



# **Framing Strategic Urban Projects**

Learning from current experiences in European urban regions

Edited by Willem Salet and Enrico Gualini

# Framing Strategic Urban Projects

In the 1990s, large-scale urban projects were launched in almost every metropolitan region of Europe. Several years on, the much-anticipated positive results of the innovative integration of economic and sustainable objectives have not always been apparent. To be successfully implemented, strategic urban projects require the successful coordination of collective action in a fragmented metropolitan setting, which often involves crossing barriers set up by the sector-minded, single-issue approaches typical of statutory territorial agencies. This book explores why existing projects have achieved such mixed results, and suggests new ways of thinking about strategic urban projects in future.

The first part of the book sets out the framework for the study, looking at the social, policy and institutional context of strategic urban projects in Europe. Part two goes on to explore seven case studies to discuss recent experiences of large-scale projects in European city-regions and to assess each city's capacity to respond to the challenges of strategic urban projects. Each case study highlights a different planning issue including new urbanism, the use of culture to drive the urban economy, information networks and public partnerships. Finally, part three assesses the findings of the research and makes recommendations for the future development of urban projects.

Offering a systematic comparison of a wide variety of projects, this book provides a multidimensional framework for assessing economic networks, spatial organisation, democratic policies and sustainability in urban European projects. This is essential reading for planners, policy makers and students interested in how to make strategic urban projects work effectively.

**Willem Salet** is Professor of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Amsterdam. His research is part of the Amsterdam Institute for Metropolitan and International Development Studies (AMIDSt). As a sociologist and urban planner Professor Salet specializes in institutions and cities, metropolitan governance and strategic spatial planning.

**Enrico Gualini** is Professor of Planning Theory at the Institute for Urban and Regional Planning of the Technical University Berlin. His research focuses on spatial policy, planning and governance in regions and city-regions.



# Framing Strategic Urban Projects

Learning from current experiences  
in European urban regions

Edited by Willem Salet  
and Enrico Gualini

First published 2007

by Routledge

2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada

by Routledge

270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016

*Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business*

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2009.

To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge's collection of thousands of eBooks please go to [www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk](http://www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk).

© 2007 Willem Salet and Enrico Gualini, selection and editorial matter;  
individual chapters, the contributors

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

*Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data*

Framing strategic urban projects : learning from current experiences in European urban regions /

edited by Willem Salet and Enrico Gualini.

p. cm –

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-415-39043-5 (hbk : alk. paper)

1. Regional planning–Europe. 2. City planning–Europe.

3 Economic development projects–Europe–Case studies. 4 Community development, Urban–Europe–Case studies. I. Salet, W.G. M. II. Gualini, Enrico.

HT395.E82F62 2007

307.1'216094–dc22

2006021388

*British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data*

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 0-203-96612-0 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0-415-39043-5 (hbk)

ISBN10: 0-203-96612-9 (ebk)

ISBN13: 978-0-415-39043-9 (hbk)

ISBN13: 978-0-203-96612-9 (ebk)

# Contents

<i>Contributors</i>	vii
<i>Foreword</i>	ix
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xi
 <b>PART I</b>	 1
<b>Theoretical framework</b>	
 1 <b>Framing strategic urban projects</b>	 3
WILLEM SALET	
 2 <b>Institutional capacity and planning milieux in European urban regions: an introduction to the case studies</b>	 20
ENRICO GUALINI AND WILLEM SALET	
 <b>PART II</b>	 51
<b>Experiences of strategic projects in European city-regions</b>	
 3 <b>Amsterdam Zuidas: the dream of ‘new urbanity’</b>	 53
STAN MAJOOR	
 4 <b>Barcelona Universal Forum 2004: culture as driver of urban economy</b>	 84
JOSÉ LUIS LÚZON BENEDICTO AND JORDI VILA CARRASCO	
 5 <b>Berlin-Adlershof: local steps into global networks</b>	 115
MARIE BACHMANN	
 6 <b>Brussels Tour &amp; Taxis: entrepreneurship versus the fragmented city</b>	 146
MATHIEU VAN CRIEKENGEN, CHRISTOPHE GUISSSET AND CHRISTIAN VANDERMOTTEN	
 7 <b>Copenhagen Ørestad: public partnership in search of the market</b>	 172
STAN MAJOOR AND JOHN JØRGENSEN	

<b>8</b>	<b>Strasbourg Parc d’Innovation d’Illkirch: a technopole French-style</b>	<b>199</b>
	JÖRG WENDEL	
<b>9</b>	<b>Vienna Erdberger Mais: public-sector driven long-term planning strategies</b>	<b>223</b>
	CHRISTINA ENICHLMAIR AND AXEL BORSDDORF	
	<b>PART III</b>	<b>247</b>
	<b>Conclusions</b>	
<b>10</b>	<b>Assessing strategic urban projects: findings and recommendations</b>	<b>249</b>
	WILLEM SALET AND ENRICO GUALINI	
	<i>Appendix</i>	<b>277</b>
	<i>Index</i>	<b>297</b>

# Contributors

**Marie Bachmann** is at the Institute for Town Planning and Structural Policy (IfS) in Berlin, and was previously Senior Researcher at the Free University of Berlin. She studied geography, sociology and economics and worked for about seven years as a regional planning consultant. Her main research is on urban and regional planning, metropolization, tertiarization, service sector and logistics; currently she is concluding her PhD dissertation, a comparison of locational choices for high-ranking services in the metropolitan areas of Berlin and Vienna.

**Axel Borsdorf** is Professor of Geography at the University of Innsbruck and Director of the Research Unit for Mountain Research: Man and Environment of the Austrian Academy of Sciences at Innsbruck. His research subjects are metropolization and urbanization, and his reference regions are Europe and Latin America.

**Christina Enichlmair** studied geography and regional research at Vienna University. Her fields of interest are urban and regional research, international development, migration, processes of globalization and geoinformatics. She is currently working at the Department of Geography and Regional Science of Vienna University on a PhD dissertation on the development of cities in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain.

**Enrico Gualini** has been Senior Lecturer in Urban and Regional Planning at the Department of Geography and Planning, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of Amsterdam, and since 2006 has been Professor of Planning Theory at the Institute for Urban and Regional Planning of the Technical University Berlin.

**John Jørgensen**, PhD, is Senior Researcher at Nordregio, Stockholm and at the Department for Urban and Landscape Studies, Danish Centre for Forest, Landscape and Planning, Copenhagen. His research interests are urban and regional development, urban policy and planning, new forms of urban and metropolitan governance in Europe with a special focus on the Nordic countries, multilevel governance and rescaling of territorial policies.



**José Luís Luzón Benedicto** is Professor of Geography at the University of Barcelona. He coordinates the PhD programme in Territorial Planning and Regional Development. His main research fields are related to urban and physical geography with a special focus on Latin America.

**Christophe Guisset** studied Geography at the Free University of Brussels and wrote his PhD dissertation on gentrification processes in Brussels. Since 1998, he has worked as a Researcher at the Institute of Environmental Management and Land Planning (IGEAT) at the Free University of Brussels. His main fields of interest are in urban and regional geography.

**Stan Majoer** received his Masters degrees in Urban and Regional Planning and Political Science at the University of Amsterdam. He is currently a PhD candidate and Junior Researcher at the Amsterdam Institute for Metropolitan and International Development Studies (AMIDSt) of the University of Amsterdam, where he is working on a dissertation on large-scale urban development projects.

**Willem G.M. Salet** is Professor of Urban and Regional Planning at the Department of Geography and Planning, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of Amsterdam. His research interests are in the field of urbanism, metropolitan governance and spatial planning.

**Mathieu Van Criekingen** is Post-doctoral Researcher of the Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique at the Department of Human Geography, Free University of Brussels. His research interests are in the field of urban and social geography, with a particular focus on gentrification processes.

**Christian Vandermotten** is Professor of Economic Geography and Territorial Planning at the Free University of Brussels, where he is co-director of the Laboratory of Human Geography and past President of the Institute of Environmental Management and Land Planning (IGEAT). He is President of the Royal Belgian Society of Geography and a member of the Royal Academy of Belgium.

**Jordi Vila Carrasco** is a geographer specialized in GIS and planning. He works for the local administration in the territorial planning and management department. He also collaborates with different institutions and research centres specialized in strategic and urban planning.

**Jörg Wendel**, MSc in Geography, studied Geography, Town Planning and Sociology at the University of Bonn, Germany and is currently Research Assistant and PhD candidate at the University of Basle, Department of Geosciences, Geography/Urban and Regional Studies. He conducts research on regional development, urban poverty and GIS applications, with a regional focus on the Upper Rhine Valley and South-East Asia (India).

# Foreword

'It is not good, that a man works alone – he needs participation and stimulation, to make his work sufficient', Goethe remarked to Eckermann, on 7 March 1830. European projects, financed within the Framework Programmes, correspond in an ideal way to the advice of the German poet and scientist.

The actual presentation of results of COMET – Competitive Metropolises, an EU project funded within the Fifth Framework Programme, is proof of how deep international and interdisciplinary cooperation between European scientists and stakeholders may be realized. It is not just a compilation of isolated contributions by different authors. This group of scholars cooperated intensely for four years in the institutional framework of the COMET project. They discussed the concepts in different meetings and furthermore made up their own mind on all large projects, discussed in this volume, by intensive site visits, studying and discussing the structure and concepts of the projects with the local representatives, managers and politicians. The intense study of all sites encouraged comparisons and stimulated the exchange of ideas and experiences of scientists, local authorities, planners and managers.

It should be mentioned that this book does not document the large spectrum of COMET findings but presents an important part of these results (for more information see the homepage: <http://www.comet.ac.at>). When in March 2000 the European Union formulated its strategy for the future in Lisbon (the so-called Lisbon agenda) this concept was based on innovation as the motor for economic change, a 'learning economy', and social and environmental renewal. Since then, the economic and political aim of the European Union is to become the most competitive region of the world by 2010, based on knowledge and innovation.

The COMET project was designed in the framework of the Lisbon strategy to find solutions to improve the global competitiveness of European metropolises. Large urban projects may be seen as a key issue or main topic for realizing the Lisbon agenda. However, the European development is not only orientated towards competitiveness in an economic sense, but even more towards a sustainable future, which also includes social coherence and an ecological environment, suitable for future generations.

It is in this context that large urban projects all over Europe have to be seen. Social science and knowledge necessary to describe the layout, structure, and

function of these projects, and assess their strengths and weaknesses and to evaluate their sustainable effects on European development. The participating scholars were aware of their responsibility for science and the future of Europe in a globalizing world. It was the intense exchange of their expertise which made this book possible. Participation and stimulation – as already mentioned by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe in 1830 – were the decisive elements of cooperation in this project. And – although the German poet did not mention this explicitly – cooperation will only function if some persons assume some management responsibility. The authors of this book would like to thank Willem Salet and Enrico Gualini for their involvement and their wise guidance and leadership in this challenging task.

Axel Borsdorf  
Co-ordinator of COMET  
Innsbruck, May 2006

# Acknowledgements

The research presented in this volume is part of a larger research project called COMET – Competitive Metropolises: Economic Transformation, Labour Market and Competition in European Agglomerations.

The COMET research project was supported by the European Commission under the Fifth RTD Framework Programme – Key Action ‘City of Tomorrow and Culture Heritage’ – and was conducted between 2002 and 2005 by a network of scientific and governmental partners in seven European cities.

The aim of the project has been a comparative analysis of spatial development patterns and planning measures in seven European urban regions, with a focus on the emergence of new locational patterns in the service sector and on the influence of their spatial features on the effectiveness of strategies of competitiveness and excellence. Research has been based on a comparison and harmonization of data on spatial development patterns and locational preferences in the service sector and on case-study based analyses of the effectiveness of spatial and economic planning strategies and steering tools aimed at achieving a sustainable combination between economic competitiveness and compact spatial development. In pursuing these research objectives, COMET has benefited from the expertise of the single project partners as well as from the involvement and strict cooperation with local governmental partners and end-users.

COMET was initiated and coordinated by Prof. Dr Axel Borsdorf (Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna and University of Innsbruck) and Prof. Dr Michaela Paal (University of Marburg). The Scientific Committee was formed by: Dr Francesc Carbonell (Institut D'Estudis Territorials, Barcelona), Dr Christof Ellger (Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin), Prof. Dr Günter Mertins (Philipps-Universität Marburg), Dr Roman Seeliger (Wirtschaftskammer Österreich), Prof. Dr Willem Salet (Universiteit van Amsterdam), Dr Arlette Verkruyssen (Gouvernement de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale), Dipl. Ing. Sibylla Zech (stadtland). The Steering Committee members were: Prof. Dr Axel Borsdorf (Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna and University of Innsbruck), Prof. Dr Georg Kluczka (FU Berlin), Prof. Dr José Luís Luzón (Universitat de Barcelona), Prof. Dr Willem Salet (Universiteit van Amsterdam), Prof. Dr Christian Vandermotten (Université Libre de Bruxelles), Dr Lars Winther (København's Universitet), and Prof. Dr Gabriel Wackermann (Université Paris-Sorbonne).

This volume focuses on some of the project findings and presents a comparative analysis of institutional conditions for innovative spatial development projects in urban regions, with particular reference to the planning and conduct of large integrated urban projects that may play a strategic role in their development patterns. The findings presented are a combination of contributions from two working packages – respectively on institutional capacity and planning milieux and on the framing and decision-making process in strategic urban projects – coordinated by Prof. Dr Willem Salet and Dr Enrico Gualini at the Amsterdam Institute for Metropolitan and International Development Studies, University of Amsterdam.

The partners of the project have contributed by providing the analyses and case studies that form the empirical basis for this volume. COMET teams involved researchers from the following universities and academic institutions: Universiteit van Amsterdam, AMIDSt – Amsterdam Institute for Metropolitan and International Development Studies; Universitat de Barcelona, Departament de Geografia Física i Anàlisi Geogràfica Regional; Freie Universität Berlin, Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften; Université Libre de Bruxelles, Institut de Gestion de l'Environnement et d'Aménagement du Territoire; Københavns Universitet, Geografisk Institut; Philipps-Universität Marburg, Fachbereich Geographie; Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Institut für Stadt- und Regionalforschung; Université Paris-Sorbonne. The editors gratefully acknowledge the contribution of all participants in the COMET project not explicitly mentioned in this volume.

The research project was furthermore supported by the following governmental and end-users: Gemeente Amsterdam, Dienst Economische Zaken; INGECON Ingeniería del Conocimiento S.A., Barcelona; Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung Berlin, Abteilung Stadt- und Freiraumplanung; Gouvernement de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale, Cabinet du Ministre-Président, Cellule Aménagement du Territoire; Universität Innsbruck; Københavns Universitet, Økonomiforvaltningen; Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg, Direction des Études et de la Prospective; Amt der Niederösterreichischen Landesregierung, Abteilung Raumordnung und Regionalpolitik, Geschäftsstelle für EU-Regionalpolitik; Stadt Wien, Magistratsabteilung 18; stadtländ – Ingenieurkonsulent für Raumplanung und Raumordnung, Vienna.

Our acknowledgment goes to local experts who have contributed to the single case studies through interviews and the provision of information. A list is given at the end of each case study.

Finally, many thanks to Howard Turner for his revision of the English text.

**Part I**

# **Theoretical framework**



# 1 Framing strategic urban projects

*Willem Salet*

## Introduction

The evolution of cities is the largely unplanned and unintended outcome of more or less deliberate actions by many individuals and dispersed agencies searching to find a way out of the problems and circumstances they experience. As such, urban evolution is consciously man-made and even policy-made in many respects, but it does not unfold harmoniously according to the lines of a strategic plan. There is no complete control, not even in countries where powers are shaped to enable hierarchical planning. On the other hand, collectivities feel the need for ‘strategic devices’ to guide action. Such strategic devices are frequently invented and promoted not just by single planning agencies, but by all sorts of coalitions of stakeholders and shareholders both in the public sector and/or the private sector. Strategic devices (collective missions, visions, plans etc.) attempt to settle or to stimulate certain joint courses in individual actions. The strategic devices may contain compulsory or contractual conditions, but sometimes they are just indicative, and not necessarily legally binding. The strategic dimension lies in the *transcendence of individual horizons* in scope and time – i.e. in exceeding the reach of single actors, single-purpose behaviours, and the space–time span of daily activities and routines – and in the *selection of symbols* that enable the reproduction of a joint direction for a possible future of cities that directly and indirectly might be shared by an unspecified number of individual agents. Obviously, the possible impact of strategic devices is extremely sensitive to the different ways in which the conditions for action are framed in the multifarious context of individuals and agencies.

The subject of this book is the framing of strategic urban devices in the context of urban governance. By *framing*, we simply mean the different ways in which individual agents can be held together. This term requires further specification. Strategic devices are used both in the general and indicative sphere of ‘integrative strategic plans’ for major cities or urban regions and in the operational sphere of decision-making in ‘urban projects’. Strategic plans and strategic projects often alternate. They may be adopted simultaneously and be in perfect concordance as well. However, it is more frequently the case that more energy is invested in indicative strategic visions and plans than in operational strategic



projects in one planning episode, and the reverse in another planning episode (Healey 2006). In this book, we explicitly choose to focus on the framing of strategic urban projects.

Cities are in a process of transformation, and large-scale urban projects can be used as vehicles to promote a certain direction of urban change, not just because of the social and spatial impact of their own mass, but because their potential impact and dominance can be amplified by consciously symbolizing the structural direction of transformations that is being aimed at. This may, of course, have a positive or negative effect, as large-scale projects may also be subject to criticism due to their overt visibility and dominance. The symbolic amplification of strategic action is particularly important as the volume of large-scale projects as such is only a small proportion of the total amount of small-scale urban transformations which account for urban evolution, and this is even the case in the largest mega-projects. The impact of large-scale projects can, in fact, be easily overestimated. In our empirical case studies, we made a selection from the largest economically relevant urban projects in seven European urban regions, but none of these amounts to more than 10 per cent of regional employment. Although this is a substantial percentage, most of our selected projects 'only' aimed to score somewhere between 1 per cent and 2 per cent of regional employment. Obviously, more significant figures of employment and other indicators of urban development are the outcome of the aggregate of small-scale development initiatives. Strategic urban projects, however, symbolize in a very visible way the commitment of a local society to invest deliberately in a certain direction for the future. This can take the form of an investment in a new cultural or economic specialization of the urban system, or in certain new spaces and new spatial configurations of an emerging urban region, and the like. Some urban regions more than others invest in the *potential symbolic amplification* of strategic projects in processes of urban transformation. In this volume, we investigate the different degrees in the strategic use of large-scale urban projects.

This chapter introduces the conceptual framework of our investigation. The chapter is organized as follows. First, we consider some basic conditions of change in the process of urban transformation in European states in the era of globalization. Analysis of the process of urban transformation is crucial, not just to give circumstantial evidence of changing context to decision-making in large urban projects but more fundamentally because of its changing impact on the frames of decision-making in these projects themselves. Thereafter, we discuss the current state of debate in urban studies on decision-making in urban mega-projects. Then, we outline the framework of our comparative analysis. Finally, we give a brief account of the methodology of research adopted and of the criteria for selection of the case studies in seven urban regions of Europe.

## Changing conditions of urban development

The globalization and modernization of social and economic relationships are having a large impact on the functioning and spatial organization of urban

regions in Europe. Economic liberalization, the opening of national borders to people and goods, the globalization of social and economic relationships and innovation in communication technologies are all recent phenomena which have dramatically changed the space–time coordinates of social and economic performance in urban regions. Regional stakeholders feel the importance of being connected with external networks and increasingly raise the issue of regional competitiveness. Many observers consider sub-national scales, particularly those of major urban regions, as the new strategic institutional arenas. Brenner even refers to the emergence of ‘glocalizing’ competition state regimes between 1960 and 2000, in contrast to the project of national territorial equalization associated with Keynesian welfare national states. A feature of these new ‘state spaces’ at regional level is that a) significant aspects of economic regulation are devolved to sub-national institutional levels, and b) major socio-economic assets are reconcentrated within the most globally competitive urban regions and industrial districts (Brenner 2004; see also Cox 1997; Swyngedouw 2004). These conclusions may be too generalized to cover the locally very different arenas of regional economic governance (the role of national government, for instance, is more pronounced in a number of European countries), but may in a general sense underline the increasing significance of regional competitiveness as an asset of national economies and the significance of its externally focused, inter-regional orientation (in both competitive and cooperative relationships). The highly international redistribution and rescaling of economic specialization created new hierarchical relationships and unequal conditions for regional systems. Some urban regions are better connected than others in the dynamic processes of social and economic rescaling. Processes of globalization and modernization generally appear to enhance the further growth of major urban regions (as being better connected spaces than rural regions), but the same processes tend to enlarge differences with urban regions which are not well connected to dominant socio-economic networks and which, for this very reason, are in a stage of stagnation or decline. This is occurring not only in rural but also in urban areas.

The enlargement of scale and scope of social and economic relationships generates a complex transformation of urban-regional spatial configurations. In most urban regions, there is evidence of urban growth, but this is not to be regarded as just a new round of metropolitanization intended to be an extension of the familiar city-centred region. The city-centred hierarchy of urban regions itself is being challenged under current conditions. The enlarging scope of social and economic activities – facilitated by non place-bounded communication and interaction – adds new weight to the ‘accessibility’ and to the ‘connectivity of activities’ beyond the familiar dominance of physical conditions typical of traditional notions of urbanity, such as ‘physical proximity’, ‘compactness’ or ‘physical density of activities’. The complex interactions of specialized urban activities no longer one-sidedly depend on physical proximity and many central city types of urban specializations tend to be more dispersed over enlarged urban areas. Some specializations – for instance in the advanced service sector economies – may regroup in new concentrations near

to airports or at crossing-points of highways at the edge of the cities; cultural activities, retailing or large-scale entertainment may move in the direction of 'suburban' housing markets, etc. There is a lot of local variation in these processes of urban transition, but what they have in common is the fact that they challenge the original centrality of the city as node of interference of the most specialized and advanced urban activities. The typical climate of high urban variety is being dispersed on a larger – regional – level of scale according to very different spatial patterns. It is against this background that planners and urban geographers all over Europe are investigating processes of urban transformation that challenge the familiar hierarchical relationships between 'city centre' and 'urban periphery' (with the periphery also becoming increasingly specialized), between 'urban compactness' and the 'openness' of the surrounding areas' (which are challenged by processes of urban landscaping at regional level), and between 'places' and 'non place-bounded interactions' (Ascher 1995, 2001; Bourdin 2005; Amin and Thrift 2002; Sieverts 2003; Healey 2004; Sieverts *et al.* 2005). Thus, the mutual relationships between changing *social and economic activities* in urban regions on the one hand, and the shifting *configurations of urban space* on the other, are very dynamic in the current process of urban transformation. It is not possible to assume beforehand that these reciprocal relationships will be harmoniously ordered. It is more likely that obstacles and stalemates will be caused, and different time paths of adaptation will emerge, certainly in the current era of urban transformation. The very dynamic social and economic tendencies may easily tend to become disruptive, creating unbalanced spaces, 'tunneling' the use of urban space, 'splintering urbanism', and the like (Graham and Marvin 2001). In turn, the existing spatial patterns, and the spatial policies and regulations involved, usually need time to become adapted to new social and economic circumstances. Hence, the interrelationships between the two domains – respectively societal and spatial tendencies – are likely to be tense. Strategic urban projects are, typically, the highly visible and symbolic objects emerging in this reciprocal minefield of urban transformation.

There is a third important dimension to this complex process of urban transformation, and this is the *institutional dimension* of framing. Institutions are considered in a sociological sense as evolving patterns of social norms that keep citizens aware of what is appropriate to do and what is not. In our scheme of research, the institutional dimension regards the challenge of achieving legitimized strategic devices in the context of changing urban environment. The institutional challenges are the other side of the same coin of urban transformation. If the new tendencies of social and economic action and their interchange with shifting spatial configurations are undergoing an enlargement of scale and scope, the same challenges can be found as regards the question of the responsiveness of institutions. The enlargement of 'scale' urges the displacement of the site of organization and legitimization of collective action from local to regional level. In practice, this turns out to be an extremely challenging task (Jouve and Lefèvre 2002). In the 1980s and early 1990s, many urban

Table 1.1 Three interrelated domains of urban change

Social and economic action	Spatial configuration	Institutional responsiveness
----------------------------	-----------------------	------------------------------

regions in Europe were involved in processes of administrative reform in order to fill the ‘administrative regional gap’ in one way or another. Most attempts failed, however, because of internal stalemates or because of the high regional dynamism – whereby social and economic activities are performed at many different levels of regional scale – or for other, mostly political, reasons. During the last decade, the responsiveness of institutions usually is no longer sought in the reforming of the structures of administration, but in the organizing of flexible strategies of co-production. Representatives from different parts of the private sector are often involved in defining and operationalizing such strategies. This type of flexible solutions appears to be more effective, but raises lots of issues relating to their institutional legitimacy.

The ‘enlargement of scope’ of social and economic action necessitate more – and more fundamental – institutional responses than the ‘enlargement of scale’, since it implies that processes of decision-making on the use of urban space are increasingly to be arranged in a trans-scalar fashion, in particular trans-regional processes (Newman and Herrschel 2002; Salet *et al.* 2003). This is a crucial challenge, both for the private and the public sectors. More and more decisions on urban development are framed in a domain of external relationships of urban regions. Actually, the diversity of inter-regional, international, European networks that focus on decisions concerning urban change has increased dramatically in the last decade. Many new coalitions and conflicting coalitions are unfolding in this enlarged domain. In our investigation on the framing of strategic urban projects, we will explore how public and private local stakeholders cope with this trans-regional dimension.

To summarize, we conceptualize the process of urban change and the resulting challenges for the framing of strategic urban projects as articulated in three inter-related domains, as shown in Table 1.1.

The fascinating thing is that these three domains are strongly interdependent as three aspects of the very same urban systems, but simultaneously take their own dynamic paths of development, most likely driving towards different directions and according to different paces and horizons of temporality. This threefold embedding of strategic urban projects, therefore, is anything but an oasis of tranquillity.

### **Framing strategic projects: insights from urban studies**

Urban studies have a long tradition of analysing the societal and institutional significance of large-scale urban projects and of investigating the interrelationships with the spatial configuration of urban and regional systems. The framing of large-scale projects changes over time in accordance with the change of

regimes of social, economic and political patterns. In the USA, in the 1950s and 1960s, the post-war policy coalitions in major cities were forged by stakeholders within outspoken pro-growth regimes (Fainstein *et al.* 1983). This was the time of the expansion of central business districts (CBD) in cities, and the urban mayors also successfully managed to connect the heart of the cities with the new generation of national highways. The urban periphery still prevailed as the area for extensive suburban housing. Offices and retailing centres were the first to follow to the outskirts of the major cities, but still very gradually in these first post-war decades (Hoover and Vernon 1959; Frieden and Sagalyn 1989). In the course of the 1960s, the urban pro-growth coalitions were superseded by the spectacular rise of the protest generation. The new generation not only raised criticism, but also acquired political power within a few years. New issues were brought onto the urban agenda, in particular with respect to social housing, education, social policy and environmental issues, and these also left their imprint on the new agenda for strategic urban projects. New social, economic and political coalitions were framed to enable radical changes in urban policy to be dealt with. Regarding policies for the spatial configuration of urban regions, the political focus switched from CBD planning to the social renewal and revitalization of urban neighbourhoods. The same happened with the priority setting of major urban projects. Economic growth was regarded as a relatively low priority in the socially driven political climate of cities in the early 1970s (Altshuler and Luberoff 2003). The sociological and spatial asymmetries between the rivaling 'inside' and 'outside' areas of urban regions increased considerably at this stage of urban development (Rusk 1999). However, local fiscal accountability should not be underestimated in the context of largely self-supportive urban systems in the USA. They soon urged most of the major cities to re-adopt entrepreneurial agendas. During the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, new urban regimes were established to enable the recurrence of economic investment in inner cities in order to generate local income and to create new employment. The frames of decision-making were adapted accordingly. The new coalitions involved parts of the private sector with a strong stake in local development and urban governance also attempted to include the major electoral interests in enduring coalitions (Logan and Molotch 1987; Stone 1989). Thus, the entrepreneurial agenda made its comeback to most American cities, but frames of decision-making did not return to those of the unadulterated growth machines of the first post-war era. North American researchers observed more mitigated regimes in the 1990s. Usually, strategies of negotiation are adopted in order to serve both sides with different interests and to forge enduring coalitions of cooperation. The agenda of 'economic development' is more or less 'socially embedded'. Regime theories point to economic hegemony in this capitalist urban society, but this is expressed indirectly in 'concessionary' and 'conserving' relationships (Fainstein *et al.* 1983), is framed in 'political-economic regimes' (DiGaetano and Klemanski 1999), and the principle of local fiscal accountability is countered – albeit often more in principle than in practice – by electoral-driven policies (Elkin 1985). Urban policies do matter and

may provide negotiated results (Savitch and Kantor 2002). Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) go as far as labelling the current era since the early 1980s as the era of 'do no harm'. They observed a move of development activity to 'conflict-free' zones on the urban periphery or to decayed urban areas where new economic investments are politically welcome. They also highlight the considerable impact of environmental legislation – albeit as a residue of the more environmentally driven political agenda of the 1980s.

Compared with the American experiences of framing large-scale urban projects, European states exhibit more internal variation because of more sensible cultural and institutional differences between nation states. Nevertheless, the general post-war fluctuations resemble those of American cities, albeit usually a bit later in time and far less radically. The economic forces of capitalism are much more embedded in social regulation in the European welfare states. After the post-war reconstruction era of the 1950s, most western European countries experienced the first period of solid economic growth in the 1960s. Typically, this economic growth was accompanied by the construction of an extensive national welfare system, provided in each country by different coalitions of national organizations and/or governments (Esping-Andersen 1996; Le Galès 2002). For this reason, national actors – in different sorts of coalitions – have been more intensely involved in the evolution of urban policy frameworks than in the largely self-supportive urban systems of the USA. For the same reason, local governments in European countries were used to getting more support from national level for socially targeted urban strategies. With due regard for these conditional institutional differences, the same sort of social and economic fluctuations impregnated the frames of urban policymaking in Europe as in the USA: a trend towards economic growth in the 1960s, followed by an era of social contestation in the 1970s, and an entrepreneurial recovery since the early 1980s. Institutional differences become apparent and show how a disruptive adaptation to the entrepreneurial city was enabled under the Thatcher regime in the UK, while far more mitigated transformation occurred in countries such as Germany and France. However, the pressure for competition among urban regions under the current circumstances of a globalizing economy has become a universal tendency in European urban regions. Many urban regions have felt urged to quit internal quarrels and to generate more regional coherence and partnerships (public and private) in order to face the external inter-regional competition.

For most European regions, transformation of urban space at the regional level of scale is a new experience. It requires a structural reconfiguration of urban organization. Increasingly, large-scale urban and regional projects have been used to symbolize the transition to regionalization and the enhancement of external regional competitiveness. Often these projects are launched with multiple-purpose ambitions in order to symbolize the need for balancing economic, social and ecological goals at the regional level. The ambition is to promote the 'use value' of strategic projects instead of their 'commercial value' alone (Lefèbvre 1991). However, urban studies literature in Europe is rather sceptical about the real impact of these integrative ambitions so far. In a

Europe-wide investigation of 13 large-scale urban projects, Moulaert *et al.* (2001) observe a one-sided tendency towards the promotion of private economic interests. They also criticize the lack of democratic input and social orientation in new urban development policies, and the poor integration of large-scale urban projects in wider urban processes and planning systems (Moulaert *et al.* 2003; see also Graham and Marvin 2001). In the summary overview of a broad recent investigation into the change of cities in the UK, British researchers labelled the frequently referred to convergence of regional competitiveness, social cohesion and metropolitan governance a bit cynically as the 'new conventional wisdom', as they highlighted the many deviations from this gospel that can be found in urban-regional development practice (Buck *et al.* 2005). Other researchers warn against the hybris and the misleading use of information by interested groups that deliberately neglect the risks implied in initiating large-scale projects, resulting in an exceeding of the budgets during the course of project implementation. In this respect, the failure to frame consciously the coherence of projects and the quality of decision-making on behalf of large-scale operations is also alarming (Flyvbjerg *et al.* 2003). There has not yet been much comparative empirical investigation into this type of urban project in Europe, but the first outcomes provide evidence of a frequent gap between their integrative ambitions and their actual outcomes. We have been warned.

## Problem statement

Building on these analytical arguments, the problem statement of present comparative research into the framing of large-scale, multiple-purpose projects in seven European regions can be described in more definite terms. In the 1990s, large-scale and multiple-purpose urban projects were introduced in almost every urban region in Europe. These projects are expected to create new connections among the interdependent domains of societal, spatial and institutional change. We are interested in strategic urban projects that are explicitly the most ambitious of those of this generation. To be precise, the strategic projects selected for research are meant to pursue the following goals:

- first, to serve as the symbolic vehicles for a *balanced societal development* of a) the economic competitiveness of the urban region in a world of increasing inter-regional rivalry, b) the social coherence at new regional scale avoiding the risk of 'tunnelling', and c) the significant contribution to durable sustainability of the new urban region;
- second, in order to balance these integrative ambitions, exemplary urban projects are expected to amplify symbolically the new *spatial conditions* that enable a successful spatial transformation of the traditional urban system into a new regional configuration;
- third, governance conditions for the framing of these projects are expected to be responsive to the *institutional requirements* of democratic legitimacy.

This threefold ambition defines the almost perfect conditions for a 'mission impossible'. We do not expect to find projects that are completely successful in all respects. Rather, the outcomes will most likely be very differentiated and unbalanced, certainly in the current stage of urban transformation. Moreover, we may learn most precisely from observing the variation in framing strategies that are adopted to deal with these complex challenges, and from assessing their different degrees of success and failure. Successful innovation requires not only the negotiation or mitigation of contrasting social, economic or ecological interests, but also the convergence of these – in themselves quite different – societal aims and political action, bowling between the risk of being dominated by either the political or the economic side on the one hand, and the risk of becoming imprisoned in excessively close interrelationships of neo-corporatism on the other. The experiences of urban development demonstrate that the chances of running either into 'planning voluntarism' by local or regional government, or into the opposite but similarly unsatisfying position of 'one-sided market domination', are not at all merely hypothetical. Also, the above mentioned neo-corporatist trap of getting into public–private partnerships that combine their mutual real-estate interests in an 'iron coalition of mutual interest' is an extremely realistic one. Strategies that actively promote and enable innovative *democratic qualities* have to avoid the emergence of such closed bilateral games. This will not happen on the basis of hearings and institutionalized participation to public policymaking, but instead requires a cross-cutting of hegemony coalitions of decision-making and an active involvement of civic groups.

Successful strategies also presuppose the effective coordination of collective action in a fragmented urban-regional arena, which consists of the scattered, rather single-purpose, specific and sectoral interests of manifold public and private actors. They also presuppose a triumph over single-purpose coalitions of interests and power. Successful integration and innovation of collective preferences is neither self-evident nor easy to achieve at all. It requires *intelligent strategies of coordination and governance* in a world dominated by fragmentary coalitions of interests and power. It also requires *institutional innovation* by crossing through the barriers of the sector-minded, single-issue approaches typical of statutory territorial agencies.

According to these considerations, the challenges for the innovative framing of large-scale urban projects can be summarized as shown in Table 1.2.

### Analytical concept of framing

The frames that define the features of strategic urban projects in our case studies will be empirically investigated along the following three dimensions:

- a) the nature of *conceptual integration* among social–cultural, economic and sustainability perspectives;
- b) the nature of *strategic alliances*;
- c) the modes of *democratic legitimation*.



Table 1.2 Innovative dimensions in the framing of large-scale urban projects

<b>Aims</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• connecting the regional service economy with international economic networks (the purpose of regional <i>competitiveness</i>)</li> <li>• condensation of cultural, social and economic flows of activity in diverse and high standard, multi-nodal networks</li> <li>• balancing new urban patterns by development of mixed land use in selected nodes and environmental qualities</li> <li>• shaping the physical conditions for <i>balanced spatial</i> patterns (instead of tunnelling);</li> <li>• resulting in new diverse <i>use values</i> of urban space instead of the <i>exchange values</i> of purely commercial space</li> </ul>
<b>Context conditions</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• enlargement of scale and (trans-scalar) scope of urban activities</li> <li>• fragmentation of urban interests, inequality and conflicting coalitions of power</li> <li>• different sets of institutional conditions</li> </ul>
<b>Strategies/actions</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the convergence of economic and political action (in concept-building and in strategic alliance)</li> <li>• the coordination of public interests over partisans</li> <li>• strategies of active democratic innovation</li> <li>• practicing interconnected multi-level strategies</li> <li>• cutting through sector boundaries</li> </ul>

In practice, it may not always be easy to make a neat distinction between these three different dimensions of analysis as they form part of the same reality. However, an analytical distinction is necessary in order to detect the different structural elements of practices of framing and to assess their relative weight. For instance, it may be the case that the conceptual framing of projects, on the one hand, perfectly symbolizes the ambition of integrating different perspectives while, on the other hand, the arrangement of strategic alliances still supports a different agenda stemming from existing forms of organized power. Similarly, the arrangements of strategic alliance might, on the one hand, perfectly fit the conceptual framing of the project, but the joint capacities thus created might, on the other, lack the institutional quality of democratic legitimacy that is granted by an established institutional regime. By distinguishing among three different dimensions of framing, we can articulate our analysis to enable the possible detection of differentiated outcomes of framing practices.

### ***Conceptual integration***

Several political–economic studies into the role of large-scale urban projects criticize the hegemony of market forces in the conceptual framing of their strategic goals. We have previously discussed recent tendencies towards an era of neo-Liberalist entrepreneurialism, both in the USA and Europe. According to these interpretations, the commercial value of large-scale projects may be partly mitigated by social and ecological conditions, but its persistent dominance appears overt in the present stage of advanced capitalism.

It is important to take structural indicators into the analysis of local projects, but we have to adopt a cautious position in translating macro-level tendencies of social and economic systems to the micro-domains of urban projects. The interrelationships between structural tendencies at the macro-level and local processes at the micro-level are highly complex and changeable. First of all, macro tendencies in current processes of modernization take differentiated local forms, not only because of structural differences in urban regions – as previously argued with reference to different national institutions – but also because of the highly different impact of the same macro tendencies on different local situations. For instance, the macro-level tendency towards increasing hierarchy in the rescaling of financial trade services has a completely different impact on urban regions that are well situated in such rescaling operations than on urban regions that are not. In an era of increasing regional competitiveness, where sub-national economic spaces are considered as the most strategic vehicles for international competition between national states, we may expect that the largest strategic projects in urban systems are driven by the promotion of private economic interests. Still, there is a lot of variation in the local embodiment of such structural parameters. The commercial conceptualization of large-scaled projects may be purely dominated by promotion of private sector interests, but it may also be brought forward by the local or regional governments for other, substantive or political–electoral reasons, such as raising local income or raising the level of employment. Private sector commitment to specific spaces, conversely, is not self-evident at all places and at all times. Obviously, there even more variation can be found if we look at the particular spatio–temporal configuration of local projects.

The relevance of inquiring into this variation is, for our purposes, twofold. On the one hand, the way by which economic imperatives and commercial objectives are eventually incorporated and operationalized in a project may depend on the specific way social or cultural values are embedded in local political and civic culture. This may significantly affect the way an urban community deals with the meaning of urban space in arguing about and in justifying development choices. The nature of conceptual integration of projects can therefore differ substantially, and so the degree to which their goals actually do promote more the general ‘use values’ than just the commercial values. If so, a question that arises is: how are these integrative ambitions organized and symbolized in the process of project framing? On the other hand, the nature of coalition-building may be

highly affected by local political and civic culture. This bears important consequences on the capacity to build strategic alliances with economic stakeholders and to 'bind' supra-local interests to local and project-specific commitments, in order to establish effective ad hoc development coalitions. A related set of questions is hence: which strategic alliances are behind different integrative approaches to project framing? And how do different modes of urban-regional governance possibly affect the features of project framing?

By asking these questions, we intend to take structural tendencies into account in our scheme of analysis, but without postulating specific outcomes at the micro-level of urban projects on the basis of direct causal relationships with macro-level structural conditions. An analytical approach that is open to multi-dimensional variables is necessary in order to explore differences in the socio-spatial development of urban systems, as Lefèbvre (1991) pointed out analysing the city as *oeuvre*, as a total urban laboratory.

Frames of decision-making are conditioned by institutional factors and by implied power relations, but they also emerge, evolve and disappear in the fine grain of specific spatio-temporal contexts. The question of the *how and what of the dynamic process of concept formation and coalition-building under complex structural conditions* is at the heart of our research. Specific differences in local and regional responsiveness do matter, and recognizing them makes it possible to learn from a variety of situations and experiences. Urban and regional developmental contexts differ: in some cities, urban development is merely private-led and extremely single-purposed, while in other cities expansive capital investment is no longer accepted in the historical centre and new economic coalitions have to be forged on the outside edges of the core city. In some cities, expansive economic urban projects are embedded in cultural or integrative spatial planning strategies, while in yet other cities a successful mix of urban activities may be realized. Some cities are better than others in using the historical shape of the urban region as a framework for embedding new social and economic constructs. In conclusion, the challenge is to investigate how different trajectories are spatialized under specific structural conditions.

### **Strategic alliances**

The second crucial dimension in our scheme of analysis concerns the different potential of strategic alliances in large-scale projects in the new context of multi-actor and multilevel governance. In the modern era, strategic alliances can no longer be adequately analyzed in terms of territorially based action. In the introduction to this chapter, we already mentioned the extensive rescaling literature. Increasingly, decisions on the economic or social use of urban space are made in external networks and societal scopes that intersect urban territories. Cities face the international market place, as Savitch and Kantor (2002) conclude with respect to the asymmetric relationships between the global margins of market networks and the local policies in urban space. Moreover, social interaction – for instance, regarding the composition of the urban population and its high mutation

of in- and out-migration – reflects the increasing non place-bounded dynamics of urban space. Local government may respond actively to these changes of trans-local, social and economic interaction. See, for example, the search for encompassing and durable local regimes in regime theories, the significance of local and regional developmental policies and public choice theories (Peterson 1981, 1995), the quest for new trans-local leadership (Hambleton *et al.* 2002) and the potential of negotiated outcomes by local planners (Savitch and Kantor 2002). Local responsiveness certainly ‘does matter’ and may ‘make a difference’. However, a more structural consequence of the regional diversification of urban space is that local and regional governance itself need to address a diversification of dimensions for responsiveness. Here, we deliberately take a more multilevel perspective than is customary in local regime studies. By doing so, different styles of policymaking and planning may be investigated. In contrast to traditional debates on local planning and policymaking, within the new dynamic context, urban planning is no longer a matter of equipping local and regional policymakers with more territorial steering capacity, but instead requires strategic responses in terms of interconnectivity. The highest potential for strategic responsiveness lies not just in territorial capacities but in the robustness of trans-scalar connections in the relevant networks. The key to strategic planning in a context of multi level governance is in the quality of interconnectivity (Salet *et al.* 2003). Urban planning strategies have to connect different spheres of action: *private sector domains of action, interregional and international governmental spheres of action, and finally, the inner regional spheres of action.* We therefore consider these three dimensions in our frame of analysis.

Major urban projects have a world to win by multiplying the local scope of strategic planning studies and strategic policymaking. Regarding the framing of large-scale projects in urban Europe, we are particularly interested in the profile and intensity of *trans-regional, trans-national* and *international* relationships. How are these trans-regional spheres of action involved in the framing of large-scale urban projects, both with respect to the research agendas, the policy lobbies, and the final decision-making of the involved private and public actors? As the territorial jurisdictions of universal tiers of government usually do not match the increasing dynamics of social and economic interaction, increasingly formal and informal arrangements of interconnected governance have to be established as forms of cooperation and coalition building (public–public – i.e. intergovernmental – and public–private).

### ***Democratic legitimacy***

The final dimension of analysis concerns the institutional dimension of democratic legitimacy. Large-scale urban projects may fulfill a strategic role in setting conditions for the future only if citizens and all sorts of societal groups feel committed and actively represented in the processes of project framing. We previously observed that this dimension is rather sensible and that empirical findings in urban studies thus far are outspokenly sceptical about the democratic

Table 1.3 Dimensions of framing for comparative project evaluation

---

a) nature of conceptual integration:
combining multiple purposes
b) strategic alliances:
• private-sector alliances:
influences of economic networks and social and cultural activities on the decision-making of urban projects
• supra- and trans-regional strategic alliances in the public sector
• inner-metropolitan alliances among public and private actors
c) democratic legitimacy:
experiments in democratic deliberation and processes of institutional innovation

---

performance of large-scale urban projects (Moulaert *et al.* 2003). Formal methods of hearings and institutionalized participation cannot guarantee active commitment by different sectors and groups of population. We will therefore investigate whether and how far innovative democratic experiments are involved in these ambitious urban endeavours.

To summarize, the analytical framework for comparative research may be recapitulated in three dimensions of analysis and in their sub-articulation, as shown in Table 1.3. The outcomes of our investigation will be analysed according to these dimensions, providing the elements for evaluating the nature of framing practices in strategic urban projects.

### Selection of case studies

The case studies of the strategic urban projects are made in the context of the EU sponsored research program 'Competitive Metropolises' (COMET) that enabled the cooperation of academic researchers and professional end users from seven urban regions in Europe, namely Amsterdam, Barcelona, Berlin, Brussels, Copenhagen, Strasbourg, Vienna. In order to select strategic projects in these urban regions, the following indicators have been adopted:

- the cases should contain an area-based concentration of sophisticated service sector development (tertiary or quaternary services), which connects the regional economy with global economic networks. The volume of economic activity should be large enough to ensure a substantive impact on the competitiveness of the region. The quantitative indicator of at least 20,000 intended work places on location gives a more precise indication of the involved economic volume. A further indicator of the standard and the physical condensation of economic activity is the requirement of minimal 12 work-places per hectare;
- the area should represent a critical mass of location potential such that it can bear a considerable impact on the spatial and environmental organization of

the urban region. For this reason the *location conditions* of the area should be capable of supporting high level infrastructure connections and of combining multiple urban activities of different sorts;

- the selected projects may be at different stages of development, but the actual stage of preparation or construction should be advanced enough to ensure a conscientious analysis of the evolution of framing concepts, the coalitions of decision-making and the institutional dimension of democratic legitimacy.

We deliberately did not select ‘success stories’ (whether alleged or expected), and neither did we expect to find complete successes among our case studies, given the ambitious multidimensional scope of our analytical framework. On the contrary, some cases may be more successful than others in certain respects, but they are usually not successful in all respects. What we expected is rather a very differentiated set of situations, some being economically successful but rather one-sidedly ordered, others being successful in mobilizing the voice of civic groups and again other projects successful in joining economic, ecological and cultural goals of development. Some may demonstrate an alert responsiveness to the context of multi-actor and multilevel governance, where other projects are still a product of good old local or regional government. Therefore, a variety of practical experiences is to be expected, most of them being successful in some respects but lagging behind in others. We may learn both from unsatisfying practices and from successful experiences.

The following projects were selected:

- Amsterdam: *Plan Zuidas*
- Barcelona: *Universal Forum of Cultures 2004*
- Berlin: *Adlershof*
- Brussels: *Tour & Taxis*
- Copenhagen: *Ørestad*
- Strasbourg: *Parc d’Innovation d’Illkirch*
- Vienna: *Erdberger Mais*

A structured questionnaire served as guide for the analysis of the case studies. Furthermore, some 80 interviews were held with key figures in the seven city regions in order to deepen the understanding of the analytical findings. The interviewees were selected from the private sector, the governmental sector, the non-governmental sector (i.e. functional organizations, or quangos (quasi administrative non-governmental agencies)) related to urban economic and spatial development, such as railway companies, infrastructure management agencies, port authorities, land management agencies, housing associations), and finally the interviews also included well-informed people from civil society (academic circles, press, community groups).

## References

- Altshuler, A. and Luberoff, D. (2003) *Mega-projects: The Changing Politics of Urban Public Investment*, Washington DC: Brookings Institutions Press.
- Amin, A. and Thrift, N. (2002) *Cities: Reimagining the Urban*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Ascher, F. (1995) *Métapolis; ou l'avenir des villes*, Paris: Odile Jacob.
- Ascher, F. (2001) *Les Nouveaux Principes de l'Urbanisme*, La Tour d'Aigues: Éditions de l'Aube.
- Bourdin, A. (2005) *La Métropole des Individus*, La Tour d'Aigues: Éditions de l'Aube.
- Brenner, N. (2004) 'Urban governance and the production of new state spaces in Western Europe, 1960–2000', *Review of International Political Economy*, 11, 3: 447–488.
- Buck, N., Gordon, I., Harding, A. and Turok, I. (2005) *Changing Cities, Rethinking Urban Competitiveness, Cohesion and Governance*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cox, K. (ed.) (1997) *Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local*, New York: Guilford.
- DiGaetano, A. and Klemanski, J.S. (1999) *Power and City Governance: Comparative Perspectives on Urban Development*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Elkin, S.L. (1985) *City and Regime in the American Republic*, Chicago, Chicago University Press.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (ed.) (1996) *Welfare States in Transition*, London: Sage.
- Fainstein, S.S., Child Hill, R., Judd, D., and Smith, M.P. (1983) *Restructuring the City: The Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment*, New York: Longman.
- Frieden, B. and Sagalyn, L. (1989) *Downtown Inc.: How America Rebuilds Cities*, Boston: MIT Press.
- Flyvbjerg, B., Bruzelius, N. and Rothengatter, W. (2003) *Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Graham, S. and Marvin, S. (2001) *Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructure, Technological Mobilities, and the Urban Condition*, London: Routledge.
- Hambleton, R., Savitch, H. and Stewart, M. (2002) *Globalism and Local Democracy*, New York: Palgrave.
- Healey, P. (2004) 'The treatment of space and place in the new strategic spatial planning in Europe', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 28, 1: 45–67.
- Healey, P. (2006) 'Relational complexity and the imaginative power of strategic spatial planning', *European Planning Studies*, 14, 4: 525–546.
- Hoover, E.M. and Vernon, R. (1959) *Anatomy of a Metropolis*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Jouve, B. and Lefevre, C. (eds) (2002) *Métropoles ingouvernables? Les villes européennes entre globalisation et décentralisation*, Paris: Elsevier.
- Lefebvre, H. (1991) *The Production of Space*, London: Blackwell.
- Le Galès, P. (2002) *European Cities: Social Conflict and Governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Logan, J. and Molotch, H. (1987) *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place*, Berkeley CA: University of California Press.
- Moulaert, F., Swyngedouw, E. and Rodriguez, A. (2001) 'Social polarization in metropolitan areas', *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 8, 2: 99–102.

- Moulaert, F., Rodriguez, A. and Swyngedouw, E. (2003) (eds) *The Globalised City: Economic Restructuring and Social Polarization in European Cities*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Newman, P. and Herrschel, T. (2002) *Governance of Europe's City Regions*, London: Routledge.
- Rusk, D. (1999) *Inside Game Outside Game*, Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press.
- Peterson, P.E. (1981) *City Limits*, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Peterson, P.E. (1995) *The Price of Federalism*, Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press.
- Salet, W., Thornley, A. and Kreukels, A. (2003) *Metropolitan Governance and Spatial Planning: A Comparative Study of European City-Regions*, London: Routledge/Spon.
- Savitch, H.V. and Kantor, P. (2002) *Cities in the International Marketplace: The Political Economy of Urban Development in North America and Western Europe*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Sieverts, T. (2003) *Cities without Cities: Between Place and World, Space and Time, Town and Country*, London: Routledge.
- Sieverts, T., Koch, M., Stein, U. and Steinbusch, M. (2005) *Zwischenstadt – Inzwischen Stadt?* Wuppertal: Verlag Müller & Busmann.
- Stone, C.N. (1989) *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946–1988*, Lawrence KA: University of Kansas Press.
- Swyngedouw, E. (2004) 'Globalisation or "glocalisation"? Networks, territories and rescaling', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 17, 1: 25–48.



## 2 Institutional capacity and planning milieux in European urban regions

### An introduction to the case studies

*Enrico Gualini and Willem Salet*

#### Introduction

The purpose of the research presented in this volume is to find out how decision-making processes in urban regions are framed in order to achieve innovative urban developments. The focus is on a systematic comparison of experiences with strategic urban development projects. Their analysis and critical assessment is based on a complex set of dimensions of institutional capacity-building that are deemed crucial for the achievement of integrated urban quality goals.

A key assumption on which this approach is based is that the framing of large urban projects has to be understood in a context of changing *spatial* and *institutional* conditions. The two aspects are mutually connected in two ways. On the one hand, changing patterns of urbanity challenge the capacity of governmental institutions to meet emerging needs, demands and claims, and to develop adequate capacities for responsiveness and reflexivity. On the other hand, given the highly path-dependent character and the resistance to change of formal institutional settings in local and regional government, constraints to jurisdictional reforms and to competence reallocation significantly limit the scope of actions available to governmental institutions in urban regions to meet such responsiveness and reflexivity requirements. Against this background, recourse to integrated and actively promoted area-based spatial development initiatives is frequently seen and advocated as a measure for overcoming situations of formal decision-making deadlock and coordination constraints. It is hence on the broader background of the institutional conditions in which spatial development practices take place that the strategic and operational framing of urban development projects must be understood and critically evaluated.

The present chapter is intended to contribute to an analysis of these issues. It is primarily meant to support the systematic comparison of experiences with large urban development projects with a cross-sectional evaluation of institutional conditions for innovative urban and planning practices in the urban regions which host our seven case studies. The purpose is to place the studies in the broader framework of conditions for institutional change with which local forms of action are confronted.

### **Scope and methodology of analysis**

The overview presented in this chapter focuses on the institutional conditions for the development and implementation of spatial strategies and policies in urban regions, which are intended to be key dimensions of 'local' institutional capacity. The main objective is to explore the interrelationship between the formulation of a spatial policy with a strategic meaning for urban-regional development, and the institutional arrangements that enable the effective governance and implementation of spatial decision-making processes. The questions it addresses can be summarized as follows:

- which institutional settings are available for integrated and coordinated decision-making in the urban regions analysed?
- which relationships do such institutional settings at the level of the urban region have with the formation of spatial concepts and with their implementation?

The institutional focus adopted in addressing these questions entails two complementary components of analysis:

- a structural component, i.e. the analysis of long-term, stable and formalized patterns of administrative, statutory, financial relationships and of organizational conditions which influence the formation of concepts and the behavioural patterns of interaction between the parties involved (e.g. their 'regime' characteristics). In terms of structural conditions, the main question is how far extant institutional settings effectively correspond to the spatial challenges and to the policymaking conditions of urban regions;
- a process component, i.e. the analysis of the evolutionary patterns of interaction between the parties and of the organization of interaction processes. In terms of processes, the main question is which additional options exist for fostering coordination of public-private initiatives that may enhance creative solutions within highly differentiated urban-regional power structures.

As the institutional contexts of the seven urban regions involved are significantly different, conditions for innovation and coordination strategies may differ greatly from region to region. For this reason, a typology of different institutional conditions is adopted as a framework for analysing the specificity of each context. The challenges that are specific to each type are discussed in a short analysis of its strengths and weaknesses. In a further step, an analysis is presented of how the urban regions involved in our case studies cope with these challenges in their economic and spatial planning strategies. Finally, the implications for planning and coordination strategies related to large urban projects are briefly explored.

The comparative framework adopted for this purpose is based on an analysis of the combination of institutional, political, and socio-economic factors and of their specific structured patterns of relations involved in each specific situation.<sup>1</sup>

An investigation was conducted within the context of each case study on the basis of a unitary methodology, based on multidimensional sets of indicators and descriptors.<sup>2</sup> These may be grouped as follows according to their focus and methodological approach:

- institutional context and governmental capacity;
- governance and planning milieu;
- economic and spatial development strategies.

### ***Institutional context and governmental capacity***

The first set of indicators refers to the institutional conditions for ‘governmental capacity’ in the urban regions object of this study. A first dimension of analysis relates to patterns of governmental relationships that define the context for planning and policymaking in urban regions. The analysis includes a reference to changes which occurred in the structure of government in the period reviewed, highlighted as discrete ‘shifts’ in formal–legal frameworks. A distinction is then introduced between two analysis components:

- the specific formal–legal structure of intergovernmental relationships defined by the constitutional system;
- the specific forms of government devised to address urban-regional issues.

A further dimension relates to patterns of relative financial dependence of autonomy enjoyed by local governments in urban regions, expressed by reference to the concept of ‘financial capacity’. The overall dimensions analysed are, therefore, the following:

- a intergovernmental framework: central-local governmental and administrative relationships;
- b government in the urban region;
- c financial capacity of the urban region.

### ***Governance and planning milieu***

The second set of indicators relates to the nature of policy responses given to problems of regulation, coordination, and strategic orientation at metropolitan scale that include but go beyond the competencies or capacities of formal–legal governmental and administrative structures. With reference to current debates focusing on the notion of ‘governance’<sup>3</sup> – intended as a challenge of coordination and joint action among public and private actors in the pursuit of mutual goals – this implies a focus on aspects of the political environment like the ability to promote cooperative approaches to problem solving and to strategy formulation. The dimensions analysed in this respect are the following:

- d political environment in the urban region;
- e planning conditions and planning milieu in the urban region.

### ***Economic and spatial development strategies***

The third set of indicators addresses the specific measures and strategies adopted in the respective situations in order to cope with the spatial and economic effects of development processes. The dimensions analysed are grouped as follows:

- f economic development policy in the urban region;
- g spatial planning in the urban region.

This section is complemented by a review of the latest developments and of the nature of innovative practices which deal with the active steering of developments in the urban regions analysed. In this part, based on qualitative analyses, particular attention is devoted to publicly led or publicly promoted projects and to the specific institutional, political, and operational conditions affecting their prospects of success or failure.

### ***Strengths and weaknesses of governments in urban regions***

The last section comprises a summary evaluation of findings regarding the 'governance capacity' of the urban regions which are the object of this study. In particular, the focus is on steering economic and spatial development processes. This evaluation is based on a typification of steering conditions recognized in the different situations, and leads to the introduction of a number of hypotheses concerning the expected effects on the framing of strategic urban development projects. According to this typification of given conditions in intergovernmental relationships, political climate, and strategic ability, situations in the urban regions analysed are contrasted with the potential for innovation represented by 'best practices' and by their application to defined context conditions.

## **Institutional context and governmental capacity**

### ***A typology of intergovernmental relationships***

The first two sets of indicators adopted in our analysis of institutional conditions and planning milieux are targeted at an analysis of the formal-legal structure of government in the urban regions which are the object of this research. The main objective is to identify the specific patterns of governmental relationships that define the context for planning and policymaking in the contexts analysed. Such patterns can be seen as the combined result of two aspects:

- the specific forms of central-local intergovernmental relationships defined by the constitutional system;

- the specific forms of government devised for addressing urban-regional issues.

Starting with central–local governmental relationships, it is important to note the shift which occurred relative to the strong position held by national governments in local and regional policies throughout Europe in the first decades after the Second World War. Constitutionally, the Napoleonic unitary states were dominant on the European continent until far into the 1970s, with the notable exception of the federal states (Germany and Austria). In the differently structured British constituency the national government also adopted a strong position. It is no wonder that the central government has such a crucial impact almost everywhere in the context of building up the national welfare systems (with a strong effect on urban-regional strategies). The national patterns and political cultures differed everywhere, but even in liberal Britain the central state was directly involved in metropolitan planning strategies and this was even more evident in the various corporatist and unitary traditions on the Continent. The match between constitution and national involvement in planning practices has proven to be problematic particularly in federal regimes such as Western Germany (with its highly autonomous states and the resulting complex system of federal ‘joint decision-making’). However, the dominant unitary constitutions served the purpose of ongoing active national involvement well.

Since the mid 1970s, however, this pattern has drastically changed. Obviously, national governments are still well equipped, both constitutionally and in policy practices, but intergovernmental relationships have become far less one-sidedly dominated by the national governments. A substantial differentiation has developed in the last decades in intergovernmental relationships, featuring a stronger and more direct influence by European and other supra-national competencies and policy programmes, as well as a simultaneous increase in the direct involvement of local and meso-governments. All former Napoleonic regimes (with roots in the 1800s) have devolved policy competences to local and meso-governments. Some constitutions have even been turned into federal or quasi-federal systems, most notably in the cases of Belgium and Spain although most constitutions are somewhere in between. The public policy literature of the 1980s and early 1990s reflected the high expectations generated by the prospect of the rise of meso-government (Meny 1982; Sharpe 1993, 1995). It has now become clear that attempts at constitutional change and related ongoing experiments of reform have to be considered as specific to highly differentiated institutional regimes as well as local contexts (Lefèvre 1999; Jouve and Lefèvre 2002; Le Galès 2002; Salet *et al.* 2003).

In the context of our research, it is therefore crucial to focus on the different sorts of relationships between local and meso-level government at the scale of the urban region. Accordingly, the following types can be distinguished (cf. Salet *et al.* 2003):

- *unitary urban regions*, i.e. jurisdictions combining local and meso-level government status at the urban-regional scale;
- *hierarchical dualism*, i.e. a duality of local and meso-level government within a framework of urban-regional hierarchy;
- *dualism with a 'mediating region'*, i.e. a duality of local and meso-level government with a mediating position for urban-regional jurisdictions.

Obviously, these three ideal-types can be further differentiated, for instance by including considerations related to functional organization, polycentric patterns of organization, different forms of cooperation between governments, etc. The flexible use of additional forms of organization is becoming more and more urgent as territorial boundaries of local and meso-governments no longer match the pace of spatial dynamics. Moreover, urban government itself may as well be articulated into several (mainly two) tiers – often called 'upper-tier' and 'lower-tier' – of local government, as happens to be the case in a number of the selected case studies. Nonetheless, it is useful to focus attention here, in the first instance, on the basic patterns of intra-regional and extra-regional governmental relationships – as defined above – each of which has its own typical impacts on strategies of planning coordination. Before reverting to our empirical findings, we will briefly sketch the typical potentials and the typical challenges of each type.

### ***Government in urban regions: strengths and weaknesses of different types***

#### *Unitary urban regions*

Unitary urban regions are the result of an assimilation of local governments of large cities with the status of meso-level jurisdictions. Apparently, this typology is closest to the ideal-type of a consolidated unitary urban-regional government as in the 'metropolitan reform' tradition. In reality, examples of quasi-identification between meso-level and local government are exceptional, are seldom the result of recent institutional reforms, and are more often the expression of path-dependent institutional conditions.

In fact, although internal fragmentation within urban regions is frequently considered a problem, unitary models are only seldom put forward as the remedy. This is due to the high political salience of attempts to reform territorial jurisdictions, and is also down to the lessons stemming from the failures or, at best, the mixed results achieved during a decade of experiences in Europe. Significantly, unitary urban-regional governments are politically highly contested arrangements and are highly sensitive to shifts in political preferences. This is reflected in the history of many European cities since the 1970s as well as in recent reform approaches – as in the Netherlands, where the creation of 'urban provinces' for Amsterdam and six other major Dutch cities has been abandoned due to a lack of popular support in the mid 1990s.

Considered as an ideal-type, urban-regional arrangements like these are characterized by an endowment with the meso-level status which significantly

empowers the urban region with respect to key planning and service provision functions. Regional and local government tasks are united, and only smaller-scale problems and issues are dealt with by administrative decentralization. The obvious advantage of such a unitary model is that amenities at the level of the urban region may be arranged from an overarching level of authority. Even if a tendency towards technocratic solutions arises, conditions are, in principle, favourable for the attainment of regional economies of scale. This bypasses the problem relating to the distribution of competencies and related resources among a meso-level regional government and a local government 'extended' to the scale of the urban region – a problem typical of dualistic systems.

In turn, however, problems in intergovernmental relationships are often only displaced to the borders of the unitary urban region, where they then require more or less voluntaristic coordination efforts among formally (quasi-)equal and hence non-hierarchically related jurisdictions. Typical problems with unitary models may arise if they get either too large to enable efficiency and legitimacy (raising problems of internal cohesion, degree of control, and democratic accountability), or too small to match the increasing spatial dynamics outside their boundaries. This may result in problematic internal and external relations. In the former perspective, this may lead to the introduction of a new duality at local level, with the establishment of a two-tier system of urban government based on principles of functional decentralization and democratization that may, in turn, generate internal coordination problems at the level of the urban region. In the latter case, there is a risk of surrounding areas becoming unwilling to cooperate with the dominating urban jurisdiction. Precisely the size and dynamics of the unitary urban region may hamper the emergence of shared perceptions of policy problem and even often favour the pursuit of contrasting interests. Given the absence of a mediating region, this may result in the emergence of structural constraints on coordination and the reinforcement of mutually competitive relationships among jurisdictions. Consequently, the unitary model may prove inflexible in its external relations and strategies.

#### UNITARY URBAN REGIONS: BERLIN AND VIENNA

As mentioned above, unitary urban regions are mainly the result of historical developments that are highly specific to the political–institutional history of each territorial situation. Moreover, the extent to which it is possible to talk of a unitary pattern of urban-regional government is therefore also a matter of scale, and is dependent on the broader nested hierarchy among territorial jurisdictions of the state.

Two very striking examples of the factors at play in this type of urban region are related to the jurisdictions bearing the status of 'city-states' or 'city-provinces', as in the cases of Berlin and Vienna.

A particular case of an historical unitary type is represented by *Berlin*, a city-state with an urban-regional planning tradition dating back to 1919. Until recently, the territory of the city-state of Berlin was so extended as to encompass

its actual urban-regional dynamics, thus justifying its comparison to the actual urban region. The considerable size of Greater Berlin and the size of its population have, in turn, encouraged the empowerment of local districts. The districts have acquired a degree of status and autonomy (e.g. in fiscal matters) that has progressively strengthened the city's two-tier system of government, but has also gradually led to the emergence of some sort of internal dualism. At the same time, new dynamics developing outside the territorial boundaries of Greater Berlin have raised new questions of coordination. Urban-regional development exploded after the fall of the Iron Curtain in the early 1990s and caused Berlin to search for new scales of cooperation.

Both Berlin and Vienna have clear boundaries separating them from the surrounding meso-level jurisdiction. As no form of government is in place to either mediate or hierarchically shape intergovernmental relationships in the urban region, intergovernmental relationships are characterized typically by the dominance of the city-state attempting to cooperate with its neighbouring territorial jurisdictions. In such cases, initiatives based on cooperation are mostly established in experimental, loosely organized and weakly institutionalized forms, often on an *ad hoc* basis.

Establishing a truly urban-regional dimension of government is particularly problematic in Berlin due to the history of the city and of its particular status in the federal system. Political proposals for merging two federal states of Berlin and Brandenburg were turned down by a referendum in 1995, highlighting a lack of popular support due to the extreme asymmetries between the urban and the rural state. The negative vote of the electorate of Brandenburg was an expression of distrust of the imbalance of power resulting from Berlin's trends in urban expansion. What has since become apparent is the lack of viable flexible alternatives to the unitary model in dealing with external relations. Current development issues are only partially addressed by joint spatial planning efforts between the states of Berlin and Brandenburg, and no overarching arrangement whatsoever is in place dealing with emergent agglomeration issues.

The same applies to the case of the city-province of Vienna. Here also, a dominant central agglomeration with a special meso-level status is confronted with a dynamics of development that increasingly overarches its boundaries and involves the territory of the neighbouring provinces of Lower Austria and Burgenland. Relationships among territorial jurisdictions are subject to increasing competition for development at the urban-regional fringe, an issue only partially tackled through special purpose intergovernmental cooperation arrangements in spatial planning among Vienna, Lower Austria and Burgenland. Conditions for joint cooperative planning strategies are vulnerable in this institutional context, and do not constitute a guarantee for concrete and stable mutual commitments in matters affecting inter-municipal or inter-jurisdictional cooperation.



*Hierarchical dualism*

Dualistic relationships between meso-level and local government are also mostly the result of long-term historical processes, and are more frequently found than unitary patterns since they are representative of a 'nested' conception of territorial jurisdictions that characterized the formation of state structures in many European countries.

In the case of *hierarchical dualism*, meso-level governments are well equipped. This is not uncommon in federal or quasi-federal systems, where the power of the federation is rooted in the autonomy of regional entities or states. The single meso-level governments may or may not use their hierarchical position in dealing with local government. The practice of government often sensibly differs from formal constitutional positions, allowing a significant degree of flexibility.

As an ideal-type, the model of hierarchical dualism offers favourable conditions for a differentiation of public policies. Strongly equipped regions, regional provinces or regional states usually have their own legal powers, financial resources (e.g. taxation or fixed shares) and strong autonomy. Furthermore, under certain conditions hierarchy can be a solution to coordination problems. While fragmented local authorities may face problems in coordinating planning strategies beyond their territorial reach, some regional authorities easily over-arch the spatial dynamics of urban-regional development and are therefore in a hierarchical position to address coordination efforts in matters concerning urban regions.

Hierarchical dualism, on the other hand, also implies some typical political risks that may counter functional coordination rationales. Among these, a key factor is political localism. Regional polities may channel relationships between local governments and other public agencies too narrowly. Local polities, and typically those of major cities, do not like to be curbed in their ambitions and claims by representatives from meso-level governments. Conflicts of this kind are quite likely to arise in the context of nested hierarchical relationships. Political divisions between urban and regional electorates, and asymmetries in financial resources, may enhance these conflicts as well. In this model, whether bottom-up processes of urban agglomeration are stimulated or instead hampered also usually depends on the preferences of meso-level governments themselves. It is therefore not surprising that the recent history of urban regions of this type is characterized by ongoing political struggles for governmental autonomy and reform.

## HIERARCHICAL-DUALISTIC REGIONS: BARCELONA AND BRUSSELS

Within a 'nested' constitutional set-up of territorial jurisdictions, dualistic hierarchical relationships are also highly resilient to change, and the political-institutional forces behind them have very often proved to be decisive in contrasting more functionally minded approaches to jurisdictional reform.

A good example of this model is the relationship between *Barcelona* and *Catalonia*. The regional context is characterized by a strong urban-regional

polarization, with a clear dominance of the Barcelona agglomeration. Significantly, until recent events, Catalonia was also characterized by a distinct polarization of the political environment, both externally and internally, with the regional and the urban polity representing distinct sets of interests within a common orientation to more regional autonomy *vis-à-vis* the central state. Therefore, bottom-up processes at the level of the urban region traditionally lack support by the regional state. The state, in turn, is not capable of implementing its strategic policies in the region itself. Since the abolition of a formal comprehensive metropolitan government, the territory of the urban region has been described in a polycentric way by municipalities and territorial districts, with a range of associative special purpose arrangements dealing with sectoral policy issues. This structure defines a basically polycentric setting. Three main bodies deal with crucial urban-regional issues, namely an associative inter-municipal arrangement (the Mancomunitat de Municipis, a voluntary association with – among others – spatial planning tasks, created by the Catalan regional government) and two sectoral bodies, the Entitat del Transport (Transportation Council) and the Entitat del Medi Ambient (Environment Council). Both have jurisdiction over a territory defined according to membership rather than to a comprehensive definition of their spatial range of influence, and are endowed with limited autonomy and democratic legitimacy.

The federalization of the Belgian state has introduced a new, constitutionally autonomous region into Brussels' fragmented inter-municipal arena. In this respect, we cannot formally talk of a hierarchical set-up in the case of Brussels. However, the Brussels Capital Region in fact covers only part of Brussels' metropolitan dynamics. As a consequence, Brussels currently also represents a particularly fragmented situation. Indeed, federalization has not structurally changed previous patterns of relationships in the urban region, but has rather brought more complexity into the equation as more institutional actors have a stake. The federalization of the three Belgian *Régions* (Brussels-Capital, Wallonia and Flanders) introduced since the 1980s has put the region of Brussels in between the two regions that share with it the territory of the Brussels urban region. Furthermore, besides the territorial jurisdictions, the *Communauté Flamande* and the *Communauté Française* also contribute to the governmental complexity of the area. The absence of an overarching metropolitan authority means Brussels basically has a shared-power setting involving different independent jurisdictions with competencies and interests on the Brussels region, albeit with a main centre represented by the Brussels Capital Region.

#### *Dualism with a 'mediating region'*

The institutional meaning of regions in the third type is based on its communicative and coordinative position. These regions are not very well equipped with legislative powers, financial resources and other sources of policy production, but they operate as 'in-between' governmental agencies (either in the form of regions or provinces or of more *ad hoc* constructs) in order to articulate

national-level policies according to local–regional differences and to coordinate supra-local strategies. In this model, powers of implementation are firmly rooted at the local and national level, while in-between regions act as subtle brokers of coordination. Where a certain degree of delegation of competencies to the ‘mediating region’ from either the local or the meso-level of government is introduced, this is mostly embedded in a cooperative pattern of relationships that safeguards local autonomy, and in which consensual rules of decision are applied.

The advantages offered by this type of region resemble, to a certain degree, those of hierarchical regions in connecting the different levels of government. However, whereas hierarchical regions may rely on power and resources, ‘mediating regions’ must depend mainly on means of communication, persuasion, strategic reasoning, and on the capacity of linking policies and of preparing supra-local planning perspectives according to a shared strategic vision. A major threat for mediating regions is, accordingly, that of being pushed aside or hegemonically dominated in their acting by stronger operational governmental powers (like national sectoral agencies which are key in the implementation of national policies, as well as strong local governments which can play a key role in defining the development agenda in urban agglomerations). Major cities in particular do not always recognize the need for regional mediation. Nonetheless, and despite being highly dependent on political negotiations, the ‘mediating region’ model is a very subtle one, enabling flexible and creative solutions within as well as extending beyond jurisdictional boundaries. Accordingly, it is central to experiences of ‘new regionalism’ that reflect a shift towards more problem-oriented and strategic approaches to the governance of urban regions.

The impact of intervening variables of the institutional environment – such as the distributive policies, functional competencies, fiscal autonomy, and socio-cultural and political–electoral conditions – as well as the specific context-dependent articulation of typical urban-regional challenges – such as urban-regional relationships – play an important role in defining the scope and possibilities of this model. Accordingly, this ideal-type is the least amenable to generalized descriptions, and requires a differentiated analysis of specific institutional constellations and sources of governmental capacity in dealing with the specific problem definitions found in different urban regions. However, that which defines it is the assumption of meso-level governmental tasks within a pre-vaillingly coordinative and mediating framework, performed by intentionally ‘light’ and weakly institutionalized entities.

#### DUALISM WITH ‘MEDIATING REGIONS’: AMSTERDAM, STRASBOURG, COPENHAGEN

Relationships between local and meso-level governments in *Amsterdam* have reverted to a provinces–municipalities dualism after the failure to merge the two governmental tiers into a newly established ‘urban province’ in the mid 1990s. Given the unitary decentralized character of the Dutch state, the relationship is, in formal–institutional terms, subsidiaritarian with the province in a mainly supervising role. However, due to the traditionally strong political position of

Amsterdam and due to the weakness of institutional tasks of the Dutch provinces, formal relations are not a significant determinant of policymaking for the Amsterdam region. In fact, the institutional meaning of the province of North-Holland lies mainly in its mediating role. However, it is a rather weak and vulnerable role and – unlike, for instance, the case of Copenhagen – it is neither strongly backed by the city of Amsterdam nor by national departments. As a result, provincial competencies in strategic spatial planning for the city of Amsterdam have long since been devolved to the city itself, whose structure plan has the same status as a provincial plan. As a consequence, the province is much less well equipped to exert a coordinating, let alone proactive role in the Amsterdam urban region than it is to coordinate its exurban and rural areas. Moreover, after the demise of the city-province option, an important factor of renewal has been introduced through the acknowledgment of the need for flexible governance solutions in the urban region. Since the mid 1990s, matters of urban-regional coordination outside the city borders have been managed through an inter-municipal cooperation arrangement, the Regionaal Orgaan Amsterdam (ROA), which took over partial tasks and competencies as well as budget management functions from the provincial government insofar as the urban region of Amsterdam is concerned. While being endowed with limited sectoral competences, the ROA has been also entrusted with the task of drafting a regional structure plan for the Amsterdam agglomeration. On the level of strategic policy formation, various informal relationships between municipalities have also emerged, signalling the need for forms of strategic consultation organized on a more flexible cooperative basis. These have progressively stabilized in the form of a voluntary associative initiative, the Regionale Samenwerking Amsterdam (RSA), and of the regular conduct of regional conferences at the scale of the ‘north-wing’ of the Randstad. The latter have, in particular, become an important inter-municipal platform for negotiating local interests with central state administrations at the macro-regional scale. As a result, the mediating functions of the province are being progressively backed to a large extent by *ad hoc*, consensual inter-municipal arrangements, in which provincial authorities are nonetheless formally involved.

*Strasbourg* also presents a dual relationship with a meso-level government exerting a mediating role. The French regions are institutionally not well equipped for a proactive role in promoting and implementing policies but, since 1986, have developed an important role as strategic communicative and coordinative agencies. The urban-regional arena is moreover filled with associative bottom-up approaches promoted or supported by communities and departments. The regional meso-level government does not cover the whole urban region with its cross-border pattern of 141 French and 51 German municipalities and numerous inter-municipal arrangements (involving 130 of the 141 municipalities on the French side). The Strasbourg area features a polycentric bottom-up pattern in which an important element of urban-regional cohesion is represented by the establishment of various public functional entities (the *établissements publics* – EPCI), to which local authorities may delegate or transfer certain competencies.

The Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg (comprising 27 municipalities including Strasbourg) is such an EPCI as well as its spatial planning agency (ADEUS) and the inter-municipal French–German syndicate for the joint development of the area. However, the strategic coordination role played by the mediating regional government at the level of the urban region should not be underestimated. A crucial factor of intergovernmental coordination is represented by the comprehensive institutional system of contractual relationships (between the state and the regions) which has recently been strengthened and extended to regional and local planning issues by the 1999–2001 planning and local administration reforms. The central state recognized the strategic meaning of the mediating regions and is increasingly using this tier of government to arrange an urban-regional consensus.

The solution recently adopted in *Copenhagen* may be described as a dualistic relationship of the ‘mediating region’ type, as it is defined by the superimposition of a metropolitan special purpose agency on existing local jurisdictions. The reform introduced in 1999 stems, in fact, from a need for strategic cooperation among the five counties and the 50 municipalities within these counties. These include the two dominant cities of Copenhagen and Frederiksberg, both of which have the status of county and which form the urban region of the Danish capital. The Greater Copenhagen Authority (Hovedstadens Udviklingsråd), which was established by the national government and which has been operating since 2000, is a special purpose authority with rather comprehensive competencies in spatial planning (with a focus on transport planning, economic development and cultural activities), including the development of the Øresund region and strategic economic cooperation with Sweden. The authority has developed into an important consensual intergovernmental mode of policy making, but one without direct representation and fiscal autonomy. The double backing of the urban-regional authority – by both national government and the local and county governments involved – enables a very strategic use of this vulnerable mediating organization type. The elegant additional construction of strategic cooperation with the adjoining Swedish region demonstrates the flexibility of this type of arrangement in outward-oriented strategies.

To conclude, the differentiation between local and meso-level governmental relationships is useful in sorting out the different sorts of structural or conditional challenges to spatial and economic strategies of urban-regional planning and coordination. As our case studies also show, administrative boundaries never adequately fit the actual dynamics of spatial development in urban regions. As a result, polycentric and associative initiatives of urban-regional coordination are emerging in various forms in every case. They reflect attempts to create new responses to new demands for coordination, but also often result in suboptimal synergy. The challenge of spatial and economic planning strategies appears, more than ever, to be that of prudently enabling more effective and flexible approaches by connecting the different spheres of action involved in urban-regional development.

