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The Socio-Economic Drivers

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For
Nigeria
Late Mrs. Felicia Asuelime
Late Mrs. Theresa Onuh
Mrs. Raquel Asuelime
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Foreword

This book does not consider Boko Haram terrorism as a momentary threat that would pass away merely by the counter-terrorist strategies of the Nigerian state security agencies. The reason for such a view includes the fact of the growing frustration and the political atmosphere of discontent among the populace in the mostly affected northern region, particularly the youths of the area. This has been mainly engendered by the political economy of state robbery that typifies the national economy, which invariably has heightened the level of frustration and desperation among the populace since the nation's independence in 1960. Thus, at a fundamental level, the Boko Haram uprising is largely symptomatic of the ambiance of general human insecurity brought about by the pervasive corruption that has tainted Nigeria's political and economic history. By implication, control measures employed—if not entrenched in a long-term economic and political development may merely amount to an ineffective quick-fix, which would only result in the resurfacing of other "Boko Harams", perhaps under another nomenclature.

While it might be reductive to explain Boko Haram terrorism under the heading of socio-economic factors, to jettison root causes pertaining to socio-economic factors as non-important, is arguably tantamount to a further deterioration in the security and stability of the affected northern region. This, in turn, is counterproductive to Nigeria's efforts towards development. Hence, against the backdrop of the arguments that seem to disconfirm any link between socio-economic variables and terrorism, this book underscores the fact that the Nigerian context presents a different food for thought, namely that socio-economic root factors cannot be undermined based on the generalization from studies done in other contexts. Indeed, unless Nigeria tackles those socio-economic issues that tend hitherto to legitimize resorts to violence, the occurrence and re-occurrence of "Boko Harams" would remain a major blockade to peace, security, and development in the northern region and Nigeria at large. This book is pivoted on the assumption that adequate provision of social welfare service and good education, of which the Nigerian government has generally fallen short thus far, is one critical way of mitigating the growing tendency towards violence in the country. This book offers a

fresh insight into the Boko Haram conundrum in the Nigerian state. It is my pleasure to recommend it to those interested in understanding the underpinning factors of one of the greatest challenges to the Nigerian state in the annals of its existence.

Ekiti, Nigeria   Azeez Olaniyan
March 2015

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Chapter 1
The Phenomenon of Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria

Abstract This paper provides the background and context for understanding terrorism and that of Nigeria in particular. It introduces a philosophical approach towards the conceptualization of terrorism so as to show the philosophical debates around the phenomenon and the significance thereof for the 'root causes' explanation, with a fairly focused attention to Boko Haram in Nigeria. The paper provides a road map to descriptive underpinnings of the general political economy of Nigeria and its tendency to fuel terrorism, and other forms of political violence. The objective of this chapter is to problematize the phenomenon of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria.

Keywords Boko Haram · Nigeria · Political violence · Political economy · Poverty

1.1 Setting the Scene

It is no news that the northern region of Nigeria has surfaced in recent times, particularly since 2009, as a theatre of the terrorist activities of the Islamist sect properly known as *Jama'atuAhlisSunnaLidda'awati'Wal-Jihad* (Association for propagating the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad). The sect, popularly dubbed "Boko Haram", which translates to "Western education is forbidden" (which is a combination of both Arabic and Hausa language) has since claimed to be on a mission to Islamize the Nigerian state. The history of post-independent Nigeria is replete with cases of militarized groups threatening the very existence of the Nigerian state. But of all the militant groups that have sprung up in Nigeria, the Boko Haram remains the most enigmatic in terms of raison d'être, the most violent in terms of modus operandi, and the most destructive. It is arguably second to none in terms of brutality, savagery, wanton destruction, callousness, and its scope of operation (Olaniyan and Asuelime 2014).

Boko Haram is behind the nearly 300 Chibok school girls abducted in April 2014 that sparked the global campaign *#Bringbackourgirls* campaign. Hundreds more have been abducted since then. According to Amnesty International, Boko Haram has killed more than 13,000, though the Nigerian government pegs the figure at around 7,000. Nonetheless, that makes it one of the most deadly terrorist organizations (CNN Newsroom 2015). The sect is not only yet to be deterred by the state's military counter-insurgence but also growing more complex and obdurate with the passage of time. While conflicts along ethno-religious lines are not entirely novel in the Nigerian history, especially in the post-independence era, the dimension of Boko Haram is unprecedented both in terms of its unwieldiness and its accompanying number of casualties.

The losses attributed to the insurrection thus far are by no means slight, transcending human casualties and also increasingly manifesting in economic terms. In fact, over $600 billion (about ₦1.3 trillion) is reported to have been lost by the Nigerian economy due to the crisis (Eme 2012, p. 23). And, of course, these damages are mushrooming with every single attack. Sadly, there is yet no end sign in sight. According to the UNCTAD reports (2010 cited in Eme 2012, p. 23), FDI flows to Nigeria declined by about 29 % from the $8.65 billion (₦1.33 trillion) realized in 2009 fiscal year to $6.1 billion (₦933.3 billion Nigerian Naira) in 2010, a decline of about 29 %—a development which might be connected to the insurgency of Boko Haram.

This current security challenge in which Nigeria, Africa's most populous nation, has been entrapped for over a decade is not altogether unconnected to the contested poverty-terrorism nexus which is increasingly been manifested on the African continent at large. In a broader context, recent Africa's story, like the Middle East, is replete with incidences of transnational and domestic terrorism, especially in the form of religious fundamentalism. This is partly because the continent provides a safe haven for the flourishing terrorism considering its low level of development. Besides, depending on their respective allies, many African nations continue to share common enemy with America and the West in general, as was the case during the Cold War. By implication, Africa has been drawn into another international conflict and an anti-American, especially following the horrendous 9/11/2001 attacks in the United States. The bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the Paradise Hotel in Kenya in 2002, and the 2010 bombing of the UN headquarter in Abuja are reminiscent of this view. Meanwhile, to fully understand the root cause of violence and terrorism in Africa, it is apt to consider both external and internal factors.

1.2 Cleavage-Prone Colonial Heritage

The Nigerian state was born of British imperial conquest. What began as the annexation of Lagos in 1861 ended with a series of seizures and the sacking of various kingdoms and empires in the hinterland, until they were all brought under

British sovereignty in 1900 (Onabamiro 1993). At the end of the imperial campaign, an entity emerged encompassing more than two hundred groups of people with varying histories, cultures, and orientations, who were ultimately joined in two waves of amalgamation in 1906 and 1914 (Onabamiro 1993). In essence, therefore, the formation of the Nigerian state was neither a product of political bargaining nor a process of historical evolution. Rather, it was through "colonial violence and metropolitan arbitrariness" (Debanwi and Obadare 2010) that had little or no consideration for ethnic, linguistic, or cultural boundaries. Its formation, therefore, sowed the seeds of cleavages—ethnic, religious, and cultural. The cleavages of ethnic and cultural pluralism, geographical vastness, pseudo federal arrangements, personality clashes, and a dearth of unifying ideology worked together to foster separatist agitations from the year of amalgamation in 1914 (Tamuno 1970). Nigerian political life has constantly been faced with secession threats and militancy (Ayoade 1973). Colonialism's crystallizing effect on the cleavages in Nigeria include the enthronement of a culture of militarism; a culture of corruption, which has been well developed in Ekeh's doctrine of moral and amoral publics dichotomy (Dudley 1980; Crowther 1975; Osoba 1996; Ekeh 1975); the emergence of migrated, transformed, and emergent social structures (Ekeh 1975); the entrenchment of ethnic segmentation and polarization; the exclusion, or the creation of stranger quarters in cities; the creation of ethnically based federal structure (Ehimika 2002) and the development of ethnicity (Ekeh 1985). Therefore, before independence Nigerians were already divided along ethnic, regional, cultural, and religious fault lines. Obafemi Awolowo was popularly credited with the description of Nigeria as a mere geographical expression (Awolowo 1947). Ahmadu Bello described the amalgamation as "the mistakes of 1914", (Bello 1962) and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was reported to have said that Nigeria's unity is a British design. In the Nigerian novelist ChimamandaNgoziAdichie's words, "Nigeria was set up to fail" (Peel 2010).

"Before the 1890s there was no one term that could be used to embrace all the territories that today form part of the modern republic [Nigeria]" (Hallett 1974). Under British rule, three major regions, each with a distinct political economy, emerged in Nigeria. First, the west, dominated by the Yoruba, developed a cocoa cash crop economy, with a dependence on foreign markets. The North, dominated by the Hausa-Fulani, strongly resisted colonial rule and maintained a high level of autonomy (Lubeck 1977). Its economy was largely based on groundnuts, and was not as dependent on the world economy. The east, dominated by the Ibo, was the most penetrated by Great Britain, largely through the instrument of trading firms. Finally, the ethno-regional character of the nascent state was reflected in the three major parties that competed in the 1959 national legislative elections that were to pave the way for independence: the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) representing the north, the Action Group (AG) representing the west, and the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) representing the east. There were at Nigeria's birth, therefore, incipient fault lines.

The colonial system laid the foundation of Nigeria's cleavages, various post-colonial actions and events exacerbated them. Scholars have offered reasons

including elite manipulation and conspiracy, leadership deficit, ethnic manipulation, religious bigotry, and the ethnicization of politics (Ake 1975; Achebe 1984, p. 1; Suberu 2001; Uwazie et al. 1999). Today, after more than 50 years of political independence and a century of existence, the Nigerian state is characterized by its multiplicity of ethnic groups that continuously cling to primordial affiliations. It is widely known as an entity where the forces of cultural, religious, and ethnic cleavages are not only mutually reinforcing but also constantly self-regenerating, leading to interregional enmity, suspicion, and violent conflicts (Bach 1989; Falola 1998, p. 601).

While accepting the aforementioned conditions as described, we would like to introduce the concept of ethno-religious thinking as a major factor exacerbating established cleavages in Nigeria. By this we mean Nigerians' reading of ethnic and religious meanings into most actions in the country. Ethno-religious thinking thrives on suspicion and mistrust and is often manifested in hatred that translates from varying degrees and forms of social cleavages.

The foregoing discussion can be understood under the theory of social cleavages. The theory of social cleavages holds that divisive political behaviours are essentially a function of social divisions in society (Seymour and Rokkan 1967). The crux of the argument is that social divisions will impact negatively on political behaviour. Translated to Nigeria, our discussion shows how societal divisions in the form of ethnicity, religious, and regional and cultural cleavages continue to impact negatively on the Nigerian state. Boko Haram is the most recent avatar of Nigeria's social cleavages.

Both by its pronouncements and its actions, Boko Haram has exacerbated Nigeria's cultural fault lines, perhaps second only to the civil war era. On several occasions Boko Haram targeted Christian churches during service hours in suicide missions. These actions by the sect show that its philosophy was erected on a fractious interpretation of religious ideology in a multi-religious and multi-ethnic society. However, despite its declarations, its killing and destruction has cut across ethnic groups and nationalities. Yet responses to it have assumed ethno-religious framings that further polarize Nigeria. A content analysis of responses to Boko Haram across the spectrum of Nigeria's societal divides reveals the centrality of ethno-religious framings for explaining the insurgency.

To sum up, with regard to external factors, the harmful legacy of colonialism is integral, especially as it pertains to the foundation of various African states. Indeed, the greedy hodgepodge of different ethnic groups—irrespective of the historical, political, cultural as well as the religious differences of these groups—has been considered as fundamental to the emergence of various intergroup conflicts across Africa over the years. What is more, the politics of colonialism also means that the colonized African states have to share common enemy(ies) with its colonizers, thereby becoming part of its wars, as redolent of the fact that many African countries "acted as ideological proxies for the East and West" during the Cold War (Okumu 2009, p. 29). Other non-negligible factors include the adverse effect of globalization. Essentially, the negative impact of this link on domestic governance

is critical to understanding Africa's inter-state and intra-state conflicts, including ethno-religious conflicts.

On the other hand, recent and internal factors such as systemic corruption and mismanagement, which continues to engender overwhelming human security challenges ranging from epic unemployment rate, alarming environmental degradation, poverty, child mortality, HIV/AIDS, to maternal mortality, inter alia, have created severe state legitimacy issues in most African countries. The knottiness of these issues simply highlights the "paradox of plenty" in Africa since despite being home to a mammoth quantity of some of the world's precious natural resources, such as gold, diamonds, crude oil, inter alia, as well as being populously endowed—as the second most populous continent in the world Africa remains frail economically and politically. Consequently, the continent lags behind other regions of the world in development. Given the nexus between development and security, the above developmental challenges have quite often initiated, animated, and sustained conflicts among individuals or groups fighting over available resources or its scarcity as redolent of the war in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, and Sudan and the Niger Delta crises in Nigeria, among others (Barnes 2005; Karl 2007; Oyefusi 2007).

Against this backdrop, even though the driving forces behind the growing trend of terrorism in Africa may seem to be religion, their internal inducers have been aptly linked to the weakness of most African states, especially the inability of its leaders to foster development and peaceful coexistence among the diverse populace (Davis 2007; Salkida 2012). Basically, the weak state syndrome has resulted from decades of misrule by the operators of state craft, who, in lieu of fostering national unity, solidifying state legitimacy, and building national identities through the provision of security and the necessary services, have "resorted to predatory and kleptocratic practices" (Mentan 2004, p. 2). This has consequently entrenched a deep feeling of frustration and alienation among the populace, who now find terrorism as a way of responding to what they perceive as an "unjust system" in various African countries. The Islamist sect, Boko Haram, is one of such groups in Nigeria, which believes itself to be responding to the nation's "unjust system" through terrorism. The sect not only threatens the sovereignty and stability of Nigeria but particularly the security of the northern region, where its lethal attacks have been most deeply felt thus far.

1.3 Problematique

Although scholarly works on the Boko Haram phenomenon is mushrooming, there is yet a paucity of compelling scholarship on the socio-economic determinants of the uprising, especially in terms of the economic origins of the crisis with reference to the Nigerian political economy. Considering the medley of prevailing opinions, which are sometimes contradictory as far as the impetus for the Boko Haram's terrorism is concerned, the efficacy of policy response in the long term rests on a

well-informed understanding of the causal factors of which socio-economic conditions are crucial. Hence, an in-depth and comprehensive scholarly investigation that can positively influence policies geared towards ending this portentous scenario in Nigeria is pertinent. Indeed, the better the issue is understood the more efficacious would be policy aimed at combating not just Boko Haram terrorism but other like-minded individuals that might arise in the future, due to the deterioration of the socio-economic conditions of Nigerians. As a certain author has pointed out, there is not a Boko Haram but many "Boko Harams" in Nigeria. Accordingly, this study seeks to investigate the socio-economic roots of Boko Haram terrorism in northern Nigeria.

Our *central argument* here is that the high level of socio-economic inequality in Nigeria can meaningfully explain the emergence and persistence of the Boko Haram terrorism in the country. The *Objectives*—To engage the concept of terrorism from a philosophical standpoint, highlighting some of the main critical issues with its definition and justification and the nexus with Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria; to situate the debates on the socio-economic determinants of terrorism within the particular context of Nigeria political economy; to provide an understanding of the Boko Haram phenomenon especially from the perspective of its socio-economic determinants; and to suggest policies that will aim at addressing the Boko Haram crisis. The guiding *Questions* according to the aforementionedobjectives include the following: How can the concept of terrorism be explained given philosophical considerations? How can the Boko Haram phenomenon be explained within the context of terrorism? What are the socio-economic determinants of terrorism, and how do these relate to Boko Haram terrorism? In what ways can Nigeria address the Boko Haram crisis considering its socio-economic underpinnings?

From a *theoretical perspective*, we find that the post-Cold War international system is a remarkable epoch in human civilization considering the decrease of interstate conflicts; the establishment of the United Nations which has reasonably striven to minimize the hegemonic attitude of superpowers in global politics. Sadly however, what became prevalent afterward and which has endured to date, is the rise in intrastate conflicts of which no nation has been spared. Media reports, almost on a daily basis, are littered with stories and images of individuals or groups of individuals engaging in one form or other of collective actions, often directed against an established political order (Gupta 1990, p. 1). The various armed conflicts that characterized the Arab World over the past 3 years and many parts of Africa are cases in point. In the same vein, terrorism has also become prevalent, especially post 9/11.

Meanwhile, rather than being predominantly international in terms of foreign targets such as the case of Al Qaeda targeting the United States and Europe, terrorism has also taken a more domestic outlook. The latter form has particularly been on the rise in the Third World countries particularly in the Middle-East and, lately, in Africa. Indeed, great thinkers such as the eighteenth century political philosopher and economist, Karl Marx and social contract theorists such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau recognized the special role of collective rebellion in the

shaping of modern political structure. As far as Marx's theory of social evolution is concerned, conflict is a necessary component of capitalist society as a result of what he dubbed the "inherent contradiction in capitalism".[1]

Let us take a cursory look at some of the prominent theories. Note that the consideration of these few theories is necessitated due to space limitation. To begin with, the state failure thesis maintains that a state's inability to discharge its due responsibilities provides a fertile ground for terrorism. The responsibilities of a state according to this thesis include adequate discharge of political good and social welfare to its citizens and effective territorial control, given its monopoly of the use of force (Adibe 2012). Essentially, the failure to meet these responsibilities is seen as both necessary and sufficient condition to bring about various forms of politically motivated violence including terrorism (Davis 2007; Piazza 2008). Meanwhile, the cloud of conceptual confusion that engulfs the notion of "failed states", means a rigorous explication of the concept is quintessential to understanding how it explains conflict and in particular where Nigeria stands in that regard. A failed state is mostly defined as:

> one which is unable to perform a set of functions taken to be characteristic and definitive of what constitutes a properly functioning state: to maintain secure boundaries, ensure the protection and security of all of the population, provide public goods and effective governance, maintain law and order throughout the territory (Jones 2008, p. 180)

A failed state is also characterized by various other indicators such as low GDP per capita output. It is argued that these negative indicators in most states across the global south provide an environment where terrorists can easily build their sanctuaries. Hence, the rise in terrorist incidence in Africa in recent times have been attributed to the above (Mentan 2004; Davis 2007).

Although Nigeria exhibits many features of a "failed state", designating it as a failed state as it were, has remained contentious given that it does not meet all the criteria. For instance, using indices of per capita income ($2700) and GDP growth, Adibe (2012, p. 55) contended the notion of Nigeria as a "failed state" vis-à-vis the emergence of Boko Haram. It is instructive to note that there is a heated debate as well on what constitutes a failed state. Sudan and Somalia, for instance, are widely used to illustrate the relationship between a failed state and terrorism. The latter, in particular, which has generally been described as a "collapsed state" is widely believed to have provided a safe haven for the al Qaeda terrorist network, whose influence is spreading across the Horn of Africa (Hill 2005; Newman 2007; Jones 2008). Thus, going beyond this seeming self-evident appeal, some scholars have criticized the failed state thesis as being blind to the "deeply historical account of the inter-related but differentiated production of state forms and regimes of sovereignty in Europe and Africa" (Jones 2008, p. 182; Wai 2012).

Several other questions abound concerning the validity of the failed state designation given that most of the developed states in the West went through similar

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[1]The Marxist believed that capitalist society carries within itself the seeds of self-destruction (Gupta 1990, p. 31).

stages as those characteristics of some of these developing states. For instance, Wai (2012, p. 28) poses an interesting question: "could what is defined as state failure actually be part of the processes of state formation or reconfiguration". These are misrecognized or misinterpreted because of the poverty of Africanist social science and ethnocentric biases of the particular lenses used to understand them? An honest answer to such question nudges one to be quite prudent in making hasty conclusions regarding the very essence of the notion of "failed state", even before using its thesis as a causal explanation for terrorism. Depending on one's answer to the above question, it might be a misunderstanding to dub a yet-to-be completed process, such as the formation of the Nigerian state, as failed. Indeed, by "offering a beguilingly simple, richly descriptive, pseudo-analytical approach, the 'failed state' discourse obfuscates the historical social relations of crisis while legitimizing the reproduction of imperial social relations" (Jones 2008, p. 182). In other words, the state failure thesis treats Africa's current structural stasis as quite disconnected to the historical influence of the West.

Nonetheless, the state failure thesis has its own merits in the context of Boko Haram. Its proponents incisively aver that the inability of the Nigerian state to "deliver positive political good to its people" basically explains the rise of Boko Haram (Maiangwa 2012; Onapajo and Uzodike 2012; Salkida 2012). This non-delivery of political good, which ranges from "security, education, healthcare, social infrastructures, employment opportunities" to "legal framework for law and order", has largely resulted in the loss of governments legitimacy in the eyes of its citizen (Maiangwa et al. 2012; Onapajo and Uzodike 2012, p. 31). Consequently, the state becomes characterized by various forms of political violence usually directed at the established government, to the effect that Nigeria continues to move towards the wrong end of the annual Failed State Index provided by Foreign Policy Magazine (See Table 1.1). It is instructive however to state that "while weak or failed states might provide an enabling environment for certain types of terrorist groups to operate, additional explanatory variables need to be identified" (Newman 2007, p. 463). Table 1.1 for instance, illustrates Nigeria's ranking with the annual failed states index between 2007 and 2012. What is observable therein is the fact that prior to the full emergence of Boko Haram in 2009, Nigeria was already ranked negative in the Index. According to Adibe (2012, p. 54), the implication thereof is

Table 1.1 Nigeria's ranking in the Failed States Index (2007–2013)

Year	Rank
2007	17
2008	19
2009	15
2010	14
2011	14
2012	14
2013	16

Source Failed State Index as provided by *Foreign Policy* magazine (2007–2013), author's compilation

that "while Boko Haram was not to be responsible for Nigeria moving into the league of infamy of the worst 20 cases of failed or failing state, it contributed to the worsening of its ranking".

From a socio-economic perspective the human needs theory is also adduced in explaining terrorism with reference to Boko Haram. The crux of this theory is that "all humans have basic needs which they seek to fulfill. The failure to meet these needs, especially if caused (or even believed to be caused) by other individuals or groups could lead to conflict" (Alozieuwa 2012, p. 3). This theory has been adduced as explanations for the conflict in Nigeria (Adibe 2012). According to this framework, which bears striking resemblance to the relative deprivation thesis (for which the frustration-aggression thesis is the psychological base), the emergence of Boko Haram terrorism is blamed on the deplorable socio-economic condition of the Nigerian society in general and the northern region in particular (Adibe 2012). The basis of these three interrelated theories is that unmet needs create frustrations in people thereby propelling them towards violence against the perceived source of their problem.

Relative deprivation entails people's feeling of dissatisfaction arising from the sense of having less than they could or should have, which can take different forms, such as: members of a society or organization have decreasing amounts of what they previously possessed; improving conditions which then deteriorate; rising expectations, where people raise their expectations about what they could and should have. By implication, this perceived or actual sense of deprivation transcends mere economic deprivation and includes political deprivation. The first exponent of the theory, sociologist Davis (1959) advanced the theory with reference to two groups, in-group and out-group, with the former referring to the rebel group in question. Rather than being distinguished by Marxist notion of ownership of means of production, these two groups are distinguished based on "any identifiable quality such as race, religion and ethnic or economic capability". The perception of the out-group as being well-off creates, thus, a sense of deprivation for the in-group, which might make the latter antagonistic towards the former (Gupta 1990, p. 53). Essentially, a sense of deprivation arises "when one desires something, compares himself with those who actually do have them and then feels that he deserves the attainment of those objects" (Gupta 1990, p. 54).

The relative deprivation theory was further advanced by Ranchman who identified three types of relative deprivation, namely egotistical, fraternal, and double deprivation (cited in Gupta 1990). The first refers to the sense of deprivation arising from comparison of individuals with others within the same group. The second entails a collective sense of deprivation of group in comparison with other groups usually perceived by individuals in the group, who themselves are however satisfied. The third includes the combination of one and two above as perceived by the individual. Building on the Runciman's argument, psychologist Fay Crosby (1979) argues that egotistical deprivation is simply a part of a chain of variable including environmental antecedents, preconditions, felt deprivation, mediators, and behaviour. He added that these four conditions require another fifth condition, namely lack of personal responsibility to produce a sense of deprivation in an individual. In

other words, as long as the individual would blame him/herself for his/her failure to attain a cherished goal, the feeling of deprivation would not surface in that individual.

The most influential development of RD in relation to collective rebellion is probably found in the classic work of Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (1970). Essentially, Gurr maintains that collective violence is functionally related to relative deprivation. Gurr derives the fundamental ideas of the relative deprivation theory from Aristotle, who believes it is the relativesense or feeling of inequality, rather than an *absolute* measure that derives revolution (Richardson 2011, p. 5). For Aristotle, thus, "the principal cause of revolution is the aspiration for economic or political equality on the part of the common people who lack it, and the aspiration of oligarchs for greater inequality than they have" (cited in Richardson 2011, p. 5). Thus, social discontent is spurred by relative deprivation which provides motivation for collective violence as reminiscent of the political upheaval in Northern Ireland (Birrel 1972).

Based on the above view, one may reason that the causes of various forms of violence in Nigeria can be traced to socio-economic factors such as "unemployment, especially among the youth, poverty and a deteriorating standard of living, especially in the north" (Aloziewwa 2012, p. 3). Essentially, this view is in tandem with Karl Marx's position that the disequilibrium between demand and supply of socio-political and economic goods causes political unrest (Gupta 1990, p. 2). In a similar vein, socio-psychologists situate political conflicts within the framework of frustration, arguing that "people take up violent resistance when they feel frustrated by the gap between what they *actually* have and what they *feel* they *should* have" (Gupta 1990, p. 2 emphasis added). This behavioural hypothesis casts some worthwhile doubts on the traditional explanation that situate conflict within the sphere of irrationality and instinct.[2] Indeed, the problem of linking frustration with aggressive behaviours remains insurmountable with the given hypothesis since it is one thing to be frustrated but another different thing altogether to resort to aggressive or anti-social behaviours. In other words, frustration appears only to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for an individual or a group's participation in political violence. This is where Crosby's (1979) fifth condition (as earlier mentioned) becomes relevant in understanding the dynamics of the relative deprivation thesis.

Furthermore, the role of demographical and geographical factors in the emergence of terrorism which are non-negligible in the case of Boko Haram, are not easily discernible from the above behavioural hypothesis; hence the need for a more encompassing theoretical framework. On the part of Human Needs Theory, it has also been observed that rather than absolute need, it is the perception of inequality considered as the cause for those needs that actually motivates people to resort to violence (Richardson 2011). Hence while these three inter-related socio-economic

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[2]This view is inspired by Freudian psychology which situates violent behaviours in human instinctive, learnt and subconscious nature.

theories offers explanation for the emergence of terrorism, each on its own may be too reductive to cast adequate light on the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria. As Hutchful and Aning (2004, p. 200) appositely noted "monocausal explanation of conflicts may be deceptively attractive or persuasive due to their apparent simplicity, but they are ultimately unhelpful" given that "as conflicts unfold and mutates, so do the motivations and relationships underpinning them".

1.4 Root Cause (RC)

This study privileges the Root Cause [RC] theoretical approaches over the foregoing in view of its wider scope in explaining the multifarious impetus of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. The crux of the root cause argument is that certain correlations exist between "underlying social, economic, political, and demographic conditions and terrorist activity" (Newman 2006, p. 750). Factors such as poverty, population explosion, social inequality and exclusion, dispossession and political grievance, as well as oppression and human rights abuse, are considered as the independent variable on which the emergence of terrorist organization is dependent. In other words, "if terrorism—both the emergence of a terrorist organization or a terrorist act—is considered the dependent variable, then root causes form the background independent variable" (Newman 2006, p. 751). These underlying conditions and grievances help to explain why and how terrorism occurs in a place rather than others; hence, are quintessential to counterterrorist policies. Figure 1.1 illustrates how the interactions among the various root factors precipitates terrorism.

This intuitively appealing framework, despite its own limitation, shows that certain socio-economic conditions "provide a social environment and widespread grievances that, when combined with certain precipitant factors; result in the emergence of terrorist organizations and terrorist acts" (Newman 2006, p. 750). It suffices, however, to acknowledge that despite the remarkable strides made by scholars as well as policy makers, a particular determinant (root cause) of terrorism remains to be found due, among other reasons, to the complexity of phenomenon itself. Indeed, it is reductive, if not erroneous, to imagine there is a single root cause behind an act of terrorism (Maleckova 2005, p. 100). Meanwhile, according to Newman the key indicators could include: poverty, political freedom, economic dislocation, unemployment, population growth, social change, urban migration and social change. The "root causes" argument centres around the fact that "structural factors,[3] while they may not be of any explanatory value on their own, provide essential insight into the emergence of terrorism when combined with trigger factors" (Newman 2006, p. 751).

