GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON US DEMOCRATIZATION EFFORTS

FROM THE OUTSIDE IN

Edited by Sally Burt &
Daniel Añorve Añorve

Global Perspectives on US Democratization Efforts

Sally Burt • Daniel Aňorve Aňorve
Editors

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Contents

1 Introduction 1
Daniel Aňorve Aňorve and Sally Burt

Part I US Democratization Efforts in General 11

2 US Soft Power, the Studies of the United States Institutes Program, and Democratization in US Foreign Policy (1998–2014) 13
Daniel Aňorve Aňorve and Sally Burt

Part II US Democratization Efforts in Africa 31

3 Learning from the Curve: The Obama Administration's Promotion of Democracy in Africa 33
Osaretin Igbinehimwen Idahosa

4 The US, Democratization, and the Postcolonial States in Sub-Saharan Africa: Development or Distortion? A Critical Appraisal 51
Peter Sakwe Masumbe

5 US and the Democratic Process in Cameroon from 1990 to 2013 69
David Mokam

6 Labor Standards in Trade Preference Laws Between the US and Africa 89
Pawel Frankowski

7 The US and Democratization in Nigeria: Issues, Strategies, and Impacts 103
Mashood Olaniyi Omotosho

Part III US Democratization Efforts in the Middle East and the Balkans 121

8 The Fight for Libya: The Strength of Force, Not of Oil 123
Funso Adesola

9 Effects of US Foreign Policy on Democratic Processes in the Republic of Macedonia: Between Liberalism and Realism 139
Stojan Slaveski and Biljana Popovska

Part IV US Democratization Efforts in Latin America 157

10 Argentina and Brazil: The Role of the US in Their Democratic Transitions 159
Ignacio Tomás Liendo

11 The Role of the US in the Promotion of Criminal Justice Reform in Mexico: the Case of Law Schools 175
Azul A. Aguiar-Aguilar and Jesús Ibarra-Cárdenas

12 Conclusion 197
Daniel Aňorve Aňorve and Sally Burt

Bibliography 201

Index 219

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List of Tables

Table 2.1	Participant regions and states in the SUSI-FP (1998–2014)	17
Table 11.1	Law Schools in Chihuahua, State of Mexico, and Jalisco	188
Table 11.2	Student Numbers per Certified Professor	190

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Daniel Aňorve Aňorve and Sally Burt

This book constitutes a second volume to *Global Perspectives on US Foreign Policy: From the Outside In*. It follows the same form as the first volume, providing a range of perspectives of American foreign policy from those who are on the receiving end of it. In this volume, we have chosen to focus on a very contentious aspect of US foreign policy—its efforts at democratization around the globe. Given the existence of an extensive literature examining US democratization assistance, one might ask, is there a need for yet another book on the subject. The answer is yes, because this is a book that explores US assistance with democratization in specific parts of the world, and it is written by natives of the countries under study. This provides a unique perspective for the conduct of these analyses. Understanding US foreign policy as it is understood by those who directly feel its impact, rather than determine it, is an important task, and it is the aim of this volume to assist with providing that understanding. As such, a group of scholars on international relations from around the globe have

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provided insights into US democratization efforts in their countries (or aspects of it) by giving their perspectives of them. These form the chapters of this book. Some of the theories and insights provided by previous studies and writings on US democratization inform these contributions. The aim, though, is not to rehash debates about US democracy assistance that can be found in the existing literature but rather to add a new dimension to these debates through the addition of broader perspectives that can only be provided by those on the outside looking in.

According to Samuel Huntington, there have been three waves of democratization in international politics. The first wave occurred at the beginning of the nineteenth century when demands for suffrage and representation in government were made through revolutions in Europe and the New World. The second wave occurred after World War II and the defeat of the Axis dictatorships. The third wave began in the mid-1970s in Southern Europe and continued through the 1980s and 1990s, spreading to Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa.[1] There is debate about whether the "third wave" of democratization is over. As Renske Doorenspleet points out, to determine whether a period of democratization has come to an end scholars must first be able to measure levels of democracy in a state and to be able to define the process, that is, be able to determine what democratization actually is.[2] The desire to study the process of democratization, quantify, explain and evaluate it has been felt by scholars all over the world for decades and much effort has been spent in this pursuit.

The literature on US democratization efforts has been focused to a large extent on the former Communist states in Eastern Europe. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, this region represented the first opportunity in the post-Cold War era for the USA to exert its influence over the international political environment. Secondly, the post-Communist states have also proved to be the most successful of the USA's ventures in this regard (again for many reasons). One such study, conducted by Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, examined why the wave of democratization occurred in the post-Communist states in such numbers and so quickly as it did. Their argument was that although the institutional aspects of democracy such as elections, and the establishment of them, is important to the transition to this form of government, just as important is the shift in attitude, culture and public thinking or the domestic context within the states that seek democratization. The creation of democratic structures and the transition to elected government is more likely to be successful

where the society has adapted its culture and understands the nature of democracy. US aid given to assist in this transition, and its influence over the politics of these countries more generally, is more effective when the local context is understood and aid and influence are used accordingly.[3]

The difficulty with assessing democracy and progress toward it is that a democratic society depends on a state of mind or social attitude. A commitment to liberal ideals is essential to having a functioning and effective democracy. Jeff Haynes in the introduction to *Democracy and Political Change in the 'Third World'* explains that states can be "façade democracies," with elections that are regular but tightly controlled and the outcomes of which are manipulated; "electoral democracies," or states that have elections but very little else in the way of the establishment of democratic society and with no real "buy in" to democratic rule from the people or leaders; and lastly, there are states that can be deemed "full democracies," in which the established democratic institutions function within a society that has embraced the ideals and values of liberal democratic rule.[4] The differences between a façade democracy and a full democracy show the difficulty of defining and measuring democracy because it is a cultural understanding and a commitment to democratic values by the population that defines a full democracy. To measure the level of democracy in a society one must measure a level of cultural maturity or an attitude and the difficulty in this is obvious. Freedom House has attempted to measure specific aspects of democratic development and this remains the best guide for scholars seeking to determine the level of democracy in a society.[5]

There is a clear connection between the development of democracy and respect for human rights and economic progress that allows the population to achieve security and a reasonable standard of living. Several authors argue that the development of a democratic political system is not necessarily linked to economic development. It is political stability that provides the foundations for economic advancement.[6] There are some who argue that making efforts toward democratization is a key criterion for gaining access to Western, and particularly US, markets and other aid. As stability is the precondition for economic success, however, the USA and others are likely to ignore this criterion in favor of political stability if it suits their interests.[7] There is also a debate in the literature on democratization about the effectiveness of external aid in this process. The claim is frequently made that external assistance is not as effective as it may seem in the development of a democratic society.[8] Steven Finkel and others have argued that this conclusion is drawn from using inappropriate measures. Finkel and his

colleagues attempted to measure the effect of US democratic assistance by providing a very clear and narrow definition of "democracy assistance." In their 2007 study they found that US aid given for the specific purpose of democracy development, as opposed to other more general societal development, was effective and there was a clear finding that the more the money that was given to specific democratic purposes, the better were the outcomes in terms of democratic development.[9] Targeted funding, then, spent on specific programs is the best way to provide democracy assistance.

As noted above, many scholars argue that domestic factors and the culture of a society are more important than external drivers in the development of democracy. If this idea is combined with the notion that targeted funding is the most effective form of US democracy assistance, then one might argue that funding directed toward the spreading of US liberal and democratic values and culture was well spent. The idea of "soft power," then, and the USA's ability to influence different states' "mindsets" is significant to the discourse about US democratization efforts around the globe. The USA's ability to utilize "soft power" and spread the values of liberal democracy and free market economies to drive the world order so that it operates in the USA's favor is crucial in order for it to maintain its influence over global politics. This book is the product of one example of the use of US soft power and targeted funding for a specific program in its attempts to spread its liberal democratic values—the Study of the United States Institutes. It is on this topic that the book begins. An unforeseen aspect of that program, though, was the ability of international scholars to pull together their views of broader US democratization efforts around the globe. These scholars offer their insights into the international politics of US democratization efforts.

In Chap. 2, Añorve and Burt examine the USA's use of soft power in its democratization efforts. Using the Studies of the United States Institutes (SUSI) exchange program as a case study, this chapter explores how the USA engages with future leaders of societies around the world to spread democratic ideals. Having experienced life in democratic societies firsthand, participants in the SUSI program are able to develop a deep understanding of the values of democracy. The selection of participants and the countries from which they are chosen is clearly important to US democratization efforts. After providing a brief explanation and definition of soft power, this chapter explores that selection process and its relationship to US foreign policy priorities throughout the duration of the project's existence. It shows there is a strong connection between the exchange

program as a manifestation of soft power and the USA's foreign policy agenda, but also calls into question the claim that democratization efforts around the globe are a key priority of US foreign policy.

In Chap. 3, Idahosa analyzes the Obama administration's foreign policy toward Africa, particularly for strengthening democratic institutions in countries of that region. Since early in his time in office, Obama has sought first to strengthen democratic institutions and values in Africa with the view that economic development would follow once the political environment was more conducive. Africans excitedly watched Obama's first inauguration, hoping that the new president would provide greater focus on USA–Africa relations. However, about midway through his second term, expectations by Africans about his administration's transformative potential were being doused by the relatively slow pace of change in US foreign policy toward the region. Many observers would like to see Washington match its words with positive deeds that assisted with building democracy in Africa. A serious commitment by both the USA and Africa is needed to ensure a partnership that encourages a more pragmatic approach to instituting democratic governance in the region. Idahosa examines the relationship as it has developed over the last few decades and comments on possibilities for the future.

Masumbe provides an analysis of US democratization efforts in sub-Saharan Africa in Chap. 4. Given the USA's claims that it defends democracy and assists with its development in states seeking this type of governance, this chapter critically appraises the role of the USA in Africa's democratization processes. Masumbe attempts to address the lack of significant studies using the human needs paradigm or structural–functional theory as a major research method by providing this as a theoretical framework to show that democratization in this region has worsened rather than improved despite the USA's involvement in its politics. It is argued that the USA's immersion into policies surrounding social mobility, inclusiveness of the political system, voters' consciousness about national politics, and the survival of democracy has resulted in little progress. The USA's self-interest actually leads to the grasping of political power by the regions' political leaders and their attempts to end opposition to their rule. This is inimical to the rhetoric espoused by US leaders claiming they embrace free, fair and legitimate political power for leaders in the region, which addresses the challenges of human development and security in Africa.

Chapter 5 also examines African politics, but focuses on Cameroon's democratization process. The difficult task of reforming the political system

in a country already struggling with the basic functioning of governments also had the added challenge of resistance from its ruling elite. External pressure from the USA was felt before 1990, but a sustained campaign from external sources was needed to ensure change could occur. In this chapter, Mokam examines the US contribution to the development of democracy in Cameroon through an analysis of the different actions undertaken throughout this period. From the outset, US representatives in Cameroon wanted quick and radical change. That not being possible, the USA was forced to adopt a new strategy. New American representatives were sent to utilize American soft power through training, financial assistance and logistic assistance to the electoral process. America's power was exercised through official channels and nongovernment bodies such as the National Democratic Institute. The USA's contribution was essential to Cameroon's achievements in the development of its democratic politics.

Frankowski examines the USA's involvement in the promotion of labor standards and the protection of worker rights around the world in Chap. 6. The USA is not a signatory of most ILO conventions, and labor standards in the USA are not actually protected through international law. Nevertheless, the USA, among others, promotes improved labor standards around the world and uses free trade agreements and other treaties as tools to develop and further global norms relating to labor standards. Frankowski analyzes the limits to external norm promotion by assessing labor clauses in US FTAs and their effectiveness, as well as the relevance of American labor standards to other states. The ways the USA tries to promote labor standards, especially with developing countries, are explored. This chapter seeks to move beyond traditional explanations based on a relatively negative view of the American approach to labor issues, and argues that the USA plays a more important role than other, normatively oriented, actors such as the EU. Finally, it argues that ethical and moral arguments visible in the US position toward labor rights evolved over time, and the labor standards it promoted abroad should be perceived as part of the USA's global democratization efforts.

Chapter 7 moves the examination of democratization efforts to the Middle East. Omotosho argues that the end of the Cold War has generated significant momentum in the expansion of democratic governance in the Middle East and the influence of US intervention in the region is clear. Democracy promotion has become a focus of the USA's post-Cold War foreign policy toward the Middle East, using an approach that involves putting rhetorical as well as diplomatic pressure on regimes to

reform and also using direct American military engagement in the Middle East when other tactics failed. Some have criticized America's promotion of democracy in the region deeming it ineffective, inconsistent, and even claiming that the USA has used the spread of democracy as a justification for military intervention in the region for its own self-interest. This chapter examines the role and influence of the USA in the democratization process in the Middle East. Omotosho also explores the channels through which the USA influenced the transition to democratic regimes and their consolidation in Palestine and other major countries in the Middle East. He also examines some domestic factors that facilitated or undermined the USA's influence on the development of democracy in the region.

In Chap. 8, Adesola explores the dynamics of US relations with Libya during Muammar Gaddafi's reign. This period in Libya–USA relations was interesting because of the inconsistency of the policies the USA adopted toward Libya in response to Gaddafi's changeable behavior. The relationship oscillated between hostility and conciliation throughout this period and this chapter seeks to explain why this was the case. Adesola, then, seeks to critically interrogate the global role of a leading democracy that claims to be the model for the protection of liberty and people's rights, and particularly in the context of dealing with a state such as Libya. Many of the actions and policies undertaken by the USA seem to contradict its democratic mission.

The relationship between the Republic of Macedonia (RM) and the USA has been based on the RM's desire to develop a strategic partnership with the USA. This relationship and its dynamics are the focus of Chap. 9 by Slaveski and Popovska. As an investment in this partnership, RM supported the USA in the war in Iraq and agreed to be part of the "coalition forces." This decision was a setback to the RM's aim to join the EU, as the latter was opposed to the war in Iraq. RM also signed a bilateral agreement with the USA to surrender persons to the International Criminal Court, contrary to the EU's existing policy. In return for this support, the USA said it would "oppose any attempt by any party to the use of force or threat against the territorial integrity of Macedonia." The USA also supported UN missions UNPROFOR/UNPEDEP to assist Macedonia and it has also played a significant role in resolving the Greek–Macedonian dispute on the "name issue." Despite this assistance when facing external threats, democratization and domestic issues relating to political reform find the USA very cautiously lending its support. The stability of the country is much more important than the actual democratization of society. This chapter analyzes this dichotomy of US foreign policy toward Macedonia.

Liendo provides Chap. 10, which analyzes US interference in the processes of democratization in Argentina and Brazil in the 1980s and the 1990s, after the experience of military authoritarian rule. These two countries are connected in the region and by their response to the USA's use of global power. Issues such as external debt, the Central American crisis, nuclear policy, development of military projects and the links that brought about arguments, agreements that connect them and divergences in their interests are examined. It is not possible to exclude from this analysis the processes of regional integration in the context of globalization and the construction of a South American identity. In both processes, the role of Brazil and its hegemonic ambitions in the region shaped the schedule and specific strategies, such as those Mercosur used for economic and political development. In order to study US policy toward Latin America, especially Argentina and Brazil, it is necessary to stress the international economic and political context that facilitated US involvement. Capital concentration in international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank are specifically analyzed to determine how neoliberal economic policies influenced the institutionalization of these democracies.

The final chapter explores judicial reform as the main component of the USA's democracy promotion programs in the Latin American region. Improving the rule of law through the redesign of justice-sector institutions was considered an important condition for democratization and the development of a market economy. However, changing the rules of the game in the justice-sector does not guarantee judicial reform success. In this chapter, Aguiar and Ibarra explore the extent to which US aid affected the way justice is delivered in this region. Aid given to justice-sector institutions, the types of changes that were introduced, and how they affected due process are examined. Aguiar and Ibarra contend that US promotion of judicial reform at the subnational level in Mexico has had positive effects, even though several attempts were needed to achieve widespread judicial reform success.

The disparate topics and geographical areas covered in this volume offer a unique opportunity for people to read broadly about US democratization efforts within one book. A range of theories are used and varied empirical analyses can be found in the chapters. Many of the key debates found in the democratization literature are covered one way or another throughout the book. The USA uses a variety of different methods and policies to achieve the same outcome in vastly different corners of the globe. The effectiveness and outcomes that result are as disparate as the

methods used. Hearing from a range of scholars on the receiving end of these US policies fulfills a significant role in the debate. Rarely is the perspective of those on the "outside looking in" toward US foreign policy provided. That is the aim of this book—to provide the less familiar and truly global perspective on US democratization efforts.

Notes

1. Samuel Huntington's work explained in Renske Doorenspleet, "Reassessing the three waves of Democratization", *World Politics*, Vol. 52, No. 3, April 2000, p. 384.
2. *Ibid*., pp. 400–401.
3. Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist Countries*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 3–34.
4. Jeff Haynes, "Introduction" in Jeff Haynes (ed.), *Democracy and Political Change in the 'Third World',* London, Routledge, 2001, pp. 1–20.
5. See the different annual reports released by Freedom House.
6. *Cfr*. Franz Nuscheler, "Democracy: A Fragile Export" in Jochen Hippler (ed.), *The Democratisation of Disempowerment: the Problem of Democracy in the Third World*, London, Pluto Press, 1995, pp. 221–231; Liisa Laakso, "Whose Democracy? Which Democratization?" in Jochen Hippler (ed.), *The Democratisation of Disempowerment*, pp. 211–218, and Tanja Borzel, "The Noble West and the Dirty Rest? Western Democracy Promoters and Illiberal Regional Powers" *Democratization*, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 519–535.
7. Tanja Borzel, *Op. Cit.,* pp. 522–523.
8. Steven Finkel *et al.*, "The Effects of US Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003", *World Politics*, Vol. 59, No. 3, April 2007, pp. 404–438.
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PART I

US Democratization Efforts in General

CHAPTER 2

US Soft Power, the Studies of the United States Institutes Program, and Democratization in US Foreign Policy (1998–2014)

Daniel Añorve Añorve and Sally Burt

Introduction

The US has a long history of encouraging connections between its citizens and institutions and other actors and institutions around the globe. It has an extensive student exchange program for high school and college students. It also has programs for scholars and researchers, the most famous of which is the Fulbright program. There are, however, many other initiatives of the US government that encourage exchanges with international citizens. Since 1998, the Department of State has run an exchange program that includes the Study of the United States Institutes (SUSI).[1] These institutes are targeted at both students and scholars from around

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the world and the aim is to bring participants to the US for six weeks and provide them with a better understanding of the people, institutions, and culture of the US. The SUSI for scholars cover different aspects of scholarship including US political thought, religious pluralism in the US, US culture and society, contemporary American literature, journalism and media, foreign policy, and national security policy-making.

Each of these Study Institutes consists of 16–18 international participants (one per country). The institute lasts for six weeks and involves classroom-style instruction and seminars to assist with the development of the scholars' understanding of these different aspects of US society. Beyond the classroom experiences, participants also take part in extracurricular community and cultural activities designed to allow participants to experience US society and lifestyle firsthand. Each Institute concludes with a series of meetings and events in Washington D.C., including a debriefing with the US State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, which funds the program. The aim of the Institutes is to "foster a better understanding in academic institutions overseas of how US foreign policy is formulated, implemented, and taught."[2] The idea being that US perspectives of foreign policy-making and international relations will be passed on to scholars who in turn will take their understanding of that perspective back to their home countries. Naturally, the experience will inform and influence their teaching and this will provide the next generation of students from that country with that US perspective. The Institutes are open to citizens of any country and the State Department's website about the program encourages applicants from all over the globe to apply.[3]

This chapter aims to find the rationality of one particular SUSI program, the Institute on US Foreign Policy (SUSI-FP). The following questions are used to help determine the rationality: (a) Is the SUSI-FP open (really open) to any country or is there evidence that participants from some countries are more likely than participants from other countries to be chosen; also within the selection of countries, is there any evidence of regional preference or coverage? (b) Does the selection of participant countries match (and, if so, to what extent) the priorities of the US foreign policy agenda? (c) Does the selection of countries depend on its endowment of natural resources and/or the presence of permanent US military bases? (d) Is the selection of participant countries influenced by the level of democratization? What happens with failed states? It will be shown that the SUSI-FP can be seen as part of the US's strategy of using soft power to encourage democratization and the spread of liberal–democratic values

around the world, but particularly to certain countries targeted by the State Department.

Soft Power and Democracy

Joseph Nye developed the concept of soft power in the 1990s. According to Nye, soft power is "getting others to want the outcomes that you want" in international relations.[4] In other words, it is the ability to shift another state's priorities so that its interests are the same as yours without using traditional military force or coercion. By spreading cultural and political values to populations of other states it is possible to attract others to your way of thinking and perceiving the world. In recent decades, the US has been particularly successful at using soft power to change the international political environment. Studies conducted on the effectiveness of soft power have found that there are certain conditions that must exist for this form of power to be utilized. Firstly, a state must be able to communicate its ideas to the population of the target country. Secondly, the attitudes of those in the target country must be open to change. Thirdly, the attitudes of those in the target country must be able to impact international foreign policy outcomes. When these conditions do exist, there is evidence to show that soft power can be used effectively to achieve outcomes in international politics that are favorable to the user of it.[5]

During the latter stages of the Cold War, the US was able to effectively use soft power to undermine Communist regimes around the world. Although there was a need to use hard power to fight Soviet expansion, the US also used persuasion and spread its cultural values around the globe to reduce the USSR's power in international relations. Soft power is incredibly important to the development of democratic regimes. Democratic institutions can be created and democratic principles enshrined in constitutions; however, when members of a society experience and understand what it is to live in a democratic country, there is much greater "buy-in" to the process of democratization.[6] The US has, therefore, used soft power in democracy promotion and this has led to success in the post-Communist states in Eastern Europe. Elites from some of those states who turned from communism to democracy cite the US's influence as having a very significant impact on the outcome of power transitions in their countries.[7] An important step on the path to democracy is for the society seeking this form of government to be dedicated to the values that underpin it. The US's most important role in democratic assistance is to spread its culture

and attitudes toward the role of government in society. Allowing others from around the globe to share the democratic experience by visiting the US is a good way to breed the attitudes, commitment to democratic values, and cultural understanding that are necessary for democracy to flourish.

In 2010, Carol Atkinson undertook a study that explored the US's use of soft power through student exchange programs. She argued that the idea behind these exchanges was that experiencing democracy firsthand was essential to really understanding democratic society and to changing attitudes toward supporting liberal values. Her study found that as a result of participation in student exchanges foreign nationals who were able to experience democracy would transfer these values to their home countries. Often exchange participants became influential members of their home country's government and so the experience of living with liberal values and norms translated into national policy that was more sympathetic to democratic values.[8] In this way, the US is able to spread its culture and values around the world and create an environment in international politics that is favorable to its interests. Given that the SUSI program involves inviting tertiary educators to the US and that they have this opportunity to experience American culture and values firsthand, the findings of Atkinson's study are applicable to the SUSI program. Scholars and academics who participate in the program are likely to be more sympathetic to the US's aims and interests in the world and to pass on the perspective and understanding they have gained while in the US to the next generation of society's leaders in their home countries. SUSI, then, can be seen as a manifestation of the US using soft power to aid its global democratization efforts. The analysis that follows clearly shows that the State Department is strategic in its selection of participants of the SUSI-FP program. One can draw the conclusion, then, that SUSI-FP is an example of the US's use of soft power to spread democratic and liberal values and culture around the world.

Analysis of Participant Countries

There are 193 member states in the United Nations. The US has a network of 178 embassies and/or diplomatic missions around the globe, not including its missions to international organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the African Union, and the United Nations (Table 2.1).

Table 2.1 Participant regions[a] and states in the SUSI-FP (1998–2014)

Region	*Number of states in the region*	*Number of participant states (at least in one SUSI-FP)*	*Percentage of participant states (at least once in SUSI-FP)*	*Number of participant states (on multiple occasions)*	*Percentage of participant states on multiple occasions (as % of participant countries)*
Africa (sub-Sahara)	46	14	30.43	6	42.86
East Asia-Pacific[b]	25	13	52.00	10	76.92
Europe Eurasia	46	29	63.04	20	68.97
Near East	19	9	47.36	7	77.78
South & Central Asia	11	7	63.63	6	85.71
Western Hemisphere	30	9	30.00	7	77.78

Source: Based on information provided by the US Department of State

[a]The criteria for grouping regions is that of the Department of State official website

[b]Including Taiwan

Since 1998, there have been 16 SUSI-FPs. 69.57% of the states in Africa[9] have been excluded as participants in these institutes. However, it is very interesting to note that both Cameroon (which has participated in seven or 43.75% SUSI-FPs) and Nigeria (which has participated in 11 SUSI-FPs or 68.75%) have been frequent participants in the SUSI-FP. Among the states listed under the "Western Hemisphere," it is important to note that no Central American state has been represented up until now (2015). In contrast, the participation of Argentina and Brazil (each participating in 56.25% of the SUSI-FPs) stands out. Of the states listed under "East Asia-Pacific," which accounts for 25 embassies and/or missions (excluding the US mission to the Association of South-East Asian Nations [ASEAN]), but including Taiwan (a country with only unofficial relations with the US), the participation of China (in 50% of the SUSI-FP) and Indonesia (in 62.5%) clearly stands out. Also, the participation of Taiwan on three occasions is meaningful, especially considering that the US does not hold official diplomatic relations with Taiwan for historical reasons. In the case of

the states listed under the category of "Europe-Eurasia," which accounts for 46 embassies (excluding eight US missions to international organizations) we need to have a subregional analysis of the participation, otherwise there is a danger of combining Europe and Eurasia. It is important to note that of the states listed in this category, ten are former republics of the USSR. Of these ten former republics of the USSR, nine of them (90%) have participated in at least one SUSI-FP, and eight of them (80%) have had attendees on multiple occasions. Indeed, the only state from this category that has never participated is Moldova. Now, if we include former communist states the findings are even more interesting, because 19 of the 29 participating states (65.52% of the participant states of the region) are former communist states. If we consider the states listed under the "Near East," which accounts for 19 diplomatic missions, excluding that to Jerusalem, we find that seven of the nine (77.78%) participating states (the only exceptions being Iraq and Libya) have participated on several occasions. Particularly important is the case of Egypt, which has been represented at 50% of the SUSI-FPs held until now. Finally, among the states listed under "South and Central Asia," which account for 11 embassies, six of the seven participating states (i.e., 85.71%) have participated on multiple occasions. The participation of Pakistan (in 56.25% of the SUSI-FP) and India (93.75%) stands out.

The analysis shows that only 81 of the 178 possible participating states (i.e., 45.51%) have been present at least once. An analysis of each country's participation on multiple or single occasions also reveals that as many as 64 of the 81 participating states (79.01%) have attended on more than one occasion. Finally, it is intriguing that nine participating states (Nigeria, Egypt, China, Indonesia, Russia, India, Pakistan, Argentina, and Brazil) have participated in 50% or more of the SUSI-FPs. This makes it necessary to explain not only why a majority of states have been excluded, but also to make sense of why some states are recurring participants in the SUSI-FP.

US Foreign Policy Priorities

As noted by several instructors during the 2010 SUSI-FP hosted by the University of Florida, there is hardly a unitary US foreign policy agenda. While it is true that the agenda may vary from administration to administration, it is hard to believe that there are not some priorities that transcend a given administration; therefore, to establish at least some

minimum criteria for analyzing the priorities of US foreign policy, we will evaluate some documents that provide guidelines on US priorities from the second Bill Clinton administration (under which the first SUSI-FP was held) to the second administration of Barack Obama. US foreign policy priorities can be divided into geographic priorities and thematic priorities.

The Second Clinton Administration (1997–2001)[10]

The second Clinton administration highlighted several countries, either as areas of opportunity or as presenting potential danger. Among the states that primarily represented opportunities we list: China, Russia, India, South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Turkey, Cyprus, Pakistan, Ireland, Peru, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Colombia, Uruguay, Mexico, and Vietnam. Two regions were highlighted, the Middle East and the Balkans. Most of these states were considered important because, at the time, most of them were states in transition with populations of a relevant size. The allies of the US were important, but they were not specified. It may be assumed that the main aim for the allied states was to keep them as allies in the post-Cold War world. Among the countries that represented some danger were a group of states that rejected democratic ideals and that presented a physical danger to the US and its allies. This group included: Cuba, Poland, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Syria, and Serbia. There was a second group of states that presented a challenge for the US, but these were not considered to be a significant threat to the security of the US and its allies; among these countries were: several countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Cambodia.

During the Clinton administration (1997–2001), the main areas of interest for US foreign policy were: (a) the alliances with Europe and Asia (considered the cornerstone of US national security); (b) supporting a united Europe; (c) the expansion of NATO to include new democracies such as Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic; (d) updating the strategic alliance with Japan; (e) reducing the North Korean threat; (f) strengthening cooperation with South Korea, so that a trilateral approach (US–Japan–South Korea) could be used to engage with North Korea; (g) creating peace and security in the US through building constructive relations with former adversaries; (h) building a good relationship with Russia, including gaining its cooperation with NATO, the G-8, APEC,

the removal of Russian troops from the Baltics, the reduction of nuclear weapons, and the training of Russian entrepreneurs; (i) engaging China through the fostering of peace in the Taiwan Strait, nonproliferation agreements, and the accession of China to the WTO; (j) facilitating peacemaking and conflict resolution before the escalation of conflicts; (k) building a community of responsible democracies; (l) considering new threats such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, international crime, infectious disease, and environmental damage; (m) maintaining the economic security of the US, including ensuring access to vital resources, specifically oil; (n) limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (o) broadening economic networks, especially with emerging economies; (p) adapting existing alliances to face new problems such as criminal networks, fundamentalist groups, drug-trafficking, and paramilitary forces; (q) providing foreign assistance for HIV/AIDS; (r) supporting increased trade and investment with Africa; and (s) normalizing the relationship with Vietnam.

The First Bush Administration (2001–2005)[11]

The first Bush administration highlighted several countries such as India, Russia, China, Taiwan, Ukraine, Israel, Palestine, Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Pakistan as priorities for its foreign policy. Eurasia was a major focus.

During the first George W. Bush administration, the following aspects of US foreign policy were prioritized: (a) consolidating existing alliances in Europe and Asia; (b) dealing with powers in transition, specifically Russia and China; (c) promoting a fully democratic Western Hemisphere bound together by free trade; (d) defending US interests in the Persian Gulf and promoting peace in the Middle East based upon a secure Israel; (e) the US not isolating itself from the world; (f) Eurasia being the US's greatest strategic priority; (g) seeing China as a competitor rather than a strategic partner; (h) the expansion of the theater missile defenses among allies in the Asia-Pacific; (i) defending Taiwan; (j) the promotion of human rights as a universal value; (k) the rapid and mass dismantling of Russian weapons of mass destruction; (l) consolidating democracy in Russia; (m) encouraging more trade and investment with India, turning it into a force for stability and security in Asia; (n) promoting freedom of religion and consciousness; (o) strengthening of alliances to combat international (state and nonstate-sponsored) terrorism; (p) the support of moderate regimes, especially in the Middle East; (q) devoting US resources to building institutions and

international relations for crisis management; (r) establishing a new economic era based on free trade and free markets; (s) promoting regional investment, especially in Central America, southern Africa, Morocco, and Australia; (t) ensuring energy security by diversifying energy sources especially in the Western Hemisphere, Africa, Central Asia, and the Caspian region; (u) strengthening NATO; and (v) surveilling North Korea from South Korea.

The Second Bush Administration (2005–2009)[12]

The second Bush administration focused its foreign policy on several countries: China, Russia, Taiwan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, and the Middle East and Africa (while working together closely with the African Union).

During the second George W. Bush administration, new priorities were added to those considered important during his first administration including: (a) preventing Iran from building weapons of mass destruction; (b) enabling the full transition of Iraq to democracy and engaging in joint efforts with Iraqi forces to achieve its security; (c) emphasizing the right to use unilateral action and preemptive strikes for the US's self-defense; (d) bringing an end to tyranny; (e) effectively promoting democracy; (f) facilitating stabilization and reconstruction after conflicts; (g) negotiating free trade agreements with Central America, Jordan, Bahrain, Morocco, and Oman; (h) the creation of a global association for nuclear energy; and (i) the promotion of free trade agreements with countries in South America and the Caribbean.

The Obama Administrations (2009–2015)[13]

The Obama administrations highlighted several countries including Kenya, Indonesia, Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Palestine, Pakistan, China, Russia, Israel, Iran, Ukraine, Georgia, Afghanistan, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Australia, Iran, as well as Darfur (before the division of Sudan), and Tibet as foreign policy priorities.

During the Obama administrations, the priorities of US foreign policy have been: (a) creating a strong, innovative, and growing economic system; (b) promoting a sustainable international order; (c) promoting the Global Poverty Act; (d) rejecting isolationism while avoiding US unilateralism; (e)

the promotion of democracy and human rights; (f) promoting the stabilization of the Republic of Congo; (g) funding humanitarian aid for Darfur; (h) loosening restrictions on Cuba; (i) investing in the relationship with Mexico; (j) ameliorating trade relations with China; (k) opposing Russian actions in Georgia and Ukraine; (l) urging Venezuela to reopen dissident radio and TV stations; (m) gaining membership of NATO for Ukraine and Georgia; (n) condemning acts of violence by the Chinese government in Tibet; (o) championing Zimbabwe's transition to democracy; (p) dealing with the resurgence of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan; (q) imposing strong sanctions on countries ignoring the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; (r) achieving energy security through the development of renewable energy; (s) resolving the Israel–Palestine conflict with a two-state solution; (t) expanding its diplomatic network in Africa; (u) strengthening US military forces; (v) empowering communities to combat radicalization; (w) preventing genocide and mass atrocities; and (x) combatting transnational crime.

From these lists of priorities we can see that even with changes in the international environment and within the context of different ideological traditions, some geographical areas and aspects of US foreign policy have remained consistent. The spreading of liberal–democratic values, such as valuing human rights, democracy, free trade and investment, as well as US security have remained high on the foreign policy agenda despite changes in leadership and time. Russia, China, and India, as well as the Middle East have been consistent areas of interest to the US over the decades under study. Other regions have been more transitional as a focus of US foreign policy and their importance has been determined by significant international events and conflicts. The consistency in the prioritization of geographical areas comes from the focus on the principles of liberal–democracy. The promotion of stable, democratic, economically liberal, governments who pursue the liberal cultural agenda in international relations has largely determined which regions of the world have drawn the US's attention over time. The SUSI-FP program fits into this foreign policy agenda very well and the geographical origin of participants over time reflects the priorities identified for each administration. Yet some countries seem to participate much more often than others and sometimes this cannot be explained simply by the US's desire to promote democratic values around the globe.

Analysis of Countries' Endowment of Natural Resources and/or the Presence of US Military Bases

According to the US Energy Information Administration (2013),[14] there are 39 states that hold proven reserves of more than one billion barrels of crude oil. Of those 39 states, 23 have been represented at least once in the SUSI-FP, thus 58.97% of the states that contain proven reserves of over one billion barrels. Of those 23 participant states, 19 (82.61%) have participated on more than one occasion. Also according to the US Energy Information Administration, there are 19 countries producing more than one million barrels of oil per day.[15] Of these 19 states, 12 (63.16%) have been represented at a SUSI-FP at least once. Moreover, ten of those 12 participating states (83.33%) have participated multiple times. The US Energy Information Administration lists 36 states holding more than ten trillion cubic feet of natural gas proved reserves.[16] Of the 36 states, 24 (66.67%) have been represented at least once at a SUSI-FP, and of those 24 participating states, 20 (83.33%) have participated multiple times. According to the same source, there are 32 states producing more than 500 billion cubic feet of dry natural gas.[17] Of those 32 states, 19 (59.37%) have been represented at least once at a SUSI-FP. All 19 participating states (100%) have participated multiple times.

Another element that may be considered in attempting to make sense of the selection of countries is the presence of US military forces. There are many possible ways of defining the presence of military forces. We could consider the simple deployment of troops to or the presence of training centers in a country as enough to categorize it as having a presence of US military forces; however, in order to avoid including too many countries with too broad a definition we will exclude countries that have nonpermanent bases. Using the permanent presence of US troops as a measure, it has been found out that 31 states (Puerto Rico and Guam not included) are home to US military, naval, or air bases.[18] Of these 31 states where the US has a significant military presence, 17 (or 54.84%) have participated in the SUSI-FP at least once. Of these 17 participant states, which are home to US military forces, 11 states (64.71%) have participated on multiple occasions.