### **Financial capacity**

In analysing the 'financial capacity' of urban regions, an important aspect to be taken into account – besides the influence of national fiscal frameworks, which is still significant – is whether a significant connection may be found between financial resource management and patterns of governmental relationships. This may be the case in terms of an almost homomorphic reproduction of governmental relationships in fiscal terms but also, occasionally, in terms of the adoption of specific compensatory measures that alter this pattern.

The first case – although always translated into highly specific forms – is typical of situations in which a distinctive dualistic pattern of relationships characterizes the institutions involved in urban-regional government, in the absence of significant intermediate institutional arrangements, as in *Berlin* and in *Vienna*.

According to its internal two-tier structure of local government, the pattern of fiscal policy in the city of *Berlin* is decentralized. Since 1995, fiscal decentralization has been extended and there has been an increase in the power to raise taxes in the districts. This is reflected by the current distribution of local revenues. While transfers and shared taxes (mostly based on income taxes) each amount to about one third of overall revenues, a very low percentage (4.2) is derived from taxes at the level of the city of *Berlin*, whereas this source represents over 13 per cent at district level, with a dominance of income and business taxes (about 36 per cent of local district taxes) and property taxes (20 per cent). An extremely high component of revenues (over 26 per cent) is made up of user fees and charges, which are usually functionally earmarked.

On the other hand, *Berlin's* fiscal situation reproduces the dualism already noticed at the level of territorial government. While no arrangements for shared revenues are in place between the two federal states, in general terms, Brandenburg exhibits a strong and increasing dependence on business tax, amounting to about 37 per cent of the total, to which processes of suburbanization of business and services in the *Berlin* agglomeration clearly contribute a great deal. Furthermore, by adding to this almost 'island-like' pattern of dualism, while surrounding regions benefit from full coverage by EU Structural Funds, *Berlin* benefits only partially from coverage under Objective 1 (transitional coverage in eastern neighbourhoods) and Objective 2. Conversely, however, as the federal republic's capital, *Berlin* does enjoy special privileges with regard to accessing central governmental investments, particularly in sectors related to strengthening its accessibility and its diplomatic and cultural-tourist function.

These observations together are testament to an increasing pattern of dependence of the city, which is seemingly at odds with endogenously generating revenues in the face of extremely high investments in urban renewal and improvements. This pattern is an important explanation for the financial troubles currently affecting *Berlin*, which has suffered a dramatic fiscal crisis since the late 1990s.

With regard to fiscal issues, *Vienna* also has a remarkable dualistic pattern of relationships between the city-province and the neighbouring province of Lower Austria. Data are particularly asymmetrical as regards transfers (which amount to over 20 per cent for the city, but less than 3 per cent for the province of Lower Austria) and local taxes (which amount conversely to over 25 per cent for the province – with a more-than-proportional share of income taxes and property taxes – as opposed to less than 10 per cent in the city). Shared taxes are at fairly comparable levels in both the city and in the surrounding province. A very high percentage of the city's revenues (almost 40 per cent) depends furthermore on fees and user charges. Clearly, this pattern of financial and fiscal autonomy is the result of Vienna's position as the federal capital and as a centre providing superior urban services. This is reflected in a proportion of over 90 per cent of specially targeted grants. On the other hand, it reflects a comparative advantage of the suburban area particularly in the performance of local taxation, although this is, to a very limited extent, related to business and service locations. In addition to federal fiscal compensation measures which favour small municipalities, a redistributive arrangement is in place for the sharing of business taxes among the municipalities affected by the airport of Schwechat.

In matters of financial capacity *Brussels* reproduces the peculiar pattern of fragmentation without institutional mediation that is found at the level of urban-regional government. The fiscal limitations imposed upon Belgian federalism in fact reflect a contradiction which adds to the fragmented pattern of urban-regional government in Brussels, since federalization has not led to the introduction of real fiscal autonomy for the regions. Regions get the main part of their budget from income tax, which is collected by the federal administration. The share of the *Régions*, which is the result of negotiations between federal and federated entities, is then directly transferred to the *Régions*. The *Communautés* get around 65 per cent of their budget from a share on VAT and between 25 and 30 per cent from income tax. Brussels also shows a high reliance on transfers, of which about 50 per cent come from the regions' share in income taxes.

Since 2001, however, a move has been developing in Belgium towards increased fiscal autonomy for the *Régions*. The share of regional taxes is rising as the regions have been granted more taxation powers, including the possibility to add or subtract some percentage points on income tax. The right to raise new taxes is, however, limited to additional fields that are not covered by national legislation, and it is also subject to strict national control. Municipalities have some limited fiscal autonomy, but are dependent for about 80 per cent of their revenues on transfers from federal-regional taxes and from national grants.

A rather different profile of financial capacity is typical of urban regions characterized by a form of institutional mediation at the jurisdictional meso-level.

In the *Strasbourg* area, local direct taxation is one of the principal resources of the municipalities and partnership municipalities (about one-half of the total revenues of the city of Strasbourg and one-quarter for the *Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg*). The city of Strasbourg has a comparatively high level of own taxation as a source of revenues (50 per cent). While this is in line with the average

of French municipalities, for which the component of local direct taxation on total revenues ranges between 45 per cent and 55 per cent, this is interesting in comparison with the whole of the Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg, which relies much more on transfers (37 per cent against 20 per cent). As regards local taxes there is a clear divide between the dominance of fees and charges in the metropolitan community and the dominance of property and business in the city.

*Barcelona's* revenues also include a large component of own revenue sources (taxes and fees) compared with shared taxes, in a proportion of 1 to 2 respectively. The latter revenue comes mainly from property and income taxes. The functional approach to the management of metropolitan services pursued in the Barcelona region since the late 1980s is reflected in the level of operational autonomy granted to special purpose agencies. Both functional metropolitan authorities (the Entitat Metropolitana del Transport and the Entitat Metropolitana del Medi Ambient) have powers to raise taxes and set tariffs in their jurisdiction. The EMT in particular has the power to raise betterment fees in the form of an additional tax on property value. A further significant reflection of the 'functional' – if not political – autonomy which is granted to metropolitan agencies can be found in the fact that transfers from higher levels of government have a low level of heterodirection. However, these represent less than one tenth of the overall budget.

*Amsterdam*, as local governments in general in the Netherlands, has to the contrary a rather low degree of financial autonomy. The largest component of local budget – over 50 per cent – consists of transfers from the national fund for municipalities (*Gemeentefonds*) and is integrated with special purpose transfers of different sorts, which have been increasing in importance in recent years, and include subsidies targeted to promoting innovative urban policies. Only a fraction of the total budget – under 20 per cent – is provided by own revenues. In this respect, the city's land policy – based on a large extent of land ownership and on its administration via a long-term lease system – plays a key role in feeding Amsterdam's equalization fund (*Vereveningsfonds*), on the basis of which redistributive measures are taken according to the city's investment priorities and strategic development projects are co-financed.

*Copenhagen* has a rather specific arrangement. Both the counties and municipalities included in the Greater Copenhagen Authority have the power to collect taxes, set tax rates and apply user charges. The aggregate level of sub-national taxation for each fiscal year is laid down in a joint agreement between the national government and the national associations for the municipalities and counties.

The most important aspect, however, is the fact that a system of inter-municipal and inter-regional fiscal solidarity is in place in Denmark. This represents an important factor of wealth transfer towards disadvantaged areas of the country, with adverse fiscal effects for many rich urban municipalities and for the urban region of Copenhagen in the aggregate. According to this system of fiscal solidarity, the share of transfers to the urban region in total local revenues is definitely minor, and even negative for several municipalities. By far the major



source of local revenues takes the form of income taxes, a fact that may explain the relatively low level of competition for business locations in the urban region.

## **Governance and planning milieux**

This section addresses the issue of the presence of institutional arrangements that may affect the nature of relationships in the local polity and contribute to problem-solving and strategic capacity at the level of the urban region beyond the competencies and abilities of formal governments. In that respect, particular reference needs to be made to aspects relating to intergovernmental relationships (i.e. 'vertical' relationships and 'horizontal' relationships among tiers of government involved in planning and policymaking in the urban region) and to aspects related to inter-organizational relationships (i.e. the involvement of private sector and civil society in agenda-setting, strategy formulation and decision-making).

In *Amsterdam*, until recent times, rather stable political coalitions have characterized the urban region. These have created a rather mixed picture with a dominant centre-left pattern in the city. Although a significant change occurred after the 2002 electoral results, it should be noted that the pattern of inter-class integration represented by the traditional corporatist model of Dutch society is still strongly represented in the urban arena. This is due, for example, to the relevance of a pluralist system of semi-public housing corporations, backed by the traditionally active role of municipalities in land management. This represents a key factor of the support for public interests in the development process. Rather than along party lines, constraints to cooperation in the urban-regional arena seem to run primarily along jurisdictional borders, as contrasting interests and power relationships make intergovernmental partnership difficult.

*Barcelona* has traditionally been the economic motor of Catalonia and its political and cultural capital. Moreover, the city and its surroundings have attracted the location of industries, services and population in a strongly centripetal way, shaping an urban region that represents 75 per cent of the Catalan population and 70 per cent of Catalonia's GDP.

Despite the centrality of Barcelona for the region's welfare and economy, political relationships between the capital and the region are traditionally tense. This situation has historical roots which date back to the transition of the country to democracy, and has shaped Catalan politics throughout the process of building regional autonomy. The 24 years of democracy in Catalonia have been characterized by the political rivalry between the most important political parties: the conservative Catalan nationalists (CIU) and the Socialists (PSC). The former has been the dominant political force of the regional government (*Generalitat*), while the latter is more powerful in the local town's councils surrounding Barcelona and in the city itself.

In *Brussels*, the political climate seems highly dependent on the dominance of claims from the main linguistic *Communautés* and from the different federal and federated powers, and on their institutional representation in the new federal

order of the Belgian state – which is, as we have seen, one of the reasons for the peculiar fragmented pattern of the urban region – as well as on its special status as federal capital.

In addressing the political climate in *Berlin*, we are again confronted with its peculiar history which accounts for the polarization that is found within Berlin itself between the eastern and the western part of the city. In comparison, party politics apparently plays less of a role in the relationships between the city and the Land of Brandenburg. Nonetheless, it is precisely at this level that cooperation becomes more problematic. Given the lack of intermediate institutional structures between 'Greater Berlin' and the surrounding municipalities in Brandenburg, power relations are still seen as an obstacle to fair relationships and as a major reason for the lack of concrete cooperative initiatives. Hence the array of arrangements put in place in Berlin for the partnership-based management of development initiatives and the arenas for public–private concertation (such as the experience conducted in the 1990s with the *Stadtforum*) are peculiarly 'urban' in character and barely affect developments outside the city's boundaries. The main framework for intergovernmental cooperation between Berlin and Brandenburg is thus represented by the joint effort for a common *Landesplanung* (regional planning) conducted at the state planning level.

In *Vienna* there has historically been a rather stable pattern of political rivalry between the city and the surrounding region. Although generally the political situation is very stable, the political–electoral balance is homogenous within the two states of the Vienna region (Vienna, Lower Austria), but mixed for the Vienna region as a whole. In general, however, the different political power situation does not have a strong effect on the collaboration concerning planning between the mayor of Vienna and the provincial president of Lower Austria. The common political aim is to improve the competitive position of the 'Vienna region' in an international and national perspective. As we shall see, this mostly results in *ad hoc*, mainly sectoral and operational forms of cooperation in economic and spatial development. On the next lower levels of administration, the political background becomes more important and affects opportunities for cooperation. Generally, cooperation is strongly influenced by individual personalities and party affiliation. An *ad hoc* platform of cooperation between the social-democratic mayors of the suburban municipalities and Vienna has, for example, been established. A political 'upgrading' of this inter-municipal cooperation has been realized by the institutionalization of regional managements in this area.

*Copenhagen* is an example of effective and institutionalized cooperation at both the level of intergovernmental relationships – mediated by the presence of the Greater Copenhagen Authority – and of public–private relationships which develop in both strategic and operational terms. The level of inter-municipal cooperation is rather remarkable as the political balance of the entire Copenhagen urban region is mixed and rather polarized. The city of Copenhagen has traditionally been dominated by the left (including the social democratic party). It stands in sharp contrast to the most affluent municipalities of the Greater Copenhagen Authority and with Frederiksberg which have always been

right-wing. The latter is an autonomous political and administrative unit, has the status of both a county and a municipality and is physically incorporated into the territory of the city of Copenhagen. Nonetheless, the Greater Copenhagen Authority reflects a distinctive balance in the political spectrum since six of the 11 council members appointed by the municipalities represent right-wing and five represent left-wing parties. This is also an important factor in determining the high level of political consensus in the Copenhagen urban region, and the role of this institution in promoting it.

The arenas put in place for this consensus-oriented attitude are mostly formal-institutionalized and stable. Two important examples are the Copenhagen Business Council, which has an important advisory role in drafting the business development strategy of the city of Copenhagen, and the Copenhagen Business Forum, which covers the entire Greater Copenhagen region and has an advisory function for the Greater Copenhagen Authority regarding business development policies. Similar arrangements are in place in the area of social policy. This attitude also allows urban-regional interests and actors to adopt an effective position on national policies which affect the prospects of development of Copenhagen's urban region.

In French urban region areas, the extension of the contractual system of state-local agreements to agglomerations and local communities is a powerful force in the constitution of institutionalized cooperative and partnership-based relationships. These developments have extended to the regional and local levels an attitude to intergovernmental and inter-organizational concertation already established at the level of the regions where, since the 1970s, formal institutions such as the Regional Council (later to become a local authority with the laws of decentralization of 1982) and the Economic and Social Regional Council (formed on the basis of a model of the national Economic and Social Council) are in place. This is reflected in the institutions involved. In particular, the Voynet law of 1999 envisaged the installation of a consultative body (the Council of Development) on the scale and on the initiative of the agglomerations. In the process of signing a 'contract of agglomeration' with the State, the agglomerations must first submit their project of agglomeration for approval to the Council of Development. The law stipulates that this council has to be composed of representatives of the economic sector and of social, cultural and civic initiatives, along with special-purpose quasi-autonomous entities and functional autonomies (e.g. chambers of commerce). It therefore incorporates a broad range of private interest associations. In the case of *Strasbourg*, the cooperative institutional climate may be favoured by a rather homogeneous and stable pattern of party-political dominance in the region.

## **Economic and spatial development strategies**

An important aspect of the analysis of institutional conditions in urban regions is the evaluation of the influence of urban-regional government structures and practices on the effective integration of economic and spatial development

strategies. It is therefore of no surprise that some of the features previously highlighted are reflected in the nature of planning activity with regard to the spatial determinants of economic competitiveness.

The most striking example is given by what we have defined as 'unitary' and 'dualistic' urban regions, where the basic constraint to effective economic and spatial development strategies is still represented by difficulties in inter-jurisdictional cooperation.

According to its peculiar fragmented pattern, as mentioned previously, *Brussels* does not have a comprehensive planning activity at the level of the urban region. Planning inputs are a combination of policies devised by the Brussels, Walloon and Flemish regions. Some coordination efforts are taking place in the field of public transport issues, but they are rather scarce and have not yet produced any results.

Spatial planning in the *Berlin* urban region is, once again, split along the dualism that characterizes the relationship between the federal states of Berlin and Brandenburg. While structural orientations at regional level are devised by the Berlin-Brandenburg joint strategic spatial development planning department, strategic and operational planning remains confined to plans for the city of Berlin. The Joint Spatial Development Plan for the urban region was set up by the joint planning department for Berlin-Brandenburg in 1998, as an alternative measure to the failure to merge the two federal states. The overall goal of this plan is to foster 'decentralized concentration' and to counter urban sprawl, by:

- protecting and developing large open spaces;
- enhancing a balanced settlement development (priorities for settlements);
- concentrating development opportunities (housing, commercial uses and workplaces) along transportation axes (predominately parallel with rail networks/public transport routes).

The aim to achieve balanced development is adopted at urban level in Berlin's master plan (pursuing objectives of inward development, urban containment and internal mix and differentiation in development, supported by measures of environmental and landscape protection) and in a series of sectoral strategic plans for office, retail and industrial development. The Sectoral Development Plan (SDP) for retail centres is intended to strengthen the centre locations of Berlin's polycentric structure and to integrate new retail projects into it. The SDP for Industry is the main instrument of a forward-looking, practical industrial policy for the entire city. The plan aims to harmonize demand forecasts with the programming and targeting of land availability. It is also intended to further urban interests by categorizing industrial areas according to priorities, support economic development with active measures which do justice to the characteristics of specific locations and provide infrastructure conditions.

The Urban Development Concept for Office Location is a key strategic tool for the city of Berlin in its ambition to become the largest market for office space in Germany. The main aim is again to match demand and supply by relating

development forecasts to site availability and to spatial development potentials in key urban locations. The plan concept focuses on the development of the inner city as the prime location for office space and on key projects in this area. Additionally the emphasis lies on developing the major nodes of transport at the ring road and along main axes of transport.

Berlin's commitment to an active economic policy is expressed in public initiatives in the area of business services and land marketing and consultancy, such as the Berlin Business Development Corporation (BBDC), the Berlin Location Centre (BLC), and the Investor Assistance Office (IAO), as well as in public-private partnership active in the provision of business services (such as BAO Berlin Marketing Service, an initiative financed by the city of Berlin which provides full support and consultation in business issues) and in urban marketing (such as Partner für Berlin, a public-private partnership sponsored by the Senate of Berlin along with over 120 renowned German and international firms, responsible for promoting Berlin as a business location and as Germany's capital city). In terms of active locational policy, the most significant initiative is the activity of the Trustee Development Corporation set up in order to develop in four key areas (Adlershof, Wasserstadt-Spandau, Eldenaer Straße, and Biesdorf Süd) for the city's economic development.

Vienna also reproduces its dualist pattern in intergovernmental relationships in spatial planning. Because Vienna is a municipality and at the same time a provincial state, cooperation between Vienna and Lower Austria or between Vienna and the surrounding municipalities is difficult. The legal frameworks of regional planning are regulated in Austria by the federal provinces, and are therefore different. This makes cooperation even more complicated. Vienna and the municipalities of Lower Austria do not have a common inter-municipal planning body due to political reasons and the economic rivalry between the city and the municipalities of the suburban area. In addition, several special agencies are active in tasks including spatial and economic development, but mainly within jurisdictional boundaries (such as in the case of provincial districts' regional management offices). Nevertheless, the provinces of Vienna and Lower Austria have a common strategic plan, while the provinces of Vienna, Lower Austria and Burgenland have a joint spatial planning directive (of a merely indicative nature).

Planning activity at the regional level and at the agglomeration scale – encompassing the city of Vienna and the adjacent municipalities of Lower Austria – is mainly based on single *ad hoc* projects. Several special intergovernmental cooperation initiatives in spatial planning involving the neighbouring jurisdictions are in place, particularly in matters of landscape planning and environmental protection.

A different situation can be identified in urban regions in which (at different degrees) a mediating institution has been capable of enhancing the level of urban-regional cooperation and partnership in economic and spatial policies.

This is only to a limited extent the case in *Barcelona*. Planning in the Barcelona urban region is traditionally very much concerned with the spatial integration of activities in an expanding agglomeration. While the Barcelona

Metropolitan Territorial Plan (defined by a Metropolitan Territorial Structure Commission for seven metropolitan districts) is a rather regulatory instrument, meant to carry out specific actions specified in the Catalan general territorial plan, this tradition is embodied by Barcelona's strategic plans. The attitude of Barcelona's strategic plans since the 1980s has combined an innovative approach to the tradition of urbanism as a means for combining the support of competitiveness and the improvement of local quality of life. The newest Barcelona metropolitan strategic plan (2000) is based on this tradition given that it aims to achieve a balanced development between the first and second urban ring, a focus on neighbourhood economy, sustainable housing, and on general improvement of urban attractiveness along with the support of areas of the economy such as ICT and training. A peculiar role in this strategy is played by locational initiatives – such as the business and technology parks in the district of Vallès Oriental and in Poblenou, to become one of the main economic and technological platforms of both Barcelona and Catalonia – which combine land-use policy with the provision of start-up conditions and business services and facilities.

In the 1990s, the city of *Amsterdam* pursued a rather 'implicit' strategy for economic development, of which the focus on partnership and facilitated self-organization is an important aspect. The same attitude is expressed by key actors such as the chamber of commerce, as well as by the province of North-Holland, which – as a minor actor of economic policy – is highly dependent on partnership-based initiatives in pursuing its goals. Cooperative efforts in economic policy have been recently addressed through the development of joint strategies by the regional body ROA. An important initiative was taken by the Amsterdam Promotion Foundation (AMPRO), a public-private partnership that strives to reinforce the pivotal role of the Amsterdam region as a leading economic, cultural and scientific centre, both in the Netherlands and beyond, and which is gradually evolving into an effective regional promotion organization. In general, however, no stable institutional framework for economic cooperation at the regional level is yet in place, and the most significant partnership-based initiatives at regional level are project-based. In this respect, economic development initiatives mirror the reality of spatial planning, and in particular of cooperation across municipal borders. A very important example is the Schiphol Area Development Company NV (SADC), established in 1987 by the city of Amsterdam, the municipality of Haarlemmermeer, Schiphol Group and the province of North-Holland as a public-private company. SADC's objective is to secure and improve the economic position of Schiphol Airport and the surrounding areas through ongoing development of airport-related business parks and supportive infrastructure projects. The importance of 'mainport' infrastructures such as Schiphol for the international position of Amsterdam is a major reason for a radical change in the city's strategic spatial planning orientations concerning businesses and office development in the 1990s, shifting from plans for a CBD development on the northern city border towards a concentration on the highly accessible and more investment-attractive area of the Zuidas. The development of this major project has accordingly become a matter of national

importance as well as a challenge for innovative planning and project management approaches for the city administration. It also draws attention to the issue of establishing institutional synergies at regional level in order to exploit the potential of the project for the attractiveness of the urban region as a whole.

The urban region of *Strasbourg* includes 141 French municipalities and 51 German municipalities. These municipalities are involved in a joint syndicate (Syndicat mixte pour le schéma directeur de la Région de Strasbourg) in planning the development of the Strasbourg region. They also devise development concepts for their shared territory, the Plan of Territorial Coherence, or General Comprehensive Plan of the Strasbourg region (*Schéma de Cohérence territoriale de la Région de Strasbourg* – SCOTERS), in effect until 2005. The SCOTERS replaces previous *schémas directeurs* for the area and is a crucial document for the coordination of development tools at the scale of the agglomeration, with which local plans have to be compatible and are assisted in this by the metropolitan spatial planning agency (ADEUS). In addition, EPCIs (e.g. CUS) have their sectoral plans, such as the Plan for Economic Enterprise Zones.

One feature of integrated spatial economic planning which is more important for the area is, however, the possibility of drafting a voluntary *project d'agglomération* as a basis for the signing of *contrats d'agglomération* among the state, the regions and local authorities – based on national strategic allocation schemes (*schémas de services collectifs*) – and their combination with concerted development initiatives. This considerably strengthens the level of intergovernmental binding within urban-regional development strategies and the expectation is that the various active development initiatives involving forms of partnership (Sociétés d'Economie Mixte Locale – SEML) will be affected by this strategic environment as well as the nature of regulatory instruments adopted.

In the *Copenhagen* urban region, regional spatial planning has, since the year 2000, been the responsibility of the Greater Copenhagen Authority which assumed this responsibility from the five counties that previously drafted individual regional spatial plans which were then approved by the national government. This has endowed the Greater Copenhagen Authority with multi-sectoral spatially relevant planning tasks on a regional scale. The Greater Copenhagen region is also entrusted with the regional spatial plan for the Greater Copenhagen Authority, adopted recently in 2005. Besides the activities related to implementing the regional plan, several national programmes for business development and entrepreneurship are in place in the area. Their overall aim is to help maintain a broad business base in Denmark, which in the Copenhagen urban region translates into the objective of maintaining a competitive business base in the central city areas and of preventing all competitive business from moving out from the city centre to locations in the surrounding or outer regions. A crucial role in operationalizing this strategy is played by integrated urban development initiatives like the area of Ørestad, planned as one of the country's prime future locations for business and retail, being realized as a national strategic project with a high level of intergovernmental cooperation among urban-regional authorities and national government.

## **Strengths and weaknesses of government in urban regions: a summary view**

In this final section of this chapter we address a summary evaluation of findings regarding the 'governmental capacity' of the urban regions object of our research with regard to the steering of economic and spatial development processes. Bringing together the analysis of the different factors that affect the governmental capacity of urban regions allows us to advance a preliminary interpretation of local conditions for policymaking. This may, in turn, serve as a basis for formulating hypotheses concerning the role played by these local conditions in framing strategic urban projects. A summary of these findings along with related hypotheses is presented in Table 2.1.

*Berlin* and *Vienna* appear to be characterized by large unitary jurisdictions endowed with meso-level status, standing in a relationship of non-hierarchical dualism with formally equal territorial jurisdictions at the meso-level (the city-state of Berlin and the federal state of Brandenburg in the former case, the city-province of Vienna and the federal province of Lower Austria in the latter). This pattern of relationships is characterized by the co-presence of autonomous and sovereign territorial competencies in economic and spatial development, featuring different degrees of institutional means and power. The result is high potential for competition due to the imbalance in resources and capacity to act on the dynamics of development in the urban region. This is particularly evident in the strong urban-suburban polarization of development trends in sectors such as large retail centres, business and residential as well as in the location of infrastructure nodes of regional relevance (i.e. airports) and their related potentials for attraction of land development and economic activities.

In the cases mentioned, a peculiar aspect of the core-periphery dualism, resulting from this pattern of relationships and from the absence of intermediary urban-regional institutions, is the self-confinement of intergovernmental partnership to a rather abstract level of joint strategy formation, which bears the features of formal inter-institutional diplomacy rather than of a commitment to operational initiatives. This results particularly in a difficulty to address cooperation across jurisdictions at the level of concrete initiatives and of small-scale processes, most notably at the urban fringe, where developments incrementally but significantly contribute to defining spatial trends in the agglomeration as a whole.

According to our interpretation, the situation in *Brussels* falls in the category of hierarchical dualism, but this statement requires some qualification. The situation of the Brussels urban region comprises, in fact, quite specific features. In fact, despite the status of federal capital the urban region of Brussels has been redesigned by federalization according to a geographical pattern of 'shared powers' in which no jurisdiction can claim competencies in a comprehensive or coherent territorial unit. The result is a peculiar form of fragmentation. On the one hand, the federalization of the Belgian state has certainly strengthened governing and planning capacity in the core city. The autonomous capital region of Brussels is now endowed with comprehensive governmental tasks and with competencies that



overcome much of the traditional problems of inner-municipal fragmentation typical of the modern history of the city, making it to a certain extent comparable to the pattern found in Berlin and Vienna. On the other hand, federalization has defined a peculiar condition in the urban region, which reproduces intergovernmental fragmentation on a larger scale. Given the absence of an overarching urban-regional authority or of formal institutional arrangements for intergovernmental cooperation, governmental and planning capacity in Greater Brussels must rely on informal means in order to build conditions of 'institutional density' that may help reduce the transaction costs and deadlocks caused by jurisdictional boundaries. While this may prove to be more effective than formal institutional arrangements in shaping common policy directions and in solving problems, a weakness of such condition is the high dependency on voluntarism as well as on the leadership and networking ability of local polities.

In most other situations, the prevailing pattern of relationships is also of a fragmented kind, but – even in the absence of comprehensive urban-regional government arrangements – the presence of meso-level institutions plays a significant mediating role at the level of the urban region. In interpreting such situations, we can distinguish between intermediary institutions that adopt a role of a (prevailing) functional-instrumental kind and others that adopt a role of a (prevailing) cooperative-strategic kind.

Specific situations in both these groups clearly differ in dependence on historical backgrounds and national institutional frameworks, but also significantly in the degree to which this intermediate level is subject to institutional innovation and experimentation. At the lower end we can find two situations, such as Amsterdam and Barcelona, in which the demise of comprehensive urban-regional government arrangements has not yet been compensated by adequate alternatives.

A peculiar form of dual relationships has been established between Catalonia and the city of *Barcelona*, which is traditionally strong but with competing political actors in a regional economy and urban system which is highly polarized around the capital. One result of the development of this rivalry, which takes the institutional form of a hierarchical dualism, has been the replacement of an autonomous level of urban-regional government with a functional system of differentiated sectoral governance arrangements. While this represents a favourable condition for partnership-based management, its drawback lies in the limited scope of autonomy and democratic legitimacy, which limit the possibility and scope for strategic policy formulation at the level of the urban region. The constitution of weakly institutionalized arenas for this purpose is only a partial response to this gap in legitimacy.

In *Amsterdam*, a historically-rooted meso-level institution (the province of North-Holland) is in place and is endowed with formal competencies in planning within its territorial jurisdiction. Given the clear imbalance in power relationships due to the exceptional position of Amsterdam and its administration, and given the peculiar status of planning competencies given to the city (which makes its structure plan equivalent to the provincial plan), the province

has very limited capabilities to influence strategic development choice. The province's weakness is also exacerbated by the limited scope of its competencies (most notably in economic development issues) compared to the scope of strategic choices involved in consolidating Amsterdam's position in international urban competition. Even more crucially, key developments in the agglomeration are no longer captured within the territorial domain of provincial jurisdiction. This defines a situation marked, on the one hand, by inherent difficulties stemming from role- and power-play between the city and the province and, on the other hand, by widespread agreement on the need for extended intergovernmental partnerships. In fact, the province and the municipalities of the urban region are increasingly working together within the framework of regional consultation initiatives like RSA and the 'north-wing conferences' with the aim being to sign development contracts with central state administrations, most notably in the area of infrastructure and housing. Furthermore, innovative approaches to macro-regional governance at the level of the Randstad/Deltametropool are currently under way and are contributing to public debate on issues of regional strategy that are of key importance for Amsterdam. Nonetheless, what continues to be apparent is the prevailingly instrumental, selective and *ad hoc* pattern of relationships established in current forms of regional cooperation.

A different situation is found in *Strasbourg* and in *Copenhagen*. Through a consistent extension of the contracting system of intergovernmental relationships introduced by recent legislation, French urban regions are set in a multilevel system of intergovernmental relationships in which the region may play an important role of mediation of local and regional initiatives. The result is a highly interconnected institutional infrastructure of territorial government that offers room for subsidiary levels of public-public and public-private partnership in addition to a tradition of more functional partnership-based agencies. An important aspect of this system of institutional relationships, put in place in the framework of a concept of the 'recomposition' of the French state in terms of 'networked polycentrism', is that a stable pattern of vertical interconnections across levels is provided which extends to strategic policy issues.

In *Copenhagen*, the model of a semi-autonomous, special purpose authority of urban-regional governance compensates its limits in democratic legitimation and accountability with the aim of constituting a public arena for consensus-building. The weak level of institutionalization therefore seems to be a condition for establishing effective cooperation and working relationships among potentially competing parties. A crucial factor for this is the scope attributed to the urban-regional arrangement, which encompasses aspects of 'foreign relations' which allow local processes to be positioned within the broader framework of the competitiveness of the whole (cross-border) region. The strategic meaning of this also accounts for the high level of involvement of the state in strategic development projects in the urban region that bear a crucial role in directing economic and spatial trends in the medium-long term.

Table 2.1 Institutional capacity and planning milieux in urban regions: summary findings and expected effects on the framing of strategic urban projects

<i>institutional context and governmental capacity</i>		<i>governance and planning milieu</i>	<i>economic and spatial development strategies</i>	<i>expected effects on the framing of strategic urban projects</i>
<i>Berlin</i>	– unitary urban region	– internal relations: asymmetry (east–west), gradually decreasing	– strong urban development planning	– centralistic inner-urban projects
	– financial capacity: low, internally dualistic	– external relations: urban-regional dualism, formally non-hierarchical	– weak joint inter-state planning strategy (Land Berlin – Land Brandenburg)	– connected with higher governmental levels (national)
<i>Vienna</i>	– unitary urban region	– local-regional political–electoral cleavage	– urban-regional rivalry is dominant in development projects	– competitive inter-regional relations
	– financial capacity: low, internally dualistic	– high local and low regional accountability		
<i>Vienna</i>	– unitary urban region	– external relations: urban–regional dualism, formally non-hierarchical	– strong urban development planning	– centralistic inner-urban projects
	– financial capacity: low, internally dualistic	– local–regional political–cultural rivalry	– weak joint inter-province planning (provinces of Vienna – Lower Austria)	– connected with higher governmental levels (national)
<i>Barcelona</i>	– hierarchical dualism	– competitive economic relations urban–suburban region	– severe rivalry at level of operational projects	– competitive inter-regional relations
	– financial capacity: high, functionally targeted at the urban-regional level	– high local and regional accountability		
<i>Barcelona</i>	– internal relations: regional asymmetry, dominance of urban agglomeration	– external relations: urban-regional asymmetry, political polarisation	– dominant planning policy by the city of Barcelona and its urban-regional network	– projects of urban-regional relevance
	– urban-regional asymmetry, political polarisation		– associative-functional governance tasks	– initiated by the city and by inter-local networks endorsed through external networks

Table 2.1 continued

institutional context and governmental capacity	governance and planning milieu	economic and spatial development strategies	expected effects on the framing of strategic urban projects
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– common cultural roots</li> <li>– strong external-international exposure of the urban region</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– bottom-up urban-regional development strategy (not formalised but effective)</li> <li>– no active involvement in urban planning by the Catalan government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– constrained by regional and state government</li> </ul>	
<i>Brussels</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <i>hierarchical dualism</i></li> <li>– financial capacity: low, increasing</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– internal relations: inner-regional rivalry</li> <li>– external relations: regional asymmetry, strong urban-regional competition</li> <li>– cultural-linguistic fragmentation</li> <li>– high local and low regional accountability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– no comprehensive urban-regional planning strategy</li> <li>– dominance of <i>ad hoc</i> projects</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <i>ad hoc</i> projects</li> <li>– intergovernmental fragmentation</li> <li>– intergovernmental stalemates</li> </ul>
<i>Amsterdam</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <i>dualism with a 'mediating region'</i></li> <li>– financial capacity: low, with functional transfers at the urban-regional level</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– internal relations: regional asymmetry, dominance of urban agglomeration</li> <li>– external relations: non-hierarchical, cooperative</li> <li>– weak urban-regional competencies</li> <li>– no political–electoral cleavage city-region</li> <li>– increasing inter-local competition</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– tradition of both urban and provincial strategic planning</li> <li>– bottom-up initiatives in intermediate-scale regional planning</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– mainly locally initiated projects</li> <li>– endorsed by urban-regional networks</li> <li>– legitimized through regional consultation</li> <li>– relatively strong central–local coalitions</li> </ul>

Table 2.1 continued

institutional context and governmental capacity	governance and planning milieu	economic and spatial development strategies	expected effects on the framing of strategic urban projects
<p><i>Copenhagen</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <i>dualism with a 'mediating region'</i></li> <li>– financial capacity: medium, with adverse effects of fiscal distributive policy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– internal relations: quasi-confederal, functional regional orientation, flexible <i>ad hoc</i> linkages</li> <li>– external relations: strong intergovernmental cooperation</li> <li>– locally endorsed regional formation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– comprehensive spatial planning at the regional level</li> <li>– regional economic development authority</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– regional projects</li> <li>– endorsed through intergovernmental cooperation</li> </ul>
<p><i>Strasbourg</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <i>dualism with a 'mediating region'</i></li> <li>– financial capacity: high</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– internal relations: regional asymmetry, dominance of urban agglomeration</li> <li>– external relations: associative, non-hierarchical regional orientation, cross-border cooperation</li> <li>– effective regional mediation and cooperation</li> <li>– effective urban-national interest coalitions</li> <li>– political–electoral rural–urban cleavage</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– bottom-up inter-local networks of sectoral policy and planning</li> <li>– mediating role by the region in project-related intergovernmental contracting</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– introverted governmental consultation in the organisation of polycentric networks</li> <li>– mediating support by regional government</li> </ul>

## Notes

- 1 The analysis of institutional capacity and planning milieux in city-regions was conducted within the framework of the COMET project as part of Working Package 4, 'Norms and frameworks of planning', backed by the structural analysis of economic, demographic and social change since the early 1970s conducted in Working Package 5. The analysis is a collective effort resulting from the reports conducted in each case-study area by the researchers of the local COMET partners, whose contribution we hereby acknowledge.
- 2 The analysis conducted is of both a formal and qualitative nature, and aims to include an analysis of intertemporal dynamics. For this reason, the analysis was based on a specifically developed methodology, including descriptors of the main processes of change occurred in the timeframe of research.

The indicators and descriptors used in the analysis are the result of a selection from current comparative research on local governance. A particular effort has been made to refer to broad comparative trans-national research approaches in order to create a solid basis for cross-country analysis. A lot of references are made to the indicators and descriptors adopted by the OECD in the comparative study of local governance in its Public Governance and Management Programme (OECD, 1997). As regards the analysis of national and sub-national governmental levels, reference is made to studies representative of current comparative analysis of administrative structures (e.g. Hesse and Sharpe 1991; Humes 1991) and of their application to the analysis of planning systems (cf. Newman and Thornley 1996) and of metropolitan government and governance arrangements (cf. Barlow 1991; Sharpe 1995; Salet *et al.* 2003); such references have been further complemented by reference to the most comprehensive attempt at a systematization of planning systems in Europe currently available (European Commission 1997).

- 3 Our analysis of aspects of governance and planning milieux is inspired by literature concerning current transformations in urban and regional policies based on a 'governance' approach (e.g. Le Galès 1998, 2002; Kooiman 1993; Stoker and Mossberger 1994; Mayer 1995; Rhodes 1996; Stoker 1998; Pierre 2000; John 2001; Salet *et al.* 2003). For a discussion of the theoretical background of our analysis, see Gualini (2005).

## References

- Barlow, M.I. (1991) *Metropolitan Government*, London: Routledge.
- European Commission (1997) *The EU Compendium of Spatial Planning Systems and Policies*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Commission.
- Gualini, E. (2005) 'Reconnecting space, place and institutions: inquiring into 'local' governance capacity in urban and regional research', in L. Albrechts and S. Mandelbaum (eds) *The Network Society: A New Context for Planning*, London: Routledge: 284–306.
- Hesse, J.J. and Sharpe, L.J. (eds) (1991) *Local Government and Urban Affairs in International Perspective: Analyses of Twenty Western Industrialised Countries*, Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Humes, S. IV (1991) *Local Governance and National Power*, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- John, P. (2001) *Local Governance in Western Europe*, London: Sage.
- Jouve, B. and Lefèvre, C. (eds) (2002) *Métropoles ingouvernables? Les villes européennes entre globalisation et décentralisation*, Paris: Elsevier.

- Kooiman, J. (ed.) (1993) *Modern Governance: New Government–Society Interactions*, London: Sage.
- Le Galès, P. (1998) 'Regulation and governance in European cities', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 22, 3: 482–506.
- Le Galès, P. (2002) *European Cities: Social Conflicts and Governance*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Lefèvre, C. (1999) 'Metropolitan government and governance in Western countries, a critical review', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 22, 1: 9–25.
- Mayer, M. (1995), 'Urban governance in the post-Fordist city', in P. Healey, S. Cameron, S. Davoudi, S. Graham, and A. Madani-Pour, (eds) *Managing Cities: The New Urban Context*, Chichester: John Wiley: 231–249.
- Mény, Y. (ed.) (1982) *Dix ans de régionalisation en Europe: bilan et perspectives*, Paris: Cujas.
- Newman, P. and Thornley, A. (1996) *Urban Planning in Europe: International Competition, National Systems and Planning Projects*, London: Routledge.
- OECD (1997) *Managing across Levels of Government: Overview*, Public Governance and Management Programme document: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/14/1902308.pdf>
- Pierre, J. (ed.) (2000) *Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rhodes, R.A.W. (1996) 'The new governance: governing without government', *Political Studies*, 44, 4: 652–667.
- Salet, W.G.M., Thornley, A. and Kreukels, T. (eds) (2003) *Metropolitan Governance and Spatial Planning*, London: Spon.
- Sharpe, L.J. (ed.) (1993) *The Rise of Meso-government in Europe*, London: Sage.
- Sharpe, L.J. (ed.) (1995) *The Government of World Cities: The Future of the Metro Model*, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
- Stoker, G. (1998) 'Governance as theory: five propositions', *International Social Science Journal*, 50, 155: 17–28.
- Stoker, G. and Mossberger, K. (1994) 'Urban regime theory in comparative perspective', *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 12, 2: 195–212.

## Part II

# Experiences of strategic projects in European city-regions





### 3 Amsterdam Zuidas

#### The dream of 'new urbanity'

*Stan Majoor*

##### Introduction

The Zuidas ('South Axis') in Amsterdam is the biggest and one of the most ambitious and complex contemporary urban projects in the Netherlands. Throughout its relatively short history, the goal of the project has evolved from the realisation of a new office location for the Amsterdam region to the creation of an internationally competitive location with an important urban aspect that includes housing and facilities as well. The strategic location of the Zuidas, namely a greenfield site on both sides of Amsterdam's southern ring road and close to the international airport, is crucial to its development. The project can be linked to many strategic questions on urban development and governance processes that go beyond this specific episode of urban transformation (Salet and Majoor 2005). In this chapter we analyse the project from an institutional perspective and place its complex practices of decision-making in a context of institutional innovation.

The horseshoe-shaped corridor at the south of Amsterdam, between Schiphol airport in the south-west and the office parks of Amsterdam Bijlmer in the south-east, is the most spatially dynamic area of the Netherlands. During the last few decades, different new infrastructure investments in road and rail have resulted in important improvements in the external and internal accessibility of this area. In the near future, accessibility is going to be improved even further by the connection of the high-speed train to Amsterdam in 2007 and the completion of the Amsterdam north-south subway line in 2012.

The combination of these developments with an economic boom at the end of the 1990s raised the expectations of public and private parties as regards the Zuidas project. The Zuidas is often defined as the 'golden mile': the prime office location of the country. Since the initiation of the project in the mid 1990s, this has resulted in a constant increase in the ambitions for the area, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The most recent master plan proposes the creation of a lively urban centre with approximately 1.1 million square metres of office space, 1.1 million square metres of apartments and half a million square metres of facilities in a total development period of about 30 years (Gemeente Amsterdam 2004a).

In the beginning of the 1990s, after the failure of an earlier plan to realize a high quality office location in the Amsterdam region on the southern banks of the river IJ, a new local government–business coalition started drawing up plans for the Zuidas. As the process evolved, it became apparent that links had to be established with other parties, especially within national government, in order to resolve the problem of the integration of infrastructure and real estate development in the area. From the perspective of urban governance, the most interesting question is whether the adequate institutional conditions are available (or have been created) to implement the project's innovative goal of creating a new lively urban centre. This will be the main question on which this chapter focuses.

### **Zuidas Amsterdam: the birth and development of an experimental governance arena**

In this section we introduce the Zuidas project by giving a historic overview of its development in four periods: 1) the unsuccessful attempt to create a new Central Business District on the southern banks of the river IJ (until 1993), 2) the strategic repositioning towards the south side of the city (1994–1997), 3) the introduction of multiple-intensive land use as a new level of ambition (1998–2003), and 4) the process of a creation of a public–public–private development corporation (2004 onwards).

#### ***The transition from a government-led to a market-led approach: from the southern banks of the river IJ to the 'southern development axis' (until 1993)***

The start of the Zuidas project in the early 1990s is directly related to another large urban project in the Amsterdam metropolitan region: the (re-) development of the southern banks of the river IJ. Against the backdrop of structural reforms in the welfare state in the 1980s, the traditional redistributive character of Dutch spatial planning made way for an orientation which focused more on economic growth and the national and international competitive position of cities and regions (Van der Cammen and de Klerk 2003). The project to redevelop the southern banks of the river IJ as a new central business district for the Amsterdam region was one of the prime examples of this reframing process.

However, the process of turning these competition-oriented attitudes into a new urban development strategy went far from smoothly (Ploeger 2004). Inspired by successful American examples in cities such as Boston, Baltimore, San Francisco and Seattle, plans were drawn up for large office volumes and waterfront promenades which would constitute an extensive redevelopment of former harbour areas. A public–private partnership, the Amsterdam Waterfront Financieringsmaatschappij (AWF) was founded with only one private company, namely ING, a major insurance company, bank and developer. However, it soon transpired that it would be extremely difficult to turn the huge ambitions into a feasible urban project. The problem for the central area of the southern banks of

the river IJ was that the comprehensive imaginative spatial scenario, as drawn by Dutch architect Koolhaas, was not viable in development terms, particularly because of the office market slump at the beginning of the 1990s (Schuiling and Majoor 2001). Most investors – even major ones – were more interested in smaller projects, with risks that were easier to predict. On top of that, there were large political uncertainties about the new infrastructure that was necessary to improve the accessibility of the area (Schuiling 1996). Therefore, the adopted setting soon proved to be very rigid, leaving too much room for exit options necessary to generate stable commitments between actors.

While the focus of the city government planners was still on the banks of the IJ as Amsterdam's future central business district, the central area alongside the southern ring road A10 was increasingly capturing the attention of private investors as a much more attractive option as a high-end business location. This area, a former infrastructure reservation-strip from the 1935 Amsterdam Extension Plan located between two residential areas, was perfectly accessible and easy-to-develop in comparison with the southern banks of the river IJ. When the infrastructure (A10 ring road, heavy rail and light rail) was built in phases between 1950 and 1980, a considerable strip of land on the south side of the infrastructure – mainly used for parking lots and sports grounds – was left over. Some scattered developments took place in the strip north of the infrastructure in the 1980s, most importantly the building of the Amsterdam World Trade Centre and the Court of Justice. However, the real breakthrough came when ABN-AMRO – the major multinational Amsterdam-based bank – decided to leave its ensemble of scattered offices in the historic inner city for a new international headquarters and insisted on this location, instead of the southern banks of the river IJ, as suggested by the city government. Together with the collapse of the AWF in 1993, this became the start-up sign for the city of Amsterdam to reorient its strategic spatial policies and, eventually, focus on the area alongside the southern ring road as the new economic core of the city.

When viewed from a longer-term perspective of institutional change, the developments that form the backdrop to the birth of the Zuidas project represent a peculiar example of a broader shift from a traditional government-led (redistributive) mode of planning towards a more market-oriented (competitive) mode of planning. Related to that, it also meant the beginning of a strategic move away from the dominant planning philosophy that the inner city would be the main economic core of the city and the region.

The saga of the developments on the southern banks of the river IJ is extremely relevant to an understanding of the origin and the development of the Zuidas project. The failure of the planning schemes for the banks of the river IJ because of the uncomfortable relationship between the traditional strong city planning bureau and the private sector, created a learning opportunity for both public and private actors, and the idea of a 'fresh start' in the Zuidas area. 'The reports on the failures of the southern banks of the river IJ development are still on my desk' admitted a senior official currently responsible for the South Axis development (interview with representative municipality of Amsterdam 2004).

***The Zuidas: the birth of a new strategic urban object (1994–1997)***

The first phase of the Zuidas project represents a development strategy by the Amsterdam municipality that is almost completely opposite to the previous attempts to develop the southern banks of the river IJ. Officially, this shift was announced in 1994 when, after local elections, the city government of Amsterdam publicly decided to focus attention on the area around the southern ring road.

At that time, the entire area between Schiphol airport in the south-west and the highway to Utrecht in the south-east was emerging – from an economic perspective – as the most vibrant and dynamic area of the region, featuring a variety of major competing office developments, often overtly resulting from growing inter-municipal competition. From the beginning of the 1980s, planning a ring of sub-centres had been part of Amsterdam's spatial planning policy. These sub-centres were mainly conceived to be concentrated overspill areas, where large volumes of offices could be realized that could not be accommodated in the historic inner city. The locations were strategically positioned close to motorways and public transport. However, within this policy, the downtown area would remain the most important CBD.

The area around the existing small train–metro–bus station Zuid/WTC, one of these sub-centres, was designated as the core of the Zuidas development. This was no surprise because it was also the site at which ABN-AMRO was planning its new headquarters.

At this stage, the Zuidas concept eventually took shape in the city's planning strategy in the form of an intensive, rather introvert nodal development, basically contained within the city's pre-existing administrative boundaries and in strict proximity to the historic urban fabric. Thus, as for its role in the urban topology, the Zuidas took the ambiguous position of being a rather peripheral location – or in fact an 'exurban' location in the perception of most residents of Amsterdam. While claiming a high degree of centrality at regional level, it also had the potential to become a link between the pre-war Amsterdam south neighbourhood on the one side and the post-war neighbourhoods of Buitenveldert on the other side of the ring road.

Compared with the first, mainly fruitless, public-led initiatives on the southern banks of the river IJ, the Zuidas represented a major change in many ways. It was, in the first place, a market-led rather than a market-oriented initiative, supported by the local government, but in the first instance only marginally regulated. Contrary to the banks of the river IJ project, the new project followed the dominant geographical and functional market demands for accessible locations on the southern side of Amsterdam.

The first phase of the Zuidas development can therefore be characterized as a period of consolidation and operationalization of the vision of a new decentralized urban development pole, based on a fruitful cooperation between city government and the business community and by a substantial optimism about the intrinsic potentials of the area.




Figure 3.1 Location of the Zuidas project in the Amsterdam agglomeration

Source: UvA-Kaartenmakers

The business community was satisfied with the strategic move the city made towards developing the Zuidas, which apparently facilitated the pursuit of pre-defined investment objectives. On top of that, the area already had good internal and external infrastructure, both for road and rail, which would even improve in the near future. Within the small arena of city representatives and business people, ambition levels for the project soon rose.

### ***Multiple-intensive land use enters the scene: towards a new level of ambition (1998–2003)***

The next stage of the Zuidas development shows a strategic repositioning of the local government. In the first phase, its ambitions for the project could be described as striving to create a new office location in the top segment of the office market by facilitating market interests. After the first master plan and its urban design supplement were issued (Gemeente Amsterdam 1998, 1999), the city government steered the project to a more 'extrovert' phase in which it tried to incorporate additional goals into the project. A large series of public meetings and consultations of many groups resulted in a broadening of the project's scope. The Zuidas would not only be an international competitive office location, it would also provide a comprehensive housing programme, retail space, museums,

sport facilities and high-quality public space (Gemeente Amsterdam 2001). The main planning concept for the area became based on the buzzwords 'multiple and intensive land use', which would provide the physical conditions for the realization of 'urbanity'. Although not completely new as a concept – the city of Amsterdam has a history of several decades of intensifying and mixing land use within its city boundaries, the so-called compact-city policy (Jolles *et al.* 2003) – the main innovation was the geographical transfer of this policy to a relatively peripheral location (Bertolini and Salet 2003). This was confirmed in the most recent structure plan for Amsterdam, 'Choosing for Urbanity' (*Kiezen voor Stedelijkheid*), that was accepted in 2003. It designated the Zuidas as a new urban core area (Gemeente Amsterdam 2003). One could therefore argue that this move had caused polycentricity of urbanity to become officially accepted and embraced in policy reports, rather than being blocked in order to protect the position of the inner city for central functions as happened in the past.

An important source of diffusion of the concept of multiple-intensive land use was represented by the orientations of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (in the remainder of this chapter we refer to this ministry as the 'Ministry of Spatial Planning') which, in drafting the new national strategic spatial planning document, highlighted the strategic need, in a densely populated country, to intensify and combine different land uses (Ministerie VROM 2001). At the actual level of the Zuidas project, this ambition was translated into a proposed mixture of 45 per cent offices, 45 per cent housing and 10 per cent facilities throughout the whole project area (Gemeente Amsterdam 2001). At the level of the specific sub-projects these proportions could differ. However, the ambition goes further than project-wide goals. At micro-level it is also expressed in proposals to create multiple-use buildings with facilities and shops at the ground level and a mixture of offices and apartments at the higher floors. The urban character of the area should be completed through specific attention to public spaces, a dominance of pedestrian zones and high-quality architecture.

As far as local government was concerned, the concept of multiple-intensive land use gained the status of a new (marketing) label, a new agenda for the area. It became dominant in the negotiations with private and other public parties that were necessary to realize this planning concept.

A crucial precondition to making these ambitions possible is related to the mix of infrastructures (highway, heavy rail and light rail) that currently cut the area into two pieces. The preference of the city government was to develop a so-called 'dock-model'. This model implies a 1.2 kilometre tunnel that would make continuous development on the top possible and would lead to one large physically integrated area. Without such a tunnel, current environmental rules and regulations hamper mixed-use development because of noise and dust constraints in the area. The process of getting businesses, and especially the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Waterways (in the remainder of this article we use the shorter term 'Ministry of Transport'), behind the plan for a tunnel became one of the central planning themes of the project since the end of the 1990s.



Figure 3.2 Master plan of the Zuidas project (2004)  
 Source: Gemeente Amsterdam, Dienst Ruimtelijke Ordening



In the meantime, in a period of a strong upswing in the office market around the turn of the century, the first buildings of the Zuidas project were realized (Table 3.1). Since mixed-use developments will not be possible until the tunnel has actually been built, the first finalized complexes are office towers closely tied to the infrastructure mix that are not related to the planning concepts for the creation of a new urban area at the Zuidas.

### *Towards a public–public–private partnership (2004–)*

In hindsight, the year 2004 will perhaps be earmarked as a watershed in the processes towards the realization of the Zuidas as a comprehensive mixed development, including a dock-model development. Under the supervision of an independent negotiator, a new joint process has been started with the involvement of both the city of Amsterdam and a wide array of national government departments. Although – at the moment of writing – the final outcomes of this process are not clear, insiders hint at a possible agreement between parties. A public limited company dominated (60 per cent) by private shareholders would build the tunnels and the station and develop and exploit the air rights zone of approximately one million square metres. Public money would come from the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Spatial Planning, the municipality of Amsterdam (the expected profit from the other parts of the Zuidas), the provincial government of North-Holland and the Regionaal Orgaan Amsterdam (Amsterdam Regional Body). Private capital would come from a series of large financial institutions via a process of auction according to EU regulations. As we will see in our analysis, this process can be understood as a rather logical outcome of a change of positions of actors in the last years.

After describing the different phases of the development of the Zuidas project we now turn to the analytical part of our report. First, we provide a brief analysis of the

*Table 3.1* Building programme of the Zuidas project (in square metres) according to the ‘dock-model’

	<i>Housing</i>	<i>Offices</i>	<i>Facilities</i>	<i>Total</i>
Realized since 1998		137,000	7,500	144,600
Construction phase	37,700	111,600	18,600	167,900
Preparation phase	170,000	174,250	75,170	419,420
Study phase (medium term)	93,750	78,000	43,800	215,550
Study phase (long term)*	772,250	620,750	163,450	1,556,450
Total Zuidas, excluding				
Free University	1,073,700	1,121,700	308,520	2,503,920
Free University	18,000	50,000	176,500	244,500
Total development potential	1,091,700	1,171,700	485,020	2,748,420

\* In the case of development according to the dock-model

Source: Gemeente Amsterdam (2004), p. 20

structural economic impact of the project, then the next section briefly places the development of the Zuidas in the institutional context of the planning milieu of the Netherlands and the Amsterdam metropolitan region. Then, in the final section, we focus more extensively on the decision-making processes relating to the Zuidas.

### **Structural analysis of the area: impact on regional economy and labour market**

Since the project is long-term (building activities are expected to last until 2030) and is currently in a rather infant stage, calculating its final impacts is a matter of predictions, based on the most recent plans for the area. Table 3.1 already gave an overview of the project regarding the proposals for the build programme and the current completed parts. The planned addition of more than 1.1 million square metres of offices is significant in a regional perspective. It means an addition of almost 10 per cent to the current office stock in the Amsterdam Nurec region. The addition of 1.1 million square metres of housing, on the other hand, only means an increase of 0.9 per cent in the housing supply in the Nurec region.

The employment effects of the project will be considerable, although difficult to predict exactly. Forecasts differ from 32,480 (Centraal Planbureau 2003) to 53,000 (Ernst & Young en Regioplan 1999) after the completion of the project. Up to now, most jobs in the area have been in the higher segments of the service economy, most notably, finance (NACE 65–67): 4,406 jobs in 2002 and business (NACE 70–74): 5,893 full-time jobs in 2002. Even in this early stage of the project, the NACE category of business jobs accounts for 10.2 per cent of all full-time jobs in the Amsterdam Nurec area in this category. The number for finance is a more modest 2.9 per cent.<sup>1</sup> Although in an early phase, we can conclude that the labour market impacts of the project in the higher business services have been and will be considerable.

Extensive investments have been made in the area in the first decade by both public and private parties. Investments in infrastructure till now have been moderate, at about 100 million euro. The area could largely benefit from the excellent infrastructure already in place. In the near future, different large investments are going to be made, namely a major expansion of the station, local road reconstruction and the addition of a new canal on the south side of the area. The ‘invisible’ underground infrastructure is important to mention as well since new energy and information networks are being constructed. If the decision is made to realize a tunnel in the area, then a huge construction project will take place in the middle of the project area that is expected to last about 15 years. In this scenario, total infrastructure investments are expected to be in the range of €3 billion. Private investments till 2004 reached about €1.24 billion. In the case of a full development of the area they are expected to reach about €6.2 billion in 2030.

## Institutional context

Having given an overall perspective on the history of the Zuidas project and having indicated some key statistics in the previous section we now turn to a short description of the institutional context in which the Zuidas project is created and shaped.

### *Institutional conditions*

The Netherlands is a so-called decentralized unitary state. This basically means that the country has a rather strong national government, expressed particularly in a strong centralized system of tax collecting. However, many government responsibilities have been transferred to lower levels of government, to the provincial governments and especially the local authorities. The execution of these responsibilities mostly takes place via the implementation of national laws and policies that are executed with national government funding. Only a small percentage of the income from local government is from own sources, approximately 18 per cent (Janssen-Jansen and Spit 2003). This dependant situation is sometimes referred to as a situation of 'golden cords' between national and local government.

If we focus on the policy field of spatial planning, we have to start with the legal backbone of the Dutch planning system, which is formed by the National Spatial Planning Act. It is a strict procedural act, which means that it only indicates the way spatial plans at different levels of government should be prepared, how formal decision-making should take place, how appeal procedures work, etc. There are no specific instructions on the content of spatial plans.

At the level of national government, spatial planning is interpreted as a so-called facet policy. This means that the Minister of Spatial Planning is responsible for coordinating the spatial implication of policies of other (sectoral) departments such as Transport, Agriculture and Nature, Economic Affairs, Internal Affairs etc. The most important policy document of the Ministry of Spatial Planning is the National Spatial Planning Report that is issued approximately once every ten years. It indicates long-term (strategic) spatial policies. Although, by the nature of the decentralized planning system, its direct impact is often limited, nevertheless, it is an important focal point for discussions in the parliament and within the intellectual community on the long-term policies and governance aspects of spatial planning.

The intermediary between the national and the local level is the relatively weak government layer of the 12 provinces. Provincial governments have their own spatial planning documents, the provincial structure plans (*streekplannen*), which are used to integrate local planning initiatives in a wider context.

Most powers related to spatial planning are, however, at the level of the municipalities. They make spatial structure plans and local land-use plans. The latter is the only legally binding planning document in the Dutch system.

Literature often indicates the lack of regional governance structures for the Netherlands, especially in the areas around the larger cities in the western part.

Officially this should be a task for the provincial authorities. In reality, the legal, financial and political position of the provincial government is rather weak when it comes to providing this leadership. It is therefore not surprising that, during recent decades, different experiments have been proposed to tackle the 'regional gap' in Dutch planning. Proposals to create an official powerful new layer of government have failed, however (Barlow 2000; Terhorst and Van de Ven 1997). Instead a looser form of sectoral coordination of certain policies, such as public transport, is achieved in the Regional Orgaan Amsterdam, a form of cooperation between Amsterdam and 15 neighbouring municipalities. Recently, in the Amsterdam case, new more experimental forms of governance, like the 'North Wing Coalition', have been set up in which municipalities coordinate more strategic issues of regional importance, concerning investments and development locations.

As mentioned before, the concentration of powers within the planning milieu is at local level. Municipalities have the obligation to make structure and land-use plans. In the case of Amsterdam it is also important to mention that the government owns most of the land within its premises and uses a land-lease system to keep control of its properties. This creates a constant stream of revenues and gives the city government a strong position in the case of large-scale (re-)development of areas.

### *Strategic embedding of the project and legitimization*

After the Zuidas project was mentioned for the first time in official policy documents in 1994, the project soon acquired an important position in the various spatial and economic plans of local government. As we mentioned before, the latest spatial structure plan of Amsterdam designated the Zuidas as one of the three urban zones of the city (together with the historic city centre and the area around the Amsterdam Arena in the south-east). We also mentioned a more difficult trajectory at the level of the national government. Although the Zuidas was quickly selected (in 1997) by the Ministry of Spatial Planning as one of the six stops for the high-speed train, there were difficulties incorporating it into the policy frameworks of other ministries, such as Economic Affairs, Transport and Finance. In the update of the latest National Spatial Planning Report (Ministerie VROM 2004), Zuidas is mentioned as one of the important national projects with an international dimension. Our analysis on the decision-making processes will explain how the project improved its connection with different other ministries in the last couple of years.

From a content point of view, legitimization for the project is sought by the proponents in its contribution to economic development and, more precisely, in the creation of a (future) top location for international businesses. The concept of a mixture of uses helps to legitimate the project as well as a place for housing, retail and culture. From a procedural viewpoint: legitimization for the project is realized by following the political and legal spatial planning procedures for the subsequent master plans (1998, 2001, 2004) and the more

detailed and operational project development decisions (*projectbesluiten*) for specific sub-projects. Since 1994, there has been remarkable political stability regarding the project. The councillor responsible for the Zuidas (Duco Stadig, of the Social Democratic Party) has now held this position for more than ten years. He stepped down after the 2006 local elections.

Consultation with the public and the market actors involved as regards the plan is one of the crucial development strategies of the local government. Most consultation with market actors is strongly institutionalized, either within the formal Zuidas Coalition, or with the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce, an actor that strongly endorses the project. People living in the neighbourhood are critical and have united in a 'Zuidas residents platform' (*Bewonersplatform Zuidas*). We will indicate later that the project has been rather unsuccessful in realizing support outside the official political and private sphere.

### **Analysis of multilevel decision-making**

This section analyses the processes of decision-making on the Zuidas project. Having described the 'bigger picture' in the previous sections, we now carry out a more careful analysis of the formal decision-making processes and the (more) informal processes of coalition building that have taken place in relation to the Zuidas. Our main interest is in the evolution of certain settings and practices throughout the relatively short history of the project, in order to understand whether conditions are available or have been created to implement the innovative goal of new urbanity in the project.

First we describe how the project has been framed in public, private and civic spheres of action. Recent literature on governance processes in metropolitan areas emphasize the importance of the connectivity between different spheres of action (Salet *et al.* 2003). We then focus on the goals and interests of the most important actors and we examine which changes have taken place in the different practices of interaction on the project during the last decade. We argue that the limited embeddedness of the project is one of the main factors hampering the realization of its potential as a new peripheral urban area.

### ***Framing the project***

#### *Public sphere of action*

Although the ambitions for the project have grown over time and its goals have strategically changed towards the realization of a new urban centre, the framing of the project was limited for a long time to the initial strong connection between the city of Amsterdam and two large financial institutions (ABN-AMRO and ING).

In November 1997, the project was officially granted top priority status within the city organization when it was designated a 'major urban project' (*Grootstedelijk project*). This status meant that most public sector involvement was transferred from the local district council of ZuiderAmstel to the (central)

city government level (Gemeente Amsterdam 1997). The spatial planning councillor acquired control of the project. Recently, the mayor himself has become increasingly involved, especially with a view to giving the project more clout in negotiations with the national government.

A special project office (the Projectbureau Zuidas, located on-site in the WTC building) was established as a point of liaison between public and private actors, and to overcome inner-municipal controversies. The project office has almost no own staff, but enters into contracting relationships with the traditional local departments involved in spatial planning issues in order to prepare studies and plans. The project hires expertise from departments such as spatial planning, transportation and infrastructure, economic affairs, environmental affairs and housing but also from different consultancy firms. The highest democratic body on the local level, the city council has, till now, always unanimously endorsed the different overall master plans for the area.

Outside the sphere of local government, the project is less successfully embedded in the rest of the public domain, although recently many things have changed. The lack of a strong regional governing body has already been mentioned earlier. The provincial government of North Holland has played almost no role throughout the whole process and has only focused on its minimal legal tasks relating to approval of the regional spatial plan (in which Amsterdam for its own part has almost a *carte blanche*). The provincial government has only shown an interest in active participation in the recent processes which entailed a joint effort aimed at achieving a public–public–private partnership in order to develop the area (interview with representatives of the province of North-Holland 2004).

The framing at project level at national government level was, for a long period, limited to the Ministry of Spatial Planning and the Ministry of Transport. The former selected the project as one of the six Key Projects for development around future high-speed train stations (Ministerie VROM 2000, 2002). The latter approached the project in the context of the MIT (Meerjarenprogramma Infrastructuur en Transport), the long-term programme for infrastructure and transport, which presents national infrastructure investments.

There has been no direct EU involvement in the decision-making relating to the Zuidas project, but indirectly there are specific (non-spatial) EU policies that influence the development of the location. One of the most important influences is caused by the policy to create more correspondence in the different taxation systems and level of taxes between the EU member states. This policy limits the possibilities to give favourable taxation packages to foreign companies that consider establishing premises at the site.

### *Private sphere of action*

In the beginning of 1995, the city promoted the establishment of a Zuidas Coalition to improve commitment to the development of the area. The Zuidas Coalition included the main actual and potential investors in the area as well as some important local stakeholders. Key among private sector actors were two of the

country's major banking, insurance and real estate investment companies – ABN-AMRO and ING. Both expressed interest in establishing their new headquarters at Zuidas as well as in taking on a role as developer and investor in the rest of the area. The RAI conference and exhibition centre, the Vrije Universiteit and the World Trade Centre, for their part, were already located in the area (on its fringes) and had plans to expand. Furthermore, the coalition included public sector actors such as Dutch Rail and the National Public Works department, involved due to the presence of national road and rail infrastructure in the area and subsequent plans to increase their capacity and improve the Zuid/WTC station.

The Zuidas Coalition can be seen as the relational backbone of the project, although its importance has declined since the beginning of the project. At the time of its formation, however, this new coalition framework – albeit informal – represented an explicit attempt to realize a new level of connectivity as regards operational support for the project, including both horizontal (inter-organizational) as well as vertical (intergovernmental) levels of relationships with key actors. It represented, moreover, an explicit alternative to a holistic partnership-based development model that, with its juridical implications, was seen as inadequate when it came to reconciling the aims of coordination with a focus on the requirements of flexibility and changing corporate attitudes in such a complex arena. This was a lesson clearly learned from the previous failures to establish productive relationships between public and private partners in the southern banks of the river IJ project. Instead, the Zuidas Coalition defined a long-term commitment around a general vision of development and of the expected mutual benefits, leaving their short-term contractual and operational definition to *ad hoc*, situation-defined agreements. Significantly, the Zuidas Coalition made no concrete binding agreements, but rather an informal commitment to 'feed' the 30-year programme with a constant flux of investments in order to achieve the final vision in a flexible, step-by-step way. Private involvement in the different sub-projects of the Zuidas is obviously more tangible. Separate consortia of different private parties are formed to develop projects such as 'Mahler 4', 'Gershwin' and 'Vivaldi'. In the case of a sub-project dominated by housing, like Gershwin, housing corporations play an important role as well.

A major event during the project that revealed the intensity of cooperation between public and private actors was the indicative offer made by a consortium of ABN-AMRO, ING and Dutch Rail Real Estate on 21 December 2000 to buy half of the parcels on top of the possible tunnel. At that time there was hardly any certainty about the economic and political feasibility of this dock-model, as we will analyse later. Some respondents in our interviews pointed to the poor 'deal' that the private actors offered the local government (unfortunately the documents are not publicly accessible, so we only have a few opinions from insiders). However, the proposal as such showed the intensity of cooperation, and shared commitment, between local government and important parts of the private sector for the development of the area in its most 'advanced' way, which would also create conditions for new urbanity.

*Lack of embeddedness in national government and civic spheres of action*

Previous research into the decision-making processes relating to the Zuidas had already highlighted the lack of embeddedness of the project in the spheres of national government and the civic sector (Majoer 2004). The Zuidas project started out very efficiently with the Zuidas Coalition as its relational backbone as we mentioned before. While the relationships between public sector and private actors were more productive than had been the case in previous spatial projects in Amsterdam, the overall image of the project is that it is rather introvert. The project had difficulties linking up with the agenda of the national government, outside the two direct ministries involved with spatial investments. At a local level, the involvement of social groups is restricted to a couple of residents' associations, joined together in the Zuidas Residents Platform (Bewonersplatform Zuidas), an association that is partly funded by the local government.

One could hypothesize that early successes – many parts of the project started favourably once the plans had been announced – perhaps misguided the coalition of proponents in their assumption that connections to other spheres were less important. On the other hand, other levels of government, both provincial and national, only showed marginal interest in the project.

However, when the goals of the project were adjusted after the first master plan of 1998 towards the realization of a new mixed-use city centre, and it became clear that national government involvement was necessary to bear the risks of crucial infrastructure investments (as we will see in the next section), it became crucial for the project to embrace a more extrovert strategy and open up to other spheres of action to fulfil its ambitions.

**Goals and interests**

Throughout the history of the project, a latent and sometimes very apparent struggle can be observed by actors striving to achieve an 'integral framing': the project as an endeavour that surpasses goals and interests of different sectors and levels of government, versus the traditional territorial and sectoral 'segmentation' of spatial initiatives and policies. Within an inherent fragmented situation, the creation of a form of mutual surplus value is one of the most important solutions to overcome this fragmentation (Teisman 1992). The dock-model proposal can be seen as an attempt to create such a form of mutual surplus value in this project. Because of its dominance in the governance processes related to Zuidas we use the controversy that occurred around this issue as a focal point for our analysis of the goals and interests of the most important actors.

*A process of inclusion of many goals...*

The (evolving) goals of the city government of Amsterdam as regards the Zuidas project are presented in a master plan for the area and a series of updates to this






Figure 3.3 Cross-section of the Zuidas project according to the 'dock-model'

Source: Gemeente Amsterdam, Dienst Ruimtelijke Ordening

document or studies (Gemeente Amsterdam 1998, 1999, 2001, 2004a). The master plan sketches the overall development strategy and the conditions for the development of the different sub-projects. The goal of the city government is to create a new urban centre with international allure around a node of mobility, the Zuid/WTC station. As mentioned before, the planning concept of multiple and intensive land use started to play an important role in materializing these ambitions after 1998. This planning concept can be addressed as an attempt to create the conditions for the realization of a new urban area, which inevitably has to contain a mixture of uses. On the other hand, it is also a strategy to prevent opposition (or create support), by including (the goals of) possible opponents in the project. To quote a former director of the project, the main strategy was to 'create as many supporters as possible for the project' (interview with a representative of the municipality of Amsterdam 2001).

The introduction of the concept of multiple and intensive land use not only meant the addition of a 1.1 million square metres housing programme (approximately 8,000 units), but also the inclusion of a soccer club in the area (five soccer pitches). The goal is also to earmark 12 per cent of the programme (485,020 square metres) to facilities. However, this ambition remains rather vague since, for example, there are no large-scale retail complexes in the current plans to protect neighbouring retail concentrations. Other uses, such as educational facilities and a newly designed museum, are planned at the fringes of the project, but the problem of how to find lessees to fill the many ground-floor 'facilities' premises in the central area have not been addressed.

The physical precondition for realizing this ambition is, according to the city of Amsterdam, a 1.2 kilometre tunnel for the entirety of the infrastructure. This

would physically and visually integrate the two parts of the project, and almost double the space available for development to 2.7 million square metres. Since such a solution eliminates noise and dust, the environmental problems that are currently hindering housing development will disappear. The city of Amsterdam initially expected that the revenues from these 'air-rights' parcels would be sufficient to pay for the additional costs. The only thing that then had to be done was to urge the Ministry of Transport, which is responsible for national infrastructure, to execute the work.

However, things did not turn out to be that simple. The ministry was not enthusiastic about the planned tunnel. Their preferred long-term investment option was to expand the current configuration of infrastructure (highway, rail and light rail), including the station, on the existing dike. The advantages of this solution are the relatively low costs and the possibility of investing in different phases without excessively disrupting the existing flows of cars, trains and metros. From a transportation and cost-oriented perspective, a tunnel option only generates disadvantages. The ministry distrusted the argument of those in the city, which was backed by the offer of ABN-AMRO, ING and Dutch Rail, that it could compensate the additional costs. Uncertainty and negativity surrounded both the costs and revenues of the whole operation. This was confirmed by a very critical cost-benefit analysis of the plan by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis that forecast a deficit of €800 million (Centraal Planbureau 2003). Together with different worrying national and international reports about a consistency of cost overruns in 'prestigious' infrastructure projects (Flyvbjerg *et al.* 2003; Commissie Duivesteijn 2004), the political environment was very unresponsive towards such a large and risky undertaking.

After different assessments of the costs and risks, it indeed became clear that the city government had overestimated its capacity to compensate for the additional investment costs. Together with the huge unknown financial risks related to the construction costs of the north-south subway line, the city of Amsterdam decided that it had to pursue another strategy to make the dock-model a reality (interview with a representative of the municipality of Amsterdam 2004). Instead of being a client (and partly a subsidizer) of a national infrastructure project with major local consequences, it changed its position in order to try and create a partnership with the national government and a more extensive range of private investors to realize a project in which the costs and benefits would be spread among a wider range of actors.

It seemed especially necessary to expand the range of supporters at national government level in order to overcome the difficulties related to the position of the Ministry of Transport. The position of the Ministry of Transport has already been referred to, but the question remains what were the goals of some other important ministries involved in the Zuidas?

The Ministry of Spatial Planning is a longstanding supporter of the project. It selected Zuidas in 1997 as one of the six projects of the Key Projects policy to support high-density and mixed-use development around future high-speed train stations (Ministerie VROM 2000, 2002; Schuiling and Majoor 2001). These six

projects had to provide important incentives to the physical and economic structure of the country, by 1) providing new employment, 2) leading to improved management of the growing mobility, 3) producing a more intensive land use policy around the station, and 4) improving the socio-economic vitality of urban areas (Ministerie VROM 2000: 13). Selection as a Key Project meant it became a national priority supported by a grant to finance certain non-profitable (public) parts of the project. The plan for a dock-model at the Zuidas was applauded in this policy and the Ministry of Spatial Planning became the strongest, although rather powerless, supporter at national government level. However, its status as a Key Project had only a small influence on the processes of decision-making on the Zuidas, because 1) the initially proposed additional subsidy of €70 million was very small compared to the total investment costs of the project, and 2) the status as a Key Project – officially a national government-wide policy – only marginally influenced the positions and involvement of other departments on the project. This ministry was therefore ineffective when it came to overcoming the dock-model controversy between the Ministry of Transport and the city of Amsterdam.

However, the change in strategy towards the creation of a wider network of supporters at national government level finally paid off in 2004. During the course



Figure 3.4 Aerial view of the development foreseen by the Zuidas master plan according to the 'dock-model'

Source: CIIID

of a relatively long economic recession, the Ministries of Economic Affairs and Finance acquired closer links with the development of Zuidas.

First there were the goals of the Ministry of Economic Affairs which, during recent decades, has often produced policy documents on the spatial-economic development of the country. In this period of economic decline and growing attention for issues of 'competitiveness' it has started focusing away from the traditional redistributive regional economic policies and towards the support of 'spaces of opportunity', that is spaces that are already experiencing favourable economic growth, especially in the western part of the Netherlands (Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2004). For the Amsterdam region this means special attention (and probably money) for Schiphol airport and the Zuidas and to improve highway connections (interview with representatives of the Ministry of Economic Affairs 2004).

In a period of severe public spending cuts, the Ministry of Finance wants to encourage the use of public-private partnerships in urban development and other spheres of governance. It sees the Zuidas as a prime opportunity for a financial partnership between national government, local government and the private sector (interview with a representative of the Ministry of Finance 2004).

While the project was successfully integrating goals of other national government actors into the project, the connection with the ambitions of the most important actors to convert the Zuidas into a major transportation node remained weak.

Dutch Rail is still in an institutional crisis since the privatization process, which started in the mid 1990s, resulted in various subdivisions that have conflicting interests. Especially on the issue of station (re-)development there is currently a great deal of uncertainty regarding the division of tasks of the different actors (Nederlandse Spoorwegen 2004). The national government provides funding for a 'basic station', but there is wide consensus that more investments are necessary to create a station that fits in with the ambitions for the location. However, this largely is an investment without direct financial benefits. The cumbersome decision-making process on a possible dock-model recently forced Dutch Rail to start short-term improvements at the existing extremely small and uncomfortable Zuid/WTC station. The city of Amsterdam opposed these solutions because it feared that they would make a future dock-model more expensive.

The Zuidas is always advertised by its proponents as the future high-speed train (HST) stop for Amsterdam. However, in reality this status is far from being secured at the moment. The High Speed Alliance (HSA), a company founded by Dutch Rail (90 per cent) and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (10 per cent), has won the concession to run the HST between the Belgian border and Amsterdam in the period 2007–2022. In the agreement between the national government and HSA the selection of the station to be used in Amsterdam (either Amsterdam Central station or Amsterdam Zuid/WTC) was left to the corporation. HSA has decided to use Central station as its terminus in the first years (interview with representative of HSA 2004). This decision is contrary to the expectations voiced by project proponents in the different plans for the Zuidas.

*Table 3.2* Milestones in the formal decision-making process on the Zuidas project

<i>Year</i>	<i>Milestone</i>
1994	Zuidas mentioned in Amsterdam government programme of new centre-left government
1995	Zuidas Coalition formed
1997	Official involvement of national government: Zuidas obtains Key-Project status
1998	Zuidas Masterplan presented
1999	Urban design vision Zuidas presented (concept): start of series of public consultations
2000	Indicative offer of consortium ABN/AMRO, ING and Dutch Rail Real Estate for dock-model
2001	Vision Zuidas presented: choice for Zuidas as new urban centre with mixed land use
2001	Intentional agreement city government – national government to start Environmental Impact Procedure for infrastructure expansion
2003	Intentional agreement to set up joint development corporation for the Zuidas between city government and national government.
2004	Process started to set up a joint public–public–private development corporation Zuidas

Source: own construct

The HSA made the decision for a number of different reasons. The current track configuration at the Zuidas (only two tracks) is insufficient to accommodate the new high-speed trains that are expected to run six times per hour between Amsterdam and Rotterdam. On top of that, the station is too small to have a dedicated HST platform and its general layout and quality level are regarded as poor. There is no railway yard close to Zuid/WTC for cleaning and maintenance of the trains and, finally, the connections between the station and the rest of the public transport network are seen as insufficient till the north–south subway line is realized in 2012. It is unclear at the moment what will happen with the high-speed train in the future. The Zuid/WTC station will be upgraded, either on a dike or in a tunnel, to make the arrival of the HST possible. The connection on the north–south subway line improves its position (but ironically it does the same for the Central station). Within the existing concession it is still up to the operator to choose the station. Some investments to be made by HSA in order to make the Central station ready for the HST in 2007 would seem to diminish the chances for a switch to Zuid/WTC within this concession period. It is unclear how private investors and owners at Zuidas will react when this will be eventually decided, since they were always promised a location near an HST station.

