister . . . concerning the employment of foreigners in Japanese service, there are indications that the Japanese government might in the future give preference to the recruitment of Germans over foreigners of other nationalities. Your Excellency, I have the satisfaction of being able to respectfully report to you today that influential positions in some of the highest branches of government have recently been filled by German nationals, and that further recommendations of citizens of the Reich will be taken into consideration.[30]

However, despite these successes, on two occasions during Eisendecher's tenure, Germany and Japan were involved in diplomatic conflicts. Both cases involved disputes over the interpretation of the Unequal Treaties,

especially concerning extraterritoriality, the provision by which foreigners living in Japan were subject not to Japanese jurisdiction, but to that of their home country through their respective embassies (consular jurisdiction). In the first case, in 1879, Eisendecher was forced to intervene because a high-ranking visitor from Germany—Prince Heinrich (Henry) von Hohenzollern, the grandson of the German Emperor and brother of the future Emperor Wilhelm II—was arrested for allegedly violating hunting regulations. He had arrived in Japan in the course of a two-year voyage around the world that was part of his training as a naval cadet. The incident caused outrage in Germany. However, through the timely intervention of Eisendecher and efforts by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, the episode was resolved quickly and to the satisfaction of the German side and remained a minor hiccup in bilateral relations.[31]

The second incident, however, led to a serious diplomatic rift with far-reaching international repercussions. In August of the same year (1879), the German merchant ship *Hesperia* entered Japanese waters, but ignored quarantine regulations that had been imposed in response to a cholera epidemic.[32] The ship had sailed—with Eisendecher's consent and accompanied by a (rather small and unimpressive) German gunboat, *Wolf*—from Kobe to Yokohama. According to Japanese regulations, the ship had to be inspected by the Japanese port authorities. However, Eisendecher argued that, owing to extraterritoriality provisions, foreign ships were not bound by Japanese rules. He permitted inspection of the vessel only by a Dr Gutschow from the German Naval Hospital at Yokohama.[33] The Japanese government was offended by Eisendecher's attitude; the pro-Japanese English-language daily *Tokio Times*[34] wrote in provocative tones of "The Hesperia Outrage":

> Nothing in the recently published correspondence between the Representatives of Germany in Japan [Minister Karl von Eisendecher and Consul Edward Zappe] and the Minister of Foreign Affairs [Terashima Munenori] tends to palliate the conduct of the former in defying and disregarding the quarantine regulations instituted by the administration of this country… It is difficult to reject the conviction, after carefully perusing the whole correspondence, that a peculiar impulse of hostility animated the German side… (A)lthough the determination to resist the application of Japanese authority, upon the conventional "extra-territorial" ground, was manifest, there was still an indication that the spirit of the regulations should be in some shape respected. Mr. von Eisendecher had not pretended that the Hesperia should leave the quarantine ground until after a "disinfection" had taken place, and no purpose of demanding compensation for her delay had been suggested. But suddenly the tone of his epistles underwent a change. To what it may be attributed, we can only conjecture, but on the 19th, he angrily wrote that he "must hold the Imperial Japanese

> government responsible to the full extent for all the losses arising from the detention of the ship"; he stated that he would not further "subject German vessels to quarantine regulations which are manifestly insufficient," and protested against the appearance of policemen on board with an acerbity quite new to the debate. From this moment, it seems to have been resolved that the Japanese authorities should be put to such annoyance and humiliation as it was in the power of the German officials to inflict.[35]

Foreign Minister Terashima (1832–1893) was forced to resign over the incident, as Eisendecher—despite all protests—maintained his stance on the jurisdictional status of foreign vessels. For Eisendecher, it was Terashima's inflexible attitude that had been the cause of the conflict. The incident involving Prince Heinrich, just a few months earlier, might have added to Eisendecher's unwillingness to compromise. However, it is more likely that Eisendecher and Terashima simply did not get along with each other on a personal level. Following Terashima's resignation, Eisendecher, with some satisfaction, wrote to the Foreign Office in Berlin that the new Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru (1836–1915) "was much easier to negotiate with than his predecessor."[36] Nevertheless, Eisendecher may have regretted his behavior over the *Hesperia* incident later on. In retrospect, he admitted that he had gone too far with Terashima:

> During my seven-year tenure I only once profoundly offended the Japanese, when I pushed a little too harshly for the protection of our treaty rights in a situation regarding quarantine. However, their anger subsided quickly as I went to great lengths in pushing for the revision of the aforementioned old contracts, in stark contrast to my British colleague [Sir Harry Parkes], who at the time was of a different opinion.[37]

As Eisendecher suggests here, the *Hesperia* incident became a turning point in the revision of the Unequal Treaties, as we shall see in the next section.

The Question of the Revision of the Unequal Treaties

As a consequence of the *Hesperia* incident, the revision of the Unequal Treaties once again moved to the center of political interest. According to the biography of Inoue Kaoru—a leading politician of Meiji Japan—from the beginning of the Meiji period, this had been the most important foreign policy goal of the new government.[38] Following the *Hesperia* incident, Eisendecher took a strongly Japan-friendly position and became a major advocate of a swift revision of the Unequal Treaties. This earned

him powerful backing from the new Foreign Minister Inoue, who was equally vying for Eisendecher's friendship and support,[39] leading to a significant improvement in Japanese–German relations.

At the end of January 1881, Aoki Shūzō (1844–1914), the Japanese envoy in Berlin,[40] had transmitted to the German Foreign Office a memorandum written by Inoue demanding that the Western parties renegotiate the Unequal Treaties.[41] Inoue's main concern was the revision of provisions relating to consular jurisdiction, in particular extraterritoriality, which had direct implications for Eisendecher's position in Japan. Of the memorandum's 14 pages, more than nine deal with the question of consular jurisdiction and only two or so with the most-favored-nation clause and tariff issues, testifying to the weight that Inoue gave to the revision of extraterritoriality. "*In the first place*," Inoue argued, "there presents itself to the attention of the Government the necessity of introducing certain reforms into the system of consular jurisdiction . . . The government, far from wishing to raise objections against consular jurisdiction on the point of principle . . . have [sic] only the desire to fix justly and equitably the limits of its judicial functions, in order to place it in harmony with the requirements of internal police [sic] and the administrative measures of the government."[42]

However, expectations that the German government would be open to Japanese concerns proved to be wishful thinking. Alexander von Siebold (1846–1911), then an advisor to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, was told by the Foreign Office's Heinrich von Kusserow (1836–1900) that there was apparently "some misconception on Mr. Aoki's part regarding the intentions of the German government."[43] Kusserow stressed that Germany desired "to follow the actions of the other Treaty Powers."[44] As a letter sent to Aoki on March 15, 1881 reveals, Inoue was unhappy with the German attitude and spoke darkly of a possible outbreak of anti-foreign violence: "If we understood that the [unequal] treaties of the [18]50s were to be continued into the future . . . then it might happen that the people [*kokumin*] would give up the path of opening up the country [*kaimei no shinro*] . . . The results achieved so far would be lost and it could lead to an outbreak of xenophobia, as in the [18]50s . . . *This [xenophobia] will certainly be much stronger and more terrifying than at that time.*"[45] Inoue further stressed that consular jurisdiction in particular caused "complications" (*futsugō*) for Japan's government and administration, as it led to different penalties for the same offense in the case of the Japanese, on the one hand, and foreigners on the other.[46] In addition, crime was bound to increase in the long term among the Japanese if they saw the law being constantly flouted by foreigners. Inoue announced that discussions on the issue of compliance with national laws and customs by the Western powers would take place with their consuls *in Tokyo* if negotiations in Europe proved impossible.[47]

Eisendecher played a crucial role in organizing a number of preliminary conferences on the revision of the Unequal Treaties in Tokyo. According to Inoue, his contribution in this area was crucial; in a letter to Aoki dated June 23, 1881, Inoue stated that a conference of this kind had "its origin in an oral proposal made by the German and French ambassadors."[48] For its part, Britain balked at the idea of such a conference, particularly if it were to be held in one of the European capitals, and referred the Japanese foreign minister to the British envoy in Tokyo, with a view to clarifying issues regarding the future development of the Japanese legal system as an essential preliminary to any discussion on the treaties.[49]

Unlike the British Foreign Office, however, the German Foreign Office eventually made the decision to support negotiations on the issue of consular jurisdiction. Eisendecher received instructions from Berlin[50] to attend the negotiations in Tokyo and bring about an agreement. Inoue worked hard to secure Eisendecher's support and declared in private that, in revising the treaties, the Japanese government was aiming to create a "sound and sophisticated understanding"[51] between the nations involved. He emphasized that the government was eager to follow the wishes of the Japanese people in this matter and that it could no longer control public discussion of the issues, even though it hoped to continue to cooperate with the representatives of the Contracting Powers. In response, in private talks held on July 10, 1881, Eisendecher warned Inoue that his memorandum and draft of a revised treaty would be met with little sympathy by the other parties, as it "contains many demands, but few concessions."[52]

The official response of the German Reich was handed to Inoue by Eisendecher a few days later. It was very different from the British position, which "completely rejected"[53] the Japanese proposals. The German response reflected the contradictions inherent in the Japan policy of the Reich at the time, on the one hand stating that treaty revision was premature, but then acknowledging the necessity for certain "modifications" in the treaties and agreeing to "preliminary negotiations."

> After careful consideration of the draft treaty drawn up by Your Excellency's high government, the government of His Majesty the Emperor, in accordance with the other Contracting Powers, has come to the conclusion that it would not be without considerable cost, or even conducive to the further development of mutual good relations, to impose such a high degree of responsibility on Japan, such as your high government is willing to take upon itself in the submitted proposals.
>
> The German government is therefore, in light of its expectation of unavoidable injurious consequences and manifold difficulties which might arise from the implementation of the aforementioned designs, regretfully not in a position to accept these proposals or to consider them as an appropriate basis for further revision negotiations.

> On the other hand, His Majesty's Government does not fail to recognize the expediency of such potential modifications to the existing contract as would reflect the changing needs and interests of both parties and which may appear as a useful contribution towards the promotion of good relations.
>
> Therefore, in agreement with the other European powers, the German government agrees to immediately enter into preliminary negotiations in Tokyo on the content and limits of revision and the positive changes desired be made to the existing treaty provisions. It has, for that purpose, invested me with the necessary authority and instructed the Imperial Consul Mr. Zappe to attend any future deliberations as the second German delegate.[54]

With an understandable lack of enthusiasm, Inoue confirmed Japan's willingness to "enter into the proposed preliminary deliberations on the revision of the Treaties."[55] Inoue's biographers, however, emphasize Germany's openness to Japanese demands—Germany's approach was "in contrast to the attitude of Britain and France."[56] In October 1881, Inoue received approval from Grand Minister (*dajō daijin*[57]) Sanjō Sanetomi (1837–1891) to open negotiations, which eventually started in Tokyo in January 1882.[58] The first round of these preliminary talks was terminated after 21 sessions in July 1882; it took several years before they were followed by further negotiations. Not surprisingly, given Britain's opposition to any negotiations, the British daily *The Times* of London described the whole enterprise as "fruitless diplomacy."[59] Ultimately, the negotiations ended in 1887 with a compromise: The Contracting Powers would accept a limited revision of consular jurisdiction, and in return, Inoue announced the opening up of additional ports to foreign trade and investment and the enlarging of inland areas that foreign residents could freely visit.[60]

However, strong opposition emerged in Japan against this move and the imminent possibility of increasing numbers of foreign nationals entering the country. Conservatives in particular were upset at the prospect of foreigners living anywhere in Japan, but especially outside of the treaty port settlements, to which their residency was restricted under the original Unequal Treaties.[61] Inoue, however, insisted that only a handful of foreign nationals would settle in the newly opened ports, given the fact that the numbers of foreigners in most of the existing treaty ports were already very low. The treaty port of Niigata, he added, was home to "merely 23 foreigners."[62] The foreign minister's plans came under attack from all sides in the debate. The French legal advisor to the Japanese government, Gustave Emile Boissonade de Fontarabie (1829–1910), considered the revised terms to be unfavorable to the Japanese side, as the right to consular jurisdiction continued almost unchanged. Soon, the press joined in

the criticism of Inoue. Prior to the negotiations, the daily *Nichinichi Tokyo Shinbun* had emphasized that a "partial abolition of consular jurisdiction cannot satisfy public opinion. [. . .] The Foreign Minister must challenge consular jurisdiction at its roots and demand its complete abolition."[63] In the face of this criticism, Inoue finally resigned in 1887. His successor Ōkuma Shigenobu (1838–1922), who followed Inoue's pragmatic approach to negotiations in 1888/1889 as the only realistic option for Japan, became the target of an assassination attempt by a member of the radical right-wing association Genyōsha, which he barely survived.

The abolition of extraterritoriality and the complete revision of the Unequal Treaties came about only after Japan had demonstrated its military capabilities in its successful wars against China (1894/1895) and Russia (1904/1905). Extraterritoriality was finally abolished in 1899. Following the Russo–Japanese War, the major powers recognized Japan as a "first-rate power" and upgraded their diplomatic representations to embassies. In 1910, Japanese tariff autonomy was restored. Japan had attained equality, at least in diplomatic and formal terms, with the Western powers. However, discussion about cultural and "racial" equality continued to haunt Japanese politics and society for many decades to come.[64]

SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK

Germany's attitude to the revision of the Unequal Treaties in the early 1880s and Karl von Eisendecher's role in bringing about a series of preliminary negotiations in 1882 led to the emergence of pro-German attitudes in Japan, at least among sections of the political elite, and ushered in an era that is sometimes called the "Golden Age of Japanese–German relations." Although there is nothing in the German sources to indicate that Eisendecher attempted to gain Chancellor Bismarck's support for Japan's case—for example, the biography of Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru and other documents make it clear that the Japanese *perception* of German support during the early negotiations for a revision of the Unequal Treaties was a major cause of a surge in pro-German sympathies in the Japan of the early 1880s.

While the preliminary negotiations conducted in 1882 have received scant attention by researchers, for people living in pre-1945 Japan this chapter of "Meiji history" was common knowledge. The *Kōtō Shōgaku Kokushi* (National History for Higher Elementary Schools), a school textbook published in 1929, contained an image showing Inoue Kaoru giving a speech to open the 1882 negotiations on treaty revision, with Eisendecher seated close to the Japanese foreign minister. The quasi-official pictorial history of the Meiji period in the Meiji Memorial Picture Gallery (Meiji Kaigakan[65]), built in the 1920s, contains an impressive oil painting of the same scene.[66] Although Eisendecher was most likely

unaware of the important place he occupied in the Japanese historical narrative of treaty revision, these visual representations demonstrate that the Japanese side greatly appreciated his contribution to the realization of Japan's most important foreign policy goal of the Meiji period.

Notes

1. On the Unequal Treaties in general and Japanese attitudes to them, see Michael R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism: the Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).
2. Quoted in Erwin Bälz, Toku Bälz, ed., *Das Leben eines deutschen Arztes im erwachenden Japan* (Stuttgart: Engelhorns Nachf., 1930), 150.
3. This chapter is based on the sole published monograph on Karl von Eisendecher: Peter Pantzer and Sven Saaler, *Japanische Impressionen eines Kaiserlichen Gesandten. Karl von Eisendecher im Japan der Meiji-Zeit* (Munich and Tokyo: Iudicium / OAG—Deutsche Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens, 2007; bilingual, in German and Japanese). I am grateful to Peter Pantzer for having worked with me on this project and for allowing me to present our findings to an English-speaking audience.
4. On the term "Golden Age of Japanese–German relations," see Sven Saaler, "Die 'Goldenen Jahre' der deutsch-japanischen Beziehungen," in *Ferne Gefährten. 150 Jahre deutsch-japanische Beziehungen*, ed. Curt-Engelhorn-Stiftung für die Reiss-Engelhorn-Museen and Verband der Deutsch-Japanischen Gesellschaften (Mannheim: Schnell und Steiner, 2011), 79–86.
5. The Grand Duchy of Oldenburg had been a member state of the German Confederation (*Deutscher Bund*) since 1814 and later joined the North German Confederation (1866) and the German Empire (1871), which was based on a federal structure. The city of Oldenburg had a long history of trade with East Asia. See Rolf-Harald Wippich, "Oldenburg und Ostasien. Der Schiffs- und Handelsverkehr eines norddeutschen Kleinstaates im Chinesischen Meer in der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts," *Jahrbuch für europäische Überseegeschichte* 4 (2004), 33–62.
6. File K. v. Eisendecher (1841–1934), Trautz collection, Institute for Oriental and Asian Studies, Department for Japanese and Korean Studies, University of Bonn, K 12. For a more detailed biographical sketch of Eisendecher, see Pantzer and Saaler, *Japanische Impressionen*, introduction.
7. On the Eulenburg mission see Holmer Stahncke, *Die diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Japan 1854–1868* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1987); Holmer Stahncke, *Preußens Weg nach Japan: Japan in den Berichten von Mitgliedern der preußischen Ostasienexpedition 1860–61* (Munich: Iudicium, 2000); Sebastian Dobson and Sven Saaler,

eds., *Unter den Augen des Preußen-Adlers: Lithographien, Zeichnungen und Photographien der Teilnehmer der Eulenburg-Mission in Japan 1860–61 / Under Eagle's Eyes: Lithographs, Drawings and Photographs from the Prussian Expedition to Japan 1860–61* (Munich/Tokyo: Iudicium/OAG, 2011; trilingual in English, German and Japanese); Fukuoka Mariko, *Puroisen Higashi Ajia Ensei to Bakumatsu Gaikō* (The Prussian East-Asian Expedition and the Japanese Diplomacy in the late Edo Era) (Tokyo: Daigaku Shuppankai, 2013); Suzuki Naoko, *Doitsu Teikoku no Seiritsu to Higashi Ajia* (The Founding of the German Empire and East Asia) (Kyoto: Minerva, 2012).

8. When Eisendecher arrived in Tokyo, Germany's diplomatic representative had the status of minister resident (*benri kōshi* or *Ministerresident*). When Germany's diplomatic representation was upgraded in 1880, Eisendecher was promoted to the rank of envoy (*kōshi* or *Gesandter*). See Panzter and Saaler, *Japanische Impressionen*, 20.
9. See, for example, the cover of Pantzer and Saaler, *Japanische Impressionen* (accessible online at http://japanesehistory.de/wordpress/?page_id=36, accessed May 15, 2015).
10. Friedrich M. Trautz, "Deutsche Seekadettenbriefe aus Jedo 1860–1861," *Nippon. Zeitschrift für Japanologie* 7, no. 3 (1941), 129–163. Trautz was a close friend of Eisendecher and was given documents relating to Japan by Eisendecher's wife after his death.
11. Trautz, "Deutsche Seekadettenbriefe," 137 (September 6, 1860).
12. Ibid., 128–163 (September 21, 1860). Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations from German and Japanese sources are translated by the author.
13. File K. v. Eisendecher (1841–1934), Trautz collection, Institute for Oriental and Asian Studies, Department for Japanese and Korean Studies, University of Bonn, K 12. In his letters, Bismarck addresses Eisendecher as "Lieber Karl" (Dear Karl); cf. Political Archive of the German Foreign Office (hereafter cited as PAAA [Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes]), Eisendecher papers [Nachlass Karl von Eisendecher], 2/1, no. 14 (Bismarck's letter to Eisendecher, July 6, 1889).
14. PAAA, Eisendecher papers, 2/8, no. 1a.
15. On the OAG, see chapter 7 of this volume.
16. Many of the photographs are reproduced in Pantzer and Saaler, *Japanische Impressionen*. Some can be accessed online on the website of the OAG, at http://www.oag.jp/publikationen/buecher/single/karl-von-eisendecher-im-japan-der-meiji-zeit (accessed May 15, 2015).
17. John Röhl, *Kaiser, Hof und Staat: Wilhelm II. und die deutsche Politik* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2001), 224 (originally published in English as *The Kaiser and his Court: Wilhelm II and the Government of Germany* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
18. Ibid., 32.
19. PAAA, Eisendecher papers, 2/8, no. 1.

20. PAAA, Eisendecher papers 2/4 (Holleben's letters); 3/5, nos. 14 and 15 (letters from Zappe und Zedtwitz).
21. PAAA, Eisendecher papers, 2/8, no. 1.
22. On the "Yellow Peril," see the introduction and vol. I/ch. 12 of Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, ed., *Pan-Asianism. A Documentary History*, 2 vols. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011); Sven Saaler, "The Russo-Japanese War and the Emergence of the Notion of the 'Clash of Races' in Japanese Foreign Policy," in *Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War*, vol. 2, ed. John Chapman and Inaba Chiharu (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2008), 274–289.
23. PAAA, Eisendecher papers, 2/8, no. 1.
24. Ibid., 1/1, no. 1 (Eisendecher's records of a conversation with Holstein in March 1890).
25. Ibid., 1/7, no. 5 (Eisendecher's report to Wilhelm II on his desire for mutual understanding between Britain and Germany, May 11, 1913); 1/8, no. 47 (correspondence between Eisendecher and the Englishman Dickinson).
26. Ibid., 1/2, no. 24 (draft letter from Eisendecher to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, September 14, 1909); see also 1/1, no. 2 (Records by Eisendecher from February 1909).
27. Ibid., 1/7, 3 (Eisendecher's telegram to Wilhelm II, September 30, 1912).
28. See, for example, *The Times*, "England, Germany, and Japan," May 14, 1887.
29. Ottmar Mohl, *Am japanischen Hofe* (Berlin: Reimer, 1904), 9.
30. PAAA, R18602 (AA Sec. 1, Japan, vol. 1/2, Jan. 1, 1879 to Dec. 31, 1879). On the image of Germany in Meiji Japan, cf. Sven Saaler, "Das Deutschlandbild in Japans Politik und Gesellschaft, 1890–1914" (The Image of Germany in Japanese Society, 1890–1914), in *Das Deutsche Kaiserreich, 1890–1914* (The German Empire, 1890–1914), ed. Bernd Heidenreich and Sönke Neitzel (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2011), 285–364.
31. Cf. Pantzer and Saaler, *Japanische Impressionen*, Ch. 4; Rolf-Harald Wippich, "Prinz Heinrichs Japan-Aufenthalt 1879/80 und der Jagdzwischenfall von Suita," in *Überseegeschichte. Beiträge der jüngeren Forschung*, ed. Thomas Beck et al. (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1999), 267–275.
32. More than 162,000 Japanese died of cholera in 1879. Yamamoto Shun'ichi, *Nihon Korera-shi* (A History of Cholera in Japan) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1982), 27.
33. On the German Naval Hospital in Yokohama, see Pantzer and Saaler, *Japanische Impressionen*, Ch. 7.
34. On the *Tokio Times*, cf. James Huffmann, *A Yankee in Meiji Japan* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 181; on Huffmann's role as publisher of the *Tokio Times*, see ibid., Ch. 8.

35. "The Hesperia Outrage," *The Tokio Times*, August 9, 1879, 1 (reproduced in Pantzer and Saaler, *Japanische Impressionen*, Ch. 5). The German press also reported extensively on the Hesperia incident; cf. *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Abendblatt, September 11, 1879 (reproduced in Pantzer and Saaler, *Japanische Impressionen*, 26–27).
36. PAAA R18602, Eisendecher to Bülow, state secretary for foreign affairs, September 11, 1879.
37. PAAA, Eisendecher papers, 2/8, no. 1a (undated note).
38. Inoue Kaoru-kō Denki Hensan-kai, ed., *Segai Inoue-kō-den* (Biography of Marquis Inoue). 5 vols. (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1968), vol. 3, 280.
39. Cf. ibid., vol. 3, 361.
40. Aoki had spent many years with the Japanese legation in Germany, married a German woman, and was also considered a strong Germanophile. He was foreign minister in 1889–1891 and 1898–1900 and was also one of the first Japanese members of the German East Asiatic Society.
41. For the English version of the memorandum, see Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho* (Papers Relating to the Foreign Policy of Japan) (Nihon Kokusai Rengō Kyōgikai, 1951) (hereafter cited as *NGB*), vol. 14, 141–147 (no. 35, appendix); cf. Inoue Kaoru-kō Denki Hensan-kai, *Segai Inoue-kō-den*, vol. 3, 292–299.
42. *NGB*, vol. 14, 142, emphasis added.
43. Cf. Siebold's report to Inoue, *NGB*, vol. 14, 147.
44. *NGB*, vol. 14, 147.
45. Ibid., 153 (no. 38), emphasis added.
46. Ibid., 161 (no. 42).
47. Ibid.; cf. also Inoue Kaoru-kō Denki Hensan-kai, *Segai Inoue-kō-den*, vol. 3, 297–298.
48. *NGB*, vol. 14, 161 (no. 42).
49. Cf. Inoue Kaoru-kō Denki Hensan-kai, *Segai Inoue-kō-den*, vol. 3, 283–285; *NGB*, vol. 14, 165 (no. 44, appendix).
50. *NGB*, vol. 14, 180 (no. 48, appendix).
51. Ibid., 181 (no. 48, appendix). Cf. also Inoue Kaoru-kō Denki Hensan-kai, *Segai Inoue-kō-den*, vol. 3, 287 and 304–306 concerning private conversations between Inoue and Eisendecher.
52. Inoue Kaoru-kō Denki Hensan-kai, *Segai Inoue-kō-den*, vol. 3, 304–305.
53. Ibid., 319.
54. *NGB*, vol. 14, 184–187 (no. 51).
55. Ibid., 195 (no. 55).
56. Inoue Kaoru-kō Denki Hensan-kai, *Segai Inoue-kō-den*, vol. 3, 375.
57. A Western-style cabinet system was introduced in 1885. Until 1885, the government of Japan was known as the Dajōkan system, and the Dajō Daijin was the equivalent of the later prime minister of Japan.
58. Inoue Kaoru-kō Denki Hensan-kai, *Segai Inoue-kō-den*, vol. 3, 320–323 (report to Sanjō); 326–329 (negotiation proceedings).

59. *The Times*, September 17, 1887 ("A New Phase of Japanese Treaty Revisions").
60. Inoue first publicly considered opening additional inland regions on April 5, 1882. Cf. Inoue Kaoru-kō Denki Hensan-kai, *Segai Inoue-kō-den*, vol. 3, 348–355 (Inoue's speech).
61. Ibid., 306–307; 339–343.
62. Ibid., 337.
63. Ibid., 310.
64. On the continuing debate over "racial equality" in the wake of World War I, see Naoko Shimazu, *Japan, Race and Equality: the Racial Equality Proposal of 1919* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998) and vol. I/ch. 26 of Saaler and Szpilman, *Pan-Asianism*.
65. See http://www.meijijingugaien.jp/english/seitoku-gallery.html (accessed May 15, 2015).
66. Reproduced in Pantzer and Saaler, *Japanische Impressionen*, 175.

3

Count Hermann Keyserling's View of Japan

A Nation of Consummate Imitators

Joanne Miyang Cho

A German nobleman from the Baltic, Count Hermann Keyserling (1880–1946), began a yearlong journey around the world in 1911. He was discontented with a prewar Europe that had become increasingly materialistic and soulless as a result of industrialization and urbanization. Hoping to discover new spiritual stimuli that could serve as antidotes against these social phenomena, as well as to further his own *Bildung* (self-education), he visited several parts of the world, such as Egypt, Ceylon, India, China, Japan, Hawaii, and North America. He wrote the majority of his account of his travels after his return to Europe and before the outbreak of World War I, although its publication was delayed until December 1918. When his book *The Travel Diary of a Philosopher* appeared, it became an instant bestseller, alongside Spengler's *Decline of the West*. For a conservative nobleman who married the granddaughter of Bismarck, Maria Goedela von Bismarck-Schönhausen, in 1919, the new republic was not easy to accept. Yet unlike Spengler, Keyserling did not believe in the inevitable decline of the West, and he associated "as much with men from the middle of the political spectrum as with those of the Right."[1] He continued his search for a global *Lebensphilosophie* (life philosophy) through his School of Wisdom in Darmstadt, which he founded in 1920. Non-Western thought, particularly Asian thought, became an important component of the school's teachings.

The emphasis of his travel diary was the three Asian countries India, China, and Japan, yet Japan occupied a special place in his study of cross-cultural transfers. This chapter will probe in detail Keyserling's view of Japan's cross-cultural transfers, as well as the relationship between

imitation and innovation, in four sections. First, I will briefly discuss the critique of cultural decadence in Europe around World War I described by Keyserling and a number of other German conservatives. Yet, unlike these conservatives, who saw German nationalism as a possible solution, Keyserling advocated cosmopolitanism and articulated several principles of cross-cultural transfers. Second, I will examine his assessment of Japanese borrowing from China in terms of religious art and "the method of visual training,"[2] and from India in respect to Buddhism. He praised Japan's superb ability to imitate and especially appreciated its aesthetic sophistication. Third, in contrast to Asian imports to Japan, he criticized Western influences (especially technology) because the former, he argued, led to cultural and spiritual enhancement, but the latter made the Japanese, as had already happened to the prewar Europeans, materialistic and soulless. Although Keyserling went to Asia to find an antidote to Europe's material culture, he encountered the same problem in modern Japan. His critique of Japan's Westernization was, however, one sided, for he focused only on its negative aspects. Finally, since Japan showed an unusual capacity to imitate foreign transfers, often rendering them superior to the original, Keyserling regarded Japan as a nation of consummate imitators. Yet he viewed Japan, in contrast to India, China, and the West, as incapable of creating original culture or inventions due to a lack of profundity, substance, and philosophical capacity. I will, however, argue that this dichotomy between imitation and innovation is false, as imitation often leads to innovation.

A Critique of Cultural Decadence and a Transcultural Turn

Keyserling was discontented with the state of Western culture in the prewar era. He objected to its rational and technological progress, which brought not only industrialization, but also cultural decadence. Industrialization especially impacted his personal social and economic status as a landowner, because, by the late nineteenth century, it had brought urbanization and the rise of a middle class that challenged the dominance of the landed nobility.[3] His experience of having nearly lost his estates in Rayküll, Estonia, after the 1905 Revolution, added to his aversion to industrialization; in 1920, he did indeed lose his Estonian estates, like other Baltic nobility, although the military intervention of the German, British, and White Russians prevented a "full-scale social revolution."[4] Keyserling was not alone in criticizing industrialization and materialism, for this idea of cultural decadence was relatively common among conservatives around World War I. Indeed, he shared a number of beliefs with other conservatives, such as Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Hans Freyer, and Oswald Spengler. They criticized the growing social

movement away from the *Gemeinschaft* and blamed it on liberalism. They equated liberalism with parliament, political parties, Western capitalism, materialism, and equality.[5]

Although Keyserling was less opposed to the modern world and more moderate than these conservatives were, he was still critical of liberalism. He saw democracy as harming the soul, for democratic individuals do not impose limits on themselves.[6] He believed the myth of cultural decadence, having detected for himself the decline of the Western civilization.[7] No doubt, his close friendship with Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855–1927), the author of *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* (1899), in the first decade of the twentieth century intensified his belief in cultural decadence. Chamberlain was partially responsible for Keyserling's intellectual reorientation from geology, in which he received a doctorate from the University of Vienna in 1902, to *Lebensphilosophie*.[8] In Keyserling's prewar writings, he dealt with topics related to cultural crisis, such as meaning, decadence,[9] intuition, and understanding. World War I undoubtedly deepened his anxiety about a crisis of culture in the West, as he himself witnessed the destruction of the West through the senseless war. During the Weimar Republic, he tried to combat this cultural crisis through the idealistic programs of his School of Wisdom in Darmstadt. The programs reflected "his generally paradoxical, intuitive, and poetic approach to philosophy,"[10] as opposed to academic philosophy.

Despite their common critique of cultural decadence, there was one notable difference between most German conservatives and Keyserling. The former typically sought a solution to the crisis of culture through Germanic ideology. Through it, they sought to revive "a mythical *Deutschtum*" (Germanness) and create political institutions that would promote uniquely German characteristics.[11] Chamberlain avidly advocated Aryanism, in which the Germanic race was considered superior not only to non-Aryans, but also to all other Aryan peoples. Other conservatives advocated the idea of German socialism[12] and rejected cosmopolitanism, associating it with Jewish and Marxist internationalism.

In contrast, Keyserling excoriated this Germanic ideology and instead sought a cosmopolitan solution. It is perhaps surprising that he was not influenced by Chamberlain's idea of Teutonic superiority, despite their decade-long relationship. As Walter Struve points out, however, Keyserling's example "provides a good corrective to the caricature of conservatism drawn by those who stress unduly the nationalism of the Right."[13] His cosmopolitanism was, in part, shaped by his personal background. Prior to moving from Estonia to Germany at the end of World War I, he may have had "a homeland, his province," but he did not have, as a Baltic nobleman of German ancestry, a fatherland.[14] After his falling out with Chamberlain in 1910, Keyserling searched more urgently for a new orientation to his thought, and his travels in Asia and other parts

of the world provided just such an opportunity.[15] In this, Keyserling followed the practice carried out by various Germans in the prewar years—when turning to other parts of the world, particularly to Asia, was not uncommon. Through this practice, German intellectuals and writers often sought to stimulate their spiritual lives."[16]

In the section of *The Travel Diary* on Japan, Keyserling articulated several transcultural principles. Earlier than most other German intellectuals, Keyserling passionately advocated a transcultural turn. He rejected exclusive claims made by single groups, for he did not think that a group could possess all knowledge. Instead, he used the analogy of an orchestra to show how peoples could complement each other: "Some play bass, the others treble; one people strikes the basic tones, many others sing the melody. Humanity is an orchestra of many voices."[17] His role as a philosopher was then to listen to the symphony of humanity and help to interpret its transcultural contours. In that role, he strove to avoid Eurocentricism. Thus, he conscientiously tried to observe what Europeans were lacking, and what Asians excelled at. Although Keyserling was certainly less Eurocentric than many of his contemporaries, he still could not fully overcome this bias, as we will see later. Nonetheless, he articulated some advanced transcultural principles for his time, especially for a nobleman who tended to prefer tradition to change.

In advocating a transcultural turn, Keyserling began by emphasizing the basic human need for change for its own sake, even if there is no pressing reason for it. Although "the immortal part of everything" exists, change is necessary because "a certain manifestation can never serve the same people twice as a vessel of the highest ideal."[18] When both the unfamiliar and the familiar deal with same subject, it is better to choose the unfamiliar because only the unfamiliar brings new stimulations and vibrations.[19] He preferred an alien form to the inherited form[20] in order to prevent practices from becoming overly rigid; an alien form could also lead one to self-realization more quickly, rather than being a call to alter one's being.[21] In his time, Keyserling noticed the desire for "rejuvenation," which would enlarge the basis of life, and welcomed it as a sign of the world becoming renewed.[22] Keyserling's emphatic preference for the alien over the inherited is indeed remarkable for a conservative nobleman, and he is therefore rightly referred to as "an undoctrinaire man of the Right."[23]

In global history, Keyserling observed several examples of traditions that had been taken over by outsiders who eagerly adopted and improved them. "Greek art is even today, a spiritual leaven for the world, but it is not the Greeks who continue to foster it. The same applies to the world of forms of the Renaissance, of Byzantine and Buddhist art, and the same applies to forms of thought and belief."[24] Keyserling also observed similar examples of transcultural adaptations by outsiders in his own time. He

particularly noted how actively and thoroughly the orientalization of the West and the westernization of the East were taking place.[25] He himself became a follower of this transcultural phenomenon. After no longer finding inspiration in Christianity, he, like other Europeans, became involved in "Indomania."[26] He was not surprised that the opposite case was true among Japanese scholars, who received more inspiration from Christianity than from Buddhism.[27] He also found examples of cross-cultural adaptation in German history. In the past, the Germanic people became Westerners by taking over a foreign faith—the Syrian faith—and in the future, Germans will reach perfection at their level after "fertilization and rejuvenation through the Indo-Chinese spirit."[28] He not only observed that Germans preferred foreign values to their own, but he also declared Germany to be "the most universally cultured nation."[29] Unfortunately, two decades after the publication of *The Travel Diary*, his vision of a cosmopolitan Germany was thwarted by the Nazis, and he personally suffered bans on both publication and speaking, after publicly criticizing the Nazis.[30]

Cross-Cultural Transfer from China and India

Keyserling generally valued Japan's transcultural imports from China and India. He was especially interested in the aesthetic dimension of such transfers. Regarding cultural imports from China, he discussed religious art and "the method of visual training."[31] He was very impressed by how the Japanese had refined these concepts and created improved versions. Keyserling also observed that Japan had borrowed Buddhism from India and created a superior version. Although Japanese Buddhism was and is quite different from Indian Buddhism, he nevertheless viewed it as superior aesthetically. While examining the Japanese adaptations of these cultural imports from China and India, he articulated additional principles of transcultural practice, as he understood it, specifically, that later developments or copies still contained the essence of originals and that they were often superior to the originals.

Keyserling assessed past Chinese influences on Japan in a very positive light. The unique charm of the Japanese was largely due to the influence of the Chinese and "all the manifestations which delight me are familiar to me in idea from China."[32] Just as the Japanese had learned from the West in his own time, they had also earlier learned from Korea and from China in particular.[33] As David Landes explains, prior to the arrival of the Western nations, Japan had adopted practically everything from China, such as writing, language, silk, ceramics, printing, furnishings, painting styles, Buddhism, and Confucianism.[34] It is not surprising that the Japanese recognized this relationship as special and accorded the Chinese

an exceptional status until the mid-eighteenth century, meaning that the Chinese were not called barbarians, as were other foreigners.[35]

Keyserling observed that most transfers from China to Japan had been successfully carried out. In the case of Confucianism, the Japanese accepted it "as the transfigured and deepened expression of that which had always been habitual to them."[36] Keyserling, like the Japanese up to the mid-nineteenth century, held such a high opinion of Chinese culture that he would have preferred the influence of China—over that of the Greco-Roman world—for the West. Under the influence of China, Germans, he speculated, would have been more cultured, although they would have been less technologically advanced.[37] As a *Lebensphilosoph*, he, not surprisingly, privileged aesthetic and cultural advances over scientific and technological innovation, and his aristocratic background only reinforced this tendency. Seeing that "high culture flourishes only in aristocratic community,"[38] he, as an aristocrat, viewed himself as a guardian of high culture.

Although Keyserling regarded China and Japan as sharing many commonalities, principally due to Japan's imports from China, he still noted differences between them. While the Chinese expressed their philosophy of life in all aspects of their culture, the Japanese primarily expressed it aesthetically on the visible level.[39] The Japanese, Keyserling added, were "incomparably acute observers, and virtuosos in all technical skills."[40] Neither the Chinese nor anyone else on earth could emulate their sensitivity. Keyserling especially admired Japan's accomplishments in the realm of religious art as influenced by China's artistic conceptions, which were in turn "of Indian or Greco-Indian origin."[41] He therefore criticized people who dismissed Japanese art for not being indigenous, since art was never completely indigenous. Although Chinese masters had created the most significant ideas, their creations received their most fruitful reception not in China, but in Japan.[42] Similarly, although Japanese religious art had not added anything new to Chinese religious art, it was "nevertheless thoroughly genuine." It was "a true expression of inwardness," and it was "true in a wider sense than in China." Keyserling valued good imitation highly and regarded it as unnecessary for a high civilization to invent its own forms of expression.[43]

Keyserling discussed a related transfer from China to Japan. Both Chinese and Japanese artists were schooled in a method of visual training that taught them to become immersed in the spirit of nature. They became absorbed in nature just as the mystics became absorbed in God.[44] Keyserling observed, however, that the quality of refinement was higher at the Imperial court of Japan than that of China. Only the Japanese could maintain a relation between "animal-like intuition for sensuous phenomena and their extreme artistic elaboration."[45] While they know how to utilize nature artistically to its utmost capacity, they still treat it as nature and do not render it unnatural.

Keyserling observed this superior artistic capacity of the Japanese in two Japanese gardens. In the Yamato Province, which he visited immediately upon his arrival in Japan, he observed the talents of Japanese gardeners who were able to preserve natural form without violating natural principles. They simply assisted the trees in following their own natural tendencies.[46] Keyserling doubted whether non-Japanese gardeners would know how to create dwarf trees in such a manner. In Kyoto, he was once again impressed by Japanese artistic talent while observing "*the* perfectly beautiful gardens." The Japanese miniaturized their trees "so that the tiniest piece of land shall reveal infinite perspective like a landscape by Millet."[47] The Japanese artist used only simple things, such as a few stones and plants and a few drops of water, but he/she nevertheless knew how to transform a plain space into a magically beautiful garden. Japan's aesthetic taste had an obvious impact on Keyserling himself. As he was affected by "the charm of this aesthetically most attractive of all countries,"[48] he noticed himself becoming "an epicurean"[49] and being transformed "from a thinker into a visual man."[50]

Keyserling also reflected on the cross-cultural transfer of Buddhism from India to Japan when he visited the sacred mountain Koya-San, the seat of one of the most famous Japanese monasteries. He especially valued spiritual transfers from India, the country that he deemed to be the most spiritually advanced, and thus the highest Asian civilization.[51] Yet he found Japanese Buddhism to be totally alien to the spirit of India, for one does not see "a spirit of sufferance and non-volition" in it.[52] It was thus vastly different from the original Buddhism founded by the ascetic Buddha. At an earlier stage of its development, Japanese reformers shaped Mahayana Buddhism into clear doctrines, emphasizing salvation by faith, thus forming it more in accordance with the Japanese temperament. As a result of these efforts, Keyserling argued, Mahayana Buddhism became more Western than Asian.[53] He was surprised that such Western characteristics could arise from a religion that was based upon Indian ideas.

Keyserling recognized the essence of original Indian Buddhism within Japanese Buddhism, although various elements that were alien to the Buddha's teaching[54] had been added to Japanese Buddhism over the years. More importantly, he regarded Japanese Buddhism as superior to Indian Buddhism due to its "widening." This widening, which had occurred in both Buddhism and Christianity, he argued, made them deeper. He thus concluded that northern or Mahayana Buddhism is "not a degeneration, but instead the crowning of Hinayana"[55] or southern Buddhism, which had been founded earlier. Likewise, Japanese Buddhism is "the crown of Indian wisdom."[56] This argument for the superiority of Japanese Buddhism echoes a debate among liberal theologians during the first decade of twentieth-century Germany concerning the essence of Christianity [i.e., the original teachings of Jesus] versus later

developments. Unlike the theologian Adolf Harnack who, in *The Essence of Christianity* (1900), regarded essence as more important than later developments, Keyserling shared with the theologian Ernst Troeltsch the view that later reforms are superior to the original form due to the enrichment gained through "widening."[57]

Keyserling especially emphasized Japanese Buddhism's superior artistic achievements. He personally came closer to "the profoundest revelations of Indian wisdom," while viewing Japanese images of the Buddha. Although Indian wisdom reached its highest level spiritually, the Chinese and the Japanese expressed theirs artistically.[58] Keyserling, nonetheless, saw a difference between the Chinese and the Japanese in their artistic expression. Compared to the Chinese, who were only half-conscious of their spiritual artistry, the Japanese had achieved an even higher level of expression because they were so entirely immersed in imitating the Chinese and the Indians. As a result, Japanese Buddhism possessed "the highest artistic capacity of expression of the Orient."[59]

Keyserling also found Japanese Mahayana Buddhism to be superior to the equivalent doctrine of Christianity due to its lack of dogma.[60] He noted the former's appeal to contemporary seekers of the divine who, like himself, were critical of Christian dogma, and viewed Buddhism "as the religion of the future."[61] Yet he simultaneously acknowledged that its social "efficacy" was far below the Christian churches, which appealed to their many believers through their institutional strengths and clearly formulated dogmas. Buddhism's breadth and looseness of form could not serve the needs of the average man, the social group to which most Japanese belonged.[62] Nonetheless, the Japanese had managed to make this formless religion functional by making it "the central school of heroism" during the Meiji period. The samurai, Keyserling argued, preferred being educated by the Zen monks because they recognized the critical importance of such mental training for the soul. For example, Sōen Shaku, whom Keyserling visited at Kamakura, fully comprehended "the spiritual significance of the Zen doctrine," but still possessed an unambiguously practical outlook.[63] Due to this coexistence of spirituality and practicality, Keyserling regarded Sōen's mentality to be more similar to American New Thought than to Indian teachings.[64] Like Sōen's outlook, American New Thought emphasized both the speculative and the practical.[65]

Despite his many compliments to Japan's capacity to adapt and refine Chinese and Indian imports, Keyserling also identified some serious shortcomings of the Japanese. He found them to be lacking in substance, profundity, and philosophical capacity. They were superficial, "matter of fact,"[66] and lacked "profundity of recognition and imaginative power."[67] Whereas the Chinese culture was rooted in profundity, Japanese culture did not penetrate beneath the surface.[68] While the Japanese were "clean . . . as cats are clean" and "polite in the same way in which penguins

are polite," they lacked the depth and weight possessed by the Chinese.[69] Although the Japanese religion was great and beautiful, it was also shallow, excelling only at art. Since they accepted "only the emotional and practical elements of the Mahayana religion,"[70] Keyserling feared that they had made their Buddhism unphilosophical. He regarded not only their intellectual capacity, but also their ability to think, as quite low.[71] In the end, Keyserling circumscribed the achievements of the Japanese, resulting in "a superficial culture more charming than any other on earth."[72]

Cross-cultural Transfer from the West

Keyserling was impressed by Meiji Japan's ability to imitate the West, especially as it concerned technology. He noticed its similarities to the West in its modern impulses. Like Westerners, the Japanese possesses kinetic energy and an externally oriented consciousness, "but above all he is equally curious and keen on innovation as we are."[73] Keyserling also viewed the Japanese as being more similar to Europeans than to the Chinese. Although they had extensively borrowed culture from China, they were, in temperament, "like ourselves, a progressive people."[74] Thus, he differentiated the Westernization of Japan from that of India or China. Unlike in the latter cases, he found that modern Japan demonstrated astonishing achievements in modernization. They seemed "even more mechanical" than Europeans, because they had not yet had enough time "to work independently with our means." He speculated that the Japanese could someday compete with the West.[75]

Although Keyserling expressed his amazement at Japan's capacity to imitate Western technology and its potential to eventually compete with the West, his focus was not on Japan's technological and economic achievements, but rather mostly on the impoverishment of Japan's spirit as a result of its industrialization and Westernization. In contrast to his generally positive evaluations of cross-cultural transfer from China and India to Japan, he regarded most transcultural imports from the West to Japan negatively. He feared cultural decadence resulting from an industrialized Japan, much as it had happened in the industrialized West. He associated industrialization with materialism, soullessness, and social leveling; these views echoed critiques of Western technology by reactionary cultural conservatives in Japan at the turn of the century.[76] Both recognized threats to their class latent in industrialization. Like Keyserling, who saw "the days of the nobleman [as being] over,"[77] the Japanese noblemen felt threatened by the Meiji leaders, most of whom came from relatively low-ranking samurai families.[78]

Keyserling deeply regretted the Westernization of Japan. He pilloried modernization for depriving Japan of its charm. His aristocratic prejudice was apparent in his harsh portrayal of Japanese merchants, whom he

considered vulgar, impersonal, and lacking "a sense of individuality."[79] He pointed out that knights always viewed the buyer and seller "in contempt," and that contempt destroyed noble-mindedness from the start.[80] He detected the merchant mentality in all modern Japanese. All of the white businessmen in the East that he met regarded the Japanese as vulgar and as thoroughly unreliable.[81] Similarly, Keyserling rejected the new capital, Tokyo, which he associated with modernization. Tokyo lacked "soul and style" and was "oppressively trivial."[82] In contrast, he preferred the old capital—Kyoto—which exuded "the psychic atmosphere of the old days."[83]

Keyserling mostly focused on the negative similarities between the West and Japan: both were oriented toward external things, lacked inwardness (and were thus unable to counteract external development), and belonged to "the emotional and practical type." Yet the failings of industrial Europe appeared "in a more extreme form in Japan"[84] and the failings of the Japanese were therefore more instructive than their achievements. In contrast to the enthusiasts of progress who praised Japan's modernization, Keyserling focused on how the Japanese had lost their humanity rather than overcoming their crudeness.[85] He criticized the Japanese for adopting European manners and European dress in their attempt to be modern, because these practices alienated them from their nature.[86] Keyserling also questioned whether the Japanese could really become completely versed in the language of Occidental ability. Although he, in principle, strongly advocated transcultural exchange, it is clear that he was selective in his judgments, opposing exchange if it promoted modernization.

For Keyserling, the modern Japanese represented a new type of Asian, "the Westernized Far Eastern Asiatic," who strove after a "purely instrumental" existence. Keyserling was particularly concerned with the negative aspects of Japan's rapid industrialization. He expressed this career in a description of how he saw a modern Japanese man:

> He stands there today without any cultural inhibitions; he sees in himself only a means of becoming powerful and rich, and believes in success pure and simple. And he is absolutely right in so far as any justification can be admitted for his "philosophy," for he has had the most successful career of all people who have ever lived. Thanks to the absolute surrender to what is purely external, he has achieved in some thirty years what Europe, teeming with ideals, has taken centuries to accomplish[:] it is therefore in the nature of this civilization to favor soullessness.[87]

Modern Japan achieved its industrialization more quickly than any other country in history, but in doing so, Keyserling noted, it had also rapidly become soulless. He pilloried the modern Japanese, bereft of "the spirit of old Japan," as "repulsively superficial."[88] He dismissed Japan's

technological achievements as insignificant and recommended that the Japanese "remain Far Easterners in spite of their tendency to[wards] Westernisation."[89] To counterbalance Westernization, he praised efforts by the Japanese government in resuscitating the Shinto cult. In his last lecture in Japan, he recommended that the Japanese study Indian yoga in order to regain their spirituality.[90] He believed that India's old tradition of yoga, which he had practiced intensively during his travels in India, would counter Japan's soulless modernization, yet he noted that his Japanese audience was surprised by his recommendation, since they had not considered looking at the tradition of yoga as something based upon Buddhism. They were instead, Keyserling observed, far more interested in Christianity.[91]

Keyserling was clearly biased about Japan's Westernization. By primarily focusing on what he regarded as the ills of modernization, he was unable to see the economic and political benefits of the Meiji Restoration. His view of Meiji-era Japan was highly influenced by his own conservative worldview; just as he criticized industrialized Germany, he also rejected industrialized Japan. According to recent historical scholarship on the Meiji Restoration, the Meiji era was a major achievement, although there had been costs. Marius Jansen acknowledged the accomplishments of the Meiji leaders, although they were accompanied by the "sacrifices of ordinary Japanese and at a cost to other Asians."[92] Importantly, Japan's industrialization enabled Japan to avoid colonization by the West, the fate suffered by parts of China.[93] Despite "a complex legacy of progress and pain," Andrew Gordon still sees the Meiji reforms as having achieved notable political and economic progress.[94] Similarly, Landes identifies the Restoration despite its various difficulties as making Japan the first non-Western country to industrialize and thus "an example to other late bloomers."[95] As these assessments show, the Meiji Restoration had brought many more advantages than disadvantages to Japan.

Relationship between Imitator (Exploiter) and Innovator

Despite Keyserling's nearly diametric evaluations of transcultural transfers to Japan from Asian countries versus those from the West, he maintained one overriding assessment of the Japanese: specifically, that the Japanese were not innovators, but rather were extremely skilled imitators—able to copy better than any other people could. Their adaptations of foreign imports showed "their enterprising, exploiting quality, their pliant, practical adaptability:"[96] "What are the qualities required to be a master of this art? Not creative initiative, but, on the other hand, an extraordinary power of observation, an instantaneous understanding for the empirical significance of every expression, and the ability to draw the greatest

possible practical advantage for it."[97] Instead of regarding them as imitators in the usual sense, Keyserling preferred to refer to them as exploiters "in the same sense as a jiu-jitsu fighter."[98] He described this supposedly exploitive quality of the Japanese with deep suspicion:

> The Japanese does not really imitate—he derives an advantage, just as the wrestler does from the movements of his opponent [.] [H]e does not copy, but he changes his attitude; it is given to him to enter with incomparable ease into all alien appearance, so as to understand from within its peculiarity (not its essential nature!)[.] [H]aving thus entered into organic relation with it, he then exploits it so far as it can be exploited.[99]

Two important qualities of a jiu-jitsu fighter are, according to Keyserling, the ability to use an attacker's energy against him, instead of directly engaging one's opponent, and the ability to shield one's inner self from external change. Even Chinese culture, which the Japanese had borrowed from over the course of a millennium and which they had "absorbed completely in its appearance," did not affect them internally.[100] The Japanese were not really inspired by the Chinese spirit; they had merely adopted its appearance. While they seemed capable of absorbing more foreign elements than any other people could absorb, Keyserling nevertheless criticized the Japanese for not understanding the essential nature of their imports.[101] The Japanese, he contended, were only capable of superficial imitation, not of innovation.

Despite Keyserling's distinction between imitation and innovation in the case of the Japanese, the historical reality was not as simple as he argued. The process of indigenizing new Western influences into Japanese traditions was complex: "Western imports co-existed, mixed, and sometimes inflicted with a resilient set of indigenous cultural forms."[102] Westernization in Meiji-era Japan resulted in the substantial reshaping of many cultural forms. For example, the *nō* Theater, which had been endangered at the time, became revived because of the perception that it was a Japanese-style opera, and thus a counterpoint to Western opera.[103] Influenced by German historical scholarship, Japanese historians emphasized facts and evidence and reexamined Japanese history.[104] Western and Japanese elements were mixed in the songs taught at schools.[105] Moreover, faced with the contradictions between modernization on the Western model and the authority of the emperor, Japanese leaders tried to reshape "Japan's oldest myths to modern uses."[106] Men in Japan during the Meiji period struggled between "Victorian and Confucian stands of propriety."[107]

In this process of indigenizing Western imports, Jansen suggests that the Japanese did not blindly imitate the West. The Meiji leaders, many of

whom still dearly cherished national tradition, pursued Westernization in their own manner. As a result, no foreign advisor saw his recommendations enacted as proposed. Japan's leaders were pragmatic and showed "the vigor of debate and the readiness of men to speak their minds."[108] Landes understands Japan as indigenizing foreign imports more successfully than any other non-European nation; whereas other countries limited their activities to importing foreign equipment and using it as best they could, the Japanese "modified it, made it better, made it themselves."[109] In some areas, like energy and power, Japan's production was ahead of Great Britain and the United States by the 1920s, despite its late start.[110] This pattern of modernization was later followed by several other Asian nations after World War II.[111]

In contrast to Keyserling's distinction between imitation and innovation, some scholars posit a close relationship between them. As the historian Maxine Berg argues in her study of imitation and innovation in eighteenth-century Britain, imitation is a path toward innovation and thus it is "part of the inventive process."[112] She is opposed to a clear distinction between "invention, the act of creating a new process or product, and diffusion, or the spread and transfer of the new technology to broaden usage and other contexts."[113] Likewise, Eleanor Westney sees a close relationship between imitation and innovation in her study of the topic in the Meiji Restoration. She criticizes the West's belittling image of Japan as an excellent copier of others' inventions, as exemplified in Keyserling's view of Japan, and is sympathetic with interpretations that highlight the careful selection process that the Japanese went through in transnational adaptations.[114] She realizes this response is not quite sufficient to refute William Foote Whyte's portrayal of the Japanese as the rational shopper, which she rejects for undermining the level of innovation in Japanese adaptations; she, rather than focusing on Japan's careful selectivity, therefore emphasizes the idea that imitation itself involves an innovative process. Ultimately, she refutes the dichotomy between imitation and innovation, because the successful imitation of foreign ideas necessitates innovation.[115]

Recent economic developments also support the idea of a close relationship between imitation and innovation. Since imitation can reduce innovation costs, it can become "a stepping stone which enables firms from lagging countries to undertake innovation."[116] Japan was the only catching-up country that achieved advanced industrialization in the twentieth century, but its modernization pattern was subsequently followed by several Asian countries,[117] such as Taiwan and South Korea. These catching-up countries have been practicing creative imitation and, more recently, have begun to challenge firms in advanced countries.[118] Recent patent statistics also support a close relationship between imitation and innovation. According to these statistics, the East Asian countries that

most diligently imitated throughout the twentieth century are now the ones that have become the most active innovators, after the United States.[119] Imitation, one can thus argue, is a crucial mechanism that brings "practical knowledge of the current state-of-the-art into the country," thus proving an attractive basis for future innovation.[120]

In conclusion, Keyserling conducted a stimulating study of Japan in terms of cross-cultural transfer. He studied transfer from China, India, and the West to Japan, while providing several interesting, although selective, examples, and articulated a number of advanced transcultural principles. His transcultural principles highlight the role of history as an enriching and refining process, and they thus affirm the possibility of unique contributions from different geographical locations and periods. However, there are two issues related to his conception of imitation. First, his analysis of Japan's Westernization was problematic, because it was one-sided. By equating Westernization and industrialization only with materialism and soullessness, he ignored the economic and political benefits of the Meiji Restoration. His preoccupation with Europe's cultural decadence limited his evaluation of Japan's Westernization. Secondly, Keyserling problematically separated imitation and innovation as two distinctive phases and thus viewed the Japanese only as imitators, not as innovators. As we have seen, however, imitation and innovation are not separate, but related, because good imitation requires innovation. In contrast to Keyserling's conclusion, Japan did make a transition from a nation of consummate imitators to a leading innovator.

NOTES

1. Walter Struve, *Elites against Democracy. Leadership Ideals in Bourgeois Political Thought in Germany, 1890–1933* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), 277.
2. Count Hermann Keyserling, *The Travel Diary of a Philosopher*, Vol. II, trans. J. Holroyd Reece (New York: Harcourt, Brace: 1925), 144. Hereafter, it will be referred as Keyserling II.
3. Struve, *Elites against Democracy*, 280.
4. Ibid., 286.
5. Fritz Stern, *Politics of Cultural Despair* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism. Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 35–36.
6. Keyserling, II: 216.
7. George Edward Cooper, "Count Hermann Keyserling and Cultural Decadence: A Response," a dissertation submitted to the University of Michigan (1978), 6.
8. Ute Gahlings, *Hermann Graf Keyserling. Ein Lebensbild* (Darmstadt: Justus von Liebig Verlag, 1996), 31, 35.

9. Cooper, "Count Hermann Keyserling," 6–7.
10. Ibid., 12–13.
11. Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair*, introduction, xiii.
12. Herf, *Reactionary Modernism*, 37.
13. Struve, *Elites against Democracy,* 276.
14. Ibid., 279.
15. For Keyserling's view on the oppositions between the East and the West, see Hermann Graf Keyserling, *Über die innere Beziehung zwischen den Kulturproblemen des Orients und des Okzidents. Eine Botschaft an die Völker des Ostens* (Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1915). See also Gerhard Schepers, "Exoticism in Early Twentieth-century German Literature," in *Japanese-German Relations, 1895–1945: War, Diplomacy and Public Opinion*, ed. Spang and Wippich (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 109.
16. Corinne Treitel, *A Science for the Soul. Occultism and the Genesis of the German Modern* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 66.
17. Keyserling, II: 185.
18. Ibid., 231.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., 229.
21. Ibid., 232.
22. Ibid., 231.
23. Struve, *Elites against Democracy*, 287.
24. Keyserling, II: 231.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., 229.
28. Ibid., 232.
29. Ibid., 230.
30. Gahlings, *Hermann Graf Keyserling.* 242–245. See also Ute Gahlings, "'An mir haben die Nazis beinahe ganze Arbeit geleistet.' Über den Umgang der Nationalsozialisten mit Hermann Graf Keyserling," in *Deutsche Autoren des Ostens als Gegner and Opfer des Nationalsozialismu. Beiträge zur Widerstandsproblematk*, ed. Frank-Lathar Kroll (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2000), 47–74.
31. Keyserling II: 144.
32. Ibid., 149.
33. Ibid., 218.
34. David S. Landes, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor* (New York: Norton, 1999), 353.
35. Ibid., 367.
36. Keyserling, II: 147. Yet Landes pointed out that such learning from China never made the Japanese feel smaller; "on the contrary, they thought themselves inherently superior to the Chinese." Landes, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations*, 353.