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[3]Structural factors are seen as "black holes" within which fanaticism can emerge.

Fig. 1.1 Interactions between "Root Causes" and Direct Factors of Terrorism, *Source* Newman (2006, p. 766)

In analysing the root cause, BjØrgo (2005) rightly differentiated between preconditions and precipitants of terrorism, with the former referring to factors that set the stage for terrorism in the long run while the latter represent the specific events or phenomena that immediately precede or trigger outbreak of terrorism. He identified four levels of causation as follows:

Structural cause (demographic imbalances, globalization, rapid modernization transitional societies, increasing individualism with rootlessness and atomization, relative deprivation, class structure etc.) are causes which affect people's lives in ways that they may or may not comprehend at a rather abstract macro level.

Facilitators (accelerators) make terrorism possible and attractive, without being the primary cause. Examples include the evolutions of modern news media transportation, weapons technology, weak states controls of territory etc. Proponent of the so-called "ecology of terrorism" thesis even claim that international terrorism occurs because modern circumstances have made it exceptionally easy to employ terrorism methods.

Motivational cause are the actual grievances that people experience at a personal level, motivating them to act, ideologues and political leaders are sometimes able to translate cause from a structural level up to motivational level, thereby moving people to act. The role of ideology as rhetoric is to explain how things really are, and persuade individuals and groups to take actions. Motivational causes may also be seen as concentrated 'symptoms' of more fundamental structural causes.

Trigger causes are the direct precipitants of terrorist acts. They may be momentous or provocative events, or some other events that calls for revenge or actions. Even peace talks may trigger opponents of political compromise to carry out terrorists actions. In order to undermine negotiations and discredit moderates (BjØrgo 2005, p. 3–4).

Other notable precipitant factors include "leadership, funding, state sponsorship, political upheaval", which serve as catalysts to root causes in breeding terrorism (Newman 2006, p. 751). Group's leadership is therefore significant to the individual's participation in collective political violence, in the face of lower chances of any individual utility maximization, which as we have shown above is one of the major weaknesses of the rational choice theory. Certainly, "political violence takes place when a leader gives voices to the frustration by formulating a well-defined social construction of the collective identity and paints a vivid colour of the images of 'us' verses 'them'" (BjØrgo 2005, p. 19). The case of Boko Haram is quite illustrative of this view. Yusuf who is widely believed to be the progenitor of the group, is known to have captivated his followers through his eloquence of speech pivoted on a deep knowledge of the Islam, by which he was able to accent the ills of the Nigerian government. Hence, he was able to mobilize his audience, who were mostly disenfranchised youth against the "unjust" Nigerian government. In this way, the root cause thesis also augments for some of the weaknesses in the above-mentioned socio-economic theories in explaining why different individuals react to frustration in different ways.

According to Gupta (2005), three basic types of participants in group's terrorism in line with their basic source of motivation can be identified as follows: (1) the ideologue, (2) the captive participants, and (3) the mercenaries. Gupta (2005, p. 16) avers that ideologues, also known as "true believers", are mainly motivated by the promotion of the group's ideals and welfare, the mercenaries are motivated by selfish interest such as raping and looting opportunities, while captives participants are motivated by fear (cost) of non-participation. Meanwhile, an inherent interrelatedness of these different precipitant motivations actually blurs the line between group's utility and the individual utility. The distinction is arguably of explanatory significance to why individual members' criminal and economic motivations are sometimes submerged under the sect's religious ideology, as is the case with the Islamist sect, Boko Haram. The sect has been known for various criminal activities such as material robbery and killing of the innocent, which obviously are not necessarily in tandem with its supposed religious mission at a group level.

It suffices, however, to note that the Root Causes argument has its own limitations. For instance, its critics underscore the lack of "moral clarity" as its one major failing. It is argued that the concept of root causes, *prima facie,* seems to give some legitimacy to terrorism (BjØrgo 2005). But, it is instructive to clearly state that this study's use of root causes does not in any way try to justify Boko Haram terrorism, as the subsequent chapter will show.

Furthermore, a mushrooming literature showing a weak link between socio-political and economic structural factors, such as poverty, lack of economic opportunity, and terrorism, casts doubts on the efficacy of the root causes thesis (Gupta 2005, p. 16). In fact, some jettisoned the root causes perspective as "misleading as an explanation for terrorism or prescription for dealing with it" (Jervis 2002, p. 41). An interview with 250 members in most Palestine militia groups

observes that "none of them were uneducated, desperately poor, simple-minded, or depressed. Many were middle class and, unless they were fugitive, held paying jobs; thus suggesting a weak or no correlation between terrorism and root causes such as socio-economic conditions" (Hassan 2001, p. 37).

Similarly, studies have shown that "none of the 19 perpetrators of 9/11 attacks suffered from poverty, lack of education or lack of exposure to the privileged lifestyle of the Western world" (Gupta 2005, p. 19). The implication is that since structural deprivations are merely necessary conditions, there is a weak correlation between terrorism/other form of political violence and poverty. Hence, as control measure to terrorism, the root cause perspective is also criticized as infeasible given that certain factors such as media, technology inter alia, which needless to say, oxygenate terrorism cannot necessary be addressed by way of removal. Thus, posing a big question: how do we address terrorism via removing certain causal or precipitating variables that are of essential societal values in themselves? (BjØrgo 2005).

Despite the foregoing, the salience of the root cause perspective in understanding the emergence and persistence of terrorist organization is well acknowledged among scholars (Hudson and Majeska 1999; O'Neill, 2002a). In fact "even if the generalization is true (and most terrorist leaders are not uneducated or personally deprived), the background of terrorist leadership is only one variable; supports for terrorism is also important, and social condition can be significant in this respect" (Newman 2006, p. 755). Further stressing this point, Newman counters the critics of the root cause thesis who see terrorists as rarely personally deprived or uneducated. His main argument is "that terrorists (just like all people) surely do not act only according to their own experience or background…they perceive that they are responding to social conditions, irrespective of their own personal situation" (Newman 2006, p. 755).

Prompted by the multifarious nature of the causal factors of terrorism and Boko Haram in particular, the root causes perspective is preferred as it enables us to have a broader understanding of the economic underpinnings of Boko Haram terrorism ranging from poverty, unemployment, inequality, demography, population, to development amidst other possible explanations. This is against the backdrop of the view that the impetus for Boko Haram terrorism is hardly reducible to a singular factor such as religion, politics, or even economics. Indeed, the multiple and complex causes of conflict always have to be put into consideration via a more "nuanced multidisciplinary, and dynamic approach" (Hutchful and Aning 2004, p. 200). Indeed, one risks a gross misunderstanding of the "full nature and scope of terrorists' motivations and modes of operation", in limiting oneself to a single framework, considering the various manifestations of terrorism (Schmid 2004b, p. 214).

Importantly, the "Root Cause" theoretical framework incorporates both directly and indirectly, some of the socio-economic theories mentioned earlier, particularly the relative deprivation thesis, which provides a more precise insight into the socio-economic conditions of the Northern region in comparison to the South in Nigeria. This adds to the validity and suitability of the theoretical framework in illuminating the thesis of this book. Against the backdrop of the abounding

arguments that relate economic conditions such as economic deprivation, poverty, and income inequality with terrorism (Li and Schaub 2004, p. 231; Burgoon 2006, p. 176), the root causes theory can fittingly identify key socio-economic factors, among other factors, that give rise to the Boko Haram syndrome in Nigeria. Accordingly, in lieu of being treated as merely transient security crises, addressing the root factors is argued to be a more effective control of the Boko Haram terrorism. As Gupta (2005, p. 16) rightly argues, an exploration of the root cause analysis of terrorism would do well to underscore the quintessential difference between terrorism and other criminal acts. This is contrary to the fact that while having elements of criminality, terrorism is a political phenomenon. Hence, one cannot neglect the grievances that drive people towards the act of terrorism. In the incisive words of Gupta (2005, p. 27):

> Not all grievances are baseless. In our zeal to fight terrorists' atrocities, it is easy to disregard legitimate grievance. Although absolute poverty and other aspect of economic deprivation have a weak link to terrorism, a pervasive sense of humiliation and hopelessness does not. The global community must recognize the need to address the legitimated grievance of disaffected people in a meaningful way.

Indeed, "until policy-makers can understand the root causes of terrorism, they will be unable to implement effective measures to prevent it" (Richardson 2011, p. 5). The inverted U-shaped relationship between government coercion and political violence complicated the military counter-terrorist strategy in a way that it becomes more tangible for an effective and long-term "solution to the problems of terrorism with high ideological contents" such as Boko Haram, to be sought within the political arena and not the battlefield (Gupta 2005, p. 24). Hence, the explanatory efficacy of the root cause theory is notable.

Meanwhile, to systematically examine the root causes of Boko Haram, Brown's (2001, p. 219) model of underlying causes of ethnic and internal conflict is partly adopted. This is because of its relevance to the root causes theoretical framework adduced herein. In view of the multifaceted causal dimensions of the Boko Haram insurgency, this model is used to highlight the root causal factors of the insurgence, particularly its socio-economic dimension. As shown in Table 1.2 Brown identified

Table 1.2 Underlying causes of ethnic and internal conflicts

Structural factors	Economic/social factors
• Weak states	• Economic problems
• Intrastate security concerns	• Discriminatory economic systems
• Ethnic geography	• Economic development/modernization
Political factors	**Cultural/perceptual factors**
• Discriminatory political institutions	• Patterns of cultural discrimination
• Exclusionary national ideologies	• Problematic group histories
• Intergroup politics	
• Elite politics	

Source Brown (2001, p. 219)

four underlying (and interrelated) factors of ethnic and internal conflicts, to wit, (1) structural factors, (2) political factors, (3) economic/social, and (4) cultural/perceptual factors. The structural factors encompass: weak state, intrastate security concerns, and ethnic geography. The political factors encapsulate: discriminatory political system, exclusionary national ideologies, intergroup politics, and elite politics. The economic/social factors include: economic problems, discriminatory economic systems, economic development/modernization. And the cultural factors entail: patterns of cultural discrimination and problematic group histories. The relevance of the Brown's model, in explicating the root factors of Boko Haram terrorism, hinges on its broad range, given the complexity of the phenomenon under investigation.[4] However, this study focuses primarily on the socio-economic dimension, being the overall objective of the study, while merely acknowledging other possible factors.

According to Brown's model, economic problems, economic discrimination, and economic development/modernization have a significant explanatory power for internal conflict. The view holds significance for the various Armed Non-state Groups (ANSGs), including the current Boko Haram in Nigeria because the interrelated variables have telling effects on both individual and regional impoverishment across Nigeria, particularly in the northern region and in turn provide a permissive environment for anti-state rebellion. These socio-economic factors manifest themselves in various dimensions to fuel Boko Haram terrorism.

This study privileges a qualitative *method* of data analysis. The study relies on both primary sources and, for most part, secondary sources. The primary sources are defined in the context of this study as first-hand or direct evidence and materials emerging from the time period being discussed, which include official and unofficial reports of organization and government agencies such as: Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Transparency International, World Bank, UNESCO, inter alia. The secondary data include books, academic journals, and published research reports from newspapers and magazines, as well as conference papers. The reliance on secondary data facilitates a broader interpretation of the phenomenon under question. Additionally, credible and useful Internet websites of relevant organizations and scholarly databases are also sourced. Evidences drawn from this array of data sources provide a fitting base for addressing the key research questions of the study. Notably, during the study, time was also spent on direct observation of the socio-economic conditions in certain north-western states (particularly Zamfara and Sokoto states) by the physical presence of the researcher. Although the sect's activities are rather concentrated in the north-eastern region relative to the north-western region, the socio-economic conditions of both regions

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[4]It is instructive to acknowledge that though a distinction can be made between ethnic conflicts and terrorism, in the case of Boko Haram such distinction is strongly blurred considering the ethnocentric nature and dimension of its targets. Albeit northerners and Muslims have fallen victims, Boko Haram focuses more on the southerners and Christians. Hence, the use of Brown model originally designed for ethnic conflict is not a misapplication. Meanwhile, required variations are included in order to cater for the specific nature of the study.

are similar. Hence, data drawn from the latter region provides reasonable insight into the socio-economic conditions in the former region, and thus, contributes to the validity and credibility of the relevant secondary information used herein.

Albeit speaking broadly of the issues of terrorism in the light of its causes, this study particularly focused on Boko Haram vis-a-vis the Nigerian political economy. Hence, a case study analysis is employed because it provides a more practicable as well as pointed research design that can address the outlined research questions, a feature that is vital to an effective methodology (Neuman 2011). This method enhanced a detailed understanding of the phenomenon in question as well as helping to further appraise the argument whether the deplorable socio-economic conditions do or do not cause terrorism, in the particular context of Boko Haram in Nigeria. As Neuman (2011, p. 22) aptly observes, a case study allows the researcher the possibility of linking micro level, or the actions of individuals, to the macro level, or larger-scale structures and processes, due to its detailed and extensive nature (see also Vaughan 1992). Accordingly, the case study approach endorsed herein facilitates an understanding of the socio-economic determinants of Boko Haram terrorism, both from the macro and the micro level of analysis.

For data analysis, a thematic analytical approach is employed to explain the obtainable data in lending support to the core thesis of the study. According to this approach, qualitative data are systematically analyzed "by identifying themes or patterns of cultural meaning; coding and classifying data, usually textual, according to themes; and interpreting the resulting thematic structures by seeking commonalties, relationships, overarching patterns, theoretical constructs, or explanatory principles" (Mills et al. 2010, p. 2). Thus, relevant themes pertaining to the Nigerian political economy and the Boko Haram sect are used to support the thesis of the study. For instance, socio-economic variables such as poverty, education, unemployment, inter alia, are used in a thematic structure to substantiate the root causal factors regarding the emergence and persistence of Boko Haram.

1.5   Summary

This book adopts a philosophical approach towards the conceptualization of terrorism so as to show the philosophical debates around the phenomenon and the significance thereof for the *root causes* explanation. This debate will form the crux of the second chapter—the discourse section, and an attempt is also made to engage the debate on the link between socio-economic conditions and terrorism, in other to provide the necessary foundation for the subsequent chapters. Thereafter, in Chap. 3, focus is shifted towards the historical and contemporary interplay between politics and economics especially from governance perspective. Essentially, this chapter provides a descriptive account of the general political economy of Nigeria and its tendency to fuel terrorism, and other forms of political violence. This is against the backdrop of the impact of the nexus between politics and economics on the socio-economic condition of the given society. Meanwhile, the book focuses on

the economic roots of Boko Haram terrorism by looking at the socio-economic conditions in Nigeria, particularly in the mostly affected northern region. Chapter 4 x-rays the composition, ideology, modus operandi, rationale, etc., of the sect Boko Haram and Chap. 5 is dedicated to this appraisal as it pertains to its socio-economic implications for Nigeria. In the final chapter, the way forward out of the security quagmire in Nigeria is proffered and a general conclusion is drawn.

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Chapter 2
Understanding the Changing Context for Terrorism

Abstract This chapter presents an analysis of the construct of terrorism as a phenomenon with historical roots with many contestations, explanations, and understandings. Since the advent of terrorism, the term's use shifted from the *regime de la terreurs* during the French revolution, to anarchist and socio-revolutionary bombers in the nineteenth century, to the Red terror, to anti-colonial struggle, then to the Palestinian struggles in the 1960s, and finally to religious fundamentalism since the 1990s, to date. These episodes and differential motives for terror activities also beckon the question around its justification. Also, the evolution of the term has brought about problems in understanding its causality and conceptualization and by implication in articulating an approach to finding a panacea for wherever and whenever it is witnessed. This chapter argues that the prism through which terrorism can be understood is highly subjective and open to different interpretations for different times and eras.

Keywords Terrorism · Insurgency · Subjectivity · Political violence

2.1 Introduction

A plethora of studies is available on the topical issue of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria (Olaniyan and Asuelime 2014). However, a majority of them have focused fairly and narrowly on the religious causality and military security solution to the menace. The question of a just war in this particular situation has been ignored so far in the literature and this present article hopes to bridge this gap. To situate this present discourse as different from others, the following are considered: the conceptualization and justification of terrorism; the socio-economic arguments on terrorism; and the existing theoretical debates on the Boko Haram phenomenon. To the degree that resort to terrorism appeals either to the perpetrators or the sympathizers, any counter-terrorism would be less effective considering the fact that the populace also plays salient roles in the fight against domestic terrorism even when

they are not the terrorist themselves. Against this backdrop, it is pertinent to investigate if terrorism is justifiable (or has been justified) under certain conditions and what informs such justification. In a different perspective, why do people resort to terroristic violence? Root causes may well be used by some as justification for terrorism, but this too needs to be investigated. In the interim, understanding what essentially constitutes terrorism is perhaps a viable starting point of this inquiry.

2.2   The Definition Problem: The Bermuda Triangle of Terrorism

Although common in academic discourse, terrorism has proven difficult to conceptualize (O'Neill 2002a; Schmid and Jongman 2005) and the mosaic of meanings ascribed to the term have quite often been subjected to dispute from various quarters; thus leading to an ever growing variegated, and sometimes contradictory, definitions of the term. As Krueger and Maleckova (2002, p. 119) had observed, there are "more than 100 diplomatic and academic definitions of terrorism". Indeed, useful definitions have been proposed among scholars and policy makers alike, with some focusing solely on non-state actors while others incorporate and accentuate state actors alongside non-state actors (Primoratz 2004; Schmid and Jongman 2005; Lizardo 2008; Jackson and Sinclair 2012). However, there is yet no consensus regarding what essentially and precisely constitutes terrorism; hence, the concept is arguably very elusive since what it is usually referred to has surfaced in "so many different forms and under different circumstance" (Weinberg et al. 2004, p. 778).

This definitional conundrum discerningly dubbed the "Bermuda Triangle of terrorism" by Brian Jenkins of the RAND Corporation—one of the first researchers in the field of terrorism—is affirmed by Philip Schlesinger who argues that "no common agreed definition can in principle be reached, because the very process of definition is itself part of a wider test over ideologies or political objectives" (cited in Schmid 2004b, p. 375). To be sure, another expert, Bowyer Bell observed that "the very word terrorism becomes a litmus test for dearly held beliefs, so that a brief conversation on terrorist matters with almost anyone reveals a special world view, an interpretation of the nature of man and a glimpse into a desired future".

However, one may ask: is the difficulty merely tied to semantics? To answer this O'Neill (2002a, p. 5) noted that the definition problem is not merely semantic; in lieu, it is strongly tied around issues of "taking a position on whether there are limits on the use of violence, relations between the 'weak' and the 'strong', ethics in international relations, how a population can legitimately resist living under occupation and increasingly, sovereignty". He maintained that while some states considered defining terrorism to be important given their quest to address the causes, others considered such an attitude as recognizing and justifying terrorism. Hence, the definition impasse is arguably rather political than semantic given its connectedness to "root causes" debate on terrorism (O'Neill 2002a). What is more,

besides its variegated manifestation, terrorism has undergone various semantic transformations from its original *regime de la terreurs* (reign of terror) during the French revolution when it was first used (Schmid 2004a, p. 399). A historical trajectory of the term reveals precisely this trend: its use shifted from the "*regime de la terreurs*" (government by intimidations) during the French revolution, to anarchist and socio-revolutionary bombers in the nineteenth century, to the Red terror, to anti-colonial struggle, then to the Palestinian struggles in the 1960s, and finally to religious fundamentalism since the 1990s, to date (Schmid 2004a). It is instructive to note that the consequence of lack of definition, for instance by the United Nations has elicited the criticism that the organization adopts a double standard towards the phenomenon (O'Neill 2002b, p. 17).

The prevailing idea that "a person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter" (Primoratz 2004, p. ix) is another salient factor underscoring the difficulty with labeling certain acts as terrorism as opposed to other acts.[1] The divided opinion apropos that fits the label of terrorists carries within itself both conceptual import as well as justification challenges as far as the perception of terrorism is concerned. This contention arguably informed Comb's view (cited in Moten 2010, p. 37) that the term is basically ascribed to "those whose political objectives one finds objectionable". Meanwhile, Weinberg et al. (2004, p. 778) argues that person(s) to whom the term is ascribed often find it as an accusation and "seeks to turn the tables on their accusers by labeling them as the 'real terrorist'". Indeed, as a concept that "skates a thin line, hardly visible, between crime and war". Terrorism is difficult to construe from a purely value-neutral perspective (Weinberg 2005, p. 2). A recent study by Bayo (2013, p. 106) argues that "terrorism is being defined in relation to one's class position, social background, and as emotional responses expressed by those affected 'victims' or those who are being victimized from a particular act of terror at one time or the other".

Inferably, the definition of terrorism among scholars has become largely subjective depending on what aspect of the act the definer is focusing: the *objectives* or the *means* towards achieving those objectives. The merits of the means perspective, as Schmid (2004b) rightly observed is that it offers a narrow(er) and precise definition of terrorism, given that it includes less than it excludes; hence more resistive to objections and more appealing to terrorism scholars. The notion of illegitimate use of force is one oft cited central characteristic of the acts of terrorism in definitions that accentuates the *means*. According to such definitions, terrorism is reduced to the actions of non-state actors only: the state is exonerated from the act. Defending such view, Wight (cited in Jackson and Sinclair 2012, p. 57) charges that "what most people mean when they refer to terror are forms of non-state violence, and those that confuse the issues of 'state terror' with terrorism needs to defend

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[1]Menachem Begin, the leader of Irgun (Lehi' Zionist rival) in post-war Palestine was the first to refer to his followers as "freedom fighters" rather than terrorists against the backdrop of the naming game that characterizes the notion of terrorism. Meanwhile, the concept of freedom fighter became trendy thereby complicating the understanding of terrorism especially during the epoch referred to by Rapoport's "second-wave".

their accounts by providing more theoretically nuanced version of both the state and terrorism". Based on the Weberian notion of state, with its accents on state legitimacy regarding the monopoly of the use of force, Wight (2009, p. 101) simply contends that if the notion of illegitimate force forms part of the definition of terrorism, "then the concept of 'state terrorism' is a contradiction of term". In other words, he jettisons the idea of state terrorism because the state's use of force is legitimate as opposed to the non-state's use of force.

However, other scholars seem to be in acquiescent that the state cannot be exonerated from the acts of terrorism simply for the above reason (Teichman 1989; Primoratz 1990; Alex 2004; Baur 2004; Arowolo 2013). For instance, Baur (2004) introduced the concept of "pro-establishment terrorists" to counter such views that reduce terrorism to only actions by non-state actors. He posits that states can be, and have actually been, guilty of terrorism. Hitler, Idi Amin, Stalin, Saddam Husain and sons, and Mussolini are some of the state leaders he associated with "pro-establishment terrorism". In fact, based on the *means* criteria, states and non-state actors label each other as terrorist, not necessarily because of the other's use of lethal violence in attempting to attain particular political goals but simply because one views the other's acts as illegitimate (Coady 2004b; Lizardo 2008). This circle of debate must have prompted Ross (1993, p. 326) to the conclusion that academic study of terrorism is "descriptively rich but analytically barren".

In his recent "*Frameworks for Conceptualizing Terrorism*" Schmid (2004a, p. 179) identified various framework according to which terrorism has been conceived, namely terrorism as: (1) crime,[2] (2) politics, (3) warfare, (5) propaganda, (6) religion. Considering the first category, he argues that "most if not all activities commonly perpetrated by terrorists, are considered illegal if not always illegitimate by the international community" (Schmid 2004a, p. 179). Meanwhile, he further noted that despite the criminal nature of terrorism as commonly expressed as in the form of indiscriminate bombings, armed assaults on civilians, focused assassinations, kidnappings, hostage-taking, and hijacking, there is most often a political underpinning to such actions. In corroboration, Coady (2004b, p. 41) stresses the broad and fuzzy border between merely criminal and fully political. He notes that "criminal activities can become involved with the political, even in the matter of violence, as happened with the criminal drug lords in Colombia some years ago— and groups whose rationale is basically political may indulge in ordinary criminal activities, such as bank-robbery, to finance their operations" (2004b, p. 41).

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[2]The use of the term crime, however, requires its own clarification as its conceptualization varies considerably across time and cultural spaces and is more often dependent on the scope of a particular legal framework. Meanwhile, Schmid's conception of crime herein has to do with "the intentional commission of an act usually deemed socially harmful or dangerous and specifically defined, prohibited and punishable under the criminal law" (Schmid 2004, p. 179). Questions regarding the intrinsic values of an act deemed as crime by a particular state can, however, be raised concerning this definition. For instance, the distinction between 'mala prohibita' (wrong merely because it is prohibited by statute) and 'mala per se' (wrong or evil in itself'), that exists, for instance in the Roman legal traditions further complicates the understanding of terrorism as crime.

But beyond this criminal dimension the clear political motivation of terrorism is also widely acknowledged (Schmid and Jongman 2005). For instance, the report of the Policy Working Group on the UN and Terrorism maintained that "terrorism is, in most cases, essentially a political act. It is meant to inflict dramatic and deadly injury on civilians and to create an atmosphere of fear, generally for political or ideological (whether secular or religious) purposes" (Schmid 2004b, p. 214). Hence an understanding of terrorism within the broader context of political conflict is, according to Schmid (2004b), necessary in view of the reality of globalization, state interdependence, and the growing internationalization of terrorism itself. The convergence of the political and criminal aspects of terrorism begets the notion of "political crime.[3]"

The foregoing debate underscores a very common problem not just with attaining a standard definition for terrorism but also with any other particular term based on the tenuousness of language itself. As Schmid and Jongman (2005, p. 6) pointed out, "the question of definition of a term like terrorism cannot be detached from the question of who is the defining agency". Ferdinand De Saussure, the renowned postmodernist linguist, is of a similar view when he maintained that meanings are arbitrarily bestowed on persons and things, hence the concept, "terrorist" is only a perception imposed on someone that does not necessarily describe any intrinsic truth about the person (Desbruslais 2009, p. 19). Schmid and Jongman (2005, p. 6) corroborates this view by maintaining that "in many, even in most situations, the adoption of a standard meaning is just a matter of convenience". Little wonder terrorism is wildly viewed as a "contested concept" particularly among scholars and policy makers as most definitions are coloured by "political ideology, location and perspective" (Moten 2010, p. 36).

To put all the foregoing in perspective in order to identify this division of opinions over the nature of terrorism, let us look at extant definitions of terrorism. According to the U.S. State Department, terrorism constitutes "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience" (Richardson 2011, p. 17). Similarly, terrorism was defined as "a type of political violence that intentionally targets civilians (non-combatants) in a ruthlessly destructive, often unpredictable manner, employing horrific violence against unsuspecting civilians, as well as combatants, in order to inspire fear and create panic which, in turn, advances the terrorist's political and religious agenda" (Sterba and French 2003, p. 140). It suffices, however, to note that when it comes to who is a "non-combatant" and what we mean by "politically motivated" there are as many definitions as there are definers (Burgoon 2006, p. 178).

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[3]This occurs when an act is considered 'criminal' but its motive or intent is deemed 'political' (Schmid 2004, p. 179).

According to the UN Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism, Article 2 of the draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:

> (a) death or serious bodily injury to any person; or (b) serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a state or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or (c) damage to property, places, facilities, …. Resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act (cited in Schmid 2004b, p. 199).

These definitions fall under two of the four categories of definitions of terrorism that were systematically identified by Alex Schmid (Weinberg et al. 2004). Similarly, according to Schmid's widely used academic definition,[4] "terrorism is

> an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-)clandestine individual group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby— in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims or violence are generally chosen randomly (target of opportunity) or selectively (representation or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generator" (cited in Weinberg et al. 2004, p. 3).

These value-laden definitions of terrorism such as Schmid's and the state-centric definition of terrorism such as the U.S. State Department, lead us to ask a further philosophical question: why do non-states participate as actors? In other words, one may ask: what motivates or justifies terrorism perpetrated against the state? The two fundamental but related issues, namely: the conceptualization and justification of terrorism are central to a philosophical investigation of terrorism (Primoratz 1990). While the first issue is not an exclusive perverse of philosophy—as indicated by the various attempts to define terrorism by government departments and scholars from various fields—the second is. Hence, the cliché that one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter is not only pivoted on the problem of conceptualization of terrorism, but also its justification. Meanwhile, before delving properly into moral argument on the justification of terrorism it is pertinent to assay the nature of terrorism from both historical and contemporary bird-eye view. This would show why and how certain terrorists seem to have justified their acts in human history.