### ***Practices of decision-making (coalitions of power and exchanges of interest)***

Having analysed the goals of the main actors in the previous section, we now specifically turn to the practices of decision-making in which these actors

interact in order to reach decisions. In our examination we focus on the strategic decisions on the project: the decision related to the master plan and other comprehensive documents. Many of the decisions taken in the different sub-projects of the Zuidas fall outside our analysis because of their limited strategic value. Throughout our analysis so far, we have indicated different steps in the process. Table 3.2 provides a short overview of the most important 'milestones' of the Zuidas project up to now which serve as a basis for our assessment.

In a previous section we mentioned the strong embeddedness of the project in the spheres of local government and the private sector, especially ABN-AMRO and ING, two major financial institutions. The coalition between the city government and the private sector, informally in the Zuidas Coalition and formally (and more limited) in the consortium for the dock-model is the backbone of the decision-making process. The Zuidas project office, under responsibility of the councillor of spatial planning, is the integrator of the different stakes on the part of the local government as represented by the different local departments.

At the start of the project the involvement of the national government was rather weak, as we saw before. Throughout the processes of decision-making we witnessed a process of inclusion of national government actors, culminating in the recent process to set up a public–public–private development corporation (2004). This happened after the city–business coalition realized it needed to broaden support at national level to foster a breakthrough on the issue of the dock-model, where functional transportation criteria 'overpowered' and frustrated the plans for area development. Although the business coalition thoroughly supported the idea of the dock-model, it was, for a while, not motivated enough to follow the discussions between the city government and the national government. Only recently, in the process of working towards a public–public–private development, corporations have the private parties successfully adopted a more proactive position towards the national government. A senior official of the local government revealed the importance of the direct involvement of ING and ABN-AMRO in the discussions with the national government. According to him, these actors have certain lines of communication and influence that eventually led to a breakthrough at the highest levels of the national government. Since these parties have become actively involved, both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance (and Vice Prime Minister) have visited the project and expressed their interest in the successful development of the project, with the dock-model as the preferred option (interview with representative of the municipality of Amsterdam 2004). On the part of the national government, an interdepartmental working group was formed, with representatives of the ministries of Spatial Planning, Transport, Economic Affairs, Internal Affairs and Finance. Due to reorganizations at national level, the leadership in this complicated policy issue improved, both at the level of politicians and civil servants. Senior officials at national government level admitted the dominance in governance processes of the contrasting views of the Ministry of Spatial Planning (that stands for 'spatial quality') and the Ministry of Transport (that stands for functional and efficient investments). Within the

national government, the conviction grew that it was necessary to change strategies to prevent the continuation of the stubborn behaviour of actors. Instead of fighting to change the position of others, 'Everybody is now doing his or her own "thing": the Ministry of Transport is building a basic station and we have no intention of criticizing the quality thereof. We are not going to make each other's positions more difficult than they already are. We call this, "segmentation as a chance"' (interview with a representative of the Ministry of Spatial Planning 2004).

### *Critical analysis of the practices of decision-making*

If we critically analyse the practices of decision-making we can ask two major questions. The first is, are the practices capable of including (and reconciling) multiple interests? A second question involves analysing whether the practices are adequately organized in order to accomplish the goals of the project as laid out in the different official documents.

If we turn to the first question we can witness the inclusion of a wide variety of goals in the project. The plans have indeed evolved from an orientation towards a new business park to one that focuses on a new city centre. Different goals have been reconciled and a potential mutual surplus value has been reached in the planning concept of multiple and intensive land use. This 'buzzword' appealed to the private sector that wanted a high-density office district. It appealed to the public sector for several reasons. It fitted in with the overall spatial policy aim of the city of Amsterdam for a more effective utilization of space and a concentration of urban uses within the city boundaries (Gemeente Amsterdam 2003). It created the potential for a rather substantial addition of housing units and it is a possible spatial recipe for the optimization of land revenues in the area, needed in order to pay for the dock-model. The concept appealed to wider groups in society because it opened the area up for uses other than pure commercial ones. The business community began to understand that a mixed-use area was also better for the fulfilment of their goals because it would both prevent a lot of opposition and – on a positive note – would create better conditions for a lively area, which is an important asset in the high-end office market.

Since the Zuidas was a greenfield within the city, there were only limited problems with the existing users. Most of them were sports clubs that were replaced after having been offered favourable compensation. There was even modest support for the Zuidas project from the environmental community, especially because of its good modal-split performance and its high-density construction ambitions (Milieucentrum Amsterdam 2000). The modal split for the area is already favourable to public transport (40 per cent public transport, 20 per cent walking/biking and 40 per cent cars) and the expectation is that it will improve in the future when the north–south subway line and other infrastructure have been built (2020: 50 per cent public transport, 20 per cent walking/biking and 30 per cent cars: Gemeente Amsterdam 2004a). Special measures have been taken for energy conservation and water capturing in the area.

The dominant policy coalition seems adequate to reconcile the interest of many actors for the real-estate development aspects of the project. The second question we posed, however, was whether the practices are adequate as regards realizing the goals stated in the official documents. The question was literally: is the current policy coalition able to create a new urban centre?

First, it is clear that a lot depends on the actual realization of the dock-model, because without this model the housing programme (seen by many as a necessity to create 'urbanity') is impossible. On the other hand, one can argue that the stubborn position of the city government as regards the dock-model also prevented a creative search for other solutions for the infrastructure barrier and the realization of new urbanity without a tunnel-based solution. Nevertheless, the Zuidas shows a mix of varyingly favourable circumstances. One favourable circumstance is the location around an important public transport node, which is also close to the historic inner city and Schiphol airport. A major persistent problem, however, is the very high land costs in the area which do not seem conducive to the creation of a wide range of (innovative) urban uses in the area. Strong public involvement may safeguard certain public uses by means of cross-subsidizing agreements, either directly or indirectly with developers.

The creation and first few years of development of the project occurred in a period of high economic growth rates and strong demands on both the office and the housing market. This resulted in a growing ambition level on the part of the project proponents and thereby indirectly resulted in the proposal for the dock-model. Occupancy rates were extremely high and different sub-projects were put onto the market earlier than expected. Even now, in a period of crisis in the Dutch economy and office sector, the Zuidas seems to be relatively untouched compared to other office locations. This shows a strong differentiation in submarkets in the office sector, and seems to support the argument of project proponents for the need of a top quality 'international competitive' location. However, the expensive dock-model can only be 'afforded' if extreme high land prices are realized at the Zuidas. This automatically limits the target group for the area to a small segment of companies capable (and willing) to pay a high price to be located at a prestigious location. The most notable of these are companies involved in finance, consultancy and legal services. The question remains as to whether the demand for these sectors will stay high in the long term (Centraal Planbureau 2003). Financiers and investors have indicated that their involvement in the Zuidas also depends on the (artificial) creation of scarcity of competing high-end office locations in the region (interview with a representative from the Ministry of Finance). In an urban planning milieu with a weak form of regional coordination this is a problematic issue. At the moment, there are many competing locations for the project, and although they do not offer the same location qualities in terms of public space, image, and public transport accessibility, their rental prices are considerably lower than at the Zuidas, although they do offer the same quality of car-accessibility (and sometimes even better).

A process to further optimize land values to make the dock-model possible is not unlikely, and could possibly polarise the situation, if certain public goals



(such as social and affordable housing) and other (cultural) uses that could create an urban character are removed to reduce costs or improve revenues. The underlying problem is that, in such a situation, the local government is forced itself to act in a very business-like manner to help make the dock-model possible.

### ***Democracy, institutional innovation and imagery***

The Zuidas project has many aspects that harmonize with projects assessed by critical scientific scholars as the result of neo-liberal policies and 'new urban politics' (Moulaert *et al.* 2003). The Zuidas is a very large undertaking, with a strong business orientation. Some new governance structures designed to facilitate private investment are being set up to enable swift decision-making. The physical result at the moment is a purely commercial space: a collection of office towers alongside a highway, with mainly deserted public spaces in between.

Although all these comments are in a way 'true', the Zuidas in our opinion also presents glimpses of another, more positive, attitude towards the development of large projects. The project can be seen as an interesting example of a government following business interests but also trying to reposition itself – both in the goals it is striving for and in the internal government processes designed to implement these goals – vis-à-vis this same business sector in order to try to safeguard certain public goals and to create an added value. In this respect we sympathize with the conclusions of Savitch and Kantor (2002) in their comparative study on urban policies in European and North American cities. Their conclusion is that city governments, if they organize adequately, still have a very strong bargaining position to negotiate public benefits from deals with market actors, and can thereby make a difference. The question is what are the most important institutional innovations in the Zuidas which can create this added value?

The main innovations in the Zuidas are not related to the democratic processes and the way citizens' opinions are made known. Public opinion has influenced the plan – many public sessions were held after the first master plan was finalized in 1998 and these helped to shape the ambition for multiple land use. However, the project received limited attention from the media and was only occasionally the subject of societal and intellectual debate in the city. Neither did the initiators use very innovative means to create an exchange of opinions with society. To a large extent, the project was initiated and conceived in relatively closed circles. Interestingly enough, while many comparable projects of the same magnitude would be the focus of a fierce political and intellectual debate between proponents and opponents, in the case of the Zuidas there was almost no debate. This even surprised some of those directly involved (interview with a representative of the municipality of Amsterdam). We think that the explanation for this lies partly in the unique location of the Zuidas: a greenfield within the city without many users or other vested interests. Another reason is the strategy mentioned before, to include multiple claims within the project. One of the advantages of this strategy, from the position of the proponents, was that the project started swiftly, without




Figure 3.5 Plan of the Zuidas with location of current projects  
Source: Gemeente Amsterdam, Dienst Ruimtelijke Ordening

any long legal battles. Its disadvantages are related more to the long term and are also less tangible: the creation of a new international competitive location and urban centre for Amsterdam suggests the need for a wider public debate on the potentials and the meaning of the place.

From the perspective of democracy, institutional innovation and imagery, the most interesting innovation of the Zuidas is the combination of the concepts of 1) multiple-intensive land use, and 2) 'top location' as *possible* means to overcome fragmentation in goals between actors and create a situation of institutional innovation. We emphasize the word *possible*, because many processes on the Zuidas, especially in the case of a public-public-private development corporation are still unclear. Multiple-intensive land use can be conceived as a typical 'planners' wish'. It is an appealing concept that leads to positive connotations about a lively urban environment, high-quality urban spaces, a mixture of uses and incomes etc., all of which progressive urban planners find attractive. It might even appear, in this sense, that the 'ambiguity' or 'equivocality' of a planning concept possibly constitutes a condition for it to deploy a framing capacity over time, in a coevolutionary dimension capable of responding to processes of mutual adjustment among the strategies of the actors involved. In the case of the Zuidas, the concept was instrumental for the incorporation of claims of neighbouring communities and the local city council members. For the city government, multiple and intensive land use was appealing because of the scarcity of adequate building locations in the region, especially for housing. The private sector embraced the concept as necessary because high-end office areas distinguish themselves from other office locations because of their location, but also because of their embeddedness in more urban environments with a diversity of facilities such as restaurants, culture, kindergartens, hotels, temporal furnished housing etc. Therefore the business sector became more open than before to accept changes in the plans towards more mixed use. A positive factor from their perspective was also that the yields on housing development in the higher segments of the market almost equalled those on offices.

The concept of a 'top location', although a typical neo-liberal policy term, eventually generated a great deal of innovation on the part of the national government, the third important sphere of action related to the project. It served as a force to break through the contrasting positions of the two main departments involved, namely spatial quality and multiple and intensive land use as a goal of the Ministry of Spatial Planning and functional and cost-efficient infrastructure as a goal of the Ministry of Transport. By framing the Zuidas neither as an infrastructure project nor as a station development, but as an integrative project with a broader goal, namely the international competitive position of the Netherlands in comparison with other city-regions with a view to attracting the establishment of international businesses, more actors became involved and harmony started to prevail over fragmentation. The international top location argument will probably be used by the proponents of the project to defend the concept of a development corporation, as a governance structure for its further development.

Some innovative aspects of the decision-making process at the Zuidas are being transferred to other practices. The concept of a special public agency that has a contracting relationship with the traditional departments and acts as a communicator towards private parties is being used now in other larger projects in Amsterdam. The dissemination of the concept of multiple-intensive land use, and more specifically, the idea of creating places with urban qualities outside the old city centres is only slowly gaining attention. The question remains as to whether it is a concept that is applicable in many other situations. The same can be concluded of the top location label that, by definition, has to be used reluctantly. Therefore, the value of these two particular concepts for other planning situations seems limited. However, interpreting them as metaphors (or examples) of planning concepts that link different spheres of action, that is government, business and civic, brings us closer to their real value. It seems that in situations of complexity and fragmentation, single purposed stakeholders can be seduced to engage in forms of collective action if – within this collective action – there is a clear benefit for them, presented in a colourful easy-to-communicate concept.

## Lessons to conclude

Above all, the Zuidas is still a project under development. In its relatively short history, the project has gone through different phases, as discussed earlier. Flexibility is always mentioned by the project's proponents as a crucial strategy for development, due especially to the building period of approximately 30 years. Therefore, one could even argue that the Zuidas is not a project which fits into the traditional definition of a geographically contained and time-bound physical transformation, but rather a loose framework for a continuous transformation alongside the southern ring road of Amsterdam, through the execution of different smaller projects. Once the last parts of the project – as foreseen at the moment – have been finished in around 2030, the first parts will probably be under some form of reconstruction in a process Schumpeter calls *creative destruction*.

The exception to this flexible mode of urban transformation is the proposal to overcome the infrastructure bundle by building the dock-model. This plan on the one hand helped to define the ambition of the project and mobilized a lot of attention, but, on the other hand and in contrast to the flexible development strategy of the rest of the project, it adds a very inflexible aspect to it. The ambition to build the dock-model eventually drove the city of Amsterdam into a partnership with the national government, which had maintained a low project profile for some considerable time.

If we return to the question we posed in our introduction, namely whether the adequate institutional conditions are available (or have been created) to implement the innovative goals of the Zuidas project, our conclusion has to be ambivalent, and not only because many processes on the project are still ongoing.

The Zuidas can be interpreted as a possible example of a situation in which local government has repositioned itself vis-à-vis the private community. It not only facilitated the demands of the business community (a high-quality office location),

but during that process it also quite effectively positioned its own agenda (the Zuidas as a multifunctional location, a new centre) that eventually even changed the position of market actors on the area. Multiple-intensive land use became the viable, imaginative, easy-to-communicate and rather vague, adaptable concept that helped the city government to pursue an agenda for housing, public space and facilities in a predominately business-oriented plan.

The Zuidas represents, to a large extent, a significant exception to a common-sense view of large urban development projects as the mere result of neo-Liberal imperatives. As we have seen, the local government's aim was to create a strategy of integrated mixed-use development that has led to the pursuit of a high level of public involvement and – to a certain extent – to the adoption of innovative solutions.

The question remains, however, as to whether the ambition for a very intensive mixed-use area can be realized in practice. Until now, the existing and newly built properties in the area have been office buildings. Despite the outspoken commitment of the city to a strategy of quality, this might be seen as an expression of the persistence of conflicting frames within the planning process, and of their possible influence on the project's future. An apparent element of conflict among actors' frames of reference persists in their divergent views about the public meaning of the project. This refers both to its meaning in a region-wide or even nation-wide perspective of development, and to its urban quality.

Governance processes related to the Zuidas are ongoing, and have now become even more serious than ever before. This makes it hard to come to definitive conclusions. Because of the dependency on the dock-model and therefore national government intervention to create a real new urban centre, the success of the concept of multiple-intensive land use in the local government–business sphere and the master plan remains rather superficial. The question that remains unanswered is whether the concept is strong enough to align the divergent expectations of a much wider array of actors. Earlier in this chapter we concluded that the wider appreciation of the 'top location' label for the Zuidas helped to create links with other national ministries and high level political representatives. The recent process aimed at creating a public–public–private development corporation to build the dock-model – although shrouded in many uncertainties – offers more favourable conditions than ever before for the actual realization of this major part of the project.

If we address the question of the extent to which new planning concepts of multiple-intensive land use may gain the capacity of aligning the divergent initial expectation of the main actors involved we furthermore have to point at two crucial issues. First, images and visions of 'planned futures' must avoid the risk of remaining restrained to exclusionary policy arenas: they must stand – in other words – the test of a broad public debate not only as a condition for legitimization, but also as a condition for effectiveness. In this sense, despite its tradition as an open, democratic 'public city', and despite the potentials of the images and visions that have been mobilized, Amsterdam has failed up to now to raise public awareness and to involve public creativity in the development process of the

Zuidas project. The whole notion of urbanity is still rather ill-defined and maybe elitist. Second, in order to be viable, planning concepts need to be backed up by institutional creativity: an issue which requires attention to be devoted to the peculiar institutional capacities that fit the nature of the goals, rather than pre-constituted organizational and procedural arrangements. It is at both these levels that, clearly, planning concepts must show their ability to cope with 'power' in an innovative way.

## Acknowledgements

A number of different primary and secondary sources were used for this report, including papers prepared for scientific conferences by the authors. Three expert meetings organized under the auspices of Zuidas Reflector were attended in the autumn of 2004. A series of interviews with people involved in the project were conducted in the period June–August 2004 to add to our body of knowledge. The text sometimes refers directly to one of these interviews. However, the agreement was made with most respondents not to quote directly and not to reveal their names, so we have limited ourselves in the references to their institutional affinity. Particularly for this report, interviews were conducted with the following representatives: the municipality of Amsterdam (2), the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (2), the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (1), the Ministry of Economic Affairs (2), the Ministry of Finance (1), the provincial government of North-Holland (2) and Dutch Rail/High Speed Alliance (1). In earlier stages of research on the Zuidas project, other interviews were conducted with representatives of other departments of the municipality of Amsterdam and representatives of the business community.

## Notes

- 1 More information about this data, the delimitation of the Nurec region of Amsterdam and the NACE categories in: Pöckl *et al.* (2004).

## References

- Barlow, M. (2000) 'Amsterdam and the question of metropolitan government', in L. Deben, W. Heinemeijer, and D. van der Vaart, (eds) *Understanding Amsterdam: Essays on Economic Vitality, City Life and Urban Form*, Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis: 249–299.
- Bertolini, L. and Salet, W.G.M. (2003) 'Planning concepts for cities in transition: regionalisation of urbanity in the Amsterdam structure plan', *Planning Theory and Practice* 4, 2: 131–146.
- Cammen, H. van der and de Klerk, L.A. (2003) *Ruimtelijke Ordening, van Grachtengordel tot Vinex-wijk*, Utrecht: Uitgeverij Het Spectrum.
- Centraal Planbureau (CPB) (2003) *Kerngetallen Kosten-batenanalyse Project 'Zuidas Amsterdam'*, CPB Document No. 44, Den Haag: CPB.
- Commissie Duivesteijn (2004) *Onderzoek naar Infrastructuurprojecten*, TK29283.

- Ernst & Young en Regioplan (1999) *Economische Effecten Zuidas Amsterdam*.
- Flyvbjerg, B., Bruzelius, N. and Rothengatter, W. (2003) *Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gemeente Amsterdam (1997) 'Bestuurlijke Samenwerking ten Behoeve van de Ontwikkeling van het Project Zuidas', *Gemeenteblad*, 1, 502.
- Gemeente Amsterdam (1998) *Masterplan Zuidas*, Amsterdam: Gemeente Amsterdam, Dienst Ruimtelijke Ordening.
- Gemeente Amsterdam (1999) *Concept Visie Zuidas*, Amsterdam: Gemeente Amsterdam, Dienst Ruimtelijke Ordening.
- Gemeente Amsterdam (2001) *Visie Zuidas 2001*, Amsterdam: Gemeente Amsterdam, Dienst Ruimtelijke Ordening.
- Gemeente Amsterdam (2003) *Kiezen voor Stedelijkheid, Structuurplan Amsterdam*, Amsterdam: Gemeente Amsterdam, Dienst Ruimtelijke Ordening.
- Gemeente Amsterdam (2004a) *Visie Zuidas 2004*, Amsterdam: Gemeente Amsterdam, Dienst Ruimtelijke Ordening.
- Gemeente Amsterdam (2004b) *Economische Visie Zuidas Amsterdam*, Amsterdam: Projectbureau Zuidas.
- Gualini, E. and Majoor, S.J.H. (2004) 'Innovative practices in large urban development projects: conflicting frames in the quest for "new urbanity"', paper presented at the conference *City Futures*, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, USA, July 8–10.
- Janssen-Jansen, L. and Spit, T. (2003) 'Afschaffen OZB: ruimtelijke gevolgen', *Rooilijn*, 36, 10: 503–509.
- Jolles, A., Klusman, E. and Teunissen, B. (eds) (2003) *Planning Amsterdam, Scenarios for urban development 1928–2003*, Rotterdam: Nai Uitgevers.
- Majoor, S.J.H. (2004) 'Amsterdam Zuidas: Verkeersbundel en Toplocatie', in: H. de Bruin, G.R. Teisman, J. Edelenbos and W. Veeneman (eds) *Meervoudig Ruimtegebruik en het Management van Meerstemmige Processen*, Utrecht: Uitgeverij Lemma: 77–98.
- Milieucentrum Amsterdam (2000) *Hoeveel moet het Milieu Dokken voor het Dokmodel?*, Amsterdam: Milieucentrum Amsterdam.
- Ministerie Economische Zaken (2004) *Pieken in de Delta, Gebiedsgerichte Economische Perspectieven*, Den Haag: Ministerie Economische Zaken.
- Ministerie VROM (2000) *Nieuwe Sleutelprojecten 2000, Voortgangsrapportage*, Den Haag: Ministerie VROM.
- Ministerie VROM (2001) *Vijfde Nota over de Ruimtelijke Ordening 2000/2020*, Den Haag: Ministerie VROM.
- Ministerie VROM (2002) *Nieuwe Sleutelprojecten 2002, Voortgangsrapportage*, Den Haag: Ministerie VROM.
- Ministerie VROM (2004) *Nota Ruimte: Ruimte voor Ontwikkeling*, Den Haag, Ministerie VROM.
- Moulaert, F., Rodríguez, A. and Swyngedouw, E. (2003) *The Globalized City*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nederlandse Spoorwegen (2004) *De ontwikkeling van stations, samenwerking en rolverdeling*, Utrecht: Nederlandse Spoorwegen.
- Ploeger, R. (2004) *Regulation of urban office provision*, PhD thesis, Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam.

- Pöckl, A., Hagspiel, E. and Paal, M. (2004) *Scientific Concept and Structure of the COMET-Databases, Documentation of Variables*, COMET Deliverable No. 6, Vol. 1.
- Salet, W.G.M. and Majoor, S.J.H. (eds) (2005) *Amsterdam Zuidas European Space*, Rotterdam: 010 Publishers.
- Salet, W.G.M., Thornley, A. and Kreukels, A.J. (eds) (2003) *Metropolitan Governance and Spatial Planning*, London: Spon Press.
- Savitch, H.V. and Kantor, P. (2002) *Cities in the International Marketplace*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Schuiling, D. (1996) 'Key projects for urban regeneration: the Dutch experience', *Planning Practice and Research*, 11, 3: 279–290.
- Schuiling, D. and Majoor, S.J.H. (2001) 'Three generations of key projects for urban investments in the Netherlands', paper presented at the *World Planning Schools Conference*, Shanghai, China, July 11–15.
- Teisman, G.R. (1992) *Complexe Besluitvorming, een Pluricentrisch Perspectief op Besluitvorming over Ruimtelijke Investeringsen*, The Hague: VUGA.
- Terhorst, P. and Van de Ven, J. (1997) *Fragmented Brussels and Consolidated Amsterdam: A Comparative Study of Spatial Organisation and Property Rights*, Amsterdam: Netherlands Geographical Society.



## 4 Barcelona Universal Forum 2004

### Culture as a driver of urban economy

*José Luís Luzón Benedicto and Jordi Vila Carrasco*

#### Introduction

Barcelona is not a state capital and at times finds itself faced with a shortage of public investment. The organization of important international events has historically played an important role in the transformation of its urban fabric. In 2004, the city put itself forward to host another great event, continuing a century-long tradition of intense urban-wide planned transformations related to international events, such as the International Exhibitions of 1888 and 1929, the Eucharistic Congress of 1952 and the Olympics in 1992. Since the end of the 1970s, Barcelona has made a great effort to renew its obsolete functional spaces and transform degraded areas that were the legacy of a long dictatorship and the effects of the adjustment to the post-Fordist modes of production.

The Forum of Cultures 2004 was a cultural event organized with the support of the UNESCO. The initiative for this event came from Barcelona itself, providing the impulse for an additional major urban project. As C. Landry states, the connection between urban regeneration and culture is so easily made because of the low perception of the quality of life in the modern city, and the arts are seen as a resource through which that quality might be improved. Arts and cultural activity have become an increasingly important part of urban regeneration, playing an innovative central role in Barcelona's case (Landry *et al.* 1996).

The Universal Forum of Cultures could be described as the most symbolic action that, among other objectives, was intended to redevelop Poblenou's old industrial sector and the whole of the north-eastern part of Barcelona. Its main socio-economic purpose was to achieve a higher degree of spatial specialization by attracting new knowledge-dense activities and to reinforce the regeneration of one of the city's most degraded areas, namely the districts of La Catalana and La Mina.

The Forum of Cultures 2004 was located between two municipalities, Barcelona and Sant Adrià del Besòs, but was expected to have direct effects on the whole of the agglomeration and function as a positive stimulus on the international image of the metropolitan area beyond Europe.

According to Joan Clos, Mayor of Barcelona, in a speech given at the opening of the IFHP International Congress on Urban Renewal, that took place in

Barcelona from 9 to 13 September 2001, urban renewal in Barcelona has focused on transforming obsolete dynamics. Local planning authorities are currently concentrating on the following areas:

- the redefinition of density;
- the proposal of urban quality as a motto for creating an attractive centre;
- defending the undeveloped space between the historically established towns and cities in the metropolitan area as far as possible and increasing the communication networks that these towns and cities have with each other and with Barcelona.

Urban space improvement and recovery, from the point of view of sustainability, should be a major concern for all cities. Barcelona also has to deal with urban renewal in order to keep its competitiveness in economic terms and often to solve major social problems, such as economic stagnation, unemployment and low sustainability.

Renovation can be considered for different reasons. One of these is fairness, particularly relevant where residences are involved, due to improvements in the city's overall efficiency or, in the case of private agents, because of the additional income from capital resources due to the market value of the property after the renovation. These objectives can be contradictory in some cases and complementary in others. Not all renewal can be entrusted to private initiatives, but the contribution of the latter is an important factor for keeping a city in shape. It is a question of balancing financial logic and the appropriate measures so that renovation is efficient but does not ignore the interests of the city or its citizens.

The various models for renewal range from maintaining the city's pre-existent fabric to radically substituting it. In Barcelona, mixture, consensus and multidisciplinary concepts are the characteristics of its approach to urban development. This renewal concentrates on keeping historical centres' vitality, re-dimensioning free public space (green areas in particular), ensuring the city blends in with the territory of its environment and adapting industrial areas to current quality and competitiveness requirements.

The projects for keeping the historical centres' vitality have favoured the application of urban microsurgery techniques and absorbing the city's varied characteristics. As far as the green areas are concerned, small-scale projects were initiated in the 1980s in squares and gardens, and today's challenge lies in unifying the city's network of large parks.

### *The centre of a large metropolitan agglomeration*

As for blending the city into its territorial surroundings, Barcelona is seen as the centre of a metropolitan area with four million inhabitants, a real city, which is a network of other infrastructure-sharing cities.

If Barcelona represents the central role of the metropolitan area, the seafront is the maximum expression of this role. The new concept applied in 1992 with a

view to renovating the seafront marked the renewal programme for the Poblenou district. This renewal of the seafront started becoming a reality thanks to the Olympics in 1992 and has now been completed for the north-eastern coast of the city thanks to the development of the 22@ district of activities and the Forum of Cultures 2004 projects.

Railway lines and industrial activities previously hampered Poblenou's access to its beaches and civic activities. Since these areas were partially recovered by creating the Olympic Village and extending the Diagonal Avenue to the beach, Poblenou has become more important. However, the restrictions resulting from Poblenou's industrial past hindered the fulfilment of some of the programme's goals and made it necessary to use a multipurpose net of projects with common objectives.

Barcelona wants to preserve its economic prominence and occupational dynamics, intensifying the presence of knowledge-based activities by laying the optimal conditions for advanced services activities to develop. There is an urge to set optimum conditions for developing these activities despite the enormous difficulty of finding suitable premises owing to the scarcity of office space in the city.

That is how the 22@ area, the Forum of Cultures and other smaller scale projects were conceived, in response to this need and as a solution for the Poblenou transformation process. The aim was to relocate the central focus of the metropolitan process in terms of the internationalization of its economy. The methodology is based on facilitating the transformation by adjusting the final layout, while still conserving the most interesting of the oldest factory buildings. Public initiatives were linked to six action areas with a view to providing large areas for parks and facilities.

In the case of Barcelona, the key to planning a quality city – in economic, social and environmental terms – lies not so much in the urbanization of new spaces as in the renewal and metropolitan integration of the existing city. By transforming the obsolete industrial fabric of Poblenou, the city is improving its functional capacity and is opening up to new forms of coexistent uses. The high-speed train access to Sagrera station, close to the 22@ district, the Universal Forum of Cultures and some other related small projects, such as the regeneration of La Mina, also reinforce this area's central role in the agglomeration.

## **Location of the project**

Located in the north-east of the Iberian Peninsula, Barcelona's metropolitan area comprises an intense daily mobility pattern, as a functional region based on integrated job and housing markets. The region has quite a few natural characteristics that have to be taken into account. It covers 164 municipalities grouped into seven counties. It represents about 10 per cent of the Catalan territory and is home to approximately 70 per cent of its population. Due to its hilly topography, forest coverage and valuable agricultural land, the Barcelona metropolitan area still has a high percentage of rural surfaces and legally protected land. Different levels of government in the region try to preserve these

areas by concentrating urban settlement and activity in the medium-sized urban centres of the region.

The historical evolution of land occupation patterns in the metropolitan area of Barcelona is composed of successive and superimposed phases of creation of new settlements and dispersion and the extension of pre-existing settlements and densification. The topography and the pre-urban agricultural patterns formed an influential shaping framework for urbanizing processes, and growth elements were drawn towards road and rail infrastructure. This historical evolution of the land occupation patterns has led to a polycentric metropolitan region.

In contrast to most of the other Spanish metropolises, Barcelona's metropolitan region can thus be considered a real polycentric system, with a main centre, surrounded by an extremely dense first fringe. It has sub-centres that are steadily becoming more integrated into the system and they establish reticular relationships with the municipalities surrounding them. The sub-centres are linked to the core city and the first fringe by metropolitan corridors, in the form of an urban continuum of spread urbanization (García López 2001).

At present, the core city has two main development axes where the most significant development and redevelopment projects have taken shape. One of these zones is located in the south-west, along the Llobregat River, and takes advantage of some spare land at a very strategic location on the edge of Barcelona and El Prat de Llobregat.

The other zone is right on the north-east edge of the core city and extends partially to Sant Adrià de Besòs, along the Besòs River. It consists of an old industrial district, some spare public land formerly devoted to infrastructures and other urban services and some residential land. This area is generally known as Poble Nou, although the projects analysed in this article cover a wider area, and it was a key industrial area in Catalonia until the mid 1960s. It used to be referred to as the Catalan Manchester (Marrero 2003).

The aim was to concentrate logistical activities in the delta of the Llobregat River. The objectives set by the planning authorities in the Pla Delta (Delta Plan) were to turn this area into the main distribution centre for all of the western Mediterranean and consolidate it as the gateway to southern Europe. This area is in between the port, the airport, and the main logistical platforms. The operations proposed by the Delta Plan centred on the alteration of the course of the Llobregat River, which had to allow for the expansion of the port, as well as its Logistic Activities Area, or ZAL, as it is known in Barcelona. The passenger and cargo capacity of the airport were also increased. Road and rail connections also had to be improved and completed at local, regional and European levels.

At the other end of the city, the Besòs River is the location of the project that has been chosen for analysis in this chapter. The Forum of Cultures could be considered an innovative way of transforming an old industrial area and an old socially and economically degraded area into a new central space for the city. The innovation lies in the fact that culture is the driving force behind the project and a self-created cultural event is intended to be the catalyst for a huge transformation process.




Figure 4.1 Location of the Forum 2004 project in the Barcelona agglomeration  
Source: UvA-Kaartenmakers

### *Changes in economic and production activities*

In Barcelona the strength of the local economy lies in the wide diversification of sectors, predominantly the business structure of small and medium-sized enterprises. The employment share in the secondary sector is relatively high, due to Barcelona's long-standing industrial tradition. This share in the manufacturing sector has been dramatically decreasing over the years, forcing the city into an economical reconversion with severe territorial effects.

Barcelona City Council has shown clear dynamism both in long-range actions, for example the Olympic Games and the Forum of Cultures 2004, and as an agent to stimulate important public projects and promote the participation of other economic agents, both public and private.

Barcelona's importance as one of the main Mediterranean metropolises has historically been based on its industrial and commercial activities. Since the

nineteenth century, Barcelona's manufacturing industry has been dominated by the textile and metalworking industries but by the 1970s these were undergoing a major transformation. The textile industry lost its primacy and entered a deep structural crisis as the metalworking industry overtook it as the most important sector. At the same time, other new advanced sectors including chemicals, pharmaceuticals and rubber, construction, graphic arts, wood and food production started expanding.

Some authors (Trullen and Adam 1998) consider that, by the 1980s, Barcelona had developed beyond the Fordist phase and was moving towards a regulationist economy. From the territorial point of view, this implies segmentation within the productive process, the decentralization of productive plants and the decentralization of residential development with consequent increased needs for communication and transportation. Between 1970 and 1985, during the economic crisis, Barcelona experienced major changes in both its economy and its labour market. It lost 42 per cent of its industrial jobs and 69 per cent of jobs in the construction sector. In contrast, the city's service sector grew by 12 per cent and these jobs represented three-quarters of all tertiary employment in the Barcelona metropolitan area.

At the beginning of the 1980s an economic revitalization process began. Initially, the most important factor was the upturn in the world economy, but that does not explain the whole of Barcelona's recovery. Two other factors should be included. First, the integration within the European Community had a very important spatial effect on Barcelona as it occupies an advantageous location between the Iberian peninsula and the rest of Europe. Second, the city was chosen to hold the 1992 Olympic Games and hence was projected onto the international stage.

These changes initiated two processes. The first was Barcelona's internal renewal and the second the growth and renovation of the production system. The latter is having a major effect on industrial locations within the city. The central city of Barcelona is losing its industrial areas although the major Zona Franca industrial area (450 hectares) and the even more important Poblenou industrial zone are acquiring new service functions. Changes in industrial structure are accompanied by changes in spatial distribution, with industrial location diversified into a large radius of productive zones. Nowadays, however, the developing services sector accounts for more than half of the employment. Metropolitan Barcelona houses a number of well-known universities and research institutes. In addition, its port is one of the largest in the Mediterranean. In the last decades, three main economic processes can be identified: industrial restructuring since the 1960s; innovation and technological change in the productive process; and the target of integration of the Spanish economy within the European Community and global markets.

Every city which aspires to a world role needs to organize its response to changes in the production system in a coherent and viable way. These responses will address the city's functional space in its geopolitical and its economic context. In Barcelona's case, it is evident that, at present, the public sphere is

dominant in that its actions encourage other agents, whilst the private sector appears to be led by public initiatives.

## **The planning environment**

Planning in Catalonia follows a hierarchical top-down procedure in which plans are drawn at one spatial level guide and constrain the contents of lower-level plans (Keyes *et al.* 1991). This hierarchy follows the governmental and administrative structure of the Spanish state.

The Spanish State is divided into 50 provinces, grouped into 17 autonomous communities, as established by the Constitution of 1978. Barcelona's metropolitan region is in the autonomous community of Catalonia, with its own government, the Generalitat de Catalunya.

In 1987, Generalitat de Catalunya approved its own territorial organization, parallel to that of the Spanish state, by the creation of 41 counties called *comarcas*. The *comarca* of Barcelona covers 143 square kilometres and includes Barcelona and the four municipalities around it. The delimitation of this *comarca* did not follow any scientific criteria and was based on political concepts (Luzón *et al.* 2003).

The planning administrative system is currently organized into three tiers: central, regional (autonomous communities) and local (provinces and municipalities). Under the Spanish Constitution of 1978, a democratic and autonomous tier of government was established at regional level with the right to claim independent legislative powers in many areas of activity, including land-use planning and housing provision.

Spanish provincial governments, called *Diputació*, combine central and local administrative functions, being both territorial delegations of the central government and associations of municipalities. However, with the decentralization of power from central to autonomous regional government, they have lost much of their previous importance, particularly in the field of planning. While they used to be the higher planning authority reporting to the municipalities, in most cases the autonomous regional governments are now responsible for supervising local planning activities and approving local master plans.

Since the autonomous communities claimed legislative powers over planning matters under the 1978 Constitution, the power of the central administration over land-use planning has correspondingly reduced. However, there are many closely related topics for which the central government still has responsibility.

The municipalities are the effective planning authorities, responsible for planning policy and development control in their areas. Municipalities draw up master plans, called 'Pla d'Ordenació Urbanística Municipal' (POUM), which are legally binding documents containing detailed zoning and land-use requirements for the whole of their jurisdiction. Since these plans represent the lowest level in the hierarchy, they are required by law to conform to the guidance provided in higher level plans.

It is permissible for a number of municipalities to cooperate in the production of a joint land-use plan and similarly possible to form administrative entities to

oversee planning and related matters. This occurred, for instance, in the case of Barcelona and 26 adjoining municipalities that have strong economic and commuting links with the city and produced a common Master Plan.

Strategic planning is not regarded as a binding instrument by Catalan law and is not so strictly regulated. Any administration wishing to do so may draw up strategic plans, but their formulation or implementation is not compulsory.

### ***Catalonia's General Territorial Plan***

The Catalan autonomous government has retained almost full competency as regards regional planning. The General Territorial Plan for Catalonia (PTGC), approved by law 1/1995 of 16 March, is a conditioning framework for any other lower plan as it establishes the basic directives. It was designed as a definitive guiding model and reference frame for all other plans, programmes and measures which may affect regional policy. Its basic objectives are to create a regional equilibrium in Catalonia, providing incentives for economic development and safeguarding and improving environmental quality. As stated in its directives to the Barcelona Metropolitan Plan (PTMB), it has to reinforce the polycentric metropolitan structure, avoiding greater relative weight of the Barcelona metropolitan area with regard to the rest of Catalonia.

The PTGC does not set any direct planning or development measures. Its provisions are designed to establish directives for the partial regional plans, such as the PTMB and other sector plans. In its directives, PTGC also set out that PTMB must delimit areas which are suitable for supra-municipal urban planning, and establish densities and standard uses for each and every one of them in accordance with the overall standards laid down by the PTGC itself. The approximate scale of the driving areas and any individual urban renovation schemes that may be carried out will be also be in accordance with these standards.

The Commission for Metropolitan Regional Planning (Comisió d'Ordenació Territorial Metropolitana de Barcelona) is an office attached to the Catalan Ministry of Urban Development. It has elaborated a proposal for the PTMB, and it is responsible for ensuring approval of the territorial plan.

### ***The Metropolitan Territorial Plan of Barcelona***

The PTMB has been under discussion between the local authorities and the government of Catalonia for a long time, more than ten years, and it has not yet been approved. This is probably due to the political rivalry between the socialist party governing the metropolitan region and the conservative party governing the rest of the territory and ruling the autonomous government that has remained stable since the restitution of democracy in 1979, until 2004. Since the 2004 elections at the Generalitat de Catalunya the same socialist party has ruled the government and most of the cities of the metropolitan agglomeration. The PTMB is expected to set the context for regional planning, to lead to a formal 'common view', which does not yet exist, and to clarify this



uncertain institutional set-up as regards coordination and cooperation within this functional region.

The objectives of the PTMB are a thoughtful attempt to combine, in the long-term, the crucial environmental aims with economic ones to achieve sustainable development for the region. Thus, the planned proposal under discussion focuses on an urban model that tends to concentrate settlement and activities in 21 'metropolitan blocks' while keeping 80 per cent of the regional territory in a rather sparsely populated state, which is the 'open space', considered to be a whole unit. The resulting physical model also tends to improve the desired social items of social equity, security, accessibility, participation, integration, and health amongst others in that specific regional context. PTMB takes in an area that corresponds to the zone delimited by the *Pla director de l'Àrea Metropolitana de Barcelona* (AMB) 65 (Barcelona Metropolitan Directive Plan) approved in 1968. It is made up of seven *comarques* and 163 municipalities. It occupies 10 per cent of the territory of Catalonia. All in all, it constitutes an extension of 3,235.9 square kilometres with a population density of 1,663 per square kilometre. Indeed, 70 per cent of the total population of Catalonia lives in the Barcelona metropolitan area.

As regards its economic objectives, the plan proposals seek to strengthen competitiveness for the whole territory, promoting economy diversification, main infrastructure development and new technology issues while keeping landscape and natural conditions at a 'first class' quality level in order to attract investors and visitors. The improvement of commercial transportation is stressed, with a progressive conversion to international railway standards, as the present networks are a mess of three different track widths. That is expected to allow further competitive improvement of ports and airports in the area, through logistic linkages among different transportation modes.

### ***Social and economic strategic plans***

Urban strategic planning draws its inspiration from the techniques which private companies began to use in the 1970s and which started to be applied in 1984 in San Francisco and some other North American cities. It differs from traditional urban planning by being more comprehensive and less normative, and by being more closely oriented towards integrated socio-economic actions than towards the regulation of land use. It is not limited to the adaptation of expectations to what are considered 'normal' trends. Indeed, it focuses more closely on new opportunities and new solutions rather than on the specific objectives foreseen in the budgets (Santacana 2000).

Strategic planning in Barcelona has sometimes been the source, and at the same time a reflection, of the urban changes. The strategic planning process began formally on 25 May 1988 with the formation of the first Executive Committee of the Plan, although on 9 December 1987 the Area for Economy and Business of the Barcelona City Council had already presented the main features of the project to the press. On 20 April 1988 a document was issued that

contained the project's fundamental guidelines, entitled *The Economic and Social Development of Barcelona: the Strategic Plan in the Perspective of the Year 2000*.

Urban strategic planning in Barcelona was founded on the pre-Olympic city's needs, to the extent that a model with its own characteristics was created. This model has become a guide for many other cities, above all in the Latin American area but also in Europe. In contrast to the original US model, which could be said to be *business-oriented*, the Barcelona model of strategic planning has a more *citizen-oriented* focus. The first Strategic Plan (SMPB) was approved in 1990. It drew three strategic lines and a set of 59 measures. The first line aimed to establish Barcelona as one of the directing centres of the macro region. The second line tended to improve the quality of life and the progress of individuals and the third line targeted the strengthening of advanced industries and company services.

The objective of the second SMPB, 1994, was to accentuate the integration of the Barcelona area into the international economy in order to guarantee its growth in terms of economic and social progress and advances in the quality of life. The intention was for the objective to be achieved on the basis of five strategic lines. The first of these aimed to facilitate the process of adaptation of the economic sectors of the Barcelona area to the international economy. The second and third strategic lines targeted the socio-economic articulation of the Barcelona area and the generation of a positive response to the new demands for social integration respectively. The last two strategic lines aimed to ensure the unfolding of modern economic activity with an international presence while situating the Barcelona area in the international economy.

While the first SMPB focused on Barcelona's European integration, the second SMPB introduced the need to strengthen the international economic relations of the city beyond Europe. The objective of preparing the city for the new emergent activities, such as advanced service sector activities, had already been stated in the first SMPB.

The third SMPB, from 1999, states that Barcelona should press forward with a social and urban economic transformation process in order to place itself amongst the leading group of urban regions in the new information and knowledge society of the twenty-first century. So the objectives are to consolidate its position as one of the most important metropolitan regions in the European city network with the aim being to connect that network to the broader network of cities of the world. As Barcelona already plays an important role in the European cities network for the Latin Arc, from Venice to Lisbon, one of the objectives is to make the city the connection point between Europe and Latin American countries. This deepens the general objectives of the first two plans. While the first plan aimed to consolidate a European metropolis and the second plan sought to strengthen companies in the international markets, the next logical step has been to connect the city with the globalized world.

The mission proposal also stated that Barcelona must identify itself as an area of constant innovation, as a city of knowledge. The challenge was thus to consolidate Barcelona as a city of knowledge.

Among other objectives, one has appeared to be more innovative than the others. It is the recommendation that the city should promote intercultural relations as a fundamental aspect of the new society, and participation, quality of life and education as essential instruments for avoiding marginalization. Social progress is therefore regarded as a key factor for economic competitiveness and one that can be achieved by promoting intercultural relations.

The holding of the Universal Forum of Cultures is, in this respect, fundamental for facilitating the attainment of the mission of this third plan, which is proposed along five broad strategic lines.

### *The metropolitan master plan*

The master plan, known as *Pla d'Ordenació Urbanística Municipal*, is the cornerstone of the planning system. It is a legally binding land-use plan formulated for the entire area of a municipality or, in some cases, a group of municipalities, like the General Metropolitan Plan (PGM). The authority responsible for the preparation and implementation of master plans is the municipal government, subject to final approval by a higher planning authority, which is the Generalitat de Catalunya in the case of Catalonia.

The content of general plans is specified in planning law and must include a memorandum statement with a brief justification of the project, together with background complementary studies, analytical and zoning maps and planning regulations applying to each of the land-use zones. A financial and economic study is also required.

The PGM is a common master plan taking in Barcelona and 26 surrounding municipalities. It was designed in accordance with the first Spanish land law, dating from 1956, and adapted to the new regulations of 1975. It was finally passed in July 1976 and is still in force today.

The PGM provides different degrees of information about land use and development requirements, depending on the kind of land (urban, urbanizable or non-urbanizable). As far as urban land is concerned, the plan gives very detailed specifications for the use of each plot. No additional planning instrument is necessary to establish the legal right to develop urban land for the specified purposes, although planning permission must normally be granted before development may commence. Lower planning instruments, such as partial plans, are used to develop master plans. The power to approve potential plans normally lies with the municipal government. However, in Catalonia the final say rests with the regional government, a procedure which has been challenged in the Constitutional Court and which awaits a legal judgement.

Master plans may be supplemented by special plans drawn up at local level to deal with particular themes and provide additional information about allowable development. In Barcelona, for instance, much of the infrastructure associated with the Forum of Cultures 2004 has been planned and implemented through special plans. One particular form of special plan is the so-called Special Plan of Internal Reform which can be made for areas of urban

land, allowing reconsideration of the existing plans in order to improve particular sites through urban regeneration. These have been used extensively to carry out urban renewal projects in the older areas of the Core City.

Finally, even where a general plan is very specific in its provisions for future urban land use, there are many situations where the implementation of specific projects raises complex problems that have not been fully anticipated by the plan. Detailed studies address this complexity by dealing with matters such as street alignments, precise volumes and heights of buildings or the provision of minor infrastructure, although they cannot be used to modify substantially the land use specified by the general plan.

### *Development of the PGM*

The scope covered by the PGM has its origin in the previous 1953 Urban Plan, which was the first urban proposal that attempted to bring about a rational ordering of the city in a space that significantly exceeded the limits of the Barcelona municipality.

The PGM project is the backbone of the urban planning of Barcelona. It is not a project laid out in one specific document, nor conceived at the beginning of the process, neither is it a project which has one, or several, exclusive authors. The urban planning project for Barcelona during the democratic period has been based on a series of ideas and partial projects with the participation of various actors and with different contextual references and specific goals throughout the period (Esteban, 1997).

In the development of the urban planning project, and naturally in the last transformations that have taken place, there have been certain temporary stages of special importance which have served to mark the pace of change.

It is important to note that, in 1980, there was an important change in the city council urban planning team, due to the fact that 1979 marks the beginning of the process of democratic municipal management.

The earliest projects developed within the PGM, that is town planning projects in the urban sector, began to take shape as soon as the democratic city council came into being. They bring with them the idea of proximity, of recognition of the different identities of the urban make-up. After this the attention of the project moves on to consider larger urban projects of the city which leads to the proposal of new references to this urban reality.

However, we can say that 1992 marked a qualitative change in the process. In 1992, all the projects which have the characteristic mentioned above had been formed and partially carried out, and the pending projects were going through the natural process of organization and remodelling.

After 1992, there was a variation in the operative circumstances and some changes in the way the project was focused, which, without renouncing the goals of the previous period, took on different attitudes with regard to two classic urban proposals, namely housing and industry.

At another level there were projects which were brought about through concrete actions but which have proved to be a manifestation of general project ideas. Those projects have also been the broadest expression of how to carry out urban planning in Barcelona, to the point at which they have eclipsed the significance at the project level of the planning.

In the urban overall project we can identify two different but complementary streams, namely those whose subject is public space, ranging from small squares to the general systems of the city and the region, and those which provide the volume of the urban make-up.

To bring value to, or to monumentalize, the outskirts and recuperate the centre is one of the expressions which best sums up the range of objectives which have been present in the urban plan for Barcelona.

The urban remodelling plans after 1992 are also a full aspect of this objective. It is no coincidence that the last urban projects tackle problems on the outskirts of the municipality of Barcelona. In fact, all the logic from which the actions of the public powers towards the city are derived coincides with the goal of bringing value to the outskirts and regenerating the centre.

The economic logic is to realize the right level of efficiency of the existing urban fabric. The social logic aims to avoid the formation of socially and spatially segregated areas, both in the inner city and in the outskirts, in order to safeguard the cohesion of the population. Finally there is the logic of sustainability through which the full regeneration of the city avoids the temptation of peripheral expansion, and thereby prevents large amounts of energy being consumed and the swallowing up of scarce agricultural land.

The nature of the Metropolitan General Plan as an instrument for town planning established by urban legislation, along with the precision of the PGM's own decisions, meant that its development in partial urban projects has required the PGM to be modified on numerous occasions since its inception.

With the formalization of the first ideas of the Olympic project, in 1982, a new order of actions was considered, beyond the projects for gaining public space and improving its quality. The scale of the city as a global context reappeared which detailed new activities intended to transform the city.

It is the 'great projects for the city' that complement the piece meal action of the plans for the great city. Of special note is the Olympic project, the proposal of areas of new centrality and the road-network plan.

The urban project related to the Olympic Games was the first to be based on ideas which, in synthesis, were intended to take advantage of the capacity of urban transformation and improvement and implied an event of this type with a view to:

- opening up the city to the sea;
- distributing the improvement spatially and re-equipping sporting facilities;
- promoting communication infrastructures, especially the road network.

It is clear that these objectives were an expression of the will that the city as a whole should take a great leap forward.

## Recent projects for the north-eastern axis of the city

Barcelona has become well known in Europe for its ambitious programmes of planning and urban regeneration, undertaken under the leadership of the city council (Marshall 2000). The projects that involve urban redefinition, regeneration and renewal in Barcelona are many, diverse and varied. Each of these major projects tends to a major socio-economic specialization of the territories they transform.

On the Besòs River axis (or north-eastern axis) a whole range of interrelated projects aim to bring about the most wide-ranging urban renewal that has ever taken place in Barcelona with the Forum of Cultures 2004 acting as catalyst and primary visible operation. The total set of projected interventions in the Besòs area aim to complete the great transformation of Barcelona's coastal area, begun in 1992. The intention was to transform an area of more than 200 hectares at the north-east end of the city from a highly degraded area to one of the main centres of development in Barcelona in the following years.

The set of projects for this development axis is mainly: 22@ district of activities, Sagrera HST station area and Forum of Cultures 2004. However, these large-scale projects are reinforced by some smaller scale projects, such as the urban regeneration of La Mina and La Catalana and the creation of new shopping centres and hotels. The different projects have common objectives: adding value to this area, recovering it in an environmental sense and for the enjoyment of the city's inhabitants, as well as generating economic activity.



Figure 4.2 Aerial view of the coastline of Barcelona between the Olympic village and the Forum area

Source: Forum Barcelona 2004

***From Poblenou to the 22@ district of activities***

The Barcelona Town Planning approved the modification for the General Metropolitan Plan for the renovation of the industrial area of Poblenou. The result of this intervention was the so-called activity district 22@.

Due to this amendment, Barcelona is committed to reinforcing and ensuring its production capacity potential in two aspects of a different nature: on the one hand, by promoting development of the logistic infrastructure system of the Llobregat axis and, on the other, by transforming the industrial areas of the north-east of the city associated with the Besòs River axis and, particularly, Poblenou.

The 22@ project represented the most important urban transformation undertaken in the city in recent years and it was possibly the last on this scale. The object of the project was to transform 200 hectares of old industrial land into an innovative economic district. The 22@ project provided for a greater density than traditionally characterized industrial sectors, and opted for a dense, complex urban environment which permits a more efficient use of the land.

Poblenou used to be the most important productive area of Catalonia. However, industry moved out of the core city, leaving immense spaces that need to be redefined in order not to lose competitiveness. In the 1970s most of the old industrial production centres started hosting logistic activities, causing a great threat to mobility in the core city of the agglomeration and its most immediate surroundings. These logistic activities started moving out to the outskirts in preparation for the Olympics in 1992. They moved out in search of locations more logistically suitable in terms of infrastructures. Despite all of this, Poblenou continued to occupy a large area of central Barcelona, and was particularly well connected to the rest of the Barcelona metropolitan region, given its close proximity to the ring road Ronda Litoral and to the northern and north-eastern exit roads.

The main goal of the 22@ project was to maintain to a considerable degree the old productive character of the Poblenou area. This goal was to be achieved by transforming it into a centre of activities associated with new technologies, design, editorial production, culture, the audio-visual world and any other activity able to coexist with residential uses and having a potentially positive effect on the city's economy. At the same time, this made for the consolidation of a small percentage of housing, and the increase in facilities, giving the district greater complexity of use.

This modification of the PGM created the appropriate instruments for the transformation of an obsolete industrial area into spaces that are able to receive new financial activities related preferably to new economy business initiatives. 22@ is the new urban planning key with which Barcelona City Hall classified the uses and activities of the buildings constructed in Poblenou. The urban proposal basically eliminated the restriction concerning urban classification of industrial land that the PGM allocated to Poblenou.

This new 22@ sub-area is characterized by its complexity of uses. As is stated in the official text of the amendment, the new productive activities needed a balanced territory in which the mix of activities create a city with different uses assigned to the land.

Knowledge-dense activities, or '@ activities' – as Barcelona city planners call them – represent the real breakthrough of the proposed plan. These are defined as emerging activities related to the sector of new information and communications technologies (ICT) and include activities related to research, design, publishing, culture, multimedia activities and knowledge and database management, independently of the economic sector they belong to.

The successful execution of the plan was guaranteed via the drawing up and execution of an infrastructure plan for the area, complemented by the creation of a new company that was intended to manage the whole urban and economic transformation of Poblenou.

The most relevant figures of the plan are:<sup>1</sup>

- scope of the plan: 198.3 hectares (1,392 land plots);
- investment in infrastructure plan: €162.3 million;
- real-estate potential: €12,020 million;
- new ceiling for economic activities: 2,659,859 square metres;
- new ceiling for homes under protection system: 400,000 square metres;
- new equipment: 250,000 square metres;
- green areas: 115,000 square metres, representing an increase of 70,000 square metres;
- estimated new jobs: 130,000 (planners' estimation);
- legalization of 4,614 current residences.

The scope and features of the town planning proposals made in the amended PGM, and the complexity inherent in the process, led Barcelona City Council to study the best way to proceed with the project without forgetting the basic premises of providing the impulse for the transformation of the sector sought by the municipality and of ensuring the principles of effective efficient public management throughout the process of transformation. The device developed to achieve such ends is the private municipal company 22@bcn SA, an independent legal entity provided with all of the instruments and powers required to administrate the process of transformation of the 22@bcn district of activities.

The corporate purpose of 22@bcn SA is to prepare and execute all kinds of urban action related to the industrial and productive areas of the city of Barcelona classified as 22@, and other related areas, both in terms of planning, management, project and execution.

In June 2004, the refurbishment of over 50 per cent of the industrial area of Poblenou had been started. Twenty-four of the 30 plans passed were being promoted by the private sector while, of the plans put forward by the city council, the operators had already put over 500,000 square metres of roof space onto commercial circuits. The total contracted surface for companies and institutions to be established in the 22@ district were 217,466 square metres. Moreover 1,635 new social housing units have been built.



### ***La Mina and La Catalana***

The intervention planned in these two neighbourhoods represents a different type of urban regeneration. While in 22@ and the Forum site the land was previously occupied by environmental infrastructure or industry, these neighbourhoods are mainly residential.

At the end of the 1960s Barcelona was experiencing very high immigration from underdeveloped areas of Spain. Deprived areas sprung up in many peripheral parts of the city. The creation of La Mina, in 1968, meant it was possible to demolish the run-down Somorrostro area, which was right where the Forum now stands. It is a dramatic example of low-quality dwelling in accordance with the social housing policy of Franco's regime.

Nowadays it has an approximate population of 13,000, and high levels of social deprivation, including very high rates of illiteracy that have made the area infamous. There are above average numbers of people living in conditions of poverty, with illiteracy levels running at 25 per cent. Unemployment, employment in the informal sector and absenteeism from school are all very high.

The main aim of the redevelopment plan is to improve the quality of life in the district by including social capital and thereby encouraging and enabling the residents to become positively involved in the Universal Forum of Cultures 2004.

### ***Glòries square development***

Glòries square is located right at the northern edge of Poblenou. It has always been an awkward zone. In spite of its central location, as a major meeting point, it has always been perceived as a barrier between the residential district of Eixample and the industrial district of Poblenou. These characteristics turned this space into a very important element for the integration of the 22@ district into Barcelona's old residential urban fabrics.

### ***Sagrera HST station***

Within the northern sector of the city, parallel to other urban recycling operations such as the area of the Besòs or Poblenou, plans existed for a large-scale re-centralization operation that would take advantage of the high-speed train link to Barcelona. The transformation of the Sagrera sector was to affect 310,347 square metres. The main uses planned were residential areas, land for hotels and land for tertiary activities.

### ***Forum of Cultures 2004***

Great world events are an opportunity for cities to take their place on the international stage and to show themselves at their best. Barcelona, for example, followed an image strategy with its project for the Universal Forum of Cultures in 2004. Its position was a break with the great events based on competition

between countries. In the context of the debates on globalization, Barcelona wanted to invent a new kind of international cultural event based on solidarity, peace, exchange and the cultural diversity of the world. Likewise, with the organization of the World Youth Days in 2002, Toronto wanted to appear to be a cosmopolitan, welcoming, tolerant, generous and peaceful city. Similarly, on the scale of a whole country, one of the goals of the Universal Exhibition in Shanghai in 2010 is to allow China to open up to the world.

Except for a few rare cases of a clear failure in the organisation, holding a world event draws broad popular support in the city and enables people to put aside the scepticism and even hostility that may have dogged the bid. Popular support is vital for the success of multipurpose projects.

The Forum was mainly a cultural event. Its activities ranged from a varied exceptional set of exhibitions to Brazilian carnival parades in the centre of the core city, dialogues with keynote speakers in the new convention centre and many other activities. The three central themes around which Forum Barcelona 2004 was structured – cultural diversity, sustainable development and conditions for peace – were approved at the meeting of the UNESCO General Conference held in November 1997.

The construction projects of the Universal Forum of Cultures meant a large-scale reconstruction of the city within its municipal area. The operation covered 214 hectares (five times greater than the surface of the Olympic village). The Forum site buildings are located along the Esplanade. The pedestrian area of the Diagonal Avenue was extended to the sea through this 15 hectares of space, which includes the Forum Plaza and the partially covered sewage treatment plant.

The Esplanade was the first technologically equipped plaza, as it has high-tech utility connections, such as fibre-optics cable networks, as well as water and electricity connections. It was therefore possible, for example, to provide more than one location for stages or fair stands.

A yacht harbour was also created equipped with 1,000 moorings, most of them for long boats. The jetty was completed in November 2002, the inner harbour and the entire infrastructure were completed at the end of 2003.

It is assumed that marinas and yachting harbours are responsible for the loss of sand at the beaches to the south of them. After the Catalan marina building boom of the 1990s, a moratorium was established, with the only exception being the new harbours in Sant Adrià and the Forum. Building the new marina in the Forum generated criticism from some environmental groups, who saw it as an example of a lack of environmental concern which characterized the whole project. The measure of constructing new breakwaters was also criticized for being no more than a local solution.

The total surface area for the harbour project is 311,000 square metres, of which 165,000 square metres is on the water and 146,000 square metres is on land. Part of this land area is being used for commercial activities and the construction of new parking spaces. Among the port buildings, there is a sailing school, a diving school and the new harbourmaster's office.

The Forum project provides the metropolis with an innovative new area of seawater pools. The bathing area also has an island 60 metres from the coast, which is only accessible to swimmers. In addition to this bathing area, two beaches were created during the transformations.

Between the Esplanade and the sea is the Parc dels Auditoris. This 7 hectare area is a continuation of the esplanade space. It principally consists of a series of dunes covering the incline from the Esplanade to the sea. Among these dunes are two open-air public auditoriums with a capacity to hold 8,500 and 3,500 people respectively.

Northeast Park covers 11 hectares and serves as a transitional zone between the renovated energy recycling and thermal power plants, the new university campus called Llevant campus and the sea. The natural continuation of the park is a beach which is approximately 500 metres long with a boardwalk leading to the yacht harbour.

The construction of the lateral road on the shore side of the beltway, the Ronda Litoral, has allowed a strip to be freed for park and road use. This strip is 1.3 kilometres long and 50,000 square metres in area, and extends from the Poblenou Park to Diagonal Mar.

A new coastal zoo, with a surface area of 17 hectares, was planned on a platform of land gained from the sea to the south of the Esplanade. So far, the construction of the zoo has not received the necessary authorization from the Spanish Ministry of Environment.

The Forum building is a singular construction that will no doubt become one of Barcelona's most emblematic buildings. It is a triangular building measuring 180 metres on each side and 25 metres in height, located within the triangle formed by Diagonal Avenue, Rambla de Prim and the Ronda Litoral. The building is structured around an auditorium with a capacity to hold 3,200 people. The seating is under the Forum Plaza level. The upper part is suspended from the triangular superstructure measuring 180 metres per side that covers the plaza, and rests on 17 pillars. The exhibition hall and the roof of the auditorium are suspended from this. The exhibition hall covers nearly 5,000 square metres.

The Convention Centre (CCIB) is a building of 67,000 square metres with a capacity to hold congresses for up to 15,000 people. The CCIB auditorium, with a capacity for 3,200 people, is located in the Forum building. Both buildings are connected by a 20 metre-wide underground walkway. CCIB fills the city's former shortcomings as regards congress capacity and is the largest of its kind in southern Europe.

On the corner of Rambla de Prim and Carrer Llull, the Forum Centre of the Hospital del Mar, a large socio-medical complex, meets the needs of the elderly of the neighbourhoods of Sant Martí, Ciutat Vella and part of Gràcia. In the heart of the new urban area created near the mouth of the Besòs River, there is also room for a university zone. The Llevant campus is located within the triangle formed by the Ronda Litoral (beltway), Carrer de Taulat and Carrer de Sant Raimon de Penyafort.

Diagonal Mar shopping centre was opened towards the end of 2001. The operation was part of the combined projects of extending Diagonal Avenue to the sea and the Besòs seafront project. It is an important economic focal point in the area.

The urban renovation project foresees the construction of some 800 housing units, 300 of them within the triangle formed by the streets Llull and Taulat and Rambla Prim, designed by the latest generation of Barcelona architects. The housing complies with strict sustainable architecture criteria, covering everything from the construction materials to the use of clean energy forms and the maximum use of natural light. In addition, the housing is fitted with air conditioning and heating from the new district heating and cooling plant.

Seventy of the apartments in the future Llull–Taulat neighbourhood developed by Barcelona City Council were reserved for low-income occupants. The same applied to 40 of the apartments developed by the real-estate agency Urbis in the rest of the neighbourhood.

The urban renovation project for 2004 also included the construction of a series of office spaces in addition to those related to the Llevant university campus and the Convention Centre. In total, over 45,000 square metres of offices were to be constructed. The majority are located in the TMB building on the corner of Prim and Taulat. This building, designed by Lluís Clotet and Ignacio Paricio, also contains a hotel. Furthermore, in an annex to the Convention Centre, the Zona Franca Consortium constructed an office building of over 14,000 square metres. Finally, more office space was built in the Diagonal Mar tertiary building.

The demand for hotel accommodation generated by both Forum 2004 and subsequent events held at the convention centre, as well as the accommodation needs of the city in general, were to be met by the construction of various hotel establishments near the Besòs River. These hotels were built on the initiative of both Barcelona City Council and private companies. A four-star 460-room hotel was built at the end of Diagonal Avenue, annexed to the Convention Centre. Several more hotels were constructed or planned on the basis of private initiatives. Furthermore, Gas Natural constructed another complex on its land adjoining the Ronda Litoral (beltway) and the yacht harbour.

The urban development improved road infrastructure in the eastern sector of Barcelona, mainly with the construction of a new lateral road on the shore side of the Ronda Litoral beltway and the reorganization of several streets of the district of Sant Martí.

The Ronda Litoral trunk road already had a new exit point at the level of Carrer Josep Pla in the direction of Llobregat. By the same token, the seaside lateral road was extended from Bilbao Street to its junction with the future Carrer Taulat. There is also an intersection between the three new streets: Taulat, Llull and Avinguda Litoral, where the new development of Carrer Maristany will begin, culminating in the construction of a new bridge over the Besòs River.

The improvements allow the implementation in Poblenou of a network of unidirectional streets like those in the central Eixample district. The cities of Barcelona and Sant Adrià are now better connected due to the creation and



Figure 4.3 The Forum area plan: 1. Plaza; 2. Forum building; 3. Barcelona International Convention Centre; 4. Auditorium Park; 5. port; 6. photovoltaic plant; 7. swimming area; 8. Peace Park.

Source: Forum Barcelona 2004

completion of Taulat Street. Taulat became the continuation of the Diagonal Avenue after it reaches the Rambla de Prim. It is precisely at this intersection that the large Fòrum Esplanade begins, allowing a clear view to the sea for drivers and pedestrians.

In order to improve the permeability of the entrances to the beltway from the Besòs riverside neighbourhoods, another street, the Ronda de Sant Raimon de Penyafort, was created between Carrer Llull and the beltway.

The improvements in the public transport system include the creation of a new metro station on Line 4 at Carrer de Llull, between Josep Pla and Rambla de Prim, which is located halfway between the existing stations of Selva de Mar and Besòs Mar. Two tramway lines were also created to connect Glòries Square and the Estació del Nord (bus station) with Badalona, passing through the Forum area.

Various cycling paths have been extended. The coastal cycling path reaches Sant Adrià de Besòs, and the Diagonal Avenue, crossing Barcelona from end to end, includes a cycling path along its entire length, while the Rambla Prim cycling path extends to the new Sagrera train station.



Figure 4.4 Aerial view of part of the Forum area (Camp de la Bota) in 1971  
Source: Forum Barcelona 2004



Figure 4.5 View of part of the Forum area in 2004: the Auditorium of the Sea  
Source: Forum Barcelona 2004

## **Public–private collaboration and social acceptance of the Forum event**

It is not always easy to generate public–private collaboration. Not all renewal activities can be entrusted to private initiatives, but the contribution of the latter is an important factor for keeping a city in shape. It is a question of balancing financial logic and the appropriate measures so that renovation is efficient but does not ignore the interests of the city or its residents. Barcelona City Council has directed initiatives in highly diverse areas, while paying full respect to the role played by private enterprise and to market laws. One basic feature has been the aim to implement projects with a general social benefit, but which are also attractive to investors. The market has not been the only activity to drive investment, although in some cases, such as the large proportion of social housing promised in the Olympic village, economic interests have prevailed or have at least gained in importance as regards public and social interest (Raventós, 2000).

### ***Public–private collaboration***

The Organizing Consortium of the Universal Forum of Cultures was set up in 1999. Its mission was to take charge of preparing, administering and organizing the activities. Barcelona City Council, the Generalitat de Catalunya and the Spanish government, with the unanimous support of UNESCO, are the major partners in this consortium. Two governing bodies, the General Assembly and the Executive Commission, oversee the consortium, with equal representation from the three administrations.

The administrative bodies of the consortium and Universal Forum of Cultures, Barcelona SA, have the same composition and are chaired by Joan Clos, Mayor of Barcelona.

In order to implement such a project efficiently, three governmental agencies with specific attributes were created, in accordance with the Barcelona urban management model and based on public–private partnerships.

Barcelona City Council and Sant Adrià City Council set up a Town Planning Consortium. The Besòs Town Planning Consortium coordinated and assisted with the planning and approbation of the urban-architectonic proposals. The consortium was also responsible for the coordination of the administrative affairs related with the project.

Infrastructures del Llevant S.A., formerly Infrastructures 2004, was another administrative body founded in July 2000. It is responsible for the technical management and the planning attributions of the area. This company has the direct support of Barcelona Regional, Barcelona's Agency of Regional Development. Barcelona City Council decided to create it in order to manage the urban development projects and investments that are allowing the city to expand towards the Besòs River. This company is responsible for carrying out the projects that will integrate the boundary area between Barcelona and Sant Adrià de Besòs into the fabric of the city. It is entrusted with the management and operation of projects and the administration of resources, both public and

private, the administration of public spaces and all operations designed for subsequent concessions, as well as with maintaining the economic and financial balance of such operations.

In addition to solving the difficult scheduling coordination and safeguarding tasks, and the functional quality and durability of the works to be executed within the framework of the economic-financial program, Infraestructures del Llevant had to ensure the formal quality of the projects. On the basis of this objective, Infraestructures del Llevant entered into a collaboration agreement with Barcelona Regional which led to this public urban planning agency providing support as regards the control of the architectural quality and the maintenance of the urban planning objectives of the overall operation, especially at the basic project level. Along these same lines, the company also submitted all of its projects to the quality commissions of Barcelona City Council.

With a view to assisting with the issues related to the neighbourhood of La Mina, a third management agency was set up named 'Consorti del Barri de la Mina'. The Generalitat de Catalunya and the municipalities of Barcelona and Sant Adrià De Besòs supported this agency which also involves the participation of the local community.

The Consorci del Besòs (Besòs Consortium), an organization funded by the city councils of Barcelona and Sant Adrià de Besòs, coordinates and promotes urban and infrastructure development projects and exercises local urban planning authority over the inter-municipal zone on the right bank of the Besòs River.

In December 2000, the estimated budget for the Forum of Cultures 2004 was €300 million. However, by December 2003, the budget was estimated to be €341 million. The assumption had been that 60 per cent of the cost of the Forum 2004 was to be divided equally between the three organising administrations, the Spanish state, the Generalitat de Catalunya and Barcelona City Council (Peirón 2004). Private companies sponsored 20 per cent of the costs and the rest was meant to be generated by the event itself from the income.

### *The acceptance of the project*

The goals pursued by the cities that embark on the adventure of major events are generally very similar. They can be grouped into four broad categories: image and international recognition, economic and tourist, town planning, and specific although they vary from one city to another. It is on the basis of these goals, whether explicit or not, that we can assess the effects of the events.

Urban renewal always affects, to some degree, the city's overall tradition, as well as the inhabitants themselves and the activities in the area. It is a complex process that must combine the practical demands of today's city with the values the area has gained throughout history. It often includes physical interventions intended to organize the space and introduce new development perspectives, but which can also affect the existing social and economic fabric.

The preparation of cities as the setting for international events has served as an instrument for renovating not only the venues but also the whole of the city.



That transformation mechanism has been used with varying degrees of success by many cities from the early nineteenth century to the present day. The Olympic Games, World Cup football and Universal Expos are all examples of events that have put cities on the world map (Barcelona), transformed a country's image (South Korea) or accelerated local regeneration (Lisbon).

With the growth in global communications, great events – characterised by the large number of participant countries and the variety of audiences they attract – have become key catalysts to promoting cities and regions through the media. They are therefore moving up the political agenda. Whether it is the Sydney Olympics or the more controversial millennium celebrations events, such events are no longer considered frivolous enterprises. They can and should be used as an opportunity to redefine a city's identity. The nomination of Turin to host the winter Olympics, the biggest city that has ever hosted the winter games, and the transformation and international projection efforts currently being undertaken by this city, remind us of the importance attached to events, even when they are not the most massive ones.

Barcelona is a perfect example of the importance of pursuing social and cultural analyses of great events. It can be defined as an 'event-led' city. Its modern development has been marked by the staging of a Universal and International Exhibition in 1888 and 1929 respectively and, most remarkably, by the 1992 Olympic Games. The first two events were vital for the urban development of the city while, thanks to global media communications, the 1992 Olympics also acted as a vehicle for the worldwide promotion of the region's distinctive Catalan identity.

Ten years after the games were staged, the authorities in Barcelona continue to pay tribute to the legacy of 1992 and celebrated the anniversary on 25 July 2002. These celebrations were used to usher in the city's next 'great event' – the Universal Forum for Cultures in 2004. However, this was an event that was having difficulty winning popular support. Critics say the city's dependence on major events has led to an emphasis on style rather than substance, which hides an inability to tackle the day-to-day challenges of urban life.

The role of academic institutions was particularly important in this respect, and the Forum's organization committee established strong links with academics throughout the world in order to raise its credibility. However, a careful look at the event programming proposals revealed a tension between this intellectual impetus and expectations that it might take the form of a big party, a spectacular show aimed at attracting media attention. The latter was an indication that the event also had an important economic goal, namely the regeneration of yet another area of the city and the construction of new conference centres, five-star hotels, shopping conglomerates and a first-class residential zone in a space considered mainly derelict, although partially inhabited by marginal communities.

While a section of the official Catalan and Spanish media was in favour of the initiative, and international audiences continued to applaud Barcelona's inventiveness, the tension referred to raised criticism from some opinion groups at a local level. These included community representatives, non-governmental associations and various academics and intellectuals who questioned whether

great events can truly benefit the local community. In this context, critics referred to the 1992 Olympics. These Games are generally remembered as a great achievement, but the accelerated urban development caused by the event was accompanied by draconian measures, such as the clampdown on street begging and the forced shift from a low-income community with historical roots in the area to what has now become an acclaimed and lucrative beach front and gentrified trendy neighbourhoods.

There may be a contradiction between combining urban regeneration with community representation and aiming to accelerate inward investment while boosting local ownership and pride. Organizers, or project developers, often fail to consider the long-term impact of the event, as shown by the rapid degeneration of Seville's Expo site and some parts of the Olympic area of Barcelona after the event that created them. This phenomenon is often referred to in the Catalan press as a warning when considering new large-scale projects.

Academics' contributions to formulating the mission statement of a major event and to drawing up proposals for symbolic components such as ceremonies, parades and cultural programming are critical for ensuring that a representative and sustainable view of local cultures is presented. The over-emphasis on marketing and international communication strategies, and the trend towards commissioning 'event experts' from foreign countries to stylize the cultural discourse of a place, combine to weaken the credibility of the initiative being presented. While, in the short term, this may make for a spectacular media show, in the long term it is likely to diminish local feelings of ownership and weaken the chances of the event having a lasting impact, in economic as well as social and cultural terms.

It is quite difficult to evaluate the social acceptance of a large-scale project. With a view to drawing up a rough approximate evaluation of the social acceptance and the degree of involvement of Barcelona's citizens with the Forum, we interviewed a variety of people (ten experts in different fields related closely to urban development issues) and summarized some reports and published statements of some of the most significant organizations operating in the city.

The links between Forum 2004 and the war economy are the focus of the majority of the criticisms. A significant number of the enterprises that were sponsors or partners of Forum 2004 were either weapon systems builders or had a share in such enterprises. Some of the Forum 2004 enterprises are members of the strong military industry lobbies in Spain, have direct economic interests in post-war Iraq or supply military equipment to a number of armed services, including the US Navy. One of the main paradoxes, as stated by the Forum sceptics, is that an event which is meant to discuss and advance proposals on conditions for peace is sponsored by corporations that make profit from armed conflict and is, in this way, establishing the conditions for war. Some of these war-related enterprises are going to settle, or have already settled, in the 22@ district.

While the Forum was being more intensely promoted in order to secure the support of Barcelona's citizens, the city was the scene every weekend of massive demonstrations against the Iraq war. By then, the Spanish government was being

ruled by the Popular (conservative) Party which brought Spain into the war and generated a very tense social and political climate. On many occasions, the Forum was asked, as an institution, to speak out for peace and against the war. However, no response was forthcoming, because the Forum was dominated by the Spanish government. This caused the withdrawal from the Forum project of many NGOs that were working for peace and contributed to a dramatic loss of the project's credibility. Moreover, the Federation of Neighbours associations withdrew from the project.

Another reason to reject the Forum, as stated by some intellectuals, is that the Forum is helping to destroy the community's historical memory. It was built on the site where 1,689 citizens were executed by fascist forces between 1939 and 1952. Most of the victims were accused of being republicans or anarchists (Huertas 2002). This place was then known as El Camp de la Bota, and was chosen for that purposes because it was far enough away from the city centre that the population would not have to hear the daily sound of the executions. Meanwhile, El Camp de la Bota was the poorest suburb of the city, where immigrants lived in self-made shanties with no facilities. These days, the spot at which the executions took place is occupied by the wastewater treatment plant of El Besòs, and covered by the Forum Plaza. Before the Forum works started, a commemorative stone with a poem dedicated to those killed under Franco's regime used to stand at La Plaça de la Fraternitat. This monument has now gone and has not been substituted by any other. This has also led to criticism.

The fact that the Forum intends to solve major social problems in the neighbourhoods of La Mina and La Catalana has also generated much debate. According to some interviewees and many publications, it has been shown that the project has not really tackled the problem and Forum 2004 was built alongside this neighbourhood and helped to mask it and make it invisible.

The 22@ renovation has also encountered some acceptance difficulties. According to the association of those affected by plan 22@:<sup>2</sup>

many citizens of Barcelona are suffering because of this aggressive, speculative, unjust and immoral style of urbanisation which affects their properties and their comfort. You can see how in Poblenou they are carving up a neighbourhood. While, using the excuse of renovation of obsolete industrial zones and the name 22@, social cohesion is being broken down and they are taking from us centuries-old homes, productive industries and our historical heritage.

A very extensive list of the reasons why many organizations and private parties have withdrawn from Forum 2004 is included in a collective publication of the University Autònoma de Barcelona.<sup>3</sup> The association Antropologies contra 22@ also stated ten objections to the Forum,<sup>4</sup> which were basically similar to those just mentioned. In general terms these ten reasons cover all the objections to this

large-scale project and explain why it was rejected by many associations and social organizations and did not receive strong social support:

- **Supposition:** Barcelona City Council designs the city according to its economic interests and private capital instead of providing solutions to the city's planning needs. Their real interests can be deduced from a comparison between the rapid reconstruction of the site at which the Forum took place with the slow restoration process in underprivileged areas. One of the most significant examples was the improvement of La Mina, an underprivileged suburb near the site of the Forum. Only A72 million was provided to improve this area in comparison with the A2,300 million for Forum 2004.
- **The 'new' Barcelona:** Barcelona is changing into a tourist and leisure city. We do not think that this change will lead to economic, social and ecological sustainability which is sufficient to guarantee its inhabitants a proper standard of living, with proper jobs and proper housing. This new model will turn our city into a place where citizens' social needs are ignored while priority is given to the tourist sector.
- **The Forum 2004 did not respect the environment:** It is difficult to believe that the Forum worried about a sustainable environmental development when the work done presupposed a change in the sea environment, a waste of natural resources, and the construction of huge buildings (hotels, convention centres...). We should not forget that Endesa (one of the Forum's partner companies) is the fourth European company when it comes to carbon dioxide emissions.
- **The Forum's political and economic sponsors:** Amongst the Forum's partners we found companies that had been criticized for their aggressive stance to the environment and tribal peoples, that had been criticized by their own workers and consumers, and that had been involved in the war economy and corporate globalization.
- **The Forum organizers made immigration illegal:** The organizers talked about multiculturalism and human rights but they put obstacles in the way of immigration. The bodies that organized the Forum were responsible for the approval of immigration laws and for the fact that being immigrant means being illegal.
- **Forum 2004 supported the war economy:** The Forum did not participate in the protests against the Iraq war because the Spanish central government is one of its co-organizers. This Forum was not only organized by those who support the war economy but by those who attack us in an everyday war on labour and housing stability.
- **The Forum organizers were those who deal with social problems by using repression:** One of the Forum's messages is that everything can be solved with dialogue and that Spanish bodies give us the participatory ways to solve any problems. However, the real message is clouded: namely a social control policy. The organizers wanted to reduce us to simple consumers, culture consumers, political consumers, social consumers...