Analysis of Countries' Participation Based on Democratic–Nondemocratic Criteria

During the 16 years since the first SUSI-FP, 81 states have been represented at least once. If we categorize those countries into their status as free, partly free, and not free (according to data from Freedom House),[19] 27 participating states have been considered free states during the years that the program has been in place; 22 have been considered partly free; and only 15 states have been considered not free through the years that the program has been taking place. Additionally, seven have been ranked in two different categories (either as not free and then moving to partly free or as partly free and then moving into the free states category); six states have been ranked in two different categories (either as free moving down to partly free, or as partly free moving down to not free). Finally, there is no information for the year that they participated in the program on the status of three states (Jamaica, Serbia, and Swaziland).

The first significant feature to note is that the number of participating states considered as free (27) is almost twice as many as the number of states considered as not free (15). This is surprising provided that if there was a single principle that can be found consistently in US foreign policy through the years that the SUSI programs have been running and across administrations, it is the promotion of democracy. According to the Failed States Index 2013, there are 35 states that are categorized as being on "alert" when it comes to state failure. Of these 35 states, 22 are in sub-Saharan Africa; however, of those 22 states on "alert," only five states (22.72%) have been represented in the SUSI-FP. If we take into consideration the geographic participation of states in the SUSI-FP, this is hardly surprising because, as we noted at the beginning of this paper, sub-Saharan Africa has been one of the least included regions in the program. Of the five participating states considered to be on "alert," three of them (Sudan, Nigeria, and Uganda) appear in the above-mentioned list of countries that have crude oil proved reserves over one billion barrels. Nigeria, which has been represented at 11 SUSI-FPs, is an important producer of both oil and natural gas. This might lead one to think that the sheer promotion of democracy is of little relevance in the absence of material incentives to promote democracy.

On the other hand, while the Failed States Index 2013[20] only has four states in the Near East under the category of "alert," three (or 75%) of them (Yemen, Iraq, and Syria) have been represented at a SUSI-FP. This is

a clear indication that the democratic-freedom agenda may not be as central a piece of US foreign policy as one might think. On the other hand, sound strategic reasons for selecting participants from regions considered vital to US interests is much more important than simply spreading freedom around the globe.

The East Asia-Pacific region has three states labeled as on "alert." One of them, Burma, was represented at the SUSI-FP in 2014. The others (North Korea and Timor-Leste) have not been represented. The South and Central Asian region has five states with the "alert" label. All of them, except Sri Lanka, have been represented at a SUSI-FP. This reinforces the suspicion that the expansion of democracy and the promotion of freedom is one aim of the program; however, states are selected not only because of their need for democratic assistance, but also according to geostrategic criteria. Finally, in the Western Hemisphere, the only state that is considered on "alert" and in danger of failure is Haiti and it has never been represented at a SUSI-FP. Once again, this is hardly surprising given the low consideration that the Western Hemisphere has received in the geographic coverage of the program.

Conclusion

Although there have been 288 participants in the SUSI-FP during the last 16 years, less than half of the states with which the US holds diplomatic relations have participated. The fact that out of 81 participant states nine have participated in 50% or more of the SUSI-FP obliges us to seek the rationality of the selection process of participants according to their nationality. The above analysis suggests that the clear emphasis on the participation of these nine states shows that selection of participants is not solely based on criteria relating to the need for democracy assistance, but it is also based on other strategic criteria. Of those nine most recurring participant states in the SUSI-FP, seven of them are in the world's top ten most populated states, with huge populations (over 100 million people). Also, the populations of Egypt and Argentina are very high in comparison to the rest of their respective regions, despite them not reaching the 100 million mark. It also becomes evident that two regions—sub-Saharan Africa and the Western Hemisphere enjoy a lower priority on the US's foreign policy agenda. It is also important to note the strong presence that the former Soviet states have had in the SUSI-FP. In recent years, it is also possible to observe the shift in US foreign policy focus that Hillary

Clinton called "America's Pacific Century" being reflected in the selection of participants for the SUSI-FP.[21]

Among the possible explanations for the selection of certain countries, as we noted previously, the demographic criteria seems to be crucial, at least for those states that participate most frequently. The analysis of the energy stocks and/or production of these countries is also revealing. Over half of the states that contain large reserves and/or produce significant amounts of oil and/or natural gas have participated in the SUSI-FP. The criteria of hosting permanent US military bases (whether land, sea, or air) is also significant in the selection of countries, as more than half of the participant countries host one or multiple US military bases. The final criterion observed in the analysis was the level of democracy. It is well known that the US has held the promotion of democracy around the globe as a central pillar of its foreign policy throughout its history. The analysis of the priorities of the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations confirm the long-standing priority that the promotion of democracy has been given in the US foreign policy agenda. However, the analysis of the selection of SUSI-FP participants shows that states that are considered either as free or partly free are much more likely to participate in the program than those states considered to be not free. Also, if there is a democratic mission to try to influence those states where conditions are worst, the SUSI-FP does not seem to do much for those states labeled as on "alert" in the Failed States Index. Of the 35 states in clear danger of becoming failed states, only 13 (37.14%) have been represented in the SUSI-FP. This suggests that countries that have already achieved some measure of democracy are more likely to be selected to participate than those who might need the most assistance to achieve democracy.

It has been argued that states that are politically stable are more important to the US's agenda than those that are in the process of power transfer and are, as a result, unstable.[22] Political violence and state failure are the key negative factors that inhibit the success of democratization.[23] It would make sense, then, that the more stable and democratic countries are the target of further investment in terms of funding and soft power programs. The problem with the US taking this view is that it sends mixed messages to the rest of the world, as the rhetoric surrounding democracy assistance does not seem to match the action the US takes. This inconsistency undermines the goals the US is trying to achieve in that the more credible and trusted the US is, the more likely its soft power and efforts at democratization are to work.[24] So if having a large population, being

an important player in the global energy sector, and hosting US military bases are used as the criteria to select participants for the SUSI-FP, it leads people to believe that these are much more important factors for the US's foreign policy agenda than the promotion of democracy and the assistance to states that most need it. This may not be the message the US is trying to send and it may be a self-defeating policy.

Notes

1. We would like to thank the Department of State for sharing with us the lists of participant states in the SUSI on US Foreign Policy (SUSI-FP).
2. A quote from Bard College's website about the program in 2015; Bard College was the host. *Cfr.* Bard College, "U.S. Foreign Policy Summer Institute", 2015, available online at http://www.bard.edu/civicengagement/usfp/ [accessed September 16, 2015].
3. *Cfr.* United States Department of State, "Study of the U.S. Institutes for Scholars", Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Exchange Programs", available online at http://exchanges.state.gov/non-us/program/study-us-institutes-scholars [accessed September 16, 2015].
4. Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York, Public Affairs, 2004), p. 5.
5. Matthew Kroenig, *et al.*, "Taking Soft Power Seriously", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 29, No. 5, 2010, pp. 412–431.
6. Carol Atkinson, "Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs" *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 6, 2010, pp. 1–22.
7. Matthew Kroenig, *et al.*, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 412–431.
8. Carol Atkinson, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 1–22.
9. We must note that in this case, Africa does not encompass the whole continent, but the countries that are listed as Africa in the website of the Department of State (information available on March 2, 2015).
10. The information of the Clinton administration comes from the following sources, The White House, "The Clinton presidency: a foreign policy for the global age". Available at http://clinton5.nara.gov/WH/Accomplishments/eightyears-10.html [accessed March 12, 2015]; David Gompert, "The global environment", in Hans Binnendijk, David Gompert, James Zackrison, *Strategic assessment 1998: Engaging power for peace,* Washington, INSS, 1998; Hans Binnendijk (editor), "Key findings", in Hans Binnendijk, *Strategic assessment 1999: Priorities for a turbulent world,* Washington, INSS, 1999, pp. xi–xx.
11. The information for the first George W. Bush administration comes from the following sources: 4President (website), "George W. Bush 2000 on

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PART II

US Democratization Efforts in Africa

CHAPTER 3

Learning from the Curve: The Obama Administration's Promotion of Democracy in Africa

Osaretin Igbinehimwen Idahosa

Introduction

The excitement that greeted the election of Barack Obama as the forty-fourth president of the US (the first African–American to be so elected) was profound. In Africa, the premise of the jubilation was that since President Obama was of African descent, it was reasonable to expect that the new administration might pursue Africa-friendly policies that were different from those of previous administrations. When President Obama visited Africa in July 2009, expectations about a new vista in US–Africa relations were high. They were buoyed by President Obama's declaration in Accra, Ghana, on July 11, 2009, that democracy promotion was central to US foreign policy. According to the US President, "Africa doesn't need strongmen, it needs strong institutions."[1] This position, many believed, challenged African leaders, whose actions threatened the credibility of the democratic process, to desist from undermining the fairness and integrity of democratic systems on the continent. As a safeguard, the Obama

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administration promised that "the United States will take a strong and consistent stand against actions that undermine democratic institutions or the legitimacy of democratic processes."[2]

However, for a region with a mixed record of democratization (including the emergence of a large number of hybrid regimes committed to effective governance and real economic development but not Western-style democracy) the following questions seem apt in an attempt to assess the Obama administration's focus on strengthening democratic institutions:

(a) How far has the Obama administration been able to prioritize deepening democracy in Africa?
(b) Has the pro-democracy rhetoric by the US provided much needed support for governmental reforms in Africa under President Obama?
(c) Is the Obama administration's avowed mission to evaluate elections in the region against the highest possible standards of fairness and impartiality any different from the positions of previous US administrations?
(d) Has the Obama administration achieved anything on the continent?

The following analysis focuses on the variables prevalent in three African countries, namely, Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt. These countries were chosen based on the impact each has on its respective subregion.

The end of the Cold War brought about a sweeping reorientation of US foreign policy and further change was made in response to the events of September 11, 2001, with war declared on terrorism. These changes were brought about by the impact that these two catalysts had on the US's global power. In the post-Cold War and 9/11 era, world scholars have struggled to define Washington's place in global politics. Charles Krauthammer believed that the US would dominate a unipolar moment before the system would give way to multipolarity.[3] Samuel Huntington argued that the current system is neither unipolar nor multipolar but a strange hybrid of both. As such, we are in a world in which "[t]he settlement of key international issues requires action by the single superpower but always with some combination of other major states."[4] Beyond the struggle for an explanation of the US place in the new international system, there is also a need to redefine the US global interests. Issues on the African continent have not historically been identified as strategic priorities to US foreign policy, and America's engagement in the region has been sporadic. According to Letitia Lawson, "During the Cold War, United States foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa had little to do

with Africa."[5] It was used as a pawn in the Cold War struggle for influence and power. As such, deepening democracy in Africa is of little interest to the US and it is seen as "moralism," which does not fit with the realist approach to US foreign policy. There is great debate around how to create interest in the US for the promotion of global democracy. This reflects the fact that democracies often have conflicting priorities and democracy promotion is not necessarily a panacea to international peace. One of the basic assumptions in liberal thought on international relations is that established democracies never go to war with one another. The realist approach to foreign policy, however, advocates interstate relations being conducted on the basis of interests, irrespective of the character of government, in order to preserve stability at the international arena. Nevertheless, durable stability stems from domestic politics built on consensus and peaceful competition, which, in turn, promotes a corresponding healthy international politics.

Furthermore, there has been a long debate about whether democracy enhances economic development. The meteoric growth of China in recent years (without following the liberal democratic model) challenges this notion. A set of African leaders believe that economic development must precede democracy. They reject the view that democratization and development are mutually supportive. Even in the US, critics of America's efforts at promoting global democracy argue that the US national interest is not fully served when foreign policy objectives are defined in moralistic terms, and that policy should be designed only to serve national interests. On a closer inspection, one finds that the main US interest in Africa is the peaceful development of the continent so that it is no longer a region of instability and poverty that requires US assistance or intervention. Achieving this goal depends on the collaboration between the US and Africa to promote and deepen democratic institutions on the continent.

US–Africa Relations in Retrospect

The US was not a party to the original scramble for Africa in the 1880s and 1890s. This period witnessed European nations (Britain, France, Portugal, Spain, Germany, and Belgium) turning African societies into colonies following a formal partition at the Berlin Conference between 1884 and 1885. The Berlin Conference provided these European nations with legitimacy to govern Africa politically, militarily, and economically according to their spheres of control.[6] Apart from Liberia (a creation of

the US for returning freed slaves from the American subcontinent), the US has no known involvement in the colonial antiquity in Africa.

Nonetheless, the US has been engaged with Africa for over six decades, with the establishment of State Department Bureau for African Affairs under President Dwight Eisenhower in 1958. Throughout the Cold War period, the US devoted less attention to the continent as compared to other regions of perceived greater concern. Arguably, this official neglect of Africa in US policy-making was a result of a combination of a lack of adequate knowledge about the continent among US officials, and the absence of any deep interest in the region because of a belief that Africa should be the responsibility of the ex-colonial European powers.

Since September 11, 2001, US involvement in Africa has grown. 2002 saw a major shift in US–Africa relations in the post-Cold War era. In that year, officials from both the Pentagon and the State Department defined Africa as a significant potential threat to American national Security.[7] In that same year, the US House of Representatives subcommittee on African affairs observed that the policy of official neglect of Africa in US foreign policy could no longer continue. In a bipartisan meeting of members of the US Congress, some of Washington's most experienced African policy-makers confirmed that the continent was being seen in a new way.[8] Two of the reasons given for the reevaluation of US policy toward Africa were terrorism and oil.

The significance of Africa to US national security was articulated by Paul Wolfowitz, former US Deputy Secretary of Defense, when he addressed military officers and government officials from 42 African countries. He confirmed that Africa was growing in importance and stressed that it was imperative to build strong governing institutions (including military ones, which in his worldview, would play a vital role) to stabilize the region and prevent terrorist infiltration.[9] Africa's importance as it related to oil was made clear by both the former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Walter Kansteiner and the former Deputy Assistant of Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, Michael Westphal, who stated that protecting "US National Security" included the use of the military for protecting oil production.[10] The events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent war in Iraq, emphasized the US's need for access to oil supplies beyond the Middle East. As such, African oil and natural gas are critical elements to US national security.

The Bush administration's policy initiative in Africa began with the establishment of Africa Command (AFRICOM), a military command responsible for all US military activities in Africa. AFRICOM is a US

Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command; that is, a command composed of forces from two or more military services and a broad and continuing mission. AFRICOM is devoted to both military and humanitarian services for 53 African countries and combines the various US military programs in Africa under a single organizational umbrella. Egypt, because of its proximity and shared history with the Middle East, falls within Central Command's (CENTCOM) area of responsibilities and not AFRICOM's. Egypt is, however, part of Africa and is considered as such for the purposes of this study.

The inauguration of President Obama created excitement in Africa because it expected that the new administration would focus more attention on the continent than previous administrations and a new era of constructive engagement would ensue. President Obama raised expectations for a progressive approach toward democracy in the continent when he declared that "I see Africa as a fundamental part of our interconnected world; as partners with America on behalf of the future we want for all our children. That partnership must be grounded in mutual responsibility and mutual respect."[11] Moreover, the Obama administration's strategy toward Africa, which is derived from a Presidential Policy Directive, built on numerous US accomplishments in the region—strengthening democratic institutions, promoting regional peace and security, engaging with young African leaders, and promoting development, trade and investment. Despite the initial enthusiasm about the possibility of US involvement in democracy promotion in the region, the Obama administration has been confronted by a series of urgent and highly visible issues and failed to act. Political upheaval in Egypt, unexpected political events in South Africa and the possibility of a dubious electoral outcome in Nigeria have all challenged the US's ability to promote democracy in the region.

Beyond the Veil

True democracies are expected to put the interests of the citizens above those of their leaders. Democracy goes beyond fair elections; rule of law; accountability; freedom of association, assembly, opinion, and expression; equality; and responsiveness. It is the people's will determining society's direction. Multiparty democracy swept across Africa in the early 1990s as single-party states and authoritarian leaders bowed to both national and external pressure to democratize. During this period, the continent exhibited the same general pattern of rapid democratization as the rest

of the world. Academics and observers alike hoped greater political freedom and strong institutions would pave the way for more government accountability and more effective development. Decades on, democracy in the region has not improved regional development as the privileged elites exercise their political power without full regard for the public interest. Self-interested leadership and unresponsive governments have conspired to reverse the democratic gains made on the continent since the end of the Cold War.

A critical canvassing of the achievements of democracy across the continent reveals what Thorvaldur Gylfason calls "anocratic rule" (or oligarchic rule), which is a system of government where power is vested in largely self-appointed political elites rather than in public institutions. It is a hybrid between democracy and autocracy.[12] Gylfason, outlines a spectrum of governing authority that spans from fully institutionalized autocracies through mixed or incoherent authoritarian regimes (termed anocracies) to fully institutionalized democracies. According to Gylfason, between 1960 and 1989 the number of democracies in Africa stayed relatively stable at four, but the number of autocracies rose from 17 to 40.[13] After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, there was a radical change in governance in the region. Thus, by 2011 the number of democracies had risen from four to 17, while within the same period, the number of autocracies fell to single digits. Part of the reason for this development was the removal of support for command regimes that were used as ideological proxies by the great powers during the Cold War. During this period there was also an explosion of anocracies (30 existed in 2012).

Since the emergence of the US as a major global power, it has claimed to champion the cause of universal democracy. During the Cold War, each succeeding administration in Washington recited pro-democracy rhetoric in its engagement with international community. The Obama administration's key statements about its relations with Africa have been based on strengthening democratic institutions on the continent. Washington's position runs the risk of "extraversion." Extraversion is a concept used to refer to external influence. Peiffer and Englebert claim that there were rapid improvements in democracy in Africa from 1989 to 1995, which were followed by overall stagnation in progress toward democracy and so regimes merely consolidated the level of democratization they had attained by 1995. They imply that sustained external support for political transformation in Africa is necessary for the deepening of democratic development. This study uses the three case studies mentioned above, Egypt,

South Africa, and Nigeria, to measure the impact of Obama's Africa policy on the promotion of democracy in the region.[14]

Egypt

Since the military *coup d'etat* that ousted King Farouk on July 23, 1952, Egypt has been ruled by successive authoritarian governments. Of all the past leaders (Mohammed Naguib, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Mohammed Anwar Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, and Mohammed Morsi), only Mohammed Morsi had a civilian background. Even the current president, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, holds a rank within the military. As a result, the Egyptian military has always played an important role in the political, social, and economic life of the country. The military, as a subsector of the Egyptian state, is deeply respected by the citizens of Egypt. It is not surprising, therefore, that after the overthrow of Mubarak's regime, army Generals assumed responsibility for the management of the transition process and became the custodians of the 2011 "revolution."

The Egyptian revolution enjoyed support from civilians and the military alike. Soldiers joined demonstrations and the protesters were convinced that the military would protect the revolution and move the country toward democracy. In fact, the day after the fall of Mubarak, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the military body that managed the affairs of Egypt through the transition period, vowed to "ensure a peaceful transition of authority within a free and democratic system that allows an elected civilian authority to take charge of governing the country."[15] Since then, Egypt has played host to three successive governments in its march toward democracy. Each of these governments tried to impose a political system that favored its allies and contained or excluded its enemies. None succeeded. The Mubarak dictatorship failed when the army (initially its ally) refused to be used as a tool to put down protests with force. Mubarak's successor, Field Marshall Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, bowed to public pressure for parliamentary elections in 2011, followed by presidential elections in June 2012, bringing to power an Islamist-controlled parliament headed by President Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. President Morsi soon declared that his actions were above judicial review and forced a constitution written almost exclusively by members of his party through the parliament. The threat of civil strife between secular and Islamist groups that followed seemed to convince the army that the political class had botched the transition. The army removed

President Morsi from power in a popularly backed *coup d'etat* on July 3, 2013. They also arrested senior members of his party and supporters of the former president.

Initially, the army enjoyed support from citizens who were tired of instability, economic hardship, and marginalization caused by incompetent civilian leadership. However, as time went on the crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters became more and more brutal. Well over 1000 Egyptians have been killed and at least 22,000 people have been jailed (including foreign journalists) since the July 2013 military-backed ousting of the democratically elected President Mohammed Morsi.[16] Many people who were peacefully expressing political opposition to Morsi's overthrow and to the Al-Sisi government have been caught up in the mass arrests. As a result, the military's support is slipping away.

In Egypt, both mainstream Islamists and their secular opponents generally agree that the country should be governed by free and fair elections. Unlike Tunisia, where a similar uprising against a long-standing dictatorship resulted in a coalition of Islamist and secular parties, Egyptian political parties could not find a middle ground, making politics a violent, zero-sum game. Two overlapping forces make this possible in the political life of the country: (a) the deep state (the military) and (b) Islamic fundamentalist movement. The mutual inclusiveness of these two opposing forces and the sheer enormousness of the challenges they pose to Egypt, partly explains why the country was adrift when Morsi was president. Consequently, Egypt's economic and political problems continued unchecked and expanded so that the country became impossible to govern.

Since the emergence of the US as a global superpower, it has worked with Egypt to protect a stable regional order in the Middle East. After the fall of President Mubarak, Washington's approach has been to remain engaged with Cairo and work with whoever is in power. The success of this policy hinges on the fact that the US has strong interests in Egypt, no matter who is in charge of the country. Beyond the strategic relevance of Arab oil to the US economy, Egypt's Suez Canal is a vital lifeline for international trade. The US–Egyptian security partnership is important in the fight against violent extremists on the Arabian Peninsula. Equally important is US–Israeli cooperation, which is necessary for subregional security in the Arab world.

The Obama administration's emphasis on stability in Egypt was espoused in his 2009 Cairo speech. In that address, Obama spoke to the Arab and Muslim world about the principles of justice, progress, tolerance, and dignity,

while at the same time highlighting US interests in the region.[17] However, midway through his second term in office, the administration has had a difficult task of balancing US strategic and national security interests with the promotion of democracy in the region, especially in Egypt. While it is true that the Obama administration's handling of the crisis that led to the ousting of President Mubarak was fair, the same cannot be said of the administration's record of affirming human rights and democracy in Egypt. Both the construction and execution of Egypt's political transition lacked the much needed transparency for genuine democratic reform. The top-down nature of the constitutional reform, coupled with the haste of the elections reflected the military's guidance of the situation. It was reminiscent of Mubarak's performance in the previous electoral cycle, when the Muslim Brotherhood appeared to be heading for victory in the parliamentary elections in November 2005.

The reaction of the Obama administration to these challenges shows elements of continuity not only with traditional US policy in the entire Middle Eastern region but also with the policies of the latter stages of the Bush administration; pursuing regional stability at the cost of democratic reform. Thus, the pursuit of economic liberalization has always gone hand in hand with traditional US efforts toward political liberalization and more often than not, the former has obscured the latter, as in Egypt. The Obama administration's agenda is strongly influenced by the idea that democracy and the free market overlap. This has been the prevailing understanding since the 1970s. The Obama administration might be willing to settle for an autocratic regime (regardless of its human rights record) in order to protect the US's national interests. American support is crucial to the survival of democracy in Egypt but challenging the convoluted version of democratic ideals espoused by President Al-Sisi's regime will likely lead to regional instability. The challenge facing the Obama administration is to support democratic reform in Egypt while maintaining some political stability.

South Africa

In terms of regime stability, South Africa ranks above most African countries. Since the fall of apartheid in 1994, giant strides have been made by the African National Congress (ANC)-led governments to move forward from South Africa's monstrous past. Evidence of newfound freedoms abound as citizens (regardless of race) go about their daily lives. South

Africans are fully integrated citizens of the world, ruled by democratic institutions and with a constitution to be proud of. The rule of ANC governments has provided some economic transformation, access to health and education, and movement toward relatively harmonious race relations.

Nonetheless, South Africa is one of the top five most unequal societies on earth. As Thabo Mbeki, South Africa's second democratically elected president once put it:

> A major component part of the issue of reconciliation and nation building is defined by and derives from the material conditions in our society which have divided our country into two nations, the one black and the other white … the relatively rich, who, as a result of an apartheid definition, are white, prepared to help underwrite the upliftment of the poor, who as a result of an apartheid definition, are black.[18]

South Africa's average economic growth rate of 1.9% for 2013 lagged well behind the sub-Saharan average of 4.9%.[19] Unemployment, which stands at a national average of 30%, provides a launching pad for protests with a regularity that undermines future economic development in the country. This is complicated by the parlous state of social facilities. The educational sector serves as a constant reference point. This is the cost of corruption and poor leadership that has crept into the political system of South Africa.

After the initially smooth and enthusiastic movement into the post-*apartheid* period, the ANC government's activities have betrayed its idealistic principles. There is a real threat that tighter control over the judiciary and the government's critics (especially the independent media) will be instituted. Intolerance for the judicial checks on executive power associated with the government's aversion to any criticism of executive policies and actions raises questions about the future of democracy in South Africa. The Mo Ibrahim index of African Governance showed that although in 2014 South Africa ranked fourth overall among African governments, its score has been on a downward trend with significant reduction in scores for safety and rule of law, accountability, and political participation.[20] President Obama in a speech delivered in Cape Town on June 30, 2013 said:

> …if the dignity of the individual is upheld across Africa, then I believe Americans will be more free as well, because I believe that none of us are fully free when others in the human family remain shackled by poverty or

> disease or oppression … Governments that respect the rights of their citizens and abide by the rule of law do better, grow faster, draw more investment than those who don't.[21]

The Obama administration's mission to help African countries strengthen their political institutions, address the challenge of installing democratic governance, promote an active and empowered civil society, and uphold human rights has so far yielded mixed dividends in South Africa. This is partly due to the rather fractious relations between the two countries over the years. At the heart of this relationship is the long-held attitude of South Africans that democracy really means the "strong" prevailing against the "weak." South Africa's external relations (particularly with the West) are guided by this ethos and it continues to determine South African foreign relations. The result is a duality in the country's relations with Western liberal democracies. In the *apartheid* era, Pretoria saw some countries providing basic support to the ANC as antagonistic to its core values. On the other hand, the ANC came to associate democratic transitions with overcoming Western neo-imperialism. This legacy fed into the reluctance by post-*apartheid* governments to fully accept support from interventionist foreign governments. Since 1994, South Africa arguably has elevated itself into the role of a guarantor and promoter of democratic norms and values in Africa. As the ANC sees it, this messianic role does not require external assistance. Unfortunately, in the last two decades, democracy and democratic values have been on the decline in South African civil society. How well the Obama administration handles the issue of confidence building in its relations with South Africa will set the tone for the reinvigoration of democracy in that country.

Nigeria

Full political independence was achieved in Nigeria in 1960. The departing colonial administration left behind a parliamentary system based on regionalism. Most academics agree that regardless of the frail areas where tensions spring from ethnic rivalry and mutual suspicion, inexperience of some key political actors and immature democratic institutions, the parliamentary system that existed between 1960 and 1966 was relatively successful. This period (commonly referred to as the First Republic) was followed by a devastating Civil War fought between 1967 and 1970. Consequently, Nigeria's political history became tainted by successive military conflicts.[22]

On October 1, 1979, civilian rule was restored in Nigeria when the Obasanjo-led military regime handed over power to the democratically elected president, Shehu Shagari. The defining achievement of the newly installed civil administration was the introduction of a Constitution that established a government modeled on the American presidential system. Although the overall performance of the Shagari administration is debatable, there is a convergence of opinion that it did not meet the needs of the citizenry; hence a coup ousted it from office. From 1985 until 1999, the military controlled Nigeria politics.

Democratic rule returned to Nigeria in 1999 and expectations were high among Nigerians at home and in diaspora communities. The Obasanjo administration (the first civilian administration since the Fourth Republic) inherited numerous governance challenges brought about by decades of incompetent leadership. Attempts to tackle these challenges through policy intervention became the focus of the administration. One of the greatest achievements of the administration was establishing the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC). The EFCC was so effective that despite the criticism that the agency was an instrument for persecuting enemies of the administration, mere mention of it caused fear in corrupt Nigerians. The Yar'Adua administration was too short-lived to warrant any meaningful assessment in this study.

The Goodluck administration was plagued by a combination of the tenacious and pervasive grip of corruption and the security threat posed by Boko Haram's insurgency in the north-east of Nigeria. Security is the most important measure of an effective state. The territorial integrity of a state must be protected against external aggression and national insurrection. It is the foundation on which the viability of governance is constructed. In Nigeria, the Goodluck administration has witnessed a heightened deterioration of national security since its inception. Intermittent extremist religious uprisings have exploded into a full-scale war. Not only have hundreds of innocent lives been lost, the Nigerian military was deployed to reclaim seized territory from the violent Islamic sect known as Boko Haram.

In terms of corruption and electoral fraud, Nigeria has had a mixed record since the beginning of the Fourth Republic in 1999. The very definition of democracy hinges on elections that offer the people the opportunity to exercise their right to determine their government. Nigeria has conducted many elections in the past. The April 2007 election offers an

opportunity to assess the behavior of the ruling elite and, perhaps, gauge the future of democracy in the country. The entire process, according to different reports, fell far short of the required standard.[23] The 2007 election was not credible because it lacked transparency and there was widespread fraud. Many polling booths were controlled by opponents of the ruling party (The People's Democratic Party) and were denied materials to conduct the election. In some cases, these materials were eventually supplied when voters had returned home after waiting at the booth in vain. Furthermore, at many polling stations, thugs were used to steal the election materials and to thumbprint ballot papers in favor of their candidates. In some places, law enforcement agents like the police were used to rig the election for the ruling party's candidates. The power of incumbency was also used to intimidate opponents and their voters at the state level. Where the incumbent Governor was challenged by other candidates, every available means was used to rig the election against the opponents. According to the European Union (EU) Elections Observation Report of 2007:

> …[The elections] were marred by very poor organization, lack of essential transparency, widespread procedural irregularities, substantial evidence of fraud, widespread voter disenfranchisement at different stages of the process, lack of equal conditions for political parties and candidates, and numerous incidents of violence.[24]

The conditions outlined above show that democracy faces grievous challenges in Nigeria. This is where the commitment of the Obama administration's self-declared goal to work to strengthen democratic institutions in sub-Saharan Africa through high-level diplomatic engagement and institution building is most sorely tested. Nigeria is a powerhouse in Africa. As such, a stable and democratic Nigeria would positively affect the fortunes of democracy on the continent.

Looking Ahead

The joy that greeted the election of Barack Obama as the US president was premised on the fact that he would advance America's engagement with Africa. When President Obama visited the continent in July 2009, his major address on Africa policy, delivered in Accra, Ghana, was generally well received, with African leaders broadly reassured by its themes of self-reliance

and good governance. Since then, President Obama has tried to convince Africa of his sincere attempts to improve US–Africa relations. The Obama administration has taken some bold steps to effect the changes that are necessary to improve US diplomacy in the region. Notably, the US government has worked to restore democracy to Cote d'Ivoire after the crisis that followed the 2010 presidential election in the country; it helped to lead an international effort to advance reforms in Kenya in the wake of the 2007–2008 postelection violence; it launched the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in 2011 and built on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement's (CPA) implementation that culminated in the peaceful referendum for the independence of South Sudan in 2011.

Nonetheless, many African countries believe that the Obama administration's foreign policy toward the continent has failed to meet the expectations created by his early rhetoric. Africa leaders do not fully agree with the Obama administration's recipe for democracy building and creating strong national governance. The sentiment in Egypt is that the US, under President Obama's leadership, has not kept pace with the drastically altered political landscape in the country. Most Egyptians believe that the US has not sufficiently matched its professed commitment to support political transition with the allocation of resources and support that would ensure the process is successful. For example, the US faltered in its efforts to help the first democratically elected government (the Morsi administration) in Egypt to consolidate its democratic gains. Rather, the Obama administration appeared to establish cordial relations with the Al-Sisi administration who seemed to align better with US interests. This hindered Egyptian progress toward democracy. Notably, human rights (a key component of democracy) abuses, which are widespread and grave in Egypt, are often downplayed or ignored.

Elsewhere in Africa, many believe that the West's suggestions for solutions to the continent's problems (like corruption and poor governance) are based on prejudice and stereotypes. Others are of the view that since African problems are basically domestically generated, they cannot be solved by foreign intervention. In line with this thinking, South African President Jacob Zuma made it clear that Western companies must change their old "colonial" approach to Africa.[25] It should be noted, however, that many Africans are still hopeful for the future of the Obama administration's policy for Africa. To achieve a more discerning US–Africa policy, the Obama administration should integrate the following recommendations into the conduct of relations with the region:

(a) Move beyond the rhetoric of democracy promotion to reinforce the importance of democratic governance in Africa through developing public support for civil society groups. This should be accompanied by increased funding and monitoring that would empower these groups to be effective agents of political socialization. This will send an important message to governments in the region that the US stands firmly behind and expansion of civil and political rights.
(b) Promote, support, and improve security cooperation with Africa. The continent provides fertile ground for state fragility. This tendency reverses the fortunes of democratic development, and good governance cannot thrive in the absence of state security. The Obama administration should, therefore, increase funding and logistical support for training and increased professionalism of African militaries to better enable them to provide regional security. Providing more resources for the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) to help allied African forces deal with regional crises (from terrorist attacks to peacekeeping support and other emergencies) would help.
(c) US–Africa relations need to be thoroughly reevaluated to take into account ongoing upheavals and demands for change in Africa. America's support, in whatever form, should be used to advance the genuine quest for democracy as well as civil and political liberties.
(d) While President Obama believes in the advancement of democracy in Africa through strengthening institutions, Africans are of the view that this can only be meaningful when there is a corresponding advancement of the economy of the continent. A reassessment of US–Africa economic relations to accommodate this development is required.

Conclusion

From President Reagan to President Obama, US presidents have adopted pro-democracy rhetoric when referring to US interests in Africa. This rhetoric has not reflected the reality of US–Africa relations over the years. While it could be argued that the Obama administration has improved on the records of his predecessors, specifically in terms of democracy promotion in Africa, there is still a long way to go to elevate the continent to a position of priority in American foreign policy. In the three case studies examined in this study (Egypt, South Africa, and Nigeria), President Obama's score card for deepening democracy is mixed. Although certain policy actions indicate that democracy and human rights are an important priority to the Obama Administration, there are few indications (midway into the second term) that his policy toward democracy promotion in these important strategic partners of the US in the region will change significantly. In relation to President Al-Sisi's dictatorship in Egypt (an

important ally to the US in the subregion), it is unlikely that the Obama administration will drastically change US policy. President Obama has publicly declared that "…our security interests will sometimes necessitate that we work with regimes with which we have fundamental disagreements."[26] The US must know that the removal of an old dictator and the subsequent replacement with a new dictator is not the way to develop democracy in the volatile political environment of Egypt.

South Africa and Nigeria present similar challenges to the Obama administration's foreign policy and its effectiveness. The complexity of these challenges, as well as the multitude of issues they generate, mean that they have been put into the "too hard basket" of the Obama administration. For example, the efficacy of President Obama's democracy promotion in Africa will be put to the test by the outcome of the March 28, 2015 presidential election in Nigeria. The US response will be the barometer used to gauge President Obama's legacy of democracy promotion in Africa.

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CHAPTER 4

The US, Democratization, and the Postcolonial States in Sub-Saharan Africa: Development or Distortion? A Critical Appraisal

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Introduction

Any keen observer of politics in postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa would be dismayed at the prevailing "state capture" and "political power mongering" of the dictatorship-inclined rulers of these states, most of whom enjoy outstanding relations with the harbinger of liberal democracy—the US.[1] This chapter argues that, despite the US's claim to liberal democracy and its longstanding involvement in the region's democratization processes, sub-Saharan African states are in decline because democratic institutions and culture are missing. Thus, noting the insufficient study in this domain, this chapter engages with relevant theoretical and empirical analysis to demonstrate that there is institutionalization of state capture and political power mongering sustained by the region's rulers who loathe democracy as it diminishes their power and control over the people and resources of

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their countries. Using the human needs and structural-functional theories, this chapter refutes statements of this type and reveals that the people of this region prefer democracy to tyranny, but the entrenchment of democracy is impeded by the resurgence of dominant political parties operating within centralized political systems with the tacit approval of the US.