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[4]In general—academic definitions of terrorism are privileged over supposed political ones because of the tendency of the former towards value-neutrality, thereby enhancing a non-double standard justification of terrorism, if possible. However, academic definitions have quite some limitations ranging from complexity due to use of jargon to policy irreverence due to its blurring of the distinction between terrorism by state actors and terrorism by non-state actors (Onapajo and Uzodike 2012, p. 339).

2.3   **Perspectives on Terrorism: A Historical Trajectory**

As evidently a contested concept, what constitutes terrorism seems primarily to be a function of how it is defined. Meanwhile, a glance at both historical and contemporary trends illuminates various global instances of acts that have widely been termed as terrorism. From a historical perspective, Rapoport (2004, pp. 46–61) identified four waves of modern terrorism in a linear form, namely the Anarchist wave, the Anti-colonial wave, New Left Wave, and Religious wave. He dubbed the "first wave" as the anarchist wave and ties its motivation to the failure of democratic reform agendas across Europe during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He argues that anarchists attempted the abolishment of the government. Its fundamental tactics were more of individual terrorism and were primarily characterized by the assassination of key government officials as redolent of the assassination of Alexander II in 1881 in Russia. This wave, which began in Russia in the 1880s extended to the Balkans and Asia as well as Western Europe.

Then there was the second wave, the "anti-colonial wave", around the 1920s. As the name implies, this wave of terrorism was primarily characterized by national self-determination in opposition to the oppressive yoke of colonialism. The Irish rebellion of 1919 against the English is illustrative. The rebel's grievances, like the preceding wave, were directed "against the representatives of England such as police, soldiers, judges and government officials, in an effort to make the cost of maintaining continued occupation too high" (Moten 2010, pp. 39–40). Essentially, such terrorism was employed to crush the government by non-states groups. For instance, Jewish terrorist groups such the IrgunZvaiLeumi and the "Stern Gang" also known as the Lehi, an acronym for *LohameiHerutYisrael* which means Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, endorsed the use of terror to force the British out of Palestine (Garrison 2004, p. 267). Interestingly, these groups fundamentally believed they were "struggling against government terror" (Moten 2010, p. 40); hence, their hit-and-run terrorist tactics were directed at the security arm of the government, such as the police (very much like the Boko Haram's tactics).

The third wave, that is, the New Left Wave took its inspiration from the distrust in the existing democratic system. Again like the preceding "waves", the New Left wave contended against the imperialism of the west; and thus was characterized by nationalism and radicalism. It employed tactics such as hostage-taking, kidnapping, and assassination against its targets. Groups such as the Italian Red Brigades, The West German Red Army faction (RAF), and The Japanese Red Army, who all saw themselves as "vanguard of the Third World" are prominent examples during these waves (Moten 2010, p. 40).

The last phase which arguably stretches to the present era, the religious wave, surfaced in 1979 and is characterized by the clamour for religious state. It was indeed about religious self-determination. According to Moten (2010, p. 40), "Islam is at the heart of this wave although the Sikhs have sought religious state in Punjab". Besides, Christians and Jews were not exempt. This wave is essentially characterized by religious fundamentalism, whereby brutal violence, slaughter of

infidels, and the violation of human rights were given a sacred character by those who considered themselves to be a "true believer" (Schmid 2004b).[5] Schmid argues that "such a reframing of inhuman acts in the terrorist's mind to heroic deeds constitutes a "defense" or "neutralization-mechanism", which turns an actual murder into a perceived sacrifice" (Schmid 2004b).[6]

The Iranian revolution of 1979 is arguably a primary precipitant factor of modern religious fundamentalism. One of the distinguished characteristics of this wave is the commonness of a suicide bomb. The notable group in this era includes the Tamil Tigers, who according to Moten (2010, p. 41) used more suicide bombers than anyone else between 1983 and 2000. Terrorism in this wave was more frequent and violent as causalities and infrastructure damage skyrocketed. Influenced by the dramatic advancement in science and technology, the last two waves of terrorism employed various advanced tactics of terrorism such as hijacking of commercial airliners; the use of guns and bombs in attacks as well as the use of sophisticated encryption software for secrecy. While terrorism during its initial stages as can be discerned from the above were predominantly within particular nations, it subsequently assumed a more international scope—particularly during the religious wave. The transnational nature of the major religion such as Islam and Christianity arguably explains this latter dimension. Accordingly, three types of terrorism can be found in the literature, namely domestic terrorism, international terrorism, and transnational terrorism.

In trying to understand terrorism, different perspectives have been identified. One such perspective is the social and behavioural perspective, which links terrorism to "social, economic, political and other environment factors" (Moten 2010, p. 45). In lieu of restricting terrorism to a given religion or even region, this perspective associates terrorism with "root causes" such as social economic inequality and political deprivation. Terrorist groups with religious façades like the Al Qaeda are seen basically as offshoots of "internal and international forces". Such groups are believed to have been nudged by the perceived sense of injustice perpetrated against them by "others" and are motivated thus to revenge through terroristic means. For instance, a study by Marari in 1985 reveals how "those Palestinian suicide bombers often have at least a relative or close friend who was killed or injured by Israelis" (cited in Moten 2010, p. 46).

The demographic and economic determinants of terrorism constitute another perspective of terrorism. This perspective situates terrorism within the link between

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[5]It suffices to acknowledge that the activities of the groups such as: the Hindu Thugs in South Asia (2500 years); The Jewish Zealots-Sicarit (more than 1900 years ago); Islamic Assassins about 900 years reveal, contrary to the common perception, that religious fundamentalism is hardly a modern phenomenon (Schmid 2004b). All of them are arguably precursors of some contemporary fundamentalist terrorists.

[6]It is arguably this perception that promoted the sixteenth century French philosopher, Blaise Pascal to say that "Men never do evil so openly and contentedly as when they do it from religious conviction", while Karl Marx referred to terrorists as "dangerous dreamers of the absolute" (Schmid 2004b, p. 211).

economic and demographic factors such as high-fertility, high-growth regions in most non-western, particularly, Muslim societies. The bone of contention here is that such natural endowment hardly translates into a good standard of living for the members of such societies considering for instance, the large number of unemployed youths that might be found in such societies (Moten 2010, p. 47). This situation facilitates a "revolution of rising frustrations" as people are forced by poverty, hopelessness, and a sense of frustration to join extremist organizations (Moten 2010, p. 47). The aforementioned author explains that the situation is worsened if the established governments are authoritarian and illiberal as characterized by some Muslim majority countries. In lieu of responding to frustration of the population, the government in these societies tends to repress opposition movements by not providing them a non-violent means of voicing out their grievances. Hence radicalism and terrorism becomes a more convenient means by which they believe they can change the status quo.

However, some American policy makers disagree with the preceding view. Terrorist organizations such as the Al Qaeda are considered by them as essentially linked with the Islamic religion, that is, "Islam and Muslims, unlike secular institutions, are inclined towards violence" (Moten 2010, p. 48). This prevailing western perspective largely bifurcates the world into secular (the West) and religious (Muslim world)—with the former perceived as the peace lover while the latter is seen as the vanguard of violence. Samuel Huntington's (1996) "Clash of Civilization" appears to have provided the justification for such belief, given his assertion that "Islam has bloody borders and Muslim states have a high propensity to resort to violence" (Huntington 1996, p. 258). Huntington's thesis "provided needed justification for the U.S. and the West to stretch out their military in the Muslim world" (Moten 2010, p. 49). However, Cavanaugh (2007, p. 9) noted that the persistence of this dichotomy in the west has been mainly due to its ideological and political usefulness, as it "serves to silence representatives of certain kinds of faiths in the public sphere".

The U.S. has championed the cause of identifying and naming of terrorist organizations around the world as well as states sponsoring terrorism, which include Syria, Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Iran (Moten 2010, p. 50). Interestingly, therefore, experts in terrorism studies, according to Moten (2010, p. 10) "believe that the States Department list of states' sponsors of terrorism is merely a political tool used by the U.S. in order to impose sanctions" (Moten 2010, p. 10). Not surprisingly, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in the name of ridding the world of safe havens for terrorist groups is seen by Johnson (2004, pp. 74–85) as mainly driven instead by the economic motives such as oil and interest in domestic politics. Moten (2010, p. 52) corroborates the above view when he argues that "the Afghanistan attack and the Taliban overthrow were carried out not because they were harboring Al Qaeda but because they were not cooperating with the oil consortium, led by the US Company Unocal, to allow a pipeline across their country from central Asian oil fields".

Contrary to the U.S. perspective, there is the "Muslim Perspective" which stems from and is a reaction against the U.S.-led war against terror (Moten 2010). This

perspective is averse to what it sees as the West-centric perspective of terrorism which paints Muslims as terrorism- tolerant, and solely as a means of fighting the West. The Muslim perspective challenges the view that "terrorism is automatically attributed to the killing of any westerner but not the murder of civilians' *en masses* in Iraq, Palestine, and Afghanistan, or the horror perpetrated in Abu-Ghraib in the name of freedom and democracy" (Moten 2010, p. 53). Yet it is obvious that Muslims condemn acts of terrorism. Hence, the Muslim perspective basically sees the West as the chief architect of terrorism. "Washington's actions in the Muslim world in general are seen by many Muslims as evidence of collaboration with regimes what compromise Islamic values and oppress their citizens" (Moten 2010, p. 53). It is against this backdrop that charismatic leaders like Bin Ladin in his 1996 *fatwa* (religious edicts) called upon his Muslim brothers to fight against the "invading enemy", namely America and Israel. Unsurprisingly, the 9/11 attacks were greeted with cheers and celebration as an open form of moral heroism among certain groups of people in the Arab world, the same act that was considered as unmitigated evil among America (Kraemer 2004). Following this is another salient dimension, namely the divergence regarding the moral status of terrorist attacks, a topical issue for the philosophical perspective on terrorism (Baur 2004; Kraemer 2004; Primoratz 2004; Schwenkenbecher 2012).

2.4   Justification of Terrorism

The preceding perspectives indeed underscores the cliché that "one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter" (Primoratz 2004); hence raising the question: how are we to morally assess terrorism?[7] On the one hand, many scholars seem to acquiesce that terrorism is *prima facie* morally repugnant, irrespective of the agent(s) or the victim(s) as well as the "how" of its execution (Coady 1985; Primoratz 1990; Coady 2004a; Jollimore 2007). For instance, Primoratz (2004, p. xix) argues "in general, but especially in the present worldwide terrorism alert, the moral prohibition of terrorism ought to be understood and endorsed as absolute." Similarly, Schimid (2004a, p. 379) is of the view, while the above cliché "undoubtedly reflects a political praxis its moral relativism is highly unsatisfactory from an ethical and intellectual point of view".

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[7]The Israeli-Palestinian long standing conflicts represent a persuasive example of the subjectivity hovering around the debates on terrorism, in terms of its moral and conceptual implications. While to outsiders both parties are committing acts of terrorism, the involved parties not only denied such allegation but also ironically blame the others for perpetuating terroristic acts against them by simply justifying their own use of violence as not terroristic (Primoratz 2004, p. ix). Interestingly, this same conflict has quite some resonance with some Christian-Muslim conflict in various parts of the globe including Nigeria, where Boko Haram have made allusion to America's support of Israeli in marginalizing the Palestinian community (or the Muslim world) as one of their grievances against the West.

The view that "terrorism is *prima facie* wrong" (Coady 2004a, p. 83) is quite often based on the traditional Just War theory[8] under the *jus in bello*, which underscores the principle of discrimination between military and civilian targets and refraining from harming innocent civilians, is useful in this regard (Primoratz 2004, p. 25). Essentially terrorism is herein seen as violence, against civilian, noncombatants, and the innocents. It is instructive to note that attaining unanimity on the notion of non-combatants is polemical as there are as many definitions thereof as there are definers (Burgoon 2006, p. 178). Besides using the same notion of non-combatants or innocent as reference frame, one may also ask: are innocent or non-combatants not killed in war? Meanwhile, to answer this, Schmid (2004b, p. 204) differentiated between collateral but unintentional damage to civilians and intentional attacks on civilians, referring to war and most contemporary terrorism, respectively, while inferring that "terrorism is a counter value, rather than a counter-force tactic, since civilians not involved in combat are the prime target" (Schmid 2004b, p. 204).

Nonetheless, there is also the view that terrorism under grave reason might be justifiable.[9] Different aspects of terrorism are underscored in justifying the phenomenon. For instance, according to Kraemer (2004) non-consequentialist ethicists prioritize the motive rather than the goal in their moral assessment of terrorism. Considered as a sole weapon available to the political powerless, terrorism, from the perspective of the insurgent groups, may not only be seen as a necessary but also a justifiable means of expressing—if not addressing their grievances against the perception of inequality and oppression.[10] It is instructive to note that such perception may not solely be among the terrorists but also even among the populace. To be sure, a survey conducted in Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, and Turkey by Krueger (2007, pp. 24–25) to determine their view regarding the justifiability of terrorist attacks against America and other Westerners in Iraq, reveals that a high percentage, particularly of those with a higher level of education in these countries strongly justified terrorism (see also Schmid and Jongman 2005, p. 24).

It must be underscored that the West, and in particular, the U.S., is widely believed to have been unjust to the Muslim world (Moten 2010). Accordingly, terrorists might not only justify their action against these enemies as a form of vengeance but also due to the shared justification among the populace, which

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[8]The Just War tradition has two phases: the *just ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. The former designates the conditions under which resorting to war is justifiable while the latter focuses on the methods by which such war should be conducted. Besides the Just War theory, other perspectives on the justification or condemnation of terrorism can be gleaned from the utilitarian tradition and the so-called realist tradition (Coady 2004, p. 42).

[9]Given the severity of the Nazi threats during World War II, the terror Bombing of German cities has been deemed legitimate to some extent. Similarly the terroristic elimination of Hitler is applauded along the same lines. These views are anchored in the act utilitarian, which emphasizes the 'rule of thumb' that overrules moral constraint in certain situation where the outcome of an act generates more happiness than sorrow.

[10]Considered from the perspective of an attempt to address grievance and inequality Schmid noted that the weapon of terrorism is indeed a very powerful weapon for the powerless.

themselves might not necessarily be terrorists. Based on this view, the need to understand the terrorist perception of the enemy is essential to understanding the justification they offer for their acts. This justification ground tends quite often to be on non-religious ground; hence, its religious façade is a mere decoy.

Nonetheless, the stage theory developed by Mark Juergensmeyer (cited in Schmid 2004b, p. 212) also shows the need to look at the world through the eyes of terrorists acting on religious impetus in order to understand their sensed justification. For the terrorist, especially those with religious motivation, the world is bifurcated into the forces of evil and forces of good, which are responsible for the problems and solutions respectively. The terrorist believes himself to be working towards enthroning the good force in society, believed to be dominated by forces of the evil in secularism. The "us" verses "them" dichotomy strongly propels the terrorists to believe that "perpetrating acts of terrorism is one of several ways to symbolically express power over oppressive forces and regain some nobility in the perpetrator's personal life". With such premonitions, the dastardly acts of destroying the perceived "oppressive force" are not only seen as noble but necessary towards the promotion of the good force (Schmid 2004b, p. 212).

To this end discrimination of the innocents and civilians is only a matter of secondary concern for the terrorists. Hence, the *jus in belum* restraint becomes unimportant, since in as much as the terrorist(s) are averse to the killing of the innocent, it is not possible, given its clandestine nature. Moreover, the very perception of the notion of "innocent" or "civilian" by the terrorist is hardly in tandem with the meaning of the same term under the J*ust* War theory. To be sure, believing themselves to be fighting against an "unjust" system, namely the secular government, the terrorist would hardly consider the killing of the so-called innocent/civilian/non-combatant as unjustifiable in addressing their grievance considering that the latter sustain the "unjust" system. For instance, since the entire America elects the congress, what seems to matter to terrorists such as Bin laden and his followers is vengeance against the entire nation, in which case he argues "we do not have to differentiate between military or civilian. As far as we are concerned [Americans] are all targets" (Schmid 2004a, p. 384). In the words of Bin Ladin:

> The American people should remember that they pay taxes to their government, they elect their president, their government manufactures arms and gives them to Israel and Israel uses them to massacre Palestinians. The American Congress endorses all government measures and this proves that the entire American is responsible for the atrocities perpetrated against Muslims (cited in Kinyon 2004, p. 3).

By implication "many acts of violence which we consider 'immoral' as a means to achieving an end, are, in the view of the religious or ideologically motivated terrorist, justified by the absolute end for which the terrorist purports to fight" (Schmid 2004b). This same logic can be said to apply to the perception of the Nigerian government by the Boko Haram. Further complicating this issue is the fact the discrimination of non-combatants and civilians according to J*ust* war canon is hardly attainable, even under a conventional war situation by the military. Hence,

Schmid (2004b) argues that "to the extent that some wars have become more terroristic—targeting predominantly civilians than military opponents—the moral difference between the conduct of soldiers and terrorists has grown smaller". The question then that can be asked is: Given the deleterious impacts of terrorism, should the latter be justified under certain circumstances? Citing Yasser Arafat, Primoratz (2004, p. 5) opines that "no degree of oppression and no level of desperation can ever justify the killing of innocent civilians". While there may be compelling views that would justify resort to violence and terrorism in order to address grievances, it appears quite often that two wrongs hardly make a right. Arguably, one's definition of terrorism consequently is influenced by where one stands in this justification debate. However, one wants to define terrorism, there is obvious benefit in addressing grievances through other means than through terrors.

Considering the group under study—Boko Haram—definitions that underscore terrorism by non-state actors, such as the above should be more favoured in this study. According to such definitions, terrorism is wrong due to its targets of non-combatants and unintended victims, based on appeal to Just War theory, which strictly requires the discrimination of non-combatants and civilians. Indeed, as Primoratz (2004, p. xii) noted that "we might sometimes have much sympathy with a people fighting to get the occupying power off their back, but still objects if its fighter seeks to achieve their goals by attacking the enemy civilian rather than the military". Schmid (2004b, p. 211) further accentuated this view by arguing that "neither religion, nor any other lofty cause, can be accepted as a license to kill with impunity and a good conscience".

In addressing the problem of terrorism, going by the Just War theory, it is easy to condemn terrorism as evil from the perspective of the "condemner" but it is a different story altogether from the perspective of the "condemned". The latter, based on the belief that they are fighting against what they deemed as an unjust system—as in the case of Boko Haram—do not considered their actions evil. Thus, an important "initial steps of fighting terrorism is arguably to comprehend the terrorist point of view towards the world, humanity, and their justification of their violent methods" (Ozsoy 2007, p. 56). Accordingly, as Ozsoy aptly maintains, "it is unreasonable to expect to solve the problem or terrors through military and political precautions because military sanctions will be retaliated against with more severe violence and triggers a vicious cycle" (Ozsoy 2007, p. 56). Meanwhile, as noted earlier there is hardly a single cause for terrorism; but considering the focus of this study, what follows are the scholarly debates on the link between social-economic factors and terrorism in light of the root cause analysis.

2.4.1 Between Socio-Economic Factors and Terrorism

The nexus between terrorism and socio-economic variables such as inequality, poverty, social or political exclusion, and low education inter alia has been shown to be rather complicated and inconclusive both from the perspective of the

individual and the collective (Piazza 2011, p. 340). If anything, there has been a divided opinion over the relationship between the two as some empirical findings based on various contexts seem to disconfirm the view that poverty causes terrorism. For instance, studies based on cross-national data analysis has not compellingly shown that underdeveloped countries by virtue of their dismal socio-economic standings—measured by macro-economic indicators—are necessarily more likely to produce terrorists than their middle or high-income counterparts (Abadie 2006; Piazza 2006; Dreher and Gassebner 2008). In fact, according to Krueger (2007) the view that there is a link between socio-economic condition and terrorism is entirely based "on faith" rather than on "scientific evidence", as some empirical findings suggest that no relationship exists between poverty, education, and terrorism.

Hence, Schmid and Jongman (2005, pp. 6–7) maintained that "a range of socio-economic indicators—illiteracy, infant mortality and gross domestic product per capita—are unrelated to weather people involved in terrorism. Indeed, if anything, measure of economic deprivation has the opposite effects than the popular stereotypes would predict in the country level analyses". Basically, a range of empirical studies suggest that terrorists are not necessarily likely to emerge from poor socio-economic background (Krueger and Maleckova 2002; Berrebi 2007). This view is also supported by the fact that perpetrators of 9/11 were "middle-class, educated misanthropes led by a rich religious fanatic" (Burgoon 2006, p. 177).

Meanwhile, other studies seem to offer different observations apropos the nexus between terrorism and poor socio-economic factors (Nagel 1974; Berrebi 2003; Li and Schaub 2004; Blomberg and Rosendorff 2006; Burgoon 2006; Piazza 2006; Bandyopadhyay and Younas 2011; Piazza 2011). For instance, using a pooled time-series analysis, Li and Schaub (2004) found that developing countries are more susceptible to international terrorist attacks than their economically developed OECD counterparts. The variance in terms of socio-economic conditions in these two categories of countries is non-negligible in terms of how they discourage or encourage terrorism. Similarly, Bravo and Dias (2006) also underscores the negative correlation between terrorist incidences and the level of development based on geopolitical factors in Eurasia. Bravo and Dias (2006) seem to acquiesce with the hypothesis that socio-economic variable are crucial, among other factors, to terrorism by demonstrating that a "number of terrorist incidents is negatively associated with the level of development, the literacy level and ethnic fractionalization".

In the same vein, higher level of economic inequality is noted to be positively correlated with terrorism, according to Lai (2007) while Burgoon (2006) for his part underscores the importance of social welfare spending in the reduction of international terrorist attacks—a view that is pivoted on the socioeconomic determinants of terrorism. In fact, as far as policy oriented study such as that of Burgoon (2006) is concerned:

social welfare policies—including social security, unemployment, and health and education spending—affect preferences and capacities of social actors in ways that, on balance, discourage terrorism: by reducing poverty, inequality, and socioeconomic insecurity, thereby diminishing incentives to commit or tolerate terrorism, and by weakening extremist political and religious organizations and practice that provide economic and cognitive security where public safety nets are lacking.

From the perspective of international terrorism target, Blomberg and Rosendorff (2006) demonstrated that nationals are less probable to launch terrorist attacks abroad to the degree that their income levels increased. Meanwhile they also observed that higher income levels, democratic, and economically opened countries are more likely to be targets of international terrorism.

2.5 Conclusion

Inferably, there is a lack of consensus among scholars regarding the role of socio-economic indicators in the emergence of persistence of terrorism; and other studies have adopted a middle ground regarding the forgoing disagreement over the role of socio-economic in the emergence of terrorism. This general lack of consensus as identified above is not inconsequential. According to Piazza (2011, p. 340) these ambiguities has "left terrorism studies unable to articulate a clear counter-terrorism policy recommendation". While linking socio-economic factors to "religious terrorism"[11] might further seem to be a quantum leap, it appears that such is not necessarily malapropos. As Schmid (2004b, p. 212) rightly observed:

> Additional factors need to exist in order to fuse religion with political violence. Poverty of the people (not necessarily of the terrorist who identifies with them), social injustice and state repression are often listed as prime causes of insurgent terrorism. They can drive people to migration, revolt, crime, suicide or religious fervour. The terrorist temptation is often a combination of some or all of these. The migration is to paradise, the revolt is against the status quo, the method used is normally considered criminal, suicide preceded by murder is one of the means and religion offers a justification.

The implication of the above—namely the divided opinion over the role of socio-economic factors in the rise of terrorism. Also, the evolution of term creates problems for the understanding its universally acceptable causality and conceptualization. By implication this also becomes a quagmire in an attempt to finding an approach or panacea for wherever and whenever such social and security phenomenon as terrorism is prevalent. This is also due to its subjectivity and differential interpretations across time and space.

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[11]This has to do mainly with fundamentalist terrorism that employ religion as its basis; for example, groups such as Boko Haram.

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Chapter 3
Political Economy of Nigeria

A predatory capitalism has bred misery turned politics into warfare all but arrested the development of productive forces. The Nigerian ruling class has assaulted the masses with physical psychological violence thwarted their aspirations particularly their escape from underdevelopment poverty. Legitimacy has receded to the background making way for relations of raw power the perception of right as being coextensive with might.

Claude Ake

Abstract This paper takes a historical foray into the prevailing conditions that form the bedrock of collective actions and organized violence against the Nigerian authority. The analysis here presented situates the problem with the Nigerian state since independence in reference to corruption and mismanagement of the country's human and natural resources. Thus, in the quest to understand the economic predicates of Nigeria's current security challenges, this paper provides a general description of Nigeria's political economy and its tendency to fuel violence—including terrorism, as presently observed in the country and threatening its very existence. Presented differently, we conclude here that the historical trajectory to date of Nigeria's political economy has fueled terrorism in its geopolitical space through its characteristic alienation and frustration of its citizens, due mainly to the general lack of accountability and systemic corruption.

Keywords Natural resources · Boko Haram · Nigeria · Political violence · Political economy

3.1 Introduction

The prevalence of various forms of collective actions and organized violence, against established authorities and institutions in modern-day Nigeria is arguably a manifestation of Claude Ake's apt description of politics in Nigeria (Ake 1975). With particular reference to the crises in the northern region of the country, the root

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Claude Ake—During his Presidential Address to the 1982 Convention of the Nigerian Political Science Association in which he criticized the Nigerian society, politics (cited in Marenin 1985).

causes hinge on the failings of successive operators of the statecraft, since Nigeria's independence, especially the [mis]management of the nation's vast resources towards growth and development, both politically and economically (Omitola 2012, p. 5). The resultant fragility of the Nigerian state—virtually tittering on the verge of collapse—has wrongly meant the state's perpetual reliance on its monopoly of the use of force to maintain its existence.

Thus, in the quest to understand the economic predicates of Nigeria's current security challenges, this paper provides a general description of Nigeria's political economy and its tendency to fuel violence, including terrorism. Towards this end, the following are: (i) the state and economic symbiosis; (ii) the subsequent oil-centric economy and how this trend reduces Nigeria to a mono-cultural economic state and its ramifying effect on the state and society in Nigeria; (iii) the problem of corruption, particularly among the elites, against the backdrop of the state's oil-dependent nature, and how this continues to be a major factor in the underdevelopment of Nigeria; (iv) the economic crises in Nigeria, particularly since the 1980s, and the consequence of its [mis]management—particularly the macro-economic and macro-social implications of the Structural Adjustment Programs SAP; (v) and the general problem of poverty and economic frustration in Nigeria.

3.2 State and Economic Symbiosis

To illuminate the very fragile foundation of the Nigerian economy it suffices to present a cursory theoretical background pertaining to the symbiotic relationship between the state and the economy. The state can be theoretically construed as "an organisation within the society that co-exists and interacts with other formal and informal organisations, from families to economic enterprise or religious organisation" (cited in Olaitan 1995, p. 125). The state is, however, distinguished from these other organizations in the society due to its monopoly of the use of force to prevent anarchy in society. On the one hand, the survival of the state in carrying out its responsibilities largely depends on how it effectively manages its economy, that is, the production and consumption of goods and services in a given community. The reasons are not far-fetched; the state requires a strong economy for its continual functioning. In fact, as Olaitan (1995, pp. 125–126) aptly observed "any society will perish if it ceases to produce material wealth given that the production of material wealth is the basis of life and development of any society". On the other hand, the organization of a society's wealth production as well its distribution [that is the economy] depends on the state through its apparatus of social organization.

Hence, a symbiotic relationship exists between the state and the economy, because they facilitate the stable existence of each other (Olaitan 1995, p. 127). Sadly, in the case of Nigeria, especially at its very foundation, the state and

economy were, and to a large extent remains, unproductively linked (1995, p. 134). Structurally, the Nigerian economy is largely driven by the foreign-oriented trade pattern established by the British government and companies that determined the structure of the colonial Nigerian economy, a structure largely geared towards maximizing the selfish interest of the British economy at the expense of objective interests of Nigerians and the nation (Ogene 1988, p. 72). Subsequent oil exploration in commercial quantity developed along this same trade pattern but to the detriment of the majority of Nigerians. This "crises of the state and the economy", which is of significance to the socio-economic standings of the masses, have far-reaching implication for national security (Olaitan 1995). To understand this phenomenon and its relationship to the Nigerian economy, we shall now delve into the analysis of Nigeria's oil-centred economy and its ramifying effects.