37. Keyserling, II: 149.
38. Ibid., 179.
39. Ibid., 180.
40. Ibid., 187.
41. Ibid., 165.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., 144.
45. Ibid., 182.
46. Ibid., 143–144.
47. Ibid., 182.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., 186.
50. Ibid.
51. "The Indians alone have understood what was the uniform experience of all profound men." Ibid., 231.
52. Ibid., 150.
53. Ibid., 156.
54. Ibid., 155.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., 157.
57. See Ernst Troeltsch's *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Know Press, 2006).
58. Keyserling, II: 170.
59. Ibid., 169.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., 226.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid., 228.
64. Ibid., 229.
65. James William, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (Rockville, MD: Manor, 2008), 75.
66. Keyserling, II: 147.
67. Ibid., 220.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid., 147.
70. Ibid., 227–228.
71. Ibid., 158.
72. Ibid., 220.
73. Ibid., 149.
74. Ibid., 218.
75. Ibid., 232.
76. Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan. From Tokukawa Times to the Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 109.
77. Keyserling, II: 175.

78. Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard, 2000), 338.
79. Keyserling, II: 179.
80. Ibid., 177.
81. Ibid,. 179.
82. Ibid., 222.
83. Ibid., 171.
84. Ibid., 227.
85. Ibid., 233.
86. Ibid., 179.
87. Ibid., 233.
88. Ibid., 228.
89. Ibid., 170.
90. Ibid., 229–230.
91. Ibid.
92. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 411–412.
93. Ibid., 355.
94. Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan*, 114.
95. Landes, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations*, 381.
96. Keyserling, II: 219.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid. For more information, refer to chapter 5 of in this volume, "When Jiu-Jitsu was German: Japanese Martial Arts in German *Sport-* and Körperkultur, 1905–1933," by Sarah Panzer.
99. Keyserling, II: 219.
100. Ibid., 220.
101. Ibid.
102. Gordon, *A History of Modern Japan*, 109.
103. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 475.
104. Ibid., 482.
105. Ibid., 475–476.
106. Ibid., 493.
107. Ibid., 494.
108. Ibid., 412.
109. Landes, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations*, 381.
110. Ibid.
111. See Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 494.
112. Maxine Berg, "From Imitation to Invention: Creating Commodities in Eighteenth-Century Britain," *Economic History Review*, LV, no. 1 (2002), 2.
113. Ibid., 4.
114. D. Eleanor Westney, *Imitation and Innovation. The Transfer of Western Organizational Patterns to Meiji Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 5.

115. "Even the most assiduous emulation will result in alterations of the original patterns to adjust them to their new context, and changes in the environment to make it a more favorable setting for the emerging organization." Ibid., 6.
116. Amy Jocelyn Glass, "Imitation as a Stepping Stone to Innovation," http://econweb.tamu.edu/aglass/Imn.pdf (accessed on June 14, 2013), 1.
117. See Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 494.
118. Linsu Kim, *Imitation to Innovation: The Dynamics of Korea's Technological Learning* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 1997), 90.
119. According to 2010's patents data, after the United States (24.8%), China ranked second (19.8%), Japan third (17.4%), South Korea fourth (8.6%), European Patent Office (7.6%) and Germany (3%). http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/statistics/943/wipo_pub_943_2012.pdf, 17.
120. Glass, "Imitation as a Stepping Stone to Innovation," 2.

4

Western Criticism of an Occidental East

A German View of the Modernization of Japanese Literature, 1900–1945

Lee M. Roberts

When Japanese and Chinese students began to study at German universities in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Germans largely perceived them in terms of similarities generalized as common to the Mongol peoples.[1] Within scant decades, however, Japan rose to the rank of a great power alongside nations of the West, and the German view of the Japanese changed. Following their victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), the Japanese enjoyed world-renown as the first non-white power to defeat a white power in the modern era, which was achieved, in no small part, thanks to military technology and strategy borrowed from Germany. Thus, many Germans came to imagine Japan as a "Prussia of the East."[2] Regardless of their seeming prominence among Asian nations as a Western-style power, however, the Japanese remained geographically located in and, to a greater extent, also culturally, part of the East.

Success in war might seem to have been the sole criterion for the Germans' perception of Japan's rise, but, in fact, in the German-speaking world a discourse on national literature and language also accorded Japan its prime rank among Asian nations for a specific brand of nationalism that corresponds to the second of three features E. J. Hobsbawm has deemed necessary for a people to become a nation, that of a cultural elite with a national literary language.[3] Analysis of various German-language histories, travel accounts, and scholarly works on literature published between the Russo-Japanese War and World War II shows that such publications commonly founded their shifting assessment not just on the adoption of European technology and culture, but also on the seeming authenticity

of Japan's European-style nationalism rooted in language and literature. Within this discourse, three literary features made Japanese culture like Western nations: (1) The Japanese had rejected antiquated forms of language and literature based on a Chinese model. (2) Despite their seemingly innate talent for imitation, the Japanese had shown themselves capable of maintaining their own native culture. (3) The Japanese had taken in and also begun to contribute to the Western intellectual tradition, which entailed practicing European scholarly methods and building on the literature of the given discipline. Within the texts examined here, therefore, we witness a discursive transition in the German-speaking world toward the idea that Japan was a uniquely Occidentalized nation of the Orient that equaled Western powers.[4]

Japan's Rejection of the Antiquated Chinese Model

From the late nineteenth century until well into the twentieth, discourses within the German-speaking world conceived of an Orient that was the antithesis of the European Occident, and Japan was the sole Oriental country deemed capable of joining the West. While "joining the West" might suggest relinquishing everything considered Eastern, various German-language texts that treated Japan's position in the world recognized that Japan's cultural roots were in the Orient and proposed that an authentically European-style nationalism in Japan distinguished the Japanese from their East Asian neighbors, above all the Chinese. To some degree, Japan's success appeared measurable as much in relation to China's failure, or reluctance, to adopt European culture as to the changes the Japanese culture had undergone over the period of borrowing Western technologies and cultural practices. According to one writer on Asia, China's stance on Europeanization around 1900 made it a "last bulwark of Asian or . . . anti-European thought."[5] One can read in Lafcadio Hearn's book *Kokoro: Hints and Echoes of Japanese Inner Life* (1896), which appeared in German in 1907, that "modern Japan" (das neue Japan) began with a victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). Rather pointedly, one anecdote in this book stresses that Japan's naval victory over China would have been even easier if European cannoniers had not stood by the Chinese, an allusion to the difference in the two Asian nations' ability to adopt European technologies to their own advantage.[6] In 1919, philosopher Hermann Graf Keyserling expressed his views that the Japanese, for whom patriotism (*Vaterlandsliebe*) mattered more than anything else, were much like Europeans (especially Germans), whereas the Chinese were more like the Indians, wholly unpatriotic.[7] Paul Ostwald noted in 1922 that, while the conservative Chinese had remained convinced of their own superiority and rejected European culture, the

Japanese had listened to a political instinct peculiar only to their people and decided to become like Westerners.[8] One travel account from 1932 offers perhaps a clearer view of perceptions of China in relation to Japan, referring to China as Japan's "negative counterimage" and summing up the differences between the two countries with words that encapsulate much of the German-language discourse of the period under examination here: Whereas China was "a giant whose passive and barbarian-hating self-assurance had made it incapable of adopting foreign practices in time for its own defense," Japan was "a dwarf loaded with national vitality, with patriotic will, and political intelligence."[9]

In order to understand the differences between such views of China and Japan in the first half of the twentieth century, it is worthwhile to consider what made China seem so different from the West. Philosopher and historian Hans Kohn offered in *Orient und Okzident* (Orient and Occident, 1931) a view of the effects of Westernization in Asian countries during this period and explained the concept of nationalism as something that colonized Asia had learned from the colonial powers. This one work comprises merely Kohn's ruminations on the topic, but it presents a broader picture of the discourse on Western-style nationalism in Asia at the time that serves as an example in this context against which to compare other works specifically about China and Japan. According to Kohn, the numerous national movements that arose in Asia after World War I expressed the Asians' desire for freedom from oppression, but they entailed a fundamental cultural change. Prior to their encounter with Western-style nationalism, Kohn explained, Asians had thought primarily in religious terms, much like Europe during the Middle Ages. To become modern in the Western sense, however, a nation had to replace religion with the national cause. The prerequisite for such a fundamental cultural shift was the creation of a modern language and literature.[10] Kohn explained this point plainly: "At the cradle of national movements in the Orient there had to be . . . much like in Europe previously the creation of a new language and literature, which could then become the basis for a new system of education."[11] As we will see over the course of this chapter, Kohn was not alone in many of the views he expressed.[12]

Since the Chinese classics—works composed in what Benedict Anderson has called a "sacred language"—had long constituted the foundation of knowledge in China and the Chinese people had shown themselves reluctant to let go of this part of their culture, China had remained stuck in an antiquated paradigm. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the Chinese classics comprised 50 percent of Chinese education, according to Kohn. Chinese children had begun to study European languages in order to understand Western academic disciplines, but writing remained linked to classical texts and, for this reason, modernization in China had been slow, if not impossible. The entire vocabulary of Chinese writing still

contained associations derived from the classics, Kohn commented, and thus only the creation of a national language based on a Chinese vernacular could raise Chinese language and literature to a level comparable to that of a Western nation.[13]

German poet and translator of Chinese poetry, Hans Bethge made similar comments on the importance of the classics in China in *Die chinesische Flöte* (The Chinese Flute), a collection of German-language adaptations of Chinese poetry published in 1907: "Chinese lyrical poetry has become inseparable from the intellectual education of the people."[14] Ultimately, Bethge opined, the effect of reliance on the classics for learning was that a thousand years after Li-Tai-Po (701–762) composed his poems, the language and point of view (*Anschauung*) of the Chinese people who still read this poet's works had remained largely unchanged, still rooted in an ancient system. In agreement with other commentaries on China, Bethge suggested that, if China wanted to become modern (i.e., Western), the antiquated literary culture had to disappear.[15]

Even among those who agreed that an antiquated language had kept the Chinese from developing a sense of Western-style nationalism that they deemed a prerequisite for becoming modern, some still viewed Chinese culture as higher than that of Japan.[16] After all, the Japanese owed their ability to write to the Chinese language. Ironically, however, the Chinese commitment to their own high, if antiquated, literary culture had hindered the Chinese both in banding together nationally and also in effectively communicating the information of modern European academic disciplines. After all, the Chinese classics represented not so much the national genius of one group but a universalizing set of ideals that united various national groups throughout China and Northeast Asia who looked to them for wisdom. To be sure, some Chinese had tried to create a synthesis of East and West, but their attempts had not influenced the majority of the Chinese people. The writer Hu Shih (1891–1962), for instance, had tried to call attention to the fact that adherence to teaching the classical language had created a scholarly caste in China.[17] Moreover, both Hu Shih's "Die Geschichte der chinesischen Philosophie" (History of Chinese Philosophy) and also the poetry of Xu Zhimo (1897–1931) represented examples of the beginnings of a new literature in China.[18] Nonetheless, Kohn pointed out that around World War I Chinese schoolchildren were still memorizing the classics, and in the 1930s, the process that might both unify the Chinese people and also modernize their language had not been completed.[19] In contrast, by this time Japan had enjoyed its position as a Western-style great power for more than two decades.

Turning our attention to Japan, we find specific words and phrases in various German-language texts that communicate just how important Japanese nationalism was in the shifting assessment of Japan as a

successfully Occidentalized great power in the Orient. The Japanese were said to possess a "highly developed feeling for the state" (*hochentwickeltes Staatsgefühl*), or, alternatively, a "sense for the state raised to a higher power."[20] They allegedly represented a "unified national type" that had achieved "national autonomy," and love of the fatherland was one of their dominant characteristics.[21] They possessed a "passionate national sentiment," or also evinced a "marked national consciousness and self-sacrificing patriotism."[22] It was not simply gung-ho patriotism that these German commentators on Japan admired, however, but something that they felt to be an authentic nationalism.[23] That is, according to such observers of Japan, a necessary prerequisite for becoming Western was the adoption of both the Western technological and also intellectual culture—"the intellectual arsenal," as Kohn put it. The Japanese met this requirement, but it was just as important that they managed to do so without forsaking too much of their native Japanese culture.[24]

Since Sino-Japanese culture—or the blend of adopted Chinese and native Japanese culture that had given rise to the mixed culture of Japan—was as different from Western culture as was purely Chinese culture, one requirement for becoming Western within the discourse on Westernness discussed here was the rejection of previous Chinese influence.[25] That is, the Japanese had to not merely take in Western culture, but also throw out much of what they had borrowed from China. Somewhat perplexingly, however, not all previous Chinese influence had to go. One cultural feature shared by both the Chinese and the Japanese cultures that this German discourse accepted, for example, was the absence of personality (*Unpersönlichkeitskultur*) which allegedly enabled the two peoples to place a focus on the community or group rather than on the individual.[26] In China, where there was not much national sentiment in the first half of the twentieth century, this cultural feature played out mostly in the family and between personal friends and contacts, where the achievement of smaller group harmony was considered more important than any individual desires. In Japan, however, the very same cultural feature impacted not only the family and close contacts, but also the much larger national group. Thus, even though this cultural characteristic remained somewhat unchanged, its maintenance did not keep Japan from being accepted into the Western fold, according to the criteria of the discourse discussed thus far.

Acceptance as a Western power was not as simple as the argument thus far would make it seem, for racial/nationalistic biases against non-Western nations appeared even in texts that admitted, if begrudgingly, to Japan's rise in status. One German-language text on Asia by a noted scholar, for example, explained Japan's new position in the world by claiming that the Japanese were master imitators and therefore had had little difficulty rejecting Chinese culture. For this reason, the Japanese could simply

discard Chinese culture as if it were an out-of-style garment and slip into Western cultural attire.[27] Nonetheless, some wholeheartedly believed that Japan deserved its new status as a great power. One work from 1907 commented, for instance, "that there is more to modern Japan than the ability to imitate European culture."[28]

Returning once again to Kohn, we find that he felt that, although the discovery of nationalism in Asia had caused many to turn to their own native cultural systems for a new model for future development, these national movements ultimately lacked precisely the native element required for them to be authentic.[29] Over this section, China has been the example of an Asian nation that did not gain acceptance into the Western club, so to speak.[30] The Japanese became members of the modern Western community by retaining the necessary native element in their national culture, and with this new international status, Japan achieved "the goal of its passionate national sense of self."[31]

Maintenance of Japan's Native Culture

It should surprise no scholar of German Studies/*Germanistik* that, until well into the first half of the twentieth century, German thinkers judged Japanese nationalism in literary terms, for the development of German nationalism itself was closely tied to views of national language and literature, with initial notions of German unity having been established on the basis of Germany as a so-called cultural nation (*Kulturnation*). Thus, it is in keeping with practices in literary scholarship that various German-speaking commentators on Japanese literature claimed that one could glimpse the essence of the national mind or spirit within specific literary works.[32] According to David Brauns' *Japanische Märchen und Sagen* (Japanese Fairy Tales and Sagas) from 1885, for instance, fairy tales were "an absolutely essential resource for getting to know the character, way of thinking, and capabilities of the Japanese people." Moreover, he commented that knowledge both of a people's mythical traditions—whether borrowed or native—and also the manner in which they are told enabled one to comprehend that group of people.[33] Similarly, in *Die Entwicklung des ältesten japanischen Seelenlebens nach seinen literarischen Ausdrucksformen* (Development of the Oldest Life of the Japanese Mind on the Basis of its Literary Forms of Expression, 1907) Leo Justus distinguished native Japanese literary styles and themes from those inspired by the Chinese in order to present a view of an authentically Japanese mindset. Perhaps most telling of the nation-building character some speakers of German ascribed to literature is a comment by the scholar and economist Karl Rathgen about Japan's ability to maintain its ethnic uniqueness in an East Asian world dominated by Chinese culture: "The struggle between

national and foreign elements is most noticeable where it springs forth from the depths of the native soul, in literary works."[34] In other words, proof that the Japanese had not entirely succumbed to Chinese influence was to be found in tensions between native and foreign aspects of the Japanese national literary tradition throughout its historical development. Rathgen taught at the University of Tokyo from 1882 to 1890 and also advised the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, so he had much experience with Japanese culture. That this scholar of economics referred to literature as the source of understanding another people, however, demonstrates that Germans, from backgrounds even outside of *Germanistik*, linked literary expression with nationalism. Thus, it is no surprise that a work on Japanese literature like Maria Piper's *Das japanische Theater: Ein Spiegel des Volkes* (Japanese Theater: A Mirror of the Folk; 1937) explained drama as a way to acquaint oneself with the Japanese people. Literature, Piper believed, offered a "key to the language of their soul," something non-Japanese people otherwise could not access.[35]

As we have discussed thus far, to meet discursive expectations for authentic Western-style nationalism, Japan had to break with so-called medieval thinking by casting off antiquated Chinese elements that had come to Japan almost exclusively via Chinese language and literature. According to Rathgen, "Chineseness" (*das Chinesentum*) had found its way to Japan via Chinese literature, upon which the Japanese then created the bureaucracy of their state. Through studying the Chinese classics, which started at the emperor's court in the year 670, the Japanese also had learned specific rules of form for writing poetry and essays. The Chinese language offered the Japanese the ability to partake in an established literary tradition, but the Japanese created their own on the basis of the Chinese annals. According to Rathgen, Chinese culture had tamed and civilized the Japanese, but had not destroyed the literary expression of Japan's national particularity (*nationale Eigenart*) even at the end of the seventh century, when the Japanese ardently embraced Chinese poetry and composed it themselves.[36]

Maintenance of the Japanese national identity was connected to a variety of literary creations. The short lyrical poem, the *tanka*, is a prime example. Even though the Chinese had offered a normative model for writing poetry, the Japanese had chosen to nurture this native literary style and had thus given rise to a form of poetry that was generally epigrammatic but, through its brevity, also expressive of native brilliance. Rathgen remarked, "The Japanese poets who limited themselves to this single instrument made it into the tool of the virtuoso." Concentration on this one style of poetry enabled the Japanese to achieve artistic effects with the fewest words possible, and for this reason, Japanese poetry abounded in insinuations of deeper meaning and allusions to broader, more generally known ideas.[37]

The creation of *kana*, a native script comprised of the *hiragana* and *katakana* syllabaries, was seen both as another break with Chinese tradition and also as something that had allowed the Japanese to Westernize. Collections of poems like the *Manyōshū* (*Collection of Ten Thousand Leaves*, ca. 759) and *Kokinshū* (*Collection of Japanese Poems of Ancient and Modern Times*, ca. 905) marked the beginning of the national period because, by using a native script that better represented native sounds, the Japanese could distance their own words from usages associated with Chinese characters.[38] According to one work, *kana* had warded off the intellectual and moral confusion that might have come from adopting foreign cultural practices (*geistige und sittliche Entwurzelung*).[39] While Chinese did continue to be the language of the educated in Japan, an entire literature in *kana* arose. The Japanese novel was even said to owe its evolution to this national script.[40] Hauser commented, however, that prior to the period of translation, which he defined as the years from 1879 to the mid-1880s,[41] the Japanese had written in a language much like that of the medieval German poet Walther von der Vogelweide (1170–1230).

This critique was part of the criticism of Classical Chinese discussed earlier, but deserves further explanation. Following Commodore Perry's forced opening of Japan to the West in 1853, the Japanese began to reassess their relationship with Europe and the United States. Throughout the first decades of the ensuing Meiji era (1868–1912), they translated large amounts of fictional literature from various European languages into Japanese, especially in the 1870s and into the 1890s, in order to gain an understanding of the cultural world of Europe. By the 1890s, educated Japanese had gained as deep a connection to European literature in translation as to Japanese and Chinese literature. Before this period of intense translation of European literature, Japan's literary language was still largely a combination of Classical Chinese and Classical Japanese, which were no longer spoken by anyone in either China or Japan. Thus, they had continued to write in a style completely separate from their everyday language, as if speakers of German had changed their spoken language but decided to write only in the Middle High German used by medieval poets.

Prior to this period of translation, the Japanese had still been somewhat under the sway of the Chinese culture that held the writer of poetry to be the only true writer but, with the introduction of European literary prose (*Kunstprosa*) into Japan, the language and literature had been able to modernize. Writers like Yamada Bimyō (Taketarō; 1868–1910) had written in Japanese without many Chinese characters, Hauser noted, suggesting that Japanese language with few Chinese characters was something modern.[42] Hauser mused that the Japanese would eventually become free from both Chinese and Western influence and show the power of their own native culture.[43]

The modernization of Japanese literature was also purported to have shown itself in the theater. The *No* drama, for instance, had gone from being a performance for nobility and the intelligentsia—prior to the Meiji era—to one for the people. By losing its exclusivity, *No* had been transformed into a literary form of the Japanese people, which made it a treasured national art form in the twentieth century, something around which the Japanese could rally as a nation.[44] Since the 1880s, the *Shinpa* (New School) was said to have begun to modernize traditional kabuki theater, too, which had long been committed to older Japanese material. The *Shingeki* (New Theater) had brought European drama to the Japanese stage, but the new variations on older *kabuki* drama had allowed the Japanese theater to maintain its connection to its own native traditions, and the packed houses at these performances indicated the people's continued interest in their own folk ways (*Volkstümlichkeit*);[45] for, as much as the Japanese had changed on the European model, they also had stayed true to their native character.

Japan's Contributions to European Culture

Various German-language works on Japan drew parallels between Japanese and European history, calling the famed Heian-period novelist Murasaki Shikibu (ca. 978-ca.1014/25), for instance, a Japanese Madame de Scudéry (1607–1701) or comparing the poet Matsuo Bashō (1644–1694) to a German Mastersinger like Logau (1605–1665), who continued the tradition of medieval songs into the early modern period (ca. 1450–1720), and Bakin (1767–1848) to Walter Scott (1771–1832). The collection of poems *Kokinshū* was considered to be like the medieval German courtly love song known as *Minnesang*,[46] and Japanese drama much like that of the German-speaking peoples.[47] Moreover, the Japanese and the Germans appeared to have evolved in similar ways, their national consciousness having developed by first borrowing from a foreign culture and then moving away from it to reassert the native element. The Japanese had been influenced by the Chinese classics, and the Germanic peoples by Latin language and literature. The Japanese of earlier years were also said to have resembled the Merovingians, the Shogunate being like the Merovingian majordomo-system (*Hausmeiertum*).[48]

One explanation for such commonalities between Germans and Japanese rested on the concept of race. According to Otto Hauser's *Weltgeschichte der Literatur* (World History of Literature), from 1910, for instance, a common ancestor explained commonalities (*Verwandtes*) across peoples and cultures. These similarities were the "life pulses of our own blood . . . that we . . . hear . . . in literary works."[49] Hauser claimed that racial science had provided evidence for the connections between

all great cultures and all genius in the world. The fair-skinned peoples from Northern Germany, Denmark, and Scandinavia were thought to be the only creators of culture (*kulturbildend*), and wherever they had mixed with dark-skinned peoples, culture had developed. According to this argument, the peoples of southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, Naples, Sicily, Greece) had experienced the height of their cultures under fair-skinned rulers and then gone into decline with the increasing number of dark-skinned peoples. Asians and the native peoples of the Americas were considered mixed races—whereby mixing with Nordic invaders allegedly had made them into special races (*Sonderrassen*)—and the Japanese had shown themselves to be the leaders among such peoples.[50] In a somewhat similar vein, Hermann Graf Keyserling commented in his travel journal of 1918 that the Japanese had the racial composition (*Rassenanlage*) of East Asians but the mettle (*Naturanlage*) of Europeans, and that they were especially like Germans.[51] In *Weltgeschichte auf rassischer Grundlage* (World History on the Basis of Race, 1925) by folkish author Wilhelm Erbt, we find the claim that there was a foreign element in Chinese culture that was originally Aryan and Nordic, which had given them their creativity. Nordic stuff had made East Asia strong, according to Erbt, and the Japanese were a mixed race whose successful renewal he ascribed to their not having mixed further with foreign blood.[52]

Other similarities between Japanese and Germans seemed to lie in the allegedly representative status of their respective cultures for all of the Orient and the Occident. Hans Anna Haunhorst wrote of Japan in 1936 in *Das Lächeln Japans* (The Smile of Japan), for instance, as the "classic land . . . of true national solidarity" and the "single mighty nation-state of the Far East," and he felt certain that Germany could become the same for the Occident. It is worth noting here that Kazunobu Kanokogi, who happened to be the Japanese leader of the Culture Institute in Berlin in the 1920s and professor at Imperial Kyushu University in Fukuoka, had encouraged him to write this book, since he felt that Haunhorst had correctly understood Japan by observing it from the aesthetic perspective.[53] In 1944, Paul Lüth pronounced Japan and Germany two great *Kulturnationen*, comparing the idea of the Yamato race to that of the Germanic race, and posited that harmony between Japan and Germany represented the future harmony between the Orient and the Occident.[54]

More importantly, perhaps, Western-style literary nationalism enabled the Japanese to participate in modern Western culture,[55] which entailed the production of specific types of literature deemed "modern." By learning various European languages and translating European literary and scholarly works, the Japanese were said to have taken in much of Western intellectual knowledge (*Geistesbildung*), but then they also produced works in European languages that were said to be scarcely distinguishable from those written by native speakers.[56] One text described

the Japanese as so successful at learning European languages that they had used their ability to alter the very word Germans used to refer to them from "Japanesen"—similar to the German word for the Chinese (*Chinesen*)—to "Japaner."[57] Of course, criticisms of Japanese language as continuing to contain Chinese elements persisted. In 1923, Karl Haushofer commented that long-time reliance on the Chinese model had made the Japanese generally poor public speakers, but they were trying to liberate public speeches from all "pigtailed, ponderous, Chinese-trimmed drapery."[58] Haushofer also felt that the Japanese had made European culture part of their own national culture, however, and he gave Sawayanagi Matsutaro's *Waga kuni no kyōiku* (Our Country's Education, 1909) as an example of a piece of scholarship built upon Japanese-language translations of European works, which included the ideas of such German thinkers as Kant, Herbart, and Wundt.[59]

In 1929, one-time missionary and later professor of Japanese at the University of Hamburg, Wilhelm Gundert, provided an overview of Japanese development toward literary-academic Westernness. New Japanese literature began to take shape in the 1880s, mainly in prose and largely through the establishment of newspapers and later also journals and magazines. In fact, the Japanese began to print their own newspapers toward the end of the Tokugawa period (1603–1868) on the Western model. "Little newspapers" (*koshinbun*) were published for the masses in simple, colloquial language and carried serialized fictional novels. "Big newspapers" (*ōshinbun*) printed editorials and articles largely on political issues, but they were in the classical language. By 1874, the little newspaper *Yomiuri Shinbun* had a wide readership of 25,000, and other little newspapers soon followed suit. In the first few decades of the twentieth century, various literary schools also began to print their own magazines for audiences interested in their specific style. General magazines and journals also began to appear, and increasingly they carried literary works and established the reputations of their writers.[60] The first novel in modern colloquial Japanese language with a somewhat Europeanized vocabulary was Futabatei Shimei's *Ukigumo* (*The Drifting Cloud*, published in three parts, 1886–89). Over time, this new Japanese literary language increasingly contained descriptions of life founded on the natural sciences. New writing styles also appeared under the influence of world-renowned European writers. By the Taisho era (1912–1926), European culture had become part of the Japanese everyday language, and the Japanese were participating in Western culture alongside the nations of Europe and North America. Japan had become a "province of modern world culture," according to Gundert.[61] Interestingly, Gundert's bibliography included seven Japanese works published between the years 1908 and 1928, suggesting Japanese participation in the creation of German-language knowledge of Japan.[62]

The Chinese attempt to do what the Japanese had done had failed, because they had not invested Chinese words with European meanings to create a new language understood by the majority of Chinese speakers. The Qing Dynasty (1644–1944) was thought to have achieved much culturally, for example, but nonetheless to have remained on the level of the Renaissance in Europe. Part of the problem was that when the Chinese had decided to modernize, they had generalized all things Chinese as backward, which meant that Chinese culture might have been replaced by a replica of European culture. After World War I, some Chinese scholars had returned to their own culture as a guide for future development, while others continued to work on the modernization of their literary language, but they sometimes had looked to Japanese translations of European scholarly works as a guide for the development of their own new Chinese language.[63]

Among the Japanese who wrote in European languages and thus joined the intellectual debate on Japan's status in the world on European terms were world-renowned thinkers like Nitobe Inazo (1862–1933), whose book *Bushido: The Soul of Japan* (1900) found a wide readership around the world, and Okakura Kakuzo (1862–1913), with his similarly influential *The Ideals of the East* (1903), *The Awakening of Japan* (1904), and *The Book of Tea* (1906). Although originally written in English, the works of both authors found a broad German readership in translation, but Okakura's *Ideals* in its German translation (1922) is particularly interesting in this context, because of its contribution to the European understanding of Japanese and Asian art as connected to the idea of Japan as a country with an authentically European-style nationalism. Moreover, it fits neatly into this discussion of the German-language discourse on Japan's exceptional nationalism among Asian nations.

Okakura attained an exceptional command of English through study at the English-language school of James Hepburn in Japan as a boy, and then later by studying English at Tokyo Imperial University. He was also knowledgeable about the history of Asian art, about which he wrote in English. Together with Ernest Fenellosa, he was appointed to the Imperial Fine Arts Commission in Japan (1886), later became director of the Tokyo Fine Arts School (1890), and then also headed the Japanese collection at the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston (1904–1913). He drafted *Ideals* in India in the house of Rabindranath Tagore. Even though he both had friends throughout Asia as well as respect for Asian cultures, he still claimed, in *Ideals*, that Japan had liberated itself from the "lethargy" that had kept India and China from adopting Western ways.

Whether one agrees with Okakura, or not, it is important to stress here that his work was part of the English-language literature of the time on Asia. Similarly, the German translation fits into the discourses in the German-language literature on Japan discussed here by increasing the

sense of nationalistic fervor in ways not present in the English-language original. Among many examples, one will find that where the original had the Japanese "conserving and extending their national inspiration," the German translation rendered the deed an assertion of national particularity (*nationale Eigenart . . . behaupten*).[64] When Okakura spoke of a "torch that burned in the hand of [the Japanese writer] Sannyo," the German translation offered "passionate love of the fatherland" (*leidenschaftliche Vaterlandsliebe*).[65] Okakura described Japan's war against China as a "natural outgrowth of the national vigour [of Japan]" but, in German, it was the "fruit of that heightened national sentiment" (*jenes gesteigerten Nationalgefühls*).[66] Although clearly embellishments, each of these examples harmonized well with the German discourse on Japan's unique nationalism presented in this chapter.

Examples of less internationally known Japanese writers in German include Daiji Itchikawa, H. Sasaki, and Kanokogi Kazunobu. Their works cannot be considered to have had the impact of Okakura, but they reinforce the point that the Japanese had begun to participate in European scholarship. Interestingly, these works repeat various ideas presented in the German texts discussed above.

As a reader at the Oriental Seminar in Berlin and Japanese instructor at the Prussian Military Academy (*Königlich Preußische Kriegsakademie*), Itchikawa had something of an audience among German students. In 1907, he extended his potential readership outside of his classroom lectures, with the publication of a volume in German titled *Die Kultur Japans* (The Culture of Japan). In this book, Itchikawa explained that Japan had defeated Russia in 1905, not only thanks to Western technologies, but also due to native moral development. Moreover, he argued that older Japanese culture had remained largely unchanged by Western influence.[67] He did feel, however, that the introduction of Western ideas into Japan had changed the Japanese language, which had entailed giving up older culture from China for the modern culture of the West.[68] By making this shift, therefore, the Japanese had shown themselves capable of becoming a *Kulturvolk* (civilized people) and shown uncultivated peoples that a non-Christian nation could be equal to Western countries. In Itchikawa's view, Japan's victory over Russia had put the yellow race (*gelbe Rasse*) on the same level as the white race.[69]

In Sasaki's *Die Moralerziehung in Japan* (Moral Education in Japan, 1926), we find another direct link between Japanese nationalism and literature. According to Sasaki, the Japanese had changed their educational system on a Western model, but modified it to meet Japanese needs.[70] Japan had learned much from German thinkers like Pestalozzi and Herbart, but at the expense of its native ideals. Thus, Japanese stories were being used to nurture national sentiment (*Nationalgefühl*), which was in the national language itself.[71] The soul of a people (*Volksseele*) was

in the mother tongue (*Muttersprache*), and Japanese children gained their civic-mindedness (*staatsbürgerliche Gesinnung*), feeling for their homeland (*Heimatgefühl*) and love for the fatherland (*Vaterland*) from reading about their own national history.[72]

In the work of Kanokogi, we find turns of speech reminiscent of some of the above-mentioned German-language works on Asia, as well as the ideas of Okakura. *Der Geist Japans* (The Spirit of Japan, 1930)—a book comprised of lectures Kanokogi had given as visiting professor in Berlin between the years 1927 and 1929—referenced German scholars, and thus may have seemed to build on German scholarship on Japan at the time, but it also appealed to German sympathies in German terms of the day to explain that the German and Japanese cultures were on an equal level.[73] Kanokogi called Japan's initial encounter with Chinese characters "the first great tragedy of the Japanese culture," for these characters had tied Japanese culture to Chinese thought for centuries.[74] Over time, the Japanese had struggled to maintain their identity and then ultimately freed themselves somewhat from Chinese influence. The eventual Euro-American encounter with the Japanese represented the meeting of the two great cultures of the world.[75] In this way, Kanokogi's work supported the notion already long in circulation in German-speaking Europe that Japan was indeed a great power, much like other countries of the West.

As we have seen over this section, various texts in German recognized that Japanese thinkers had created a new literature in their own modern vernacular and begun to contribute to various academic disciplines. Equally importantly, some Japanese had even gained a voice within scholarly literature.

Conclusion

The selection covered here of German-language works on Japan vis-à-vis Asia and the West is not comprehensive, but it offers a glimpse of trends in thinking on Japan's status as a Western-style great power at the time. Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War had much to do with the reassessment it underwent, but a discourse on a Westernized language and literature grounded in native ideals also played a role in the creation of the concept that a non-Western nation could become Western. This German-language discourse may be expected to have some overlap with similar discourses on Japan in other Western countries, but it also corresponds with the Germans' own language-and-literature-based nationalism. Thus, the findings here lend further credence to the notion that speakers of German saw in Japan around this time a reflection of themselves, whether as an Asian Prussia or any other variant of an aggrandized German nation.

Notes

1. For more on German views of Japanese and Chinese as Mongols, see Rotem Kowner, "'Lighter than Yellow, but not Enough': Western Discourse on the Japanese 'Race,' 1854–1904," *The Historical Journal* 43 (2000), 103–131.
2. Rolf-Harald Wippich, "Japan-enthusiasm in Wilhelmine Germany: The Case of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894–5," in *Japanese-German Relations, 1894–1945: War Diplomacy and Public Opinion*, eds. Christian W. Spang and Rolf-Harald Wippich (London: Routledge, 2006), 61–79.
3. E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1730: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2nd Canto ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 38.
4. While this discussion uses terms like "Occident," the "West," or "East," the "Orient," and "Asia" as nearly synonymous, it does not deny that there were discourses that accorded one term higher or lower value. For an in-depth view of uses/misuses of the "Orient," for example, one can refer to Said's well-known work on the discourses that created perceptions of it. See: Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Random House, 1978).
5. Carl Hagemann, *Spiele der Völker* (Berlin: Schuster & Loeffler, 1919), 484. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine.
6. Lafcadio Hearn, *Kokoro, mit einem Vorwort von Hugo von Hofmannsthal* (Frankfurt a.M.: Rütten & Loening, 1907), 254; 262–263.
7. Hermann Graf Keyserling, *Das Reisetagebuch eines Philosophen*, Vol. 2 (Darmstadt: Otto Reichl Verlag, 1922), 601–602.
8. Dr. Paul Ostwald, *Japans Entwicklung zur modernen Weltmacht: Seine Kultur-, Rechts-, Wirtschafts-, und Staatsgeschichte von der Restauration bis zur Gegenwart* (Bonn; Leipzig: Kurt Schroeder, 1922), 51.
9. Paul Rohrbach, *Erwachendes Asien: Geschautes und Gedachtes von einer Indien- und Ostasienreise 1932* (München: F. Bruckmann, 1932), 267.
10. Dr. Hans Kohn, *Orient und Okzident* (Berlin: Zentral-Verlag, 1931), 11–12, 14, 38.
11. Ibid., 44.
12. Although the many works cited in this chapter support the claims made here, there were just as many that claimed that Japan was the only nation that had successfully adopted European culture without also accepting Christianity.
13. Kohn, *Orient und Okzident*, 42–44.
14. Hans Bethge, *Die chinesische Flöte* (Leipzig: Inselverlag, 1923), 103. Note: Although based on previous translations, this book enjoyed some fame, and influenced various composers, among them Gustav Mahler. For more information, see: Eberhard Gilbert Bethge, *Hans Bethge: Leben und Werk* (Kelkheim: YinYang Media, 2002).
15. Ibid., 104, 110. See also Richard Wilhelm, *Ostasien, Werden und Wandel des Chinesischen Kulturkreises* (Potsdam: Müller und Kiepenheuer Verlag, 1928), 142–144.

16. See Wilhelm, *Ostasien*, 185–86; Rohrbach, *Erwachendes Asien*, 103, 113, 121–122; Hagemann, *Spiele der Völker*, 485.
17. Kohn, *Orient und Okzident*, 46–47.
18. Wilhelm, *Ostasien*, 191–192.
19. Kohn, *Orient und Okzident*, 47.
20. Wilhelm, *Ostasien*, 186; Paul Rohrbach, *Weltkunde für den Deutschen* (Köln: Hermann Schaffstein, 1933), 59; Rohrbach, *Erwachendes Asien*, 123.
21. Dr. J. Witte, *Japan: Zwischen zwei Kulturen* (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrich'sche Buchhandlung, 1928), 18–19. See also Maria Piper, *Das japanische Theater: Ein Spiegel des Volkes* (Frankfurt a.M.: Societäts-Verlag, 1937), 12.
22. Prof. Dr. Karl Rathgen, *Staat und Kultur der Japaner*, ed. Heyck, Monographien zur Weltgeschichte XXVII (Bielefeld; Leipzig: Verlag von Velhagen und Klasing, 1907), 4; Ostwald, *Japans Entwicklung*, 93.
23. Kohn, *Orient und Okzident*, 9.
24. Ibid., 11; See also Fritz Haber, *Aus Leben und Beruf: Aufsätze, Reden, Vorträge* (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1927), 55; Witte, *Japan: Zwischen zwei Kulturen*, 34–36; Rohrbach, *Erwachendes Asien*, 214, 266–267; Ernst Schultze, *Japan als Weltindustriemacht: Japans gewaltsame Erschliessung und wirtschaftliche Entwickelung* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1935), 130, 139; Kjellén, *Die Großmächte vor und nach dem Weltkriege*, ed. Karl Haushofer, 22nd ed. (Leipzig; Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1930), 150. Note that this book by Kjellén is a reworking of the author's ideas, and thus did not represent his thoughts exactly. Haushofer was responsible for any changes on Asia.
25. Ostwald, *Japans Entwicklung*, 51.
26. Witte, *Japan: Zwischen zwei Kulturen*, 45–46.
27. Dr. F. E. A. Krause, *Geschichte Ostasiens*, Vol. 2 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1928), 2: 278–80. For a similar statement, see also Richard Wilhelm, *Die Seele Chinas* (Berlin: (Verlag von) Reimar Hobbing, 1926), 45.
28. Rathgen, *Staat und Kultur der Japaner*, 3 (Einleitung).
29. Kohn, *Orient und Okzident*, 38.
30. Kohn uses Turkey as another example of a nation that failed to adopt Western-style nationalism in their attempt to modernize their literary language. The Turks had begun to "modernize" their language by getting rid of Arabic and Persian loanwords that came from Muslim literature, but Kohn felt that they had ended up producing a mere replica of French literature in the Turkish language. Thus, the Turks remained imitators of Western-style nationalism. See Kohn, *Orient und Okzident*, 30, 44.
31. Rathgen, *Staat und Kultur der Japaner*, 138.
32. For more information on German literary nationalism, see the chapters "Germanistik" and "Nationalismus" in Karl-Heinz Göttert, *Deutsch:*

Biographie einer Sprache (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 2010). See also Helmut Arntzen, *Unsinn und Sinn der Germanistik* (Weinheim: Beltz Athenäum, 1996), 36–37.

33. David Brauns, *Japanische Märchen und Sagen* (Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Friedrich, 1885), ix.
34. Rathgen, *Staat und Kultur der Japaner*, 48.
35. Piper, *Das japanische Theater*, 11 (Einleitung).
36. Rathgen, *Staat und Kultur der Japaner*, 44–48, 52.
37. Ibid., 48, 49.
38. Otto Hauser, *Die japanische Dichtung*, ed. Georg Brandes, Die Literatur Vol. 5 (Berlin: Bard Marquardt & Co., 1905), 17, 26, 33; See also Rathgen, *Staat und Kultur der Japaner*, 55.
39. Witte, *Japan, Zwischen zwei Kulturen*, 36.
40. Hauser, *Die japanische Dichtung*, 50.
41. Hauser's definition of the period of translation corresponds to the height of translation of European works into Japanese. See also Donald Keene, "The Age of Translation" in *Dawn to the West*, Vol. 3 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 55–75.
42. Hauser, *Die japanische Dichtung*, 61.
43. Ibid., 63.
44. Hagemann, *Spiele der Völker*, 190–191.
45. Piper, *Das japanische Theater*, 15–16, 21–22.
46. A song composed in the German-speaking world largely in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the *Minnesang* often celebrated the unrequitable love of a knight for a married lady at court. Songs by Walther von der Vogelweide, one of the best-known minnesingers, also depicted love between social equals.
47. Hauser, *Die japanische Dichtung*, 44, 39. See also Otto Hauser, *Weltgeschichte der Literatur* (Leipzig; Wien: Bibliographisches Institut, 1910), 28–32; Rathgen, *Staat und Kultur der Japaner*, 44, 60.
48. Hauser, *Die japanische Dichtung*, 12–13. Wilhem, *Ostasien*, 153–154.
49. Hauser, *Weltgeschichte*, VIII.
50. Ibid., VI–VIII.
51. Keyserling, *Reisetagebuch*, 611, 671, 584.
52. Wilhelm Erbt, *Weltgeschichte auf rassischer Grundlage*, 4th ed. (Leipzig: Armanen-Verlag, 1936), 84, 96, 98.
53. Hans Anna Haunhorst, *Das Lächeln Japans* (Leipzig: Georg Kummer's Verlag, 1936), 9, 7.
54. Paul Lüth, *Die japanische Philosophie: Versuch einer Gesamtdarstellung unter Berücksichtigung der Anfänge in Mythus und Religion* (Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck)), 14, 24, 70–72.
55. Kjellén, *Großmächte*, 150–151.
56. Witte, *Japan: Zwischen zwei Kulturen*, 34, 36; Hauser, *Die japanische Dichtung*, 57.
57. Wilhelm, *Ostasien,* 157–158.

58. Karl Haushofer, *Japan und die Japaner: Eine Landeskunde* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1923), 79.
59. Ibid., 62.
60. For a detailed overview of the development of newspapers in Japan, see Keene, *Dawn*, 23–24, 7–8.
61. Gundert's work is in the second part of the following dual volume: Richard Wilhelm, *Chinesische Literatur/*Wilhelm Gundert, *Japanische Literatur* (Wildpark-Potsdam: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft Athenaion M.B.H., 1926/1929), 129. See also pp. 129–131 for the overview of this development. Gundert borrowed concepts from anthropology to explain the "Japanese race" as comprised of three parts: Mongolian, a group from the Southern islands, and the paleo-Caucasian Ainu. See p. 1.
62. Gundert, *Chinesische/Japanische Literatur*, 131.
63. Wilhelm, *Chinesische/Japanische Literatur*, 188–194.
64. Okakura Kakuzo, *The Ideals of the East* (London: J. Murray, 1903), xiii; Okakura Kakuzo, *Die Ideale des Ostens*, trans. Marguerite Steindorff (Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1923), Einleitung 6.
65. Okakura, *Ideals*, 209; Okakura, *Ideale*, 185.
66. Okakura, *Ideals*, 223; Okakura, *Ideale*, 195.
67. Dr. Daiji Itchikawa, *Die Kultur Japans* (Berlin: Karl Curtius, 1907), 11–12.
68. Ibid., 16.
69. Ibid. 45, 47–48.
70. H. Sasaki, *Die Moralerziehung in Japan* (Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft m.b.H., 1926), 9.
71. Ibid., 15–16, 51–52.
72. Ibid., 137–138, 140–142.
73. K. Kanokogi, *Der Geist Japans*, Hrsg. Japaninstitut in Berlin (Leipzig: Verlag der "Asia Major" Dr. Bruno Schindler, 1930), VIII.
74. Ibid., 3.
75. Ibid., 3–5, 13.

Part II

Transnational Partners between Two World Wars

5

When Jiu-Jitsu was German

Japanese Martial Arts in German *Sport-* and *Körperkultur*, 1905–1933

Sarah Panzer

In 1937, the Nazi leisure organization *Kraft durch Freude* (Strength through Joy) released a series of promotional posters advertising some of its offerings in physical education and sport. Among the posters depicting, in striking graphic images, swimming, horseback riding, gymnastics, and general physical training (*Leibesübungen*), one in particular stands out, given the contemporary political and ideological climate—a poster for jiu-jitsu. What makes this poster all the more remarkable is that because the series relies on the visual power of stylized silhouettes on monochromatic backgrounds, with only limited captioning, jiu-jitsu is presented as a known quantity to the German public, essentially interchangeable in its ability to be recognized and understood from a single image. The very existence of this poster, much less the fact that jiu-jitsu is presented alongside more "traditional" German sports like rhythmic gymnastics and *Leibesübungen,* raises a series of questions that this chapter proposes to answer. How was jiu-jitsu able to be incorporated into the mainstream of German sporting culture to the extent that it was just one among many options within the leisure culture of the Third Reich? What was it about jiu-jitsu specifically that made it adaptable to German notions about the purpose of sport and physical training? And, finally, what can the adoption of jiu-jitsu as a German sport tell us about the nature and shape of the German-Japanese relationship during the first half of the twentieth century?

My work examines the ways in which Japanese culture was received, appropriated, and transformed by the German public during the period

between the Russo-Japanese War and the end of World War II. During this period of sustained intercultural exchange and engagement, one predominant reading of Japanese culture within Germany was that it represented a variant of heroic masculinity that was similar to, and thus readable within, German culture.[1] Because this understanding of Japanese culture was predicated on the assumption of similarity rather than difference, it presumed a greater ease of mutual transcultural exchange between Germany and Japan. Jiu-Jitsu, and later judo, coalesced out of this dynamic exchange of cultural products and institutions, facilitated by both German and Japanese agents and conducted largely independently of official political or diplomatic policy. The first private club for jiu-jitsu opened in Berlin in 1906; by 1929 there were 13 such clubs.[2] By the early 1930s jiu-jitsu had so successfully naturalized itself within the German sporting and body-culture *milieu* that many of its participants recognized their sport as specifically, and unproblematically, German.

The history of sport (*Sportgeschichte*) in Germany provides a unique opportunity to examine these transcultural channels of exchange between Germany and Japan precisely because the question of "foreignness" has been such a defining problem in the field, with many academic works emphasizing points of friction between national German physical culture and modern international sport. This tension between German national sport and international sporting trends can be explained through the lens of cultural romanticism and its links to the Turner movement (*Turnbewegung*),[3] or through the differences between German and English economic development and the consequent different valuations of competition in the two nations, yet it still fundamentally relies on the presumption of a German *Sonderweg* within its sporting culture.[4] Although this interpretation has been problematized in recent works, the stereotype of the German sporting world as fundamentally antagonistic toward foreign sports has remained a persistent narrative trope.[5] This makes the relative ease by which jiu-jitsu and judo became incorporated into the mainstream of German sporting culture all the more astonishing, and yet the process itself relied, I will argue, on the assumption by many Germans that jiu-jitsu was not actually foreign at all, but rather a reclaimed piece of the German cultural heritage.[6]

Self-Defense and Spectacle: Introducing Jiu-Jitsu to Germany

The advent of German engagement with Japanese martial arts can be fairly precisely pinpointed to the immediate aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, which many Germans who became involved in jiu-jitsu and judo retrospectively identified as the single most important event in introducing Japanese martial and physical culture to a German audience,

in making a "*Völklein,* which up to this point had merely been admired for its splendid lacquer ware" heroic, not only for the scale and sophistication of their newly Westernized military and industrial capabilities, but also for "a physical endurance, tenacity, agility, and strength, as well as an energy, a presence of mind, a determination and a daring, that can only seldom be observed in such outstanding quantity."[7] The strength and endurance displayed by Japanese servicemen during the extended campaigns in Manchuria, wholly unexpected by many Germans given the smaller stature and lighter build of the Japanese in comparison to the average Russian conscript, quickly became attributed to an imagined hitherto secret form of physical knowledge or training. It was this association that first made jiu-jitsu attractive to many Germans, yet the question remained open whether the discipline would remain simply a short-lived foreign curiosity or if it had genuine appeal to Wilhelmine Germans already deluged with a myriad array of other sports and training regimes.

In 1906, two Japanese naval cruisers, on a goodwill tour of the North Sea, landed in Kiel and were greeted personally by Wilhelm II; several of the sailors conducted a demonstration of jiu-jitsu techniques for the German Kaiser, who was so taken with the skills demonstrated that he quickly thereafter created positions for jiu-jitsu instructors at both the *Militärturnanstalt* in Berlin and at the *Hauptkadettenanstalt* in Lichterfelde.[8] From its earliest introduction jiu-jitsu thus had an especially collegial relationship with the German military and civil law enforcement authorities, a relationship that did more to spread jiu-jitsu initially than any conception of it as a possible leisure or sporting activity. Jiu-Jitsu emerged in Germany out a specifically military context, as the answer to the riddle of the secret strength of the Japanese; even as it assumed new alternatives guises during the subsequent decades, jiu-jitsu's association with warfare and with military prowess remained relatively stable.

By contrast, jiu-jitsu had already established a presence within the other major urban centers of the West during the years immediately preceding the Russo-Japanese War. Ludwig Rieß,[9] a historian and chronicler of contemporary Japanese culture, introduced the readers of the *Berliner Tageblatt* to jiu-jitsu in March 1905 through a discussion of how it had already been adopted in London and New York:

> The London policemen, who are famed both for their physical strength and for their politeness, must now complete a course . . . in the basic elements of the Japanese form of wrestling known as "Dschiudschutsu" or "Yawara" in the land of the rising sun. Because this method of fighting particular to the Japanese is now also recommended in New York by enthusiastic trainers as a form of physical development for young men and as a way of developing elastic grace in women, the English spelling of "Jujitsu" will likely be adopted in international usage.[10]

In the remainder of this article, Rieß enumerated some of the benefits of learning jiu-jitsu for his German readers, which included both physical and mental skills. Indeed, Rieß' prediction was correct; although some German authors stubbornly insisted on "Dschiudschutsu," or some variation thereof, most quickly adopted the easier—but far less German-sounding—"jiu-jitsu." Like many of his countrymen, Rieß identified jiu-jitsu as a specifically martial element of the Japanese cultural inheritance; although, he stated, it had first come to Japan via China, the uniquely martial register of Japanese culture had allowed it to thrive, whereas in China it had been all but forgotten. Significantly, Rieß recommended jiu-jitsu as an effective and useful form of physical training, an assessment that was prescient in its claim that jiu-jitsu was more than just a exotic spectacle.

Indeed, most early public exhibitions of jiu-jitsu were staged within contexts of spectacle and extravagance,[11] often with a dramatic narrative that recalled the combatants and astonishing outcome of the Russo-Japanese War:

> One read daily how here or there in a circus or in a *Varité* a small, delicate, and weak-appearing Japanese individual, by virtue of his abilities, stood against a Hun-like opponent three times his circumference and girth, world wrestling champion Mr. So-und-so, and had thrown him astonishingly quickly, despite his gigantic strength, to the mat—how this or that seemingly undefeatable boxing champion had ignominiously gone down to his unimposing opponent, and more of the same.[12]

Given that initial German interest in jiu-jitsu was spurred by the unexpected defeat of the Russian military colossus, these jiu-jitsu exhibitions restaged the conflict on a more intimate scale. For all of their entertainment value, however, these exhibitions also suggest a latent German anxiety about Japan's growing geopolitical ambitions; if a single individual trained in jiu-jitsu could defeat the best sportsmen Germany had to offer, what hope did the nations of the West stand against the imagined Japanese "yellow peril"? Whereas many of the other contemporary exotic spectacles had a clear subtext of imperial or colonial domination, the attraction of these jiu-jitsu bouts was embedded in the subversive thrill of watching a purportedly superior Western fighter get humiliated by his Asian opponent. These events thus could not help but undermine the presumed legitimacy of Western claims to racial and cultural supremacy. These jiu-jitsu spectacles would remain popular during the early Weimar period, although a broader conception became increasingly prevalent of jiu-jitsu as a discipline that effectively straddled cultural and national boundaries.

One of the first Germans to recognize the appeal of jiu-jitsu as something transcending spectacle was Erich Rahn, born in a comfortable merchant family in Berlin, whose personal interest in jiu-jitsu was spurred, as he later recorded, by scuffles as a boy with the much smaller son of a Japanese merchant.[13] Impressed, Rahn succeeded in convincing the boy to teach him the first basic skills of jiu-jitsu; he then apparently spent much of his time, although still technically employed by his father, in cultivating contacts among the growing Japanese colony in Berlin, befriending in particular those individuals who could teach him new holds and throws.[14] In 1906 Rahn left his father's employ and opened his own academy for jiu-jitsu in Berlin, the first of its kind in Germany.

With a combination of skill and showmanship, Rahn became an active and highly successful spokesman for jiu-jitsu. Initially finding little support among the public, his first efforts mostly emphasized the utility of jiu-jitsu for law enforcement and military personnel. On June 30, 1910 he gave a demonstration of jiu-jitsu's efficacy for the Berlin criminal police at the invitation of Berlin's Police President Traugott von Jagow. The *Vossische Zeitung,* which ran an article about the event, noted that, although himself an unimpressive physical specimen, Rahn easily defeated his opponent.[15] As a result of this demonstration, Rahn soon secured a position as an instructor for the Berlin police department, becoming one of the few non-officers to work for the department. His comprehensive introductory jiu-jitsu textbook, *Jiu-Jitsu, die unsichtbare Waffe,* was published in 1932 amid a profusion of cheaply printed instructional pamphlets about jiu-jitsu, often written by individuals with questionable expertise or credentials, trumpeting the efficacy of jiu-jitsu for self-defense. By contrast, Rahn emphasized in his work the need for safe and systematic instruction in jiu-jitsu in a manner that was practical for daily life, not just for emergencies. Between his studio in Berlin and his active publishing and promotional schedule, Rahn was an instrumental figure in German jiu-jitsu throughout the first half of the twentieth century; in particular, his emphasis on the utility of jiu-jitsu for physical training—for both men and women—lent the discipline a "sporting" quality that increasingly dominated its public face.[16]

Wilhelmine Germany's comparatively late embrace of jiu-jitsu was not, however, because of its "foreignness." Indeed, one of the first scholarly works on the discipline was an explicit attempt to redefine it as fundamentally German. Martin Vogt, an instructor at the Theresien-Gymnasium in Munich, published his own findings on the cultural heritage of jiu-jitsu under the title *Dschiu-Dschitsu der Japaner—das alte deutsche Freiringen.* In this meticulously illustrated pamphlet Vogt juxtaposed images of standard jiu-jitsu holds and grips with woodcut images from medieval German texts on wrestling, including one illustrated by Albrecht Dürer. Vogt claimed that he had felt compelled to write the book in response

to the growing visibility of jiu-jitsu in Germany following the Russo-Japanese War; his work was meant to be a response to the growing suspicion among Germans that the Japanese possessed some secret or special knowledge about combat and self-defense that made them especially formidable opponents. Vogt attempted to dispel any existing anxiety about jiu-jitsu by making it more immediately familiar and recognizable, thereby effectually recovering it as a forgotten piece of the Germanic cultural inheritance.

In the text that accompanies his elaborate pictorial comparison of jiu-jitsu and medieval German wrestling Vogt argued that jiu-jitsu was, quite simply, a system of practical techniques paralleling those used by medieval Germans, preserved and formalized in Japan. He never went so far as to suggest that one evolved out of the other, but instead argued that any logical study of the human body and its weaknesses in hand-to-hand combat, unencumbered by the demands of chivalry or rules of combat, would have yielded similar practical techniques and strategies. The difference was that, whereas the German system of unarmed combat had become increasingly restricted through the intervening centuries by regulations and ethics—with the clear implication that these were foreign imports—jiu-jitsu represented grapple wrestling (*Freiringen*) in its purest, most unrestricted form.[17] In this assessment of jiu-jitsu as premodern and uninhibited by regulatory niceties like those governing modern martial sports (*Kampfsport*) like wrestling or boxing, Vogt was far from unique, yet his argument was complicated by his choice to link jiu-jitsu to medieval German traditions of combat and self-defense.

The fundamental problem, according to Vogt, was not that jiu-jitsu was especially violent or dangerous, as critics of jiu-jitsu claimed, but rather, that these critics were using the wrong basis of comparison in trying to comprehend it; modern European *Kampfsport,* made both safer and more predictable through rules and regulations, and jiu-jitsu had diverged to such a point that it was impossible to sustain a fair comparison. In expressing this point, he deployed an interesting natural metaphor, comparing jiu-jitsu to "a tumultuous and thundering mountain stream," whereas contemporary European wrestling (*Ringkampf*) was more akin to an "orderly river that leisurely flows in a well-chosen course between carefully constructed banks."[18] Vogt rejected any comparison between jiu-jitsu and contemporary European sport, yet his ultimate conclusions about both were intriguingly ambivalent. He acknowledged that German culture had become safer and more "civilized," but was ambivalent about the lasting effects that this had on German culture, especially in comparison to the thoroughly spontaneous and creative jiu-jitsu. While not going so far as to suggest a rejection of contemporary sport and its rules of conduct in exchange for a return to unrestricted combat, Vogt evinced a sympathy for jiu-jitsu, both for its efficacy as a practical form of combat

and as a preserved cultural product that interrogated the presumed intrinsic worthiness of progress and modernization. In addition, by identifying jiu-jitsu as German(ic), Vogt displaced its "exoticness" as something temporal rather than cultural, a judgment that anticipated later, more radical assessments of jiu-jitsu's relationship to German culture.

Jiu-Jitsu Sport and the Reichsverband für Jiu-Jitsu

Alongside the more practical methodology of jiu-jitsu for self-improvement advocated by Rieß and Rahn, the discipline also began taking shape as an independent competitive sport during the 1920s. The National Jiu-Jitsu Association (*Reichsverband für Jiu-Jitsu,* RFJ) was formed in 1923, initially comprised mostly of Rahn's students in Berlin, although also including several individuals who had studied with Rahn through correspondence courses; in 1924, this group was incorporated into the *Deutsche Athletik-Bund*, the national association for amateur sport. The first German Jiu-Jitsu Police Championship took place in March 1925, and the first general assembly of the RFJ met in Berlin in April of that same year.

As part of its mission statement to popularize jiu-jitsu and to incorporate it into the mainstream of German *Sportkultur,* the RFJ formed its own press organ, *Jiu-Jitsu Sport,* in the autumn of 1928. The first issue featured a short essay by the editorial staff on their envisioned role for the magazine, which was to both keep individual regional clubs (*Vereine*) informed about upcoming events and decisions made by the RFJ and to instruct individual readers in the specific and unique attributes of their chosen sport—all with the ultimate goal of popularizing jiu-jitsu. The editors adopted a defiant posture in the essay, referring to resistance from the public and from other, more established, organized sporting groups and noting that if jiu-jitsu could find support during "the times of the worst inflation, in that time when sporting activity was nearly impossible," then they could persevere through the "iron will of our sporting community (*Sportgemeinde*)."[19] This essay set the dominant tone for *Jiu-Jitsu Sport* during the first few years of its existence, with many of the essays emphasizing jiu-jitsu's innate superiority as a sport while simultaneously bemoaning the German jiu-jitsu community's self-perceived status as misunderstood and marginalized outsiders.