- The Forum 2004 was a non-participatory space where dialogue is a sham: Forum organizers made every effort to present the event as a cultural initiative open to everybody and able to cope with social criticism. However, citizen participation was eradicated and they wanted us to become a passive audience, as if they needed to justify the Forum with the participation of social movements.
- Multiculturalism as a fairy tale of globalization: Forum 2004 not only failed to take account of gypsy culture and has banned participation of this group in the event, it excluded the citizens who live in the area. What does cultural diversity mean if the Forum repressed its own culture and language? The contradictions and complexities of globalization are hidden under the pretext of multiculturalism. Endesa, one of Forum's partner companies, destroys the Mapuche people because they do not want to take part in its 'multiculturalism'.
- Forum 2004, where culture and values are merchandise: The Forum's message is clear, Barcelona is its culture. When the Forum talked about the creativity of the people from Barcelona, it sold them as a trademark image to be used by the tourist sector. However, to do that, it deprived culture of politics, of a critical turn of mind, of antagonist creativity, the disobedience still vindicated by the social movements. We did not want to let them use us as extras in a city turned into a thematic park, which cannot show its true diversity.<sup>4</sup>

## Conclusions

The organization of important international events has historically played an important role in the transformation of the urban fabric of Barcelona. The Forum of Cultures 2004 was a new global meeting, a cultural event, organized with the support of the UNESCO. The initiative for this event came from Barcelona itself, providing the impulse for an additional major urban project.

Barcelona City Council showed clear dynamism both in long-range actions and as an agent to stimulate important public projects and promote the participation of other economic agents, both public and private.

In the last decades, three main economic processes can be identified in Barcelona: industrial restructuring since the 1960s, innovation and technological change in the productive process, and the target of integration of the Spanish economy within the European Community and global markets.

The planning environment, in spite of its organizational complexity, has proven to be flexible enough to adapt itself to the new demands. The three strategic plans have been shown to be highly effective, as have the coordination and interaction between the urban and strategic planning.

Barcelona engaged in ambitious programmes of planning and urban regeneration, undertaken under the leadership of the city council. These programmes basically targeted the objective of maintaining the city's competitiveness and of improving some infrastructure aspects and socio-economic conditions. A

mixture of uses and a redefinition of densities have formed the basis of Poblenou's regeneration.

The structure of the Forum of Cultures 2004, as an event, has three central themes, namely cultural diversity, sustainable development and conditions for peace. It was designed as a catalyst to stimulate the urban regeneration of the Besòs axis, covering huge and diverse sectors of the city. The public-private collaboration is fundamental for the execution of large urban regeneration projects, especially when these imply high risk.

The involvement of citizens in large-scale multi-purpose urban projects is also an important factor for the success of such projects. In the case of the Forum of Cultures 2004 and the rest of the regeneration projects proposed for the Besòs axis, the public-private collaboration appears to have been the main reason for the project's lack of credibility and, hence, for a sceptic reaction by citizens.

## Notes

- 1 On the 22@ project, see: [http://www.bcn.es/22@bcn/pdf/22@\\_state\\_execution.pdf](http://www.bcn.es/22@bcn/pdf/22@_state_execution.pdf)
- 2 <http://www.forumperjudicats.com/hm/afectats/16marc2002.htm>
- 3 Assembla de Resistència al Fòrum 2004, Espai en Blanc, Col·lectiu Ariadna Pi (2004)
- 4 <http://www.moviments.net/resistencies2004/>. Active until 2005.

## References

- Esteban, J. (1997) 'Els 20 anys de Pla General Metropolità: les distintes escales i formes de desplegament del Pla', *Papers de la Regió Metropolitana de Barcelona*, 28: 69–83.
- García López, M.A. (2001): *Distribución de la actividad económica y estructura urbana: el caso de la Región Metropolitana de Barcelona*, Document de treball 01.19, Departament d'Economia Aplicada, Bellaterra: <http://www.ecap.uab.es/RePEc/doc/wp0119.pdf>
- Huertas, J.M. (2002) 'El final de los días de la muerte', *La Vanguardia*, 23 May 2003.
- Keyes, J., Munt, I. and Riera, P. (1991) 'Land use planning and the control of development in Spain', Working Papers in European Properties, Reading: University of Reading.
- Landry, C., Greene, L., Matarosso, F. and Bianchini, F. (1996) *The Art of Regeneration: Urban Renewal Through Cultural Activity*, London: Comedia.
- Luzón, J.L., Vila, J., and Rubio, F. (2003) *La delimitación del Área Metropolitana de Barcelona aplicando el método N.U.R.E.C*, Barcelona: Servei de Publicacions de la Universitat de Barcelona.
- Marrero, I. (2003) '¿Del Manchester Catalán al Soho Barcelonés? La renovación del Barrio del Poble Nou en Barcelona y la cuestión de la vivienda', *Scripta Nova revista electrónica de geografía y ciencias sociales*, 7, 146.
- Marshall, T. (2000) 'Urban planning and governance: Is there a Barcelona model?', *International Planning Studies*, 5, 3: 299–319.
- Peirón, F. (2004) 'El Llarg camí fins el FORUM', *Els Monogràfics del B.MM*, 4.

- Raventós, F. (2000) 'La col·laboració publicoprivada. Model Barcelona', *Quaderns de Gestió*, 8.
- Santacana, F. (2000) 'El planejament estratègic, Model Barcelona', *Quaderns de Gestió*, 5.
- Trullen, J. and Adam, C. (1998) *Noves estratègies econòmiques i territorials per a Barcelona*, Ajuntament de Barcelona: Alcaldia, Gabriel Tècnic de Programació.

# 5 Berlin-Adlershof

## Local steps into global networks

*Marie Bachmann*

### Introduction

Since 1994, an integrated scientific, economic and media site known as ‘Berlin Adlershof – City of Science, Technology and Media’ has been undergoing construction in Berlin’s outer district Treptow. This urban development project needs a more detailed description and analysis. After all, it is the second most important project and also the largest development area in the city of Berlin. In the eastern part of the city, an inner-city brownfield and greenfield site is going to be restructured and made reusable to produce a complete city with a variety of uses. Being located within the city’s limits, this important project will offer a vast amount of industrial and office space. This transformation project not only features significant research aspects of sustainability and mixture of usage but also demonstrates an interesting characteristic relating to the decision-making process (two development bodies, a steering committee and a related discussion in the City Forum). Even though some deficiencies exist, especially with regard to the progress of development, the levelling of prices, the realization of all target uses, the profile and the image, this project is gradually becoming a favourable development.

### Background to the project

#### *History of origins*

The development project ‘Berlin Adlershof – City of Science, Technology and Media’, often referred to in short as Berlin-Adlershof, is based on existing structures and traditions. The first German airport (1909), as well as additional institutes and aviation and aerospace science companies, was once located in the current development area.<sup>1</sup> The German Aviation Testing Station (Deutsche Versuchsanstalt für Luftfahrt – DVL) was established in Johannisthal and constructed laboratories, engine test beds, wind canals and hangars in 1912. After the Second World War, the airport was closed due to its proximity to the border between West and East Berlin.

In the newly founded GDR, three high security units were created on the site in the beginning of the 1950s. They were fenced off and shielded from the outside world and were:



# Entwicklungsmaßnahme Berlin Adlershof

**Berlin Adlershof**  
Stadt für  
Wissenschaft  
Wirtschaft  
und Medien



Figure 5.1 Urban development project Berlin-Adlershof

Source: Adlershof Projekt GmbH, 2004

- a guard regiment consisting of almost 12,000 men of the Ministry of State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit) based here for the protection of government and party facilities. The former airport was also used as a training base for the NVA;
- the GDR TV production unit, established on the site of the German Television and Radio Station (Deutscher Fernsehfunk – DFF);
- the Academy of Sciences (Akademie der Wissenschaften – AdW), which was also located here, including various related research institutes and companies.

The current development area was a spacious and exclusive site that was blocked off from the outside world. Due to its location it was also isolated (Teltow canal, train and subways, main road).

### *Development after German unification*

The scientific priorities of the AdW research institutes were related to physics and chemistry. They were internationally recognised and well known for their close links with industry. In 1989, 5,600 people were employed in the AdW facilities in Adlershof. After the unification of East and West Germany, the largest research site in the GDR was wound up. However, in 1991, new facilities were constructed on the same site. Approximately 1,500 former staff of the AdW were evaluated and then offered re-employment in the new research facilities. The remaining former employees had to look for new jobs and some set up new initiatives on site. Due to the winding-up of the science and media site, and the reduction in the number of jobs, the Senate was forced to act immediately.

At the beginning of the 1990s, Berlin was in a state of massive upheaval due to unification and the decision to make it the country's new capital. Expectations relating to future changes were extremely high (strong population growth, an increased need for living and office space, Berlin as a European centre of services, an East–West trading centre, etc.)

At the start of the 1990s, the Senate specified five development areas in urban Berlin, of which Adlershof is the largest. As a subsidiary of the economic development agency of the federal state of Berlin, a development agency (Entwicklungsgesellschaft Adlershof mbH (EGA) had already been formed in 1991. Its task was to initiate a development concept for an Economic and Science Park and to assume responsibility for administration and management. In 1993, a development concept for the whole development area was created and is now being worked on continuously. Its aim is to establish a living city district that has an urban quality of life characterized by different balanced uses, such as research and development, trade, media and service industries, scientific schools, and living and leisure (a mixture of uses).

The plan was for Adlershof to become more than just a pure science park, an exclusive industry site, an isolated university campus or a monofunctional media

# Entwicklungsmaßnahme Berlin Adlershof

## Städtebaulicher Gesamtplan

Entwurfsgrundlage (1993): Büro Rüdiger und Rüdiger, PAS Jourdan Müller, Steidle und Partner, Machleidt + Partner




Figure 5.2 Overall urban development plan Berlin-Adlershof  
Source: Adlershof Projekt GmbH, 2004



Stadt für  
Wissenschaft  
Wirtschaft  
und Medien

- beständige Bestandsgebäude
- BauDenkmale
- sonstige Bestandsgebäude
- beständige Neubauten
- städtebaulicher Entwurf/Vorplanung
- öffentliche Grünfläche
- Laubgehölz
- Nadelgehölz
- Straßenbegleitgrün
- Siegel
- BAB A 113

Adlershof Projekt GmbH  
Entwicklungsträger als Treuhänder des Landes Berlin  
Postfach Chaussee 19  
12485 Berlin  
Telefon: 030 63 92 30 03  
Telefax: 030 63 92 39 99

### Städtebaulicher Gesamtplan

Ursprungsplan und ergänzende Zusatzentwürfe

Ausgabe: 1.20.000  
Stand: September 2003  
Kartenvermaß: 1:10.000  
Kartenvermaß: 1:10.000

site. The idea was to build on its reputation as a research site and a think-tank location, but also to set up something new and innovative. The aim was for it to be different from some of the large science and technology, industrial and media parks with extravagant landscapes. Rather than being built on the outskirts of a city as had been the case in other countries, Adlershof was intended to be different due to the existing urban location and its planned mix of uses (Figure 5.2). As a result, Adlershof tends to be described using superlatives such as ‘development of the most modern research and technology site in Europe’ (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2000a: 22).

One of the major decisions relating to the location of Berlin-Adlershof was made by the (political) resolution in 1991 in connection with the relocation of the Institutes of Mathematics and Science of the Humboldt University of Berlin (HUB) to the new site. The Departments of Mathematics and Science were previously based in inner-city buildings that needed redevelopment. Due to their central location they had attracted considerable interest and were needed for other purposes. The final decision to relocate the HUB Departments was then made in 1997.

In 1990, responsibility for the AdW building was assigned to the federal state of Berlin. The Senate then decided to create an ‘integrated landscape of science and economy’ on the Adlershof site in 1992. A precise economic emphasis was chosen and also secured by planners in order to cope with the imminent immense tasks and financial requirements. The intention was to set up synergies between neighbouring research and industry, to enable innovations and to strengthen the economy of the city of Berlin.

### *Plurality of actors and variety of uses*

The federal state of Berlin identified a 420 hectare site for an urban development area<sup>2</sup> with the official name Entwicklungsgebiet Johannisthal/Adlershof. This included two adaptation sites<sup>3</sup> in 1994. The aim was to develop the site on the basis of a unitary urban development concept by 2010. The Berlin-Adlershof construction company (Berlin-Adlershof Aufbaugesellschaft mbH – BAAG) was established as a trust by the federal state of Berlin. Although the BAAG is a private company, it operates as a development body on behalf of the Senate and is also controlled by them. In coordination with the competent authorities, the BAAG has organized and coordinated the complex (urban) development process since 1993. A steering committee controls and governs the work.

In 1995, WISTA Management GmbH (WISTA MG)<sup>4</sup> was created as an offshoot of the EGA which had been founded in 1991. WISTA MG is the company that develops and runs the Adlershof Science and Technology Park, that is the actual core (83 hectares). In addition to the non-university based research institutes, this core also includes two centres intended to initiate innovative enterprises, namely the Innovation and Foundation Centre (Innovations- und Gründerzentrum – IGZ) which was created in 1991 and the East–West Cooperation Centre for Enterprises (Ost–West–Kooperationszentrum – OWZ),

founded in 1997. The main partners of WISTA MG are the federal state of Berlin and the economic development agency of Berlin.

As long ago as in 1992, all 12 non-university based research institutes merged to become the Joint Initiative of Non-University Research Institutions in Adlershof (Initiativgemeinschaft Außeruniversitärer Forschungseinrichtungen in Adlershof e.V. – IGAFa). IGAFa supports the cooperation and exchange of experience among all research facilities and between the university departments and the companies. The focal point of the research institutes is the key technologies of material science (new materials and processes), optical technologies (photonic, laser technology), IT and communication technology as well as resources and sustainability (environmental research/energy technology). Approximately 1,500 people work at the research institutes, of which about 50 per cent are researchers.

The planned technology transfer is expected to grow and be safeguarded on the basis of close mutual links. Due to the vicinity of research facilities and economic enterprises, Adlershof offers a healthy environment for synergies and technology transfer. In line with the research fields of the research institutes, the technology-focused enterprises develop innovative products in the following areas: photonic and optical technologies, material- and microsystem technology, IT and media technology, and environmental, bio- and energy technologies. Approximately 365 science-related technology enterprises with about 3,300 staff are currently working in the Science and Technology Park.

Between 1998 and 2003 the HUB Departments for Informatics, Mathematics, Chemistry, Physics, Geography and Psychology moved to Berlin-Adlershof where a modern university campus had been created. They were to be followed by the Department of Biology which would relocate to Berlin-Adlershof in 2007. The campus is to be completed with the addition of an electronic and audio-visual media centre including a library, computer centre and technology transfer centre. The plan is to expand the research potential of the whole site by concentrating the teaching and research facilities at one single location. There are currently 110 professors and 600 staff employed in the Mathematic and Science Departments. The opening of the departments by the students (currently 7,000) certainly helped to put more life into the Berlin-Adlershof site.

The area of the MEDIACITY which has become the leading site for film and television production in Berlin is also part of the Berlin-Adlershof development area. This most important and largest media site in Berlin is home to approximately 115 enterprises and about 950 staff. It also includes the most modern studio facilities and the largest studio in Germany (6,500 square metres.). MEDIACITY Adlershof – Society for Location Marketing and Building Management mbH (MEDIACITY Adlershof Gesellschaft für Standortmarketing und Gebäudemanagement mbH – MEDIACITY GmbH), which was founded in 1995 after the winding up of the Deutscher Fernsehfunk (DFF), is also responsible for the rental and marketing of the sites.

In addition to the Science and Technology Park, the university campus and the media centre, the development of a future-orientated city structure is also being planned. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the corresponding infrastructure has

gradually been added (i.e. hotel, shopping centre, landscape park). However, some of the planned uses, such as housing (detached houses) and leisure facilities (thermal spa with thermal brine water therapy), have not yet been realized. They were supposed to be combined around the nature and landscape park. The residential quarters in particular have now been reduced in scale due to lack of demand.

The appearance of the urban development is now characterized by renovated old houses (partly Bauhaus architecture), converted barrack buildings and various new buildings – some of them featuring striking and innovative architectural designs. Technical landmarks that are witness to past uses (wind canal, spin tower, etc.) are distributed throughout the site (Figure 5.3). The former airport has already been converted into a large centrally located landscape park (70 hectares) where conservation and urban recreational activities can be combined. A vast part of the development area is still under construction and upheaval. As a result, the living city district feeling has, as yet, only partially been achieved.

The plan was to have the whole area completely developed by 2010. The urban development procedure was also supposed to be finished by then. A continuous adaptation to the changing market conditions and the situation of demand took place throughout the years (for example, the reduction of planned housing). In 2003, the Senate decided to shorten the process so that the development procedure would be finished at the end of 2006. The development infrastructure which was then still incomplete would be finished during the remaining period of time. Just recently, the spatial expansion of the development area was reduced to a core area. A restructuring of the development body (BAAG) and the body that runs the development (WISTA MG) was made in autumn 2003. The BAAG was replaced by the Adlershofer Projekt GmbH (APG), which is a new foundation comprising WISTA Management GmbH. The area assigned to the new development body (APG) is limited in time and the body that runs the development (WISTA MG) is intended to continue management in the long term.

## **Structural analysis of the area: impact on regional economy and labour market**

### ***Determining the structure of companies and employees***

A multitude of enterprises are already based at the site of the Berlin-Adlershof development project. According to the survey of companies by the Berlin Department of National Statistics (Statistisches Landesamt Berlin) a total of 181 companies<sup>5</sup> in the industrial sectors 50–99 of the NACE classification were registered at Berlin-Adlershof<sup>6</sup> in 2001 (cut-off date: 31.12.2001). An analysis of the statistical data shows the following emphasis of sectors in Berlin-Adlershof:

- Other business activities (NACE: 74): 77 companies;
- Research and Development (NACE: 73): 48 companies;
- Computer and related activities (NACE: 72): 43 companies;
- Recreational, cultural and sporting activities (NACE: 92): 32 companies.



Figure 5.3 The monuments in their urban context  
Source: WISTA Management GmbH, 2004

The comparatively high number of companies in the 'Recreational, cultural and sporting activities' sector can be explained by the emphasis on media and film in MEDIACITY at the Berlin-Adlershof location. Moreover, by comparing the number of companies with the number in the whole of urban Berlin, a strong focus on 'Research and Science' can be identified at the Berlin-Adlershof location. Of the 486 companies in all of Berlin, 48 had already settled in Berlin-Adlershof in 2001, that is 10 per cent of all companies in this sector.

A closer look at the full-time employees (employees covered by compulsory social security) in the selected sectors is also very interesting. In 2001, the majority of employees in Berlin-Adlershof worked in the following sectors:

- Research and Development (NACE: 73): 1,852 employees;
- Education (NACE: 80): 665 employees;
- Recreational, cultural and sporting activities (NACE: 92): 444 employees;
- Other business activities (NACE: 74): 437 employees;
- Computer and related activities (NACE: 72): 259 employees.

The high number of employees in the 'Education' sector is due to the number of staff at the Departments of Mathematics and Science of the Humboldt University already based at Berlin-Adlershof. Again, in comparison to data on the whole of urban Berlin, Berlin-Adlershof shows a significantly high number of employees in the 'Research and Development' sector: approximately 15 per cent of all employees in the 'Research and Development' sector in Berlin work in Berlin-Adlershof.

About 15 per cent of all employees, but only about 10 per cent of all companies in the 'Research and Science sector' are based at Berlin-Adlershof. It shows that companies in this sector have a higher number of employees. It also reflects the number of SMEs at Berlin-Adlershof. Larger companies or investors have not yet moved to the new location. Unfortunately, a closer analysis of companies by size is not possible because the available data only covers the whole of the district of Treptow.<sup>7</sup>

The actual details on the number of companies and employees presented by the WISTA MG can be used as a supplement to the missing and classified data mentioned above. Details are available for the area of the Science and Technology Park as a core site for the Berlin-Adlershof development area and they show that growth during recent years has been immense. Between 1995 and 2003, the number of companies and scientific facilities has doubled. Moreover, the number of employees has grown substantially during the same period (Table 5.1).

There are additional up-to-date details for the whole Berlin-Adlershof development area on the number of companies and the different facilities, including the number of available employees (Table 5.2). The data is taken from the new development body Adlershof-Projekt (APG).

The list does not include details on the individual expansion and the number of employees engaged in the social infrastructure (hotels, guest houses, restaurants/bistros, conference and event services, day nurseries, music school,

*Table 5.1* Number of companies and scientific facilities as well as number of employees in the Science and Technology Park Berlin-Adlershof

<i>Year</i>	<i>Companies and scientific facilities (in total)</i>	<i>Employees (in total)</i>
1995	192	3,407
1996	217	3,360
1997	223	3,575
1998	284	4,367
1999	338	4,750
2000	342	4,940
2001	377	5,380
2002	368	5,170
2003	383	5,409
2004	393	5,915



*Table 5.2* Number of companies, scientific facilities and employees as well as size in the development area Berlin-Adlershof (Date: 21.06.2004)

<i>Thematically/functional areas of the development area Berlin-Adlershof</i>	<i>Companies or scientific facilities (in total)</i>	<i>Employees (approx. numbers, in total)</i>	<i>Size (ha)</i>
City of Science: Non-university research institutes	12	1,500	
City of Science: Technology-orientated companies and attached service sector companies	365	3,220	105
City of Science: Humboldt University with Departments of Mathematics and Natural Science and an information and communication centre	6	730	
MEDIACITY: Film and television productions as well as services for post-production in the fields of cutting and copying, synchronisation, animation and image processing, media workshops	115	950	25
Industrial Park: Companies in the service, trade and industry sectors	165	4,200	45
TOTAL	663	10,600	175

Source: Adlershof Projekt GmbH, Adlershof Facts and Figures June 2004 (21.06.2004), [www.adlershof.de](http://www.adlershof.de)

sports and leisure centre, shopping centre, etc.). Neither does it include details on employees of the Adlershof administration centre of the Treptow-Köpenick district (Youth, Family, and Social Departments and Citizen Department) and the National Employment Centre, South Berlin Agency, and the Treptow-Köpenick Office located in the Berlin-Adlershof development area. The list does not include details on the landscape park (66 hectares) and the traffic system (13.2 hectares) either.

### ***Area and land utilization***

The Berlin-Adlershof development area covers a total of 420 hectares. Additional uses are planned such as a university canteen, housing (1,200 housing units), a day nursery, a thermal spa and a health centre (30 doctor surgeries). The initial development phases have been started for the first construction site for the open construction of detached, semi-detached and terraced houses to the west of the landscape park. This construction site is going to be developed in three phases. There are 280 lots available on this 13 hectare – construction site, which is nationally owned. Some areas of the new housing district are trying to establish themselves as sites for innovative building and living, for example the 'Alternative

Building at the Landscape Park' project. Original plans to offer housing for about 15,000 people had to be reduced over the years due to a lack of demand.

The arrangement of the different uses in the separate areas of the Berlin-Adlershof development area has already been identified in the land utilization plan drawn up in 1994. It is very noticeable that a wide range of residential usage had originally been assigned. There are no official details available on the Berlin-Adlershof development area but it is possible to deduce how the lots in Berlin-Adlershof might have been divided:

- entire residential use: approximately 30 per cent (= 120–130 hectares);
- entire industrial/commercial/business use: approximately 40 per cent (= 160–170 hectares);
- mix of residential and industrial/commercial/business use: approximately 15 per cent (= 60–70 hectares);
- green: approximately 15 per cent (= 60–70 hectares).

### ***Location within Berlin***

The Berlin-Adlershof development area is located towards the south-east of the city (Figure 5.4), in the outer district of Treptow-Köpenick. It is about 12 kilometres from Berlin city centre. Travel connections to Berlin-Adlershof are very good as the train station with regional train connections to the west of the city centre (Zoologischer Garten station) and the east (Alexanderplatz and Friedrichstraße stations) is on the edge of the development area. The journey time between Potsdamer Platz and Adlershof is half an hour by local transport. The Adlershof train station is also going to be rebuilt by 2006. There is also a ten-minute, direct connection to the Schönefeld airport which is scheduled to be expanded into a major airport to be named Berlin Brandenburg International (BBI) by 2010. The highway connection to the Berliner Ring (highway) is currently under construction, and a separate exit is going to be finished by 2006. The plan is for the Berlin-Adlershof development area to be connected with the surroundings by some additional traffic infrastructure (roads, tram etc.).

Berlin-Adlershof is located on the outskirts of the city and there are no other large-scale office sites in the near vicinity. The closest office sites are Spreeufer/Friedrichshain (approximately 9 kilometres away), Bahnhof Papestrasse (under construction, approximately 13 kilometres away), City Ost (approximately 13 kilometres away), Potsdamer Platz (approximately 14 kilometres away), Regierungsviertel (approximately 14 kilometres away), Hauptbahnhof (under construction, approximately 15 kilometres away) and City West (approximately 16 kilometres away).

### ***Levelling of prices***

The ordinary prices for standard construction land on the trade and industry sites in Berlin are currently around €100 per square mile. The map of standard land value of the Senate Administration on Urban Development shows a value of about




Figure 5.4 Location of Berlin-Adlershof within the Berlin–Brandenburg agglomeration  
Source: UvA-Kaartenmakers

€107 per square mile. for industrial use in the Berlin-Adlershof development area in 1998. Based on information from the APG, the current prices for construction land at the trade and industry sites are in the range of €80 to €590 (approximately €250 on average). These high prices are problematical, because they are the highest of all inner-city locations and are affecting demand at the Berlin-Adlershof location.

### Competition

Berlin-Adlershof is not only the largest development area in the city but also the largest science and technology park in Germany. According to the former slightly unrealistic notions of the Senate Administration on Urban Development, the development of the most modern research and technology site of Europe with up to 30,000 jobs is to be finalized by 2010. WISTA MG even sees Berlin-Adlershof as being one of the 15 largest science and technology parks in the world.

Various discussions on, and requests to withdraw from, development plans arose throughout the whole development process of Berlin-Adlershof. The decrease in

land value resulted in a lack of profits when lots were sold and major financial problems arose. The economic responsibility lies with the federal state of Berlin, as the fiduciary construction company does not bear the economic risk. However, the Senate administration refused to stop the development because it would have resulted in a loss of confidence in this investment site. In addition, the 'point of no return' had already been reached and the development project thus had to be finished (Simons 2003: 76–81).

Many other new science and technology parks or complete service centre cities are being planned and built on the outskirts of the cities in the open countryside. By contrast, the Berlin-Adlershof development area was built on existing structures. For that reason, employment opportunities already existed before the start of the development and did not have to be created. Two hundred and fifty new enterprises have been founded in Adlershof since 1990, of which 100 were by former staff of the AdW during the initial period. In the course of time, a network of small to medium-sized companies started to emerge. The strongest growth of jobs in private enterprise in all of Berlin has taken place in Berlin-Adlershof during the last ten years.

### ***Relocation and start-ups***

The development of the Berlin-Adlershof location did not bring a massive migration or shift of companies from the city of Berlin or downtown. The current companies in Berlin-Adlershof are mainly newly established companies. Many enterprises and research institutes started afresh after 1989 or after the winding up of the Academy of Sciences (AdW). Throughout the years, various branches or subsidiaries (i.e. Studio Berlin as a subsidiary of Studio Hamburg) were established at the site. Shifts only took place on a smaller scale and rather as a move out of Berlin (i.e. some of the non-university research institutes). Of course, some companies were located in Berlin-Adlershof because of its proximity to the



*Figure 5.5* Centre for Photonics and Optical Technologies  
Source: WISTA Management GmbH, 2004

non-university research institutes. The relocation of the Departments of Mathematics and Natural Science and their staff was an exception as it was purely a political decision. It is obvious that relocations happened mainly for political reasons. A decision to relocate companies for purely economical reasons would probably not have resulted in a move to the Berlin-Adlershof location due to excessively high prices, the decentralized nature of the location, the supply of office space and industrial sites in Berlin, the lack of a complete infrastructure and the urbanism and weak image of the location.

Based on information from the WISTA MG about the kind of establishment from companies in Berlin-Adlershof, in the WISTA area (excluding MEDIACITY etc.), one can summarize that most of the companies are start-ups (64.1 per cent). Of the relocated companies (17.6 per cent) more than three-quarters are from inside Berlin (Table 5.3).

The relocation of the Campus of Natural Science of the Humboldt University from the city centre and the relocation of non-university research institutes in Berlin-Adlershof certainly helped to raise the profile of the city of Berlin as a location of economy, science, and media. The decision to prioritise the Berlin-Adlershof location as the most important development project in Berlin also resulted in an upgrading of the south-eastern part of the urban area. In addition, Berlin-Adlershof is part of a development axis leading to Schönefeld airport outside the city boundaries. After a number of years without any remarkable growth, the Schönefeld airport is now experiencing substantial growth because of the settlement of the British no-frills airline (low-cost carrier) Easyjet in April 2003. Soon Schönefeld airport is to be expanded into a major airport, Berlin Brandenburg International (BBI) with an expected additional increase in passengers. The proximity to Schönefeld airport is of considerable relevance to a lot of enterprises at the Adlershof location. An example is the need for specialized personnel by various enterprises in MEDIACITY.

*Table 5.3 Kinds of establishment in Berlin-Adlershof (December 2002)*

<i>Kind of establishment</i>	<i>Number of companies</i>	
	<i>absolute</i>	<i>percentage</i>
Start-up	168	64.1
Subsidiary	48	18.3
Relocation	46	17.6
<i>from Berlin</i>	39	14.9
<i>from Germany</i>	6	2.3
<i>from foreign countries</i>	1	0.4
Total	262	100

Source: WISTA Management GmbH 2004, origin of the companies (date: December 2002, not all included)

## **Institutional context**

The political, economic, and social situation of Berlin was always special until the fall of the Wall in 1989 because of the partition of Germany into two German states. With the exception of the residential developments that took place up to the end of the Second World War, the city did not undergo a single suburbanization process until the fall of the Wall. A suburbanization out of Berlin (West) was not possible because of the partition. East Berlin was under state rule which prevented any suburbanization.

Radical changes affecting Berlin came with the unification of Germany. Both halves of the city were affected by these changes. The special national funding for Berlin was cut back in the western part of the city. An adaptation to economic structures followed. In the eastern part of the city, and in the surrounding areas, a market economy was introduced and this resulted in the privatization of the state-owned enterprises. In 1991, the Deutsche Bundestag decided to make Berlin the capital of the united Germany and expectations as regards population growth and economic development were extremely high. In particular, the infrastructure (traffic, telecommunication etc.) in the eastern part of Berlin and in the vicinity of Brandenburg certainly needed renovation. This development, which included growing suburbanization (housing, retailing, industry, traffic), had to provide for the agglomeration area of Berlin in the beginning of the 1990s.

There was no planning basis and instead there was a need for stronger guidance and control of developments in the agglomeration area of Berlin. It was therefore important to accelerate the functioning of public administration. The administrative two-tier system of West Berlin had to be transferred to East Berlin. Berlin is not only a city but also a federate state and a municipality. Due to the two-tier system, Berlin has a Senate and districts as well. The Senate of Berlin is elected by the Berlin chamber of deputies every four years and is spatially responsible for the complete urban city. There are eight different Senate administrations covering eight different subjects and their tasks. Depending on the political majorities, the Senate administrations can be redistributed after elections into different fields if necessary.

The districts of Berlin are spatially determined and are subordinated to the Senate. Although they are part of the municipality of Berlin, the districts do not form an independent legislative body. However, they have large spheres of authority and the power to make decisions. The former 23 districts were reduced to 12 in 2001 and each has approximately 300,000 inhabitants. The districts of Berlin are more or less individual cities with their own administration.

The federal state of Brandenburg that surrounds Berlin is divided into many municipalities, a total of 14 administrative districts and 4 city districts. Each of these districts has a much lower population density than the districts of Berlin and is thus divided into five regional planning regions. In comparison with East Berlin, the new federal state of Brandenburg had to rebuild a new administrative structure in the surrounding area. These adaptation processes in Berlin and Brandenburg actually took quite a few years.

In order to coordinate the development in the Berlin-Brandenburg agglomeration area more effectively, both federal states founded the Joint State Planning Division. All the relevant authorities work together (Senate Administration for Urban Development Berlin, Ministry of Environment and Regional Policy Brandenburg). They defined a tight joint area which was 5,368 square metres in size and had 4.24 million inhabitants. The Joint State Planning Division is responsible for the joint spatial and regional planning of the metropolitan area but can only come to a decision if both sides agree. Neither is it a unitary and independent metropolitan government. So both federal states compete for the settlement of housing, industry, students, etc. The decision for a joint federal state of Berlin-Brandenburg was refused via a referendum by the people of the state of Brandenburg in 1995.

The financial situation in Berlin is currently very serious. The only funding the federal state of Berlin is receiving is from the State Financial Balance that is trying to achieve a financial balance among all German federal states. Berlin has a huge debt because the special funding by the federal government was cut back. Tax income is low because of the high unemployment rate through structural changes. Moreover, the loss of profits caused by cyclical and fiscal reforms and the multitude of new tasks (i.e. capital planning, redevelopment necessities in East Berlin) helped to increase the debts.

Berlin (West) already showed an unfavourable economic structure before the unification and was dependent on financial transactions. The economic structural change has grown stronger since the beginning of the 1990s. In particular, the number of available jobs in industry in both parts of the city as well as in the surrounding area of Brandenburg dropped drastically because of a less competitive economy. Jobs in Berlin were not shifted or suburbanized to the surroundings, they simply were lost. This massive de-industrialization is looked upon very seriously because the establishment of business-related services or enterprises in the R&D sector depends on the corresponding markets (Krätke and Borst 2000: 285–287).

In comparison with other metropolitan regions, Berlin has a higher number of employees in the sectors of public administration, household-related services, and construction and energy. On the other hand, the number of employees in finance services and higher qualified company-related services, and R&D-related companies is much lower than in other German metropolitan regions (Krätke and Borst 2000: 40–45). Services covering a super-regional market such as credit companies and insurances, technical services, advertising, etc. are not strongly represented in Berlin. This is, however, important for metropolitan regions (Brenke *et al.* 2002; Geppert and Gornig 2003).

The city is trying to respond to these structural deficits and their consequences. In 1999, the Senate ordered the compilation of a study on the strategic development of Berlin – the so-called Berlin Study which generated a six-model elements Berlin Study (Senatskanzlei 2000: 23–27):

- Berlin – competitive on the basis of the city's own strength;
- Berlin – open and socially fair;

- Berlin – ecologically attractive and responsible;
- Berlin – a city of knowledge;
- Berlin – West and East at the same time;
- Berlin – a civil social basis.

The two model elements ‘city of knowledge’ and ‘West and East at the same time’ are particularly important because they build on existing resources. All other model elements are characterized by a mainstream focus or describe the direction. Three further activities have also been recommended, namely the strengthening of Berlin’s knowledge basis, cross-connections and reaction interweaving, and a cooperative social state (Senatskanzlei 2000: 28–30).

The urban development plan for industries, published by the Senate Administration for Urban Development, noted in 1999 that Berlin needs to stick to its endogenous potential. Systematic Berlin needs to be developed as a ‘City of Knowledge and Knowledge Production’ (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2000b: 13). The Adlershof location is going to be developed and established as a bridge between research, development, and production (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2000b: 64).

Explaining the incorporation of the development project ‘City for Science, Economy, and Media’ in Adlershof into Berlin’s economic and spatial development trends is now a straightforward matter. The aim of the development project is akin to that of a science city with close connections to the economy.

The development project in Adlershof is also mentioned in all major publications by Berlin’s urban planning administration. These are the following contents or entries:

- Land Utilization Plan (*Flächennutzungsplan*): entry on usage by industry, housing, university, and research, special construction area with a high percentage of green space, park and sports facilities (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 1998);
- Urban Development Plan Industry (*Stadtentwicklungsplan Gewerbe*): emphasis on R&D, industrial construction site, settlement of head companies is required, centres for start-ups, technology and innovation (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2000b);
- Berlin – City of Science and Research, selected individual locations: university, public–private institutes, private research, housing construction sites, mixed construction sites, industrial construction sites, common lands, green space (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung, Umweltschutz und Technologie 1997);
- Office Location 2010 (*Bürostandort Berlin – Strukturen und Perspektiven bis 2010*): development of locations with priority on office space volume, promotion of catchment area at the new airport BBI, consideration of a location inside the airport wedge (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2001).



## **Analysis of the multilevel decision-making process**

This section analyses and presents the multilevel decision-making process, in particular the participating actors, the different aims and interests, the actual practice of decision-making as well as the citizen participation and the institutional innovation in connection with the Berlin-Adlershof development project. Interviews with selected key people from various sectors (private sector, governmental sector, non-governmental sector, and experts representing civil society) were carried out between May and June 2004. In addition, some information material and two completed studies on the Berlin-Adlershof development area were also analysed (Simons 2003: 52–93; Wilmes *et al.* 1997: 24–40).

### ***Framing the Project***

Since planning started in 1991 many, mainly public, actors have been involved in the development project entitled ‘Berlin-Adlershof – City for Science, Economy, and Media’. As already mentioned in the first section, the federal state of Berlin, or rather the Senate Administrations responsible, were forced to react after the GDR ceased to exist and after the winding-up of previous users on the site in Adlershof (Academy of Sciences, German television and radio station, barracks, NVA-training base, etc.) in 1989.

The actors who participated in planning and controlling the project mainly have their origins in the Senate and district administrations of Berlin, the assigned responsible or development bodies and the interest societies or alliances of companies or research facilities. The federal government or the EU has not been directly involved in the planning and realization process.<sup>8</sup> The following public bodies have participated in the development of the Berlin-Adlershof location since the beginning of the 1990s (the departments have been continuously re-categorized and the current areas they are responsible for are stated in brackets):<sup>9</sup>

- Senate Administration for Urban Development (currently also responsible for Construction and Housing, Conservation, Traffic);
- Senate Administration for Economy (currently also responsible for Work and Women);
- Senate Administration for Science (currently also responsible for Research and Culture);
- Senate Administration for Finance;
- The District Authority Berlin-Treptow.

The following important bodies and private development companies, or rather the fiduciary construction body, joined the team in 1993:

- Adlershof Projekt GmbH (APG) (until 2003: Berlin Adlershof Aufbaugesellschaft mbH – BAAG, until 1993: Johannisthal Adlershof Aufbaugesellschaft mbH – JAAG);

- WISTA Management GmbH (WISTA MG) (until 1995: Entwicklungsgesellschaft Adlershof mbH – EGA).

Other important actors for the Berlin-Adlershof development area were or rather are:

- The society ‘Initiativgemeinschaft Außeruniversitärer Forschungseinrichtungen Adlershof (IGAFA)’;
- Departments of Mathematics and Natural Sciences/Campus (Humboldt University of Berlin);
- MEDIACITY Adlershof – Society for Location Marketing and Building Management mbH (MEDIACITY GmbH);
- Innovation and Founder Centre (IGZ) and the Centre for East–West Cooperation (OWZ);
- Technology Circle Adlershof (TKA) – Interest Representation of the High-Tech Enterprises (until 2003: Technologieforum e.V. – Interest Representation of Smaller Technology Enterprises);
- Forschungsverbund e.V. (Bodies of various different research institutes in Berlin, some of which are located in Adlershof); and
- Stadtforum (consulting body and briefing instrument of the Senate Administration of Urban Development since 1991).

Apart from the Senate administrations of Berlin and the district authority of Treptow-Köpenick, two different development companies or bodies are represented at the Adlershof location:<sup>10</sup> the WISTA Management GmbH (WISTA MG) and the Berlin Adlershof Aufbaugesellschaft mbH (BAAG).

WISTA MG is responsible for the Adlershof science and economy location. They are very often described as a ‘private’ body or management company for the ‘Science and Technology Park’ core area. However, WISTA MG is a public company and is therefore similar to a subsidiary of the federal state of Berlin because the federal state of Berlin (99 per cent) and Berlin Economic Development (1 per cent) are partners. The company is controlled by a supervisory board that consists of representatives from the Senate administrations, lobby groups such as the Board of Trade and Industry, representatives of major German companies and various other experts. The core tasks of WISTA MG have been and continue to be: communication and marketing, acquisition/establishment of profile-close companies, setting up and administration of the centres for specialist innovation (IGZ/OWZ), letting of buildings and sale of lots,<sup>11</sup> development of construction sites, running of common service facilities, consulting and networking as well as promotion of technology fields.

The BAAG is the fiduciary development body of the federal state of Berlin. It is mainly responsible for the project guidance and develops the development area Johannisthal/Adlershof by order of the federal state of Berlin. BAAG is a subsidiary of the private consulting and services company Urban System Consult AG (USC) and works on behalf of, and is financed by, the federal state of Berlin.

As a new development body the Adlershof Projekt Gesellschaft mbH (APG) took over the tasks of the BAAG at the beginning of 2004. Most of the staff were kept on but APG is now a subsidiary of WISTA MG. BAAG was responsible for the following tasks: conception, urban development, development planning, infrastructural development, clearing, settling of legal issues, consulting, coordination, settling of HUB-Departments, location marketing, and public relations. As the main development has now ended, the new tasks of APG are the planning of infrastructure, and the development and marketing of the media site, the industrial site and the adjacent residential area. Although BAAG does not report to a supervisory board, it is controlled by a steering committee. The committee consists of representatives from the public administration, who decide on the development and economic plans, its schedule and the financing.

For formal legal reasons two parallel acting bodies or development companies had to be created to safeguard the development. The area of the WISTA MG was legally defined as an adaptation area within the development area Johannisthal/Adlershof and thus has a special rating. WISTA MG or the former EGA had been founded specially for the development of this partial area designated for future use. A spatial separation of the different uses was necessary to ensure funding and corresponding funds, such as the 'Common tasks for the improvement of regional infrastructure' (Wilmes *et al* 1997: 34).

WISTA MG was responsible for the user side, the research and technology sector, while BAAG was responsible for the supplier side, the urban development and infrastructure. Although the planning responsibility for the development area (BAAG) and the actual Technology Park (WISTA) were clearly divided, the situation between BAAG and WISTA MG was permanently tense and arguments on the competency were ongoing (Simons 2003: 76 and Wilmes *et al.* 1997: 34). The Senate had hoped to reach a more efficient 'business-like' realization of the location planning and handed the development task over to a trustee (BAAG) and a management company (WISTA MG). The passing-on of the WISTA major political project to 'private' organizations certainly did not speed up the implementation process (Wilmes *et al* 2003: 38). Due to the historical background, WISTA MG is supported instead by the Senate Administration for Economy and BAAG by the Senate Administration for Urban Development. It was also a disadvantage to the outside world to have two 'development bodies'. In the beginning of 2004, APG was restructured as a subsidiary of WISTA MG and there were high hopes that this would lay many of these conflicts to rest.

The steering committee has a special place within the project development and controlling of the development area. While originally under the authority of only one Senate administration, the project is now controlled by many different sectors together. The steering committee was created in 1994 and is responsible for coordination with all the administrations and the development body involved. It meets four times a year and its members include each permanent secretary, the district councillor and the managing director of the BAAG. The 'Conference of Permanent Secretaries', also known as 'Small Government

Conference' or 'Little Senate' was also authorized to issue directives. A coordination group consisting of the respective official in charge and specialists prepared each meeting of the steering committee in a separate meeting.

In the beginning of the project development, even the Senate administrations argued about the sectors, in particular about the contents, leadership and financing. The Senate Administration for Economy and the Senate Administration for Urban Development each came up with a separate, almost contrary, concept and plan at the beginning of the 1990s. The Senate Administration for Economy was initially the leading authority. In 1991, it asked the newly founded development company Adlershof mbH (EGA) to set up a framework to define the location as a Science and Technology Park. In conjunction with this, the Senate Administration for Urban Development set up a framework which focused on a city-tolerable mixture of uses. This was then discussed with representatives of other Senate Administrations, actors on site and various experts (Simons 2003: 63–94).

The Senate of Berlin decided to investigate and develop the existing framework further by an expert and a fiduciary development body set up in 1993. The Senate administrations, the District Authority of Berlin-Treptow, various planning offices and experts were part of this cooperative investigation. The aim was to involve all the participating actors in the opinion finding. As a result, a common urban development framework was worked out and presented to the public in 1993 by the three Senate Administrations for Urban Development, Economy, and Science. The spreading of the uses structures had now been rearranged and a single model for the development of Adlershof was fixed ('City for Science and Economy'). The Senate then passed this compromise as a resolution (Simons 2003: 65–67).

In 1994 the Senate declared Adlershof to be an area of extraordinary importance and the site was then designated a development area. Urban development then became a relevant option and the district was no longer responsible for the planning. Responsibility was assumed by the Senate Administration for Construction and Housing, which was later combined with the Senate Administration for Urban Development and Conservation. The Johannisthal Adlershof Aufbaugesellschaft mbH (JAAG) was soon established as a fiduciary development body in 1993 and was then renamed Berlin Adlershof Aufbaugesellschaft mbH (BAAG).

Following this first phase of the project, characterized by the negotiations on future uses, the teamwork between both actors improved significantly. All the actors and the steering committee started working with huge enthusiasm and energy – at least in the beginning – and supported the drive of the 'City for Science, Economy, and Media' model. Work was also improved through the intensive and permanent cooperation of all actors and due to the personal ties that were established and the trust that was built up.

### *Goals and interests*

The goals and interests of the main actors correspond and complement one another in many areas. All the participating actors are aiming to strengthen and

reinforce the profile of the location, to achieve the quick realization and improvement of the traffic system (regional train, highway) and to bring about the creation and preservation of enterprises and jobs. All in all they are working to generate a sustainable mixture of uses and urban district development. They are also interested in good public relations and in supporting popular activities such as the annual 'Long Night of Sciences'.

If one analyses the aims and interests, it seems to be clear that commonalities exist between the Senate Administrations for Urban Development, the District Authority of Berlin-Treptow and the BAAG because they all wanted to revitalize this greenfield and brownfield site and develop an urban district. Commonalities are also apparent between the Senate Administration for Economy, WISTA MG, IGAFa and MEDIACITY regarding an improvement in the connection between science, research and economic development. The Senate Administration for Science, the Humboldt University of Berlin and the IGAFa combined forces to create a natural scientific campus and ensure a research transfer to research facilities and companies.

However, in some areas, interests and aims are in competition. One example is the creation of a drinking-water conservation zone within the Berlin-Adlershof development area. Here, the interests of the Senate Administration for Urban Development are in total contrast to the interests of many other actors. Certain uses, for example as an industrial site, could then not be established because it is essential that only clean water drains into the ground.

Conflicts relating to the project's aims also arose between the Senate Administration for Urban Development and the BAAG on the one hand and the District Authority of Berlin-Treptow on the other. These were, for example, related to the calculation and identification of a retail location within the development area or the follow-up of public investments. The district has to bear all the costs for the care and upkeep of the facilities such as green areas, traffic roads, etc. after the end of the development phase. The district is, of course, completely opposed to expensive and delicate infrastructure planning. BAAG was also blamed for not having enough local knowledge or contacts, as it is situated in downtown West Berlin, close to the Senate administration departments and far away from the actual Berlin-Adlershof development area. The district had to give up its main responsibility during the development-restructuring phase, and when the conflict arose between the BAAG and the district, BAAG was soon regarded as arrogant. Further infrastructure-related arguments between the District Authority of Berlin-Treptow and the BAAG occurred as both bodies wanted to assign their own staff.<sup>12</sup> The establishment and expansion of the research facilities also conflicted with traffic planning as the facilities are extremely sensible to vibrations and shocks.

Finally it needs pointing out that there are no real alternatives to the Adlershof development project. One alternative could have been to 'do nothing' although the Senate and the district had to deal with the existing site and, potentially, that may have otherwise been left deserted. The planned residential use could of course have been planned on other sites. Initially the population

prognosis for Berlin was completely different and a mixture and combination of different uses had explicitly been aimed at. All the actors wanted development in Adlershof and it was necessary to restructure the area (the area was actually 'crying out for restructuring'). Alternatives were not really discussed. Companies and science facilities could have easily settled on other competitive sites in Berlin. The media city in Adlershof has, for example, an important and globally well-known competitor, namely the film city of Babelsberg. The emphasis of the media site Babelsberg lies mainly on film production and would have been a supplement for the TV-focus of Adlershof. The German Radio Archive still relocated from Adlershof to Babelsberg (although funding was provided for it to do so). The inner-city water locations alongside the river Spree with a focus on media are another area in competition with the Adlershof media city.

Another competitive location and alternative is the Science Park Golm, close to the federal capital of Potsdam in the surrounding area of Brandenburg. Adlershof is not automatically a favourable location, as the settling of the Technology College (TFH) in nearby Oberschöneweide shows. A consulting firm initiated a location search and the Senate decided to invest in a renovated building ensemble in Oberschöneweide. Adlershof was also shortlisted as a potential site but the site in Oberschöneweide was chosen instead because of a feared 'over-potential'.

The legal decree on the development phase of 1994 clearly defined the aims of the Berlin-Adlershof development project. The participating actors initially came to an agreement and all interests were combined. The interests in nature conservation (landscape park, preservation zones) and the renovation of listed buildings shown by the Senate Administration for Urban Development were maintained, as were the interests in keeping the media city of the Senate for Economy and the interests in keeping the research facilities of the Senate Administration for Science. All aims referred to in the framework were transferred to the superior land utilisation plan and then applied in detail to each development scheme. Various resolutions were passed by the Senate in which the aims for Adlershof were explained. These resolutions very often followed the recommendations of the steering committee and therefore mirrored the interests and common decisions of its members.

As already mentioned, the general conditions during the planning period changed and the high expectations as regards population and economic growth were lowered. Aims and plans for the development project also had to be cut back to a rational degree. The adjustment to the changing general conditions led to more pragmatism and the initially high demands (for architecture, housing, park, clean enterprises, etc.) were reduced. In contrast to earlier times – when the focus was only on companies with a strong scientific orientation – other industries are now being encouraged to establish premises in Adlershof. In contrast to the initial plans, the district administration office was established in Adlershof. The different market situation (lack of demand for multi-storey housing) reduced the quality (reduced architectonic expectations, detached houses) and the quantity (only to a minimum) of the housing construction. The total size

of the Berlin-Adlershof development area was also reduced. Easier development can be expected because of the release of the northern part of the development (fewer actors and within the area of responsibility of the district). However, the character of the development area is to be maintained for reasons of image.

### ***Practices of decision-making – coalitions of power and exchanges of interest***

All objective adaptations into the changing framework were accompanied, negotiated and decided on by the steering committee. The steering committee existed from 1994 to 2003 and reported to the Senate Administration for Urban Development. The Senate Administration for Finance was also important as it had veto power in the case of financial decisions. The BAAG did not have a vote and decisions were taken by majority. All resolutions had to meet the planning law and, once passed, they were binding. Minutes were taken at a later stage in order to verify discussions and votes. The steering committee was the BAAG controlling body and took care of the management tasks, the budget and the working schedule as well as continuous record-keeping. The BAAG also helped to prepare the content of the resolutions (expert proceedings, urban development competition).

The steering committee met four times per year and the meetings were prepared at great length. During the last two years, the meetings were kept shorter as all parties were aware of procedures. Many experts and public figures remained the same and the discussion rounds became more open. Whereas sector-oriented thinking was still present at the beginning, the practice was reduced and discussions went much more smoothly. At the moment the resolution or the steering of the WISTA supervisory board is under discussion. The tasks of the steering committee actually finished with the winding-up of the BAAG in 2003. However, the network continues to exist and there are plans for a continuation with one or more meetings of the permanent secretaries of the Senate administrations annually and of additional expert working groups.

One intense critic who was interviewed referred to the links between decision-makers or actors in Berlin-Adlershof as consisting of 'permanently changing actors'. Apart from the above-mentioned interest bundling,<sup>13</sup> some interview partners pointed out some sectoral and time-dependent unions. These actually developed outside hierarchies. Some of those interviewed spoke of a strong sectoral thinking by the Senate administrations and political ties were dominant. The permanent secretaries of the Senate administrations belonged to different political parties. Teamwork was made easier or more difficult depending on which party the opponents belonged to. Between 1990 and 2001, Berlin was governed by the Great Coalition and the sectors were divided for control purposes. This resulted in a 'permanent election campaign' and decisions were often simply blocked (Wilmes *et al.* 1997: 36).

Apart from these decision links, various simple actor or company links also existed. The 'Initiativgemeinschaft Außeruniversitärer Forschungseinrichtungen Adlershof (IGAFA)' or the Technology Circle Adlershof e.V. (TKA) is one

example. Currently, there are also various working groups and circles which meet regularly once or twice a month to develop ideas and take decisions:

- working circle on infrastructure (staff level): WISTA MG, APG, IGAFa, HUB, Senate Administration for Urban Development, MEDIACITY;
- working circle on PR (i.e. 'Long Night'): APG, IGAFa, HUB, MEDIACITY, district Treptow;
- working group Humboldt University Adlershof (now coordination group): WISTA MG, BAAG/APG, IGAFa, HUB, Senate Administration for Urban Development, Senate Administration for Science.

There are also various Jour-Fix-dates for strategic discussions at management director level: IGAFa & WISTA MG, IGAFa & HUB, and WISTA MG & HUB. A very up-to-date link is the new action 'Vision 2010' comprising the HUB, IGAFa and the Technology Circle. They have built on the existing ideas to develop competence fields, to establish new enterprises, and to support contacts with industry.

On the basis of the facts, Adlershof is a public project since it is controlled and managed by the public sector. However, an individual actor can influence the process as one of the few large companies in MEDIACITY has already shown. It actually prevented the building of a road – that was already planned – adjacent to its site, as it did not want the traffic so close by.

The interest in Adlershof on the part of the Senate administration departments was always very clearly defined. However, a few Senate administration departments started to have doubts when the financial situation became very bleak. A general rethinking developed throughout the city and the adaptation or reduction of the development area was then decided at a political level. The only actor that had doubts from the beginning in the shift of the Departments of Natural Sciences to Berlin-Adlershof was the Humboldt University of Berlin. Some initial doubts existed especially with regard to the planned concentration of the natural sciences at the external location at Adlershof because of the feared isolation between the natural and the social sciences. Some other doubts existed concerning the loss of the urban surrounding at the former location in the inner city and these had to be dealt with. Most non-university research institutes were already based in Adlershof. Some of the newly founded research institutes (such as BESSY II) were happy to settle here, while others (such as FIRST) needed encouragement.

Completely open actions are not possible due to the quite strong official influence in Berlin-Adlershof. The dominant power ties also correspond to the formal institutional conditions. Of course there are always loose arrangements, such as those relating to listed buildings, and the major decisions were only taken by the steering committee. Ideas and interests were certainly debated and exchanged inside the steering committee, in additional discussion circles (formal and informal), or during telephone conversations. The dominant strategy link in the steering committee was bound by the aims of the project and no conflicts could



arise because these aims were laid down in the framework. Apart from the guidelines in the framework and existing resolutions, the budget and available manpower are the steering forces.

Sustainable and economic aims for the Berlin-Adlershof development area are integrated into the various plans. Some of the aims that are manifested in the framework are the mixture of uses, the link to public transport and the removal of existing old neglected deposits. Binding ecological standards are scheduled in the development schemes (roof planting, drainage).

### ***Democracy, institutional innovation and imagery***

The citizen participation was carried out subject to given legal conditions during the planning of project supervision (land utilization plan, development scheme). The development and planning process was accompanied by an intense discussion process with experts and the interested public in the City Forum between 1992 and 1996. The City Forum is a consulting body and a loose planning instrument of the Senate Administration for Urban Development. It supports the public discussion and informs on the tasks and aims of the urban development. Residents were interviewed during the initial phase of the development project. A permanent exhibition on site (models, showcases) is available for all citizens and interested parties. Each household also received leaflets and information events were held. The PR initiatives also included leaflets and brochures, an annual press conference and information for delegates and members of parliament.

As there are almost no residents in the development area as yet, there have been no demonstrations or initiatives opposing the Berlin-Adlershof development area. Some conflicts arose with neighbouring residents and owners of plots, as they feared too much traffic. An expert opinion on traffic was, however, initiated to avoid conflicts during the run-up. An organization called 'Landschaftspark e.V.' supports the existing landscape park and there is also an interest group and district initiative 'Interessengemeinschaft Dörfeldstrasse' whose aim is to support a shopping street nearby. The two interest groups 'Bürgerinitiative Stadtring Süd' (BISS) and 'Interessengemeinschaft Teltowkanal' (IGT) are fighting against the construction of the A113 highway, also called 'Teltowkanal-Autobahn'. The highway construction is only indirectly and marginally connected with the development area.

It is quite striking that there are no large and global companies in the Berlin-Adlershof development area. 'Excellent' relocations have not yet happened and no large German company has a subsidiary based in Adlershof (i.e. Siemens, Daimler-Chrysler). The smaller existing companies feel a bit left out and the major unions and employee representations are not present in Adlershof. The large number of students also goes almost unnoticed. Because housing has not yet been realized as originally planned, the site lacks social infrastructure. Students, scientists, and employees are not happy with this situation. Students in particular are not well looked after although they could be the future contributors to the Berlin-Adlershof location. It would be perfect if some of the students establish a start-up within the

Adlershof area after finishing their studies and the City of Science expands further. A student's canteen on site is not planned in the near future and the food and catering would certainly need improving. After closing time the development area does not seem very busy and the desired level of 'urbanism' is hardly achieved.

One innovation – within the planning and steering process – is the discussion within the City Forum. The future development of Berlin-Adlershof was a frequent subject during these informal discussions between 1992 and 1996. The setting up of a steering committee, which is not bound by sectors or hierarchies, can be regarded as innovative. Rather than having one single authority passing decisions, the steering committee enabled various different bodies to work together and to come to an agreement. According to an interview partner, the structures alone are not the guiding hand. Instead, an expert and a promoter are required to create a collective awareness and lead to a presentation in public.

A new procedure was used or developed within the framework of urban development. This has been adapted in the meantime to cope with the German Construction Code of Law. Interferences in the environment in general have to be compensated. These compensation phases in Berlin-Adlershof were linked together to form one common compensation initiative for many development schemes (landscape park). This procedure was not yet allowed according to the Construction Code of Law and has now been integrated as permission for development areas. The Federal Office for Construction Trade and Regional Policy (BBR) awarded this procedure as 'best practice' for innovative ideas in the planning of project supervision.

The relocation of the Departments of Natural Sciences and the implementation of the various tasks within six years have taken place quite quickly (planning, passing of resolution, construction phase, relocation) and are an innovation in themselves.

## Lessons to be drawn

The fact that the Berlin-Adlershof development project was built on existing structures means it was not created from scratch or in the open countryside. The site in Adlershof was part of a dissolving process and the winding-up of GDR uses meant a greenfield and brownfield site was deserted in 1990. The Senate of Berlin and the responsible district authority of Treptow had to come up with a common conception and determined project guidance. The Senate of Berlin was under extreme pressure and was forced to look at the different uses of each individual actor.

The political resolution for the development of a 'City for Economy, Science, and Media' was to combine economic, scientific, employment, and urban development aims. Because the character of the project was based on sector spreading, a strong level of agreement and coordination had to be found. The realization of urban development projects that are spread to various sectors is very difficult to achieve, particularly in Berlin, due to the political fragmentation.

The existence of two development bodies, the managing company WISTA MG and the fiduciary development body (BAAG) caused difficulties as they regularly

blocked each other's initiatives. A steering committee was set up and was responsible for the agreement, the search for compromises, the coordination, and the control of the sector, and interest spread. Its establishment was regarded as very useful and effective. If there had not been a steering committee, there would certainly have been more delays and arguments on the issue of competency. The developed framework was a compromise for all interests and its contents were transferred in the binding planning instruments (land utilization plan, development schemes). The influence of the citizen participation was not so significant simply because there was hardly any affected population at the location.

According to the Senate, the Berlin-Adlershof development project is the second most important project in Berlin (after the relocation of the government). Public assignments are also realized in Berlin-Adlershof (i.e. non-university research institutes, Departments of Natural Sciences of the Humboldt University of Berlin). It is a development project in public hands and would be difficult to realize purely out of private funding. However the federal state of Berlin bears the financial risks. The urban development step was used as a legal planning instrument. It was hoped that the prepared pre-developments would raise the value of the land and the complete project could be refinanced. Because of that, a flexible price calculation is now impossible, and is affecting demand.

Although the development dynamics did not at all live up to the original expectations, the original euphoric expectations for the agglomeration area of Berlin (considerable economic and population growth) were certainly too high. The original plan was to register 20,000 to 30,000 employees on the site. Today there are more than 10,000 employees and an additional 7,000 students. The development step will continue until 2006 and the number of companies and employees is continuously rising. The developments already achieved should not be matched against the former excessive euphoric expectations. It should not be forgotten that the initial general conditions at this location (brownfields, mono-functional utilization, separation, etc.) and the national and international business environment have not been that favourable during recent years. The effects of the comparatively small demand for housing and business settlements in the metropolitan area during recent years is strengthened by the various offers within the whole metropolitan area. It is clear that the politically desired focus on science and education in particular is not comparable in the case of Adlershof with sites for retail etc. which normally have a higher demand on the part of private developers and enterprises.

Even though Berlin-Adlershof is a unique location, there are other competitive and attractive locations in the agglomeration area. A levelling of prices according to the market, that is a better pricing policy, would be necessary to attract more businesses. Adlershof is presented as a scientific location but not yet as an economy, or real estate location. The exchange between the companies, the research institutes and the university departments and among the companies certainly needs improving. Synergy effects cannot only grow on the basis of neighbouring vicinity and the corresponding knowledge about others needs to be made accessible and appreciated in general.

All in all the location is well established. Additional work needs to be done as regards attracting further company settlements or new foundations, the realisation of housing construction, and improving the social infrastructure. There is still a long way to go before an urban city district can be realized. The mixture of uses will need to be completed and the image will need to be built up further. In the medium to long term, some developments such as the traffic infrastructure (i.e. airport, highway), which is still under construction, will eventually take effect.

Some of the actors criticize the chosen mixture of uses and the development in total (prices, quality is too demanding, etc.), however overall it is regarded as correct and good. The aims of the Berlin-Adlershof development project are useful and innovative. They also correspond with the intended development of the city of Berlin as a 'City of Knowledge'. Because the development project lies within urban Berlin, it is connected with an economic use (jobs, taxes) and sustained development (area recycling) can be expected.

## Acknowledgements

Special thanks are due for the time and trust given by all those interviewed. An interview model was used to carry out the following interviews with selected key people from various sectors (private sector, governmental sector, non-governmental sector, and well-informed persons in representation of civil society) between May and June 2004: Mr Sichter, Senate Administration for Urban Development, Head of Adlershof and Eldaner Strasse, Department IV D, Housing Construction, projects Development Areas (Interviews: 29.04.2004 and 11.05.2004); Mrs Huge, Senate Administration for Economy, Work and Women, Official in Charge, Department III A, Central Coordination Point ZAK (Interview: 12.05.2004); Mr Lietzow, Senate Administration for Science, Research, and Culture for the Federal State of Berlin, Head of Department, Department III B Affairs on Scientific Infrastructure, Science Transfer, WiSta, Engineering Science (Interview: 10.05.2004); Dr Schmitz, District Authority Treptow-Köpenick, District Councillor, Head of Department of Construction and Urban Development (Interview: 26.05.2004); Mr Schmitz, WISTA-Management GmbH (WISTA MG), Managing Director (Interview: 24.05.2004); Mr Steindorf, Adlershof Projekt GmbH (APG), Managing Director (Interview: 17.05.2004); Mr Oltmann, MEDIACITY Adlershof – Society for Location Marketing and Building Management mbH, Managing Director (Interview: 01.06.2004); Mrs Franz, Humboldt University of Berlin (HUB), Official in Charge, Presiding Committee (Interview: 24.05.2004); Dr Westphal, Joint Initiative of Non-University Research Institutions in Adlershof (IGAFA), Head Knowledge Office/ Branch (Interview: 01.06.2004); Mr Wilmes, Free University of Berlin, Head Division Controlling IT, former scientist DFG-research project on Adlershof (Interview: 28.05.2004).

## Notes

- 1 This and all the following facts and characterizations relating to the Berlin-Adlershof project are based on the interviews conducted (see 'Acknowledgements') and information from both the development bodies BAAG and WISTA MG (Berlin Adlershof Aufbaugesellschaft mbH 1999, 2003; WISTA Management GmbH 2002, 2003, 2004) as well as the material from the Senate administration (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2000a; Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umweltschutz Berlin 1994, 1995).
- 2 A municipality can identify a development area as a brownfield or greenfield site which needs to be made reusable or needs to meet the demand for more housing or jobs. The enforcement of urban development plans as a planning instrument of the Special Urban Development law is designed to accelerate the mobilization of construction land. It is also designed to speed up the process, to distribute – if necessary – the tasks to a development body and to co-finance the local development costs that arise if a sale of lots is profitable later on (profits through development of construction land, i.e. rise of land value through change).
- 3 So-called adaptation sites ('*Anpassungsgebiete*') are sites within the urban development area, which should be adapted to the planned development within a connected built-up area (§ 170 German building law).
- 4 The abbreviation WISTA stands for Wissenschafts- und Wirtschaftsstandort Adlershof (Science and Economic Site Adlershof), a former name of the Science and Technology Park.
- 5 The total number of companies is covered by the NACE sectors 50–52, 60–66, 70–74, 80–93. To ensure data protection the data for the sectors 55 (= Catering and Hotel Trade), 67 (= Trades connected with Credit Companies and Insurances), 75 (= Public Sector, Defence, Social Security) have been blacked out. Therefore, no details are available. Sectors 95 (= Private Households with Staff) and 99 (= Ex-territorial Organizations and Bodies) are not registered in the national company survey, so no details are available. With the exception of sector 75, all other missing sectors on the location Berlin-Adlershof are of no further importance.
- 6 The area of the Berlin-Adlershof development project is almost identical to the Statistical Lot 125 and is supplemented by a small adjacent housing area.
- 7 The Berlin Department of National Statistics also only supplied widely blacked-out data. It is not possible to make a comparison with data from earlier times because no data on the Statistical Lots in Berlin exists before 2001.
- 8 The federal government is indirectly involved through the Federal Authority of Construction and Regional Policy. The Adlershof development area is an example of a research project on 'mixture of use'. Various types of funding by the federal government (common task on the 'improve of the regional infrastructure') and the EU (KONVER, EFRE) were also added to the project.
- 9 For a short time the Senate Administration for Education, Youth and Sport was also involved.
- 10 The development companies or bodies described have different policy attitudes (see 'Practices of decision-making – coalitions of power and exchanges of interest').
- 11 Apart from the WISTA MG and the BAAG, or rather APG, the Adlershof Facility Management GmbH (AFM) has existed since 2001. It supervises the buildings and sites, i.e. it ensures the commercial, technical and infrastructural running. AFM is also a subsidiary of WISTA MG.
- 12 The handling of public funds by the BAAG is even described as 'self-service mentality' in the study by Simons. As a developer, the BAAG has a specific self-interest at the project, because it tries to spread its tasks among associated companies (Simons 2003: 92).
- 13 Different alliances existed here as well. The Senate Administration for Urban Development and the Senate Administration for Economy worked closely together

when the redevelopment and preservation of old building in MEDIACITY was under discussion. However, the BAAG preferred a total demolishment and a new restructuring.

## References

- Berlin Adlershof Aufbaugesellschaft mbH (1999) *Straßen Plätze Parks – Der öffentliche Raum in der Wissenschaftsstadt*, Berlin: BAAG.
- Berlin Adlershof Aufbaugesellschaft mbH (2003) *Stadt Struktur – Von der Vision zur Realität*, Berlin: BAAG.
- Brenke, K., Geppert, K., Hopf, I., Pfeiffer, C., Spieß, K., Vesper, D., Wagner, G.C. (2002) 'Bausteine für die Zukunft Berlins', *Wochenbericht des DIW Berlin*, 10.
- Geppert, K. and Gornig, M. (2003) 'Die Renaissance der großen Städte – und die Chancen Berlins', *Wochenbericht des DIW Berlin*, 26.
- Krätke, S. and Borst, R. (2000) *Berlin: Metropole zwischen Boom und Krise*, Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Senatskanzlei – Der Regierende Bürgermeister von Berlin (2000) *Die BerlinStudie: Strategien für die Stadt*, Berlin: Regioverlag.
- Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung Berlin (1998) *Flächennutzungsplan Berlin Kulturbuchverlag*.
- Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung Berlin (2000a) *Planwerk Südostraum Berlin – Leitbilder, Konzepte, Strategien*, Berlin: Regioverlag.
- Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung Berlin (2000b) *Stadtentwicklungsplan Gewerbe, Gewerbestandort Berlin*, Berlin: Regioverlag.
- Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung Berlin (2001), *Bürostandort Berlin – Strukturen und Perspektiven bis 2010*, Berlin: Regioverlag.
- Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umweltschutz Berlin (1994) *Johannisthal-Adlershof. Technologie- und Wissenschaftsstadt*, Berlin: Kulturbuchverlag.
- Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umweltschutz Berlin (1995) *Projekte der räumlichen Planung (Fortschreibung)*, Berlin: Kulturbuchverlag.
- Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung, Umweltschutz und Technologie Berlin (1997) *Berlin – Stadt der Wissenschaft und Forschung. Karte mit Erläuterungen zu ausgewählten Einzelstandorten*, Berlin: Kulturbuchverlag.
- Simons, K. (2003) *Politische Steuerung großer Projekte. Berlin Adlershof, Neue Mitte Oberhausen und Eurolille im Vergleich*, Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Wilmes, M., Keil, I., Schroeder, K. (1997) *Der Forschungs- und Technologiepark Berlin-Adlershof – Modell einer neuen Form regionaler Kooperation zwischen Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft und Politik?* Berlin: Free University of Berlin.
- WISTA Management GmbH (2002) *Origin of the companies* (unpublished enquiry results)
- WISTA Management GmbH (2003) *Jahresbericht 2002*, Berlin.
- WISTA Management GmbH (2004) *Jahresbericht 2003*, Berlin.
- WISTA Management GmbH (2005) *Jahresbericht 2004*, Berlin.

## 6 Brussels Tour & Taxis

### Entrepreneurship versus the fragmented city

*Mathieu Van Criekingen, Christophe Guisset and  
Christian Vandermotten*

#### Introduction

Over the last fifteen years, western cities have been generally very proactive in implementing strategies of re-imagining the local urban scene and in trying to establish a new, dynamic urban imagery. Such strategies are major components of new entrepreneurialist urban policies aimed at turning the city into a global competitive actor in a context of increasing inter-urban competition and developing neo-liberal economic policies (Harvey 1989). Large area-based urban development projects are the hallmarks of these new urban policies. Since the 1990s, local urban authorities in almost every Western city have strongly relied on the planning and implementation of such projects (e.g. post-industrial waterfronts, large entertainment facilities, the organization of international sport events) in order to strengthen the competitive position of their metropolitan economies in the new international division of labour, production and consumption (Swyngedouw *et al.* 2002; Moulaert *et al.* 2003).

In this respect, Brussels may seem an atypical case at first sight since none of the projects implemented in the city since the 1980s actually correspond to large-scale entrepreneurial-style strategic projects led by dedicated place-bound public–private project agencies. Moreover, the lack of so-called ‘Bilbao effect’ – or ‘Guggenheim effect’ – in Brussels is periodically deplored in the media by some political, cultural or economic local elites. Nevertheless, Brussels’ urban landscape has been dramatically transformed in earlier post-war decades by a series of large-scale schemes, with the EU complex undoubtedly on top of this list. This large-scale but highly specific urban development dates back to the late 1950s and was (and still is) largely developed in the city ‘despite itself’, since Brussels ‘received’ the EU, NATO and other international institutions mainly because of external geo-political considerations (Swyngedouw and Baeten 2001).

If there is one place that best exemplifies the absence of recent large-scale area-based urban projects in Brussels, this place is definitely Tour & Taxis. This large inner-city area (about 30 hectares), which once used to accommodate the city’s inland port with a railway station, customs offices, warehouses and railway yards, has mostly been a huge piece of vacant land since the late 1980s. One may




Figure 6.1 Location of Tour & Taxis in Brussels  
Source: own construct (M. Van Criekingen)

suppose that urban authorities and private developers in most Western cities would have 'jumped' at such an opportunity for large-scale urban redevelopment and profit-making in the inner city. Actually, several redevelopment projects have been initiated since the early 1990s at this prime location site but none of them have been completed. Amongst these projects were a large entertainment centre ('Music City'), new facilities to accommodate EU summits, a large shopping centre ('Brussels Factory'), a range of museums and a new European school. The last (uncompleted) project dedicated to the site focused on building a cluster of technological activities and high-education resources ('Knowledge City'). These days, most of the area is still vacant. Only two early twentieth-century



landmark warehouses have been renovated under a mixed-use redevelopment scheme (i.e. high-standard office, retail and a place for commercial fairs and corporate events) implemented by a joint venture of two Belgian real-estate developers, named 'Project T&T'.

Past unfruitful experiences and present-day developments in Tour & Taxis stress a series of major issues relating to the planning, management and implementation of large area-based urban projects in Brussels. These can be translated into questions, such as: why has no strategic project been implemented in Brussels since the 1990s, particularly in Tour & Taxis? and: what are the obstacles to such schemes in a city which can undoubtedly lay claim to world city status? We argue that key elements of this enigma lie in conditions and backgrounds that sustain the perpetuation of a formalized statutory planning framework with relatively rigid practices and regulatory requirements. These conditions and backgrounds hinder in turn the development of more strategic project-based urban governance models in Brussels.

This chapter is divided into four sections. First, we highlight the generation of a large rent gap at Tour & Taxis through the urbanization and further decline of the site. The second section outlines key political, economic and socio-spatial conditions that shape the urban context of present-day Brussels. Within this context, the site of Tour & Taxis constitutes a first-order opportunity zone for both economic redevelopment and urban 'revitalization' purposes. The third section turns to practices of governance and urban planning in Brussels, highlighting the conditions responsible for the perpetuation of a formalized statutory planning framework in the city, out of step with contemporary evolutions towards the adoption of more flexible project-based urban planning frameworks. These elements



*Figure 6.2* Aerial view of the Tour & Taxis site. The warehouses are in the foreground.  
Source: photo Airprint, November 1996

set the scene for a more detailed analysis of the failure of recent strategic urban projects in the Tour & Taxis area. The fourth section then analyses the two main projects which have been initiated at the site since the early 1990s, that is, the Music City project (1992–2001) and the Knowledge City project (2002–2004). After a brief outline of the rise and fall of the Music City project, the mix of protagonists, interests and political goals implicated in the Knowledge City project is analysed in more detail. The development and final failure of these two projects highlight the fact that the Tour & Taxis area is a highly contested site which has been the backdrop to conflicts between multiple stakeholders.

Research for this study mainly took place during the spring of 2004. We reviewed planning documents, previous research reports, policy statements, press articles and reports of sessions in the Brussels parliament relating to past and present developments in the Tour & Taxis area. Additionally, we have attended public meetings and a press conference that brought together most of the key protagonists of the ongoing Tour & Taxis redevelopment project. We also have had individual contacts with some of these protagonists<sup>1</sup> and experts as regards planning policies and governance practices in Brussels.

### **Past and present of Tour & Taxis: excavating the rent gap**

Over the last 20 years, successive redevelopment projects have been initiated at Tour & Taxis. In essence, these projects have been primarily market-driven and real estate-based, that is ‘invariably predicated upon closing existing rent gaps by means of the production of a new built environment that is at least potentially capable of generating high income’ (Swyngedouw *et al.* 2002: 567).

The present-day rent gap in Tour & Taxis results from a cycle of investment and disinvestment that dates back to the late nineteenth century. In that period, striking industrial growth and a rapid increase in trade in Belgium urged the Brussels authorities to build new facilities for goods transport and warehousing. Located on the western edge of the inner city and along the canal linking the Walloon industrial basin to the North Sea through Antwerp, the site of Tour & Taxis became a highly valuable location in this context. It was then a marshland belonging to the von Thurn und Taxis aristocratic dynasty who used it as a pasture for the horses they used for their European postal service system. The name ‘Thurn und Taxis’ was subsequently transformed to ‘Tour et Taxis’ in the Brussels dialect.

By the late 1890s, the land had been bought by the Belgian state and annexed to the territory of the municipality of Brussels (1897). Different projects were proposed for its development, with some supporting the idea of building a large port while others attached more importance to railway infrastructures. The final project adopted by the Belgian government was a compromise between these two rival projects. Hence, between 1904 and 1907, two very large warehouse buildings and a customs office were erected alongside a vast new railway station and warehouse built by the Belgian National Railway Company (1902–1910). All these buildings were constructed to high architectural standards. In addition, the

canal was enlarged in front of the Tour & Taxis site in order to allow an increase in boat traffic (Valente 1998). Since then, the Tour & Taxis area developed into a major hub for freight transport, customs clearance and warehousing while the neighbouring districts (located in the municipalities of Brussels and Molenbeek) developed into high density working-class areas mixing industries, warehouses and housing.

Since the early 1970s, massive deindustrialization of the Brussels economy, increasing competition from road freight transport and the lifting of most trade barriers in Europe progressively rendered the Tour & Taxis railway, warehousing and customs installations obsolete. As a result, most of the activities at Tour & Taxis had been terminated by the late 1980s, except for activities relating to road logistics, which were added to the site from the late 1950s onwards. About 30 hectares of prime canal-side land with some large heritage buildings located at a stone's throw from the Brussels CBD were then left vacant. In addition, many industrial and warehouse buildings were abandoned and the population decreased significantly in the neighbouring districts. However, further abandonment has been prevented by an influx of immigrant populations – mostly originating from Mediterranean Europe and Maghreb – from the 1960s onwards. Nowadays, the districts around Tour & Taxis consist of an area of very dense construction with low-quality private housing accommodating a generally poor and low-qualified tenant population severely hit by unemployment (Table 6.1). Nevertheless, despite assumptions by some commentators or policymakers that deindustrialization is now complete in the area, about 200 small-industrial, transport-related and port-related activities still exist in the port and northern canal area close to Tour & Taxis, providing about 5,700 jobs (50 per cent of

Table 6.1 Socio-economic characteristics of the Tour & Taxis neighbourhood

	<i>Tour &amp; Taxis</i> <i>neighbourhood</i>	<i>municipality</i> <i>of Molenbeek</i>	<i>municipality</i> <i>of Brussels</i>	<i>Brussels</i> <i>Capital</i> <i>Region</i>
Population density, 2000 (inhab./km <sup>2</sup> )	15,796	14,252	7,155	9,708
Household income, 1999 (Belgium = 100)	70	77	93	98
Unemployment rate, 1998 (% of the economically active)	27%	23%	15%	13%
% of workers, 1991 (% of the economically active)	43%	33%	27%	23%
Non-Belgian population, 2000 (% of the total population)	41%	33%	33%	28%
Tenants, 1991 (% of households)	62%	62%	65%	60%
Housing with low comfort, 1991 (% of the housing stock)	29%	20%	17%	15%

which are low-skilled) (Clerbaux and Vroman 2002). Given these characteristics, the Tour & Taxis area has been long excluded from the urban experiences of the middle and upper classes.