Theoretical Framework of the Analysis: The Human Needs and the Structural-Functional Theories

Human Needs Theory

This theory implies that people really only define their place in society based on the satisfaction of their needs. Human needs, in their diverse forms, are the root of all human conflicts. Although conflict resolution is not the focus of this work, this premise provides an understanding of the US's involvement in the democratization processes in sub-Saharan Africa.[2] It is argued here that the US's behavior is confrontational, that is, it tends to revolve around covert, sometimes overt, nonconciliatory actions based on a one-sided relationship. It is essentially the proclivity to acquire specific human needs that impels the US to interfere in the economic, political, social, and cultural affairs of sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, it would be foolhardy to believe that US involvement is based on care for the well-being of sub-Saharan Africans. Essentially, the US is in sub-Saharan Africa because of its interest in gaining access to the economic resources found there. Claude Ake argues that over the years, Africans have fooled themselves into believing that the US has an agenda to democratize African countries. Despite professing the democratic peace theory, the US does not intend to direct significant resources into democratization efforts in Africa.[3]

If human needs dictate human behavior, on an individual and international level, this theory explains how the US is able to deceive sub-Saharan Africans into believing that it is satisfying their human needs by providing liberal democracy and economic growth.[4] Irrefutably, the US faces numerous accUStions about its shying away from working for liberal democracy and economic growth in this region. However, by denying the people of this region these needs, John Mueller asserted that the US is behaving in a manner that is counterproductive to fighting the war against terrorism, as by its actions it undermines its own rhetoric and turns friends into

enemies.[5] Sub-Saharan Africans want to believe that the US supports the region and so they will support the US in return, but without clear demonstration of the US's friendly intent there is little evidence to preserve that belief. For the purposes of this work, the needs that sub-Saharan Africans are seeking to fulfill are: the dissuasion of tyrannical rulers, the ability to voice dissent against bad governments, and the entrenchment of liberal democracy, with its freedom, economic growth, human happiness, progress, and prosperity. Thus, according to Dennis J. D. Sandole, "… the human needs theory as an academic tool for analysis has proved to be lucidly scholarly in explaining when, why, how, for what and who goes into conflict over needs in their respective diverse nature and character worldwide."[6] Similarly, Christopher Mitchell posits, "…the human needs theory amply provides concrete responses to the necessitous man and his quest for conflict resolution…; and more importantly to provide answers to more basic questions about human needs in society…"[7]

Structural-Functional Theory

Structural-functional theory, a social sciences thesis with origins in biology, focuses on the character and structure of organizations and how this structure determines the functions or outputs of such structures.[8] Simply put, the structural character of organizations determines the character of output and the degree of positive or negative functions performed by such organizations. The majority of people in sub-Saharan Africa believe that the structural organization of their states (overbearing, centralized, with immense power at the disposal of one person—the Head of State, with little accountability) largely inhibits the functionality of liberal democracy in them. On the contrary, they believe that when the structure of the state is such that state power is fully devolved into various units of the state, within constitutionally guaranteed frameworks, the various structures will perform functions that will not be antagonistic to democracy and economic growth.

Thus, this theory provides the theoretical underpinning that explains how the character of state organization in postcolonial sub-Saharan African states do not allow democratic rule. There are four functional imperatives of all action systems, and these illuminate the present work. These activities are (a) Adaptation; (b) Goal attainment; (c) Integration; (d) Latency or pattern maintenance.[9] Each of these four activities is aimed

at meeting a need or multiple needs of a social system and is imperative to the survival of the system. Adaptation refers to a situation whereby a system must adjust to its environment and fine-tune the environment to meet its needs, especially those of majority of the people. More specifically, a system must cope with external situational dangers and contingencies.[10] Thus, a system cannot remain long at odds with its environment. This mismatch of system and environment describes postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa, ruled by dictators yet craving to be democratic. Jean-Germain Gros argues that the social conditions that existed under President Ahmadou Ahidjo, who was in power from 1960 to 1982, favored tyranny because a leader was required that could unite the French- and English-speaking sides of Cameroonian society. Under a dictatorship they were forcibly brought together.[11] Today, Cameroonians need change; hence, as Ritzer posits, "…if the systems continue to rebuff changes (as in the case of several other post-colonial sub-Saharan African states), such systems will be in grave danger of perishing."[12] Goal attainment involves a system being able to define and redefine its primary goals, which ultimately must not only be surviving into the future, but also growth and expansion to accommodate new ideas and methods of human progress and happiness.

Integration demands that a system regulates the interrelationship of its component parts.[13] Thus, where a state succeeds in establishing a democracy, it must also create a viable liberal economic system, and then seek to integrate personal freedom, free and fair elections within multiparty politics, periodic peaceful transfers of political power, and an accountable bureaucracy. Ritzer observed that Parsons called the fourth functional imperative Latency, or pattern maintenance.[14] Latency refers to the need for a system to furnish, maintain, and renew the cultural patterns that create and sustain individual and group motivation. Accordingly, latency is embedded in the functional theory of social stratification, which gives individuals the opportunity to self-actualize based on each individual's capacity to attain educational and economic credentials to climb the society's social ladder.[15] Latency squarely explains the current feelings of the people of sub-Saharan Africa, "…whose educational and economic opportunities have been thwarted by the character and degrees of state capturers and political power mongers, whose stock-in-trade has been to facilitate only their self-maintenance culture to the detriment of the majority's progress and happiness."[16]

Liberalism and democracy are used deceptively by the US in sub-Saharan Africa by engaging into sins of commission, rather than of omission. One such sin of commission is the conscious and direct impoverishment of the

populations of sub-Saharan Africa, through deceptive economic partnerships with the US. Another sin is found in the promotion of the resurgence of tyranny for the narrow economic self-interest of the US. The US is also complicit in the leeway provided to Communist China to move into the economic and social vacuum created by the absence of liberal democracy in the region. In this analysis, I refer to the sheer refusal of the US to reject the re-emerging dictatorial regimes in sub-Saharan Africa as an unforgivable sin of commission. Certainly, the US has placed concern for its economic interests above value for human life and happiness in the region.[17] The US's neglectful posture toward the woes confronting the people of this region, who trust in the US's ability to rescue them, could be translated as a sin of omission. This is so, because the US foreign policy-makers and their local constituencies are deeply ill-informed; and do not care to be so informed of the actual political, economic, and social challenges facing the people of this region. After the jubilant embrace of multiparty politics in the early 1990s by sub-Saharan Africans, it was expected that by 2015, multiparty politics would have facilitated the institutionalization of democratic principles and economic growth.[18]

Truth-Seeking Liberalism and Democracy

According to George Sabine and Thomas Thorson, the concept of liberalism is clear: politics aims to preserve individual rights and maximize freedom of choice. Liberalism as a political movement can ill-afford to part ways with humanitarianism, for the good of humanity is a powerful motive for liberals to pursue their agenda.[19] The US, which was founded on a liberal economic movement, as well as a liberal political philosophy, has, in the case of the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa, decided to separate humanitarianism from US foreign policy. Liberalism, as a political and an economic philosophy, was born some four centuries ago, at the beginning of the English Civil War.[20] Liberalism emerged as a major doctrine in response to the religious wars that gripped Europe throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[21] However, the scholarly foundations of liberalism were established by the English philosopher John Locke, and drew added impetus from the Enlightenment, which questioned old traditions of societies and governments in the eighteenth century. Thus, the truth-seeking character of liberal democracy calls for enlightened understanding of human relations and the provision of a free and level playing field in both politics and economics. And this is what the US is failing to create in Africa.

The concept of liberalism eventually coalesced into powerful revolutionary movements that toppled archaic regimes all the over the world, especially in Europe and the Americas.[22] Locke had espoused the belief that all people are created equal in the eyes of the law, and this important political and legal principle eventually became the cornerstone of the new government developed by the colonists in the US. Locke developed a radical political notion that "…government acquires consent from the governed, and without which such a government is illegitimate."[23] This philosophy is completely absent from politics in sub-Saharan African states, yet, these states claim to be practicing liberal democracy. In fact, majority of governments in sub-Saharan Africa do not obtain their mandates from their peoples' consent, but enjoy the acquiescence of the US, so they act with impunity over matters of governance. In many African countries, the US supports electoral results, irrespective of the lack of accountability, transparency, or legitimacy of such results. The US's vital interest is in Africa's natural resources, and not the manipulation of elections or achieving liberal democracy.[24]

In his leading *Two Treatises of Government* (1690), the foundational text of liberal ideology, Locke outlined his major ideas comprising of coherently described principles of the liberal movement; the right to private property, the freedom to speak and be heard, and the obligation to acquire consent and to obtain political power from the governed.[25]

> Men being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the liberty of the state of nature. When any number of men has so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority has a right to act and conclude the rest.[26]

Locke laid the foundation stone of democratic governance, now simply referred to as liberal democracy. This new thinking became more widespread and it became a more common belief that no citizen within the regime can claim to rule by natural right, jettisoning the consent

of the governed. In postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa this obligation to obtain the peoples' consent in order to govern has not been found to be necessary, keeping those yearning for democratic rule in a state of despair. Ironically, governments in the region are said to emanate from the people.

Theorizing about liberalism went beyond Locke, and people began to question the legitimacy of monarchies. This led to a period of revolutions in Europe—a period of profound intellectual vitality that questioned old traditions and influenced several European monarchies throughout the eighteenth century. Therefore, besides the Enlightenment, a rising tide of industrialization and urbanization in Western Europe during the eighteenth century also greatly contributed to the growth of liberal societies by spurring individual and group commercial and entrepreneurial activities. Thus, liberal ideas gained worldwide momentum, with the US at the forefront. When it came time to spread these ideas to sub-Saharan Africa, the US was blinded by self-interest and economic greed.

To African political leaders, democracy is seen simply as the conduct of elections. This has been the case with Egypt, Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Angola, Ivory Coast, Sudan, Togo, Guinea Bissau, Guinea Conakry, and several other sub-Saharan African states. In its deeper principles, democracy represents the true expression of the people's sovereign will to periodically select the representatives that provide for their welfare. It is this sense that Abraham Lincoln simply but sophisticatedly described democracy as "…government of the people, for the people and by the people."[27] In contemporary times, democracy has become a most cherished value that has attained near-universal admiration. This holds true even to those oppressed by dictatorial political systems. The US's Constitution provided the world's first formal blueprint for modern democracy,[28] yet the US continues to undermine the efforts of sub-Saharan Africans to adopt similar constitutions for themselves. Definitely, it is the US's support for the regimes of people such as Mobutu and Bokassa that calls into question the US's claims to support the spread of democratic values around the globe.

The Case Against Sub-Saharan African States

The objective insights gleaned from close study of the politics of sub-Saharan Africa show that to lay blame on the US for the colossal failure of liberal democratic politics and economic growth in the region is completely

misleading. Certainly, the US may be ascribed some blame, but a greater extent of the responsibility must ultimately be accepted as a result of the limitations of the people of the region. These limitations accrue from the docile and unassertive character of the people of the region who do not fight to ensure democratic societies are developed for themselves, using their sovereignty to entrench such democracies. Sub-Saharan Africans should not expect the US to chew and swallow their food for them. Of course, in a rare but commendable use of such sovereignty, in late 2014, the people of Burkina Faso worked with civil society organizations to rid themselves of their ruler, Blaise Compaore, an oppressive dictator. Other two examples worthy of note are the refusal to allow Frederick Chiluba to continue in power in Zambia and Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigeria, who each attempted to exploit their countries' constitutions to provide mandates for third terms for themselves. Many political analysts believe that these acts by civil society organizations in Burkina Faso, Zambia, and Nigeria are isolated, because several other dictators, such as Chiluba, Obasanjo, and Compaore still rule in Africa.

Pertinent to this analysis is the fact that Africans are hyper-consumers of goods they do not produce and so this materialism makes the people vulnerable to deceit. The propensity to consume rather than to produce means that the average African shies away from politics and liberal democracy, human rights, freedom, representative governments, free and fair elections, periodic peaceful transfers of political power, responsible opposition political parties, and economic growth. An average African political leader is thought to be focused on ephemeral and unproductive social development and transient social capital, as opposed to the permanently productive sectors leading to genuine industrialization. Leadership is assured by political patronage and self-serving scheming and cheating. African governance is defined by the absence of hard work, a high degree of consumption with very low or no productivity, unsophisticated political and economic thoughts, simplified state organization, a lack of technological ingenuity, agricultural backwardness, and the absence of social interaction to provide equal opportunities for the community's members. Indeed this is a true description of present day sub-Saharan Africa, which docilely depends on others to democratize his society.

Sub-Saharan African states fit well into Niccolo Machiavelli's descriptions of principalities rather than republics. In principalities all the traits outlined above are present. Only people with higher virtues can form and live in republics.[29] Sub-Saharan African states are not yet qualified

to become republics; thus, rather than blame the US for democratic failures in the region, self-examination would be a much more worthwhile pursuit if they really wish to become liberal democracies and find economic growth. Nevertheless, Stanley Hoffmann believes that the US has overreached itself as a superpower and liberator of peoples worldwide. Hoffmann succinctly points out that:

> It wasn't its innocence that the United States lost on September 11, 2001. It was its naiveté. Americans have tended to believe that in the eyes of others the United States has lived up to the boastful clichés propagated during the Cold War (especially under Ronald Reagan) and during the Clinton administration. We were seen, we are thought of, as the champions of freedom against fascism and communism, as the advocates of decolonization, economic development, and social progress, as the technical innovators whose mastery of technology, science, and advanced education was going to unify the world.[30]

Thus, according to Hoffmann, the US actually left itself vulnerable to even unsubstantiated accUStions made against it. Hoffmann continues:

> Some officials [in US foreign policy-making circles] and academics explained that US hegemony was the best thing for a troubled world and unlike past hegemonies it would last—not only because there were no challengers strong enough to steal the crown but, above all, because we were benign rulers who threatened no one. But we have avoided looking at the hegemon's clay feet, at what might neutralize our vaunted soft power and undermine our hard power. Like swarming insects exposed when a fallen tree is lifted, millions who dislike or distrust the hegemon have suddenly appeared after September 11, much to [Americans'] horror and disbelief. America became a great power after World War II, when we faced a rival that seemed to stand for everything we had been fighting against—tyranny, terror, brainwashing—and we thought that our international reputation would benefit from our standing for liberty, and stability… We were not sufficiently marinated in history to know that, through the ages, nobody—or almost nobody—has ever loved a hegemon.[31]

One can examine the Roman Empire and find a comparable set of resources, which are now enjoyed by the US. Accordingly, Hoffmann claims that "Britain, France, and Spain had to operate in multipolar systems [when at the height of their power]; the United States is the only superpower…"[32] Sub-Saharan Africans fail to see that the US is, unlike

Rome, unable to completely impose its will by the use of force. What the US fails to fully appreciate is that it *can* enforce its will through soft diplomacy, by using the sub-Saharan Africans to entrench liberal democracy and economic growth for themselves.

Emergent Multiparty Politics and the Decline of Liberal Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa

Most international relations and public administration scholars believe that the emergence of multiparty politicking in the early 1990s has not enhanced the production or re-production of democracies in sub-Saharan Africa. Rather, the introduction of multiparty politics has been based on rhetoric about democratization, not action. The impoverished peoples of the region still wallow in despotism, leading to the dislocated and those with unfulfilled aspirations flowing out of sub-Saharan Africa into the overstretched polities and economies of the US, Europe, and Asia in search of greener pastures. It is the people's apathy toward good governance, typified by arrogant and dishonest electoral victories and stage-managed modifications of national constitutions, with rubber-stamp parliaments, politicized and corrupt judiciaries, and the public and private bureaucracies that pilfer the resources of their states, prevailing in the region, which thwarts the emergence of liberal democracy through multiparty politics. For instance, the region's bureaucracies, which ought to be politically neutral to serve any political party in power, are heavily connected to the individuals in power. The second African Governance Report produced by the UN Economic Commission of Africa in 2009 found that:

> Democratic culture has yet to be institutionalized, as vestiges of authoritarianism threaten the democratic process and the politics of consociationalism and political accommodation are not yet rooted in the polity … many ruling parties in Africa continue to suppress opposition parties with different degrees of severity. And access to the media, state funds and logistical facilities are skewed in favour of the ruling parties in most countries.[33]

Consequently, Jean-Francois Bayart's "politics of the belly syndrome," and dreadful state capture and political power mongering with the repudiation of dissenting voices leave most people in constant trepidation that democratic aspirations will be extinguished from the region in the near future.[34] In all this, the US and China are predator partners in subjugating

sub-Saharan Africans. No doubt, the US Government Accountability Office's (GAO) report to Congress titled: "Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends in US and Chinese Economic Engagement," of February 2013, gives the erroneous impression that all is well between the US and China and sub-Saharan African states.[35] In fact, contrary to that report, China, with its soft loans policies, appears to greatly threaten the US's interests. America's IMF-inspired policies appear to be ineffective in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, if the US must be relied upon as a true promoter of liberal democracy and a reliable partner for economic growth, it must quickly readdress its policies toward sub-Saharan Africa.

More importantly, if the US does not advance a liberal democratic culture in the region, the people of sub-Saharan Africa are likely to begin to think of America as a predator and this will create strategic enemies rather than strategic allies in the face of heightened Chinese competition in the region. To avoid this, Garry Wasserman advised the US to borrow John O'Sullivan's proposal regarding an element of the US's Manifest Destiny published in the New York Democratic Review in 1845, "…the US has virtuous obligations to extend urbane human behaviors comprising full human freedoms and liberties, which must allow mankind to form and associate in democratic institutions across the Western hemisphere and the globe at large."[36] China, though, with its discreet connections with totalitarian regimes and communist elements, poses great challenges to liberal democracy. The US appears to see it as a necessity to restrain China's covert, sometimes overt, communist agenda, which is slowly laying the foundation for long-term insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa. The US's neglect of this region opens the door for other players to intervene. Although the illegitimate elections and political corruption that can be seen in much of the democratic process claiming to be undertaken in Africa,[37] should raise the ire of the US and its professed goals for spreading political and economic liberalism, it does not. The US neglects the region to the determent of its own interests.

Baka Lolingo argues, "…their lives would have been thrilling had they learned more unto Communist China than unto the US, which merely professes without actualizing liberal democracy beyond its frontiers, as China appears a more progressive, prosperous and happiness attracting partner to the region than the US."[38] Biota Adeline, a Yaoundé resident stated, "… as a competitive and comparatively newcomer, China has widely improved the region's social infrastructure—hospitals, roads, bridges, public buildings, education, water and agriculture."[39] Thus, grievances against the US

grow and the defects of US–sub-Saharan African relations are caused by US foreign policy-makers who incessantly adopt a skewed approach to the challenges the region faces. In other regions, the US acts positively. For instance, on October 19, 1939, the American Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, in a formal address to the America–Japan Society stated:

> …the new order in East Asia has appeared to include, among other things, depriving Americans of their long established rights in China, and to this the American people are opposed… American rights and interests in China are being impaired or destroyed by the policies and actions of the Japanese authorities in China.[40]

In international relations, the persons, contexts, times, and places of foreign policy-making change. However, as Christopher Hill observes, "… national interests remain constant in persons, contexts, places and times, which might shift only in terms of magnitude and actors."[41] Thus, if the US stood against Japan's violation of its rights and interests in China in 1939, why should it not stand against China or others threatening its interests in sub-Saharan Africa in 2015? Perhaps, the answer is that the US has no meaningful interests in sub-Saharan Africa to threaten.

This argument has been espoused in several quarters, as the US tends to ignore the Chinese incursions into sub-Saharan Africa. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye contend that the US ought to have evolved adequate interdependent relations rather than encouraging dependent relations, while furthering its self-interest in such a strategic region. The presence of AFRICOM provides a positive message for the continent, but it is not enough.[42] Olusola Ojo and Amadu Sassy believe that certain states dictate the actions and set the pace for other actors around the globe. The Gulf of Guinea, the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Gibraltar, the Strait of Magellan, have all attracted significant foreign policy attention of states at different points of time in world history.[43] Now, it should be Africa's turn to attract the attention of the US. This thesis, though, seems to be undermined by US foreign policy scholars. US–sub-Saharan African relations are typified by conceptual difficulties. Accordingly, Dudley explains:

> …early studies of African politics [particularly those emanating from the US scholars]—mostly written in the mid-fifties and early sixties—were largely descriptive and institutional with either an historical or a constitutional orientation. Classical examples of these [are]… James S. Coleman's study of

Nationalism in Nigeria, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), Ruth Schechter's *Political Parties in French Speaking West Africa,* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964).[44]

Perhaps, it is this academic orientation that produced the existing misunderstanding of US–sub-Saharan African relations that narrows it to be thought of as a zero-sum game. Perhaps, this also explains why China's win–win attitude to relations with the region is penetrating with ease and great magnitude. China's increasing penetration into, and acceptance by the people of, this region should be understood in terms of China's efforts to address the deficits of US policy, especially in terms of proliferating socioeconomic infrastructure in the region.[45]

The US and Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Growth or Distortion?

Since the 1990s, the US reaction to political events, especially the outcomes of multiparty elections and the entire democratization process in the African region, does not cast the US as a champion of liberal democratic tenets and economic progress in sub-Saharan Africa. Rather than develop this region democratically and economically, the US appears to ignore this region. The US has expressed its desire to strengthen democratic institutions, support human rights, use development assistance to improve health and education, and help sub-Saharan African countries increase its trade with the rest of the world, especially with the US through the African Growth Opportunities Act (AGOA). While these goals do not appear impractical or unachievable, they have not been realized in the region to date.

It appears that the US advances democratic rhetoric to simply cajole the unsuspecting impoverished people of the postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa into aggressively revolting in the manner of the Arabs and their Arab Spring, who stood against the oppression inflicted upon them by the ruling oligarchies and despots, whose political power was maintained by the US's political and economic establishments. As Ake observes:

> It is quite good to emphasize trade for a people, but it is illogical to talk of trade without democratically involving those who produce the bulk of the products to be traded upon, which in the case of sub-Saharan Africa is the peasant farmers who form the majority of the population in the region.

> How can the US claim to advance trade in a region where the people's free choices at electoral consultations have since the re-introduction of multiparty politics in the early 1990s been covertly muzzled, denied and ditched?[46]

The US has stood by while electoral manipulations in the region have produced a spate of leaders with a strong penchant to confiscate political power. Thus, the US's tacit complicity in one-party or dictatorship rule in the region has imposed unbearable political oppression on the people of sub-Saharan Africa. Democracy must have a human face that fundamentally connects itself to sovereignty and produces a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. Thus, when democracy has become merely a charade used by corrupt twenty-first-century oligarchs and despots, it becomes an instrument used for the deception of the very people it should serve. The proliferation of political parties might appear to be synonymous with increasing democracy, just as periodic elections appear to amount to democracy. However, when the transfer of political power is predetermined this is not the case. Thus, in sub-Saharan African politics, the development of political parties could be a sound democratic act, but the assistance of the US and other powers is needed to ensure that democratic change is real and lasting.[47] The people of sub-Saharan Africa want their politics to be guided by liberal democratic principles, but they must be supported by the US, and not China, if the character of liberal democracy is to be imbued. The presence of the pervasive political vices facilitates the devastating disharmony that exists between the sub-Saharan African states and the sustainable growth and development of the impoverished peoples of this region.

Conclusion

This chapter shows that in sub-Saharan African states democracy has become a façade that leaders hide behind, rather than a true tenet guiding the political life of the region. The leaders retain despotic rules, while the people docilely accept their plight. The moves made toward democratic reform, the development of multiparty politics and the holding of elections, are not truly reflective of the principles enunciated by the theorists that first espoused the ideas of liberalism and democracy. Since the sort of democracy the theorists originally envisaged is not seen in sub-Saharan Africa, people of the region will continue to long for the fulfillment of the promise that the US provided in relation to the spreading of the

principles of government by the people, of the people, for the people. The faceless majority is ruled by a deceptive elite, characteristic of dictatorial oppression, which negates democracy and processes toward liberty. Nevertheless, in the long run, democracy will prevail with the eventual downfall of dictators.

Thus, the self-interests of the US that lead to its contradictory policies toward sub-Saharan Africa, such as ignoring the oppressive and dictatorial behavior of leaders in the region and even active support of these rulers, will give way to the realization that unless the US takes up its role as champion of democracy, China will fill the void. If that happens, US interests will not be served and so the most rational policy open to US policy-makers is to take a keen interest in politics in sub-Saharan Africa and to do all it can to promote the development of democratic principles and institutions there. Sub-Saharan Africans must take some responsibility for their current plight, as their lack of assertiveness and docility allowed local leaders to protect their self-interests by retaining power and ingraining the culture of oppression and dictatorship. So far, given the acclaimed historical culture of egalitarianism in the US produced by its attachment to the idea that democracy is the optimum state for human development, it is expected that the US will become involved in assisting its longtime partners in sub-Saharan Africa to eventually enjoy that same culture of egalitarianism.

For it is pathetic noting that when in the early 1990s multiparty politicking re-emerged in the postcolonial sub-Saharan African states, after decades of demeaning dictatorship, the region's inhabitants jubilated widely. By then, tyranny, they opined, would become history, relying on the harbinger of liberal democracy and their longtime partner—the US, to assist in ensconcing liberalism and democracy in their respective states. But by 2015, rather than concretize liberalism and democracy, multiparty politicking is fraught with cajoling phrases of democratization. Now, most sub-Saharan Africans wallow in despair and couched dictatorships, epitomized by resurging dominant political parties. Thus, in spite of the US's claims to spread democracy, its involvement in the region's democratization processes is contradictory and predatory; and given this the US should embrace the yearnings for liberalism and democracy of the masses rather than the self-seeking interests and egos of rulers in sub-Saharan African countries. Such a U-turn would obviously facilitate efforts by the US to create friends rather than enemies in postcolonial states in sub-Saharan Africa.

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CHAPTER 5

US and the Democratic Process in Cameroon from 1990 to 2013

David Mokam

Introduction

In the early 1990s, Africa in general, and Cameroon in particular, was swept with what Samuel P. Huntington called "democracy's third wave." Cameroon embarked on a democratization process that took an important step in 2013 when parliamentary elections were held. Much has been written about the democratization process in Cameroon. Scholars provided conflicting views of the external influence on Cameroon's decision to follow the course of Western liberal democracy. Now there is no more debate on the issue. It has become quite clear that Cameroon democratized as a result of external influence. François Mitterrand's speech in La Baule in June 1990 is evidence of that fact. The US was another major influence on the process and that influence is the focus of this chapter.[1]

Martin Dieudonné Ebolo analyzes the interference of France and the US in the democratization process in Cameroon from 1989 to 1997. He concludes that these Western countries intervened in Cameroon's democratization in order to spread Western cultural values and at the same time defend their own national interests. Jean Marcel Ilunga Katamba also

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examines the real motivations behind the intervention of Western powers in the democratization of Cameroon. He submits that legal, cultural, and political reasons accounted for this intervention. Both authors provide data related to American action in the democratization process of Cameroon up to 2000, but there is little data provided on activities beyond 2000. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the US, however, changed the orientation of US foreign policy, and this had strong implications for the democratization process in the world in general, and in Cameroon in particular. From 2001, the US relied more heavily on soft power for the protection of the US national security to preempt the development of new sources of terrorism, including in sub-Saharan Africa.

This chapter focuses on the period 1990–2013 and seeks to address the questions: How did the US involve itself in the democratization process in Cameroon and how did the events of September 11, 2001, influence this involvement? It does this by scrutinizing the actions of the diplomats, US institutions, and organizations acting in Cameroon. This chapter will describe the advent of the "Eastern wind" in Cameroon with the reaction of Cameroonian authorities and people. The views of two opposing camps, those who wanted the status quo to remain and those who wanted immediate change, will be examined. It will be argued that the regime at the time was pushed into the democratization process and showed its reluctance by attempting to stall the process. The actions undertaken by the US in response were motivated by cultural and political factors. The US denounced gross abuse of democratic rules, assisted with training to build political capacity in Cameroon, and acted as an observer for elections. After 2001, however, US intervention was less aggressive than it had been, as the US adopted a new attitude vis-à-vis Cameroon.

The Advent of the "Eastern Wind" in Cameroon

The democratization process began in Cameroon following the "Eastern wind" movement in Africa. This third wave of democracy began in Benin. From this West African country, it spread to the rest of the continent, notably in the sub-Sahara, which was dominated by one-party political systems and which was stricken by an economic crisis. The "Eastern wind" circulated like a contagious disease and reached Cameroon in 1990.

Benin, like other African countries stricken by economic crises in the 1980s, was bankrupt and needed the structural adjustment plan imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions. The financial assistance offered by

these institutions was conditional on implementation of democratization. Benin accepted this condition and in 1990 organized a national conference, the goal of which was to set new foundations for the country's political system. This conference, held from February 19 to 28, framed the trajectory for Beninese democratization.[2] New transitory institutions were established, the president was stripped of some powers and they were transferred to the transitional prime minister, the former National Assembly was replaced by the *Haut Conseil de la République*, the members of which were elected by the national conference. The transition term was one year, from March 1, 1990, to March 1, 1991. During this period, the transitional institutions were to implement the decisions taken by the national conference, notably the drafting of a new constitution by an *ad hoc* committee appointed by the national conference, the organization of the constitutional referendum, and the holding of various elections. There was a spillover from these events that spread from Benin to many countries in Africa, including Cameroon.

At the same time, the media in Cameroon was made up of a radio channel and a television channel, both sponsored by the state. The media did not report what was unfolding in Benin. The only owner, the state, dictated this blackout. There were methods for Cameroonians to get uncensored news. Western media were broadcasting through satellite. The ability to tune into them was a privilege only given to well-to-do Cameroonians. Those that were able to access foreign broadcasts keenly followed the events in Benin and gained inspiration from them to press for multiparty politics to be instituted in Cameroon. In aid of this, they provided the information about Benin to the public that could not afford to view Western television.

One of those at the forefront of this movement in Cameroon was Yondo Black, a former president of the Cameroon Bar Council. Yondo Black and his supporters made the first move against the one-party system in Cameroon in early 1990. He and nine other Cameroonians held a meeting in Douala to form a political party. This was not unconstitutional but taboo in the political setting that existed in Cameroon. On February 19, 1990, they were arrested on charges of subversive activities and for contempt against the Head of State.[3] These charges were, of course, baseless and were brought only because there were no legal grounds to challenge the creation of a new political party. These Cameroonians were arrested and tried because they wanted the political system to change so that Cameroon, like Benin, would have a multiparty political system. Though

some of them were sentenced to prison, the movement had already taken root and apparently nothing would stop it. This situation sparked a debate in Cameroon about the necessity of introducing multiparty politics to the country. The debate was continued under pressure from the Social Democratic Front (SDF).

On March 16, 1990, a group of Cameroonians, headed by Ni John Fru Ndi, held a constitutive assembly for a political party, the SDF. All the documents pertaining to the creation of this party were submitted to the administration for authorization. As the political system was a *de facto* one-party system, this attempt could have failed. The founders of the party said that if within two months' time, as provided by the legislation on associations, the administrative authorities did not react, they would consider their party legal.[4] The ruling party, the Cameroon Peoples' Democratic Movement (CPDM), organized nationwide rallies in order to support the stance of the president against multiparty politics. In an address to the nation on April 9, 1990, Paul Biya declared that the main battle was against the economic crisis. Actions toward any other political objective were tantamount to maneuvers of diversion and destabilization. In order to avoid this, he announced that there would be elections within his party. Moreover, he said his party would organize a convention. The announced elections took place. The winners were nearly all against political reform, a clear sign that the regime opposed change, but the opposition was determined to bring democracy to Cameroon.

After CPDM's elections and the celebration of the National Day on May 20, 1990, the chairman of the SDF announced that his party would launch its activities in Bamenda on May 26, 1990. The administrative authorities deployed massive numbers of troops to the town after failing to dissuade the SDF leaders from launching their party. Troops were instructed to intimidate the population and deter them from turning out in order to nip the new party's creation in the bud. Despite the massive deployment of troops, the party launched its activities, but at a cost as six people were shot dead by law enforcement officers. The official media reported six deaths by stampede, which was not true. In his speech, Ni John Fru Ndi declared that: "You can't afford to be ignored. You must yell because even if you are ignored, your children and your children's children will not be ignored tomorrow… You have nothing to lose but the straight jacket in which you, as free born citizens have been cast."[5] On the same day, in Yaoundé, a march organized by students of the University of Yaoundé was quelled. An editorial on state radio said that students were

singing the national anthem of Nigeria during their march. The reaction of the government was violent. Its determination not to allow multiparty politics was matched by the determination of the opposition to institute a new system. There was a political clash between the opposing sides. At this point, external intervention occurred and influenced the CPDM's convention.

The first external intervention came from France's president, François Mitterrand. On June 20, 1990, on the occasion of the sixteenth conference of the Heads of State of France and Africa held in La Baule in France, François Mitterrand told the African Heads of State that democracy was universal and that the wind of change was to blow everywhere on the planet, even in Africa.[6] During the press conference held at the end of the summit, François Mitterrand added that France's aid to the continent would be conditional upon democratic progress being made. He said there was no development without democracy. President Paul Biya of Cameroon was present at La Baule. He certainly understood the message and it influenced his stance on democracy in Cameroon. His country was abiding by a structural adjustment plan and France was his great ally in fighting against the economic crisis. Biya's stance toward the institution of democratic principles in the Cameroonian political system changed during the CPDM convention.

The belated first ordinary convention of the CPDM took place on June 28–30 in Yaoundé. During this convention, Paul Biya, chairman of the party, told his fellow party members to prepare for competition. This announcement came as a surprise, since the party's chairman, who was also the Head of State, was known to oppose multiparty politics. After the convention, he took some measures toward political reform. A committee was created to draft new legislation on public freedom. This resulted, at the end of 1990, in the National Assembly's adoption of laws regulating associations, political parties, the press, and public rallies. As a consequence, the first new political parties were legalized in February, 1991. These political parties wanted speedy political reform. This contrasted with the attitude of the ruling CPDM that was in favor of slow evolution. Actually, having been forced to open the door to multiparty politics, the regime's goal was to institute a model of democracy that favored the domination of its own party, and this has been well demonstrated by David Mokam.[7] Evidence is found in the way the first elections were carried out in Cameroon. Mbapndah Ajong Laurean shares this point of view: "Cameroon's leadership yielded to democratic pressures in the early

1990s more out of convenience than of conviction."[8] The Cameroonian democratization process did not satisfy great Western democracies, notably the US.

Basis of US Intervention in the Democratization Process in Cameroon

According to Marcel Merle and Maurice Duverger, quoted by Jean Marcel Ilunga Katamba, interest is central to actions taken by an individual, a group of persons, a state, or a group of states. Western idealism is nothing but a means of hiding self-interest. This applies to the US and its intervention in the democratization process in Cameroon, and in this case, its interests are related to culture and the defense of national security.[9]

Sustaining Democracy in Africa as a Cultural Value

In La Baule in 1990, François Mitterrand said that democracy was a universal value, but Liberal democracy is a value that is rooted in Western culture, and exemplified the US. Democracy is one of the US's foundation stones, but it is promoted by myth. According to the idea of Manifest Destiny, the US is destined to defend liberty in the world and it is supported by the divine in this undertaking.[10] With inspiration from this myth, President Woodrow Wilson said that the US had a particular responsibility to the international community to defend democracy. In the context of the Cold War, Harry S. Truman believed that the US must help countries to preserve their freedom. President Bill Clinton followed Truman's outlook and espoused that it was the US's mission to promote democracy. This was the theme of his 1996 State of the Union address. Democracy is a cultural value of the West. According to a former ambassador of the US to Cameroon, Robert P. Jackson, this value, although taking different shapes in different regions of the world, is based on a common characteristic of large-scale public participation in the political process.[11] This Western value, it seems, is to be disseminated worldwide as a homogenous model. The United Nations' system has been a tool for that dissemination process. On December 18, 1990, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution number 45/150 titled "The reinforcement of the principle of Free and fair elections."[12] This resolution used some of the language of the Universal declaration of Human Rights to show that democracy is a universal principle and that all members of the UN should

adopt it. The US is the chief patron of democracy and, therefore, has to promote this Western cultural value across the world. In doing so, the US also defends its national interests.