3.3   The Nigerian Oil-Centric Economy and Consequences

Prior to the emergence of its oil-dependent economy in the 1970s, Nigeria was an agricultural-based economy. Agriculture accounted for 85 % of the nation's total export. In fact, aside from being the world's leading groundnut producer, Nigeria was the second leading producer of cocoa in the world as well as the major exporter of rubber, hides, and cotton (Walker 2000, pp. 78–79). As the mainstay of the national economy, accounting for almost 60 and over 70 % of the nation's GDP and total export earnings respectively, in the 1960s, the agricultural sector not only provided employment for over 75 % of the population, but also funded various national development projects (Ileso 2000, p. 7).

However, upon commercialization of oil in the mid-1970s, export from agriculture plummeted to an insignificant 5 % (Walker 2000, p. 86). Agriculture shares in the non-oil GDP, which averaged 60 % during the 1960s, plummeted to 30 % between 1978 and 1981; annual growth rates of agriculture production and real output for food crops declined to an average of –2.6 and –5.6 % respectively, between the 1970s and 1980s; and from the 70 % in 1970, exported shares plummeted to an insignificant 3 % in 1982 (Forest 1995, p. 159; Ileso 2000, p. 8). This development was due basically to the drawing out of much labour from the sector by the then booming oil sector. Essentially, the agriculture sector was neglected for the latter from whence the national revenue was receiving about 90 % of its foreign exchange by the mid-1970s, thereby resulting in the fall from 75 to 56 % (between 1970 and 1982) of the sector's share of total employment (Ileso 2000, p. 8; Walker 2000, p. 79).

This structural shift is hardly inconsequential for Nigeria's current socio-economic malaise, as we shall see subsequently. Meanwhile, it is noteworthy

to highlight the economic system into which this oil was brought.[1] Like most of its colonized counterparts, especially in Africa, raw materials were exported from the country at low prices and the finished products were being imported at high prices. Nigeria's economy was over-dependent on "foreign industrial products for virtually all locally consumed manufactured goods and …little indigenous capitalist production of final consumer goods" (Olaitan 1995, p. 132). Based on this trend, the Nigerian economy was dubbed "a commercial capitalist economy".[2] Fundamentally, economy was hardly self-propelling as it essentially depended on the external factors for its survival (Olaitan 1995, p. 132). It was on this weak foundation that the subsequent oil economy thrived; thereby constituting a curse rather than a blessing for the Nigerian economy and in turn the state, given the symbiotic relationship between the two. Government became an attractive avenue for sharing the "national cake" through wage employment, with the implication that peasant farmers abandon the agricultural sector for easy cash, especially under the oil-centred economy (Oyejide 1993; Walker 2000).

Hence, one of the defining characteristics of Nigeria's political economy is this over-dependence on one commodity, namely crude oil for its revenue. To date, oil has been the backbone of Nigeria's economy: crude-oil has contributed the highest but also a rising percentage of Nigeria's foreign earnings as can be gleaned from Fig. 3.1. In addition, as at 2001, according to Ogunleye (2008, p. 68), the total export and total foreign exchange from oil amounted to 98.7 and 90 %, respectively (Ogunleye 2008, p. 68). Essentially, all other sectors of the economy which have been significantly instrumental to development prior to the oil boom have become meaningfully relegated to the background.

In addition, the oil economy also oiled and entrenched systemic corruption, as it offered an easy ticket for wealth accumulation for the self-serving political elites. Thus, considering its lingering social and economic implications since the 1980s, the oil-induced economic crises in Nigeria deserve some historical analysis so as to

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[1]The imposition of the taxation system (paid in British currency) practically necessitated that subsistent producers abandon agriculture and become part of the capitalist system by taking up paid employment or sell their products to earn the currency for tax. As Olaitan (1995, p. 127) avers, "the essence of this development was the monetisation of the Nigerian economy and the creation of social relations of exchange". More so, the Nigerian economy practically became a foreign-oriented economy as it was "assigned the subservient task of production of agricultural produce and other raw materials for manufacturing concerns in Europe while depending on the European economies for manufactured goods" (Olaitan 1995, p. 131). This characteristic of the economy was unfortunately not only maintained but consolidated by the indigenous post-colonial leaders, with the adverse implication that the price values of Nigeria raw material remained determined by the metropolitan economies, given the nation's tenuous relationship to production. Local bourgeoisie classes, who were practically "underdeveloped, dependent, corrupt, unproductive, undisciplined and unpatriotic, wasteful and highly fractionalised" were created and incorporated into the services of the foreign-oriented economy (Ihonvbere 1988, p. 10).

[2]Terisa Turner (cited in Olaitan 1995, p. 132).

Fig. 3.1 Crude Oil and Non-Oil Export Earnings in Nigeria, 1988–1996, *Source* the Central Bank of Nigeria, *Nigeria: Major Economic, Financial and Banking Indicators*, Abuja: CBN 1997, p. 8

underscore its implication for the rising level of poverty.[3] Undoubtedly, Nigeria since the 1980s has remained mired in economic crises with a debilitating effect on socio-political stability. Hence, it would be inappropriate to jettison any causal relations between the current Boko Haram terrorism and this economic situation given factors such as its anti-state dimension, anti-corruption dimension as well as the predominance of the poor in the sect's membership (Forest 2012). Little wonder, proponents of the state failure thesis of the phenomenon have rightly viewed the inability of Nigerian state to address socio-economic needs and political aspirations of its populace as key to Boko Haram [up]rising (Alozieuwa 2012).

3.4 Nigeria's Economic Crises from the 1970s

As the foregoing suggests, vital to Nigeria's economic crises is the collapse of oil price, due to the oil-centric nature of the economy. While still convalescing from the devastating civil war of 1967–1970, Nigeria was confronted with international

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[3]It would be overambitious, if not impossible, to capture the entirety of historical factors that are of explanatory efficacy to Nigeria's current situation. Therefore, only aspects pertinent to the ensuing discourse are encapsulated herein. Defining epoch in Nigeria's history when key economic policies underlying the present socio-economic conditions of Nigeria were taken is underscored herein. For instance, the decade between 1983 and 1994, during which the various political and economic reformations such as the SAPs were undertaken in Nigeria is of particular relevance, given the skewing political economy that marked the regimes hitherto. Beyond the need for a manageable analysis of Nigeria's complex political and economic history, the pertinence of the focus on this particular epoch relates also to its unprecedented socio-economic impact which have only been aggravated today.

events that brought her some luck: the Arab-Israeli war in 1973. The Arabs used petroleum as an economic instrument of foreign policy by boycotting oil exports to the West. This event was to the benefit of oil-producing countries such as Nigeria. Albeit far away in the East, the positive impact of the war for Nigeria was to such a great level "that the deficits accumulated to prosecute the civil war was wiped and its reserves position increased enough to guarantee Nigeria imports for 23.9 months without Nigeria exporting a cent's worth of goods" (Kalu 1996, p. 233).

However, such a level of importation with no exportation, signals a serious danger for any market economy of which Nigeria was not exempted. Not so surprising, UkpabiAsika, a former civilian administrator of the East Central State under the Gowon administration notes that, "oil misled us… oil created false impression that all was well and that money was no longer a problem" (cited in Kalu 1996, p. 233). Indeed, the impending doom following the oil boom manifested itself only shortly thereafter. Between 1980 and 1982, oil revenue from exportation plummeted downwards. Expectedly, since oil accounted for more than 95 and 80 % of foreign exchange and government expenditure, respectively, such sharp drop in oil price was detrimental to the economy (Lewis 1996, p. 81). For instance, the country lost approximately 50 % of its already insufficient manufacturing capacity a few years into the crises, leading to the retrenchment of thousands of workers. As Olukoshi (1995, p. 140) noted "an acute shortage of consumer goods and imported food items hits the economy, fuelling an already bad inflationary situation. The country's payment position deteriorated sharply, the budget deficits widened, while internal public debt rose from N 4, 6 billion in 1979 to 22, 2 billion in 1983". Overall, short-term borrowing was necessitated for the continual running of the state. And this added to the accumulated debts incurred during the boom thereby eventuating a rapid "bunching of external obligation… balance-of-payments deficits, growing arrears and withdrawal of international lending" (Lewis 1996, p. 81). With the 2 % fall in GDP in 1982, which deteriorated to 4 % in 1983, it was not surprising that foreign debt stood at ₦15 billion with another ₦5 billion excess in trade payment (Olukoshi 1995, p. 140).

This oil-induced economic crisis was not bound to the 1970s and 1980s but has also lingered on to date in varying degrees. Thus, we shall now assay what happened afterward, especially the efforts of the subsequent administrations at economic recovery, beginning from the Second Republic to the Fourth Republic, that is, from Shagari to Obasanjo. We shall endeavour to weigh their successes and failures in the management of the crises and their efforts at boosting the nation's economic performance over the years.

3.5 The (Mis)Management of the Crises: From Shagari to Obasanjo

Various factors could have helped in forestalling the economic crises and its numerous socio-economic impacts that have trickled down the years. Some of these factors include a clear vision of what to do and a prompt response driven by patriotism, particularly, a political acumen for national development. These, however, seem lacking in the various administrations during the crises, considering the unyielding crises management strategies applied by these administrations. In the case of the Second Republic, the administration of Shagari (1979–1983) was initially reluctant to acknowledge the presence of a crisis until 1982 when the temporal provision of the Economic Stabilization Act[4] was enacted. Hoping that the world oil price declination was only transient, the government erroneously believed that the Act was sufficient in managing the crises; hence, saw no need for the involvement of the World Bank and the IMF promptly (Olukoshi 1995, p. 141).[5]

However, the precipitous rise in foreign debts and fiscal deficit on the one hand, and the declination in GDP and the productive sectors on the other hand, eventually necessitated talks between the government and IMF in early 1983. Meanwhile, the latter insisted on various austerity measures at the structural level including the devaluation of the Naira, prices and interest rates deregulation, the promotion of non-oil exports and the liberalization of trade (Olukoshi 1995, p. 141, 2). The rejection of these austerities conditionality's, with the exception of "the reduction of capital expenditure and the rationalization of some public enterprises" by the Shagari administration supported by the populace led to a stalemate in the negotiations between the regime and the IMF.[6] Essentially, rather than redressing the economic crises, the Second Republic (1979–1983) exacerbated the crises by its fiscal mismanagement, widespread corruption, and the budgetary cost caused by the then impending national elections. In the December 1983 administration, the Shagari civilian administration was ousted in coup that brought the nation under the military government of General Muhammadu Buhari.

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[4]This Act was essentially purported towards reducing public expenditure, curtailing imports using import restrictions, monetary control and financial instruments. It led to: about 2 % increase in interest rates; import duties imposition where they were non-existence; the rise in tariffs and gasoline prices, inter alia (Olukoshi 1995, p. 141).

[5]Alternatively the Shagari administration approached private international financiers for a loan of US$2 billion, which however delayed in coming thereby prompting him to merely withdraw ₦314 million and ₦170 million in a Special Drawing Rights (SDR) from its reserve with the IMF without necessarily involving the latter in its economic recovery efforts. Sadly these efforts only yielded little in addressing the dwindling fortunes of the economy.

[6]Suffice to note that the administration's jettisoning of some of the conditionalities of the IMF had bolstered their unpopularity among many Nigerians including students, academics, labour, civil servants and some professionals, perhaps because these were among those who mostly felt the pangs of the austerity introduced by Shagari's Act (Olukoshi 1995, p. 142).

The Buhari administration (1983–1985) also showed the zeal to address the economic crises. His strong emphasis on the reduction of the budget deficit, public expenditure, and the balance of payment deficits are reminiscent of this view. But even more laudable, the Buhari administration cracked down on corruption through his systematic attacks on the politicians of the Second Republic and also launched a general campaign against indiscipline and rent-seeking activities such as smuggling. This campaign which saw over 70 % officials that served in the 2nd Republic arrested and convicted for looting various sums of money, reveals the depth of corruption that sapped the nation of its development potentials during the oil boom. Unfortunately, "some of these people were released under the regime of Major General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida and some were reappointed to serve in some government offices" (Eddy and Akpan 2008, p. 163).

Meanwhile, the rather more telling socio-economic costs of the Buhari crises management strategy measures include the wage freeze and employment freeze imposed on the public sector, alongside the massive retrenchment of public sector employees, all purported at reducing the import profile of the economy (Olukoshi 1995, p. 143). This cost recovery approach of the administration also meant the imposition of harsh decrees that essentially infringed on basic democratic rights such as freedom of the press. Notably, prescription of any form of demonstration, procession and unauthorized meetings became rampant under the Buhari military administration.[7] Strike leaders were usually arrested and detained (Olukoshi 1995, p. 143). Through various austerity measures, the administration managed to reduce the budget deficit from ₦6.2 billion in 1983 to ₦3.3 billion in 1984 and also reduced the size of public spending by some 40 % (Olukoshi 1995, p. 143).

However, Buhari crises management strategies "were derailed by the dwindling revenues from oil exports and the tremendous burden of huge internal and external debts" (Iyoha and Oriakhi 2008, p. 651). And since the continued economic decline impacted more on the masses due to the growing suffering and unemployment, Buhari's austerity measures only further entrenched the degeneracy of state's legitimacy as the state was continually seen as irresponsive to the people's immediate needs. In addition, like his predecessor, Buhari failed to fully revive the economy due to the deadlock that ensued in the negotiation with the IMF. He refused to accept certain demands by the latter. For instance, he was averse to the policy option of devaluation, and also preferred commercialization to privatization. Similarly, in lieu of oil subsidy removal, the regime "opted to campaign against oil smuggling and bunkering", believing the option to be less of a complication to the economic problem (Olukoshi 1995, p. 144).

Additionally, as far as the trade liberalization demands of the Fund were concerned, the regime refused to throw open the economy in view of the detrimental impacts thereof on local production structure (Olukoshi 1995). Whatever the merit of Buhari's position, these disagreements with the Fund, as Olukoshi (1995, p. 144)

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[7]Among the proscribed were the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), the Nigerian Medical Association NMA, the National Association of Resident Doctors (NARD).

observed led to the "cutting off of lines of credits to Nigeria and an intensification of the financial boycott of the country which began under Shagari". It is pertinent to note that Buhari's reluctance towards accepting the IMF/World Bank's policies was not necessarily in accord with the outpourings of domestic opposition to the same. While for Buhari, it was about a nationalist outlook that "a devaluation-led crises management strategy would worsen the country's economy", for the domestic opposition it was about the "alienation of the groups such as workers, academics and professionals by the military regimes" (Olukoshi 1995, p. 144). The implication of this divergence of motivations meant that the government did not enjoy the support of these groups in its opposition to the Adjustment Programme as a result of which the crises continued even into the military takeover by Babangida.

General Ibrahim Babangida took over power in August 1985 when Nigeria appears to have been long overdue for major economic and political reforms as glaring from previous administrations. In the continued effort to arrest the nation's economic malaise, the Babangida Military administration opted, against public opinion, for loaning from the IMF, breaking the deadlock of the previous administration[8]; note that this was after his initial repudiation of IMF conditional finance. The president introduced an orthodox measure (home-ground approach) towards resolving the crises. The economic package introduced essentially included: "fiscal restraint, movement towards a more realistic exchange rate, trade liberalization, the reductions of key subsidies, higher agricultural prices, financial liberalization, and partial privatization" (Lewis 1996, p. 83). Alongside its economic reform agenda, the regime also favoured political reforms as reminiscent of his "commitment to human rights, eliminating some of the more repressive and restrictive decrees passed by his predecessor and embracing the principle of consultation" (Olukoshi 1995, p. 148). In addition, by promising to return the nation to civil rule, the regime's initial populism won the confidence of Nigerians, making Babangida seem as the one to redeem Nigeria from its political and economic predicaments.

The Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) was officially launched in July 1986 by the Babangida administration. Emphasis was on the commercialization of key public programmes such as: water and energy supplies, postal and telecommunication services, railways and shipping lines to ensure their declining dependency on government subsidy; all geared towards addressing the debt crises but also trade liberalization (Lewis 1996, p. 83). Part of the reasons for embarking on the SAP includes the dwindling world market oil price and the exacerbation of the fiscal crises of the state. Hence, the devaluation of the naira was construed by the

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[8]Based on the previous experiences of countries like Ghana and Brazil, among other reasons, the public was averse to this option after the president opened the debate as to whether or not the country should take the IMF Loan with all its conditionalities. Sadly this gesture of involving the citizenry was merely superficial if not deceitful as it did not fully influenced the regime's decision. Just as the debate was going government was discreetly negotiating on with World Bank concerning an adjustment programme for the country (Olukoshi 1995, p. 145). Hence, this populist approach that improved the state legitimacy was short-lived.

administration as being able to mitigate the effects of the declining dollar earnings by boosting the revenue in naira terms (Olukoshi 1995, p. 147).

Furthermore "devaluation was to be complimented by the privatization/ commercialization of public enterprises, the deregulation of prices and interest rates, trade liberalization, and subsidy withdrawal, marketing board abolition, export promotions incentives, public expenditure reduction and the curtailment of deficit budgeting" (Olukoshi 1995, p. 148). Essentially the hope was that these would limit the poor citizen debtors' demands for goods, and consequently foreign exchange; thereby ensuring the gradual reduction of the country's foreign debt and ultimately promoting economic recovery and growth (Orewa 1997). While these "belt-tight measures" where required to make the country "more self-reliant in the procurement of its industrial raw materials, and in the patronage of the home-made good" (Orewa 1997, p. 132), there was still further need to reschedule its debts with the Paris and London Clubs. Meanwhile, the social consequences of austerity measures were enormous as the economy rather deteriorated.

Additionally, in spite of the decline in oil prices in 1986; growth in the output of traditional exports crops surged reasonably (Lewis 1996, p. 83). However, the far-reaching and excruciating impacts of SAPs on most social groups and classes in the Nigerian society are widely acknowledged among scholars (Olukoshi 1995; Jega 2000; Zakari Ya'u 2000). Basically, the people-unfriendly economic and social reforms in the mid-1980s set the ball rolling for the current "social turmoil, worsening unemployment, run-away inflation and stagflation, spiraling prices of food, unaffordable housing, the enhanced diminution of the majority" (Amuwo 2009, p. 33). Suffice it to acknowledge the warning of Haq and Kirdar (cited in Geo-JaJa and Mangum 2003, p. 294) that such distortions unless remedied stand to "impede the future development of at least a generation to come". The manifestation of this warning in Nigeria is all too glaring as suggestive of the foregoing analysis. One of such consequences can be glanced from the worsening poverty trend in Nigeria since the 1980s, as Fig. 3.2 reveals. Rural and urban poverty has remained alarming despite

Fig. 3.2 Trends in rural and urban poverty in Nigeria (1980–2004), *Source* Nigeria Strategy Support Programme (in Omonona 2009, p. 2)

many economic recoveries programmes and market reforms by various administrations. In fact national poverty has only continued to grow.

One of the crucial implications of the economic pressure of the 1980s was its pervasive neglect of human development considering the negative effects that underdevelopment has had on peace and security in the nation. Nigeria is ranked the 13 poorest nation in the world in 1991 according to the World Bank Report, while topping the list of 11 Third World countries in terms of human deprivation in 1990, according to the UNDP (Adejumobi 1995, p. 180). This is hardly surprising since during the period between 1980 and 1992 the country declined from being middle country with per capital GNP of Labour US$1500.00 to a low income country (Orewa 1997). GNP grew negatively by 4.8 % for the period of 1980–1983; Gross Domestic Investment acutely declined from $84.602 billion in 1980 to $5.735 billion and then from $7.604 billion in 1991 to $7.754 billion in 1992 (Orewa 1997, pp. 136–137). Yet both private and government consumption skyrocketed from $78.496 to $84.667 billion and $9.153 to $10.312 billion respectively according to *The Guardian* (May 26, 1993). In short, with an overall capital outflow of about $4 billion between 1986 and 1991, Nigeria was far from addressing its foreign debts. The combination of these poor economic indicators with the deteriorating social services (education, health, and public utilities), continuous high rates of inflation, declining productivity and high rates of unemployment led to the inference that the "liberalization in the country was wrong" (Orewa 1997, p. 6).

The wrongness of the SAP could be further elucidated against the backdrop of what Momoh (1995, p. 20) dubbed the "privatization of the state". The lack of government commitment to welfare in the midst of drastic unemployment and retrenchment, due to its liberal democratic agenda put unnecessary strain on the populace. As Momoh (1995, p. 21) rightly explains, SAPs advocacy for fiscal discipline and prudence, deregulation and the privatization of public enterprises in order to cub corruption, and mismanagement could have only made positive impacts on the following grounds. (1) That all public enterprises auctioned were actually running at loss to necessitate privatization; (2) That the recklessly mismanaged public enterprises were not actually sold back to the same officers who mismanaged them in the first place; (3) That the enterprises were not actually sold at an alarmingly low sum; (4) That capital was not centralized, yet with insufficient state intervention where they were really required; (5) That the privatization project did not limit government sources of incomes and its ability to provide for the peoples' welfare; and (6) that the withdrawal of the state's social responsibility does amount to the accumulation of money mainly used for repression and co-optation. These conditions were not entirely met; hence, the people's resistance to the regime and its project, which overall only managed in creating "a rich but lazy class" as the supposed overall target beneficiaries of the SAPs, namely rural majority were hardly empowered (Momoh 1995, p. 20). The astronomical rise in income inequality, deepening poverty, frustrations, and the various violent conflicts that marked the era are reminiscent of this view. As Table 3.1 for instance illustrates, real income continued to fall after it peaked at ₦1934.61 in 1986 (Adejumobi 1995, p. 183).

Table 3.1 Trends in real rural household income in Nigeria (1984–1989)

Year	Nominal income (₦)	Rural income *Price index*	Real income (₦)
1984	7606.96	455.4	1691.05
1985	7772.72	482.3	1611.59
1986	9767.83	504.9	1934.61
1987	10,034.01	558.9	1795.63
1988	12,532.96	771.6	1626.87
1989	14,861.21	1061.7	1400.68

Source CBN/NISER National Study (cited in Adejumobi 1995, p. 183)

In essence, the programme, while enriching the bourgeoisies, "produced considerable privation and discontent, as retrenchment and declining real wages cut across a broad band of society" (Lewis 1996, p. 84). It is arguably these demerits that unpinned the various anti-SAP protests launched by MAN, ASUU, NANS, and NLC in mid-1987. Albeit fighting different aspects of adjustment policies, there appeared to be a general sense of dissatisfaction with the scheme. Indeed, only the *nouveau riche* class of the Nigerian society, particularly the merchant bankers, benefitted from the deregulation (Olukoshi 1995, p. 154).

Thus, even though successive governments in the post-SAP epoch instituted various economic recovery and poverty alleviation programmes, with the benefit of hindsight one can rightly say that such programmes have failed to better the socio-economic condition of Nigerians. The enormous mineral revenues could not be channeled to the poor through education, health, infrastructural, and industrial development that would boost employment opportunity. To fully appreciate this let us look at the intensity and consequences of corruption in Nigeria.

3.6 Corruption in Nigeria

The problems of underdevelopment and abject poverty in Nigeria are principally benchmarked upon the chronic level of corruption (political or bureaucratic) in the society.[9] As shown earlier, the mono-cultural nature of the Nigerian economy fuels grand embezzlement particularly among the ruling elites. From the beginning, in lieu of facilitating development in the nation "the effect of the oil boom was to convert the military political decision-makers and their bureaucratic aides into a new property-owning, rentier class working in close and direct collaborations with

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[9]Corruption has been widely construed as the abuse of public office for private gains for the benefit of the holder of the office or some third party (Transparency International).

foreign business interests with the sole aim of expropriating the surpluses derived from oil for their private and personal benefit" (Dudley 1980, p. 116). While corruption cannot be construed as an exclusive preserve of Nigeria, given its universal nature, it is, however, pervasive and almost inexorable in Nigeria. According to Obadina's (1999, p. 10) apt observation, the "culture of kickbacks, bribery and embezzlement has encouraged mismanagement and wasted huge amounts of limited national resources".

This trend of grand speculation has continued almost inexorably into the civilian regime. In fact, according to Ogbeidi (2012, p. 16), "if corruption in the 1990s was endemic, corruption since the return of democracy in 1999 has been legendary". Particularly alarming is the rate of systemic corruption,[10] at the high echelon of power as this arguably underlies most of Nigeria's current socio-economic and political quagmire. Essentially, the lack of transparency suffusing both private and public sector in Nigeria has remained the main impasse to development (Lewis 1999, p. 51).

Table 3.2 illustrates the gloomy picture of the level of corruption in Nigeria by the Transparency International between 1996 and 2012. As can be discerned from the table, between 1999 and 2004, Nigeria was consistently ranked among the three most corrupt countries in the world in the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International (CPI-TI).[11] Little wonder, a *Wash Post* commentator, Rupert (1998) once observed that "in Nigeria, corruption is not part of government; it is the object of government". So worrying is the problem that the renowned Nigerian writer, Achebe (1983, p. 58) warned that Nigeria is at the brink of an early grave if she does not take proactive measures to checkmate the widespread corruption. Sadly, the seeming improvement in the country's ranking during recent years, namely the triple jump from 6th (in 2005) to 17th (in 2006), and then almost doubled to 33rd (in 2007), has hardly impacted positively on the living conditions of Nigerians. Even the heightened clampdown on corruption, especially during the Obasanjo democratic administration (1999–2007) has declined in the subsequent administrations as suggestive of Nigeria's worsening index in CPI-TI in subsequent years. Let us thus take a cursory look at some of the cost of corruption for Nigeria.

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[10]Three forms of corruption have been identified namely: incidental (individual), instrumental (for instance, the public service) and, systemic (societal). Systemic category comprises the situation whereby corruption is endemic and pervasive that it becomes routinized and accepted in society as a *modus vivendi,* affecting both institutions and individual behaviour at all spheres of political and socio-economic system.

[11]Transparency International annual Corruption Perception Index available at http://www.transparency.org. TI's corruption perception Index rates countries on the scale of 0–10. 0 refers to the most corrupt countries while ten refers to the least corrupt country. In producing the index, the scores of countries/territories for the specific corruption-related questions in the data sources are combined to calculate a single score for each country.

Table 3.2 Transparency
International's corruption
perception index/rankingon
Nigeria, 1996–2012

Years	Country's ranking	Index (Max = 10)
1996	1	0.7
1997	1	1.8
1998	5	1.9
1999	2	1.6
2000	1	1.2
2001	2	1.4
2002	2	1.6
2003	2	1.4
2004	3	1.6
2005	6	1.9
2006	17	2.2
2007	33	2.2
2008	59	2.7
2009	44	2.5
2010	42	2.4
2011	37	2.4
2012	27	2.7
		Average: 1.9

Source Transparency International Corruption Perception Index
(various years), author's compilation

3.7   Cost of Corruption

The pernicious impact of corruption on development in Nigeria, especially considering its enormous natural wealth, arguably explains Nigeria's consistent poor United Nation's annual Human Development Index (HDI) ranking among its peers. Nigeria has been consistently rated among the countries with the Lowest Human Development, according to the United Nations HDI. To be sure between 2005 and 2012, Nigeria has maintained the dismal average of 0.4545 in the HDI. This trend may not be unrelated to the high level of corruption in the country which has stifled development. In Fig. 3.3 we compare the level of corruption according to the CPI-TI and the HDI among six selected countries, including Nigeria. What is discernible from the figure is that the three countries with the high level of corruption, among which is Nigeria, also have the poorest ranking in the Human Development Index.

Corruption in Nigeria has also "fuelled political instability by placing a high premium on the control of state office" (Obadina 1999, p. 10). Due to the looting that characterizes public offices, seeking political positions have become a lucrative business, since "anything spent to secure a political office is regarded as an investment which matures immediately one gets into office" (Dike 2008). Hence, upon getting to office, politicians use every means at their disposal, including the use of force to pursue selfish interests. Thus, typical of a fragile state, the Nigerian

Fig. 3.3 Corruption Perception versus Human Developments Index (HDI) in 2005 among selected countries, *Source* International Human Development Indicators, Corruption Perception Index (2005), author's compilation

government has continued to spend generously on the military and other institutions of state coercion, but allocated very few resources to education, health care, economic infrastructures, and other areas critical to economic growth and development. This is most often geared towards protecting and consolidating the continual hold on power and occupation of such offices by the elites (Dike 2008). Consequently, development-inducing aspects of the economy, such as basic education, health care, and infrastructural development are either neglected or underfunded by the government.