Most issues featured one or two articles submitted by prominent jiu-jitsu instructors across Germany. "Die Entwicklung des Jiu-Jitsu-Sportes" by Rud.[olf] Krotki, an instructor at the *Deutsche Hochschule für Leibesübungen* in Leipzig, appeared in the first issue and offered a concise history of jiu-jitsu in Germany. Krotki echoed Vogt's earlier claim that jiu-jitsu had actually existed, in some primitive form, in all societies,

suggesting that advances in military technology in the Western world had made such a system of unarmed combat largely irrelevant, and that the Japanese alone had "maintained and further developed" the discipline.[20] Krotki did credit Rahn as one of the first to realize the potential value of jiu-jitsu, but ultimately was critical of the way in which jiu-jitsu was practiced in Germany, especially when compared to Japan, arguing that German clubs should emphasize jiu-jitsu's potential as a competitive sport over its utility as self-defense.[21] Krotki conceded that the formation of the RFJ was evidence that German jiu-jitsu was "on the right track," but concluded that the Japanese were still far superior to their German counterparts, both on an institutional and on an individual level. Indeed, Krotki went so far as to advocate that Germans should view the Japanese as a model of physical and mental emulation in the same way that the Japanese had once used German science.[22]

Jiu-Jitsu's standing association with techniques of law enforcement was taken up again in the very next issue, with the article "Polizei und Jiu-Jitsu." The author discussed the adoption of jiu-jitsu by police departments across Germany during the immediate postwar period as the result of two significant trends. The first was the evolving demographics of German police departments. A system that had been staffed largely by men with military training before World War I was now increasingly composed of men who, although requiring some physical training regimen in order to perform the job, were not especially keen to perform the "lockstep and the parade march . . . future officers should derive joy from their exercises and be convinced of their efficacy."[23] The solution was the incorporation of physical training regimes similar to those practiced by private individuals, including jiu-jitsu, into official training programs. The second development was the endemic social instability of the immediate postwar period; the author specifically referred to the problem of mass gatherings, which could often turn dangerous quickly, and the limited access that police officers had to side arms or other defensive weapons. This article is especially interesting in that it discussed jiu-jitsu both as a form of self-defense and as a physical training regimen without privileging one or the other, which was relatively rare in the contemporary literature about jiu-jitsu. Unfortunately, the article is unsigned, although it is reasonable to conclude that it was written by an individual associated with the police rather than an independent jiu-jitsu instructor or enthusiast, who were generally much more strident about differentiating between jiu-jitsu as self-defense and jiu-jitsu as a sport.

The RFJ's increasingly rigid self-identification as a sporting organization can be seen, for example, in the article "Neue Wege im Jiu-Jitsu-Sport," which called for specific reforms to the teaching and practice of jiu-jitsu in Germany. The author argued that the system for jiu-jitsu instruction was basically unchanged since its introduction a decade earlier,

with the courses for beginners still focusing on techniques more appropriate for self-defense than for competitive sport: "the 'freeing of the hands,' multiple techniques of 'escaping from clinches,' the 'defense against daggers and knives,' the 'action against an assault with a revolver,' the 'tricks performed with a hat or a chair,' etc."[24] The author conceded that all of these techniques were useful within the appropriate context, but warned that, when taught in a jiu-jitsu course for beginners, they prevented the participants from learning the fundamental skills necessary for successful competitive sparring. He suggested that the methodology of jiu-jitsu instruction be amended so as to make a clearer distinction between the sport of jiu-jitsu and its application as a form of self-defense—students should only be taught the defensive tricks and techniques after a thorough grounding in the sport, and only then in separate, specialized classes. Ultimately, the author argued that competitive jiu-jitsu needed to be systematized in order to better meet the expectations of a German audience more familiar with European sports like boxing or wrestling.

This initial article spurred a chorus of reactions, mostly positive, from jiu-jitsu clubs and instructors across Germany. Hans Feulner from Munich described a general assembly among the membership of his group following the publication of the article in order to discuss the suggested reforms, many of which were resoundingly applauded as making jiu-jitsu more approachable and interesting for the general public.[25] Krotki weighed in with a submitted response, wherein he reiterated several of the main points from his earlier article. He observed that, "Over the years we have come to the point where we no longer need to rely on self-defense, as good for promotion as it may be, but should teach the competitive sport first."[26] His response was exceptional, however, in that he restated his conviction that German jiu-jitsu should model itself after its Japanese counterpart, rather than on European forms of *Kampfsport.* Most of the other participants in this emergent debate, which the editorial staff of *Jiu-Jitsu Sport* contributed to in the April 1929 issue, instead emphasized German jiu-jitsu's unique trajectory of development as a national sport, which theoretically made it increasingly less analogous to other forms of the discipline, whether in Japan or in the West.[27]

Changing Priorities: Jiu-Jitsu vs. Judo

Around the same time that Erich Rahn opened his jiu-jitsu academy in Berlin, one of the early Western texts about judo, H. J. Hancock's *Das Kano Jiu-Jitsu (Jiudo),* appeared for the first time in a German translation. Although Kano Jigoro is remembered worldwide as the founder of judo, in Germany, his name still often appears alongside a less likely innovator in Japanese sporting history, Dr. Erwin Bälz.[28] In 1876, Bälz

was appointed to a post at what would later become the Medical College of Tokyo Imperial University; of all the foreign experts hired by the Meiji government, he managed to hold onto his position the longest, staying in Japan for 27 years and was eventually appointed personal physician-in-waiting to the Meiji Emperor.[29] Bälz is still memorialized in Japan as one of the fathers of modern Westernized medicine, but in Germany, his legacy is much more closely tied to his advocacy of Japanese martial arts, most significantly, judo.

In the introduction he contributed to the German translation of Hancock's work, Bälz described how he first became interested in jiu-jitsu while attempting to find a form of physical exercise appropriate for his students at the university; after seeing an exhibition by an elderly jiu-jitsu master Bälz became convinced that jiu-jitsu was "the ideal form of gymnastics."[30] Although Bälz expressed deep admiration for the physical practice of jiu-jitsu, he reserved his greatest praise for the synthesis of the physical and the moral that Kano had achieved with judo. The discipline that Kano enforced in his school, Bälz claimed, "claimed for jiu-jitsu a moral side and cultivated it in that he taught the strictest self-control, not only in regard to the physical but also in relationship to the character."[31] This self-discipline, although important on a practical level because so many of the moves employed in judo could have otherwise resulted in serious injury, also gave judo an aura of moral elevation that gradually challenged the standards by which Germans judged Japanese martial arts.

The first German judo club was formed in 1922 in Frankfurt by Alfred Rhode, a former student of Erich Rahn.[32] For several years, jiu-jitsu and judo coexisted relatively collegially in Germany, most likely because the still relatively small community of instructors and active participants made cooperation necessary if either discipline was to survive. The first signs of trouble appeared in the summer of 1932, when Alfred Rhode organized a summer training course in judo in Frankfurt am Main, and a rival organization to the RFJ, the German Judo Federation (*Deutsche Judo-Bund*) was formed. Along with this growing associational bifurcation between jiu-jitsu and judo, a series of articles appeared in *Jiu-Jitsu Sport* during 1932–1933 that evidenced a growing philosophical tension between the two factions.

Jiu-Jitsu Sport covered all of Rhode's activities during the summer of 1932 thoroughly and sympathetically, yet, in the September issue, an author identified only as Gramkau fired the opening salvo in a debate as to the relative merits of jiu-jitsu and judo. The article, "Judo-Dämmerung," discussed both jiu-jitsu and judo, but his argument hinged on one essential point: "Let us be clear that the difference lies only in the rules of combat, not at all in the system itself."[33] This may seem an insignificant critique in retrospect, but it called into question the need for judo as an

alternative discipline to jiu-jitsu; if the differences were procedural rather than fundamental, then all of the claims made as to moral superiority of judo were meaningless. From this starting-point, the debate soon turned into a referendum that concerned the relative value of native tradition and imported innovation as it did the respective merits of jiu-jitsu and judo.

By 1932, many in the German jiu-jitsu community believed that their sport had evolved its own identity, distinct from its counterpart organizations in the United States and the United Kingdom. The extent to which this was objectively true is difficult to judge from the available sources; what is clear is that the German jiu-jitsu community self-identified as exceptional. An article from January 1931 had already made the argument that German jiu-jitsu and Japanese jiu-jitsu were effectually two different sports, and that because most other countries had adopted Japanese jiu-jitsu as the template for practice, German jiu-jitsu was effectively a unique discipline.[34] Soon after Rhode's organizational activities in the summer of 1932, Otokar Klimek expanded upon this idea to draw clear boundaries between the foreign import of judo and a form of jiu-jitsu that he understood as authentically German. He narrated German jiu-jitsu's roots in self-defense, the early struggle by a few energetic instructors to popularize the sport, and observed that the German jiu-jitsu organizations had few organizational ties to groups in other Western nations, concluding that "the German jiu-jitsu persists relatively isolated from other branches of sport up to the present day."[35] For Klimek and his colleagues, German jiu-jitsu's uniqueness was a point of pride, a testament to the difficult early years, and a symbol of the continuing evolution of a specifically German *Sportkultur*.

In the February 1933 issue of *Jiu-Jitsu Sport,* Alfred Rhode attempted to explain to an increasingly defensive German jiu-jitsu community how judo could be helpful, even necessary. He agreed with Klimek's earlier assessment that German jiu-jitsu had evolved out of a system of self-defense, but to Rhode this represented a critical problem with the sport: "No sport can serve its purpose, if its ethical demands come up short. The jiu-jitsu cultivated in Germany seems to me to be based too much on just self-defense. The moral merits that are inherent to the Japanese method must be adopted by Germany."[36] For Rhode the question of whether German jiu-jitsu was unique and special was secondary to the question of whether it was a morally instructive discipline. Yet even in advocating for a greater regard for judo's "moral merits," Rhode still felt it necessary to defend himself against charges that he is acting in an "un-German" way by aligning himself with a foreign practice. Despite all the inroads international sporting culture had made into Germany by the 1930s, the German jiu-jitsu community still thus used a litmus test of native/foreign in order to judge philosophical and organizational allegiances.

An article simply signed 'Gra.' in the March 1933 issue raised the eminently practical point that having separate jiu-jitsu and judo organizations in Germany would be unnecessarily complicated, ultimately concluding that if a choice had to made, jiu-jitsu should serve as the blanket authority, owing to its greater degree of "Germanness."[37] Franz Dauhrer, however, had the final word on this controversy in the April issue, with the appropriately titled essay "Nun endlich Schluß mit dieser Debatte!" Dauhrer had little patience with any of the arguments in favor of judo, first dismissing the notion that judo was worthier because it had greater clout internationally: "If it comes to it, there are a total of about a dozen judo clubs in all of Europe, including Germany, and the United States—that is the entirety of 'internationalism.' To invoke this pathetic internationalism and to regard it as such should suggest, in addition, a great deal of naiveté and unquestioning obedience to the Japanese gentlemen."[38] Dauhrer's essay dripped with thinly veiled sarcasm and contempt for the moral self-regard of the judo advocates. He referenced earlier claims that the Japanese should be regarded as role models for their superior techniques and ethics, yet whereas advocates for judo had used this a platform to suggest an incremental transition to Kano's system, Dauhrer rejected the basis of the claim itself—that Japan was the home of jiu-jitsu. According to Dauhrer, "True, Japan is the motherland of judo, the Mongolian conception of a *Kampfsystem* that was originally adopted from China, but Germany is the motherland of German jiu-jitsu, the German conception of a system of unarmed hand-to-hand combat originating and developed in Germany."[39] For Dauhrer, jiu-jitsu had become German and should be regarded as such. Vogt may have reflected nostalgically in 1909 that Germany had lost its counterpart to jiu-jitsu through the intervention of time and foreign cultural influences, but by 1933 factions of the German sporting community had adopted jiu-jitsu as their own and were willing to defend it actively against foreign interference—the obvious irony of wielding jiu-jitsu as a shield against international sport, as embodied by judo, went conspicuously unremarked.

Conclusion

The introduction of Japanese martial arts to Germany during the first decades of the twentieth century may seem a topic of minor importance, a bit of academic trivia at best, yet it lends a necessary new perspective as to the content of the evolving German-Japanese cultural relationship. The transcultural exchange between Germany and Japan during the first half of the twentieth century—of which *Sportkultur* was but one facet—was predicated on the assumption of innate similarities between German and Japanese culture, similarities that could be systematically identified,

elaborated, and strategically deployed. It was this emphasis on cultural parallels that ultimately made jiu-jitsu, and later judo, successful within the German context; because Japanese culture was understood to resemble traditional German culture on some fundamental level, it became easier to nationalize jiu-jitsu as akin to, and therefore, reconcilable with the German *Sportgeist*.

Ultimately, the German reception of jiu-jitsu and judo was relatively unproblematic because it tapped into a broader consensus that Japanese culture was, at its core, familiar and recognizable to Germans. This transcultural romanticism presented Japanese culture using much of the same rhetoric and symbolic associations that informed German national romanticism, particularly a regard for a form of hegemonic masculinity grounded in stereotypes of martial heroism. The German adoption of jiu-jitsu, in this respect, represented an attempted reclamation of its "imagined" native sporting and physical traditions in a way that was not dependent on the dynamics of international sport, but was instead a reflection of the unique shape of the German-Japanese cultural relationship during the first half of the twentieth century. The casual inclusion of jiu-jitsu within the program of sporting opportunities of the Nazi leisure administration therefore represents the culmination of a process that, while not consciously political, did have significant political and ideological implications for the trajectory of German-Japanese engagement during the subsequent decade.

Notes

1. This is not to say that other German images of Japan did not exist during this era; there was, for example, a dynamic cooperative relationship between the two nations as scientific and medical innovators. However, whereas this "scientific" framing of Japan also appeared in other national contexts, as did the widespread Western appreciation for Japanese art, the German regard for Japanese martial culture was rather more exceptional for the era, in its emphasis on commonality.
2. "Berliner Jiu-Jitsu-Turnier 1928–29," *Jiu-Jitsu Sport* 1, no. 4 (January 1929), 27.
3. Allen Guttmann, *From Ritual to Record. The Nature of Modern Sport* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 87–89.
4. Christiane Eisenberg, *"English Sport" und deutsche Bürger. Eine Gesellschaftsgeschichte 1800–1939* (Paderborn; München: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1999), 250–61.
5. See for example: Erik N. Jensen, *Body by Weimar: Athletes, Gender, and German Modernity* (Oxford University Press, 2010); Bernd Wedemeyer-Kolwe, *"Der neue Mensch" Körperkultur im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2004).

6. Jiu-Jitsu was originally a method of unarmed combat brought to Japan from mainland Asia and cultivated by the samurai warrior caste; its basic principles involve the manipulation of an opponent's balance and physical pressure points in order to subdue or injure them. The mantra often repeated in reference to jiu-jitsu is that "victory comes from surrender," which refers to the various techniques used in the discipline to turn an opponent's strength or advantage against them, as opposed to attacking them directly. Throws, joint locks, pins, and holds are all common techniques used in the discipline—karate and other Asian martial arts, in contrast, utilize kicks and strikes much more extensively—with the ultimate goal being either to bring the opponent into submission or to cause enough pain to force a surrender. Judo is a modern derivative of jiu-jitsu. Although the technical distinctions between jiu-jitsu and judo is a matter of some debate, there is a very clear difference between the two words in their Japanese context. The word "jitsu/jutsu" suggests a more mechanical technique whereas "dō" literally means "way" and is mostly used in reference to religious or ethical doctrine (e.g., Bushidō = Way of the Warrior).
7. Martin Vogt, *Dschiu-Dschitsu der Japaner—das alte deutsche Freiringen* (Carl Aug. Seyfried & Comp.: München, 1909), 5.
8. Klaus-Dieter Matschke and Herbert Velte, *100 Jahre Jiu-Jitsu/Ju-Jutsu und Judo in Deutschland (Eine Chronik von 1905 bis 2005)* (Schramm Sport GmbH.: Vierkirchen, 2005), 37.
9. Ludwig Rieß (1861–1918) was one of the founding members of the Department of History at the Imperial University of Tokyo, where he was instrumental in introducing German positivist methodology to Japanese historiography. He had returned to Germany in 1903, and wrote a series of articles for the German press during the Russo-Japanese War on topics like the modern Japanese army, bushido, and contemporary Japanese politics.
10. Ludwig Rieß, "Die japanische Ringkunst," *BT* no. 157 (March 26, 1905).
11. One immediate association is with the *Völkerschauen,* the most famous of these Wilhelmine spectacles and a similar performance of the exotic. See: Eric Ames, *Carl Hagenbeck's Empire of Entertainments* (University of Washington Press, 2008); Andrew Zimmerman, *Anthropology and Antihumanism in Imperial Germany* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
12. Vogt, *Dschiu-Dschitsu der Japaner*, 6.
13. Erich Rahn, *Jiu-Jitsu, die unsichtbare Waffe* (Leo Alterthum Verlag: Berlin, 1932), 10.
14. By 1906, there were several Japanese *Jiu-Jitsu-Meister* living in Germany. Rahn later identified Katsukuma Higashi and Agitaro Ono as two of his foremost instructors and mentors. See: Erich Rahn, *Neue Griff und Kniffe im Jiu-Jitsu/Judo. Waffenlose Selbstverteidigung* (Berlin: Falken-Verlag Erich Sicker, 1972), 9.

15. Anonymous, "Jiu-Jitsu im Polizeipräsidium," *Vossische Zeitung* (June 30, 1910).
16. Unlike other sports that were explicitly coded as either masculine or feminine, jiu-jitsu occupied a somewhat liminal gendered space. Rahn's studio offered classes specifically for women, both for self-defense and for competitive training. Marga Garnich, "Jiu-Jitsu als Selbstverteidigung im Dienste der Frau," *Velhagen & Klasings Monatshefte* 51, no. 6 (February 1937), 630.
17. Ibid., 13.
18. Ibid., 18.
19. Anonymous, "Zum Geleit!" *Jiu-Jitsu Sport* 1, no. 1 (October 1928), 1.
20. Rud. Krotki, "Die Entwicklung des Jiu-Jitsu-Sportes," *Jiu-Jitsu Sport* 1, no. 1 (October 1928), 2.
21. Ibid., 2.
22. Ernst Fischer, "Jiu-Jitsu, der Sport der Jugend," *Jiu-Jitsu Sport* 1, no. 1 (October 1928), 3.
23. Anonymous, "Polizei und Jiu-Jitsu," *Jiu-Jitsu Sport* 1, no. 2 (November 1928), 10.
24. Anonymous, "Neue Wege im Jiu-Jitsu Sport," *Jiu-Jitsu Sport* 1, no. 4 (January 1929), 26.
25. Anonymous, "Neue Wege im Jiu-Jitsu-Sport," *Jiu-Jitsu Sport* 1, no. 5 (February 1929), 34–35.
26. Anonymous, "Neue Wege im Jiu-Jitsu-Sport," *Jiu-Jitsu Sport* 1, no. 6 (March 1929), 42.
27. Anonymous, "Jiu-Jitsu als Kampfsport," *Jiu-Jitsu Sport* 1, no. 7 (April 1929), 50.
28. Inoue Shun, "The Invention of the Martial Arts: Kanō Jigorō and Kōdōkan Judo," in *Mirror of Modernity: Invented Traditions of Modern Japan* ed. Stephen Vlastos (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998), 163–173.
29. Bälz has a complicated legacy in Japan as a scientist, most notably, for his racial studies of the Japanese, which profoundly impacted the trajectory of Japanese anthropology. Hoi-Eun Kim, *Doctors of Empire: Medical and Cultural Encounters between Imperial Germany and Meiji Japan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014).
30. Erwin Bälz, "Einführung zur deutschen Ausgabe"in H.J. Hancock and Katsukuma Higashi, *Das Kano Jiu-Jitsu (Jiudo)* (Julius Hoffmann Verlag: Stuttgart, 1906), XII.
31. Ibid., XIV.
32. Wedemeyer-Kolwe, *Der neue Mensch*, 308.
33. Gramkau, "Judo-Dämmerung," *Jiu-Jitsu Sport* 5, no. 6 (September 1932), 3.
34. Anonymous, "Japanisches und Deutsches Jiu-Jitsu," *Jiu-Jitsu Sport* 3, no. 10 (January 1931), 3.
35. Otokar Klimek, "Judo-Dämmerung," *Jiu-Jitsu Sport* 5, no. 8 (November 1932), 5.

36. Rhode, "Warum Judo?" *Jiu-Jitsu Sport* 5, no. 11 (February 1933), 6.
37. Gra, "Jiu-Jitsu und Judo," *Jiu-Jitsu Sport* 5, no. 12 (March 1933), 1–4.
38. Franz Dauhrer, "Nun endlich Schluß mit dieser Debatte!" *Jiu-Jitsu Sport* 6, no. 1 (April 1933), 3.
39. Ibid., 3.

6

Anna and Siegfried Berliner

Two Academic Bridge Builders between Germany and Japan

Hans K. Rode and Christian W. Spang

In recent years, various books have been published that provide information about some largely overlooked bridge builders between Germany and Japan.[1] Most *oyatoi gaikokujin* (foreign advisors) of the Meiji (1868–1912) and Taishō (1912–1926) era, as well as the vast majority of aspiring Japanese scholars who studied in Europe or America during these years, went abroad alone.[2] Many of these men found local consorts or wives.[3] Yet a growing number of German professionals going to Japan were accompanied by sophisticated wives, many of whom also played a visible role within early twentieth-century German-Japanese relations.

Siegfried (1884–1961) and Anna Berliner (1888–1977) were one such professional couple. They influenced the relationship between East and West in rather noteworthy, if not yet broadly examined, ways that deserve scholarly attention. As widely published authors, both Berliners were pioneers of academic emancipation and bridge builders between Germany and Japan at the same time. Their presence gently pushed the two nations toward a common understanding of how to treat one another, even during the hardest of times.

This chapter will explore three dimensions of their careers and life experiences. First, this unusual couple made an effort to make Japanese POW camps during World War I more bearable for German prisoners. Their actions led to the closing of various makeshift camps and thus facilitated the creation of the well-known Bandō camp. Second, their views on Japan will be examined through their professional activities and their writings. Third, the last section of this chapter will deal with their work in the Weimar Republic, their experiences as Jews in Nazi Germany, and their eventual emigration to the United States.

FAMOUS COUPLES IN GERMAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS

Before acquainting ourselves with Siegfried and Anna Berliner, it is worthwhile to consider the circumstances that made it possible for them to live and work in early twentieth century Japan as an academic couple. Initially, foreign businessmen, diplomats, and scholars went to Japan alone, often leaving their wives and families behind. After the *fin-de-siècle*, it became increasingly common for couples to go abroad together.[4] An early example for this was Dr. Bruno Petzold (1873–1949) and his Norwegian-German wife, Hanka Schjelderup-Petzold (1862–1937). While the former journalist Petzold evolved into an expert on Buddhism and a professor at the prestigious first high school in Tokyo,[5] his wife was a celebrated pianist and soprano and worked as a respected lecturer at the *Tokyo Ongaku Daigaku* (Music Academy) in Ueno from 1910 to 1924.[6] She was followed (1925–1931) by the equally distinguished German-Jewish soprano Margarte Netke-Löwe (1889–1971), who later taught at the *Kunitachi Ongaku Daigaku* (Kunitachi College of Music). Her husband, Martin Netke (1881–1971), was a well-known figure in Tokyo because he ran a photography shop in Ginza. He also worked as a German lecturer at the Tokyo Foreign Language School for many years.[7]

Although the above-mentioned women and men worked in Japanese academia, dual-degree PhD couples were rare in the early twentieth century. Within the German-Japanese relationship, one of the very few such combinations (other than Anna and Siegfried Berliner) was Dr. Kanokogi Kazunobu (1884–1949) and his Polish-German wife Dr. Cornelia (nee Zielinski, 1889–1970).[8] While he has attracted some research as a pro-German pan-Asianist and co-founder of the German-Japanese Society in Berlin,[9] few people are familiar with his wife, despite the fact that she taught German at an elite school in Tokyo for decades.[10]

Similarly, the little-known Jewish-German academic couple—Dr. Anna and Dr. Siegfried Berliner—has so far attracted little attention. There are some specialized studies about Anna Berliner,[11] but Siegfried's publications about Japan have been largely overlooked. However, since both Berliners played a not insignificant role in East-West relations, it would be helpful to begin with a brief overview of their lives, so one can better understand their cross-cultural efforts.

Siegfried Berliner was born in 1884 into a well-integrated and wealthy German-Jewish family.[12] His brother Bernhard (1885–1976) became a renowned psychologist in San Francisco[13] and his sister Cora (1890–1942)—later murdered by the Nazis—was a social scientist.[14] However, the most famous member of the family was Siegfried's uncle Emil(e) Berliner (1851–1929), who—after immigrating to the United

States—changed the world of entertainment by inventing the vinyl record and the gramophone.[15]

Siegfried Berliner studied mathematics, physics, and economics in Leipzig and Göttingen, where he received his doctoral degree in 1905.[16] After that, he joined the Hannover military as an *Einjährig-Freiwilliger* (one-year volunteer).[17] In 1907/1908, he went to the United States for postgraduate research at George Washington University in Washington, DC, where he "studied especially Constitutional Law under Chief Justice [John Marshall] Harlan."[18] Upon his return to Germany, Siegfried took up a position as lecturer at the *Handelshochschule* (Commercial College) in Leipzig, where he was promoted to professor two years later at the age of 26. With his career soundly established, he married Anna Meyer on September 25, 1910.

Anna was born in 1888 into a wealthy Jewish family in Halberstadt. She met Cora Berliner at a high school in Hannover. After graduation, Anna studied medicine in Freiburg and Berlin for three semesters before following Siegfried to Leipzig,[19] where she introduced herself to the famous psychologist Dr. Wilhelm M. Wundt (1832–1920). Wundt had been the *Doktorvater* (doctoral advisor) of Siegfried's brother Bernhard,[20] but had so far only accepted male students as doctoral candidates. While Anna's official *Doktorvater* remained Dr. Max Brahn,[21] Wundt acted as second advisor[22] and participated in her *Rigorosum* (oral exam) in the summer of 1913.[23] Immediately afterward, both Berliners left for Japan so that Siegfried could take up his new position to teach *shōgyō-gaku* or *Handelstechnik*[24] (commercial science) at Tokyo Imperial University.[25] Based on Wundt's connections,[26] Anna Berliner worked at the university's psychological laboratory and the attached psychiatric hospital in 1913/1914.

Their life as a couple was frequently disturbed by the changing relations between Germany, Japan, and the United States. First, Siegfried spent one year in Washington (1907/1908), then he went to Tokyo with his wife (1913). In the following year, he joined the German defense forces in Qingdao (China), ultimately leading to his detention as a prisoner-of-war. Anna spent five years (1915–1920) in the United States alone while her husband was in Japanese custody. After his release, Siegfried was rehired by his former university and reunited with his wife in Tokyo, where both conducted their research and taught until 1925. Following the stabilization of the Weimar Republic, the Berliners returned to Germany. In addition to their various other activities, they served as representatives of the German East Asiatic Society (OAG), only to be ousted in 1934 due to their Jewish heritage. Although they managed to escape Nazi Germany in 1938, it took about a decade before they finally settled down in the United States. After being deprived of their German citizenship, both Berliners were naturalized as American citizens.

AFTER THE JAPANESE-GERMAN WAR (1914): FROM THE MARUGAME TO THE BANDŌ POW CAMP

After the outbreak of World War I, 30-year-old Siegfried Berliner was among the Germans who went to China to defend Qingdao. After about ten weeks of futile fighting, roughly 5,000 Germans, as well as a few Austro-Hungarians, surrendered to the superior Japanese forces in China, whereupon the latter occupied the German leasehold.[27] The beaten defenders were sent to Japan as prisoners of war but were never perceived by the Japanese as real enemies.

The POWs were therefore received in a surprisingly friendly fashion, a welcome that resembled the cheerful send-off that some 120 Japan-based Germans had experienced before leaving the country on their way to Qingdao in August 1914.[28] This lack of enmity against the Germans was summarized very well by the last Japanese representative (*chargé d'affaires*) to Imperial Germany, Funakoshi Mitsunojō, who described his feelings upon departing from Berlin in 1914 as follows: "I left Germany without any enmity towards the people of Germany [. . .]. [. . .] Our public had no enmity against Germany."[29]

The German businessman Johannes Barth, one of Siegfried Berliner's fellow POWs, described the welcome for their group of 324 POWs in the small town of Marugame on Shikoku Island on November 16, 1914 in his autobiography thus: "The village entrance was decorated with flowers and above the road we discovered to our biggest surprise a plate decorated with flowers and the German words: 'Herzlichst und mitleidvollst willkommen.'"[30]

The Marugame camp for members of the second and seventh German regiment had been hastily constructed and initially consisted of little more than the fenced-in buildings of Shioya-Betsuin temple—which housed the ordinary soldiers—and a little warehouse for officers.[31] The situation in the camp has been described by Barth as follows:

> The temple, which now became our home, was the most beautiful and biggest building in all Marugame. We common soldiers each had one tatami mat to sleep on in the huge temple hall. The officers had a smaller building of their own. In front of the temple there was a wide courtyard which served as space for the construction of a kitchen, Japanese-style washing rooms and for a bath. At the sides of the big hall a few small rooms were built where during daytime we could sit at a big table and where we could eat.[32]

The cramped temple grounds and insufficient food soon created discontent among the POWs. To improve conditions, the highest-ranking officer,

Captain Waldemar Lancelle, submitted a list of requests a mere two days after their arrival.[33] As a result, a cafeteria was opened for two hours in the afternoon, offering beer, cigarettes, fruits, and sweets. Furthermore, the meal portions were increased and POWs were allowed to cook for themselves.

The daily routine in the camp included compulsory morning roll call, some military drill, joint meals, and irregular (guarded) excursions into the vicinity. Because there was no forced labor, the POWs spent most of their days organizing and participating in sport competitions, or occupying themselves in activities such as learning languages, playing musical instruments, or staging plays. Siegfried Berliner, for example, participated in concerts as well as in chamber music sessions.

After Anna got the news that her husband was interned on Shikoku Island, she unsuccessfully asked for his transfer to Tokyo through a letter to the American ambassador in Japan, George W. Guthrie.[34] Following this failed attempt, Anna moved to Marugame, where she saw her husband for the first time as POW No. 1841 on February 15, 1915.[35] As regular visits were permitted only twice a month, Anna went to the camp roughly every two weeks. Shortly before she left Japan for further research in the United States, more frequent encounters were granted by the camp commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ishii Yashirō, as cautiously documented in the camp diary.[36] At one of these meetings in mid-August, Siegfried passed an anonymous letter of complaint to Anna, which she smuggled out of the camp and brought to the United States. From there it was sent to the German government, which then asked the Woodrow Wilson administration (representing German interests in Japan until April 1917) to intervene on behalf of the German POWs. The letter listed examples of maltreatment, like the ones enumerated below:

- Completely insufficient food during the initial weeks.
- Available space per soldier of only one tatami (less than two square meters).
- Distance between open toilets and living quarters less than 10 meters.
- Insufficient heating during winter season.
- Repeated harassments by the guards: pushing and beating of the prisoners.
- Bad treatment of the sick in the hospital section.
- Singing rehearsals banned on various occasions.
- Prohibition to hold lectures.
- Delivery of goods and letters to the prisoners delayed or rejected.[37]

As a result of these complaints, the Japanese government granted American representatives the right to inspect the POW camps. In March 1916, the 23-year old Benjamin Sumner Welles (1892–1961)[38] of the American embassy in Tokyo visited all the camps. His report criticized other

places more harshly than Marugame, but he still called the camp extremely overcrowded and clearly stated that the Shioya-Betsuin temple was not suitable for the accommodation of prisoners.[39] There is no doubt that Sumner Welles' report played an important role in the closure of the three makeshift POW camps on Shikoku Island (Marugame, Matsuyama, and Tokushima) and the construction of the much bigger Bandō camp as a replacement.[40]

After the transfer of all POWs on Shikoku to Bandō in April 1917, Siegfried Berliner continued to play in the so-called Engel Orchestra, now enlarged to 24 musicians. According to the orchestra's chronicle, Berliner acted not only as its first violinist but also as secretary and treasurer.[41] As there were multiple orchestras in the camp, the famous first performance of Ludwig van Beethoven's Ninth Symphony took place on June 1, 1918 by the Tokushima, and not by the Engel Orchestra. Therefore, Siegfried Berliner was most likely among the witnesses of this historic event but was not one of the performers.[42]

In the new camp, Berliner started teaching a course on the financing of joint-stock companies.[43] Apparently, some of these lectures where held in the nearby city; at least that is how one of Berliner's fellow-inmates, the businessman and Japanologist, Kurt Meissner, remembered it in his autobiography: "Professor Berliner offered lectures in Economics in Muya (nowadays Naruto). I served as interpreter [. . .]."[44]

Activities in Tokyo (1920–1925) and the Berliners' Views of Japan

Although Tokyo Imperial University's Law Faculty had decided to terminate Siegfried Berliner's contract at the beginning of the "Japanese-German War," a faculty meeting had discussed (but rejected) a plan to reinstate him in December 1914.[45] After Siegfried's release in 1920, he was employed by the university's newly established Business Department.[46] Despite spending five years in a POW camp, Siegfried resumed his work with a very positive attitude in early 1920.[47]

At the very beginning of his renewed employment at Tokyo Imperial University, Siegfried published the first four books of his *Weltwirtschaftliche Abhandlungen* (World Economic Treaties) series, which he edited until 1933. Volume I–IV, mentioned below, all appeared through the "Hahnsche Buchhandlung".[48] The four books dealt with the Japanese import trade (I), Chinese imports (II), the Japanese iron industry (III), and the Chinese export business (IV).

Volume I: *Organisation und Betrieb des japanischen Importhandels*, Hannover, 1920.

Volume II: *Organisation und Betrieb des Import-Geschäfts in China*, Hannover, 1920.

Volume III: *Die Entwicklung der japanischen Eisenindustrie während des Krieges*, co-authored with Kurt Meissner, Hannover, 1920.
Volume IV: *Organisation und Betrieb des Export-Geschäfts in China*, Hannover, 1920.

A good deal of the research for and the writing of these publications had been conducted in Bandō.[49] According to his own foreword, Berliner wrote Volume I based on material supplied by fellow inmates Kurt Meissner and Heinrich Steinfeld.[50] The foreword was signed, "Kriegsgefangenen-Lager Bando bei Tokushima im August 1919" (POW Camp Bandō near Tokushima in August 1919). Volumes II and IV have similar signatures.[51] The first volume featured the following self-description of Siegfried Berliner: "vor dem Kriege Professor der Handelstechnik an der Kaiserlichen Universität zu Tokyo" (before the war Professor of Commerce at Tokyo Imperial University), which shows that the book had been completed before Siegfried was (re-)hired. Berliner had advertised two of his forthcoming books in November 1919 in the daily telegram service of the Bandō camp; he asked fellow inmates interested in obtaining copies of the books to sign a list that he provided.[52]

Volume III of *Weltwirtschafliche Abhandlungen* featured Kurt Meissner as co-author. The foreword was nevertheless written by Berliner alone in June 1920 on board the *S. S. Mishima Maru*, most likely, on his way to Germany for a holiday. The title page shows that he was already teaching again at Tokyo Imperial University by then. He was featured as "Professor der Handelstechnik a[n]. d[er]. Kaiserlichen Universität, Tokyo" (Professor of Commerce at Tokyo Imperial University). In 1924, Siegfried Berliner published a booklet titled *Das Geld als Kapital* (Money as Capital), as well as another short text about the indigo trade.[53] The most striking feature of the latter volume was the personal dedication of the booklet to Matsue Toyohisa, the commander of the Bandō camp.[54]

At the Imperial University, Siegfried lectured in English and exerted considerable influence on the younger researchers there because he introduced new ideas in the field of economics.[55] He was also instrumental in the early stages of the establishment of a collection of statutes and annual reports (*shōgyō-shiryo bunko*).[56] Besides his university duties, Berliner also became involved with the German East Asiatic Society (OAG), which he had joined in 1913.[57] In February 1921, he audited the year-end settlement of 1920, and from 1921 to 1924, he acted as the association's treasurer.[58] In both functions, Berliner succeeded Kurt Meissner.[59] Due to a lack of any documented history of the OAG for the early 1920s,[60] it is hard to tell if either Siegfried or Anna presented their research at the OAG, but it is very likely that they did.[61]

As most of his publications are very specialized, dealing with economic questions, only one of his early works shall be briefly introduced here,

namely, the one that he co-authored with Kurt Meissner, *Die Entwicklung der japanischen Eisenindustrie während des Krieges* (The development of the Japanese Iron-Industry during the [First World] War). Berliner and Meissner had compiled this during their internment in Bandō, which was, without doubt, an astonishing accomplishment. Apparently, they had access to Japanese periodicals, because there are many references to newspaper articles,[62] even though, in most cases, the exact source was not indicated. In his already mentioned foreword, Berliner explicitly explained that he and Meissner had in mind as readers those individuals who had a practical interest in the development of Japan's economy. This hands-on approach is reflected throughout the book, which seems to have aligned with Berliner's above-mentioned initiative to create a collection of statutes and annual reports at Tokyo Imperial University, as well as his later career in the insurance business, rather than as a regular economics professor.

The co-authored introduction to the book is prophetic because it referenced the ideal of autarky, which World War I had strengthened. The fact that Britain and the United States had (nearly) halted the export of iron to Japan during World War I was interpreted as a lesson to the Tokyo leadership to strive for autarky. With hindsight, this sounded like a prediction of Japan's later Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere policy.[63]

Berliner and Meissner explained the past and present status of no fewer than 68 Japanese steel companies—even though they concluded that only the largest seven played a decisive role, due to their much bigger size.[64] The analysis presented by the two authors was cautiously optimistic. Berliner and Meissner envisaged that some steel companies would collapse due to the postwar economic downturn, but expected some healthy development for the survivors. Overall, they predicted that the increase of the country's iron output would reduce Japan's dependence on iron imports in the future.[65]

Many of Siegfried Berliner's works can still be found in German and Japanese libraries. Most likely, their practical approach matched the attitude of the immediate postwar years. Also, the fact that the above-mentioned book *Organisation und Betrieb des Import-Geschäfts in China* was not only translated into French by J. R. Baylin, but published in two editions (1924/1928) with the title *Pratique commerciale en Chine*,[66] indicates that Siegfried's research was appreciated beyond German-Japanese circles.

Around the time Siegfried was allowed to leave the Bandō camp in 1920, Anna Berliner returned to Tokyo. She had spent the first year of her exile in the United States at the psychology laboratory of the University of California, Berkeley (1915/1916). In San Francisco, she stayed for a while with Siegfried's younger brother Bernhard.[67] Later, she continued her studies at Colombia University (1916–1919) in the fields of psychology, philosophy, and anthropology. Toward the end of her stay, she

worked as a psychologist at the Hebrew Orphan Asylum in New York (1917–1919).[68] During her years on the East Coast, some of her research was published in professional journals.[69]

Back in Japan, Anna studied Japanese advertisements and worked as an advisor for Hoshi Pharmaceutical Company. She developed tests for selecting female workers and even screened employees herself. She also taught at Hoshi Seiyaku Commercial College,[70] as well as at Nihon University.[71] Her active life as a researcher is documented by at least six articles in psychological journals in Germany (1920–1923),[72] and others appeared in Japanese periodicals.[73] One of these was based on a lecture that Anna delivered at Meiji University in Tokyo on June 24, 1922. It was published in *Jitsugyō Kai (The Business World)*, in English and Japanese, as "Trade-Mark and Character."[74] Her Japanese publications appeared in psychological journals such as *Shinri Kenkyū (Psychological Research)*, the organ of the Japanese Psychological Association,[75] and trade-related periodicals like *Jitsugyō no Sekai (The World of Business)*,[76] indicating her connection to both worlds.

In the autumn of 1924, a few months before the couple returned to Germany, Anna Berliner finished the first draft of a concise but pioneering work about Japanese newspaper advertisements, which consisted of about 50 pages of text and 60 pages of reproductions from Japanese newspapers. It was published in Stuttgart the following year as Volume VII of Siegfried's *Weltwirtschaftliche Abhandlungen* with the title *Japanische Reklame in der Tageszeitung (Japanese newspaper advertisements)*.[77] In her book, she claimed that while it was the aim of Western advertising to convince potential buyers, advertisements in Japan aimed at pleasing the onlooker aesthetically, and thus creating a positive atmosphere. It was Siegfried's acquaintance, Kurt Meissner, who reviewed the book positively for the OAG, thus spreading her name among OAG members worldwide.[78]

Along with her work on advertisements, Anna Berliner was engaged in other activities. She acted as an advisor to Count Gotō Shinpei during his term as mayor of Tokyo (1920–1923).[79] Anna also applied her Tokyo-experience to write some shorter pieces on Japanese theater and an introduction to contemporary Japanese periodicals.[80] Furthermore, she composed a well-informed article about the situation of contemporary Japanese women.[81] In it, she spoke positively about the situation of women in Japan, pointing to many examples of emancipated women, but also mentioned some of the problems—like widespread prostitution and the fact that the legal position of wives and husbands after marriage was unequal.[82] In the conclusion to her article, Anna mentioned that it would be wrong if Japanese women were to blindly follow the precedents of Western feminist trends. Instead, she suggested that Japanese women should maintain their alleged superiority gained by voluntary subordination.

In Japan, Anna Berliner had immersed herself in weekly tea ceremony lessons. Her originally private interest in the "way of tea" (*cha-dō*) finally became more serious when she decided to write a book on the topic, leading to an intensification of her related studies toward the end of her time in Japan.[83] Back in Germany, she composed *Der Teekult in Japan* (1930),[84] one of the most comprehensive Western works about the Japanese tea ceremony, again reviewed favorably by Kurt Meissner.[85]

Based on her own first-hand experience, the book explained the objects used in the ceremony, the way participants should behave, and the setting; it also elucidated some of the seasonal changes to the procedure. This 369-page text was followed by a list of around 1200 relevant Japanese terms, which were given in both alphabetic spelling and in Kanji. After the table of contents on page 395, there were 64 additional (unnumbered) pages with about 100 related pictures, which means that the book consists of more than 450 pages. In a lecture delivered 1978 in memory of Anna Berliner at Pacific University in Forest Grove, Mathew Alpern regarded the book as the final highlight of "the most productive phase of her professional life (and that of Siegfried's)."[86]

Activities of the Berliners after Leaving Japan

In 1925, the Berliners returned to Saxony. At that time, Leipzig had already been playing an important role in Germany's relations with Japan for decades. Since the late 1870s, an impressive collection of Japanese artifacts, gathered by the OAG in Tokyo, could (and still can) be seen in the local Ethnology Museum.[87] Harrassowitz publishers distributed its books about Japan and East Asia all over the world; and its local competitor, Asia Major, was responsible for all OAG publications. In 1932, Leipzig University finally opened the second Department of Japanese Studies in Germany.[88]

In this environment, Siegfried Berliner, in addition to teaching part time at the local Commercial College and acting as co-founder and director of the "Hamburg-Leipzig Life Insurance Bank AG," established an office representing the interests of the OAG in Germany. His activities included negotiations with authors and publishers as well as correspondence with OAG members in Europe. From 1929 onward, Anna Berliner was officially registered as a co-representative.[89] During these years, their home was not only decorated with many Japanese artifacts, but they were also regularly visited by Japanese students and researchers.[90] Anna Berliner was active within the *Deutsch-Ostasiatischer Klub Leipzig* (German East Asiatic Club Leipzig), where she headed the Japanese section since 1927.[91]

While the representative office had existed for many years without any kind of OAG grassroots structure, this changed in October 1930 when

the East Asiatic Club dissolved itself, and its former members instead established a local OAG group.[92] Considering that Anna was the head of the Japanese section of the club and that she represented the OAG, along with her husband, both Berliners must have played an important role behind the scenes. The new OAG group, with Siegfried Berliner as a board member, organized various events and thus further elevated the importance of Leipzig as one of the centers of German-Japanese exchange in Germany.[93]

However, after the National Socialists seized power, Anna and Siegfried Berliner's position within the OAG quickly became precarious. The fact that they were Jews, although not previously an issue, now disqualified them. During a trip to Europe in 1933/1934, it was Siegfried's acquaintance Kurt Meissner, who—in his capacity as chairman of the OAG—moved the representative office to Hamburg and dissolved the OAG group in Leipzig. Various local *Vertrauensausschüsse* (boards of trustees) were created instead. The reason for this reorganization was the OAG's preemptive adaptation to the Nazi leadership, or simply political opportunism.[94] It is therefore not surprising that neither Siegfried nor Anna Berliner appeared on the Leipzig board—despite their unquestionable related expertise in Japanese culture and economy.

Thereafter, life in Germany became more and more difficult for the Berliners. At the Commercial College, for example, Siegfried was no longer allowed to teach regular classes. When a regulation was passed in October 1937 that joint-stock companies had to mention the names of their directors in their letterhead, Siegfried decided to retire from the company and to leave the country.[95] The following year, both Berliners travelled to the United States, officially to study the American life insurance business. In truth, it was their intention to escape from Nazi Germany. Due to these circumstances, they were forced to leave all their property behind. In the United States, Siegfried taught first at Howard University from 1939 to 1941 in Washington, DC, then he joined the American Citizen Life Insurance Co. in Columbus, Ohio. From 1943 onward, however, he had to work as a travelling insurance salesman.[96]

After their move to Columbus, Anna taught some Japanese language classes for adults at Ohio State University.[97] According to her extended Curriculum Vitae, she was busy at the same time, translating "my book on Advertising in Japanese Newspaper for the Civil Affairs Training School, University of Chicago."[98] For some time, she also taught psychology at the Northern Illinois College of Optometry.[99] In January 1949, more than a decade after immigrating to the United States, both Berliners moved to Oregon so that Anna could take up a position at Pacific University, from where she retired in 1962, one year after Siegfried's death. Her own life ended tragically in 1977 when she was murdered at home by a teenage burglar.[100]

CONCLUSION

Anna and Siegfried Berliner did not have any relation with Japan before Siegfried was hired by Tokyo Imperial University in 1913. Shortly after that, Siegfried's participation in the short German-Japanese War over Qingdao meant that he became a POW. Most likely, the famous Bandō camp, created in 1917, would not have been established if Siegfried and Anna Berliner had not composed and forwarded the decisive letter of complaint two years earlier.

After having used his time in Marugame and Bandō to study the Japanese economy, Siegfried returned to Tokyo Imperial University. Subsequently, he and Anna spent very productive years in Tokyo between 1920 and 1925. Their inquisitiveness and close cooperation resulted in a range of publications about Japan into the early 1930s, some of which were quite innovative. These publications, along with their (joint) commitment to the OAG in Tokyo and in Leipzig, established their role as bridge builders between Germany and Japan. Very expressively, it has been said that their Japan-related works "had been devoted to making the Japanese people, their civilization, culture and custom better understood by Germans."[101]

Anna and Siegfried Berliner's later life in the 1930s and 1940s illustrates the hardships many German Jews experienced, first in the Third Reich and then in their new host countries, many of which were far less welcoming than the refugees had hoped for. In this sense, their life stories are case studies for the difficulties that many (German) Jews encountered in the middle of the twentieth century.

Despite their sufferings, it is rather notable that they maintained their optimism and their affection for Germany and Japan. After they settled in Oregon, they revisited Japan at least once.[102] Furthermore, they generously sponsored the resurrection of Siegfried's liberal student fraternity "Alsatia," which had been closed by the Nazis in 1933.[103] Notwithstanding the support by both Berliners, the fraternity, which had been reestablished in Marburg (Hesse), finally failed, and was closed in 1974.[104] Due to these circumstances and the fact that Leipzig and its university were located in East Germany, Anna's last will asked for the transfer of her remaining assets to her husband's alma mater to provide funds for scholarships.[105]

NOTES

1. See Christian W. Spang and Rolf-Harald Wippich, ed., *Japanese-German Relations, 1895–1945. War, Diplomacy and Public Opinion* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), as well as Kudō Akira, Tajima Nobuo and Erich Pauer, ed., *Japan and Germany. Two Latecomers*

to the World Stage, 1895–1945 (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2009). Additionally, there is the following bilingual German-Japanese volume: Japanisch-Deutsches Zentrum Berlin (jdzb) and Japanisch-Deutsche Gesellschaft (JDG), ed., *Brückenbauer: Pioniere des japanisch-deutschen Kulturaustausches* (Berlin: Iudicium, 2005). Furthermore, a substantial exhibition catalog and its Japanese translation have to be mentioned here: *Ferne Gefährten. 150 Jahre deutsch-japanische Beziehungen*, ed. Curt-Engelhorn-Stiftung für die Reiss-Engelhorn-Museen and Verband der Deutsch-Japanischen Gesellschaften (Mannheim: Schnell und Steiner, 2011) and *Nichi-Doku Kōryū 150nen no kisekei* (Tokyo: Yūshōdō Shoten, 2013). See Kamimura Naoki, *Meiji jidai doitsugo gakusha no kenkyū* (Studies Regarding Japanese German Scholars of the Mejii Era) (Tokyo: Taga Shuppan, 2001) for information about early German Studies in Japan.

2. See Kurt Meissner, "Die Deutschen in Yokohama (Alt-Yokohama)," *Mitteilungen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens (MOAG)* 39A (1956), 9.
3. With regard to Japanese men who married German women, two of the top diplomats of the late Meiji- and the early Shōwa period have to be mentioned here: Aoki Shūzō and Tōgō Shigenori. Both spent years in Berlin before becoming foreign minister. Another example was Nagai Nagayoshi, who got his first (of three!) PhDs in Berlin before teaching at Tokyo Imperial University. He was heavily involved with the Japanese-German Society and to some extent with the German East Asiatic Society (OAG) as well. His wife, Therese Schumacher-Nagai, taught German at Japan Women's University.
4. Karl Haushofer, a Bavarian military observer in Japan 1909/1910, had to ask for special permission to bring his wife with him. In Japan, he realized that nearly all other foreigners had brought their wives with them as well. See Christian W. Spang, *Karl Haushofer und Japan. Die Rezeption seiner geopolitischen Theorien in der deutschen und japanischen Politik* (Munich: Iudicium, 2013), 88–89. While he later became a famous geopolitician, Martha published various articles about Asian topics; cf. ibid., 152–157 and 756–757.
5. See Detlev Schauwecker, "Bruno Petzold (1873–1949)," *OAG Notizen*, part 1: 11/2008, 10–32; part 2: 3/2009, 10–41, and part 3: 12/2009, 10–30.
6. See Aaron M. Cohen, "Hanka Schjelderup Petzold (1862–1937)," *Reitaku University Journal* 64 (1997), 153–167, and Detlev Schauwecker, "Hanka Schjelderup Petzold (1862–1937)," *Journal of Foreign Language Education and Research* [Kansai University] 13 (2007), 57–77.
7. See Robert Schinzinger, *Aus meiner OAG-Mappe, Weihnachtsansprachen in Tokyo* (Tokyo: OAG, 1981), 57–65, for more details.
8. Both got their PhDs from Jena University before World War I. See Kanokogi Kazunobu, *Das Religiöse. Ein religionsphilosophischer Versuch*

(Weida: Thomas & Hubert, 1912) and Cornelia Zielinski, *Der Begriff der Mystik in Friedrich von Hügels Werk "The Mystical Element of Religion"* (Jena: Kämpfe, 1913).

9. In the late 1920s, Kanokogi worked as Japanese director of the German-Japanese Culture Institute in Berlin. See Katō Tetsurō, "Personal contacts in Japanese-German cultural relations during the 1920s and early 1930s," in Spang/Wippich, *Japanese-German Relations* (2006), 127–129, and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, "Kanokogi Kazunobu: 'Imperial Asia,' 1937," in *Pan-Asianism*, eds. Sven Saaler and C. W. A. Szpilman, Vol. 2 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 149–154.
10. See Cornelia Zielinski-Kanokogi, "Für meinen Kollegen und Freund Prof. Goro Mori," *The Journal of Musashi University. Liberal Arts and Natural Sciences* 4 (1966), 3–14.
11. Some of these studies deal with Anna Berliner's time as a PhD candidate in Leipzig. Thomas A. Kindermann, Gerald D. Guthrie and Frank Wesley, "Anna Berliner, Wilhelm Wundts einzige Studentin," *Psychologie und Geschichte* 4, No. 3/4 (1993), 263–277; Horst Gundlach, "Wilhelm Wundt, Professor, und Anna Berliner, Studentin," *Psychologie und Geschichte* 5, No. 1/2 (1993), 143–151. For an evaluation of Anna Berliner as a scholar of Japanese tea ceremony, see Detlef Kantowsky, *Cha do Tee Weg*, Konstanz University, 2006, 92–99, https://kops.unikonstanz.de/handle/123456789/11539 (accessed April 19, 2015).
12. See Helmut Zimmermann, "Die Familie Berliner," in *Leben und Schicksal. Zur Einweihung der Synagoge in Hannover*, ed. Landeshauptstadt Hannover, Presseamt (Hannover, 1963), 88–101.
13. Daniel Benveniste, "Bernhard Berliner: San Francisco's First Émigré Analyst," *The Northern California Society for Psychoanalytic Psychology Newsletter*, Fall 1994, 1–8.
14. See Zimmermann, "Die Familie Berliner," 98, and Esriel Hildesheimer, "Cora Berliner. Ihr Leben und Wirken," *Bulletin des Leo Baeck Instituts* 67 (1984), 41–70.
15. An early version of the gramophone (or phonograph) had been invented by Thomas Edison in 1877. Berliner's patent of the vinyl record and the adapted gramophone date from 1887. Among other companies, Emil(e) established the still existing Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft, initially run by his brother Joseph. The company was the first to mass-produce records.
16. Siegfried Berliner, *Über das Verhalten des Gusseisens bei langsamen Belastungswechseln* (Leipzig: Barth, 1906).
17. Zimmermann, "Die Familie Berliner," 97. Berliner left the army as non-commissioned officer.
18. Leo Baeck Institute (New York), AR 5280 (Siegfried Berliner Collection): Curriculum Vitae.

19. Pacific University Archive, Anna Berliner Collection (hereafter "P.U. Archive, A.B.C."), folder 12, Anna Berliner CV.
20. Bernhard Berliner, *Der Anstieg der reinen Farbenerregung im Sehorgan* (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1907).
21. Brahn headed the independent Institute for Experimental Pedagogy in Leipzig from 1911 to 1921. He was later deported by the Nazis and died in Auswitz-Birkenau. See Steffen Dietzsch, "Max Brahn (1873–1944)," in *Sächsische Lebensbilder* 6, ed. Gerald Wiemers (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2009), 97–112.
22. Kindermann, Guthrie, and Wesley, "Anna Berliner," 263–272, and Gundlach, "Wilhelm Wundt," 143–151. The article by Gundlach corrects various mistakes made in the earlier one. See also Anna Berliner's own account of her time as a student in Leipzig, mentioned in note 26.
23. Gundlach, "Wilhelm Wundt," 148, indicates July 8, 1913. In Anna Berliner, *Subjektivität und Objektivität von Sinneseindrücken* (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1914), it is mentioned that the thesis had been accepted at August 1, 1913.
24. This is the rather uncommon word Siegfried Berliner used himself. See the cover pages of the first volumes of his *Weltwirtschaftliche Abhandlungen* series.
25. The history of Tokyo (Imperial) University, encompassing more than 1300 pages, mentions the hiring of Siegfried Berliner within the chronology of the Law Department, giving September 3, 1913 as the starting date of the contract. See Tōkyō Daigaku Hyakunenshi Henshū-Iinkai, ed., *Tōkyō Daigaku Hyakunenshi: Bukyoku-shi 1* (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppan, 1986), 145.
26. Anna Berliner, *Reminiscences of Wundt and Leipzig* (January 1959), 8 (P.U. Archive, A.B.C., folder 3): *"After my Ph.D., Wundt helped me to be admitted to the Imperial Univ[ersity]. of Tokyo."*
27. Berliner had served as Vice-Sergeant (*Vizefeldwebel*) in the 7th Regiment of the 3rd Sea Battalion in Qingdao. The following homepage offers a bibliography along with short biographical sketches of many German Qingdao-fighters: http://www.tsingtau.info/ (accessed October 17, 2015).
28. See Heinz van der Laan, *Erinnerungen an Tsingtau* (Tokyo: OAG 1999), 24–25.
29. Funakoshi Mitsunojō, "Most Popular German Ambassador," *The Japan Times and Mail*, December 16, 1928, 6. For a similar interpretation from a German viewpoint, see Wilhelm Solf, "We Never Were Enemies," ibid., 5.
30. Johannes Barth, *Als deutscher Kaufmann in Fernost. Bremen—Tsingtau—Tōkyō 1891–1981* (Berlin Schmidt, 1984), 49–50. The German message can be translated as follows: "*Cordially and most compassionately welcome.*"

31. The camp diary is available online at http://homepage3.nifty.com/akagaki/indexb.html (accessed October 17, 2015). Substantial parts of it have been translated into German by Kosaka Kiyoyuki of the Qingdao War German Soldiers' Internment Camps Research Society: http://koki.o.oo7.jp/Marugame_Lagertagebuch.htm (accessed October 17, 2015).
32. Barth, *Als deutscher Kaufmann*, 50. All translations into English are by the authors.
33. Marugame camp diary, November 18, 1914. See note 31 above.
34. Anna Berliner's German letter, dated January 25, 1915, was forwarded to the Japanese Army Ministry on January 27, which rejected the transfer of any internee out of principle. This argument was made in a letter sent by the foreign minister to the American ambassador on February 6, 1915. Further details can be found in Takahashi Terukazu, "Eine anonyme Anzeige aus dem Kriegsgefangenenlager Marugame," *Journal of the Faculty of Letters [Okayama University]* 38 (2002). A picture of Anna's original letter is available in section 4.5 of Hans K. Rode's internet-based report on Anna and Siegfried Berliner: http://www.das-japanische-gedaechtnis.de/lebensbilder-a-z/berliner-siegfried-anna-1884–1961hochschullehrer.html (accessed October 17, 2015).
35. Some basic information about Anna and Siegfried Berliner (incl. his POW number) can be found in the "*Kurzbiographien [short bios]*" section of the following homepage: http://www.tsingtau.info/ (accessed October 17, 2015).
36. The Marugame camp diary (cf. note 31) mentions visits by Anna Berliner on the following days: February 15, 16; March 2, 12, 22; April 6, 12; May 7, 21; June 4; July 2, 20 and August 3, 17–22, 1915.
37. On January 22, 1916, the German War Ministry sent a copy of Siegfried's letter to the Foreign Ministry. See German Federal Archive Berlin, R 901, 84614–84616. A scan of this letter can be viewed in Hans K. Rode's already mentioned (note 34) internet-based report on Siegfried and Anna Berliner (section 4.6).
38. Sumner Welles later became a trusted foreign policy advisor to Franklin D. Roosevelt.
39. Sumner Welles, *Report on Prisoner of War Camps in Japan*, US Department of State Records 9763.72114/1491 (1916). A German version was prepared by the German Foreign Ministry. Parts of this version are available online: http://www.tsingtau.info/index.html?lager/mar-welles.htm (accessed October 17, 2015). The original is available in the Federal Military Archive in Freiburg, Germany.
40. For a virtual exhibition of the camp, see http://bando.dijtokyo.org (accessed October 17, 2015).
41. The Engel Orchestra was named after its leader, Paul Engel. Siegfried Berliner is mentioned 21 times in the history of the orchestra: *Das Engel Orchester, Seine Entstehung und Entwicklung 1914–1919* (Bandō: Lagerdruckerei, 1919), http://koki.o.oo7.jp/Engel-Orchester.pdf (accessed October 17, 2015).