Sustaining Democracy as a Means of Defending the National Interests of the US

US foreign policy has long included a dimension of promoting democracy in order to protect its national interests. Theorists call it democratic realism. It has evolved over time and appeared clearly in the 1990s with the fall of communism and the end of the Cold War. In 2002, Henry Hydes, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of Representatives, stated it clearly. He said that the progress of liberty had been a fundamental element of US foreign policy since the nation was created and that it would continue to be so. Moreover, he said, beyond pure altruism, the promotion of liberty would also be an element of the US's geopolitical strategy.[13] US interests, both economic and security, are protected through the promotion of democracy.

Liberal democracy embodies free trade. By promoting democracy worldwide, free trade will be guaranteed and that will be good for American enterprises and entrepreneurs, who will, through their activities abroad, create jobs at home for Americans and will sell American products for the good of American economy. This idea was espoused by George H. W. Bush in a speech in May 1989, about the creation of the American Free Trade Area. He said that the US's commitment to this free trade area was aimed at ensuring the prosperity of the market economy.[14] What holds true for the American continent also holds true for Africa. By promoting democracy in Africa, in Cameroon in particular, US investments will be promoted and American companies can access their share of its markets. In Africa also, there is the need for the US to secure oil sources in an era of turbulence in the Middle East. Oil is vital for the US economy. As a consequence, it is considered as an element of national security that has to be preserved, even through the promotion of democracy.

After the 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, there was a renewed focus on its national security. The promotion of democracy was an important means for the preservation of US national security. According to analysts in the US, terrorism resulted from poverty and a lack of good governance. Terrorists are recruited from among the poor in countries with poor democratic records. By implication, recruitment can be

prevented by promoting democracy and prosperity. Once a country is democratic, there is less possibility that it will breed terrorists. Hence, the promotion of democracy in Cameroon contributes to the preservation of American security interests. As a matter of fact, Cameroon is in the heart of the Gulf of Guinea, which is very rich in oil. The Gulf of Guinea, then, is of obvious interest to the US.[15] It is for these reasons that the US involved itself in the democratization process in Cameroon.

US's Intervention in the Democratization Process in Cameroon

US involvement in Cameroon's democratization process included press releases from the State Department, providing assistance to political parties, training influential democratic actors, and various other actions carried out by the US diplomats in Cameroon. In the early years of the democratization process in Cameroon, US intervention was very heavy. The trend changed after 2001, however, when its stance softened.

US Involvement Before 2001

As mentioned above, the early years of the democratization process in Cameroon were characterized by a clash between the opposition and the regime in power over control and the speed of the democratization process. For the opposition, it was necessary to organize a national convention to establish the rules for the new political system. The regime, however, believed that Cameroon already had institutions capable of carrying out this task. The opposition, therefore, moved to compel the regime to organize a national convention. The activities they undertook ranged from civil disobedience to creating "ghost towns" that nearly paralyzed the economy. These actions did not achieve the expected goals, as the regime took harsh measures to restore order and discourage the population from supporting the opposition. Eventually, though, legislation to allow other parties to organize and compete at elections, including presidential elections, was passed by a parliament made up of representatives of the former state party. As expected, these laws were framed in a way that favored the former state party. The ruling party was unwilling to allow genuine democracy in Cameroon and, as in most African counties that democratized in the early 1990s, prospects were not bright.[16] The

US understood the situation, and so, as the guarantor of democracy, US officials started mounting pressure on the regime in Cameroon.

Actions of the Department of State

The Department of State website makes it clear that "Promoting freedom and democracy and human rights around the world are central to US foreign policy."[17] True to this commitment, the Department of State began warning the ruling elite in Cameroon. In 1990, Herman Cohen, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, said that democracy would be a precondition of US development aid.[18] The Biya regime did not heed these initial warnings. It followed its own agenda and rejected all opposition proposals. It persistently rejected the calls for a national convention saying that it was irrelevant. As operation "ghost towns" and the opposition's civil disobedience were occurring, the regime responded by banning the large gatherings. The regime was encouraged by the alleged support of the US. As a matter of fact, in May 1991, President Paul Biya paid a private visit to the US and received an audience with President George W. H. Bush. He was also awarded an honorary doctorate by the University of Maryland. Moreover, the US had forgiven Cameroon's bilateral debt, despite the country's middle-income status. The regime interpreted all these actions as supportive of the way the democratization process was being carried out, but it was not the case. The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, canceled a scheduled trip to Yaoundé, and other comments and statements were reported by the press, in order to show the Department's displeasure.[19]

In 1974, Congress had asked the State Department to produce annual reports on the human rights situation in every country around the world. As Martin Dieudonné Ebolo observes, the accuracy and detail of the annual reports varied over time and reflected *realpolitik*.[20] After the Cold War, however, the reports were more keenly produced and had a great impact on US foreign policy. Concerning Cameroon, the reports for the years 1993–1996 depicted a negative perception of the democratization process there. The introductions of these reports always stated that Cameroon was a multiparty republic in name only and that it was actually ruled by President Paul Biya and a circle of advisers hailing mainly from his ethnic group and his party, the CPDM.

On October 11, 1992, Cameroon organized its first pluralistic presidential election. The results published by the Supreme Court proclaimed

President Biya the winner. The Supreme Court observed that the election had many irregularities. This corroborated opposition accounts. On the grounds of these irregularities, the opposition called for nullification of the election result. The regime did not heed to the call and President Biya was sworn in. The opposition alleged that the winner was Ni john Fru Ndi and proclaimed him the new Head of State. This act was unconstitutional, so Ndi was put under house arrest and a state of emergency was declared in the North West Province. The State Department's reaction to these events was a declaration on November 13, 1992, by its spokesman, Richard Boucher. Boucher accused the Cameroonian government of using intimidation to silence the opposition that was right to cry foul after the presidential election.[21] After the 1992 presidential election, the Cameroonian government continued to intimidate the opposition. The Department of State issued a press release in November, 1994 urging the Cameroon government to initiate a transparent election process and to stop harassing and detaining journalists. In another press release, issued on August 31, 1995, the spokesman for the State Department called on the government to promote democracy in Cameroon. In January, 1995, the US suspended the activities of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Cameroon.

Imposition of Economic Sanctions

The US, through the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), was an observer to the first pluralistic presidential election in Cameroon on October 11, 1992. As already noted, this election was marred by many irregularities and led to the declaration of a state of emergency in the North West Province that aimed to silence the opposition. The US expressed its concern and protested against this injustice by sanctioning Cameroon for its very poor democratic performance and abuses of human rights. On November 19, 1993, Brian Atwood, the director of USAID in Cameroon, announced that USAID would cease aiding Cameroon as of the 1995 fiscal year.[22] Many reasons were given for this closure, including budgetary, political, and efficiency considerations. The decision, though, was politically motivated. On January 26, 1995, John Shattack, in an interview on WorldNet, said that the decision was taken in response to violations of human rights in Cameroon. He added that the economic and political reforms that were a condition of the aid had not been carried out in Cameroon.[23] The ceasing of operations by USAID in

Cameroon was a big blow for the regime. It was believed that this harsh measure would put more pressure on Cameroon to restart the democratization process. With the same aim in mind, the Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, suspended the sale of military vehicles and materiel to Cameroon, saying that the US could no longer waste time and money supporting countries that do not want to develop.[24] These harsh actions were carried out alongside softer ones, notably the observation of elections and the provision of training for civil society.

Observing Elections: A Case Study of the NDI

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs is an American-based nongovernmental organization that was established in 1983 with its headquarters in Washington D.C.[25] Its main goal is to promote and support democracy all over the world. Before coming to Cameroon, the NDI had already conducted democratic development programs in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union. These programs focused on six major areas: political party training, electoral processes, legislative training, local government development, civil–military relations, and civic education.[26] The NDI first came to Cameroon in September, 1991, invited by the then prime minister, Sadou Hayatou. It was invited to "examine the draft electoral law specifically and the democratization process generally."[27] The NDI delegation worked in Cameroon from September 6 to 17, 1991. It reviewed legal and political issues related to the democratization process, including the drafting of an electoral law, media access, and constitutional issues like decentralization, guarantees of political freedoms, and the separation of powers. In its final report, the NDI proposed two alternative solutions for the problems with control of the election processes. The first was the control of the electoral process by a multiparty national commission, including representatives of the opposition. The second suggestion was that the elections be controlled by an independent national commission made up of citizens recognized to be politically neutral.[28] The NDI was invited by the Cameroonian government to try to build confidence in election process as the transition from a one-party state to multiparty elections. The government also invited the NDI to observe the legislative elections scheduled for March 1992. The NDI turned down the invitation given that the notice it had been given was not sufficient for it to be effective. The NDI *did* observe the 1992 presidential election.

After the 1992 presidential election, the NDI published a report. The report stated that the presidential election had many shortcomings and irregularities. The competing political parties had not agreed on the rules for the election and administrative officers influenced voting in their respective constituencies so that the incumbent president would be the winner.[29] The report concluded that the government and President Paul Biya were most at fault. The report questioned the legitimacy of the 1992 presidential election and offered proposals for the creation of an independent electoral commission to manage elections in Cameroon. These proposals represented another dimension of US intervention in the democratic process in Cameroon.

Intervention by US Ambassadors in Cameroon

The US embassy in Cameroon was instrumental in the US's intervention in the Cameroonian democratization process. The embassy provides firsthand information to the US government and is the main channel of communication with the Cameroonian government. The "Eastern wind" reached Cameroon during the ambassadorship of Frances D. Cook. She was a very enthusiastic and active ambassador and a sincere advocate for democracy in Cameroon. She ignored diplomatic parlance when expressing her feelings about the Cameroonian democratic process. In October, 1992, prior to the presidential election, she personally supervised the election monitoring seminar that the NDI organized at the Hilton Hotel in Yaoundé, in collaboration with GERDES Africa. This seminar trained more than 170 Cameroonian political activists and civic leaders. The participants became trainers for other Cameroonians in matters related to elections: the organization of domestic election observation preparations, pre-election day activities and preparations, observation on election day, monitoring vote counting, and evaluating the transparency and legitimacy of the election.[30] Participants at the seminar were drawn from the civil society and political parties, namely, the CPDM, the SDF, the NUDP (National Union for Democracy and Progress), the UPC (Union of the Population of Cameroon), and the CDU (Cameroon Democratic Union). During the seminar, Ambassador Cook interacted with participants and took pictures with some of them. As in some pictures she appeared with members of the opposition, these were later used by the government to discredit her. Martin Dieudonné Ebolo argues that she openly campaigned for the election of the SDF, assisted by other American advisers.[31]

She strongly contested the final result of the 1992 presidential election and as a consequence, she was summoned by the Minister of External Relations who expressed the displeasure of the Cameroonian government about her political activism.[32] She condemned human rights abuses in Cameroon from 1990 to 1992. Following Ambassador Cook's example, between 1990 and 2000, other US diplomats in Cameroon were critical of the government, as concerns about human rights, democracy, and good governance increased. It was in this context that on November 22, 1994, the US embassy in Yaoundé issued a press release expressing US concerns about government interference in opposition meetings and rallies.[33] The opposition also had difficulty accessing state-sponsored radio and television. Moreover, the press release condemned the detention of members of the opposition occurring in some regions of Cameroon. The US also reminded the Cameroonian government that, in a democracy, security forces are not used to silence the opposition, but rather for the security of the citizens.

In general, prior to 2001, US involvement in the Cameroonian democratization process was limited to mounting pressure on the regime in power. This pressure ranged from suspension of some bilateral relations to calls to heed to democratic principles. The US embassy in Yaoundé played a significant role in US intervention. They were critical of the government. The US continued its intervention after 2001, but its approach was different and it reflected changes in the US's foreign policy around the globe.

US Intervention After 2001

After 2001, the State Department itself was less involved and it was left to the US embassy in Cameroon to handle the situation. In addition, the attitude of US diplomats in Cameroon was less harsh as compared to prior to 2001.

Motivations for the Change of Strategy

It is difficult to say what motivated the change of strategy. It appears that the regime's resistance to change was so strong that the US could not help but alter its strategy. The regime in Yaoundé resisted US pressure by applying what Martin Dieudonné Ebolo called "governmental nationalism."[34] An illustration of this concept was provided by the Cameroonian government's response to the US embassy's press release of November

22, 1994, stating that it was unacceptable in its tone and content. The Cameroonian government reminded the US that Cameroon's democratization process was not brought about by external pressure; it was the achievement of the Cameroonian people who are proud and protective of their sovereignty.[35]

It also appears that the September 11 terrorist attacks influenced the way the US promoted democracy, in that it was necessary to focus on poorer societies. Evidence seemed to show that extreme poverty could be a source of terrorist fighters. The promotion of democracy was seen as an effective way of defeating terrorism.[36] Democracy promotion was best accomplished by encouraging governments to implement democratic reform rather than trying to force them. The suspension of aid for development, a common tactic used to pressure governments into reform, does not help societies but rather exposes them to greater poverty and consequently they can become a threat to the US. This is certainly what US Ambassador Robert P. Jackson, had in mind when, on April 12, 2012, he announced that USAID would reopen its doors in Cameroon. He said the US had realized after 18 years that the removal of USAID support in Cameroon was a mistake.[37] So, after 2001, the US embassy in Yaoundé focused its democracy promotion on observing elections and supporting the growth of civil society.

Promoting Democracy Through Observing Elections

In 2002, the National Elections Observatory (NEO), or its French acronym ONEL, started monitoring elections in Cameroon. The municipal and legislative elections that took place had so many irregularities for which NEO could not do anything that the US embassy started working in partnership with the government of Cameroon in order to strengthen NEO as an independent body. The embassy also worked with the government for electoral reform that computerized voter registries to make municipal, legislative, and presidential elections more transparent.[38]

In 2006, NEO was replaced by Elections Cameroon (ELECAM), a new body designed to be more evenhanded. When its first members were appointed, the US embassy was disappointed, as most of them were members of the ruling CPDM. The US ambassador in Yaoundé strongly criticized ELECAM, saying it did not represent Cameroonian society at large.

She first expressed her disappointment to the government before making more public statements and boycotting the oath-taking ceremony of ELECAM board members.[39]

After the observation of the 2011 presidential election, US observers noted "inconsistencies and irregularities in and between almost all polling stations as well as technical difficulties on the part of ELECAM in administering the election."[40] One of the biggest criticisms related to the way that the voter registry was managed, as it created opportunities for duplicate votes. The lack of training of election officials and the lack of voter education were also apparent. The ink that was intended to prevent repeat voting was not indelible, and election officials did not check people's thumb to see if they had ink on them. The US embassy made 18 recommendations concerning all aspects of the electoral process. A major proposal was that polling stations should be closed earlier so that counting can be carried out in daylight. The embassy also recommended that poll workers should have more training and that voters should be better educated to understand the voting process.

Promoting Democracy Through the Empowerment of Civil Society

The idea of promoting democracy by supporting civil society development stems from the American example. The political history of the US is full of great people who have left their mark on politics without holding an elected office. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. is a legendary illustration, as he deeply changed the concept of human rights in the US with his civil society activism.[41] The US embassy in Cameroon, in order to perpetuate that legacy, decided to support democracy in Cameroon by forging partnerships with the civil society. It is believed that by partnering with civil society, there is an opportunity for all voices in a democracy to be heard. In addition, as Hillary Clinton stated when she launched the strategic dialogue with civil society in February 16, 2011, "civil society holds governments accountable, keeps them honest, and helps them be more effective."[42] Ambassador Robert P. Jackson, underscoring the role of civil society, stated that when politicians reach out to voters, it is to increase electoral results and when members of the civil society do so it is to increase electoral turnout.[43]

In order to empower civil society, the US embassy in Cameroon has a fund for democracy and human rights, which is allocated annually to democratic institutions. Subsidies of up to US$25,000 are allocated from this fund, which is directly managed by the US ambassador.[44] This fund provides subsidies to a cross section of Cameroonian associations, including human rights groups, trade unions, and students' associations. In 2006, the students' association, known by its French acronym ADDEC (*Association pour la Défense des Droits des Etudiants du Cameroun*), received around US$13,975 for the promotion of democracy and human rights in students' circles.[45] This funding allowed ADDEC to launch a project to train students' leaders in lobbying.

In order to have transparent elections, the public must have broad and accurate information about political affairs. The media, therefore, is a significant factor in any democracy. Consequently, ahead of the 2004 presidential election, the US embassy decided to train some media personnel. It sponsored training for six Cameroonian journalists in the US.[46] The US embassy also organized a series of seminars to empower other civil society actors in Cameroon. As can be seen, the US provided great support to the development of civil society in Cameroon. This was a major step for democracy promotion as civil society's role is to awaken people to their civic responsibilities, make political entities accountable, and to facilitate the citizenry's participation in the political process.

Conclusion

This chapter explored US intervention in the Cameroonian democratization process and how it was shaped by the 2001 terrorist attacks. The above analysis has shown that the US was involved in the democratization process in Cameroon for two major reasons: the dissemination of a cultural value and the defense of the US national interests. US intervention in the Cameroonian democratization process was initiated by the Department of State and the US embassy in Yaoundé. The State Department issued appeals to move toward democratic practices. It also issued threats to the government of Cameroon to suspend development aid if the country did not institute democratic reform. The Department of State denounced human rights abuses and had to suspend some bilateral relations and impose economic sanctions on Cameroon.

The US embassy in Yaoundé was also instrumental in the democratization process in Cameroon. The embassy issued press releases condemn-

ing undemocratic practices and human rights abuses. US Ambassador Frances D. Cook was noted for being too biased against the government of Cameroon after the US acted as an observer to the 1992 presidential election. After 2001, the US changed its strategy toward encouraging the democratization process in Cameroon. This change of strategy was caused by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. These attacks ensured the US paid more attention to poorer parts of the world, including Cameroon. It was believed that in order to protect the US from further terrorist attacks, it was necessary to help fight extreme poverty that could be a source of terrorism. According to this perspective, it was better to persuade Cameroon to promote democracy. After 2001, then, the US's attitude toward Cameroon softened and was mostly characterized by the empowerment of civil society and talks with the government about the improvement of the democratization process. This new strategy achieved some good results for the electoral process, notably, the computerization of the voters' registration, the adoption of an electoral code, the creation of ELECAM, and the subsequent enlargement of its board members, and the institution of a biometric voter identification system. It is not overstating to say that US intervention in the democratization process in Cameroon resulted in success, as the 2013 elections were managed by ELECAM, and the results were not contentious.

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CHAPTER 6

Labor Standards in Trade Preference Laws Between the US and Africa

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The US is not a signatory to most ILO conventions, so labor standards are not protected in the US under international law. Nevertheless, the US promotes the protection of workers and modernization of social protection for labor around the world. Norms relating to the use of labor have been promoted using different methods and different actors have been involved. One example is the use of provisions in free trade agreements (FTAs) signed between the US and African countries.

This chapter analyzes the limits of external norm promotion by assessing labor clauses in US FTAs and their effectiveness, as well as the relevance of American labor standards to those found in other states. It identifies core American methods for promoting labor standards with an emphasis on relations with developed and developing countries. This chapter seeks to move beyond the traditional explanations and generally negative view of the American approach to labor issues and argues that the US plays a more important and effective role than other actors, such as the EU. Finally, it argues that ethical and moral arguments framing the US's position toward

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labor rights, particularly labor standards promoted abroad, should be perceived as part of the US's efforts to influence developing nations toward democratization.

Role of Labor Standards in the World

Workers' rights in global economic relations are underemphasized, contested, and attract much less public attention than general human rights.[1] Arguments about the universal nature of human rights have not necessarily translated into recognized labor standards. The right to work in the midst of global economic crises means less for the already developed and rich North than for the growing economies of the South. Human rights issues, especially the need for freedom and safety, attract global attention, yet the labor rights of workers in mining companies, textile industries, or agriculture, who form the basis of the global economy, seem to be seen as an obsolete problem of the nineteenth century. The new century demands a more focused approach on individual worker rights. Moreover, challenges to labor standards should be analyzed over a long time span as responses to changes in international and domestic law are gradual and take a long time to be seen in the broader global economy. The achievement of progress for labor standards in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were important for Western democracies, but were not seen in developing countries. Implementing the improved standards was seen as inappropriate given the level of economic development in these countries. However, one of the roles of the more advanced trading partners of developing nations, such as the US, the EU, or Canada, should have been the promotion of good practices and standards for workers in these poorer states. The social elements of trade must not be ignored by the World Trade Organization (WTO) or in agreements made by other preferential schemes. Labor standards constitute an important part of this approach.[2]

Labor standards are part of human rights and this is reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 4, 5, 7, 22, and 23), but it is only part of the story.[3] Labor rights also represent an important factor in determining global economic relations. Labor is, in most cases, the main component of the price of products or services, and their availability depends directly on the availability of labor. Labor rights and standards, and environmental standards, play an important role in the competitiveness of both developing countries and those that can be assessed as highly developed countries. The competitive advantage of poorer countries, in

the absence of the ability to affect exchange rates and the lack of innovative economies, is based on the two aforementioned factors: underregulated labor and low levels of environmental protection. Therefore, the competitiveness of poorer countries relies partly on maintaining low levels of protection for fundamental workers' rights.

As of March 2015, 58 trade agreements included labor provisions, compared to 21 in 2005, and four in 1995.[4] Some authors suggest that this development is particularly visible in the US, where, since NAFTA and due to strong partisanship, ratification of any FTA is dependent on widespread public support.[5] Thus, bargaining between the Republicans and Democrats generally leads to a strong emphasis on labor standards being written into the agreement in order to obtain sufficient support for it. This does not reflect altruism on behalf of members of Congress in support of workers' rights. The US and other developed economies generally have an advantage in this area over less developed economies and so agreements that include high labor standards as a condition of trade work in their favor. A similar phenomenon can be seen in agreements made by the European Union as well. Improved labor standards are, thus, a side effect of global trade agreements.

Labor standards are not an area of competence for the WTO. At the first WTO Ministerial Conference in 1996 held in Singapore, the question of linking labor standards to international trade was rejected as a matter of interest to the meeting (as were the so-called Singapore issues).[6] In the Ministerial Declaration adopted at the meeting, WTO members reaffirmed their commitment to respect core labor standards recognized at the international level, while stating that responsibility for labor standards really rested in the International Labor Organization (ILO). The ministers expressed the belief that the development of trade and trade liberalization would naturally enhance the promotion of labor standards. However, they also stated that labor standards should not be used for protectionist purposes.

Adopted in 1998, the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work requires members of the organization to respect and promote workers' rights and to realize the four principles concerning the fundamental rights, which are the subject of ILO conventions: the freedom of association and collective bargaining, the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor, the abolition of child labor, and the elimination of discrimination in employment. Compliance with these four categories of rights is compulsory for members of the ILO, regardless of whether they have ratified the relevant individual conventions or not.

US and Labor Standards

Moonhawk Kim suggests that labor standards in US trade agreements have been largely effective in increasing workers' rights among US trade partners. He also argues that most countries decide to improve labor rights *before* signing agreements with the US in order to become a more attractive trade partner.[7] In the long run, then, global trade improves the situation of workers in developing countries. However, the enthusiasm of developing countries to improve labor standards does not translate into diluted regulations on labor standards in the agreements. On the contrary, all US PTAs are constructed with very detailed and legalistic labor regulations.[8] Sanctions, in the form of withholding of trade preferences, when labor standards are violated, are normal and accepted practice and are an instrument for enforcing obligations in these agreements. It is worth adding, however, that some other developed countries use even more restrictive instruments toward their trading partners. Canada, for example, in its agreement with Colombia included a section on labor standards (Articles 1601–1605). Noncompliance with the agreement is subject to the judgment of an independent review panel and can result in financial penalties. Rulings of the panel can include "monetary assessment" of up to 15 million USD annually. Provisions such as these allow institutional mechanisms to ensure effective implementation of the agreements. In this case, the monetary penalty "shall be paid into an interest-bearing fund designated by the Council and expended at the direction of the Council for appropriate labour initiatives in the territory of the Party that was the object of the review," which means that workers' rights are supported in two ways.[9]

The US's approach to workers' rights and labor standards in multilateral arrangements differs in many respects from the EU's approach. These differences are the result of a number of factors related to the economic development model of the two regions and also different approaches to international law and the adoption of international legal obligations. The US strives to reduce its international legal obligations and so it is not a party to most of the conventions of the ILO, yet it actively promotes labor standards in bilateral agreements. US politicians and the American public lack trust in multilateral solutions to disputes, so US officials prefer to promote international labor law through free trade agreements. In some cases, for example NAFTA, regulation of labor laws occurs in the accompanying documents (the North American Agreement on Labor

Cooperation, NAALC). The US agreement with Peru was an exceptional case where the principles of the ILO were written into the bilateral agreement itself. In 2002, the US Congress passed a law on trade (the Trade Promotion Act, TPA), authorizing the President to negotiate trade arrangements with other countries and limiting the powers of Congress to vote on the adoption or rejection of the agreement, without the possibility of amendments. Treaties made under this arrangement are known as "fast-track" agreements. Because fast-track legislation allows very limited opportunity for consultation with civil society organizations (e.g. representatives of employees and environmentalists), the Act contained a commitment to establish rules relating to workers' rights in the content of negotiated trade agreements.

Bart Kerremans and Myriam Gistelnick point out that debate on labor standards in trade agreements started in 1994, but a partisan approach to this issue meant that Democrat efforts were largely unsuccessful. However, changes in the American political attitudes resulted in growing support for labor standards both from Republicans and Democrats. As Republicans tried to preserve high levels of support from key constituencies—rural areas, textile, and steel districts—labor standards played a significant role in the strategy of protectionism. By using labor rights, Republicans were able to attract moderate Democrats to support trade agreements at a time when disagreements between the parties about other issues meant they could rarely find compromise.[10]

The Trade Act, which expired on June 30, 2007, was replaced with the bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy (BATP). Its adoption was a result of a rising US trade deficit and the Democrats taking control of Congress. It should be noted that the legislative leader in this area, Charles Rangel (D. NY), was also a strong supporter of free trade and provisions having the least restriction on the freedom of movement of goods and services. The new US trade policy provided that labor provisions should be included in every new FTA. In particular, they were to include a commitment from the signatories to adopt and maintain national legislation to protect core labor rights as defined in the ILO Declaration of 1998. This required an effective implementation of these rights and acceptable working conditions that include a minimum wage, regulated working hours, and health and safety regulations.

Obligations relating to workers' rights are subject to the same dispute settlement procedures and subject to the same remedies as trade tariffs. A complaint about a breach of the agreements in the area of labor regulation

can only be lodged by one state against another. The arbitrators' decisions cannot change national laws, but if their recommendations are not implemented or no compensation is proposed, other remedies may apply in the form of loss of commercial advantage or a fine, in proportion to the damage to trade.

In agreements with Peru, Panama, and South Korea, concluded after 2007, key aspects of the bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy were taken into account. Thus, in the agreements establishing a free trade zone the need for respect and the application of the basic principles of the ILO was recognized. Free trade agreements negotiated by the US after 2007 include very specific regulations, and these go far beyond the model adopted by the European Union. This is primarily due to the fact that the US, although a member of the ILO, is not bound by a majority of the organization's provisions. To date, the US has ratified only 14 of the 189 ILO Conventions, including two of the eight core conventions (the Convention on the Abolition of Forced Labor and the Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor) and one of the four priority Conventions (on tripartite consultation). However, it is not only less developed countries that have been affected by the US approach to labor standards in PTAs/FTAs. For example, Article 18 of the FTA between the US and Australia, in addition to clauses encountered in other contracts, states that it is wrong to stimulate trade or investment by weakening or reducing the protection of existing labor law of the contracting parties (Article 18, paragraph 2, point 2). This article also defines international rules and workers' rights such as the right of association, the right to collective bargaining, prohibition of forced labor, child labor, and acceptable conditions of work (Article 18, paragraph 7).[11] Australia had already adopted these rules before ratifying the ILO core conventions. Thus, although the US is not a party to most of the conventions of the ILO, it includes provisions consistent with the ILO's principles in its trade agreements.

The US's agreement with Australia also provides the ability to create a working subcommittee, composed of government representatives responsible for matters of work and employment (Article 18, paragraph 4, point 2). This provides the opportunity to effectively resolve disputes relating to labor and employment issues. Concepts such as labor law obligations, the parties, and others are defined in Article 18, paragraph 7, point 2b. By clearly defining these terms, the ability for interpretation that is incompatible with the objectives and spirit of international agreements is reduced. In another of the recently concluded free trade agreements, the agreement

between the US and Korea (KORUS) in 2011, terms and concepts were also clearly articulated. The KORUS agreement agreed to the appointment of the Labor Affairs Council that is responsible for ensuring that the regulations agreed to in the contract are observed (Article 19, paragraph 5). Unlike the agreement between the US and Australia, the convening of the Labor Council is mandatory.[12] This is due to the fact that South Korea has a very weak and flawed system for the regulation of labor standards. According to the Congressional Research Service, the Korean labor market has serious shortcomings and more than 200 unionists are imprisoned for "exercising labor rights."[13] Moreover, the labor market in Korea is divided into two groups: one-third of the labor force is well paid and represented by strong and effective unions while two-thirds consists of temporary and day workers without basic labor rights.

The American approach to labor standards, as some authors suggest, results from two-level game theory being a prominent phenomenon in American politics.[14] Since trade agreements contain both economic and normative elements, constituents are allured by "fair trade," which in fact serves protectionist and normative interests. Control over the negotiation phase of agreements is in the hands of the US Congress; therefore, ordinary citizens and loosely organized promoters of human rights and labor standards can, and do, influence members of Congress and their choices. Accordingly, prospective trading partners of the US, aware of the two-level game and the role of domestic politics in the formulation of trade agreements, decide to improve their labor standards to get an access to American market. However, to build on this seemingly voluntary process of improving labor standards, the US tends to build into agreements various mechanisms of coordination and control. This ensures that labor standards continue to improve in the longer term, but also strengthen the US's global trading position.

African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a US trade agreement with sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), was passed in May 2000. The main aim of AGOA is to help SSA countries open their economies to be guided by more competition- and market-oriented principles, but that Act also seeks to assist in the development of improved human rights and labor standards. Another important goal of AGOA is to deepen American trade and investment ties with SSA countries and open these markets to American goods.

According to ILO estimates, almost one in three children in sub-Saharan Africa between the age of five and 14 are active participants in the labor market.[15] Recent economic growth in African countries has not translated into an improvement of the situation for child workers. Child labor in SSA stems from the extreme poverty of its people and many African societies are in the very early stages of economic development. Therefore, children have little opportunity for meaningful education and become adults without qualifications that cannot compete on the global or regional labor market. Children are commonly exploited and undervalued as workers. The most prevalent rates of child labor are found in fragile or failed states, such as Burkina Faso and Mali.[16] Children work as street sellers, on rural properties and in agricultural labor, or in small-scale mines, where children workers comprise 30–50% of the workforce. The ILO considers mining as one of the worst forms of child labor, as the risk of injury or death is very high and negative long-term health consequences result from constant exposure to toxic chemicals, especially mercury.[17] AGOA's aim of improving this situation in SSA, then, is very important.

Since 2000, Congress has amended AGOA five times, but most of the changes have been technical in nature. AGOA was drafted during Bill Clinton's Administration, but most of achievements of AGOA were seen during George W. Bush's time in office. The US vision of trade relations with Africa from 2000 onward was developed in the aftermath of good economic conditions in the US in the 1990s and the growing need for Africa's abundant natural resources. AGOA provides preferential trade status for eligible SSA countries by reducing tariff and nontariff barriers. Sub-Saharan African countries are also supported in instituting economic reforms, eradicating poverty, facilitating development of civil societies, and implementing political reforms. Countries must meet specific eligibility requirements to have an access to American support of this kind and these provisions give an impression of inequality between the US and its trading partners. However, AGOA is nonreciprocal and unilateral, thus when preferences are granted, they apply to US imports and not to US exports. Although Congress supports negotiating reciprocal and mutually beneficial trade agreements, including the possibility of establishing free trade areas that serve the interests of both the US and the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, it is not essential for negotiating these kinds of agreements. The eligibility requirements allow the President to establish particular sub-Saharan countries as trading partners. AGOA distinguishes between established and developing countries in Africa and rewards prog-

ress toward establishing a market-based economy that protects private property rights, incorporates an open rules-based trading system, and minimizes government interference in the economy through measures such as price controls, subsidies, and government ownership of economic assets. The distinction between established and developing countries means that reversal of previously achieved goals toward economic development can result in change of American policy and the withdrawal of trade preferences. Preferential treatment for AGOA countries is not unconditional and also depends on national security issues. AGOA countries must cooperate with the US and not engage in activities that undermine US national security or foreign policy interests.[18]

AGOA, in general, has been constructed around three sets of rules regarding governance, the economy, and widely adopted concepts of human rights and justice. These three concepts are related and economic development, with American support and preferential treatment, should allow the fostering of improved conditions for society more generally. AGOA encompasses the elimination of barriers to US trade and investment and the creation of an environment conducive to domestic and foreign investment. In addition, the question of barriers to trade and investment are linked to the protection of intellectual property and the resolution of bilateral trade and investor–state disputes. Therefore, AGOA countries are encouraged to introduce and maintain the rule of law, political pluralism, and the right to due process, a fair trial, and equal protection under the law. There are also requirements to develop economic policies to reduce poverty, increase the availability of health care and educational opportunities, expand physical infrastructure, promote the development of private enterprise, and encourage the formation of capital markets through microcredit or other programs. AGOA trading partners should develop working and credible systems to combat corruption and bribery and one of the suggested courses of action is to sign and implement the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Yet further AGOA regulations encompass human rights and prohibit engaging in gross violations of internationally recognized human rights or providing support for acts of international terrorism. The last element of AGOA's goals is to improve labor standards and AGOA countries are required to be actively involved in the protection of internationally recognized worker rights, including the right of association, and the right to organize and bargain collectively. Other labor standards referred in AGOA are very broad. For example, SSA countries are required to provide accept-

able conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.[19] How is it that these labor standards improve democracy?

First and foremost, it must be noted that strong democratic standards should involve an appropriate model of economic and social relations in society. In countries where forced labor or child labor exists, any improvement of living standards and societal development is unlikely. Therefore, US trade and development assistance forces poorer countries to develop because access to the American market is dependent on improvements and is incentive enough to encourage them. Even though the US has the power to enforce standards,[20] most of the requirements are noncompulsory. The US focuses on promoting improvements as the challenging demands written into AGOA are very difficult for developing countries to meet. A detailed analysis of models of enforcement of labor provisions used by the US in other free trade and preferential trade agreements shows that only some labor standards are enforceable. This is due to the fact that the administrative resources of the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) are limited. Any wide-scale action toward an AGOA country regarding a breach of labor standards demands both resources and personnel on the spot. Accusation of breaking bilateral obligations must be supported by evidence and occasional contraventions of AGOA regulations do not necessarily result in a formal dispute. Usually, a case must be clear and violations of labor standards must be obvious to the USTR officials.[21] American officials also realize that any formal action that is taken will be time consuming. Moreover, the reality of support provided by trade preferences cannot be narrowed to a straight connection between labor standards, development, and democracy. It takes time to improve labor rights in very poor and still developing countries.

In July 2014, the US did take action against Swaziland, showing that the Obama Administration takes workers' rights seriously. Swaziland is a small country in Southern Africa that is deeply affected by problems prevailing in African countries. Is not only poorly governed, as most sub-Saharan Africa countries are, but it also has serious societal problems in the fields of unemployment, poverty, and health. The rates of prevalence of HIV/AIDS are the highest in the world and the Swaziland government faces tremendous challenges for the future of its population, where one of four adults is infected. Therefore, any support for its economy, such as AGOA, is an important part of its development program. AGOA allowed improvements in the textile and clothing economic sector in Swaziland and 15,000 Swazi citizens have been employed in this industry since 2000,

thanks to American trade preferences.[22] However, the economic requirements of AGOA were largely ignored by the Swaziland government and the labor clauses were not implemented. As mentioned above, one of the criteria for eligibility of sub-Saharan countries to join the AGOA scheme is "established" or "continual progress toward establishing" protection of internationally recognized worker rights, including the right to organize and bargain collectively. In Swaziland, workers' rights to assembly and association and to form trade unions are nonexistent. Moreover, Swazi security forces seek to punish labor leaders for activities aimed at creating workers' unions.