Hence, Mauro (2002) talks about the distortive impact of corruption on government expenditure as development fund are diverted from state coffers to private pockets to the detriment of the masses. For instance, despite having received an estimated US$228 billion from oil exports between 1981 and 1999, Nigeria remains extremely underdeveloped with an alarmingly high rate of illiteracy, which is worse in the northern regions where Boko Haram thrive, because education fund are siphoned (Udeh 2000). For instance Abdulmalik (2013) remarks that some officials were indicted "for stealing funds released to the nomadic education commission, an agency charged with the responsibility of getting Fulani herdsman to enroll their kids in school".

Furthermore, epileptic power supply has remained Nigeria's "single biggest bottleneck" since it affects "everyone from the barber to the grocery store owner to the factory worker" (Forest 2012, p. 27). Despite the over $30 billion spent on improving the energy sector in recent years, Nigeria still remains "the world leader in private demand for generators" (2012, p. 27). The Economist (2011, p. 27)[12] vividly illustrates the energy problem in Nigeria by pointedly noting that Nigeria grid power is only comparable to that of Bradford, a small post-industrial town in

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[12] *The Economist*, (May 28, 2011) "A Man and a Morass", available at http://www.economist.com (also cited in Forest 2012, p. 27).

the north of England with estimated population of 467 665 (2001 census). It suffices to accentuate that the adverse impact of this terribly low power supply on economic growth and socio-economic development is far reaching.

One of the clearest means of measuring a country's economic well-being is to look at the level of poverty and inequality. In Nigeria, these two remain negative given the unimpressive picture of economic performance over the years. For instance, per capital income plummeted from US$1000 in the 1980s to US$310, and poverty increasing from 27.2 % of the population in the 1980s to 65.6 % (Ali-Akpajiak and Pyke 2003, p. 29). It is against this backdrop that Agbaje et al. (2007, p. 79) appositely assert that corruption has reduced Nigeria to what he saw as a

> Resource-rich country of poor people in which pathological substance often triumphs over sanitized form; institutional recession masquerades as institution building; endless new constitutions parade as substitutes for constitutionalism; and… performance is often in direct contrast to fervent declarations of intent and achievements

Nigeria's Human Poverty Index (HPI) as at 2001 was 41.6; ranking 54th out of the 78 poorest countries of the world in terms of provision of education and services such has potable water, public-health measure and sanitations (Ali-Akpajiak and Pyke 2003, p. 7). Nigeria in that same year ranked among the lowest of the low in the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI), with an index of 0.456, ranking, 156th in the world. In fact, the situation has merely deteriorated such that between 2005 and 2011, Nigeria's HDI stood at an average of 0.445, that is, about 97 % decline in comparison with the 2001 score (UNDP 2011). The increasing economic gap between the rich and the poor is due, among other reasons, to the astronomic level of corruption in Nigeria today. This is largely because corruption mainly rewards indolence while penalizing hard work in Nigeria.

Similarly, in Nigeria corruption encumbers the fair distribution of social services and adds another layer to the resentment caused by the lack of political participation. The rest of society has no voice, is ignored, and placated. The telling effects of such placating of the masses on social stability cannot be overstated. This has virtually resulted in eroding the functional capacity of the state, thereby creating "their government" rather than "our government" mentality among Nigerians as evinced by the growing lack of patriotism. Furthermore, corruption has the characteristic of undermining morale and *esprit de corps*, compromising a nation's external security, threatening internal order and stability, and generally slowing down the pace of economic growth and sustainable development.

Corruption has damaged Nigeria's capacity for building and sustaining a professional competent and efficient civil service, to the effect that Nigerians must pay for public goods and services (sometimes of inferior quality) that should be free. In fact, due to adverse impact of corruption on government expenditure, the latter is unable to provide socially beneficial services as health, education, and security. To be sure, the more than US$380 billion allegedly lost by the Nigerian state to graft since independence (Ibukun 2011), could have translated to enormous socio-economic development, the absence of which arguably underline the general

state of discontent in Nigeria today. Due to corruption, Nigeria has one of the world's worst income distributions, with most of the wealth going to a select few (Forest 2012, p. 32). What is even more piquing about corruption in Nigeria is that it goes with impunity. Various anti-corruption programmes initiated over the years have achieved less than expected. This brings to mind that talks by political actors about accountability and integrity by itself does not translate into a genuine commitment to detect and penalize unethical behaviour.

The prevalence of politically motivated conflicts including terrorism in Nigeria is arguably also connected to such negative impact of corruption, particular poverty and political exclusion. In this light, besides destroying lives and communities and undermining countries and institutions corruption "generates popular anger that threatens to further destabilize societies and exacerbate violent conflicts" (Transparency International 2012). The manifestation of corruption thus far in "violence, mistrust, hostility and fractions cleavages along ethnic, religious and ideological lines, nepotism, unaccountability, misappropriation and maladministration" in Nigeria (Fasan 2002, p. 161) basically corroborates the above view.

3.8 Poverty in Nigeria

The concept of poverty strictly defiles a clear-cut definition due to its multidimensional scope (Gordon 2006). Albeit, it is trendy for poverty to be seen through the prism of material dispossession particularly in terms of income level, "dimensions of deprivation that relate to human capabilities, including consumption and food security, health, education, rights, voice, security, dignity, and decent work" are equally identified as vital to the notion of poverty (Oshewolo 2010, p. 265). This view is corroborated by the Human Poverty Approach, developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which sees poverty as the absence of the capability to "lead a long, healthy, creative life and to enjoy a decent standard of living, freedom, dignity, self-respect, and the respect of others" (cited in Oshewolo 2010, p. 265). Poverty has been commonly measured either in relative or absolute term. According to the United Nations, absolute poverty is "a condition characterized by severe deprivation of basic human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and information. It depends not only on income but also on access to services" (UN 1995). On the other hand, relative poverty entails "the concern with inequality or relative deprivation, where the bare minimum is socially guaranteed" (Oshewolo 2010, p. 267).

Following the economic crises of the 1980s, both rural and urban poverty in Nigeria have continued to soar higher and higher over the years in absolute and relative sense. Although based on the Word Bank (2011, p. 8) report Nigeria has experienced robust economic growth since 2001, the pace at which this translates to impact on the socio-economic conditions of the larger Nigerian populace appears

relatively slow, a view corroborated by Witwack (2013). As indicative of this claim,[13] to be sure, accordingly a UNDP (2010) report reveals that the population in poverty as of 2004 stood at 68.7 million. Ideally economic growth is supposed to positively impact on poverty alleviation. Nonetheless, the role of management in determining the pace of growth and development is even more important than the availability of the wealth itself as this determines whether the resources bring development or curse.

According to the international indicator for extreme poverty, 70.2 % of Nigerians live on less than 1 dollar or ₦124 per day (UNHD, cited in Buba 2007, p. 2). Infrastructures such as potable water, roads, electricity, *inter alia* continue to elude the country despite the economic growth rate. As Buba (2007, pp. 2–4) reveals based on UNHD data: child mortality rate remains high with about 201 immediate deaths out of every 1000 live births; maternal mortality rate stood at 704 per 100,000 as at 2004; the health sector can only afford one doctor per 1000 people; preventable disease such as malaria remains among the leading causes of death; the spread of HIV/AIDS remains high, with more than 930,000 children estimated to have been orphaned by the disease while another 5 million were estimated to be living with the consequences of disease in 2007. In fact, according to the United Nations Human Development report of 2013, Nigeria is ranked the 36th least developed country of the world. These indicators are clearly reminiscent of the discrepancy between the economic growth and development, which is largely felt by the masses. Hence, given that these indicators fly in the face of abundant minerals, one can safely draw the conclusion that rather than the mere resource itself "it is the political economy of resources that drives the growth and poverty results" (Roemer and Gugerty 1997, p. 21). Part of the reason for this assertion is that poverty has been on the rise since the 1980 economic crises as redolent of Fig. 3.1 above. Similarly, the high level of corruption that characterizes Nigerian political economy, which has mainly concentrated the dividend of mineral wealth in the hand of the few, explains the excruciating poverty and underdevelopment that continue to plague the Nigerian society. It is against this background that one can safely infer that Nigeria's economic malaise can be attributed to the nation's overreliance on crude oil. In the incisive words of Femi Boyede, the Chief Executive Officer of Koinonia Ventures Limited, the over-dependence on oil is "the cause of unemployment, poverty kidnapping, militancy and terrorism in the country" (Abellegah 2012).

According to the World Bank (2011, p. 5) "Nigeria lags far behind many other major developing countries in Africa in terms of socioeconomic indices". For

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[13]Interestingly, this rather rapid growth is driven not by oil but non-oil sector (the remarkable of which is the telecommunications sector) (World Bank 2011, pp. 2 and 9). Witwack's (2013, p. 7) study for World Bank reveals that this trend can be interpreted as implying that "the Nigerian non-oil economy is now 240 % times higher than a decade ago". Accordingly then, the annual growth rates that average over 7 % in official data during the last decade has placed Nigeria among the fastest growing economies in the world (Witwack 2013, p. 2). For example, Nigeria's annual real GDP growth averaged 9.20 % between 2001 and 2009 as compared to an average of 2.5 % between 1995 and 1999.

instance, Fig. 3.3 assesses the country's socioeconomic standard in comparison to four other developing countries in Africa in terms of their progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. What seems clear from the table is that despite its surpassing mineral wealth than the enlisted countries in the various aspects enlisted (World Bank 2011, p. 7), Nigeria lags behind in meetings the MDGs. The figure indicates that Nigeria, despite being the second largest economy in Africa, trails behind smaller nations such as Botswana, Kenya, and Ghana as far as net primary enrolment and youth literacy are concerned. On the other hand, however, its records in terms of infant mortality rate stand at 89 %, which is higher than any of the countries enlisted. Indeed, this is a sad reality for Nigeria. Little wonder, Rogers (2012) inferred that the nationwide protest against fuel subside removal in January 2012 somewhat confirms the widespread poverty suffered by many ordinary Nigerians, who are at the receiving end of such economic policy.

According to the World Bank (2011, p. 8), the failure of economic growth to tally with socio-economic development can be "due to weak employment creation as well as sub-optimal patterns of public expenditure". Thus even though Nigeria has enacted a number of market reforms over the years, which has impacted on its economic growth, the development of the citizen is only minimally improved, if at all. As Sen (1999) aptly noted, any economic growth in terms of GNI that does not reflect the capability and opportunities people enjoy is questionable in terms of relevance. In the same vein, the 1993 Nobel Memorial Prize winner in Economics, Douglass C. North, underscores the salience of institutional factors supporting the political, economic, and social in the creation of national wealth. As far as North (2005)is concerned, there ought to be a direct correlation between the citizen's quality of life and the nation's economic development, otherwise economic growth is worthless, and rightly so. This view is pivotal to the UN's Human Development Index HDI,[14] in which Nigeria's ranking over the years have been unimpressive despite its mammoth natural and human wealth. To be sure, according to the latest Human Development Report (2013), Nigeria is rated 132 out of 187. Some of the factors acting alone and in combination to cause poverty in Nigeria as well as in other Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, which is of pertinence to this study include:

> Low savings and investments; Weak institutions of governance; Poor infrastructure and structural weaknesses in the economy; Low incomes outstripping high population growth; High external dependence; Political and social instability which manifest in social strife; Lack of technological capacity to deal with environmental challenges like disease epidemics, floods, drought, pest outbreaks…; Adverse effects of globalization in terms of capital flight vis-à-vis inflow of capital (Musa 2006, p. 7).

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[14]The HDI assesses a country's average achievements based on (1) long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy of the total population of a country at birth, (2) Knowledge production as measured by the adult literacy rate (with tow-third weight) and the combined primary secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (with one-third weight), (3) a decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita in PPP terms in US dollars. Available at: http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/103106.html [Accessed on 23 August 2013].

Another key socio-economic indicator, education, is an important aspect of human development since its outcome is a veritable indication of well-being (World Bank 2011, p. 6). Corroborating this view, Duze (2011, p. 803) aptly noted that "a nation's overall development is inextricably tied to its educational system". Unfortunately, the Nigerian education system still remains in a state appositely described by Ibe (2006) as "shameful" due to—among other reasons—corruption which constantly diverts education funding; hence engendering incessant strike actions (Ibe 2006; Olujuwon and Odunayo 2010; Kennedy 2011). For instance, the EFCC disclosed that the ₦361 million contract which AlaoAkala (erstwhile Oyo State Governor) awarded to a publishing firm for the supply of textbooks to the State in 2008 was inflated by ₦488 million, and another for ₦631 million was also inflated by ₦395 million (Adegun et al. 2009). Innovative education programmes such as Universal Primary Education UPE inaugurated in 1976, and Universal Basic Education UBE have mainly indeed "served as conduits to transfer money to the corrupt political leaders and their cronies" who, having killed the education system, now fly their children abroad for proper education (Dike 2005).

Consequently, despite government's efforts to promote education and literacy in Nigeria, primary school completion rate stood at 75.2 % in 2006 (Buba 2007, pp. 2–3). As an important aspect of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) indicators for monitoring its progress have been identified. These include: the net enrolment ratio in primary education, the primary school completion rate and the youth literacy rate. Table 3.3, for instance, reflects how Nigeria is far from meeting the MDGs in 2015. The indicators put net enrolment ratio in primary and secondary education at 57.0 and 47.8 %, respectively, out of the 100 % target of the MDGs. Clearly, more efforts are still needed if Nigeria is to meet the MDGs in 2015. Albeit, Nigeria seems to be doing well in the proportion of pupils who reached last grade of primary at 2009 (94 %), recent indicators reveal the disturbing fact that Nigeria holds the highest number of young people out of school. Based on UNESCO record in 2010, approximately 10.5 billion children in Nigeria are out of school. According

Table 3.3 Progress on the education goal of the MDGs in Nigeria as at 2009

	2009	2015 Target
Net enrolment ratio in primary education (%)	57.0	100
Net enrolment ratio in secondary education (%)	47.8	100
Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach last grade of primary (%)	94.0	100
Literacy rate of 15–24 year olds, men (%)	70.7	100
Literacy rate of 15–24 year olds, women (%)	74.9	100
Adult literacy rate, women and men (%)	66.5	100
Adult literacy rate, men (%)	57.4	100
Adult literacy rate, women (%)	65.4	100

Source NLSS 2009; NICS 2007 (World Bank 2011, p. 6)

to the records, Nigeria "accounts for almost one in five out-of-school children in the world" (Abdulmalik 2013).

This indeed is a "national disgrace" especially when one compares this fact about Nigeria with other low and middle income countries around the world, which can hardly boast of the amount of human and natural wealth in Nigeria's possession. As can be gleaned from Fig. 3.4, poor African countries such as Niger, Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso fair far better than Nigeria, the so-called "African giant" with all her natural endowment (Fig. 3.5).

The above is hardly surprising because the 6–8 % of Nigeria's budget officially committed to the education system can only provide a sub-standard quality of education. Strike in the sector is now not only rampant but has almost become the


Fig. 3.4 Key MDG Indicators: Nigeria and Selected Countries in Africa as at 2009, *Source* World Bank (2011, p. 5), author's compilation


Fig. 3.5 Number of children out of school within primary school age in 2010 (in millions), *Source* UNESCO 2010 (cited in Abdulmalik 2013, no page)

only means to demand for reforms or paychecks (Forest 2012, pp. 36–37). Access to this largely sub-standard education, particularly higher education, is extremely difficult despite the over 100 universities across the country. Forest (2012, pp. 36–37) observed that "each year more than 500,000 young men and women (ages 16–25) apply to one or more of these institutions, but because of the low intake capacity only about 150,000 of them are admitted. Indeed, education in Nigeria has become a thing of luxury rather than necessity since it is hardly affordable for the poor in society.

More so, linked with the problem of education is the rising unemployment rate at the national level, which stood at 23.9 % in 2011 according to the report of the National Bureau of statistics (NBS 2013, p. 35). The same report disclosed that female unemployment was also higher in 2011 at 24.3 %, compared to male unemployment rate of 23.5 %. According to age categories, the age groups 15–24 and 25–44 had higher unemployment rates as well: 37.7 and 22.4 % respectively. Rural unemployment stood at 25.6 % compared to urban unemployment of 17.1 %. These bad socio-economic indices are worst in the northern region. Notably among all the states in the region, Zamfara, a north-western state in Nigeria, recorded the highest unemployment rate in 2011 (42.6 %), compared to the (3 %) of Osun State, which is the lowest. Hence, as we shall see in detail in the subsequent Chaps. (4 and 5), the dismal socio-economic conditions in the northern region compared to the southern region of the country suggests why the region is prone anti-state violence manifesting in the form of terrorism in recent years.

3.9 Conclusion and Summary

Fundamentally it is assumed that the trend of violence and terrorism in Nigeria, including the Boko Haram crisis, is among other reasons, a manifestation of deep-rooted and structurally entrenched crisis of development that creates the environment for the emergence of conditions of poverty, unemployment, and inequality in the country. Accordingly, this chapter has shown the tendency of the Nigeria political economy to fuel terrorism through its characteristic alienation and frustration of its citizens, due mainly to the general lack of accountability and systemic corruption.

This was shown by explicating how the prevalence of corruption and the resultant underdevelopment in Nigeria are both tied to the mono-cultural nature of its political economy which engendered the nation's economic crises of the 1980s, with its lingering implications such as the rising level of poverty, despite traces of economic growth in recent years. Essentially, there has been a great divide between indicators of economic growth and economic development. The latter has remained gloomy as redolent of the high level of inequality, unemployment, and poverty, the reason being that the biggest portion of the national revenue is corruptly controlled by the few ruling elites to the detriment of the largely alienated populace. In response, various interest groups have to express their dissatisfaction in different

ways, including resorting to crimes, kidnapping, as well as anti-state terrorism depending on their context. Unfortunately, the state has mainly but wrongly tried to counter such anti-state resistance with heavy-handedness. The lingering Niger Delta crisis is a case in point. It is against this backdrop that the emergence and persistence of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria is explored in the subsequent chapters, with particular emphasis on the deplorable socio-economic conditions that characterizes the northern region where this sect has its stronghold. Accordingly, the next chapter explores the nature of the organization so as to create an adequate basis for analysing its socio-economic determinants.

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Chapter 4
Evolution, Ideological Foundation, and Strategy of Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria

Abstract Of all the militant groups in Nigeria, Boko Haram terrorism remains the most enigmatic in terms of raison d'être, the most violent in terms of modus operandi and the most destructive. Thus, this paper finds it expedient to espouse the evolution, ideological foundation, modus operandi, organogram, strategy, and links to international networks of Boko Haram in Nigeria. We conclude in this work that any effort at ending the scourge of Boko Haram in Nigeria would continue to remain ineffective unless such strategy is adequately grounded on a clear understanding of what the sect is about. We also conclude that Boko Haram is first a domestic problem caused by domestic anomalies and therefore must be seen as such before any regional and international outlook as a microcosm of a larger macro-cosmic global terrorism.

Keywords Boko Haram · Nigeria · Political violence · Evolution · Ideology · Strategy · North east

4.1 Introduction

Boko Haram's terrorist activities in Nigeria have become an encumbrance to development, security, and peace in Nigeria. In comparison to other militant groups that have sprung up in Nigeria, Boko Haram remains the most enigmatic in terms of raison d'être, the most violent in terms of modus operandi and the most destructive (Olaniyan and Asuelime 2014). To this end, unfortunately the much needed comprehensive understanding of the sect is yet to be discerned as virtually everything about it is contested, including the meaning of its name, the reasons for its emergence, radicalization, and its international link and scope (Adibe 2012). Accordingly, the objective of this paper is to provide a general description of Boko Haram, in terms of its mission, origin, ideology, *modus operandi*, international scope, target, and tactics as well as sponsorship. An understanding of the very nature of the organization is believed to be of paramount importance to

understanding its underlying motivations and subsequently finding a lasting solution to the problem.

It is basically hard to discern what and who exactly constitute Boko Haram; hence, Goodluck Jonathan's view that the sect is faceless is instructive (Ekwueme and Obayi 2012). In fact, it is not inapt to ask whether "Boko Haram" is responsible for all the security crises usually attributed to them in the Northern region of the country or not. Such question is important since it is possible that other groups with similar (or even dissimilar) ideology and motivation now hide under the sect's name to promote their own agenda. Similarly, given the changing nature of the sect's terrorist tactics, one may ask: have the sect's initial grievances remained the same over the years? Moreover, it is worth knowing if Boko Haram is just a single body or a conglomeration of different criminal gangs—considering the rather amoral and un-Islamic nature of its attacks, such as alleged bank robbery, hostage taking as well as allegations of rape. Adequate responses to these questions are deemed essential to a better understanding of why this group not only came into existence but still persists.

4.2 Evolution and Identity

There is a great level of obscurity surrounding the precise origin and identity of Boko Haram. While it has become trendy to trace the sect's full-blown activities to 2009, it is arguably inapt to situate its general evolution in that year. Many dates have been postulated including 1995[1]. Besides, due to the sect's emphasis on the strict implementation of the Sharia law, one can trace its recent trigger in 1999 endorsement of strict implementation of Sharia law among the northern states. Yet even more backward, at least in terms of its ideological background, the sect's evolution has been traced to the Maiatatsine uprisings of the early 1980s.[2] Indeed, certain semblances are noted to exist between the two Islamist groups especially in

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[1]A group known as Sahaba Muslim Youth Organization which evolved in 1995 is also believed to have metamorphosed into Boko Haram. Similarly, Boko Haram is traced to a group known as the *Ahlulsunnawal 'jama' ah* that emerged in 1995 under the leadership of Abubakah Lawan before he moved to Saudi Arabia.

[2]Named after its Cameroonian founder, Muhammadu Marwa Maiatatsine, the Maiatatsine was an Al-Masifu group with estimated 3000–5000 members that existed in the 1980s. The sect is said to have denounced what an average Kano Muslim at the time would consider sacrilegious such as "ostentatious display of wealth, owning houses, wearing Muslim customs, such as facing Mecca while praying" (Sani 2011). The sect members, who sought to purify the practice of Islam to conform with the teachings of their leader eventually began to pose security challenge to the locals and thus got themselves entrapped in violent confrontation with the authority in what is commonly referred to today as the Maiatatsine crises in the 1980s. At least over 5000 lives and property worth millions of Naira are said to have been lost in the series of violent religious attacks by the sect Maiatatsine carried out in the commercial city of Kano.

terms of modus operandi and mission and enabling conditions, even though the two groups existed at different times in the history of Nigeria (Musa 2012; Adesoji 2011). While the period between 2002 and 2004 is widely accepted among scholars apropos the origin of Boko Haram, this study endorses 1995, which is the time the sect emerged as a *Sahaba* group under the leadership of Abubakar Lawan, who was succeeded by Mallam Yusuf upon the former's departure for studies at the University of Medina (Sani 2011).

In addition to the ambiguity surrounding Boko Haram's date of origin, its true identity is also obscure. The sect is believed to have flourished under various names such as: *AhlulSunnawal'Jama'ahhijra,* the Nigerian or Yobe Talibans,[3] *Yusufiyyah* (named after the successor of Lawan, Yusuf), and then Boko Haram (Adibe 2012; Danjibo 2012). Part of the reason for this confusion is because the activities of these various groups all seem to promote the same ideology as that of Boko Haram. Meanwhile, certain differences can be identified among some of these groups. For instance, while it has been identified that Boko Haram originally emerged in 1995, the Yobe Talibans, who were neither infiltrates from the widely known Taliban of Afghanistan, only emerged in 2002 (Sani 2011, p. 22). They consisted essentially of Nigerian university graduates, ex-military personnel and professionals, and were "easily identified by their Spartan dress code and long beard, reminiscent of Osama bin Laden. They call themselves *Al Sunna Wal Jamma*, which in Arabic language translates: followers of Prophet Mohammed's Teaching" (Sani 2011, p. 22). Nonetheless, like the Boko Haram, they envisaged replacing "the corrupt incumbent administration with a holier government founded purely on the teachings of the Qur'an and the Hadith" (Sani 2011, p. 23).

On the other hand, various Boko Haram scholars have noted that the term Boko Haram is the combination of a Hausa word, *Boko*, and an Arabic word, *Haram*. *Bok*o refers to book or, the noun, *ilimin* which means education while *Haram* refers to forbidden. The word, *Boko* was particularly used derogatively in reference to the colonial-styled education, as opposed to the *ilimin Islamiyya* (Islamic education). Fundamentally, *Boko Haram* is widely believed to translate as Western Education is forbidden (a sin or sacrilege) (Waldek and Jayasekara 2011). But the acting leader of Boko Haram as in August 2009, Mallam Sanni Umaru, jettisoned such designation. He charged that "Boko Haram does not in any way mean 'Western Education is a sin' as the infidel media continue to portray us. Boko Haram actually means 'Western Civilization' is forbidden" (cited in Onuoha 2012b, p. 2).

Although the distinction that the Muar makes above is mild, his argument suggests that the sect is not merely opposed to formal western-styled education but

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[3]This particular identity according to Onuoha (2011) was only pejoratively used for the sect among the locals, given the unpopularity of its philosophy and teachings among the people. Hence despite being fashioned like the Afghanistan Taliban there are no hard facts to conclude that the group has any other link with the former, besides an ideological one. As Nigerian Taliban, the sect ambushed and attacked the police in 2004, killing about 15 (Sampson and Onuoha 2011).

acknowledges the *supremacy* of Islamic culture, which he believes subsumes education and not the other way round (Onuoha 2012a, p. 2). Because of this, the sect prefers the *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad* (meaning People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad) over the Boko Haram designation. Non-members are referred to as *Kuffar* (disbelievers; those who deny the truth) or *Fasiqun* (wrong-doers). The group which started as a non-violent entity became an extremely vicious and violent terrorist group, particularly in 2009 when the administration of former Borno State Governor, Ali Amodu Sheriff, backed by late President Yar'adua adopted a repressive stance toward what Salkida (2012) referred to as an "ideological problem".

4.3   Ideological Background, Mission, and Location

Like Boko Haram, various other Islamist groups typically adverse to western culture and the Christian, have originated in northern Nigeria since the nineteenth century. Among these include the *Kala-Kato*, the *Darul-islam*, the *Ahmadabad* Movement, the *Khadiriyyha, Darika Shi' a Salafiya* (or Izala), the *Tijjaniya, Tariqqa* group and the *Muhajirun* (Onuoha 2012b). It must be acknowledged that all of these sects have an extremist approach. Meanwhile, the extremity and violence of Boko Haram is uniquely unprecedented, especially since 2009. Its aversion to western-styled education can be traced to the British's non-intervention education policy in the northern region of Nigeria during the colonial era, which prohibited the Christian missionaries from evangelizing the northern region. Due to their merging of education with religious doctrine for holistic impact (Akanle 2011), Christian missionaries were viewed with suspicion that they would be converting Muslims to Christianity through their evangelization. This policy, which gave the north its special Islamic identity (Dudley 1968, p. 18) had at least two implications: first, western education was not only discouraged but also abhorred in the north; secondly, the southerners who had welcomed it were viewed with suspicion by their northern counterparts. According to Thomson (2012), northern parents were convinced that Koranic education was better for their children as it would allow them acquire the necessary moral training in the face of the economic challenges and the resultant lawlessness among Nigerians.

It is not a coincidence, thus, that the founder of Boko Haram emerged from such Islamic education background. Not surprisingly, it is widely held that the founder's motivation is rather ideological than material. The founder is believed to have been influenced by the ideology of a thirteenth century Islamic scholar, Ibn Taymiyya who sternly advocates a strict adherence to the Qur'an and authentic Sunna (practices) of the Prophet Muhammad, which he argued contains all the religious and spiritual guidance necessary for salvation in the earthly and heavenly lives (Salkida 2012). Ibn Taymiyya was not only opposed to the ideas of philosophers

and Sufis regarding religious knowledge, spiritual experiences and ritual practices, but also the flexibility of the other schools of jurisprudence in Islam, which he believed had become distorted by Greek logic and thought as well as Sufi mysticism (Salkida 2012). Meanwhile, beside the ideological façade, according to Waldek and Jayasekara (2011, p. 170) the deep-rooted ethnic tensions across northern Nigeria and the middle belt states are also intrinsically linked to the anti-western ideological position of Boko Haram.