### **Brussels in the 1990s and 2000s: Tour & Taxis as an opportunity zone**

In the urban context of present-day Brussels, the largely vacant 30 hectares of prime inner-city land at Tour & Taxis constitute a first-order 'opportunity zone' for profit-making in real estate. Moreover, this site is of particular importance for urban authorities as far as both the (re)development of the city's economic base and the social 'revitalization' of the urban core are concerned.

### ***Suburban developments in a spatially truncated metropolis***

Compared to most European countries, urban sprawl is rife in Belgium, with about one-third of the country's population living in suburban zones (Van der Haegen 1991). While suburbanization is rooted in a long-standing tradition of commuting in Belgium, this trend has been strongly reinforced since the Second World War as the spatial expression of Fordist economic growth in a context of loose spatial planning constraints (Kesteloot 2000). As a result, middle-class suburbanization has dominated urban growth in Belgium since the 1960s. Moreover, suburbanization has also become the main evolution trend for service activities since the mid 1980s (Colard and Vandermotten, 1996). This evolution is particularly striking in the case of Brussels, with the city's periphery gaining 110,000 new jobs (+42 per cent) between 1986 and 1997 while only 50,000 new jobs (+10 per cent) were created in the core city during the same period. Both in the core city and in the suburbs, the biggest jobs gains have been in business services (Van Hamme and Marissal 2000).

These suburban developments have a particular significance in Brussels, since the city is now a federated region on its own within the new federal configuration of Belgium, formally named 'Brussels Capital Region'. Actually, the boundaries of the Brussels Capital Region do not coincide with the existing spatial extension of the metropolitan area, rather they correspond to the extension of the core city (one million inhabitants). About 1.4 million inhabitants live in the rest of the metropolitan area (i.e. in Flemish or Walloon Brabant), among whom many of whom are daily commuters and city users. This truncation of the Brussels metropolitan area has been confirmed as a means of political pacification between the Dutch-speaking and French-speaking communities during the country's federalization process. Enlarging this territory is now a political taboo for the Flemish majority at national level since it would mean the conversion of part of Flanders (which has a significant French-speaking minority in the first-ring of suburban municipalities around Brussels) into an area with an officially bilingual status.

In this context, large pieces of vacant land located within the limits of the Brussels Capital Region have become highly strategic opportunities for economic

redevelopment purposes. They have been identified as 'Zones of Regional Interest' in the Brussels Regional Land Use Plan (see below). The Tour & Taxis area is one of them, and a very large and centrally located one at that.

### *The quest for urban 'revitalization'*

Moreover, massive suburbanization of the middle classes during post-war decades has left the Brussels Capital Region with a polarized socio-spatial structure. Brussels has developed into a divided city, with most of the skilled and affluent population favouring suburban residential areas and most of the low-qualified and the poor (i.e. elderly people, working-class immigrants, singles and one-parent families) being restricted to derelict nineteenth-century working-class inner-city neighbourhoods. This socio-spatial structure has a major influence on the region's budget structure since most of the fiscal capacity of the city is directly or indirectly linked to the size and wealth of its resident population (Lambert *et al.* 2000). Hence, middle-class commuters use the city's public services (e.g. hospitals, public transport, etc.) without paying for them since their tax payments are based on the region they live in, such as Flanders or Wallonia.<sup>2</sup>

This tight financial situation is a strong argument for implementing policies aimed at retaining – or bringing back – middle-class households to the city. This goal has become the main leitmotiv of the region's new politico-institutional elites – both right-wing and left-wing. It stresses notably the option of 'opening up' inner-city neighbourhoods in order to integrate them as possible living environments into the urban experiences of the middle classes. Hence, various urban renewal programmes have been implemented since the early 1990s, most of which focus on the production of new or renovated housing for the middle classes and rely on diverse – but still quite loose – public-private partnership structures. These trends in urban policies and planning have underpinned the development of various gentrification processes since the 1980s (Van Crieckingen and Decroly 2003). In this context, the Tour & Taxis area has become one of the target zones for urban revitalization purposes. Moreover, gentrification processes have been incipient in the neighbourhood since the early 1990s (Cornut *et al.* 2003).

### **Urban planning and governance in Brussels: the perpetuation of statutory planning frameworks**

One of the first legal achievements of the newly created Brussels Capital Region was the adoption of the Ordinance on the Organization of Urban Planning in 1991. This ordinance defines two levels of spatial planning – regional and municipal – and two types of plans – namely development plans and land-use plans. In addition, it establishes a basic hierarchical principle according to which land-use plans have to conform to development plans and municipal plans have to conform to regional ones (Table 6.2).

The Regional Development Plan is intended to be a strategic plan that provides answers to the main challenges faced by the Brussels Capital Region. However, it actually works as a mere framework for physical land-use planning only. The plan's main emphasis is on the protection of residential areas and on the enhancement of the 'quality of urban life' while it sets up a very defensive attitude towards further office development, fearing over-specialization of the Brussels economy in administrative functions and an ever-increasing pressure on the real-estate market to the detriment of housing (Vandermotten 1994). These restrictions on office development have been slightly reduced in the second Regional Development Plan, since the latter reflects a more economic-oriented right-wing urban project (see below).

This limited bearing of the Regional Development Plan reflects the perpetuation of a formalized statutory planning framework in Brussels, which is out of step with contemporary evolutions towards the adoption of more flexible project-based urban planning frameworks. This gap may be understood as the outcome of the combination of three main factors, that is 1) socio-political fragmentation at national, metropolitan and local level, 2) a strong reliance on the international public service sector as an 'automatic' engine for local economic growth, and 3) marks of past experiences involving large-scale urban projects. These elements are now outlined in turn below.

Table 6.2 Levels in urban planning in the Brussels Capital Region

	Scale	Planning typology	Legal impact	Validity term	Number and period
Regional Development Plan <sup>a</sup>	region	comprehensive socio-economic planning ('urban project')	binding upon public authorities	legislature (5 years)	first: 1995 second: 2002
Regional Land Use Plan <sup>b</sup>	region	land use	binding upon public authorities and citizens	no term	2001 (project: 1998)
Municipal Development Plan <sup>c</sup>	municipality	comprehensive socio-economic planning	binding upon public authorities	legislature (6 years)	only 1 in application <sup>e</sup>
Special Land Use Plan <sup>d</sup>	municipality (parts of territory)	land use	binding upon public authorities and citizens	no term	about 350 (since 1962)

Source: adapted from Vandermotten (1994) and Lagrou (2002)

a Plan Régional de Développement / Gewestelijke Ontwikkelingsplan

b Plan Régional d'Affectation du Sol / Gewestelijke Bestemmingsplan

c Plan Communal de Développement / Gemeentelijke Ontwikkelingsplan

d Plan Particulier d'Affectation du Sol / Bijzonder Bestemmingsplan

e The Brussels Capital Region is composed of 19 municipalities – most of the 18 other municipal development plans are still at early stages of conception

### ***Three levels of socio-political fragmentation***

First, Brussels remains an area which is highly contested by French-speaking and Dutch-speaking authorities, both of them implementing their own separate investment strategies in the city (e.g. in education, culture, etc.).<sup>3</sup> Actually, institutions of the Brussels Capital Region have largely been built in order to trace Belgian internal divisions between Dutch-speaking and French-speaking communities. As a result, the whole political scene of the city is divided into two parts, including two separate electoral colleges (respectively French-speaking and Dutch-speaking) and a majority has to be acquired in both of them in order to form a regional government. These conditions very much restrict local political debate to French/Flemish issues while the city's official bilingual status does not match its much broader cosmopolitan make-up (Kesteloot and Saeys 2002; Lagrou 2002).

Second, the above-mentioned confinement of the institutional Brussels Capital Region to the core part of the metropolitan area hinders the development of a metropolitan-wide urban vision. Since matters of urban planning are the exclusive competences of the regions, authorities face a host of metropolitan-wide cross-border issues (e.g. public transport networks, development of the airport) that are dealt with in the absence of any coordination between the three regional authorities. Actually, unlike in other European federal states (e.g. Germany), there is no coordinating or arbitral authority at federal level. Rather, consultation between the three Belgian regions regarding issues of urban planning mostly takes place at supra-national levels, that is within European or Benelux structures. In this context, coordination efforts at supra-regional level regarding cross-border issues continue to be very rare, single-purposed and very much constrained by Flemish or Walloon political agendas (e.g. regarding the planning of a metropolitan public transport network). Spatial competition rather than cooperation between the different parts of the metropolitan territory actually continues to be the order of the day (Vandermotten 2000; Kesteloot and Saeys 2002).

Third, rifts and fractures are also numerous in institutional frameworks at intra-urban level. On the one hand, mostly poor non-EU citizens only have a very weak political voice.<sup>4</sup> They compose, however, up to 25 per cent of the population in some inner-city municipalities. On the other hand, international elites are very weakly embedded in Brussels' local institutional and political frameworks. As Swyngedouw and Baeten (2001: 836) stated, '...the economic re-scaling of Brussels is not accompanied by a parallel institutional and political re-scaling ... While the key actors and drivers of Brussels' economy are international and global, the political and cultural elite actors are decidedly local and regional.' This hiatus is instrumental in keeping the EU-related and international-related economy in Brussels politically and socially 'out of joint' with most of the city's inhabitants. Furthermore, the urban experiences of most EU expatriates living in Brussels are spatially highly selective in character, with large parts of the urban fabric constituting a kind of 'terra incognita' as far as they are concerned (Cailliez 2004).

To summarize, these three dimensions of socio-political fragmentation have hindered the formation of a coalition able to build up an inclusive consensus on a strategic vision for Brussels as a cosmopolitan world city including the entire metropolitan area (Vandermotten 1994; Swyngedouw and Baeten 2001).

### ***The EU as an ‘automatic’ growth machine***

The presence of the EU and other international public bodies (e.g. NATO, WEU, Benelux, Eurocontrol) acts as the cornerstone of Brussels’ present-day high international visibility. Employment in the EU institutions, other international institutions and in EU-dependent (e.g. the international press, regional missions to the EU) and EU-related activities (e.g. international organizations, specialized law or consultancy firms) now corresponds to about 55,000, that is 8 per cent of the Brussels Capital Region’s labour market. Moreover, about 13 per cent of the city’s GDP is related to the EU economy and 10 per cent of the city’s office stock is occupied by EU institutions (Claes *et al.* 2001).

This exogenous development has been traditionally considered as an ‘automatic’ engine for local economic growth. As a corollary, strategic thinking on possible broader or alternative urban development strategies has remained substantially underdeveloped. Instead, a major emphasis in urban policies has been – and still is – on cashing in on the economic impact of Brussels’ role as political capital of the European Union. This has triggered the implementation of basically reactive, real-estate-based measures committed to accommodate the EU, other international institutions and whatever clients are attracted to Brussels because of the city’s international status (Vandermotten 2000).

### ***Past experiences of large-scale urban projects: traumatic destruction of the existing urban fabric and the emergence of a defensive urban agenda***

Since the late 1950s, Brussels’ urban fabric has been considerably restructured due to a series of large-scale, centrally managed schemes.<sup>5</sup> The most emblematic of these projects include the ‘Europeanization’ of the Leopold quarter on the eastern edge of the inner city (Baeten 2001), the development of a large modernist office district around the station in the north (named ‘the Manhattan project’) (Timmerman 1991) and the building of a high-speed train terminal with a large retail and office complex at South station (De Corte 1992).

These projects were not based on any real ‘urban growth coalition’ in the sense referred to by most contemporary social scientists who use this term (e.g. Strom 1996). Rather, they were designed and implemented by different kinds of alliances – or collusions – between real estate interests (i.e. real estate agents, property developers, speculators) and politicians of different government levels, from the municipal to the European. These projects were actually motivated first and foremost by existing real estate opportunities created by land availability and increasing demands for new office development in order to accommodate the ongoing development of the service sector in the city, especially the EU-related



international sector. They were generally very destructive for the existing urban fabric – especially with regard to housing – and often resulted in high waves of community protest and considerable delays. The economic recession of the 1970s led to the emergence of a host of local preservationist committees which opposed these traumatic experiences of urban redevelopment and the real-estate-led destruction of the historic urban fabric – then labelled ‘bruxellisation’. These community action groups have had a large influence on public opinion and have successfully brought about the implementation of more transparent and participative decision-making procedures (see below). Parallel to this, they have developed mostly defensive and preservationist agendas, putting a strong emphasis on the conservation of the traditional urban fabric and on the protection of the so-called ‘weak urban functions’ (i.e. housing, local shops, small-sized urban industries) as opposed to the development of large-scale projects, particularly office schemes. Since then, the most influential community action groups (e.g. IEB, ARAU, BRAL, La Fonderie<sup>6</sup>) have been largely institutionalized (e.g. the authorities paying for parts of their operation costs) and some of their leaders have been co-opted into political parties (Noël 1998).

### **Implementing large redevelopment projects in Tour & Taxis**

Whereas Brussels’ urban fabric has been heavily remodelled since the late 1950s by a series of highly contested urban (re)development projects, no comprehensive ‘growth coalition’ has ruled these waves of urban change. Multiple levels of socio-political fragmentation have hampered the formation of such a powerful elite coalition which shares a strategic vision for the metropolis, beyond laissez-faire attitudes aimed at cashing in the ongoing development of EU-related functions in the city. Moreover, traumatic experiences with these urban redevelopment schemes of the 1960s and 1970s consolidated a formalized and highly defensive statutory urban planning framework in the 1990s. These elements set the scene for a more detailed analysis of the failure of recent strategic large-scale area-based urban projects in the Tour & Taxis area. This section analyses in turn the two main projects which have been initiated on the site since the early 1990s, that is the Music City project and the Knowledge City project.

#### ***First attempt at closing the rent gap in Tour & Taxis: the Music City saga (1992–2001)***

From the early 1990s up to 2001, passionate debates on the elaboration of a large scheme named ‘Music City’ in Tour & Taxis has held most of the Brussels political, cultural and economic scene spellbound. The chaotic development of this large entertainment centre project – and its final failure – has been a lasting experience for its protagonists, many of them – both private-based and public and community-based – being the main actors involved in the later Knowledge City project.

The concept of Music City was officially launched in 1992 by a Belgian marketing and design company called Language of Forms. It aimed to build on part

of the Tour & Taxis site (9 hectares) a cluster of music-related and entertainment-related activities comprising a large concert hall (12,000 seats<sup>7</sup>), multiple recording studios, music shops and related high-quality offices, retail and hotel facilities. The total investment was expected to be about €75 million. Together with Language of Forms, which was in charge of the concept outline and the marketing of Music City, the main initial investors in the project were a transnational US entertainment company (Ogden Entertainment) which was in charge of the management of the concert hall, and a Toronto-based investment company with a large portfolio of prestigious office buildings in both North America and Europe (TrizecHahn), which was in charge of real-estate development. By the late 1990s, an Antwerp-based Belgian holding company (Ackermans & Van Haaren) joined the pool of investors, soon followed by a Brussels-based real-estate company (Robelco). Public authorities were not involved in the funding of the project, and its main political supporters favoured a private-led commercial development with very limited public investments (Ayari 2000; Corna Pellegrini 2000).

Since its early stages, the Music City project faced strong community opposition. Criticism mainly came from preservationist action groups (e.g. La Fonderie) and highlighted the project's destructive impact on a major heritage building on the site. Moreover, the fortress-like design of the project and its layout as an island of wealth and ostensible consumption in a deprived environment were heavily contested by associations of local residents who feared a *de facto* privatization of urban space in the neighbourhood. These action groups were quite successful in finding support in some – mostly left-wing – political elites who were in charge of parts of the legal procedure dedicated to the granting of building permits (see below). Despite the introduction of successive architectural visions and additional secondary instruments (e.g. the granting of €75,000 to a so-called 'social fund' for the neighbourhood), the promoters of Music City only managed to achieve very partial success in reducing community opposition regarding both issues of architectural heritage preservation and the integration of their project in its socio-spatial environment.

Successive building permits were granted or refused for these different architectural visions for about a decade (1993–2001). Legal procedures against the project, media interventions and lobbying campaigns by both local preservationist groups and international NGOs for conservation of the architectural heritage<sup>8</sup> have been very influential on this chaotic gestation. Moreover, divergences arose between political protagonists. On the one hand, most of the right-wing protagonists were unconditional supporters of the project, stressing the opportunity to catch an important private investment in an area severely hit by disinvestment. On the other hand, most left-wing protagonists were said to be supporters of the project under conditions of heritage preservation and positive social and environmental integration in the local neighbourhood. In addition, disagreements emerged between private investors too, with Language of Forms determinedly attached to its original concept – so far as to threaten the authorities of the Brussels Capital Region with the prospect of setting up Music City in the suburbs

– while Ackermans & Van Haaren was more prone to adapt it to meet some of the community and political requirements (Ayari 2000; Corna Pellegrini 2000). Finally, the Music City saga ended up in 2001 with the withdrawal of Language of Forms.

### ***The rise and fall of the Knowledge City (2002–2004)***

When the Music City project finally failed, a new redevelopment project for Tour & Taxis emerged in 2002. It conflated a real-estate project by private stakeholders and a public-led Knowledge City scheme.

#### *Private involvement: speculators with a social conscience?*

The Belgian National Railway Company (an autonomous public company still fully controlled by the federal government) and the Brussels Port Authority (since 1992, a para-public body under the authority of the Brussels Capital Region government) are the historic landowners in Tour & Taxis (Figure 6.3). In recent years, however, these public properties have been transferred under the control of private companies following strategies of land promotion on the real-estate market.

On the one hand, after years of negotiations, the property of the Brussels Port Authority (9 hectares) was sold under long lease (90 years) to Ackermans & Van Haaren and TrizecHahn in 1999 for about €12.5 million. When the latter left before the final collapse of the Music City project, the land became the sole property of Leasinvest, a one hundred per cent subsidiary of Ackermans & Van Haaren. Nevertheless, the Brussels Port Authority still owns a large piece of land (15 hectares) nearby for road logistics activities. On the other hand, in 1999, the Belgian National Railway Company signed a sale arrangement with Robelco for the remaining 21 hectares of the Tour & Taxis site. According to the terms of the sale arrangement, the full price of the land (about €33 million) will be due when Robelco gets all the necessary building permits and operating authorizations, with a time limit of seven years. Until then, Robelco holds ownership rights against payment of a yearly fee of – a mere – €150,000 to the Belgian National Railway Company.

In December 2001, Leasinvest and Robelco went into partnership to form 'Project T&T', a place-bound joint venture business that holds property rights to the entire Tour & Taxis site (30 hectares). Their involvement in the redevelopment of Tour & Taxis is part of a strategy of diversification of their assets, both companies being traditionally active in suburban high-quality office park schemes (e.g. in the Zaventem airport area).

In January 2003, Project T&T officially presented their vision for a new – possible – future for Tour & Taxis to the media. The investors' vision for Tour & Taxis was outlined in a master plan drawn up by HOK, a major American firm of architects with an extensive portfolio of large-scale urban development projects,<sup>9</sup> in association with Altiplan, a Brussels-based firm of architects. With

this partnership, Project T&T aimed to take advantage of an 'ideal combination of global expertise of mixed urban developments and knowledge of the local market'.<sup>10</sup>

In contrast with Music City, the new project encompasses the whole Tour & Taxis site for a total foreseen investment of about €250 million. First, it aims to renovate the heritage warehouses and former railway station and convert them into a mix of high-quality new office spaces, retail infrastructures, exhibition halls, a museum and entertainment infrastructures. Second, it aims to redevelop the remainder of the site – currently comprising mostly railway yards – into a mixed-use ensemble of new office spaces, new housing, hotel, exhibition and entertainment facilities, a congress centre and facilities for a 'Knowledge City' (see below) (Project T&T 2002). The whole project is intended to be highly 'flexible', that is, continuously (re-)adapted to the perceived changes on the real-estate market. As a manager of Project T&T stated, 'it is up to the market to decide whether we will include either more offices or more housing in the scheme' (author's contact, April 2004, translated).

On the other hand, Project T&T is actively promoting a new discursive construction on the redevelopment of Tour & Taxis. This new discourse is primarily directed at breaking with the adverse image left in the public opinion and the local community by the failure of the Music City project. Its leitmotivs are made clear in a 'Charter for the development of Tour & Taxis' that was presented by Project T&T together with the master plan. The charter includes a series of key themes: 'a balanced master plan' (i.e. balance between community expectations and profitability for the private investors), 'a true integration in the urban fabric' (e.g. in terms of accessibility to public transport), 'sustainable development' (i.e. flexible design and occupation), 'a diverse range of urban functions' (including high-quality public spaces) and 'an innovative architectural vision, focused on quality (with particular respect for our historical heritage'.<sup>11</sup> For those who still had the highly controversial experience of Music City in mind, these very much self-legitimizing arguments are designed precisely to appease their fears, and possible opposition. Moreover, between January and May 2002, Project T&T embarked on its own initiative on multiple sector-based round-table discussions with various interest groups ranging from key protagonists on the tourism and culture market to the media and associations of local inhabitants (Project T&T 2002). This strategy has not gone unnoticed in the media, even leading an observer to comment that 'Project T&T appears to be that rare thing – speculators with a social conscience' (Blyth 2003)!

#### *Public involvement: A 'Knowledge City' in Tour & Taxis?*

In a press conference in May 2004, the former Minister-President of the Brussels Capital Region, a member of the French-speaking liberal party (MR), emphatically stressed the Knowledge City as 'THE flagship project of the next ten years in Brussels ... [dedicated to the ambition of] making Brussels the capital of knowledge in Europe' (Simonet 2004, translated). The concept of Knowledge City was officially introduced 20 months earlier (September 2002) by the authorities of




Figure 6.3 Tour & Taxis: structure of landownership  
Source: own construct (M. Van Crieckingen)

the Brussels Capital Region as a key ingredient in the redevelopment of Tour & Taxis. In broad terms, this project ‘... aims to create an innovative European-scale scientific and economic centre in the Brussels Capital Region that would bring together some key actors of the knowledge economy, as stated by the Lisbon European summit declaration<sup>12</sup> and in coherence with the Regional Land Use Plan’ (Brussels Capital Region 2002: 3, our translation).

In essence, the Knowledge City project aimed to create a new cluster of scientific and technological activities that would bring together key protagonists in the production, diffusion and commercial exploitation of scientific and technological knowledge. The ambition of its promoters was to strengthen the competitive position of Brussels in the contemporary economy of knowledge by linking regional

economic and scientific potentials to transnational networks of capital and 'grey matter' (Brussels Capital Region 2002). The project was based on the assumption that the physical proximity between these key protagonists – notably between universities and enterprises – would enhance cross-fertilization benefits (Cornut *et al.* 2003). When the project was first introduced, explicit reference was made to the Adlershof project in Berlin as a case in point (see Chapter 5, this volume).

In addition, the Knowledge City project has been inspired by a diagnostic of existing weaknesses as far as the development of the economy of knowledge in Brussels is concerned (Conseil Economique et Social 2001). In this respect, the Brussels Capital Region has to face both structural weaknesses and a hard spatial competition from suburban areas. On the one hand, Brussels displays a contrasted profile in Europe as far as science and technology are concerned, with solid references in scientific and technological innovation (e.g. high level of education of the workforce, high level of investment in R&D) but a weak capacity to transform these assets into profitable economic activities. In fact, processes of innovation in Belgium are largely controlled by foreign-based transnational companies which tend not to transfer technology to the local market. These characteristics stress the need for more proactive policies in favour of local entrepreneurship in order to enhance the competitive position of Brussels within networks of the globalizing knowledge economy (Capron 2002). On the other hand, the mushrooming of brand new technology parks in the Brussels suburbs since the 1980s has infused a strong spatial competition between the three Belgian Regions, each of them being politically fully competent for science and technology matters (Cornut *et al.* 2003).

To fulfil these goals, the project intended to create a new campus at Tour & Taxis for about 4,500 students, around a new engineering sciences college that would break with the traditional French/Flemish division of education in Belgium and be attractive for a European-wide audience. In addition, the project foresaw the building of a large congress centre for international scientific congresses, a 'City of Science and Technology' (based on the model of La Villette in Paris), new facilities to accommodate high-tech enterprises – from local spin-offs to large international technology firms and a range of new office, housing (e.g. student houses) and retail facilities. The whole project was initially planned to be completed by 2007. Ironically enough, neither Project T&T, nor the government of the Brussels Capital Region have communicated any quantitative estimates of the total number of new jobs that would be created by their projects in Tour & Taxis. Nevertheless, a rough estimate of the possible future stock of jobs can be derived from figures of the total amount of new surfaces foreseen on the whole site, that is about 600,000 square metres dedicated to commercial use, mostly in office space. Using building norms for different uses (30 square metres by office job, 100 square metres by job in shops), the estimated total number of jobs is 11,000 for the whole site, most of these in relocated service activities. At the moment, about 600 people are employed on the site in business service firms which have taken offices in the renovated B warehouse (see Figure 6.3).

When introducing the Knowledge City project, the authorities of the Brussels Capital Region made a clear statement about the project funding: 'the objective is to look for diverse but *essentially private* funds and for support from the European Investment Bank (for the creation of the new high school for engineering sciences)' (Brussels Capital Region 2002: 14, our translation, original emphasis). Hence, the Knowledge City project was not intended to be funded by a large flow of local public money, except for parts of the planned public infrastructures on the site (i.e. public transport infrastructures and green spaces). Instead, investments were left to the private market (i.e. Project T&T and their future clients) while the city's authorities intended to cash in on indirect economic and social benefits of the project, i.e. tax returns, job creation, conservation and re-use of heritage buildings, etc.

This model of public involvement is quite atypical in comparison with most of the recent experiences of large-scale entrepreneurial schemes in Western cities (Swyngedouw *et al.* 2002). In the Brussels case it involves local public authorities not taking many financial risks in the speculative, real-estate-based redevelopment of the area. Instead, authorities in the Brussels Capital Region basically intend to frame the private-led process of real-estate promotion of urban land and to cash in on its assumed trickle-down benefits. In this context, crucial decision-making processes evolve around granting building and operating permits to the private developers.

### ***Complex procedures: Tour & Taxis as a 'Zone of Regional Interest'***

According to the 1991 Ordinance on the Organization of Urban Planning in the Brussels Capital Region, building permits are granted by municipalities under condition of approval by the region's authorities and have to conform to Special Land Use Plans. Moreover, the Regional Land Use Plan defines the site of Tour & Taxis as a 'Zone of Regional Interest' (ZRI n°6), that is, an urban node of strategic importance for the Brussels Capital Region with a high potential of (re)development. The planning of the ZRIs is directed by a statutory step-by-step procedure whose main protagonists are the regional government and the municipality where the ZRI is located (Table 6.3).

In essence, the procedure aims to make a Special Land Use Plan for the ZRI that has to transcribe the prescriptions made by the government into a dedicated decree. Community participation is ensured in thirty-day periods of public consultation during which every citizen may submit comments on the project to the municipal authorities. In addition, institutional protagonists give their opinions through a dedicated multi-actors consultation commission that brings together representatives from the municipality, the region and several single-purposed para-regional bodies.<sup>13</sup> The expected time period for the completion of the whole procedure is about three years.

The decree adopted by the government of the Brussels Capital Region in January 2003 for the ZRI 6 'Tour & Taxis' composes a framework that largely corresponded to the 'vision' of Project T&T for the area (i.e. the master plan)



Figure 6.4 Interior view of the renovated B warehouse

Source: photo Project T&T – Yvan Glavie

which was then articulated in the Knowledge City project. It imposed a series of constraints for the redevelopment of the site that de facto gave little freedom to the municipality for the design of the Special Land Use Plan. Amongst the main prescriptions of the decree were the definition of the stock of floor space – new or renovated – to be produced (i.e. about 600,000 square metres, including 140,000 square metres for the Knowledge City project), the definition of a large public green space (i.e. 3 hectares) and a host of details on issues such as the localization of the different activities on the site, the design of the new public spaces, the recycling of the heritage buildings and the connections with the adjacent neighbourhoods. The decree even gives indications for an alternative scenario in the event that the Knowledge City project does not come to an end (i.e. a 100,000 square metre unspecified mixed-use development scheme).

When transcribing these prescriptions into its first project of Special Land Use Plan, the municipality of Brussels achieved a total of 180,000 square metres new office space – excluding office space in the renovated warehouse buildings – and 75,000 square metres new housing (Figure 6.5).

***Governance frameworks and practices of decision-making: a tale of divergent political agendas and incomplete coalitions***

The municipality has a major responsibility within the procedure of the ZRI (i.e. to draw up the Special Land Use Plan) whereas its role is strictly controlled by



Table 6.3 Planning procedure of the Zones of Regional Interest (ZRI)

<i>authority in charge</i>	<i>planning stage</i>	<i>participation levels</i>
Government of the Brussels Capital Region	decree of the ZRI	
	↓	
Municipality	Special Land Use Plan – 1 <sup>st</sup> project	
	↓	public consultation (30 days) consultation commission
Steering Committee (named by the Government)	impact assessment	
	↓	
Municipality	Special Land Use Plan – 2 <sup>nd</sup> project	
	↓	public consultation (30 days) consultation commission
Municipality	Special Land Use Plan – final project	
	↓	
Government of the Brussels Capital Region	final approval of the Special Land Use plan	

Source: own construct, based on the Decree of the Brussels Capital Region of 9 January 2003 and on the Regional Land Use Plan

the regional authorities. Nevertheless, crucial decision-making processes may be hampered if divergences arise between municipal and regional strategies and visions. In this respect, divergent political agendas competed with each other during the period 2002–2004.

On the one hand, a right-wing programme has dominated at regional level since the launching of the Knowledge City project. It has been mainly epitomized by the leadership of the former Minister-President of the Brussels Capital Region – later defeated in the June 2004 elections. It was basically an economic growth-oriented programme with a major emphasis on the enhancement of urban competitiveness through the promotion of an improved labour market based on high-technology and advanced services. The Knowledge City project was designed to play an instrumental role in this agenda (Simonet 2004).

On the other hand, the municipality of Brussels has been ruled since 2000 by a centre-left coalition (Socialists, Greens and Centrists) whose political agenda particularly stresses the so-called ‘revitalization’ of inner-city districts. At municipal level, this agenda is implemented through a variety of programmes mostly directed at middle-income groups (e.g. conversion of former industrial buildings into loft dwellings) and the organization of various events aimed at turning the inner city

into an attractive and festive place for leisure and shopping. The Tour & Taxis area fits very well into this agenda of 'opening up' impoverished and physically decayed inner-city neighbourhoods to the middle classes. For instance, since 2003 the municipality of Brussels, together with the regional authorities and private partners, have organized the transformation of the section of the canal bank in front of Tour & Taxis into an urban beach during August.

To summarize, the overall political agenda for Tour & Taxis is two-sided, with an emphasis on economic growth and international competitiveness on the one hand, and on urban and social 'revitalization' on the other. Nevertheless, these divergences should not be interpreted as clear-cut ideological oppositions between different political protagonists. They instead consist of different priorities for an expected global redevelopment of the area which would integrate ingredients from both agendas. For instance, while advocates of the growth-oriented economic programme are more prone to encourage new office development in the inner city, supporters of the 'revitalization' agenda




Figure 6.5 Project of Special Land Use Plan (schematic representation)  
Source: own construct (M. Van Crieckingen)

regard new housing development as more of a priority. Finally, both visions stress the preservation of architectural heritage.

Until 2004, an alliance between the private investors and the right-wing component of the former regional government has taken the lead of the Tour & Taxis redevelopment project. This partnership has been joined by La Fonderie, an influential preservationist action group which was the most fierce community opponent to the Music City project during the 1990s and which has been attracted by the prospects of heritage preservation aspects being included in the current project. Moreover, the former regional government attempted to enlarge this partnership through the launching of a task force through which negotiations with the universities and the engineering high schools were engaged. Most of the latter were said to be supporters of the project unless they will be asked to provide their own funding or to merge entirely into a new single structure. Nevertheless, such evidence of exchanges of interests between stakeholders cannot be said to have led to the formation of a comprehensive growth coalition centred on the redevelopment of the Tour & Taxis area. Rather, it epitomizes a model of partial alliance articulated around a particular real-estate opportunity. Such a partial alliance is, however, fragile. The withdrawal of the Knowledge City project after the election of a new regional government in June 2004 proved it. One of the first achievements of the new – left-wing – government has been the abrogation of the existing decree of the ZRI, bringing the whole planning procedure for Tour & Taxis back to the starting point – except for the new office and retail spaces produced by Project T&T in the former warehouse buildings on the site.

### ***Local participation for a superficial democracy***

Experiences of large-scale strategic urban projects in Western cities have often been highly controversial in terms of disregard for local democracy and participatory mechanisms. In many cities, such projects have typically been used as vehicles to establish new urban policies and governance frameworks which are very much shaped by elite-driven priorities and wherein the interests of deprived social groups are marginalized (Ogden 1992; Swyngedouw *et al.* 2002). In Brussels, local democratic participation is ensured within the ZRI procedure through the mechanism of public consultation, that is, thirty-day periods during which citizens and community associations may submit criticisms and remarks to the municipal authorities. This mechanism is a legacy of former waves of community protest directed against very destructive office and infrastructure projects during the 1970s (Noël 1998).

However, a public consultation procedure like this basically enables the expression of defensive and partial positions leading to ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ attitudes. This was already very much the case during the Music City period, as successive public consultations had been instrumental in channelling opponents’ voices against the project (e.g. criticisms against the partial demolition of heritage buildings). Furthermore, a participatory framework like this does not allow for the emergence of any larger democratic debate about different possible

alternatives in the area since the public consultation period is kept very much downstream in the procedure, that is, far below the adoption by the regional government of the ZRI decree. Alternative projects that are periodically presented by various economic, cultural or political protagonists take different routes which are parallel to the ZRI procedure – with varying degrees of media attention. Among such projects presented since 2002 are a plan for a new European school (i.e. for the children of EU officials) and a project for a concert hall which would function as a venue for large musicals and other shows. Moreover, it is highly ironic that notable efforts designed to encourage the implementation of participatory mechanisms relating to the current redevelopment project in Tour & Taxis have been initiated by the private investors themselves – through a series of sector-based round-table discussions with various interest groups, most of whom were also possible future clients of Project T&T. However, Project T&T avoided engaging in any large-scale forums on the future of Tour & Taxis and in any debate on conflicting interests which might have led to possible alternatives.

To summarize, the implementation of a very formalized statutory planning framework for the redevelopment of the ZRI keeps local democracy at a superficial level, far downstream from the strategic orientations for the area (i.e. the decree) and without much power. Rather, it basically enables well-established community groups to express defensive positions while preventing the emergence of any alternative development path which could fit in more closely with the social needs of the local inhabitants – and beyond (e.g. education structures for the low-qualified, spaces for local entrepreneurs, public housing). Issues related to such alternatives are, notably, the competition for urban space in this part of the city between industrial activities (e.g. logistics activities related to the port providing blue-collar jobs) and new post-industrial service activities or anti-gentrification measures (e.g. new public housing).

## Conclusions

Brussels may at first sight surprise people if they are looking for the kind of large-scale entrepreneurial-style strategic urban project that has been such a feature in so many Western cities over the last twenty years. The absence of such projects is most critically exemplified in Tour & Taxis, now a 30-hectare piece of – mostly – vacant land in the inner city. This area, however, may be considered as a first-order opportunity zone in the Brussels metropolitan context, for economic redevelopment and urban ‘revitalization’ purposes as well as for real-estate profit-making strategies. On the one hand, Tour & Taxis is one of the largest pieces of vacant land inside the Brussels Capital Region, favourably located at a stone’s throw from the historic city centre, the central business district and the main location of the EU institutions. These conditions give to this zone a strategic importance if one considers the context of spatial competition between the Brussels Capital Region and its suburban fringes for new advanced tertiary activities, and if one considers the global economic performances of the

Brussels Capital Region. On the other hand, the possible 'revitalization' of the Tour & Taxis area fits in very well with a public-private agenda of 'opening up' inner-city neighbourhoods that were long excluded from the mental maps of the affluent population as possible new living environments for the middle classes. Finally, disinvestment since the early 1970s in the railway, custom and warehousing infrastructures in Tour & Taxis has produced a large rent gap that nowadays has an incontestable potential for generating high income through real-estate redevelopment.

However, the absence of any recent strategic project in Tour & Taxis – and in Brussels more generally – does not result from a lack of proposals as to how to redevelop the area. On the contrary, numerous projects have been proposed since the early 1990s but none of them reached any conclusion. One of the key reasons for this lack of achievement are specific conditions that shape the contemporary style of urban governance in Brussels. Socio-political fragmentation at national, metropolitan and intra-urban levels, the influence of the presence of the EU and other international institutions and highly traumatic experiences of 'bruxellisation' in the post-war decades have consolidated a formalized and defensive statutory planning framework. These conditions have, in turn, hampered the emergence of a negotiated comprehensive vision on the identity of Brussels, both as a metropolitan region extending far beyond its politico-institutional boundaries and as a European world city whose nature is definitely cosmopolitan. As a corollary, there is no integrative strategy of urban governance based on an inclusive consensus. As far as the redevelopment of disinvested urban areas is concerned, authorities of the Brussels Capital Region are rather restricted to private-led area-based initiatives – invariably motivated by prospects of profit-making through flexible real-estate development – and to cash in on assumed trickle-down benefits (e.g. heritage conservation, job creation). Highly relevant examples of this are the multiple instances of transfer of public properties to private companies in strategic 'opportunity zones' prior to any large public debate on the possible future of these zones. The transfer of state-owned land under private control in Tour & Taxis – in order to acquire cash money in the short term – is all but an exception in Brussels in recent years.

This particular type of articulation between private real-estate-led initiatives and public management set in a formalized statutory planning framework is very influential in Brussels. In the case of Tour & Taxis, it has resulted in an experience of highly contested development that lasted for most of the 1990s (i.e. Music City) and the failure of the Knowledge City project. The only achievement on the site has been the recycling of two heritage warehouses in a high-standing office complex and events space by a totally private actor, Project T&T, whose main objective has been to close (part of) the rent gap in Tour & Taxis. Moreover, community participation plays an important role in this articulation between private and public interventions, as epitomized by the efficient opposition to the Music City project by preservationist and local action groups. Actually, democratic participation mechanisms ensured by the statutory planning framework in use in Brussels enable well-organized groups of citizens to

express defensive or preservationist positions but hamper the emergence of any possible alternatives for neighbourhood redevelopment. Such a strategy would imply the setting-up of participative mechanisms to ensure a broader democratic debate during the very first phase of the redevelopment process, that is, before the involvement of private real-estate place entrepreneurs and the launching of the procedure of granting permits. Such conditions are necessary for the emergence of a democratic planning framework that could ensure people's empowerment through neighbourhood and urban redevelopment rather than strategies of place promotion invariably led by real-estate interests and elite priorities.

## Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to Pierre Cornut, Etienne Castiau, Marcel Roelandts, Moritz Lennert and Valerie Biot (IGEAT-ULB) for helpful remarks and suggestions.

## Notes

- 1 These people included a representative of Project T&T, the architect in charge of the design of the special land-use plan of the Tour & Taxis area, representatives of a local action committee and officials of the former Brussels Capital Region government (member of the former Minister-President's cabinet). The information collected through these contacts is not referred to explicitly in the subsequent pages but rather used as background information to the study.
- 2 Moreover, officials of the European institutions do not pay their income taxes locally – either to the Brussels Capital Region, or to the Belgian state – by virtue of intergovernmental agreements at European level.
- 3 Despite a deeply-rooted distrust of major cities in Flanders (Kesteloot and De Maesschalk 2001) the Flemish chose Brussels as their official capital. In contrast, the Walloons opted for Namur.
- 4 Those of them who have lived in Belgium for at least five years will be allowed to vote for the first time at the next municipal elections (in 2006).
- 5 Before the institutionalization of the Brussels Capital Region, Brussels' affairs were ruled by a minister within the national government.
- 6 IEB = Inter-Environnement Bruxelles, ARAU = Atelier de Recherche et d'Action Urbaines, BRAL = Brusselse Raad voor het Leefmilieu.
- 7 The largest existing concert hall in Brussels ('Forest National') has a capacity of 10,000 seats.
- 8 This lobbying activity has resulted in propositions by international organisations (e.g. ICOMOS – International Council on Monuments and Sites) to include the buildings of Tour & Taxis on the UNESCO World Heritage List.
- 9 E.g. the Dubai marina, the headquarters of Levi Strauss in San Francisco, the new waterfront passenger terminal in Amsterdam (see: [www.hok.com](http://www.hok.com)).
- 10 Website of Project T&T, [www.tour-taxis.com](http://www.tour-taxis.com), accessed April 2004.
- 11 Website of Project T&T, [www.tour-taxis.com](http://www.tour-taxis.com), accessed April 2004.
- 12 'Towards a Europe of Innovation and Knowledge': declaration of the Lisbon Special European Council (23 and 24 March 2000). Its stated objective is to make Europe the world's most competitive and dynamic economy.
- 13 I.e. the Institut Bruxellois pour la Gestion de l'Environnement (IBGE) for environmental issues, the Commission Royale des Monuments et des Sites (CRMS) for issues on architectural heritage and the Société de Développement pour la Région de Bruxelles (SDRB) for urban renewal issues.

## References

- Ayari, I. (2000) 'Enjeux socio-politiques de la réhabilitation du patrimoine: le cas de Music City', unpublished MSc dissertation, Université Libre de Bruxelles.
- Baeten, G. (2001) 'The Europeanization of Brussels and the urbanization of "Europe": hybridizing the city, empowerment and disempowerment in the EU district', *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 8, 2: 117–130.
- Blyth, D. (2003) 'Tour & Taxis takes off', *The Bulletin*, February 6: 14.
- Brussels Capital Region (2002) *Tour & Taxis Cité de la Connaissance – Wijk van de Kennis – Knowledge City*, promotion material, Brussels.
- Caillez, J. (2004) *Schuman-City. Des fonctionnaires britanniques à Bruxelles: entre enclave et intégration*, Louvain-La-Neuve: Academia Bruylant.
- Capron, H. (2002) 'La transition vers l'économie de la connaissance: potentialités de croissance et régions apprenantes', in Services fédéraux des affaires scientifiques, techniques et culturelles (ed.) *Rapport Belge en matière de science, technologie et innovation* (tome 2), Brussels.
- Claes, A., Thienpont, I. and Christiaens, E. (2001) *Synthèse impact socio-économique, research report*, Brussels: Iris Consulting.
- Clerbaux, P. and Vroman, P. (2002) 'Poids socio-économique des entreprises implantées sur le site du Port de Bruxelles', in ORBEM (ed.) *Observatoire bruxellois du marché du travail et des qualifications*, Brussels.
- Colard, A. and Vandermotten, C. (1996) 'La périurbanisation de l'emploi dans les zones métropolitaines belges', *Revue Belge de Géographie*, 60, 1: 33–40.
- Conseil Economique et Social (2001) *Bruxelles métropole*, Brussels: Brussels Capital Region.
- Corna Pellegrini, C. (2000) 'Le projet de Music City dans la reconversion du site de Tour et Taxis', unpublished MSc dissertation, Université Libre de Bruxelles.
- Cornut, P., Castiau, E., Roelandts, M. and Van Crieelingen, M. (2003) 'Réaffectation urbaine et développement socio-économique. Le projet "Cité de la Science et de la Connaissance" sur le site de Tour et Taxis à Bruxelles', *Belgeo – Belgian Journal of Geography*, 4: 425–442.
- De Corte, S. (1992) 'Pokerspel rond een station. De komst van de Hoge Snelheids Trein in Brussel', *Planologisch Nieuws*, 12: 129–144.
- Harvey, D. (1989) 'From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: the transformation in urban governance in late capitalism', *Geografiska annaler*, 71b, 1: 3–17.
- Kesteloot, C. (2000) 'Brussels: postfordist polarisation in a fordist spatial canvass', in P. Marcuse and R. van Kempen (eds) *Globalizing cities: a new spatial order?* Oxford: Blackwell, 186–210.
- Kesteloot, C. and De Maesschalk, F. (2001) 'Anti-urbanism in Flanders. The political and social consequences of a spatial class struggle strategy', *Belgeo–Belgian Journal of Geography*, 1/2: 41–62.
- Kesteloot, C. and Saey, P. (2002) 'Brussels, a truncated metropolis', *GeoJournal*, 58, 1: 53–63.
- Lagrou, E. (2002) 'Brussels: A surimposition of social, cultural and spatial layers' in A. Kreukels, W. Salet and A. Thornley (eds) *Metropolitan Governance and Spatial Planning: Comparative Case Studies of European City-regions*, London: Spon Press, 301–319.

- Lambert, J.-P., Tulkens, H. and Cattoir, P. (2000) 'Le financement de Bruxelles : enjeux et voies possibles', *Reflets et Perspectives de la vie économique*, 2: 1–15.
- Moulaert, F., Rodriguez, A. and Swyngedouw, E. (eds) (2003) *The Globalized City*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Noël, F. (1998) *La ville rapiécée. Les stratégies de la réhabilitation à Bruxelles*, Brussels: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles.
- Ogden, P. (eds) (1992) *London Docklands: The Challenge of Development*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Project T&T (2002) 'Tour & Taxis – Implantation et philosophie générale', unpublished document, Brussels.
- Simonet, J. (2004) *Tour & Taxis Cité de la Connaissance*, press conference, May 24, Brussels.
- Strom, E. (1996) 'In search of the growth coalition: America urban theories and the redevelopment of Berlin', *Urban Affairs Review*, 31, 4: 455–481.
- Swyngedouw, E., Moulaert, F. and Rodriguez, A. (2002) 'Neoliberal urbanization in Europe: large-scale urban development projects and the new urban policy', *Antipode*, 34, 3: 544–577.
- Swyngedouw, E. and Baeten, G. (2001) 'Scaling the city: the political economy of "glocal" development – Brussels' conundrum', *European Planning Studies*, 9, 7: 827–849.
- Timmerman, G. (1991) *Main basse sur Bruxelles, argent, pouvoir et béton*, Antwerp: EPO.
- Valente, P. (1998) 'Bruxelles – Tour et Taxis ou la nécessité d'une gare de marchandises', *Les cahiers de la Fonderie*, 24: 75–82.
- Van der Haegen, H. (1991) 'Les franges périurbaines, quelques éléments de recherche concernant leur délimitation, leur population et leurs caractéristiques sociales', *Espace, Populations, Sociétés*, 2: 249–256.
- Vandermotten, C. (1994) 'Le plan régional de développement de la région de Bruxelles-Capitale', in C. Vandermotten (ed.) *Planification et stratégies de développement dans les capitales européennes*, Brussels: Editions de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles, 195–205.
- Vandermotten, C. (2000) 'Le positionnement des trois régions dans le contexte européen', paper presented at the seminar *Bruxelles au centre d'une communauté d'intérêts socio-économiques*, 22 June, Brussels.
- Van Criekingen, M. and Decroly, J.-M. (2003) 'Revisiting the diversity of gentrification: neighbourhood renewal processes in Brussels and Montreal', *Urban Studies*, 40, 12: 2451–2468.
- Van Hamme, G. and Marissal, P. (2000) *Les causes de la faible croissance économique de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale*, research report for the Brussels Capital Region, Brussels: IGEAT-ULB.



## 7 Copenhagen Ørestad

### Public partnership in search of the market

*Stan Majoor and John Jørgensen*

#### Introduction

Ørestad is a major urban development scheme in Copenhagen (København). It is centrally located on the island of Amager – between the old city centre and Copenhagen's international airport. The idea has been to establish a 'city annex', to attract national and international investors. Beside its central location the area owes its attractiveness to its high accessibility by different means of transportation, from all parts of the Øresund region, and its location right next to a major green area. The actual building process of this 3.1 million square metres development started at the end of the 1990s and is expected to take about 35 years.

The Ørestad development project resembles other major European projects in the sense that it is part of an entrepreneurial strategy through which the city and the region aim to improve their position in the competition for international investments. However, it is certainly also affected by the local institutional context in which it was envisaged. Amongst its most distinctive features are:

- political involvement of national government: the development project was decided upon in the Danish parliament and is executed via a publicly controlled development corporation;
- major investments in public transportation predates – and facilitates – the development of the area;
- the development corporation operates on markets terms while the state guarantees the loans covering the development costs;
- the development follows a master plan that envisions a high density and mixed-use environment consisting of office development, housing, major (public) facilities and green space. The master plan is adopted in the Municipal Plan.

Although plans were made for the western part of the island of Amager in the 1960s, the first plans for the Ørestad development in the form that is actually materializing were made at the end of the 1980s. In this chapter we first analyse the development of the project in a wider framework of governance change in

Denmark during the last decades. Ørestad can be seen as a clear marker and product of a change towards a more developmental urban development policy and polity. In the following three sections we analyse the initiation of the project and the master plan. In the second part of the chapter we analyse the decision-making process.<sup>1</sup>

### **From 'welfare planning' to 'entrepreneurialism' in the Copenhagen region**

In many respects, the history of spatial planning in Copenhagen is a typical tale of a Scandinavian metropolis. As part of the welfare-state philosophy, the public sector had, especially after the Second World War, an important influence the city's spatial development through planning measures and through large public investments in infrastructure and housing. Interestingly enough, at the start of the 1990s, a quite abrupt change of policy led to the embracement of a stronger entrepreneurial philosophy which also affected spatial planning and development (Thor Andersen and Jørgensen 1995). The Ørestad project can be seen as one of the prime examples of this new policy direction. To understand this change, we have to recognize some socio-economic, political and spatial developments that took place in the previous decades.

From a spatial perspective, the expansion of Copenhagen from 1940 to 1980 took place particularly in the rural areas adjacent to the municipality. The spatial framework for this expansion was formed by the famous 1947 'Fingerplan' (officially named 'Skitseforslag til egnsplan for Storkøbenhavn') which presented a clear philosophy of controlled suburbanization in radial corridors around several infrastructure corridors that were connected to central Copenhagen with a rail system (Egnsplankontoret 1947). In these four decades approximately 240,000 new housing units were constructed. The dwellings predominately attracted young households, which then moved out of the small low-quality apartments in the city (Thor Andersen and Jørgensen 1995). In this process of controlled suburbanization the Fingerplan has acted as a *Leitbild* for the regional plans that have been produced ever since. However, this meant that the island of Amager has been somewhat overlooked, in a reflection of the fact that the plan largely neglected the 'palm' area of the hand (see also the intermezzo on Amager). As a result, commuter trains were constructed to facilitate the 'fingers', while for example the 100,000 citizens on the island of Amager in the palm of the hand were reliant on buses which could only cross the water separating the island of Amager from the city centre at two locations.

This spatial movement of households to the suburbs had immense economic and financial consequences for the municipality of Copenhagen because the tax base eroded. The Danish state has a decentralized financial system, which means that local governments are heavily dependent on income from taxation on their premises to balance their budgets. Although a complicated system of compensation exists between the city of Copenhagen and its more prosperous suburbs, during the 1970s and 1980s the financial situation of the city worsened. A net

loss of wealthy inhabitants meant that the city of Copenhagen had to counteract increasing social needs with decreasing taxable incomes (Thor Andersen and Jørgensen 1995).

In this rapidly growing, but politically fragmented, metropolitan area, the need for metropolitan governance arose not only in order to professionalize the welfare state but also to ensure the coordination of tasks relating to transportation and physical planning. However, the nationwide reform of local authorities, which was decided upon in the beginning of the 1970s, did not take account of the metropolitan conditions of the Copenhagen region. In order to compensate for this, a relatively strong regional body, the Greater Copenhagen Council (GCC), was set up in 1974. The main tasks of this council were planning, hospital services, public transport and secondary schools. The council was regarded as a fourth tier of government, with indirectly elected politicians, a governance setting which is unique in the country. However, the GCC was abolished in 1989, in an attempt by the national government to simplify decision-making and reduce the number of local governmental officers (Thor Andersen *et al.* 2002).

The problematic relationship between the city government and the Danish state is a recurring theme in the 1970s and most of the 1980s. While the city faced a decline in population, employment and investments in the 1980s, direct support from the national government was limited. As a matter of fact, the city of Copenhagen had to borrow money from the state to counteract its rising budget deficits. From the late 1980s onwards, with a view to breaking the impasse of decline and growing budget deficits and debts, the national government, which was then dominated by a liberal-conservative coalition, urged Copenhagen to initiate a metropolitan growth strategy. This was an important strategic decision. In the political scene of Copenhagen this coincided with the adoption of a more pragmatic orientation of the dominant social democratic party, which became less committed to the classical values of the welfare city (Andersen 2002).

In this situation of depopulation, deindustrialization and a financially strained city government, two main decisions were made by the national government. The first was to study the opportunities for the redevelopment of the Copenhagen harbour, once a leading port in the Baltic region but now a large area of obsolete structures and wasteland in the middle of the city, and the second was to set up a committee to discuss the current state of the city and to suggest key actions that could generate new prosperity (Thor Andersen *et al.* 2002). Both actions were heavily linked and inspired by some important geopolitical changes at the end of the 1980s. Because of the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the application by Sweden and Finland for membership of the EU, the geopolitical position of Copenhagen suddenly changed from peripheral to central – at least in a Nordic context. The discussions that followed the two initiatives marked a change in the political attitude towards the Capital region. A proactive growth-oriented policy style was adopted, aimed at improving the competitive position of Copenhagen vis-à-vis other metropolitan areas in Europe (Lund Hansen *et al.* 2001). As a whole this meant, 'a shift away from the former dominant orientation in Danish regional policy, which had emphasized

on interregional equalisation, and hence disfavoured the Capital in the ongoing struggles over public infrastructure and other investments' (Andersen and Hovgård 2003: 39). Hence, the road was paved for two major decisions, which the Danish Parliament passed within a few years, namely the decision to build a fixed link between Copenhagen and its neighbouring Swedish city Malmö, and the decision to establish the Ørestad.

### Initiation of the Ørestad project

Within this new political, economic and planning context, the first ideas for the Ørestad project were proposed in around 1990. Interestingly enough, but maybe not surprisingly in the Copenhagen context, the proposal turned out to reflect both entrepreneurial and social-welfare aspects. The decision, at the end of the 1980s, to close Copenhagen's naval harbour and move the activities to Jutland, which meant a loss of several thousand jobs, increased the need to implement activities designed to revitalize the city's economy and improve its financial position. A small group of people that had expressed views on Copenhagen in the past formed a committee (Würtzen Committee) which was asked to come up with proposals to be presented in the parliament. The recommendations of the group were discussed in parliament in 1990 and mainly included infrastructure investments (new rail links, new highways and expansion of the airport), since the general belief was that Copenhagen had suffered from long-term investments in infrastructure. The recommendations of this committee proved to be an important stepping-stone along the route that eventually led to the decision to establish the Ørestad, as another commission was assigned the task of more precisely defining these infrastructure investments and, maybe more importantly, of finding means and methods of financing. The latter was a much-politicized issue. Not only did Denmark as a state face huge debts at that time which could hamper financial integration into the European Monetary Union, history had shown that it was always very difficult to get approval for infrastructure investments in the Copenhagen area in the national parliament.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, as was already pointed out, the weak financial situation of the city government itself prevented it from taking any substantial initiatives.

The philosophy and rationale of the Ørestad project was also determined by a group of initiators consisting of some of the members of the committee, and local and national politicians, and retrospectively the *raison d'être* can be summarized in two points (several interviewees):

- the Ørestad development was seen as a possible opportunity to finance a new high-quality public transport system that would not only serve Ørestad but the whole city and provide an additional connection to the airport. The development of a mixed programme of approximately 3.1 million square metres on a 5 kilometre strip of empty parcels on Amager (310 hectares), that were jointly owned by city and state, would create sufficient revenues to eventually pay back the construction costs for this new form of public transport. A state-local




Figure 7.1 Location of the Ørestad project in the Copenhagen agglomeration  
Source: UvA-Kaartenmakers

development corporation would operate this controlled land speculation. It would obtain cheap bonds, construct the necessary infrastructure and plan and operate the development process for the area;

- the Ørestad project would do more than provide an innovative way of financing new infrastructure. It would give Copenhagen's economy a boost by creating a new area for international businesses, high-end research, and quality housing and help cultural institutions to capitalize on new economic possibilities thanks to the changed geopolitical context of Copenhagen. Since the historic city centre was seen as unable to accommodate these new investments physically, a new central location was needed. It was expected that the strategic location of Ørestad, which was close to the city centre, the airport and the new bridge to Sweden, would make this site the most appealing site for international investors.

The initiators were inspired by the English new town development concept, in which a public development agency leads the development. By setting up such a special public development agency that would obtain cheap bonds, the development could be omitted from the public budget.

When the proposal for an Act on Ørestad, based on these initial ideas, was presented to the parliament, the government and other proponents indeed promised to 'finance the project without using taxpayers' money', or as a 'self-financing project'. This would also prevent the political need to make compensatory investments in the rest of the country. Although presented as a major innovation, a rather similar solution had previously been used for the Great Belt bridge (and later for the Øresund bridge).<sup>3</sup>

Furthermore, the proposal for a Ørestad development project was seen as a political solution to creating a new partnership between levels of government that were at odds with each other. At state level there was a conservative-liberal coalition whose agenda involved adopting a more market-oriented form of urban development. Although it was not the first ideological preference of the social democrats – who had a majority on Copenhagen City Council – this solution was acceptable for pragmatic reasons since it was expected to foster development, increase employment and improve the city's tax base.<sup>4</sup> This strong alliance between state and city has been the political backbone of the project ever since its initiation and has survived various government changes both at national and city level.

Eventually, in June 1992, the 'Act on Ørestad' was passed by parliament. This was the first Act of Parliament in thirty years which presupposed state involvement in a major new urban development.<sup>5</sup> According to the Act, a development corporation, Ørestadsselskabet I/S (Ørestad Development Corporation), to be co-owned by the city of Copenhagen (55 per cent) and the Ministry of Finance (45 per cent), was going to develop 'Ørestad' on an area which likewise was to be co-owned by the two parties. Within the realm of Danish urban development, it represented an organizational innovation. The Act gave the Ørestad Development Corporation the power to plan the area, provide the required land improvements and infrastructure and to plan, develop and operate a new public transport system in the area and the rest of Copenhagen. This eventually became a fully-automated mini-metro system, which runs on an elevated track through the Ørestad. The capacity to invest in the mini-metro has been assured by allowing the Ørestad Development Corporation to obtain loans on the international financial markets.<sup>6</sup> In other words, by improving the accessibility of the area, the price of the building sites would rise, and the development corporation would then be able to pay back the loans. Along with the organizational innovation, this represents a financial innovation in Danish urban development schemes.

Most opposition came from the social democrats who opposed the speculative character of the plan. Another issue that was important in the discussion was the relationship with nature preservation in the area (see next section). It was eventually decided that, during the master planning process that would follow the decision, environmental concerns would be taken into account as much as possible. However, due to the law, the special status of the project bypassed most of the traditional forms of public and civic deliberations that are part of the Danish planning system. Some of the most important Danish urban planning professors criticized the liberalization of planning symbolized by the Ørestad project.<sup>7</sup> They

warned that this project-oriented approach, in a situation in which the Greater Copenhagen Council had already been abolished, would result in a fragmented spatial development of the region if it were to take place without an overall strategic framework that prioritizes locations.

### **Intermezzo: Amager, the strategic repositioning of a forgotten part of Copenhagen**

The famous 1947 regional plan, which covered a huge area of 3,000 square kilometres and a housing programme to accommodate up to one million inhabitants, left the partly artificial island of Amager, located on the south-east side of the historic city centre, largely untouched. Most new urban developments were planned to the west of Copenhagen, although some planning schemes were drawn up in the 1970s for a programme of 25,000 houses on Amager. These plans were never implemented. This was mainly due to the poor infrastructure connections between the island and the rest of the metropolitan area, since all the traffic would need to cross the two small harbour bridges and find its way through the historic centre.

While the east part of Amager is mostly urbanized, including the separate town of Tårnby, the west part was, for a long time, almost untouched. This part of Amager is reclaimed land and, during the Second World War, was filled as part of a forced-labour programme which prevented Danish workers going to Germany. After the war the Danish Army used this area for target practice.

From a planning perspective, the zoning of the area was rather peculiar. The western part, the actual infill part, was zoned as a rural area, while the part with most environmental value, namely the former coastline area close to the existing built-up area, was zoned for urban uses. The growing environmental awareness during the 1970s led the Danish society for the conservation of nature (Danmarks Naturfredningsforening) to start a process to get a nature conservation status for the whole area in 1974. This would prevent any future development. The public authorities opposed this status since they claimed to have long-term development plans for the area which would be frustrated by this new status. The preservation case, which was decided in court, was then halted.

During the 1980s, a new comprehensive planning effort for the western part of Amager started, which included a large number of stakeholders. A commission was formed to come up with new plans for the area, after the military had moved out. After two years of thinking and negotiating, a new zoning ordinance was agreed on that would protect the largest part of the area, but which also permitted some development activities in the form of a linear north-south strip on the eastern fringe of the new area. While the protection of the former military site was safeguarded by an official preservation easement, the protection of the most valuable environmental parts, the former coastline close to existing built-up areas, was protected by regional planning guidelines. This was, at that time, a considerable theoretical difference, since the area was not under any development pressure.

Most parties involved were happy with this compromise since it allowed some development while also protecting up to 90 per cent of the area, including many of the most sensitive environmental parts. A protocol was drawn up which was signed in an official setting by the national government, the city of Copenhagen, the Copenhagen regional council and the Danish society for the conservation of nature. Since, at that time, there was not much prospect for development, it looked as if the western part of Amager would stay untouched for a longer period.

However, due to external reasons mentioned before, this somewhat forgotten 'finger' of Denmark's capital became an attractive development site at the end of the 1980s since it was the most natural starting point for the bridge to Malmö. Given the additional presence of Copenhagen's expanding Kastrup international airport at Amager, the ideas on the potential of this area were strongly reframed during a turn towards a more metropolitan development approach.

When the first proposals for the Ørestad development, which were to cover large parts of the 'protected' area, were leaked to the press, the environmental groups felt as if they had been caught unawares (Paludan 2000). The plan for Ørestad partly coincided with the areas zoned as urban areas, but it also covered areas that – the environmental groups thought – were under protection thanks to regional planning guidelines. This compromise was suddenly forgotten, and the environmental groups quickly started a procedure to achieve an official conservation status via the preservation court. This request was submitted directly by the national government. Then the new Ørestad Act stated that all pending court cases would be invalid, and overruled the whole case leaving the environmental groups stunned. According to the former chairman of the Danish society for the conservation of nature: 'It was all very ugly, this is not the normal way administration is done in this country. This is actually the ugliest I know.'<sup>8</sup>

## The Ørestad master plan

After the basic layout of the project was agreed upon by parliament in 1992, a competition for a master plan for the area was launched. The development of Ørestad would take place according to a linear north–south shape alongside the new high-quality public transport system that would connect the area with the inner city of Copenhagen. The area was to be a long rectangle with a width of 600 metres and 5 kilometres in length (indeed it was dubbed 'the tie' for that very reason). It includes the existing Bella Centre, Copenhagen's large congress and exhibition facility. A development potential of 3.1 million square metres was foreseen, with an emphasis on offices (60 per cent). The rest would be a mixture of housing, public institutions such as universities and medical facilities, retail and entertainment.

One of the first important decisions that had to be taken was on the type of public transportation, since the Act governing Ørestad left this question open to be decided by the Ørestad Development Corporation. This decision had spatial and economic impacts far beyond the project area itself, since most parts of the system would be operating outside the project area. After a long (internal) process of studying and decision-making, a preference was expressed for an





Figure 7.2 Map of current development parcels in the Ørestad project  
Source: Ørestadsselskabet, 2006

innovative driverless mini-metro system. Compared to other alternatives that were studied – especially trams – this solution was more expensive to build but it was expected that this would be compensated by higher revenues from ticket sales. On top of that, the mini-metro system was expected to be safer because, by not interfering with street level traffic, it would be able to run at a very high frequency and, what was especially important for the Ørestad area, it would help to create a modern, twenty-first century image.<sup>9</sup>

The Finnish team of ARKKI that won the master plan competition in 1995 proposed the alignment of the metro on the eastern fringe of the area. This would ensure that one of the most precious natural areas would remain largely untouched. This compromise partly satisfied the nature conservation groups that strongly opposed the project in the initial phase (see previous section). Development would be concentrated around the six future stations and would start in two areas: 1) in the north around the Islands Brygge and Universitetet metro stations where a mixed area was foreseen with an emphasis on university institutions and housing, and 2) the so-called Ørestad-centre area where the metro now crosses other infrastructure lines (highway and train) in the direction of the airport and the bridge to Malmö. The latter area was foreseen as a prime location for international businesses.

### **First development stages**

Actual building developments have been taking place in the Ørestad area since 1999. We will now briefly examine three major issues that featured in the first development stage before drawing more general conclusions in the next section: 1) the change towards a more mixed use programme, 2) the development of the Fields shopping centre, and 3) the cost overruns for the mini-metro and reorganization of the Ørestad Development Corporation.

#### ***A change of spatial concept: from office development to a more mixed-use spatial programme***

While, initially, the area was designated to become a top location for international businesses and other related economic activities, this programmatic goal was modified somewhat during the first years of development and became focused on a more mixed environment. The original goal of about 80–90 per cent office development was changed into a 60:20:20 proportion of offices, housing and facilities in the master plan. The first development period 1999–2006 (Table 7.1) suggests that this proportion may have been geared even more towards housing development, since office construction in the first years was disappointingly low.

The reasons for this change are threefold. First, and most importantly, the project suffered from a lack of private investments in office construction. This was not primarily due to economic reasons – although Copenhagen did also suffer from a post 9/11 economic recession – but mainly due to fierce competition from other prestigious areas, especially Copenhagen's harbour front. This area became

*Table 7.1* Overview of first development stages (1.175 million square metres sold for development out of 3.1 million square metres, as of 1 February 2006)

<i>Land use</i>	<i>Development (in % of sold areas)</i>
Offices	29%
Housing	42%
Facilities	29%*

\* of which the 146,000m<sup>2</sup> Field's shopping mall is a major part

Source: Ørestadsselskabet, 2006.

available for development after most navy and other economic activities left (Desfor and Jørgensen 2004). During the past decade, its attractive quayside locations were developed to accommodate a variety of office ventures which were expected to be located in Ørestad. The development of the Copenhagen harbour forms an interesting contrast with the Ørestad development. While the latter is a very comprehensive planning scheme, managed by a public authority, that strives to integrate development with public transport improvements, the former is being developed in a more haphazard, parcel-by-parcel way with, to date, no provision for new public transportation. Most of the development in the central part of the harbour has been carried out by the Danish state since it owns most parcels in that section of the harbour. Ironically, it is also a shareholder (45 per cent) in the Ørestad Development Corporation. However, the city government of Copenhagen is also strongly involved in the waterfront development since it owns some parcels and holds the final responsibility for zoning issues and planning permissions in the whole area.

Since the development corporation is obviously heavily dependent on annual sales of land to finance its bonds, it was necessary to change the strategy and speed up the non-office parts of the plans to keep performing financially. In the first development period, the national government was instrumental in persuading (and partly subsidizing) some (government) institutions to be located in the Ørestad area. The university district not only consists of a large cluster of educational facilities, but is also home to the new headquarters of the Danish national television and radio. Attempts to also relocate the national archives to this area failed. Although the establishment of these institutions is not contrary to the philosophy of the development, which provides excellent spatial location factors for these large-scale (public) facilities, the forced character of their move reflects the urgency associated with coping with the financial difficulties of the project at this early stage.

A second reason for a switch towards a more mixed programme comes from the current boom in the Copenhagen private housing market after a period in which government involvement was scaled down. There is considerable demand for housing in almost every segment of the market and this makes it a more profitable investment for developers than before. This has resulted in pressure from

project developers in Ørestad to speed up the housing parts of the project, and has increased the land prices of housing plots vis-à-vis office areas. In the autumn of 2005, a local plan for the southernmost part of the 'tie' was prepared. In this area, the plan is to develop 5,000 units and social institutions. By the end of year 2005, 40 per cent of Ørestad Syd had been sold to developers and the CEO of the development corporation foresees completion of this area within 10 to 15 years – faster than most critics would have thought possible (Agger 2005).


Third, a larger housing programme was not only satisfactory from a business point of view since a more even proportion of spatial uses fitted in well with a policy of mixed uses that started to be pursued in Denmark. The conviction that more mixed uses would eventually lead to a more attractive area came to be supported by the Ørestad Development Corporation, though pragmatic (financial) reasons could have been part of the reason. In any case, the more mixed programme has definitely helped improve the project's public image.

### *Development of the Fields shopping centre*

One of the developments in Ørestad that received most attention was the large Fields shopping centre, opened on 9 March 2004 and consisting of 150 shops, restaurants and leisure facilities. It was advertised as being the largest shopping mall in Scandinavia (146,000 square metres) and occupies one of the most prominent and central parcels of the project, next to the Ørestad station – the interchange station between metro and regular trains – and is visible from the highway leading to the airport and Malmö. The strategy of its investors was clearly to capitalize on this highly accessible location by also attracting Swedish customers.<sup>10</sup> In the near future, Fields is to be expanded as part of a 51,000 square metre programme consisting of a multiplex cinema, a hotel and offices.

Both its planning process and its eventual spatial concept and constructed shape have generated fierce criticism which reflect the difficult position the development corporation is in as regards implementing its spatial goals for the area when it is involved in actual negotiations with private investors.

For a long time, a moratorium on out-of-town shopping mall construction – to protect inner city shopping areas – was included in the Danish planning guideline, which then prevented large-scale retail developments from taking place in Ørestad. However, due to the weak financial position of the Ørestad Development Corporation (caused by cost overruns in metro construction and a lack of demand for office parcels mentioned before) there was a desperate need for development in the area, and hence a proposal made by a Norwegian investor (Steen & Strøm) to build a shopping mall was welcomed with open arms. Not only would it result in the selling of some of the most prominent parcels, the expectation was that it would also create a 'destination' in the area and improve metro ticket sales. Inner-city shop owners opposed the plans, as did environmentalists as well on the grounds of expected increase of car traffic which went against the project's environmental rationale to reduce car use and stimulate public transport. Since it interfered with national planning guidelines on large



Projektkort, forslag  
Cityring  
Møllerup Designlab A/S  
12 dec 2005 / HO-009-aba

Figure 7.3 Map of the metro and of the new Ring Metro line  
Source: Ørestadsselskabet, 2005

out-of-town shopping mall construction, permission for the development was only given after the national government had intervened.

The mall is a huge typical box-type shopping mall with a closed facade, fully oriented towards the shoppers inside. It is very disappointing from the viewpoint of spatial quality and street liveliness, which were two important goals for the development of the central area of Ørestad. Although the development was desperately needed in order to generate income from the sale of the parcels, and although it is valuable as a local destination, the constructional form was disappointing, a view shared even by leading development corporation officials.<sup>11</sup>

### ***Problems with the mini-metro and reorganization of the Ørestad Development Corporation***

The construction of the driverless mini-metro system did not go smoothly. The Italian firm Ansaldo won a competition to operate the system but, mainly because of the novelty of the system, there were technical difficulties, delays and cost overruns.<sup>12</sup> The first part opened in 2002 and since then ticket sales have been much lower than expected. The proposed alignment of the metro shows the double nature of the investment, which not only serves public transportation goals. The part in the city centre, especially between Frederiksberg and

Christianshavn, is well used. The part through the Ørestad project, from Islands Brygge to Vestamager, is sometimes cynically referred to as the 'prairie express' because it connects a still rather empty area. Ironically, less than one kilometre to the east, the densely populated areas of central Amager are not served by this new form of transportation, leading to disappointing numbers of passengers (and revenues for the Ørestad Development Corporation). Decisions have now been made to construct two new extensions to the driverless mini-metro system. A new track on the east side of Amager, the so-called third phase, will be close to the coast and mainly pass through low density areas, and will connect the system directly to the airport. Furthermore, parliament has approved a very costly city-ring, or Ring Metro, which will be a circular line under the historic inner city and the adjacent gentrified areas. It is believed that a city-ring will increase the 'feeding' of the system and improve the integration with the successful regional S-train system, as the two systems will intersect at three different stations.

Due to cost overruns relating to the metro, disappointing incomes from the metro fares and a lack of interest in the (more) expensive office plots in the Ørestad, the debts of the development corporation have risen to over 14 billion DKK (approximately €2 billion), and the expected time to pay back all the loans has been extended to 2048 (Ørestadsselskabet 2005). In connection with this, the Ørestad Development Corporation has been reorganized. After the reorganization, the overall development of the 'tie' remained with the Ørestad Development Corporation, which is now led by the former Lord Mayor of Copenhagen, Kramer Mikkelsen. The mini-metro, and the construction of the new ring-line, is now the responsibility of a separate entity, led by Anne-Grethe Foss (who consequently had to step down as a CEO for the Ørestad Development Corporation).

At the time of writing (January 2006) it is very difficult to determine the financial consequences of the organizational split. It is estimated that the construction of the first phases of the metro, including the third phase which will connect the airport to the metro system in 2007, is going to cost 12.3 billion DKK based on 2005 prices (approximately €1.7 billion), but it is hard to judge whether the sale of building sites and tickets for the metro will cover the costs (within the estimated period of 25 years).<sup>13</sup> First of all, the last liquidity budget (Ørestadsselskabet 2005) covers the larger organization, and is based on a set of complicated, and interwoven assumptions with regard to, for example, the loan facility, annual sales of floorage, operating revenue from the metro (based on 80 million passengers per year in 2010 – and rising fares), which makes it impossible to assess the financial strengths and burdens in each of the separated entities. Moreover, the decision to build the Ring Metro had not been taken, and the subsidies obtained from other parties, most notably the state, and the two central municipalities of Frederiksberg and Copenhagen were obviously not available at the time at which the liquidity was calculated. Although sales of building sites have increased in recent years, the revenue from the metro seems overly optimistic, and will most likely have to be lowered, despite the expected rise in the number of passengers which is likely to occur after the completion of the Ring Metro.<sup>14</sup>

## **Analysis of multilevel decision-making**

Having briefly described the decision-making processes and the organizational and financial aspects we now turn to a more analytical approach in order to assess the framing of the project at a strategic and operational level. We will therefore move away from a discussion of whether Danish entrepreneurial urban policies, such as the Ørestad Development Corporation, are at odds with welfare-oriented urban policies (for a discussion, see Andersen 2002, 2003). Instead, our main interest is in the evolution of certain settings and practices throughout the project's relatively short history. We distinguish two layers, a strategic layer in which we analyse how the project has been framed in public, private and civic spheres of action, and a more operational level of decision-making between key actors in the concrete project. Recent literature on governance processes in metropolitan areas emphasises the importance of the connectivity between different spheres of action (Salet *et al.* 2003). We argue that the limited connectivity between the two layers is one of the main factors hampering the realization of Ørestad as a successful new peripheral urban area.

### ***Strategic level framing***

At this level we analyse how the project has been positioned in different domains of governance action (private, higher government and local governance/civic), and to what extent this positioning has changed during the course of its planning/development.

Roughly speaking, the Ørestad project has always been more closely affiliated with public domains of action (both the local council and the national government were strong supporters) than with private or civic domains. This situation has been quite stable throughout the last 15 years and this partly explains the problems related to optimizing the connections to other domains of governance action.

### ***Public domain framing***

Our analysis shows that the project is more than a mere development scheme to attract international investments to the capital. The Ørestad project not only aims to capitalize on an opportunity identified by the state and city to improve the position of Copenhagen in its international competition with other cities, but is also a very peculiar compromise designed to unlock a difficult political and financial relationship between two levels of government and to pacify differences of opinion between the dominant Danish political parties. The national government, ruled by a liberal-conservative coalition that had adopted an agenda of deregulation and privatization at the time of parliamentary decision-making on Ørestad, was seduced by the idea of a more market-oriented approach to urban development. At the same time, the social-democratically controlled city government saw it as an opportunity to, finally, attract much needed (infrastructure) investments to the

capital, and eventually to lower unemployment and improve its tax base. The institutional backbone of the project was formed by the Act on Ørestad, while its operational basis was the use of profits from publicly controlled land speculation to be (pre-)invested in a 'common' good, namely the mini-metro.

At a strategic level the switching of government policies from a welfare-oriented perspective to a growth-oriented, 'competitive' rationale has already been pointed out. Both by its aims and governance structure, the Ørestad project fitted perfectly into this new discourse. One of the most intriguing aspects of this new policy direction has been the ambitious project to create a European cross-border region, the Øresund region, which consists of the most eastern part of Denmark (Sjælland) and the southern part of Sweden (Skåne) (Bucken-Knapp 2001; OECD 2003; Wichmann Matthiessen 2000, 2004). Its most tangible feature is the 16 kilometre Øresund road and rail bridge that opened in 2000 between Copenhagen and Malmö. A wide range of policy programmes and networks have been set up to improve the competitive position of the region vis-à-vis other regions. This primarily means the Stockholm region which is the major other competitor as regards acquiring a dominant position in the Nordic market. INTERREG funds from the EU have been allocated to the area to support a variety of policies to accelerate integration between the two regions.<sup>15</sup> Programmes to integrate labour markets and foster exchanges between universities and other research institutes in the two countries are designed to enhance the advantages of economies of scale. The economic and social effects of the integration, which is in essence a very long-term trajectory, have been difficult to measure until now. Some hard indicators, like cross-border travelling or working, suggest that its effect has been very moderate in the first years of the initiative (OECD 2003; Wichmann Matthiessen 2004).

### ***Lack of private and civic involvement***

Nevertheless, the existence of this programme and the strategic location of the Ørestad project right on the corridor between Copenhagen and Malmö suggest that the project would at least be able to benefit from attracting businesses. However, its connection to the private sector, in terms of (international) firms willing to set up offices in the area, and the lack of a strategic response, have been major weaknesses of the project since its initiation. Ironically, the expected attractiveness for business was one of the project's financial foundations, since this was expected to create enough revenue to build the new metro system. Although the Copenhagen area has exhibited favourable economic growth in the last decade, and although there has been a steady influx of foreign companies, for a long time only one was accommodated in the area, namely Ferring, an international pharmaceutical firm with its headquarters in Switzerland. The result has been financial difficulties for the development corporation, that were worsened by the cost overruns and disappointing economic performance of the metro. The reason for this lack of interest is a combination of different factors. First of all, there is a typical location factor. Although the location of the Ørestad development may be strategic and very well connected



to both private and public transport, it misses some of the location qualities that its main intra-regional competitor, the harbour front, can offer in terms of (historic) atmosphere and waterfront vistas. Furthermore, the central parts of the harbour are closer to the city centre. Ørestad is a typical greenfield development which is still searching for its own identity, and is currently struggling to realize a high-quality public sphere. While the northern part, which is the most successful in development terms right now, is physically and visually connected to existing built-up areas, the Ørestad-centre part is not connected to anything. This creates a feeling of spatial unease, of a 'planned', purely artificial location. The second point is related to this. The opening up for development of different plots in the harbour front has led to a certain over-supply of available development options without a strong strategic planning framework in the metropolitan area to prioritize locations for office development. The development rationale of the Ørestad project demanded high-paying clients in search of a quality location. This is just a small part of the office market, and it is precisely that part of the market which is most interested in the 'soft' qualities with regard to which the harbour front areas score better.