After more than a decade of modest and slow improvement of labor standards, the Swazi government decided to change its existing law, and in 2012 deregistered the Trade Union Congress of the Swaziland Labor Federation. The excuse given for this action was the very dubious claim that the Swazi Industrial Relations Act only permitted registration of "organizations," but not "federations."[23] This legal move was followed by police action against union leaders. Aware of the fragile economic conditions of Swaziland, the US offered to provide the Swazi government with assistance to implement necessary changes, such as the Amendment of the Swazi Industrial Relations Act to allow for the registration of worker and employer federations, and other changes in Swazi law, to protect the rights of freedom of association, assembly, and free speech. Unfortunately, despite being sympathetic to the Swazi people, the American government could not find a common language with its Swazi counterpart. Frequent visits of USTR representatives, meetings with Swazi officials, and constant persuasion did not bring any result. In June 2014, President Obama decided to withdraw the benefits Swaziland received under AGOA, taking effect from January 1, 2015. A lack of political will on behalf of the Swaziland government forced the President into undesirable action. However, democratic pressure did bring some results in Swaziland. At the beginning of 2015, the Swazi government amended the Industrial Relations Act and allowed the registration of union federations. Moreover, the Swaziland government also allowed labor leaders to conduct peaceful demonstrations.[24]

Conclusion

The aim of this study was to determine the scope and character of US provisions on labor standards in trade agreements with developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Drawing on the AGOA example, the

study revealed that mechanisms used by the US to encourage improvements in labor standards cope with reality in these developing states in a more nuanced way than some scholars of international labor studies have claimed. Labor clauses in AGOA have first and foremost helped to develop poor economies by introducing democratic principles and workers' rights. American officials, when it comes to implementation, rarely use the US's position of power in these relationships and instead tend to support and assist fragile states and then immediately punish when any misconduct occurs. Thousands of workers benefit from AGOA on a daily basis and there has been advancement (albeit slow) of democratic principles, which should, first and foremost, serve citizens of developing countries. Therefore, US trade policy seems consistent with American interests and values, by protecting human dignity through democratic standards and it moves beyond a zero-sum game of economic gains. Growth and development must be inclusive and workers' rights are an important part of US democracy promotion all over the world. Difficult actions, like those taken against Swaziland, are sometimes necessary when the obligations of receiving that assistance are ignored. These actions, though, may also produce democratic development and continual support of workers' rights may bear important fruit. The most successful labor movement, Solidarnosc in Poland, spurred massive change in Central Eastern Europe. Pressure on developing countries in Africa to further improve labor standards will assist African societies to unlock their potential and help consolidate moves toward democratic regimes and better living standards for all in their societies.

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CHAPTER 7

The US and Democratization in Nigeria: Issues, Strategies, and Impacts

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Introduction

When the Berlin Wall fell, signaling the end of the Cold War, the third wave of democratization swept over several Third World Countries (TWCs), impelling African leaders to start making concessions relating to their level of political control. The campaign for democracy in Africa triggered revolts against autocratic regimes around the continent. The US assisted with dismantling the neo-patrimonial political structures in Africa and promoted the establishment of accountable democratic structures. The US and other major European powers, that is, Britain and France, have had an inevitable influence on the democratization process in Nigeria.[1] The enunciation of the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) was another positive measure aimed at democracy promotion, especially as it provided rewards for the consolidation of democratic values and institutions.[2]

America began intervening in Nigeria's political process with the intention of spreading democracy and to remove the undemocratic regime in

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Nigeria. Larry Diamond contends that US policies toward Africa since 1990 have been increasingly driven by a "concern for democracy, accountability and human rights."[3] On the other hand, Britain, which enjoyed a privileged position in Nigeria from 1960s onward, has also provided support for democratic progress in materially challenged societies, such as Nigeria. The European Union (EU) is one of the largest donors of external assistance in the world.[4] Despite a lack of conceptual clarity in its democracy promotion strategies, the EU has often declared that the aim of supporting democracy throughout the world must be understood within the general framework of also ensuring social and economic development, referring to the indivisibility of human rights enshrined in the Vienna Convention of 1993.[5]

Over the last decade, Nigeria's democratization experience has been varied. After decades of military dictatorship, the country has shifted sharply toward representative government. Efforts toward democratization have been accompanied by an upsurge in the number of civil society organizations and mass media outlets. For over 30 years, the military remained firmly in power, using oppression and exploitation to keep the people under their control. Under military dictatorship Nigeria has witnessed little socioeconomic change. There is no doubt that the involvement of the military in Nigerian politics has, more often than not, been defined by bad governance and corruption among postcolonial politicians, the suppression of opposition, neo-patrimonialism, and, above all, the absence of a free press and the preponderance of economic stagnation.

Political transition programs and democratic processes in Nigeria, especially under the leadership of the military junta, have been greatly influenced by external players. There is no doubt that some aspects of socioeconomic and political development depend on its donors or "developmental partners," including the US and major European countries. Since 1990, the West has provided financial support to Nigeria's democratic institutions.[6] Nigeria is the US's leading African trading partner. Not only is Nigeria a major power in West Africa, but it remains a major influence on economic and political power throughout the continent. Given the increased attention on Africa given by politicians in the US, it is vital that American policy provides as much support as possible to the consolidation of Nigeria's democratization process. Given the strategic position of the US in the democratization process in Nigeria and its symbolic importance and the prominent role of the United Nations and its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa, this study is highly relevant in the current politi-

cal climate. Nigeria provides a "test-case" for US democracy promotion policies in Africa. This paper examines the engagement of the US in the process of democratization in Nigeria, especially in the wake of the third wave of democratization in the international system and how it has shaped the recent drive toward democracy and democratic consolidations.

Democratic Governance in Nigeria: A Background Analysis

Nigeria gained independence more than 50 years ago, yet political stability remains an aspiration, not a reality. When Nigeria gained independence on October 1, 1960, it did not immediately translate into sociopolitical and economic growth, but it did lead to the first successful attempt at establishing Western-style democratic processes. In the first republic, Nigeria adopted fundamental laws that were "carbon-copied" from the constitutions of the former colonial powers.[7] That is, the country experimented with a parliamentary system of government modeled on the British Westminster system, consisting of an executive cabinet headed by a prime minister and a bicameral national assembly elected largely by universal suffrage, and an independent judiciary. It is, therefore, a fair assumption that the aim was to create entities that would mimic the models of the West, in form and in action.[8] In October 1963, Nigeria altered its relationship with the UK by proclaiming itself a federal republic and writing a new constitution.

From the outset, Nigeria's ethnic, regional, and religious tensions were magnified by the significant disparities in economic and educational development between the south and the north of the country. As a result of the socioeconomic and political mismanagement on the part of the first republic politicians, the military struck in January 1966; a small group of army officers, mostly south-eastern Igbos, overthrew the government and assassinated the federal prime minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Belewa, and Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello and Sir Ladoke Akintola (the premiers of the northern and western regions, respectively). On its assumption of government, the military, under the leadership of General Aguyi Ironsi, promised to correct all the socioeconomic and political anomalies created by the overthrown civilian government. Instead, a barrage of despotic and authoritarian leaders emerged, and the incessant retrogressive ideologies and methods of rule emerged, changing the atmosphere of politics in Nigeria. The "Khaki Boys" set up their autocratic structures and between 1966 and 1979

the country was ruled by perpetual military dictatorship and struggled through a series of military coups, assassinations, civil war, and several other forms of political and religious strife. The federal military government was unable to alleviate tensions between ethnic groups and failed to produce a constitution acceptable to vast sections of the population. In fact, its efforts to abolish the federal structure greatly increased tensions within the country. On July 29, 1975, General Murtala Muhammed and a group of fellow officers staged a bloodless coup, accusing the military government of General Yakubu Gowon of delaying the promised return to civilian rule and becoming corrupt and ineffective. On assumption of office, the new military administration of General Murtala Mohammed announced a timetable for the resumption of civilian rule with a deadline of October 1, 1979.

On February 13, 1976, General Murtala Muhammed was assassinated in an abortive military *coup d'état*. In 1978, the military regime of General Olusegun Obasanjo lifted the ban on political activities, resuscitating political activities in the country that had been absent since the demise of the first republic in 1966. Political parties were formed, and candidates were nominated for the offices of the president and the vice president, the two houses of the National Assembly, governorships, and state houses of assembly. In the 1979 general elections, five political parties competed in a series of runoff elections in which a northerner, Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), was finally elected president. All five parties won representation in the National Assembly. On October 1, 1979, the military handed over the mantle of leadership to the first democratically elected executive president. These actions appeared to those on the outside to have all the trademarks of a Western democracy, constitutions, elections, parliaments, and parliamentary opposition. General Olusegun Obasanjo's transition to a civil rule program produced, for the first time, an Executive President for the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

The main features of the 1979 Constitution that prescribed these democratic processes were that there would be elected:

(i) An Executive President who was both head of state and head of government as well as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
(ii) A bicameral National Assembly comprising a Senate whose members were elected on the basis of equality of states (five from each of the then 19 states) and a House of Representatives with 450 members

There were also provisions for fundamental human rights, duties and rights of citizenship, maintaining the independence of the judiciary, and the powers and functions of the federal, state, and local tiers of government were also outlined.[9]

In August 1983, the first transition between elected civilian governments returned Alhaji Shehu Shagari and the NPN to power in a landslide victory, with a majority of seats in the National Assembly and control of 12 out of the 19 state governments. The elections, though, were marred by violence and allegations of widespread vote rigging. The political pandemonium that followed the reelection of the incumbent president prompted the military to stage another coup. On December 31, 1983, the military overthrew the civilian administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari and Major General Muhammadu Buhari emerged as the leader of the Supreme Military Council (SMC). The army argued that these ousted civilian governments were corrupt and lacked foresight regarding developmental issues. The politicians did not lead their country in terms of people-oriented policies, as civil and political turmoil was the hallmark of the country. Neo-patrimonialism, nepotism, and inclinations toward ethno-regional politics were championed by the first democratic governments of the Nigerian state.

The rationale for military intervention was not only the reorganization of the economy, but also the setting of the stage for a return to true democratic practices, including securing basic freedoms such as open elections. Though the military promised to set the country back on the path to democratic and development and then return to the barracks, as the saying goes: "power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." The military elite found that holding on to power had great advantages, hence the trend of coups and counter-coups in the country. By the 1990s, the military junta in Nigeria started working toward returning to its foundational democratic ethos, moving away from authoritarianism toward a purposeful transition program. In 1993, after a long transition program and many years driving a society broken by perpetual economic hardship, General Ibrahim Babangida held a comparatively free and fair election, which he, however, quickly annulled because he did not like the result. General Babangida was forced to hand power to Chief Ernest Shonekan under the cloud of controversy generated by the annulment of the presidential election. General Babangida left office on August 27, 1993, leaving power in the hands of an interim government.[10] Chief Earnest Shonekan, however, presided over the interim government for only three months.

On November 17, 1993, General Sanni Abacha unceremoniously dismissed Chief Earnest Shonekan and all the democratic institutions created under the interim regime were disbanded. With the pronouncement of his takeover in January 1994, there was no schedule for a return to civilian rule and all debate about Nigeria's political future was suspended. General Abacha, therefore, returned Nigeria to military dictatorship. In June 1998, Abacha died in office and General Abdusalami Abubakar assumed leadership of the country.

After General Abubakar's consolidation of support from within the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC), the Abubakar government took several important steps toward restoring democratic governance in the country. In August 1998, General Abubakar appointed the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to conduct elections for local government councils, the state legislatures and state governors, the national assembly, and the president. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) successfully held the Local Government Council elections on December 5, 1998. Elections for 36 state legislatures and governorships were held on January 9, 1998, on February 20, 1999, elections to the national assembly were conducted and the presidential election was held on February 27, 1999. A former military head of state, General Olusegun Obasanjo, freed from prison by General Abdulsalami Abubakar, ran as a civilian candidate and won the presidential election.

On May 29, 1999, General Abubakar handed over power to a democratically elected government under the leadership of President Olusegun Obasanjo. Since then, the country has embarked on a series of reforms geared toward the consolidation of democracy. Nigeria has had a tainted political history and its effect continued to hamper the country's drive toward socioeconomic growth. The recent waves of democratization have led to the establishment of democratic institutions and the emergence of civilian rule in the country. The fact remains, though, that democratic consolidation and political stability hang in the balance after more than a decade of democratic governance in the country. The legacy of long periods of military rule is that Nigerian politics has an atmosphere of militarization, violence, and bitterness. Despite democratic politics slowly being achieved, the country remains little more than a failing state, a dictatorship on the brink of economic collapse marred by blatant violations of human rights and the carnage inflicted by merciless religious insurgencies.

Foreign Influence and Democratization in Nigeria

With respect to competitive party systems, democratic aid exhibits a direct influence, particularly through party assistance provided through the US government and other intergovernmental agencies, such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and NGOs such as the National Endowment for Democracy. In the realm of democratic aid, the aim of the US and these other agencies is to promote more responsive, responsible, and representative political governance in the developing nations of the world.[11] The US has orchestrated its own self-promotion and perpetual dominance in Africa and of Africa's economic and social transformation. After the Cold War, the US and major European powers pumped millions of dollars of monetary aid trying to assist impoverished African countries in conducting free and fair elections.[12] The US efforts toward development and democracy assistance, the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, aimed to harmonize development assistance to Africa, especially through budget support, and to view developing country governments as partners with "ownership" rather than just recipients. A critical gap on the aid agenda is how to align policies both across and within donor agencies to achieve the approach that is best for development and supporting fledgling democracies.[13]

By the turn of the twenty-first century, global politics was dominated by the US. There was also rapid dispersion of manufacturing activity across the globe, aided by technological advances and increased capital mobility in the global system.[14] The material improvements resulting from these structural changes led to demands for democratic governments in many parts of the world. The growing wealth of industrializing societies created an expanding middle class eager for political recognition and civil liberties from authoritarian regimes.[15] It is clearly in the interest of the US and other intergovernmental agencies to demonstrate their commitment to the development of stable and prosperous democratic processes in Nigeria and Africa more generally. A well-functioning democracy in the most populous black nation will make a positive contribution to global conditions in multiple ways. The democratization experience in Africa also shows that external influences matter. The end of the Cold War created a more hospitable environment for democratization to take root on the continent. The US is no longer undermining democratic reformers who challenge the status quo of dictator rule. Moreover, the winds of change that drifted into the region convinced the US to readdress its conception of the building of democratic institutions in Nigeria.

Development and democracy assistance from the US to Nigeria has had disparate effects on key elements of democratic consolidation, including the avoidance of democratic erosion, the enhancement of accountability, promotion of competitive party systems and election monitoring. With respect to the militarization of the Nigerian political terrain and democratic erosion, the US has used threats of withdrawing financial aid to the Nigerian government in a number of instances, especially when the incumbent attempted to abrogate the conduct of free and fair elections. It should be emphasized that the failure to install the presumptive winner of the 1993 election, Chief M.K.O. Abiola, has become a focal point for opponents of the regime. Apparently, even those who express little support for Abiola personally see the denial of the election result as a symbol of the oppression of the military regime. The junta has dismantled civilian institutions and has jailed or harassed critics of the military. Furthermore, the execution of the "Ogoni Nine" in 1995, which created tension in diplomatic relations with the US and a deepening of sanctions first imposed after the June 1993 elections were declared null and void. The US has an array of sanctions in place against Nigeria, including the ban on the sale and repair of military goods and services to Nigeria, and a visa ban on all officials involved in planning or implementing policies believed to hinder Nigeria's return to civilian rule. Since the reemergence of democratic governance in Nigeria, however, the US has restrategized its democratic initiatives in Nigeria, which has helped to strengthen democratic institutions, boosting broad-based economic growth, trade, and investment, creating strong, accountable, and democratic institutions, sustained by a deep commitment to democratic governance in the country.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Nigeria set out specific objectives related to development of democratic institutions, which brings together opposition parties, civil society groups, business leaders, and the media. The political opposition has the deepest interest in fair elections, rooting out corruption, and providing the public with responsive policy alternatives. In addition, it also provided elites with opportunities to pursue their own political ambitions.[16] One of the major cornerstones of USAID democratic assistance to Nigeria was the Consortium for Electoral and Political Processes (CEPPS), which is made up of three American NGOs: the National Democratic Institution for International Affairs (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). USAID's support to the national legislature is implemented by NDI. These

organizations assist selected civil society organizations to construct viable linkages with community groups representing community-level input. The purpose of this component of the aid package is to provide communities with alternative means to engage in the political process, especially in helping to build grassroots democracy. By increasing the grassroots membership of specific civil society organizations (CSOs) their legitimacy among diverse communities in enhanced.[17] USAID's current program further strengthens the foundation of democratic governance in Nigeria and also supports both government and civil society efforts to respond to the problems of ethnic, religious, and resource-based conflicts.

USAID is the largest bilateral donor of democracy aid to Nigeria. In 2009, USAID provided an estimated US$17.552 million for various forms of democracy assistance in Nigeria. In 2011, it spent about US$32 million. USAID's work in the country supports Nigerian civil society in demanding openness and accountability from the government, as well as helping certain government institutions including the National Assembly and anticorruption agencies to respond to these demands. The main aim is to enhance the "efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness" of the National Assembly by forging progressive partnerships that integrate support, skills transfer, and technical assistance to all members, key committees, National Assembly administrators, staff, executive officials, CSOs, and citizens.[18] The set of activities corresponds to two aspects in the Foreign Assistance Framework, firstly increasing citizen participation and oversight, and secondly, initiating crosscutting civil society programs. The impact of these and various other programs increased the representational capacity of civil society at the local level and it further assisted the government to become more responsive to citizens' needs and demands.

In the 1990s, the US placed greater emphasis on democracy assistance and this approach was very effective at promoting democratic transitions. For instance, after many years of military dictatorship, Nigeria was undertaking a democratization process and working toward becoming a genuine multiparty democracy. Following the successful inauguration of President Olusegun Obasanjo in May 1999, the US government reconsidered all its political sanctions on Nigeria. As a result, the two countries began to talk about how to reinforce their diplomatic relations and how best to move Nigeria toward more stable democratization. The US, along with other intergovernmental agencies, began to attach political conditionality to development aid during this period. In its efforts toward promoting democracy in Nigeria, the Clinton administration supported independent

media outlets, augmenting the capacities of civil society, reinforcing electoral commissions and the judiciary in Nigeria. Democracy assistance from the US aimed to reinforce relationships of responsibility between citizens and their government, as well as between different government institutions. Without this aid, many of the key institutions and actors important for democratic consolidation would be much weaker.

The US's democratic principles emphasize the importance of the rule of law, respect for human rights, and good governance. Nonetheless, this "extraordinary investment" in regional stability arguably contributed to the American goal of making the world safe for democracy. As former US Secretary of State Madeline Albright noted: Nigeria is "potentially a very valuable partner for us in promoting peace, democracy, and the rule of law throughout West Africa."[19] The US is no doubt committed to supporting strong, open, and accountable governments and sustainable development in Nigeria. Strengthening democratic institutions is one of the four pillars of US policy toward Africa. Others include supporting African economic growth and development, advancing peace and security, and promoting opportunity and development. President Barak Obama asserts that Africa is a fundamental part of the US's interconnectivity with the rest of the world, and called for a partnership with Africa that is "based on mutual interests and mutual respect." The National Security Strategy, released in May 2010, reinforces this vision, and calls for partnership with African nations as they grow their economies and strengthen their democratic institutions and governance.[20] The US government supports Nigerian democratic process, which is based on strengthening the democratic institutions and creating democratic processes that benefit the people. Democratic governance that is based on transparent processes, a reliance on the rule of law, and steady progress toward eliminating corruption and strengthening institutional capacity will address many of the challenges currently facing Nigeria.

As has been argued above, the US and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) continue to influence in the democratization process in Nigeria. For instance, the US has, for many years, been consolidating its democracy assistance to the country in the form of financial aid. After successive general elections, the new US Ambassador to Nigeria declared that American development and democracy aid will not be undermined and that aid to civil society was not to be overlooked in carrying out democracy assistance to Nigeria.[21] Though most of the assistance was designed to favor political participation, much of the aid directed to civil society groups goes to spe-

cialized think-tanks, often urban-based, with scarce membership and little capability to represent the needs of the poor. The US and the EU, in collaboration, followed a multitiered approach to democratization assistance, which included monitoring the election process, the negotiation of new bilateral economic frameworks, and a commitment to long-term involvement with the Special Program of development assistance.[22] The Special Program, which was the foundation of the new policy, was more explicitly oriented toward the consolidation of the new democracy in Nigeria. The US, for its part, established a bilateral relationship with the civilian regime. A new emphasis was placed on support for democracy, the rule of law, social justice, and the promotion of human rights as core themes in the effort to sustain the new democratic regime in the country.

Over the last 15 years, Nigeria's democratization experience has benefited from these external influences. Global trends such as the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Berlin Wall and heightened expectations for democratic governance have clearly shaped political reform in the international system. Foreign aid and funding under the present democratic dispensation represents a tangible manifestation of a democratic dividend, sending a clear signal to the populace that democracy is rewarded, while encouraging further consolidation of existing democratic institutions in Nigeria, as in other developing nations. Recognizing that democratic consolidation takes time, such developmental aid should be sustained to promote greater political liberalization.[23] While development aid encourages democracy through social and economic transformation, democratic assistance focuses more on providing domestic agents with the means to foster change. The US's democratic assistance to Nigeria has helped in building the ethos, capacity, and the structure of democratic institutions.[24] The direct involvement of the US and its aid has strengthened the technical, managerial, and financial capacity of independent electoral commissions, and assisted with building the technical expertise of legislators so that they can effectively oversee the executive branch, stimulating the emergence of independent think-tanks.[25]

The value of the US's role as democracy promoter goes beyond numbers and figures. The more extensive approach to democracy promotion and the historical linkages with Nigeria makes the US a favored actor in Nigerian politics. US–Nigerian relations, though, have had a bumpy ride. The relationship reached its lowest point in November 1995 when General Sanni Abacha executed environmental campaigner Ken Saro-Wira and other Ogoni leaders. This led to the US introducing sanctions, which

included banning of arms sales, the suspension of developmental cooperation, visa restrictions for high-level visits, and the suspension of all cooperation with the military regime. These sanctions were repeatedly extended until 1998 when there was a change of government in Nigeria and a timetable for democratic elections was announced. The US responded by adopting a new position, easing the sanctions and also by making a support package available for the elections. To some extent, it can be argued that foreign aid for development and democratization has helped encourage the creation of institutional checks and balances, and served to provide more effective participatory mechanisms in the political system. US intervention and assistance has increased public engagement with the political process and the development of a democratic ethos in the country. The increased proficiency of the independent media in Nigeria, which is a prerequisite for the airing of alternative political views, fosters transparency among government officials, mobilizes government action to address emerging humanitarian crises, and enforces the rule of law. External support for civil society groups has also strengthened public participation and led to more effective democratic processes.

It should be noted that democracy assistance from the US has also had some negative effects. Critics have argued that "externally assisted democratization cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of sovereignty, which asserts that every country, regardless of its size, is the unquestioned master of its internal affairs and forbids other countries from interfering with those affairs."[26] The impact that development and democracy aid has on a state's sovereignty is currently debated by social science scholars around the globe. As the rate of foreign and democratic aid being given by Western states increases, there is arguably a threat to the sovereignty of non-Western states presented by the level of interference in domestic policy matters that is demanded in return for the aid. The role of the domestic government in all policy decisions, including those regarding democracy assistance is important, especially in relation to a state's sovereignty. Given that democracy is unfamiliar to the governments in some of these countries, they may be punished for policies they see as necessary for effective rule, such as important actors who are not welcomed by the government being excluded from receiving finance or having their activities hindered. Questions of democracy and human rights have been voiced with rising intensity by the US, the EU, and by individual European countries. However, when it came to resourcing the implementation of the ambitious democratic principles these countries demanded, the US,

some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other bilateral donors lacked a "serious" commitment.[27] The policies of the US toward Nigeria in the 1990s were primarily influenced by its own security concerns, and thus by its narrowly defined national interests and those of other individual donors.

Another major negative effect of US democracy assistance in Nigeria is the lack of wide-ranging evaluations of the impact of programs and projects. Although development projects are better monitored, pro-democracy initiatives are often assumed to have a positive effect without any kind of impact assessment. This system could negatively affect the process of regional economic and political integration that the US claims to support in Nigeria, with the aim of consolidating peace and promoting democracy. Furthermore, there is no measure of the extent to which Western donors have been intolerant in promoting true democracy in Nigeria through their democratic aid. If Western actors are truly concerned about consolidating democracy, rather than what Joseph Schumpeter called "objectless self-propagation," should Nigeria's economic transformation not become the foremost priority?[28] To put it differently, is the cart not being put before the horse, by racing ahead with establishing democratic processes without first tackling the deep poverty of the population? Moreover, the technically oriented assistance to political institutions seems to be often incapable of responding to concrete problems facing local politicians.[29] In short, it seems the US's pro-democracy programs leave it vulnerable to the common charge of making "cynical calculations," advancing its own national interest under the guise of promoting democracy. The most recent independent evaluation has shown that programs devoted to human rights and democratization reflect a scattered portfolio of policies without strategic linkages, revealing the absence of a clear overall strategy. This assessment only further opens the US to the criticism outlined above.

Conclusion

The US and some nongovernmental organizations have devoted financial aid and resources to foster Nigeria's democracy. Before and after the 1999 general elections, the major Western powers demonstrated a commitment toward the democratization process. Prior to the emergence of democratic governance in Nigeria, Western donors took a very negative

approach to the military administration, including the implementation of sanctions. After 1999, the new strategy for consolidating democracy has shown several key features, namely, strict dialogue and cooperation with the new democratic government and the more extensive employment of positive measures.

The West and the Nigerian government, under the present democratic dispensation, could be said to be in a "partnership for the consolidation of democracy," with many programs co-funded by the US and Nigerian governments. Although understandable in the new political environment, the US's strategy has not always achieved valuable results. A first weakness was signaled in the general framework of democratic promotion and capacity building, sometimes too vague in defining clear results to achieve. During 1999–2003, the first evaluation of the US and EU democracy assistance strategies in the country underlined that the scope of action was too broad to be effective. This led to duplications, especially in the context of decentralized cooperation, and to relatively small support from important social actors, such as trade unions, that were particularly crucial to South Africa's social development. The US and nongovernmental organizations can further contribute to the spread of democratic norms in Nigeria by rewarding major agencies that promote democratic reforms while facilitating the exchange of lessons learned within the country. Civil Society Organizations and pro-democracy bodies are important forums for conveying these lessons. All these bodies have advocated expanded democratic practices and have introduced progress toward these practices. These innovative, indigenous national accountability strategies have considerable merit and potential. Increased national engagement with these bodies can elevate awareness of how other parts of the world have pursued democratic reforms, enhance the exposure and exchange of ideas in the country, and boost the capacity of organizational structures. The analysis above found that there is a need for the Nigerian government to look inwardly and restrategize its way forward instead of relying on foreign assistance to consolidate its democracy. There is a need to undergo economic, social, and institutional transformation in order to consolidate a well-functioning democracy. The Nigerian government should recalibrate its steps toward launching economic reform to promote growth and build the foundation for more stable democracy in the country.

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PART III

US Democratization Efforts in the Middle East and the Balkans

CHAPTER 8

The Fight for Libya: The Strength of Force, Not of Oil

Funso Adesola

Introduction

This chapter examines the US's checkered relations with Libya during the Muammar Gaddafi years. Integral points raised in this study are the country's strategic location, its oil wealth, and its controversial leadership in relations with the US. We shall focus on the country's enigmatic leader (Gaddafi) and his activism in the Middle East, the Sahara, and North Africa, his anti-Western and anti-Zionists postures as well as his anti-Communist, pro-Islamic, and pro-Arabian views. This chapter explores how his territorial ambition, rashness, and nonconformist attitude earned him names such as "an irritant," "a terrorist," and "a lout." These labels provide an indication of the reason for his downfall. Attention will be given to how the change in the international power configuration and the practical economic realities of his country at a given historical moment "pruned" Gaddafi's international relations. This study also discusses the elasticity of the phrase "protection of the civilian population" and how the use of force overwhelmed the conventional use of oil sanctions in tensions Libyan. This chapter will also focus on

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the distinction between the Libyan crisis and other revolutions in the "Arab spring."

The study is divided into ten parts. Background is provided to the development of Gaddafi's persona, Libyan foreign policy initiatives under Gaddafi, the oil and arms trades, and Libya's relations with the US. Following this comes a discussion of the US's oil sanctions on Libya, constitutional and regional issues surrounding the 2011 US intervention in Libya, Gaddafi's last days in power, and the differentials between the Libyan revolution and those of Tunisia and Egypt.

Gaddafi's Persona

> On September 1, 1969, a group of junior Libyan army officers took control of the Libyan government in a bloodless coup d'état. After the coup, the group formed the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), chaired by Muammar al-Qadhafi. In four decades following, Libya faced numerous foreign policy challenges. The Qadhafi regime took on a distinctly anticolonial flavor that mirrored the revolutionary political trends in Egypt under Gamal Abdul Nasser. This change in foreign policy posture shook Libya's relations with the United States and the United Kingdom and initiated the degradation of Libyan-Western ties.[1]

The above quotation summarizes Gaddafi's reign, foreign relations, and personality. His ascension to power and growing popularity was predicated on the promotion of popular participation in a society that had a culture of elite-domination of politics. His nomadic roots and gregarious lifestyle coupled with his personal charm, modest appearance, and charismatic qualities aided his popularity and social acceptance.[2] Drawing from local tradition, Gaddafi forged an alliance with the *ulamas* (Islamic clerics). He was also fond of speaking in mosques and consulted the clerics on public policy—with the view to legitimizing his own rule.[3] His main sources of strength were charisma and rhetoric facilitated by a supportive government structure and the media. The "Green Book" that was published in 1975 gave a broad outline of his political philosophy.[4]

Gaddafi also had notions about regional organization. In 1999, he proposed the replacement of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) with a United States of Africa. He had no faith in the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states governing the global community—irrespective of grave human rights abuses.[5] In fact, when he

became the President of the Union in 2009, Gaddafi's tenure was marked by shameful repeated public arguments with other African leaders.[6] Worse still, Gaddafi did not respect protocol and due process—an attitude he had adopted much earlier in his life and that was shown in his rebellious school days.[7] Gaddafi, for reasons attributed more to his person than the circumstances of national history, his country's wealth and geography, has been a "dramatis personae" in the Middle Eastern politics.

He championed the attack on the Zionists, their accomplices, and those seen or perceived by him to be aiding them. For instance, he organized a heroic welcome for Palestinian guerrillas and assassins that had slain 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972.[8] He not only took action, but also whipped-up Arab sentiment against Cote d'Ivoire because it restored diplomatic relations with Israel after more than a decade of ruptured relations. He was also intent on dealing with any African country that was keen on reconciling with the Zionists. These actions were taken before he lost hope in Arab solidarity. Indeed, for his truculence, cavalier arrogance, and major anti-Western positions, Gaddafi has been portrayed by the West variously as an irritant, a terrorist, a nonconformist, or a lout.[9]

Gaddafi Foreign Policy Initiatives

Gaddafi's foreign policy initiatives hinged mainly on his anti-imperialist, anti-Israeli, anti-Communist, and pro-Islam and Arab unity views. He was also committed to African affairs as shown by his activism in the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU), which has now become the African Union (AU). The Libyan petrodollars earned during the Gaddafi years "bought" him great clout in the international system. He established Islamic centers and sent missionaries across the African continent. His populism, from which *Jamahiriyya* (state of the masses) emerged as part of the country's name (Libya Arab Jamahiriyya), he claimed was rooted in the "socialism of Islam." He espoused rhetoric that strongly appealed to his people by condemning Zionism, imperialism, graft, blackmail, and the rich.[10] He strove to maintain friendly relations with Libya's neighbors by acquiescing to the Tripoli Charter that sought to unite Libya, Egypt, and Sudan. He also made spirited efforts to extend Libya's influence to Chad and Uganda. Gaddafi was also keen to maintain and promote relations that diminished Israel's influence, not just among its immediate neighbors but also outside the Arab world. He was thus pleased to promote understanding of, and support for, countries in sub-Saharan Africa and

elsewhere in order to disrupt Israel's overtures toward developing countries in the region seeking benefactors.[11]

Gaddafi had so much wealth generated from petrodollars that he was able to strongly support rebel groups in Chad and Uganda and became more intrusive in the international relations of many unstable regimes that were former dependencies of France. To him, Israel was a European colony in Palestine and as such, he believed it should be obliterated. He also reveled in supporting rebels or liberation movements in Eritrea, South Africa, and Northern Ireland. In the tradition of Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt, Gaddafi supported insurgent groups that challenged Western-supported regimes.[12] At the peak of Gaddafi's defiance, the then US President, Ronald Reagan, called Gaddafi the "mad dog of the Middle East."[13] Gaddafi could act as a good international citizen. For instance, he did not challenge either the International Court of Justice's (ICJ's) ruling in favor of Chad against Libya in their dispute over the ownership of the uranium-rich Aouzou Strip and nor the ICJ's verdict in favor of Malta in the dispute over the territorial waters between Malta and Libya.[14]

The eccentricity and inconsistency that defined Gaddafi's foreign relations could be seen in Libya's unilateral withdrawal from Chad in 1988, despite France's unrelenting involvement in the war there. This was particularly inconsistent with his anti-imperialist claims. In the same way, his four-day war with Egypt in 1977, after the demise of Gamal Abdul Nasser, undermined the Egyptian aspects of his vision for the continent. The extradition of two Libyans accused of the December 21, 1988, bombing of Pan American Flight 103 at Lockerbie, Scotland, to Western authorities occurred after years of outcry by the West on the issue, but seemed inconsistent with Gaddafi's principles. Also the jettisoning of weapon of mass destruction programs in the midst of the US-led war in Iraq was not in keeping with his strong-willed anti-imperial foreign policy posture.[15]

Background to Gaddafi's Oil and Arms Trade

Part of Gaddafi's foreign policy was based on his country's oil and arms trade. His activism in the world was facilitated by petrodollars. He not only confronted the West in his bid to end colonialism, but he also stoked the embers of rebellion in West Africa. He started by promoting terrorist groups that targeted the US. Libyan terrorists planted a bomb in April 5, 1986, at *La Belle* discotheque in Berlin killing as many US servicemen as possible, as so many patronized the venue. The US undertook reprisal

attacks on two Libyan cites, Benghazi and Tripoli, in April 1986. This did not, however, deter Gaddafi's Libyan terrorists from bombing the Pan Am Airliner at Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 people, mainly Britons and Americans.[16] Libyan terrorists also brought down French UTA airliner over the Nigerian and Chad regions of the Sahara causing 171 deaths.[17] Gaddafi also trained and supplied arms to many insurgents across Africa. The brutality and carnage caused by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the Sierra Leonean Revolutionary United Front (RUF) is recalled by many. The civil war that created the deepening chasm between the Muslim north and African south of the Chadian population was also a result of Gaddafi's intervention. Gaddafi was also a major backer of President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso. All these and the *Janjaweed* insurgents that committed horrific acts in Darfur (now Southern Sudan) were Gaddafi's handy work. He had mercenaries and rebels from a range of African countries from Eritrea to Mauritania, Somalia, and Mali. He used military adventurism to intrude into the politics of many countries in Africa.[18]

The US, Britain, Germany, Belarus, France, Russia, and South Africa directly or indirectly enhanced Gaddafi's ability to manipulate politics in the African region. This is because the arms trade between those countries and Libya ran to several thoUSnds of millions of dollars and pounds sterling. It is from the above-listed countries that he was able to amass riot-control gear, small arms and ammunition, electronic equipment used to block the opposition's mobile phones and internet access, and also military planes. Between 2005 and 2009 alone Libya imported military aircraft worth £278m, just under £100m worth of small guns, and £85m in electronic equipment from the European Union (EU).[19]

Background on Libya's Relations with the US

Libyan relations with the US were good when Muammar Gaddafi overthrew the feeble 79-year-old King Idris I in a bloodless coup. He assumed power as an army Captain at age 27 and later promoted himself to the rank of Colonel.[20] ESSO, an American oil firm, like many others, made staggering profits between 1959 and 1986. However, the relationship between it and Libya deteriorated when Gaddafi expelled Americans from Wheelus Air Force base. That base was used as a vital headquarters for bombers, tanker-refueling planes, and reconnaissance fighters.[21] It was also considered the most important military base outside the US, apart from Weis

Baden in what was then West Germany.[22] Gaddafi's partial nationalization of Libyan oil companies was a further source of his country's sour relations with the US, as were Libya's support for Palestinian terrorist groups and its eventual closeness to the Soviet Union. The bitterness of Libyan–US relations climaxed in the 1980s during the Reagan Administration, which not only led to the latter's attempt to overthrow Gaddafi but also provoked an attempt on his life.[23] The US banned its citizens from traveling to Libya and Libyans from entering the US. This prevented the elites from sending their children to American universities as was the usual practice. The encumbrances of Western oil and other economic sanctions also bruised Gaddafi's ego and ambition of statesmanship of Africa and the Arab world. He was thus denied the recognition and prestige that he yearned for.[24] In the end, these moves proved effective and Gaddafi began to "back-pedal" on his policies. By April 5, 1999, he had surrendered Abdel Basset ali al-Meghrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhima (the suspected Lockerbie bombers) to the United Nations to face trial in the Netherlands.[25]

US Oil Sanctions

Under the Clinton Administration, the US was alleged to be "sanction happy." Many of its Western allies became weary of imposing further sanctions, especially oil sanctions on Libya. In fact, Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and other European countries undermined the US's Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA).[26] Yet Gaddafi's government continued to antagonize Washington policy-makers with his inflammatory rhetoric and penchant for developing weapons of mass destruction and missiles that the US considered inimical to its interests.[27] However, US oil companies and elements within the US Congress began to make a case for normalization of the country's relations with Libya. These moves intensified when the Clinton Administration was not willing to reconcile with Gaddafi's government even after January 31, 2002, when the Scottish Judges ruled on the case of the alleged "Lockerbie bombers." Abdel Basset ali Meghrahi was found guilty and Lamen Khalifa Fhima was acquitted. The pro-Israeli lobby and its allies within the US Congress, though, wanted the sanctions to continue.[28]

Determined to obtain rapprochement with the US, Gaddafi's government cooperated with the US in the "war-on-terror," especially in fighting against the *al-Qaeda* Movement. He not only extradited Islamist terrorist groups but also refused to provide shelter for those that were hitherto

harbored and trained in Libya. Gaddafi also provided Libyan underground agents to aid the US's war-on-terror.[29] Gaddafi's actions were guided by his perception that the US might attack any country providing safe haven to terrorist groups. He also avoided making any criticism of US policies, even those that directly related to the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. He was ready to pay compensation to the families of the victims of the Lockerbie bombing and by May 2002 he proposed paying $10 million to each family (a total sum of $2.7 billion). Yet the US rejected the offer until such time as Libyan officials were willing to accept responsibility for the bombing.[30]

It is striking that Gaddafi leveraged on his country's considerable oil wealth and its strategic location to make both enviable and unenviable marks in international relations. The collapse of the Soviet Union, recognition of US hegemonic power, international isolation of his country, a sanction-induced economic downturn, and the rise of anti-Gaddafi Islamist opposition, all eventually led to Gaddafi changing his policies. He made his officials take responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing, compensated the families of the victims of the bombing, ended support for terrorism and terrorists, and dismantled his program to develop weapons of mass destruction.[31] The above tale of events provides an understanding of the issues that preceded the battle for Libya and Gaddafi's loss of power and eventually his life.