The sect strongly rejects the secular authority and instead pursued the quest to Islamize the Nigerian state. Its mission thus is simply to radically change the socio-political order in the Nigerian state for a Sharia-governed system (Onuoha 2012a, p. 2). The inspiration for the prevalence of such rejectionist trend in northern Nigeria is traceable to the empire created through the Jihadist war by Usman Dan Fodio between 1804 and 1808, which united the Hausa land under the Sokoto Caliphate. Aside his opposition to perceived corruption in the ruling Habe Dynasty, Fodio maintained that if non-Muslims are to be accommodated in the region they would have to be subjected to the Sharia law (Aguwa 1997, p. 339). According to Thomson (2012, p. 47), more than an empire, the Sokoto Caliphate was also a religious community, distinguished by its faithfulness, and its leader, the Sultan of Sokoto, claimed descent from the prophet Mohammed. The Sokoto Caliphate remained West Africa's most powerful region prior to falling under the British rule. And the Sharia law was strongly operative under the caliphate. Indeed, the empire and the system of powerful Islamic caliphates of preceding centuries "constituted the apex for high Muslim civilization given its typical role in uniting the region, rejection of corruption and creating prosperity under Islam" (cited in Thomson 2012, p. 47–48). Not only is the empire remembered with fondness, it is even wished among prominent Northern leaders to be revived as at independence in 1960, with the intentions to subjugate every other civilization or culture in Nigeria. Nevertheless, the expansive empire collapsed following the invasion of the British colonialists around 1903. Not surprisingly, Yusuf is averse to the current social system which he believed is an imposition by the colonial master, arguing that "our land was an Islamic state (Northern Nigeria) before the colonial masters turned it to a Kafir land" (cited in Onapajo and Uzodike 2012, p. 27).

In addition, Boko has been largely dissatisfied with the weak Sharia re-introduced in the 12 northern states in 1999, given how it has not been able to checkmate the corruption. Hence, the Ibn Taymiyya's formulation, which gives Muslim rights to revolt against inept and corrupt state have been the adopted platform for mobilization by the group (Umar 2013, p. 24). Therefore, amidst obscurity surrounding the sect's main objective, the clearest state thus far is to Islamize Nigeria in order to change the status quo, given the sect's dissatisfaction not only with the northern states but the entire country, which it believed has been compromised by westernization (Brinkel and Ait-Hida 2012).

Boko Haram is averse to western liberalism in its entirety as long as it contradicts Islam. Like the Afghanistan Taliban the sect aims at creating:

> an independent state that comprises all the characteristics of the modern state, including a government, population, territory and strong security base, which would be run by its ideology. It also advocates an economic system that would basically be characterized by trading and farming as alternatives to the modern economic system characterized by capitalism (Onapajo and Uzodike 2012, p. 29).

As far as the sect's areas of operation are concerned, the core northern states such as Yobe, Borno, Adamawa, Kano, Kaduna, and Bauchi, among others, have been predominantly affected. Nonetheless it has vowed to detonate bombs in the "evil" southern cities of Nigeria which it has dubbed the "axis of evil". These include Lagos, Port Harcourt, and Enugu (Onapajo and Uzodike 2012).

4.4 Leadership

At its inception, Boko Haram was led by Muhammad Yusuf as its commander in chief (Amir ul-Aam).[4] Arguably, a number of factors must have motivated his appointment to this leadership position by a committee of *Shaykhs* in 2002 (Gargon and Bean 2010). Besides being a charismatic speaker and well versed in the knowledge of the Qur'an, Yusuf had acquired a remarkable profile at the time. He was associated with the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) under the leadership of Ibrahim el-Zakzakky prior to 1990, and eventually decamped to the *Jama'atulTajdidi Islam* (JTI) led by Abubakar Mujahid, due arguably to his discomfort with the influence of Shi'ia Muslims in the former group. Yusuf gained an outstanding profile and recognition in the latter group and was made Amir of the JTI. According to Waldek and Jayasekara (2011, p. 170), Yusuf was also reported to be a member of the Borno State Sharia. These authors accentuate Yusuf's rise to Boko Haram leadership as tied to his oratory skills and Islamic knowledge, with which he spoke openly and preached on radio stations.

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[4]Yusuf hailed from a very poor background in Jakusko, Yobe state. He dropped out of school and received a radical Islamic education in Chad and Niger, during which he developed a strong abhorrence for Westernization and Modernization, through his exposition to the Salafist ideology. This Salafist ideology, strongly influenced by Ibn Taymiyya ideologies, espouses a staunch defence of Sunni Islam, a strict adherence to the Qur'an and Sunna traditions of Prophet Mohammed. He set up a religious complex in Maiduguri in the state of Borno with a mosque and an Islamic school, which not only attracted the region's poor, but also Muslims from nearby countries like Chad, Niger and Cameroon. Yusuf gained popularity among the local people upon his return to Nigeria as he established the Yusufiyyah and, through local radio and television stations voiced out his radical Islamic views (Danjibo 2012, p. 6). He set up a religious complex in Maiduguri in the state of Borno with a mosque and an Islamic school (Madrassah), which not only attracted the region's poor, but also Muslims from nearby countries like Chad, Niger.

Moreover, by eventually ousting the Shaykhs who appointed him "on allegations of corruption and failure to preach pure Islam" (Onuoha 2012a, b, c, p. 3), Yusuf showed his radicalism and zeal for the promotion of Islamic faith, even when he had to controvert the views of other Islamic scholars. He jettisoned most tenets of Western Science, including the view that the earth is spherical or that the rain is caused by evaporation. Ironically, however, he led a life of opulence embellished by western luxuries such as a Mercedes car and imported delicacies, (Onuoha 2012b, p. 3), while also maintaining private attorneys and doctors (Umar 2013, p. 19). Indeed, as Umar noted, by Nigerian standard Yusuf would not be considered as poor. Nonetheless, the sect's descent to Islamic extremism and its quest to overthrow the secular Nigerian state was chiefly motivated by the Yusuf's personal charisma, namely his outright denunciation of the pervasive decadence in government and society. His ability to maintain control over his adherents had kept the sect one until the recent emergence of Ansarul (Umar 2013, p. 20).[5] As the leader of the Boko Haram, Yusuf was deputized by Na'ib Amir ul-Aam I & II, who in turn had their own respective assistance both at the state and local governments where they existed (Onuoha 2011, p. 3). When Yusuf was killed in police custody following his arrest during the riots of July 2009, the mantle of leadership was given to Mallam Sunni Umaru, who publically stipulated the objectives and intent of the sect. Currently Boko Haram is believed to be headed by AbubakarShekau,[6] who is rumoured to have died after being wounded by the Joint Task Force (JTF) during one of its raids of the sect's hiding.

4.5 Membership

Boko Haram's membership is multinational in scope, drawn not only from northern Nigeria but also neighbouring countries such as Niger, Cameroon, Chad, as well as Sudan and Mali. There are a huge number of members of Boko Haram across the 19 states of northern Nigeria, Niger Republic, Chad, and Sudan (Lawal 2009, p. 35). From these countries a bulk of weapons are also smuggled into the country by the sect. Part of the enabling factors for this link has to do with (1) the porosity of Nigerian borders; the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons of the

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[5]Ansarul, for example, claims that it is against the killing of civilians, as opposed to Boko Haram's more indiscriminate targeting selection. The genesis of Ansarul is likely connected with the paradigmatic suicide attacks Boko Haram employed throughout the north and central regions, which killed many Muslims during the fall of 2011 and spring of 2012. Ansarul leader is Abu Usmatul (Cook 2013).

[6]"Profile of Nigeria's Boko Haram Leader Abubakar Shekau Abu-Bakr Shekau," *BBC News*, June 22, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18020349.accordingt to Umar (2013, p. 23), Shekau, does not possess the oratorical skills and charisma of Yusuf but he is ideologically committed and very ruthless. He is believed not to have direct communication with the sect's foot soldiers.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which facilitates easy migration among western African nations; and the ethno-linguistic and historical ties between these countries and northern Nigerians over the years (Onapajo et al. 2012, p. 345).

Although members are drawn from diverse socio-economic backgrounds including the unemployed, illiterates, graduates, single, dependent, inter alia, majority of its foot soldiers are from the poor background in Nigeria or outside Nigeria. The provision of welfare, food, and shelter by the sect constituted a strong incentive used to attract members, among who include "refugees from the wars across the borders of Chad as well as jobless Nigerian youths" (Umar 2013, p. 19). Little wonder, aside those intellectuals who, swayed by the sect ideology abandoned their jobs, burnt their certificates and sold their assets to join or/and promote the sect, a multitude of Muslim graduates unable to secure jobs have been attracted to the sect. Additionally, authentic report has also shown that some Igbo Youths and retired soldiers have also joined the sect (cited Onapajo et al. 2012, p. 354). It suffices to point out the striking similarity between the sect and the Maiatatsine of the 1980 in terms of recruitment. Both sects took advantage of the dwindling economic condition in the country to attract followings. As Danjibo (2012, p. 6) appositely observed, "Marwa exploited the dwindling economic situation and the almajiri system was able to attract large number of followers among the commoners, who, unable to afford the basic necessities of life become die-hard patriots of the sect and Marwa himself".

Similarly, there are evidences that Boko Haram has provided means of livelihood for a number of desperate Nigerians, thereby making the sect attractive. In similar fashion, desperate Nigerians are drawn to the sect not only to gain from the welfare packages offered by the sect but to enrich themselves through the sponsorship and robbery (Sani 2011; Umar 2013). In fact, according to a recent news report, a member of the sect who was handed over to the JTF by his father, revealed that he owned two cars while also having millions of Naira buried in the ground. These were basically benefits acquired through the sect's robbery and looting activities (Olugbode 2013). This is perhaps an indication that membership and participation in the sect's activities has become a money venture; thus making the sect attractive for the piling number of unemployed youths in the region.

Boko Haram has also "engaged in extensive and intimidating sermons that included the threat of the use of force in recruiting new members" (Umar 2013, p. 19). Other sources of membership include tradesmen, carpenters, and drivers who were disgruntled with the provisions of government (Lawal 2009, p. 34). Members of Boko Haram avoid interaction with the local Muslim population, and government and private establishments deemed to have been influenced by Western culture. With their rejection of the modern establishments and various forms of modern technologies, which are believed to hamper Muslims from rightly observing daily prayers, earnings from such establishment are forbidden (Onapajo and Uzodike 2012, p. 27). Judging from the overwhelming number of jobless youth, uneducated, school drop-outs, political thugs and students from low socio-economic backgrounds, Aghedo and Osumah (2012, p. 861) noted that Boko

Haram membership "largely relates to the depth of feeling about socioeconomic injustice, marginalization, and human insecurity". These authors' view was based on the survey which shows that bad leadership and the consequent poverty is pivotal to Boko Haram uprising.

4.6   Targets and Tactics

The group's major targets include the security outfit of the Nigerian government such as the army and police; and the Christian (largely Igbos) minorities in the north and central regions of the country; and the Muslim political and religious elites in northern Nigeria. As with most terrorist attacks, victims of Boko Haram's carnage are also random and indiscriminate; hence, Muslims are also not spared. There is an angle of vendetta to the group's target of the Nigeria security agencies, particularly the police which partly has to do with the so-called extra-judicial killing of the Muhammad Yusuf while in police custody (Ajayi 2012; Cook 2013). Meanwhile, Sani (2011) observed that the sect always targeted the police from its very inception due to the various disagreements that have led to confrontation between the two. The general public has been promised to be spared from attack unless they take side with the state, which the sect considers is behind all the illegalities committed against Muslim (cited in Onapajo and Uzodike 2012, p. 27). However, the great number of civilian casualties so far contradicts the sect's claim to be merely against the state and its security agency. Other major targets include churches, supermarkets, shops, and banks. In line with its anti-secular and anti-Christian standpoint, Boko Haram have directed its attacks on schools or universities, singling out Christian students for execution (Cook 2013, p. 11). Southerners are prime targets for promoting the western ideas. As the group once declared, "We promise the West and Southern Nigeria, a horrible pastime. We shall focus on these areas which is the devil empire and has been the one encouraging and sponsoring Western Civilization into the shores of Nigeria" (cited in Onapajo and Uzodike 2012, p. 328).

Initially the group attacked its "enemies" with machetes, club and small arms. This changed with time as the different sophisticated gadgets such as Molotov cocktail and simple improvised explosive devices (IED) became increasing employed by the sect in its terrorist activities (Stewart 2013).[7] Suicide bomb, Motorcycle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (MVEID) Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) have been eventually added to the group tactical repertoire thus making them more dangerous, lethal, and intractable, thus, recording notable success rate in its attacks (Thomson 2012, p. 53). In Table 4.1

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[7]According to Onuoha (2012b) these IEDS are usually constructed with the use of explosive substances such as Trinitrotoluene (TNT), Pentaerythritol (PETN) and Ammonia (fertilizers), among others. This tends to suggest the presence of highly trained personnel in the use manipulation of chemicals, among the group.

Table 4.1 Some reported suicide bombings mounted by the Boko Haram (June 2011–Nov 2012)

Date	Attacker	Mode	Target(s)	Effects
16 June 2011	Mohammed Manga (35 years old)	VBIED (ash-coloured Honda 86)	Police headquarters, federal capital territory, Abuja	At least 7 people were killed, about 33 vehicles were burnt beyond recognition and over 40 others damaged beyond repair
26 August 2011	Mohammed Abul Barra (27 years old)	VBIED (Honda Accord car)	UN House, Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.	The explosion killed 24 persons and injured over 100 others. The building houses over 400 staff of 26 UN humanitarian and development agencies. It was the sect's first attack on an international organization
4 November 2011	26-year-old Abi Yusuf	VBIED (black Jeep)	JTF headquarters in Maiduguri, Borno State	The suicide bomber and a soldier died in the attack at the JTF headquarters
26 April 2012	Umaru Mustapha and another unnamed suicide operative	VBIED (Honda Accord (Academy))	SOJ Global Plaza, which houses The Sun, This day and Moments Newspapers, at Ahmadu Bello Way, Kaduna, Kaduna State	The first suicide bomber exploded his car at the SOJ Global Plaza, killing three persons and injuring 25 others. The second suicide bomber (Umaru Mustapha) whose car did not explode was handed over to the police
30 April 2012	Names not disclosed or reported	Motorcyle borne Improvised Explosive device (MBIED)	The convoy of Taraba State Police Commissioner, Jalingo, Taraba State	Three suicide bombers riding motorbikes rammed into The convoy of the Police Commissioner, killing at least 11 people
3 June 2012	Name not disclosed or reported	VBIED (Honda Civic car)	Harvest Field of Christ Church in Yelwa area of Bauchi, Bauchi state	A suicide bomber drove into the church premises, killing at least 21 people and injuring 45 others
13 July 2012	Name not disclosed or reported	A 15-year-old suicide bomber laced his body with explosives (BBIED)	The Shehu of Borno, Alhaji Ibn Abubakar Umar Garbai Elkanemi, and the deputy governor of the state, Alhaji Zanna Umar Mustapha	At least five people and the suicide bomber died in the attack at the central mosque in Maiduguri, Borno State

(continued)

Table 4.1 (continued)

Date	Attacker	Mode	Target(s)	Effects
3 August 2012	Name not disclosed or reported	BBIED (a suicide bomber laced his body with explosives)	The Emir of Fika Alhaji Mohammed Abali Ibn Muhammadu Idrissa, at Potiskum mosque, Yobe State	Six people including three civilians, the emir's police orderly and two other policemen sustained various degrees of injuries while the suicide bomber died in the incident
16 August 2012	TBIED (a tricycle, popularly known as Keke NAPEP)		A patrol vehicle of the JTF in Custom area of Maiduguri	The suicide bomber on a bomb-laden tricycle missed his target and rode into a moving Mercedes Benz car. The blast killed the suicide bomber and a civilian, while two other people including a soldier sustained injuries
25 November 2012	VBIED (a Bus and Toyota Camry car		St. Andrews Protestant Church, Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Jaji, Kaduna	The first suicide bomber rammed a bomb-laden bus into the wall of the church while the second explosion came about 10 min later, killing about 50 people and injuring several others

Source Onuoha (2012c)

below for instance, Onuoha (2012c) illustrates some reported incidences of suicide bombing carried out by Boko Haram between June 2011 and November 2012. He pointed out that based on the US Joint IED Defeat Organization records, the number of IEDs attacks in Nigeria increased from the 52 incidents in 2010 to about 196 incidences in 2012—which is nearly a fourfold jump.

Other incidences within 2012 include: the suicide attacks on South Africa's MTN and India's Airtel in the city of Kano on 22rd of December; the suicide attacks outside a police station in Maiduguri on 8th June, killing four people; the suicide attack at a Catholic church in Bauchi on the 23rd of September which killed a woman and a child, and the list goes on (Online Nigeria News 2012).[8]

Albeit cases of suicide bombs have been less in 2013 compared to the previous year, perhaps due to the intensified crackdown from the security agencies, especially since the declaration of the state of emergence, a number of suicide bombings have been recorded in 2013. Boko Haram major onslaughts in 2013 are well accounted for:

> On 16 April 2013, an estimated 37 people were reported killed in a single operation in Baga community. In May 2013, the terrorists attacked Bama military barracks, killed 50 people, and freed 105 inmates from the prison. On 12 July 2013, students were massacred in a secondary school in Damaturu. This was followed by another 33 students 2 weeks later in Mamudo, Yobe state. On 17 September 2013, about 161 people were reported killed during an attack on civilians at Benisheik border town in Borno state. A few days later 29 September 2013, about 42 students of the School of Agriculture, Gujba, Yobe State, were massacred during a night raid. On 2 December 2013, Boko Haram operatives staged daring attacks on air force formations and police stations in Maiduguri, killed scores of people, and set fighter jets and buildings ablaze. On 20 December 2013, Boko Haram terrorists staged a raid on a military barracks in Bama and left scores of people dead (Olaniyan and Asuelime 2014).

This onslaught continued into 2014; to name a few for instance:

> On 23 January 2014, Boko Haram's operation in WagaChakawa town in Adamawa killed 30 people, mostly worshippers in a Catholic church. In another operation on the same day in Kawuri village in Borno State, Boko Haram terrorists staged an invasion in 26 vehicles, two armoured personnel carrier and 6 pickup trucks. At the end of the bloody operation, 85 people were dead and 7 mosques and 300 houses burned (Olaniyan and Asuelime 2014).

The Boko Haram terror campaign is very intense to the extent that it seems unhindered in any meaningful way. In fact, the sect has changed its tactics, by now packaging their IED in disguising gadgets like schools bags for suicide bombing, a tactic which according to JTF was probably copied from the attack in Boston, United States, in April that killed three and injured many.[9]

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[8]Available at: http://news2.onlinenigeria.com/headline/234057-a-summary-of-all-the-boko-haram-attacks-in-2012.html.

[9]Available from: www.informationng.com/2013/10/boko-haram-adopts-new-methods-now-package-ieds-school-bags-for-suicide-bombers.html [Accessed on 12 July 2013].

4.7   Indicators of International Link and Sponsorship

Whether the sect is merely domestic or has some international links remains to be fully resolved. However, abounding evidence strongly suggests that while having a multitude of internal as predicate, Boko Haram has an international dimension. Boko Haram shares similar ideology with other Islamist movements such as the Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Ajayi 2012; Onapajo et al. 2012; Umar 2013). In fact, according to the sect's statement "Boko Haram is just a version of the Al-Qaeda which we align with and respect. We support Osama bin Laden, we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is totally Islamized which is according to the wish of Allah".[10] According to Ajayi (2012), a link was established between the Algerian Salafist Group by the Boko Haram leader. This availed the members' training opportunities; especially technical training, including the making and using of the IEDs and "dirty bombs" as well as training for combat.

The sect's adroitness and tactical sophistication in confrontation lends credence to the view that its specialty in the above could not merely have emerged from domestic training (Dearn 2011). For instance, outcome of the forensic analysis of the August 2011 attack on the UN building in the state capital Abuja reveals that the sect used large quantities of the "highly powerful and volatile plastic explosives pentaerythritoltetranitrate and triacetonetriperoxide", an indication of international link and expertise (Onapajo et al. 2012, p. 347). Furthermore, Onapajo et al. (2012, p. 347), suggested links between Boko Haram and some Iraqi insurgent groups based on the report of John Myrick, a US bomb expert, that traced a deadlier type of bomb known as a "shaped charge"—used exclusively in the 2003 Iraq war—to insurgencies in Somalia and Nigeria. Not surprising then that Nigeria's Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General OnyeaborAzubuikeIhejirika, categorically claimed that:

> It is definite that the groups that call themselves Boko Haram or terrorists receive training and possibly funding from elements abroad. This was evident from the types of weapons we have captured from them; the type of communication equipment we have captured from them; and the expertise they have displayed in preparation of improvised explosives and these are pointers to the fact that there is foreign involvement in the terrorism going on in Nigeria (cited in Onapajo et al. 2012 p. 347)

As to whether the sect receives financial support from other similar groups, there are emerging evidences to that end. For instance, according to Salkida (2013), Boko Haram receives donations from other likeminded Jihadist groups around the world. Aside the material support, the sect has also been given assurance of human support promised according to a trusted source (Salkida 2013). What is more, the sect's international scope, especially its operation in other countries has also been recorded. For instance, the sect's kidnapping of a French family from Cameroon,

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[10]*Vanguard* (2009). "Boko Haram Resurrects, Declares Total Jihad." 14 August 2009. http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/08/boko-haram-resurrects-declares-total-jihad/# [Accessed on 2 September 2013].

"signals the willingness of Boko Haram to operate outside of Nigeria's boundaries for the first time, and to execute attacks for the cause of Ansar Eddine or AQIM" (Cook 2013, p. 12).

Furthermore, given prevailing features such as bad governance, underdevelopment, and a general atmosphere of poverty and discontent that characterized Nigeria, especially the Northern region, the chances of Al-Qaeda's infiltration of Boko Haram remain high and continuous. The fact remains that both groups share the same ideology. History has shown that such conditions have provided a safe haven for Al-Qaeda in countries such as Somalia, Afghanistan, Sudan, Pakistan and Algeria (Maiangwa 2012).

For Boko Haram not only to have sustained its campaign for so long but also to have grown more sophisticated, it has a strong financial base, although little is known about this source(s). Meanwhile, the following sources have been suggested: (1) financial contribution from its members[11] (especially at its embryonic state); (2) ransoms paid by kidnapped victims; and[12] (3) income derived from the sect's constant raid of financial institutions such as the bank and supermarkets as part of its terrorist tactics. For instance, on 18 July 2011, seven arrested Boko Haram suspects raided the Unity Bank of Nigeria Plc. at Alkaleri town in Bauchi, taking off with ₦17.8 to support Boko Haram terrorist activities (This Day 2013). Meanwhile, there are evidences that the sect is being sponsored/supported by prominent Nigerian politicians,[13] particularly in the northern region. The arrest of the contractor Alhaji Bunu Wakil, a Borno state citizen, and 91 others in January in 2011 is a case in point. These were alleged to be financiers of Boko Haram. Similarly, Goodluck Jonathan had decried the infiltration of all the arms of his government (judiciary, executive and the legislature) by sympathizers or even members of the sect. Going by this view one can concur with Uadiale (2012, p. 88) that the Boko Haram phenomenon is indeed, "a manifestation of mobilization and manipulation within the elite-class as well as of the class opportunistic competition… within the power group who are frequently in contention for political power and offices as well as for scarce state owned economic resources" (Uadiale 2012, p. 88).

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[11]Members had to pay a daily levy of 100 naira to their leader.

[12]With the intensification of security counter terrorism which has limited the sect's bank robbery strategy, kidnappings for ransoms, (particularly of key figures such as politicians, business persons, traditional rulers, senior civil servants and foreigners) for ransoms alike have become means of raising money. According to a Nigerian government report, the Islamist militant group Boko Haram was paid more than $3m (£2m) before releasing a French family of seven. The payer was not disclosed however (BBC 2013; Premium Times 2013).

[13]Part of why Boko Haram is believed to be sponsored by Nigeria elite classes has to do with Yusuf's demonstrated connection with people in high places of authority as redolent of his several unexplainable disappearances from police custody back to his compound in Maiduguri. For instance on one occasion, Yusuf was reported to have returned to his Maiduguri compound from Abuja barely 5 days after his arrest. But more importantly powerful individuals in the exotic cars with tinted windows (for the purpose of hiding their identity) are reported to have gone to see Yusuf on a Friday before he was killed (Sani 2011).

Unfortunately, however, GoodLuck Jonathan's administration has yet to clearly name and shame any of the suspects within the government circle.

Even so, external financiers have also been identified. For instance, an Algerian terrorism group was said to have transferred 40 million naira to the sect (cited in Ajayi 2012, p. 105). Other suspected funders of Boko Haram include the *Al-Muntada al-Islami*, an England-based agency "associated with Saudi Arabia charity and Da'awa institutions as well as other institutions that have been classified as terror financing agencies" (Umar 2013, p. 21). On another front, about US $300,000 was also reported to have been received from Al-Qaeda by Muhammed Damugun (a businessman and director of Media Trust Ltd) "to recruit and train Nigerians in Mauritania for terrorism, and aiding terrorists in Nigeria" (Onuoha 2012b, p. 57). These youths who are said to be about 10 years, were trained in desolated places in order to be hardened enough as to be "full of bitterness for the Nigeria's socio-economic and political situation" (Sani 2011). Such disposition was necessary for them to be able to confront the situation in a stern and inhuman manner.

4.8   Conclusion

Any effort at squelching Boko Haram would continue to remain ineffective unless adequately grounded on a clear understanding of what the sect is about. Against this backdrop, this chapter has tried to explicate Boko Haram reviewing its evolution, ideological foundation, modus operandi, leadership, membership, targets and tactics, international dimension and links as well as its sponsorship. What is deducible from the forgoing is that irrespective of its transnational/international scope, Boko Haram is a symptom of a number of domestic challenges facing the Nigerian nation. Thus, in the subsequent chapter effort is devoted towards examining the socio-economic determinants of Boko Haram, which is the major aim of this study. Considering the context in which the sect and its activities have prevailed, as well as the individuals constituting its membership, the next chapter shall cast light on the explanatory efficacy of socio-economic factors in the rise of Boko Haram.

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Chapter 5
RC of Boko Haram Terrorism: Socio-Economic Prism

"If in global terms Nigeria as a whole was economically the periphery, Northern Nigeria was the periphery of the periphery".

Ali Mazrui (2002, p. 66)

Abstract For years, Boko Haram in Nigeria has engaged in public advocacy for the strict implementation of Islamic Sharia law. This has led many to view the sect as a strictly religious quagmire. This approach seems too narrow, because it is concealed in socio-economic and political façade. Indeed, it is a misunderstanding to reduce the impetus of Boko Haram to religion considering its mammoth support base in the teeming uneducated, jobless, and poor northern youths. We argue therefore that despite the seeming religious appearance of the mission of Boko Haram, the socio-economic drivers are imperative in understanding the root cause of the current terror campaign in Nigeria. Thus, we show that socio-economic indices such as poverty, unemployment, inequality, economic underdevelopment, low education, inter alia, underlie the emergence and persistence of Boko Haram terrorism. These factors, which appear higher in the northern region compared to the south, coupled with the predominance of Islamic religion, makes the region more susceptible to easy manipulation by fundamentalist movements such as the Boko Haram.

5.1 Introduction

Boko Haram is driven in divergent perspectives and has exacerbated divisions within Nigerian society (Olaniyan and Asuelime 2014). Given the Boko Haram's public advocacy for the strict implementation of Islamic Sharia law, the sect has mostly been viewed through the prism of religion. However, this has arguably

concealed its socio-economic and its political façade as well. Indeed, it is a misunderstanding to reduce the impetus of Boko Haram to religion considering its mammoth support base in the teeming uneducated, jobless, and poor northern youths. This dynamics to the group suggests a reasonable socio-economic root to its uprising. To illuminate this view therefore, this paper assays some of the prevailing socio-economic factors in the northern region of Nigeria which drives Boko Haram. Among these factors are the high level of unemployment, galloping poverty, economic underdevelopment and inequality, and low level of education which are more prevalent in the epicenter of Boko Haram. It suffices to reiterate the irreducibility of the causal factors of Boko Haram insurgence to one single factor. Nonetheless, using the following subheadings this paper assays the generic socio-economic contexts in which Boko Haram thrives.