42. The concert is the center piece of the 2006 movie "Baruto no Gakuen" (Ode an die Freude).
43. See *Die Baracke. Zeitung für das Kriegsgefangenenlager Bando, Japan*, No. 10 (December 2, 1917), 3. As starting point May 23, 1917 is indicated. Furthermore, Berliner's seminars are also mentioned in *MOAG* 17B (1922), 269.
44. Kurt und Hanni Meissner, *Sechzig Jahre in Japan* (1973; reprint, Hamburg: Hans K. Meissner, 2007). Meissner had been interned in the Matsuyama camp before being transferred to Bandō.
45. Tōkyō Daigaku Hyakunenshi Henshū-Iinkai, *Tōkyō Daigaku*, 149.
46. See ibid., 904, for the establishment of the department, and 915, for the hiring of Siegfried Berliner. Ibid., 929, refers to the subjects Berliner taught in the early 1920s: *kokusai kinyūron* (International Finance) and *shōgyō sūgaku* (Mathematical Economics).
47. In an interview published in a Hiroshima newspaper, Berliner spelled out his convictions clearly: *"Since both countries [. . .] have re-established a peaceful and friendly relationship we want to work with fresh courage as much as possible for Japan . . . "* See *Chūgoku Shinbun*, January 24, 1920. We are indebted to Seto Takehiko for this information.
48. While the publisher was located in Hannover, the books were printed by Bär & Hermann in Leipzig.
49. See the *MOAG* 17 (1922), for details about the research of German POWs.
50. Siegfried Berliner, *Organisation und Betrieb des japanischen Importhandels* (Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1920), 2.
51. In the case of volume 4, the signature reads the following way: "Bando, January 1920."
52. *Täglicher Telegramm-Dienst Bando*, November 24, 1919, No. 213. See http://bando.dijtokyo.org/?page=object_detail.php&p_id=548 (accessed October 17, 2015). The German notice by Siegfried Berliner read the following way: "Im Verlag der Hahn'schen Buchhandlung Hannover erscheint von mir 'Organisation u. Technik des Importgeschäfts in China' und 'Organisation und Technik des Import-Geschäfts in Japan', Interessenten bitte in die Listen eintragen (Berliner)."
53. Siegfried Berliner, *Organisation des Indigo-Handels im Lande Awa* (Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung 1920), 40 pages. The booklet appeared as Vol. 6 of Siegfried's *Weltwirtschaftliche Abhandlungen*.
54. The dedication appears on page 3 of the book.
55. Tōkyō Daigaku Hyakunenshi Henshū-Iinkai, *Tōkyō Daigaku*, 929
56. Ibid., 915. Apparently the collection had been started in 1913.
57. *MOAG* 16 E (1913), 164.
58. See Jahresbericht 1920, in *MOAG* 15 (1922), 29, for Berliner's role as auditor in 1920/21 and Carl von Weegmann and Robert Schinzinger, *Die Geschichte der OAG 1873–1980* (Tokyo: OAG, 1982), 55, for Berliner's engagement as OAG-treasurer.

59. Meissner was chairman of the OAG in 1921/1922 and then again from 1932 to 1945/1948.
60. No annual reports (*Jahresberichte*) for the early 1920s survived and the *NOAG,* the newsletter of the society, was started only in 1926, when both Berliners had already left Japan.
61. Meissner mentions that Anna had talked about her research in the OAG. See his review of her book *Der Tee-Kult in Japan*, *NOAG* 25 (1931), 26–27.
62. See Berliner and Meissner, *Die Entwicklung*, 14–15 and 58.
63. Ibid., 5: "Japan sah ein, daß es sich in Kriegszeiten selbst auf seine Bundesgenossen nicht verlassen konnte, und sah sich besonders durch das Vorgehen Amerikas auf den Weg zur Selbstversorgung gedrängt."
64. Ibid., 59.
65. Ibid., 6 and 58–59.
66. The publisher was the Beijing-based company Nachbaur.
67. The lab had been founded by George M. Stratton, one of Wundt's former American students, who was also most likely responsible for Anna Berliner's move to Berkeley in 1915. Stratton is explicitly mentioned in Anna Berliner's CV (P.U. Archive, A.B.C., folder 12). See Mathew Alpern's memorial lecture 1978, 5 (ibid., folder 27).
68. These engagements are mentioned in Anna Berliner's CV (P.U. Archive, A.B.C., folder 12).
69. See Anna Berliner, "The Influence of Mental Work on the Visual Memory Image," *American Journal of Psychology* 29, no. 4 (October 1918), 355–370, as well as her article "Asthetic judgements of school children," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 2, no. 3 (September 1918), 229–242.
70. The college was the predecessor of Hoshi Pharmaceutical University. Its founder Hoshi Hajime supported German science in the difficult postwar period. He closely cooperated with Fritz Haber, Wilhelm Solf and Gotō Shinpei. A concise description of Hoshi's role within Japanese-German relations offers Hanai Kiyoshi, "Hoshi Hajime (1873–1951)," in jdzb and JDG, *Brückenbauer*, 146–155.
71. See Anna Berliner's CV (P.U. Archive, A.B.C., folder 12).
72. Ibid., Enclosure 4 Publications. In 1920, 1921 and 1924, she published papers in *Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie*, in 1922, she had two articles featured in *Archiv der gesamten Psychologie* and in 1923, one more of her works appeared in *Praktische Psychologie*.
73. Some of the English titles that Anna Berliner's CV (P.U. Archive, A.B.C., folder 12), lists in the section "Enclosure 4 Publications" seem to be mere translations of Japanese titles as the following case indicates: "The importance of the ranking method for advertising," in *Shinrigaku* (Psychology) (1923). In fact, the equivalent Japanese article is called "Hintōhō ni okeru bunpai-ryō no kangen," published in *Shinri Kenkyū* 21, no. 122 (1922), 91–97.
74. The text published in *Jitsugyō Kai* is based on the English lecture (pp. 140–143) and appeared here along with a Japanese translation (pp. 143–147) by Iseki Jūjirō.

75. Anna Berliner, "Ta-nin wo fūbō de handan suru koto ga dekiru ka," *Shinri Kenkyū* 25, no. 144 (1924), 319–327. The title can be translated as: "Is it possible to judge others by their appearance?"
76. Anna Berliner, "Hōkoku-yō ni ha donna iro ga yoi ka," *Jitsugyō no Sekai*, March 1923, 331–335. The title question can be rendered as: "What colors are good for advertisements?"
77. Anna Berliner, *Japanische Reklame in der Tageszeitung* (Stuttgart: C.E. Poeschel, 1925).
78. Meissner, *NOAG* 4 (1926), 8.
79. See Anna Berliner's CV (P.U. Archive, A.B.C., folder 12), where she wrote that she cooperated with Gotō on "introducing industrial testing."
80. Anna Berliner published her article about Japanese theater in *Leipziger Illustrirte Zeitung* 175, no. 4465 (1930), 490–491, and her review of Japanese journals ("Japanische Zeitschriften") in *Börsenblatt für den Deutschen Buchhandel* 98, no. 206 (September 5, 1931), 797–798.
81. The article "Japanische Frauen von heute" appeared in Margarete Driesch, ed., *Frauen jenseits der Ozeane* (Leipzig: Kampmann, 1928), 143–156. Shorter versions of this text have been published in *Die Böttcherstrasse* 1, no. 5, 31–32, as well as in *Deutsche Hochschule* 17, no. 7, 104–107.
82. Berliner, *Japanische Frauen*, 155. Adultery by a married women was sufficient reason for a husband to ask for a divorce but not vice versa.
83. Anna Berliner, *Der Teekult in Japan* (Leipzig: Asia Major, 1930), 2–3.
84. Publication details are mentioned in the preceding note.
85. Kurt Meissner in *NOAG* 25 (1931), 26–29. On page 27, Meissner describes Anna Berliner as the best foreign expert on the topic.
86. P.U. Archive, A.B.C., folder 27. The "phase" mentioned by Alpern lasted from 1920 to 1930.
87. See Christian W. Spang, "Anmerkungen zur frühen OAG-Geschichte," *NOAG* 179–180 (2006), 70–74.
88. In 1887, the Seminar for Oriental Languages had been founded at Berlin University, focusing on language teaching. The first German chair of Japanese Studies had been established in Hamburg in 1914.
89. See the *Jahresbericht [annual report] der OAG 1926* (Tokyo: OAG, 1927), 2, 11. Anna Berliner's new role is mentioned in *OAG-Jahresbericht 1929* (Tokyo: OAG, 1930), 11. The OAG's annual reports regularly featured positive comments regarding the activities of both Berliners in Leipzig. Anna referred to herself in her CV (P.U. Archive, A.B.C., folder 12) as "secretary of the European branch of the German East Asiatic Society" for the years 1925 to 1932. See chapter 7 of this book for more information about the OAG.
90. See the introduction of Anna Berliner, in Driesch, *Frauen*, 12–13.
91. Ibid., 13.
92. *NOAG* 23 (1930), 2.
93. A description of the foundation of the group is featured ibid., 3–4.

94. It surely fits this assumption that Meissner had joined the Nazi Party in January 1934. See Federal Archive Berlin (former Berlin Document Center), for information about NSDAP-Membership lists. In Meissner's already mentioned autobiography, the voluntary activities of both Berliners for the OAG were not mentioned, let alone their removal from the OAG. Without any reference to the events of spring 1934, Meissner refers to Siegfried Berliner in his chapter "My Jewish Friends," which clearly shows his opportunism.
95. Niedersächsisches Landesarchiv: Akte Nds. 110 W Acc 84/90 Nr. 446/24: Siegfried Berliner. A severance agreement was signed on September 23, 1937.
96. The American Citizen Life Insurance Co. was liquidated by the US government in March 1943 because its director was German. For details about Siegfried's income in the early 1940s, see Niedersächsisches Landesarchiv: Akte Siegfried Berliner.
97. See Anna Berliner's CV (P.U. Archive, A.B.C.), folder 12.
98. Ibid., folder 12. The translation is available ibid., folder 1.
99. Ibid., folder 12.
100. Ibid., folder 28–29: Dan Grubb, "Berliner murder suspect [...]," *Student Newspaper of Pacific University*, October 6, 1978.
101. Ibid., folder 27. Alpern's comment regarding Anna's aim to explain Japan to others is strongly supported by Anna's own words on page VII of her introduction to *Der Tee-Kult in Japan*, 1930. Overall, this approach matches OAG intended goals since 1873. See chapter 7 of this book.
102. P.U. Archive, A.B.C., folder 9, features a letter from Alexander Nagai, written November 17, 1958, which proves that Anna and Siegfried had visited Japan that year.
103. Despite the fact that Siegfried Berliner died in October 1961, Anna continued this support until 1964.
104. Today, only the related OB network still exists.
105. The Siegfried Berliner Foundation was later merged with the Ungewitter Foundation. The Faculty of Physics still awards scholarships from this joint foundation. See http://www.uni-goettingen.de/de/44771.html (accessed October 17, 2015). Despite accepting this sponsorship, it took Göttingen University until 2004 to reinstate Siegfried's academic title, which he had been deprived of during the Nazi era. According to Dr. Ulrich Hunger (University Archive Göttingen, email message to Christian W. Spang, November 25, 2013), Berliner was deprived of his PhD on August 8, 1940. This was based on the fact that both Berliners had lost their German citizenship earlier that year. On October 27, 2004, the university reinstated all academic titles taken away during the Nazi era. The resolution is online at: http://www.uni-goettingen.de/de/19166.html (accessed October 17, 2015).

7

The German East Asiatic Society (OAG) during the Nazi Era

Christian W. Spang

Introduction

As a Tokyo-based independent academic association run by Germans according to Japanese laws, the *German East Asiatic Society* (OAG) undoubtedly occupies a special place within German-Japanese relations, at the very least because of the extent of the OAG's cooperation with Japanese members and benefactors. Closer examination of the society's history during the first half of the twentieth century shows how far international relations interfered with the activities of this group of a few hundred Germans abroad, whose declared aim it was to study East Asia. This is especially the case for the most active branch groups in Shanghai (1931–1945) and Batavia (Jakarta, 1934–1940), which were seriously affected by Japanese and German expansionism.[1]

Following a brief overview of the establishment of the OAG in the early Meiji era, this chapter goes on to examine the society's Japanese members before surveying the difficulties the OAG experienced during the interwar years. Originally, the association almost exclusively dealt with Japanese topics, but over time, this changed in two ways. First, coverage of Chinese and Southeast Asian themes increased when the society opened branch groups abroad. Second, more and more "Germanic" topics were included after the OAG board in Tokyo came to be controlled by members of the local chapter of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP). From the mid-1930s to the end of World War II, the OAG thus lost control over its domicile, its members, and—to some extent—even its program.

FOUNDATION AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT

Inspired by the establishment of the *Asiatic Society of Japan (ASJ)* in 1872,[2] the first representative of the Wilhelmine Empire in Japan, Max S. von Brandt, initiated the foundation of the OAG in Tokyo on March 22, 1873.[3] The original name of the association expressed the aim of the founding fathers to study the nature and peoples of East Asia: *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens* (literally, German Society for East Asian Natural History and Ethnography). To avoid this exceedingly complicated term, soon, most people referred to the association as *Ost-Asien-Gesellschaft* (East Asiatic Society), from which the acronym "OAG" developed, which—along with its original name—is still in use today. By organizing lectures and issuing its own journal, the *Mitt(h) eilungen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens (MOAG*; Transactions of the OAG),[4] the society quickly established itself as an early center of Western academic studies on Japan (and East Asia).[5] One expression of this reputation was its thriving exchange of journals with other scholarly institutions worldwide. Their number peaked at 195 on the eve of World War I.[6]

Even though Japan and Germany fought each other in 1914 over the German Kiautschou Bay Concession (Qingdao) in China, the OAG was not closed down. This was partly because the society had acquired the legal status of a Japanese association (*shadan hōjin*) in 1904.[7] After World War I, a new group of younger leaders took the fate of the society into their hands.[8] Among these, Kurt Meissner, a successful businessman and Japan-expert, was most significant. He had come to Japan in 1906 and became OAG chairman in 1921, at the age of 35. Even though he stepped down from his post due to an extended sojourn in Germany in 1922/1923, soon after his return, Meissner was back on the OAG board. Following many years as deputy, he was reelected as chairman in 1932 and remained in this position until his repatriation in 1948.[9]

By the mid-1920s, the OAG was still suffering from the consequences of World War I. Membership had dwindled from 433 in 1912 to 328 in 1925. In combination with significant war-related financial losses, this reduced membership-base meant that the society faced serious fiscal problems. In this dire situation, the OAG-board asked Dr. Wilhelm Solf, German ambassador to Japan and honorary OAG president, for help.[10] His request to the Japanese authorities facilitated the release of a considerable amount of money which had been confiscated from Germans during World War I. Solf was thus able to arrange the transfer of around 61,000 Yen to OAG accounts, a sum that roughly equaled four years' worth of the society's expenditures, thus allowing the OAG to pay off all its debts in 1926.[11]

With the above-mentioned developments as a backdrop, the society expanded its activities. First, a newsletter called *Nachrichten der OAG*

(*NOAG*) was launched.[12] Then, Dr. Carl von Weegmann was employed as (part-time) librarian and editor of *MOAG* and *NOAG*, and in 1929, the society paid no less than 25,000 Yen for renovation and extension of the old OAG-building.[13] As the society continued to spend much more than it earned, it soon faced financial problems again.[14]

The OAG and the Japanese

Initially, the Japanese were seen as an object of anthropological study, rather than being accepted as equals. For the first 12 years of OAG history, Japanese were allowed as guests but not as regular members. From 1885 onward, a number of distinguished professors, such as Wada Tsunashirō (Geography/Geology) and Nagai Nagayoshi (Pharmacy/Medicine) from Tokyo Imperial University as well as various high-ranking officials such as Aoki Shūzō (long-time Japanese representative in Berlin and twice foreign minister), Katsura Tarō (former military attaché in Berlin and three-time prime minister), and Konoe Atsumaro (relative of the imperial family and speaker of the House of Lords), joined the OAG.[15] Thus, the society facilitated cross-cultural exchanges between influential Japanese and various foreign advisers (*oyatoi gaikokujin*).[16] In 1912, the OAG had a total of 425 members, of whom 235 lived in Japan, and 105 in Tokyo; 19 of the 22 Japanese members lived in the capital. While only 5.2 percent of all members were Japanese, the corresponding proportion among the Tokyo-based members was 18 percent—a considerable number for a "German" society.[17]

It should surprise no one, therefore, that 27 contributions by Japanese authors can be found within the 16 regular volumes and the 8 *Supplementbände* (special issues) of the *MOAG* published before 1914. On average, there was more than one "Japanese" contribution in each tome. After World War I, the participation of Japanese in the activities of the OAG was much less prominent. Within the 19 *MOAG* volumes that appeared between 1922 and 1945, there were only 10 articles published by Japanese authors, and most of these featured in the two special issues celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of the OAG in 1933. Among a total of 43 authors, there were six Japanese, representing 14 percent of all contributors.[18] Their articles were published—as was the norm—in German and covered medical topics (Kure and Irisawa), prehistorical studies (Ōyama), legal questions (Nakamura), German-Japanese relations (Mutō) and Buddhist studies (Wakai):

- Kure Shūzō: "Einfluß der fremden, insbesondere der deutschen Medizin auf die japanische seit Anfang des 18. bis gegen Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts" (Influence of foreign, especially German, Medicine on Japanese Medicine from the Beginning of the Eighteenth until the End of the Nineteenth Century) (Vol. I, 76–91).

- Ōyama Kashiwa: "Yayoi-Kultur. Eine prähistorische Kultur der japanischen Inseln" (Yayoi-Culture. A Prehistoric Culture of the Japanese Islands) (Vol. I, 127–134).
- Irisawa Tatsukichi: "Ein Beitrag zur Statistik des Speiseröhrenkrebses" (A Contribution to Statistics on Esophageal Cancer) (Vol. I, 200–206).
- Nakamura Takeshi: "Die gegenwärtige Lage des japanischen Arbeitsrechts" (The Current State of Japanese Labor Legislation) (Vol. II, 181–191).
- Mutō Chōzō: "Dr. Philipp Franz von Siebolds Plan zur Gründung der ersten Schule für Handelswissenschaften in Japan" (Dr. Philipp Franz von Siebold's Plan for the Foundation of the First Commercial Science School in Japan) (Vol. II, 192–195).
- Wakai Shingen: "Meishō-Daishi (Hōnen Shōnin) der Begründer der japanischen Jōdo Sekte" (Meishō-Daishi [Hōnen Shōnin] the Founder of the Japanese "Pure Land School" Sect) (Vol. II, 196–233).

The participation of six Japanese in the special issue(s) of 1933 can be interpreted as an expression of gratitude for the contribution of the OAG to the development of Japanese studies. Conversely, it also means that the remaining 17 *MOAG* volumes contain only 4 "Japanese" contributions. The main reason for the retreat of Japanese academics was the establishment of their own specialized associations and journals. There was therefore far less incentive for them to publish in the *MOAG* than before. Another reason why the involvement of Japanese never again reached the level of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was the establishment of the *Japanisch-Deutsche Gesellschaft* (*JDG—Nichi-Doku Kyōkai*) in 1926 and the Japanese-German Cultural Institute (*Japanisch-Deutsche Kulturinstitut*) in 1927.[19] Both institutions focused more on German culture and science, an aspect that made them attractive to those Japanese who had studied in Germany and wanted to keep some link to their former host country. The OAG reacted by asking the German leaders of the Cultural Institute to join the OAG board and by elevating the top brass of the JDG to the status of honorary OAG members to avoid any potential conflict with either institution.[20] Three out of five Japanese "*Ehrenmitglieder*" appointed between 1919 and 1945 were JDG representatives:

1928: Graf Dr. Gotō Shinpei (JDG president)[21]
Prof. Dr. Dr. Dr. Nagai Nagayoshi (JDG vice-president)
1929: Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Dohi Keizō
Prof. Dr. Irisawa Tatsukichi (JDG general secretary)
1933: Prof. Dr. Koganei Ryōsei

Despite the propagandistic talk about a German-Japanese *"Völkerfreundschaft"* (friendship among nations), symbolized by the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact (1936), the German–Japanese Cultural Agreement (1938) and the German-Japanese-Italian Tripartite Pact (1940), racial questions remained a constant problem between Germany and Japan. Two aspects of the OAG history support this claim. First, a number of Japanese left the society in 1933/1934, a point discussed in detail below. Second, until the 1950s no more Japanese were elevated to the status of honorary member.[22]

The focus of OAG activities changed due to the growing Nazi influence, suggesting that many of the remaining Japanese members themselves were supporters of close Axis relations, like Ōshima Hiroshi, Tōgō Shigenori, and Endō (or Yendo) Yoshikazu, three influential, long-time Japanese OAG members.[23] The fact that the seventieth anniversary of the OAG was celebrated in the German embassy in March 1943 in the presence of some members of the Japanese government further supports this interpretation.[24]

The Restructuring of the OAG in Germany 1933/1934

In 1925, a representative office had been established in Leipzig, voluntarily run by Anna and Siegfried Berliner.[25] When, in 1930, the *Deutsch-Ostasiatischer Klub Leipzig* (German East Asiatic Club) was dissolved and its members formed an OAG branch group, Leipzig became the undisputed center of OAG activities in Germany.[26] This development also led to an unusually even distribution of OAG-members in Japan (330) and abroad (329).[27]

At a local celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the OAG in 1933, Wilhelm Solf initiated the foundation of another OAG branch group in Berlin. As it was well known that Solf opposed National Socialism, his attitude caused internal problems because the OAG leadership in Tokyo had quickly joined hands with the representatives of the Nazi regime in Japan. When Meissner went to Germany in the winter 1933/1934, he outmaneuvered Solf. Not only did he avoid meeting the former ambassador,[28] but he also changed the OAG structure in Germany in a way that the planned new branch group never materialized. At the same time, the short-lived group in Leipzig quietly disappeared. Instead, new committees were established in Berlin, Hamburg, Leipzig, and (later on) Munich, which featured the peculiar name of "*Vertrauensausschüsse*" (boards of trustees). These committees were to organize (sporadic) OAG events in these cities, without posing a threat to the leadership of the OAG in Tokyo or causing any trouble due to political disagreements with the new Nazi leadership.[29]

The following episode elucidates the opportunistic background of these moves. Until 1933, nobody cared much about the fact that the representatives of the OAG in Leipzig were of Jewish descent. Yet, in early 1934, the office was quietly closed down and reopened in Hamburg, even though very few OAG members lived there. This was done to adapt to the new Nazi system: as in many other German associations or clubs,[30] Jews appeared to be no longer acceptable within the OAG, even before the Nazis changed the laws accordingly. It is therefore not surprising that contemporary OAG documents largely avoided expressing any gratitude to the former representatives, Anna and Siegfried Berliner, who had voluntarily worked for the OAG in Leipzig for nearly a decade.[31] The OAG simply argued that Hamburg was the better place for its representative bureau, because the city, with its big harbor, was Germany's "gateway to the world." An anonymous external report about the 1934 general meeting of the OAG, published in the *Ostasiatische Rundschau* (*OR*), is more telling: it states that Meissner clearly referred to the location of the headquarters of the *Auslands-Organisation* (foreign branch) of the Nazi Party (NSDAP-AO) in Hamburg when explaining the transfer of the OAG office.[32]

The Establishment of Branch Groups in Asia

The first Asian branch was established in Shanghai in the winter 1930/1931. The driving force behind this foundation was Dr. Wilhelm Othmer, who had come to Qingdao in 1907 and impressed many of his local students there as well as later at Tongji-University in Wusong near Shanghai.[33] He spent many years in Japan as a prisoner of war (1914–1920) after participating in the failed defense of Qingdao in autumn 1914. The OAG board in Tokyo took the quickly growing branch group[34] very seriously. Not only did they urge local OAG leaders to send a representative to the celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the society in March 1933, but Meissner himself came to Shanghai twice in 1933/34.[35] Moreover, after Othmer died of cancer in 1934, the OAG declared him an honorary member posthumously, the only time this was ever done.[36]

Othmer was followed by Alfred Glathe, a businessman who had come to Qingdao in 1909 and had—like his predecessor—spent most of World War I in Japanese POW camps.[37] Pastor Ewald Krüger (1935–1937), Consul Dr. Hans Traut (1939–1941), and Siegmund R. von Winterfeldt (1941–1945), who worked for the German embassy, succeeded Glathe. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that between 1931 and 1939, Dr. Leonie von Ungern-Sternberg (Shanghai University) was a member of the local OAG board.[38] She was thus most likely the first woman to hold an official post within the society.

The fact that many diplomats had joined the local OAG group hints at close relations between the Nazi-controlled Consulate General and the OAG, but a look at the topics covered at OAG meetings does not attest to this. While China was the most frequent topic, Japan also featured rather prominently in the list of titles. Most of these Japan-related lectures were delivered by Germans living in Japan (Trautz, Meissner) or by Japanese visiting Shanghai.

On average, about six or seven talks were organized in Shanghai every year (see Table 7.1). Additionally, there were movie screenings, invitations to other lectures, excursions, and the annual general meeting.[39] The local activities of the OAG were disturbed at times by skirmishes between Japanese and Chinese forces in or around Shanghai.[40] These problems suggest an explanation for the declining membership, which gradually went down to 98 in 1940 before a drive for new members increased their number again to 187 (in 1943) and 222 (in 1944).[41] Thus strengthened, OAG lectures in Shanghai continued until the end of World War II.[42]

The OAG group in the Dutch East Indies (1934–1940) was far less fortunate. The early beginnings of OAG activities there are mentioned in the *OAG Jahresbericht (Annual Report) 1933,* while the first account of related events in Batavia was published in 1934.[43] This time, the initiative had come from Prof. Dr. Ernst R. K. Rodenwaldt and Albrecht L. Lorenz-Meyer. Because of their efforts, a branch group was established on March

Table 7.1 Japan-related presentations at the OAG branch group in Shanghai

Date	Speaker	Title
October 4, 1934	Friedrich M. Trautz	Der große Stūpa auf dem Kōyasan (The Great Stūpa at Mt. Kōya)
November 23, 1934	Kurt Meissner	Die Deutschen in Japan einst und jetzt (Germans in Japan Then and Now)
February 23, 1938	Hans E. Krüger	Japanisch-Sachalin, seine Geschichte, Volksstämme und Wirtschaft (Japanese Sachalin, its History, Tribes and Economy)
April 23, 1942	Klaus Mehnert	Die Mächte im pazifischen Raum (The Powers in the Pacific Region)
March 23, 1943	*Fujisawa Chikao*	*Japans Stellung zu den Problemen der Jetztzeit (Japan's View of Today's Problems)* *
June 24, 1943	Kawasaki Torao	Die Religionen Japans (Japan's Religions)
March 12, 1944	Carl E. Vissering	Die Zeit Nobunagas und Hideyoshis ([Oda] Nobunaga's and [Tokugawa] Hideyoshi's Times) <delivered in Tientsin>

* This was not an OAG event as such. Yet due to Fujisawa's talk on March 23, the OAG did not organize its own lecture at the annual OAG meeting on the preceding day. See *NOAG* 64 (1943), 43.

12, 1934, with about 25 founding members. As Rodenwaldt and Lorenz-Meyer left for Germany soon after, neither of them became chairman. Instead, leadership in Batavia remained unstable, changing each year, in fact: Dr. Hans Siebert (1934/1935), Alexander Koch (1935/1936), Dr. C. Beyer (1936/1937), Otto Otzen (1937/1938), Dr. Theodor Müller-Krüger (1938/1939), and Hermann Schultze (1939/1940) each led the group for roughly one year apiece.

OAG activities in the Dutch East Indies included an average of five to six lectures, some additional excursions, and the annual general meeting. Most of the talks dealt with what is now Indonesia, very few with other countries or regions. In 1938, there were 12 events, making Batavia the most dynamic OAG group of that year. One evening, on November 22, 1938, the Nazi race theorist Egon von Eickstedt spoke in Batavia about "Rasse und Volk in Mitteleuropa (Race and Nation in Central Europe)."[44] Even though little is known about internal affairs in Batavia, topics like this indicate that the group had opened its doors to the Nazis. In May 1940, all OAG activities came to an abrupt end. When the German *Wehrmacht* occupied the Netherlands along with Belgium, Luxembourg and the northern parts of France, Dutch authorities interned all Germans in their colonies.[45]

As late as autumn 1942, the OAG got involved in the Japanese puppet-state Manchukuo, as well. The German representative to the country, Dr. Wilhelm Wagner, called upon all Germans living in Mukden (Shenyang), Hsinking (Changchun) and other places to join the OAG.[46] The driving forces behind these activities were Helmut Leutelt (Mukden) and Ludwig Zumfelde (Hsinking). Leutelt, who later described himself as secretary of the group, was an employee of Kurt Meissner's company and had—like Wagner—lived in Japan for some time.[47] Their first-hand experience of OAG activities there must have been the foundation for their support of the society. Despite the ongoing war, two OAG lectures were organized in Mukden in spring 1943. On February 14, Walther Heissig spoke about Mongolian historiography and ten weeks later, on April 21, Morishita Tatsuo delivered a speech about the soul of Japan.[48] The fact that a Japanese professor was one of only two speakers in Manchukuo strengthens the impression that the OAG intensely cooperated with the Japanese abroad. No further reports about activities in Manchukuo are known.[49]

The OAG Headquarter under the Swastika[50]

In the middle of the well-known radicalization process in Japan and Germany,[51] the OAG commemorated its sixtieth anniversary with two days of celebrations on March 21/22, 1933. Among the guests were the

British, the Dutch and the German ambassadors, high-ranking Japanese diplomats such as OAG member Tōgō Shigenori, and many Japanese and German professors.[52] Even a member of the imperial family, Prince Fushimi-no-miya Hiroyasuō,[53] the chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff, graced the event with his presence.

Only two months after the OAG celebrations, a local Nazi chapter (NSDAP-*Ortsgruppe*) was established in Tokyo. Nearly all of its early representatives were OAG members. This was true for Fritz Scharf and Heinrich Loy, the first leaders of the *Ortsgruppe Tokyo-Yokohama* as well as for the first leader of the *Ortsgruppe Osaka* (est. 1935), Franz Glombik.[54] Furthermore, when a new umbrella organization, the *Landesgruppe Japan* (National Committee Japan), was installed in 1935, yet another OAG member became its leader: Rudolf Hillmann.[55] As other Nazi-organizations followed suit, the number of NS-functionaries in Japan grew quickly.

In the summer of 1933, Fritz Scharf went straight to work. Initially, he focused his attention on the *Deutsche Vereinigung Tokyo* (DVT, German Union Tokyo), an organization that had closely cooperated with the OAG since its establishment in 1919. While the OAG concentrated on lectures and publications, the DVT organized social events that aimed at bringing together all Germans, regardless of their interests. As the Nazis wanted to take over this endeavor, they forced the retreat of the long-time DVT leader, Albert Kestner. Already in July 1933, they maneuvered the election of two Nazi Party members (*Parteigenossen*), Wilhelm Bunten and Paul Timme, to replace him.[56]

The conservative-patriotic convictions of most OAG board members meant that they harbored positive feelings toward the Nazi movement. The above-mentioned coup d'état-like takeover of the DVT then convinced (nearly) everyone within the OAG not to mess with the local Nazis. Therefore, the OAG obliged, even before the Nazis demanded anything, a behavior that has been called "*vorauseilende Selbstgleichschaltung*" (preventive self-coordination).[57] That is, in order to maintain at least some control of its own organization, the OAG fell in line with Nazi policy of its own accord. The first step in this direction had come when the OAG provided the new Nazi group with a room for their meetings immediately after its foundation.[58] Furthermore, it did not take long before Meissner and other OAG leaders joined the NSDAP[59] and started to work on new by-laws for the society, reflecting the *Führerprinzip* (leadership principle) of the Nazi movement.[60]

Within a year after the "democratic" sixtieth anniversary of the society, the OAG was thus controlled by Nazi Party members, either because the long-established board members had joined the NSDAP or because party members had replaced non-party members.[61] Some joined the Nazi-movement based on a mixture of interest and opportunism, among

them most likely Meissner and his deputy, Johannes Barth.[62] Others must have been more ideologically convinced Nazis, like Weegmann who, as "unit head of Tokyo," led the Tokyo subgroup of the *Ortsgruppe Tokyo-Yokohama* for a while.[63] The most committed Nazis on the OAG board were two well-known Japanologists: Dr. Wilhelm Gundert (board member 1933–1935) and Dr. Walter Donat (1936–1941). Both men headed the Japanese-German Cultural Institute in Tokyo between 1927 and 1941 (with a short interlude in 1936/1937).[64] In 1934/1935, Gundert, a cousin of Hermann Hesse, chaired the influential *Redaktionsausschuss* (editorial board), which supervised all OAG publications. He joined the NSDAP in April 1934 and was among the most outspoken representatives of a National-Socialist Japanology after he became professor of Japanese Studies at Hamburg University in 1936.[65] Donat, who headed the Japan branch of the *Nationalsozialistischer Lehrerbund* (National Socialist Teachers League, NSLB),[66] joined the OAG board in September 1936 as one of two deputy-leaders. He kept this position until the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 forced him to stay in Berlin, where he had been on leave from Tokyo.[67]

Due to people like Gundert and Donat, OAG members of Jewish descent, Nazi critics, and some Japanese became quickly disillusioned. They either left the society of their own free will or were excluded—like the Berliners in Leipzig.[68] Between May 1933 and July 1934, the *NOAG* listed no fewer than 34 former members who had left the society.[69] The first striking aspect of these departees is the fact that the list includes 14 Japanese (42%), which meant that they were proportionally overrepresented. The aggressive approach of the Nazis to "racial questions" must have made some Japanese reconsider their engagement with an institution that openly accepted National Socialism. Second, some well-known Jewish artists and academics left the OAG in 1933/1934. Most prominent among them were Robert Pollak, Klaus Pringsheim, Leo Sirota, and Kurt Singer.[70] Third, there also were some anti-Nazis among the departees. One of them, Bruno Petzold, was an expert on Japanese Buddhism and a professor at the prestigious First High School (*Dai-ichi Kōtō Gakkō*) from 1917 to 1943. Since 1921, he had been on the OAG board and a member of the already mentioned *Redaktionsausschuss*, which he chaired in 1932/1933. When he became aware of the appeasement policy of the OAG toward the Nazis, he stepped down from his posts at the end of 1933 before leaving the society soon after.[71] Due to some critical articles about the Third Reich and the OAG, Petzold became more and more isolated within the German community in Japan and a *persona non grata* in the OAG.[72]

In autumn 1936, the OAG finally passed the new by-laws that had first been mentioned in the *OAG Jahresbericht 1934*. Not only did they introduce the *Führerprinzip*, they also broadened the scope of the society.

Previously, the OAG had focused almost exclusively on East Asian topics, but now the spread of German culture was added to its agenda.[73] The embassy and the NSLB had been calling for this new stance for some time already.[74] From their point of view, a well-established academic society focusing on East Asia alone was far less useful for propaganda purposes than an association that covered contemporary Germany as well.

An event closely connected with the above-mentioned new OAG by-laws was the foundation of the *Deutsche Gemeinde Tokyo-Yokohama* (DGTY) in autumn 1936. This Nazi-oriented community was intended to assimilate all Germans living in the Tokyo-Yokohama area. Anyone who did not want to make an open statement against the Hitler regime had to join. Institutions such as the German Protestant church and the German school were integrated, and became part of the DGTY. Only, the OAG could not be fully absorbed because of its non-German members and its status as a Japanese association. Nevertheless, the society had to hand over its residence, becoming little more than a tolerated guest on its own property. Instead of an individual OAG membership, everyone who joined the DGTY became a quasi-member, and the OAG received a yearly lump sum of 6,000 yen to cover its expenses. Instead of complaining, the *OAG Jahresbericht 1936* called this arrangement a step forward because the association could now focus on its academic purposes.[75]

Based on arrangements of the sort described above, the connection between the OAG and the Nazi Party developed so smoothly that many outside observers viewed the OAG as an outpost of Nazi propaganda in Japan, among them the Japanese police.[76] Partly, this perception developed because many non-OAG-related events took place in the (former) OAG house during the late 1930s and early 40s. The subservient attitude of the association included better treatment for *Parteigenossen* at regular OAG events.[77]

As the *OAG Jahresbericht 1940* shows, the obedience of the society was noticed even in German government circles. The front page featured a section from a letter sent by the Nazi *Propagandaministerium* (Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda) to the OAG, which explained that the ministry was not only aware of the activities of the association, but also recommended its publications.[78] Considering the close relations of the OAG with the Nazis in Tokyo as well as in Berlin, it is not surprising that the most prominent OAG leaders of the time, Kurt Meissner and Carl von Weegmann, were awarded the *Ehrenzeichen für deutsche Volkspflege* (Badge of Honor for Caring for the German People) in 1943.[79] The ceremony took place in the German embassy at the seventieth anniversary reception of the OAG (already mentioned above).

For this occasion, Meissner had written a short account of the first seven decades of the OAG, which was full of self-praise. A few weeks after the defeat of the German *Wehrmacht* at Stalingrad, Meissner proclaimed

that future historians would interpret the preceding decade of the society (under his leadership) as a highlight in OAG history.[80] Two years later, OAG activities came to an abrupt end mostly due to the unconditional surrender of Nazi-Germany and Imperial Japan.

CONCLUSION

The OAG did much to appease the Nazis in Tokyo as well as in Germany as early as 1933/1934. Thereafter, the events of 1936 brought the organization in line with the Nazi-controlled German community in Japan. The hand-over of its premises, the loss of a specific OAG membership and the entry of NSLB-leader Walter Donat into the board sealed the *Gleichschaltung* of the OAG, without any serious resistance from within.[81] Thereafter, the OAG continued to quietly cooperate with the Nazis until 1945. Had the OAG (more) strongly resisted this development, it would have put the society in a precarious position that might have led either to a potential threat to its existence or to serious infighting between Nazis and anti-Nazis within the OAG.

Finally, the OAG's role in bilateral relations should be briefly evaluated here. Traditionally, the relations between the association and the German legation/embassy in Tokyo were very close, at least until the late 1920s. The stronger the influence of the Nazi Party got in Japan, the weaker the OAG's standing at the embassy became. Yet, at the same time, some of the most influential contemporary Japanese diplomats such as Tōgō Shigenori and Ōshima Hiroshi, were OAG members and participated in OAG events, if only sporadically. This involvement of important Japanese representatives had its own tradition, beginning with Aoki Shūzō and Katsura Tarō. During the Taishō era, Gotō Shinpei, was one of the most active Japanese politicians within the OAG ever. Considering the high-ranking Japanese guests that the OAG entertained at some events from the 1920s to the early 1940s, it can be concluded that the society provided an important forum for transnational exchange.

NOTES

1. This chapter is based on earlier papers the author has published on the history of the OAG in German and Japanese. For a more detailed account of the history of the OAG, refer to the forthcoming volume by Christian W. Spang, Rolf-Harald Wippich and Sven Saaler, *Die Geschichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens (OAG) von 1873 bis 1979* (Munich: Iudicium, 2016).
2. For further details, see Douglas M. Kenrick, *A Century of Western Studies in Japan. The First Hundred Years of the Asiatic Society of Japan 1872–1972*

(Tokyo: ASJ, 1978), and Robert Schinzinger, "Die Beziehungen zwischen OAG und der Asiatic Society in hundert Jahren," in *Sechs Vorträge im Jubiläumsjahr 1972–73*, ed. OAG (Tokyo: OAG, 1974), 82–97.

3. See Rolf-Harald Wippich, "Max von Brandt und die Gründung der OAG," *Studien des Instituts für Kultur der deutschsprachigen Länder* 11 (1993), 64–77.
4. The circulation of the *MOAG* quadrupled from a modest 250 copies in 1873 to 1000 copies in 1899.
5. See Ulrich Goch, "Gesellschaft und Auslandswissenschaft am Beispiel der Deutschen Japanologiegeschichte," *Bochumer Jahrbuch zur Ostasienforschung* 3 (1980), 98–129.
6. *MOAG* 16 (1914), S. XXXIX (Membership lists between 1883 and 1914 regularly featured a table of exchange partners).
7. See Christian W. Spang, "Anmerkungen zur frühen OAG-Geschichte bis zur Eintragung als 'japanischer Verein' (1904)," *Nachrichten der OAG* (*NOAG*) 179/180 (2006), 67–91.
8. Some of them had left Japan in summer 1914 to defend Qingdao, only to be brought back to Japan as prisoners-of-war in autumn. Among them was Siegfried Berliner. For an account of his time in Japan and his role within the OAG, see chapter 6 in this volume.
9. Cf. Kurt and Hanni Meissner, *Sechzig Jahre in Japan* (1973; reprint, Hamburg: Hans K. Meissner, 2007).
10. Political Archive of the German Foreign Office (PAAA), R 64567. Letter signed by chairman Dr. Max Huth, and his deputy, Kurt Meissner, addressed to Solf, November 27, 1925.
11. See *OAG Jahresbericht [annual report] 1926* (Tokyo: OAG, 1927), 8, and 10. Annual reports were regularly published in Tokyo by the OAG in the year following the one covered. Therefore, this information will not be mentioned in the notes below.
12. See Christian W. Spang, "Die Frühzeit der NOAG 1926–1945," *NOAG* 179/180 (2006), 55–65.
13. See *OAG Jahresbericht 1929*, 8–9.
14. According to the report "Unsere Finanzen [our finances]", *NOAG* 29 (1932), 8–12, the OAG lost the following sums between 1928 and 1931: 1928: ¥ 6323, 1929: ¥ 4337, 1930: ¥ 3834 and 1931: ¥ 3706.
15. See Christian W. Spang, "Die ersten Japaner in der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens (OAG)," *Foreign Language Education* [Daitō Bunka University] 42 (2013), 85–92, for further details about Aoki, Katsura, Konoe, Nagai, and Wada. The latter was the first Japanese OAG member. He was asked to join the society in 1885 to front for the OAG in a transaction that enabled the association to buy a house outside the foreign settlement.
16. Besides various German advisors, some British and Americans such as Basil Hall Chamberlain, Sir Ernest Mason Satow and others joined the OAG as well. For further details, see Robert Schinzinger and Carl von Weegmann, *Die Geschichte der OAG 1873–1980* (Tokyo: OAG, 1982), 25.

17. These figures are based on the membership list published in January 1912 in *MOAG* 14 (1911–13), part 3, XXXIV–LVII.
18. See Spang, Wippich, Saaler, *Die Geschichte der OAG von 1873 bis 1979*, Chapter IV.
19. The JDG had, in fact, a predecessor, but the *Japanisch-Deutsche Verein* existed only between 1911 and 1914.
20. The new honorary members are mentioned in the following annual reports: 1928, 1 and 4–5; 1929, 3; 1933, 1–2. See also Spang, Wippich, Saaler, *Die Geschichte der OAG von 1873 bis 1979*, Chapter III and IV.
21. Gotō's career as governor of Taiwan (1908–1911), interior (1916–1918, 1923–1924) and foreign minister (1918) is common knowledge. The fact that he got his doctorate in medicine in 1892 from Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich is not as well known.
22. The Nazi attitude to the Japanese was rather ambivalent. On the one hand, they admired the assumed racial purity and the samurai along with their famous bushido spirit, but they still did not accept the Japanese as racially equal. The clearest incidence for this can be found in Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, where he created a three-fold racial system with the supposedly "culture-creating" Aryan race on top, "culture-bearing" races in the middle, and the "culture-destroying" races at the bottom. The only race Hitler explicitly mentions to be "culture-bearing" are the Japanese. See Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (Munich: Eher, 1934), 317–320.
23. Ōshima had followed his father Ōshima Kenichi in pursuing a military career, but in 1938 he was promoted from military attaché to Japanese ambassador to Germany, a very unusual move. Tōgō was stationed three times in Switzerland and Germany and had a German wife. After being ambassador in Berlin 1937/1938, he moved on to represent Japan in Moscow (1938–1940) before becoming foreign minister in 1941–1942, a post he regained in 1945. Endō, who rendered his name "Yendo" in German, was an influenti Navy representative, twice serving as naval attaché in Berlin. He also worked as liaison officer for the emperor and as head of the Institute for Total War (*Sōryokusen Kenyūjo*). See Christian W. Spang, *Karl Haushofer und Japan. Die Rezeption seiner geopolitischen Theorien in der Deutschen und japanischen Politik* (Munich: Iudicium, 2013) for more details on Endō/Yendo.
24. See the two related OAG publications, which praise the OAG and the Axis: Kurt Meissner, "Der O.A.G. zum 22. März 1943," *NOAG 63* (1943), 1–12, and anonym, "Siebzig Jahre O. A. G. Ein Rückblick auf die Feier in der Deutschen Botschaft am 24. März 1943," *NOAG 64* (1943), 1–11. Among the guests were the minister of education, Hashida Kunihiko, Vice-Foreign Minister Matsumoto Shunichi, and two former Japanese ambassadors to Germany: Count Mushakōji Kintomo and Tōgō Shigenori.
25. See *OAG Jahresbericht 1926*, 2, and 11.

26. Already in 1878, the OAG had transferred many Japanese artifacts to the Ethnological Museum in Leipzig. Even today, some of these are still on display at the local *Grassi Museum*. See Christian W. Spang, "Das gescheiterte Museumsprojekt, Leipzig und die 'Sektion Berlin'," *OAG Notizen* 2/2005, 32–39.
27. The *NOAG* 23 (1930), 2, mentions the foundation of the new group and *OAG Jahresbericht 1930*, 12, lists the membership figures mentioned in the text.
28. See Detlef Schauwecker, "Bruno Petzold (1873–1949)," *OAG Notizen* 12/2009, 7–8.
29. The new structure is explained first in *NOAG* 35 (1934), 7–8, and again in *OAG Jahresbericht 1934*, 3 and 17–19.
30. At the beginning of the Nazi era, it was peer-pressure, rather than legal requirements, that led to the expulsion of Jews from German clubs. The following homepage mentions that some German sports associations were initially stricter than the Nazi-government demanded: http://www.berlin.de/2013/en/open-air-exhibitions/urban-memorials/07-olympic-stadium-a-display-of-diversity/the-exclusion-of-jewish-athletes-from-clubs-and-associations/ (accessed October 17, 2015). The related German page is more detailed and provides references as well.
31. Fortunately, both Berliners managed to escape from Germany in 1938. For an account of their fate, see chapter 6 of this volume.
32. See *OR*, May 1, 1934, 216.
33. See the mostly Chinese book *Outeman Jiao Shou Ai Si Lu (Gedenkschriften an Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Othmer)*, ed. Ku Teng (Nanking: Guo Hua Yin Shu Guan, 1934), which consists of various obituaries and remembrances by former colleagues and students. The book is accessible online at http://www.nla.gov.au/apps/cdview/?pi=nla.gen-vn6225630 (accessed October 17, 2015).
34. The *NOAG* 28 (1932), 9, mentioned that OAG membership in Shanghai reached 168 by mid-1932.
35. Othmer's deputy, Consul Dr. Walter Fuchs, went to Tokyo in March 1933. See *MOAG* 26F (1934), 23–24. The following publications provide an overview of the early developments in Shanghai: *OAG Jahresbericht 1933*, 5, and *OAG Jahresbericht 1934*, 7.
36. See *OAG Jahresbericht 1934*, 3. See also *NOAG* 36 (1934), 7, as well as *NOAG* 34 (1934), 1–2, and 11–12.
37. For some information about Glathe, please refer to the following homepage: http://www.tsingtau.org/glathe-alfred-1887-1954-kaufmann-in-tsingtau-und-shanghai/ (accessed October 17, 2015).
38. In *NOAG* 30 (1932), 6, Ungern-Sternberg is mentioned as *Schriftführerin* (secretary), a job that she must have had since 1931. Later Mrs. Ungern-Sternberg was a board member without portfolio or "*Beisitzer*".
39. See *NOAG* 31 (1932), 13–14, or the report of the 1942 general meeting of the group, held in Shanghai on August 28 in *NOAG* 62 (1942), 27.

40. For the events in spring 1932, see *NOAG* 28 (1932), 10–11. For the problems in autumn 1937, see *OAG Jahresbericht 1937*, 4.
41. According to the report about the annual meeting, held on August 28, 1942 (*NOAG* 62 [1942], 28), there had been 98 members in 1940 and 100 in 1941. The later increase is mentioned in the annual reports from Shanghai in *NOAG* 64 (1943), 41, and *NOAG* 69 (1944), 44. The rising membership is attributed to the activities of the local OAG treasurer, Joseph Krönert.
42. Even the report of the last wartime general meeting in Tokyo on February 28, 1945 (*NOAG* 70 [1945], 9) explicitly mentions the branch group in Shanghai.
43. Cf. *OAG Jahresbericht 1933*, 4–5; *NOAG 35* (1934), S. 11–12, and *NOAG 37* (1935), 12–14. Batavia is the contemporary name of today's Jakarta.
44. Between 1937 and 1939, Eickstedt travelled to India, China, the Philippines, Malaysia, and the Dutch East Indies. As a result, he later published *Rassendynamik von Ostasien (East Asian Race Dynamics)* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1944).
45. The end of OAG activities in Batavia is reported in *NOAG* 50 (1940), 14. See *OAG Jahresbericht 1940*, 5, and anonym, "Indies' Police Round up 25,000 Suspects," *The Straits Times*, May 16, 1940, 12. The latter report mentions that the Dutch arrested around 700 Germans in Batavia within one hour.
46. *NOAG* 62 (1942), 24–25. Wagner's letter closed with "*Heil Hitler!*"
47. In a letter dated December 2, 1955, Leutelt called himself "*Sekretär der OAG*" (OAG secretary). This letter and other sources have been given to the author by Leutelt's son Dietrich.
48. *NOAG* 64 (1943), 45. An abstract of Morishita's talk can be found in *NOAG* 65 (1943), 36–38.
49. The protocol of the general meeting of the OAG in February 1945 in Tokyo mentions that the huge distances between members had made further events unfeasible. See *NOAG* 70 (1945), 10.
50. See Christian W. Spang, "Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens (OAG) zwischen den Weltkriegen," in *Flucht und Rettung. Exil im japanischen Herrschaftsbereich (1933–1945)*, ed. Thomas Pekar (Berlin: Metropol, 2011), 65–90.
51. In Japan, the transformation toward a totalitarian system happened between 1930 and 1936. The most important (abortive) coups d'état during this period were the "March incident" and the "October incident" in 1931, the "May 15 incident" in 1932, the "November incident" in 1934, the "Aizawa incident" in August 1935 and the "February 26 incident" in 1936. In Germany, the decisive events were Hitler's accession to power on January 30, 1933, the passing of the infamous *Ermächtigungsgesetz* (Enabling Act) on March 23, 1933, and the open breach of the military restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty in 1935.

52. Japanese newspapers reported about the speeches delivered at the occasion—some of them in special issues. Celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of the OAG in 1923 had been cancelled after the devastating Tokyo earthquake of September 1, 1923. See Christian W. Spang, "Das ausgefallene Jubiläum," *OAG Notizen* 1/2006, 26–33.
53. Admiral Fushimi had studied in Kiel (Germany) from 1889 to 1895.
54. For some comments on Glombik, see Nikola Herwig, Thomas Pekar and Christian W. Spang, ed., *Heinz Altschul, As I Record These Memoires…* (Munich: Iudicium, 2014), 26, 40, and 113 n.52.
55. For further details, see Nakamura Ayano, "The Nazi Party and the German Colonies in East Asia," in *Japan and Germany. Two Latecomers on the World Stage, 1890–1945*, ed. Kudō Akira, Tajima Nobuo and Erich Pauer. Vol. 3 (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2009), 446.
56. Federal Archive Koblenz, N 1053, Vol. 92, 36–37. Otto von Erdmannsdorf to Wilhelm Solf, July 20, 1933.
57. Herbert Worm, "Japanologie im Nationalsozialismus. Ein Zwischenbericht," in *Formierung und Fall der Achse Berlin-Tokyo*, ed. Gerhard Krebs and Bernd Martin (Munich: Iudicium, 1994), 181.
58. *OAG Jahresbericht 1933*, 2–3.
59. Meissner was registered as *Parteigenosse* no. 3.398.387 (January 1, 1934), his later deputy Johannes Barth followed four months later as no. 3.444.606. The NSDAP membership lists are available at the Federal Archive Berlin, the former Berlin Document Center.
60. The OAG *Jahresbericht 1934*, 1, mentioned the plan for a rigid reorganization of the society. A look at the original wording clearly shows the influence of Nazi terminology. Most likely, it was also due to Nazi pressure that the OAG changed the names of its regional groups from "*Ortsgruppe*" (local group) to "*Zweiggruppe*" (branch group) in 1938 to avoid any confusion with local Nazi-"*Ortsgruppen*".
61. See Nakamura, "The Nazi Party," 437, and Christian W. Spang, "Die OAG zwischen den Weltkriegen," in *Flucht und Rettung*, ed. Thomas Pekar (2011), 73–74, and 88–90.
62. See Johannes Barth, *Als deutscher Kaufmann in Fernost. Bremen—Tsingtau—Tōkyō 1891–1981* (Berlin: Erich Schmidt, 1984), 190. Barth explained here that he had joined the party because everyone else had done so and not joining would have been an economic risk he had not been prepared to take.
63. See Nakamura, "The Nazi Party," 437. Weegmann was *Parteimitglied* no. 3.454.574 (May 1, 1934).
64. Annette Hack, "Das Japanisch-Deutsche Kulturinstitut Tokyo in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus," *NOAG* 157/158 (1995), 77–100, for further details.
65. See Worm, "Japanologie im Nationalsozialismus," 167–169, for an account of Gundert's Nazi-oriented views. Gundert was *Parteigenosse* no. 3.444.620 (April 1, 1934).

66. Eberhard Friese, "Varianten deutsch-japanischer Kulturpolitik vom Ende des Ersten bis zum Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs (1918–1945)," in *Deutschland—Japan in der Zwischenkriegszeit*, ed. Josef Kreiner and Regine Mathias (Bonn: Bouvier, 1990), 349–355, provides some insight into Donat's Nazi career.
67. Donat's role as outspoken representative of Nazi ideology in Japan has been confirmed by many former German Japan-residents. See Dietrich Seckel's narration in *Gelebte Zeitgeschichte. Alltag von Deutschen in Japan 1923–1947*, ed. Franziska Ehmcke and Peter Pantzer (Munich: Iudicium, 2000), 50. Equally telling are the comments by the Jewish-German philosopher, Klaus Löwith in his book *Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2002), 117.
68. See chapter 6 of this volume.
69. See *NOAG* 32 (1933), 3; *NOAG* 34 (1934), 3, and *NOAG* 35 (1934), 2. *NOAG* 33 (1933) was a special issue, which did not feature any information on internal OAG affairs.
70. *NOAG* 34 (1934), 3. See Schauwecker, "Bruno Petzold," 12/2009, 13–14.
71. *NOAG* 34 (1934): 5. See also Löwith, *Mein Leben*, 119.
72. For further details on Petzold, see Schauwecker's already mentioned 3-part article "Bruno Petzold (1873–1949)," in *OAG Notizen*, published in November 2008, 10–32; March 2009, 11–32; and December 2009, 10–41.
73. *OAG Jahresbericht 1936*, 1.
74. In 1935, NSLB leader Walter Donat had called for the establishment of a "German House" in Tokyo. Ambassador Herbert von Dirksen reported Donat's request in a letter to the Foreign Office in Berlin. As this idea was financially not feasible, Dirksen suggested that the OAG should be transformed accordingly. Dirksen to Foreign Office, Aug. 20, 1935: 1, in: PAAA, R 85965. Cf. Schauwecker, "Bruno Petzold," 12/2009, 18–19.
75. *OAG Jahresbericht 1936*, 1–2. After years of financial problems, this security was much appreciated. Besides this fixed income, the OAG was allowed to keep any money it made by selling its publications, etc.
76. Nakamura, "The Nazi Party," 448 n.66, mentions a 1936 police report, which shows the police's view very clearly: "The German East Asiatic Society (OAG) [. . .] hold[s] various seminars, lectures and film showings to coordinate all political and other activities by the National Socialist regime." The quote is Nakamura's translation. The original is taken from *Gaiji keisatsu gaikyō 2*, ed. Naimushō Keihōkyoku (Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 1994), 370.
77. After the monthly OAG lectures, *Parteigenossen* were allowed to use the salon; others were limited to a drink at the bar. Rudolf Voll remembered the relevant announcement the following way: "Die Parteigenossen ins rote Zimmer, die Volksgenossen an die Bar!" This is quoted by Heinrich Menkhaus, "In memoriam," *OAG Notizen* 5/2009, 61.

78. *OAG Jahresbericht 1940*, 1. A few weeks before the OAG office in Hamburg received the above-mentioned letter on November 20, 1940, the long-time OAG member Dr. Leopold G. Scheidl had joined the Far Eastern section of the ministry. See *NOAG* 55 (1940), 11, and *NOAG* 57 (1941), 23.
79. See *NOAG* 64 (1943), 3.
80. Meissner, *NOAG* 63 (1942), 5.
81. A look at the length of the regular general meetings of the OAG shows the effect of *Gleichschaltung*. After 1936, most of these gatherings lasted only 30 minutes. Discussions did not fit the newly introduced *Führerprinzip*.

8

Japanese Ambivalence toward Jewish Exiles in Japan

Thomas Pekar

Although Jewish and political exile in Shanghai during World War II has been relatively well examined through a multitude of publications,[1] the research situation with regard to exiles in Japan is—even considering there were far fewer of them—unpropitious.[2] Above all, there has been little research that encompasses exiles in the entire Japanese-controlled area of military power during the war years—consisting of the Japanese "puppet state" of Manchukuo, Shanghai, Taiwan, Korea, and parts of South East Asia (such as the Philippines), and which contextualizes them as one.[3] This is a significant gap, as Japanese Jewish policy must be viewed against this background, specifically in Manchukuo (with the capital Harbin) and also in Shanghai, where tens of thousands of Jews were subject to Japanese rule.

Although Japan was indeed an ally of Nazi Germany,[4] it is also true that Japan should also be regarded, for the specific period during the National Socialist dictatorship in Germany and the military dictatorship in Japan, as an "exile country," which poses certain contradictions. Words of the prominent Jewish-German philosopher Karl Löwith (1897–1973), who resided in Japan from 1936 to 1941 and taught philosophy at a Japanese university, reinforce this claim, for he spoke of "German emigrants in Japan" at the time.[5] The many Jewish emigrants from other parts of Europe (e.g., Poland) must also be counted among these emigrants. Certainly, Japan was not a typical "exile country," as was the United States, but it did offer emigrants opportunities for survival, if only temporarily. This paradoxical situation, that an ally of Nazi Germany should be simultaneously also a country of possible exile, will be examined here more thoroughly in the first part of the chapter, following a brief literature review. However, after the Pearl Harbor attack, as the last section shows, the closing of ranks between Germany and Japan worsened

the Japanese attitude toward the Jews and other migrants and affected how they were treated. Regarding the German-Japanese relationship during the years 1933–1945, it must be said that Japan's attitude toward Germany—and conversely, Germany's attitude toward Japan—was not at all straightforward. Moreover, it changed constantly.[6] This mutability, in turn, influenced the treatment of Jewish emigrants from Europe who found themselves in areas under Japanese control.