Not only was its connection with the private domain of action problematic, there were difficulties throughout its development with connecting the project to the inner-metropolitan domain of non-governmental groups and citizens. In the initial phase, the project was heavily criticized for its exclusive status, which made it more difficult for non-governmental groups and citizens to influence its development. There was considerable discomfort about the magnitude of the plan and its environmental impact (Paludan 2000). As a result, combined with the governance setting, the project was made to feel like a 'running train' that could not be stopped or diverted, so most environmental and neighbourhood groups lost interest.

### *Ørestad as an introvert mega-project*

The overall picture of the project at a strategic level is as rather introvert, and built around a strong and sustainable political partnership between city and state. This has undeniably resulted in an effective (but maybe overpriced) new public transport system for part of the downtown area. In the first period, the project accommodated some public institutions and much needed housing in the overpriced Copenhagen housing market. Although the strong public-public partnership and the elite status of the project match the initiators' deeper strategy to depoliticize its development,<sup>16</sup> it has hampered the project in various strategic ways. The failure to connect to the private sector initiatives for office development, even though the project was embedded in the Øresund concept and even though the region has undergone favourable growth in the last decade, caused economic problems for the development corporation. A lack of connection with broader circles of society might be beneficial from the point of view of efficient decision-making and execution of the project, but it also resulted in a situation of general disinterest in the development. We have not identified many initiatives by the project initiators designed to 'repair' this situation during the

course of the project. The peculiar institutional and economic situation of the project also make this very difficult. Even if there was a will to organize more inclusive processes of deliberation for the remaining development period, processes that would accommodate citizens' involvement, they have to take place within the context of the financial burden of the expensive metro line. This would make it almost impossible to change phasing, development intentions or land uses. The only flexibility the development corporation has is to speed up certain parts that are in strong market demand. This is what happened with the project's different housing developments in recent years. However, if this is going to result in a project dominated by housing development rather than high-end office development, questions have to be asked not only about the financial rationale of the project (housing plots are much cheaper than office plots) and the need for such an expensive transportation system to serve a 'housing location', but especially about the alleged strategic character of the project as a premier business location to help the strategic position of Copenhagen.

### *Operational level of decision-making*

In this section we analyse the practices of interaction in which the operational aspects of projects are discussed and decided on, and the extent to which these practices of interaction have developed during the course of the project.



Figure 7.4 Impression of plans for Ørestad Syd  
Source: ARKKI, 2005

The special status of the development and the concept of a public–public development corporation (Ørestadsselskabet I/S) was beneficial for its proponents for a variety of reasons. First, it made the project almost invisible in the national budget since the investments made in the initial stage were ‘only’ government-secured loans, not direct capital investments. This made it a lot easier to get the proposal through parliament, where normally large infrastructure ‘investments’ had to be matched outside the capital to guarantee regional equalization. Another very important aspect was that the project would be, to a large extent, de-politicized after the adoption of the law. A stable project execution, according to a business style, would then take place at a certain distance from political deliberations on the project. This was also done to safeguard the project in the event that political majorities suddenly and drastically changed. According to one of those directly involved in the decision-making:

Because of the coalition governments, decisions were changed and many times nothing happened. ... The only solution was to put it in a separate entity. If you talk to the politicians involved in these projects, they say this was done to prevent it from being on the state budget, and also to prevent projects being stopped when the majority changed.<sup>17</sup>

The governance innovation was (and continued to be) heavily contested. According to Andersen:

The project’s proponents argued that the development corporation combined the best of two worlds: it was publicly controlled but with sufficient autonomy to operate efficiently in market terms. The critics argued that the project combined the worst of two worlds: the lack of both effective democratic control and the transparent economic management.

(Andersen 2003: 100)

To a certain extent, the opinions of both the proponents and the critics are true. The development corporation was at the same time the ideal device to unlock a problematic political situation and a way to use speculative gains from land development efficiently for a common good. The idea was for this to result in a high-quality new public transport system for the region. On the other hand, it was indeed also an entity that could operate at a certain distance from effective democratic control. The project was devised by a small expert committee. The plans were then made accessible for a short period for the purpose of political decision-making, and then work continued behind closed doors based on a business-oriented development style. After a first period of massive investment in infrastructure, a point of no return was quickly reached, which made the project an ‘inevitability’ for the coming decades.

The governance innovation of a city-state controlled development corporation put the operational aspects regarding the development of the metro and the planning and selling of the land largely in the hands of one actor,

Ørestadsselskabet. One may well ask what standards governed the behaviour of this actor in the initial development period. The Act on Ørestad defines the room for manoeuvre, including the limitations, but this mainly referred to institutional aspects. There was relative freedom as regards the planning goals for the area – within the range of acceptance of the proposals by the planning department of the Copenhagen municipal government. The first planning documents, related to the master planning competition and its outcomes (Ørestadsselskabet 1994; 1995) indicate a progressive stance towards different planning issues, namely a heavy concentration of developments around the stations, mixed-use environments and special attention for environmental issues such as water and parks.

### *Double goal of the project*

However, real difficulties started occurring in relation to the project's peculiar double goal to be both an urban development and a 'money maker' initiative. As noted before, the (financial) dependence on annual sales of land (for a set price) obviously shaped interactions between the development corporation and the private investors and influences the execution of these planning intentions. This is not a hypothetical assumption. The description of the development of the Fields shopping mall is an example of a situation in which the development corporation had to compromise different planning intentions in order to attract investments.

The package deal proved to have hampered further development, as recognized by two of the participants who were involved at the very start of the project:

It was a shame that everything was lumped together. One issue involved Ørestad and whether it was a good idea to build offices and other buildings on that plot of land. A completely different issue was, of course, whether it was wise to build the metro. These two things have nothing to do with each other. Ørestad already had a good rail connection. I never saw the benefit of the metro for Ørestad ... I think it was important to do something about the infrastructure but I think this problem should be analysed in its own right, not linked to other things like who owns which area of land. Playing clever financial tricks is not a good idea either because all they do is mask the fact that we are talking about public money.<sup>18</sup>

I think that every decision maker would like to separate the metro from the Ørestad project. But the problem was that then both projects would not exist. It was like a forced marriage.<sup>19</sup>

The main lesson at operational level is that the project seemed to be detrimentally affected by the (financial) package deal with the infrastructure development. From an infrastructure and financial perspective, the development project existed only to generate revenues to recoup the investments made in the



Figure 7.5 View of the metro line from the Fields shopping centre  
Photo: S. Majoor, 2004

metro. From a (broader) economic and urban planning perspective, Ørestad was (and continues to be) much more of course. The rather naïve expectation of a win-win situation – both a major investment in infrastructure and a high-quality new development area – resulted in a forced development speed and serious demands for financial performance of the area, which proved to be at odds with a more incremental and inclusive development style that would probably have safeguarded better democratic and spatial performances.

### *Operational responses*

The recent organizational split between the Ørestad Development Corporation, responsible for land development, and the Metro, responsible for the maintenance and expansion of the mini-metro, in itself proves that the ambiguities were too large to handle within one single organisational structure. This might prevent the Development Corporation from being forced to compromise on planning goals in favour of economic gain. The split, however, has caused other concerns to arise since some of the local authorities that have obtained loans to pay their share of the development costs for the metro now fear that they will have to cover for the debts without having the possibility to rely on the profits earned from the sales of building sites within the Ørestad.

Since demand for offices has been lower than expected, a few strategic moves had to be made by the Ørestad Development Corporation. Most did not actually seem to have an adverse effect on the spatial performance of the area, such as a greater emphasis on, and acceleration of, the housing part of the project and the enticement of some public institutions to the area. Especially in the northern area they were able to (and in fact did), create a more mixed, lively, urban area. However, the compromise on the Fields shopping centre, in particular, following a lack of clarity regarding the legal possibilities for such an 'out-of-town' shopping mall, was detrimental since it resulted in the development of an area which lacked spatial quality, on probably the most central and valuable plot of land in the whole project.

To conclude, the biggest difficulty for the project was the fact that, on an operational level, two projects were linked in one 'package deal'. Although this was partly solved through the organizational split, the financial burden has remained with the metro. Freed from financial constraints, the Ørestad Development Corporation might adopt more inclusive strategies, one example being the establishment of a council of alternative advisers to advise on how a café culture can be established in the newer housing development schemes in Ørestad Syd.

Due to the project's framing, practices of interaction at this operational level are, again, rather introverted. Together with the inward-looking positioning at strategic level, a picture is painted of an important and huge undertaking outside the domain of involvement (and interest) of large parts of the society. The result is that the status of the project is contested. Fundamental discussions on the strategic aspects only took place in a short period of decision-making on the Ørestad Act (1991–1992). After the proposal was accepted, the project became more business oriented. After some compromises were made with the environmental groups during the master planning process, interest in the project from society in general, and civic groups in particular, faded. It is very early to judge the spatial performance of the project, since less than ten years of an expected 35 years development programme have passed. The project has undergone some changes as regards its spatial goals, most of which were for the better. However, the development of the Fields shopping mall casts a dark shadow of economic gains that jeopardize planning goals. The organizational split of the development corporation might reduce the level of controversy, although new tensions amongst the parties have been detected.

### **Conclusion: the limited connectivity between strategic framing and operational decision-making**

Our analysis shows that both the strategic framing and the operational level decision-making were quite introverted. At a strategic level, the project was well embedded in a small city-state political elite that was able to reconcile political differences and seize economic opportunities, but did not connect its project very well to private spheres or civic interests. At an operational level, a governance

structure was put in place to execute this political compromise in a business-oriented focused way. Relating the project to civic interests was not a primary objective of the Ørestad Development Corporation. It was more important to attract businesses to the area.

Precisely this crucial aspect turned out to be the greatest problem in the initial development stages. Ironically, while the project was well embedded in government domains, it suffered badly from a lack of efficient regional planning that would have made Ørestad more of a priority than other development alternatives, especially that in the harbour area. This was the real weakness of the project, namely the capacity – at a strategic level – to realize a more connective strategy that safeguards a sustainable flow of (private) investments in office development to the area. It seems that Copenhagen, after the abolishment of the Greater Copenhagen Council, is moving away from strategic planning and, to a large extent, this is in line with the development of a more business-oriented style of planning based on private spatial preferences. Whatever the (political) opinion, in this case, it is hampering the financial performance of a very public investment. The governance structure at operational level was obviously too introverted to repair this strategic problem, since the function of Ørestad Development Corporation is basically to execute a development scheme.

Although – as we have pointed out many times – the project was an effective tool by which to create a useful partnership between the city and the state, at this level this coalition did not create the right (planning) conditions to safeguard and optimize its spatial and economic performance. It should have devised a metropolitan/regional framework to prioritize the development of high quality office areas, to make sure that a sustainable flow of private investments would be guided to Ørestad. Discussing such a framework would be the ideal opportunity to actually have a fundamental debate on the development of a region, the necessity (or form) of such a major urban project, and the (planning) strategy to implement it successfully. This would have been a major democratic innovation at strategic level, compared to the current closed settings within which the project was conceived, developed and executed. If, on the basis of these deliberations, a decision would have been taken to implement a project with a major public benefit (and investment) like the metro, then policies might have been implemented to guarantee (better) success. In the case of Ørestad this was only done in a haphazard and forced manner by the national government, via the relocation of some (semi) government institutions to the area. However, the obvious lack of a clear strategy and policy to attract businesses to the area and prevent them from locating in other areas where land profits would not help realize a public goal was a weakness. A more steady influx of private capital for office development to the area would have helped the Ørestad Development Corporation, at an operational level, to improve its position to attract investors and that, in turn, would have made it easier to implement the planning agenda during negotiations. Ironically, such a situation could have resulted in less dependency on maximizing economic performance on every plot, and thus on increasing the possibility for citizen

involvement and identification, since possibilities may have arisen for spatial planning configurations that did not only have to produce economic profits. Ørestad teaches observers that the success of a development depends neither on a successful strategic positioning in domains of governance action alone, nor only on a sound operational approach. The key is the connection between the two levels, and the reflective capacity to learn and adapt during the course of a project. In that respect, the 'Ørestad-format' is not the ideal device for such a trajectory.

## Acknowledgements

Research on the Ørestad project by Stan Majoor was made possible by a financial grant from the city of Amsterdam. During a two-month period, facilities were made available from the Kgl. Veterinær- og Landbohøjskole (KVL), Center for Skov, Landskab og Planlægning (Royal Veterinary and Agriculture University, Centre for Forestry, Landscape Architecture and Urban Planning) in Copenhagen. A word of appreciation is due to Laila Ruttel, planning student from the Universiteit van Amsterdam, for assisting during the project and for doing translation work. An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the 2005 Congress of the Association of European Schools of Planning, in Vienna, 13–17 July 2005.

## Notes

- 1 Research for this chapter took place primarily during November and December of 2004. During that period, planning and policy documents related to the Ørestad development were reviewed, and 25 interviews with major players conducted. The following face-to-face interviews were conducted by Stan Majoor:

John Andersen, University of Roskilde; Kurt Bligaard Pedersen, DONG and former political advisor to the social-democratic party; John Bloch Poulsen, neighbourhood activist, Sundby local council; Peder Boas Jensen, retired professor of urban planning; Kresten Bloch, Ørestad Development Corporation; Jesper Buch Jakobsen, City of Copenhagen; Dan Christensen, retired planner, Ørestad Development Corporation; Ulrik Dahlin, newspaper journalist, Information; Henning Dyremose CEO, TDC, former Minister of Finance (e-mail interview); Anne-Grethe Foss, director Ørestad Development Corporation; Claus Frelle-Petersen, Copenhagen Capacity; Peter Hartoft-Nielsen, Ministry of the Environment; Per Hendriksen, political assistant, Socialistisk Folkeparti, Danish parliament; Nina Kampmann, Ørestad Development Corporation; Jan Lilliendahl Larsen, Supertanker (independent group of urban planners and professionals); Lars Nielsen, retired chief planner, Ørestad Development Corporation; Torben Nøhr, city manager, Frederiksberg; Dorthe Nøhr Pedersen, Ministry of Transport; David Rehling, newspaper journalist, Information, former head of Danmarks Naturfredningsforening; Johan Schröder, New Zealand honorary consul general, former director of Confederation of Danish Industries; Hans Thor Andersen, University of Copenhagen; Poul Walbjørn Christensen, City of Copenhagen, planning department; Christian Wichmann Matthiessen, University of Copenhagen; Christoph Wiese, sales manager, Ørestad Development Corporation; and Lars Winther, University of Copenhagen.



Interviews were conducted in English in Copenhagen. Each interview was about one hour long and was semi-structured, taped and subsequently transcribed. Although written questions were prepared for each interview the sessions were conducted in a somewhat informal way and tended to follow the issues that arose rather than a rigid script.

- 2 The so-called 'Jutland mafia' is often mentioned by interviewees. Denmark's national parliament partly has a district representation. The members from Jutland (a large predominantly rural area in the west of the country) were always very effective in setting aside party differences to operate like a regional block to make sure that infrastructure investments in the Copenhagen area were matched by investments in Jutland, in the form of package deals which, to a certain extent ignored the actual need of the investments, which frustrated the whole policy process. Cynical Copenhagen observers keep mentioning the empty highways in Jutland, while pointing to the fact that much needed investments in the Copenhagen area were sacrificed.
- 3 For both projects a state company outside the state budget was set up. This company obtained cheap loans which were guaranteed by the state. Instead of income from tolls, the income in the Ørestad project was to come from ticket revenues from the new public transport system and the selling of development plots in the project. The strategic aspect is that the national budget makes almost no mention of this whole operation (Interview Bligaard Petersen).
- 4 Interviews Andersen, Bligaard Petersen, Dyremose and Foss.
- 5 Although this was a major governance innovation in the Danish planning context, a relatively similar proposal was used, and executed, in the 1960s to develop one of the corridors of the Copenhagen Fingerplan. This Køge Bay finger (Køge Bugt-fingeren) leads from the capital to the south-west. The National Government Act stated that a joint committee representing the interests of eight local municipalities, two counties, six ministries and the Danish railways would manage the planning. The plan integrated new infrastructure (highway and new suburban train) with urban development. In reality, the infrastructure was created years after the first urban developments had been completed. This caused a lot of trouble for the low-income groups that had moved there (Christensen 2003: 32).
- 6 Owing to the Danish government's joint and several liability, the corporation has indirectly been credit-rated in the same way as the Government, which means Aaa at Moodys and AAA at Standard & Poors. Consequently, the corporation is generally able to obtain capital market terms equivalent to those available to the government (Ørestadsselskabet 2005: 17).
- 7 Interview Boas Jensen.
- 8 Interview Rehling, former director of Danmarks Naturfredningsforening.
- 9 Interview Foss.
- 10 In 2004, 6 per cent of customers were Swedes (Ørestadsselskabet 2005).
- 11 Interview Foss and Nielsen.
- 12 Most cost overruns were outside the project area, and were related to the construction of the tracks and stations under the historic city centre.
- 13 In 2004, DKK 10 million profit was made from the metro operations. In 2010 the expectations are set at DKK 235 million (excluding operating profits from the new ring-metro) (Ørestadsselskabet 2005).
- 14 In 2004 the metro served 34 million passengers. The Ørestad Development Corporation still expects that, in 2010, 80 million passenger trips a year will be made (Ørestadsselskabet 2005).
- 15 In the first INTERREG phase (INTERREG II A), between 1996 and 2001, the Greater Copenhagen area and Skåne received total funding of €29 million (€13.5 million provided by the Commission, €13.5 million from public funds from the region itself and €2 million from private sources). In the next programme (INTERREG III A) for 2000–2006, an expanded geographical area covering the whole Øresund region was

allocated a budget of €61.8 million (equally co-financed by the EU commission and the Danish and Swedish governments) (OECD 2003: 87–90).

16 A comparative study by Moulaert, Rodríguez and Swyngedouw (2003) shows that this is a common feature of many contemporary large-scale development projects.

17 Interview Bligaard Petersen.

18 Interview Schröder.

19 Interview Bligaard Petersen.

## References

- Agger, C. (2005) 'Grundsalg boomer i Ørestad', *Jyllands Posten*, December 10.
- Andersen, J. (2002) *Between Community Empowerment and Elitist Corporatism – The Struggles about Urban Policy in Copenhagen*. Research Paper 13/02, Department of Social Sciences, Roskilde University, Denmark.
- Andersen, J. (2003) 'Gambling politics or successful entrepreneurship? The Ørestad Project in Copenhagen', in F. Moulaert, A. Rodríguez and E. Swyngedouw (eds) *The Globalized City: Economic Restructuring and Social Polarization in European Cities*, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 91–106.
- Andersen, J. and Hovgård, G. (2003) *Welfare and Urban planning in Transition – A Copenhagen Case Study*. Research Paper 8/03, Department of Social Sciences, Roskilde University, Denmark.
- Bucken-Knapp, G. (2001) 'Just a train ride away, but still worlds apart: prospect for the Øresund region as a binational city', *GeoJournal* 54: 51–60.
- Christensen, D. (2003) *Ørestad. Perspektivering. Planlægning. Realisering. Dokumentation*, Copenhagen.
- Desfor, G. and Jørgensen, J. (2004) 'Flexible urban governance. The case of Copenhagen's recent waterfront development', *European Planning Studies*, 2, 4: 479–496.
- Egnsplankontoret (1947) *Skitseforslag til egnsplan for Storkøbenhavn*, Copenhagen.
- Lund Hansen, A., Thor Andersen, H. and Clark, E. (2001) 'Creative Copenhagen: globalization, urban governance and social change', *European Planning Studies*, 9, 7: 851–869.
- Moulaert, F., Rodríguez, A. and Swyngedouw, E. (2003) *The Globalized City: Economic Restructuring and Social Polarization in European Cities*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) (2003). *Oresund*, Paris: OECD Territorial Reviews.
- Paludan, E.H. (2000) 'Bypolitik under Forandring', Master thesis, Department of Geography, University of Copenhagen.
- Ørestadsselskabet (1994) *Ørestaden, Ideas Competition*, Copenhagen.
- Ørestadsselskabet (1995) *Ørestaden, Master Plan*, Copenhagen.
- Ørestadsselskabet (2005) *Annual Report 2004*, Copenhagen.
- Ørestadsselskabet (2006) *Statusnotat 1 February 2006*, Copenhagen.
- Salet, W.G.M., Thornley, A. and Kreukels, A.J. (eds) (2003) *Metropolitan Governance and Spatial Planning*, London: Spon Press.
- Thor Andersen, H. and Jørgensen, J. (1995) 'City Profile Copenhagen', *Cities*, 12, 1: 13–22.

- Thor Andersen, H., Hansen, F. and Jørgensen, J. (2002) 'The fall and rise of metropolitan government in Copenhagen', *GeoJournal*, 58: 43–52.
- Wichmann Matthiessen, C. (2000) 'Bridging the Øresund: potential regional dynamics. Integration of Copenhagen (Denmark) and Malmö-Lund (Sweden). A cross-border project on the European metropolitan level', *Journal of Transport Geography*, 8: 171–180.
- Wichmann Matthiessen, C. (2004) 'The Øresund area: pre- and post-bridge cross-border functional integration: the bi-national regional question', *GeoJournal*, 61: 31–39.

# 8 Strasbourg Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch

## A technopole French-style

*Jörg Wendel*

### Introduction

The Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch is a very ambitious project of extraordinary relevance for the economic development of the Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg (CUS)<sup>1</sup> and the whole Greater Strasbourg region. The major objectives are, first, the creation of a highly specialized research and innovation centre of international relevance and, second, the project seems to be a suitable tool to accelerate the economic restructuring of the Strasbourg region. For different reasons the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch is a good example of a French-style technopole and very suitable for scientific analysis. The project has now reached maturity, thus enabling a performance review of the original objectives and the identification of the significant problems. Although more than 2,000 new jobs were created at the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch it is questionable whether the general strategy of the project is the right one in terms of a tool for regional development. Why has only one-third of the area been commercialized after a run-time of twenty years? Why is public investment still dominant and what about the relatively poor investment of global players? After a short explanation of the French technopole politics we discuss below the history, the goals and planning methods, the current situation of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch and the problems the project is facing.

### Institutional context

Since the institutional context and administrative structures in France are very specific, a short introduction to these topics is required.

France has a relatively centralistic administrative structure, with five entities at regional and local level which can deal with the topics of urban and regional development, each with very distinct competencies. The principal secondary units at regional level are the *Départements* and *Régions*, followed by the *Préfet* (prefect) and at last by the municipal governments. The Région d'Alsace is composed of the Départements Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin. Additionally, as a result of the increasing decentralization of the administrative structures, the municipalities are allowed to set up *Communautés urbaines*. These are intermunicipal entities to which the members delegate competencies pertaining to economic

development and planning. The city of Strasbourg and 26 other municipalities founded such an entity, the Urban Community of Strasbourg (Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg, CUS) in 1967. In 1999 the Law Chevènement (Loi n° 99-586 du juillet 1999) furthermore simplified and strengthened the intermunicipal cooperation and assigned more competencies to the urban communities instead of the municipalities. According to this, the CUS is empowered to create, install and manage zones of industrial, commercial or tertiary activity on behalf of their member municipalities. It is worth noting that, since 1972, the administrative units of the CUS members and the city of Strasbourg have been combined to form just one total administration. This guarantees a more efficient and powerful administration and enables savings to be made with regard to the current undertakings. At present this is the only case of its kind in France.

The active partners in the project are the Région d'Alsace, represented by the Regional Council of the Alsace-Region (Conseil Régional d'Alsace), the Lower Rhine County (Département Bas-Rhin), the Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg (CUS) and last but not least the municipality of Illkirch-Graffenstaden. According to the competencies of French territorial entities, the *Région* elaborates the general orientations in accordance with the orientations of the national planning and development policies. The *Département* has a more or less advisory function. The main competencies with regard to elaborate detailed land utilization plans are assigned to the municipalities and their intermunicipal entities – in the case of Strasbourg this is the CUS. Consequently, the financial competencies for development measures at CUS level are also assigned to the CUS and its member municipalities. Furthermore the local governments can also create inter-communal agencies in the form of associations, in order to carry out studies on town and regional planning topics or to promote economic development. The CUS is assisted with this task by the agency of development and town planning of the agglomeration of Strasbourg (Agence de Développement et d'Urbanisme de l'Agglomération Strasbourgeoise, ADEUS). All planning activities at the different regional levels are coordinated with the superordinate national level by the Délégation à l'Aménagement du Territoire et à l'Action Régionale (DATAR),<sup>2</sup> which is also in charge of the establishment and evaluation of technopoles. In general, the municipalities and intermunicipal entities receive direct and indirect subsidies and support from the superordinate entities and its agencies. In this context it is notable that the county (Département Bas-Rhin) is in charge of the construction and the maintenance of the county's road network (A-roads). It was therefore important to involve the Département Bas-Rhin in the planning of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch, because it was necessary to relocate the CD468, an important A-road.

## Background of the project

What is the general idea behind the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch (acronyms PII or P2I)? Its complete and official name, Strasbourg Technopôle – Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch, provides some initial answers and, at the same time, generates a number of new questions.

### ***What is a technopole in France?***

The idea of the technopole was certainly born in the United States of America, and may have originated in Silicon Valley (Wackermann 1992: 43). The first person to adapt the concept of technopoles to the French context was Pierre Laffitte, senator of the Département des Alpes-Maritimes and principal of the École Nationale Supérieure des Mines. In 1969, he created the first French technopole at Sophia-Antipolis, close to Nice and Cannes. Additional technopoles were created in subsequent years and the new movement started to gain momentum. In 1982, three technopoles had been initiated: Sophia-Antipolis, Grenoble-Meylan and Nancy-Brabois. In 1984, the Club International des Technopoles, an association of technopoles under private law, was formed in Sophia-Antipolis. Strasbourg was one of the first club members and was very keen to adopt the new ideas and concepts.

According to Wackermann (1992: 61), the recent French definition of a technopole is the result of its original definition and the understanding that has developed in the French practice. Thus, technopoles are not optimally developed industrial parks, but rather incentive-based and interwoven clusters of university research and high-tech companies. In particular, the proximity to researchers and business partners enhances their interrelations. The optimized transfer of knowledge and know-how is expected to lead to a continuous innovation process within the technopoles. In a word, it can be stated that a technopole is a political tool for the promotion of economic development, offering a creative and innovative environment as well as optimal networking possibilities, specifically for small and medium-sized enterprises (Benko 2000: 158). In this context it should be pointed out that the concept of technopoles is no longer promoted by the French authorities. Similarly to the old teleports, such as the Media-Park in Cologne, these concepts have been caught up by time and reality. Now, the existing facilities have left their establishment phase behind and have to develop on their own. Thus, from today's viewpoint, technopoles and comparable facilities are primarily regarded as initial-cores for new economic developments. However, there is scientific discussion regarding the general efficiency of such technopoles, as is the case with the former showcase Sophia-Antipolis, which has recently been evaluated as more or less failed and as being of only minor performance as a tool for regional development.

### ***The basic policy conditions at national level***

In the early 1980s, French national policy prescribed the development aims for all political and administrative levels. France was to acquire more international relevance in research and high-tech businesses. At the same time, French policy started to loosen up the centralistic political and administrative structures accompanied by a paradigm shift in regional development policy. Policy changed from aiming only at consolidating existing enterprises or their establishments in economically weak regions to a more integrated approach which promoted the mutual

relationship between the enterprises in a region, accompanied by new establishments. Thus, more attention was paid to French regions as the arena for innovative economic development and, in particular, as suitable locations for cooperations between universities, R&D facilities and enterprises. Additionally, it is important to note that at this juncture a strong regional-cultural identity emerged in France, which is particularly important for Alsace (Wackermann 1993: 91). Consequently, the French national government promoted the establishment of regional technopoles (CUS 1982a: 1). Whereas the first technopoles in France were conceived as mono-centric facilities with a newly created technology pole as the innovation core and more or less without a regional focus, the creation of a new technology pole as an innovative core was not essential for the new regional technopoles. The focus was on fusing the existing R&D mechanisms in the sense of a global regional development programme (Bruhat 1990: 196). Sophia-Antipolis, whose development was generated completely externally by the central state, is an example of the first, mono-polar type of technopoles, whereas the development planning in the Greater Strasbourg area and in particular at the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch was conceived as a multi-polar regional technopole.

### *Stages in the development of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch*

During the course of the structural changes, the Strasbourg region had to deal with an industrial and economic crisis. Nevertheless, Strasbourg's situation was very specific and the crises it faced were not as intense as other French and European regions. Due to the region being poor in mineral resources, there has never been a focus on heavy industries and the tertiary sector has traditionally had an important share in the regional economy. Due to Strasbourg's historic European functions and importance, the city was not under pressure to restructure the local economy immediately or to perform a U-turn as regards its economic orientation. However, the creation of a technopole offered, on the one hand, the possibility of enhancing the image of Strasbourg as a metropolis with international relevance. On the other hand, it was also possible to establish new jobs and a sustainable economic profile. Unfortunately, there is no reference information on the expected impact of the project. The available documents do not mention numbers of jobs, etc. This might be a general problem of technopoles, since their goals are not very precisely defined and therefore the achievement of objectives is not really verifiable (Kuhlmann and Holland 1995: 3).

The main objective of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch was and is, therefore, to increase the competitiveness and the image of the Strasbourg region in the European and global context. The Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch is not intended to be a competitor to the core city, but is intended instead to revalue and upgrade Strasbourg as a metropolis, since Strasbourg was and still has a high-ranking international metropolis status. This ambition is expressed by the aim to create an outstanding facility offering an exceptional and inviting environment for research activities and high-tech businesses. Therefore, the urban planning concept of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch is oriented towards the specific needs of high-tech

branches and science and aims to create a communicative climate (CUS 1982b: 3). Consequently, nearly all planning documents refer to its 'communication' and 'communicative' qualities, in addition to the outstanding architecture.

The decision to establish the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch was taken by the Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg (CUS). It should be noted that, in France, the *Communauté Urbaine* is a very distinct type of urban community which resulted from the decentralization efforts of the national government and which is responsible for its own planning. In 1983, the CUS decided to create a specific facility for universities and other R&D establishments to promote the interrelations of the regional industries and research facilities. This decision was based on the findings and recommendations of a 'white book' for the region edited by the CUS, the Agency for Development of the Lower Rhine County (Association de Développement du Bas-Rhin – ADIRA) and the Agency for Infrastructure and Development of the Strasbourg Region (Société d'Aménagement et d'Équipement de la Région de Strasbourg – SERS) (CUS, 1982a). However, a closer look at the decision-making process clearly reveals that this decision goes back to the initiative of two personalities in leading positions at the CUS and the county, one of them with personal ties with the chamber of commerce.

For different reasons the initial position at Illkirch-Graffenstaden was more or less perfect for the creation of a new regional technopole. First of all, there was an R&D tradition. The university campus had already been located in Illkirch since 1972 (area: 3 square kilometres), as well as the Faculty of Pharmaceutics and several laboratories and some biotechnological oriented enterprises, which are located in the periphery of the campus. Second, there were the existing plans and the ownership situation. The land utilization plans of 1969 and 1973 defined an area of about 3.9 square kilometres at Illkirch as a zone of mixed use (*Zone d'aménagement différé* – ZAD), of which the designate location of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch was part. It was therefore relatively easy for the CUS to set up the Parc d'Innovation at Illkirch-Graffenstaden, without any designation of zones or legal acts. Furthermore, almost 85 per cent of the terrain to be developed was already property of the CUS at this time. Finally, since the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch was intended as a directly adjacent prolongation of one of Strasbourg's most important urban development and suburbanization axes, car and public transport accessibility was good and easy to optimize.

In 1985 the CUS transferred the planning, execution and management of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch to the Société d'Aménagement et d'Équipement de la Région de Strasbourg (SERS), which is still in charge of these duties. Two years later, in 1987 the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch began with an area of about 0.63 square kilometres (Figure 8.3). At the same time an important A-road (CD468) was relocated, right in-between the university campus and the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch. In 1993, in the second stage the area of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch was enlarged to its maximum of 1.7 square kilometres. The total area was expected to be commercialized within 25 years (by about 2010). Although the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch is part of a *Zone d'aménagement concertée* (ZAC: urban development zone) which also allows residential use, the






Figure 8.1 Location of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch and other important large-scale office sites and tertiary parks in the agglomeration of Strasbourg

Source: UvA-Kaartenmakers

park area is statutorily defined as a business park and enterprise zone (*Zone d'activité concertée*). Therefore only industrial, commercial and business use, but no residential use, is allowed (the entire industrial/business/commercial use area is 1.3 square kilometres).

Other high-tech and research enterprises had already been established during the first planning phase. As an example, in 1982 IREPA-Laser took up residence at the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch. Today IREPA-Laser produces rotor blades, using the results of their basic research in laser technology. At present (June 2004) two privately managed initiatives offer approximately 17,000 square metres of space for offices and other activities, enjoying a one hundred per cent occupancy rate. Due to this success a third area is being developed, with four new office buildings offering top-range facilities. Furthermore a Bioparc, initiated by the CUS and the SERS is in its project stage, to meet the needs of companies in their post-incubation phase.




Figure 8.2 Detailed plan of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch. Urban Planners: Maechel, Delauny, Jund. Architects: A. Zubléna and J.M. Blondelle.  
Source: SERS

***Architecture and physical characteristics of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch***

The physical and architectural characteristics are easily recognizable on the map (Figure 8.2) and the aerial photo (Figure 8.3). Westwards, the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch is bordered by the Rhine–Rhône canal and an A-road (CD468). Northwards, the area is bordered by the university campus and eastwards by forest. The Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch is designed to high standards in terms of architecture and aesthetics which are intended to allow the creation of a park of exemplary environmental quality, with due consideration for the ecological, social and economic conditions. The architecture and the principles of urban development of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch are intended to represent civilization at the end of the twentieth century and to set up a new benchmark for technopoles on an international level (SERS 1987: 17).

Currently the whole Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch covers 1.7 square kilometres. Approximately 20 per cent of the whole area has been designated as green belt and forests. As a result, only 1.3 square kilometres are available for development. The park's architecture is purpose-designed on a radial layout to fit in with the natural quality of the site. Ample public areas and green belts reflect the desire to preserve the innovative spirit of the project. The contours and outlines interact with the surrounding vegetation and form a natural boundary. The radial structure, which is intended to symbolize the position of mankind in the cosmic infiniteness, is overlaid with an equilateral pentagon which is also a symbol of science and free thinkers (SERS 1987: 17, 38). The intersections of the pentagons and the concentric circles are the locations of the main communication



Figure 8.3 Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch: aerial view from north  
Source: SERS



Figure 8.4 Ortho-clinical diagnostic building.

Architects: P. Engassu and G. Wojtyczka.  
Photo: Airdia sol Rothan.



Figure 8.5 Pôle API.

Architects: A. Zubléna and J.M. Blondelle.  
Photo: Airdia sol Rothan.



Figure 8.6 Chiral building.

Architects: SA Collard et Taxis.  
Photo: Airdia sol Rothan

points (e.g. the forecourt of the Pôle API). Quite a lot of symbolism is imbedded in this regional development project. However, such planning along the lines of aesthetic and symbolic objectives rather than economic ones is regrettably not untypical for technopoles and comparable establishments, particularly in a French context. The high requirements made of architectural design and free spaces are shown in the additional pictures of selected buildings (Figures 8.4–8.6).

### ***Organization and financing of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch***

The lion's share of the investment of approximately €100 million (before tax) needed to realize the Parc d'Innovation was financed by the Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg. As already mentioned above, the CUS as the appropriate authority and landowner of the developing area assigned all rights of planning, commercialization and management as well as adjunctive duties such as maintenance to the SERS<sup>3</sup> (CUS 1985). In order to enable and promote the establishment of new and smaller enterprises, Alsabail was founded as an affiliated company of the SERS. Alsabail is a private but publicly owned property-owner and leasing agency. The office buildings and the shared facilities are administrated by Alsabail and therefore indirectly by the SERS, whose major mission is the preservation of the spirit of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch. The SERS therefore has the power to decide which companies are allowed to buy plots and establish premises at the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch (CUS 1985: 3, 5). In addition to the selective power of the SERS regarding the first-time selling of a plot, these rights are also given by contract in the event that an enterprise closes down and wants to sell its terrain and buildings. Even then the SERS has a say in the proceedings. The same applies to leasable areas. As the right-hand man of the SERS, Alsabail decides who is allowed to lease and who is not. The leasers are not allowed to sublet or to retail the leasing contracts without the approval of Alsabail (CUS, 1985: 5). Thus, the real-estate management at the Parc d'Innovation is not evolutionary and market-oriented but controlled and oriented towards the super-ordinate interests and ideologies of the Parc d'Innovation, which were determined 20 years ago. Probably as a result, only 0.5 square kilometres of the disposable area had been commercialized by April 2004, despite land prices being very moderate. The price of building land is fixed at €47<sup>4</sup> per square metre for the whole Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch and the net lease price for offices and laboratories is stable at between €105 and €145 per square metre per year.

### ***Current milestones and innovative ways of funding***

It is worth noting that, since 1994, three large image-enhancing institutions of international relevance have been established at the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch, namely the Pôle d'Application et de Promotion de l'Innovation (Pôle API in 1994 with more than 29,000 square metres of offices and laboratories), the Institut de Génétique et de Biologie Moléculaire et Cellulaire (IGBMC in 1994) and the International Space University (ISU in 1995). These projects have been implemented in very different ways, mostly with excessive public investment at various levels, one of them due to a very innovative, more or less unorthodox financing plan. The Pôle API was realized by the Région d'Alsace with financial aid from the Département Bas-Rhin (30 per cent), the CUS (35 per cent) and the municipality of Illkirch-Graffenstaden, which paid approximately €1 million in addition to its quota already paid by the CUS share. The

total project costs amount to approximately €50 million. A more innovative way of funding was invented for the International Space University (ISU). The ISU, as part of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), was not planned in the beginning of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch, but it is definitely an important milestone due to its excellent international image. The ISU building costs amount to about €16 million, financed equally by the CUS, the Région d'Alsace and the French national government. The running-costs are paid for by the French Space Agency (Centre National d'Études Spatiales, CNES) and partially by the European Space Agency (ESA). Indeed, long-term financing is not guaranteed because the space agencies are continuously reducing their contributions. Lastly we wish to mention the Institut de Génétique et de Biologie Moléculaire et Cellulaire (IGMBC) which, since January 2001, has been a joint research unit of the Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), the Institut national de la santé et de la recherche médicale (INSERM) and the Université Louis Pasteur (ULP). The institute is financed completely by private means. The total building and some of the running costs are paid for by the US pharmaceutical company Bristol Myers Squibb. In addition, the CUS, the Région d'Alsace and the Département Bas-Rhin pay a certain share of the equipment costs. In return for the investment, Bristol Myer Squibb maintains all the patent rights and research results of the IGBMC. In any event, the researchers are free to take their own decisions and engage in their own research topics and strategies.

### **Impact on the regional economy and the regional labour market**

It is not easy to evaluate the impact of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch on the regional economy since data on the Parc d'Innovation is not maintained as well as it should and could be. This might also be a general problem applicable to all technopoles and similar facilities. Thus, in 1991, an evaluation of the French technopoles, initiated by the Délégation à l'Aménagement du Territoire et à l'Action Régionale (DATAR) failed since there was obviously resistance to the technopoles, that apparently supplied no, or insufficient, information because they did not want their rivals in business to find out too much about them (Eberlein 1997: 107). Moreover, a second study in 1993 failed due to similar problems. Similarly to Eberlein, this study is based only on the profiling of the technopoles and hardly permits serious statements on the synergies and economic effects of the technopoles (Eberlein 1997: 109). Unfortunately, no current business and employment data on the Parc d'Innovation level is available for the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch case study. The basic information available at Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch level is summarized in Table 8.1. Indeed, the number of employees listed in Table 8.1 is outdated, although it still allows some interesting interpretations.

The business and employment data of Tables 8.1 and 8.2 is classified according to the statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE Rev. 1). NACE Rev. 1 is very suitable for an international comparison at EC level and at a global level as well, since it is linked directly

Table 8.1 Enterprises and institutions at the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch

<i>Branches</i>	<i>NACE code</i>	<i>Number of enterprises</i>	<i>Number of employees (at time of settlement)</i>	<i>Origin (when known)</i>
Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres	24	2	36	France (1) Spain (1)
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus	32	1	– *	France (1)
Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel	50	1	80	USA (1)
Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles	51	17	321	Canada (1) France (7) Japan (2) Taiwan (1) UK (2) USA (2) Unknown (2)
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods	52	3	25	France (2) Germany (1)
Hotels and restaurants	55	4	– *	France (4)
Air transport	62	1	219	France (1)
Post and telecommunications	64	1	30	France (1)
Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding	65	1	2	France (1)
Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and household goods	71	1	7	USA (1)
Computer and related activities	72	10	191	France (8) Germany (1) Unknown (1)
Research and development	73	13	771	Canada (1) France (6) Germany (1) Japan (2) USA (1) Unknown (2)
Other business activities	74	10	367	France (5) Japan (2) Sweden (1) USA (2)
Education	80	4	560 (+ approx. 600 Students)	France (3) USA (1)
Activities of membership organizations n.e.c	91	3	49	France (3)
Total		72	2658	

\* Number of employees at time of settlement unknown

Source: L'Annuaire des Entreprises, June 2003, SERS

with the internationally recognized ISIC Rev. 3 classification, developed under the auspices of the United Nations. The very detailed NACE classification system is divided into 17 sections (letters A to Q), 31 subsections (2-character alphabetical codes), 60 divisions (2-digit codes), 222 groups (3-digit codes) and lastly 503 classes (4-digit codes). The following analysis focuses on the service sector, using the NACE 2-digit level and the aggregation thereof respectively.

The focus of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch is shown in Table 8.1. One quarter, that is 17 of the 72 enterprises and institutions situated at the Parc d'Innovation, are involved in R&D and education. These 17 establishments employ approximately 50 per cent of all employees at the Parc d'Innovation. The most important employers in this R&D are the IGBMC (600 employees, France), Q-Biogene (53 employees, Canada), Prestwick Chemical Inc. (25 employees, USA) and Transgene (25 employees, France). As regards the education sector, the most important players are the École Supérieure de Biotechnologie de Strasbourg (300 employees plus 160 students), the École Nationale Supérieure de Physique de Strasbourg (150 employees plus approximately 350 students) and the International Space University (28 employees plus 47 students, USA). Secondly, the NACE section 51 is of importance. Most of the enterprises allotted to this section are involved in pharmaceutical products or laboratory apparatus. With approximately 100 employees the French Fisher Bioblock Scientific is particularly significant, as is Ventana Medical Systems (65 employees, USA). Furthermore, many other highly specialized, mostly small and medium-sized enterprises are situated at the Parc d'Innovation. Most of them are involved in consulting and specialized production topics, often closely linked to R&D facilities.

This description of the status quo of the economic impact should also include details of how the employment situation has developed. As already mentioned, the economic data of the Parc d'Innovation provided by the SERS is neither very detailed nor does it enable the realization of a time-series at the Parc d'Innovation level. Due to this lack of data, even on the urban district level, the municipal level was used as a supplement for the time-series (Table 8.2). The number of enterprises and employees shown in Table 8.2 are also classified according to NACE Rev.1. Since the French statistics did not use the NACE classification until the census of 1999, the older data (census 1990), following the national NAF-classification, was reclassified using a correspondence table which was specifically developed for this task. However, due to the very different systems of the two classifications it was not possible to allocate all the NAF classes to the NACE categories. Some additional aggregations were therefore needed.

Table 8.2 is an impression of the dynamics of the service sector at Illkirch-Graffenstaden. The number of jobs in the service sector is increasing all the time in the municipality of Illkirch-Graffenstaden. From 1990 onwards, the number of people employed in the service sector increased from 6,108 to 9,680 (plus 58 per cent), whereas the growth at CUS level was only 27 per cent (1990: 97,336, 1999: 124,328). The same applies to other agglomeration municipalities at



Table 8.2 Enterprises and employment at Illkirch-Graffenstaden and at the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch

Branches (NACE)*	At PII (2003)**	Number of enterprises				Number of full-time employees	
		at Illkirch-Graffenstaden (1999)*** in total and by size-class (number of full-time employees)				at Illkirch- Graffenstaden	
		Total	0	1-9	> 10	1990	1999
50+51+52	21	256	85	138	32	2416	2662
55	4	55	9	40	6	216	251
60	0	36	22	13	1	132	122
61+62+63	1	3	2	1	0	64	166
64	1	0	0	0	0	72	93
65+66+67	1	24	14	9	1	116	109
70+71+72+74	21	855	682	151	18	672	1259
75	0	2	0	0	2	636	1187
73+80	17	33	19	8	6	1140	2072
85	0	176	129	41	6	328	1406
91	3	40	26	14	0	28	81
92	0	52	39	12	1	40	67
90+93	0	47	26	20	1	164	141
95	0	0	0	0	0	80	64
99	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
Total	69	1579	1053	447	66	6108	9680

\* For definitions of the NACE-classes see Table 8.1

\*\* Source: L'annuaire des Entreprises, June 2003, SERS

\*\*\* Source: INSEE (SIRENE Base de donnés, 1990 NAF classification, 1999 NACE classification)

which tertiary parks are located, for example Schiltigheim. Thus, one could deduce that there has been a forced growth of service jobs in the close vicinity of technopoles and comparable facilities. A similar analysis, focusing on the so-called *fonctions métropolitaines supérieures* (superior metropolitan functions, such as R&D, financial services or telecommunication), which are a subset of the tertiary sector, lead to the same findings. The number of these superior metropolitan functions grew only slightly in Strasbourg between 1990 and 1999, but increased significantly at CUS level (without Strasbourg, plus 49 per cent) and specifically in Illkirch-Graffenstaden, as a clear result of the Parc d'Innovation as well as in Schiltigheim (Wendel 2004: 611).

The fastest growing economic sectors in Illkirch-Graffenstaden are real estate, renting and business activities (NACE 70, 71, 73, 74), including EDP and related services, public administration, including defence and compulsory social

security (NACE 75) and R&D (NACE 73) together with education (NACE 80). Considering the establishments situated at the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch (Table 8.1) it is apparent that the growth in public administration activities is to be considered as taking place more or less autonomously. By contrast, the development of the R&D and education sector, as well as real estate, renting and business activities, is definitely a result of the Parc d'Innovation. Approximately 1,330 (in 2003) jobs in R&D and education are located at the Parc d'Innovation, whereas the total number of those jobs at Illkirch-Graffenstaden is about 2,100. Similarly to the situation with regard to the renting activities, approximately 45 per cent of all jobs in these sectors are situated at the Parc d'Innovation. It is also worth noting that most of the enterprises at Illkirch-Graffenstaden, as well as at the Parc d'Innovation, are small and medium-sized enterprises, including those with a foreign background.

To recapitulate, the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch has had a clear and positive effect on employment in the municipality of Illkirch-Graffenstaden, as well as in the whole agglomeration. In April 2004, about 2,300 people were employed at the 70 enterprises of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch, most of them in chemistry, biotechnology and even aerospace technology. The Parc d'Innovation therefore provides approximately 20 per cent of all jobs in the service sector at Illkirch-Graffenstaden and approximately 8 per cent of those in the Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg. However, according to Benko no further beneficial effects are expected since the positive potential of technopoles in general is limited and their regional integration is relatively weak (Benko 2000: 166).

### ***Potentialities of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch***

As shown in Figure 8.1, the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch is very accessible by car and public transport. The nearest highway intersections are 500 metres to the south and 1500 metres to the north and the nearest tram station is 250 metres away, situated at the adjacent university campus in the north of the Parc d'Innovation. The nearest railway station (Graffenstaden) is about 3.3 kilometres away. Depending on the train connections, the Strasbourg main station can be reached from Graffenstaden station within 7 to 15 minutes. It also takes only about 25 minutes to reach the main station by tram. By car it takes about 15 minutes if there is no traffic jam, although this is not very often the case. Thus, the Parc d'Innovation is perfectly integrated into the regional traffic network. The Parc d'Innovation has a wide catchment area. As far as public transport is concerned, the 45-minute isochrone includes the whole CUS (1999: population approximately 451,150, employees approximately 224,350, source INSEE) and some municipalities in the west of the CUS, as well as the German municipalities of Kehl and Willstätt. Moreover, as regards individual traffic, the 30-minute isochrone includes the whole Schéma de Cohérence Territoriale de la Région de Strasbourg (SCOTERS),<sup>5</sup> an area with approximately 581,150 inhabitants and approximately 261,150 employees (1999, Source: INSEE), as well as Offenbourg and the lion's share of Ortenau County in Germany (Ortenau County, approximately

411,500 inhabitants in 2000, source: Statistisches Amt Baden-Württemberg). The 45-minute isochrone by car extends in a southern direction to Colmar (Alsace) and close to Freiburg-Breisgau (Germany). These catchment area assessments correspond with the results of a survey of ADEUS for the *Livre blanc de la région transfrontalière Strasbourg–Offenburg* (ADEUS 2003: 67). The Parc therefore offers enormous potential for employable and highly qualified people.

Furthermore, the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch, and Strasbourg itself, obviously projects a certain international image. Despite the majority of establishments at the Parc d'Innovation having a French background (43 of 72), foreign investments have been made. For example, in 2003, approximately 450 people were employed at eight establishments with a US American background and an additional 50 or so people each at Canadian and Japanese companies. Most of the establishments with a foreign background are head offices for the European market and fulfil customer care or teaching functions, such as the Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics European Support Centre which has more than 100 employees. This reflects a general trend in Alsace, since Alsace, and specifically the Greater Strasbourg area, are situated very centrally in Europe. Further growth can therefore be expected.

### **Analysis of the multilevel decision-making process**

Even though France is becoming more and more decentralized, the country still has a centralist administrative structure. In view of this, the decision-making process related to the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch is of special interest and specifically the question of whether it really is multilevel or even innovative. This question is investigated below in more detail and in relation to the different stages of the project and its specific aspects.

#### ***The actors who framed the project***

The actors most involved in the project are administrative actors and their subordinate public agencies. Despite the fact that Strasbourg has traditionally been an EC location, no EC programme was drawn on when the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch first started. There is a similar situation at the national level. The French national government gave subsidies and support to the project, but is not directly involved as an actor. This has changed during recent years due to the fact that since 1996 the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch has been part of the trinational BioValley Project (France, Germany, Switzerland). The aim of this project is to promote the Upper Rhine Valley as a biotechnology region and to achieve the critical mass to become one of the world's leading locations. Today, 40 per cent of all worldwide pharmaceutical groups and enterprises are represented within the perimeter of the BioValley initiative. Since the BioValley Project is trans-border oriented, it is supported by INTERREG II and III. About €2.2 million were spent on the project in the period 1997–2001 and an additional €2.4 million in the period 2002–2005.

In the case of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch, the Département Bas-Rhin and the Région d'Alsace are the official project partners at regional level. The agency for regional development of the Département Bas-Rhin (ADIRA) was assigned to make the first inquiries and feasibility studies. At local governmental level, the departments of economy of the Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg and the municipality of Illkirch-Graffenstaden are the parties which are most heavily involved. The executive agencies at this level are ADEUS and SERS. The Louis Pasteur University is the most heavily involved semi-governmental or non-governmental organization. Moreover, the Deposit and Consignment Office (Caisse de dépôts et consignations) and the Société de Développement régional (SADE) are involved as main financial intermediaries. SADE is specialized in financing innovative start-ups and enterprises in their post-incubation phase.

The most seriously involved interest organization is the chamber of commerce and industry, which can also be indirectly regarded as one of the initiators of the project. The commitments of the chamber have been very important for the framing and the implementation of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch. Even if the chamber's function is more or less advisory, it has had a crucial influence due to the person in charge being a representative of the chamber of commerce and at the same time a representative of the Région d'Alsace.

Unfortunately there is no participation by citizens or action groups, nor was there during the project's development and realization. The steering committee of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch comprises the CUS as the landowner, the SERS as the property developer and building promoter and the ADIRA and ADEUS as consultants, with the Louis Pasteur University as associate to this committee. Thus only public stakeholders with strong potential, and no private stakeholders, were involved in the project framing.

### ***Goals and interests of the actors***

The strategy that was mainly pursued was intended to boost the international recognition of the Strasbourg region and the whole of Alsace as the third largest scientific centre in France. No additional mention was made of any additional project legitimatization. The goals and interests of the actors mentioned above are not very well documented but they can be deduced from the actors' general policy and the basic principal documents of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch. The main goals supported by all actors were to combat the industrial crisis and restructure the economy, including the promotion of important, but until then absent economic activities (e.g. Biotech) as well as to stabilize Alsace as the third largest French research centre. One of the main objectives of the CUS and the chamber of commerce was to boost the image of Strasbourg as a real metropolis. This was because Strasbourg had been perceived more as a sleepy and picturesque EC capital, rather than as a centre for research and innovation. Lastly, the primary aim of the chamber of commerce was to create a suitable environment for small and medium-sized enterprises as innovation poles for future economic development. There is no documentation to show whether the augmentation of

tax revenues was a motive for the implementation of the Parc d'Innovation. However, it is assumed that this was the case since all regional entities profit from the initiative. It is obvious that different actors' goals only differ from each other outwardly and that they are not really in competition with each other.

That is not to say that there was no competition. However, there was none between the main actors but rather between their subsidiaries. The municipalities of the CUS started competing with each other especially after the implementation of the Espace Européenne de l'Entreprise at Schiltigheim, the second important tertiary park at the CUS. The other municipalities of the CUS wanted to have their own technopoles or tertiary parks to increase their tax revenues. For example, the municipalities of Lampertheim and Eckbolsheim had plans to create comparable facilities. These competing activities were reconciled in 2002 by a national law. According to this law, 1 per cent of the revenues of tertiary parks in an urban community, such as the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch, has to be distributed to all the other municipalities in the urban community that do not have such facilities. Thus, the competing municipalities earn money without investment and, at the same time, the inexpedient race to see which municipalities can develop the most business parks – many of which are often not required – is stopped.

To summarize, the main objective of the project was, and still is, to provide a large and high-quality facility for innovative research and business activities. The general philosophy is to create a place of integral communication. The Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch was conceived as an invention for communication between individuals, technologies and between the mutually inspiring enterprises (SERS 1987: 17). The economic focus is on biotech, genetics and aerospace technologies. It is interesting to note that the involved actors did not change the defined goals of the Parc d'Innovation during the process, even though the Parc d'Innovation has, since 1996, been embedded in the superordinate BioValley Project. Indeed the focus on technologies has changed slightly. For example, laser technology is not that important anymore.

### ***Practices of decision-making, coalitions of power and exchanges of interest***

As discussed, the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch is definitely a public project, despite a lot of lobby interests being incorporated. Two major coalitions therefore need to be mentioned. First, the coalition of the Département Bas-Rhin and the Department of Economy of the Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg, which is linked primarily to the initial phase. They were associated with the chamber of commerce which, at the time, was managed by the director of the Département. Second, there is the CUS itself, with the fact that it is dominated by the interests of Strasbourg being of particular relevance. The development of the CUS was affected substantially by the interests of the core city of Strasbourg. In fact, Strasbourg leads the CUS. The mayor of Strasbourg is also president of the CUS and more than 50 per cent of the members of the CUS council are delegates from Strasbourg. The coalition's structure has not

changed since 1983. It is still primarily a public–public structure with some public–private investments and projects. The dominant coalitions and the domination of the organization of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch by the SERS correspond with the formal institutional conditions. This dominant policy coalition is certainly adequate as regards matching the established objective of the project, which is the settlement of high-tech establishments in leading positions. Whether this coalition – and even more so this settlement policy – is adequate for the creation of a self-preserving development and economy at the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch is still open for discussion. In this context it should be mentioned that citizens did not have a say in the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch project in which no private interest group participated. The project was planned and realized without offering any co-determination possibilities to citizens. Unfortunately, the local and national media do not seem to pay much attention to the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch. As a result, the power of the media with regard to the promotion of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch and the formation of opinion is not bailed out. Furthermore, there is no evidence for the existence of an opposing coalition. However, it is clear that some local politicians are becoming more and more dissatisfied with the achievements of the project and a powerful opposition will probably emerge.

One may think that the municipalities are the losers in the decision-making process, but they in fact benefit from the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch. Moreover, the leading coalition cannot be accused of acting on the basis of nepotism. The objectives pursued benefit the sustainable economic development of the whole region.

In addition, there have been clear investments by private and public stakeholders. Nevertheless, the level of private investment has been relatively low. Although new establishments and therefore private investments have occurred, the really huge investments (e.g. Pôle API, ISU, IGBMC, CRITT) have been made by the public authorities. This public investment was primarily done to enhance the attractiveness of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch for further private investments. The crucial reasons for private stakeholder investments were the well-equipped infrastructure, the proximity to the universities and, without doubt, the hidden subsidies, for example the preparation of plots at the second stage of the park, even though there was still enough free first stage space. As far as the public investors are concerned, further investments are essential to keep the project running and to provide hope for autonomous development. As far as the private investors were concerned, the park's proximity to high-skilled research facilities was the main reason for them to respond.

### **Insights from the inside: the local actors' point of view**

In order to acquire a more complete impression of the state of the art and possible problems of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch, several key figures in the public and the private sectors have been interviewed. Although the interlocutors represent

enterprises, administrations and political parties with sometimes even opposite objectives, their opinions hardly deviate from each other.

What do they think are the most important successes and failures of the project? The most obvious success from their point of view is the creation of about 2,000 new jobs, although this is not as many as expected. The most notable success is the clearer definition of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch profile. Now there is a distinct focus on biotech and aerospace technologies. The settlement of the IGBMC (Institut de Génétique et de Biologie Moléculaire et Cellulaire), Transgene and the International Space University (ISU) are important milestones on the way to a high-tech location of international relevance. These kinds of institutions and companies are needed to improve Strasbourg's still weak image as a high-tech location. One further success is that lots of enterprises have privileged interrelations with the universities at Strasbourg, especially the Campus d'Illkirch of the Université Louis Pasteur (ULP). It is openly acknowledged that the overall concept of communication and knowledge transfer between universities and companies is working. However, these relations are not as intensive as they should and even could be. The cooperation is still just some kind of process-selling with a unilateral orientation. There is, therefore, still a coordination backlog between the university research and innovative enterprises. Another problem is the lack of entrepreneurial visions as referred to in the case of most of the smaller enterprises at the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch. This lack of long-range strategies and visions is rated as a major problem because it means it is nearly impossible for the SERS to develop sustainable strategies for the Parc d'Innovation.

The main failure stated is that, even after approximately 20 years, the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch is not completely commercialized. Therefore it has not achieved the critical mass of enterprises and employees to generate its own endogenous momentum. The common conclusion is that this is not a failure of the project's conception, but of the general business development strategy and the politicians' attitude. One of the interviewed people expressed it very aptly by saying 'Most politicians did not yet understand that they have to recruit and attract the companies, they still think that the companies have to earn the honour to be located in the Alsace. Therefore Strasbourg is not as hard-working as Mulhouse (115 kilometres south of Strasbourg, close to Basle/CH) to establish a close network of technopoles'.

The interviewed people evaluated no element of the project as particularly innovative. Only the commercialization of real estate and of leasable buildings by subsidiaries (SERS and Alsabail) was mentioned as a minor innovative approach, since the availability of good value offices and laboratories is particularly important for start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises.

Hardly any statements were made regarding the framing, the decision-making and the democratic qualities of the project. There was basically no distinct democratic process. This is one of the major problems mentioned by all people interviewed. Two major problems concerning the economic development of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch and of the whole Strasbourg region have been mentioned: the French political and planning structures; and the specific situation at

Strasbourg itself. Although the CUS and Strasbourg are relatively autonomous with their development strategies, the main strategies and frameworks are provided by the Département Bas-Rhin and the Région d'Alsace. The local authorities and councils have to adapt to them if they want to receive the urgently needed project subsidies. Therefore, the strategies are not developed from the bottom up and are often not problem-oriented at local level. Second, as already mentioned, there is the imbalance of power and the supremacy of Strasbourg in the sense-making process at the CUS. Furthermore, politicians at all administrative levels were blamed for not recognizing the current problems and for reacting too late and sometimes inappropriately. They are blamed for thinking in a national way without any vision of an international and trans-border level, including Switzerland and Germany, despite talking about such international approaches, preferring perhaps not to grant other states a share in their success. Finally all those interviewed are doubtful about the success of the Parc d'Innovation and do not exclude the possibility of it failing.

The people interviewed are or have been in leading positions within the Communauté Urbaine Strasbourg, the Région d'Alsace, the Département Bas-Rhin, the chambers of handicraft and commerce, the municipal governments, two major banks, the Association de développement du Bas-Rhin (ADIRA), the EC council, an international company and an advisory committee.

## **Lessons to be learned**

The Strasbourg metropolitan area is definitely a growth pole of tertiary functions and research activities. However, Strasbourg seems to have problems maintaining and improving its position in the face of international competition. Strasbourg is still characterized by small and medium-sized enterprises, primarily serving a regional and often local market, albeit that this market is sometimes a trans-border one. The business landscape of the Strasbourg region is complemented by some global players and research facilities with an international reputation. It is not known why the expected others have not established premises in Strasbourg – after all, the conditions in Strasbourg are ideal. The Louis Pasteur University ranks third after Paris and Lyon, the financial sector is highly developed and the natural environment is definitely adequate to attract highly skilled employees. One reason, of particular relevance to the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch, is probably the policy and the concentrated authority of the SERS, as well as the general attitude of politicians and planners, as borne out by the complaints of the key people interviewed. Probably the main reason is that Strasbourg has still not reached the critical mass required to gain international recognition as a true metropolis. Obviously Strasbourg has almost reached a qualitative-critical mass (e.g. BioValley, EC-functions), but not yet a quantitative one. The number of internationally famous companies present in the area is still too small. Moreover, the pull-factors are still too weak.



Therefore, in terms of a tool for regional development, the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch has to be evaluated as unsuccessful. From the economic point of view, the creation of 2,000 jobs and 70 companies definitely constitutes an insufficient achievement given the enormous investments. However, the aim to create an extraordinary facility for innovative enterprises and research has been achieved. Thus, the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch can be regarded as a technopole, namely a concentration of promising research and technology transfers.

Beyond all criticism, and despite apparent problems related to the commercialization of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch, the establishment of the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch, as well as the strategic focus on biotechnology chosen by the Communauté Urbaine des Strasbourg, were correct steps towards the economic reorientation. The successful application of the Région d'Alsace to the national government in Paris for the regional label of *Pôle de Compétitivité* (competition pole) for therapeutic innovation is to a large extent based on synergies existing at the Parc d'Innovation. The *Pôle de Compétitivité* was initiated as a national promotional instrument in autumn 2004 by the inter-ministerial committee for development and planning (Comité Interministériel de l'Aménagement et du Développement du Territoire – CIADT), in order to better position France within international competition among regions.<sup>6</sup> Once recognized as such, the *Pôles de Compétitivité* will receive financial support amounting to €1.5 billion (until 2007). Thus, starting from autumn 2005, not least thanks to the commitment of the Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg, Alsace will receive the benefit of new subsidies and tax exemptions. Considering the success with the instrument of the *Pôle de Compétitivité*, the decision-making practice of the SERS, focusing strictly on high-end research facilities and companies, may prove to have been right. Possibly, in the near future, this may stimulate new growth at the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch – as it is urgently needed.

## Acknowledgements

I would like to thank all the people who supported me with the compilation of this case study. They are, in alphabetical order: Bernard Aubry (INSEE), Mathieu Berg (SERS), Elisabeth Guth (CUS), and Prof. Gabriel Wackermann (Université Paris-Sorbonne).

## Notes

- 1 The Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg (CUS) is a community of 26 municipalities surrounding Strasbourg and the city of Strasbourg.
- 2 The DATAR (Delegation for regional planning and operation, established 1963) was a powerful research and planning agency at national level in France. In December 2005 the DATAR was replaced by the Délégation Interministérielle à l'Aménagement et à la Compétitivité des Territoires (DIACT).
- 3 The SERS is also in charge of the second important tertiary park at the CUS, the Espace Européen de l'Entreprises at Schiltigheim. The Espace Européen was set up in the early 1990s and is completely financed by the municipality of Schiltigheim.

Furthermore, the SERS was the awarding authority for the new buildings of the European Parliament at Strasbourg.

- 4 This price is subsidized by national, regional and municipal finance. The relatively high price per square metre, resulting from the charges for the extraordinary local public infrastructure and the high contingent of green spaces, was one of the major problems that has existed since the beginning of the project (CUS, 1982a: 30).
- 5 In France the regional comprehensive plan is named Schéma de Cohérence Territoriale – SCOT (Loi n° 2000–1208). In order to develop and implement this kind of plan, the voluntarily participating municipalities create syndicates and by doing this they delimit the plan's scope. In the case of the Strasbourg region, the SCOT is called Schéma de Cohérence Territoriale de la Région de Strasbourg. The syndicate dealing with this task is a unique formation, since it is bi-national, consisting of 144 French municipalities and 51 municipalities of the German province of Ortenau (Wendel 2005: 263).
- 6 See [www.competitivite.gouv.fr](http://www.competitivite.gouv.fr)

## References

- ADEUS – Agence de Développement et d'Urbanisme de l'Agglomération Strasbourgeoise (2003) *Livre Blanc – Strasbourg/Ortenau. Document pour la concertation*, Strasbourg: ADEUS.
- Benko, G. (2000) 'Technopoles, high-tech industries and regional development: a critical review', *GeoJournal*, 51, 3: 157–167.
- Bruhat, T. (1990) *Vingt technopoles, un premier bilan. Étude à l'attention de la DATAR*, Paris: La Documentation Française.
- CUS – Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg (1982a) 'Propositions pour la création du Parc d'innovation d'Illkirch', Strasbourg: unpublished internal report.
- CUS – Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg (1982b) 'Parc d'innovation d'Illkirch – Dossier préparatoire', Strasbourg: unpublished internal report.
- CUS – Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg (1985) 'Contract between the Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg and the Société d'Aménagement et d'Équipement de la Région de Strasbourg (SERS)', Strasbourg: unpublished internal document.
- Eberlein, B. (1997) *Abschied vom Unitarismus? Regionale Innovationspolitik und 'Technopole' in Frankreich*, Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Eurostat (1996) *NACE Rev.1 – Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community*, Luxembourg: European Union.
- Kuhlmann, S. and Holland, D. (1995) *Evaluation von Technologiepolitik in Deutschland. Konzepte, Anwendung, Perspektiven*, Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag.
- Loi n°99–586 du 12 juillet 1999: *Loi relative au renforcement et à la simplification de la coopération intercommunale constituée*.
- Loi n°2000–1208 du 13 décembre 2000: *Loi relative à la solidarité et au renouvellement urbains (1). Version consolidée au 19 janvier 2005 – Titre Ier: Renforcer la cohérence des politiques urbaines et territoriales*.
- SERS – Société d'aménagement et d'Équipement de la Région de Strasbourg (1987) 'Parc d'innovation d'Illkirch – Zone d'aménagement concerté. Dossier de création – réalisation', Strasbourg: unpublished internal report.
- Wackermann, G. (1992) *Les pôles technologiques – Une mode ou une nécessité?* Paris: La Documentation française.

- Wackermann, G. (1993) 'Ansätze der Raumplanung in Frankreich – Bemühungen um Dezentralisierung', in: F. Schaffer (ed.) *Innovative Regionalentwicklung. Von der Planungsphilosophie zur Umsetzung*, Augsburg: Selbstverlag des Lehrstuhls für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeographie der Universität Augsburg.
- Wendel, J. (2004) 'La mutation des emplois hautement qualifiés dans l'agglomération transfrontalière strasbourgeoise', *Bulletin de l'Association de géographes français*, 81e Année, 4: 596–620.
- Wendel, J. (2005) 'Die Agglomeration Strasbourg: Struktur, Entwicklung und Tendenzen – ein Überblick', *Geographica Helvetica*, 60, 4: 260–274.

## 9 Vienna Erdberger Mais

### Public-sector driven long-term planning strategies

*Christina Enichlmair and Axel Borsdorf*

#### **Large-scale projects in Vienna: an introduction**

For Vienna, the main consequence of the fall of the Iron Curtain was the dramatic shift of its geopolitical and geo-economical location: from a marginal position to a central one in Europe. Vienna expected to become one of the most promising interfaces between the east and the west (Borsdorf 2002). The new location factors became even more relevant when Austria entered the European Union in 1995 and the Union itself expanded towards the east in 2004. The new location in a unifying Europe was the reason for fundamental changes in the urban economy. While the industrial sector suffered a remarkable decrease in size, the service sector was not only able to compensate for the loss of the secondary sector, but was even responsible for an increase in the number of employed people in Vienna. In 2001, more than 80 per cent of all gainfully employed people were working in the service sector (Hatz 2002).

A much more significant statistic is the growing importance of the office sector in the urban fabric. Vienna is a quite traditional, densely populated capital, orientated around just one main centre and structured in concentric rings. Over the years its social and economic characteristics have changed and in the 15 years after the fall of the iron curtain, the city's physiognomy has altered quite visibly. Scattered high-rise buildings emerged from the homogenous fabric of the former 6–7 storey houses, accentuating new fragmented structures in the urban organism. Most of these new towers are office buildings, some of them complemented by malls and/or residential functions.

Donau City, Floridotower, Millennium City, Vienna Twin Tower, T-Center or City Tower Vienna are just a few of a number of projects which have only been realized in the last decade and which make the skyline of Vienna much more diverse than it has been in previous centuries (Fassmann and Hatz 2002; Hansely and Schopper 1999; Juchelka 2002; Schopper 2000). In spite of the lack of urban planning efficiency – hardly any of these projects corresponded to the official urban development plan – it is evident that Vienna's service sector was much more effective in keeping its main activities within its administrative boundaries than the retail trade sector, where quite powerful businesses established their centres and shops outside the city's administrative area. In a bid to stop, or at

least delay, this process of suburbanization of economic activities, Vienna city administration showed that it was quite tolerant of new private projects, and it even encouraged new developments by public–private partnerships (Fellner and Schopper 2002). Of all these efforts, the four gasometers project in the Erdberger Mais area was one of the most successful projects.

Erdberger Mais is the most diverse of all Vienna's large projects. It can be regarded as the most ambitious urban planning project in modern-day Vienna. We analyse this large-scale project in more detail below.

## **Background of the Erdberger Mais project**

The project site is located in sections of the municipal districts of Landstrasse (third district) and Simmering (eleventh district) in the traditionally industrialized south-eastern area of Vienna, between its nearby city centre and Vienna International Airport. It is bordered by the Danube Canal to the north, the Eastern Railway to the east, residential zones near Simmeringer Hauptstrasse and Rennweg to the south and south-west, and Landstrasser Hauptstrasse as well as Schlachthausgasse, which separate the project area from residential zones in the north-west, closer to the city centre.

Erdberger Mais is divided by highway A23 running from the north-east to the south-west of the area (Figure 9.1). At present, the whole area covers 250 hectares and includes 5,000 inhabitants, 17,000 employees and 1,200,000 square metres of housing development. The project started in 1998 after the closure of the St Marx slaughterhouse, which dominated the St Marx area. The extension of the underground line U3 from the Schlachthausgasse station to the new Simmering terminal with the line running through the project area was a precondition for the development of the Erdberger Mais area. The goal of the project is to create a concentrated location that offers potential investors security and flexibility. This goal is to be achieved by means of a designated mix of land use and ecological uses of production-oriented services.

The housing development of 1,200,000 square metres is estimated to at least double in size during the process. The area is expected to have 13,500–16,000 inhabitants and around 45,000–53,000 employees by the time the project's scheduled completion date is reached. This is presumed to be between 2010 and 2015 (Magistratsabteilung 21A 2003a). The cooperative planning procedures will be supervised by the Vienna Municipal Department of District Planning and Land Use – Central West (MA 21A). In 1998, this body commissioned a planning team to coordinate the following fields of activity: extent and nature of land use, traffic, law of planning, available spaces, land management and preparation of land for building. According to the development plan, a stepwise development of the area requires service-orientated management of spaces in connection with professional marketing (Magistrat der Stadt Wien 2003a).

During the first project completion stage, which should have been finished in 2005, an increase in employment is expected due to the preparation and construction of the T-Center and TownTown projects, the expansion of Vienna




Figure 9.1 Location of Erdberger Mais in the Vienna agglomeration

Source: UvA-Kaartenmakers

Biocenter and projects adjacent to the Gasometer surroundings. The number of jobs is expected to double from 17,000 to 32,000, although the population will only increase by about 10 per cent. In its second stage, presumably lasting from 2005 to 2010, employment at the combined former slaughterhouse area, federal property holding grounds at Karree St Marx and Vienna Biocenter and the Baumgasse/Litfassstrasse and Gasometer areas will grow to 45,000. However, the population will only rise by up to 12,000 during the same period. The third stage of the project is to last from 2010 to 2015 and will be less dramatic than in the stages before, with smaller increases in employment and population. About 8,200 additional jobs will be created and the population will increase by up to 13,500. Overall, it is estimated that the number of jobs will triple during the development process, while the population will only increase by around 60 per cent (Magistratsabteilung 21A 2003b).

There are several reasons for preferring the description of practices of decision-making in the Erdberger Mais project and in particular the sub-areas of St Marx and Neu-Erdberg to the description of other urban development zones in Vienna such as Donau City or Wienerberg City. Apart from the size and scope of the project, the challenge lies in turning a huge trade and industrial area into a

service sector area, rather than establishing an entire new business centre in the open countryside.

According to the municipality of Vienna (Magistrat der Stadt Wien 2002), the strengths of Erdberger Mais are not only its favourable situation between the city centre and the airport but also its access to public transport such as the railway S7 going to and from Vienna International Airport, the underground line U3 which runs from the western districts of Vienna via the city centre to Simmering, access to highways (A23, A4), the proximity to the Wiener Prater recreation and park area, the amount of space available with a high potential for development especially due to the closure of the St Marx slaughterhouse in 1997, numerous building plots owned by the city of Vienna or funds related to the city of Vienna and the existence of the Campus Vienna Biocenter biotechnology cluster, which is the mainspring for establishing a highly qualified labour-intensive district.

However, the area also needs to tackle a number of weaknesses such as the high unemployment rate, low purchasing power, a high proportion of migrants, poor housing, housing near a heavily used traffic node and the barrier effect of the highway A23, deficient public transport and a poor pedestrian and bicycle network, unsatisfactory accessibility to the 'Prater' recreation area, which at present is solely accessible by bicycle or on foot from Erdberger Mais, a poor image due to the existence of various infrastructure facilities situated there (e.g. maintenance yard for the Vienna Underground, gas and electric works, old slaughterhouse area, old industrial plants) and the lack of local open spaces resulting from past industrial developments.



Figure 9.2 The Erdberger Mais project area

Source: Institut für Architekturwissenschaften – Digitale Architektur und Raumplanung (IEMAR), Technische Universität Wien

Although the extension of the underground line U3, which made development in this area possible, only took place in the year 2000, one of the crucial problems is still the timely supply of adequate infrastructure, both private and public. A new transport planning concept concerning streets and public buses was needed that is in step with the development process of realization of the particular project sites. The large old industrial sites are in need of technical infrastructure to make it possible to prepare building land.

The eastern part of Erdberger Mais, located in Simmering, is characterized by an exceptional and famous landmark, namely the four Viennese gasometers, built in the years 1896–1899 to ensure that Vienna was supplied by gas for lighting purposes (see figure 9.2, the four gasometers are situated in the centre of the project area). The gas tanks inside the 78-metre-high brick buildings were closed down in the middle of the 1980s as a result of the complete changeover from locally made town gas to cheaper natural gas. The rotund gas pumping buildings were designated as listed buildings in 1981 and, after years of planning, a mixture of uses with the main focus on housing was finalized. After a construction period of three years, the brick buildings were reopened as a new centre for living, shopping, leisure and recreation in 2001 (Figure 9.3). In 2004, 1,600 inhabitants and around 600 employees were living and working in the Vienna gasometers (Pöschek 2004).



Figure 9.3 The Vienna gasometers after revitalization  
Photo: A. Borsdorf, 2005



Another striking landmark is the recently finished T-Center near the biotechnology cluster Vienna Biocenter, in the south-western part of Erdberger Mais in the third district at the edge of Rennweg and the slaughterhouse area St Marx. Designed as the headquarters for the second largest wireless carrier in Austria, T-Mobile Austria, it is one of the biggest office buildings in the country. Because of the centralization of the hitherto distributed departments of T-Mobile Austria, 2,000 jobs are concentrated in one building. Construction started in 2002, and was completed in August 2004 (Figure 9.4). The T-Center offices are reserved for the companies T-Mobile Austria, T-Systems, T-Online, branch-related industries and infrastructural facilities (T-Systems 2004).

The most recent development in Erdberger Mais is TownTown, the superstructure of the 'Erdberg' station of underground line U3. This is to be a business town with 21 huge office buildings, shops, restaurants and a large public square in between the buildings (Figure 9.5). The project is expected to have a major effect on the Vienna skyline through the creation of high-quality modern architecture. Plans now entering their final stage amount to an estimated total of 130,000 square metres of living and working space for 4,000 to 5,000 employees. This project is special because it offers companies the opportunity to design their own company buildings even before the construction phase has begun (TownTown 2002).

An ambitious project within the Erdberger Mais project is the development of the slaughterhouse area St Marx, located between T-Center and TownTown. Its roots go back to the middle of the nineteenth century, when due to the growth of the city, it became necessary to construct a slaughterhouse to safeguard supplies to the Viennese population. It increased in importance and in size until the 1930s.



Figure 9.4 T-Center  
Photo: A. Borsdorf, 2005



Figure 9.5 TownTown

Source: Institut für Architekturwissenschaften – Digitale Architektur und Raumplanung (IEMAR), Technische Universität Wien

After the second World War, the slaughterhouse area was largely destroyed, but was reconstructed on the basis of old plans. In the 1960s, the city of Vienna decided to build a more modern meat processing centre to centralize the necessary supply facilities which were previously located in other parts of Landstrasse. A new meat processing centre was built between 1968 and 1975 and included a slaughterhouse, a vocational school and branch-related industries. In the beginning of the 1970s, the Federal Department of Landmark Protection concluded that there was no public interest in preserving old assets. The Cattle Market Hall, the administration building and the bank acquired the status of listed building in the 1990s. In 1997, the St Marx slaughterhouse was closed down due to structural problems. The plan is for the adjacent businesses located at Meat Center St Marx to be relocated in the intermediate term in order to make space for the development of this economically strategic important area covering 20 hectares (Magistrat der Stadt Wien 2002).

The listed Cattle Market Hall of the former slaughterhouse area is an example of another striking landmark. It is located near the T-Center in the centre of the slaughterhouse area St Marx, and is one of the last examples of large iron constructions from the nineteenth century. It is a moot question as to whether it is going to be used for sports, leisure, culture or food and drink in the context of the high technology Campus St Marx, or torn down and rebuilt in another place.

Some parts of the project have already been realized: the flagship project was the revitalization of the Viennese Gasometer. A new renovation scheme gave the four gasometer buildings several new functions, namely housing, shopping and recreation facilities by 2001. The second largest project was the realization of the 'T-Center' office and business centre in autumn 2004, especially designed for the wireless carrier 'T-Mobile'. Another property already developed is the Media Center St Marx, located in the former administration building of the closed-down St Marx slaughterhouse .

Apart from the revitalization of the Viennese Gasometer no new residential buildings have been realized until now, although there have been some developer

contests and land-use plan adaptations for an adequate mixture of land uses. To give an example, the Karree St Marx project situated on the periphery of the slaughterhouse area consists of four hectares of building land of which two-thirds are designated for residential use. The winning project of the developers' contest in Karree St Marx is to be completed by 2005–2006, when the approval by the MA 21A and the adaptation to the land-use plan has taken place.