5.2 Unemployment and Bourgeoning Population in Northern Nigeria

The link between unemployment and violence especially among youths in Nigeria, has received considerable attention among scholars (Zakari Ya'u 2000; Arowosegbe 2009; Gordon 2011; Aiyedogbon and Ohwofasa 2012; Katsina 2012). For instance, according to Gordon (2011, p. 26) "unemployed and underemployed young adults can rapidly destabilize a society with their restive energy. They are quick to join nationalistic movements or are quite often easy targets for radical religious movements". How do we understand unemployment? As the opposite of the employed; that is, "the number of people working for wages, in cash and in kind, in public and private enterprises"; the unemployed include "the number of people skilled and unskilled in any political entity without work" who cannot find a job (Katsina 2012, p. 113). Notably, to be unemployed is distinct from being unemployable, which refers to those who cannot find a job because they lack the necessary skills. Albeit a mild distinction, the social impacts of both conditions are dreadful: they facilitate disharmony in society. Meanwhile, of immediate importance to this study is the case of unemployment, which is one of Nigeria's biggest problems, particularly for the young generation.

   An alarming number of employable Nigerians roam the streets daily searching for jobs that never come, due mostly to inability of the government to provide an enabling environment and necessary institutions (Katsina 2012, p. 113). The Nigerian labour force is currently "skewed in such a way that employment opportunities are literally impossible to exist" (Katsina 2012, p. 113). The reason for this as Katsina (2012, p. 113) rightly explains, pertains to the fact that the agricultural sector which absorbs about 70 % of the labour force only contributes no more than 30 % GDP. What this means is that with the over bloating of the sector, a huge pull of employment was lost to the extent whereby over 70 million Nigerians are out of a job.

Fig. 5.1 Unemployment rates in selected states in Nigeria (2007–2011). *Source* National Bureau of Statistics (2012, p. 41), author's compilation

Although a national phenomenon, the rate of unemployment in the northern region is worst. As shown earlier, agriculture was the mainstay of northern economy prior to the oil boom. Its decline is mainly due to leadership failure thus has essentially contributed to the gross underdevelopment in the region, thereby aiding the crime and security bedlam in the region.

To appreciate the view, Fig. 5.1 shows the level of unemployment in the selected states based on the reports of the National Bureau of Statistic (NBS) in 2009 and 2011.

As the above graph clearly illustrates, while rising unemployment is nearly a national phenomenon, the Northern region, particularly states where Boko Haram seems to have a stronghold such as Adamawa, Yobe, Borno, ZamfaraBauchim, and Gombe, is affected the worst. Comparing the rates of unemployment in these states

to that of Lagos, Osun, Abia, and Anambara, for instance, it would become clear why the mostly affected, namely the youths of those northern states become susceptible to the manipulation by Boko Haram leaders. As has been noted, lack of proportionate distribution of industries during the early stages of the formation of Nigerian state has deprived the region of employment opportunities. The decline of agriculture due to oil has worsened the regional economic dynamics. Meanwhile, the same state which is unable to create jobs for the youths has become a source of wealth for a host of self-serving elites and leaders in the nation over the years. Faced with such conditions, the prevailing tendency toward anti-state violence is hardly surprising as has been seen in the Niger Delta region and now among the northern states. Thus, as Forest (2012) argues that even if the group has its antecedents in theology, its swelling ranks are as a result of a huge reservoir of unemployed urban youths from many parts of the country. These youths who have completely become disenfranchised readily provides the group with its foot soldiers who commit all manner of atrocities, including assassinations and suicide bombings in the name of religion. So much on unemployment, let us look at its most common effects, namely poverty.

5.3 Pervasive Poverty

While the debate on poverty-terrorism nexus remains inconclusive, certain regions of the world such as Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa present appropriate landscape in which to consider the relations given that "besides being the poorest of the world in terms of average incomes in the 1980s and 1990s, it has been the most plagued by civil strife" (Ikejiaku 2012, p. 129). West Africa in particular in recent times seems to suggest a positive correlation between poverty and terrorism. To be sure, 11 out of the 25 poorest and underdeveloped countries in the world are in West Africa which has also become one of the most unstable on the globe. Despite being Africa's largest economy and having the third fastest growth rate in the world in recent years, Nigeria still suffers from the heavy wealth of absolute poverty. It increased from 54.7 % in 2004 to 60.9 % of the population in 2010 according to the National Bureau of Statistics (2011).[1]

The 2012 Poverty Survey by the NBS "shows that 69 % of Nigerians are defined as poor—112 million people—a huge increase from just 17 million in 1980" (Rogers 2012, p. 3). Typical of a rentier state both individual and national prosperity is continually "hindered by rampant corruption, underdeveloped and insufficient human services and industrial infrastructure, overreliance on a single commodity (oil), a poor education system, and an ever-growing youth bulge" (Kinnan et al. 2011, p. 39). Inferably, despite the complexity surrounding the causes

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[1]Joe Brock, "Nigerian poverty rising despite economic growth," *Reuters*, February 13, 2010. Online at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/13/us-nigeriapoverty.

of violence, its link with poverty as well as inequality cannot be underestimated. As O'Neill (2002, p. 9) appositely observed "poverty of resources, combined with poverty of prospects, choices and respect, help enable terrorism to thrive".

Against this backdrop, a number of scholars have rightly linked the Boko Haram terrorism with the socio economic conditions such as poverty in the region. A former newspaper editor ascribed the northern crises to "the alarming poverty rate and the neglect of the youths in the region" (Musa 2012, p. 118). Forest (2012, p. 57) also noted that "the emergence of violent extremists like the Nigerian Taliban and Boko Haram can be viewed as a response in northern communities to insecurities about their spiritual and socioeconomic future". While not peculiar to the north, the higher rate of poverty in the region has been blamed on the political class due to their not promoting education, all in order to keep the populace vulnerable to manipulation. According to a researcher (cited in Musa 2012, p. 118):

> This problem is due to poverty in the North despite that region of the country producing presidents for the country more than other regions. The North is divided between the masses who are in majority and the elites and rulers who are in a small minority. The latter made sure the former are kept illiterate and poor so that they can manipulate them. There is also this idea of obedience to those in authority which the elites and rulers used to hold down the masses.

Similar to the case of unemployment, poverty in the northern region is also higher than in the other regions of the country. Figure 5.2 compares the level of absolute, relative poverty, food, and dollar per day, in the different regions of Nigeria. What is clearly obvious is that the northern region is fairly worse than its southern counterparts. So severe has been the situation that in 2008, the then governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, ChukwumaSoludo rightly observed that persistently high levels of poverty in the country had become a "northern phenomenon" (African Report 2010). To be sure, eight of the 10 poorest states in the country at the time were in the region. Precisely, the indices indicated that Jigawa topped the list with 95 % of its citizens classified as living in poverty; then followed by Kebbi, 89.7 %; Kogi, 88.6 %; Bauchi, 86.3 %; Kwara, 85.2 %; Yobe, 83.3 %; Zamfara, 80.9 %; Gombe, 77 %; Sokoto, 76.8 %; and Adamawa, 71.7 %.

Moreover, the most affected by the ugly trend in the region are the children and youths. As Musa (2012, p. 116) rightly noted a "throng of street children dressed in rags and begging for alms and food for their daily survival" are obvious sights across the region. These children known as the Almajiria[2] solely depend on alms for their survival hence are easily manipulated by anyone that promises such alms,

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[2]These are pupils/students sent to the city from rural areas by their parents to study Islam under the tutorship of Mallams (teachers). Rather than being taken care of by the schools, these pupils depend solely on arms for their tuition and food. There is a startling population of the *Al-majiris* in Maiduguri. In the words of some respondents in a study on this phenomenon: "We hear that on weekly basis trailers go there with children as *Al-major* and dump them (cited in Musa 2012, p. 118). Hence, it is not surprising that Yusuf had a large following in Maiduguri reputed as one of the poorest in Nigeria before extending to other impoverished parts in the North-West (Musa 2012, p. 121).

Fig. 5.2 Trends of poverty in the geo-political zones as at 2010. *Source* National Bureau of Statistics, HNLSS 2010 (2012, p. 3)

including politicians and groups such as Boko Haram. In the words of Dr. Suleiman Shinkfi, who runs a Kaduna-based NGO helping *Almajiris*: these children "assume that they don't have anybody….They feed on the roadsides, they rush for your scraps when you finish eating … Sometimes they fight dogs for food" (cited in Parker 2012). Little wonder, "Whenever there is any clash of whatever sort, without even understanding it, they participate. They are always the foot soldiers that burn houses and kill and maim" (Musa 2012, p. 118).

Tayo Fatinikun, the State Secretary of the Child Protection Network in Sokoto, surmised that these children who are basically "living where they don't have families" are vulnerable to activities of the sect, considering the natural vulnerability of children to criminality (Parker 2012). As seen from its membership structure, Boko Haram's provision of welfare package for destitute youths and children across the affected region makes it more attractive for followers. Indeed "the terrorist potential of having about one million hungry and gullible children roaming aimlessly in Nigeria's northern cities, from whom any fanatic, religious or otherwise, could readily recruit disciples for antisocial purposes is immense" (Awofeso et al. 2003, p. 324).

In addition, Fig. 5.3 indicates the alarming level of malnutrition in the various geopolitical regions of the country. Observably, the northeast and north west rates very badly, with 34.5 and 35.1 % of its children malnourished. It must be noted that it is these same regions—particular the north east where Boko Haram is thriving. It is not inapt to think such vulnerable children can become prey to any groups that can cater for their material needs, especially when such sect presents itself in a religious light.

There are also available evidences suggesting that young boys from poor homes have been instrumental to the activities of the group at ridiculous fees. For instance, it was reported by the *Punch* Newspaper (2013) that in Yobe state capital, Damaturu, some of the 35 kid suspects confessed been lured by money to

Fig. 5.3 Malnutrition prevalence rate in Nigeria according to geopolitical zones, 2008. *Source* World Bank (2011, p. 12)

participate in the sect's despicable activities. They were given petrol to burn schools, and were also made to divulge the activities of the soldiers to the sect's commander for a token of ₦5000. In their words:

> We were taken to Damaturu. We watched out for the soldiers at their unit and reported back to them. We were reporting either when soldiers were at ease or enjoying themselves and when they were off guard and we were paid for doing that.

Another child suspect said:

> I usually helped Boko Haram to leak information on military activities so that they could attack them (soldiers). My last job was to travel from Maiduguri to Gashua to spy on soldiers before I was caught.

Yet another said:

> We usually help Boko Haram to carry stolen items each time and sometimes help them to give information about people they want to attack and sometimes even help to hide their guns after attacks. They pay us ₦5000 after every operation. I regret what I did, I want to go home and ask for forgiveness from my father and mother for what I did; I also want to go to school.

Furthermore, evidence suggests that Yusuf was motivated by financial compensation when he became reluctant to support the group. For instance, according to Musa (2012, p. 117), "at a point Yusuf realized his mistakes and backed out but they threatened him. He even kept away from them completely. They worked hard to win him back and heavily remunerated him financially, making life much easier for him and above poverty line".

Although, one may ask: why has the high level of poverty in the southern region not amounted to the same uprising as Boko Haram. But the Niger delta crisis basically comes to mind in that regard. Above all, it must be noted that the feeling of deprivation, as far as the relationship between actual poverty and perception of poverty in both regions present some food for thought as to the different reactions to the same problem (See Fig. 5.4). The report expressed therein also corroborates by a

Fig. 5.4 Self-assessment poverty status versus actual incidence of poverty by geopolitical regions in Nigeria (% of populace). *Sources* Central Bank of Nigeria (Soludo 2007)

field research. As Fig. 5.4 reveals, there is a big gulf between the actual level of poverty and the perception in the South, unlike in the North. Such difference goes a long way to determine the different levels of discontent and frustration arising out of the conditions in both regions (Kinnan et al. 2011, p. 40). It suffice however to acknowledge that the South, particularly the Niger Delta region, has equally experienced its own series of insurgences, determinants of which are socio-economic in nature as well (Clark 2009; Etemike 2009; Agbiboa 2011).

Accordingly, it is not inapt to uphold Musa's (2012, p. 111) view that the violent Islamist group, Boko Haram "is using religion as a decoy, as its main motivation is economic; it is capitalizing on the extreme level of poverty in the northeast of Nigeria to swell its rank of foot soldiers". While actual self-assessment of poverty among Nigerians varies across regions (Fig. 5.4), both the self-assessment and the actual incidence of poverty reveal that the northern region is worst hit. And as a key finding of the World Bank, based on its dialogue with Nigeria's poor in 2000, reveals that poverty is not merely construed in material terms "but as an over-whelming denial of the right to quality of life which is enabling and empowering" (Rogers 2012, p. 3).

Following the above, Aghedo and Osumah (2012, p. 861) also argue that "Boko Haram's membership largely relates to the depth of the feeling about socioeco-nomic injustice, marginalization and human insecurity". The Research Director of the Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG), SopeWiliamsElegbe lends support to the above view by incisively averring that when one mixes the higher rate of unemployment, high illiteracy and poverty in the north (relative to the south) with radical Islam, which promises a better life for martyrs, it becomes very under-standable why the region is a breeding growth for terrorism (Roger 2012, p. 3). Inferably, a sect that seems to offer not just material wellbeing but also promises a greater after-life, indeed stands the chance of being very attractive to the destitute youths and children who are not sure where their next meal will come from, let alone any future life prospect.

5.4   Economic Development and Income Inequality

In addition to the foregoing are the issues of economic development and the problem of inequality. There is acquiescence among scholars that an intricate relationship exists between conflict and economic development (Olson 1963; Gupta 1990; Ross 1993; Piazza 2006; Katsina 2012). The nature of the relationship is often complex. According to some accounts, nations with little economic development are less conflict prone given that they are mostly steeped in traditional relations. This, however, changes as such nations move into a transitory stage of development. As the nation experiences transition, the value of the old social systems comes in conflict with new values thus engendering conflicts. Finally with more economic development comes more political stability (Gupta 1990, p. 32). This dynamic explains the fact that in "developed countries, tensions among the classes are less tensed because the state can afford to offer some concessions such as social security benefits, unemployment stipends, housing allowances, single mother benefits, scholarship and student loans, pension among others to the working and lumpen classes to cushion the effect of economic crises" (Ogunrotifa 2013, p. 39). Such concessions are likely to dissuade members of the lumpen class, frustrated by dismal socio-economic conditions, from forming or joining sophisticated "non-state actor group who used individual terrorism to achieve specific objective such as counteracting state apparatus and instrument of terror" (Ogunrotifa 2013, p. 39). Corroborating this view, Achumba et al. (2013, p. 92) submits:

> The establishment of developmental projects tailored to the needs of the people would improve societal welfare and reduce the extent of social and economic insecurity which consequently would reduce social conflicts and aggression. Once people's needs are met, they become naturally less agitated and confrontational, and the tendency to want to use illicit and criminal means to ensure their survival or try to force government to behave in certain ways or make certain decisions, would be reduced.

From another vantage point, the relationship between economic factors and political violence is bidirectional. While for Collier et al. (2003, p. 53), "the key root cause of conflict is the failure of economic development", conflicts on the other hand stagnates economic growth and consequently development according Wayne Nafziger and Auvinen (2002). This relationship between political and economic factors, finds expression in the Nigerian context especially with current Boko Haram insurgences, which is arguably a product of years of economic underdevelopment in the affected region. Nigeria may have been experiencing certain economic growth in recent times, but its economic development profile is far from appealing, as redolent of the foregoing socio-economic analysis.

As the analysis of poverty above suggests, this has influenced the low income level that characterised the North. Southern Nigeria, due to its receptivity towards western education has made great strides in assimilating the dividends of economic globalization, part of which include the rapid industrialization. On the contrary, the northern region has had little or no such foundation due to the discouragement of the western education in the region during the colonial era; hence it has been

economically marginalized. Part of the reasons include the underdevelopment of the agriculture sector—the mainstay of the northern economy prior to the discovery and exploration of crude oil. These together have culminated into creating massive unemployment in the region. The all-important agricultural sectors now only employ workers seasonally thereby contributing to the rate of rural-urban migration. Also bearing the burden of urban congestion are migrants from landlocked and draught-affected neighbouring countries of Chad and Niger.[3] With "virtually no modern industries there is a high dependence on government as the sole source of largesse and dispenser of patronage, intensifying the contests between ethnic and religious groups for control of public office" (African Report 2010, p. 10). Yet the government has not been able to adequately meet such needs.

It suffices to acknowledge that when political power was in the North there was some tolerance of this economic inequality until the 1999 national elections which marked a shift of political power from the north. Following the sudden death of President Umar Musa Yar'Adua, GoodluckEbele Jonathan who is of southern origin ascended to the presidency and was later re-elected in the subsequent national election in 2011. Given this development, the northern elites saw themselves being short-changed in a certain zoning formula (Onapajo 2013). It was against the backdrop of this politicization of ethnicity that the Shariacracy,[4] on which Boko Haram pivots has become an instrument of protest. The resort to the politics of Sharia advocacy by the Boko Haram Islamist sect was indeed part of a protest against regional economic disparities in Nigeria (Uadiale 2012). This is why Adesoji (2011, p. 95) incisively maintained that "whereas the religious sensitivity of Nigerians provided fertile ground for the breeding of the Boko Haram sect, the sect's blossoming was also aided by the prevailing economic dislocation in the Nigerian society, the advent of party politics (and the associated desperation of politicians for political power". Corroborating Adesoji's view, Mazrui (2002, p. 67) also maintained that "against economic marginalization, the Sharia is a form of passionate protest.[5]"

Indeed, the economic downturn of the 1980s has some explanatory efficacy to the crises in the north, although not necessarily exclusive of other factors peculiar to the region such as religion and bourgeoning population of virtually homeless Almajiri children. According to Africa Report (2010, p. 10):

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[3]It is well known that members of the Islamist sect, Boko Haram, are also from neighbouring countries such as Chad, Niger, and Cameroun.

[4]The concept of Shariacracy is defined as "governance according to the norms, principles and rules lay down by Islamic law" (Mazrui 2002, p. 66).

[5]Albeit the Sharia debate has always been boiling since the colonial era, the dimension it assumed since the advent of democracy in 1999 is arguably unprecedented. It is on such that Boko Haram has been able to build its stronghold and was also able to attract sponsorship from the northern elites.

As the national economy shifted from agriculture to heavy dependence on oil, services and importation of finished products, cash-crop production, which had been the region's mainstay, declined. For instance, across the cotton-producing states (eleven of the thirteen are in the far north), the decline of cotton production led to mass closures in the textile sector, collapse of rural economies, massive unemployment and increased rural-urban migration. Kano, once the center of a thriving textile industry, has been particularly badly hit and now has acres of disused factory space. The federal government's Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), inaugurated in 1986, and other economic policies through the 1990s, including import liberalization and lack of protection for local industries, aggravated agricultural ruin and rural impoverishment.

This structural condition pertaining to economic underdevelopment has prevailed in the northern region over those years, which is why the rise in poverty level has been higher in the northern region compared to the south. For instance, Fig. 5.5 illustrates the discrepant percentage level of poverty among the six geopolitical between 1980 and 2004. Consistent with the foregoing socio-economic analysis, the table shows that poverty level has not only been higher in the three northern regions, where Boko Haram has dominated so far, but has also risen exponentially within the given time.

Essentially, the above uneven economic development has impacted adversely on the issue of income inequality, which is noted to be also related to emergence of conflict in society. Scholars such as Nagel (1974); Muller (1985); Thorbecke and Charumilind (2002) have aptly observed that income inequality is critical to the emergence of social conflict and political violence. Based on the psychological theory of social comparison, Nagel (1974) maintained that an increase in inequality from a relatively low level increases social discontent thereby engendering political instability. He further noted however that as the gap between the rich and the poor widens significantly, the likelihood of revolution diminishes because the poor basically loose the framework for social comparing. Based on the above, Nagel postulates a U-shape correlation between income inequality and political instability (Nagel 1974).


Fig. 5.5 Poverty level percentages by region (1980–2004). *Source* Kinnan et al. (2011, p. 40)

Muller (1985) lends to the above view by arguing that a high level of income inequality in a country is positively correlated with the rise in violence against the state. Accordingly, aside from the direct link between poverty, inequality and wellbeing, high levels of economic inequality can also indirectly undermine the ability of a society to promote valued capabilities, which can have implication for emergence of conflict. South Africa's conflict during the apartheid highlights is reminiscent of this view.

Income inequality has engendered much conflict in Nigeria since independence, particularly due to the prevailing impact of identity politics (Osaghae and Suberu 2005). The emergences of various militant anti-state groups including MEND, MOSOP, inter alia, over the years are illustrative of this claim. Notably, inequality in Nigeria according to a 2007 University of Oxford study, is "due to discriminatory allocation of government projects, different access to key sectors of the economy, as well as unintended consequences of macroeconomic policies" (Kinnan et al. 2011, p. 20). Nigeria's export orientated and royalty collecting economy due to its over prioritization of oil, coupled with pervasive systemic corruption, has entrenched a high level of inequality in terms of income distribution among its populace. What occurs in Nigeria today is a divided society where a huge portion of national revenue ends up in the pockets of an insignificant few elite population, while the remaining majority struggle over a tiny fraction, hence wallowing in abject poverty. Besides, this kind of inequality between the elite and the mass, which can be termed as vertical inequality, there is also the notion of horizontal inequality, which mainly exists between culturally defined groups (Stewart 2002). The group that perceives itself to be at a disadvantage often tends to strive to challenge the status quo. Thus, both forms of inequality arguably reinforce and reignite the anger caused by poverty and unemployment among Nigerians. The region most affected by the problems is still northern region (Fig. 5.6).


Fig. 5.6 Percentage of secondary school education enrolments in Nigeria in 2003 and 2008. *Source* Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) EdData Profile 1990, 2003, 2008 in Umar (2013, p. 30)

A field study with the local population reveals that the northerners perceive themselves as less well-off compared to their southern counterpart (Kinnan et al. 2011). The significance of relative deprivation in understanding the security challenges facing the nation cannot be overemphasized. Firstly, it explains why poverty though prevalent in the southern region is not necessarily resulting in terrorism, with the exception of Niger Delta. Hence, this regional inequality between the northern and southern region of Nigeria bears some explanatory efficacy to the rise of Boko Haram and its anti-southerners tendencies. As Kinnan et al. (2011, p. 40) explain:

> Nigeria's south is receiving a disproportionately large fraction of the infrastructure development for the purpose of bringing goods and services to the major seaports. These advances are not likely in the north where its leaders and social structure tend to stifle education, restrict global and national engagement, and restrain economic opportunity. As the Muslim population in the north grows, the combination of traditional values will keep the restive youth in the conservative north primed for conflict against the more liberal south.

Essentially, there is the sense of victimhood among the northerners, based on the perception that "the wealthy elite throughout the country tend to be Christian, while the most impoverished communities in the country are found among the Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri, and other northern groups—all of them primarily Muslim" (Forest 2012, p. 56; Agbiboa 2013).

Taking advantage of this glaring inequality and economic marginalization, Boko Haram, like other similar religious terrorist groups around the world, "portrays the situation in terms of a Muslim population oppressed by non-Muslim rulers, infidels, and apostates backed by sinister forces that intend to keep the local Muslim communities subservient" (Forest 2012, p. 15). One of the clearest expressions of the problem of economic underdevelopment in the northern regions is its low education profile.

5.5   Low Educational Profile in the Northern Region

The problem of underdevelopment in the North is actually worsened by the region's low education profile, which dates back to the colonial era. According to the report of CBN, poverty is correlated with level of education and the size of house land/household. Unfortunately, education is poorer and the size of household is larger in the northern compared to the south. As noted earlier, the problem of low education in the region dates back to the colonial era. With the barring of the missionaries from the region by the colonialists to facilitate their hold on the locals through the indirect rule, schools were mainly concentrated in the southern region with the implication that citizens of the southerners dominated commerce and the jobs (Guest 2004, p. 122). School enrollment in the northern region to that effect has been dismally low over the years. As at 1950, there was only one university in the north in comparison with the plethora in the south (Guest 2004, p. 122).

Similarly, the North accounted for a merger 8 % of the total student population in comparison with the 48, 5, and 39 % for the East, Lagos and West respectively (Graf 1985, pp. 29–30). Likewise public primary schools in the north have virtually collapsed due largely to mismanagement, poor funding, and the inadequacy of a skilled workforce; hence, the Hausa and Fulani rightly felt excluded (Awofeso et al. 2003, p. 324).

Meanwhile, this backwardness in the North in terms of western education is partly blamable on the British and partly Northern Emirs' reluctance to introduce English language in the region during the colonial era. The prominent medium of early childhood Islamic education obtainable in the region was the Quran schools, which dates back to as far as the eleventh century. It became more important in the early nineteenth century during the consolidation of Islam in the northern region. These Islamic religious schools, the Almajiri education system, was not merely but also increased monumentally overtime.[6] For example, from 20,000 schools with 250,000 pupils in the 1900s, the school increased to 27,600 with 423,000 pupils (Abdurraham and Canham 1978; Awofeso et al. 2003). As at 2005, there were about 7 million Almajiria children in northern Nigeria according to the National Council for Welfare of the Destitute (Africa Report 2010). Similarly, in Kano state alone as at 2008, over 80 % of its 3.7 million population within the age bracket of 5 and 21 years attend some form of Islamic school. Interestingly, this age bracket of the population is considerably more susceptible to violence depending on context. Consequently, despite its big share in the national population, the northern zones contribute less than 30 % of the young people going to university (Umar 2013, p. 20).[7] This discrepancy is not only limited to higher education but also primary and secondary school enrollment, which obviously are prerequisite for attaining higher education.

Right from the colonial era, these schools have been "denied funding and recognition as part of a series of assaults by the colonial administration to destabilize it attests to the courage of the *Mallams* (teachers) and the popularity of Koranic education in this region" (Awofeso et al. 2003, p. 324). This underfunding has had some indirect negative social consequences. It suffices to note that in recent years, government has made concerted efforts to improve the educational quality and opportunities in the region. For instance, there was an increase in the share of education budget spending to 6 % in 2011 from 4 % in 2010, and the literacy rate from the ages of 15–24 has improved from 64.1 % in 2000 to 80 % in 2008 (African Economic Outlook 2012, p. 11). Nonetheless, the general outlook remains far from appealing with the northern region being the worst hit. Borno state, where Boko Haram has its stronghold, for instance, have a staggering 72 % of its children (between 6 and 16 years), who have never attended modern schools.

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[6]This system of education promotes a moral affair but had little or no place for social and economic enhancement of the student. Even its moral agenda is arguably hardly attained given that these same children have grown to constitute social ill in their respective societies.

[7]See National Population Commission (Nigeria) and RTI International (2011). Nigeria Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) EdData Profile (1990), (2003), (2008): Education Data for Decision-Making (2011, pp. 3–8).

Furthermore, according to UNESCO (2012, p. 1) reports, only 450,000 out of the 3.5 million nomadic school-aged children are accessing any form of schooling. The report reveals that seventeen states out of thirty-seven states (including Abuja) are at risk of not achieving EFA goal 4 by 2015. Interestingly the affected states which have youth and adult literacy rates between 14.5 and 49.3 % (of the total population) are within the northern region with a predominant Muslim and pastoralist population. Some of these states include: Taraba (23.3 %), Yobe (26.6 %), Zamfara (33.9 %) Borno (14.5 %), among others. Compare this trend with states in the southern region such as Lagos (92.0 %), Osun (80.0 %) and Rivers (72.8 %) and a big gulf between the regions in terms of education attainment becomes discernible.

Figure 5.7 vividly illustrates these discrepancies. The graph, which clearly illustrates the rate of secondary school enrolment across the main geopolitical regions in Nigeria, reveals a dismal rate of secondary enrolment in the north-east and north-west regions. Compared to the high rates of enrolment in the south west, southeast and south-south regions, the three indicated northern regions have an average percentage enrolment rate below 30 % both in 2003 and 2008. This goes also a long way to affect the number of those who make it to higher institutions. Essentially, a circle of illiteracy is bred as a result of this trend.