Literature Review

In the *Handbuch zur deutschsprachigen Emigration 1933–1945* (Handbook on German-speaking Emigration, 1933–1945), published in 1998, is the claim that "Japan poses a problem with respect to research on exiles."[7] This conclusion appears to be not entirely justified, however, as in 1976, the American Holocaust expert David H. Kranzler presented a thorough examination in his book *Japanese, Nazis & Jews*—distinguished by its extensive interviews with contemporary witnesses—not only of the exiles in Shanghai but also of the more general situation of Jews in East Asia during the period of the Nazi dictatorship, especially World War II.[8] Later works on Jewish exiles in East Asia and in Japan, respectively, orientate themselves around this standard work, as did, for example, Birgit Pansa's 1999 publication, *Juden unter japanischer Herrschaft*[9] *(Jews under Japanese Control)*, which was particularly concerned with the specific case of one prominent emigrant, Karl Löwith.[10] Key examinations of Jewish exiles in Japan and East Asia have been conducted by the historian Gerhard Krebs, mainly through the lens of the German-Japanese relationship during the Nazi period.[11] Of particular note here is his literature report published in 2004, *Die Juden und der Ferne Osten* (Jews and the Far East).[12]

Also worth mentioning is Heinz Eberhard Mauls' publication under the somewhat misunderstood title *Warum Japan keine Juden verfolgte* (Why Japan Did Not Persecute Jews), originally published as a dissertation at the University of Bonn under the more neutral title *Japan und die Juden* (Japan and the Jews); this version, which includes the complete notations and bibliographic information that disappeared in the published book, is available online.[13] Martin Kaneko—more critical than Maul by far—assessed the behavior of the Japanese toward the Jews in his 2008 book *Die Judenpolitik der japanischen Kriegsregierung* (The Jewish Policy of Japan's Wartime Government).[14] Several more specialized works should also be mentioned, namely the book by Tokayer and Swartz about the Fugu Plan of the Japanese government to establish a Jewish state in the Japanese-occupied territory[15] and the more extensive examination by Goodman and Miyazawa of stereotypical impressions the Japanese held of the Jews.[16]

Japan's Independent Jewish Policy Prior to Pearl Harbor

Japan's independent Jewish policy prior to Pearl Harbor is not surprising when one considers that on the German side, there were caveats stemming from politically strategic qualms concerning an alarmingly close partnership with the Japanese. There were also racial complications, since the Nazis did not regard the Japanese as equal to them.[17] The two countries were also too far apart geographically to exchange news or goods easily or to coordinate their actions more directly. In effect, Japan and Germany could never align the respective manners in which they conducted their military campaigns with each other, which is why the historian Bernd Martin came to the following fundamental conclusion, "The world war was conducted separately by Germany and Japan."[18] These ambiguities, distances, and ambivalences, which are all indicative of the German-Japanese war alliance, permits the reasonable assumption that Japan, at least with regard to the treatment and handling of Jewish emigrants, can in no way be perceived as a proxy for Nazi Germany's policies, but should instead be understood as negotiating an independent path that was shaped as much by the traditional image of the Jew in Japan.

Despite the various pacts between Nazi Germany and Japan—including the Anti-Comintern pact of 1936[19] and the Berlin pact of 1940 (the powers of Berlin-Rome-Tokyo)—the two partners operated with complete autonomy. A report from March 1939 by the press advisory council of the German embassy in Tokyo—in which the German diplomats complained about the Japanese—may be indicative of the not altogether unfriendly Japanese stance toward the Jews *before* Pearl Harbor. This report conveys "that the Jewish Problem is relatively new in Japan and that it has not yet been counteracted with sufficient measures. The Jews are most prominently represented among artists—especially among musicians—and academics, which includes teachers, professors, and doctors."[20] Due to this tolerant Japanese policy toward the Jews during the brief period between 1938–1941, Japan took in many Jewish emigrants and helped them escape from Nazi Germany, although perhaps it was only during this short historical period that Japan can be considered an exile country. In this section, the fate of Jewish emigrants to Japan will briefly be discussed, but the main focus is on Japanese "experts" and Japanese policy toward Jews prior to Pearl Harbor.

Japan—unlike China—did not have any longstanding Jewish communities.[21] The first Jews—for the most part, merchants—came to Japan after the forced opening of the country at the end of the nineteenth century and were allowed to settle in Japanese port cities—Yokohama, Kobe, or Nagasaki. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Russian Jews fled to Japan after the revolutionary unrest and the October Revolution in

Russia in 1917. Jews also arrived from the Middle East, a population that included the Sassoon Family, known as the Rothschilds of the East. In the first third of the twentieth century, both an Ashkenazic and a Sephardic synagogue were situated in Kobe. Nevertheless, the total number of Jews in Japan—in 1930, around 500[22]—was too few for a discernible Jewish community to develop. From the perspective of the Japanese, these individuals represented their nations of origin, rather than a particular unified religious or ethnic group.[23]

As much as these early Jewish residents of Japan shaped the image the Japanese had of them, so too did an event connected to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/1905. At that time, an American businessman of Jewish descent working for an investment bank in New York—the German-born Jacob H. Schiff (1847–1920)—financed Japanese war loans for around two million dollars, which were used by the Japanese to fund the war against Russia, which resulted in a Japanese victory. Enraged by the anti-Semitic pogroms in Tsarist Russia, Schiff supported Japan.[24] This particular businessman founded the reputation that the Jews had in Japan, that they are above all, financially and politically powerful.

The political situation in the 1930s dramatically changed the number of Jews with whom Japan came into contact. The question of Japanese-Jewish relations became increasingly urgent. The Japanese occupation of Manchuria (1931–1932), North China, and above all Shanghai in 1937, resulted in approximately 70,000 Jews becoming resident in Japanese-controlled areas. In addition to these people were the Jewish emigrants from Central Europe who had fled to Shanghai or Japan itself after *Kristallnacht* in November 1938, in Germany, when harsher anti-Semitic measures were put into effect. Most of them saw these Asian harbor cities as transit places from which they could continue on to other countries.[25] German citizens—at this time, German Jews were still viewed as German citizens—did not need a visa in order to travel to Japan or Shanghai.[26] Jews in so-called protective custody by the Gestapo were freed, if they could prove they were emigrating, for example, to Shanghai, if confronted with a lack of other options.[27]

Some known Jewish emigrants to Japan should be named. In addition to academics, such as Löwith and Kurt Singer, they were, for the most part, musicians, for example, the violinist and violin teacher Robert Pollak (1880–1962),[28] the composer, conductor, and pianist Leonid Kreutzer (1884–1954),[29] the pianist and piano teacher Leo Sirota (1885–1965),[30] the singer Margarete Netke-Löwe (1889–1971), the conductor Joseph Rosenstock (1895–1985),[31] and the brother-in-law of Thomas Mann, the conductor Klaus Pringsheim (1883–1972).[32]

As the Japanese increasingly came into contact with Jews and became more acquainted with the West's anti-Semitism over the course of the

twentieth century, Japan produced several Jewish "experts" and came up with a Jewish policy. While few of them merely copied the West's traditional anti-Semitism, some of them diverged from the West's anti-Semitic view, expressing ambivalence and, in some cases, tolerance toward the Jews prior to Pearl Harbor.

The Japanese General Shiōden Nobutaka (1878–1962) is one example of the spread of anti-Semitic thought throughout Japan, despite the relatively small percentage of Jewish individuals resident in Japan. His stay in France during World War I shaped his anti-Semitism and fostered later close contact with Nazis in Germany.[33] In 1937 he founded an anti-Semitic organization, the so-called *Studiengruppe für Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft (Kokusai seikei gakkai—Study Group for International Politics and Economy)*, which was financially supported by the Japanese foreign service.[34] Some influential Japanese that were self-proclaimed Jewish experts,[35] for example, the marine officer Inuzuka Koreshige (1890–1965)[36] and the entrepreneur Aikawa Yoshisuke (1880–1967), were of the opinion that the economic and political power of the Jews could be used to Japan's benefit as part of a controlled immigration.

Another case of a so-called Jewish expert revolves around a high-ranking officer of the Japanese army Yasue Senkō (also known under the name Yasue Norihiro) (1886–1950). He exemplified this Japanese mutable regard toward the Jews, vacillating between philo- and anti-Semitism. When Japanese troops were deployed to Siberia between 1918 and 1922, he joined them to aid anticommunist White Russia, which had at that time made its anti-Semitic attitude known in the battle against the Bolshevists.[37] Upon returning to Japan, Yasue translated the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* from Russian into Japanese; this well-known fictional anti-Semitic pamphlet, supposedly written by members of the Tsarist Secret Service, claimed to detail the Jewish plan for world domination. Amazingly enough, the reception of the *Protocols* in Japan was actually not very anti-Semitic. Time and again, it is reported that the Japanese actually embraced the claims in the *Protocols* of a world dominance as a positive model, but as one to be envied in order to earn and maintain worldwide influence.[38]

Based on this translation, Yasue became one of the de facto experts on Judaism in Japanese politics and Japanese society and was consequently sent to Palestine in 1926, where he met with important leaders of the Zionist movement and even lived for a period of time on a Kibbutz. In 1938 Yasue served as the contact person between the Japanese government and the *Far East Jewish Society*, which had been founded in Manchuria in 1937 and which represented over 30,000 Jews who lived under Japanese hegemony there and throughout North China.[39] The *Jewish Society* organized three conferences; in the third conference in

the capital of Manchuria, Harbin, Yasue gave a speech and was "openly praised for his assistance on behalf of the Jews"[40] by one member of the board, Dr. Abraham Kaufmann (1885–1971). Kaufmann was naturally unaware of the anti-Semitic activities and attitudes held by Yasue. The behavior of Yasue appears typical of Japanese thought, more generally, in that he attempted to combine two things that would otherwise appear to be irreconcilable, in this case, philo- and anti-Semitism.[41]

That ambivalent Japanese view of the Jews, which was still more philo-Semitic than anti-Semitic prior to Pearl Harbor, was demonstrated further by an important conference of Japanese ministers held on December 6, 1938. It was prompted by two key events: the pogroms that had taken place in Germany on the night of November 9–10, 1938 (*Reichskristallnacht*), and the German-Japanese Cultural Treaty of November 25, 1938. The topic of this conference was the question of how Japan should deal with the Jews and particularly those Jews who wanted to immigrate to Japan. A few of the ministers supported a Jewish state under Japanese suzerainty in Manchuria; it remains a subject of debate whether this plan was actually named the "Fugu-Plan," a name inspired by the Japanese Fugu fish that can be a delicacy but can also prove deadly when not prepared properly.[42] This theory demonstrates the Japanese ambivalency toward this plan. On one hand, they likely hoped for a boom in the Japanese economy through a Jewish client state that one could only imagine as being prosperous; the Japanese also probably expected rich investments by American Jews and, above all, the benevolence of the United States, which was widely viewed as being controlled by the Jews. On the other hand, the Japanese feared that the Jews would involve themselves too deeply in economic policy and in Japanese politics, and could even wrest leadership away from the Japanese. The conference ended with the plan to follow these emigration plans without substantiating them. A relatively pro-Jewish consensus was maintained that, although the Japanese did not want to actively take in the persecuted Jews, they did however wish to treat those Jews currently living in Japanese areas of control "justly and in the same manner as other foreigners" and it was reaffirmed that Jews entering Japan would be afforded "the same entry provisions as other foreigners."[43]

The activities of the Japanese consul in Kaunas, Lithuania, Sugihara Chiune (1900–1986),[44] are of particular importance for Japanese-Jewish relations. During the summer of 1940, Sugihara issued transit visas for over 2,000 Jewish refugees, for the most part from Poland. He is said to have issued over 100 visas a day,[45] enabling the refugees to travel via Moscow and then on the Trans-Siberian Railway to Vladivostok, where most of them ended up in the Japanese port town of Kobe.[46] Sugihara issued these visas against the express wishes of his own government.[47] Among these refugees were the leaders and members of the Mir yeshiva

(a Jewish educational institution), the only European yeshiva to survive the Holocaust intact.[48] They were able to stay temporarily in Kobe from 1940 until 1941. There are many reports of the relatively positive reception of Jewish refugees in Kobe, where they were supported by Jewish organizations such as the *National Council of Jews in East Asia* and the *Jewish Committee of Kobe*. Kobe functioned as a good transit station, because Jews from Harbin and Shanghai had settled there and founded a small Jewish community at the end of the nineteenth century.[49] They organized themselves under the name JEWCOM and helped the emigrants.[50] In this respect, Kobe can serve as a useful model of Japanese exile policy. Kobe was not a target destination like the United States, but merely a transit station; by November 1941, almost all of the refugees that arrived in Kobe had continued their travel on to other exile countries. Although this transit station certainly did not offer the refugees the security of a long-term residency, it still held the possibility of travel to other parts of the world.

The End of Japan's Independent Jewish Policy after Pearl Harbor

Japan's autonomous Jewish strategy eventually became obsolete, due to changing Japanese policies that were moving increasingly toward war. The relatively pro-Jewish guidelines of 1938 would be replaced a few months after Pearl Harbor (in March 1942) by a new set of rules, under which the immigration of Jews was prohibited and those Jews living in Japanese-controlled areas were placed under strict observation.[51] As a result of this drastic change in policy, after 1941, Japanese authorities began to expel Jewish refugees from some areas and redirect them to Shanghai, where, in February 1943, a ghetto for the stateless (mainly Jews expatriated from Germany) was founded. One can therefore divide the Japanese attitude toward the Jewish emigrants quite clearly into *before* and *after* Pearl Harbor, which suggests that this event considerably worsened Japanese attitudes toward and treatment of Jews and other emigrants.

Pearl Harbor came to mark a decisive turning point; the escalation of the war to a global conflict coalesced the unequal coalitions irrevocably, with Japan and Germany standing in opposition to a world power, following the United States' entry into the war. Because meaningful cooperation between the allies was not possible due to geographic, military and technical factors, this association was mostly ideological. Nevertheless, it impacted the Japanese attitude toward the Jews. After all, it precipitated the arrest of foreigners, in general, and of Jews in particular in Japan. Reports tell of inhumane conditions and also of torture of Jewish inmates in the prison cells.[52]

The Nazi government started to show more interest regarding the Jews in East Asia and started to hassle the Japanese. Above all, German state agencies (e.g., the German embassy in Tokyo), exerted pressure regarding the propagation of anti-Semitic rhetoric and discrimination and persecution against emigrants.[53] Illustrative of this tough stance was the deployment of the so-called police attaché—in reality a Gestapo attaché—Josef Meisinger from Germany to Japan in April, 1941, who stayed in East Asia until the end of World War II. Meisinger, head of the German police and an SS colonel, was known as the "Butcher of Warsaw" for his role in authorizing mass shootings in Poland. He was executed in 1947 as a war criminal in Warsaw. His job was to observe Germans in Japan and to intervene in Japanese companies, in order to crack down on the Jews. He also travelled to Shanghai, where there was a much larger group of Jews.

Many Jewish emigrants in Japan lost their livelihoods after 1941 and were forced to leave Japan. The Japanese also established a Jewish ghetto in Shanghai on May 18, 1943. They mandated that all of the "refugees" (the Japanese avoided the use of the word "Jew" as well as the word "ghetto" in their proclamation, although the order affected only Jews and the "area" was in reality a ghetto) that had arrived after 1937 must relocate to a "given district" which lay in the Chinese area of town, Hongkew. Around 20,000 Jewish refugees lived under inhumane conditions and degrading circumstances in this ghetto, which was approximately 2.5 km^2 in size, and until the war's end, one could only leave the ghetto with the permission of the Japanese military authorities.[54] During the course of ghettoization, Jews were issued with new passports on which a "'yu' for 'yudayajin (Jew) was marked."[55] It can therefore be surmised that there were always circles of high influence in Japan in which a "hardliner" like Meisinger could find receptive ears. One can only speculate about whether the Japanese were prepared to actualize the murder of the Jews in Shanghai and, if possible, also those Jews living in other parts of East Asia under Japanese military control, if the war had continued longer.

Although the situation for the German-Jewish emigrants in Japan worsened, particularly in regard to their career prospects, they were at least not sent back to Germany, as there was no repatriation treaty between Germany and Japan. Löwith, for example, who habilitated in 1928 under Martin Heidegger and who, from 1936 until 1941 lived in Japan under far from uncomfortable circumstances, was not sent back to Germany.[56] He taught in Sendai at what was then imperial Tōhoku University.[57] It was during this time in Sendai that Löwith finished his most important work, *Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Der revolutionäre Bruch im Denken des 19. Jahrhunderts* (From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolutionary Break in

Thought of the Nineteenth Century).[58] In 1941, due to the intervention of German Nazis in Tokyo,[59] he was forced to leave Japan with his wife and emigrate to the United States.[60] Löwith initially went to Hartford, where he taught at the Theological Seminary.[61] In 1949, he gained employment at the *New School for Social Research* in New York. After the war, Löwith returned to Germany and became a professor of philosophy in Heidelberg. Löwith should be viewed as a special case, however, as the good standard of living which he had in Japan until 1941 cannot be compared with the hard and often inhumane living conditions of other Jewish emigrants.

The same was the case with another German academic, Kurt Singer (1886–1962), the writer and national economist, even though he had to leave Japan in 1939. Singer arrived in Japan in 1931 in order to teach as an associate professor of National Economy at the Imperial University Tokyo. Because of his Jewish heritage, his teaching license was revoked in 1933 in absentia by the University of Hamburg, where he had habilitated. During this same year, the University of Tokyo chose not to renew his contract, which could have been extended for up to two additional years, even though such an extension was usual. Also decisive in this case, as in the case of Löwith, was the pressure of the National Socialist Teachers' Association (*Nationalsozialistische Lehrervereinigung*), as well as other Nazi organizations, on the Japanese cultural minister.[62] Singer then found a position as a German teacher at a secondary institution in Sendai—in the very same town as Löwith—but they rarely saw one another. Singer remained in Sendai until 1939, and then went to Australia and then later back to Europe; he died in 1962 in Athens.[63]

Conclusion

It can be concluded that Japan's Jewish policy during the time covered here—which the Jewish exiles in Japan were dependent upon—was fundamentally ambivalent. Even when it was essentially pragmatic, as was the case during the Japanese handling of the Jews in their areas of occupation in China and in Japan until the end of 1941, it was still never free of the basically anti-Semitic thought of those Japanese individuals who were responsible for Jewish policy and who were under the influence of anti-Jewish libelous writings, such as the *Protocols of Zion*. In their daily dealings with Jewish exiles, as in the example of Kobe, there were no racial, or rather anti-Semitic, acts of discrimination by the Japanese; at most, there were those certain reservations that the Japanese generally bore against foreigners. On the other hand, when the Japanese policy toward the Jews was markedly more anti-Semitic, as demonstrated by the construction of the "ghetto" in Shanghai in 1943, it still possessed pragmatic elements.

This pragmatism can be seen in the fact that the Japanese allowed the Jews to work outside of the Shanghai Ghetto, even if they did have to obtain permission to do so.

This permanent ambivalence of the Japanese attitude toward the Jews was, in any case, completely different than the Nazis' profound hatred for the Jews; this hatred was, however, the product of the long Western, or even specifically German, tradition of anti-Semitism, which of course did not exist in Japan. It was this ambivalence that made Jewish exile in Japan possible.

NOTES

1. Compare this to the bibliographical details in: Patrik von Zur Mühlen, "Ostasien," in *Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigranten 1933–1945*, eds. Claus-Dieter Krohn, et al. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1998), 336–349, which details the level of research up to 1997. Further important works are, among others: Ammon Barzel, *Leben im Wartesaal. Exil in Shanghai 1938–1947* (Berlin: Jüdisches Museum, 1997); Pamela Rotner Sakamoto, *Japanese Diplomats and Jewish Refugees: A World War II Dilemma* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998); Georg Armbrüster and Michael Kohlstruck and Sonja Mühlberger, eds., *Exil Shanghai. Jüdisches Leben in der Emigration (1938–1947)* (Teetz: Hentrich & Hentrich, 2000); Astrid Freyeisen, *Shanghai und die Politik des Dritten Reiches* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2000). Aside from this scholarly research, many biographical memoirs of the persons affected have been published detailing their time in Shanghai: Ernest G. Heppner, *Shanghai Refuge: A Memoir of the World War II Jewish Ghetto* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993); Evelyn Pike Rubin, *Ghetto Shanghai* (New York: Shengold, 1993); Vivian Jeanette Kaplan, *Ten Green Bottles: Vienna to Shanghai. Journey of Fear and Hope* (Toronto, ON: Robin Brass Studio, 2002). In 1997 the film "Exil Shanghai" (dir. Ulrike Ottinger) premiered at the Berlin International Film Festival (at the *Internationalen Forum des Jungen Films*). In 2002 the American documentary film "Shanghai Ghetto" (dirs. Dana Janklowicz-Mann and Amir Mann) was released.
2. Records suggest approximately 20,000 Jewish (and also other, e.g., political) emigrants in Shanghai and from around 4,000 in Japan (who stayed there often for only a relatively short amount of time).
3. Thomas Pekar, *Flucht und Rettung. Exil im japanischen Herrschaftsbereich (1933–1945)* (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2011), represents a first attempt at such a full contextualization.
4. In 1936, Japan and Germany signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, in order to fight against the Communist International. The Tripartite Pact (1940) was signed along with Italy; Germany declared war upon the United

States on December 11, 1941, just a few days after the Japanese attack on the American naval base Pearl Harbor and the American declaration of war upon Japan on December 8, 1941.

5. Karl Löwith, *Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933. Ein Bericht. Mit einem Vorwort von Reinhart Koselleck und einer Nachbemerkung von Ada Löwith* (Stuttgart: Metzler,1986), 115.
6. Bernd Martin, for example, stressed "the complexity of this alliance," as well as the "vicissitudes" and the "rivalries and misunderstandings," that are observable in this relationship. Bernd Martin, *Deutschland und Japan im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1940–1945. Vom Angriff auf Pearl Harbor bis zur deutschen Kapitulation* (Hamburg: Nikol, 2001), 14.
7. Zur Mühlen, "Ostasien", 346.
8. David H. Kranzler, *The Japanese, the Nazis, and the Jews: The Jewish Refugee Committee of Shanghai 1938–1945* (New York: Yeshiva University, 1976); and David Kranzler, "Shanghai Refuge. The Jewish Refugee Community of Shanghai 1938–1949," in *Jews in China. From Kaifeng . . . to Shanghai*, ed. Roman Malek (Nettetal: Steyler Verlag, 2000), 401–415.
9. Birgit Pansa, *Juden unter japanischer Herrschaft. Jüdische Exilerfahrungen und der Sonderfall Karl Löwith* (München: Iudicium Verlag,1999); her book is structured upon her Master's thesis from the Japanese Seminar at the University of Heidelberg.
10. Karl Löwith, *Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933. Ein Bericht. Mit einem Vorwort von Reinhart Koselleck und einer Nachbemerkung von Ada Löwith* (Stuttgart: Metzler,1986).
11. Gerhard Krebs and Bernd Martin, ed., *Formierung und Fall der Achse Berlin-Tōkyō* (München: Iudicium Verlag, 1994). This volume also contains the essay: Françoise Kreissler, "Japans Judenpolitik (1931–1945)," 187–210.
12. Gerhard Krebs, "Die Juden und der Ferne Osten. Ein Literaturbericht," *NOAG 175–176* (2004), 229–270; and Gerhard Krebs, "Antisemitismus und Judenpolitik der Japaner," in Armbrüster/Kohlstruck/Mühlberger, *Exil Shanghai*, 58–74.
13. Heinz Eberhard Maul, *Japan und die Juden. Die Judenpolitik des Kaiserreiches Japan während der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus (1933–1945)* (Bonn: University Diss., 2000); and Heinz Eberhard Maul, *Warum Japan keine Juden verfolgte. Die Judenpolitik des Kaiserreiches Japan während der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus (1933–1945*) (München: Iudicium Verlag, 2007).
14. Martin Kaneko, *Die Judenpolitik der japanischen Kriegsregierung* (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2008).
15. Marvin Tokayer and Mary Swartz, *The Fugu Plan: The Untold Story of the Japanese and the Jews during World War II* (New York: Paddington Press, 1979).
16. David Goodman and Masanori Miyazawa, *Jews in the Japanese Mind: The History and Uses of a Cultural Stereotype* (New York: Free Press,1995).

Japanese language research on this subject such as: Bandō Hiroshi, *Nihon no Yudayajin seisaku. 1931–1935* (Gaikō Shiryokan Bunsho, Tōkyō: Miraisha, 2002), was not systematically evaluated for this article.

17. When the British colony Singapore was captured by Japan, the Nazi leadership was said to have regretted "the white man's great loss in East Asia." Quoted in Martin, *Deutschland und Japan*, 70. "As a racist, Hitler was far from recognizing the Japanese as equals. He accorded them an intermediary position as a 'culture-bearing' people, distinct from the 'culture-creating' Aryans but still superior to the 'culture-destroying' Jews." Krebs, "Antisemitismus," 62. There were also cases of discrimination against Japanese and the children of German-Japanese marriages in Germany: "The Japanese fear that they will become, as a 'colored' people, themselves the victim of German racial delusions, and worriedly speak out often about this to Germany." Krebs, "Die Juden und der Ferne Osten," 241; Kreissler, "Japans Judenpolitik," 188f. Only the *Nuremberg Laws* of 1935 somewhat calmed the fears of the Japanese, in that they finally defined the Jews as "non-Aryan." Despite this legislation, German racism against the Japanese remained in everyday life. A similar situation was perceptible on the Japanese side; there, too, were there reservations toward the "white race." Martin, *Deutschland und Japan*, 47.
18. Martin, *Deutschland und Japan*, 15. He wrote further, "Like the Germans, the Japanese also pursued their own plans…" (110). The most clear expression of this was the so called "Division of the World," which was put into practice in 1941 in a military convention between Germany, Japan, and Italy. The political purpose of the military division of the operational areas lay on the side of the Japanese in the creation of a "großasiatischen Wohlstandssphäre," from which the white race—even the Germans—would be excluded.
19. This pact against the Communist International was joined by Italy a year later, with other countries following.
20. Krebs, "Antisemitismus," 63.
21. Jews arrived in China as early as the seventh century—perhaps even earlier—working mostly as merchants. Their biggest community was in Kaifeng (founded in the tenth century).
22. Pansa, *Juden unter japanischer Herrschaft*, 17.
23. The first Japanese to receive and engage in German literature and culture did not differentiate between Jewish and non-Jewish German authors and artists.
24. For this, he later received the Japanese "Order of the Rising Sun" from the Japanese Emperor and was the first foreigner to ever do so. Geoffrey Wigoder, *Dictionary of Jewish Biography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 461.
25. Around 27,000 Jews lived in Manchuria and in Northern China, most of whom had come from Russia; around 18,000 Jews lived in Shanghai and an aditional 20,000 arrived immediately before and during World War II.

26. The *Reich Citizenship Law* of September 15, 1939 (a part of the *Nuremberg Laws*) differentiated between "Citizens of Reduced Rights" (Jews) und "Citizens of the Reich" (Aryans). The German Jews thus had not yet lost their citizenship. The *Eleventh Amendment to the Reich Citizenship Law* of November 25, 1941, however, stripped Jews who were "resident abroad" of their German nationality. The *Twelfth Amendment* to this law (of April 25, 1943) stripped all Jews of their German citizenship.
27. An example of this is Hugo Burkhard who, after seven years' imprisonment, was released in 1940 from Buchenwald so that he could immigrate to Shanghai. Hugo Burkhard, *Tanz mal Jude! Meine Erlebnisse in den Konzentrationslagern Dachau, Buchenwald, Getto Shanghai 1933–1948*, 2nd ed. (Nürnberg: Reichenbach, 1967), 141.
28. The Vienna-born violinist Pollak lived and taught in, among others cities, Geneva, Lausanne, Moscow, Vienna, and San Francisco before he went to Japan. He remained there from 1930 until 1936 and taught at the Imperial Academy in Tokyo, after which he moved to the United States.
29. Kreutzer, born in St. Petersburg to German-Jewish parents, was in Japan from 1938, and died in Tokyo.
30. Sirota, a Ukrainian of Jewish heritage, went to Vienna in 1908, where he completed his musical apprenticeship and made his debut. He was an Austrian citizen at this time. In 1929, he went to Japan where he became a Professor of Piano at the Imperial Music Academy, Tokyo, staying for some 15 years. During the war, he remained in Japan and in 1944, he was interned in Karuizawa as an expatriated German musician. After the war, he went to the United States, where he enjoyed a very successful musical career. He died in New York.
31. Rosenstock was the conductor of the Japanese State Symphony Orchestra from 1936 until 1946, which is known today as the NHK Symphony Orchestra.
32. Klaus Pringsheim Sr., brother-in-law to Thomas Mann through his marriage to Pringsheim's twin sister Katia (1883–1980), was born in Munich. In 1931, he went to Tokyo as the conductor of the Imperial Orchestra. In 1937 he had to leave this post and lived, first in Thailand, and then returned to Japan in 1939 where he maintained a living through the war years by teaching at music schools and giving private lessons. Klaus Pringsheim Jr., who was not his natural born son, was already mentioned above.
33. He translated the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* into Japanese in 1936; in 1938, he observed the Nuremberg Rally, where he met with, among others, Alfred Rosenberg and Julius Streicher. Shiōden described himself as the "Streicher of Asia." Louis W. Bondy, *Racketeers of Hatred: Julius Streicher and the Jew-Baiters' International* (London: Newman Wolsey Limited, 1946), p. 245. After World War II Shiōden was denounced as a war criminal but not prosecuted.

34. Compare this with, for example, Maul, *Japan und die Juden*, 47. This association also had offices abroad, for example, in Shanghai, where a Bureau of Jewish Affairs (*Büro für Jüdische Angelegenheiten*) was opened in 1940. Kaneko, *Die Judenpolitik*, 61f.
35. "The singular behavior of the Japanese authorities in dealing with the Jewish refugees . . . can only be grasped if the influence exerted on Tokyo by a number of Japanese 'experts' on Jewish affairs . . . is understood." Kranzler, *Japanese*, 169.
36. He was chairman of the *Japanese Imperial Navy's Advisory Bureau on Jewish Affairs* from 1939 until 1942.
37. Compare him to Kranzler, *Japanese*, 170–174.
38. Hadassah Ben-Itto relates in his book about the *Protocols* an anecdote told by Professor Ben-Ami Shillony—head of East Asian Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and author of several groundbreaking books and essays on the Japanese-Jewish relationship. In 1978 some Japanese guests presented him with a bound copy of the *Protocols* as a well-meaning hospitality gift; the Japanese had read this book in preparation of their trip to Israel and "they were in awe of the Jews, because they had implemented the ambitious plan outlined in the book with so much success." Hadassa Ben-Itto, *Die Protokolle der Weisen von Zion. Anatomie einer Fälschung* (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1998), 372.See also: Ben Ami Shillony, *The Jews and the Japanese. The Succesful Outsiders* (Rutland, VT; Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1992).
39. Kranzler, *Japanese*, 171.
40. Pansa, *Juden unter japanischer Herrschaft*, 29.
41. The incompatibility of these stances *in concreto* remains in force even when one acknowledges both as branches of the same root. For comparisons to this problem, see: Frank Stern, *Im Anfang war Auschwitz. Antisemitismus und Philosemitismus im deutschen Nachkrieg* (Gerlingen: Bleicher, 1991); and Hanno Loewy, ed., *Gerüchte über die Juden. Antisemitismus, Philosemitismus und aktuelle Verschwörungstheorien* (Essen: Klartext, 2005).
42. Tokayer and Swartz, *The Fugu Plan*.
43. For the German translation of these *Guidelines for the Treatment of Jews*, see: Kaneko, *Die Judenpolitik*, 37.
44. Hillel Levine, *In Search of Sugihara: The Elusive Japanese Diplomat Who Risked His Life to Rescue 10,000 Jews from the Holocaust* (New York: Free Press, 1996). It may be worth noting that the present Emperor Akihito honored Sugihara specifically during his visit to Lithuania in May 2007, during which he and the Empress Michiko visited a monument dedicated to the memory of Sugihara in Vilnius. Yasuhiko Shima, "Emperor honors 'Japan's Schindler'," in *Asahi Shinbun* (May 28, 2007). http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200705280065.html (retrievable March 5, 2013). This signifies a belated recognition by Japan of Sugihara and his efforts in Lithuania.

45. This number appears in Kranzler, *Japanese*, 311.
46. These visas were transit visas for Japan, with the official destination designated as Curaçao, a Caribbean island that did not acknowledge incoming visas. This was confirmed by the Dutch ambassador at that time in Kaunas, Jan Zwartendijk (1896–1976). It was, however, understood that no one would travel to this island. Although the Japanese Foreign Office criticized Sugihara's issuing policy, the visas issued by him were accepted by Japan, meaning that the refugees could travel through the Soviet Union to Kobe (this worked until the end of 1941, when Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union effectively closed this path to the refugees), and from there they travelled on to the United States or to Palestine. Even if they were forced to stay in Japan and were subsequently deported to Shanghai, they were not killed or persecuted, although they did have to endure extremely bad living conditions.
47. Kaneko, *Die Judenpolitik*, 24.
48. She arrived in Kobe, and from there she travelled on to Shanghai and finally to Jerusalem, where she still lives today.
49. Kaneko, *Die Judenpolitik*, 127–136. Kaneko views the Japanese treatment of the Jews very critically and argues that they were "criminalized" through reports in the Japanese press.
50. The president of this aid committee was the Russian textile merchant Anatol Ponve (or Poniversky).
51. Compare this document to: Kaneko, *Die Judenpolitik*, 41f.
52. The prison cells were often crowded and a breeding ground for infectious diseases such as typhoid. Torture in Japanese cells is widely reported; according to Burkhard, "The prisoner had to sit on the cold cement floor with crossed legs, without even being allowed to straighten themselves or to stretch their limbs, which had gone numb, once a day." Burkhard, *Tanz mal Jude!*, 152. A similar account from Klaus Pringsheim, imprisoned in Tokyo, reports the "Compulsion to sit upright for the entire day" and about not receiving enough to eat. Klaus Pringsheim, Jr., *Wer zum Teufel sind Sie? Lebenserinnerungen* (Bonn: Weidle, 1995), 76.
53. In this way, anti-Semitic publications were financed by the German embassy and two large anti-Semitic exhibitions (1942 and 1943 in Osaka and Tokyo) were organized. Kranzler, *Japanese*, 485.
54. An eyewitness described this as follows: "We received IDs, on which the time was recorded that we could leave the ghetto and when we had to return. In addition we also had to visibly wear a small round emblem resembling a medallion on our clothing…We were therefore marked again. This time not with the Star of David, but with a tin badge." Burkhard, *Tanz mal Jude!*, 155. Upon this metal badge was marked the Sino-Japanese sign for the Japanese verb *tōru* and/or *tōsu* meaning "allow to pass through" or "allow to pass by." These metal badges were thus not a "racist" marking in comparison to the yellow "Stars of David" in Germany.

55. Pansa, *Juden unter japanischer Herrschaft*, 73.
56. Löwith continued to teach in German and was paid to some extent.
57. Löwith had a teaching contract in Marburg from his habilitation until 1933. In 1934, he went to Italy with a stipend from the Rockefeller Foundation. In 1935, his contract in Marburg was withdrawn; it was his connection to the Japanese Professor Kuki Shūzō (1888–1941) from his Marburg days that led him to Japan.
58. This book was published in 1941 in Zurich.
59. A certain Dr. Walter Donat, a self-proclaimed National Socialist "Cultural Attendant," involved himself ingloriously in this. Walter Donat (1898–1970), a Japanophile, habilitated in 1937 with *Heldenbegriff im Schrifttum der älteren japanischen Geschichte* (The Concept of Heroism in the Literature of Ancient Japan) in Hamburg—a theme which completely mirrored existing National Socialist ideology—and was rewarded in 1943 for his party loyalty by being named Director of the East Asian Institute of Berlin University and the SS, in Berlin-Dahlem.
60. Even before there were some instances of intervention against Löwith by the *Nationalsozialistischer Lehrerbund* (National Socialist Teachers League) in Japan, for example, through the rector of the University in Sendai, he successfully withstood this pressure until 1941.
61. Friends such as Paul Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr helped him secure this position.
62. Krebs, *Die Juden und der Ferne Osten*, 63.
63. In Australia, Singer wrote an informative book about Japan titled *Mirror, Sword and Jewel*; this book was published posthumously in 1973 in English—it was only in 1991 that the German version appeared in print.

Part III

Post-World War II Affinity: Pariah Nations?

9

The Nuremberg and Tokyo IMT Trials

A Comparative Analysis

David M. Crowe

The International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg (IMTN), was the most important international criminal trial in history. The same cannot be said for its sister tribunal, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) or Tokyo trial, which was plagued by legal, linguistic, and procedural missteps so serious that they have raised questions about the fairness of the proceedings, which some see as a prime example of "victor's justice" gone awry. While the IMTN certainly had its flaws, particularly when it came to questions of precedents in international law as legal anchors for its four charges, these were minor compared to the flaws of the Tokyo trial, which, though theoretically anchored in Nuremberg precedent, was handicapped from the beginning by the failure to indict the central conspiratorial figure in Japan, emperor Hirohito. In addition, the trial's chief prosecutor and the court's president were flawed jurists who provided inadequate leadership throughout the lengthy trial. This, coupled with some of the same translation and evidentiary issues that haunted the IMTN tribunal, set the stage for severe criticism of the trial, from not only a larger international audience but even some of the court's judges.

These trials were born in the aftermath of the World War II, the most destructive in modern history, with about 60 million civilian and military deaths.[1] The greatest losses took place in the Soviet Union (26–28 million) and China (15–20 million), the vast majority of them civilians.[2] In early 1942, the Allies created the Inter-Allied Commission on the

Punishment of War Crimes (IACPWC) and issued the Declaration of St. James, which stated that one of

> their principal war aims was the punishment, through the channel of organized justice, of those guilty of or responsible for these crimes, whether they have ordered them, perpetuated them or participated in them.[3]

Later that year, the Allies created the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) to begin to gather evidence of German war crimes.[4] On November 1, 1943, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin issued the Moscow Declaration that concluded with the warning:

> Let those who have hitherto not imbued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly, the Three Allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost end of the earth and deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done.[5]

A month later, Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Chiang Kaishek issued the Cairo declaration, which warned that the "Three Great Allies" were "fighting this war to restrain and *punish* the aggression of Japan."[6] In 1944 and early 1945, the Allies warned the Germans and the Japanese that they would punish those responsible for war crimes.[7]

The Path to Nuremberg

In the fall of 1944, Hans Morgenthau, Roosevelt's secretary of the treasury, developed a plan that Roosevelt later rejected that would have transformed postwar Germany into "a pastoral community" too weak to threaten Europe and the world.[8] It also proposed that the allies draw up a list of easily recognizable "arch-criminals" who would "be apprehended" and executed. Morgenthau also suggested a similar fate for lesser German criminals tried before military commissions for violations of "the rules of war."[9] He also thought that all members of the SS, the Gestapo, as well as other "high officials" from the Reich's police, security, paramilitary, government, and Party organizations should "be detained until the extent of the guilt of each individual is determined."[10]

Unfortunately, there was considerable confusion in Washington about how to create and conduct a war crimes tribunal.[11] In the fall of 1944, the War Department asked Col. Murray C. Bernays, a member of the Army General Staff, to prepare a memo on this question. Bernays outlined some of problems in trying large numbers of alleged Nazi war criminals, but warned that summary executions of major war criminals like Hitler could lead to their martyrdom.[12] He recommended that an international court

charge the Nazi government, Party, and various state and security organizations "with conspiracy to commit murder, terrorism, and the destruction of peaceful populations in violation of the laws of war."[13] Individuals "representative of the defendant organizations" would be put on trial, meaning that any member of such an organization could be arrested, tried, and convicted by various national courts. An individual could also be held accountable for criminal acts other than conspiracy. This charge, he concluded, would include all crimes committed from the inception of the act to conspiracy itself.[14]

After the military as well as the State and Justice departments questioned some of his ideas,[15] Bernays wrote a new memo in early 1945 that proposed that German leaders and their organizations be prosecuted for "joint participation in the formulation and execution of a broad criminal plan of aggressive warfare" as well as "a conspiracy to achieve domination of other nations and peoples by the foregoing unlawful means."[16] He suggested two possible approaches to dealing with German and Italian war criminals—"political disposition without any trial or hearings," or a "judicial method." If the latter course were taken, he proposed the creation of an international court created by a United Nations treaty or an "International Military Commission or Court" appointed "by the Supreme Military Authority in the field" to try the accused. He also suggested that "prime leaders" be "charged as principals for violations of the law of war" for a number of war crimes including mass murder, rape, and failure to punish those responsible for committing "atrocities and other offenses."[17]

In early May 1945, the United States's new president, Harry Truman, appointed US Supreme Court Judge Robert H. Jackson as representative and US Chief Counsel to plan the prosecution of leaders of the Axis powers "before an international military tribunal."[18] Several weeks earlier, Jackson stated that

> I have no purpose to enter into any controversy as to what shall be done with war criminals, either high or humble. If it is considered good policy for the future peace of the world, if it is believed that the example will outweigh the tendency to create among their own countrymen a myth of martyrdom, then let them be executed. But in that case let the decision to execute them be made as a military or political decision. We must not use the forms of judicial proceedings to carry out or rationalize previously unsettled political or military policy. Farcical judicial trials conducted by us will destroy confidence in the judicial process as quickly as those conducted by any other people.
>
> You must put no man on trial before anything that is called a court, if you are not prepared to establish his personal guilt . . . But, further, you must put no man on trial if you are not willing to hear everything relevant that he has to say in his defense and to make it possible for him to obtain

> evidence from others…Any United Nations court that would try, say, Hitler or Goebbels, would face the same choice… *The ultimate principal is that you must put no man on trial under the forms of judicial proceedings if you are not willing to see him freed if not proven guilty. If you are determined to execute a man in any case, there is no occasion for a trial.*[19]

In June, Jackson began talks with the British, French, and Soviets about the creation of such a tribunal.[20] Problems quickly arose over differences between the Anglo-American and continental legal systems as well as initial Soviet insistence on a "quick and dirty" show trial. There were also questions about the charge of conspiracy and trying Nazi organizations.[21] These problems, coupled with questions about the location of the trial, almost destroyed the talks. However, by early August, the negotiators finally settled on a series of compromises that "were crude but…workable."[22] The trial would be held in Nuremberg in the American occupation zone though the "permanent seat" of the tribunal would be Berlin, which was jointly occupied by the four Allies.[23]

The International Military Tribunal (IMT) Charter laid out the guidelines for the trial of "major war criminals of the European Axis," and discussed the "jurisdiction and functions of the International Military Tribunal."[24] It would be made up of four judges and four alternates appointed by each signatory power. The tribunal had the authority to try individuals or members of organizations for one of three crimes (crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity) as well as a "common plan or conspiracy" to commit these crimes.[25] It added that superior orders and being a head of state or "responsible officials in Government Departments" would not prevent one from being charged with any of the above crimes. The court also had the right to declare any organization criminal, meaning its members could be tried by "national, military or occupation courts."[26]

The tribunal's permanent judges:

Francis Biddle, United States

Donnedieu de Vabres, France

Sir Geoffrey Lawrence, United Kingdom (tribunal president)

Major Gen. Iona T. Nikitchenko, USSR.

Chief prosecutors:

Francois de Menthon (later Champetier de Ribes), France

Robert H. Jackson, United States

Lt. Gen. Roman A. Rudenko, USSR

Sir Hartley Shawcross, United Kingdom

Once trial planning got underway, the prosecutors decided that the British would handle the cases involving aggressive war, the French would deal with the question of war crimes in Western Europe, the Soviets would prosecute German crimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the United States would handle the question of a common plan and conspiracy.[27] The charter promised a fair trial and the right of each defendant to choose his own attorney or conduct his own defense,[28] though the opposite was often the case because of the large body of documentation flowing into Nuremberg, and, at least from the defense's perspective, the seeming unwillingness of the prosecution to provide them with adequately translated copies of all documents in a timely manner. After a number of defense complaints, Sir Lawrence ruled that only documents fully translated into the tribunal's four official languages could be "received as evidence," and then only if there were sufficient copies in German for the defense teams.[29]

The IMTN trial (October 18, 1945–October 1, 1946) theoretically functioned like most traditional western criminal courts, though it was not bound by "technical rules of evidence," and reserved the right to review any evidence before it was presented in court to determine its relevance. The tribunal's decisions would be decided by a majority vote, and a tie would result in an acquittal on that particular charge. The Control Council for Germany reserved the right to review the sentences though, while it could reduce them, it could not increase them. It could also decide to bring new charges against a defendant if new evidence surfaced against him during the trial.[30]

Nuremberg IMT Defendants

Hermann Göring (1893–1946). *Reichsmarschall.* Headed Luftwaffe, Four Year Plan. *Death.* Committed suicide before execution.

Fritz Sauckel (1894–1946). General Plenopotentiary for Labor Deployment. *Death.*

Alfred Jodl (1890–1946). Chief of the Wehrmacht Command Staff. *Death.*

Joachim von Ribbentrop (1893–1946). Foreign Minister. *Death.*

Wilhelm Keitel (1882–1946). Head of OKW (Wehrmacht High Command. *Death.*

Ernst Kaltenbrunner (1903–1946). Headed RSHA, Security Police, SD. *Death.*

Alfred Rosenberg (1893–1946). Headed Party Foreign Office; Reichminister Ostland. *Death.*

Hans Frank (1900–1946). Governor General, General Government. *Death.*

Wilhelm Frick (1877–1946). Headed Interior Ministry. Reich Protector Bohemia and Moravia. *Death.*

Julius Streicher (1885–1946). *Gauleiter* of Franconia. Editor, *Der Stürmer*. *Death.*

Arthur Seyss—Inquart (1892–1946). Reich Governor, Austria. Reich Commissioner, Netherlands. *Death.*

Martin Bormann (1900–1945). Headed Reich Chancellery. Tried *in absentia*. *Death.*

Rudolf Hess (1894–1987). Deputy Party leader. Head of Party Chancellery. *Life*.

Walther Funk (1890–1960). Reich Economics Minister. *Life*.

Erich Raeder (1876–1960). Supreme Navy Commander to 1943. *Life*.

Baldur von Schirach (1907–1974). Youth Führer. *Gauleiter*, and Reich Governor, Vienna. *20 years.*

Albert Speer (1905–1981). Reich Mininster, Armaments and Munitions. *20 years.*

Konstantin von Neurath (1873–1956). Foreign Minister to 1938. *15 years.*

Karl Dönitz (1891–1980). Supreme Navy Commander. President of Germany, 1945. *10 years.*

Franz von Papen (1879–1969). Vice Chancellor. Ambassador to Austria, Turkey. *Acquitted*.

Hjalmar Schacht *(1877–1970)*. Headed Reichsbank. Economics Minister. Plenipotentiary for War Economy. *Acquitted*.

Hans Fritsche (1900–1953). Headed Radio division, Propaganda Ministry. *Acquitted*.

Robert Ley (1890–1945). Head of German Labor Front. *Committed suicide before the trial began*.

Gustav Krupp (1870–1950). Military Economy Führer. *Not tried because of health.*[31]

The key charge was conspiracy, which Jackson discussed in his opening remarks against Nazi organizations in late February.[32] The "very essence of the crime of conspiracy," he noted, "or membership in a criminal association is liability for acts one did not personally commit, but which his acts facilitated or abetted. The crime is to combine with others and to participate in the unlawful common effort, however innocent the personal

acts of the participants, considered by themselves."[33] In the end, conspiracy also became the most troubling charge for the judges since, according to French judge Donnedieu de Vabres, it was an unknown crime in international law. They finally decided that a conspiracy "must be 'clearly outlined in its criminal purpose' and not 'too far removed from the time of decision and action.'"[34]

The highlight of the trial, which suffered from long days of legal wrangling and uninteresting testimony, was Göring's appearance in March. The prosecution considered the case against him "almost a microcosm of their entire indictment," since there was no one in the dock who had played such an integral role in the complex operations of the Nazi state since 1933.[35] Unfortunately, Jackson's cross-examination of Göring was less than successful because the judges failed to intervene and force Göring to answer Jackson's questions and not branch "off into monologues" that often had little to do with Jackson's questions.[36]

Göring's appearance marked a major turning point in the trial. The cases of defendants who followed him were, for the most part, far less dramatic, though there was still some chilling testimony during some of the defense presentations. This was particularly true during the testimony of Otto Ohlendorf, the head of one of the *Einsatzgruppen* killing squads, and Rudolf Höss, a commandant at the Auschwitz death camp. Their testimony, as well as that of earlier witnesses, underscored the vast criminal intent of the Nazi state when it came to the mass murder of groups and individuals deemed racial, political, and social threats to the Nazi racial purity and the German state. Shawcross declared later in the trial that all of the defendants were "common murderers,"[37] whose crimes were "so frightful that the imagination staggers and reels back at their very contemplation."[38]

Their crimes went beyond the normal definitions of murder[39] and were calculated acts of genocide.[40] Rudenko agreed, and said that each defendant played a role in Hitler's efforts "to exterminate millions of human beings, to enslave mankind . . . to achieve their criminal aim of world domination."[41] Consequently, he concluded, all deserved the death penalty.[42] That was the fate of 12 of the 18 defendants found guilty on October 1, 1946, of various war crimes, including conspiracy.[43] Those condemned to death were hanged 15 days later in the nearby prison gymnasium, while those with lesser sentences were transferred to Spandau prison in Berlin the following summer.[44]

The court also declared the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the SS and the SD, the Gestapo, and the SA to be criminal organizations, meaning members of these organizations could later be prosecuted for war crimes and conspiracy to commit such crimes. The Reich Cabinet and the German General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces were found not to be criminal organizations.[45]

The Tokyo IMT Trial

Though the Nuremberg IMT trial had its critics, it was a far more successful trial than the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMFTE), or the Tokyo trial, which was plagued by controversy and dissent. Though the Soviet judge at Nuremberg, Nikitchenko, filed a modest dissenting opinion about some of the acquittals and other sentences, several of the Tokyo tribunal's judges filed lengthy dissenting opinions or judgments that raised key questions about the fairness of the trial, the charges of crimes against peace and conspiracy, and the failure of the United States to indict Emperor Hirohito for war crimes.

The Tokyo trial (May 3, 1946–April 16, 1948), was born in the shadows of the Nuremberg tribunal, though many of the latter's legal concepts were not applicable to the Tokyo trial because the nature of the Japanese war crimes, and the role of various Japanese officials in planning the war was quite different from what took place in Europe. The trial of German war criminals had always been the principal focus of the major powers, though China, Australia, and other Asian-Pacific nations kept the prospect of the trial of Japanese war criminals alive through their work with the IACPWC, the UNWCC, and their own national investigations of such crimes. Once Japan surrendered on September 2, 1945, General Douglas MacArthur, the recently appointed Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Asia, quickly moved to create an American-dominated trial of major Japanese war criminals.[46]

Plans for such a trial were laid out in several documents prepared by the US State, War, and Navy Departments' Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). One envisioned international and national trials that would apply the same charges and legal principles developed in Nuremberg. The Tokyo trial would try Class A defendants for crimes against peace, while those who committed other war crimes would be categorized as Class B or C war criminals, and would be tried by lesser allied courts or military commissions.[47] SWNCC also gave MacArthur full authority to create such a tribunal but told him to "take no action against the Emperor as a war criminal pending receipt of a special directive concerning his treatment."[48]

Soon after he became SCAP, MacArthur proposed the trial of the cabinet of Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō for the attack on Pearl Harbor, a suggestion rejected by the White House. He then moved ahead with the trials of two Japanese generals in the Philippines—Tomoyuki Yamashita, and Masaharu Homma—whose troops had committed horrible atrocities during the war. The principal charge against both was "command responsibility," or the idea that, as commanders, they had failed

> to control the operations of the members of [their] command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against people of the US and of its allies and dependents.[49]

Unfortunately, there "was no precedent in U.S. military law for this charge," which centered on the idea that each of them was simply in command when the crimes took place.[50]

The US military commissions that tried them found both guilty and sentenced them to death, decisions that were quickly appealed to the US Supreme Court. It upheld Yamashita's conviction but refused to hear Homma's appeal, which, several Supreme Court justices argued in dissenting opinions, raised serious questions about the fairness of these trials. This successfully strengthened the resolve of some of the Tokyo trial's judges to stop MacArthur from playing any important role in the trial's proceedings.[51]

Though modeled on the Nuremberg charter, the IMTFE charter was different because the United States wanted to avoid some of the problems that its prosecutors had encountered in Germany. It gave SCAP the power to appoint judges and the trial's controversial president, Sir William F. Webb, though diplomatically, MacArthur had to rely on nominations from the 11 countries chosen for these appointments.[52]

The tribunal's judges were

Webb, Sir William F. (tribunal president)
Edward McDougall, Canada
Henri Bernard, France
Myron Cramer, United States
Delfin Jaranilla, Philippines
Ju-Ao Mei, China
Erima Northcroft, New Zealand
Radhabinod Pal, India
Lord Patrick, United Kingdom
Bernard Röllins, The Netherlands
Ivan Zaryanov, USSR

MacArthur also appointed the tribunal's single Chief Counsel, Joseph B. Keenan, at Truman's insistence, along with Keenan's Associate Counsels. By all accounts, Keenan was not up to the job, and members of his own American team complained constantly about his lack of focus, organizational skills, and prolonged absences.[53]

Legally, the most serious problem facing the tribunal was the United States's decision not to prosecute Emperor Hirohito because it considered him "an invaluable military asset" who could be useful in helping maintain stability in Japan during the occupation.[54] This decision proved to be particularly problematic when it came to proving the five conspiracy charges, which were included in counts 1–36—crimes against peace. The other

counts, murder (37–52), and war crimes and crimes against humanity (53–55), were essentially legalistic overkill, which the tribunal pointed out in its final decision when it rejected all but ten of the original counts.[55]

The sweeping nature of the indictment also spilled over into the selection of defendants, which had less to do with each one's alleged individual criminality than their presence in court as "representatives of the responsibility of the various criminal acts or Incidents." British associate prosecutor Sir Arthur Comys-Carr wrote before the trial began that whether a defendant was or was not a major war criminal was a question "of degree." Those selected for trial would be Japan's "principal leaders" who bore the "primary responsibility for the acts committed." The prosecution's case against them would be "so strong as to render negligible the chances of acquittal." Those most eligible would be members of the highest organs of state and war, including the emperor's Imperial Conference and Privy Council.[56]

TOKYO IMT DEFENDANTS

General Kenji Doihara (1883–1948). Commander, Eastern Army (1943); Singapore. *Death.*

Baron Kōki Hirota (1878–1948). Foreign Minister. *Death.*

General Seishirō Itagaki (1885–1948). Commander, China/Korea; War Council. *Death.*

General Heitarō Kimura (1888–1948). Vice Minister of War; War Council. *Death.*

General Iwane Matsui (1878–1948). Commander-in-Chief, Central China. *Death.*

General Akira Mutō (1883–1948). Staff, Central China, Kwantung & Philippine Armies. *Death.*

General Hideki Tōjō (1884–1948). Kwantung Army; Minister of War; Prime Minister. *Death.*

General Sadao Araki (1877–1966). Minister of War; War Council. *Life.*

Colonel Kingorō Hashimoto (1890–1957). Army General Staff; rape of Nanjing; publicist. *Life.*

Field Marshal Shunroku Hata (1879–1962). Commander, Central China; War Council. *Life.*

Baron Kiichirō Hiranuma (1865–1952). Vice President; Privy Council; Prime Minister. *Life.*

Naoki Hoshino (1892–1978). Minister of State, Manchukuo. *Life.*

Okinori Kaya (1889–1977). Minister of Finance. *Life.*

Marquis Kōichi Kido (1898–1977). Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal; adviser to Emperor. *Life.*

General Kuniaki Koiso (1880–1950). Commander, Kwantung Army; Prime Minister. *Life.*

General Jirō Minami (1874–1955). War Council; Kwantung Army; Privy Council. *Life.*

General Hiroshi Ōshima (1886–1975). Ambassador to Germany. *Life.*

General Kenryō Satō (1895–1975). Chief, Military Affairs Bureau; adviser to Tōjō. *Life.*

Admiral Takasumi Oka (1890–1973). Chief, Navy Military Affairs Bureau. *Life.*

Admiral Shigetarō Shimada (1883–1976). Navy Minister (1941). *Life.*
Toshio Shiratori (1877–1949). Ambassador to Italy (1939); publicist. *Life.*

General Teiichi Suzuki (1888–1989). Minister; cabinet adviser. *Life.*

General Yoshikirō Umezu (1882–1949). Vice War Minister; diplomat; Chief of Staff. *Life.*

Shigenori Tōgō (1881–1950). Ambassador, Germany, USSR; Foreign Minister. *20 years.*

Mamoru Shigemitsu (1887–1957). Ambassador, China, USSR, UK. Foreign Minister. *7 years.*

Shūmei Ōkawa (1886–1957). Administrator; publicist. *Case dropped for mental illness.*

Admiral Osami Nagano (1880–1947). Navy General Staff; adviser to Emperor. *Died 1947.*

Matsuoka Yosuke (1880–1946). Diplomat; Manchurian Railway; Foreign Minister. *Died 1946.*[57]

Like the Nuremberg trial, the Tokyo proceedings were plagued by a number of problems, particularly for the defense, that has raised serious questions about the "fair trial criteria under international law" used in the trial.[58] There were also language problems that significantly reduced the pace of the trial because everything in English and Japanese, the trial's official languages, had to be translated into four other languages to accommodate the judges, witnesses, and others.[59]

The defense was also crippled by the fact that few of the defendants' Japanese attorneys spoke English or were familiar with Anglo-American legal principles. The result was, at least according to Justice Röling, a certain "clumsiness" during the early stages of the trial that led the Japanese government to request help from the American government. Ultimately,

MacArthur arranged to have a team of US military and civilian lawyers serve as co-counsels for each of the defendants,[60] although the quality of defense provided by the allied and Japanese attorneys was uneven,

> the Americans assigned to the Defence made a huge difference in the quality of legal representation which the Defendants received and earned the lawyers huge respect in Tokyo. Twelve of these lawyers were granted the unique honour of being the only foreigners ever admitted to practice at the Bar of Japan and several of them remained and did very well for themselves there throughout the remainder of their professional careers.[61]

The greatest challenge for the prosecution was that, unlike Nazi Germany, there was no core center of power wrapped around a tight knit group of conspirators with some grand design on war and international power in Japan between 1931 and 1945.[62] In fact, the defendants in the Tokyo trial were chosen for one reason—to prove the prosecution's contention that they were part of a

> grand conspiracy . . . to expand Japan's empire through force . . . [This] reflected a prosecutorial theory of total responsibility for all harm attaching to those who conspire to start illegal wars.[63]

Consequently, though there was ample testimony about numerous atrocities, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, even rape, they were all filtered through this aggressive war theme, and did not play the role in the Tokyo trial that they did at Nuremberg. This resulted in the over use of "circumstantial evidence" by the prosecution and a lot of "irrelevant material" by the defense.

In the end, the judges and the lawyers were to a very large degree "victims of the material and temporal scope of the Charter, something for which the Allies themselves must bear responsibility."[64]

The Japanese public was entranced by the trial, particularly the testimony of Pu Yi, the last emperor of China, who later became the Japanese puppet emperor of Manchukuo. Equally dramatic was Webb's questioning of Tōjō, to many the most important defendant in the dock. With the exception of the emperor, Tōjō, whose bespectacled image appeared on numerous Allied propaganda posters and the cover of *Time* magazine, was the person most closely associated, not only with the attack on Pearl Harbor, but the war in general.[65]

In many ways, the case against Tōjō, who was charged with 54 counts, was made easier by the fact that he had already admitted to full "administrative responsibility" for various war crimes. While Minister of War and Chief of the General Staff,[66] like Göring, he also proved to be an astute

witness who time and again befuddled Keenan.[67] The result was what some dubbed "Tōjō's cross-examination of Keenan."[68]

Another key defendant was Kōicho Kido, the emperor's confidential adviser, whose diary was widely used by the prosecution. He was charged with all 55 counts, as well as with involvement in the meetings held during the fall of 1941 that helped pave the way for the decision to attack Pearl Harbor.[69] Given this, the direct examination of Kido, who had willingly turned his diary over to allied investigators, should have strengthened the prosecution's case against him and the other defendants. Unfortunately, Keenan's ill-prepared cross-examination of Kido elicited nothing from him that would have helped the prosecution.[70]

These prosecutorial missteps played well into the hands of William Logan, Kido's top American defense attorney.[71] During his summary in early April 1948, Logan argued that the prosecution's efforts to try to prove his client was guilty of planning aggressive war was an example of its "aimless wandering in the wilderness of complicated and detailed factual matter."[72] Unlike Nuremberg, he went on, the Tokyo tribunal was weighed down by 55 charges instead of four, which made it "almost humanly impossible to touch upon the Indictment allegations with the fullness they deserve."[73] In the end, given that his client was neither a "soldier in the field nor a formulator of policy" when it came to war crimes and crimes against humanity, the real case against Kido centered on a simple charge—"whether the accused is responsible for the accomplishment of aggressive war."[74] The truth, Logan argued, lay in a careful reading of Kido's diary, not the random selections made by the prosecution that were often taken out of context or mistranslated.[75]

Though Japanese defense attorneys rarely addressed the court, when they did it was dramatic. Dr. Somei Uzawa, the chief Japanese defense counsel, for example, raised serious questions about the legitimacy of the charge of waging aggressive war, arguing that it was not an "international crime" under "world law."[76] Dr. Kenzō Takayanagi, another renowned Japanese attorney, made the same point. The court would have to subject any charge of aggressive or defensive war against Japan to the "charge of *ipso dixit* [asserted but not proven], if not subservience to popular prejudices or a willful travesty of history."[77]

Another Japanese attorney, Kiyose Ichirō, challenged the prosecution's charge that "Japan . . . continuously committed alleged international crimes."[78] He explained that one of the principal goals of Japanese leaders after the United State's forced opening of Japan in 1853 was to "preserve the nation as a perfect independent and sovereign state."[79] Logan followed up on this theme by noting in his summation on March 10, 1948, that it was the allies, not Japan, that brought war to the Pacific, provoking Japan "into a War of Self-Defense."[80] Led by the United States, he went on, the allied powers adopted policies that affected Japan's economic stability.[81] In

reality, he concluded, the Pacific war was merely an attempt by "Japan to exercise its internationally recognized sovereign right of self-defense against encroachments by foreign powers which threatened its very existence—a decision which no authority questions as being their prerogative."[82]

The other major charge was conspiracy, which the prosecution tried to prove by claiming that the widespread nature of various crimes underscored their conspiratorial nature. Chinese, Australian, British, Dutch, Philippine, and other prosecutors presented evidence of widespread war crimes and crimes against humanity, such as the rape of Nanjing, the Bataan Death March, and the rape of Manila to document this charge.[83] The prosecution also used gruesome testimony about Japanese acts of cannibalism and medical experiments to underscore the widespread, conspiratorial nature of such atrocities.[84] Dr. Takayanagi challenged this idea.