In our study we focus on decision-making in planning in the sub-area of St Marx-Neu Erdberg, situated north to north-west from highway A23. St Marx and Neu Erdberg are a matter of particular interest due to the revitalization of the former slaughterhouse quarter, St Marx, the development of the Biotechnology cluster Campus Vienna Biocenter and the establishment of TownTown, where companies will be offered the chance to design their own individual company buildings and/or office sites.

### **Structural analysis of Erdberger Mais: impact on regional economy and labour market**

Ten census districts cover the whole project area Erdberger Mais. Table 9.1 shows the number of business establishments and the number of fully employed people in 2001 at census tract level, project area level and municipal district level.

The data gives an account of the situation in the project area before the realization of the big office site projects. The census tract 6, Franzosengraben, the area north of the Viennese Gasometer and census tract 7, and the area south of Franzosengraben had the highest number of business establishments as well as the highest number of employed people in 2001. They were centres of economic activity even before the existence of the Erdberger Mais project and, due to their location near highway A23, they are characterized by a high proportion of wholesale trade companies, textile companies, transport companies and the maintenance yard for the underground lines of public transport. A closer look at the census tract 2, the slaughterhouse area of St Marx, shows that, in 2001, economic activities relating to the processing of meat were still being performed there. There are plans to close these premises and relocate them in the mid term. T-Center, Media Center St Marx and other research buildings for the Vienna Biocenter were built and adapted after 2001. As a result, no data is available on the present situation of the number of establishments or employees working there. In 2003, a developers' contest for an office and residential building was held for the Karree St Marx area which also belongs to the former slaughterhouse area St Marx.

Table 9.2 describes the Erdberger Mais project area in relation to other large urban projects in Vienna such as Donau City and Wienerberg City. Donau City is located north-east of the city centre on the northern bank of the Danube and is connected both with the Donauufer-highway and the U1 underground line, which runs from the north, through the city centre to the south of Vienna. Donau City is situated adjacent to Vienna International Centre, which is the international office and conference centre of the UNO, and is also close to the Austria Center Vienna conference and event building and the Neue Donau Residential Park. It is regarded

Table 9.1 Business establishments and total employed persons in the workplace 2001

	<i>Number of business establishments</i>	<i>Number of total employed persons at the workplace</i>
Census tracts <sup>1</sup>		
(1) Residential area adjacent to Campus Vienna Biocenter	23	128
(2) Slaughterhouse area St Marx (now location of Campus Vienna Biocenter, Karree St Marx, T-Center, Media Center St Marx, Cattle Market Hall, Meat Center St Marx, Triple A)	57	1,528
(3) Residential area north of slaughterhouse area St Marx	40	234
(4) Underground Station Erdberg (U3) and surrounding area	27	1,029
(5) Area north of underground station Erdberg (now location of TownTown)	79	1,622
(6) Franzosengraben and area north of Viennese Gasometer	124	4,386
(7) Area south of Franzosengraben	94	2,136
(8) Area south of Viennese Gasometer	13	224
(9) Viennese Gasometer and gas works	23	573
(10) Fuchsroehrenggebiet	37	158
Project Area Erdberger Mais <sup>2</sup>	527	12,018
Municipal Districts <sup>3</sup>		
Landstrasse (3rd District)	5,420	58,683
Simmering (11th District)	1,984	20,808

Source: Statistics Austria, Business Units Census 2001, MA 21A, 2004.

1, 3 Statistics Austria

2 MA 21A

as being a multifunctional urban mix of land use with international relevance. One-third of the total area is dedicated to offices and shops (Magistrat der Stadt Wien, 2003b). Wienerberg City in the south of Vienna is the extension of the existing Business Park Vienna, and its goal is eventually to counterbalance the inner city and Donau City. Critics state that Wienerberg City missed several planning targets. In contrast to the land-use plan, the buildings were built so close together that there are not enough open spaces in between and it is therefore quite dark for people living and working on the ground floors. There is also no direct connection with an underground line, no children's playgrounds and there are no recreation possibilities for the resident population because there is no access to the adjacent green space due to its rededication to a golf course (Die Grünen Wien 2004).

Table 9.2 Comparison of the project Erdberger Mais with the large-scale urban projects Donau City and Wienerberg City

	Erdberger Mais					Donau City		Wienerberg City	
	2001	2003	2005	2010	2015	2004	2012	2004	2005
area in ha	250					17.4		6.2	
inhabitants		5, 000	5,500	12,000	13,500			3,000	
amount of dwellings			9,000		16,000				
employees	12,018	17,000	32,000	45,000	53,000	1,004		1,196	
housing development in m <sup>2</sup>		1,200,000			2,400,000		500,000		210,000
number of business establishments	527								
price level of rents in office		9,00–				10.00–		8.50–	
site market (€/m <sup>2</sup> , min.–max.)		14.00				16.00		13.50	
project duration	[1998 – 2015]					[1991 – 2012]		[1995 – 2005]	

Source: MA 21A (2004), Wiener Entwicklungsgesellschaft für den Donauraum AG (2004), Wienerberg City Errichtungs Ges.m.b.H. (2000), CB Richard Ellis (2004)

Based on Table 9.2, Erdberger Mais is the largest of the three urban projects in Vienna. This is confirmed by the data concerning the (future) inhabitants, as well as the (estimated) number of jobs created or relocated. T-Center, which is rented by the wireless carrier T-Mobile, is an example of the relocation of jobs due to the centralization of most of the employees (except the T-Mobile Call Center) at the new headquarters. The development of the biotechnology cluster, the Vienna Biocenter, will lead to the creation of new jobs and new companies as well, as was the case in the past decade.

As regards the functional structure of the metropolitan area of Vienna, the dynamism of the centre structure will be enhanced by the large-scale Erdberger Mais project. This is the view of Robert Schweighofer, who is a member of the Erdberger Mais planning team, as expressed in an interview with the authors (on 1 July 2004). In Erdberger Mais, and especially in the sub-area of St Marx, the emphasis is on telecommunications, biotechnology and the media sector (Andreas Schandl, St Marx property development organisation, interview 1 July 2004). Apart from the central business district, attractive office sites have been planned under the guidance of the city of Vienna. These represent the polycentric structure of the agglomeration: Donau City–Lassallestrasse in the north-east, Erdberger Mais in the east, Wienerberg City in the south, Heiligenstadt in the north (headquarters of the most important daily papers in Austria and near the most attractive residential area in Vienna) and a relatively small office site in the western part of Vienna (near the western highway and suburban residential area).

## **Institutional context**

### ***Administrative embedding of the project***

The city of Vienna is the capital of the Federal Republic of Austria and a federal province as well as a municipality. Vienna's city government is controlled by the Social Democrats, who have been in power since the 1920s, except for the period from 1938 to 1945, when Austria was part of the Third Reich due to Nazi occupation. The party has held an absolute majority since then, although there was a coalition between the Social Democrats and the Conservative party during the period between 1996 and 2001.

According to the provisions of the federal constitution, the municipal structure of the city of Vienna consists of the mayor, the city council and the city senate. The mayor of Vienna is elected by the city council and is also the governor of the federal province. The city council also acts as a provincial diet and the city senate serves a double function as the provincial government. The city council has 100 members and is the city's supreme body. Every land-use plan made by the planning authorities has to be passed by the city council in order to become binding by law. The city senate, that is the city government, is headed by the mayor of Vienna and is made up of the city councillors. The mayor is also the head of the executive city councillors and of the city administration.

The city administration (*Magistrat*) administers both the city of Vienna (municipal competence) and the administrative districts of Vienna (district competence). In practice, the various tasks are carried out by the Chief Executive Office, approximately 70 municipal departments (*Magistratsabteilungen* - MA) and the municipal district offices.

In the context of the municipal departments and offices, the executive city councillors, who at present consist of eight representatives of the Social Democratic party, manage the (currently eight) administrative city groups assigned to them. The Chief Executive Offices run the administrative groups of the city of Vienna and they are entitled to issue instructions to its staff members.

Economic issues are handled by the Vienna Business Agency (details below), housing is a task of the Vienna Land Provision Fund, and integration is the responsibility of the Vienna Integration Fund. These various competencies were assigned to independent bodies because their implementation would be too complicated in a strictly municipal context (*Magistratsdirektion – Allgemeine Angelegenheiten* 2004).

The Chief Executive Office 'Executive Group for Construction and Technology, Executive Office for Urban Planning' acts as a principal for the development of the Erdberger Mais area. It heads the 'Urban Development, Traffic and Transport' administrative group, which again consists of 12 municipal departments, among them the most important MA 18 (Urban Development and Planning) and MA 21A (District Planning and Land Use Central West). The main tasks of MA 18 include urban development planning, traffic planning and regional development, urban research and trend analyses, landscape architecture, project management and regional management for the city of Vienna. MA 21A deals with specific regional planning at district level, covering planning intentions in the inner city and the western districts of Vienna, to which the project Erdberger Mais belongs (MA 21B is responsible for all other districts in Vienna). The scope of duties consists of the preparation of land-use plans, which have to be approved by the city council before becoming legally binding, the composition of experts' reports during the course of construction processes and the carrying out of tasks related to information for citizens and citizen participation. Other municipal departments which deal with planning tasks for Erdberger Mais are MA 19 (Architecture and Urban Design), MA 28 (Road Management and Construction), MA 29 (Bridge Construction and Foundation Engineering), MA 33 (Public Lighting), MA 41 (Surveyors) and MA 46 (Traffic Management and Organization).

Apart from the 'Urban Development, Traffic and Transport' administrative group there are other administrative groups involved in the planning process of Erdberger Mais: the 'Environment' administrative group consisting of MA 30 (Vienna Waste Water Management), MA 31 (Vienna Water Works) and MA 42 (Parks and Gardens), the 'Housing, Housing Construction and Urban Renewal' administrative group consisting of MA 34 (Building and Facility Management), MA 64 (Legal Affairs: Construction, Energy, Railways, Traffic and Aviation) and MA 69 (Real Estate Management), the 'Finance, Economic Affairs and Vienna

Public Utilities' administrative group consisting of MA 4 (General Financial and Economic Affairs; Duties and Charges) and MA 27 (EU-Funding and Economic Development) as well as the municipal departments MA 7 (Cultural Affairs) and MA 59 Market Authority (concerning Meat Center St Marx).

Apart from the above mentioned actors, the role of the Vienna Business Agency is significant in terms of planning large-scale urban projects as well. In 1982, the Vienna Business Agency (VBA) was established by the city of Vienna, the Vienna Chamber of Commerce and two banks. Acting as a private enterprise it is a central platform designed to assist foreign companies and investors, as well as Viennese companies, with the establishment of businesses, plant extension and start-ups. The VBA is responsible for developing sites, helping companies to find attractive locations or premises and fulfilling all requirements of the various business support programmes and all questions concerning these tasks. It serves as a link between interested entrepreneurs and the interests of the city of Vienna. In 2001, the VBA helped 35 companies to establish premises for more than 400 new employees (Wiener Wirtschaftsförderungsfonds 2004).

### ***Strategic embedding of the project***

There have been several stages of urban development planning in Vienna. The first guidelines in 1972 were called 'Guidelines for Urban Development in Vienna' (*Wiener Leitlinien für die Stadtentwicklung*) and were not legally binding. When the first urban development plan for Vienna (*Stadtentwicklungsplan STEP* 1984) came into existence in 1984, binding objectives and strategies of action for the city administration were formulated with a focus on preservation and careful adaptation of the historical building structure, soft urban renewal, increased significance of the public participation and expansion along axes with efficient public transport. The second urban development plan (*Stadtentwicklungsplan STEP* 1994) comprised the fall of the Iron Curtain, accession of Austria to the EU in 1995 and, as a result of that, increased competition in the European urban system. New settlement areas have been linked to the specific development axes.

The coalition of the Social Democratic Party with the Conservative Party in the 1990s led to new elements of policy control and innovative aspects being included in the Strategy Plan of Vienna published in 2000 (*Strategieplan Wien*). The Strategy Plan provides details on: disclosure of people in charge of the project; target time frames; specific budget and the predefining of indicators of success and the pushing of the public-private finance model; explicit frame of action for private owners; investors and actors; knowledge of which developments are possible in which area and cooperation between public and private sector by means of public-private partnerships in both planning and realization.

As a result of the eastern enlargement of the European Union, a new Vienna Strategy Plan was formulated in 2004 (Magstratsabteilung 18, 2004). Compared with the Strategy Plan 2000 the main focus is on sustainable development, regional interrelation, gender mainstreaming, active location politics, publicity and participation. Vienna's new geopolitical situation in the extended European



Union was worked out more clearly. Strategically important fields, such as 'sustainable social security' and 'residential building, housing promotion and sanitation of residential buildings' were reformulated. Initiatives in areas such as economics, labour policies and public health policy were substantially expanded and broadened. The Strategy Plan included the goals and frames of the Traffic Masterplan for Vienna which are related to urban planning and traffic and which were published in 2003. The Strategy Plan offers a fundamental strategic orientation for the Urban Development Plan 2005 (STEP 2005), which specifies the total spatial development of Vienna.

The contents of STEP 2005 were worked out by the members of the Vienna city administration and city council, investors, property developers, lobbyists, citizens from the agglomeration of Vienna and other relevant institutions by taking into account the principles of gender mainstreaming. According to STEP 2005 (Magistratsabteilung 18 2005), the central economic challenge is to guarantee and strengthen the economic-political quality of Vienna in the light of growing international and European competition. The urban development plan takes account of changes such as spatial specialization, the concentration of important functions in a few metropolitan regions and the development of central business districts. The Centropole region, including the 'Twin-Cities' Vienna and Bratislava, is intended to achieve a more competitive and more distinct position amongst the regions of south-central Europe. For that reason STEP 2005 is promoting the development of Erdberger Mais as a future central business district in addition to the inner city of Vienna and Donau City. Erdberger Mais is therefore treated as a development zone of crucial economic-political importance. Economic and residential functions as well as the quality of land-use mix are promoted in the light of internationality and a high level of innovation to ensure high living standards within the urban environment.

Another instrument relevant to the encouragement of urban development is the EU-based URBAN II programme. This is of crucial importance for the development and revitalization of the traditionally industrialized area of Erdberger Mais. EU funds and public national funds are used to enhance disadvantaged urban areas so that they can attain the average level of economic and social development in Vienna. The URBAN II Vienna-Erdberg programme covers a timeframe from 2000 to 2006 and deals with a number of priority areas, such as economic development, the development of urban diversity, small-scale business promotion, the provision of district management, the integration of ethnic groups, migrants and refugees in terms of creating equal opportunities, the transformation and adaptation of public open spaces, the enhancement of environmental and residential quality, the quality of living and the preservation of cultural heritage (Urban II Wien-Erdberg 2004).

The (re)development of Erdberger Mais therefore has to be seen in the context described above. The need for action in this area also arose from the poor economic situation of the St Marx slaughterhouse, which had to be closed in 1997 due to structural inconsistencies, a loss of profitability and a failure to fulfil EU obligations. The extension of the U3 underground line helped to enhance

accessibility of the Erdberger Mais area and this resulted in an appreciation of this strategically well-positioned area between the city centre and Vienna International Airport.

Since 1998, a planning team coordinated by the 21A (MA 21A) Municipal Department has been working on the area's future development. The work of the planning team, consisting of the relevant municipal departments and institutions related to research and planning, is focused on utilization types and densities, traffic and transport, planning law, open spaces, land management, and developing infrastructure for land resources within the competence of the Vienna Public Utilities. It has now become clear that service-oriented land management and professional marketing measures are needed to ensure progressive development of this area (Magistrat der Stadt Wien 2003a).

## **Analysis of the multilevel decision-making process**

### ***Framing the project, goals and interests***

When framing the Erdberger Mais project one has to consider that actors of the public and the private sector are involved both in the field of planning and in the field of realization of the planning targets. Table 9.3 shows the most important actors involved with regard to the St Marx–Neu Erdberg sub-area.

### *Planning*

Apart from the institutions already described such as MA 21A, MA 18, MA 19, MA 27 and the Vienna Business Agency, the process of planning includes additional actors from the public sector.

The infrastructure and energy provider Vienna Public Utilities AG (Wiener Stadtwerke Holding) has to guarantee supply of energy (electricity, gas, long-distance heating) and efficient operation of local public transport. Although Vienna Public Utilities AG has been outsourced from the Vienna Municipal Departments since 1999 and acts as a private company owned by the city of Vienna, it is regarded as a public actor because it acts in the interest of the city of Vienna. It consists of six subsidiaries, including the Vienna Public Utilities Holding Company Management Ltd. (Wiener Stadtwerke Beteiligungs GmbH), which deals with the acquisition and administration of share companies. It has a holding share of 44 per cent in the public–private partnership Real Estate Development of Vienna Public Utilities & Soravia Corporation which deals with planning and realization of the TownTown project in Erdberg. The other two shareholders are Soravia Corporation (technical know-how) with a share of 44 per cent and Swiss Town Consult (planning know-how) with a share of 12 per cent. The concept is based on giving companies the opportunity to design their own company building even before construction has started. The companies can then choose from several structural components which, although specified, can be put together in different manners. This measure is

Principal	Chief Executive Office, Executive Group for Construction and Technology, Executive Office for Urban Planning					
Administrative Groups of the City of Vienna	Urban Development, Traffic and Transport		Environment	Housing, Housing Construction and Urban Renewal	Finance, Economic Affairs and Vienna Public Utilities	
Municipal Departments (= Magistrats- abteilungen, MA's) belonging to the respective Administrative Group	MA18 Urban Planning	MA19 Architecture and Urban Design	MA30 Vienna Waste Water Management	MA34 Building and Facility Management	MA4 General Financial and Economic Affairs; Duties and Charges	MA 7 Cultral Affairs
	MA21A District Planning and Land Use- Central West	MA28 Road Management and Construction	MA42 Parks and Gardens	MA69 Real Estate Managment	MA27 EU- Funding and Economic Development	MA 59 Market Authority
	MA29 Bridge Construction and Foundation Engineering	MA33 Public Lighting				
	MA41 Surveyors	MA46 Traffic Management and Organisation				
Other involved Institutions and Companies	Vienna Business Agency (Wiener Wirtschaftsförder- ungsfonds WWFF)	Vienna Public Utilities AG (Wiener Stadwerke AG)	Vienna Public Utilities Holding Company Management Ltd	Austrian Research centers Seibersdorf (ARCB)	Transport Planning ARGE Snizek, Tralico	Municipal District Office or Erdberg
						Municipal District Office or Simmering
						External planning, public relations




Figure 9.6 The structure of planning and development in Erdberger Mais having regard to the sub-areas St Marx – Neu Erdberg  
 Source: MA 21A (2004), modified and completed by Christina Enichlmair

intended to stimulate international companies in particular to set up headquarters in Vienna in the long run, because it gives them the possibility of adapting their future headquarters or office sites to their own needs.

Other public actors are the municipal district offices of Landstrasse and Simmering, which represent the interests of the respective districts. They also collaborate with the planning team, property developers and investors.

There are also two private sector actors involved in the issue of traffic planning in Erdberger Mais. ARGE Snizek deals with traffic analysis, decision support, design and operation of traffic routes etc. (Snizek und Partner, 2004) and Trafico creates traffic concepts, public transport concepts, road planning and road development concepts, etc. (Trafico 2004).

The Austrian Research Centers Seibersdorf (ARCS) is a research institution that is jointly owned by the public and private sectors. The Republic of Austria holds a majority share which is slightly higher than 50 per cent, while the remaining minority share is held by actors in the fields of industry, electricity supply industry, banks and insurance companies. It is a research centre for the private sector and government agencies with around 800 employees at locations across Austria. It is the largest application-oriented information enterprise in the country (Austrian Research Centers Seibersdorf, 2004). In terms of planning for Erdberger Mais, a new project evaluation method was developed on the basis of collaboration between MA 21A and ARCS.

### *Development*

Several public and private actors have been involved in the completion of the specific projects or properties to be developed as defined in the Erdberger Mais strategy plan.

The St Marx Property Development organization (Immobilienentwicklung St Marx – IEM) was established in 2000 as a one hundred per cent subsidiary of the city of Vienna. The objective target is the meaningful utilization or reinforcement of strategic important locations of large-scale properties owned by the city of Vienna. In order to ensure a sustainable development process on behalf of the city of Vienna, private property developers were excluded from this process. The St Marx Property Development organization developed the former slaughterhouse area of St Marx and participated in the planning, preparing and opening up of properties for building. The main focus is to turn this area into attractive office sites for telecommunication, biotechnology and media technology. The St Marx Property Development organization participates in exclusively developing building sites of its own and founded a further subsidiary which is responsible for building construction. One example was the development of T-Center, where the St Marx Property Development organisation founded mmL (at that time it was named max mobil Liegenschaftsbesitz before max mobil was overtaken by T-Mobile) to build new headquarters for the wireless carrier. The property, which was rented to T-Mobile for 20 years, was recently sold to the German real-estate fund GENO Asset Finance (GAF), which is a joint venture of Citigroup and the

German Genossenschaftszentralbanken DZ Bank and WGZ-Bank. The St Marx Property Development organization is also involved in other projects that include St Marx Media Center, which has already been finished, Cattle Market Hall, which is under landmark protection and for which, therefore, certain building criteria have to be fulfilled before development, and Skybox, a small office site that is still in the planning stage. Future developments are to include the St Marx Meat Center, which is to be closed down in the near future. The St Marx Property Development organization is going to purchase this area from its present owner, Vienna's Municipal Department of Market Authority (MA 59), and expand the development sites total space from 12 to 20 hectares.

Another actor is the public-led Federal Property Holding (Bundesimmobiliengesellschaft – BIG) which is engaged in the development of the Karree St Marx and the Campus Vienna Biocenter. In the case of the Karree St Marx, a new office and residential building is planned for location in part of the old St Marx slaughterhouse area. A development tender was called to ensure a high-quality project based on the strategy plan guidelines. According to building law, every single property developer who is planning an office or residential site with a height of over 26 metres and covering an area capacity of 20,000 square metres has to undergo this process. The winning project is to be announced in 2005/2006. The plan is for two-thirds of the area to be dedicated to residential use.

In the case of the Campus Vienna Biocenter the Federal Property Holding in collaboration with ARWAG, a public–private joint venture acting as property developer, established the Bio Medicine Research Laboratory Development Agency (Biomedizinische Forschungs- und Errichtungsgesellschaft) in order to facilitate collaborations among universities.

The Center for Innovation and Technology (Zentrum für Innovation und Technologie – ZIT) is a one hundred per cent subsidiary of the Vienna Business Agency that was established in 2000. It is involved in the development of Campus Vienna Biocenter. The main tasks are direct financial support for companies, incentives for the most ambitious companies, provision of technology-related infrastructure and support in the innovation process. The focus is on Viennese companies working in the fields of life sciences, information and communication technologies as well as creative industries. The Center for Innovation and Technology is collaborating closely with the private sector actors Prisma Holding and Competence Investment AG (CIAG). While Prisma Holding is the largest technology park developer and operator in Austria, Competence Investment AG, founded in 2001, is acting as an investment partner and owner of one building situated in the Campus Vienna Biocenter. An additional objective of CIAG is to create an Austrian network of technology centres.

Another private project developer is *raiffeisen evolution*, which is owner of a building site adjacent to the former slaughterhouse quarter St Marx. After 2005, *raiffeisen evolution* is going to establish a complex of office and residential buildings called TRIPLE A with a total of 40,000 square metres floor area. There are

to be three office buildings of 35,700 square metres and one residential building of 4,300 square metres. The construction phase has not started yet because the land-use plan has yet to be approved by MA 21A and the city council of Vienna.

### *Citizen participation*

There are no social organizations, interest organizations or action groups that are known to be actively involved in the planning process and development of the Erdberger Mais project. This includes the period before actual development of the project started.

The St Marx Meat Center, where several meat processing companies are still located, is to be closed down and the affected companies are either going to resettle in the southern area of Vienna near highway A23, where many wholesale trade companies such as the Viennese Green Market (Produce and Wholesale Market) are located, or they will go bankrupt. No interest group has yet been formed to oppose these developments.

On the other hand, citizen participation has already been determined during the course of the planning. Every land-use plan prepared by MA 21A has to pass through the Vienna city council and must, by law, be accessible to the public for a period of six weeks in order to give people the opportunity to raise any objections. Furthermore, (travelling) exhibitions have been organized by the city of Vienna since 1982 relating to current and future developments in the Erdberger Mais area, especially for citizens living in and around this area. Only recently a school contest was organized relating to the appearance of the huge TownTown Square between the office sites. Generally, decisions concerning urban development planning and project developments in Vienna are made by consensus, with attention being paid to the concerns expressed by the involved actors as often as possible.

### *Decision-making practices*

In addition to the establishment of a planning team to deal with the conditions for the realization of a large-scale urban project like Erdberger Mais, it is also necessary to divide the project area into sub-areas such as St Marx, Neu-Erdberg, Gasometer surroundings in the south, etc. because every single project or project area has its own needs regarding planning, infrastructure and environment. For this reason, experts at the municipal departments of urban planning, infrastructure and environmental protection are working together with the project developers and project owners in the respective sub-area in order to reach consensual solutions. As regards the proposed urban development measures formulated in the strategy plan of Erdberger Mais, land-use plans and building plans – which comply with the targets of the urban development measures – are defined by MA 21A in collaboration with all involved actors. It may be the case that land-use mixes or building densities do not correspond with the targets of the strategy plan, that is they are caused by the reaction to changing market conditions in the field of residential or office use. In this case, development has to be

counterbalanced in other sub-areas in order to meet the requirements for land-use density and land-use allocation within the whole project area. This is crucially important for the traffic system and individual traffic.

### ***Democracy, institutional innovation and imagery***

The process of decision-making in large urban projects differs strongly from regular processes of decision-making in certain respects.

Regarding project development of large-scale properties owned by the city of Vienna, subsidiary companies owned by the city are found to represent the respective interests of the city regarding the objectives formulated in the strategy plan for the respective area of development. This is also found to be the case for many public–private partnerships involving projects like those listed above.

Furthermore, a very important difference is a new project evaluation method which was developed by a collaboration effort between MA 21A and the Austrian Research Centers Seibersdorf. It entails a real-estate project measuring software which was designed as a strategic planning game to define urban development scenarios using different samples of real-estate projects for regional development and economic effects. Although it was designed for the Erdberger Mais project in the beginning, it can also be applied to any other urban planning projects in future.

The absorption of planning yields is another innovation, albeit at planning level. The structure plan of Erdberger Mais in some areas makes provisions for a higher density in building construction as was originally laid down in former land-use plans. The absorption of planning yields helps to finance for example a public park in the district of Simmering.

In the event that private project developers want to build office or residential buildings, they have to participate in a developers' competition for the respective project area. In order to ensure financing, sustainability and the designated mix of land use, the building law of Vienna states that developers have to bid for development rights in the case of potential buildings in building class VI, which exceed the height of 26 metres and a housing development area of 20,000 square metres.

### **Lessons to be learned**

Generally speaking, urban planning in Vienna is a public sector issue which focuses on long-term strategies. As regards Erdberger Mais, planning and realization is carried out by means of public–private partnerships with the main focus on local and national companies. Many of them, especially at property development level, have been established by the city of Vienna to ensure that the city maintains its influence in the development process. Decisions made by the planning team in collaboration with project developers and other investors rest upon broad-based consent.

Framing, decision-making, institutional aspects and democratic properties seem to be taking place on a proper basis as regards the mechanisms of consultation, the developers' contest or the development of a project evaluation method.



The present development in Erdberger Mais is taking place at Gasometer and T-Center – which are the flagship projects – and their surrounding areas. Apart from Gasometer, no new residential building has yet been built, but the Karree St Marx and TRIPLE A projects are dedicated to a mixture of land uses. The Erdberger Mais planning team is trying to construct a lively quarter consisting of office buildings which attract international investors and companies and, to a less extent, residential areas as well, plus facilities for shopping, gastronomy and recreation. Because of its huge dimensions, the Cattle Market Hall would be a perfect building in which to accommodate these leisure facilities. However, due to landmark protection and the fact that potential projects may not meet the corresponding criteria that landmark designation creates, it will be difficult to determine whether a well-balanced development plan could be presented that could overcome these obstacles.

### **Summary and final evaluation**

During the past 15 years, Vienna's position within the system of European cities has changed dramatically. The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989/90, Austria's membership of the EU in 1995 and the eastern enlargement of the European Union in 2004 turned the former marginal location of Vienna into one of the most central in Europe, allowing the city to function as one of the lively interfaces between east and west. This led to a boom in the service sector, and new office quarters were established all over the city, visible by the new landmarks of high-rise towers. The Vienna city administration developed a variety of strategies to attract investors to locations within its administrative boundaries and tolerated the quite fragmented pattern of single investments in order to keep its controlling function. The development of Erdberger Mais, the largest project of New Vienna in spatial terms, is indicative of the diversity and vitality public-private-partnership can create. Its ideal location, and a broad mixture of different infrastructures, functions and architecture may make this large-scale project a quite successful one for the future of Vienna.

By turning away from the traditional architectural tradition and opening up instead to new and exciting experiments in urban renewal and post-modern forms and structures, which combine old and new elements, Vienna has been looking for its own and distinctive way to express its unique position and possibilities. Erdberger Mais, which is being developed by public and private investors, is an example of how city administration and investors can work even if on the basis of unequal interests and of a quite diverse structure of functions. The result is both expressive of a common architectural language typical of Vienna and adequate enough to compete globally with other models.

### **Acknowledgements**

The authors would like to express their thanks to the following people and institutions that provided background information and agreed to be interviewed for this article: Hans Peter Graner and Robert Schweighofer, Municipal Department

of District Planning and Land Use – Central West (MA 21A); Rudolf Zabрана, Landstraße district office; Andreas Schandl, the St Marx Property Development organisation (IEM); Alexandra Vogl, Center for Innovation and Technology (ZIT); Bernhard Öl, Competence Investment AG (CIAG); Mr Horak and Mr Fitzegg, Federal Property Holding (BIG); Mr Foltin, Municipal Department of Market Authority (MA 59); Christian Kerth and Dieter Ruff, raiffeisen evolution; Mr Radice, T-Mobile Austria; Felix Jonkisch, TownTown; Werner Kollercker, meat processing company situated at the St Marx Meat Center.

## References

- Austrian Research Centers Seibersdorf (2004) *Organization*, <http://www.arcs.ac.at/unter> (accessed 7 October 2004).
- Borsdorf, A. (2002) 'Wien – Europäische Metropole an der Schnittstelle zwischen West und Ost', *Praxis Geographie*, 32, 9: 4.
- CB Richard Ellis (2004) *Marktbericht. Wien Büromarktbericht. Zweites Quartal 2004*, <http://www.cbre.at> (accessed 7 October 2004).
- Die Grünen Wien (2004) Wienerberg City – Ein städtebauliches Fiasko, <http://wien.gruene.at/themen.php?tid=24827&wo=2&kat=stadtplanung&kid=119> (accessed 28 May 2004).
- Fassmann, H. and Hatz, H. (2002) 'Wien – städtebauliche Entwicklung und planerische Probleme'. In: H. Fassmann, and H. Hatz, (eds) *Wien. Stadtgeographische Exkursionen*, Wien: 11–34.
- Fellner, A. and Schopper, M. (2002) 'Wien wirbelt den Staub der Monarchie auf. Innovative Bauprojekte in einer traditionellen Stadt', *Praxis Geographie*, 32, 9: 49–53.
- Hansely, H. and Schopper, M. (1999) 'Wien im Aufbruch', *Geographische Rundschau*, 51, 10: 529–534.
- Hatz, G. (2002) 'Wien im Umbruch. Aktuelle Prozesse der Stadtentwicklung', *Geographische Rundschau*, 54, 9: 4–9.
- Juchelka, R. (2002) "'Wien an die Donau". Bipolare Stadtentwicklung und das Projekt Donau-City', *Geographische Rundschau*, 54, 9: 10–17.
- Magistrat der Stadt Wien (2002) *Erdberger Mais*, [http://www.wien.gv.at/stadtentwicklung/erdberger\\_mais](http://www.wien.gv.at/stadtentwicklung/erdberger_mais) (accessed 28 May 2004).
- Magistrat der Stadt Wien (ed.) (2003a) *Stadtentwicklungszone 'Neu Erdberg – Simmering'. ÖV-Konzept*. Magistratsabteilung 21A, Stadtteilplanung und Flächennutzung Innen-West.
- Magistrat der Stadt Wien (2003b) *Donau City*, <http://www.wien.gv.at/stadtentwicklung/donaucity> (accessed 8 October 2004).
- Magistratsabteilung 18 (ed.) (2004) *Strategieplan Wien*, Wien: AV Druck.
- Magistratsabteilung 18 (ed.) (2005) *Stadtentwicklungsplan 2005*, <http://www.wien.gv.at/stadtentwicklung/step/step.htm> (accessed 30 June 2005)
- Magistratsabteilung 21A (2003a) *Lage in der Stadt. Stadtentwicklungszone Neu Erdberg – Simmering*, <http://www.iemar.tuwien.ac.at/mais/download-section/gebiet.pdf> (accessed 1 June 2004).

- Magistratsabteilung 21A (2003b) *Strategieplan: Zeithorizonte städtebauliche Entwicklung, Stadtentwicklungszone Neu-Erdberg – Simmering*, [http://www.iemar.tuwien.ac.at/mais/download-section/strat\\_horizonte.pdf](http://www.iemar.tuwien.ac.at/mais/download-section/strat_horizonte.pdf) (accessed 1 June 2004).
- Magistratsdirektion – Allgemeine Angelegenheiten (2004) *Die Organisation der Wiener Stadtverwaltung*, <http://www.wien.gv.at/organisation> (accessed 17 June 2004).
- Pöschek, A. (2004) *Projekt Gasometer. Die Revitalisierung der ehemaligen Gasbehälter*, <http://www.wiener-gasometer.at/de/revitalisierung> (accessed 24 June 2004).
- Schopper, M. (2000) 'Stadtentwicklung und Stadtplanung auf dem Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert', in *Handbuch der Stadt Wien II*: 24–33.
- Snizek und Partner (2004) *Tätigkeitsfelder*, <http://www.snizek.at> (accessed 7 October 2004).
- TownTown (2002) *TownTown: Eine neuartige Business-Stadt für Wien – Innovative Konzepte gegen Büroflaute*, <http://www.towntown.info> (accessed 16 June 2004).
- Trafico (2004) *Angebot*, <http://www.trafico.at/angebot.html> (accessed 7 October 2004).
- Urban II Wien-Erdberg (2004) *Prioritätsachsen und Maßnahmen*, [http://www.urban.wien.at/index.php?ccpage=mission\\_massnahmen](http://www.urban.wien.at/index.php?ccpage=mission_massnahmen) (accessed 1 June 2004).
- Wienerberg City Errichtungs Ges.m.b.H (2000) *Wienerberg City – Facts in Kürze*, <http://www.twintower.at> (accessed 7 October 2004).
- Wiener Entwicklungsgesellschaft für den Donaauraum AG (2004) *Vienna Donau City*, <http://www.viennadc.at> (accessed 10 July 2004).
- Wiener Wirtschaftsförderungsfonds (2004) *Der WWFF*, [http://www.wwff.gv.at/DerWWFF/Beschreibung\\_WWFF](http://www.wwff.gv.at/DerWWFF/Beschreibung_WWFF) (accessed 7 October 2004).

## Part III

# Conclusions



# 10 Assessing strategic urban projects

## Findings and recommendations

*Willem Salet and Enrico Gualini*

### Introduction

Under complex post-Fordist conditions of urban transformation that increasingly involve an extension and differentiation of activities on an urban-regional scale, defining strategies for urban development becomes a task located at the cross-roads of multiple interests, forms of rationality, knowledge, and spatio-temporal horizons. Institutional solutions for governing urban regions are far from easy to find and implement, and local politics is not very well equipped at all to cope with the new complexity of socio-economic and governmental relations that affect governance practices on such a scale.

Under these conditions, it comes as no surprise that defining public strategies for the future of urban regions that are robust – that is, viable, shared and amenable of operationalization – appears to be a difficult, and almost impossible, challenge. Most probably, the recurrent calls for the need of such strategies that can be heard in European urban regions are the background music for a reality that instead consists of several incremental, tentative coordination efforts under macro-level tendencies, resulting possibly in partial achievements, and equally often in failures or unintended outcomes.

In this context, large-scale urban projects acquire – at least potentially – a peculiar strategic meaning. As viable, durable and shared strategies are difficult to formulate and often absent, specific area-based development projects may often be the only means planning practice has in order to contribute to defining an overall frame of reference.

A strategic project, in this sense, is more than just an area-based attempt at strategic change. It is – at its best – a *strategic frame*. In order to be ‘strategic’ in its formulation, it must define its own overall frame of reference with regard to key issues at play in the development of the urban region and to its own potential of responding – within its limits – to them. As such, a strategic urban project in principle becomes an opportunity for comparing, correlating and possibly negotiating – in a setting of public deliberation – among different interests, visions and options of development for the urban region, in that they can be reflected and made explicit in a specific spatio-temporal and operational context. It is this ability to make public dilemmas concrete and amenable to deliberation that confers a strategic meaning on the framing of projects and generates material for the

possible formation of broader strategies. However, this also defines the burden of criteria which a project must satisfy in order to be deemed truly 'strategic' in character.

The task of this concluding chapter is to test our case studies against these criteria. The findings from our case studies form the basis for a multidimensional comparative evaluation of the strategic framing of large-scale urban projects. We refer to the three dimensions – and their sub-articulations – discussed in Chapter 1, namely the nature of *conceptual integration*, the nature of *strategic alliances*, and modes of *democratic legitimation*. Our conclusions are structured in two parts. First, we propose a summary discussion of each of the projects, pointing out their main features and articulating related findings according to our three evaluative dimensions. Subsequently, we address a cross-sectional comparative discussion of our findings, which allows us to introduce – from the perspective of each dimension – some elements for a critique of framing practices and for their possible improvement.

## A summary of the case studies

### *Amsterdam Zuidas*

The 'Zuidas' in Amsterdam is meant to become the prime office location in the Netherlands. Located on the southern ring road of Amsterdam, directly connected by rail and highway to Schiphol airport, and yet very near to the historic city centre, the project benefits from the region's full economic and social network space. Its strategic position will be improved even more by the arrival of the high-speed train to Amsterdam in 2007 and the completion of the local north-south subway line in 2012.

Since its official adoption in the mid 1990s and its nomination as a national 'key project' in 1997, the project's development has benefited from high conjuncture in the international financial and legal service markets, in particular until 2001. However, the existence of a pro-growth climate is not evident in

Table 10.1 Dimensions of framing for comparative project evaluation

---

a	nature of conceptual integration: combining multiple purposes
b	strategic alliances: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• private-sector alliances: influences of economic networks and social and cultural activities on the decision-making of urban projects</li> <li>• supra- and trans-regional strategic alliances in the public sector</li> <li>• inner-metropolitan alliances among public and private actors</li> </ul>
c	democratic legitimacy: experiments in democratic deliberation and processes of institutional innovation

---

Amsterdam. In fact, it took the city more than two decades to establish a cooperative attitude with the market sector. Rather unwillingly in the 1970s, and more willingly since the urban crisis of the mid 1980s, a developmental attitude finally became a core element of the city's spatial policies in the 1990s. After the failure of large-scale development plans for the inner city space along the river IJ, the city eventually decided in the mid 1990s to follow market preferences by promoting development along the urban ring road, where some decisive initiatives had already been taking place. It was in fact a private decision. The Amsterdam-based ABN-AMRO multinational bank decided to cluster various scattered offices at a new headquarters in that area. It was this that caused a breakthrough in local government's views on the prospects for development at the Zuidas.

In the first instance, the private sector took a leading role in the new development of a top office market segment of the Zuidas, supported by a coalition of stakeholders – including the second major bank ING – and only weakly regulated by local planning. However, public involvement materialized a few years later. In 1998, the city adopted the first master plan for the Zuidas area, embracing the goal of promoting it as a core economic development area but also advancing ambitions for a mixed-use development, with the aim being to create an integrated and highly qualitative 'urban space' rather than a mere 'economic space'. The provision of residential space was seen as a crucial condition for achieving the goal of creating a lively urban environment. However, housing prospects were constrained by the environmental impact of large rail and highway infrastructure cross-cutting the area. Moreover, since building sites are situated on both sides of the large infrastructure corridor, the option of hiding infrastructure below ground was key to generating more potential for realizing an integrated programme of housing and facilities. The crucial condition for achieving the centrality and quality desired for the new planned urban space was therefore soon identified in the realization of the 'dock-model'. This design option implies a 1.2 kilometre tunnel enabling the realization of integrated land use on top of it.

Since this option was officially adopted by the city in 1999, ambitions for mixed-use development have increased all the time. In the first master plan of 1998, functional ratios were still dominated by offices (65 per cent as opposed to 21 per cent for housing and 14 per cent for facilities). With the introduction of the so-called 'dock-model', the planned functional programme turned into a real mixed-use development. The 'Zuidas Vision' of 2001 provides for 44 per cent of office space, 44 per cent housing and 12 per cent facilities (see Table 3.1). To date, mainly office space has been realized along the ring road, with the first residential plans being currently realized only on the outskirts of the area. The prospects of creating an integrated urban space have become dependent on the realization of the highly demanding solution to allow building over the infrastructure corridor. Local public and private partners are cooperating on this ambitious goal which represents a large-scale project in itself. Local partners have reached agreements on their mutual financial involvement. The city is prepared to refund its 'full profits'



out of tax income from future office locations to the dock-model, while the two major banks and the railway real-estate company has offered to purchase building rights to 50 per cent of the new land above the tunnel for an agreed price. However, these agreements will need to be revised, as participation by central government is also needed to implement the project. Central government agencies – represented by five ministries – have signed a declaration of intent with a view to joining the local partnership, and have agreed in principle to look for practical solutions to implement the dock-model. At present, the partners are negotiating about the feasibility of the project, the division and sharing of responsibilities and risks, and the organization of long-term operations.

### *Framing the Zuidas*

The economic goals of this large-scale urban project are strongly supported by *private sector* economic involvement. Within the space of a few years, the area has grown into one of the most remarkable nodes in Europe's hierarchy of economic space. Its potential for growth in the office sector is contested, though, since the aim of the Zuidas is to reach a share of 9.8 per cent (having already achieved 3.8 per cent) in the overall regional office market, while vacant office space is dramatically increasing in the urban region. Its economic base, however, is barely in competition with other economic sites in the region, being embedded in – and bound to compete with – international networks. The stagnation in the regional office market which in fact emerged in recent years has not yet severely affected the Zuidas.

Beyond commitment by economic stakeholders, however, private sector involvement is rather weak. There is no evidence of strong pressure on this project by *cultural or social actors*. At its margins only, it is primarily housing expansion, the restructuring of university buildings and the provision of some new cultural facilities (design museum, entertainment) that directly – but rather sectorally – affect civic interests.

As *trans-regional strategic alliances* are concerned, the recent and direct involvement of central government is a new and important development. Hopefully, it may bring to an end the many intergovernmental stalemates relating to the ambitions and the financing of the infrastructure (the dock-model, the railway station, the high-speed connection, etc.). Thus, local–central connections might improve. However, there is no evidence of a trans-regional level of policymaking, and also no significant connection with European or other international policies. This is astounding considering the scope and the high strategic potential of economic activities foreseen in the area. Important issues such as infrastructure connection and environmental quality are framed only in a local – and recently local–national – policymaking setting. Finally, within the sphere of *inner-metropolitan relationships*, the intermediating role of the province has been absent up to now, although very recently there have been signs of increasing involvement. There are no policy arrangements to deal with inter-municipal rivalry on office site development within the urban region. With respect to the

*integration of multiple purposes*, planning is indeed framed by concepts of multiple and intensive land use, but the actual organization of the process is mainly framed as a real-estate partnership. Finally, as far as our final indicator for evaluation is concerned, namely experience with *democratic innovation*, the project started with an active debate and strong public involvement mainly because of controversies relating to inner-city development. The shift towards promoting office development at the Zuidas, instead of along the southern IJ bank, pacified public controversies on the tertiarization of the inner city, and generated a relatively positive climate around the new area. The adoption of the Zuidas Masterplan in 1998 was supported unanimously by the city council, although a downside of this political consensus has been that city-wide civic debate on one of the most outspoken future urban centres of the region has been, if not silenced, hardly enhanced so far.

### ***Barcelona Universal Forum of Cultures 2004***

Barcelona's 'Universal Forum of Cultures' combines a series of urban projects in the north-eastern part of the city by means of an impressive *image strategy*. Actually, the Forum is more of a cultural event than a pure physical urban project. It is concentrated in a small urban area (the Forum area), but its influence is used to stimulate a series of urban projects in the north-east. The cultural embedding of urban planning builds on Barcelona's tradition of organizing large-scale cultural events of international allure in order to mobilize social and economic forces towards a structural transformation of the urban fabric. In its urban history, Barcelona used world exhibitions, global sport events, and mass cultural activities as vehicles for urban regeneration. The last great manifestation – the Olympic Games in 1992 – was an opportunity to rejoin the city with the seafront, and the present operation attempts to complete this structural reform on an even larger scale. In 2004, in cooperation with UNESCO, a self-created 'universal forum of cultures' was invented in order to mobilize societal energy for the regeneration of degraded parts of the city and to develop high standard physical urban qualities. The cultural event itself focused on such themes as cultural diversity, sustainable development, and conditions for world peace. During a period of four months, hundreds of international mass events were organized, ranging from carnival parades to exhibitions, dialogues among international students and world leaders, music festivals and other expressions of mass communication and entertainment. Millions of visitors and tourists attended these manifestations. This cultural energy, however, was channeled in particular towards creating social consensus and momentum for structural economic and spatial transformations. In contrast to American business-style urban regeneration, Barcelona promotes (and even exports) a civil society-oriented style of strategic urban planning. It does so in a non-conventional and interdisciplinary way, associating geopolitics, cultural policies, spatial planning and social and economic regeneration in loose integrative planning concepts. In addition to this mobilization strategy, a business-like type of operational management is used

in the implementation stage, based on separating operational tasks from cultural events and physical operations, entrusting relatively independent agencies with operational and budgeting tasks, and by adopting business-style procedures of building permissions.

Several urban projects have been injected with this cultural impetus. The largest effort for the economic regeneration is the transformation of the decayed industrial area of Poblenau into a new area of sophisticated, knowledge-intensive productivity called @22. This 200 hectare area, formerly occupied by textile and metalworking industries, extends along the sea to the north-east of the city, close to the urban ring highway. Since the decline of manufacturing in the 1970s, it has been used for distribution and freight transportation activities. The ambition is to create a dense, complex urban environment which is well connected to the metropolitan system. Plans are aimed at the creation of a new productive centre of knowledge-intensive industries, such as new technologies, design, editorial production, and cultural and audio-visual industries combined with residential and retail/entertainment uses. The regeneration started with an infrastructure project in order to connect the area to the metropolitan system. The economic regeneration itself is still in its embryonic stage. The plans only indicate the maximal possible rates of growth (a huge ceiling of 2.6 million square metres of office space, good for up to 130,000 jobs, and a residential programme of 400,000 square metres). However, these ceilings are not representative of what will be actually achieved. In particular, the above-mentioned economic figures regarding office building and new employment – the only official figures available – cannot be considered realistic estimates. Barcelona's economy used to be strongly industrialized, the necessary transformation into economic service sectors in the last two decades still leans strongly on tourism and other urban economies. The regional economy is not yet strongly connected to the international economic networks of the global knowledge economy. Hence, these high ambitions might easily be overestimated. To date, not many offices have yet been realized. Building permits have been issued for about 50 per cent of the area, but it is too early to review the project's economic progress.

Besides the Poblenau project, two of the most decayed residential areas (La Catalana and La Mina) are being regenerated with support from the Urban Community Initiative. Plans are aimed at upgrading the quality of life (new constructions, large public spaces and mixed activities). Furthermore, at Segrera station a huge urban intensification is planned in case high speed trains – again with EU support – are going to have a stop there. Finally, the urban project at the Forum area itself initiated the transformation of neglected urban space into a new international centre of culture and communication. This 214 hectare area is conveniently situated at the end of the famous Diagonal (the largest artery of the city cross-cutting the whole urban grid) and provides its connection to the sea. Barcelona's seaside has been turned into the city's gold coast since the Olympic games enabled renewed interconnectivity between the city and the sea. The Forum area is the finishing touch to this spatial operation based on the removal of the last barriers and the shaping of new urban qualities. In the Forum area, a

new convention centre (15,000 seats) and two auditoriums (3,200 seats) have been realized around a huge public space created above a sanitation plant whose sustainable recycling process was awarded a European prize for inventive sustainability policies. Many additional facilities exist for the recreation and entertainment of inhabitants and visitors at and near the Esplanade (beaches and dunes, a yacht harbour, a new zoo, a health complex, hotels, retailing, etc.).

### *Framing the Universal Forum of Cultures 2004*

The innovative framing of the Universal Forum of Cultures offers inspiration for the planning of multi-purpose projects in other cities as well. Yet, in one important respect, Barcelona's project lacks interconnectivity. All the plans for cultural and physical regeneration have been initiated by the *public sector*.

Private actors are involved – in particular based on the initiative of the municipality of Barcelona – by using inventive business-type implementation methods. On the other hand, however, Barcelona's economy has not been strongly positioned in *international economic networks* and in the shifting hierarchies of the international knowledge economy emerging since the early 1990s. The project of urban transformation is not pushed forward by the private sector, and the intriguing question is whether the inventive public methods will eventually attract international and national capital investments in Barcelona's ambitions to become a knowledge economy. Regarding the connectivity to the second domain of action, the embeddedness in *trans-regional alliances*, Barcelona is one of the most active European urban regions. Although the connections with the (semi-federal) Catalanian and the national government are rather complicated, Barcelona has managed to adopt a leading position in interregional policymaking, European policy strategies and even global geopolitical strategies (e.g. UNESCO and Latin America connections). Barcelona's urban strategies start by reflecting on its potential position in global networks. Regarding *inner-metropolitan* interrelationships, the relations between bottom-up centripetal initiatives by the core city and top-down tendencies towards more polycentrism by the Catalanian government are troublesome. However, at present these troubles have been overcome by organizing cultural events of international allure. With respect to the framing of *multiple-purpose strategies* of urban projects, the case of Barcelona is exemplary in that it organized economic upheaval as a public goal that is embedded in interdisciplinary thought and action (cultural policy, civic engagement, social and physical–environmental planning). Finally, as far as *democratic innovation* is concerned, Barcelona managed to raise public attention and to generate a variety of ideas on urbanization in a global perspective at the beginning of the decision-making process. However, after selecting the policy alternatives, new controversies arose. The Catalans managed to project themselves to the world as an innovative nation in direct response to the challenges of globalization, but the organization was threatened with losing popular support and citizens' involvement at a very local scale. In Barcelona's case, the planning authority seems to have failed in persuasively communicating to all social actors the founding concept of the project,

namely how a new global event, creating new centrality in the urban region, can bring prosperity to the most disabled communities instead of pushing them to the outskirts of the metropolitan agglomeration.

### *Berlin Adlershof*

Under construction since 1994, the 'City of Science, Technology and Media Adlershof' is Berlin's largest current development area. It is strategically situated in the south-eastern district of Treptow-Köpenick, right on the new development axis to the planned airport of Schönefeld. The area is well connected to the central city by train (12 kilometres) and will be connected in 2010 to the new airport via a direct 10-minute service. A direct link with the urban ring highway is also planned. The technical economic specialization of Adlershof is embedded in its history. Germany's first aerospace technology pole was sited in the Adlershof area, which – being situated in eastern Berlin – later became a centre of technological research and development of the German Democratic Republic. In that period, three highly secured complexes were situated in the area: military state security forces, state television production, and the Academy of Science. However, these post-war settlements were dismissed in the early 1990s and, after Germany's reunification, the area was an ideal location for restructuring. The federal state of Berlin took the initiative of continuing the technological tradition of the area, and installed a developmental agency for the creation of a park for economy and science. In 1993 a concept for the whole area was developed. Ambitions were high in early years after reunification. The whole area was planned to generate 30,000 jobs, and a complete urban restructuring was foreseen, aimed at creating a living city with an urban quality of life and a balanced variety of urban functions. It was also decided to relocate parts of the Humboldt University to Adlershof (in particular the exact sciences departments, as well as the departments of psychology and geography at a later date).

The economic development is concentrated on about 40 per cent of the huge 420 hectare area, and focuses on three major complexes, namely commercial and non-commercial research in the City of Science, the Industrial Park, and the television and media production in MEDIACITY. The original plans allocated some 130 hectares for residential use (for an expected 15,000 inhabitants), and about 70 hectares each for mixed use and for green space (including the old airport). Although development agencies are observing these high expectations, results after the first decade are actually rather modest. There is evidence of economic growth, but the absolute volumes of 2004 feature only 10,000 employees, whereas official documents envisioned to some 20,000 by 2006. Still, the economy of this area is the fastest as regards growth in a region characterized by economic stagnation. Table 5.2 (p.xx) also shows the relatively large amount of small and medium-size enterprises. Some 64 per cent of these enterprises were started up recently and only 14 per cent have relocated from other parts of the city. Strikingly, almost no international firms or large national companies have settled in the area. Moreover, the initial policy ambitions for residential use and for retail

have been downsized dramatically to only about 15 per cent of the initial expectations. The 7,000 students of the relocated Humboldt departments commute daily between the city and the decentralized university site, and the shortage of social infrastructure does not attract young urban residents. Apparently, stagnation of the regional economy since the mid 1990s has not generated optimal conditions for success for this large-scale, multiple-purpose urban project.

### *Framing Adlershof*

How have patterns of coordination been framed for this city of science, technology, and media? Adlershof is an example of a local, *public-led* urban project. Regarding the *private domain* of economic action, commitment is limited to local entrepreneurs. The shifting hierarchies of international economic networks have, for the most part, neglected the region of Berlin and even national companies as Siemens have partly left the region. Moreover, the second domain of action, related to *trans-regional alliances* for the formulation of public strategies and policies by the central federation or by international coalitions (in particular with the European Union), is strikingly weak. There is no evidence of inter-regional coalition-building or lobbying. Despite Berlin's location in central Europe, at a crossroads between east and west, large-scale development strategies for the Adlershof have been granted little priority in national urban-regional policies. The progress of the project is thus primarily dependent on the convergence of *inner-metropolitan coalitions*. Here, a relatively strong level of interconnectivity has been established between the worlds of science and enterprise. Empirical evidence demonstrates that many of the recently settled enterprises are well connected to organizations of scientific and commercial research. This applies in particular to exact sciences. Regarding the embeddedness of economic growth in *multiple-purpose concepts* of urban use, results have thus far been very modest. There has been a more or less latent rivalry between the 'economic development coalition' and the 'urban planning coalition', represented by two different departments of the federal state of Berlin. Formally, the establishment of an overarching project development agency has ended rivalry between economic-minded and environment-minded polities. However, there is no evidence of an active involvement of civic groups or social organizations in the further development of the project. The lack of *democratic innovation* in the sense of finding integrative solutions has not generated a response by a social or cultural organization or led to additional experiments with local democracy. For this reason, the framing of the project lacks important conditions that could favour the creation of a kind of integrated new urban space.

### *Brussels Tour & Taxis*

'Tour & Taxis' is a 30 hectare inner-city site near to North station in Brussels. Historically it was owned by the aristocratic family of von Thurn und Thassiss whose slightly altered name still serves as a brand for the site. However, in the

course of the nineteenth century it was taken over by public agencies – the port authority and the national railways – in order to establish a freight transportation terminal. These backgrounds explain the characteristic shape of the site, which consists of spacious and potentially attractive industrial heritage buildings on the one hand, and vast empty spaces featuring outdated infrastructures on the other. When the area was dismissed in the late 1980s, urban use options were immediately highly contested and this is still the case today. During the course of the 1980s, the first new initiative for the area was put forward and aimed to create a large-scale ‘music city’. A group of private promoters had developed its own concept and subsequently asked the authorities for the necessary permits to implement their concept. At that point, grassroots contestation and political indecision started to play a role. This flagship-style project was severely objected to by heritage preservationists and the local community, in particular by the residents of the popular neighbourhoods who managed to get the plan rejected. Protests by local groups highlighted the polarized political and cultural atmosphere of Brussels during the last two decades. Since becoming the ‘capital of Europe’, Brussels city centre has shifted dramatically towards becoming an American-style central business district. In particular, the historical shape of the inner city has, in a few decades, become Europe’s most dense office town. In the meantime, the middle classes and innovative economic activities which are suburbanized to the very competitive surrounding areas – largely in the rival Flemish region – are helping the city of Brussels to remain in its present condition of antinomy between ‘imperialist’ office development on the one hand and popular neighbourhoods with a high rate of migrant population on the other. Urban and regional plans are aimed at more social and economic differentiation through the re-entertainment of middle-class residents to the city and through the promotion of different types of economic growth. Community groups, on the other hand, have hardened their struggle against the office invasion, and are claiming new housing and provisions for the popular neighbourhoods.

In recent years, new approaches have been tried. The complete site was sold to two real-estate agencies that cooperate in the development of the project. Regional and local government still have powers of decision as regards redevelopment conditions but the initiative is – again – in private hands. Along the sidelines, local community groups are watching Argus-eyed and have adopted a defensive attitude. In this institutional setting, the current plan aims to establish an international knowledge city. According to estimates based on the 2003 plan, 380,000 square metres of floor space is planned for business and commercial use, 83,000 square metres for residential use and 95,000 square metres for non-commercial services. At present, 60,000 square metres for business and commercial use have been realized. Industrial heritage buildings on the site are being restored and re-used for office and retail use and other facilities, while there are also plans to build new (middle-class) housing and new infrastructures for knowledge-related activities, including university, campus and enterprises on vacant parts of the site.

There are still many uncertainties about the real development programme behind the project’s urban design, but insiders are fascinated by the vast public

purposes of this private-led plan. Would the myth of achieving public purposes by private investment become reality? The basis of the current situation is the potential of a sort of redevelopment that both the regional and local governments and the private real-estate agents are interested in. However, the impulse for development is left completely to the private protagonists, and the public agencies restrict themselves to a role of conditioning the private-led initiatives and to cashing in on its assumed trickle-down benefits. There is a clear lack of vision on the public side. The community groups, for their part, are still sceptical, and are demanding old-style social housing provision. Thus, again, the setting for the current plan of the site is controversial to the point of engaging the local and regional governments involved in stalemates (recently the regional government reversed conditions for implementation that were proposed by local government). The interdependent regional and local governments have not reached consensus on the sort of conditions to apply in the present climate of polarization, which puts pressure on local government in particular. On the other hand, the site is in private hands. However, the private players cannot bear the costs of procrastination related to public decision-making and have already started their own initiative by cleaning the site, recycling the heritage, attracting clients, etc. The hampering of private-led project development by cumbersome public-sector decisions is a costly matter and, paradoxically, might drive public-minded private developers towards adopting more one-sided commercial solutions.

### *Framing Tour & Taxis*

As far as the frame of decision-making is concerned, the Tour & Taxis project is ambitious. The concept combines economic development (connecting the urban economy with international networks of knowledge), mixed-use and diverse urban spaces and functions, and a respectful approach to the design and environmental features of urban redevelopment. Although the social dimension of the plan is controversial, with a problematic embedding in the existing urban fabric, the overall concept is highly *public-oriented* and potentially innovative. However, current *strategic alliances* are no guarantee of success. Although basically *private-led*, the economic purposes of the project are not optimally embedded in relevant social and economic networks. Attracting knowledge services and establishing a European top university requires a strong involvement in the relevant interregional social and economic networks prior to adopting actual developmental plans. Within the public sector, however, there is no strong connection with policies and strategies of national and supra-national – namely European – governmental agencies. The ambition of creating an international knowledge city is not seriously framed in a *trans-regional*, let alone *international*, strategy of action. It is largely dependent on initiatives in the *inner-metropolitan sphere* of local and regional action. Finally, the embedding of new urban space in the context of political and cultural polarization requires *democratic experimentation* rather than mere institutionalized public participation. Tour & Taxis faces the challenge of reframing inveterate defensive civic attitudes, of turning them



into constructive forms of collective action, and of realizing innovation by bridging existing antagonisms. In the Brussels case, it can be concluded that frames of concept building and frames of action should be brought into more strict correspondence in order to make innovative outcomes possible.

### ***Copenhagen Ørestad***

'Ørestad' is a major urban development scheme, centrally located between the old city centre of Copenhagen and Copenhagen's international airport. The idea is to create a 'city-annex' which will attract national and international investors. Besides its central location, a key factor for the attractiveness of the area is its multi-modal accessibility from all parts of the Øresund region (motorways, rail and metro). Its location next to a major green area also contributes to its attractiveness. The area has the shape of a long rectangle with a width of 0.6 kilometres and a length of 5 kilometres (it has been dubbed 'the tie' for this very reason) for a total surface of 310 hectares. One-third is a green area, including small ponds, which provide conditions for special biotopes. The area is served by six stops on a newly built, fully automated metro line.

In June 1992, the Danish parliament passed the 'Ørestad Act'. This was the first parliamentary act in thirty years providing direct state involvement in a major urban development. According to the Act, a development corporation – *Ørestadsselskabet I/S*, co-owned by the city of Copenhagen and the Ministry of Finance – was to develop Ørestad in an area likewise co-owned by the two parties. Similar organizational constructions had been used a few times before, but within the realm of Danish urban development this represented a real innovation. The act empowered the Ørestad Development Corporation to plan the area and provide for the required land improvement and infrastructure, most notably to construct a railway – which eventually ended up being a fully automated metro – running on an elevated track through most of Ørestad. The capacity to invest in the metro was ensured by allowing Ørestad Development Corporation to obtain loans on the international financial markets. By improving the accessibility of the area, the price of the building sites was expected to rise, thus enabling the development corporation to pay back the loans. Along with its organizational feature, this financial provision represented a significant innovation in Danish urban development schemes.

The Act also entrusted the Ørestad development corporation with producing a master plan. This meant that the Municipal Plan for Copenhagen, which was revised in 1993, provided only a very broad description of future developments in Ørestad – more or less reproducing the main features of the Act. The master plan, which was presented by Ørestad Development Corporation in 1995, followed the general ideas of the Finnish entry which was awarded first prize in an ideas competition held the year before – including a winding canal in the northern part of the area. The master plan was incorporated into the revision of the Municipal Plan in 1996. The master plan laid out priorities according to which the 'University District' in the north and 'Ørestad District' – situated where the international

transportation corridor to Sweden intersects the new metro line – would be developed first. In both of these areas, and notably in the University District, developments are currently underway. The two other districts, the ‘Amager Common District’ – located between the ones mentioned previously – and the ‘West Amager District’, both of which will have a higher proportion of housing, are to be developed in the coming five-year period. The Ørestad Development Corporation keeps an initiating role while the city of Copenhagen maintains planning authority.

The metro line was inaugurated in October 2002. After completion, land use in the area will be subdivided into 60 per cent commercial, 20 per cent residential, and 20 per cent retail, education, culture, services and leisure facilities.

### *Framing Ørestad*

Reviewing the five dimensions of our model, Ørestad may be considered a public sector-led plan which is not very well integrated into international economic and cultural networks (private sector), but which is well established in *trans-regional intergovernmental relationships*. Actually, the interregional and the international strategic profiling of the project is exemplary. As far as *intra-metropolitan relationships* are concerned, however, there seems to be some local rivalry about the location of economic investments. The Ørestad Development Corporation even decided to lower quality requirements and rent levels in order to compete with other sites in the region. With respect to *mixed-use development*, a successful arrangement was organized with the university and with agencies involved in public transportation and green spaces. However, a strong separation among different land uses has hampered full integration. Finally, as regards modes of *democratic legitimization*, the project was merely backed by formal routines of public participation.

### *Strasbourg Parc d’Innovation d’Illkirch*

‘Parc d’Innovation d’Illkirch’ is one of the largest French technopoles. France has a particular national policy regarding technopoles, since Pierre Laffitte started the first one – Sophia-Antipolis near Nice – in 1969. France is keen on its international position in research and high-tech business. Here, a technopole is not just a more advanced industrial park, but rather an innovative and interconnected cluster of university research institutes and high-tech companies. Close interrelationships between science and industry are promoted by the proximity of researchers and business partners. Lots of public effort has been traditionally invested in France in such a model of economic excellence. In the wake of political decentralization in the early 1980s, new regional governments were established and a new round of ‘regional technopoles’ was introduced. The newly established Strasbourg region, its development agency (SERS), and local governments strongly supported the establishment of a technopole in the region. In 1983, the *Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg* (CUS) – the association of municipalities of the agglomeration – indeed decided to develop it in Illkirch

in order to upgrade Strasbourg as an urban region and to enlarge its economic image in the European and global contexts. Illkirch is situated 10 miles outside Strasbourg in a natural environment. A university campus had been already founded there in 1972, and an area of almost 4 square kilometres – largely owned by CUS – was already foreseen for mixed use in zoning plans. These factors favoured a steadfast development. In 1985, an area of 0.63 square kilometres – later extended to 1.7 square kilometres – was designed for the technopole itself, and planning and management competencies for the park were delegated to the regional development agency SERS.

The economic focus of the technopole is on biotech research and industries, genetics and space technology. Twenty years after its establishment, 69 enterprises and institutions employ 9,600 workers. Since far more jobs had been expected in advance, the results thus far are rather disappointing, but the site has not yet been completed. Most of the small and medium-sized enterprises stem from private investments. On the other hand, all large institutes are public-financed. There is a European Space agency, closely related to the International Space University (connected with MIT). Since 1996, the biotech industry has been connected with the German area of the Upper Rhine region. In this framework, the BioValley project is promoting the Upper Rhine region's international specialization, as 40 per cent of all pharmaceutical enterprises worldwide are represented in this region. The BioValley project is supported under the INTERREG Community Initiative, strands II and III.

### *Framing the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch*

How is the project *framed*? The technopole is not promoted strongly by *international networks* of private investment. The growth factors are rather supply-side driven, usually supported by governmental initiatives. Among the interviewees there is a general feeling of too much *public-led management* of the technopole and a lack of market dynamics. There appears to be more potential in the Alsace region than is actually demonstrated. The project is backed by *trans-regional strategic alliances*, but their international and cross-border operationalization is relatively modest. Cross-border regions cooperate in the BioValley project, and in 2003 even the national political leaders (the German chancellor and the president of France) announced support for more cooperation in a new cross-border Euro district. The BioValley involves Baden-Württemberg, Alsace, the Upper Rhine Valley and the Constance region in Switzerland. These types of inter-regional and European strategies have been promoted already for more than ten years, but more intense commitment by local and regional politicians at inter-regional levels will be needed in order to make a real difference. At lower levels of scale, *public–public relationships* within the region of Strasbourg are cooperative. Although there is evidence of some inter-local rivalry – for instance regarding a second technopark within the region – the joint efforts by the region, the department and the municipalities in the *Communauté Urbaine* to promote the technopark in

Illkirch demonstrate effective intergovernmental cooperation – something certainly not common in France in the 1980s and the early 1990s. The feeling of industrial crisis and the urgency for an effective employment policy strongly backed this public–public cooperation. Regarding the *integration of policies*, the technopole policy has always focused on promoting relationships between economy and science. A more comprehensive strategy towards the upgrading of the urban region as a whole and towards its internationalization has not been operationalized, however, and neither have there been significant innovations in modes of *democratic legitimation* through extended deliberation approaches.

### **Vienna Erdberger Mais**

Vienna's most ambitious urban project at present is the large-scale regeneration scheme called 'Erdberger Mais'. The project combines several distinct regeneration measures in a 250 hectare urban area, situated in the traditionally industrialized south-eastern area of Vienna, between the nearby city centre and Vienna International Airport. It is strategically connected by highway and public transportation both to the city centre and the airport, and it is also well located in the proximity of the recreation and park area 'Wiener Prater'. There is plenty of available space with high potential for development, and several building plots are owned by the city of Vienna. A further incentive for development is the existence of the biotechnology cluster Campus Vienna Biocenter. New economic potential for the area, in particular, is being sought in telecommunications, biotechnology, and the media sector. Social and economic reconstruction of the area is responsive to the existing problems in the area, such as the high unemployment rate, the low purchasing power, the high rate of migrants, poor housing conditions near heavily used traffic nodes, and a bad image due to the presence of infrastructure facilities (e.g. maintenance yard for the Vienna Underground, gas and electric works, old slaughterhouse area, old industrial plants) and a lack of open spaces.

The ambition of the project is to turn the huge trade and industrial area into a modern service-sector area, and herewith also to prevent the emergence of new business centres in the open countryside. In 1998, the Vienna planning department started procedures to transform the area by designating a mix of land use and low-polluting production-orientated services. In doing so, security and flexibility were guaranteed to potential investors. At present, the whole area hosts 5,000 inhabitants, 17,000 jobs and 1,200,000 square metres of housing. The latter is expected to at least double in size during the process. Some 16,000 inhabitants are expected to live in the area by the end of the project, between 2010 and 2012, and according to plans around 44,000 units will be employed there by that time. The existence of old-industrial heritage provides good conditions for combining flexible and mixed uses with an upgrade of the urban environment.

Some parts of the project have already been realized. The flagship project was the revitalization of the Viennese Gasometer, made up of four cylindrical gas

containers constructed of red bricks which was closed down at the beginning of the 1980s. The regeneration scheme of 2001 gave the four gasometer buildings several new functions, combining housing, shopping and recreational facilities. The second largest project was the realization of the office- and business-centre T-Center in autumn 2004, especially designed for the wireless carrier T-Mobile. Another property already developed is the Media Center St Marx, located in the former administration building of the former St Marx slaughterhouse. The project also foresees mixed-use redevelopment of the old slaughterhouse. Further initiatives relate to the upgrading of the biotechnology cluster Campus Vienna Biocenter and the establishment of a covered superstructure for the Erdberg underground station. The latter, called TownTown, is a new planned business town with 21 office buildings in Neu-Erdberg. It uses a new strategy to attract companies or investors by enabling companies to design their own individual company buildings or office sites.

The first stage of the project, completed in 2005, is expected to double employment in the area – from 16,000 to 32,000 – due to the construction of T-Center and TownTown, the expansion of Vienna Biocenter, and projects adjacent to the surroundings of the gasometers. The population will only increase by about 10 per cent at this stage, but is expected to reach 13,500 units in 2015. Employment is expected to increase in the second and third stages to 45,000 jobs in 2010, with an additional 8,200 in 2015 after the completion of the former slaughterhouse area, of Vienna Biocenter, and of other scattered projects. Overall, the number of jobs is expected to triple in the development process, while population will increase by around 60 per cent.

### *Framing Erdberger Mais*

The framing of the Erdberger Mais project is obviously strongly characterized by the combination of its various differentiated operations. We focus here on the general characteristics. The most striking one is the leading role of local government with its institutionalized long-term planning tradition. The *public-led* frame of the project is set up in close cooperation with local business and also with some national companies. In setting up real-estate public–private partnerships, the city is keen on keeping influence on the development process. Decisions are usually prepared in joint planning teams. The enhancement of new service economies is locally driven and there is no strong pressure from the connectedness with *international economic networks*. Regarding *trans-regional alliances*, there is a light EU involvement regarding social policy via the Urban Community Initiative. The project is not taken up in trans-regional strategies, although Vienna recently started new inter-regional initiatives and adapted its structure plan to the new condition represented by EU accession by new Member States from central and eastern Europe. The significance of these sorts of relationships undoubtedly might increase in the next few years. Regarding *inner-metropolitan policies*, the Erdberger Mais project is safely framed within local and provincial responsibilities. Furthermore, the *multiple-purpose integration* and the creation of

new urban space are explicitly framed in this public-led project. Actually, the preference for regenerating an old-industrial area above the establishment of a new business centre in the surroundings is an important part of this strategy centred on upgrading the existing city. Finally, *democratic practices* in general follow the routines of formal planning procedures, without significant experiments of democratic innovation. It is noteworthy, however, that a new project evaluation method has been developed by the municipality in collaboration with the Austrian Research Centres Seibersdorf. It is a strategic planning game to define urban development scenarios using different samples of real-estate projects for regional development and economic effects. It was designed at the beginning of the Erdberger Mais project and might also be applied to other urban planning projects in the future.

### A multidimensional evaluation of framing processes

Our comparative investigation of large-scale urban projects in seven urban regions of Europe provides a rich array of insights into the features of these experiences – *both good and bad*. The adoption of an integral and multidimensional scheme of analysis means the different approaches, rationales and processes of strategic framing adopted for these projects are investigated systematically, but still on the basis of an awareness for the path, context and situation-dependent conditions – cultural, political, economic and institutional – which define the expectations, preferences and attitudes of ‘local’ actors. Set against the background of this awareness, our findings may hence be applied in a cautiously generalized manner to other urban regions of Europe. The hope is they will generate useful lessons for the suitable framing of large-scale projects in other urban regions.

Our selection of case studies focused on large-scale urban projects guided by multiple-purpose concepts aimed at the creation of *use values* related to the shaping of new urban places, instead of the creation of mere *exchange values* within commercial schemes of commodifiable space. In our definition, the strategic purpose of these projects can be considered multiple as it combines economic goals – in particular it links the regional economy with advanced networks of international service economies – with cultural and social goals of urban development and with the promotion of a well-balanced and sustainable urban environment. These sorts of urban projects are highly ambitious in their intent to coordinate the fragmentary norms, interests and power relationships of the multifarious public and private actors involved into a framework for collective action. The existence of integrative concepts was assumed beforehand as a criterion for selection of the projects, but the route from *concepts* formation to *performance* requires even more intelligence in the coordination of action if these concepts are to live up to expectations. This is the main reason for considering the strategic framing of projects as a process which needs to be investigated along its evolution as a collective endeavour. Given the complex conditions governing their origin and evolution, it is clear that hardly any practices will be found that perfectly fulfil

the requirements of strategic framing as delineated in our analytical framework. Even the best-meant plans have some deficiencies as regards the assumptions that guide ambitions for interconnected public action and innovative integration. For this reason, projects should be evaluated with regard to the specific inventive and creative nature of their framing strategies, as well as for their capacity to evolve reflexively according to adaptation and learning processes. Both constitute aspects that may serve as *exempla* to the framing of other large-scale projects.

Almost all of the selected projects – with the exemption of the Brussels case – are intended to create more than 20,000 jobs in advanced service sectors in integrated area-based developments, and all projects aim at the creation of rich varied urban environments. All the projects claim to play a strategic role in the process of urban transformation and urban-regional rescaling. This may be the restructuring, qualitative upgrading and urban reintegration of old industrial or residential areas, or the transformation of degraded urban centres – such as in Brussels, Barcelona and Vienna. It may also relate to the creation of new urban centres in the context of emerging urban-regional configurations – as in the cases of Amsterdam, Berlin, Copenhagen and Strasbourg. The achievement of these large-scale operations implies a time scale of about 25 years on average, and it is therefore no wonder that none of the projects has already achieved its final targets. All are in different stages of development, but in most cases the current state of affairs provides realistic clues for interpreting progress. Project data included in the Appendix – as far as was currently available and reliable – express the quantitative scope of the projects, both on aggregated and on a more detailed basis.

### ***Conceptual integration: combining multiple purposes***

The first dimension addressed in our framework of analysis concerns the cross-sector challenge of *integrating multiple-purpose strategies* into the projects' framing concepts. The question here is how to integrate economic policies with social and cultural policies and how to shape related dynamic trends in environmentally balanced urban-regional and local configurations of space and place.

It goes without saying that, in evaluating the nature of conceptual integration in these projects, one cannot remove them from their idiosyncratic context and background. In this respect, the projects we selected show significant differences in origin as well as in contextual conditions and ambitions. We selected projects – like such as those in *Brussels* and *Vienna* and, in its own way, *Barcelona* as well – which are rather traditional inner-city regeneration projects based on redeveloping, refunctionalizing and redefining the image of derelict or obsolete sites within the consolidated urban fabric. Accordingly, these projects present a comparatively high level of integration among social, cultural and economic inputs, in line with their embeddedness in a rather consolidated tradition of urbanism which deals with the inward growth and change of cities through a reuse and resymbolization of its historic fabric. Vienna's *Erdberger Mais* is a good example of

public-led inner-city restructuring addressed in an integrative way. It makes good use of existing urban potentials, something that is easier to organize in this type of regeneration project than in new out-of-town settlements. Brussels' *Tour & Taxis*, for its part, relies mainly on corporate visions and strategies – with little public inputs – for the valorization of the assets represented by its location and its cultural heritage. Finally, the case of Barcelona's *Universal Forum of Cultures* is also exemplary for its effort of embedding economic generation objectives in a balanced integrative frame of area-based social, cultural and environmental policies. These features, however, are not a guarantee for the strategic contents of these projects. As will be more extensively argued below, our examples show how the strategic contents of a large inner-city regeneration project rely on the ability to connect the objectives of such urban planning initiatives to an urban-regional vision of spatial and economic development and to a related system of actors and interests, as has been done effectively in Vienna, as well as to mobilize social interests and forces in innovative ways in order to address integrative approaches to urban transformation, which proved difficult in Brussels.

On the other hand, our research has dealt with cases in which – in different ways – the constitution of economic polarities of urban-regional importance follows patterns that challenge the city's centrality and introduce a significant reconfiguration of its functional fabric. In the cases of *Amsterdam*, *Berlin* and, partially, *Copenhagen*, the promotion of the project's location stems from the acknowledgement of a new regional geography of economic activities more than from a logic of decentralized spatial and functional specialization which is, however, still dominant in *Strasbourg's* technopole model. The identity of these projects is hence non-detachable from locational assets like their integration with infrastructure connections, most notably highway networks and, in particular, international airports.

These cases seem to suffer from a paradox that is typical of locations facing the need to 'reinvent' a sense of urbanity in a condition which is neither exurban nor suburban, but instead aims to become a new form of urban-regional centrality. This is evident in the cases in which the ambition to realize a high-quality urban place is emphasized, like in Amsterdam's *Zuidas* and, in their own way, in *Berlin-Adlershof* and *Copenhagen Ørestad*. All these cases face the difficulty that a smooth transfer or spill-over of inner urban uses and lifestyles to a place that is located – physically and symbolically – at the urban fringe is anything but a matter of course. On top of this there is the difficulty of inventing an urban identity that is original and idiosyncratic enough to allow a recognizable 'branding' of places, but which also effectively relates to the system of values of an urban community. In the case of the *Zuidas*, this is expressed in the difficulty of realizing an effective dialogue – substantially and metaphorically – with the urban population, and of countering the 'natural' attitude of the project to look outwards, in the direction of international networks and activities, even if the new development directly borders the consolidated, compact fabric of historical Amsterdam. Here, the fact that the project has, up to now, figuratively turned its back on the city – despite ambitions to realize a mixed-use environment and attempts to



infuse it with significant cultural facilities – is a result of the dominance of economic purposes in its framing, and this is reflected in the nature of the strategic alliances and coalitions formed. *Adlershof* struggles with the aim of realizing a campus atmosphere in a location that offers only part of the required urban services and facilities, and in which their integration appears to be only limited and artificial. *Ørestad*, for its part, has been suffering from a rather introvert project design and from a dual strategy in which, during the process, operational priorities have favoured business interests more than the integrated urban qualities of the new settlement.