Constitutional and Regional Issues in the 2011 US Intervention in Libya

During the 2007 election campaign, Barack Obama pledged not to commit the US's military to any new operations in another country. His Administration instead tried to exorcise the US army from its military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq. Little did Obama know that there would be a need to begin a fresh conflict in Libya in March 2011. A conflict for which he did not seek or obtain permission from Congress, instead relying on the United Nations' Security Council and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies to provide legitimacy for the action.[32] As anticipated, the war was not limited in nature, time, and scope but extended beyond the 90-day limit of the War Powers Resolution (WPR) that gave the President the power to deploy troops to engage in foreign operations without recourse to the Congress for 60 days, after which he was required to prepare to withdraw them within

the next 30 days. This action was taken against the historical records that show that US military actions in foreign lands are most successful when they occur with the informed consent and authorization of the Congress.[33]

It could be argued that once Libya did not present an imminent or actual threat to the US, the invocation of the principle of self-defense for military action against Libya was not tenable. It is interesting to note that UN Security Council Resolution 1973 of March 2011 was meant to protect the civilian population in the embattled Libya; however, it provided leeway for the US to become involved in the battle. For instance, while the Resolution established a ban on "all flights" in the airspace, in reality it only applied to the Libyan government's forces, not the military flights of the coalition force. Russia and China had once been prepared to veto the resolution, but they abstained from the vote and once the consent of the 22-member Arab League had been obtained there was sufficient support for a no-fly zone over Libya to be declared. Indeed, it was also the protection of the civilian population that informed the Arab League's action.[34]

It is important to examine the place of the African Union in the Libyan conflict to understand the regional dynamics. The Libyan conflict was seen as an "African Civil War" in that it had implications not only for Libyans but also the entire Sahara, and its repercussions destabilized the region.[35] Some have argued that the African Union was not given a free hand to bring its initiatives to bear on the outcome of the Libyan conflict. This argument is predicated on the selective implementation (by the US, France, and Britain) of the UN Security Council's Resolution 1973 that was adopted on March 17, 2011.[36] The resolution permitted UN member states to take:

> 'All necessary measures' to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack', provided only that they act in cooperation with the UN Secretary General and keep him and the Security Council informed.[37]

The resolution was allegedly perverted by the 'powerful-three' (mentioned above) in the Security Council in that they went beyond the 'protection of civilians' directly to 'forcible regime change.' This action was taken far in advance of the AU's initial road map of 'ceasefire and negotiations.' Cautious of weak international support for outright military action, the AU made its priority the 'protection of the civilian population.'[38] The US

cautiously chose to act in concert with its allies in the conflict—as clearly stated below:

> In this effort, the United States has not acted alone. Instead, we have been joined by a strong and growing coalition. This includes our closest allies—nations like the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Spain, Greece and Turkey—all of whom have fought by our sides for decades. And it includes Arab partners like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, who have chosen to meet their responsibilities to defend the Libyan people.[39]

Gaddafi's Latter Days in Power

It could be argued that Gaddafi dragged his feet in normalizing Libyan's relations with the US. He did not hand over, early enough, the two Libyans alleged to be involved in the Lockerbie bombing. Neither did he accept responsibility for the incident or pay compensation to the victims of the bombing, soon enough. He was also dilatory to renounce his weapon development program. His change of attitude was a result of the events of September 11 and the US–Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Gaddafi was quoted as saying to Hosni Mubarak, the former Egyptian President, that "we must comply with international legality even though it's been falsified and imposed by the United States, or we will be slaughtered," and to Silvio Berlusconi, the Italian Prime Minister at the time, that "I will do whatever the Americans want, because I saw what happened in Iraq and I was afraid."[40] Indeed, Libyan opposition groups in the US were also keenly and persuasively lobbying the Bush administration to invigorate regime-change activities against Gaddafi's government.[41] Interestingly, the ease of NATO's intervention in Libya in 2011 was attributed to Libya's renunciation of its WMD programs. It was believed that the intervention would have been difficult, or not contemplated at all, had Libya developed and sustained its WMD program rather than renouncing it as it did.[42]

In spite of the public renunciation of Libya's weapons of mass destruction program in December 19, 2003, a huge cache of mustard gas (a chemical weapon) and associated artillery shells were discovered in the country. The discovery was confirmed by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The revelation came in the wake of the Arab Spring—a wave of revolutionary protests and popular revolts across the Middle East and North Africa.[43] Part of the problem was that the Libyan

government gave "full and transparent cooperation" to the verification and monitoring agencies (i.e., OPCW and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) as well as the US and British Officials. For instance, unlike Iraq and South Korea, Libyan officials revealed sites that were not previously disclosed, turned over substantial equipment and stockpiles, and allowed inspectors access to multiple facilities. Therefore, the standard demanded of reporting was apparently eased once it appeared that Libya was cooperating. Added to this was the anxiety of undermining Libya's cooperation if US officials insisted on exerting too much pressure on the country. Rather than stating that coercion prevailed over subtle appeal, diplomacy or confidence-building in the outcome of Libya's nuclear reversal in 2003, it is argued that responsibility for the Libyan "turn-around" resulted from a combination of all these instruments.[44]

The groundswell of opposition against Gaddafi arose among disenfranchised segments of the middle class in Libya, as well as from disaffected revolutionaries and, most importantly, a new generation of Libyans, born after the revolution, who questioned the efficiency of Gaddafi's policies.[45] Part of Gaddafi's undoing was the bogus and overly ambitious projects that he embarked upon. For instance, most Libyan cities lacked potable water on account of very expensive irrigation projects that did not produce the promised result. His unguided subsidization of unprofitable state farms also led to skyrocketing prices on basic food items.[46] The prospect of development of the industrial sector was also compromised by Gaddafi's ambition for the sector. No doubt, the regime had stupendous petrodollars to spend on developing capital-intensive heavy industry, but the project was bereft of the requisite indigenous work force required for a successful scheme of its nature. It also lacked the maintenance requirements and local-contents restrictions needed for the smooth running of a heavy industrialization project.[47] Rather than address all these challenges, the regime relished distributing petrodollars and dispensing generous welfare projects in order to appease the population that was already caving-in under the pressure of economic hardship. To be sure, the hardship was stoked by falling oil prices on the world market that began at the latter part of the 1980s.[48] At some point, almost all Libyan citizens expected the state to provide for their needs—given the regime's unbridled dispensation of populist welfare policies. However, as the size and resources of the state shrank, its outreach to the citizenry diminished accordingly. The regime then turned to coercion to preserve and perpetuate its power.[49]

The Differences Between the Libyan and the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions

Many characteristics specific to Libya accounted for the fall of Gaddafi. First and foremost, and in contrast to what occurred in the Tunisian and Egyptian Arab uprisings that preceded Libya's, the revolt was not driven by well-educated members of an expanding middle class. It was the huge number of unemployed and largely illiterate young men that first ignited the anti-Gaddafi uprising in the country.[50] Secondly, trade unions and labor movements that pressured Presidents Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak of Tunisia and Egypt, respectively, were nonexistent in Libya. This is because Gaddafi did not allow trade or labor unions to thrive.[51] Thirdly, the Libyan army disintegrated rapidly because of the loyalties of the rank and file of the army to their tribes rather than to Gaddafi himself. What appeared, in the main was senior officers and entire army units disbanding and reorganizing in their various community and tribal groups to protect themselves against the regime's brutal repression. This meant that there was a lack of institutional pressure on the leadership (Gaddafi) to resign and initiate a transition scheme for the government, which is what occurred in Tunisia and Egypt.[52] Gaddafi deliberately weakened the regular army and he also centralized power and made the command structure of the military an incestuous affair. His bias was skewed toward the informal networks of his extended family and tribe (the Qadhafa and the two sister tribes of Warfalla and Magarha).[53] The Berbers, a minority Toubou tribe, and many other tribes, were excluded or sidelined in the political process. The justification given for this was that Libya did not produce strong political parties or national institutions in the post-World War II years due to the incursion of Western imperialism. What it had instead was fragmented tribal societies kept intact by the grip and bond of Islam.[54]

It is striking to note that disgruntled elites who detached themselves from Gaddafi during the revolution played a leading role in the anti-Gaddafi National Transitional Council (NTC) that eventually confronted the leader during the uprising and took his place after he was deposed.[55]

Conclusion

The seed of discontent and treachery between the US and Gaddafi's Libya has a deep historical context. In February 1981, high-level French officials visited Washington to discuss the coordination of actions against

Libya. Some of the actions suggested included: the possible assassination of Gaddafi; organizing Libyan exiles to form a "Libyan Liberation Front" in Somalia and Egypt; mounting an Africa-wide anti-Gaddafi propaganda campaign (similar to that used against Fidel Castro in Cuba in the 1960s) portraying Libya as a source of terrorism and subversion; falsely attributing to Libya incidents in Nigeria, Tunisia, Ghana, Somalia, the Gambia, and Sudan; increasing the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) and Pentagon's presence in North Africa; destabilizing Libya's economically, namely, through disrupting its oil sales; and attempting to provoke a coup in Libya.[56]

By December 1981, most of these suggestions began to find expression in practical terms. The US started with oil embargos and advised Americans living in Libya to leave the country for their own safety. Ronald Reagan, the then American President, wanted to humiliate the radical Gaddafi. US foreign policy encouraged anti-Gaddafi policies throughout Africa.[57] Furthermore, it could be said that the United Nations Security Council's measures imposed when Gaddafi refused to hand over two Libyan suspects alleged to have bombed the Pan American Flight 103 were pungent and far-reaching. Some of these measures were: the denial of permission for Libyan aircraft to take off from, land in, or overfly their territory if it had taken off in Libyan territory (excluding in cases of humanitarian need); the prohibition of the supply of aircraft or aircraft components or the servicing of aircraft or aircraft components from Libya; bans on the provision of weapons, ammunition, or other military equipment, technical advice or training to Libyan forces; the withdrawal of officials from Libya that advised the Libyan authorities on military matters; a significant reduction in diplomatic and consular personnel in Libya; and the prevention of the operation of all Libyan airlines offices in foreign countries.[58]

This chapter, therefore, argues that oil sanctions are incredibly effective when used against an oil-bearing country that relies almost solely on returns from that commodity. As has been shown in this study, the US and Western countries' oil sanctions on Libya crippled its economy. However, the rebellion that brought down Gaddafi was not a result of United Nations' actions or oil sanctions but a Western (US)-orchestrated armed intervention purportedly to "protect civilian population." One of the main motives for the US's involvement in the Libyan war was that, in President Obama's words, "it is U.S. policy that Gaddafi needs to go."[59] It is appropriate to dwell on this quotation that demonstrates Obama's inconsistent reaction to the Libyan debacle when compared with similar

situations and events that occurred in the region. The citation also verifies the thesis that this chapter espouses, namely that it was peculiar that the US called for military action in Libya and eventually brought down its leadership but not in other parts of North Africa and the Middle East where public resistance movements arose against centralized and established dictatorial authorities.

> … Obama was in the process of forcing regime change in Libya to drive Colonel Qaddafi out of power. Moreover, he supported the Syrian people in urging a transition to democracy and advised President Assad to either "lead that transition, or get out of the way … Having temporized on the fate of President Mubarak of Egypt, he finally supported his removal. As for President Saleh in Yemen, he urged that he "follow through on his commitment to transfer power …[60]

It could, therefore, be surmised that Gaddafi, having had imprudent dealings with several US administrations, chiefly Reagan's, Clinton's, Bush's, and Obama's, eventually had to pay the supreme price for his enduring 'wrongdoings,' cavalier attitude, and nonconformist behavior. Be that as it may, it is imperative for the new Libyan government to work concertedly with the US and the international community to destroy its remaining chemical weapons in order to maintain adequate security for the people and property of Libya, especially as its politics and economics have become even more turbulent in the post-Gaddafi years.

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CHAPTER 9

Effects of US Foreign Policy on Democratic Processes in the Republic of Macedonia: Between Liberalism and Realism

Stojan Slaveski and Biljana Popovska

Introduction

From the earliest days of its independence, the Republic of Macedonia expressed an interest in building a strategic partnership with the US. As an investment in this partnership the Republic of Macedonia supported the US in war in Iraq, signed a bilateral accord with the US agreeing not to hand over American citizens to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and it has become part of the international antiterrorist coalition. For its part, the US has supported the territorial integrity of the Republic of Macedonia, has helped broker the Interim Agreement with Greece and the Ohrid Framework Agreement with ethnic Albanians, has recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name, and has actively supported the nation-state in its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Overall, the US has taken an interest in the security and stability of the country when it has faced external threats or problems in interethnic relations. However, when it

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comes to the democratization of Macedonian society and the problems the society faces, the US is much more circumspect about lending its support. The US, therefore, has shown that it is much more interested in the stability of the country than in its democratization. This paper analyzes this dichotomy of US foreign policy toward the Republic of Macedonia through the liberal and the realist paradigm to show that although democratization and liberal aims are provided as the basis for determining US policies in the region, it is realist motivations that actually dictate the US's interactions.

Applying the liberal and realist standpoint on security and international relations, the paper reviews US recognition of the independence of the Republic of Macedonia (RM) as a precondition for the democratization of the state, mitigating the potential for conflict both within the country and elsewhere in the Balkans. The paper argues that the search for greater influence and stabilization of the states that emerged from the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, motivated the decisions made about recognizing newly independent states, including Macedonia. The process of international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia proceeded slowly. The answer to this "controversial question" was sought from 1991, when the country declared independence, until 2004, when the Republic of Macedonia was finally recognized by the US under its constitutional name.

The US and Regional Stability in the Balkans

For the duration of the "Macedonian story," different US administrations have been guided by the US's interest in gaining greater influence and a more visible presence in the Balkans. During the Cold War, the US's presence in the Balkans was not particularly significant. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was part of the Non-Aligned Movement, seeking a balance between involvement with the East and West; Albania was a closed state and rejected any kind of cooperation; Bulgaria and Romania were part of the Eastern Bloc. The only US ally in the Balkans was Greece. However, Washington could not always rely on Greek loyalty. The US wanted to exploit the geostrategic changes that occurred with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the former Yugoslavia, as it hoped to acquire greater influence over the Balkan states. In parallel with this process, the US, as the world's leading superpower, wanted to stabilize the region as a whole[1] and specifically Macedonia, a country located in the heart of the Balkans. This was confirmed in the memoirs of the first

president of independent Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, who wrote that "the United States, in accordance with its national interests, as a great power had been interested in regional stability in the Balkans, particularly the RM, since the very beginning of the country's independence."[2]

To streamline the procedure for recognizing newly declared post-Yugoslav states, the US, in keeping with the principles of liberal democracy, drew up an appropriate set of guidelines.[3] These listed six criteria to guide the executive branch in its decision to recognize or refuse recognition of any former Yugoslav states after their secession.[4] The criteria suggested the acts of the state seeking independence that should be measured to assess its suitability for recognition. Therefore, to be recognized by the US the new government should: (a) achieve their country's independence in a peaceful and democratic manner; (b) respect internal and external borders; (c) respect democracy and the rule of law; (d) promote democratic processes; (e) protect human rights, including providing equal treatment for minorities; and (f) respect international law and obligations, in particular the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. In creating this manual, the State Department sought to avoid spillover of the ethnic tensions seen in the former Yugoslavia into their emerging countries. These criteria were designed to ensure the emerging countries would observe certain standards for internal organization and administration, thus maintaining regional stability.[5]

Minimizing security threats was one of the policies of the US for increasing the stability of the region and it was intended to reduce or eliminate the economic, military, and political benefits accruing to those countries in the region that were likely to be hostile to the US.[6] For example, after the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, Washington quickly recognized Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina as sovereign states, to deter the territorial ambitions of Serbia. Although Croatia, and to a lesser extent Bosnia and Herzegovina,[7]initially suffered from internally instability, which might have rendered them ineligible for recognition according to the State Department's guidelines, the US decided to recognize them anyway. Thus, the US tried to minimize any security threats that might be of benefit to Serbian expansionism. On the other hand, recognition of the Republic of Macedonia was delayed, even though the country was under an external security threat from Serbia and Greece. According to Risto Nikovski,[8] in the period following the declaration of independence by the Republic of Macedonia, Serbian President Slobodan Milošević had suggested to Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis that they divide up Macedonia

between them.[9] Washington's decision to withhold recognition from the Republic of Macedonia was not based on notions of liberal achievement, but rather was motivated by a realist agenda.

Recognition of the Independence of the Republic of Macedonia: A Precondition for the Democratization of the State

American recognition of the Republic of Macedonia provides an interesting example of a decision-making process in US foreign policy that did not follow the usual process for recognition of new states.[10] The process took more than 12 years and was considered by three successive US administrations, finally culminating in the full diplomatic recognition of the Republic of Macedonia in November 2004. The story began in the spring of 1992, when the administration of George W. Bush, Sr. decided to postpone recognition prompted by considerations of *realpolitik*. Later, the same considerations led the Clinton administration to recognize the independence of Macedonia in 1994 under the provisional label "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)." However, the first US ambassador to Macedonia was not appointed until 1996, the White House having delayed the establishment of full diplomatic relations with the Republic of Macedonia at the ambassadorial level. Finally, in November 2004, the administration of George Bush, Jr., in a surprise move that was guided by liberal principles, recognized the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name, judging that this would contribute to the stability and development of democratic processes in the country.

Membership of the Republic of Macedonia of International Institutions as a Liberal Tool for Reducing the Risk of Military Conflict

According to the liberal viewpoint on international relations, membership of states in international institutions reduces the likelihood of conflict and increases the likelihood of cooperation. The arguments in support of this claim are numerous. International organizations and alliances can promote peace by: deterring aggression or increasing the likelihood of intervention to end a conflict; providing mediation or arbitration of disputes; monitoring the implementation of international agreements;

promoting standards to regulate a conflict; presenting the negative aspects of a conflict and expanding areas of cooperation, thus creating opportunities for renewed interaction and the rebuilding of trust. Most international institutions reduce conflict by using a number of these mechanisms simultaneously.

US Support for the Admission of the Republic of Macedonia to the United Nations

Using this liberal paradigm as its basis, on July 23, 1992, the Macedonian Parliament considered a proposal for the country to seek membership of the United Nations. On July 29, the Parliament decided that President Gligorov should send a letter to the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, officially seeking admission to the world organization on July 30, 1992. Risto Nikovski argues that Macedonia was hesitant to apply for admission to the UN because the US and EU had stated that they would not recognize the state until there was a resolution of the name dispute with Greece.[11] Given that the US, Britain, and France are members of the UN Security Council with a veto power over the admission of new members, this explanation seems logical. This prompted the Macedonian authorities to ask for the Clinton administration's support of Macedonia's membership of the United Nations.[12] UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali began the procedure for admission of the Republic of Macedonia to the Organization in January 1993, after an acceptable name under which the state would be admitted was found. The Americans expected that this would encourage Greece and the Republic of Macedonia, in accordance with the liberal paradigm, to solve the "name dispute" under UN auspices.

Security Council resolution 817/93, by which Macedonia was admitted to the UN, provided for mediation "to overcome differences over the name of the state and to encourage measures for trust building between the parties." It is interesting to note that at the suggestion of the US, first Cyrus Vance, and later Matthew Nimetz, both US diplomats, were appointed special envoys of the UN Secretary-General to assist with a settlement, underlining the US interest in the dispute. Greece reluctantly agreed to UN membership for the Republic of Macedonia under the provisional name "former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," demonstrating its willingness to solve this issue. Thus, the Republic of Macedonia was admitted as the 181st member of the UN by resolution of the Security Council, under the temporary name. The admission of the Republic of Macedonia

to the United Nations was supported by the US (and EU members) to increase stability in the Balkans without increasing tensions between Athens and Skopje. This was done without the Clinton administration changing its official position on recognition of the Republic of Macedonia.

US Role in the Missions of International Organizations in the Republic of Macedonia

As US diplomatic recognition of the Republic of Macedonia depended on the resolution of the Greek–Macedonian dispute, the Clinton administration took two important decisions that enhanced the stability of the Republic of Macedonia without aggravating the country's already tense relations with Greece. Firstly, before the UN sent the Protection Force Mission (UNPROFOR) to Macedonia, another international organization already had a mission on the ground there. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) sent a mission to the country in 1992. An American presence was also notable in this mission. It was led by the US diplomat Robert Frowick, who, according to some experts "came to personify the many aspects of the often bold, but sometimes insensitive American policies in the region."[13]

Secondly, as a substitute for diplomatic recognition, the White House sent troops to Macedonia in April 1993 to enhance the security of the republic. On December 9, 1992, the UN Secretary-General, at the request of the Macedonian government on November 11, and following the report of an assessment team sent on November 28, recommended authorization for the presence of UN forces. In May 1993, an additional 300 US troops were added to forces for the protection of the UNPROFOR mission in Macedonia, which comprised a total of about 700 UN troops. Deployment of US troops along the Macedonian border with Serbia was a clear signal of the importance the US attached to the stability of the country. This was especially true as the Macedonian government had not explicitly requested protection by US forces in its application. This decision was part of the US strategy for the region, which sought to build a "cordon sanitaire" around Serbia, to prevent Slobodan Milošević from perpetrating acts of aggression against the Republic of Macedonia and its neighbors. The decision was also driven by the need for President Clinton to be proactive in the region at a time when members of Congress were anxious about the brutal ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia and the

lack of action by the US to put an end to it. However, this measure by the Clinton administration led to the bizarre situation of American soldiers being sent to protect the territorial integrity of a state that the US did not recognize. US's policy, as it has so often in the past, showed that its decisions in foreign affairs are taken in accordance with the country's national interests and follow the realist paradigm.

Greek Attempts to Exploit the Weakness of Macedonia and the Interim Agreement

There was a clear dependency in the economic relations between Macedonia and Greece. The economy of Macedonia depended on imports of goods via the port of Thessaloniki in Greece (this is especially true of oil and oil derivatives), while the Greek economy did not depend on the import of goods from Macedonia. This asymmetric relationship enabled Greece to use its economic power through an economic blockade to try to achieve certain political goals including a change in the name and the flag of the Republic of Macedonia. Greece imposed an unofficial embargo on Macedonia in February 1992, "… skillfully concealed to avoid criticism from the EU."[14] The embargo became official in mid-1992,[15] when Greece decided to close its border with the Republic of Macedonia and imposed an embargo on shipments of oil.[16] In February 1994, the Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, decided to completely halt the transport of goods to and from Skopje through Thessaloniki. The EU condemned this as a violation of European law and decided to initiate proceedings before the European Court of Justice. However, the Court considered that there were no grounds for treating the case as urgent and warned that a decision could not be expected before 1996.[17]

For its part, the Republic of Macedonia did not impose an embargo on Greek goods.[18] This decision by the Macedonian government illustrates the asymmetry in the relationship between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece. The president of the Republic of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, commented on the situation: "We have always been afraid of Milošević's Serbia. Greece has never been considered a serious threat, because we have known that it is restrained in its actions due to membership in the EU and, above all, in NATO."[19]

The Interim Agreement, which was signed by the Republic of Macedonia and Greece on September 13, 1995, did not derive from the

resolution of the UN Security Council conditionally admitting Macedonia to the UN. The agreement was an initiative of the US, implemented by the mediation of Cyrus Vance and the US diplomat Richard Holbrooke. In the months after the Republic of Macedonia's admission to the UN, talks regarding the name issue failed to lead to significant progress. Things started to move forward in late 1995, when US Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke, held a series of talks with Greek and Macedonian leaders. After several visits to Skopje and Athens, Holbrooke persuaded Greece and Macedonia to sign an Interim Agreement on mutual recognition to normalize their relations. Under the agreement, the two countries agreed to recognize each other's borders. Then, the Republic of Macedonia agreed to adopt a new flag and, in turn, Athens lifted the economic embargo on Macedonia and agreed not to hinder Macedonia's integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions as long as it was labeled with the provisional reference "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." The two countries also exchanged liaison officers and agreed to start trade negotiations and to attempt to reach final agreement on their "differences." As a result of the agreement, political tensions between the two countries were significantly reduced.[20]

After the signing of the Interim Agreement in September 1995, economic relations between the two neighboring countries began to recover. In 1995, Greece became the largest foreign investor in Macedonia, where it now owns an oil refinery, a brewery, banks, cement plants, and supermarket chains. Greece has made significant investments in the country and in November 1999, after the Kosovo crisis, the two countries agreed to build a pipeline from Thessaloniki to Skopje.[21] All this helped to improve political relations between the two states.

Additionally, after the signing of the agreement with Athens, Macedonia was eligible to join several international organizations in which Greece had been blocking its membership. These included the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, and NATO's Partnership for Peace. In 1997, the Greek foreign minister made a surprise visit to Skopje and urged improved cooperation between the two countries in the light of the crisis that had erupted in Albania. In December of that year, a military agreement was signed, partly because of the Albanian rebellion in southern Serbia.[22]These measures, taken in the spirit of liberal principles, helped reduce tensions between the two states and enhanced stability in the region, increasing the Republic of Macedonia's prospects

for integration into the Euro-Atlantic family and the achievement of full democratization.

US Efforts to Resolve the Conflict in Macedonia in 2001: Liberal and Realist Paradigms

During the conflict in Macedonia in 2001, the US cooperated closely with the Macedonian government and President Boris Trajkovski. Its role in signing the Ohrid Framework Agreement was crucial.[23]At a critical moment in the intensification of the conflict, the president of RM visited the US, requesting American assistance in restoring peace in the country. Diplomatic efforts by the US were of great importance in the formation of "a government of national unity," which included the four largest political parties in the country, two Macedonian and two Albanian. The Americans were also active in the drafting of the "President's peace plan."[24]

US strategy during the conflict was two-pronged. On the one hand, the actions of "Albanian extremists" were condemned, while on the other, the Macedonian authorities were encouraged to meet the "legitimate demands" of the Albanian community in Macedonia. When a truce was reached between the government forces and militants of the so-called National Liberation Army (NLA), the US, through its special envoy, James Pardew,[25] participated in the drafting of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Once the agreement was signed, the US welcomed its adoption and called on "rebels to disarm and disband and the Parliament to adopt the necessary constitutional amendments and legislation."[26]

American strategy is best reflected in the statement of Elizabeth Jones, then Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, at the hearing of the Europe Subcommittee of the House of Representative's International Relations Committee:

> In Macedonia, a violent insurgency is destabilizing a country that has experienced 10 years of democratic, multi-ethnic governance. We are working with our allies to put Macedonia back on the path of the democratic development and Euro-Atlantic integration. This will require political reforms that are significant but achievable within Macedonia's democratic political process … We are certainly working extremely hard with all of the parties in Macedonia, with all of the members of the unity government, to accomplish a political settlement that takes into considerations the concerns of all eth-

> nic groups in Macedonia … There is no future for Macedonia in a military settlement.[27]

In addition to the bilateral involvement of the US in the resolution of the conflict, there was also multilateral engagement through NATO and the OSCE. Robert Frowick, formerly the head of the OSCE mission, who was the personal representative of the OSCE Chairman for Macedonia, had a remarkable role in articulating American interests. However, this time he was not as successful as in 1992. He left the country to avoid formal expulsion by the Macedonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which noted that "his services are no longer needed." He was quickly disowned by the US Embassy and the OSCE itself, which claimed the emissary acted on his own initiative.[28]

The US ruled out military intervention by NATO because it was afraid that NATO troops in Kosovo could be the target of Albanian extremists and that the conflict could spread and further destabilize the Balkans. In order to avoid military conflict, the US pushed the Macedonian government to make political reforms and meet the demands of the Albanian community. Hence, at the end of July 2001, National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, asked Ukraine to halt shipments of weapons to the Republic of Macedonia. For the duration of the conflict the US took a series of steps, bilateral and multilateral, using both liberal and realist arguments in support, in order to achieve de-escalation of the violence and move toward peace. All these measures, directly or indirectly, had a significant impact on the achievement of a political solution to the crisis.

The NATO Summit in Bucharest: Comeback of *Realpolitik*

In the lead-up to the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, the US ignored the Interim Agreement it had brokered and sought instead to institute a permanent solution to the problem. The mediator in the dispute, Matthew Nimetz, in an interview with Voice of America radio said:

> The interim agreement was a very important step. I was an American negotiator for the Interim Agreement 1994–95, and I believe I am the only one still active in the negotiations from 1994 onwards. Some people think it's weird to be dedicated for so long, but I remember that time. Compromises were made at that time, but the agreement was achieved. Now, we are talk-

> ing about a new agreement and people need to see what is to be done now and what not. I think the issue is not to look back, but to look forward.[29]

This approach set the stage for blocking NATO membership for the Republic of Macedonia at the summit. Thus, the US supported the notion that Macedonia should join NATO, but on the condition that this should occur only after the name dispute with Greece was resolved. Shortly before the NATO Summit in Bucharest, US President George Bush, Jr. announced that NATO would take a historic decision to extend an invitation for membership to Macedonia.[30] This did not happen, even though the Macedonian government accepted the latest proposal to name it "Republic of Macedonia–Skopje." The "Nimetz proposal" was not acceptable to Athens, and the US failed to convince its NATO allies to admit the Republic of Macedonia under the label FYROM. It seems that President George Bush, Jr. genuinely wanted Macedonia to join NATO. His friendly attitude toward Macedonia was demonstrated at the post-summit meeting in Zagreb with the Macedonian Prime Minister and President, when he announced that Washington and Skopje would sign a Declaration on Strategic Partnership.[31] A month later, this declaration was signed by the foreign ministers of the two countries.

After Greece's serious violation of the Interim Agreement at the summit in Bucharest, and its illegal interference in the admission process, Macedonia instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice in The Hague. To the surprise of many, the Court unanimously ruled in favor of the Republic of Macedonia, saying that Greece had violated the Interim Accord by blocking Macedonia from receiving an invitation for membership of NATO. However, the judgment formally changed nothing. The US, as the most influential member of NATO, did nothing to correct the injustice of Bucharest. The statement of the former US Ambassador to the Republic of Macedonia (2008–2011) and then Assistant Deputy Secretary of State for European Affairs of the State Department, Philip Reeker, best illustrates the position of the US:

> The opinion of the International Court of Justice concerns the dispute between Greece and Macedonia. We hope both sides will use this opinion to solve the problem between the two countries. It is the position of NATO, meaning that when the name dispute is resolved, regardless of how the countries decide to settle it, Macedonia will progress towards NATO.[32]

During the NATO summit in Chicago, 2012, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, met with the foreign ministers of member countries and countries aspiring to membership (Macedonia, Georgia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina), declaring:

> This summit should be the last which will not be an enlargement summit. Macedonia contributes to regional and global stability, including long-term participation in ISAF and meets the key criteria for NATO membership. We strongly support resolution of the name issue and we call on both sides to reach an agreement, so that Macedonia may become, as quickly as possible, a member of NATO.[33]

However, two years later, the NATO summit gathered in Wales, and again enlargement did not happen. With this policy, the US sought to redress the tension caused with Greece by the 2004 decision to unilaterally recognize the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name. Once again there was clear demonstration that in its international relations, the US does not always respect international law and that national interests and *realpolitik* are more important bases of policy.

Change in US Policy Toward Macedonia: Is Democratization of the Society Becoming a Priority?

The US continues to show an interest in the situation in the Republic of Macedonia (stability, democratization, and Euro-Atlantic integration), but the interest is peripheral. The current engagement was best summarized by US Ambassador to Macedonia, Paul Wohlers, in an interview with the daily newspaper *Vest*:

> The political polarization has significantly deteriorated, and leading political parties do not seem to be able to work together for the good of the whole country. The division between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians is growing deeper and more people are expressing a lack of confidence in major institutions in the country and complain of persistent corruption … . We are your strongest ally and will continue to work until Macedonia becomes a full member of NATO. But it is important to note that we cannot resolve the name issue on behalf of the countries involved … The pressure that Macedonia may feel to resolve the issue, I think that stems from the needs

> of the citizens. Resolving the dispute will bring significant economic and political benefits for the citizens of this country.[34]

The future of US engagement in the country was announced by the new US ambassador to Macedonia, Jess Baily, in his speech to the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Senate: "While Macedonia has developed strong democratic structures, the United States …, the European Union … have expressed concerns about the freedom of the Macedonian press, the independence of the judiciary, and the transparency of government finances."[35] According to Denko Malevski, recent criticism that US Ambassador Paul Wohlers leveled at some of Macedonia's politicians, as well as Jess Baily's testimony at the Senate hearing, could be interpreted as a shift in US diplomacy. Malevski considers: "[t]his is good news for all those who are sincere supporters of the European integration of Macedonia, but also bad for those impeding these processes, because they will be exposed to pressure to change the situation." According to Malevski, this statement reads as an open announcement that the US ambassador would "meddle" in the internal affairs in Macedonia, which in turn is due to the fact that the political body of Macedonia bears a wound that could suppurate and spread infection both domestically and elsewhere in the region.[36]

Such a shift in US policy toward the Republic of Macedonia should be seen as part of a wider strategy to strengthen the effectiveness of NATO against the new "Cold War" that has begun between the West and Russia. Time will show the extent to which this policy will contribute to the democratization of the country or to the development of anti-American feelings. It should be borne in mind that although the majority of citizens of the Republic of Macedonia support the US as a global leader[37]and a strategic partner of the country, some Macedonians view the US with distrust, believing that "America continually sponsors Albanian nationalism in Kosovo."[38]

Conclusion

Even in the early days of its independence, the Republic of Macedonia expressed an interest in building a strategic partnership with the US. As an investment in this partnership, the country supported the US in the war in Iraq. Following the US decision to intervene in Iraq, Macedonia unilaterally agreed to be part of the "coalition forces" and allowed US

combat aircraft to use airspace over its territory. In so doing, Macedonia opened itself to criticism from the European Union, which it sought to join. Its pro-US stance opposed the EU position on the war on Iraq. Furthermore, although Macedonia in 2002 ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, in 2003 it signed a bilateral agreement with the US agreeing not to hand over US citizens to the ICC. This policy also opposed the EU's stance.[39] Finally, in 2014 Macedonia also joined the US-led antiterrorist coalition to show its support for US foreign policy.