> Even if the alleged atrocities or other contraventions assume a similar singular pattern of acts it cannot justify such an assumption. Such a pattern may have been a sheer reflection of national or racial traits. Crimes no less than masterpieces of art may express certain characteristics reflecting the *mores* of a race. Similarities in the geographic, economic, or strategic state of affairs may in part account for the "similar pattern" assumed. The existence of a command from above, and from whom it issued, has certainly to be proved beyond any reasonable doubt in a case of this grave character. The impression prevails after listening to the testimony of the witnesses alleging atrocities, that they follow not a uniform pattern but manifold patterns according to the nationality of the witnesses, not only negating 'orders from above' but telling an entirely different story.[85]

But it was not the charges of conspiracy and waging aggressive war that has most angered Japanese legal scholars. It was Keenan's statement at the beginning of the trial that it was "a part of the determined battle of civilization to preserve the entire world from destruction."[86] One Japanese scholar, Ōnuma Yasuaki, later wondered if the Allied powers [were] in a position to arrogate themselves the title of "civilization at large," while Takigawa Masajirō, a member of the defense team, later asked if the tribunal had "judged the vanquished arbitrarily in the name of 'civilization' with the primitive idea of retaliation, but without any self-examination on their part."[87] Takayanagi said as much in his comments before the court on March 3–4 1948, while another Japanese defense attorney, Kiyose Ichirō, noted that

> Both Mr. Keenan and Mr. Comyns-Carr have said that this trial must be conducted in order to protect civilization. On this point, I, too am in complete agreement. But, by "civilization," do you not include the terms "respect for treaties" and "impartiality of trials[?]."[88]

In the end, however, it was the question of aggressive war, not civilization, that the judges principally addressed in their 1443 page judgment. It relied heavily on Nuremberg IMT precedents for its interpretation of international law,[89] and accepted the idea that "aggressive war was a crime at (sic) international law long prior to the date [July 26, 1945] of the Declaration of Potsdam," which laid out the terms of Japan's surrender.[90] The majority judgment rejected much of the defense's evidence, and condemned defense delays caused by over rigorous translation issues and "a tendency for counsel and witnesses to be prolix and irrelevant."[91] Webb stated after the trial that if the "Japanese lawyers had been more proficient in English, or the interpreters had been more competent, it might have affected the judgement of the trial."[92]

Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, the foremost western experts on the trial, add that many of the judges probably thought that United Nations Resolution 95 (I), *Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal* (December 11, 1946) buffeted the majority's interpretation of aggressive war as an integral part of international law.[93] However, both point out that since this and the Nuremberg judgment took place after the Tokyo court "had rejected the defence motions to jurisdiction in early 1946, Tokyo's reliance on Nuremberg was, in the final analysis either adventitious, or betrays the initial rejection of the defence motions," challenging the question of whether "the Charter reflected existing law on crimes against peace." Such a rejection by the court, they conclude, was "done thoughtlessly."[94]

Their comments underscore just one of the problems of the Tokyo IMFTE trial, which—though it drew some of its most important legal precedents from its Nuremberg cousin—was weighed down by more than just these points. The Nuremberg IMT trial remains the most important legal undertaking in modern international criminal law, in large part because it established many legal precedents then unknown in international criminal law. These were later cited in numerous international legal proceedings, even though they were based on a significant body of ex post facto legal decisions. As such, they became the cornerstones of the new body of International Humanitarian Law that emerged after World War II. The same cannot be said for the decisions of the Tokyo tribunal. While part of the reason for this is that the Tokyo trial faced very different legal challenges than its German cousin, it also suffered from an almost total lack of interest, legally, in the decades after the war. Whereas the United States published the transcripts of the Nuremberg trial almost immediately after it ended, the Tokyo trial transcripts were not published until the 1980s, and then only in limited, obscure editions. This robbed the legal community of any opportunity to study its transcripts and decisions, and thus discuss the possible precedents buried deep in them. In the end, the Tokyo trial is known not for its legal precedents, but as an example of

"victor's justice." Unfortunately, this one-dimensional view has obscured some of the more important legal ideas that surfaced, not only in the trial, but also in the dissenting opinions and separate trial judgment.

NOTES

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10

A "Penologic Program" for Japanese and German War Criminals, 1945–1958

*Franziska Seraphim**

> I have always doubted the wisdom of the policy of continuing to incarcerate war criminals in jail over long periods of time. It only serves to perpetuate in the minds of the people the memory of the horrors of a nightmarish war, and the enmity, which the vanquished feel towards their victors. It may even have the effect among the ignorant of making martyrs and heroes of the war criminals concerned. From the humanitarian point of view also, I felt that the men concerned should be released, since one may be safe in assuming that they have, by their confinement, more than atoned for whatever they have done.
>
> —Yoshida Shigeru, memoirs[1]

In his reminiscences of his last foreign tour as Japan's prime minister in the fall of 1954, Yoshida Shigeru articulated a sentiment many Japanese (and Germans) would have shared at the time. While in Europe, Yoshida made it a point to meet with West Germany's chancellor Konrad Adenauer, whom he sought to enlist in a common quest to solve their respective "war criminals problems" (*senpan mondai* in Japanese and *die Kriegsverbrecherfrage* in German), and he traveled to the Vatican to plead with the Pope, who had been supportive of a general amnesty for convicted war criminals all along.[2] Adenauer for his part had urged US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to speed up the release of German war criminals on his first visit to Washington the year before.[3] Clearly, of concern here was not the issue of justice for wartime atrocities that had animated the Allied war crimes trials in the 1940s, but the political, social, and allegedly humanitarian consequences of long-term imprisonment amid the need for domestic and international reintegration in the opening stages of the Cold War.

The question animating this chapter concerns how American war crimes policymakers in the Judge Advocate General's office (JAG)—the legal branch of the US army in charge of military justice—managed the treatment of accused and convicted German and Japanese war criminals during their occupation of both countries, and how the German and Japanese public, in turn, used this in efforts to resist the occupiers' punitive policies while attending to the need for social reintegration and political self-legitimation as military occupation gave way to Cold War alliances. It hinges on the fact that the experience of dealing with (tens of) thousands of war criminals was unprecedented; the post-World War I war crimes trials were so small in scope and deemed so unsuccessful that they hardly served as a useful example except in the negative. While the legal profession wrestled with important questions of what constituted a prosecutable crime—from "ordinary" crimes against the established code of war conduct (in Asia labeled "Class B" or more often "Class B/C") to state crimes against peace (in Asia "Class A") and the newly invented category of "crimes against humanity" (only sparingly applied in Asia)—the war crimes program's administrators dealt with the *people* in question, namely war criminals, both as individual offenders and as a collective category. Ultimately, this entails a broadening of the analytical focus from the trials per se to the war crimes program as a whole, and a shift from the courtroom to the prison, which functioned as the focal point for contemporary debates about "the war criminals problem" that extended into the late 1950s. This shift introduces a different temporality and spatiality to the study of Allied transitional justice, one that brings German and Japanese responses into sharper view.

The historical sensibility would call for a chronological retelling of this development, distinguishing between a pretrial, trial, and post-trial phase of the Allied war crimes program in both occupied countries. Of these, the post-trial decade from about 1948 to 1958 has escaped scholarly attention until recently. This may be because it appears as an unremarkable time in the history of international law on the one hand, and the emergence of national memory cultures on the other—the two main topics of interest in the study of war crimes trials. The focus on national memory especially tends to leap over the 1950s as a "silent" period and straight into later debates about war criminality spurred by the Auschwitz, Eichmann, and other war crimes trials conducted mainly by West Germany after the Allied program had ended—in conspicuous contrast to the complete absence of such legal procedures in Japan. Indeed, the post-trial efforts, on all sides, to finish out the war crimes program in the name of national rehabilitation and Cold War alliance reflects poorly on Allied intentions of dedication to justice, fits uncomfortably into the narrative of West German atonement, and appears unsurprisingly illustrative of the stereotype of an altogether unapologetic Japan. In the 1990s, Norbert

Frei, Ulrich Brochhagen, Ulrich Herbert, and others challenged this with major works on domestic German efforts and international negotiations to affect amnesty for convicted war criminals.[4] In Japan, historians are only now subjecting to scholarly inquiry a topic that has long been part of popular culture focused on Sugamo Prison, and whose most enduring icon is the perennially remade TV drama and film *Watashi wa kai ni naritai* (I Want to Be a Shellfish) based on the best-known autobiographical writing from Sugamo, allegedly by the Class B/C war criminals Katō Tetsutarō before his execution.[5]

In order to spearhead the comparison of how American policies toward incarcerated war criminals played out in occupied Japan and in Germany, however, this chapter is organized around three analytical themes whose chronologies overlap. The first concerns the legal and social category of an enemy war criminal standing before or sentenced by a military court or commission in relation to American courts-martial, a prisoner of war (POW), or an "ordinary" criminal convicted in a civilian court, and the ways in which this could be exploited for rehabilitative purposes. The second highlights the prison as an important physical and symbolic space that acquired enormous meaning in the public discourse of the day with varying ramifications for public memory. The third theme briefly outlines American rehabilitative justice policies in the administration of prison sentences inside and outside the prisons as well as the interpretive space that this afforded German and Japanese critics of the Allied program. Comparative studies of the Allied trials tend to be limited to general remarks on the differences between the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals, while many more have insisted on almost diametrically opposed memory cultures in Germany and Japan.[6] Few have recognized—and if so only in passing—the remarkable similarities in efforts to bring the Allied program to an end, on the side of the occupier building Cold War alliances, and also on the side of the occupied interested in regaining social integration and national sovereignty.[7] These historical similarities also ultimately help to shed new light on the equally important differences between the two cases without relying too much on the usual puzzle over alleged cultural differences.

Upon closer inspection, it turns out that the Allies, under American leadership, were keen to coordinate their clemency, parole, and release policies toward convicted German war criminals with those in Japan, and deliberately synchronized the end to their program in Asia and in Europe in 1958. Furthermore, vigorous domestic release movements developed in West Germany as they did in Japan, both in response to regaining a measure of national sovereignty after the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949 and Japan's independence in 1952, and on the governmental as well as on the level of civil society. Indeed, in domestic elite-political as well as popular usage in both countries, even the term "war criminal" was

largely supplanted first by the use of the term in quotes or by the qualifier "so-called," and later by the newly-coined term "war-convicted" (*sensō jukeisha* in Japanese and *Kriegsverurteilte* in German), which are exact linguistic equivalents.[8] "War-convicted" cleverly reframed the juridical approach to transitional justice owned by the Allies and defined not the crimes but the (foreign) convictions as the real problem Japanese and Germans were reckoning with.

Imprisonment, rather than legal prosecution and conviction, occupied a broader public, and for a longer period of time than did the trials, certainly in Germany and Japan, but also periodically in the countries that had prosecuted war criminals, the foremost being the United States. Prisons assumed real and symbolic space within which to make meaning of social and political issues, not only among the convicted themselves in their interactions with each other and their foreign captors, but more critically, as part of local communities and as metaphors in national politics. "Landsberg, Werl, and Wittlich," the Allied prison trio in the Western occupied zones, symbolized Allied punitive policies against "ordinary" Germans in political circles in Bonn as in the civic release campaigns. The American-run prison in Landsberg was the main focal point, for it held the greatest number of convicted for the longest time.[9] All three subsequently fell into oblivion as places of incarceration of convicted war criminals, having been converted back to regular prisons in the latter 1950s. West Berlin's Allied prison Spandau, in contrast, is to this day known for housing Nazi leaders sentenced at the IMT in Nuremberg, even though the grand structure in the heart of West Berlin with a capacity of 600 housed no more than seven men, most of whom were released in the 1950s, when the war crimes program was deemed to have been over. Spandau came to represent an exception, for it continued to hold one Nazi, Rudolf Hess, until his death in 1987, earning it a place of infamy and controversy in public life. In Japan, meanwhile, Sugamo Prison in Tokyo served as the only prison in Japan to incarcerate war criminals, including Japan's leaders convicted at the IMTFE in Tokyo. Under the administration of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces (SCAP) during the occupation from 1945 to 1952, it came under Japanese management until all prisoners had been released by 1958. Thereafter it closed permanently, eventually replaced by a state-of-the-art shopping center, but it retained an enduring place in popular lore.[10]

This chapter draws attention to the contemporary uses of war criminals' prisons writ small and large as a useful way to illuminate the links between Allied practices of transitional justice and Japanese and German efforts at social reconstruction and the management of public memory. This epistemological shift allows for a better exploration of how an issue of

criminal responsibility for war crimes came to be reframed as a social and humanitarian problem of continued imprisonment, for it created ample space for Germans and Japanese to provide their own interpretations and exert pressure on the Allies to modify their post-trial program.

Mass Treatment for Individual Crimes

How are we to treat convicted war criminals, especially those with long sentences, in relation to prisoners of war and to common criminals—military and civilian? Where do we incarcerate them and under what conditions? And what are we to do with them once the occupation ends? These questions were anticipated among the Allies as early as 1944 and throughout the rest of the decade.

The first question with long-term consequences concerned the legal status of a war criminal and the extension of the 1929 Geneva Convention (which provided for the safeguarding of prisoners of war) to enemy war criminals, both military and civilian: "May the conventional protection of a prisoner of war, respecting imprisonment and punishment, be denied a prisoner of war who is charged by a responsible accuser as a war criminal?" This question was discussed inconclusively at the twenty-third meeting of the United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes in 1944. Of the ten articles of the 1929 Geneva Convention that dealt with the safeguarding of prisoners of war while being subjected to judicial criminal proceedings, none considered the punishment of prisoners of war for crimes committed before their capture. In the absence of a clear definition of the treatment of war criminals in international law, the US Theater Judge Advocate, European Theater of Operations, was initially prepared to grant war criminals the protection enjoyed by POWs: in a memorandum of July 15, 1944, however, Army postwar planners laid down their interpretation that

> *As a strict matter of law* persons so charged with crime are not entitled to the rights of a prisoner of war, but *as a matter of policy* for those to be tried only at the end of the war it is believed that they should be given practically all the rights available to ordinary prisoners of war except for close surveillance and other measures necessary for assuring their availability for the trial. (italics added)[11]

American war crimes policymakers apparently wanted to have it both ways. According to this document, they denied accused war criminals the rights of POWs in court, but were willing to be generous when it came to the conditions of imprisonment. The controversy focused on Article 63 of the 1929 Geneva Convention,[12] which established that prisoners of

war were to be tried in the same courts and by the same rules as applied to courts-martials of the capturing nation.[13] The defense of the Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita took this all the way to the Supreme Court in the fall of 1945, which rejected it on the grounds that Article 63 applied only to crimes committed while in custody as a POW, not before capture.[14] The International Committee of the Red Cross, meanwhile, insisted on the need to guarantee war criminals a minimum of protection under international law, which was anchored in Articles 47–67 of the Geneva Convention[15] and could thereby be applied to Axis war criminals. As it turned out, this viewpoint eventually won enough common ground among the Western Allies in 1948 (and in opposition to the Soviets) that, at the 1949 Geneva Convention, the granting of prisoner-of-war privileges was indeed extended to convicted war criminals.[16]

In anticipation of Nazi Germany's defeat, the Office of the Judge Advocate for the US Army solicited a 69-page treatise on the question of war criminal imprisonment from Professor of Criminal Justice Sheldon Glueck of Harvard University, an advisor to Nuremberg prosecutor Jackson, dated May 9, 1945.[17] Titled "A Penologic Program for Axis War Criminals" and divided into six chapters, it made recommendations on everything from considering penal philosophy to prisons' amenities and how often "war-crime prisoners" were allowed to write or receive letters. Glueck wrote as the Nazi concentration camps were being liberated in the spring of 1945 and Nazi criminality seemed self-evident.

Glueck had primarily the American public in mind as he sketched out the theoretical and practical challenges of an unprecedented situation, namely the mass incarceration of mass murderers and its public reception over time. His treatise was part of a whole genre of writings by American intellectuals on "what to do with Germany," from the philosopher John Dewey and the psychoanalyst Erich Fromm to the anthropologist Margaret Mead and the theologian Robert Niebuhr.[18] Given the comparative paucity of independent (nongovernmental) writings on Japan and the fact that Japan had not yet been defeated at the time of his writing, Glueck's effort to include Japanese war criminals, however tentatively, speaks to the desire not only on his but also on the US government's part to consider the problem of Axis war criminals as a structural one that transcended specific local contexts. Still, Germany stood undeniably front and center in contemporary thinking, while Japan, in Glueck's opinion at the time, presented a less complicated case.

No matter how ghastly the revelations of Nazi atrocities, Glueck wrote, Americans' ethnic, religious, and business ties to the country of the perpetrators as well as to the victims made for a disturbingly diverse range of attitudes toward German war criminals, which demanded careful management. The long-term treatment of war criminals was central to this endeavor. Japan, in contrast, invited a more base reaction, Glueck

ventured, as "the color element" favored an "attitude of almost lawless, brutal, indiscriminate and ultra-swift punishment" and lacked the advocacy of an influential Japanese-American constituency (who, he neglected to say, was locked away in internment camps).[19]

The treatment of war criminals was essentially a multi-purpose propaganda tool in Glueck's view to "educate and reeducate the American public," to afford the victims a measure of retribution, and to aid in "the mental hygiene and moral rehabilitation of the German people."[20] In the terminology of modern penology, the "retributive-expiative" had to be balanced against the "correctional-reformative" aims of punishment, which, in light of the huge numbers of offenders, could not realistically live up to the modern ideal of "individualization," but in fact rested on mass punishment. Glueck, however, foresaw a "later phase" of the war crimes trial program, "only after considerable period of strict penal administration, and the gradual reorientation of the American, Allied and German public opinion." Select war criminals "who have given promise of response to more constructive, individualized treatment," would then be transferred to "special reformative institutions" to unlearn Nazi ideology in order to become contributing members of postwar German society.[21]

Although there is no evidence of Glueck's study having guided US military policy directly, it spoke well to American penological thinking at the time, at whose forefront Sheldon Glueck stood as a scholar. It turns out that the considerable relaxation in the treatment of American-held Japanese and German war criminals from the late 1940s on were very much part of an envisioned penal regime more generally and not solely an outcome of a Cold War-induced "change of priorities," as is so often assumed. This included granting imprisoned war criminals impressive opportunities for work, education, and practical training, as well as self-organization, publication, and leisure.

Glueck further recommended that convicted war criminals undergo a two-week intensive scientific study by "psychiatrists, psychologists, anthropologists, and social investigators" for immediate practical as well as for longer-term academic purposes. The data thus collected was to serve as additional personal information for prison wardens and review boards determining eligibility for rehabilitative programs and parole. At the same time, and perhaps inspired by the prominence of cultural mentality studies, he hoped that an analysis of such data might help explain how certain individuals can cause ordinary people to lose their basic humanity "and whether the process is 'reversible.'"[22] Such studies, however, had to await their social scientists, for example, Tsurumi Shunsuke and his sister Kazuko who, in the 1960s, analyzed Japanese war criminals' writings in the broader context of war and postwar experiences, or Jay Robert Lifton's psycho-sociological study of Nazi perpetrators in the 1980s.[23]

Of interest here is the obvious tension between the juridical as well as ethical insistence on *individual* culpability and responsibility on the one hand, and the practical reality of imprisoning (war) criminals *en masse* on the other. Especially in the first few years, persons suspected of, on trial for, or convicted of war crimes all shared space even with those who had committed crimes after the war, including violations of occupation regulations, and war criminals convicted by other countries and in other places came to join as well. This unintentionally opened the door to a gradual fading away of war criminals as a social category of war responsibility with significance for the nation as a whole, in the public discourse of the defeated. On the one hand, and more prevalent in Germany than in Japan, the homogenization of people convicted and held in prisons by the foreign occupiers led some to dismiss all war criminals as common criminals (with the explicit exception of a handful of top leaders in Spandau Prison) who had nothing to do with the rest of the population. Ironically, this found official legitimation in West Germany's *Strafgesetz* 131, passed as one of the first pieces of legislation after the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949. It pardoned common crimes committed before 1949 and prosecuted by Allied authorities, but it willy-nilly came to include a number of convicted war criminals, as Norbert Frei's detailed study shows.[24]

Another social and even legal mechanism of fading out the war criminals category in both countries in the 1950s followed the opposite logic, namely the discursive identification of Japanese and German national communities with the imprisoned war criminals as victims of war. Perhaps the starkest articulation of this logic can be found in Japanese release campaigns, spearheaded by the civic organization Sensō jukeisha sewakai (The War-Convicted Benefits Society). A public letter addressed to governmental and private social welfare offices including the Red Cross in 1952 stated,

> The convicted were made scapegoats for the Japanese people as a whole and are victims in need of our help. They were convicted of individual crimes and cannot bear the responsibility that all Japanese have for the war. Whatever their individual crimes, they don't compare with the much greater collective responsibility of the Japanese people, for which we feel deep regret. That they are treated as war criminals is a result of our defeat, so we cannot simply look away and let them suffer.[25]

In the context of increasing public outrage over tens of thousands of unaccounted for POWs in Soviet detention in the 1950s, pressure groups such as the Verband der Heimkehrer, Kriegsgefangenen, und Vermißtenangehörigen Deutschlands (Association of Returnees, Prisoners

of War, and Relatives of Missing People of West Germany)—the counterpart to the Sensō jukeisha sewakai in Japan—demanded extensive social welfare measures for returnees, among whom they simply included "those in Landsberg, Werl, and Wittlich." Both were successful in effecting legislation: German war criminals received government pensions and various other types of aid as part of broader categories of war returnees and expellees.[26] Japanese war criminals recovered their passive voting rights and became eligible for some government assistance as "people who had not yet returned" (*mifukuinsha*) in the summer of 1952. When military pensions were reinstated in August 1953, war criminals and their families qualified, as did the bereaved families of executed war criminals.[27] Distinctions between "war criminal" and "prisoner of war" were blurred in public perception, as the need for social integration became pressing, and the Red Cross, for example, found itself advocating the release of mass murderers for humanitarian reasons.[28]

Places of Incarceration

Another major question intensely debated in the Judge Advocate General's Office in the first half of 1946 (and revisited numerous times in the following years) was the place of war criminals' confinement. As suspects were apprehended in all corners of the former war theaters, existing camps were first utilized to house them, often the same places of which the accused had been in charge only a short while earlier and where many of the crimes had occurred. For example, most of the 1,672 German war criminals indicted by American military courts were first held at the former Dachau concentration camp before and during their trials;[29] likewise, the majority of the 1,409 Japanese war criminals put in trial by the US military were first brought to Ōmori stockade near Tokyo, which had been a notorious camp for Allied POWs during the war.

Upon conviction, German war criminals were transferred from Dachau and other camps to Landsberg Prison, a Bavarian high-security jail that had housed political prisoners since the 1920s, including a stint by Adolph Hitler, who wrote parts of *Mein Kampf* there. Likewise, Sugamo Prison had housed political prisoners before and during the war, most famously the German spy for the Soviet Union, Richard Sorge and his Japanese recruit Hotsumi Ozaki, both of whom were executed there on November 7, 1944. Britain, France, the Netherlands, China, Australia, the Philippines, and many of the Allied countries in Europe also made use of existing camps and prisons, most of which had their origins in the early-twentieth century wave of modern prison building. Changi (Singapore), Cipinang (Jakarta), Muntinglupa (Manila), Stanley (Hongkong), and other infamous prisons around Asia that had been built by European

colonial powers for the disciplining of local insurgents, were then used by the Japanese to incarcerate European and Allied POWs as they conquered Southeast Asia, and after the war housed Japanese war criminals. The Soviet Union, in contrast, dispersed convicted German and Japanese war criminals and POWs to labor camps in Siberia as part of its vast gulag system. The Japanese Foreign Ministry mapped out 35 such camp locations for its citizens in the year 1946.[30]

No matter how much "Sugamo" and "Landsberg" were to become synonyms for the American, if not the Allied war crimes trial program as a whole, this was not apparent in the spring of 1946 or even for some years later, when these locales were subjected to ongoing debates among the offices of the Provost Marshall, the Judge Advocate General, the Director of Legal Division, and Prison Director in the US occupation zone in Germany and the US Army Forces in the Pacific, respectively, as well as in the War Crimes Office in Washington. More so than the legal process of the trials, which had limited transparency for most, the long-term execution of sentences was grounded in everyday administrative practicalities that made not only the meaning of justice, but also that of democratic rebuilding, concrete for different participants and audiences, including the German, Japanese, and American public, and the victims of war atrocities as well.

First, there was recognition that a certain amount of uniformity in the treatment of imprisoned German and Japanese prisoners was desirable. This was particularly evident in the first and last years of the war crimes trial program, when coordination between the two theaters was most pronounced. Sidney Rubinstein, Deputy Director of the War Crimes Office, for example, urged in February 1946 that any study on a policy governing the confinement of war criminals requested by the Provost Marshall "should include Europe as well as the Pacific because the problems are common to both."[31]

In a detailed survey of all the conceivable possibilities for holding former Axis war criminals—in Germany/Japan, on an island in the Pacific or Atlantic that was administered by the United States, in the US Federal Prison System, or in one of the other Allied countries—these prisons were correctly foreseen as a "constant source of irritation" on both policy and psychological levels, and not only if they were located in Japan and Germany. It was feared, for example, that the safety of Axis war criminals from violence by fellow criminals could not be guaranteed were they imprisoned in the already overcrowded American Federal Prison System.[32] When Japanese officials and German local leaders in the American zone were consulted as to their own wishes for the best place of incarceration, Japanese authorities were inclined to send them all to America while the Germans insisted they be kept on German soil.[33] In the end, the

most practical solution was to keep American-convicted war criminals in Sugamo and Landsberg and deal with the "irritation" this was likely to cause on an ad hoc basis.

Second, war crimes prisons, particularly the American prisons Sugamo and Landsberg, exhibited a population diversity that originated in different administrative policies and presented different challenges. Legally, war criminals were "in the custody of the occupying power under whose authority they were tried and convicted."[34] In occupied Germany, each occupation zone maintained its own prison for convicted war criminals—the British in Werl and the French in Wittlich. The Americans in Landsberg had jurisdiction over three different groups of war criminals tried in different kinds of legal settings. The vast majority had been convicted by special American military government courts in Dachau (86% of a total of 703 war criminals in March 1949), 11 percent in the 12 subsequent Nuremberg trials based on Allied Control Council Nr. 10 and adjudicated by the High Commissioner rather than the European Command (and considered international in character), and 3 percent by an American military commission in Shanghai, which operated under different war crimes trial regulations than those drawn up for the European theater.[35] Because jurisdiction over the Nuremberg cases lay with the High Commissioner (HICOG) while the Dachau cases were the responsibility of the European Command (EUCOM), two separate clemency boards guided by different policies were necessary. Meanwhile, the Shanghai-Germans, as those convicted in China were known, were summarily released in 1951, only weeks after the US Supreme Court had rejected their appeal for *habeas corpus*.[36]

In addition, about 60 to 70 prisoners were *post*war espionage criminals mainly of Czech nationality, and at least 31 displaced people of south- and southeast European origin had been sentenced for murder in the US occupation zone.[37] Similar numbers of Chinese and Korean spies and "troublemakers" convicted of criminal activities in occupied Japan were imprisoned in Sugamo but eventually moved out to a separate stockade. Even several Japanese-Americans convicted in traitor trials (most famously, the wartime radio announcer Iva Taguri better known as Tokyo Rose) spent time in Sugamo. In the British prison Werl in Germany's British zone, former Polish forced laborers who had committed crimes against Germans after the end of the war in fact made up the majority of inmates (and executions). Public interest, meanwhile, focused on a handful of high-ranking military officers, who enjoyed much better treatment than "lesser" war or postwar criminals for the few years they spent in Werl. They had more comfortable living conditions than the Polish common criminals did, and some routinely received visits from politicians, including Adenauer himself.[38]

Sugamo Prison's diversity had, in part, other origins. As the only prison for war criminals in Japan, in January 1949, it housed 13 wartime leaders (Class A) given term sentences at the IMTFE in Tokyo (seven had been executed in December 1948) and 837 so-called Class B/C criminals convicted of the violation of the rules of war or crimes against humanity by American military commissions. Similarly to Landsberg, the B/C war criminals had been convicted in four different locales whose legal and procedural settings differed in some respects: the majority had been convicted by United States 8th Army courts in Yokohama (67% of all American cases), which were considered international in character because jurisdiction lay with the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces (SCAP) as representative of the Allies in the Asia-Pacific. Those sentenced in Manila (20%) and Shanghai (2%) had come before military commissions while convictions in Guam and Kwajalein Island (10%) had been in the hands of navy courts, which operated on their own legal basis. Of greater consequence, perhaps, for the perception of the war crimes program inside and outside Sugamo was the fact that the Manila trials relied overwhelmingly on local witnesses instead of documentary evidence, as was the case in the other trials, while the Pacific navy trials enjoyed much greater than usual Japanese cooperation and support.[39]

Third, the prisons were sites in which the evolving relationship between captors and captives, victors and vanquished, occupiers and occupied played out with rare intensity. Indeed, John Dower's characterization of the US occupation of Japan as an extraordinarily "electric" cross-cultural moment whose "focused intensity" had no match in Germany is clearly observable in the dynamics that prevailed in the prison.[40] There are political, cultural, and psychological reasons for this, but one administrative difference of consequence was EUCOM's decision to keep the American staff of Landsberg to an absolute minimum by hiring Poles as guards, whereas SCAP ran Sugamo almost exclusively with US Eighth Army GIs and the help of Japanese cooks and janitors. In Landsberg, the Americans remained distant authority figures, relying almost exclusively on local resources in supplying and servicing the prison and on the German prison chaplains as mediators (or self-appointed advocates) for the prisoners' requests.

In Sugamo, Americans created a home away from home with all the familiar amenities spiced up with a healthy portion of exoticism that led John L. Ginn, a guard there from 1948, to assert years later that "there could have been no place in occupied Japan where an American G.I. would have preferred to serve."[41] Class C war criminals Tobita Tokio, Fujiki Fumio, and a few others discovered their talent for capturing the surprises, ironies, and sheer humor in the day-to-day encounters between prisoners and guards in their sketches, drawings, and cartoons.[42] When

American guards began to leave for Korea in 1950, they often took with them gifts and souvenirs made for them by the prisoners, which are now being collected by a New York artist.[43]

Over the course of the 1950s, the war criminals population dwindled until the last war criminals were released in 1958, from both prisons. When the American occupation of Japan came to an end in April 1952, Sugamo Prison was transferred to Japanese administration under the condition that sentences would be carried out according to Allied decisions. From 1952 to 1958, the prison was therefore a Japanese operation with minimal American supervision from afar. Landsberg Prison, in contrast, remained under American operation until 1958, although one part of it was portioned off in 1955 for the housing of common criminals under German administration.[44] Since 1958, Landsberg has been in continued use as a high-security jail, whereas Sugamo was torn down and replaced in the early 1960s with Sunshine City, a state-of-the-art shopping complex. This had important implications for the public memory of these sites of Allied punishment. The 13 years as Landsberg War Criminal Prison No. 1 were just another phase in the longer history of the institution and the town, not unlike the Nazi interlude. Sugamo Prison, in contrast, by virtue of never having been used again, retained its early postwar image as the definitive site of the occupation's brand of transitional justice.

Rehabilitative Justice

From the perspective of occupation history, the complexity of the prisons as particular physical and social spaces, their embeddedness in their respective local communities, and their adaptability to changing circumstances in both cases speak in part to American penal practices, recalling Shelden Glueck's vision of a two-phase penologic program, and in part to the ability of Germans and Japanese to carve out a certain space of the war crimes program for themselves. The convicted may have thought of their prison as a place "cut off and segregated from society," as one put it, and in a sense, it was a world unto itself, but it was certainly not a world apart. All participants' accounts of Sugamo in the early years of American requisition, from memoirs to interviews with former inmates and American guards corroborate a harsh climate of enmity as the trials got under way and punishment through hard labor and exceedingly severe supervisory measures for those who began their sentences.[45] Through much of the year 1947, war criminals transformed the burnt-out landscape surrounding the prison compound into living and recreational facilities for the American overseers, while being themselves housed in cold, crammed cells. By 1949, and especially in 1950, however, inmates were building a theater, sports courts, goldfish ponds, flower gardens, and the like for their

own enjoyment, grew their own food at a hydroponic farm under minimal supervision, prepared their own meals, ran arts shops, a school, even their own publication house, and organized their own entertainment—both inside and outside the prison. Important markers for this transition to rehabilitative justice were the introduction (in Sugamo earlier than in Landsberg) of "good time credit" and a "trusty system" rewarding good prison conduct and creating a record that could later be useful to support eligibility for parole.[46]

Much the same was true for Landsberg. Vocational and academic course offerings with lecturers from among the prisoners (especially the "Shanghai Germans," who taught everything from foreign languages to business and history) as well as supplies by Bavarian institutions were impressively wide-ranging and even granted degrees, of use for future employment.[47] In both places, the social networks that formed among the imprisoned war criminals by shared war or trial experiences, through different work teams, clubs, and especially with the prison chaplains, had important individual and collective ramifications—from sharing resources to contest sentences to rekindling careers and finding employment after release. This was hardly limited to celebrities like Ernst Freiherr von Weizsäcker and Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbbach, or Shigemitsu Mamoru and Kishi Nobusuke, who quietly rebuilt their political connections while at Sugamo and once again acquired high positions in government after their release. EUCOM authorities worried about a "closely knit clique . . . of former members of the SS within the prison . . . upon whom four years imprisonment has had little effect in changing their viewpoint concerning the invincibility of the Nazi ideology."[48] In Sugamo, it was more in the nature of Communist sympathies that caused consternation.[49]

Ultimately, rehabilitative justice was about clemency. After the post-trial reviews were completed, SCAP set up a Parole Board in 1950, which functioned until the end of the occupation and was, in the fall of 1952, replaced by a Clemency and Parole Board jointly operated by a representative of the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense in Washington, in liaison with the American Embassy in Tokyo. This board accepted recommendations for clemency and parole for US convicted war criminals from the Japanese government through the National Offenders Prevention and Rehabilitation Commission (NOPAR), whereupon it alone made decisions to parole, grant sentence reductions, or early release on a case-by-case basis.[50] Its director, Conrad E. Snow, had previously been a member of the Peck Board, advising High Commissioner for Germany John McCloy on clemency for German war criminals. The situation in Germany was more complicated as separate clemency boards were set up for war criminals convicted under different jurisdictions: the Dachau EUCOM

(European Command) Modification Board, in operation from 1949 to 1953, and the Nuremberg HICOG (High Commission) Advisory Board on Clemency set up in 1950 for those convicted in the 12 Nuremberg follow-up trials. These took recommendations from the West German government through the Zentrale Rechtsschutzstelle. From 1953 to 1958, a Mixed Parole and Clemency Board operated with two German representatives, granting Germany direct influence over the clemency program for war criminals, in stark contrast to Japan, where Japanese participation was never even considered.[51]

Although only the convicting powers could grant clemency, Germans and Japanese inside and outside the prisons did everything they could to mold this process to their interests. Public calls for general amnesties mounted in Germany after the Federal Republic's establishment in 1949 and in Japan after the occupation had come to an end in 1952,[52] but no matter how insistent or persistent such demands, American authorities stuck to the principle of administering clemency on an individual basis only, however elastic that principle turned out to be. Because the option of judicial appeal was not open to German or Japanese war criminals, sentence reviews, sentence reductions on the basis of good prison conduct, and parole were made by executive decision and ultimately rested in the power of the US president, who is known to exercise presidential pardons.[53] The particular formula used to calculate good time conduct and eligibility for parole could be adjusted to allow larger numbers of prisoners to be released. This is what eventually ended the program in Germany and Japan in coordinated moves—if the formula changed in one country, it was adjusted in the other accordingly—with the result that both programs ended the same year, 1958. German and Japanese war criminals thus benefited from the rehabilitative aspects of America's "humane" penal system, but that benefit also unequivocally marked them as "criminals." The Japanese government was made to recognize that criminality by a clause in the peace treaty (Article 6) that ended the occupation in 1952, by which it officially accepted the Tokyo Trial verdicts. In direct response to this precedent, the West German government refused to sign a treaty with the Allies that included a comparable clause.[54]

Similarly, Article 11 of Japan's peace treaty established that each country involved in the war crimes trial program reserved its rights to determine clemency and release for the war criminals it had convicted, while the Japanese government was compelled to prepare recommendations and carry out Allied decisions faithfully.[55] This the Germans successfully avoided, too. Debates in the Zentrale Rechtsschutzstelle, the government agency dealing with the war criminals issue, suggested that imprisoning Germans convicted by foreign legal codes incongruent with the Federal Republic's Basic Law was plain illegal. German authorities would not

carry out Allied sentences, for this would amount to a tacit acceptance of the sentences, and Landsberg remained under American administration, even after the Generalvertrag went into effect in 1955.[56] The Japanese, on the other hand, embraced the administration of Sugamo as the only way in which they could influence the war crimes program, not by challenging sentences, but also by lightening prison conditions and preparing the war criminals' eventual reintegration into society through domestic social legislation of the kind that aided in their virtual decriminalization.

The punishment of Japanese and German war criminals showed many parallels and connections, from American penal policies to German and Japanese strategies of resistance. The differences lay not in greater German contrition, however, but rather in earlier and more active German participation in the war crimes program. In Japan, a broad public movement to press for release did not come into its own until after the occupation had ended, and targeted mainly the Japanese government, rather than the Allies, for failing to stand up for the imprisoned. Germans learned early to use the management of their criminal past proactively to various political ends, not only in relation to the occupying powers but also across the Iron Curtain and in its efforts to integrate the many different victims of war, expulsion, and occupation. The Japanese government learned to lay low, choosing other battles to fight with the Americans, on whom it depended, and reacting to domestic political pressure when the need arose. From this perspective, it is hardly surprising that Germany ended up pursuing its own war crimes trials while Japan let this episode merely fade away.

NOTES

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1. Yoshida Shigeru, *Yoshida Shigeru: Last Meiji Man*, ed. Hiroshi Nara (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 94.
2. Nishi-doku hōmon, Bonn, October 12–15, 1954. Gaimusho A'- 0136 microfilm 396.
3. Ulrich Brochhagen, *Nach Nürnberg: Vergangenheitsbewältigung und Westintegration in der Ära Adenauer* (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 1999), 113.
4. Nobert Frei, *Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999). Translated into English as *Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi*

Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Brochhagen, *Nach Nürnberg*; Ulrich Herbert, *Best: Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauuung, und Vernunft, 1903–1989* (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1996). The first and so far only study of Landsberg Prison is Thomas Raithel, *Die Strafanstalt Landsberg am Lech und der Spöttinger Friedhof 1944–1958* (Oldenburg: Institut für Zeitgeschichte, 2009).

5. Sugamo Prison has been the subject of numerous collections of memoirs, poetry, photo collections, TV shows, and films. The first TV drama of "*Watashi wa kai ni naritai*" (I want to be a Shellfish) was a popular hit in 1958; the latest film version was produced to commemorate 50 years since then, in 2008, by the same scriptwriter Hashimoto Shinobu. The most notable scholarly treatment of Sugamo Prison is Utsumi Aiko, *Sugamo purizun: senpantachi no heiwa undō* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2004). In English, the first studies are by Sandra Wilson, "Prisoners in Sugamo and their Campaign for Release, 1952–1953," *Japanese Studies* 31, no.2 (September 2011), 171–190. See also Chapter 6 in Barak Kushner *Men to Devils Devils to Men: Japanese War Crimes and Chinese Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014). About Katō Tetsutarō, see Sandra Wilson, "War Criminals in the Postwar World: The Case of Katō Tetsutarō" *War in History* 22, no. 1 (2015), 87–110.
6. A collection of short overview studies on aspects of war and occupation criminality in Japan and Germany is *Der Umgang mit Kriegs- und Besatzungsunrecht in Japan und Deutschland*, ed. Klaus Marxen, Koichi Miyazawa, and Gerhard Werle (Berlin: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001).
7. Manfred Kittel, *Nach Nürnberg und Tokio: "Vergangenheitsbewältigung" in Japan und Westdeutschland 1945 bis 1968* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2004), 71.
8. On the German usage of "*Kriegsverurteilte*," see Frei, *Vergangenheitspolitik*, 22. Although the Japanese term "*senpan*" or war criminals never disappeared, by 1952 at the latest, the term "*sensō jukeisha*" was widely used in all release campaigns, as the name of the main organization Sensō jukeisha sewakai suggests. The longer term, "*sensō hanzai ni yoru jukeisha*," appears consistently in the parliamentary resolutions of 1952–1954 and the official records of the Justice Ministry. Homu daijin kanbō, *Senpan shakuhō shiyo* (Homusho, 1967).
9. The largest number of imprisoned war criminals in Landsberg were convicted in American military courts and peaked at 930 in March 1948 (Raithel, *Die Strafanstalt Landsberg*, 2009, Appendix). Norbert Frei estimates an overall total of 6,233 convicted by tenWestern countries (Norbert Frei, "Einfürung und Bilanz," in *Transnationale Vergangenheitspolitik. Der Umgang mit deutschen Kriegsverbrechen in Europa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrig*, ed. Nobert Frei (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2006), 31–32). Included in this number are convictions by the United States, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Greece, Italy, and Canada, in

the order listed. Excluded are trials conducted in German and Austrian courts (as the Allies did not permit comparative trials in Japan), as well as the Communist East bloc

10. Sugamo peaked at 1,835 in January 1950 (numbers based on the official statistics by the Japanese Justice Ministry and reprinted in Chaen Yoshio, *Zusetsu sensō saiban Sugamo Purizumu jiten* (Tokyo: Nihon tosho sentā, 1994), out of a total of 4,403 convicted by seven US-allied countries. See John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War I.* (New York: Norton, 1999), 447. The seven countries conducting trials were: The United States, Britain, Australia, China's Nationalist government, the Netherlands, the Philippines, and France.
11. Memo by Colonel Archibald King, Chief of War Plans Division, Headquarters Army Service Forces, to The Judge Advocate General, July 15, 1944. NARA, RG 153 Entry 145 Box 16, p. 3.
12. Art. 63. "A sentence shall only be pronounced on a prisoner of war by the same tribunals and in accordance with the same procedure as in the case of persons belonging to the armed forces of the detaining Power," at https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=064E5A22A741FDA3C12563CD0051914F (accessed May 6, 2015).
13. For an in-depth study of this issue, see Günter Winands, *Der Status des Kriegsverbrechers nach der Gefangennahme: eine völkerrechtliche Untersuchung* (Badhonnef: Bock & Herchen, 1980), esp. 20–21.
14. Allan A. Ryan, *Yamashita's Ghost: War crimes, MacArthur's Justice, and Command Accountability* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2012), 285.
15. All articles of the 1929 Geneva Convention are available at https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/305?OpenDocument (accessed May 6, 2015).
16. Winands, *Der Status des Kriegsverbrechers nach der Gefangennahme*, 24–25.
17. "A Penologic Program for Axis War Criminals" by Sheldon Glueck, Cambridge, MA, May 9, 1945. NARA RG 153, entry 145, Box 16 "Imprisonment of German and Japanese War Criminals 1946–49." See also The Sheldon Glueck Papers, 1916–1972, Harvard Law Library.
18. For a discussion of American intellectuals on Germany, see Felicitas Hentschke, *Demokratisierung als Ziel der amerikanischen Besatzungspolitik in Deutschland und Japan, 1943–1947* (Münster: LIT, 2001), 83–98.
19. Ibid., 12.
20. Ibid., 16.
21. Ibid., 24.
22. Ibid., 60.
23. Tsurumi Kazuko, *Social Change and the Individual; Japan before and after Defeat in World War II* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). Tsurumi Shunsuke, "Kyokutō kokusai gunji saiban—kyū Nihon gunjin no hitenkō to tenkō" in *Sekai* (August 1968). Robert Jay Lifton,

The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

24. Frei, *Vergangenheitspolitik*, Part I.
25. "Sokoku dokuritsu no menshutsu ni sepansha ni tsuite shinshi shiyō" (Let's think deeply about the war criminals at the outset of our country's independence) in "Zenkoku jukeisha sewakai ai no undo ni kan suru yō" Hōmu chosaka, Kokuritsu kobunshokan (Hōmusho, 1997), 4A:21:6300.
26. Bernd Kasten, "Pensionen für NS Verbrecher in der Bundesrepublik" *Historische Mitteilungen* 7, no. 2 (1994), 262–282.
27. Materials relating to the extensive negotiation of benefits for war criminals are in part available in the Justice Ministry papers at the Kokuritsu kobunshokan. Some materials are reprinted in Chaen Yoshio, ed., *Nihon Senryō Sugamo Purizun Shiryō* (Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Sentā, 1992). A summary of the various laws is included in Kōseisho engokyoku, *Hikiage to hogo: sanjūnen no ayumi*. (Tokyo: Koseisho engokyoku, 1978), 461–473.
28. Related documents can be found in the German Red Cross Archives in Berlin, DRK 2329, 2339–2341.
29. Statistics in Frei, "Einfürung und Bilanz," 31. See also Christa Schick, "Die Internierungslager," in *Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform: zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland*, eds. Martin Broszat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Hans Woller et al. (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1988), 302 ff.
30. Map of detention camps for Japanese prisoners in the Soviet Union, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1946 (Gaikō shiryōkan, K'7.1.2, 2–1–3). This included POWs as well as war criminals; the situation in the Soviet Union was, and remains, notoriously unclear.
31. Memorandum to Major C. E. W. Smith, Research and Planning Division on "Confinement of War Criminals" (February 14, 1946) in NA RG 153, Entry 145, Box 16 Folder "Imprisonment of Japanese and German war criminals, 1946–49."
32. Memorandum "Observations on the place of confinement of war criminals sentenced to terms of imprisonment" (April 17, 1946) by Bertram W. Tremayne, Jr., Judge Advocate General's Office, Plans and Policy Section, War Crimes Branch. NA RG 153, Entry 145, Box 16 "Imprisonment of German and Japanese war criminals, 1946–49."
33. Colonel David Marcus, Chief of War Crimes Branch, Civil Affairs Division, War Department, "Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of War" (May 9, 1946). NA RG 153 Entry 145 Box 16.
34. Quoted in a memo by Colonel Damon M. Gunn, Judge Advocate, on "Transfer of Convicted War Criminals" (June 1, 1950). NA RG 549 Landsberg Administrative Files, Box 6, Landsberg 201–1950
35. Raithel, *Die Strafanstalt Landsberg am Lech*, 54–57.
36. Supreme Court of the United States, *Johnson vs. Eisentrager*, No. 306—October Term, 1949. In NA RG 153 Records of the Judge Advocate General, Case Files 1944–1949, Box 1418: Review of the Nanking Trial.

37. See Raithel, *Die Strafanstalt Landsberg*, 54–57. For 1949 statistics, see "Future Requirements Concerning German War Criminals in Landsberg Prison" (March 14, 1949). Communication from General Lucius D. Clay to the Chief of Staff, United States Army. NA RG 549 USAREUR Landsberg 1947–1956 Box 6.
38. "Allied Prison 1945–1954: Todesurteile, Frauengefängnis und Generalsfetisch." Justiz online: Justizvollzugsanstalt Werl, http://www.jvawerl.nrw.de/wir/Geschichte_und_Ausblick/Geschichte/index.php (accessed December 6, 2013). See also Kerstin von Lingen, *Kesselring's Last Battle: War Crimes Trials and Cold War Politics, 1945–1960* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), esp. 57, 146–147.
39. Philip Piccigallo, *The Japanese On Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945–1951* (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1979), 95.
40. John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: Norton, 1999), 23.
41. John L Ginn, *Sugamo Prison, Tokyo: An Account of the Trial and Sentencing of Japanese War Criminals in 1948, by a U.S. Participant* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co, 1992), 195.
42. Some of this material is reproduced in Chaen Yoshio, *Zusetsu Sensō saiban Sugamo purizun jiten* (1994). Tobita Tokio recently published his own memoir, Tobita Tokio and Okamura Ao, *C kyū senpan ga suketchi shita Sugamo purizun* (Tokyo: Soshisha, 2011).
43. On the Sugamo Project of the New York artist Bill Barrette, see "JPRI Occasional Paper No. 33," at http://www.jpri.org/publications/occasionalpapers/op33.html. Also of interest is "A living legacy of prison life | The Japan Times Online," at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fl20030622a4.html (accessed December 8, 2013).
44. Discussed, for example, in the documentary by Lutz Hachmeister, "Das Gefängnis—Landsberg und die Entstehung der Republik" (Colonia Media Production, 2002).
45. The secondary source that dwells most on the conditions at Sugamo in the early postwar years is Tanaka Hiromi, *BC kyū senpan* (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 2002).
46. Related records available in NA RG 544 E-39 Box 299.
47. Bayrisches Staatsarchiv, M 53833 Akten des Bayrischen Staatsministeriums für Unterricht und Kultus Landsberg am Lech. Various materials relating to the US. administration of Landsberg Prison is located in NA RG 549 Landsberg.
48. "Transfer of War Criminal Prison No. 1 to German Control" (August 24, 1950), 3.
49. Aiko, *Sugamo Purizun: Senpan tachi no heiwa undo.*
50. US records are located in NA RG 59 Clemency and Parole Board, Box 25, and RG 220 Clemency and Parole Board general files. See also Homu daijin kanbō, *Senpan shakuhō shiyo*, Ch. 10.

51. John Mendelsohn, "War Crimes Trials and Clemency in Germany and Japan" in *Americans as Proconsuls: United States military government in Germany and Japan, 1944–1952*, ed. *Robert Wolfe* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984).
52. Frei, *Vergangenheitspolitik*. Part II.
53. Mendelsohn, "War Crimes Trials and Clemency in Germany and Japan," 227.
54. Hayashi Harufumi, *BC kyū senpan saiban* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2005), 189–190.
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11

Restoring German-Japanese Relations after World War II

Rolf-Harald Wippich

Introduction

After the disaster of World War II, two very different Germanies emerged from the ruins of the Third Reich: in the west, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) developed into a politically stable and economically prosperous capitalist democracy; in the east, the German Democratic Republic, or GDR for short, proved to be economically the most productive state in the Communist bloc and one of the Soviet Union's most reliable allies.[1]

This paper traces the first steps in the process of political and cultural normalization of relations between West Germany and Japan after World War II. Although West Germany and Japan shared basic political and economic assumptions and were stable partners in the anti-Communist camp, after 1945, their long-term political goals differed considerably, so that close political cooperation seemed a very unlikely prospect. While West Germany, under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer, was primarily concerned with Western integration and, above all, reconciliation with its "hereditary enemy" France, Japan was practically isolated among its Asian-Pacific neighbors. Accordingly, it was fully committed to the United States, which represented the only trustworthy partner in an atmosphere in which peaceful relations appeared to be a task of unforeseen challenges due to painful wartime memories. As a consequence of the inevitable postwar constellation, mutual German-Japanese contacts rather developed in the field of cultural activity, as neither Germany nor Japan could be of decisive help to the other nation's political needs.

After World War II, the international system of power changed fundamentally. In this era characterized by the East-West conflict, the old epoch of nation-states was replaced by the ideological confrontation of two opposing power blocs in which the United States and the Soviet Union were determining the rules of international politics. As for diplomacy in general, the all-pervasive Cold War was responsible for the extension of the "classical" set of tasks, because it shifted from fostering bilateral contacts to dealing with multilateral relations in a global context. For German foreign policy in particular, the Nazi past and the political division of the country along ideological lines presented new experiences as well as obstacles during economic reconstruction, which proved to be important factors in postwar diplomacy.[2]

Early Economic and Diplomatic Contacts

The unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan in 1945 brought an abrupt end to official relations between the wartime allies. In Germany, as in Japan, occupation law replaced national law, and considerably restricted the sovereignty of either country. The consequence was that the former Axis powers were barred from restoring their previous diplomatic contacts and were not permitted to fully maintain economic relations. They were permitted, however, to join international organizations, such as UNESCO or GATT,[3] and to establish consular and commercial relations with other countries.[4] After the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) on May 23, 1949 with its capital at Bonn, the three Western allies (i.e., the United States, Britain and France) took steps to revive bilateral contacts in the economic field between Germany and Japan. On October 31, 1949, representatives of these three powers signed a commercial agreement with representatives of occupied Japan, which was to regulate postwar economic relations between the former wartime allies from then on.[5] On the same day, the Federal Republic was also admitted to the Organization for European Economic Corporation (OEEC), which decided how US-Reconstruction or "Marshall Plan" Aid was to be distributed in Europe.[6]

Even if the outlines of a West German foreign policy slowly began to take shape when the FRG was founded, seen from institutional and organizational perspectives, the initial lack of an independent ministry with an overall international network was painfully felt. For this reason, any notion that there was a specific policy toward Japan during the early postwar years is surely misleading. Many years were to pass, indeed, before a West German policy toward Japan slowly emerged. At any rate, the Chancellery-embedded "Bureau for Foreign Affairs"

(*Büro für auswärtige Angelegenheiten)* was taken out of the Chancellery in 1951 and reestablished as an independent ministry under its traditional name *Auswärtiges Amt* (Foreign Ministry). The first Foreign Minister (from 1949) was Chancellor Konrad Adenauer himself, who held that office personally until 1955. Walter Hallstein, "who practically exercised the function of a foreign minister,"[7] then became *Staatssekretär* (State Secretary) of the Foreign Ministry. Nevertheless, it was Chancellor Adenauer who determined the principal features of foreign policy until his resignation in 1963.[8]

The Bonn Republic considered itself the only legitimate successor of the German Empire—that maxim was to become the guiding principle of West Germany's foreign policy—and claimed the right of sole representation of all Germans, which left the second German state, the GDR, also founded in 1949, politically sidelined. As the GDR did not enter into official relations with Japan until 1973, it will remain outside the scope of this paper.[9]

On August 2, 1951, a new Commodity and Tariff Agreement was concluded between Germany and Japan. This treaty basically reconfirmed the old German-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Shipping of 1927 and materially substantiated postwar bilateral relations.[10] Initially, West Germany mainly exported machinery and chemical fertilizers to Japan, while Japan especially exported raw silk and agricultural products to Germany.[11] At the German Foreign Ministry, it was understood that "the perfect functioning of the new treaty depended on official representations being ready on both sides, which could supervise the implementation of the treaty and, if necessary, remove any difficulties."[12] Moreover, the treaty also stipulated the establishment of a mixed commission to resolve any forthcoming questions. For that very purpose, Japan intended to establish an Overseas Trade Office as a relay station in Bonn. The diplomatic mission itself, however, was to be considered only after Japan's Peace Treaty (Treaty of San Francisco, September 8, 1951) came into effect.[13] During the Adenauer era, Germany was in a comparatively minor position as Japan's trading partner, though it was the second-most important addressee for Japanese imports from and exports to Europe after Britain.[14]

The revival of German-Japanese trade benefitted particularly from the Korean War of 1950–1953, which is said to have triggered an economic boom in both countries. During this early Cold War period, the creation of two blocs in Europe was cemented, and, furthermore, West Germany's integration into the collective security system of NATO was finalized in 1954. As for Japan, the East Asian crisis of the early 1950s strengthened its ties with and its dependency on the United States, culminating in the security alliance with Washington of 1952. Thanks to that security

umbrella, Japan was in a favorable position to launch its industrial energies as well as domestic reforms.[15] Both Germany and Japan succeeded as loyal US allies and, owing to their firm integration into the capitalist bloc, were able to build up parliamentary democracies and evolve their efficient national economies into leading industrial nations.[16]

When the so-called Germany Treaty[17] between the Western allies the United States, Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany was signed in 1952, the occupation of (West-) Germany was officially brought to an end and full authority over internal and external affairs was granted to the Bonn Republic. The Three Powers retained, however, their rights in relation to Germany as a whole and especially to Berlin (which they continued to exercise until German unification in 1990). In that same year, Japan's period of occupation also ended with the Peace Treaty of San Francisco, which enabled the country to regain its sovereignty. Now the way lay open to establish normal diplomatic relations between the two countries.[18] The resumption of official contacts was to take place at the ambassadorial level, yet, for the time being, offices were to be held by chargés d'affaires so long as the letters of accreditation of the respective missions had not been exchanged.

Dr. Heinrich Northe (1908–1985) became the first postwar representative of the young Federal Republic in Japan. He had entered the diplomatic service in 1933 and had primarily been appointed to East Asian posts since 1938. The incumbency of the newly established mission in Tokyo was, however, his first appointment in Japan.[19] Northe's Japanese counterpart as the first Director of the so-called Bureau for Foreign Affairs in Bonn, which was to perform semi-official diplomatic tasks, was Teraoka Kōhei (1910–1960) in 1952/1953. After a brief interlude of Sono Akira as chargé d'affaires, Kase Shun'ichi (1897–1963), who had held various positions in Japan's diplomatic corps since the early 1940s, became the first postwar ambassador on German soil in 1954.[20] The most urgent task for Northe and his small staff was to find adequate rooms in Tokyo for residence and chancellery. The first chancellery was located in Tokyo's Roppongi district, while the ambassador's residence was far away in Iigura, Katamachi. It was not until 1960 that chancellery and residence, after several relocations, could be united at last on the same site in Tokyo's central Minami Azabu district.[21]

As a consequence of newly established official contacts, consular offices were opened by both West Germany and Japan. In 1953, the German Consulate General in Osaka-Kobe was reestablished, having jurisdiction in the economically vibrant Kansai region.[22] In return, Japan opened consulates in several German cities[23] and chose Düsseldorf, the capital of North Rhine-Westphalia, as the center of its economic interests in West Germany. The city of Düsseldorf had been considered the

ideal location, as both a key business center in Germany and because it was very close to the industrial heartland of the Rhine and Ruhr areas, from which Japan sought to receive steel and chemical products for its own recovery.[24] Already in 1951, the first Japanese businessman had settled there permanently, but it was some time before the first officially registered overseas subsidiary of a Japanese company was set up by the Mitsubishi trading house.[25]

Formal and Informal Cultural Ties: The Role of the German East Asiatic Society (OAG)

As far as foreign policy was concerned, West Germany's possibilities remained severely restricted despite the "Germany Treaty" of 1952. As comprehensive sovereignty had not yet been regained, the establishment of fully-fledged diplomatic relations was not under discussion for the time being.[26] In the absence of a clear political position regarding Japan, the West German government fell back on tried and tested instruments to foster bilateral ties that had already characterized prewar relations, as they seemed to guarantee a viable revival of German-Japanese relations under democratic conditions.

Germany's impact upon Japan had been particularly impressive during the modernization project of the Meiji era (1868–1912), when crucial models and patterns in the fields of military and law, education, medicine, and philosophy were adopted from Germany.[27] On the one hand, Japan was striving to shed this obsolete Prusso-German legacy after 1945, which had shaped the country in such a lasting way; on the other hand, Japan's high regard for German culture had been little affected by American occupation. Consequently, Japan's unbroken deep appreciation for German culture made a good starting point to renew bilateral relations.