Furthermore in terms of adult literacy rate in English, the northern regions fair worse than their southern counterparts. Figure 5.7 illustrates this fact vividly. For instance, adult literacy rate in English among the males stands at 73.1 % in the north compared to the 82.6 % in the south-south region. The case of females is worse. It is against this backdrop that Reverend Mathew Kaka argued that the success of Boko Haram was founded on the factor of the prevailing insufficient formal education for many children, which provided space for their itinerant teachers to promote a form of Quranic literacy characterized by hatred for Western education. Cognizant of the low education profile in the North and its influence on the Boko Haram, the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan, embarked upon grading the Almajiri schools. About thirty-five of those schools are being built


Fig. 5.7 Adult literacy rate (in the medium of English) by geopolitical zones. *Source* National Bureau of Statistics (2010), author's compilation

around the country. The development was given a welcome zest by the governors of the northern states. Meanwhile, a visit to one of the schools in TalataMafara, Zamfara State during the course of this research reveals that some of the completed schools remained closed and are however used for other unknown purposes.

In fact, based on a National Population Commission's report, Umar (2013, p. 38) noted that "72 % of children between the ages of 6 and 16 never attended schools in Borno state, where Boko Haram is found". This high rate of illiteracy in the region goes a long way to affect the quality of life among the populace and the level of their susceptibility to ideological indoctrination by any set of people or individual. Arguably this is why these children, particularly the Almajiria, who are now commonly known as street children in the region easily fall prey to the Islamist sect, Boko Haram. Rather than being in formal classrooms and studying, they occupied their daily lives with begging. Umar (2013, p. 38) pointed out that the Almajiri schools, which most of such kids substitute for Western education have been used by Islamic extremists to indoctrinate the student to perceive "those who pursue Western education as infidels".

Even though Boko Haram claims aversion to western education, taking such claim at face value is detrimental to understanding the sect's driving motive. It clearly amounts to gross contradiction for the sect to be averse to Western culture when all its instruments of attacks and propaganda are of Western origin, including the technological gadgets and the media which it uses for its propaganda. In fact, Chinaka (2013, p. 83) sarcastically but incisively accused the sect of such contradiction: "If you are truly as sickened by a defense of Western education as you make out, why have you gone on week after week, year after year, in season and out of it, speaking their language and using their loathsome technological inventions for your selfish goals. Surely, your bow and arrows should have been the obvious apparatus for your cause, rather than the Western bombs". Akin to this view, Omonobi (2013), noted that the sect's religious disguise, especially its claimed aversion to western education is only a deceit, after the JTF found "syringes and narcotic drugs believed to have been used by the insurgences to get high before embarking on their deadly attacks". Inferably, it is the judgment of the lack of life chances created by the Western culture perhaps through growing westernization that Boko Haram is demonstrating its aversion, rather than the Western education itself (Umar 2013). This is consistent with Umar's claim in 2009 that the group is not against the Western education but preaches the supremacy of culture over culture which includes but not limited to education. Corroborating this view Forest (2012, p. 1) surmised that "the group is adamantly opposed to what it sees as a Western-based incursion that threatens traditional values, beliefs, and customs among Muslim communities in Northern Nigeria".

5.6 Conclusion

The foregoing has basically tried to show the socio-economic underpinnings of the Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria particularly from the contextual and individual levels. The main argument is that despite the seeming religious appearance of the sect's mission, the socio-economic drivers cannot be over emphasized. Accordingly, this chapter basically attempted to show that socio-economic indices such as poverty, unemployment, inequality, economic underdevelopment, low education, inter alia, underlie the emergence and persistence of Boko Haram terrorism. These factors, which appear higher in the northern region compared to the south as the chapter has shown, coupled with the predominance of Islamic religion, makes the region more susceptible to easy manipulation by fundamentalist movements such as the Boko Haram. The study meanwhile, acknowledges that it is reductive to view Boko Haram uprising as owing only to the deplorable socio-economic condition in Nigeria, particularly in the northern region. Other political, structural, history-cultural and ideological factors, as according to Brown's model of underlying factors of internal conflict are undoubtedly relevant to the uprising. However these are not the focus of this study. As such, having explored the socio-economic drivers of Boko Haram insurgence, the subsequent chapter shall focus on a general recommendation on how Nigeria can forestall this security challenge. This would go beyond mere socio-economic factors given the multifaceted impetus of the uprising.

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Chapter 6
Conclusion: Responses and Recommendations to End Boko Haram Terrorism

> *Any country that seeks to achieve adequate military security against the background of food shortage, population explosion, and low level of productivity, fragile infrastructural base for technological development, inadequate and inefficient public utilities and chronic problem of unemployment has a false sense of security.*
>
> (McNamara, cited in Tedheke 1998, pp. 6–7)

Abstract Since the emergence of the terror campaign by Boko Haram in Nigeria, it seems different approaches have been adopted but predominantly a military response to religious and ideological problems as seen by many. A misguided military-centred crises management strategy has largely been favoured. Considering the complexity of the sect's mission and objective, the need for a root cause approach to the crises has become almost indispensable to the general quest for lasting peace and security in Nigeria. The root cause approach will help to correct and avoid future emergence of such a phenomenon in terror pursuits. This study has unravelled and supported a socio-economic perspective to the problem since Boko Haram terrorism seems to have been driven first from socio-economic deprivations. The recommendations in this chapter follow from the preceding analysis around an oil-centric characteristic of Nigeria political economy, endemic corruption, poverty, frustration, despair, and social exclusion and marginalization inherent in Nigeria. Key root cause recommendations are presented as solutions for present terror crises: Good governance and leadership; improving the education profile in the northern region; effective poverty alleviation programme and social welfare improvement; and creating employment opportunities.

Keywords Boko haram · Nigeria · Poverty alleviation · Military · Socio-economic · Deprivations

6.1   Introduction

The foregoing analysis has basically tried to unravel the underlying root causes of Boko Haram insurgencies in Nigeria. This study focused more specifically on the socio-economic root factors of Boko Haram emergence through the prism of Nigeria's political economy and its characteristic mono-cultural nature, which has facilitated endemic corruption. As a result of this corruption and general mismanagement of the statecraft, rather than translating to enormous wealth and socio-economic development, Nigeria's vast mineral resources have mostly amounted to a curse for the majority of the population as reminiscent of the rising level of inequality, poverty, unemployment, and general underdevelopment. This loathsome socio-economic condition, particularly the relative deprivation suffered by a majority of Nigerians given the nation's enormous wealth, is shown to have engendered a general atmosphere of discontent and hatred for the pervasively corrupt Nigerian state.

Consequently, various anti-state movements, including Boko Haram, have emerged in response thereby entrapping the nation in a web of insecurity, fear and terror. In view of the complex nature of this particular problem, this chapter proffers possible ways out of the current Boko Haram crises as well as how to prevent the rising of other "Boko Harams" in the future in Nigeria. In addition to the "stick" approach hitherto endorsed by the state, this chapter, in line with the thesis of the study, emphasizes the "carrot approach" as a viable means to attaining lasting peace in Nigeria and the northern region in particular. The carrot approach which entails addressing the root causes of Boko Haram (e.g., the general problem of underdevelopment among others issues) is paramount. We shall begin by doing a cursory review of the militarized approach of the Nigerian government, after which an analysis of the [in]security and [under]development nexus would follow as a long-term solution to the crises. Other general recommendations shall also be highlighted, followed by a general conclusion summarizing the findings of this study.

6.2   A Review of Government's Response to Boko Haram

In response to the threat posed by Boko Haram and its horrendous activities, the Nigerian government has used many strategies ranging from military crackdown, declaring a state of emergency in affected states, attempting a political dialogue as well as trying to grant the group an amnesty. Similarly, on 17 February 2011, the government passed the Anti-Terrorism Bill, showing its intent to deal with the crises. Unfortunately, these strategies have not been adequately effective in stalling the sect's activities considering the unabated suicide bombing and various attacks being executed by the sect till date. For instance, the call for amnesty was rejected by the sect who ironically claimed that they are the ones who are in the position to

grant the state an amnesty for its wrongdoing. Hence, while these various strategies have been successful in some cases and are and thus commendable, the success rate has been extremely limited as the sect's incessant terrorist activities till date suggest. The militarized response to an "ideological issue" as to Boko Haram is bound to have certain shortcomings, especially considering the nature of Nigerian security agency, which has been known for its brutal response to similar uprisings across the country over the years. What follow are some of the shortcomings of government response.

When the Nigerian Chief of the Army Staff, Lt. General AzubuikeIhejirika, organized a defence conference, he concluded that the armed forces were not equipped or trained to handle this hybrid terror insurgent threat. As shown earlier, Boko Haram mutated into a vicious group after the government adopted a heavy-handed approach through its security agency in 2009 in which the sect leader is alleged to have been extra-judicially killed. Many scholars have rightly condemned such response as not merely addressing the symptoms but also as serving to escalate the group's terrorist activities (Aghedo and Osumah 2012; Forest 2012; Agbiboa 2013; Umar 2013). So far the various military crackdowns have mostly had temporal effect.

But worse still, the use of force has resulted in many civilian casualties, which in turn has aggravated the resentment of state by most of the affected communities. For instance, in one particular incidence, a woman whose husband and brother were killed by one of the military campaign approached Salkida (2012), a reporter renowned to have had many direct contacts with the sect, "pleading that he should give her number to Boko Haram in order for the sect to assist her in avenging the death of her loved ones, and the miscarriage she had following their deaths" (cited in Maiangwa 2012). This clearly points out how frustrated the unintended victims of the government crackdown on the sect generates among the locals.

Furthermore, often the military's forceful counter-terrorism, as Umar (2013) notes, tends to disperse the sect thereby leading to the formation of new cells. It was believed that getting hold of the sect leaders would create a turning point for the activities. Despite the reported killing of the sect leader, Shekarau, by the JTF, Boko Haram sect has continued its horrendous killing crusade in the region.[1] What is even more glaring is the fact that the government lacks the necessary infrastructural and military gadget to curtail the activities of the sect. On this, Nigeria can learn from the experience of the United States. Despite the sophisticated military and intelligence resources of the US which are far beyond the level of Nigeria, the States has hardly won its war against terrorism.

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[1]In fact, the validity of this claim by the JTF remains questionable among Nigerians given the reappearance of Shakua on a *YouTube* video clip after the report. Had the security agencies been able to provide the body of the said, we would have mitigated this doubt.

Although a military approach is both justified and pertinent, it solely cannot halt the terrorist activities of the Boko Haram as redolent of their re-occurring strikes despite the continued efforts of the security agencies (Umar 2013). To think otherwise is to have a wrong notion of security. Indeed as General (Sir) Frank Kitson of British Army once said: "there can be no such thing as a purely military solution to an insurgency because insurgency is not primarily a military activity" (cited in Umar 2013, p. 46). Likewise addressing Boko Haram requires an understanding of security that transcends the traditional military sense. In fact, even the success of the military intelligence depends significantly on the level of cooperation and support of the local communities. Accordingly, the need for appropriate development of the communities cannot be overstated. This can be a good step to restoring the local's trust in the state as a functional system. To fully appreciate this perspective we shall now do an analysis of the security-development nexus. This would provide the foundation on which the socio-economic predicates of Boko Haram can be addressed.

6.3 The Security and Development Nexus

The changing notion of security is increasingly being acknowledged among scholars (Buzan 1991; Baldwin 1997; Echeverri 2010; Agbiboa 2011; Katsina 2012). During the pre-Cold War era, the concept of security mainly revolved around military statecraft by which only issues for which military force was relevant were dubbed security issues; others were merely "consigned to the category of low politics" (Baldwin 1997, p. 9). Such military-centred perspectives basically construe security as "a state's capabilities to defend its territorial integrity from threats—actual and imagined—as well as actors of aggression for other potential enemies" (Katsina 2012). However, the basic assumption of this perspective namely, that "internal law-enforcement agencies and other instruments of domestic intelligences" and the "protection of national interest in foreign policy" alone could ensure security is a gross negligence of the centrality, if not the supremacy, of individual (human) security to state security (Echeverri 2010, p. 58; Katsina 2012, p. 109). The realization of this mistake has rightly led to the broadening of the notion of security in the post-Cold War era to include features such as "economic development, equality, political accountability and good governance" (Katsina 2012, p. 9). Thus, in addition to its traditional military denotation, the political, societal, economic, and environmental aspects of security are now being strongly emphasized.

In particular, the concept of human security, which "deals with how people live and breathe, how they exercise choice, how much access they have to opportunities…", (in other words human development in the broadest sense of the word) have become fundamental to the understanding of security in modern times (Buzan 1991, p. 17; Booth 2007; Hettne 2010). Note, however, that the attainment of human security is mainly possible through socio-political and economic development since

it is not merely about protecting people, but also empowering people to fend for themselves. Hence, human security entails creating political, social, environmental, economic, military, and cultural systems that collectively provide people the constructing blocks of survival, livelihood, and dignity. It entails a holistic development of the individual, society, and the state.

Meanwhile, the notion of development itself is not any less contested: there exists an array of definitions as well as measurement of development. For instance, it is trendy among scholars to measure development in monetary or quantitative terms. According to such views, which drive from classical economics, a country is said to be developing only if that country has a "significant potential to raise the per capita standard of living" (Gopinath 2008, p. 91). Critically considered, however, development cannot be confined to such quantifiable indicators. Development certainly encompasses "quantitative growth, qualitative improvement and the expansion in the capabilities, capacities and choices of individuals, groups and states" (Mirakhor 2010, p. 1). Rather than relegating the notion of development to abstract statistics concerned merely with per capital, this view of development accentuates the holistic empowerment of the human person and the society.

Focusing on socio-economic development, three features such as poverty, unemployment and inequality constitute central questions to be asked concerning a country's development. As Seers (1972, p. 124) aptly observes "if all three of these have declined from higher levels, then beyond doubts this has been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of these problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have it would be strange to call the result development, even if per capital income doubled". This reasoning is in line with the proclamation of the General Assembly of the Second United Nations Development Decade on 1 January 1971, which asserts that development includes: (i) a minimum standard of living compatible with human dignity; (ii) improvement of the well-being of the individual; (iii) sharing of benefits by society at large; (iv) more equitable distribution of income and wealth; (v) a greater degree of income security; and (vi) the safeguard of the environment (UN 1971).

Considered as such, the absence of these core elements of development in Nigeria, particularly in the Northern region of Nigeria, has been shown to constitute the root cause of the crises in the region in the preceding chapter. It has been shown, particularly that socio-economic factors such as gross underdevelopment manifested in endemic poverty, high level of illiteracy, rising unemployment, and severe inequality not only erode patriotism, which is vital to peaceful coexistence in a religiously heterogeneous, ethnically diverse, highly polarized country as Nigeria, but also "build angst and resentment among the alienated majority against the state and its intuitions" (Katsina 2012, p. 114). Since these factors hold sway for the emergence and persistence of Boko Haram, addressing the crises requires treating these underlying issues.

6.4   Addressing the Socio-Economic Root Causes

Following the thesis of this study, development-oriented recommendations are deemed vital, not only to checkmating the sect's insurgence but also preventing the rise of such likeminded groups in the country in the future, the likelihood of which is high given the rising frustration among the populace. Elsewhere, Umar (2013, p. 14) made similar argument that "an effective solution would be achievable by resolving the root causes of the conflict". As already noted, militarized approach to the crises without adequately and effectively addressing the underlying issues of unemployment, poverty, deplorable infrastructure, and illiteracy, inter alia, would be futile. Hence, the following practical developmental steps ought to be taken by the government, well-meaning non-governmental organizations, local and international as well as capable private individuals in order to address the socio-economic factors underpinning the emergence and persistence of Boko Haram insurgency.

6.5   Creating Employment Opportunities

The importance of creating employment opportunities cannot be overstressed. In view of the high level of poverty and unemployment plaguing the region, the government needs to heighten its efforts to create more jobs for the community so as to take the youths off the streets. It must be acknowledged, however, that developing the North, while very important to addressing the current security issue, is not going to be an easy task. The continuous violence in the region has aggravated the problem of underdevelopment as its scares investors away. Nevertheless, addressing the problem of unemployment that is ravaging the region is strategic to providing a lasting solution to the security crisis. One way of doing this is to revive the agricultural sector in the region to provide jobs for the ever growing unemployed population. This hardly needs much outside inputs as the core resource, the land, is abundantly available already. Also linked to this therefore is the urgent need to address the bad infrastructural situation in the country.

Another strategic move the government can make in the region is to revive the once flourishing textile industries in the Kaduna and Kano State. This would go a long way to ameliorate the problem of youth unemployment in the region, thereby helping them to channel their energy usefully into production that can add value to the development of the state. The inestimable ripple effects of such development, as far as the promotion of peace and tolerance in the region is concerned, are indeed crucial to halting the continual emergence of anti-state movement in the region. The creation of more employment opportunities could see many restive youths resisting any killing tendency and focusing on transforming their lives and their society. In this way, the youths would become less gullible to the sways of the political leaders and resist being used as agents of political and religious violence—a prevailing trend in Nigeria especially during elections.

6.6 Effective Poverty Alleviation Programme and Social Welfare Improvement

While not abandoning other avenues, especially as it is concerned with understanding the philosophy, objectives, and *modus operandi* of Boko Haram, government needs to devote significant effort towards improving the welfare of the citizens in the North. Of particular importance is the urgent need to alleviate, if not eradicate, poverty and the gross underdevelopment that plague the northern region where the sect has been dominant. Such efforts constitute a more sustainable approach to mitigating the problems than mere tokenism, such as the amnesty programme or militarized efforts, which significantly neglect the support base of Boko Haram in the teeming discontented and poverty-stricken local population.

The evident galloping level of poverty in this region can be partly explained by the arguable lack of enabling environment, particularly in terms of social infrastructure, for individual self-development. Nigeria urgently, for instance, needs to address its lingering power issues and improve its health care facilities for the well-being of the populace in the Boko Haram infested northern regions. In this light, the contribution of non-government organization (NGOs), private enterprises, and other stakeholders in providing development could be useful complimentary for the state in its fight against the sect.

6.7 Improving the Education Profile in the Northern Region

There is urgent need to improve the education standard in the northern region. Given the ideological dimension of the sect, there is a need for the government to launch a counter-ideology war against the sect through the Islamic society in order to dissuade ordinary Muslims from being swayed. In this light, government cannot neglect the need to launch general public enlightenment programmes in order to discourage the narrowed interpretation of the Quran or other sacred scriptures that serve the purpose of extremist groups such as Boko Haram. By so doing, moderate Islam would be promoted, while radicalism would be discouraged. Crucial to this dimension is the need for ensuring that the prison officials harness the expertise of the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)[2] personnel and moderate Islamic scholars to deliver de-radicalization programmes for arrested Jihadist (Onuoha 2012, p. 13).

Although, given the sect's outright aversion of Western education, it is obviously difficult to de-radicalize its members through the same system, an advancement of the Islamic schools—particularly the Almajiri schools—can be useful in

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[2]This programme has been introduced by the administration of the US president, Barack Obama as a means to address the present threat of religious terrorism.

addressing this difficulty. Little wonder, the government has made many efforts in this regard. But these schools have to become functional and running rather than being left as decoration in their various locations as currently seem to be case in the TalataMafara (Zamfara State) where I visited during the study. Whatever issues that are hindering these schools from operating ought to be addressed as a matter of urgency.

One suggestion that can be endorsed is incorporating media education as a complementary effort. One such media education is mobile learning through simple text messaging devices of mobile phones. Given the nomadic lifestyle of a majority of northerners, mobile schooling can be enhanced if the mode of learning makes use of the advancement in technology to reach out to people in remote areas, especially nomads who rarely wish to stay at a place for learning. However, this suggestion must not take for granted that although the usage of mobile phones is widespread today, not everyone possesses one. Hence, other media forums like the radio and television must be utilized; even as a government face-to-face propaganda by mass education on peaceful co-existence is vital; needless to say that non-state actors are welcome onboard on such a campaign.

6.8   Good Governance and Leadership

Good governance and leadership is important for national peace and security. The Boko Haram insurgence highlights this more than anything. Its root causes point to the links between governance and development. Hence, tackling Boko Haram terrorism requires vital reforms in various aspects of the state to ensure good governance as characterized by "the existence of checks and balances (horizontal accountability), participation and elections (vertical accountability), and respect for basic human rights (which include political rights)" (Amunden 2010, p. 1). This would ensure that good and credible leaders man the affairs of the state in order to promote an unbiased development across the 36 states of the federation, thereby mitigating the effects of economic disparity among these states.

As have been shown, the socio-economic underpinnings of the Boko Haram uprising seem to be disguised in religious cloak (Lacey). A possible way to explain this might be to say that religion is perceived to be capable of correcting the various failings of some aspects of the state—for instance, the legal system—which hitherto mainly serves the selfish interest of the political elites to the detriment of the masses. In this case, the reformation of the legal system is of paramount importance in addressing the legitimate grievances of the sect, as it would not only address the problem of inequality but would also promote social justice in all aspects of the economy—thereby ensuring an equitable distribution of the nation's wealth. Indeed, it is the sect's advocacy for the restoration of social justice that makes them appealing in their communities, who lend them various forms of support. Akin to the above, addressing the problem of corruption is an integral part of the solutions to the crisis since it is only an accountable, responsible, and transparent government

that can transform the vast natural wealth in the country into tangible benefits for a meaningful living condition among the populace. Such would bring about the needed socio-economic development across Nigeria, particularly in the northern region.

It is undoubtedly parochial to tie the continued existence and spread of Boko Haram and its activities solely to internal socio-economic factors, as the foregoing analysis suggests. Accordingly, the following are some other recommendations deemed pertinent and complimentary to the root causes approach to resolving the crises:

Effective Border Control and International Cooperation—In order to restrict easy flow of weapons as well as human supports from other Jihadist groups such as the AQIM or Al-Shabab in the sub-region, border controls must be tightened and sophisticated with the use of adequate modern technology. Such measures are necessary to effectively deprive the sect of access to supply and resupply of weapons and technology from sympathetic bodies in the sub-region, thereby trapping them within the confines of Nigeria for the necessary disarmament. In addition, considering the transnational scope of the Boko Haram, the cooperation of the international community, particularly the neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Niger, Benin Republic, and Ghana is also required in fighting the sect. Such cooperation would boost the effort of the Nigeria's border control; thus improving its effectiveness. This would go a long way to checkmate the influx of individual(s) with extremist religious ideology from the neighbouring countries.

Furthermore, given that the threat posed by the sect is not merely restricted to Nigeria, the international communities would need to compliment Nigeria's counter-terrorism efforts, particularly in the aspect of technological abilities, instrument, and intelligence. In this respect the assistance of developed nations is especially significant. Besides, Nigeria needs to collaborate with, and learn from other countries with similar challenges in the past, to learn better ways of addressing the issues.

Breaking the Sponsorship Link—Like other terrorists around the world, Boko Haram strengths pivot on its continual financial support base. To effectively deal with the sect, concerted efforts must be made by the government to track the sect's source of income. This invariably may include tightening the security of banks and financial institutions to deprive the sect of its constant raid of these institutions. This would certainly go a long way to constrain its financial strength and consequently reduce its lethal attacks.

A Think Outside the Box—When we take a holistic view of the Nigerian question, a lot of structurally endemic factors have pressed this situation that Nigeria finds itself. For Nigeria to move away from this structural quagmire therefore, it needs to strengthen: 1. Governance and '*developmentalist*' leadership; 2. State Capacity including the public service and bureaucracy for development; 3. Actors, Institutions, and Agencies for Economic and Social Transformation; 4. National Planning: Content, Coordination, Implementation, and Monitoring in a Developmental Context; 5. Macro-economic policy and strategies towards industrialization and Inclusive Growth; 6. Research, Science and Technology for

Development; 7. Social Policy for accelerated development and Empowerment of Economically marginalized groups; and 8. Regional and international institutions, frameworks and Agreements in Southern Africa's development quest.

6.9 General Conclusion

It is roughly a decade since the emergence of the Boko Haram Islamist sect. Yet, Nigeria has hardly been able to end the crises due mainly to what can be dubbed a misguided military-centred crises management strategy. Considering the complexity of the sect's mission and objective, the need for a root cause approach to the crises has become almost indispensable to the general quest for lasting peace and security in Nigeria. This study has basically tried to unravel the socio-economic root causes of the crises. From the preceding analysis, certain conclusions can be made regarding root causes of Boko Haram terrorism. The oil-centric characteristic of Nigeria political economy driven by endemic corruption has created an atmosphere of poverty, frustration, despair, and social exclusion as a colossal amount of national revenue is controlled by an insignificant few elites; while the majority of population is marginalized and oppressed.

These objective conditions are pivotal to the emergence of the various anti-state movements such as Niger Delta militants and the most recent Boko Haram insurgency. Indeed, the ever worsening economic condition in Nigeria, "has produced a majority of hungry, unemployed youths, whom Islamists characterize as 'the disinherited' brainwashed to strongly believe that their only route to salvation lies in the propagation of Jihad and the creation of an Islamic State" (Awofeso et al. 2003, p. 323). In the case of Boko Haram, the group believes that the restoration of Islamic reign would bring justice to the oppressed citizen. Thus, the sect's success can be located in the socio-economic challenges facing most Nigerians due to the deepening economic crises since the 1980s. This was in turn a result of Nigeria's "perpetual dependence on oil-based revenue and the harsh impact of the structural adjustment programme" (Arowosegbe 2009, p. 584).

The state which has become a source of self-enrichment for the political elites is left ineffective in delivering basic essential social services such as: shelter, food, education, comfortable and affordable housing, and health care, among others. While this is a national problem, it is more pronounced in the northern region of the country. Hence, the [mis]management of the socio-economic reality of the region has engendered the current security situation, whereby the frustrated are manipulated by the narrow view of the Islamic religion to agitate for the overthrow of the state rightly deemed unjust to its citizen.

With the passage of time, however, the seeming moral motivation of the group has become clouded with the selfish interest of the members who have become gullible to manipulation by the political elites through the latter's financial support. Accordingly, addressing the crises should necessarily include addressing the underlying causal factors as these would not only help delegitimize the group but

also facilitate that indispensable cooperation of the local communities with the security agencies for more effective result. It is in this light that Ukpokolo's (2010) recommendation that "a way of dealing with the phenomenon of terrorism is to reach the community from which these agents stem and learn to minimize the receptivity of people to recruiting organizations" is noteworthy. This task is possible not only through the creation of a better socio-economic platform for the people but also through civic education.

Hence, while military coercion may be required to bring the sect into a fruitful dialogue with the state, by separating the hardliners from the moderate, Boko Haram is more likely to disappear with the killing of its support base in the surrounding communities rather than just with mere force. Onuoha (2012) summarized this view when he articulated the three strands on which the sect rest. According to him:

> The first strand is rooted on large numbers of followers or recruits drawn from an expansive pool of Almajiris and other destitute children from neighbouring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger Republics who easily cross into Nigeria's porous borders. The second is rooted in the financial support from politicians and other wealthy members, which helps to sustain the sect's operation in the areas of arms and weapons procurement, training, and compensation for those wounded in battle or relatives of suicide bombers. The last leg rests on the influence of local experienced ideologues that frame the violent ideology of the sect and exploit their connections with established foreign terror groups such as Somali-based Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Land of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to fanatically indoctrinate or radicalize recruits (Onuoha 2012, p. 5).

Therefore, the view that the uprising is mainly provoked and sustained simply by Islamic intolerance is reductive and constitutes a major corrigendum. Rather than merely encouraging religious tolerance, the socio-economic context in which such intolerance exists should be underscored. Focus should not merely be on addressing the symptoms but also the root causes. Until such time when the populace is made to stop sympathizing with the situation as substitute for the Nigeria state's responsibility toward their meaningful existence, they are unlikely to detach themselves from the sect and its goals, so as to support the activities of the security agencies.

To show these dynamics thus, the study was situated in the political economy of Nigeria. In the first and second chapter a philosophical analysis was used to engage the general debate of terrorism in order to show the ideological justification of goals and activities of the sect which seem to give it certain legitimacy among the populace. The third chapter explored the political economy of Nigeria and its tendency to fuel terrorism due to the pervasive corruption. This was shown to hold some explanatory efficacy to the galloping poverty and social alienation since the discovery of oil, despite different economic recovery and poverty alleviation programmes by the various administrations. The study reveals that the oil economy has, contrary to expectation, underdeveloped the economy due to lack of accountability and mismanagement by the operators of the statecraft. The fourth and the fifth chapters situate the poverty trend in the north as the ember that fans the flames of anti-state violent resistance, such as the Boko Haram among others. Finally, the sixth chapter proffers recommendations in light of the preceding analysis.

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Dr. Onapajo Hakeem is included as an additional author to the book because of his notable contribution, in development of the problem, theoretical framework, content, organization, and some materials used herein, especially at the formative stage.

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