On the other hand, US recognition of the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name was based solely on its national interest in regional stability in the Balkans. Recognition was initially delayed largely because it was determined that it would intensify the conflict between Greece and Macedonia. Then, in 1994, recognition was forthcoming for "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," in order to reduce the risk of Serbian aggression in the region and to appease Greece's objections to the name Republic of Macedonia. Diplomatic relations between the US and RM were expanded in 1996, after agreement was reached for US support of constructive dialogue between Greece and Macedonia. Finally, the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia was recognized by Washington in 2004 in an effort to ensure the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, which aimed to strengthen the internal stability of the country. The last episode of the story shows that the cost–benefit analysis of the US produced a different outcome 10 years earlier. In 2004, the internal stability and cohesion of Macedonia was more important than the feelings of Greece on the issue. This can be explained by the fact that the Greek–Macedonian tensions at the beginning of the 1990s, which prevented President George Bush, Sr. from recognizing the Republic of Macedonia, were much less important in 2004.

In January 1992, during the first visit of a Macedonian president to the US, the US emphasized that it would "oppose any attempt by any party to use force or threats against the territorial integrity of Macedonia."[40] The first example of action based on this US commitment was the OSCE monitoring mission, for which the US provided the head of mission and the necessary logistical support. Later, in the framework of the UN mission (UNPROFOR/UNPREDEP) the US again showed its interest in the stability of Macedonia, sending a battalion of troops as a signal to other countries in the region to respect Macedonian sovereignty. American officials have played a significant role in the progress made in the Greek–Macedonian

name dispute and the achievement of the Interim Agreement. Specifically, with the help of US envoy Richard Holbrooke, Macedonian–Greek relations were restored after Greece imposed an embargo on Macedonia. US interests in the sovereignty of the Republic of Macedonia were again visible during the crisis in the country in 2001, when the US president sent his special representative to participate in negotiations for a peaceful solution to the conflict and the resultant Framework Agreement. As a contribution to the stability of the country, the US recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name. Furthermore, the US actively supported the RM in its Euro-Atlantic aspirations through Congressional resolutions and by assisting in the country's defense reforms.

Overall, the US has shown great interest in the security and stability of the RM when it has faced external threats or problems in interethnic relations. When it comes to the democratization of the Macedonian society and the problems that it faces (media freedom, rule of law independence of the judiciary, etc.), however, the US is very cautious in lending its support. The US has shown it is much more interested in the stability of the country than in the democratization of society. Involvement in Macedonian democratization efforts could be seen as interference in Macedonia's internal affairs.

US foreign policy decisions toward RM over the past 20 years show that Washington claimed to act in the spirit of liberal principles but its actions fit more easily into realist notions of national interest. Sometimes those decisions coincided with the national interests of the Republic of Macedonia, but that was not always the case. The Macedonian state remained consistent in its decision to build friendly relations with the strongest power in the world. It did not do so out of altruism but because any other policy would have adversely impacted the realization of its own national interests. The task of Macedonian foreign policy is to achieve the national interests of the state and to present them to the US as the best solution for regional stability. Only when the national interests of the RM and the US match in terms of regional stability can support for the Macedonian state be expected.

Notes

1. Ivo Daalder, & Michael E. O'Hanlon, "The United States in theBalkans: There to Stay", *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 2000, pp. 157–170.
2. Kiro Gligorov, *Macedonia is all we have*, Skopje, Kultura, 2002, p. 500.

3. It is interesting to note that on December 25, 1991, the day of the official breakup of the USSR, the US recognized the 14 new states that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. A similar practice was applied in relation to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, when, on January 1, 1993, the date of dissolution, the US recognized the new states Slovakia and Czech Republic. Recognition of the states that emerged from the breakup of Yugoslavia was handled differently, probably because of the military conflicts that resulted.
4. In the process of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, the European Community (EC) created the so-called "Badinter Commission," composed of five top officials (presidents or judges of constitutional courts) in their countries, whose task was to determine and propose to the EC which members of the federation were eligible for recognition. The commission submitted a recommendation that only Slovenia and Macedonia should be recognized. Despite this proposal, the EC recognized Slovenia and Croatia and a few months later, under pressure from the US, Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized too. Thus, the EC showed disregard for the decisions of the body it had itself created. It is obvious that the EC and the US were driven by considerations of *real politik*.
5. Jonathan Paquin, Recognizing the Obvious? The United States Response to Secessionist Ambitions since the End of the Cold War, Ottawa, Published Heritage Branch, 2006, p. 443.
6. Ivo Daalder & Michael E. O'Hanlon,Op. Cit., pp. 157–170.
7. It should be noted that the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not help the country, which was facing an internal conflict, nor did it minimize the Serbian influence on the conflict.
8. In that period, Risto Nikovski was an undersecretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia and later ambassador to Great Britain, Albania, and the Russian Federation.
9. Risto Nikovski, The role of the US in Macedonia's Troubled Journey to International Recognition (1991–2013), Canada, Risto Stefov Publications, 2014, p. 19.
10. Ibid., pp. 27–30.
11. Risto Nikovski, Op. Cit., pp. 39–41.
12. Kiro Gligorov, Op. Cit., p. 501.
13. John Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and rebels in the Balkans, Skopje, Foundation Open Society Institute, 2009, p. 63.
14. Ibid., p. 58.
15. The immediate reason for the introduction of the trade embargo by Greece was the adoption of the new national flag, which contained the star of Vergina, a symbol that can be found on the tomb of Philip of Macedonia, father of Alexander the Great. The move was seen by the Greek authorities

as a falsification of the history of Greece and a direct provocation. This event brought Greek nationalist passions to a boiling point and dimmed hopes for a quick resolution of the conflict.

16. It was also when the Democratic candidate for US President, Bill Clinton, was elected. However, the change of political party in the White House did not result in a major transformation of US policy toward Macedonia. Like the previous government, the Clinton administration pointed to the importance of regional stability to justify its nonrecognition of the Republic of Macedonia. As time went on, and as a result of the expansion of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia that threatened to spread to other parts of the region, the US interest in the region grew.
17. John Phillips, *Op. Cit.*, p. 59.
18. Risto Nikovski, *Op. Cit.*, p. 24.
19. John Phillips, *Op. Cit.*, p. 58.
20. After this move, the US established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Macedonia at the ambassadorial level, upgrading its relations office to an embassy in February 1996. This decision was made after both sides had shown a clear commitment to respect each other and make efforts to find a solution to the "name issue."
21. Christos Nikas, "The Effects of the Interim Accord on the Economic Relations Between Greece and FYROM", in Kofos, Evangelos & Vlasidis, Vlasis, *Athens-Skopje: An Uneasy Symbiosis (1995–2002),* Athens, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 2005, pp. 89–125.
22. John Phillips, *Op. Cit.*, p. 62.
23. Zidas Daskalovski, *Walking on the Edge: Consolidating Multiethnic Macedonia 1989–2004*, Chapel Hill, NC, Globic, 2005, p. 83.
24. Stojan Slaveski, *National Security of the Republic of Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic integration*, Skopje, Digiprint, 2003.
25. James Pardew was appointed special envoy of the US president and played an important role in the negotiations that led to the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. He had previous experience of negotiations in Dayton, when the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina was discussed.
26. Zidas Daskalovski, *Op. Cit.*, p. 103.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 111.
28. Jolyon Naegele, *Macedonia: Government, International Community Outraged by OSCE Envoy*, RFE/RL, May 25 2001, available at http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=article (accessed on January 27, 2015).
29. Matthew Nimetz, "Agreement was achieved, now we need a new Agreement", *Dnevnik*, March 3, 2008.
30. George Bush, "Macedonia is entering into NATO", *Utrinski*, April 1, 2008.

31. An interesting statement was made by Deputy Secretary of State Daniel Fried at the Washington press conference on the Bucharest NATO summit. Responding to the observation of a Greek journalist that the "Macedonian language," is "so called," Fried said, "I do not think the language is 'so-called' as the Macedonian language exists. There are Macedonians. As you know, the Macedonian language is taught at the State Department. All languages are human creations, they are developed and codified. Therefore, there is a Macedonian language. Sure, there is a historic Macedonian province, which is something different from the state. And that's important. It is clear that the government in Skopje, as we Americans call the government of Macedonia, has no aspirations. We recognize the difference between the historical territory of Macedonia, which is certainly greater than the state. And we support the process of finding a solution to the name led by mediator Matthew Nimetz". http://www.komarec.com.mk/poveke.php?id=1393 (accessed on January 20, 2015).
32. Philip T. Reeker, "Hard decisions must be taken by yourself", *Nova Makedonija*, January 10, 2012.
33. *Macedonia*. http://daily.mk/vesti/chikago-treba-da-e-posleden-samit-bez-proshiruvanje-veli-hilari-2 (accessed on January 20, 2015).
34. Paul D. Wohlers, "You are capable you need a courage", *Vest*, January 9, 2015.
35. Statement of Jess Baily, Ambassador-Designate to the Republic of Macedonia, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 17, 2014.
36. Denko Maleski, "We are becoming country that can infect neighbors". Weekly *Globus,* N. 387, 30.09.2014 see: http://globusmagazin.mk/?ItemID=C273876EBAB652468CB3BD477A7B52F4 (accessed on January 20, 2015).
37. According to a survey on global leadership in the US in 2013, 48% of Macedonians approved, 19% disapproved, while 33% refused to answer (The US–Global Leadership Project, A Partnership between the Meridian International Center and Gallup 2013).
38. John Phillips, *Op. Cit.*, p. 191.
39. Mieczyslaw Boduszyński & Kristina Balalovska, "The Battle over Article 98", *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 51, No. 1, January/February, 2004, pp. 18–30.
40. Kiro Gligorov, *Op. Cit.*, p. 501.

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PART IV

US Democratization Efforts in Latin America

CHAPTER 10

Argentina and Brazil: The Role of the US in Their Democratic Transitions

Ignacio Tomás Liendo

Introduction

This chapter shall start with a brief review of US policy toward Latin America. The statement that became known as the Monroe Doctrine was the main source of US policy toward Latin America through the twentieth century. When it was pronounced, the Latin American republics were young and vulnerable and they did not see it as a tool to justify US interference. Rather they saw it as a statement of support for their newly attained independence. Over the years, it became a deeply held principle of the US unilateral policy toward the region and it continues to guide US policy toward the region today. The Monroe Doctrine has been updated over time, through its implementation and its contextual

The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, shall not be considered as eligible for future colonization by any European powers… Sincerity and friendly relations between the United States and those powers, require us to declare that we would consider dangerous to our peace and safety any attempt on the part of them that is aimed to extend their system to a portion of this hemisphere, whatever it may be. We have not intervened nor will

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rhetoric. President Theodore Roosevelt added a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine that asserted the US's right to intervene in the affairs of Latin American countries.[1] The motto *America for the Americans* had become an ideological umbrella for the strategic objective of the US to maintain its hegemony over the entire continent.

During his presidency, Teddy Roosevelt implemented his "big stick" doctrine with a series of political and military interventions throughout Latin America. As Rodrigo Borja observes, "The diplomacy of the Big Stick, impacted on the raids to the Caribbean, in promoting independence in Panama and the construction of the Panama Canal, in imposing an economic protectorate over the Dominican Republic, on coercion against Haiti, in the military invasion to Cuba and other adventures of this order."[2] Years later, at the Versailles Peace Conference, President Woodrow Wilson restated US policy of keeping Latin America in its exclusive area of influence. The Covenant of the League of Nations' Article XXI espoused that nothing would "affect the validity of international agreements such as treaties of arbitration or regional agreements such as the Monroe Doctrine."[3] Thus, Wilson identified the Monroe Doctrine as Panamericanism and as a regional agreement that deemed the region's troubles to be beyond the control of the League of Nations.

Throughout the Cold War, the US fostered the National Security Doctrine, which was implemented after all the countries in the region signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (also known as the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, signed in 1947). In Article 3 it states that "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered an attack against all American States, and therefore each of

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intervene in the colonies or dependencies of any European power: but in the case of governments that have declared and maintained their independence, and that after mature consideration, and in accordance with equitable principles, have been recognized as independent by the government of the United States, any intervention by a European power, for the purpose of oppressing them, or somehow directing their destinations, will not be able to be seen by us but as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

James Monroe
Seventh Annual Message to Congress, Washington, DC, December 2, 1823
(James Monroe, Seventh Annual Message to Congress, Washington, DC, December 2, 1823, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29465 [accessed February 27, 2015].).

the Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in coping with the attack." However, Article 2 of the treaty postulates that "the High Contracting Parties undertake to submit any dispute arising between them to methods of peaceful settlement and try to solve it together, using the existing procedures of the Inter-American System, before referring it to the General Assembly or the United Nations Security Council."[4] With the inclusion of that article, the US gave primacy to the American system of resolving conflicts, usurping the United Nations' authority over regional disputes. A year later, in 1948, during the 9th Inter-American Conference in Bogotá, the Organization of American States (OAS) was formed. According to Moniz Bandeira, the US once again sought to exclude Latin America from the immediate jurisdiction of the UN, and to promote specific private and business interests, with an emphasis on fostering free markets, and welcoming foreign investment.[5]

The US and Dictatorships in Argentina and Brazil

In Argentina, from the beginning of the Process of National Reorganization, the military leadership became aware of the need to prioritize bilateral relations with Brazil. As a result, President Jorge Videla developed the Special Commission for Brazil–Argentina Trade and showed his support for Brazil's signing of a Nuclear Agreement promoting the transfer of the full cycle of uranium enrichment signed with West Germany in 1975.[6] This was despite US pressure not to sign it. These actions were influenced by the military junta's recognition that there was an unfavorable power relationship with its neighbor. They had decided to increase their negotiating position and attempted to move to a more equal footing.[7] Despite differences between Brazil and Argentina arising from infrastructure and energy projects (Itaipú and Corpus projects), neither country wanted armed confrontation. Both countries faced major internal and external problems and, during the Carter presidency, they also began to face pressure from the US about the defense of human rights in international affairs. Indeed, Carter vehemently opposed the nuclear agreement that Brazil signed with West Germany, so, in retaliation, President Carter presented the US Congress with a report on human rights violations occurring in the South American country. Unlike Brazil, and in order not to become dependent on foreign technology, Argentina opted to use natural uranium in its nuclear program, cooled and moderated by heavy water in the Atucha atomic power plant.[8]

The focus on human rights in US foreign policy generated growing resentment from both Brazil and Argentina.[9] The US would not admit that neither country could produce nuclear weapons, and so under the pretext of nonproliferation commitments, in 1978, the US suspended all military aid to the region. The military was not the only tool the US government used to pressure South American countries into compliance with its policies. There were increasing difficulties in the economies of Argentina and Brazil, particularly the Argentinean balance of payments after the creation of the European Community closed European markets to its products. This led Argentina's military authorities to apply to the US Export Import Bank (EXIM) for credit. The application was rejected citing the violation of human rights, following a recommendation from the US Department of State.[10]

Brazil and Argentina, facing pressure from the US, began to implement guidelines for cooperation with each other. In 1980, President João Figueiredo of Brazil, and his Argentine counterpart Videla, signed a set of protocols for cooperation between the militaries of their two countries. They included a framework for the joint manufacture of aircraft and missiles, and cooperation on the development of atomic energy. The latter was possible since neither country was a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which was of concern to the US State Department. By 1981, the understanding between Argentina and Brazil deepened while the new government in Washington, that of Republican President Ronald Reagan, was taking action to break this entente and prevent Brazil from broadening and strengthening its strategic position through cooperation with Argentina.[11] Reagan's Administration sought to influence Argentine servicemen to change their foreign policy. In terms of economics, General Leopoldo Galtieri, who had succeeded Videla as Argentina's president, deepened the neoliberal policies implemented by his predecessors and the stabilization program instituted under the terms of the agreement with the IMF. This approach created an alignment with the US's interests.

The military *junta* considered that this approach, with a Republican administration in the White House, would allow Argentina to become a key country in the region as a direct intermediary of the US. This aspiration led to Argentina reviving the proposal of the US State Department to establish a political–military pact in the South Atlantic. Brazil never accepted this proposal. It meant that Argentina began cooperating closely with Reagan's policies in Central America, where the President sent counterinsurgency

advisers and intelligence agents in order to train troops from El Salvador to fight Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front guerillas and participate in covert operations against the Sandinista regime of Nicaragua.[12] This situation led to the Argentine Government's belief that America would assist it in pursuing its claim of the Falkland Islands.[13] These expectations led Galtieri to order the invasion of the archipelago in April 1982. However, pressure from domestic public opinion and Congress, as well as from its NATO commitments, meant that the US government had no choice but to ally with Britain. The US provided logistical support for the military operation to recover the islands. These actions convinced leaders in South America that both the Rio Treaty and the OAS only existed to protect US dominance over Latin America and to serve powerful Cold War interests.

Brazil's military government was anti-Communist; however, it had a different approach from the aggressive policies toward the region implemented by the US that attempted to prevent revolutionary uprisings. Brazil refused to provide paratroopers in the US-led mission to occupy Paramaribo Airport in Suriname to prevent infiltration by Cuban sympathizers into that country. Although Brazilian officials did not support the expansion of a leftist regime in its immediate neighbor, they were not willing to allow US involvement in South America in that close a proximity from the Amazon. Instead, Brazil took responsibility for peacefully resolving the problem by offering financial and technical assistance, and even weapons to the Surinamese government in exchange for policies separating it from Cuba.

Democratization and Regional Integration

Despite Brazilian attempts to contain the US's influence in the region, the Reagan Administration revived competition with the USSR and this led to military action to contain any Communist infiltration of its sphere of influence. The conflict in Suriname in early 1983 had been resolved, but toward the end of that year there was an invasion of Granada, the counter-revolution in Nicaragua was financed and sustained, the resistance against guerrillas in El Salvador was encouraged, and similar policies were adopted toward other countries of Central America and the Caribbean. These actions, though, did not hinder the process of re-democratization in South America. When the potential the military dictatorship in Argentina had for destabilizing the region was recognized, the Reagan Administration withdrew its support for authoritarian right-wing regimes, despite their

anti-Communist stance. The US instead sided with democratic regimes, which were much more predictable in terms of maintaining the regional *status quo*.[14] Thus, even before the fighting over the Falkland Islands had ceased, the US Ambassador to Argentina had already begun a dialog with various political opposition members in order to prepare for the restoration of democracy. Argentina's capitulation was expected to bring down Galtieri and his weakened military regime.[15]

At the same time, Brazil was in the process of re-democratization. President Figueiredo granted a general amnesty to those convicted of political crimes (those repressed for opposing the ruling regime) and open elections for state governors were held in 1982. The military regime, worn down by its internal contradictions and public pressure in favor of the restoration of democracy, began negotiating the transition of the political system. These actions took place in the context of the so-called third wave of democratization,[16] where "the Western states, with the United States in the lead – which began to develop a clearly Wilsonian policy – and international organizations imposed a new legitimacy established on the basis of human rights and democracy."[17]

While Argentina and Brazil undertook a process of re-democratization of their governance systems driven by an international trend, the bilateral policies between the two countries continued to strengthen.[18] One of the main signs of this approach was their commitment to pursue peace and cooperation and the creation of an environment conducive to the integration of both nations. After the opening of an international bridge over the Iguazu River, Presidents Raul Alfonsín (Argentina) and Jose Sarney (Brazil) began a series of talks aimed at: (1) promoting a gradually bilateral integration between the two nations to form a common market, allowing self-sufficiency in essential products, basic inputs, and capital goods; (2) enhancing cooperation for the development of sectors able to generate scientific and technological advances in strategic areas such as computer science, robotics, biotechnology, and nuclear energy; and (3) increasing the political power and negotiating strength of both countries within the international system.[19]

> In a context marked by destabilizing economic policies and low negotiating skills of external debt, the integration process that began to take shape in 1985 in articulation between the external policies of Argentina and Brazil not only aimed at the integration of productive sectors of the respective states, but also the consolidation of the region as a zone of peace and democracy as

> a form of government, expand the autonomy of decision and action in the international arena and the revitalization of Latin American integration.[20]
>
> […]Through a High Level Joint Commission of Cooperation and Bilateral Economic Integration, Argentina and Brazil gave rise to a joint work in order to examine and propose programs, projects and forms of economic integration, especially with regard to areas of industrial complementation, energy, transport and communications, scientific and technical development, bilateral trade and other market.[21]

In the Act for the Brazilian–Argentine Integration of 1986, a series of protocols were signed and a common list of capital goods that would have preferential treatment were agreed upon. There were also secret agreements on military aviation and atomic energy, wherein it was agreed that the two countries would share Air Force radar systems and air traffic control.

> This integration model concerted by Sarney and Alfonsín aimed at […] not only to favor the capital goods sector and the scientific and technological cooperation, but also to set standards, with the aim of preserving the balance and symmetry of the development of economic and trade relations between the two countries, avoiding the sectoral specialization of their production systems as well as the negative balances in their trade accounts.[22]

One of the controversial points that sparked some sensitivity in the US was the nuclear cooperation protocol that established the possibility of jointly building a nuclear submarine and the binational project for the development of a super breeder reactor (fast breeder) enabled with plutonium.[23]

A year later, the Argentine and Brazilian presidents signed the Joint Declaration of Viedma relating to nuclear matter and in 1988 they decided to improve the bilateral mechanisms of political and technical cooperation. These measures were aimed at strengthening the positions of both countries against external pressures—mainly from America. Argentina and Brazil signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and submitted their nuclear programs to international monitoring agencies.[24] The treaty was seen in the region as discriminatory, since it favored allowing existing nuclear powers to freely continue to develop the technology. As such, Brazil and Argentina expressed their willingness to extend their nuclear cooperation with all Latin American countries who were interested in participating in it, and reaffirmed the inalienable right to develop its nuclear program for peaceful purposes without external constraints.

In 1988, the Treaty of Integration, Cooperation, and Development was signed, in which both countries agreed to form a common economic space through the gradual removal (within 10 years) of all tariff and non-tariff barriers to the movement of goods and services, and to harmonize and coordinate their customs, monetary, fiscal, exchange, agricultural and industrial policies, among others.[25] A clear example of the coordination of foreign policies was the joint actions performed in a Contadora Support Group (the Accountant Support Group), with the aim of achieving a peaceful and Latin American solution to the problem of Central America, seeking to avoid direct US intervention.[26]

> Although all these countries were opposed to an expansion of the Soviet influence area in Latin America and possibly would not welcome the presence of revolutionary regimes in Central America, was even greater aversion to direct US military intervention in the region. […] In the discourse of the Chancellors of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay a new line of foreign policy was stood out: based on the conviction that a reduction in military conflicts in Latin America -and particularly in Central America- is needed, in order to reduce the militaristic tendencies in the region and consolidate the democratic regimes.[27]

In Argentina, the radical government had the support of the opposition to the Central American crisis, as evidenced by the declarations and resolutions presented to both Houses of Congress in May and December, 1984 calling for support of the Contadora Group, to repudiate the attacks in Central America, and to support Nicaragua against US "imperialism."[28]

This defiant stance against US policy, however, meant that President Alfonsín had to provide less commitment to the Central American crisis, as Argentina required greater support from Washington on priority issues such as assistance with the external debt problem and the dispute with Britain over the Falklands. This "realistic turn" adopted by the radical government had positive and tangible consequences when Argentine authorities signed a standby agreement with the IMF. The Reagan Administration had played a prominent role as arbitrator between the authorities of Buenos Aires and the banks.[29] Similarly, the implementation of the Austral Plan, together with the first privatizations, generated a positive reaction in both the US and among international financial institutions and resulted in a new series of loans to Argentina. This clearly demonstrated the direct effect of US interference in the internal politics of another state.

Another area where Argentina and Brazil coordinated their foreign policy foreign debt: a priority issue for both countries. After the Mexican financial crisis of 1982, each of the debtor countries of the region began to carefully observe the behavior of their neighbors, fearing the impact any moves could have on their domestic public opinion and, above all, the attitude of its creditors. For this reason the Argentine government, together with the support of Brazil and other Latin American countries, proposed starting a multilateral policy for Latin American countries to meet the demands of international economic and financial organizations. Thus, the Cartagena Consensus attempted to unify the position of the continent on the issue of external debt. It was ultimately rejected by creditors, who followed the IMF's strategy, designed largely by the US Treasury Department, of "case by case" negotiations. An essential condition of signing IMF agreements was that negotiations with the rest of the creditors would follow.[30] As well as this, Argentina's new democratic government inherited the Condor I and Condor II missile programs from the military leadership.[31] This secret project was not interrupted for both political and economic reasons. The official decision to continue with the Condor missile projects faced strong pressure from the US and other major powers. In April, 1987 a group of powers instituted the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), an agreement designed to prevent the export of missile technology to developing countries.[32]

Consolidation of Democracy and the Washington Consensus

The 1980s was a period of recession and economic stagnation for Latin America and it came to be referred to as the "lost decade." It was thought that the best way to handle the crisis was to return to liberal economic, political, and ideological practices in order to undertake structural reforms proposed by the "Washington Consensus."[33] This crisis also had a major impact on the US economy as it not only limited the capacity to service external debt, but it also reduced the ability of Latin America to import products. The US attempted to achieve a trade surplus and Washington believed that Latin America should unilaterally promote the liberalization of foreign trade.

In 1990, the *Institute for International Economics* held a conference, the focus of which was a presentation by John Williamson called Decalogue. It detailed the economic reforms needed to restore the Latin American

economies. Driven by neoliberal directives issued by the Washington Consensus, the Argentinean and Brazilian governments developed new priorities for their foreign policies. Leaders in these countries appeared to perform an about-face regarding their political and strategic approach to the US and had to redefine their national interests in economic terms in order to adapt to the basic rules of the prevailing economic and financial international order. The adoption of these policies became a *sine qua non* for the renegotiation of external debt and the receipt of any assistance from international financial agencies. In order to mend its relationship with the US, Brazil passed a patent and intellectual property protection law covering several areas, which appeased important American lobby groups. Similarly, and despite the resistance maintained up until then, the government of Collor de Melo was induced to sign the Quadripartite Agreement with Argentina, the Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the control and supervision of its nuclear material and to adhere to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Argentina had a much closer alignment to US interests when it needed to renegotiate and restructure its external debt. This linkage arose from a "realistic acceptance of American leadership in the Western Hemisphere."[34] Therefore, under President Carlos Menem, the project for the production of the ballistic missile Condor II was abandoned; he adhered to the MTCR and also ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco. This unconditional alignment to the US had been a consistent foreign policy for Argentina and it was the only Latin American country to actively participate in the international forces in the 1991 Gulf War. That decision profoundly irritated Itamaraty and decreased its faith in the Argentine government.[35] Support for the US aimed to reduce confrontation in Argentine foreign policy in order to attract investment and facilitate negotiations with banks and international organizations.[36] The adoption of this *peripheral realism* did not limit the integration process with Brazil initiated in the previous decade, despite the fact that it had been derived from competition with Brazil.

In 1991, and in order to provide a regional scope to previous bilateral commitments, Paraguay and Uruguay signed the Treaty for the Constitution of the South Common Market. Years later, Presidents Menem and Collor de Melo decided to enhance integration, expanding the objectives of the Treaty to include economic liberalism and tariff reform, in order to accelerate trade liberalization. Indeed, the Mercosur assumed a free-trade character with general openness, without sectoral

protection and without managed trade (except for in the automotive and sugar trades). As this process of regional integration was underway, President Bill Clinton continued his predecessor's initiative and proposed to the other heads of government in South America the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).[37] This proposal for regional economic integration concealed geopolitical objectives with respect to continental security. The aims was to strengthen democratic institutions and combat drug trafficking and terrorism; threats that had replaced subversion and communism as challenges to US interests in the region.[38]

The FTAA represented the US's newest strategy to maintain its hegemony in the hemisphere. The implementation of neoliberal measures that promoted privatization of state enterprises, deregulation of the economy and unilateral trade liberalization was important to the US. The orientation of the Washington Consensus was that state interference in the economy was to be replaced with market forces, which implied the limitation of national sovereignty for the countries of South America. The US proposal totally undermined the Free Trade Area of South America (SAFTA) idea introduced by Brazil a year earlier, which aimed to form an economic space that complemented Mercosur. While the Brazilian initiative was not successful, the Common Market was, and it represented an obstacle to the economic, political, and military purposes of the US. According to Madeleine Albright, President Clinton's Secretary of State, Mercosur was "harmful" to US interests.[39]

Conclusion

Since the early nineteenth century and the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, the US has shown a particular interest in Latin America. This study has shown that the strategies employed to enforce its interests mutated and adapted to new contexts. Nevertheless, retaining South America in its sphere of influence has always clearly been the guiding principle of US policy. During the analyzed period, it was possible to demonstrate that relations with the military governments of Argentina and Brazil were hesitant and oscillated between support to limit the spread of communism in the region and rebukes over violations of human rights and actions relating to nuclear programs. In turn, the increasing difficulties in the economies of Argentina and Brazil created ideal conditions for America to use economic tools to exert pressure on these governments. In this context, the military authorities of the two South American countries began to

find common ground. An area of cooperation developed and completely relegated any conflicts between them. Thus, a series of understandings and agreements were made in key areas, such as the joint manufacture of aircraft, missiles, and nuclear activities. *Detente* between Argentina and Brazil generated enormous concern for the Reagan Administration, which began to successfully develop strategies to reach out, particularly to the government of Leopoldo Galtieri. While Argentine servicemen participated in US-sponsored counterinsurgency activities in Central America, Brazil opted for diplomatic alternatives to resolve the crisis in Suriname.

With the advent of democracy in both countries, the bilateral agenda continued with greater policy coordination, positively impacting on the integration process. Common positions on regional external debt crises and the development of an independent nuclear policy aroused strong objections from the US State Department, which used economic leavers to acquire the acquiescence of the weak democratic governments to the US's agenda. The "lost decade" of the 1980s provided the ideal conditions to rebuild the economic dynamics of the countries in the region. Neoliberalism emerged, then, as the dominant economic paradigm and reform became imperative for the renegotiation of foreign debt and assistance from international credit agencies. Argentina and Brazil had to adapt their foreign policies to reflect the political and strategic interests of the US, redefining the national interest in economic terms and making concessions that had been resisted by previous governments. This chapter has made it clear that continued US involvement in the politics of Argentina and Brazil has been guided by a policy whose origins can be traced back two centuries but still survives.

Notes

1. In his State of the Union Address to Congress on December 6, 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed what became known as the "Roosevelt Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine. In response to a crisis over defaulting debt payments to European banks by some American nations and fear that the European powers may use force to obtain payment for those debts, Roosevelt stated that the US could intervene in the affairs of other nations of the Western hemisphere to control the situation, and serve as "international police" and act on behalf of the European powers to avoid the need for their intervention. The policy commonly became known as "the big stick" (named after a saying of Roosevelt's: "*speak softly and carry a big stick*." Available at: https://

history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/roosevelt-and-monroe-doctrine [accessed February 27, 2015].
2. Borja, Rodrigo. *Enciclopedia de la Política* (4ª Edición), Tomo I. A-G, p.326. México, FCE, 2012. http://www.enciclopediadelapolitica.org/ [accessed March 15, 2015].
3. Covenant of the League of Nations, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp [accessed March 3, 2015].
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5. Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, "The geopolitical importance of South America, in the strategy of the U.S." Conference at the War College in Brazil, Rio de Janeiro. September 23, 2008. http://www.laondadigital.uy/ [accessed March 5, 2015].
6. Marcos Novaro y Vicente Palermo, *La Dictadura Militar. 1976–1983. Del Golpe de Estado a la Restauración Democrática*, Buenos Aires, Paidos, 2003, p. 263.
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8. Roberto Russell y Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, *El lugar de Brasil en la política exterior argentina*, Buenos Aires, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2003, p. 35.
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10. Oscar Camilión, *Memorias políticas. De Frondizi a Menem (1956–1996)*, Buenos Aires, Planeta, 1999, p. 108.
11. Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, *Op. Cit.*, p. 397.
12. García Lupo, Rogelio, *Diplomacia secreta y rendición incondicional*, Buenos Aires, Editorial Legasa. 1983, pp.180–183.
13. Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, *Op. Cit.*, p. 399.
14. Andrés Cisneros & Carlos Escudé (eds.). *Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina*, *Tomo XIV. Las Relaciones Políticas, 1966–1989*, Buenos Aires, Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 2000.
15. García Lupo, Rogelio, *Op. Cit.*, p. 71.
16. The phrase is drawn from Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman, Oklahoma, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
17. Juan Tovar, "De la Tercera Ola al gran Roll-Back: Democratización y utopía en la Posguerra Fría", *Relaciones Internacionales*, N° 16, febrero de 2011, p. 206.
18. Mario Rapoport y Eduardo Madrid, *Argentina-Brasil: de rivales a aliados*, Buenos Aires, Capital Intelectual, 2011, p. 74.

19. Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, *Op. Cit.*, p. 412.
20. Leonardo Granato, "Un recorrido por las fases de la integración sudamericana de la mano de las políticas externas de Brasil y Argentina", *La revista del CCC,* No. 16, septiembre / diciembre 2012, p. 1.
21. Ibid.
22. Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, *Op. Cit.*, p. 415.
23. *Ibid*, p. 413.
24. Monica Hirst (comp.), *Continuidad y cambio en las relaciones América Latina-Estados Unidos*, Buenos Aires, Grupo Editorial Latinoamericano, 1987, p. 21. The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was approved in June 1968 by resolution 2573 of the XXII Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Argentina abstained in the vote of the General Assembly approved by this treaty, considering it discriminatory to enshrine the "disarming the unarmed" while the nuclear powers may or may not be subject to the safeguards system established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
25. Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, *Op. Cit.*, p. 418.
26. It is important to remember that the installation of the Sandinista government in Managua not only radically altered the history of Nicaragua, but had profound consequences for the Central American region as a whole, since shortly after the outbreak of the civil war in El Salvador, and from then, the Central American political crisis expanded until it had serious international impact. Reagan framed the Central American conflict in the east–west dispute, which led the US to initiate a series of covert paramilitary operations and an international offensive to isolate Nicaragua economically and politically. In this context of increasing US interventionism in the region, a regional initiative to finding a peaceful and negotiated solution to the conflict emerged: the Contadora Group and, a few years later, the Contadora Support Group, where Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay joined the mediation initiative.
27. Alicia Frohmann, "De Contadora al Grupo de los ocho: el reaprendizaje de la concertación política regional", *FLACSO.* Work Paper No. 410, Santiago, Chile, 1989, p. 372.
28. Cisneros & Escudé (eds.). *Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina*, *Tomo XIV. Las Relaciones Políticas, 1966–1989*, Buenos Aires, Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 2000.
29. Frohmann, Alicia, "Democracia, deuda externa y disciplinamiento económico. Las relaciones entre Argentina y Estados Unidos 1983–1985", *FLACSO,* Work Paper, No. 298, Santiago, Chile, 1986, p. 243.
30. Diana Tussie, "La coordinación de los deudores latinoamericanos: ¿Cuál es la lógica de su accionar?", *Revista Desarrollo Económico,* vol. 28, N° 109, 1988.

31. The Condor II was a ballistic missile in around 1000 km range, capable of reaching the Falkland Islands from the Patagonian coast, or Santiago de Chile, the two scenarios of conflict that the Air Force had when it secretly launched the project in 1982, after the defeat of the Falklands War.
32. Cisneros & Escudé (eds.), *Op. Cit.*
33. The name for a consensus that developed between the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the United States Treasury Department.
34. Carlos Escudé, *Realismo Periférico. Fundamentos para la nueva política exterior argentina*, Buenos Aires, Editorial Planeta, 1992, p. 22.
35. Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, *Op. Cit.*, 428.
36. Carlos Escudé, *Op. Cit.*, p. 84.
37. President George W. Bush announced on June 27 of 1990 *The Enterprise of the Americas Initiative*, with the intention of establishing a free-trade zone.
38. Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, *Op. Cit.*
39. Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, *Op. Cit.*, p. 451.