The German Foreign Ministry had made it very clear at an early stage that, owing to Germany's recent Nazi past, it wished to avoid, at any cost, all signs of state-controlled cultural propaganda in its foreign relations. For that very reason, external cultural relations were to be conducted primarily with the support of established private organizations.[28] This low-profile approach, or "culture of restraint" (*Kultur der Zurückhaltung*),[29] adequately describes the situation in East Asia, because that part of the world featured prominently in German overseas cultural activity in the early postwar years (1952–1955).[30] With regard to the independent nations in Asia, the West German government was careful to ensure that foreign policy made a good impression and that it sustained a sympathetic perception. Appealing to a positive image, though, originated for one single reason: to commit these countries to a determined policy of

the nonrecognition of Communist East Germany—one of the "essentials" of FRG policy in the 1950s.[31] Undoubtedly, it was helpful that West Germany, by its own account, only had economic interests in Asia, and these objectives could be advanced together with cultural activities, without any serious complications.[32]

In that sense, foreign cultural policy was considered a vehicle for the presentation of the "other," or "better" Germany, in contrast to the eastern Communist GDR, against which a strict policy of marginalization was to be pursued. Moreover, culture was deliberately used to launch a charm offensive on behalf of West Germany.[33] The major interest of early foreign cultural policy was, as a leading conservative parliamentarian pointed out, "to explain the Federal Republic to other countries" and "to create mutual understanding between the people of West Germany and the people of other nations."[34]

In establishing cultural contacts with Japan, private institutions appeared to be suitable candidates as primary mediators because they were already active in the country. Among them were the German East Asiatic Society in Tokyo (OAG) and Sophia University, founded by German Jesuits in 1913. The latter not only had emerged as one of the leading universities in Japan, but also upheld a small, but important German legacy in pedagogy and philology. Last but not least, there was the German School in Yokohama, founded in 1904. All three institutions had the advantage of having been rooted within the culture of their host country for decades, and additionally had at their disposal a network of pro-German Japanese supporters who could claim some status in Japanese society. Above all, however, it was the OAG that became the backbone of German-Japanese cultural exchange after World War II.[35]

The OAG, founded by German diplomats, merchants, and experts in 1873, had only recently been newly constituted under democratic auspices (1951). The Society was seen as German diplomacy's most important "assembly point" in cultural matters (*Sammelpunkt für das Deutschtum*) since no alternative institution could serve such a central role. In this respect, the OAG held the position of a semi-official German cultural agency up to 1958 when a culture institute was established in Tokyo. It is because of that collaboration that the importance of the German East Asiatic Society for West Germany's foreign and cultural policy toward Japan must not be underestimated. Consequently, official influence upon the Society was maintained by arrangements that proved beneficial to both sides, for example, by appointing the German Ambassador honorary president of the Society, by granting financial support and book gifts from the Foreign Ministry, or by having embassy staff members in various OAG committees as experts.

First of all, by being linked with the OAG, the government in Bonn could realize its goal of a low-profile cultural policy, and, second,

collaboration with that Society was an inexpensive yet efficient way to pursue German cultural policy in Japan without maintaining an institute of its own. As far as the Society was concerned, its proximity to the German Embassy was very helpful with regard to Japanese authorities and, moreover, could strengthen its position as a transmitting organization for German culture and science overseas. Never before or thereafter in its history did the German Asiatic Society enjoy such a high-profile status as it did in the 1950s. The real aim of the OAG, however, was and still is to inform about East Asia, but the Embassy wanted the Society to be a reliable organ of German cultural policy in Japan. These were, of course, contradictory ideas that strikingly resembled the way Nazi Germany had tried to manipulate the OAG.[36]

Private Encounters and Nonstate Initiatives

Despite the resumption of diplomatic relations in 1952, official cultural contacts between Germany and Japan only developed slowly. The FRG's major political concern, which overshadowed everything else, was regaining its full sovereignty. Until that objective had been achieved, the initiation of an official foreign cultural policy was only of minor importance to the policy-makers in Bonn. In the aftermath of the war, a German social or cultural infrastructure no longer existed in Japan. Due to the repatriation of most Germans in 1947/1948,[37] Germany had lost most of its prewar networks in Japan, which had proved extremely helpful in maintaining local contacts or promoting ties in various areas. Consequently, a number of issues were in a state of flux, yet this particular situation offered the opportunity for private arrangements in cultural activities. First of all, old contacts and information channels had to be reactivated to put German-Japanese relations on solid ground again. The reestablishment of contacts was brought about with considerable difficulties for all participants. In 1952, the first Germans who had been forcibly repatriated returned to Japan. Thereafter, the small German colony in Japan that once had lived in the Greater Tokyo—Yokohama as well as Osaka—Kobe areas began to grow, paving the way for a revival of active cultural and social life, albeit on a modest scale. Among the returnees, there were many merchants and old Japan hands, such as the influential OAG-members Kurt Meissner and Johannes Barth, who came back to claim their assets and to take up business again.[38]

At around the same time, German business groups and renowned scientists began to visit Japan. For example, the chemist Karl Ziegler was even received in audience by the Emperor in 1958.[39] Before that, during summer 1953, the *Offenbacher Kickers* soccer team had come to Japan on an exhibition tour, playing several matches against Japanese teams.[40] One year later, in 1954, the bilateral student exchange program resumed.[41]

Soccer, in particular, was to have a major impact on bilateral cultural relations. In 1960, the first German coach, Dettmar Cramer (*1925–2015), was hired by the Japanese government as an advisor to its national soccer teams. Cramer is considered, with complete justification, to be the "Father of modern Japanese soccer" because of what he was able to accomplish for the sport in Japan. When Japan unexpectedly placed third in the soccer tournament at the XIX Olympic Games in Mexico in 1968, Cramer was awarded with the highest degree of the prestigious Japanese Order of Culture (*bunka kunshō*).[42]

Resuming business in Japan, however, proved to be harder than expected. The reason was that former German property, according to Article 20 of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco, was controlled by the so-called Tripartite Commission, consisting of the three victorious Western allies United States, Britain, and France; the Commission had indeed gradually begun to liquidate German property. Therefore, German efforts to recover confiscated property, or at least some form of reimbursement for lost assets, were doomed from the start. In 1957, the repatriated Germans were formally rehabilitated by the Tripartite Commission, yet were not able to lay claim to their lost fortunes. The liquidation of German property continued until 1960, when a new German-Japanese commercial treaty created a promising framework for successful economic ties.[43]

Much like during the late Meiji period when relations between Imperial Germany and Japan were particularly active, personal ties represented an important factor in the postwar period too. These ties were initiated in part by the same protagonists that had been involved prior to 1945. This applied, along with the long-time residents, *mutatis mutandis* to the embassy staff that had been on diplomatic duty in Tokyo before and/or during the war. There were also groups of visitors paying courtesy visits to Japan in the 1950s, mainly consisting of politicians of every shade. Among them were Christian Democratic (CDU) parliamentarian Paul Leverkühn in 1955, as well as the President of the Parliament, Eugen Gerstenmaier (CDU), who came in 1956, together with the leader of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Erich Ollenhauer. They were followed by State Secretary Walter Hallstein (CDU) in 1957 and, on behalf of the Federal Government on the occasion of Tokyo's 500th anniversary in the same year, by the provisional Governing Mayor of West Berlin and Chairman of the West Berlin chapter of the CDU, Franz Amrehn.[44]

The churches also succeeded in establishing ties with Japan at this early stage. The first ecclesiastical dignitary to arrive in Japan was the Protestant Bishop of Hannover in 1956. The following year, it was the turn of his Catholic colleague, Josef Cardinal Frings, the Archbishop of Cologne and Chairman of the German Bishops' Conference at Fulda.[45] As a result of Frings' initiative, the very first Roman-Catholic god-parenthood of any

German diocese came into being as early as 1954, between the archdioceses of Cologne and Tokyo. The reason for Cardinal Frings' journey in 1957 was the official opening of the Faculty of Law of the Jesuit-affiliated Sophia University at Tokyo, which had been supported financially by the archdiocese of Cologne.[46]

The first German-Japanese town twinning came about in 1959, and was particularly meaningful. It was the brainchild of the Director of the Yanmar Diesel Engine Works, Yamaoka Magokichi, who, since his time as a student in prewar Munich, had developed a deep sympathy for Germany. Yamaoka, in particular, felt an affinity for the like-minded Bavarian engineer and inventor Rudolf Diesel and for his hometown Augsburg, which he visited while on a trip to Germany in 1953. After returning to Japan, he launched the idea of establishing a *Rudolf Diesel Gedächtnishain* (Rudolf Diesel-Memorial Park) at Augsburg, which was finally opened in autumn 1957.[47] From this small beginning, the project of a twinning agreement between Augsburg and the two manufacturing sites of Yanmar came about—one located in Amagasaki (Hyogo Prefecture), and the other in Nagahama (Shiga Prefecture).[48]

Indications of a Postwar Policy toward Japan

Though there had been a promising start to West German-Japanese postwar relations, the Federal Government was not yet in a position to formulate a solid policy toward a Japan under democratic conditions. As was the case during the Wilhelmine period, if for different reasons, Japan was only of secondary importance to West Germany, whereas German and European issues unmistakably prevailed. This political indifference was essentially a consequence of the international political situation.

Hans Kroll, the newly appointed first Ambassador to Japan in 1955, therefore, asked Chancellor Adenauer about West Germany's policy toward Japan with good reason, because he had been left without any concrete instruction as to Bonn's diplomatic intensions in Tokyo. Adenauer's reply was as short as it was vague and all encompassing: "Just draw up a program for a West German-Japanese policy after your arrival."[49] Kroll outlined his thoughts, which were to serve as a principal orientation with regard to Japan, and identified four key maxims:

1. West Germany is not directly involved in disputes in the Far East as it has no political interests or possessions of its own there. In Asian-Pacific conflicts, West Germany does not side with anyone.
2. Nevertheless, West Germany is interested in political events in that region; West Germany regards its economic interests there as not insignificant.

3. The Western world has to confront Communist expansion everywhere and the Cold War cannot be divided; consequently, détente can only be achieved on a global scale.
4. West Germany is interested in a strong, economically healthy, and socially pacified Japan; the same is anticipated with regard to Japan's policy toward West Germany.[50]

According to Ambassador Kroll, long-term political cooperation with Japan appeared to be unlikely for the time being, owing to the lack of necessary preconditions between the two countries. Apart from sharing basic political viewpoints, the political objectives of the Bonn state unmistakably differed from those in Tokyo.[51] In a sense, a good starting-point for political talks was provided by the West German-Japanese exchange of information on negotiations, which Chancellor Adenauer was holding with the Soviet Union during 1955. To Kroll, this communication meant a valuable opportunity to relaunch talks with Tokyo on an Ambassadorial level, after the interruption of almost ten years. In light of the fact that, prior to Tokyo, Kroll had been Ambassador to Belgrade in Socialist Yugoslavia (1953–1955), he was in a unique position to provide the Japanese government with precise information on the Communist world.[52] Kroll had come to Japan with the goal of "restoring our former good position and our reputation in the country."[53] The day he arrived in Yokohama on May 8, 1955, ten years to the day after the German capitulation, the new Ambassador was faced with the challenge "of building up the diplomatic representation into a well-functioning agency, to give it the respected position within the diplomatic corps and Japanese authorities it was entitled to, and to breathe life into the traditional framework of commercial and cultural relations as soon as possible."[54]

As far as cultural activities were concerned, by the mid-fifties, the Foreign Ministry had apparently become aware that Japan represented an important factor in Germany's foreign relations because "it was on an equal footing with the great European civilizations and the United States of America."[55] As for its cultural engagement with Japan, however, the FRG was confronted with a special obligation: Japan thought so highly of Germany and German culture that expectations were high for any cultural agenda.

Kroll was especially interested in a closer collaboration between the Embassy and the German East Asiatic Society as he considered the Society as a perfect channel for cultural exchange.[56] In Japan, the OAG was a fully established organization through which a semi-official cultural policy could be launched. This fact was made clear in connection with a one-time allowance in November 1955 of 70,000 German Marks for the new OAG building. This financial support from Bonn was granted in the expectation

"that our influence upon the Society will remain intact."[57] A further occasion where the closeness between the Foreign Ministry and the OAG was obvious was the opening of the new OAG House in 1956, during which the diplomats primarily praised the revival of German-Japanese friendship.[58] To be specific, the harmony between the Embassy and OAG was particularly distinctive during the 1950s and 1960s. The ambassadorial incumbents considered their office of honorary president of the Society as a kind of court of appeal in all matters related to the OAG. In their view, they felt justified in exerting their influence upon the Society via personal ties. Not only did the ambassador receive copies of all protocols from the OAG board and general meetings, but he also could intervene immediately whenever delicate topics on the OAG agenda appeared to be politically inopportune. Such was the case, for example, in all matters pertaining to Japan's nuclear policy, which, according to Ambassador Kroll, seemed to not be a proper topic of the East Asiatic Society's business.[59]

According to Kroll, both the outcome of World War II and the interruption of diplomatic contacts between 1945 and 1955 were the obvious causes responsible for the "undermining" of German-Japanese relations in their "key sectors," which he considered to be commerce and culture.[60] In particular, Kroll had high expectations of the musical sector in Japan, where German influence was still particularly present, and he did succeed in gaining ground there. What mattered to him was achieving "the revival of our traditional reputation as Europe's leading music nation." This aimed directly at Austria's musical ambitions in seeking to establish itself as the preeminent country of classical music in Japan.[61] Kroll was able to benefit from the support of long-time Japan resident Margarete Netke-Löwe, a well-known music pedagogue, and others in the field.[62] Kroll reached the peak of his cultural ambitions with the conclusion of the new cultural treaty between Germany and Japan in February 1957.[63] The treaty aimed to promote the translation and dissemination of print media and to encourage the study of the contracting partner's culture in various ways. It stipulated, among other items, the exchange of academics and artists as well as the teaching of each other's culture at school. The treaty soon bore fruit in the form of the Great German Book Fair "*Das Deutsche Buch*" in Tokyo in September 1957, which emphasized nonfiction titles in areas such as technology, mathematics, natural sciences, and medicine, which covered approximately 50 percent of all the publications presented. According to German sources, about 5,500 Japanese, most of whom were academics and students, came to see the exhibition thereby expressing an interest in Germany's culture of knowledge.[64] In November of the same year, guest performances of the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra conducted by Herbert von Karajan followed suit, giving several concerts in Tokyo as well as in other cities across the country.[65]

GOVERNMENT AND STATE VISITS IN THE 1950S

As has already been mentioned, personal ties remained as important a factor of mutual understanding during the postwar period as they had been in earlier decades. The significance of these contacts was that they revitalized the relationship between West Germany and Japan in a way that formal ties alone would not have been able to achieve. These lively encounters at the highest political level (*Besuchsdiplomatie*) offered an outstanding platform to boost sympathy and trust for each side's own cause. Direct contacts became an important factor in bilateral relations and contributed a great deal to mutual understanding. Japanese statesmen and business leaders were eager to study West Germany's economic reconstruction first-hand and, moreover, revealed a keen interest in obtaining accurate information directly. In the end, more Japanese visitors found their way to West Germany than vice versa,[66] a fact that seemed to reflect anew the asymmetrical relationship between Germany and the Japan of the past.[67]

The first Japanese dignitary to visit West Germany after the war was 19-year old Crown Prince Akihito in the summer of 1953. Akihito had come to Europe as an Emissary of the Japanese Emperor to attend the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II of England on June 2, 1953. After the conclusion of the celebration in England, he extended his European tour by travelling for about a week through the Federal Republic (July 31—August 5, 1953).[68] In timely fashion, the West German chargé d'affaires in Tokyo, Heinrich Northe, had provided reliable information for his government about what Japanese visitors in general would associate with Germany and, consequently, would like to see there. Northe's recommendations amounted to a mixture of romantic and modern clichés—"Heidelberg, the river Rhine, technology and science" were items on the list, and this list was meticulously followed in order to please the distinguished guest.[69]

In 1954, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru followed suit; he was the first Japanese head of government to make a trip to West Germany. He was much impressed by the state of German reconstruction and was keen to learn "how the financial recovery of West Germany had been accomplished; how, in particular, a substantial prosperity had been achieved in so short a time; why West Germany had no strike problem; and what measures were being taken to combat Communism."[70] Yoshida attempted to present a realistic picture of postwar Japan for his hosts, including its economy, which was not yet on a level with Germany's. After all, there was no doubt in Yoshida's mind "that the Germans had come out winners in the battle for national survival."[71]

On the West German side, a visible increase in personal visits to East Asia had been established by the mid-1950s. Ambassador Kroll remembered, "Visits from West Germany became more frequent then. Very quickly Japan appeared to be *en vogue* as a travel destination."[72] The first German cabinet member who visited Japan in 1958 was the Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard, who later succeeded Adenauer as Chancellor in 1963. During his stay in the Japanese capital, he opened, among other things, the new German Cultural Institute (now the Goethe-Institute Tokyo) in the name of the Federal Government, located within OAG House.[73] Two years later, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer followed as the first German head of government to visit Japan, thereby reciprocating Prime Minister Yoshida's earlier visit in 1954.[74] From 1963 onward, political contacts between Tokyo and Bonn substantially increased, as regular consultations of the Foreign Ministers were held to exchange information on the world situation at that time. Similar consultations and meetings soon spread to other areas as well.[75]

The first European Head of State to pay a visit to Japan was President Heinrich Lübke in November 1963, on a 12-day visit that was met with great interest and cordiality on both sides.[76] The first Japanese Emperor to visit the Western world was Emperor Hirohito, who paid an official visit to the Federal Republic in 1971.[77]

Epilog

To conclude, though there were some striking parallels in Germany's and Japan's postwar development, in the long run, the differences between the two countries prevailed over the legacy of the jointly waged and lost war. In Germany's case, the division of the country, rearmament, and the question of coming to terms with the past were decisive for policy-making. Despite the resumed friendship in 1952, no spectacular bilateral projects were to be expected from subsequent contacts. The reasons for that were differing interests, to which the partner country could be, at best, supportive, but could never have a crucial influence on national politics. As long as Germany's division and security remained in the foreground of all political concerns, Bonn's Japan engagement was naturally lacking momentum. To return to normalcy on an official level was largely synonymous with the recourse to well-tested formats of presentation and models of cooperation in the fields of economics, science, and culture. What was new, however, was the establishment of a regular exchange of views between political leaders from both countries.

However, with the continuing movement toward European unification, several political and economic problems shifted from national to EU

jurisdiction, like the problem of market access, which had been a bone of contention with Japan for years. According to the Treaty of Rome (1957), a separate German trade policy with Japan was no longer possible, but had to be coordinated with Brussels.[78]

In general, West German-Japanese relations in the period under investigation were free from conflict. This was to be the case until the 1970s, when the Oil Crisis compelled industrial nations to rethink their global strategies.

NOTES

1. See Mary Fulbrook, *A Concise History of Germany*, updated edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), Chapter 7.
2. Eckart Conze et al., *Das Amt und die Vergangenheit. Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik* (Bonn: bpb, 2011), 621–624.
3. Both countries became UNESCO members in July 1951, and joined the **G**eneral **A**greements on **T**ariffs and **T**rade in 1951 (FRG) and 1955 (Japan) respectively.
4. Gregor Schöllgen, *Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Munich: Beck, 1999), 23.
5. *Bundesanzeiger* 1949, no. 31 and http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/02/004/0200473.pdf. (accessed June 26, 2014). See also Katja Schmidtpott, "Die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik und Japan in der Ära Adenauer," in *Die Herausforderung des Globalen in der Ära Adenauer*, ed. Eckart Conze (Bonn: Bouvier, 2010), 35–51, here 37–38. For the general background see: Gerhard Krebs, "Japan and Germany—From Wartime Alliance to Postwar Relations," in *1945 in Europe and Asia*, ed., Gerhard Krebs and Christian Oberländer (Munich: Iudicium, 1997), 149–160.
6. See http://www.chroniknet.de/daly_de.0.html?year=1949&month=10 (accessed June 26, 2014). The OEEC was to run the US-financed Marshall Aid for the reconstruction of Europe devastated by the war. For West Germany's reintegration into the global economy after 1945 in general, see: Christoph Buchheim, *Die Wiedereingliederung Westdeutschlands in die Weltwirtschaft 1945–1958* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990).
7. Claus M. Müller, *Relaunching German Diplomacy. The Auswärtiges Amt in the 1950s* (Münster: LIT, 1996), 62 and 56–61; see also Schöllgen, *Außenpolitik*.
8. Müller, *Relaunching*, 85.
9. For these questions, see Schöllgen, *Außenpolitik*.
10. *Bundesanzeiger* 1951, no. 168.
11. Schmidtpott, "Wirtschaftsbeziehungen," 40–41.

12. *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1952* [hereafter cited as AAP], ed. Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000), Vol. 1, Doc. 147.
13. The Treaty of San Francisco was signed by most (48) of the Allies and came into force on April 28, 1952.
14. AAP Vol. 1, Doc. 147; Schmidtpott, "Wirtschaftsbeziehungen," 38 and 43.
15. See Schöllgen, *Außenpolitik* and Mikiso Hane, *Modern Japan. A Historical Survey* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986).
16. Joachim Glaubitz, "Die Deutschen und Japan," in *Deutschland. Porträt einer Nation*, vol. 10: *Deutschland, Europa und die Welt*, introduced by Michael Stürmer (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Lexikothek, 1986), 313–326, here: 324.
17. Its full name is Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany.
18. AAP Vol. 1, 477 n.5; AAP Vol. 3, Doc. 96.
19. Auswärtiges Amt, ed., *Biographisches Handbuch des deutschen Auswärtigen Dienstes 1871–1945* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008), Vol. 3, 382–383; Heinrich Schwalbe and Heinrich Seemann, eds., *Deutsche Botschafter in Japan 1860–1973* (Tokyo: OAG, 1974), 124.
20. Tobias C. Bringmann, *Handbuch der Diplomatie, 1815–1963: Auswärtige Missionschefs in Deutschland und deutsche Missionschefs im Ausland* (Munich: K.G. Saur, 2001), 235.
21. Schwalbe and Seemann, *Botschafter,* 131. The ambassador's residence was already established at Minami Azabu in 1956. See also http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deutsche_Botschaft_Tokio (accessed December 1, 2014).
22. Thilo Graf Brockdorff, "Deutschland und Japan: Partner und Konkurrenten," in *Japan, Europa, USA. Weltpolitische Konstellationen der neunziger Jahre*, ed. Wilfried von Bredow and Thomas Jäger (Opladen: Leske + Budruch, 1994), 13–33, here; 16.
23. Apart from its Embassy at Berlin, the Japanese government's presence in Germany currently extends to three Consulates General (Düsseldorf, Frankfurt/Main, and Munich), one Consulate (Hamburg), and one Honorary Consulate (Stuttgart).
24. http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japaner_in_D%C3%BCsseldorf (accessed August 2, 2014).
25. Ibid. See for further information: Benedikt Mauer, *Düsseldorf—Japan. Eine Beziehungsgeschichte* (Düsseldorf: Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf, 2011); "Japan und Nordrhein-Westfalen," *Nippon aktuell* 5 (2008).
26. Schöllgen, *Außenpolitik*, 29.
27. See Christian W. Spang and Rolf-Harald Wippich, "From 'German Measles' to 'Honorary Aryans': An overview of Japanese-German relations until 1945," in *German-Japanese Relations, 1895–1945*, ed. Christian W. Spang and Rolf-Harald Wippich (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 1–18.

28. Eckard Michels, "Zwischen Zurückhaltung, Tradition und Reform: Anfänge westdeutscher auswärtiger Kulturpolitik in den 1950er Jahren am Beispiel der Kulturinstitute," in *Auswärtige Repräsentationen. Deutsche Kulturdiplomatie nach 1945*, ed. Johannes Paulmann (Köln: Böhlau, 2005), 241–258, here: 219.
29. Alexander Troche, *"Berlin wird am Mekong verteidigt," Die Ostasienpolitik der Bundesrepublik in China, Taiwan und Süd-Vietnam 1954–1966* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2001), 39–40.
30. Michels, "Zurückhaltung," 231, and Schöllgen, *Außenpolitik*, 29–30.
31. Troche, *Berlin*, 39.
32. Ibid.
33. Hildegard Hamm-Brücher, *Kulturbeziehungen weltweit. Ein Werkstattbericht zur auswärtigen Kulturpolitik* (Munich: Hanser, 1980), 36; Manfred Abelein, *Die Kulturpolitik des Deutschen Reiches und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Ihre verfassungsgeschichtliche Entwicklung und ihre verfassungsrechtlichen Probleme* (Köln and Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1968), 137–140.
34. Eugen Gerstenmaier, "Deutsche Kulturpolitik im Ausland," *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Auslandsbeziehungen* 8 (1958), 273–278, here: 273. Gerstenmaier (1906–1986) was Parliamentary President (1954–1969) and Vice-Party Chairman of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 1956–1966. See also Johannes Paulmann, "Auswärtige Repräsentationen nach 1945: Zur Geschichte der deutschen Selbstdarstellung im Ausland," in *Auswärtige Repräsentationen. Deutsche Kulturdiplomatie nach 1945*, ed. Johannes Paulmann (Köln: Böhlau, 2005). 1–32, here: 4–6.
35. Wilhelm G. Grewe, "Japan und Deutschland—gestern, heute und morgen," in *Zwei Zaghafte Riesen? Deutschland und Japan seit 1945*, ed. Arnulf Baring and Masamori Sase (Stuttgart and Zürich: Belser, 1977), 621–646, here: 625.
36. For the history of the German East Asiatic Society (OAG), refer to the forthcoming (2015) study by Christian W. Spang, Rolf-Harald Wippich and Sven Saaler, titled *Die Geschichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens (OAG), 1873–1979.* See for further information also the OAG-homepage http://www.oag.jp/ueber-die-oag/goag (accessed May 15, 2015).
37. See Charles Burdick, "The Expulsion of Germans from Japan: 1947–1948," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 4th Series* 11 (1996), 49–75.
38. *Kurt* and Hanni Meissner, *Sechzig Jahre in Japan* (1973; reprint, Hamburg: Hans K. Meissner, 2007), 201; Johannes Barth, *Als deutscher Kaufmann in Fernost. Bremen—Tsingtau—Tōkyō 1891–1981* (Berlin: Erich Schmidt, 1984), 183–184.
39. Ziegler was Director of the Max-Planck-Institute for the Research of Coal 1943–1969. In 1963, he won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry. Hans Kroll, *Botschafter in Belgrad, Tokio und Moskau 1953–1962* (Munich: dtv, 1969), 137–139.

40. See Galinsky Papers, OAG Archives Tokyo. See also http://www.fr-online.de/Offenbach/Kickers-stadion-zeitkapsel-fuer-die-fans (accessed 7/3/2014). *Offenbacher Kickers* was one of West Germany's top soccer teams in the 1950s and 1960s. The East Asian trip, which was made in the interest of international understanding, also took them to Hong Kong, India, and the Philippines where a couple of matches were played against home teams in each destination. http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerhard_Kaufhold (accessed July 1, 2014).
41. Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Tokyo, ed., *Deutschland und Japan. Die deutsch-japanischen Beziehungen in Gegenwart und Vergangenheit* (Tokyo 1986), 9.
42. http://www.das-japanische-gedaechtnis.de/lebensbilder-a-z/cramer (accessed July 1, 2014)
43. Botschaft Tokyo, *Deutschland und Japan*, 9; Schmidtpott, "Wirtschaftsbeziehungen," 39.
44. See Spang, Wippich, Saaler, *Geschichte der OAG*, and Kroll, *Botschafter*, 152–153. After the sudden death of Governing Mayor Otto Suhr in 1957, Amrehn temporarily took up office in an acting capacity, for about four weeks—exactly at the time of Tokyo's 500th anniversary.
45. Kroll, *Botschafter*, 136–137.
46. Norbert Trippen, *Josef Kardinal Frings (1887–1978)* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2005), Vol. 2, 23–103, esp. 55–71. The contacts between Cologne and Sophia University can be traced back as far as 1913, when that higher institute of learning had opened its doors.
47. The Memorial park within Augsburg's *Wittelsbacher Park* was inspired by a traditional Japanese stone garden and was turned over to the city of Augsburg by Yamaoka Magokichi in a special ceremony on October 6, 1957. For pictures of this Memorial Park, refer to http://schule.a-city.de/holbein-gymnasium/diesel-gedaechtsnishain.htm (accessed March 25, 2015).
48. Galinsky Papers (1957), OAG Archives Tokyo and http://www.schwaben-media.de/Bauwerke/Augsburg/Rudolf-Diesel-Gedächtnishain, Augsburg (accessed July 30, 2014).
49. Kroll, *Botschafter*, 116.
50. Ibid, 108–109.
51. Ibid, 123 et al.
52. Though at the time of Kroll's appointment Yugoslavia had long broken up with the Moscow-led Communist camp and was pursuing its own Socialist path under Marshal Tito, the ambassadorial position there had Kroll provided with insights into the Communist world in general.
53. Kroll, *Botschafter*, 138.
54. Ibid., 125.
55. Abelein, *Kulturpolitik*, 163.
56. For example, see: OAG Board Meeting, March 13, 1955; Political Archive of the Foreign Ministry (Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes), [hereafter cited as PAAA] AV Neues Amt/7255.

57. Ibid., Foreign Ministry to Embassy Tokyo, Telegram, November 19, 1955.
58. Ibid., Kroll to Foreign Ministry, February 10, 1955.
59. Ibid. see the notice by the German Embassy Tokyo, October 7, 1955.
60. Kroll, *Botschafter*, 125.
61. See Marion Knapp, *Österreichische Kulturpolitik und das Bild der Kulturnation. Kontinuität und Diskontinuität in der Kulturpolitik des Bundes seit 1945* (Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang, 2005).
62. Kroll, *Botschafter*, 127 and 164.
63. Ibid., 158–159. See for the German and Japanese versions of the 1957 treaty, *Bundesgesetzblatt* 1957, part II, 1462–1466.
64. Walter Schmiele, "Unsere Buchausstellung in Japan," in *Börsenblatt für den Deutschen Buchhandel*, November 5, 1957, 1370–1373. The German Book Fair was held from September 17 to 29, 1957 in Tokyo and, subsequently, moved to Sapporo, Sendai, Osaka, Fukuoka, and Nagoya.
65. Kroll, *Botschafter*, 173–174; Abelein, *Kulturpolitik,* 149. See also: http://www.karajan.co.uk/asia.htmlhttp (accessed July 9, 2014). Karajan already made his first visit to Japan in 1954, when he had been invited as a guest conductor of the NHK Symphony Orchestra. See for Karajan's concert and program schedules in Japan: http//www.karajan.info/concolor/2008/LiveinJapan1English.html (accessed September 7, 2014).
66. See Manfred Pohl, "Deutsch-japanische Beziehungen—von wohlwollender Nichtbeachtung zum intensiven Dialog?" in *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik. Vol. 3: Interessen und Strategien*, ed. Karl Kaiser and Joachim Krause (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996) 155–166, here: 156.
67. See the list of official Japanese visitors to Germany provided by the Japanese Embassy Berlin: "Japanische Besucher in Deutschland von 1953 bis heute"; http://www.japan.diplo.de/contentblob/3629698/daten/.../BesucheJinD.pdf (accessed August 2, 2014).
68. For example, see the weeklies *Der Spiegel*, March 27, 1953, and *Die Zeit*, August 6, 1953.
69. Simone Derix, *Bebilderte Politik. Staatsbesuche in der Bundesrepublik 1949–1990* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 192–193; see also ibid, 61–62.
70. *The Yoshida Papers. The Story of Japan in Crisis*, translated by K. Yoshida (London: Heinemann, 1961), 109.
71. Ibid., 111.
72. Kroll, *Botschafter*, 140.
73. See Spang, Wippich, Saaler, *Geschichte der OAG.*
74. Holger Löttel, "Konrad Adenauers Japanbesuch 1960," in *Ferne Gefährten. 150 Jahre deutsch-japanische Beziehungen*, ed. Curt-Engelhorn-Stiftung für die Reiss-Engelhorn-Museen and Verband der Deutsch-Japanischen Gesellschaften (Mannheim: Schnell und Steiner, 2011), 266–267.

75. Glaubitz, "Die Deutschen," 325; Grewe, "Japan und Deutschland," 640.
76. Rudolf Morsey, *Heinrich Lübke. Eine politische Biographie* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1996), 318, 617.
77. Derix, *Staatsbesuche*, 177, 192–195, 351.
78. See Schmidtpott, "Wirtschaftsbeziehungen," 44.

12

Peace, Business, and Classical Culture

The Relationship between the German Democratic Republic and Japan*

Volker Stanzel

When Hans Modrow, formerly Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), watched the celebration of the unification of East and West Germany on October 3, 1990, he did so in Tokyo, together with the Prime Minister of Japan, Kaifu Toshiki.[1] That day, a relationship that had been characterized by the Cold War conflict, had been a factor of the overall political, economic, and cultural objectives pursued by the GDR and Japan, and had become part of the history of German–Japan relations, came to an end. It had had its own character, yet Kaifu's invitation to Modrow sheds a light on where the relationship was most distinct—that is, unexpectedly, the realm of culture.

Politics

After the GDR was founded in 1949 and Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952, both countries were still trying to get back on their feet and thus had more important partners. It was the Cold War, and they stood on opposite sides of the conflict. During the 40 years that the relationship lasted, neither country moved out of the confinements of the blocs to which they belonged. Until the Wall was built in Berlin in 1961, a close relationship to the USSR and to a common Communist ideology was essential for East Germany's survival, and afterwards, the Soviet Union

still controlled most of East Germany's foreign affairs. Beyond that, the priority of East German foreign policy for two decades was to break out of its international isolation. At that time, the Federal Republic of Germany" (FRG), denied the existence of a "German Democratic Republic, insisting it was still the "Soviet Occupied Zone" of the former Third Reich. Formed by the other three occupation zones—the United States, Great Britain and France—and founded in 1949 with a government based on free elections, the Federal Republic claimed to be the sole legitimate representative "Germany" until free elections were possible in the East. From 1955 until 1969, following its so-called Hallstein Doctrine, the Federal Republic threatened to break off diplomatic relations to any country (with the exception of the Soviet Union) that established diplomatic relations to the GDR.[2]

During the 1950s and 1960s, East German propaganda painted an extremely negative picture of capitalist Japan. Conversely, influenced by Japanese Marxists, GDR analysis warned of a newly militarist Japan, one of "three rival centers of Imperialism," where "ambitions of militarist and certain monopolist circles play a distinct military-political role in the regional framework of the Far East,"[3] serving "the aggressive goals of U.S. imperialism,"[4] even to the point of "considering nuclear armament."[5] East Germany supported the Japanese Communists' and Socialists' demands to terminate the American-Japanese Security Alliance, and asserted that Japan and West Germany were close only because the latter wanted to "become a political world power."[6] While East German dailies such as the official paper of the ruling *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (Socialist Unity Party of Germany, SED), *Neues Deutschland*, regularly reported on positive Japanese views of the GDR's economy and East German success in the field of sports, the foreign policy magazine *Deutsche Außenpolitik* focused more on analyzing the "economic imperialism" of Japan and its role as an instrument of US imperialism.

At that time, in Japan, only the Marxists had any political interest in East Germany. The government was circumspect in its relationship with the GDR as it tried to avoid friction with West Germany. This circumspection was due not only to political ties but also to the sizable financial support provided by the Federal Republic through the 1960s in order to help alleviate Japan's lack of foreign reserves. This turned "West Germany's policy of nonrecognition into one of the most important aspects in the relationship of the GDR to Japan."[7] However, a Japanese ambassadorial conference in 1966 produced the idea to send an "undercover" diplomat to the GDR via the trade fair in Leipzig: Kimura Keizō, Political Counselor at the Japanese embassy in Warsaw, who was charged with observing East German politics and was able to speak German. Following a report in the *Tokyo Shinbun*, which was picked up by the German paper *Frankfurter*

Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), the West German embassy in Tokyo inquired about this matter at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was told that Kimura's "wish had already been refused."[8] That Tokyo consulted the Bonn government in such matters before the fact and did not pursue its plans any further if West Germany objected, was assumed by the GDR to be the general rule. Articulating the hints of their Japanese interlocutors, the East German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MfAA) noted on January 20, 1969, "The West German embassy has a strong influence on Japanese government agencies and thwarts [. . .] the issuance of visas to GDR citizens, and intervenes strongly to impede the normalization of [Japan's] relations with the GDR."[9] At the same time, the exasperation of West German diplomats is conspicuous in official communication over the decades between the two states, because whenever Japan saw promising opportunities appearing, it invariably tended to become more flexible toward the GDR.[10]

Early on, in 1960, a major point of contention for the Japanese government was what kind of IDs East Germans would need if they wanted to travel to Japan. At that time, the Japanese government tried to avoid a conflict with its powerful socialist opposition party by allowing East Germans into Japan, in exchange for the opposition not pushing its demand to recognize the GDR diplomatically.[11] Later, the GDR made an effort during negotiations in 1981 for a Trade and Shipping Agreement to convince Japan to consider GDR citizens as GDR nationals only. This was refused by Japan, and a confidential exchange of letters between Japan and the Federal Republic subsequently validated the provision of the West German Constitution, Article 116, that the "Germans" who West German diplomats were responsible for were all Germans living within the 1937 borders of the German Reich. This was relevant in the case of East German refugees to the West.[12] While there were slight shifts in Japan's handling of the political differences between East and West Germany, its basic position took Federal Germany's concerns into account as much as its own interests permitted. Still, both the East and West German embassies' attention—as well as that of their respective secret services—was focused continuously on the presumed "successes" that the "other" German state might achieve in Japan.

Until 1971, East Germany's political contacts in Japan were confined mainly to the Japanese Communist Party (JPC) and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). The former was never a party with much political strength, frequently changing its affiliation between Moscow, Beijing, and reformist "Euro-Communists,"[13] while the JSP evolved into the major organization of the Japanese Left over the postwar era. With its programmatic mix of social-democratic and Marxist-Leninist thought (until it abolished its ideological platform in 1986), the JSP was more consistent and

much closer to East Berlin. Similarly, the major Japanese trade unions close to the JSP maintained their own contacts with the *Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund* (East German Trade Union Federation, FDGB). If East German condemnation of the Japanese political system was tempered somewhat by the assumption that Japan tended to be more critical of the United States than was West Germany—due to its having suffered from the American atomic bombs—this misconception can be traced back to the GDR's contacts in the JSP.[14]

During the first two postwar decades, the shared perceived threat of Communism was strong enough to bring Japan and West Germany together, which impacted Japan's relationship to the GDR.[15] Given the reluctance of the Japanese government to allow too much interaction between officials from the GDR and the JSP, some contact was facilitated through the huge East German embassy in North Korea. In 1962, the GDR's ambassador to Pyongyang invited JSP representatives in the Japanese National Diet to visit East Germany. On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the establishment of the German Democratic Republic in October 1969, a JSP delegation was received by the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the SED. Beginning in the 1960s, the German Peace Council, a sub-organization of the World Peace Council founded and directed by the Soviet Union, established contacts to pacifist groups around the world and in Japan—mainly with the Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons (*Gensuikyō*)—in search of support for its proposal of a peace treaty between the two German states and the demilitarization of Western Europe. The Japanese partners of the German Peace Council in 1963 supported the GDR's proposal to develop a "German Federation" as a step toward "peaceful coexistence" in Europe. These movements lost strength in Japan over the course of the 1960s, when leftist sentiments were reoriented toward the contemporary Western student movement. Contacts were established between the West German leftist student organization SDS and its Japanese counterpart *Zengakuren* (the SDS even established a German language school in Tokyo where the texts of Marcuse and Bloch were taught).[16] These groups were not interested, however, in contacts to the GDR.

Though Japan denied entry visas to high-ranking members of the SED, the exchange of parliamentary representatives allowed for some important mutual acquaintances. Both the Japanese and the East Germans began to deal more flexibly with each other around 1960, but the major breakthrough occurred later. The new West German "*Ostpolitik*," begun in the late 1960s under the then Social Democratic German Foreign Minister (1966–1969)—and later Chancellor (1969–1974)—Willy Brandt, also changed the parameters of political interaction between Japan and the GDR. However, economics played a role as well; for the GDR, intensifying

economic exchange held the promise of access to Western technology not available from NATO countries. For Japan, the GDR, as the most industrially advanced East bloc country, seemed to offer the most practical entry to East European markets. It was mainly economic interests, therefore, that directed considerable political energy toward creating a more active relationship.

The crucial year, when well-established informal contacts between parliamentary members such as Hans Modrow,[17] Nabeshima Naotsugu, and Kosaka Zentarō paid off, turned out to be 1972. In January, a trade delegation headed by Secretary of State Gerhard Beil—who was to be involved for many years in cultivating the Japanese-East German relationship[18]—visited Japan. From April to June, the first large East German art exhibition was held in Japan. Also in April, a delegation of members of the Central Committee of the SED, headed by Modrow, received visas upon the invitation of the JSP and, after being extensively briefed and instructed by the Soviet embassy's Japan experts in Tokyo, held talks with all political parties, as well as the foreign affairs committees in both houses of the Japanese National Diet. In that same year, a Parliamentary Friendship Committee GDR–Japan, composed of 20 members, was established in East Berlin with Modrow serving as its chairman. Both countries envisioned establishing diplomatic relations soon thereafter, and negotiations to that effect took place through their embassies in Moscow as well as on the margins of the Olympic Winter Games in 1972 in Sapporo. However, Japan insisted that the Basic Treaty between the GDR and the Federal Republic needed to be signed before diplomatic relations were possible. On May 11, 1973, the German Federal Parliament in Bonn agreed to the Basic Treaty, and so, on May 15, Japan and the German Democratic Republic established diplomatic relations; Japan declared, as a gesture to West Germany, that it continued to support the objective of German reunification.[19] The exchange of ambassadors was postponed until both German countries had become members of the United Nations, which happened on September 18, 1973. On April 22, 1974, Horst Brie—an experienced diplomat who had previously worked in China and North Korea—became the first East German ambassador to Japan.[20] His Japanese counterpart Tani Moriki—a diplomat with a profile as a critic of Communism[21]—handed his Letters of Credence to Willi Stoph, the East German head of state, on May 17, 1974. Japan moved quickly to establish its embassy in East Berlin as a center for pursuing its economic objectives in the less-industrialized states of Eastern Europe. The GDR only sent a few actual diplomats to Tokyo, but a number of intelligence officers were charged with collecting political, economic, and technological knowledge. In the MfAA, the North America Department, not the Asia Department, was made responsible for relations to Japan.

However, a true political dialog between the East German and Japanese governments never came to fruition, even after establishing formal relations. The relationship increasingly stalled in the late 1970s, when the Cold War heated up, after the Soviet Union deployed SS-20 missiles to Eastern Europe (which, Japan feared, might also eventually be deployed to East Asia) and invaded Afghanistan, which was followed by a Western boycott of the Moscow Olympics in 1980. Some hope was attached to visible high-level engagement. Both countries therefore began to consider an exchange of prominent visitors. SED General Secretary Erich Honecker's autobiography was published in Japan, and at the industrial Spring Fair at Leipzig, where he pointedly visited Japanese exhibitions and received Japanese journalists,[22] he made the statement, later much quoted by GDR representatives, that "All conditions for further improving the economic and other relations between both countries are in place."[23]

Honecker was finally invited by the Japanese government for a state visit in May 1981. Having so far only visited, aside from the Eastern bloc, neutral Austria, this was Honecker's first official visit to a Western bloc country. To be invited to the country with the oldest monarchy in the world also carried great value in terms of prestige. The Emperor and the Crown Prince both welcomed Honecker. Modrow later wrote that the visit to "a major imperialist country" would "form a barrier against the influence of aggressive imperialist confrontational policy."[24] Japanese business' interest in improving trade and investment relations with East Germany led to an initiative by the chairman of the Japan-GDR Economic Committee, Nippon Steel president, and deputy president of the Japanese Federation of Industry (*Keidanren*) Saitō Eijirō, to have Nippon University bestow an honorary doctorate on Honecker during his visit. In Tokyo, the long-negotiated Trade and Shipping Agreement was signed. No agreement on political matters was concluded, due to Japanese hesitation in respect to the present "complicated international situation."[25] In a press conference, Honecker compared the Berlin Wall to the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem, and emphasized that because of the unique position of West Berlin, it needed to have a status separate from that of the Federal Republic of Germany. Honecker visited Osaka (where Saitō guided him personally through the Nippon Steel plant), Kyoto, and Nagasaki, where he dedicated a "*Stele der Völkerfreundschaft*" (Stele of People's Friendship), which still stands today.

Political problems, however, continued between the GDR and Japan. When Foreign Minister Abe Shintarō visited East Germany in June 1985, overall relations between East and West were impaired by tension surrounding the American SDI project. With the new Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Michael S. Gorbachev, however, improvements seemed possible. The governing Liberal Democratic

Party (LDP) in Tokyo took the initiative. The LDP invited Modrow, who the Japanese seem to have regarded as their channel to the upper ranks in East Berlin; to his surprise, he was invited to a meeting with Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō.[26] Then, in January 1987, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro decided to explore the possibility of improving East-West relations in general, but also in regard to the remaining territorial disputes between the USSR and Japan. Nakasone therefore initiated an exchange of Japanese think tank members with representatives from the East German Academy of Social Sciences concerning Gorbachev's new policies. Nakasone visited several countries before continuing to the Soviet Union. On January 12, he arrived in East Berlin.[27] However, given the stagnation in economic relations and uncertainty about the new direction in Moscow, little initiative existed on either side to reshape the relationship; Honecker left the task of reading his prepared speaking notes to his interpreter, foregoing any discussion.[28] In his speech at the state banquet, Honecker at least expressed support for Gorbachev's new disarmament concept and for his proposal for an "Asian CSCE." Nakasone, on the other hand, emphasized that his country belonged to a group of states sharing the values of democracy; he also demanded that human rights be respected. During the following two years following, the winds of change swept across the entire Communist bloc. Again, as in the 1950s, both countries had more immediate concerns than their bilateral relationship; for Japan, it was the increase in economic opportunities offered by the rise of China; for the GDR, it was the question of the regime's survival. The Japan-GDR relationship ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and German reunification in 1990. Kimura Keizō, the last Japanese ambassador to East Berlin, became the first ambassador to newly united Germany.

Economics

The real engine of the relationship between the GDR and Japan was economic.[29] In the first phase, the GDR tried to use trade relations as a way to establish official contacts and thus increase its own legitimacy on the international stage. However, since "the FRG in trade matters is Japan's springboard to enter the EEC area,"[30] East Berlin was in no position to compete with Bonn in this respect. Between 1953 and 1971, trade relations were minimal; there was just one Japanese trading company represented in East Berlin (C. Itoh) and Japan had a trade balance deficit, due mainly to sizable Kali imports from East Germany.[31] Beginning in 1960, when Japanese companies started regularly attending the Leipzig Fair, trade between the states gradually increased. Conservative Japanese politicians, prodded by Japanese industry, pushed to accelerate the

relationship. LDP members of the Diet initiated meetings between representatives of the GDR trade organization and officials of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, as well as the Japanese Minister of International Trade. Despite this, in 1965, Japan refused, following requests from Bonn, to permit the opening of a GDR trade office in Tokyo. In retaliation, the GDR canceled a contract worth almost US$12 million, immediately before it was due to be signed, for a Mitsubishi textile factory, because of Japan's "unfriendly position."[32] Japan finally agreed to issue permanent residence permits to two representatives of the East German Chamber for External Trade in 1968. The Japanese position softened only with West Germany's *Ostpolitik*, and when—due to slowing economic growth at home and protective measures against Japanese imports in the United States—Tokyo wanted to expand its political and economic relations to Eastern Europe. In 1969, only 202 Japanese visited the GDR; by 1971, that figure had climbed to 1227 (without a comparable change on the East German side), and 150 Japanese companies participated at the Leipzig fair. Western countries had decided, for reasons of military security, to embargo the trade of certain militarily sensitive products to countries that were members of the Soviet-led economic cooperation agreement "Comecon" through a "CoCom" ("Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls") list. However, Japan was looking for ways to gain business opportunities in Comecon countries—even if not completely in line with CoCom provisions—and for this purpose, the GDR seemed well positioned.

The first petrol crisis in 1973/1974 with the subsequent global recession and changing terms of trade put pressure on Japan—which depended on energy imports by 90 percent—to increase its exports. GDR experts realized that "the state monopolist system of Japan increasingly had difficulties assuring its competitiveness."[33] Because Western countries also suffered from the recession, the USSR, Eastern Europe, and, later, China, became more important trading partners. The areas that stood to benefit the most from trade with the GDR were the chemical industry, machinery, shipbuilding, and electronics; the GDR specifically hoped for access to modern microelectronic technologies. It was the president of the largest Japanese chemical company Shōwa Denko, Anzai Masao—and after Anzai's death, the Chairman of the Japan GDR Economic Committee, Inayama Yoshihiro—who exerted influence on the Japanese government to improve conditions for expanding trade with the GDR and Eastern European countries. Anzai, according to an observation out of the West German embassy, was a "most active promoter of GDR interests in Japan."[34] The magazine of the Japanese Federation of Industry (*Keidanren*) had already reported in 1968, that "the East German industrial potential is greater than we thought, . . . a reunification of Germany

is hardly possible,…[so] we should accommodate East Germany's interests."[35] The International Trade Center, the Grand Hotel in East Berlin, the Hotel Merkur in Leipzig and the Hotel Bellevue in Dresden, all built by Japanese construction companies, thus became prestigious landmarks of the improving Japan-GDR relationship.

There were some successes during the 1980s, especially as an increasingly powerful Japan began fearing the weakening of its "eurosclerotic" partners in Western Europe.[36] In 1979, the exchange of technical licenses tripled. An agreement was reached that allowed Mazda to export 10,000 cars to the GDR. For the period 1980–1985, the GDR agreed to a trade exchange with Mitsui of US$100 million per year on the basis of mutual compensation; Mitsui provided metal and chemical products to the GDR, while the GDR sent machine tools and equipment to Mitsui plants in various countries. Because of the dearth of foreign reserves in the GDR, this "counter-trade" (barter) model proved to be a useful innovation. The low value of the East German Mark on international markets, however, remained a problem, and although the East German Minister of Economics, Günter Mittag, wished to increase "counter trade," it proved a cumbersome task for Japanese companies to arrange for East German sales elsewhere in the world with equivalent value. As the East German foreign ministry stated frankly, "A significant expansion of direct exports from the GDR to Japan is out of the question due to the high technological and commercial requirements of the Japanese market."[37] In the end, trade interests achieved politically much more for the GDR than its contacts to the Japanese opposition parties—yet despite some improvements and good will on both sides, trade, up to the end, was minimally important for both sides. Although Japan became the GDR's most important economic partner in East Asia during the 1970s, and the GDR was Japan's major trading partner in Eastern Europe, bilateral trade with Japan between 1970 and 1980 only contributed between 0.18 to 1.22 percent to the GDR's foreign trade, imports from the GDR to Japan figured between 0.06 and 0.14 percent of Japanese imports, and Japanese exports to the GDR reached 0.1 to 0.27 percent of Japanese exports between 1970 and 1980.[38]

Culture

With the dim picture presented by its political relations to Japan, and its economic plans ambitious but ultimately unrealized, there was one area where East Germany had some advantage over the Federal Republic. This was culture, and the GDR owed the Japanese recognition of its hidden value vis-à-vis its West German competitor to its ambassador in Tokyo of eight years (1974–1982), Horst Brie.[39]

The German towns and cities best known in Japan for classical German culture were located mainly in East Germany: Dresden, Leipzig, and Weimar.[40] Additionally, many of the Japanese academics who had studied in Germany prior to the war, and who had developed an attachment to Germany, had done so at universities located in what was now East Germany. Because the GDR thus represented the heir to so much of traditional German culture, it generated interest among Japanese intellectuals; in addition, the GDR's prowess in sports impressed a sizable audience in Japan. Katō Masahide wrote that not only had the GDR experienced its "own economic miracle," but it also "is much more 'German' than West Germany, and its citizens have kept more of the traditional character of the German for better or worse."[41] As the West German embassy put it, "the GDR's positive image in public opinion rests mainly on its accomplishments in culture and sports."[42] At the same time, the GDR had to fight its other image: that of a country that deprived its citizens of their freedom, had built the Berlin Wall, and murdered citizens trying to flee the country.[43] As polls frequently showed, there was little understanding in Japan that a country like Germany could be "divided." Christin Tewes concludes that in Japan, the GDR was perceived as "dark," a country defined by its lack of freedom and its party control, but, on the other hand, boasting social security, equality, good education, and friendliness.[44]

Without fully established diplomatic relations, it was difficult for the GDR to initiate any meaningful exchange that could influence public opinion in Japan. Only the Gewandhaus Orchestra (Leipzig) was allowed into Japan in 1961 and 1971. Among the Japanese, the impulse to visit the GDR was limited mostly to Marxist and leftist academics. Shimizu Makoto, a professor of economics, after visiting East Germany, wrote for *Neues Deutschland*, "The first socialist constitution is the most impressive result of two decades GDR; . . . for us Japanese it is encouraging."[45] And Saitō Eiko wrote, "The GDR has overcome capitalism. The people are free and equal. Japan can learn much."[46] Koreya Senda, who had visited Berlin in 1927 and studied New Leftist theater, had tried after his return to Japan to "make my experiences in German agitprop[47] useful for progressive theatre in Japan."

Beginning in 1962, "Friendship Committees GDR-Japan" in East Germany and "Friendship Committees Japan-GDR" in Japan were founded. They conducted various activities, such as the first "Days of Friendship between the Japanese People and the People of the GDR" in 1966, and made grants available to study at East German or Japanese universities.[48] The problem was that while such groups could be established in East Germany by the party or the government, culture was highly commercialized in Japan and public distrust of communist countries—Communism, after all, was the enemy threatening the West—was strong.

Exchange depended on private initiatives or those by leftist political organizations in Japan. The first friendship committee in Japan was founded by the Marxist professor of economics, Kambayashi Teijirō, and the first Friendship Committee GDR-Japan at Humboldt University in East Berlin was formed by Professor of *Japanologie* (Japanese Studies) Gerhard Mehnert.[49] Yet, by 1970, there were still only eight of these committees in Japan. They did try to influence reporting in Japanese media and sponsor publications, and they demanded that Japan recognize the GDR as a sovereign state, but their public influence was limited. Also, their cultural work only reached a small part of the Japanese public. A major success was achieved in 1967 when, after some rather unsubtle pressure by the West German embassy on the Japanese Society for German Study to forego an exhibition organized with help from the GDR, some professors of German Studies (mainly from Waseda and Dōshisha universities) founded a "Friends of Weimar" association.[50]

A first taste of later success came as the establishment of diplomatic relations was in the offing. In May 1972, the GDR presented an extremely popular exhibit "German Art from Dürer's Age," followed in 1973 by an exhibition of rare pieces from the Berlin Pergamon Museum. Ambassador Brie's cultural work subsequently aimed at larger audiences, and at initiating more substantial cooperative projects between universities. In East Germany, Japanese Studies gained a significant academic standing through the work of japanologists like Jürgen Berndt (also the founder and first curator of the Mori Ōgai Memorial in East Berlin). Contacts between sports organizations, first established after the Munich Olympics by Nabeshima Naotsugu, flourished; East German judo competitors especially benefited from work with Japanese trainers.

Brie received strong support from the long-time chief editor of the largest—and conservative—Japanese economic daily, the *Nihon Keizai Shinbun*, Enjōchi Jirō, later its chairman. Enjōchi was enthusiastic about European culture and had no ideological compunctions, having also sponsored Soviet exhibitions in Japan. As early as 1966, he had contacted the East German Ministry of Culture through the League for People's Friendship and succeeded in sponsoring an outstanding exhibition in Japan of works by Rembrandt from Dresden. He later helped Brie in bringing orchestras like the Gewandhaus Orchestra and the Thomanerchor (both from Leipzig) to Japan, as well as—among other artists and groups—the Dresden Staatskapelle, Theo Adam, and Peter Schreier. In 1974, Brie initiated the "GDR Music Days in Japan," in 1976 the GDR staged an exhibit of "Deutsche Realisten" (German Realists), the German State Opera (East Berlin) visited in 1977 and 1978, and, when Honecker visited Japan, the embassy hosted "Culture Days of the GDR," with performances by the State Opera and other orchestras from

Berlin. Again, with Enjōji's support, Japanese entertainers and artists traveled to East Germany, and Bunraku and Noh were performed there. In 1983 and 1984, the Japan-GDR Friendship Society again organized "GDR Days." In addition, science was presented in an exhibition of "175 Years Humboldt University Berlin."

If there was anything that allowed the Japanese public to form a positive image of East Germany, this was it. Still, the exchange of academics and scientists was mainly limited to students of music and German language that had received scholarships to study in the GDR, or that had an interest in classical literature or Bertolt Brecht.[51] The first successful attempt to promote the concept of sister cities was an agreement reached between the two traditional porcelain producing towns of Arita and Meissen in 1979, following the success of a large exhibition of Meissen porcelain in Arita (named "The Daughter's Return to Her Parental Home"); Arita made Honecker its honorary citizen during his visit in 1981. Youth exchange programs remained relatively limited in scope, but the two states agreed on an exchange program begun in November 1987 with a trip of 50 young people, who were personally welcomed by the prime minister, from the GDR to Tokyo. In March 1988, Honecker received, in turn, a group of Japanese students in East Berlin. Early in 1987, during Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to East Germany, the two countries finally concluded a Cultural Agreement. This, however, was never actually implemented, probably because of the Berlin Clause problem.[52]

Conclusion

In 1989, bilateral relations between Tokyo and East Berlin seemed set to continue at their modest level. Throughout the 40 years of the GDR's existence, Japan had adhered to Western positions toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The GDR, while trying not to provoke the Japanese government, was ideologically firmly linked to the USSR. Both the GDR and Japan were anchored in their respective political configurations and eyed each other with some distrust. Therefore, it is not surprising that both countries expended more energy on the economic dimension of their relationship than on the political. Here ambitions turned out to be more substantive than was practically achievable. The GDR was impeded by its lack of competitive products, Japan by CoCom rules, and both countries, by the GDR's lack of foreign reserves. German unification brought to an abrupt end whatever might have developed along these lines in the future.

If political and economic relations between East Germany and Japan were both more or less irrelevant, except in the short term, then what

existed within the longer perspective? Ironically, it was something that seems to run counter to the major political objective of East Germany, namely to prove itself as a country independent of West Germany. Through its successful cultural activities in Japan, it instead strengthened the perception of one homogenous German culture. It was mainly in the cultural realm that the GDR managed to somewhat counterbalance its image as a repressive Communist dictatorship; if there were obstacles to this work, they were very often financial in nature. Culture had been one of the most important elements of German-Japanese relations for over 100 years,[53] and the GDR both benefited from and—unconsciously—furthered this trend. For Japan, its relationship to the GDR within the cultural sphere thus represented a continuation of its traditional relationship to Germany—and the division of Germany had never seemed a reality in Japanese eyes anyway. This was the lasting achievement of East Germany and Japan in their dealings with each other over the four decades of the GDR's existence. If we look for the reason that the Japanese Prime Minister would invite his (former) East German counterpart, who had only just resigned from his job, and whose country had now disappeared, to watch the celebration of German unification on October 3, 1990 together with him, it may be found here. It is this cultural dimension that gives the relationship between the German Democratic Republic and Japan its final historical significance.

Notes

* There is not much academic literature on the subject of East German-Japanese relations. The author has therefore drawn on documents in the archives of the German Foreign Office (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, henceforth "PA AA") into which those files from the former East German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MfAA) not destroyed during the months before German unification in 1990 were incorporated; such resources are referred to as "MfAA paper," or "GDR embassy correspondence"; in the case of West German documents, as either "embassy report" or "AA paper." Translations are by the author. The author thanks for extensive briefings: the former Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic (i.e., prime minister), Hans Modrow (who agreed to a conversation in order to "contribute to a mature view" of the GDR-Japan relationship), the former minister of the Japanese Embassy in East Berlin, Noriaki Ōwada (who kindly also made his written notes available), former political counselor at the GDR embassy in Tokyo, Hermann E. Häber; former political counselor at the GDR embassy in Tokyo, Dr. Lutz Kleinert, for written comments; Ms. Grit Ose-Weth for her collection of reference titles on the GDR-Japan relationship. The views expressed by the author are his own.