Most remarkably, in this respect, the ‘creative’ solution appears to be Barcelona’s approach to the framing of large-scale projects within a strategic vision developed out of a deep sense of continuity in urban transformation. Such continuity is intended to be both historical and physical. In line with a long tradition of event-based urban transformation, multi-scale and multi-purpose arguments for change are combined in strict continuity to the historic form of the city and its fabric. Urban form therefore provides the primary symbolic frame with which to present Barcelona as the traditional but ever evolving and modern centre of an emerging urban region of international allure. Furthermore, this symbolic strategy offers conditions for mobilizing and accommodating different societal interests across a broad range of initiatives that gain their integrative dimension at the scale of the overall agglomeration. It is important to note that, even if not devoid of shortcomings and contradictions, the strategic frame in which the *Universal Forum of Cultures* is embedded needs to be addressed accordingly, beyond the confines of the single projects and rather at the level of their urban integration in both a multi-functional and multi-locational sense.

### ***Strategic alliances: public–public and public–private rationales of action***

As stated above, according to the criteria adopted, all selected projects have a substantive, albeit different, impact on the current spatial reconfiguration of the urban and regional space because of their volumes and – even more so – because of their symbolic significance. However, our investigation shows considerable differences between the framing of planning concepts themselves, on the one hand, and the framing of planning processes intended to be collective action practices on the other. This introduces a key aspect of our study concerning the consistency between two dimensions of framing, namely the conceptual framing of projects and the framing of conditions to realize strategic alliances in support of development concepts.

All the projects considered are intended to realize multiple-purpose and mixed-use urban settlement. However, collective action may be framed in completely different ways and, as our findings show, this does not always happen in accordance with these aims. Some of our case studies show this in remarkable ways. In Berlin’s *Adlershof*, conflicting coalitions have long been divided among representatives of purely economic and mainly environmental planning purposes, and accordingly rooted in respective departments and political responsibilities at

the federal state of Berlin. Recently, these administrative–political contradictions have apparently been solved by establishing an integral body serving both goals. However, most involved actors still focus on purely economic purposes. Besides the successful relocation of parts of Humboldt University and the recovery of a large green area, no effective societal coalition has emerged yet to guarantee the achievement of integrated urban space. In the case of *Parc d'Illkirch* in Strasbourg, the planning concept aims to shape a new urban settlement in order to realize environmental conditions for a polycentric metropolitan configuration while, in practice, the organization of the project relies rather on the traditional concept of an out-of-town technopole. Amsterdam's *Zuidas* is also a difficult case. Plan *Zuidas* is aimed explicitly at the creation of an urban centre in the new urban-regional configuration of the Dutch capital, but a rather narrow local public–private coalition of economic development occurred during the first ten years of the project development process. Here, planners are waiting for the crucial decision to bring large infrastructure under the ground. This solution – the so-called 'dock-model' – is being regarded as the *conditio sine qua non* for the transformation of economic space into a new integrated urban place. Although some mixed-use facilities were already present in the area (stadium, campus, park, plus minor local cultural facilities), social, cultural and environmental interests are not yet organized strongly enough to achieve real urban quality. Brussels' *Tour & Taxis* is a fascinating case because of the public urban ambitions incorporated in the plans of the private developer. The levels of governments involved only set some general conditions for development, while the initiative substantially lies with the developer. Local community groups, however, are mobilized in a prevalently defensive attitude. Hence, while the project has strong urban potential, the institutional setting and the context of social relations in which it is embedded is rather vulnerable. The *Ørestad* project is an interesting case of deliberately planned polycentrism, based on the creation of a new integrated mixed-use urban settlement on the periphery of Copenhagen, including a new campus, green areas, and a high-performance light rail link. A typical feature of this case, however, is the decision to *cumulate* different urban functions in separate sectors of the area rather than integrating them. The price paid for this rather functionalistic, conflict-avoiding approach of multiple-purpose planning is that the use values represented by the urban variety and by the integrative quality of spaces in the new settlement are rather substandard.

We conclude that framing strategic urban projects requires more than simply concept innovation. The crux of the matter is the game of coordinating collective action in ways that adequately support concept innovation. Clearly, we are referring here to a dual challenge in which innovation in concepts and in relations may mutually and iteratively reinforce each other. The concrete trajectory this may take is dependent on the nature of projects and of their origin and context, as we have shown. It is, however, important to note that the framing of concepts may play a key role in framing the coalitions that support them. In given situations, alterations or adaptations of conceptual frames may be key to facilitating new actors and interests configurations. If, for instance, new urban

qualities are to be realized by large-scale multiple-purpose projects, it might be necessary to involve the people and organizations that are concerned to shape the qualities of urban variation. With this respect, it might be helpful to prioritize parts of the programme – for instance, residential functions – on behalf of others in order to improve the livability of new spaces and to lay a basis for further social and cultural claims.

With regard to the presence and nature of *strategic alliances* backing the projects, the following more specific observations can be made. As far as the *private sphere of action* is concerned, it should be noted that current literature on large-scale projects usually highlights the concern felt about the dominance of economic interests in framing large-scale projects and alludes to the, more or less surreptitious, adoption of economic imperatives as well as to the structuring influence of joint public–private interests in real-estate programming. Our findings indeed show quite clearly that the promotion of economic growth by the local and regional governments involved is a key priority in all seven case studies. However, the nature of economic interests involved is not at all self-evident. Explicit economic pressure from (inter-)national investment capital on the selected area-based projects, for instance, is evident only in the case of Amsterdam's *Zuidas* and, in a more indirect way, in Brussels' *Tour & Taxis*, while in the case of Vienna's *Erdberger Mais* it mainly takes the form of local economic pressure. In the other case studies, attempts by local and regional governments to attract private investment are much more cumbersome and sometimes even lead public local actors to overstate their case, as in Barcelona, Berlin and Strasbourg, where project performance is still far off official growth projections. In a number of cases, the alleged dominance of private sector interests in framing the projects is reflected in the rhetoric of policy and planning documents rather than in the actual coalitions supporting the projects. This, of course, does not lessen the relevance of economically biased urban development discourse, but raises further important questions about local capacity to actually realize a *fix* of economic forces within strategic urban projects. An even more striking feature is the lack of involvement by civic groups and cultural or social organizations in the framing of large-scale projects. Here, conditions related to the location of the project in the urban fabric make a difference. Pressure by social groups is most evident in Brussels' *Tour & Taxis* where local neighbourhood inhabitants find their interests being affected most directly. However, we are confronted here with a traditional example of reactive and mainly defensive antagonistic involvement. More surprising, although restricted to this one case, is the critical pressure exerted by large-scope community groups on Barcelona's *Universal Forum of Cultures*. Conversely, we found no indication at all of active pressure by community groups or cultural and social organizations on the framing of plans for new urban settlements in the urban fringe of the core cities of Amsterdam, Berlin, Copenhagen and Strasbourg. Actually, the *absence of social and cultural pressures*, on the one hand, and the *problematic involvement and commitment of economic forces*, on the other, in defining the future of new strategic centres of urban-regional configurations, is more alarming than the presumed omnipresence of international capital.

Another crucial area of action concerns the interconnectedness of projects with *supra- and trans-regional strategies and policies*. Considering the increasing significance and non-place-bounded social and economic networks, the relevant question is whether urban strategies respond adequately to the rescaling and the multilevel nature of relationships which affect the prospects of success of large-scale projects. Findings from our investigation are very significant in this respect, and highlight the remarkable differences. On the one hand, we found cases in which large-scale projects are embedded in a traditional and introspective local planning attitude that does not effectively reach beyond the jurisdiction of the directly involved local and regional governments and of related private sector representatives. In our research this is the case as regards *Berlin, Brussels, Strasbourg* and *Vienna*. In the case of *Amsterdam*, national government recently joined local Zuidas partnerships, but a structural shift in the introspective tradition of framing had not yet occurred. Only in the cases of *Copenhagen* and particularly *Barcelona* are inter-regional strategies and European lobbies and cooperative networks common in the framing of urban planning and urban projects. Urban planning strategies in *Barcelona* are even more explicitly interconnected with intercontinental and global relationships (albeit sometimes in opposition with higher echelons in the national intergovernmental relationships). By promoting the cooperation with Malmö and the Skåne region as a European model of crossing border regions, *Copenhagen* mobilizes a lot of external energy for its major Ørestad urban project, ranging from European subsidies to national policy involvement and private sector lobbying. Economic regeneration is also embedded here in extensive inter-regional networks between science and industry. Why should *Berlin* and *Vienna* not undertake similar active inter-regional strategies in central Europe (*Vienna* only recently started a cautious relationship with Bratislava)? Why should *Strasbourg*, situated in its Triple-Rhine area, not aim to achieve real inter-regional impact? Why should *Amsterdam* not reflect on its urban strategies in an inter-regional perspective and, for instance, inscribe its project aims – for instance, the option for its infrastructure connection which is currently the Achilles' heel of the Zuidas – in a trans-regional and European agenda? These are more than rhetoric questions since they reflect a current reality of asymmetric institutional relations that do not keep pace with societal dynamics. Reflecting urban strategies at supra- and trans-regional level may affect the way winning and losing coalitions are framed, as the economic and social challenges of strategic urban transformations cannot be solved by introspective institutions.

Regarding the *inner-metropolitan sphere of action*, forms of cooperation between the public and the private sector and between the local and regional governmental agencies in the framing of the selected large-scale projects have been successfully addressed in most of the seven urban-regions involved in our case studies. Internal quarrels between inner-regional actors used to be very dominant until the early 1990s but, apparently, the increasing needs of joint regional development in the face of growing inter-regional competitiveness stimulate more inner-regional political cohesion. Striking examples of this are the cooperation

between *Barcelona* and Catalonia in the Universal Forum of Culture project (in this particular case its structural conflicts were even overcome), the way *Copenhagen* formalized a new local–regional functional-administrative body and the inter-municipal cooperation in *Strasbourg* and – albeit less strongly – in *Berlin* and *Vienna*. As the region with the highest pressure from international capital interests, *Amsterdam* has also addressed the issue of establishing a certain level of regional coherence in framing the Zuidas. However, the province and the neighbouring municipalities are still scarcely involved in this major regional project. In the case of *Brussels*, relationships between region and municipality are still complicated, severe inter-local rivalries also prevent strong inner-regional cohesion. In general, the presence of sub-optimal regional connectivity currently does not seem to be having a severe effect on most of the projects' framing process, but may turn out to be a significant weakness factor under different conditions of economic and social fluctuation.

### ***Democratic legitimacy: experimenting with democratic deliberation***

Finally, we devoted attention in our analysis to the dimension of *democratic legitimation* and to experiences with *innovative practices of democracy* in large-scale urban projects. As we have noted in the introduction to this volume, there is more than one reason to highlight this dimension in the framing of strategic urban projects. Not only does the impact and volume of resources implied by large-scale projects challenge the capacity of 'normal' (representative democratic) decision-making procedures to account adequately for their implications with the means at their disposal and within their short-term (electoral) frames of justification. Even more challenging for the democratic legitimation of large-scale projects is the multilevel and multidimensional scope of governance practices implied. The prospects of effectiveness of complex, integrated urban projects simply exceed locally bounded and institutionally codified contexts of political deliberation. This means that the context for justification for the strategic role of large-scale urban projects, from a perspective of public accountability, must be reconstructed according to the nature of political and societal contributions involved, whether governmental or otherwise. What is particularly challenging in this is that these contributions must be related to defining *supra-local conditions of local transformations* as well as to defining the *local conditions for supra-local impacts*. While local impacts and conditions are key, they are not the sole aspects that must be considered for large-scale urban projects to be 'effective' and 'democratic'. In other words, large-scale urban projects should be regarded as particular sites of democratic deliberation. It is according to this specific nature that the adequacy and legitimacy of procedures and arenas for democratic justification should be evaluated.

In this respect, however, providing democratic legitimacy for strategic projects is subject to challenges that are typical of emergent governance structures. Under conditions of public–private co-production, innovation requires not only the negotiation or mitigation of contrasting social, economic or ecological interests,

but also the capacity to realize a convergence between a legitimate mix among these different societal aims and concrete political action. The risk entailed in this has to do with the difficulty institutional policymaking systems have – whether they be path-dependently, ideologically or discursively defined – to escape dominant patterns of interests structuring, either on the side of dominant economic imperatives and of solutions of ‘one-sided market domination’, or on the side of relatively closed neo-corporatist relations. Against this background, several experiences in urban development show that there is a real chance that local or regional governments will slip into some sort of ineffective ‘planning voluntarism’ when searching for alternatives. Conversely, it is towards a strategically oriented and context-specific redefinition of interests and actors’ constellations that the framing potential of planning concepts for urban projects should be directed. Redefining patterns of democratic justification, in this respect, might itself bear a strategic transformative meaning. Again, the legitimacy of large-scale urban projects should be considered, in a strategic sense, in its dual normative dimensions, namely that of being ‘effective’ and ‘democratic’. Besides responding to democratic-theoretical imperatives, innovating patterns of democratic justification might become key to addressing issues of uncertainty that constrain the decisions of both governmental and economic actors and, ultimately, may hamper the prospects of success of large public endeavours in the absence of adequate strategic-communicative arenas for the sharing and exchange of knowledge and for negotiating meanings and objectives.

These reasons together explain why arguing about the strategic nature of projects generates a *need for innovating democratic practices* around large-scale urban transformations and why this – in most local government contexts in which projects are embedded – would require a commitment to *addressing targeted, ad hoc experiments in local democracy*.

As shown by our projects, reality is unfortunately rather different. In our case studies, policy ambitions and operational complexity are barely supported by an adequate commitment to experimenting with *ad hoc* deliberation arenas and procedures, in an active and anticipatory rather than reactive and remedial way.

Institutionalized forms of democracy are common to all the case studies and include familiar procedures of hearing, consultation and, eventually, litigation. Still, the interconnectedness of sections of the existing urban community is rather weak in most of the case studies. Again, a strong difference can be found between inner-city regeneration projects and new urban settlements which are aimed at a new configuration of urban-regional importance outside of the core cities. While, in the first case, local involvement – in particular in light of its focus on particular interests – may sometimes even be too direct and pressing to allow new forms of urban deliberation, as in *Brussels*, in the latter case the risk of a relative indifference of urban populations is evident, as is the case in *Amsterdam, Berlin, Strasbourg and Copenhagen*. In the latter case, this is obviously also connected to the issue of generating a sense of awareness and problem-ownership and of finding solutions for channelling them besides more traditional area-based forms of citizens representation.

As all projects explicitly claim their ambition is to shape new urban conditions for the transformation of urban-regional space, an adequate commitment should be generated to the adoption of inventive forms of urban deliberation in order to mobilize the societal energy needed for a successful strategic framing. This certainly does not imply relativizing or 'silencing' directly involved local interests, such as community groups in Brussels or particular local real-estate interests in some other cases, but rather enlarging and enriching the scope of contribution of existing societal interests in imagining and delineating innovative urban-regional perspectives. In our view, the main problem concerning the lack of democratic legitimacy of large-scale urban projects lies not mainly or only in the presence of particular interest, but rather in the *absence* or *indifference* of multiple and possibly divergent interests, as well as in the lack of strategies that enable a dialectics among partisans, and possibly their participation in actively defining integrative trajectories of project development. We believe that an important condition for this to contribute to improving the democratic quality of the framing of large-scale projects is the addressing of experiments of democratic deliberation relating to concrete projects against the background of an open public discussion on their contribution to urban-regional futures. Although it is certainly controversial in its implementation, *Barcelona's* planning philosophy hints at an interesting possible approach to involving citizens in cross-border deliberative policies. In this instance it is not by chance that new urban perspectives have emerged at the convergence between different definitions of scope and different levels of scale. Unfortunately, by contrast, particular local interests have not been served optimally in this exciting case, resulting in new problems of cultural integration. Nevertheless, this case is still one of the few inspiring examples of mobilizing trans-local democratic energy in the framing of large-scale projects. Considering the overall findings of our analysis, we can conclude that the dimension of experimenting with innovative forms of democratic legitimization is still the most embryonic dimension in current practices in the framing of large-scale urban projects.

Table 10.2 Summary evaluation table

	<i>Amsterdam Plan Zuidas</i>	<i>Barcelona Universal Forum of Cultures 2004</i>	<i>Berlin Adlershof</i>	<i>Brussels Tour &amp; Taxis</i>	<i>Copenhagen Ørsted</i>	<i>Strasbourg Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch</i>	<i>Vienna Erdberger Mais</i>
<i>a.</i> conceptual integration: combining multiple purposes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– mainly economic and environmental</li><li>– weak framing of cultural and social urban uses</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– culturally embedded environmental social and economic</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– mainly economic, education and environmental</li><li>– weak framing of social and cultural urban</li><li>– outcomes still uncertain</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– economically dominated integration of uses</li><li>– outcomes still uncertain</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– cultural, economic environmental</li><li>– however scarcely integrated</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– mainly economic</li><li>– weak framing of urban uses</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– integrative urban project</li></ul>
<i>b.</i> strategic alliances: private-sector alliances:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– strongly connected to international economic networks</li><li>–no socio-cultural pressure</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– weakly connected to international economic networks</li><li>–strong cultural ties</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– weakly connected to national and international economic networks</li><li>– weak cultural ties</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– well connected to national, not international service economy</li><li>– cultural potential</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– weakly connected to national and international economic networks</li><li>– weak cultural ties</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– no strong pressure from national and international economic networks</li><li>– no significant cultural ties</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– well connected to local and national economic networks</li><li>– no strong connections to international economic networks</li><li>– strong cultural potential</li></ul>
supra- and trans-regional strategic alliances in the public sector:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– only national</li><li>– no supra-, trans-regional and international alliances</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– strongly connected with supra-regional and international policies</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– poorly connected with all supra-regional levels</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– poorly connected with all supra-regional levels</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– well connected to supra- and trans-regional (European) networks</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– only starting trans-regional initiatives</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– weakly connected with EU and national levels</li></ul>



Table 10.2 Continued

	Amsterdam <i>Plan Zuidas</i> 2004	Barcelona <i>Universal Forum of Cultures</i>	Berlin <i>Adlershof</i>	Brussels <i>Tour &amp; Taxis</i>	Copenhagen <i>Ørestad</i>	Strasbourg <i>Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch</i>	Vienna <i>Erdberger Mais</i>
inner-metropolitan public-private alliances:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– role of province weak but increasing</li> <li>– strong local government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– inter-local cooperation</li> <li>– strong local ppp*</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– strongly embedded in local-regional policy</li> <li>– strong local ppp</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– frictions local and regional municipalities</li> <li>– local developmental ppp</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– well integrated in trans-regional policy</li> <li>– still high local rivalry</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– strong local and regional partnerships</li> <li>– strong local ppp</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– strong local and regional partnerships</li> <li>– strong local ppp</li> </ul>
c. <i>democratic legitimacy</i> : experiments in deliberation and institutional innovation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– urban debate only in starting phase</li> <li>– no experimentation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– generating ideas and debates on cosmopolitan nature urban planning</li> <li>– however selective elaboration</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– urban debate only in starting phase</li> <li>– no experimentation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– failure of synergy</li> <li>– conflicting interests</li> <li>– only formal procedures</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– only formal procedures</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– only in starting phase urban debate</li> <li>– no experimentation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– formal procedures</li> <li>– one experimental strategic game</li> </ul>

Notes

\* ppp = public-private partnership(s)

# Appendix



Table A.1 Summary of projects data<sup>1</sup>

<i>Project name:</i>	<i>Amsterdam Plan Zuidas</i>	<i>Barcelona Forum 2004, 22@ etc.</i>	<i>Berlin Adlershof</i>	<i>Brussels Tour &amp; Taxis</i>	<i>Copenhagen Ørestad</i>	<i>Strasbourg Parc d'Illkirch</i>	<i>Vienna Erdberger Mais</i>
<i>Spatial impact:</i>							
area extension planned (sq km)	2.757	4.123	4.20	0.3	3.1	1.70	2.5
area extension realized (sq km)	0.85	n.a.	2.65	0.08	0.8	1.70	n.a.
<i>Economic impact:</i>							
employment (total) planned	51,000	130,000 <sup>2</sup>	20,000	11,000	60,000	20,000 <sup>3</sup>	44,000
employment (total) realized	25,254	n.a.	10,600	600	n.a.	2,576	12,018
employment tertiary planned	n.a.	n.a.	20,000	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
employment tertiary realized	10,299	n.a.	10,600	550	n.a.	1,338	n.a.
real estate (total) planned (sq m)	2,748,920	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3,100,00	n.a.	130,000 <sup>4</sup>
real estate (total) realized (sq m)	500,000	n.a.	230,800 <sup>5</sup>	n.a.	1,175,500	n.a.	n.a.
real estate: business planned (sq m)	1,171,700	n.a.	n.a.	382,000	1,860,000	n.a.	n.a.
real estate: business realized (sq m)	450,000	679,000	220,000 <sup>6</sup>	60,000	341,000	46,000	n.a.
real estate: residential planned (sq m)	1,091,700	351,900 <sup>7</sup>	n.a.	83,000	620,000	n.a.	n.a.
real estate: residential realized (sq m)	0	163,500 <sup>8</sup>	10,800	0	493,500	n.a.	n.a.
investments (total) planned (m€)	9,200	341 <sup>9</sup>	3,900	n.a.	n.a.	100	n.a.
investments (total) realized (m€)	1,340	n.a.	1,585	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
public planned (% of total)	3000 (32.6)	271.8 (80.0) <sup>10</sup>	1,100 (28.0)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
public realized (% of total)	100 (7.5)	n.a.	785 (49.0) <sup>11</sup>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
private planned (% of total)	6,200 (67.4)	68.2 (20.0) <sup>12</sup>	2,800 (72.0)	250 (100)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
private realized (% of total)	1,240 (92.5)	n.a.	800 (51.0)	25 (100)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Table A.2 Project data Plan Zuidas, Amsterdam<sup>13</sup>

Date of start of formal planning: 1995

Date of start of realization: 1998 (first Masterplan Zuidas)

Date of realization:

– planned realization 2030

– actual realization in progress

<i>Project area extension (sq km)</i>	<i>Business / commercial</i>	<i>Residential</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	2.757
<i>Realized (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.85 (including projects in progress)

<i>Floor space (sq m, gross)</i>	<i>Business / commercial</i>	<i>Residential</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned (reference year: 2030)</i>	1,171,700	1,091,700	485,020	2,748,420
% of COMET-Nurec region	9.8	0.9	3.6	2.1
<i>Realized (reference year: 2004)</i>	450,000	0	50,000	500,000
% of COMET-Nurec region	3.8	0	1.0	0.04

<i>Employment in the area (direct, full time, NACE 50–99)</i>	<i>Business (NACE 70–74)</i>	<i>Finance (NACE 65–67)</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned (reference year: 2030)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	51,000
% of COMET-Nurec region	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	8.8
<i>Realized (reference year: 2002)</i>	5,893	4,406	15,955	26,254
% of COMET-Nurec region	10.2	2.9	4.3	4.5

<i>Public investments (m€)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 2030)	3,000	n.a.	n.a.	3,000
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2004)	100	n.a.	n.a.	100

<i>Private investments (m€)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 2030)	n.a.	6,200	n.a.	6,200
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2004)	n.a.	1,240	n.a.	1,240

<i>Public investments (% of total)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 2030)	100	0	n.a.	32.6
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2004)	100	0	n.a.	7.5

<i>Private investments (% of total)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 2030)	0	100	n.a.	67.4
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2004)	0	100	n.a.	92.5

Table A.3 Project data International Forum of Cultures 2004, 22@, Sagrera HST station, La Mina and La Catalana urban regeneration, Les Glòries, Barcelona<sup>14</sup>Date of start of formal planning: 2000<sup>15</sup>Date of start of realization: end of 2000<sup>16</sup>

Date of realization:

– planned realization expected to last from 15 to 20 years<sup>17</sup>

– actual realization 2004 (Forum 2004), in progress

<i>Project area extension (sq km)</i>	<i>Business / commercial</i>	<i>Residential</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Realized (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Floor space (sq m, gross/net)</i>	<i>Business / commercial</i>	<i>Residential</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned (reference year: 2004)</i>	n.a.	351,900 <sup>18</sup>	n.a.	n.a.
% of COMET-Nurec region	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Realized (reference year: 2004)</i>	679,000	163,500 <sup>19</sup>	n.a.	n.a.
% of COMET-Nurec region	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Employment in the area (direct, full time, NACE 50–99)</i>	<i>Business (NACE 70–74)</i>	<i>Finance (NACE 65–67)</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	130,000 <sup>20</sup>
% of COMET-Nurec region	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Realized (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
% of COMET-Nurec region	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Public investments (m€)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	271.8 <sup>21</sup>
<i>Realized</i> (reference year)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Private investments (m€)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	68.2 <sup>22</sup>
<i>Realized</i> (reference year)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Public investments</i> <i>(% of total)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	80.0 <sup>23</sup>
<i>Realized</i> (reference year)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Private investments</i> <i>(% of total)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	20.0 <sup>24</sup>
<i>Realized</i> (reference year)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.



*Table A.4* Project data Adlershof City of Science, Technology and Media, Berlin <sup>25</sup>

Date of start of formal planning: 1991–1992 (decision by the Senate of Berlin)

Date of start of realization: 1994 (entry of an urban development area and foundation of a construction company)

Date of realization:

– planned realization 2010 (since 2003: new planned realization until 2006/2007)

– actual realization in progress

<i>Project area extension (sq km)</i>	<i>Business / commercial</i>	<i>Residential</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 1994/2001)	2.49	0.94	0.77	4.20
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2004)	1.75	0.13	0.77	2.65

<i>Floor space (sq m, net)</i>	<i>Business / commercial</i>	<i>Residential</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 1994)	n.a.	375,000	n.a.	n.a.
% of COMET-Nurec region	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2004)	220,000 <sup>26</sup>	10,800	n.a.	230,800 <sup>27</sup>
% of COMET-Nurec region	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Employment in the area (direct, full time, NACE 50–99)</i>	<i>Business (NACE 70–74)</i>	<i>Finance (NACE 65–67)</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 1994)	30,000	n.a.	n.a.	30,000
% of COMET-Nurec region	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2004)	10,600	n.a.	n.a.	10,600
% of COMET-Nurec region	approx. 5	n.a.	n.a.	approx. 5

<i>Public investments (m€)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 1994)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1,100
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2004)	340	445 <sup>28</sup>	n.a.	785

<i>Private investments (m€)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 1994)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	2,800
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2001)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	800

<i>Public investments (% of total)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 1994)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	28.0
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2004)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	49.0

<i>Private investments (% of total)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 1994)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	72.0
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2004)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	51 .0

Table A.5 Project data Tour & Taxis, Brussels <sup>29</sup>Date of start of formal planning: January, 2003<sup>30</sup>Date of start of realization: 2002<sup>31</sup>

Date of realization:

– planned realization n.a.

– actual realization spring 2004<sup>32</sup>

<i>Project area extension (sq km)</i>	<i>Business / commercial</i>	<i>Residential</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 2003)	0.16	0.04	0.1 <sup>33</sup>	0.3
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2004)	0.08	0	0	0.08

<i>Floor space (sq m, gross)</i>	<i>Business / commercial</i>	<i>Residential</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total<sup>34</sup></i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 2003)	382, 000	83,000	95,000	560,000
% of COMET-Nurec region <sup>35</sup>	2.1	insignificant	insignificant	2.1
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2004)	60,000	0	0	60,000
% of COMET-Nurec region	0.3	0	0	0.3

<i>Employment in the area<sup>36</sup> (direct, full time, NACE 50–99)</i>	<i>Business (NACE 70–74)</i>	<i>Finance (NACE 65–67)</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 2003)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	11,000
% of COMET-Nurec region	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1.2
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2004)	500	50	50	600
% of COMET-Nurec region	insignificant	insignificant	insignificant	insignificant

<i>Public investments (m€)<sup>37</sup></i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Realized</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Private investments (m€)<sup>38</sup></i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 2003)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	250
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2004)	0	25	0	25

<i>Public investments</i> <i>(% of total)<sup>39</sup></i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 2003)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	100
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2004)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	100

<i>Private investments</i> <i>(% of total)<sup>39</sup></i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 2003)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	100
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2004)	0	100	0	100

Table A.6 Project data Ørestad, Copenhagen <sup>40</sup>

Date of start of formal planning: 1990 / 1992

Date of start of realization: 1999

Date of realization:

– planned realization 2030

– actual realization 2036

<i>Project area extension (sq km)</i>	<i>Business / commercial</i>	<i>Residential</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned (1995)</i>	1.17	0.39	2.44 <sup>41</sup>	3.1
<i>Realized (2006)<sup>42</sup></i>	0.23	0.34	0.23	0.8

<i>Floor space (sq m, gross)</i>	<i>Business / commercial</i>	<i>Residential</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 2030)	1,860,000	620,000	620,000	3,100,000
% of COMET-Nurec region	9.8	0.9	3.6	2.1
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2006)	341,000	493,500	341,000	1,175,500
% of COMET-Nurec region	1.79	0.71	1.98	0.79

<i>Employment in the area (direct, full time, NACE 50–99)</i>	<i>Business (NACE 70–74)</i>	<i>Finance (NACE 65–67)</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 2030)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	60,000
% of COMET-Nurec	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2002)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
% of COMET-Nurec region	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Public investments (m€)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 2036)	2,500	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Realized<sup>43</sup></i> (reference year: 2006)	1,900	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Private investments (m€)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 2030)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2004)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Public investments</i> <i>(% of total)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 2030)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2004)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Private investments</i> <i>(% of total)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 2030)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2004)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Table A.7 Project data Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch, Strasbourg<sup>44</sup>

Date of start of formal planning: 1983

Date of start of realization: 1987 (first Masterplan Zuidas)

Date of realization:

– planned realization about 2015

– actual realization in progress

<i>Project area extension (sq km)</i>	<i>Business / commercial</i>	<i>Residential</i>	<i>Others<sup>45</sup></i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned</i> (reference year: 1993)	1.30	n.a.	0.40	1.70
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 2004)	1.30	n.a.	0.40	1.70

<i>Floor space (sq m, gross)</i>	<i>Business / commercial</i>	<i>Residential</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
% of COMET-Nurec region	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Realized</i> (reference year)	46,000	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
% of COMET-Nurec region	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Employment in the area (direct, full time, NACE 50–99)</i>	<i>Business (NACE 70–74)</i>	<i>Finance (NACE 65–67)</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	20,000 <sup>46</sup>
% of COMET-Nurec region	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	
<i>Realized</i> (reference year: 1999)	1,336	2	1,238	9,620 <sup>47</sup>
(reference year: var.)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	2,576 <sup>48</sup>
% of COMET-Nurec region	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Public investments (m€)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Realized (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	100

<i>Private investments (m€)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Realized (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Public investments (% of total)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Realized (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Public investments (% of total)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Realized (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.



Table A.8 Project data Erdberger Mais, Vienna <sup>49</sup>

Date of start of formal planning: 1998

Date of start of realization: n.a.

Date of realization:

– planned realization 2010–2015

– actual realization in progress

<i>Project area extension (sq km)</i>	<i>Business / commercial</i>	<i>Residential</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	2.5
<i>Realized (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Floor space (sq m, gross/net)</i>	<i>Business / commercial</i>	<i>Residential</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	130,000 <sup>50</sup>
<i>% of COMET-Nurec region</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Realized (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>% of COMET-Nurec region</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Employment in the area (direct, full time, NACE 50–99)</i>	<i>Business (NACE 70–74)</i>	<i>Finance (NACE 65–67)</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned (reference year: 2010–2015)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	44,000
<i>% of COMET-Nurec region</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Realized (reference year: 2001)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	12,018
<i>% of COMET-Nurec region</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Public investments (m€)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Realized (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Private investments (m€)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Realized (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Public investments (% of total)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Realized (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

<i>Public investments (% of total)</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Non-commercial services</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Planned (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Realized (reference year)</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

## Notes

- 1 Not all the data are available for all projects, depending on the treatment of quantitative data in planning and evaluation documents. All the data have been gathered and elaborated by COMET research partners in cooperation with local governmental and end-users.
- 2 Estimation: data refer only to the expected total amount of jobs in the area of 22@ project.
- 3 Estimation.
- 4 Data refer only to the sub-project TownTown.
- 5 Information only for residential area and Science and Technology Park (i.e. part of City of Science, without university campus and media city).
- 6 Information only for Science and Technology Park (i.e. part of City of Science, without university campus and media city).
- 7 Estimation based on 3,519 units  $\times$  100 sq m.
- 8 Estimation based on 1,635 units  $\times$  100 sq m.
- 9 Data refer only to Forum 2004 project.
- 10 Data refer only to Forum 2004 project.
- 11 Information for the public investments of buildings only for Science and Technology Park (€170 m) and university campus (€275 m) (i.e. without media city).
- 12 Data refer only to Forum 2004 project.
- 13 Not all the data are available for all projects, depending on the treatment of quantitative data in planning and evaluation documents.  
References to COMET-Nurec areas are based on the delimitation of metropolitan areas according to the Nurec methodology realized in the framework of the COMET project. More information on COMET-Nurec areas can be found on the COMET website under: [http://www.oew.ac.at/isr/comet/nurec\\_head.htm](http://www.oew.ac.at/isr/comet/nurec_head.htm).
- 14 Not all the data are available, depending on the treatment of quantitative data in planning and evaluation documents.  
References to COMET-Nurec areas are based on the delimitation of metropolitan areas according to the Nurec methodology realized in the framework of the COMET project. More information on COMET-Nurec areas can be found on the COMET website under: [http://www.oew.ac.at/isr/comet/nurec\\_head.htm](http://www.oew.ac.at/isr/comet/nurec_head.htm).
- 15 Project 22@ only.
- 16 Project 22@ only.
- 17 Project 22@ only.
- 18 Estimation based on 3,519 units  $\times$  100 sq m.
- 19 Estimation based on 1,635 units  $\times$  100 sq m.
- 20 Estimation: data refer only to the expected total amount of jobs in the area of 22@ project.
- 21 Data refer only to Forum 2004 project.
- 22 Data refer only to Forum 2004 project.
- 23 Data refer only to Forum 2004 project.
- 24 Data refer only to Forum 2004 project.
- 25 Not all the data are available, depending on the treatment of quantitative data in planning and evaluation documents.  
References to COMET-Nurec areas are based on the delimitation of metropolitan areas according to the Nurec methodology realized in the framework of the COMET project. More information on COMET-Nurec areas can be found on the COMET website under: [http://www.oew.ac.at/isr/comet/nurec\\_head.htm](http://www.oew.ac.at/isr/comet/nurec_head.htm).
- 26 Information only for Science and Technology Park (i.e. part of City of Science, without university campus and media city).
- 27 Information only for residential area and Science and Technology Park (i.e. part of City of Science, without university campus and media city).

- 28 Information only for Science and Technology Park (€170 million) and university campus (€275 million) (i.e. without media city).
- 29 Not all the data are available, depending on the treatment of quantitative data in planning and evaluation documents.

References to COMET-Nurec areas are based on the delimitation of metropolitan areas according to the Nurec methodology realized in the framework of the COMET project. More information on COMET-Nurec areas can be found on the COMET web-site under: [http://www.oeaw.ac.at/isr/comet/nurec\\_head.htm](http://www.oeaw.ac.at/isr/comet/nurec_head.htm).

- 30 This is the date of passing of the decree of the ZRI Tour & Taxis by the Brussels regional government. Hence, we do not take into account past unfruitful experiences of redevelopment of the site.
- 31 This is the time when the renewal of the warehouses by Project T&T began (on the basis of permits granted at the time of the former Music City project). Besides, nothing has been realized yet on the rest of the site (i.e. the former railway yards). The planning phase is not over yet but should be finished for January 2006 (3-year period of time after the passing of the decree). Hence, this large piece of land is still vacant, except for some temporary events (e.g. music festivals, circus performances).
- 32 The only actual realization in Tour & Taxis is the complete renewal of the B warehouse. These works were mostly completed in spring 2004 and Project T&T is now busy looking for renters to take up the new office spaces in these buildings.

The current planning framework does not indicate any deadline for completion of the works on the site.

- 33 Including 0.03 sq km green space. Please note that these figures are (personal) rough estimates elaborated from various sources of information. These figures may seem low in absolute terms but please do not forget that T&T is located in a very dense inner-city environment.
- 34 Please note that these figures are personal estimates based on the information given by the decree of January 2003. The later includes two scenarios, one with the completion of the Knowledge City, one without. Figures in the table reflect the second scenario (i.e. without the Knowledge City) as this one seems now the most likely. What has been realized up to now is the renewal of the B warehouse. More precise data are not available since the whole project intends to be highly 'flexible', i.e. continuously (re-)adapted to the perceived future changes on the real-estate market. As a manager of Project T&T stated, 'it is up to the market to decide whether we will include either more offices or more housing in the scheme'. Nevertheless, it can be surely stressed that the ongoing project for Tour & Taxis is basically dedicated to commercial uses, with a predominance of offices. This is of course no surprise since the redevelopment of the area is basically led by private real-estate developers. If the Knowledge City is realized, figures would be: business/commercial 352,000 sq m; residential 70,000 sq m; non-commercial services 170,000 sq m; total 592,000 sq m.
- 35 The percentage on the whole Comet area has been calculated on the total office floor space (i.e. planned: 253,000 sq m in T&T / 12 million sq m in the Brussels metropolitan area – realized : 40,000 sq m / 12 million sq m). Figures of total floor space for other commercial uses (e.g. shops) are not available for the whole Comet area.
- 36 The planning framework for Tour & Taxis does not include any formal indication either for the future amount of jobs, or for the type of activities (except for the concept of Knowledge City). Hence, we can only provide estimates based on usual building norms in Brussels (e.g. 30 sq m/ office job, 100 sq m/ job in a shop, 250sq m/ job in hotel). Using indications of the decree of January 2003 this provides an estimation of a potential of a further 11,000 jobs on the site of Tour & Taxis (compared with 900,000 jobs on the whole Brussels agglomeration). At the present time (September 2004) eight enterprises have already taken up office spaces in the renovated B warehouse, that is, 600 employed people, most of them in business service activities.

37 As we mentioned in the study when introducing the Knowledge City project, the authorities of the Brussels Capital Region made a clear statement about the funding of the project: 'the objective is to look for diverse but essentially private funds and for support from the European Investment Bank (for the creation of the new engineering high school)' (Brussels Capital Region, 2002, 14, translated, text emphasized as in the original text). Hence, the Knowledge City project is not intended to be funded by a large flow of local public money, except for – parts of – the foreseen public infrastructures on the site (e.g. public housing, public transport infrastructures, green spaces). Rather, investments are left to the private market (i.e. Project T&T and their future clients) while the city's authorities intend to cash in on – indirect – economic and social benefits of the project, i.e. tax returns, job creation, conservation and re-use of heritage buildings, etc.

At present-day, it is not possible to give any figure about future public investments in Tour & Taxis since the planning phase is still in progress (besides realizations of the private developers, Project T&T, on part of the site – see below).

38 Again, only estimates can be provided for the total investment for the whole site, i.e. about €250 million. What is sure now is that the renewal of the B warehouse has been done with an investment of €25 million.

39 See comments above.

40 Not all the data are available, depending on the treatment of quantitative data in planning and evaluation documents.

References to COMET-Nurec areas are based on the delimitation of metropolitan areas according to the Nurec methodology realized in the framework of the COMET project. More information on COMET-Nurec areas can be found on the COMET website under: [http://www.oeaw.ac.at/isr/comet/nurec\\_head.htm](http://www.oeaw.ac.at/isr/comet/nurec_head.htm).

41 Including natural reserve areas.

42 Sold areas

43 Including metro development

44 Not all the data are available, depending on the treatment of quantitative data in planning and evaluation documents.

References to COMET-Nurec areas are based on the delimitation of metropolitan areas according to the Nurec methodology realized in the framework of the COMET project. More information on COMET-Nurec areas can be found on the COMET website under: [http://www.oeaw.ac.at/isr/comet/nurec\\_head.htm](http://www.oeaw.ac.at/isr/comet/nurec_head.htm).

45 Includes other uses (i.e. non-commercial services, recreational, infrastructure).

46 Estimation.

47 Employment in the municipality of Illkirch-Graffenstaden.

48 Employment at the Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch.

49 Not all the data are available, depending on the treatment of quantitative data in planning and evaluation documents.

References to COMET-Nurec areas are based on the delimitation of metropolitan areas according to the Nurec methodology realized in the framework of the COMET project. More information on COMET-Nurec areas can be found on the COMET website under: [http://www.oeaw.ac.at/isr/comet/nurec\\_head.htm](http://www.oeaw.ac.at/isr/comet/nurec_head.htm).

50 Data refer only to the sub-project TownTown.

# Index

- ABN-AMRO (bank): and Zuidas 55, 56, 65, 66, 73; and Zuidas tunnel 69
- academic criticism, Ørestad 177–8
- academic institutions, and Forum 2004 project 108–9
- access issues, Erdberger Mais project 226–7
- Ackermans & Van Haaren, landowner, Tour & Taxis 158
- Act on Ørestad 177
- actors: Adlershof project 119–21, 132–5; Amsterdam Zuidas 64, 252; Erdberger Mais 237–42; PII 214–19
- Adlershof project 40, 115–45; influence on Brussels project 161
- Adlershof Projekt GmbH (APG) 121, 132, 133–4, 135–8
- Adlershof Science and Technology Park 119
- administrative embedding, Erdberger Mais 233, 235–7
- administrative structures: Spain 90–1; France 199–200
- Agence de Développement et d'Urbanisme de l'Agglomération Strasbourgeoise (ADEUS) 200
- Akademie der Wissenschaften (AdW), Treptow 117
- Alsace region, administrative structures 199–200
- Amager island, Copenhagen 172, 173, 178–9, 181
- Amsterdam Arena 63
- Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce 64
- Amsterdam Court of Justice 55
- Amsterdam Extension Plan 1935 55
- Amsterdam municipality: and Zuidas dock-model 70–1; and Zuidas tunnel 68–9; dualism with mediating region 30–1; fiscal capacity 35; governance/planning milieu 36; spatial planning cooperation 41–2; strengths and weaknesses of government 44–5; transport infrastructure investments 53, 55; Zuidas project finance 60
- Amsterdam North Wing Coalition 63
- Amsterdam Nurec area 61
- Amsterdam Promotion Foundation (AMPRO) 41–2
- Amsterdam Waterfront Financieringsmaatschappij (AWF) 54–5
- Amsterdam World Trade Centre 55
- Amsterdam Zuidas project 16–17, 53–83; building programme 60t3.1; decision-making practice 72–9, 72t3.2; development strategy 56–61; dock-model 67, 68f3.3, 69–72, 70f3.4, 75–6, 80; location 53–4, 55–6, 57f3.1, 74–5; master plan 57–60, 59f3.2, 77f3.5; summary 47t2.1, 250–3, 269, 270, 271; summary data 280–1tA.2
- Antropologies contra 22@, objections to Forum 110–12
- architectural heritage conservation: Music City project 157–8; Project T&T 159, 163f6.4
- architecture, Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch 206–7, 206f8.3, 207ff8.4–6
- areas: Erdberger Mais, 224–6, 226f9.2; extent data, projects, 279–96; PII 203, 205f8.2, 206–7, 206f8.3; Tour & Taxis 148f6.2
- ARGE Snizek 240
- ARKKI 181
- ARWAG property developer 241
- assessment, strategic urban projects 249–74
- Austria Center Vienna 230

Austria, planning frameworks 40  
Austrian Research Centers Seibersdorf  
(ARCS) 240

BAAG *see* Adlershof Projekt GmbH  
(APG)

balanced societal development 10

Baltimore, market-led projects 54

Barcelona: 22@ area 86, 97, 98–9, 110; and  
Catalonia 28–9; coastline 97f4.2;  
governance/planning milieu 28–9, 35,  
36, 44, 90–6; metropolitan area 85,  
86–7, 89–90; north-eastern axis projects  
97–105; Olympic Games project 84, 86,  
88, 89, 93, 96–8, 101, 112–13;  
public–private collaboration 106–7;  
social/economic strategic plans 92–3;  
spatial planning cooperation 40–1

Barcelona Metropolitan Plan (PTMB) 41,  
91–2

Barcelona Universal Forum of Cultures  
2004 16–17, 84–114; area 104f4.3,  
105f4.4, 105f4.5; building 102;  
location 86–8, 88f4.1; social  
acceptance problems 106, 107–112;  
summary 46t2.1, 253–6, 267, 268, 270,  
271; summary data 282–3tA.3;  
sustainability issues 108–9, 111; and  
war economy 109–10, 111

Baumgasse/Litfassstrasse area 225

Belgian National Railway Company 149,  
158

Belgian regions: competition 154; fiscal  
autonomy 34

Bella Centre, Copenhagen 179

Berlin Adlershof Aufbaugesellschaft mbH  
(BAAG) *see* Adlershof Projekt GmbH  
(APG)

Berlin Adlershof – City of Science,  
Technology and Media 16–17, 115–45;  
summary 46t2.1, 256–7, 267, 268–9,  
268–9, 271; summary data 284–5tA.4

Berlin Adlershof construction company  
(BAAG) 119, 121

Berlin-Brandenburg agglomeration area  
130

Berlin Brandenburg International (BBI)  
airport 125, 128

Berlin-Brandenburg joint spatial  
development planning department  
39–40

Berlin Business Development Corporation  
(BBDC) 40

Berlin city, as German capital 129

Berlin City of Science and Research  
(plan) 131

Berlin federal state: and Adlershof  
117–21, 129–31; and EU Structural  
Funds 33; as unitary urban region  
26–7; Brandenburg proposed merger  
27; fiscal capacity 33;  
governance/planning milieu 37;  
Sectoral Development Plan (SDP) for  
retail centres 39; Senate  
Administrations 132, 135; spatial  
planning cooperation 39–40; strengths  
and weaknesses of government 43;  
Urban Development Concept for  
Office Location 39–40

Berlin Location Centre (BLC) 40

Berlin Marketing Service (BAO) 40

Berlin Study, strategic development 130–1

Berlin-Treptow District Authority 132

Berliner Ring (highway) 125

Besòs River 87; hotel construction 103

Besòs River axis projects 97–105

Besòs Town Planning Consortium 106–7

Biesdorf Süd economic development area,  
Berlin 40

Bijlmer office parks 53

Bilbao effect 146

Bio Medicine Research Laboratory  
Development Agency 241

Bioparc project, CUS & SERS 204–5

BioValley Project, PII and 214, 216

Boston, market-led projects 54

Brabant, and Brussels 151–2

Brandenburg federal state 129–30; Berlin-  
Brandenburg joint spatial development  
planning department 39–40;  
Brandenburg/Berlin proposed merger  
27; fiscal position 33;  
governance/planning milieu 37;  
strengths and weaknesses of  
government 43

Bratislava, and Centropre region 236

brownfield sites, Adlershof 115, 117

Brussels Capital Region 29, 151, 152, 154;  
fiscal capacity 34;  
governance/planning milieu 36–7;  
hierarchical dualism 28–9; linguistic  
communities 28, 36–7; and Knowledge  
City project 159–62; spatial  
competition 167–8; spatial planning  
cooperation 39; strengths and  
weaknesses of government 43–4; urban  
planning/governance 151–2, 152–6,  
153t6.2

- Brussels metropolitan area, truncation 151–2
- Brussels Factory project 147
- Brussels Port Authority 158
- Brussels Regional Land Use Plan 152–6
- Brussels Tour & Taxis 16–17, 146–71; summary 47t2.1, 257–60, 267, 269, 270, 271; summary data 286–7tA.5
- Buitenveldert neighbourhood 56
- Burgenland: spatial planning cooperation 40; Vienna and 27
- business development programmes, Copenhagen 42
- Business Park Vienna 231
- business-oriented strategic planning 93
- Campus St Marx, Vienna 229
- Campus Vienna Biocenter 241
- canal, Tour & Taxis 149–50, 165
- capitalism, and social regulation 7–9
- case studies; scope 21–2; selection 16–17; summary data 47t2.1, 279–96; summary evaluation 275–6t10.2
- Catalan Ministry of Urban Development 91
- Catalan nationalists (CIU) 36
- Catalonia: administrative structure 90–1; and Barcelona 28–9; General Territorial Plan (PTGC) 91; governance/planning milieu 36; locational initiatives 41
- Cattle Market Hall, Vienna 229, 241
- Center for Innovation and Technology, Vienna 241
- central business districts (CBD) planning 8
- central-local intergovernmental relationships 23–4
- centralisation, government planning 24–5
- Centre for Photonics and Optical Technologies, Adlershof 127f5.5
- Centroepe region 236
- Chief Executive Offices, Vienna 234
- Chiral building, PII 207f8.6
- Christianshavn, and mini-metro system 184–5
- Citigroup 240–1
- citizen participation provision, Erdberger Mais 242
- citizen-oriented strategic planning 93
- city government, relations with state 174–5
- City Forum, Adlershof 141
- City Tower, Vienna 223
- Clos, Joan 106; on urban renewal 84–5
- coalitions: Tour & Taxis 163–6; PII 216–17
- collective action, coordination 269–70
- COMET (Competitive Metropolises) project ix–x, 16–17, 49n1
- commercial space, exchange values 12
- commercialization failure, PII 218
- Commission for Metropolitan Regional Planning, Catalonia 91
- Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg 32, 34–5
- communication infrastructure, Barcelona PGM 96
- communication philosophy, PII 216
- communicative position, and mediated dualism 29–30
- community, and Forum 2004 project 108–9
- community opposition, Music City project 156–8
- compact-city policy, Amsterdam 58
- competition: Adlershof Project 126, 137, 142; Belgian regions 154; Copenhagen 174–5; Strasbourg, PII and 202–3, 216
- conceptual integration 11, 13–14, 266–8
- connectivity issues, Ørestad Development Corporation 193–5
- conservation issues: Music City project 157–8; Project T&T 159
- Consorti del Barri de la Mina 107
- construction projects, Universal Forum of Cultures 101–5
- Construction Code of Law, Germany 141
- Convention Centre (CCIB), Barcelona 102, 103
- cooperation, inter-jurisdictional 39–42
- coordination, collective action 11, 269–70; and mediated dualism 29–30
- Copenhagen Business Council 38
- Copenhagen Business Forum 38
- Copenhagen: dualism with mediating region 32; economy, Ørestad and 176; fiscal capacity 35–6; governance/planning milieu 37–8; spatial planning cooperation 42; strengths and weaknesses of government 45; urban development initiatives 42
- Copenhagen-Malmö fixed link 175, 176
- Copenhagen Ørestad 16–17, 32, 42, 172–98; summary 48t2.1, 260–1, 267, 268, 269, 271; summary data 288–9tA.6



- criticism, neighbourhood, Zuidas project 64, 67
- cultural actors, Amsterdam Zuidas 252
- cultural facilities, Zuidas project 68
- cultural institutions, Ørestad and 176
- cultural pressures 270
- culture, as project driving force 87
- cycling paths, Barcelona 104
- Danish society for the conservation of nature, and Amager island 178–9
- Danube Canal 224
- data summary 279–96
- DATAR 200
- decision-making: institutional settings 21–2; operational level 189–91
- decision-making practice: Adlershof 132–41; Erdberger Mais 225–6, 237–43; Ørestad 186–93; PII 214–19; Tour & Taxis 163–6; Zuidas project 72–9, 72t3.2
- defence sector, at PII 212–13
- deindustrialization, Tour & Taxis 149–51
- Delta Plan 87
- democracy 11; Adlershof 140–1; Erdberger Mais 243, 265; PII 218–19; Tour & Taxis 166–7, 259–60; Zuidas project 76–9
- democratic innovation: Adlershof 257; Barcelona 255; Zuidas 253
- democratic legitimacy 11, 15–16, 272–4; PII 263
- Denmark, financial system 173–4
- descriptors, methodology 22–3
- Deutsche Bundestag, and Berlin 129
- development actors, Erdberger Mais 240–2
- development parcels, Ørestad project 180f7.2
- development plan support, Adlershof 126–7
- development potential, Erdberger Mais 226
- development stages/structures: Adlershof 142; Erdberger Mais 237–42, 238–9f9.6; Ørestad 181–5, 182t7.1; PII 202–5; Zuidas project 56–61
- development tender process, Vienna 241
- Diagonal Mar shopping centre, Barcelona 103
- dock-model proposal, Zuidas project 67, 68f3.3, 69–72, 70f3.4, 75–6, 80
- Donau City 223, 225, 230–1, 232t9.2
- drinking-water conservation zone, Adlershof 136
- dualism: Amsterdam 30–1; Copenhagen 32; hierarchical 25, 28–9; inter-jurisdictional cooperation 39–42; Strasbourg 31–2; with mediating region 25, 29–32
- Dutch National Public Works department, and Zuidas Coalition 66
- Dutch Rail 71; and Zuidas Coalition 66, 73; and Zuidas tunnel 69
- Dutch-speaking/French-speaking communities, Brussels 151, 154
- East–West Cooperation Centre for Enterprises (OWZ), Adlershof 119
- Easyjet 128
- EC, and Strasbourg 214
- Eckbolsheim, tertiary park 216
- economic development agency of Berlin, and Adlershof 120–1
- economic liberalization 5
- economic/spatial development strategies 22, 23, 38–42
- Economic and social development of Barcelona ... year 2000* 93
- Economic and Social Regional Council, Strasbourg 38
- Economic Enterprise Zones, Strasbourg 42
- economy, regional, PII impact 209–14
- education sector, at PII 210t8.1, 211, 213
- educational facilities, Zuidas project 68
- El Camp de la Bota 110
- Eldenaer Straße economic development area, Berlin 40
- embedding, Zuidas project 63, 67
- employment; Adlershof 121–8, 124t5.2; Berlin 130; PII 211, 212t8.2; projects, 279–96; St Marx area 230–1, 231t9.1
- engineering sciences college, proposed, Tour & Taxis 161
- enterprises: at Adlershof 121–4, 124t5.2; at PII 209–12, 210t8.1, 212t8.2
- entertainment centre project, Brussels 147, 149, 156–8
- Entitat Metropolitana del Medi Ambient 29, 35
- Entitat Metropolitana del Transport 29, 35
- entrepreneurism: Copenhagen 173–5, 187; Ørestad 172; urban development 7–10
- Entwicklungsgebiet Johannisthal/Adlershof 119
- Environment Council, Catalonia 29
- environmental issues: Adlershof 141; Amager island 177, 178–9, 181; Fields

- shopping centre 183–4; Forum 2004 project 111
- equalization funds, Amsterdam 35
- Erdberger Mais project *see* Vienna Erdberger Mais
- Espanade construction, Barcelona 101
- établissements publics (EPCIs), Strasbourg 31–2
- European Union: as automatic growth machine 155; Brussels economy share 154, 155–6, 168; COMET (Competitive Metropolises) project ix–x, 16–17, 49n1; economic growth 9–10; enlargement, Vienna and 235–6; INTERREG funds 187, 214; policies, and Zuidas project 65; Structural Funds, Berlin and 33; summit facilities project, Brussels 147; URBAN II programme 236
- European cities network 93
- European integration, Barcelona 93
- European Monetary Union, Denmark and 175
- European school project, Brussels 147, 167
- evaluation summary 275–6t10.2
- exchange values: commercial space 12; strategic projects 265
- exchanges of interest, PII 216–17
- expatriates, Brussels 154
- expectations, euphoric, Adlershof 142
- fascist executions, effect on Forum 2004 project 110
- Federal Property Holding [company] 241
- Fields shopping centre, development 183–4
- finance: Berlin 130; Denmark 175, 176; Forum 2004 project 107; Ørestad 191–2; Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch 208–9, 214; suburbanization, Copenhagen 173–4, 176; Zuidas projects 60, 69, 70–1, 75–6
- financial capacity; urban regions 22, 33–4; urban-regional dualism 22, 46–8
- financial resources, and mediated dualism 29–30
- Fingerplan 1947, Copenhagen 173
- fiscal accountability, local 8–9
- fiscal capacity: Berlin 33; Brussels 34; Vienna 33, 34
- Flanders, and Brussels 29, 151–2
- Flemish/Walloon issues 39, 151, 154
- floor space data, projects, 279–96
- Floridotower, Vienna 223
- Forum of Cultures 2004 *see* Barcelona Universal Forum ...
- frameworks, decision 7–10
- framing 193–5; Adlershof 132–5, 257; Amsterdam Zuidas 64–7, 252–3; analytical concept 11–12; Barcelona Forum of Cultures 255–6; Brussels Tour & Taxis 259–60; comparative project evaluation 250t10.1; Copenhagen Ørestad 261; Erdberger Mais 237–42, 264–5; multidimensional evaluation 265–74; Ørestad 186–7; PII 218–19, 262–3; Zuidas project 64–6
- France: administrative structures 199–200; BioValley Project 214; governance/planning milieu 38; municipalities, Strasbourg 31, 42; policy conditions 201–2
- Franco regime, monument to victims 110
- Frederiksberg (Copenhagen): governance/ planning milieu 37–8; and mini-metro system 184–5
- future-orientated city structure, Adlershof 120–1
- gasometers, Erdberger Mais 224, 225, 227, 227f9.3, 229
- Gemeentefonds 35
- General Metropolitan Plan (PGM), Barcelona 94–6
- Generalitat de Catalunya 90, 94, 106–7
- GENO Asset Finance (GAF) 240–1
- geopolitical context: Copenhagen 174, 176; Vienna 223
- German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Treptow district 115, 117
- German unification, and Adlershof 117–19
- Germany; BioValley Project 214; cities in PII catchment area 213–14; municipalities, Strasbourg 31, 42, 213
- Gershwin housing project 66
- globalization, social/economic relationships 4–7
- Glòries square development 100
- goals: Adlershof Project 135–8; Barcelona PGM 96; Erdberger Mais 237–42; Ørestad 191–2; PII actors 202–3, 215–16, 217–19; strategic projects 10–11; Zuidas project 67–72
- governance capacity, urban regions 23
- governance issues 11; Brussels 152–6; Ørestad 190–1; planning 22–3, 24–5,

- 36–8; Tour & Taxis 148, 163–6; and urban-regional issues 24–5
- government institutions, relocation to Ørestad 182
- government-led to market-led approaches, Zuidas 54–5
- governmental capacity 22, 25–32, 43–5
- governmental relationships, typology 23–5
- Great Belt bridge, private finance 177
- Greater Copenhagen Authority 32, 34–5, 35–8, 42
- Greater Copenhagen Council (GCC) 174
- greenfield sites: Adlershof 115; Ørestad 188; Zuidas 53, 74, 76
- Grenoble–Meylan technopole 201
- Guggenheim effect 146
- gypsy culture, banned from Forum 2004 112
- Haarlemmermeer municipality 41–2
- harbours; Barcelona 101; Copenhagen 174, 181–2
- heritage buildings protection: and Music City project 157–8; Project T&T 159, 163f6.4
- hierarchical dualism 25, 28–9
- High Speed Alliance (HSA) 71
- high-end research, Ørestad and 176
- high-speed train stations, 63, 65
- high-tech orientation, urban planning 202–3
- Hospital del Mar, Barcelona 102
- hotel construction, Barcelona 103
- hotels, Adlershof 120
- housing; Adlershof 121, 139, 140; Copenhagen 173–4; market, effect on Ørestad 182–3; quality, Ørestad and 176; St Marx area 231, 232t9.2; sustainable, Barcelona 41; Zuidas project 53, 57–8, 66
- housing corporations, and Zuidas Coalition 66
- Hovedstadens Udviklingsråd 32
- Humboldt University of Berlin (HUB) 119, 128, 133, 139
- ICT-related activities, Barcelona 98, 101
- IFHP International Congress on Urban Renewal 84–5
- IGBMC, PII 208, 209
- Ij River project 54–5, 56, 66
- Illkirch-Graffenstaden municipality 200; regional economy 209–14
- imagery 140–1; Erdberger Mais 243; Zuidas project 76–9
- immigration issues, Forum 2004 project 111
- implementation, strategic projects 265–6
- indicators, methodology 22–3
- industrial area, converting to service sector area 225–6
- industrial decline, Berlin–Brandenburg area 130
- industrial sectors: Adlershof 121–4, 125; Berlin 130; PII 209–12, 210t8.1
- infrastructure: Erdberger Mais 237; finance issues, Ørestad 191–2; projects, Brussels 149–50
- Infrastructures del Llevant S.A. 106–7
- ING company 54–5; and Zuidas Coalition 65, 66, 73; and Zuidas tunnel 69
- Initiativgemeinschaft Außeruniversitärer Forschungseinrichtungen Adlershof (IGFA) 138–9
- inner-metropolitan relationships: Adlershof 257; Amsterdam Zuidas 252–3; Barcelona Forum of Cultures 255; Brussels Tour & Taxis 259; Erdberger Mais 264
- inner-metropolitan sphere of action 271–2
- Innovation and Foundation Centre (IGZ), Adlershof 119
- innovative democratic practices 272–3
- institutional context 6–7, 10, 21–2, 23–35; Adlershof 129–31; decision-making 21–2; Erdberger Mais 233–7; Ørestad 172; Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch 199–200; Zuidas project 62–4
- institutional innovation 140–1; Erdberger Mais 243; PII 218; Zuidas project 76–9
- integration of multiple-purpose strategies 266–8; Amsterdam Zuidas 253; Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch 262
- inter-jurisdictional cooperation 39–42
- interest exchanges: Adlershof 138–40; PII 216–17
- interests: Erdberger Mais 237–42; Adlershof Project 135–8; Zuidas project 67–72
- intergovernmental relationships 23–5; Copenhagen Ørestad 261
- international businesses, Ørestad and 176, 187–8
- international competition: Strasbourg and 219–20; Tour & Taxis 164–6, 259
- international economic networks, Erdberger Mais 264

- international events, as transformation mechanisms 107–9
- international relevance, PII 218
- International Space University (ISU), PII 208, 209
- international-related economy, Brussels 154, 155
- introversion, Ørestad project 188–9
- investment/disinvestment cycle, Brussels 149–50
- Investor Assistance Office (IAO), Berlin 40
- Iraq war, effect on Forum 2004 project 109–10, 111
- IREPA-Laser, at PII 204
- Islands Brygge to Vestamager mini-metro system 185
- JAAG *see* Adlershof Projekt GmbH (APG)
- job creation: strategic projects 266; Tour & Taxis 161
- Johannisthal Adlershof Aufbaugesellschaft mbH (JAAG) *see* Adlershof Projekt GmbH (APG)
- Karree St Marx 241
- Kiezen voor Stedelijkheid* 58
- KLM Royal Dutch Airlines 71
- Knowledge City project, Brussels 147–8, 149, 158–62
- knowledge-dense activities, Barcelona 98, 101
- Koolhaas (architect) 55
- La Catalana project, Barcelona 84, 97, 100; social acceptance problems 110
- La Fonderie, preservationist action group 166
- La Mina project, Barcelona 84, 97, 100; Consorci del Barri de la Mina 107; social acceptance problems 110
- La Plaça de la Fraternitat 110
- labour market impact 266; Adlershof 121–8, 124t5.2; Erdberger Mais 230–3; PII 209–14; Tour & Taxis 150–1, 161; Zuidas project 61
- Laffitte, Pierre 201
- Lampertheim, tertiary park 216
- land ownership, Tour & Taxis 158, 160f6.3
- land prices: Adlershof 125–6; Zuidas project 75–6
- land use 12; Adlershof 124–5, 131; Erdberger Mais 229–30; multiple/intensive 68–9, 74, 78, 80–1; planning, Vienna 233
- landscape parks, Adlershof 120
- Landstrasse municipal district, Vienna 224, 240
- Language of Forms [company], and Music City project 156–8
- Latin Arc, European cities network 93
- Law Chevènement, Strasbourg 200
- Leasinvest, landowner, Tour & Taxis 158
- legislative powers, and mediated dualism 29–30
- leisure facilities, lack of demand, Adlershof 121
- lessons; Amsterdam Zuidas 79–81; Berlin-Adlershof 141–3; Erdberger Mais 243–4; Strasbourg PII 219–20
- linguistic issues, Brussels 151
- Llevant campus, Barcelona 102, 103; Infrastructures del Llevant S.A. 106–7
- Llobregat River 87
- Llull-Taulat neighbourhood, Barcelona 103
- local conditions for supra-local impacts 272
- local democratic participation, Tour & Taxis 166–7
- location 16–17; Adlershof 125, 126f5.4; Amsterdam Zuidas 53–4, 55–6, 57f3.1, 74–5; Erdberger Mais 224–5, 225f9.1, 226f9.2, 236–7; Ørestad project 176, 176f7.1; PII 203–5, 206–7, 204f8.1, 206f8.3; Tour & Taxis 146–7, 147f6.1, 148f6.2
- localational initiatives 41
- Logistic Activities Area (ZAL), Barcelona 87
- Louis Pasteur University, and PII 215, 219
- Lower Austria 43; fiscal position 34; governance/planning milieu 37, 40; spatial planning cooperation ; Vienna and 27
- Lower Rhine County (France) 200, 215
- MA 21A, Erdberger Mais 224, 230–2, 234, 237, 238–9f9.6, 240, 242–3
- Mahler 4 housing project 66
- Malmö-Copenhagen fixed link decision 175, 176
- Mancomunitat de Municipis, Catalonia 29
- marina construction, Barcelona 101
- market/demand: Adlershof 137–9; Ørestad 186–7; Zuidas project 54–5, 64, 75–6
- Market Authority, Vienna 235, 241
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and ISU 209

- master plans: Barcelona 90, 94–5; Ørestad 179–81; Project T&T 159; Zuidas project 57–60, 59f3.2
- media, and Forum 2004 project 108–9
- Media Center St Marx 229
- Media-Park Cologne 201
- MEDIACITY Adlershof 120
- mediating regions, and dualism 25, 29–32
- meso-level government 25, 29–32
- Metro, Ørestad 184f7.3; financial issues 184–5, 188, 191–3, 192f7.5
- military economy, Forum 2004 involvement 109–10, 111
- Millennium City, Vienna 223
- mini-metro system, Ørestad 181, 184f7.3, 184–5, 188, 192f7.5
- Ministry of Spatial Planning, Amsterdam 58, 60, 63, 65, 69–71, 78
- Ministry of Transport, Amsterdam 58, 60, 65, 69
- mission statements, strategic projects 10–11
- mixed environment development proposals, Ørestad 181–3
- modernization, social/economic relationships 4–7
- monuments, Adlershof 122f5.3
- multiculturality issues, Forum 2004 project 112
- multidimensional evaluation, framing processes 265–74
- multilevel decision-making analysis: Adlershof 132–41; Erdberger Mais 237–43; Ørestad 186–93; PII 214–17; Zuidas project 64–79
- multiple-intensive land use, Zuidas project 57–60
- multiple-purpose strategies 266–8; Adlershof 257; Barcelona Forum of Cultures 255; Erdberger Mais 264–5
- municipalities: cooperation, Spain 90–1; planning system, Netherlands 62–3, 64–5
- museums: Brussels 147; Zuidas project 57–8
- Music City project, Brussels 147, 149, 156–8
- Nancy-Brabois technopole 201
- Napoleonic unitary states, planning centralisation 24
- national/local government issues, Ørestad 186–7
- nature conservation issues, Ørestad 177, 178–9, 181
- neighbourhood economy, Barcelona 41
- Netherlands, as decentralized unitary state 62–3
- Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, on Zuidas tunnel 69
- Neu-Erdberg area 225
- Neue Donau Residential Park 230
- new town development concept, UK 176
- non-governmental associations, and Forum 2004 project 108–9
- North Wing Coalition, Amsterdam 63
- North-Holland provincial government 31, 60, 65
- Northeast Park, Barcelona 102
- Nurec area, Amsterdam 61
- Oberschöneweide Technology College (TFH) 137
- OECD, Public Governance and Management Programme 49n2
- office development/location: Adlershof 131; Berlin 39–40; Erdberger Mais 241; Ørestad 181–3; Zuidas project 53–83
- Ogden Entertainment [USA], and Music City project 157–8
- Olympic Games project, Barcelona 84, 86, 88, 89, 93, 96–8, 101, 109, 112–13
- operational decision-making, and strategic framing 193–5
- operational responses, Ørestad 192–3
- opportunity zones, Tour & Taxis 151–2, 167–9
- Ordinance on the Organization of Urban Planning, Brussels 152–3
- Ørestad Development Corporation 176, 177, 179–81, 181–5; connectivity issues 193–5; debts 185; introversion 188–9; split from Metro 192–3
- Ørestad Syd 183, 189f7.4, 193
- Øresund bridge 177
- Ortho-clinical diagnostic building, PII 207f8.4
- Parc dels Auditoris, Barcelona 102
- performance, strategic projects 265–6
- Pla d'Ordenacio Urbanistica Municipal (POUM) 90, 94–5
- Pla Delta 87
- planning issues: Barcelona 29, 90–6; Brussels 151–2; centralisation 24–5; Erdberger Mais 237–43, 238–9f9.6; Netherlands 62–3; Tour & Taxis 162–3; Wienerberg City 231; Zones of Regional Interest (ZRI) 162–6, 164t6.3, 167

- planning milieus 22–3, 36–8
- planning strategies, public-sector driven 223–46
- Poblenou project, *see* Barcelona Universal Forum ...
- Poblenou: business and technology parks 41; industrial area 84, 86, 89, 98–9
- Pôle API, PII 207, 207f8.5, 208
- policy making systems 29–30, 272–4; France 201–2; PII263
- political issues 8; Adlershof 136–40, 141; Berlin 115, 117, 129; Music City project 157–8; Ørestad 177, 186–7, 190–1; Tour & Taxis 163–6; Vienna 235
- Popular (conservative) Party, Spain 110
- Potsdam, Science Park Golm 137
- poverty: Erdberger Mais project 226; Tour & Taxis 150
- power coalitions: Adlershof 138–40; PII 216–17
- Prisma Holding 241
- private sector investment 8–9, 270, 279–96; Adlershof 257; Ørestad and 175–7, 182–3, 187–9; Tour & Taxis 158–62, 259
- project data summary 279–96
- Project T&T 147–8, 158–62
- Projectbureau Zuidas 65
- public consultation/involvement: Adlershof 139, 140; Erdberger Mais 242; Knowledge City project 159–62; Music City project 156–8; Tour & Taxis 162, 166–7; Zuidas project 57, 64, 67, 76–8, 80
- public-led management: Adlershof 257; Erdberger Mais 264; Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch 262; Brussels Tour & Taxis 259
- public-private alliances 21, 268–72; Barcelona 106–7; Zuidas project 60–1
- public-public alliances 268–72; Ørestad 190–1; PII 262
- public-public-private partnerships 54, 60–1, 65, 72, 73, 78, 80
- public sector: investment data, projects, 279–96; Barcelona Forum of Cultures 255; Ørestad 187–8; PII 214–15; planning strategies 223–46
- public transport: Ørestad and 175–6, 179, 181; PII 213–14
- questionnaires, case study analysis 17
- R&D sector, at PII 203, 210t8.1, 211
- RAI conference centre, and Zuidas project 66
- Raiffeisen Evolution [company] 241–2
- Randstad/Deltametropool infrastructure 45
- real estate sector: Brussels 155–6, 158, 168–9; PII 212
- Regionaal Orgaan Amsterdam (ROA) 31, 60
- regional economy impact: Adlershof 121–8; Erdberger Mais 230–3; PII 209–14; Zuidas project impact 61
- Regional Council, Strasbourg 38, 200, 215
- Regional Development Plan, Brussels 153–6, 153t6.2, 162–3
- Regional Orgaan Amsterdam 63
- Regionale Samenwerking Amsterdam (RSA) 31
- relocations: Adlershof 127–8, 128t5.3; Ørestad 182
- rent gap, Tour & Taxis 148, 149–51, 156–8, 168
- retail sector: Berlin 39; Vienna 223; Zuidas project 57–8
- Rhine-Rhone canal 206
- Ring Metro, Copenhagen 185
- Robelco, landowner, Tour & Taxis 158
- Ronda Litoral, Barcelona 102
- Sagrera HST station sector 86, 97, 100, 104
- San Francisco: market-led projects 54; strategic planning 92
- Sant Adrià 84, 87, 106–7; marina 101; transport infrastructure 103–4
- Schéma de Cohérence territoriale de la Région de Strasbourg (SCOTERS) 42
- Schiltigheim, tertiary park 216
- Schiphol airport 53, 56, 71, 75
- Schiphol Area Development Company NV (SADC) 41–2
- Schönefeld airport 125, 128
- Science and Technology Park, Adlershof 119, 120
- Science Park Golm, Potsdam 137
- Seattle, market-led projects 54
- Senate Administration on Urban Development (Berlin) 126
- service sector: PII 211–12, 212t8.2; Vienna 223
- shopping centres: Adlershof 120; Barcelona 97; Brussels 147; Ørestad 183–4
- Simmering municipal district, Vienna 224, 240
- Skybox office development 241

- slaughterhouse area (St Marx) 224, 225, 228–9, 236–7
- social issues 270; Adlershof 140; Barcelona 92–3, 106, 107–112; fragmentation, Brussels 151, 154–5; revitalization, Tour & Taxis 150t6.1, 164–6
- Socialists (PSC) [Catalonia] 36
- Société d'Aménagement et d'Équipement de la Région de Strasbourg (SERS) 203, 214–17
- Sociétés d'Économie Mixte Locale (SEML), Strasbourg 42
- Sophia-Antipolis technopole 201, 202
- Soravia Corporation 237
- South Axis, Amsterdam, *see* Amsterdam Zuidas project
- Spain; public–private collaboration 106–7; governmental/administrative structure 90–1
- spatial planning 10, 21–2, 23, 38–42; Amsterdam 56; Brussels 151–2, 167–8; Copenhagen 173–5; Ørestad 177–8, 179, 181–3
- Special Land Use Plan, Tour & Taxis 162–6, 165f6.5
- Special Plan of Internal Reform, Barcelona 94–6
- sports facilities: Barcelona PGM 96; Zuidas project 58, 68, 74
- St Marx area, Vienna 224, 225, 228–33, 231t9.1, 236–7, 241–2; planning/development structure 237–42, 238–9f9.6
- St Marx Property Development organization 240–2
- Stadig, Duco 64
- Steen & Strom, shopping centre development 183–4
- STEP 2005, Vienna 236
- Strasbourg Council of Development 38
- Strasbourg Parc d'Innovation d'Illkirch (PII) 16–7, 199–222; dualism with mediating region 31–2; fiscal capacity 34–5; governance/planning milieu 38, 42, 45; Economic Enterprise Zones 42; summary 48t2.1, 261–3, 267, 269, 271; summary data 290–1tA.7
- strategic alliances/embedding 3–4, 11, 14–15, 268–72; Brussels Tour & Taxis 151–2, 259; Erdberger Mais 235–7; Ørestad 176, 176f7.1, 177–8, 186; Tour & Taxis 167–8; Zuidas project 63–4
- strategic framing 186, 193–5
- strategic planning: Barcelona 92–3; Copenhagen and 194; Vienna 2004 235–6
- strategic urban projects, assessment 249–74
- structural analysis: Adlershof 121–8; Erdberger Mais 230–3, 237–42; indicators 13–14; institutional settings 21–2; Strasbourg 202; Zuidas project 61
- suburbanization; Berlin 129; Brussels 151–2; Copenhagen 173–4; Vienna 223–4
- summary evaluation 275–6t10.2
- supra-regional strategies 271–2
- sustainability issues: Forum 2004 project 41, 108–9, 111; Project T&T 159
- Swiss Town Consult 237
- Switzerland, BioValley Project 214
- Syndicat mixte pour le schéma directeur de la Région de Strasbourg 42
- T-Center, Vienna 223, 224, 228, 228f9.4, 229, 230
- T-Mobile 229, 233, 240
- Tårnby 178
- Technology Circle Adlershof e.v. (TKA) 138–9
- technopoles 199, 201–2, 209
- Thurn und Taxis dynasty 149
- Toronto, World Youth Days 2002 101
- Tour & Taxis *see* Brussels Tour & Taxis
- TownTown project, Erdburg 224, 229f9.5, 237, 242
- trans-regional alliances/strategies 271; Adlershof 257; Amsterdam Zuidas 252; Barcelona Forum of Cultures 255; Tour & Taxis 259; Copenhagen Ørestad 261; Erdberger Mais 264; PII 262
- transport infrastructure: Adlershof 125; Amsterdam 53, 55; Barcelona 29, 103–4; Erdberger Mais project 226–7; Ørestad 179, 181, 184f7.3; PII 213–14; Tour & Taxis 149–50; Zuidas project 58, 63, 69–72, 74
- Treptow district, Berlin 115–45
- Trinational BioValley Project 214
- TRIPLE A development, St Marx 241–2
- TrizecHahn [Toronto] 157–8
- unemployment: Erdberger Mais project 226; Tour & Taxis 150
- UNESCO, and Barcelona Forum of Cultures 84, 101, 106, 112, 253

- unitary urban regions 25–7; Berlin 26–7; inter-jurisdictional cooperation 39–42; Vienna 26, 27
- United Kingdom: new town development concept 176; planning centralisation 24
- universities; Adlershof 117–19, 136; PII and 203
- urban development 3–7; Barcelona 97–105; Berlin-Adlershof 116f5.1, 117–19, 118f5.2, 131; Brussels 146–8, 155–6; Ørestad 42, 186–7; Tour & Taxis 158–62, 164–6; Vienna 235–7
- urban planning 7–10, 12; Barcelona 95–6; Brussels 151–2, 152–6, 153t6.2; Erdberger Mais 242–3; high-tech orientation 202–3; Tour & Taxis 148
- urban regions: financial/governance capacity 22, 23, 25–34, 43–5; unitary 25–7; urban growth 5–7
- urban renewal, Clos on 84–5
- Urban Community of Strasbourg (CUS) 200, 203, 214–17
- Urban Development Concept for Office Location, Berlin 39–40
- urban-regional issues 22, 24–5, 38–42, 46–8
- USA: market-led approaches 54; strategic planning model 92–3; technopoles 201; urban studies 8–9
- use values 9–10, 12, 265
- Vallès Oriental, business and technology parks 41
- Vereveningsfonds 35
- Vienna 26, 27; and Centroepe region 236; governance/planning 33, 34, 37, 40, 43; and Lower Austria/Burgenland 27; municipal structure 233–5
- Vienna Biocenter 225, 226, 230, 233
- Vienna Business Agency 237, 241
- Vienna Erdberger Mais 16–17, 223–46; summary 46t2.1, 263–5, 266–7, 270, 271; summary data 292–3tA.8
- Vienna International Airport 224, 226
- Vienna Municipal Department of District Planning and Land Use – Central West *see* MA 21A
- Vienna Public Utilities AG 237
- Vienna Twin Tower 223
- Viennese Gasometer Project 224, 229
- Vivaldi housing project 66
- Vrije Universiteit, and Zuidas project 66
- Wallonia, Brussels 29
- Walloon/Flemish regional cooperation 39
- war economy, Forum 2004 and 109–10, 111
- Wasserstadt–Spandau economic development area 40
- welfare planning, Copenhagen 173–5, 187
- Wiener Prater recreation area 226
- Wienerberg City 225, 230, 231, 232t9.2
- WISTA MG 119, 121, 132, 133, 134–5
- World Trade Centre, Zuidas project 66
- Würzen Committee, Copenhagen 175
- Zona Franca industrial area 89
- Zones d'aménagement concertées *see* urban development zones
- Zones of Regional Interest (ZRI), Brussels 151–2, 162–6, 164t6.3, 167
- Zuid/WTC station 56, 66, 68, 69–72
- Zuidas Coalition 64, 65–7
- Zuidas development area 41–2
- Zuidas project *see* Amsterdam Zuidas project
- Zuidas Reflector 81
- Zuidas Residents Platform (Bewonersplatform Zuidas) 64, 67
- ZuiderAmstel district 65