1. Modrow had received an invitation by Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru early in the year while he was still prime minister of the GDR, but which then was made as a similar offer on a personal basis by Kaifu after he became Japanese prime minister in August 1989; Kaifu had been chairman of the Parliamentary Friendship Group Japan-Germany for many years. This was actually the official partner of the West German Parliamentary Friendship Group, but Kaifu, according to Ōwada's as well as Häber's recollection, took great pains to cultivate his relationship to both East and West Germany.
2. Christian Heideck, *Zwischen Ost-West-Handel und Opposition. Die Japan-Politik der DDR 1952–1973* (Munich: Iudicium, 2014) in an exceptionally insightful analysis covers the trade relationship of both countries under the conditions of the Hallstein Doctrine. See also Beate Neuss, "Die Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und Japan," in *Die Westpolitik der DDR zu ausgewählten westlichen Industriestaaten in den 70er und 80er Jahren,* ed. Peter R. Weilemann (Melle: Ernst-Knoth OHG, 1989), 265–316. For a brief review of events after 1973, see Peter Pantzer, "Japan und die DDR (1973–1989)," in *Ferne Gefährten. 150 Jahre deutsch-japanische Beziehungen,* ed. Curt-Engelhorn-Stiftung für die Reiss-Engelhorn-Museen and Verband der Deutsch-Japanischen Gesellschaften (Mannheim: Schnell und Steiner, 2011), 268–270.
3. Quotes from an internal paper written by the US Department (which included relations to Japan and Canada) in the MfAA on April 11, 1980: "About Japan's domestic and foreign policy" (PA AA Bestand MfAA ZR 1384/88).
4. Hans Modrow ("Head of an Authors' Collective"), *Die DDR und Japan* (Berlin: Dietz, 1983), 54.
5. See memo dated November 23, 1981 about a meeting with "Kitahara, foreign policy advisor to the Japanese government" (PA AA Bestand ZR 635/87).
6. Quoted from an internal MfAA paper of January 20, 1977: "Some recent problems in the political cooperation between the FRG and Japan." On the work of West Germany in Japan, it says, "The political and ideological implementation of this orientation is coordinated mainly by the Federal Government, the major parties of the FRG, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation as well as the FRG embassy in Tokyo" (PA AA Bestand MfAA C 4684).
7. Heideck, *Ost-West-Handel,* 23. In the harsh words of Kleinert, "It was no-one but the FRG, with its diplomats in Tokyo and its bureaucrats in the Foreign Office, who impeded tangibly the relations GDR-Japan, and who saw their task more in defaming the GDR than in developing their own relations to Japan."
8. See embassy report dated June 16, 1966 (PA AA AV Neues Amt, 6.773).
9. MfAA paper dated January 20, 1969 (PA AA Bestand MfAA ZR 634/87).

10. An embassy report dated September 8, 1969 (PA AA AV Neues Amt 7.116) quotes a Japanese diplomat emphasizing that the Federal Republic surely did not expect Japan to adopt a harder line toward East Germany than some of West Germany's NATO allies took.
11. Generally, Japan demanded formally from East German visitors that they refrain from "political activities" while in Japan. See embassy report 809 dated June 15, 1960, Pol 700–82 (PA AA AV Neues Amt, 6771).
12. See embassy report 467, dated April 29, 1981, Pol 322 JAN (PA AA AV Neues Amt, 6.792).
13. For an illustration of the tortured relationship of Communists from either country to the other, see Fukuzawa Hiromi, *Aspekte der Marx-Rezeption in Japan. Spätkapitalisierung und ihre sozioökonomischen Folgen, dargestellt am Beispiel der japanischen Gesellschaft* (Bochum: Brockmeyer, 1981), which hardly ever uses as reference East German authors but prefers Marxist authors from West Germany. Cf. Nakai Takeshi, *Mō hitotsu no Doitsu: aru shakaishugi taisei no bunseki* (Tokyo: Asahi, 1983).
14. The West German embassy observed early on that leftist parties, the trade unions, and the anti-nuclear movement coordinated their policies while the Japanese public in general seemed to tend toward communism (embassy report dated July 29, 1959, PA AA AV Neues Amt 6.884). Note also how East Germany's leader Walter Ulbricht, tried to play on these assumed coordinated leftist sentiments in Japan in a long interview with the Japanese daily *Asahi Shinbun* in 1966 (embassy report dated Sept. 25, 1966, PA AA AV Neues Amt 6.773)
15. Modrow quotes Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru: "West Germany and Japan are both border guards of the free world." See Hans Modrow, *In historischer Mission. Als deutscher Politiker unterwegs* (Berlin: edition ost, 2007), 137. Certainly, the impact of North Korea's nearly successful attempt to conquer South Korea in the context of a war happening next-door to Japan just a few years after World War II left a lasting impact on Japanese society and politics.
16. See embassy reports and newspaper clips of the 1970s in PA AA AV Neues Amt 6.773.
17. Modrow became a long-time member of the SED's Central Committee, in charge of propaganda and culture, and a member of the East German parliament where he headed the Committee on Culture. From 1973, he additionally held the influential position of First Secretary of the SED District Committee Dresden (which he used to promote Dresden's and Meissen's contacts to Japan).
18. See Gerhard Beil, *Außenhandel und Politik. Ein Minister erinnert sich* (Berlin: edition ost, 2010).
19. There still remained (as in other countries) the problem of nationality. Following Willy Brandt's dictum (not accepted by the GDR) that East and West Germany were two states and not foreign countries in their bilateral relationship, every East German citizen, even after the conclusion of the Basic Treaty, was still regarded as "German" by the West

German constitution, and handed a West German passport if he or she wished. This naturally impinged, in East German eyes, on East German sovereignty. It was a problem for Japan when East German citizens on Japanese soil wanted to flee the GDR. The legal problem thus had very tangible consequences in the realm of human rights as well as for the political relationship between the three states. Japan found a solution by accepting West Germany's position but insisting—as awkward as it was for West German diplomats—that each time an East German citizen on Japanese soil decided to flee to the Federal Republic, Japanese authorities had to meet with the person in order to ascertain that the decision not to return to the GDR was a voluntary one.

20. Horst Brie, *Erinnerungen eines linken Weltbürgers* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 2006).
21. Ōwada recounts that this was not unknown to the East German side, which took great care to closely keep a watch on Tani's movements in the GDR.
22. The Japanese daily *Asahi Shinbun* reported on May 12, 1981 that Honecker asserted that the standard of living in the GDR was higher than in the developed industrial countries in the West because the cost of living was lower and because there was no unemployment.
23. For example, quoted by the Chairman of the *Volkskammer* (East German parliament), Horst Sindermann, in his interviews and speeches during his visit to Japan April 1–6, 1980.
24. Modrow, *Die DDR und Japan,* 1983: 5/6.
25. GDR embassy correspondence dated March 10, 1982 about a meeting with the head of the Second East European Division of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on March 8, 1982 (PA AA Bestand MfAA ZR 506/83).
26. In 1987, Modrow, was awarded the Emperor's Order of the Sacred Treasure for his efforts in promoting East German-Japanese relations; he was the only East German politician honored in this way. See Modrow, *In historischer Mission,* 146.
27. A protocol detail—provided by Ōwada—illustrates how cautious Tokyo was not to act contrary to the legal position of the Western Allies and West Germany: Nakasone visited East Berlin, which from the Western viewpoint was not legally part of the GDR. As he obviously visited the GDR he needed to do so by stopping on its actual territory: the Zeuthen lake resort outside of East Berlin, to meet the press and the Japanese community in East Germany. Also see the West German embassy report dated January 23, 1987 (PA AV AA Neues Amt 17.611) on the result of the visit.
28. In Häber's words, "The energy of a decade ago had been exhausted."
29. The author here disputes Heideck's claim (Heideck, *Ost-West-Handel,* 19) that Japan wanted to turn its relationship to the GDR into the "object of a Japanese foreign policy aimed at independence." This notion may have been at times an assumption in East Berlin based on an

over-interpretation of JSP analyses of Japan's domestic political situation, coupled—as Häber explains—with misunderstandings of Japanese statements motivated mainly by courteousness. Japan, however, certainly was an intriguing example of a different kind of "capitalism" for East German observers; see Hans-Christian Herrmann, "Japan – ein kapitalistisches Vorbild für die DDR?" *Deutschland-Archiv. Zeitschrift für das vereinigte Deutschland* 39, no. 6 (2008): 1032–1042.

30. MfAA paper of Nov. 5, 1975: "Information on Japan-FRG relations", PA AA Bestand MfAA ZR 21/83.
31. See embassy reports from several years in PA AA AV Neues Amt 7.116.
32. See embassy memo, dated May 4, 1965 and Heideck, *Ost-West-Handel*, 173–179; an official trade office was permitted from 1971 on (PA AA AV Neues Amt, 7.116).
33. Modrow, *Die DDR und Japan*, 1983, 9.
34. Embassy report dated May 4 1972 (PA AA AV Neues Amt, 7.117).
35. Translated by the West German embassy in Tokyo from *Keidanren Geppō* of July 1968 (PA AA AV Neues Amt, 7.117).
36. See GDR embassy report dated November 23, 1981 (PA AA Bestand MfAA ZR 635/87).
37. From the MfAA paper "Short assessment of the domestic and foreign trade situation of Japan," dated July 4, 1980 (PA AA Bestand MfAA ZR C 4684).
38. Between 8 and 10 percent and between 2.7 and 4.5 percent respectively in the case of West Germany.
39. On the state of things in the cultural field, see Siegfried Kupper, *Die Tätigkeit der DDR in den nichtkommunistischen Ländern, VIII Japan* (Bonn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 1971), 33–35. While the official aspect to these relations in a system such as East Germany's is certainly the crucial one, even here was a civil element, playing a marginal but curious role for over thirty years: in 1966 the owner of the Thuringian restaurant "Waffenschmied" in the small town of Suhl, Rolf Anschütz, created a "Japanese" restaurant—complete with a facility for nude communal bathing—which was as a private enterprise, initially a nuisance to the state authorities, but later became a boon for the Japan-GDR relationship after the establishment of diplomatic relations, and was an immense success after it was "discovered" by Japanese living in the GDR, who provided it with authentic Japanese foodstuff, and booked it for years in advance. See the 2012 movie "Sushi in Suhl" and http://lotharanschuetz.de/6.html (accessed May 6, 2015).
40. More politically accentuated, Kleinert writes, "In Japan it was assumed that the historical point of departure for the German-Japanese relations was not to be found in Bonn, but in Berlin, the capital of Prussia."
41. See Masahide Kato, *Doitsu to Doitsujin* (Tokyo: Nihon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 1976), 156. Other books on the GDR, often published with East German support, include: Saimaru shuppan kaihen/Panorama

DDR, *Ittemitai Higashi-Doitsu* (Tokyo: Saimaru Shuppankai, 1983); Jin Takaiwa, *Higashi Doitsu. Erube-gawa no shakaishugi* (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō, 1988).

42. Attachment to embassy report dated August 12, 1987 (PA AA AV Neues Amt, 6.844). For how the GDR's success vexed West German diplomats despite their own overwhelming presence in Japanese cultural life, see Johannes Preisinger, *Deutschland und Japan. Die deutsch-japanischen Beziehungen in Gegenwart und Vergangenheit* (Tokyo: Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1986), 15–21.
43. See the analyses of West and East Germany's images in Japan in Josef Kreiner, "Neuorientierung im Westhandel der DDR?" in *Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik 30* (Bonn: Europa-Verlag, 1984), 91–92; "Hakenkreuz und Butterfly—Japanische Schüler sehen uns, Deutsche Schüler sehen Japan," Paul Schwarz ed. (Stuttgart: Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen, 1981), 18.
44. Christin Tewes, *Die Wahrnehmung der DDR in Japan. Darstellung der DDR-Gesellschaft in ausgewählten japanischen Augenzeugenberichten* (Munich: Akademische Verlagsgemeinschaft, 2012), 62. Also see Kupper, *Die Tätigkeit der DDR*, 8–9.
45. *Neues Deutschland*, May 11, 1969.
46. Eiko Saitō, *Sekai chizu kara kieta kuni: Higashi Doitsu e no rekuiemu* (Tokyo: Shinhyōron, 1991), 19.
47. During the October Revolution in Russia, the Communist Party had organized "agitation and propaganda" activities in order to spread Communist views more widely. One important element was "agitprop theater," intended to use theater plays for propaganda purposes. In a more sophisticated way, this notion was further developed by Bertold Brecht and other playwrights in the 1920s and 1930s.
48. On the institution of these Friendship Committees see in detail Modrow, *Die DDR und Japan,* 108–114; also Kupper, *Die Tätigkeit der DDR*, 14–16. For the surprised—and distrustful—West German reaction to the establishment of the first of these Friendship Committees, see *SPD-Pressedienst,* June 27, 1963, P/XVIII/119.
49. Modrow quotes Kambayashi as saying, "We want to show the true German Democratic Republic which after liberation from fascism walks ahead on the path of democracy and socialism." (Modrow, *Die DDR und Japan,* 71). Modrow buys into this sentiment, asserting in his 1983 book that there was an "East German miracle" (beside the well-known and talked about West German "*Wirtschaftswunder* (economic miracle)"), stressing the East German effort of reconstruction without the aid of the US Marshall Plan. Modrow, *Die DDR und Japan,* 12.
50. See, also on a number of other successful East German cultural initiatives, Heideck, *Ost-West-Handel,* 180–190.
51. An exception to the rule of commercial sponsoring was a Kabuki theater tour to East Germany, financed by the Japanese government, on the occasion of the celebration of the 750th anniversary of Berlin.

52. While the East German government—along with the Soviet Union—insisted that the occupation status of West Berlin meant that it could not be in any legal way part of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Bonn government's position, supported by its Western allies, was that as long as the three occupation powers in charge of West Berlin agreed, laws valid in the Federal Republic also included West Berlin. The Bonn government, as well as the Americans, British, and French insisted, on the other hand, that the occupation status also included East Berlin; the USSR concurred in principle, but still allowed the East German government to call East Berlin the "capital of the GDR." To avoid trying to resolve the underlying legal question—which was impossible in the short term—Bonn and its allies agreed that any international agreement between the Federal Republic and another country would have to include the so-called Berlin Clause, which asserted that the provisions of the agreement included West Berlin. East Germany, naturally, was opposed to this.
53. On this question, see Volker Stanzel, "Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Japan," in *Länderbericht Japan. Die Erarbeitung der Zukunft*, ed. Raimund Wördemann and Karin Yamaguchi (Bonn: bpb, 2014), 184–200.

13

Transnational Communicability

German-Japanese Literature by Yoko Tawada

Birgit Maier-Katkin and Lee M. Roberts

Yoko Tawada, a renowned writer in German and Japanese, offers insight into her impressions of both German and Japanese culture through an intriguing playfulness with language. By setting into motion cultural and lingual concepts in ways that expose new energies in and between the two languages, her work encourages the reader to think creatively and critically about transnational communicability. Through experimentation with orthography, word play, translation, and various ambiguities of language and culture, her texts invariably offer manifold perspectives on transnational issues.

Tawada´s texts—both in the original German and Japanese as well as in German translation—engage with ideas of otherness, strangeness, and transnationalism. They bring to light myriad perceptions of the German and Japanese cultures that are evoked by the limitations as well as the commonalities of different languages. The texts treated here include the Japanese stories "Etoki" (*Nur da wo du bist da ist nichts*, Only where you are there is nothing, 1987), "Jisho no Mura" (*Talisman*, Mascot, 1996), the German translations "Bilderrätsel ohne Bilder" (Picture-Riddles without Pictures) and "Das Wörterbuchdorf" ("The Dictionary Village"), the German and Japanese-language drama "Till" (1998), and the German-language story "Rothenburg ob der Tauber: Ein deutsches Rätsel" ("Rothenburg ob der Tauber: A German Riddle," in *Talisman*). All these texts suggest that through interaction with what is foreign, one can become aware of both the vagaries of one's own language-bound sense of self and the sphere of the other. Indeed, Tawada's contrasting and shifting linguistic renderings

of German and Japanese cultural experience ultimately draw attention to an "in-between" space in cross-cultural and global exchanges.

The Author's Story: A Japanese and German Background

Tawada's numerous publications span a range from essays, prose, and plays to poetry. Before analyzing any of her texts individually, it is worthwhile to consider her place within German migrant literature. Her life story affords insight both into how she came to write in Japanese and German and also the various intertextual references throughout her work.

Born in Tokyo in 1960, Tawada studied Russian literature at Waseda University. In 1979, she traveled via the Trans-Siberian Railway to East Berlin, then relocated to Western Europe, where she studied German literature in Hamburg and Zürich and received a doctorate in 1998. By this time, she had already published several works in German and Japanese, having debuted in Germany in 1987 with a collection of poetry and essays titled *Nur da wo du bist da ist nichts* (Only where you are there is nothing), which was published as a dual-language text in German and Japanese. In 1991, she published two books: *Sanninkankei* (Three-Way Relationship), a collection of stories and her first book publication in Japan, and *Wo Europa anfängt* (Where Europe Begins), her first book written entirely in German and published in Germany.

Tawada has received various prestigious awards in Germany and Japan that have earned her a special position as a writer across different cultures, and yet, within a discussion of transcultural literature, it is not easy to place her work in the category of migrant literature. The concept evolved over the second half of the twentieth century in Germany. There have, of course, been numerous reasons for people to come to Germany. One prime reason was that during the "economic miracle" in the 1960s, the German government entered into contractual agreements with Turkey and Southern European countries to recruit workers. Some guest workers—such as Franco Biondi, Carmine Chiellino, or Yüksel Pazarkaya—wrote about their work experiences and impressions as foreigners in Germany. The term "Gastarbeiterliteratur" (guest worker literature) was assigned to these works.[1] During the 1970s and 1980s, some of the guest workers' children, many of whom had been born and raised in Germany but had not gained citizenship, emerged as writers. A new "migrant literature" took shape that reflected themes of estrangement, social displacement, identity conflict, and the search for a place in German society.[2] Following the opening of the Berlin Wall and the influx from the East, the 1990s witnessed another development in literature by foreign nationals. Maxim Biller and Wladimir Kaminer, for example, introduced themes of coming to terms with the

Nazi past, but also confidently asserted their presence as writers within German literary production.

Among non-German writers in German, East Asians, and especially authors from Japan, constitute a small minority.[3] As compared to many authors of migrant or guest worker literature, Tawada presents her work to a more academically oriented audience that spans several continents. Strikingly, her work deals less with the migrant experience than with the question of what happens when different cultural concepts and ideas come into contact, and it incorporates various intellectual discourses that draw on an analysis of language and culture in ways suggestive of a transnationalist mindset. Much like scholarly essays, many of her fictional stories openly refer to the ideas of intellectuals such as Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida, and Mieke Bal, and thus link her work to a transcultural discourse across regional and national boundaries.[4]

Tawada's work also exhibits a focus on the spaces between cultures. Her characters are in motion, traveling between countries and opening themselves to different cultural concepts and languages. Through a process of transformation, her stories expose readers to different modes of being and thinking, revealing unique new structures of interaction with other cultures. According to Tawada's English translator Margaret Mitsutani, Tawada is interested "in the borders themselves—the spaces in between that are hidden by conventional bridges, including official channels of communication."[5] The scholar Hansjörg Bay points out that Tawada generates transculturalism in two ways. On the one hand, most of her literary figures transcend cultural borders and explore the new interpretive possibilities that arise from cross-cultural experience. On the other hand, Tawada successfully publishes different works in both her native and adopted languages.[6] In fact, her work poses an interesting challenge for her audience. As Christine Ivanovic has remarked, a characteristic feature of Tawada's readership is that it must accept the condition that it will not be able to access all of her writing, since it is in both German and Japanese.[7] For Tawada's reading majority—who reads her work either in German or in Japanese but less commonly in both languages—a multi-cultural approach entails a space where not all information and not all communication can be immediately understood or integrated into the familiarity of the reader's own background. Thus, the encounter with the other becomes like a game or a puzzle that requires time and an open mind.

Translation and Transnationalism: Japanese Originals and Their German Variants

The essay "Das Tor des Übersetzers oder Paul Celan liest Japanisch" (The Translator's Gate Or Paul Celan Reads Japanese, *Talisman*) introduces

the reader to a theme common throughout much of Tawada's work: the multiplicity of meaning involved in translation between German and Japanese. The narrator, who once experienced Celan's poems as especially meaningful in Japanese translation, is surprised to find them not easily interpretable in their native German and muses about the relationship between an original text and its translation. The chapter finishes with a passage from Walter Benjamin, which suggests the narrator's own ultimate conclusions, about how a translation offers insight into the original.[8] The narrator also remarks briefly, however, that there is a gap between languages into which all words fall,[9] suggesting that words used in one language to express ideas from another language might seem to represent a bridge between the two, but, in fact, they often fail to do so. There are few exact equivalents across languages, so translations make the differences between languages, the gap between them, only more apparent. It is this sort of gap that some of Tawada's publications in Germany emphasize with their various poems in Japanese or Japanese-language prose texts next to translations into German. The originals and their translations are not mirror images, but different texts that point to gaps between languages and introduce varying modes of transnational communicability, as we will see in this chapter.

Established translation theory offers a lens through which to view sensibly some of the many differences between Tawada's Japanese- and German-language texts. Antoine Berman's essay "Translation and the Trials of the Foreign," for instance, lists 12 deforming tendencies that occur through translation, 6 of which will be discussed here: rationalization and destruction of rhythms, clarification, expansion, ennoblement, and destruction of underlying networks of signification. For the sake of brevity, this essay groups the first five of these deforming tendencies together and treats them as related deviations from the source text. Rationalization and the destruction of rhythm describe an alteration in the order and flow of sentences and the new cadence that comes about through translation into the target language. Clarification is making explicit in the translation what is merely suggested in the original, and expansion is the addition of language without increasing the meaning of the text, while ennoblement attempts to make a work more elegant or easily "understandable." Finally, and most importantly for this section, destruction of underlying networks of signification is the elision of various meanings a reader might find interpretable in specific words that make up an implied subtext of the original work.[10]

Between the story "Jisho no mura" and its German translation "Das Wörterbuchdorf" we find many of the deforming tendencies that change the tone of the original, if perhaps not the plot. Looking just at changes to words—not to the storyline!—we find that the very first sentence-like phrase in Japanese appears rationalized in German (i.e., the word order

altered as necessary to be meaningful in German) as two phrases that destroy the rhythm of the original.[11] Consider this example:[12]

> Koyomi wo odorokisawagasu kyōkai no kane ga naru asa no goji ni.
>
> Morgens um fünf Uhr. Die Glocken der Kirche schrecken den Kalender auf.
>
> Five o'clock in the morning. The church bells startle the calendar.

The German translation is rationalized, beginning with the time expression (Morgens um fünf Uhr) that is at the end of the Japanese source text (asa no goji ni), and it also offers clarifications that are left open to interpretation in the original. A few lines down, the word "denn" (since) in the German text adds an element of causality not present in the Japanese original.[13] That is, a word like "since" by its very nature suggests a reason for something being the way it is, and thus adding it to a sentence that has no comparable word clarifies matters. Elsewhere, the German translation simultaneously clarifies and ennobles the original, rendering "yamu koto no nakatta akisame ni nurete" ("made wet by the fall rain that did not stop") as "im Herbstregen, der . . . unausweichlich zu fallen anfing" (rain that began to fall unavoidably).[14] Here, the German translation suggests a desire to evade the rain, whereas the Japanese original describes it simply as unceasing. In another case, the German word "Zeitgenossen" (contemporaries) ennobles the tone of the original Japanese "ningentachi" (human beings/people).[15] Sometimes, the German translation also ennobles by exaggerating the Japanese original, as when "kyodai na shitto" (colossal jealousy) is rendered as "sagenhafter Eifersucht" (legendary/fantastic jealousy).[16] This word choice may match the surreal quality of the story, but it embellishes by giving an adjective meaning "immeasurably large" an added fantastical quality.

The deforming tendencies of translation abound throughout Tawada's dual-language texts since her first publication in Germany *Nur da wo du bist da ist nichts* (1987). In this debut volume, for instance, the originally Japanese short story "Etoki" and its German translation "Bilderrätsel ohne Bilder" thematically cover a Japanese woman's nighttime trip by train to a German city to look for books that don't exist. However, it is the language of the text and its translation that are of interest here. As in the case discussed above, we find that the German translation is more suggestive than the Japanese original, thus expanding on and also ennobling it. In one instance, the verb *kasegeru* ("to be able to earn money") is altered in the German translation to *einen kleinen Vorteil ziehen* ("to draw a small advantage"),[17] which increases the number of words and yet still indicates financial gain but also suggests any kind of advantage, a sense not readily available in the Japanese verb. In another

similar case of ennoblement, a man gets onto the train with the narrator, takes out a book and peeks at it as if at "hito no himitsu" ("people's secrets"), but the German words for this passage are "das Geheimnis des Menschen" ("the secret of *the* person/the human being"). Within the context of this particular scene, the first of these two English interpretations would be virtually meaningless, and the second is far grander than the original Japanese phrase.[18] Contextually, there is simply no reason to believe that this man might be looking at the secret of what it means to be a human being. Perhaps related to the simultaneous appearance of expansion and ennoblement—at least as their opposites—the translation also sometimes elides nuances available in Japanese words. We find the phrase "hohoemi no yō na mono wo kaeshi wa suru ga" (I did indeed return something like a smile), for example, rendered as "Ich lächelte zwar zurück," (Although, I *did* smile back...).[19] This shorter German text conveys the impression that the act of smiling was little more than a gesture but it downplays the lack of authenticity about this smile, because it omits the idea rendered by the English words "something like," which is in the Japanese text.[20]

More significantly, we find in "Bilderrätsel" the destruction (in Berman's sense of the word) of underlying networks of signification revolving around a sort of speech impediment present in "Etoki," with the ultimate result that the German translation does not convey the very crux of the narrator's problem: Since she knows that words can have many interpretations, she has extreme difficulty with the very act of "speaking," a feature of the original story that creates subtle but highly meaningful narrative tension. The case in point revolves largely around the Japanese word *hanashi*, which in the original story appears in moments that are crucial for understanding the narrator's problem, and conveys extreme difficulty in making sense of varyingly interpretable language. This one Japanese word can be translated in a variety of ways, perhaps most often as "speaking/talking; a matter/topic (something about which someone has spoken); a story," but in each of the cases where *hanashi* appears, the German text uses a more specific word that fits the given context but limits the interpretability of the scene. Without an understanding of the broader array of meanings of this one word in Japanese, therefore, the German-reading audience must miss an element of the text that arguably comprises the core of the problem that Tawada's story in Japanese relates.

The breakdown between the original and the translation begins early in the story, when the narrator recalls her grandmother's concern about her taking a train alone at night. The grandmother asks her "What will you do, if some man you do not know does something like speak to you?"[21] On the one hand, the grandmother's words suggest that unknown men might be dangerous. On the other hand, her language leaves her warning

up to interpretation. In the narrator's mind, the grandmother's comments signify the narrator's own discomfort with using and interpreting language of any sort, especially the language of someone she does not know. This language phobia becomes most noticeable when she recalls her grandmother's words and refers to the matter under consideration as the "hanashi":

> "Shiranai otoko no hito ni koe de mo kakeraretara, dō suru no?" to iu sobo no shinpai wo watashi wa sono toki wa waratta ga, "dō" shitara yoi no darō. Tatoe sore ga otoko no hito de naku onna no hito da to shite mo, sore de hanashi ga kantan ni naru to wa omoenai.
>
> Aber wenn man von einem Menschen angesprochen wird, der einem wirklich "unbekannt" ist, dessen Hintergrund und Kontext man nicht kennt, dann ist die Sache nicht so einfach, zumal wenn es sich darüberhinaus um eine Frau und nicht um einen Mann handelt.[22]
>
> "What will you do, if some man you do not know does something like speak to you?" At the time, I laughed at my grandma's concern, but what would I do? For instance, even if it were not a man but a woman, it is unlikely that the matter/talking would thereby get any easier. (Note: Approximate translation of the Japanese original)

In this context, *hanashi* could mean "the matter/topic," as the German translation shows (die Sache), but it could also be "speaking/talking." Thus, the Japanese narrator's words suggest that she may have trouble speaking. In fact, the ambiguity of this Japanese word allows the reader of Japanese to feel the complexity of interpreting other people's words. The German translation merely demonstrates the truth of the complexity of interpreting others' words accurately. A reader of the German translation might recall that the grandmother's words were ambiguous, but ambiguity is not emphasized in the German text, because there is no word like *hanashi* in German that can convey this particular interpretive tension.

The narrator's constant malaise with language appears multiple times, and thus is a defining feature of the story; but it consistently disappears in the German translation. In another scene, the narrator tries to avoid conversation on the train by looking out the window as if there were something there that had drawn her attention and describes it as an attempt to divert attention from the "hanashi." The German text renders the word here as "Gespräch" (conversation). While this German word is a possible choice, perhaps even the best choice in this context, it sets an interpretive limit not present in the Japanese original. As in the previous example, the word *hanashi* does not have to be understood as the narrator's problem with this one conversation, or even with conversation in general, but more broadly as with the very act of "speaking."[23]

Finally, "hanashi" appears again in the title of a book the narrator finds, which is written out in hiragana (a phonetic syllabary for native Japanese words) as "Mushi no hanashi."[24] Since this title is in purely phonetic script, rather than in the Chinese characters (*kanji*) that also convey specific meanings, the exact meaning of the title is left open to interpretation. The book contains pictures of leaves that one can fold back to uncover pictures of various bugs, but this content does not force one specific interpretation of the meaning of the book's title. The German translation of this book's title conveys both more and also less meaning with the simple word "Käfer" (beetle/beetles).[25] In fact, *mushi* could have a broad range of meanings, from "insect" to such things as "selfless/impartial," "disregard," and even "steaming (of vegetables)/hot and humid." Each of these possibilities is written with a different Chinese character but all are pronounced "mushi." They become more meaningful, however, when placed next to the range of possible interpretations of *hanashi*. When not written in specific Chinese characters, this word could indicate any of the possible words with this pronunciation, which include "talk/speech/speaking/matter/news/rumor," as mentioned earlier, but also "separation/setting (something) apart (from something else)" and "freeing/loosening (of something)." Within the context of this story, even some of the seemingly odd combinations of *mushi* and *hanashi* make sense. "Selfless disregard" or "selfless freeing" are cases in point, since this narrator shows considerable anxiety about expressing herself. The book's pictures of nature suggest that it is about bugs, but we might also see it as something meant for the sort of contemplation that enables the reader to leave the self behind.

Turning our attention now to Tawada's drama "Till," we encounter the untranslatable qualities of language and culture. Tawada wrote "Till" (1998) partially in German and partially in Japanese and published it in Germany with an appended German translation of its Japanese-language sections. In fact, the German and Japanese sections of the original were meant to stand as they are without any translation. For readers who know either only German or only Japanese, "Till" is comparable to two half-plays. The Japanese part of the text occasionally offers information about what takes place in the German section, but the reader who knows only Japanese must figure out what is going on entirely from the point of view of the Japanese-language sections, while the German reader may consult the translation at the end of the work.[26] As one might expect, the German translation exhibits deforming tendencies like those discussed above, but what we will treat here is how "Till" communicates something that the previous texts do not. It stages not merely the ambiguity of language, but also the multiple ambiguities of languages, especially when certain words or idiomatic expressions have no clear counterparts in other languages.[27] Interestingly,

this drama also showcases what one gains even from ultimately inaccurate interactions with another culture.[28]

"Till" presents twentieth-century Japanese tourists in a medieval German city who meet Till Eulenspiegel, a well-known fictional character from the German Middle Ages, but the play has little to do with anything specifically medieval, other than in depicting this character. It is worth noting that Till meshes well with what we have discussed thus far as common to Tawada's work. One of his defining characteristics is his habit of playing with words. Typically, Till's word-games result in some sort of minor setback for the people who engage with him. Thus, Till's often wild—albeit always plausible—interpretations of language make him the ideal medium for the sort of statement about the unreliability of language that Tawada's fiction so often makes. Unlike the narrator in "Etoki"/"Bilderrätsel" but in keeping with the German character of the same name, Tawada's Till takes great comfort in the multiple interpretability of language. The stage directions make this point explicit, stating that Till can find safety inside a walled city not because it is walled but because he will find people there whose words he can use to his own advantage.[29] In one case, Till takes a master-smith at his word when he tells Till to forge all that he finds. It seems likely that the smith means work in the smithy that he himself would otherwise have done, but Till muses that one can forge rhymes (*Reime schmieden*) and then eventually invents a long word. In so doing, he avoids concrete work in the smithy and infuriates the smith.[30]

The Japanese people in the play have few interactions with the Germans, but the character Inondo, who would seem to be simply an ordinary Japanese man interested in experiencing language and culture that are not his own, draws the aforementioned master-smith's attack, when the smith cannot get at Till. Inondo exclaims: "Anta ni imi no wakaranai sakuhin wo tsukutte, warukatta ne" (It was bad that [someone] created a work that you do not understand either, right?), which the translation renders as "Tut mir leid, ihnen etwas so Sinnloses hergestellt zu haben" (I'm sorry about having produced for you something so meaningless).[31] The German translation suggests that Inondo wants to apologize for making something meaningless, but the word "sakuhin" shows that he does not just mean "something" but specifically a "text." In this way, Inondo shows that he is aware that he and the smith are caught up in a drama that plays with the meaning of words. Later, he admits that he himself was similarly caught up in language and thus wanted to travel to a country where no one could understand him.[32]

More than a mere demonstration of language as an unreliable medium for communication, Tawada's "Till" suggests that through travel to another country one can discover an unusual form of self-awareness or

self-confidence.[33] Inondo recalls that, when he was younger, he read an article that claimed that replacing the customary Japanese food rice with bread would make the nation civilized.[34] The Japanese reader of "Till" might see in Inondo's comment a jab at colonial Europe's claim to cultural superiority, for we learn from another Japanese character (the group's interpreter) that Germans in Till's day had not yet begun to use such seemingly simple eating utensils as the fork, which is an item that Europeans later would imagine as part of the "civilized" world. Somewhat pointedly, Inondo notes that Europeans never even hit upon the idea of chopsticks, eating utensils that had been in use in Northeast Asia since ancient times.[35] The critique is softened, however, because without this trip to a German medieval setting, Inondo might not have been able to discover how ludicrous the article he once read was. Interestingly, the Japanese interpreter suggests that "tradition" itself came about in response to tourism,[36] a message that one will find corroborated in the story "Rothenburg."

"Rothenburg" as *Rōtenburugu*

Tawada's short story "Rothenburg ob der Tauber: Ein deutsches Rätsel" describes a guided tour through the famous Southern German medieval town of the same name. The storyteller, a Japanese tourist, listens attentively to a German tour guide—called, rather fittingly, a *Fremdenführer* (foreigner-guide) in German—explaining the city's various features, and asks questions about Germany that result in a game of conundrums. While the tour guide situates Rothenburg's medieval landmarks within the German cultural tradition and intimates the notion of a historical continuum, the Japanese visitor has difficulty understanding the answers she receives to her questions and thus seeks solutions in plays-on-words and images that transpose German landmarks into Japanese cultural understanding. A strange contrast arises. When the storyteller notices the depiction of a black bird on the city gate, for example, she wonders about its significance:

> Auf der Mauer, genau über dem Eingang, war ein schwarzer Vogel gemalt. Vielleicht war dort bei der Gründung der Stadt ein wirklicher Vogel als Opfergabe hingehängt worden, der später durch das Bild ersetzt wurde. Ich konnte mir vorstellen, daß eine solche Opfergabe die Baumeister beruhigte, die wegen des Stadtbaus von dem Ort verjagt worden waren.[37]
>
> (On the wall, right above the entrance, a black bird had been painted. Perhaps at the time of the city's founding a real bird had been hung there as a sacrificial offering which later had been replaced by the picture. I could imagine that such a sacrificial offering appeased the tree spirits that had been chased away due to the construction of the city.)

To a German visitor of the city, this black bird is easily identifiable as the "Reichsadler" (Reich Eagle) a symbol of the city's position within the political structure of the medieval German Reich. The Japanese tourist's association of the black bird with tree spirits rips what is familiar to German culture out of its native context and places it into a setting familiar to Japanese. Of course, many Germans might understand that bird-sacrifice and tree spirits are elements of East Asian culture, but the contrasting cultural interpretations cause pensive friction that forces the reader to recognize how a Japanese tourist could imagine tree spirits disturbed when Rothenburg was built.

The process of blasting objects out of a previously carefully constructed continuum calls to mind Walter Benjamin's discourse on monads in his philosophy of history, which presents past events as fragments of earlier times that resurface in contemporary moments. Benjamin argues that time moves not only in a linear fashion, but also as an explosion of images, and the monad-like structure of past phenomena suggests that they contain elements of their own prehistory and future.[38]

Tawada's "Rothenburg" offers examples of Benjamin's point when the city is discussed in the context of its medieval architectural appearance. Two distinct narrative voices (the German tour guide's and the Japanese tourist's) offer two different perspectives on the Middle Ages that emphasize the historical-cultural estrangement constantly occurring over the course of the tour. At the beginning of the story, the tour guide announces, "Nun sind wir in der Stadt des Mittelalters angekommen."[39] (Now we have arrived in the city of the Middle Ages). Her words suggest that one could simply travel back and forth between past and present and the narrator asks, "Meinen Sie, daß die Stadt zwar im Mittelalter existierte, aber heute nicht mehr da ist?"[40] (Do you mean that the city existed in the Middle Ages but is no longer here today?). The tour guide explains that one might look at the city as a theater where the buildings and streets serve as stage design, a vague response that allows the tourist to decide for herself that the past is an event with elements that reemerge in different times, such as her own present time:

> Das Wort Bühnenbild gefiel mir gut. Ich konnte mir das Mittelalter nicht vorstellen als eine Zeit, die einmal da gewesen und irgendwann für immer vorbei war. Das Mittelalter muß ein Theaterstück gewesen sein, das immer wieder zurückkehrte, wenn es neu aufgeführt wurde.[41]
>
> (I really liked the word "stage design." I could not imagine the Middle Ages as a time that once was and at some point [simply] forever gone. The Middle Ages must have been a play that recurred again and again whenever enacted anew.)

While the original medieval architecture of Rothenburg has fallen victim to the passage of time and, to some degree, war, the preservation and restoration of the city's medieval image support the notion of a city as a stage that performs the Middle Ages. In this way, the past touches the present. Still, the tour guide and the tourist interpret this coexistence of past and present in different ways. The tour guide's explanations create links to the past and establish a linear connection to contemporary German time. The tourist offers glimpses of monads and fragments, interrupts the continuity of German history, and places these objects into a Japanese—or larger more universal—historical continuum where, through contrast and shifts, all cultures relate somehow to individual experience. Whether the reader agrees with the German guide or the Japanese tourist, or finds a middle ground, "Rothenburg" offers a view of how German cultural objects become—like Benjamin's monads—with different meanings that give rise to the interpretive tension a reader experiences when considering the same phenomenon from multiple positions.

This fragmentation of objects calls attention to an "in-between" space in the text outside of German and Japanese culture, as readers familiar with one tradition find themselves forced to make new interpretive connections to follow the tourist's line of thought. During the transposition of one culturally determined system of interpretation onto an object described in another language with its own system of interpretation, one might wonder what exactly falls into a sort of gap between systems. Benjamin alludes to such conflicting pensive instances as moments of shock in which the process of thinking is encapsulated in tension and treats each thought as a monad.[42]

Caught between differing cultural perceptions, Tawada's work introduces a unique translingual writing style. Through the interlacing of cultural concepts and ideas, chaos emerges and provides access to new focal points. That is, Tawada's experimentation with contrasting cultural worlds reveals lingual structures that help to explore how the meaning of words can be expanded.[43] The chaos of an "in-between" space created by new lingual constellations that rely on different cultural concepts becomes perhaps most evident in a scene in which the Japanese tourist rearranges symbols and arbitrarily plays with letters as she becomes fascinated by a sign outside of a bakery in Rothenburg. The tourist explains:

> Ein Ladenschild mit einer rätselhaften Form fesselte meinen Blick. Wenn die Zahl Sechs mit ihrem Spiegelbild zusammentreffen würde, könnte eine ähnliche Form entstehen. Als ich die Fremdenführerin fragte, was diese Form bedeute, sagte sie nur, das sei eine Brezel. Ein B-rätsel? Ein schönes Wort.[44]

> (A shop sign with a mystifying form caught my attention. If the number six joins with its mirror image a similar form arises. When I asked the tourist guide what this form signified she just said that it was a pretzel [*Brezel*]. A B-riddle? [*B-rätsel?*] Nice word.)

In the passage above, the tourist's ear does not distinguish the first "e" in *Brezel* from the sound "ä"—a mistake that gives rise to a larger misinterpretation. We might imagine that the tourist's mind recreates the word on the model of *katakana*, a syllabic script used in Japanese for words borrowed from other languages. *Katakana* has a phoneme like the first *e* in *Brezel* (transcribable as *ē*), but it does not have the phoneme *ä* (also transcribable as *ē*, as its closest approximation). The loan word in Japanese for *pretzel* actually comes from English (rendered something like *pu-re-ttzu-eru* in a transliteration of the *katakana*-spelling), but if the Japanese had borrowed the German word *Brezel*, one can imagine that the *katakana* script would have rendered it *bu-rē-tsu-eru*. Similarly, *Rätsel* (puzzle, riddle) would be *rē-tsu-eru*, virtually identical to the previous word, albeit without the initial *bu*-sound. Of course, to a native speaker of German, *e* and *ä* are two distinct phonemes, not interchangeable, which lend themselves to completely different words (e.g., *Zeh* (toe) vs. *zäh* (tough)). To a Japanese mind that perceives the German sounds in relation to *katakana* syllables, however, a word like *Brezel* might seem to sound much like *Brätsel*, or a "B"-*Rätsel*. Moreover, since there is no word in German spelled or pronounced *Rezel*, *B-Rätsel* even seems like a logical conclusion. Interestingly, a mistake of this sort is sophisticated enough to suggest some degree of familiarity with the German language, an inexplicable reminder to the reader that the German tour guide is speaking German to these Japanese tourists.

Once again, monad-like, the object is not only taken out of its original context but is attached to a different script used for a different range of phonemes and thus assumes a different identity. Instead of referring to food, therefore, the word *Brezel* now signifies a puzzle or riddle pointing to a mystery concerning the letter "B." The tourist wonders what a B-puzzle and a baker have in common and comes up with a new misinterpretation: "Wahrscheinlich bedeutet diese Form etwas Schönes in der Geheimsprache des Bäckers."[45] (Probably this form means something beautiful in the secret language of the baker.) In this way, the original association of the baked good *Brezel* becomes a mysterious activity of a baker who produces items that puzzle humanity. "Die Aufgabe eines Bäckers war es scheinbar, Rätsel herzustellen, die die Menschen nicht lösen aber essen konnten."[46] (Seemingly, the baker's task was to create riddles that people cannot solve but eat). This misinterpretation serves as a rather humorous but altogether understandable explanation for strange-looking

baked goods whose shape and purpose seem otherwise inexplicable. More importantly, on this *katakana*-model, we might understand all of the tourist's experiences of Rothenburg as if they were taking place in a sort of *Rōtenburugu*, a *katakana*-form or Japanized version of this German city. It is worth noting that this *katakana*-name is only a sound-based approximation of the German original and thus does not convey the meanings of the distinct parts of the city's name in German: "red" (Rothen-) and "castle" (Burg).

This discussion of the *B-rätsel* agrees with what scholars have said of Tawada's style, for Tawada routinely uses metamorphosis as a poetic device to capture the moment of contemplation. Through the act of transformation, the text reveals that each moment of experience inevitably contains a challenge for a writer (or observer such as the tourist) to encapsulate what is being observed in letters, words, and sentences. According to Ivanovic, in Tawada's work, everything one sees becomes textualized, turned into a symbol, or created as a sign by having come into view.[47] Similarly, Jürgen Wertheimer has noted, one of Tawada's narrative strategies for making sense of foreignness is through showing how one makes sense of the world with one's own criteria, codes, and pictures.[48] This strategy reveals an individual process of amalgamation of a strange culture, but it does not provide reliable information about the other culture. Wertheimer judges the transposition of Japanese thought onto German culture to be an aesthetic of transformation, which he describes as "a process of contrasting and assimilating diverse cultural elements rather than a discourse on cultural difference [that ultimately]…highlights the limits of cultural comprehension."[49] Ivanovic, too, has commented on how Tawada's texts present awareness of one's limitations, pointing out that it is something beneficial, insofar as this lack of cultural understanding is about activating individual perception which—contrary to cultural amalgamation—is not subject to the pull and judgment that occur when one acquires a new culture.[50] Tawada's descriptions follow a pattern of constantly shifting contrasts between what seems strange and what seems familiar, and explore these contrasts through different lingual representations. This process of contrasting creates a free-floating intellectuality that is unique to Tawada's work.[51]

This analysis of "Rothenburg" confirms these scholars' views for, as we have seen thus far, the story presents the reader of German with an estranged dialog in which familiar phenomena appear as isolated cultural fragments, like pieces of a strange puzzle. Indeed, the story's very subtitle "Ein deutsches Rätsel" (A German riddle/puzzle) promises German-language-specific estrangement. Objects and historic events become disconnected from their previous cultural setting and then reconstructed as new and different stories. Thus, the original form is broken and reveals

new shapes with which the reader has to reconnect, a process described in detail in scholarship on Tawada.[52] It is also worthwhile to note in this context that the Japanese tourist in "Rothenburg" sees the German world from the angle of an outsider, but does not register German "otherness" as a threat. Hansjörg Bay has observed that in Tawada's texts, the reader is not faced with discrimination or cultural despair but "a peculiar frictionless encounter with foreignness and cultural difference."[53] This feature of Tawada's work places her writing more in the framework of a poststructuralist or Benjaminian discourse than the German tradition of migrant literature, in which the experience of a stranger in a strange world features more prominently. It also points to the fact that Tawada's work explores the space between cultures in ways that question such universal themes as communicability and the concept of language as such.

Tawada's style also bears the signs of her scholarly training in *Germanistik*. Intertextual references to Benjamin's work throughout "Rothenburg" are a case in point. In some of Tawada's other more clearly scholarly work one can find allusions to ideas that also appear in her literary work, such as the "in-between" space, the chaos of language, and the experimentation with different cultural and lingual backgrounds and thought structures that reveal the challenge of communicability and disclose a tension between the material existence of an object and its transformation into written, acoustic and spoken language. In the essay "Sprachpolizei und Spielpolyglotte" (Language Police and Playpolyglots"), Tawada provides insight into her thinking, which resonates with much of what has been discussed here: "A word is a puzzle/riddle [Rätsel]. A letter of the alphabet is a traveler. It can depart from the sentences. Another [letter] steps into the place where it was."[54] These statements echo what the tourist engages in when she recognizes the bakery sign as a slight rearrangement of letters that opens up fresh contemplations of reading an unfamiliar object.[55] In fact, the tourist engages in a mode of permanent translation, transformation, and transposition that exposes new possibilities, such as the discrepancy between spoken and written language, and reveals how different cultural concepts can coexist in the same moment, as people from different cultural contexts approach objects and lived experiences differently.

In summary, Tawada's "Rothenburg" detaches language from its everyday confinement and explores uncharted possibilities of communication. In this way, it explores differing spheres of language and points to what Benjamin calls "the conflict between what has been expressed and is expressible and the inexpressible and what has not been expressed."[56] "Rothenburg" takes Benjamin's concept of communicability in a new direction by giving it a multicultural twist. Tawada herself has commented on the potential inherent in words and images as "an unlimited possibility

of the simultaneity of different qualities."[57] That is, language contains within its structure a degree of simultaneity, as one word can easily allude to many other words and meanings. Indeed, not only is language a medium of communication, but every language also communicates itself. These ideas echo Walter Benjamin's essay "Über Sprache überhaupt und über die Sprache des Menschen" ("On Language as Such and on the Language of Man," 1916), in which he ponders the essence of language. In Benjaminian fashion, Tawada's work alludes to the "inkommensurable einziggeartete Unendlichkeit" (incommensurable unique limitlessness) that one finds in language.[58] While limitations are imposed on language by the inability of verbal communication to convey all of its meaning at once, Benjamin writes that it is the "linguistic nature (sprachliches Wesen) [of language] not verbal content [that] sets the boundaries."[59] Tawada's work frees language and opens it to possibilities that otherwise remain hidden, highlighting in Benjaminian style the magic of language and revealing how objects have a language of their own.[60]

Conclusion

In an interview with the *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, Tawada explained that through her texts, she sought to cause one to think without specific reason, because her writing represented an attempt to circumnavigate (*umkreisen*) an idea with language.[61] Written from the perspective of the supposedly unknowing foreigner, the works by Tawada examined here communicate an "othered" reading of German and Japanese language and culture. Whether hidden in the various deforming tendencies of translation or conveyed conspicuously through the narrative strategy of contrasting and shifting cultural images that belong to different cultures, as in "Till" and "Rothenburg," Tawada's texts provide a fresh look at otherness and strangeness in the native culture for the native reader. The result is a new approach to globalized communication, at the center of which is not the accommodation of a stranger to a foreign culture, but the stranger revealing new insight into the "native" culture. By pointing toward moments of cultural simultaneity in an "in-between" space, Tawada's work creates a place of cross-cultural interaction in which different cultures coexist and engage in a global community, a feature of Tawada's work that Ivanovic has described as an illumination of "the simultaneity of unification and diversification in a globalizing society."[62]

Tawada has formulated a new way of writing and thinking in a transnational setting that challenges her readers to engage in a game of lingual expressions, concepts, and forms, in which the objective is not to find the one true meaning or information about the text but to discover the endless variations hidden in words, sentences, and expressions.

Her deep familiarity with Japan and Germany allows her to reflect on language and culture in general from multiple viewpoints. Thus, her work presents a view of intercultural encounters at the point at which individual experience is confronted with a moment of multicultural simultaneity. In fact, Tawada's own poetically enigmatic words probably express it best: "It is much like in theater: one acts according to [certain] rules . . . and then waits to see what happens. In this way, a space for magic is created."[63]

Notes

1. For a more detailed discussion see, Linda Koiran, *Schreiben in fremder Sprache: Yoko Tawada und Galsan Tschinag: Studien zu den deutschsprachigen Werken von Autoren asiatischer Herkunft* (München: Iudicium, 2009), 66–114.
2. Representatives of this group are Zehra Çirak, Selim Özdogan, Zafer Şenocak.
3. In addition to Yoko Tawada, a few other Japanese writers in German include Hisako Matsubara, who worked as a journalist and later moved to the United States, and Miyuki Tsuji, who lives in Hamburg and publishes essays about her travels. East Asian writers have traditionally not featured in the categories of guest worker or migrant literature, and there are still few well-known East Asian writers of German, such as Anant Kumar from North India or the Chinese student Daxing Chen, who published under the pseudonym Bei-Min. For more detailed information, see Koiran, *Schreiben in fremder Sprache*, 114–126.
4. Christine Ivanovic, "Exophonie und Kulturanalyse: Tawadas Transformationen Benjamins," in *Yoko Tawada: Poetik der Transformation: Beiträge zum Gesamtwerk*., ed. Christine Ivanovic, Stauffenburg Discussion, Vol. 28., eds. Elisabeth Bronfen, et. al. (Tübingen: Stauffenburg Verlag, 2010), 173.
5. Margaret Mitsutani, "Translator's Afterword," in Yoko Tawada, *Facing the Bridge*, trans. Margaret Mitsutani (New York: New Directions, 2007), 176.
6. Hansjörg Bay, "A. und O. Kafka—Tawada," in *Yoko Tawada: Poetik der Transformation: Beiträge zum Gesamtwerk*., ed. Christine Ivanovic, Stauffenburg Discussion, Vol. 28., eds. Elisabeth Bronfen, et. al. (Tübingen: Stauffenburg Verlag, 2010), 166–167.
7. Christine Ivanovic, "Vorwort," in *Yoko Tawada: Poetik der Transformation: Beiträge zum Gesamtwerk*, ed. Christine Ivanovic, Stauffenburg Discussion, Vol. 28, eds. Elisabeth Bronfen, et. al. (Tübingen: Stauffenburg Verlag, 2010), 14–15.
8. Yoko Tawada, "Das Tor des Übersetzers oder Paul Celan liest Japanisch," in *Talisman* (Tübingen: Konkursbuchverlag, 1996), 134.

9. Tawada, "Tor," 122.
10. For a full explanation of Berman's 12 tendencies, see Antoine Berman, "The Translation and the Trials of the Foreign," in *The Translation Studies Reader*, eds. Lawrence Venuti and Mona Baker, trans. Lawrence Venuti (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 288–297.
11. Yoko Tawada, "Jisho no Mura"/"Das Wörterbuchdorf," *Talisman* (Tübingen: Konkursbuchverlag, 1996), 64. For specific Japanese-English meanings used throughout this chapter, compare, for example, with Masuda, Koh (Ed.), *Kenkyusha's New Japanese-English Dictionary*, 4th ed. (Tokyo: Japan, 1974).
12. Tawada, "Jisho"/ "Wörterbuchdorf," 64/65.
13. Tawada, "Denn dieses Dorf ist aus einem Wörterbuch geboren."/"Sono mura wa jisho no naka kara umareta," 65/64.
14. Tawada, "Jisho"/ "Wörterbuchdorf," 64/65.
15. Ibid., 67/66.
16. Ibid., 68/69.
17. Yoko Tawada, "Etoki," in *Nur da wo du bist da ist nichts*, trans. Peter Pörtner, 3rd ed. (Tübingen: Verlag Claudia Gehrke, 1997), 54/175 and 9/120. Note: This dual-language text is printed in two directions, and thus the pagination of all comparisons between the Japanese and German texts are cited on this model.
18. The passages under scrutiny are "hito no himitsu wo nozokikomu yō ni" and "als wollte er…das Geheimnis des Menschen offenlegen." See Tawada, "Etoki," 42/87 and 21/108.
19. The example is "aber man kann ihm leider nicht entgehen" as a rendering of a piece of this sentence: "Dare ka ga haitte iru nado to iu gekitekishunkan wa dekiru koto nara saketai ga, sō mo ikanai." See Tawada, "Etoki," 11/118 and 52/77.
20. Tawada, "Etoki," 52/77 and 11/118. Another example is "to iu gekitekishunkan wa dekiru koto nara saketai" which was rendered as "Ich liebe diesen dramatischen Augenblick…nicht," changing the Japanese idea of "avoiding [such moments], if possible," to "not loving them." See Tawada, "Etoki," 52/77 and 11/118.
21. Tawada, "Etoki," 15/114 and 48/81.
22. Tawada, "Etoki"/"Bilderrätsel," 48/81 and 15/114.
23. The passages in question are: "Watashi wa, tada chotto hanashi kara ki wo sarashite mitakatta dake datta" and "Aber ich wollte mich nur ein wenig vom Gespräch ablenken." See: Tawada, "Etoki," 46/83 and 15/114.
24. Tawada, "Etoki," 36/93.
25. Tawada, "Bilderrätsel," 29/100.
26. In one example, after Till has created a long word, the Japanese-language stage directions explain his deed as something created "shiritori no yō ni" (like the Japanese word-game "shiritori,"), in which players create new words beginning with the last syllable of the previous word). Yoko Tawada, "Till," in *Orpheus oder Izanagi/Till* (Tübingen: Claudia Gehrke Verlag, 1998), 62–63.

27. Tawada, "Till," 43.
28. One example is the use of the word "kaji," which can have a variety of meanings in Japanese. The translated section contains a footnote that explains these homophones. See footnote 2: Tawada, "Till," 111.
29. Tawada, "Till," 72.
30. Ibid., 62.
31. Ibid., 64/97.
32. Ibid., 101.
33. The Japanese interpreter's words in reaction to Inondo's response to the master-smith's attack give insight into this idea: "Tsūyaku: komarun desu yo ne. fudan wa ka no naku yō na koe dashite, ojiga bakkari shite iru sararīman ga, kaigai no yūmei na iseki nanka mite kyū ni kōfun shite, jibun no namae to hizuke wo naifu de baka de kaku ishi ni kizamitsuketari suru koto ga aru deshō."/"Das ist doch wirklich peinlich: Da sind diese Angestellten, die normalerweise keinen Mucks von sich geben und sich immer brav verbeugen, die sofort in helle Aufregung geraten, sobald sie im Ausland an einen geschichtsträchtigen Ort kommen und dann mit einem Messer ihren Namen und das Datum in jeden einzelnen Stein einritzen müssen." Tawada, "Till," 65/98.
34. Tawada, "Till," 77/107.
35. Ibid., 75/106.
36. Ibid., 79/109.
37. Yoko Tawada, "Rothenburg ob der Tauber: Ein deutsches Rätsel," in *Talisman* (Tübingen: Konkursbuchverlag, 1996), 28–29.
38. Walter Benjamin, "Aufzeichnungen und Materialien: Erkenntnistheoretisches, Theorie des Fortschritts: (N10, 3)," in *Walter Benjamin: Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 5.1, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1989), 594.
39. Tawada, "Rothenburg," 28.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Walter Benjamin, "Über den Begriff der Geschichte," in *Walter Benjamin: Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. 1.2, eds. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1974), 702–703.
43. For a detailed explanation of this linguistic phenomenon in Tawada's work, see Ottmar Ette, "Zeichenreiche: Insel-Texte und Text-Inseln bei Roland Barthes und Yoko Tawada," in *Yoko Tawada: Poetik der Transformation: Beiträge zum Gesamtwerk.*, ed. Christine Ivanovic, Stauffenburg Discussion, Vol. 28, eds. Elisabeth Bronfen, et. al. (Tübingen: Stauffenburg Verlag, 2010), 228.
44. Tawada, "Rothenburg," 29.
45. Ibid., 30.
46. Ibid., 33.
47. Ivanovic, "Exophonie," 190.

48. Jürgen Wertheimer, "Yoko Tawada: Eine Ornitholigin der Wörter," in *Yoko Tawada: Poetik der Transformation: Beiträge zum Gesamtwerk*., ed. Christine Ivanovic, Stauffenburg Discussion, Vol. 28, eds. Elisabeth Bronfen, et. al. (Tübingen: Stauffenburg Verlag, 2010), 244.
49. Ibid.
50. Ivanovic, "Vorwort," 12.
51. Ivanovic, "Exophonie," 173.
52. Ibid., 180–81.
53. Bay, "A. und O. Kafka—Tawada," 168.
54. Yoko Tawada, "Sprachpolizei und Spielpolyglotte," in *Sprachpolizei und Spielpolyglotte* (Tübingen: Konkursbuchverlag, 2007), 35. See also, Birgit Maier-Katkin, "Über Polyglotte und Mitteilbarkeit: Yoko Tawada im benjaminischen Kontext der Sprache," *Etudes Germaniques* 65, no. 3 (July–September 2010): 455–464.
55. Ivanonic explains this process adeptly. See Ivanovic, "Vorwort," 9.
56. Walter Benjamin, "Über Sprache überhaupt und über die Sprache des Menschen," in *Walter Benjamin Gesammelte Schriften*, eds. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser, Vol. 2.1 (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1989), 146.
57. Tawada, "Sprachpolizei," 34.
58. Benjamin, "Sprache," 143.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., 147. Ivanovic explains this aspect of Tawada's language concisely. See Ivanovic, "Exophonie," 198.
61. Daniela Tan. "Im Meer der Mehrsprachigkeit," *Neue Züricher Zeitun*g, November 24, 2012. http://www.nzz.ch/aktuell/feuilleton/literatur/im-meer-der-mehrsprachigkeit-1.17842399. page 5.
62. Ivanovic, "Vorwort," 15.
63. Tan, "Im Meer der Mehrsprachigkeit," 5.

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