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CHAPTER 11

The Role of the US in the Promotion of Criminal Justice Reform in Mexico: The Case of Law Schools

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Introduction

Since the transition of several countries in Latin America to democratic rule, several international agencies have promoted judicial reforms in the region. Improving the rule of law is crucial for the stability of democracy and the certainty of a market-oriented economy. International organizations, such as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the World Bank, and government agencies, such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the European Commission, have invested their resources into reforming the justice system. International aid was directed toward changing the legal system (from mixed-inquisitorial to accusatorial), granting independence to Supreme Courts, creating constitutional courts and offices of public defenders, and

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professionalizing the judiciary, prosecutors, the police, as well as other members of the justice-sector complex. The US also played a very active role in promoting these reforms in Latin American countries.

The aid provided by the US to the justice-sector in Mexico only increased in 2008 with the implementation of the Mérida Initiative, a cooperative regional security strategy. Prior to that Initiative, aid for judicial reform was scant and what little assistance the US did provide was directed toward counter-narcotic activities. After the 2008 Mérida Initiative, though, the US Congress started to appropriate funds to Mexico. To date, US$2.3 billion had been funneled into Mexico.[1] Initially, the Mérida Initiative focused on financing equipment, technology, and military and police training to aid the fight against organized crime and drug trafficking. Since 2010, however, the Mérida Initiative expanded its scope and now focuses on four areas: "1) disrupting organized criminal groups; 2) institutionalizing the rule of law; 3) building a 21st century border; and 4) building strong and resilient communities."[2] This chapter will focus on the second area: institutionalizing the rule of law.

In 2008, Mexico passed a landmark reform to the criminal justice system. This reform aimed to transform the mixed-inquisitorial legal system into an adversarial one, and this new system was to be implemented nationwide by 2016. Under the area of "institutionalizing the rule of law" of the Mérida Initiative, the US government has directed funds to assist with this significant justice-sector reform. How is the implementation of this reform working? What are the main obstacles for the implementation? To answer these questions one needs to focus on two types of actors. On the one hand, justice-sector actors, that is, judges, prosecutors, police officers, and defense attorneys; and, on the other hand, societal actors, especially law faculty members and users (victims and defendants) of the criminal justice system.

In this chapter, we will explore the role played by societal actors, in particular law faculty members, in facilitating the implementation of the 2008 criminal justice reform at the state level through the change of law schools' curricula, the training of professors, and the development of infrastructure for the adversarial criminal system. It will be argued that law faculty members' commitment contributes to setting a steady base for the success of the new adversarial system. The cases of different law schools in the states of Chihuahua, the State of Mexico, and Jalisco will be used to provide evidence regarding the commitment of these societal actors to the reform and to show how collaboration with the US might be best utilized in the

future. These states have been selected because they introduced the new adversarial system *de jure* and they have progressed in the implementation of the reforms. Chihuahua and the State of Mexico adopted the adversarial system in 2006 and 2009, respectively.[3] Chihuahua is currently the leading state in terms of reform implementation. The State of Mexico remains at the introduction phase: state representatives have changed the law but the system still does not work in all judicial districts. There are considerable differences in the degree of progress shown by the various institutions of the justice-sector (police, prosecutor's office, public defender's office, and the judiciary), as well as insufficient training and financial support to implement the reforms fully.[4] Jalisco changed its laws to allow the introduction of the criminal reform only two years before the 2016 constitutional deadline established by federal authorities. To date, the status of its implementation is precarious: the reform operates in only one judicial district, training has not been extended to all justice-sector operators, and the budget assigned to further advance the reform implementation is insufficient.[5]

In the next section of this chapter, a brief context of the promotion of justice-sector reform in Mexico will be presented with an emphasis on the Mérida Initiative. The third section reviews the literature that helps to frame the case studies. Borrowing from John Searle's (1997) proposal about the creation of "institutional facts," it will be argued that the *commitment* of actors is crucial for the reforms to be implemented successfully. In the fourth section, evidence regarding the commitment of law faculty members in nine universities across three Mexican states will be presented and used to argue the effect this commitment has had on the implementation of criminal justice reforms. Finally, the chapter concludes with some suggestions about how future cooperation between Mexico and the US, especially in supporting the transformation of law schools, might bolster the implementation of the reforms in the Mexican criminal justice system.

Promoting Justice Reform: The Mérida Initiative

The bilateral relationship between Mexico and the US has traditionally encompassed collaboration on a broad range of areas such as the economy, migration, education, and security. Both countries agree on the great importance of bilateral relations for their foreign political agendas. For Mexico, the US is deemed to be the most important partner, while for the

US, Mexico is "one of the most important partners."[6] The US and Mexico have a long-standing relationship in the security area, in particular, regarding drug trafficking and operations to reduce the production of drugs in Mexico, or to detect illegal drugs crossing the border into the US. The parameters of this relationship have always been set by the US whose interest in controlling drugs dates back to 1930. Proposals for cooperation are viewed by Mexico as political pressure rather than suggestions. For instance, drug certifications were the primary tool used to induce change, while other efforts such as funding for law enforcement activities or training to strengthen justice-sector institutions were lacking.[7] On several occasions the US government has seemed too intrusive to Mexican authorities, especially because drug production, violence, and police and political corruption were considered issues of national sovereignty to be resolved by Mexicans. However, politicians in Mexico (especially in the PRI —Institutional Revolutionary Party) never took drug-related problems seriously, and the justice system was incapable of delivering effective enforcement.[8] As a matter of fact, government authorities, and also many analysts, believed that the bilateral relationship should concentrate on other, softer, trade issues, in order to avoid controversy.[9]

Since 2001, however, security—in particular national security—became a greater focus for the US. This had serious implications for Mexico, because it shares a 2000 mile border with the US. Since then, the US government has named illegal migration, organized crime, and drug trafficking as posing significant threats to US national security.[10] Internal strife in Mexico that dramatically escalated conflicts between criminal organizations under Vicente Fox (2000–2006) and between the government and criminal organizations under Felipe Calderón's administration (2006–2012) only heightened the sense of threat to the US. Especially in this last period, law and order collapsed in Mexico.

It was in this context that in 2007 the then presidents of Mexico and the US, Calderón and George W. Bush (2000–2008), launched the Mérida Initiative, a partnership aimed to enhance cooperation on anticrime measures and military and police training. The initiative was approved and the US Congress appropriated funds to it in the 2008 budget. Initially, the Merida Initiative was "designed to develop a heightened military response to Mexico's drug war"[11] and aid concentrated mainly on technical assistance, counter-narcotic equipment such as helicopters, planes and x-ray devices for border inspections. Once Barack Obama took office (2009), however, the agreement extended to include four pillars (Fig. 11.1):



Fig. 11.1 The four pillars of Mérida Initiative (*Source*: Compiled from data found at: http://mexico.usembassy.gov/news-events/press/us-government

The four pillars have sought to address the problem from a more comprehensive perspective, in order to extend cooperation to resolve not only the visible outcome of battling drug-related violence, but also those problems that cause it, such as unprofessional justice-sector institutions, law schools with outdated curricula, and a culture of corruption. This transformation in scope required more resources to be appropriated by the US Congress for the Mérida Initiative than the ($1.4 billion) that was initially allocated. Up to 2014, $2.3 billion had been assigned for financing several programs.

Graph 11.1 shows the evolution of the total founding for the Mérida Initiative through three different appropriation accounts managed by the US Department of State: the Economic Support Fund (ESF), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE). As we can see from the graph, the INCLE has received the most funding—75% of the total budget for the Mérida Initiative. The resources allocated to ESF and INCLE have been directed to air mobility for counternarcotics operations, scanners, professionalization of federal police, equipment, training canines, but also to accomplishing justice-sector reform, institution building, training, and rule-of-law activities.[12]



Graph 11.1 Resources appropriated by US-Congress to Mérida Initiative, 2008–2015 (US$millions) (*Source*: Compiled from data found in Ribando Seelke, Clare and Kristine Finklea, "U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond," *Congressional Research Service*, 2014)

The Mérida Initiative is managed by the Department of State with the US Agency for International Development (USAID) playing a major role in the operation of pillars II and IV of the Initiative, in particular the implementation of criminal justice constitutional reform and the development of community-based initiatives to prevent and control crime. Regarding criminal justice reform, USAID has financed several programs to (a) strengthen the capacity of the legal system and professionalize the judiciary and legal professions within the new adversarial legal system; (b) monitor the implementation of criminal justice reform at the state level; (c) develop the academic programs of law schools; and (d) acclimatize citizens to the criminal justice constitutional reforms.[13] Additionally, USAID, in cooperation with the US Embassy in Mexico and Mexico's Technical Secretary of the Coordination Council for the Implementation of the Criminal Justice System (SETEC), launched the program "Promoting Justice" (PROJUST), deemed the "most ambitious USAID project so far to promote justice-sector reform," in 2014.[14] PROJUST seeks to advance the implementation of criminal reform at the state and federal level by providing "training and technical assistance to professionals who work within the criminal justice system, including judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys."[15]

Are these efforts effective? According to a report of the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), the State Department faces several

challenges in the implementation of the Mérida Initiative programs, including having an insufficient number of staff to administer the programs, adapting to changes in government, and funding availability.[16] Additionally, there is evidence that the commitment of actors involved in the activities of the Mérida Initiative, particularly the implementation of criminal reform, plays an important role in transforming the system. In the following section, the literature on the role of actors' commitment in the implementation of reforms that helped frame the cases selected for this study will be presented.

Actors and Their Commitment to Institutionalizing Criminal Reform

In relation to the criminal justice system reform in Mexico, this chapter asserts that the actors' *commitment* to the principles of an adversarial criminal justice system is closely related to the success or failure of reform implementation at the local level. If this premise is accepted, then the process of training, socialization, and appropriation of new values becomes very significant. That process occurs firstly at universities, which are responsible for training future juridical officers—those who will drive the adversarial model and build the new institutional reality. Thus, redesigning curricula, investing on educational infrastructure (oral trial rooms and mediation centers for professional practice), and training professors in the new law and procedures of the adversarial criminal justice system are priorities for successful implementations of the reforms. A set of relevant data obtained from some federal states (see below) show the meager results achieved by universities, a situation that is significantly worsened if one takes into account the persistence of malpractice, as well as some constitutional incongruences such as criminal law aimed at combating organized crime.[17] This section presents some theories that explain reform implementation and seek to understand the role of different actors in this process, so as to create the "institutional facts" necessary to give effect to a reform, that is, to implement it successfully.

The literature in policy implementation offers several approaches to explain when and why a reform is implemented successfully. There are two main approaches: top-down and bottom-up.[18] On the one hand, top-down approaches explain implementation through policy designer actors and, in particular, the extent to which these actors clearly emphasize the objectives, processes, budget, and supportive groups or institutions

for the reform to be implemented in the design of the statutes.[19] On the other hand, bottom-up theories propose that local actors' commitment, will, and motivation are significant for the implementation of a reform. According to Milbrey McLauglin, the bottom-up "perspective shifts the focus of analysis away from institutions and institutional goals to individuals and individual incentives, beliefs, and capacity. Organizations don't innovate or implement change, individuals do."[20] Thus, we expect to observe advancements in the implementation of criminal justice reform in law schools (through the design of new curricula, infrastructure, and human resources) if their faculty members are committed to the system's change.

John Searle proposed an approach similar to the bottom-up theories of policy implementation in his explanation of the conditions that favor the creation of institutional facts. The notion of "institutional fact" was Searle's and it explains how social reality is constructed, that is, institutional facts constitute and form a determined (institutional) social reality.[21] His approach is relevant to the study of the implementation of the legal reform at the local level in Mexico, since it focuses its analysis on the influence that individual perspectives have on the creation and maintenance of social reality. According to this author, what constitutes institutional facts is precisely the degree of collective acceptance of its objectives. The core of Searle's proposal is the differentiation between facts that exist independently, what he calls "brute (physical) facts" (e.g., the presence of snow on the summit of Mount Everest), and those events that depend on agreement or acceptance by people, these are "institutional (mental) facts," and Searle qualifies them as a subclass of social facts. For example, institutions like money, marriage, borders, or criminal justice systems exist because they were created and their recognition is shared by the collective. The acceptance of the formula "X counts as Y in context C" is what allows the continued and persistent existence of institutional facts.[22]

The *commitment* of the system's operators to the principles of the new scheme of criminal justice is the initial element from which they create and maintain the "institutional facts" needed to win recognition and deploy the socializing function of the new organization, in this case the adversarial criminal justice system. The serious risk involved is that where there is no such commitment, there is no trigger for the new regulatory framework and so no institutional facts would manifest.

An example of an institutional fact related to criminal proceedings is the duty of the judge to appoint a public defender to represent the person

accused of a crime if no one has previously been appointed. Another is the convention whereby an apprehension requires a warrant to be issued by a competent judge. In a case where the accused was judged without adequate defense or had been arrested without a valid warrant, the judicial decision should be favorable to them according to the *presumption of innocence* principle. Institutional facts occur in certain conditions. Searle states that there are three components that determine the existence of institutional facts: (1) the collective intentionality, (2) the assignment of function, and (3) the establishment of constitutive rules. The first element, the collective intentionality, has to do with the degree of *acceptance* or *collective belief* needed to generate cooperative behaviors between individuals who participate in the actions of that institutional fact. Once this condition occurs, the cooperation between people allows *assigning functions* (the second element) to be applied to some facts or processes, which means achieving a consensus about which functions must be accomplished. Finally, the third component refers to the formalization of this scheme, or as Searle explains:

> The key to understanding institutional reality is to see it as a class of functions imposed on entities where the functions cannot be performed solely in virtue of the physical constitution of the entities, but require the collective acceptance of the imposed status and function. These collective impositions of what I call "status functions," are of the form "X counts as Y in context C."[23]

According to Searle, the assignation of status functions and the establishment of constitutive rules are the successful result of having materialized the collective intentionality. An illustrative example is money: the piece of printed-paper is a brute fact, but the fact that that piece of paper is "money" (and then can be used as medium of exchange) is an institutional fact. Whether this is the case implies: (1) the existence of a collective intentionality on the meaning of that piece of paper (it would not exist as money without the shared belief that is such); (2) the assignment of function (to assign it as a means of exchange) from a (3) constitutive rule that indicates that the pieces of paper with certain characteristics (X) counts as money (Y) in the context of an economy (C). Thus, the physical properties of the piece of paper (X) would be insufficient in causal terms to fulfill the function Y (be money) if there is no such assignment status. The example of money also allows us to observe the importance of education as a vehicle for establishing beliefs, prejudices, and moral and

cognitive resources that give meaning to the three constituent elements of institutional facts. Regarding collective intentionality, the commitment of law students to an "internal statement"[24] of the values and principles of the legal system (in this case the adversarial criminal justice system) allows them to participate in a community that shares the same socially validated criteria or behavior.

When sharing the same axiological perspective, the legal community is able to assign roles, goals or objectives and put them into practice. Therefore, the training of lawyers must include the procedural instruments that make up the adversarial model of criminal justice. For example, the commitment to the protection of human rights means avoiding obtaining evidence through torture. This feature of criminal proceedings must be socialized in classrooms. To fulfill this purpose, the 2008 reform established a constitutive rule (Art. 20.IX Constitution) to exclude illegally obtained evidence. The exclusionary rule says: "[a]ny evidence obtained in violation of human rights is void."[25] This constitutional provision supports the function of preventing torture and its inclusion in the reform is a result of the rejection (by collective intentionality of the academic community) of the violation of human rights.

Criminal Reform Implementation in Law Faculties in Chihuahua, the State of Mexico, and Jalisco: A Target for Judicial Promotion

As stated above, the commitment of actors is crucial for the implementation of criminal justice reform. Two types of actors have been identified. Firstly, justice-sector actors—judges, prosecutors, forensic scientists, defense lawyers, and police officers, that is, those in charge of making the system work. Secondly, societal actors, such as law faculty members and users (victims and defendants) of the criminal justice system. This work concentrates on law faculty members, that is, those actors that are in charge of reforming law degree programs to prepare the next generation of lawyers. This section will explore the extent to which law faculty members show commitment to the implementation of criminal justice reform in Mexico by advancing changes in their law school curricula, educational infrastructure, and training professors in the new system. In order to implement reform that drastically changes the legal system, it is necessary to also reform legal education. Indeed, the introduction

of an adversarial legal system implies, as Mauricio Duce states, a radical change in the training of law students to teach them litigation strategies for oral trials.[26]

In Mexico, only a handful of law schools have adapted their programs to prepare students to work under the new adversarial system, while the vast majority still train students using old curricula with a strong emphasis on learning abstract doctrines and memorizing norms. In fact, according to the 2011 Legal Education Reform Index for Mexico—a study led by the American Bar Association (ABA):

> Law courses in Mexican law schools are taught primarily through lectures… Law professors received their legal educations (sic) in the form of lectures and are not themselves familiar with alternative teaching techniques. Most are successful lawyers, very good speakers in the classroom, and have the ability to synthesize and convey information well. However, they are simply not trained to teach courses focused on developing practical skills in students, such as research, analysis of real cases, drafting of legal documents (and) oral arguments and client relations… According to some law schools deans [interviewed for researching this document] the schools do not offer their professors training opportunities to develop interactive teaching methodologies because the professors are not interested in attending such courses. One explanation for this is the belief that being a successful lawyer is a sufficient qualification to give a good class.[27]

This evidence raises serious questions about faculty members' commitment to reforming law school curricula and, thus, contributing to the implementation of the criminal justice system reform. Both Searle and McLaughlin argue that to institutionalize or implement a reform, the existence of a collective intentionality or societal actors' beliefs is necessary. If, however, law professors place little value on the quality of their training of law students in new ways of understanding criminal law and its practice, then this commitment is clearly missing. Additionally, the assessment of the ABA also found that "most schools place little emphasis on instruction in professional skills of the profession… "[28] As a result, law graduates are unable to develop the ability to analyze facts and solve problems later in their careers because "there are no courses that strive to develop students' critical thinking, advocacy, or client relations skills."[29]

An analysis of private and public universities in the states of Chihuahua, the State of Mexico, and Jalisco showed that these states' efforts to reform law curricula to develop professional skills that prepare future

lawyers for work in an adversarial system were floundering. Despite the fact that criminal justice reform is at different phases in each state, law faculty members in nearly all universities lacked the bases for preparing students for the new system. In order to observe law faculty members' commitment to the reforms law school curricula, in particular the lists of courses related to the acquisition of knowledge and skills needed to perform well in an adversarial system, such as introduction to criminal adversarial law, case theory and analysis, adversarial criminal procedure, oral litigation techniques, criminal defense, alternative mechanisms for dispute resolution (AMDR), and legal argumentation, were examined. The existence of infrastructure and skilled human resources were also measured. This included the existence of an oral trial room, an AMDR room, a legal clinic, and the number of professors certified to work in an adversarial system.[30] Table 11.1 shows this information for three universities for each of the selected states:

Chihuahua is the highest ranking of these states in the criminal justice reform implementation advancement.[31] As a matter of fact, in this state, the introduction of an adversarial system started well before the 2008 constitutional reform on criminal justice. The three universities reviewed for the case of Chihuahua have taken important steps to introduce courses related to the adversarial system. The UACH, UACJ, and ITESM (the first two public and the last private) have installed oral trial rooms. However, only the UACH has an AMDR room to develop the professional skills of students. None of the universities under study has established legal clinics to foster the litigation abilities of future lawyers.

The State of Mexico adopted the constitutional mandate on criminal reform and transformed (*de jure*) its inquisitorial system into one with predominantly adversarial features quite early on. The system operates in some municipalities. According to CIDAC[32] (2013), however, the level of its criminal justice reform implementation advancement is very low. This is consistent with the evidence of progress we found in law schools. Two public universities and one private university were examined in this state. The public universities (UAEM and UNAM-Campus Acatlán) at the time of the study did not have obligatory courses to train students in the adversarial system. The only subject related to this system was legal argumentation. The private university, University of Toluca Valley, offered the legal argumentation subject and also included in its obligatory curricula a subject on AMDR. Regarding educational infrastructure for the development of practical skills needed in an adversarial system, only the

UAEM had an oral trails room, while none of them had an AMDR room or a professional practice center, such as a legal clinic.

Jalisco recently passed legislation at the state level to introduce the adversarial system mandated by the 2008 constitutional reform. As of 2014, however, the system was not yet operating, and thus its ranking of implementation advancement was very low.[33] In this state we selected UdeG (a public university) ITESO and ITESM (private universities). All of them had included in their curricula a few courses related to the development of professional skills for an adversarial system, such as oral trials, arbitration, and AMDR. They also installed oral trial rooms for students to practice their skills for the new system. More efforts need to be made, however, to introduce an AMDR room and to establish a legal clinic to provide evidence of their commitment to train students for the adversarial model. To measure the capacity and training of professors for teaching the new system, the ratio of the average number of students to professors certified by the SETEC has been used.[34]

These data show a substantial difference. Chihuahua, with the higher ranking in the implementation progress of the criminal reform, has 35 students for each certified professor. The State of Mexico, with a low ranking in the implementation of the reforms but with an early start in the *de jure* introduction of the adversarial system, has 113 students for each certified professor. Finally, Jalisco, with a very low ranking in criminal reform implementation and a latecomer to the *de jure* introduction of the adversarial system, has the greater number of students (162) for each certified professor. Jalisco, then, has the fewest certified professors to teach the adversarial system to students who will soon be seeking to work in that system. Searle's proposed scheme for the constitutional reform of the criminal justice system in 2008 explains the problems found with the reform's institutionalization. The main issue is the lack of training given by law faculties to provide the moral and cognitive resources needed to address conceptual contradictions and practices inherited from an authoritarian criminal law system.

The Existence of a Collective Intentionality

The first requirement for building institutional facts is the development of an intentional state of mind of the collective. To date, Mexico does not have a widespread commitment or shared intentionality to effectively change the legal system into a minimum criminal law that guarantees

Table 11.1 Law Schools in Chihuahua, State of Mexico, and Jalisco

State	*University*	*Last curricula modification*	*List of courses related to an adversarial legal system*	*Oral trial room*	*AMDR[a] room*	*Legal clinic*
Chihuahua	Autonomous University of Chihuahua (UACH)	2013	Legal Argumentation AMDR Oral Litigation	Yes	Yes	No
	ITESM, Campus Chihuahua	2011	Oral Trials AMDR	Yes	No	No
	Autonomous University of Ciudad Juárez (UACJ)	2005	Legal Argumentation Criminal Procedural Law Clinic (Adversarial System)	Yes	No	No
State of Mexico	Autonomous University of State of Mexico (UAEM)	2004	Legal Argumentation	Yes	No	No
	National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), Campus Acatlán	2013	Legal Argumentation	No	No	No
	University of Toluca Valley (UVT)		Legal Argumentation AMDR	No	No	No
Jalisco	University of Guadalajara (UdeG)	2013	Legal Argumentation Theory AMDR on Civil and Family Area Arbitration and AMDR	Yes	No	No
	ITESM, Campus Guadalajara	2011	Oral Trials AMDR	Yes	No	No
	ITESO	2012	AMDR	Yes	No	No

Source: Compiled using data found on Faculty web pages, from program coordinators and SETEC

[a]Alternative Methods for Dispute Resolution.

human rights.[35] One of the main obstacles is the formalist model of legal education, which tends to perpetrate the *status quo*. In the case of criminal law, the state of affairs is maintained mainly because teaching methods are still based on strong components of inquisitorial criminal law, components that are then reproduced and legitimized in the everyday practice of legal authorities. Faced with this reality, students uncritically assume the correctness of the written law that they are presented with in codes and judicial precedents. Their training is devoid not only of a solid evaluative criteria that would allow them to contrast the judicial reality with adversarial criminal law's principles, but it is also limited by epistemological abilities to prove facts. This is an activity that is a defining feature of an adversarial legal system. This problem is illustrated in the statements of several "employers" who were interviewed in a study conducted by Ana Laura Magaloni in 2006: "… Law schools not only do not train lawyers well, but deform the legal talent that many students have at the beginning of their career (sic)."[36]

The quality of professors is another obstacle for promoting reform of the criminal justice system. Selection processes that favor merit include evaluations of professors by students and coordinators, as well as courses to improve professors' teaching skills. These are difficult instruments to implement in law faculties in which most professors are also successful attorneys. This makes improving the quality of their teaching complex, since they are not always willing to take time away from their core business to do this.

> Law faculties are overwhelmingly comprised of practicing lawyers who spend only a few hours a week at the school teaching one or two courses. While this has the advantage of bringing the professors' professional experience and networking opportunities into the classroom, it also means that faculty generally lack the time to adequately prepare to teach, grade assignments, support students outside the classroom, or conduct scholarly research.[37]

A final point has to do with the elitist and conservative nature of the legal *status quo* of professors of law. According to Dunkan Kennedy, "… professors are overwhelmingly white, male with typical middle-class manners and heterosexuals,"[38] and they reproduce a complex set of institutional practices that lead students to voluntarily participate in the specialized hierarchical role of lawyers. In his analysis there were few professors that were critical of the system and or and/or who did not match the students' image of a quintessential "successful lawyer."

To conclude, the existence of a collective intentionality means to internalize a change and create new habits, when this does not happen, true change cannot occur. To create this intentionality it is essential to leave behind legal formalism in teaching, specifically, the formalistic interpretation of the law.[39] Alejandro Hope mentions five strategies to obstruct change; the second one is telling and is related to a formal adherence to the new legislation while contradicting the spirit of the reform. In his opinion the State of Mexico is representative of this situation, wherein:

> The reform of the criminal justice system, mandated by the constitutional changes of 2008, meant only to put a patina of orality to the old ways. In Mexicans' land, an oral and adversarial system means to read out loud a preliminary investigation, built in the old style, and not to argue before a judge a theory of the case. That is, the methods are new, but the bottom line remains intact.[40]

The Assignment of Function

Universities, in particular law schools, play an important function in the implementation of an institutional fact, in this case, criminal justice reform. Their function is clear and shared: when educating students, they must provide the knowledge, skills, and values to act in the new adversarial system. The main aim of legal training is to create common knowledge, where everyone knows and shares an understanding of the procedures and results. With the data presented in Table 11.2, it can be argued that law faculty members, in particular professors, need to perform their function of educating the next generation of lawyers better. For this, they need to learn the rules of the new system. A way to observe the extent to which they are achieving this is by looking at the number of professors certified in the new practices, which is currently quite low. There is also much-needed

Table 11.2 Student Numbers per Certified Professor

State	*Law students enrollment*	*Professors certified by SETEC*	*Numbers of students per certified professor*
Chihuahua	4241	120	35.3
State of Mexico	34449	303	113.6
Jalisco	16726	103	162.3

Source: Compiled using data from ANUIES (2012), SETEC (2015)

change to be made in the methods used for teaching the new system of law. The old methods are incompatible with the skills required for the new criminal justice system. Magaloni evaluates law students' training at the main universities in Mexico and concludes that:

> Legal education in Mexico has focused on the theoretical and conceptual study of the rules in the abstract, and the teaching methods have emphasized the ability to memorize over any other ability students might possess. This causes a situation of separation or divorce between what students learn and the reality of practice.[41]

This widespread university legal pedagogy limits the development of the necessary skills for the student to solve practical problems of the profession, especially those related to the adversarial model of criminal justice. The most significant absences are related to oral and written skills in argumentation, research, decision-making, negotiation, and measurement. Magaloni suggests focusing the change in the methodological innovation in teaching to include simulations, case studies, legal clinics, or negotiation exercises. In short, focus legal education on practicing the law and not merely on the transmission of knowledge. This innovation in the educational model would bring the classroom and the exercise of professional practice together, thereby better achieving the allocation of functions to the different actors and the institutionalization of the new model of criminal justice.

The Establishment of Constitutive Rules

The constitutive rules (rules of the game) indicate the conditions for materializing or implementing institutional facts. Its logical structure is expressed in the formula: X counts as Y in context C. For the purposes of our discussion, these rules are mainly the reform to the criminal system that changed various articles of the constitution, but also include other complementary reforms such as the creation of the National Code of Criminal Procedure, or the National Law of Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Criminal Matters. It is worth noting, however, that the national authorities have not designed a project or a procedure that contributes to transforming legal education in Mexico. Universities are only changing their law curricula, creating new infrastructure for oral trials or training professors in the new criminal system as a response to the will of their faculty members

or budget availability. This is not good enough. Universities (both public and private) need government or international support to advance this transformation. An institutional project was designed to help the implementation of criminal justice reform in the various justice-sector institutions (polices, public prosecutor offices, courts), and authorities also need to design a strategy to advance the reform of legal education in Mexico, since at universities we find the tomorrow's generation of justice-sector operators. There are a few examples of cooperation between the governments of Mexico and the US that might be replicated. Both USAID and the North American Consortium on Legal Education (NACLE) had facilitated small-scale exchange programs and cross-border university partnerships among law schools in the US, Canada, and Mexico. University partnerships, as well as student and professor exchange programs, prepare legal professionals for the adoption of an adversarial legal system and reduce the costs of training in Mexico. According to Zachary J. Lee, "close cooperation between Mexican law schools and US law schools would significantly enhance the effort to implement the constitutional reforms."[42] The progress of criminal justice reform will stall if law schools are not included in the this much-needed transformation process.

Conclusion

The promotion of justice in Mexico faces several challenges. Beyond the administrative and budgeting challenges of training judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and police officers, cooperation between Mexico and the US should address the current problems faced by university law faculties. So far they have been left to their own devices and reform depends entirely on the will of faculty members to adopt the changes needed to make the implementation of the adversarial legal system easier. This is problematic. Faculty members' commitment to legal reform that changes all their epistemological paradigms, all what they have learnt and been teaching, requires more than constitutional changes. The Mérida Initiative might be a promising framework to foster cooperation among universities' law faculties in Mexico and the US, especially under Pillar II. If one accepts that legal education directly affects the possibilities of creating institutional facts, then the law schools would have to be the central factor of change and implementation of criminal justice reform. In this sense, economic and institutional support will ensure the construction of a collective intentionality favorable to the adversarial criminal justice model.

The success of the reform involves a broad consensus about the social role of the new model of criminal law. In the end, what will make the difference to implementation is doing what it takes to make true change happen and achieve the expected results. That means achieving systemic adequacy of the rules with their environment. To institutionalize the rule of law and to implement criminal justice reform, a much bigger budget needs to be provided for academic exchange programs for students and professors so that they can personally experience an adversarial justice system. This will provide firsthand knowledge of the advantages of that system and could potentially stimulate the creation of actors' commitment to develop, adopt, and promote new law curricula and teaching methods to favor the implementation of the adversarial criminal justice reform in Mexico.

Notes

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CHAPTER 12

Conclusion

Daniel Aňorve Aňorve and Sally Burt

Since its independence, the US has been a champion of democracy and liberal values in the international community. Its attempts to spread the democratic system of government around the globe have been varied in their success across times and places and they have been met with reactions varying from unconditional welcoming to outright hostility. The explorations of US democratization efforts found in this book provide examples of this range of reactions and outcomes. The different perspectives of scholars from around the globe provide a unique insight into the significant debate about what democratization is, what the process looks like, and the effectiveness of efforts to assist it. The many aspects of US democracy assistance covered in this volume demonstrate the wide array of activities in which the US is engaged around the world that different states consider to be aiding in the process of democratization. They provide some examples, then, of the different possible definitions of the concept. Assessing the effectiveness of these efforts in objective terms is just as difficult because

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of the debate over exactly what constitutes democratization. There is a clear sense throughout the chapters of this book that there is a level of dissatisfaction and disappointment surrounding the US's involvement in the countries that have been examined. That disappointment is a result of different actions in countries. The US may be seen to have intervened too much, not enough, or just not in the right way.

There is a gap between the expectations of the populations of various countries around the world and the US's actions towards spreading democracy. The rhetoric of US leaders about the commitment to democratization of the globe and the spreading of liberal values have clearly oversold the US's will and/or ability to deliver on its stated goals. Although there are clearly some moves towards assisting other countries to develop into mature democracies, such as the promotion of labor standards in international agreements and aid programmes to assist in the development of democratic institutions, such as the judiciary in Mexico, there also seem to be higher priorities on the US's foreign policy agenda. Political stability, in many cases, seems to provide too many benefits to the economic and development agenda of the US to risk it for the sake of democratization. This can be seen in the case study of US relations with the Republic of Macedonia and in the case of US foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. There is, of course, an underlying rationality to the US's selection of countries that it chooses to intervene in the politics of in order to democratize the state. The US has finite resources and its own interests to pursue. The selectiveness of the aid given in many cases serves to undermine the US's own goals. Inconsistent policies or policies that do not match the rhetoric espoused by a particular administration add to the perception of the US's goals for intervention in the politics of particular countries being far from the stated claim of democracy assistance. This is clearly the case when it comes to the Middle East and perceptions of US intervention in that region.

An underlying theme of the analyses found in the chapters of this volume is the significance of domestic factors and the role that they play in the democratization process. It has been argued that for external assistance to be effective in the promotion of democracy the target country's unique domestic circumstances need to be accounted for in the strategy that is adopted. This argument is supported by several of the case studies found in this book. Many elements make up a democracy and beyond the institutions, constitutions and political framework is the fundamental culture and value base of the society. Without the commitment of the

population, and the leadership, to democratic ideals such as human rights and the rule of law, little progress will be made towards constructing a democratic society. Arguably, then, financial aid is only effective when offered in combination with the promotion of other democratic principles. The case studies relating to sub-Saharan Africa provide evidence of this. It is the slow pace at which these countries are transforming their domestic situation that is delaying democratization assistance. Frankowski's chapter exploring the US's use of labor standards in international trade agreements also shows that the US prefers to see some moves towards a conducive domestic setting prior to expending large amounts of democratization aid. Making trade agreements conditional on improved standards of labor and worker rights is one way to encourage moves towards democratic values.

In the Middle East, as the case studies from this region show, the strategy of focusing on domestic challenges and making conditions on the provision of democracy assistance has led to disillusionment with the process and the US. Ensuring the fundamental attitude of the people in states that seek democracy is correctly positioned for achieving that end prior to offering aid or assistance programmes is very important to the success of the democratization process. When aid is offered once the domestic conditions are right, it is sown into fertile and productive ground. The problem this creates, though, is that someone must determine when the domestic factors are "right." If the US becomes the sole judge of this condition, then democratization efforts become subjective. This may be a natural and fair aspect of the process, in that the US is under no obligation, apart from that which leaders feel they are, to assist foreign countries to democratize. It only need do so where it suits US interests and the gain is great enough to warrant the intervention and expenditure. It is reasonable to expect, then, that the US will aid democratization in the way that it sees as being the most effective and efficient. Each new policy or intervention to aid in the democratization of a society must take into account the domestic factors and environment of that state and be tailored accordingly in order to be most effective. The evidence from the case studies in this volume supports this being the case, but it clearly makes democratization efforts complex. The need to listen to, and gather the perspectives of, those on the ground in the states in question in order for them to input into the process is obvious.

The process of spreading the culture of democracy is part of soft power diplomacy. Rather than engage with other states in confrontations of hard power, such as military force and coercion, sometimes more can be

gained by influencing other states to align their interests with yours. US foreign policy scholars and officials have, for a long time, seen the virtues of adopting a soft power strategy in many regions of the globe. The opening chapter of this book examined the principles behind soft power diplomacy and provided a case study of its use. This connects quite clearly with the democratization efforts of the US as it is one method of advancing the process of transitioning to democracy. Through scholar and student exchange programmes with participants from non-democratic countries, the US is able to give them a firsthand experience of a democratic society. This encourages the spread of democracy by influencing future leaders of other countries with American liberal values. Selecting countries of interest to the US for participation in such programmes is a visible strategy undertaken as part of the broader soft power strategy in its foreign policy. Moving forward into the twenty-first century, soft power strategies will become increasingly important to the achievement of foreign policy aims. One could expect that these programmes and method of democratization will continue and be strengthened into the future. In order for it to be most successful, however, the US needs to maintain its credibility and that of its espoused mission, to spread democratic values around the world, and the best way to achieve this is to adhere most fervently to that mission and to adopt strategies that have proved the most effective in achieving true democratic reform. As can be seen from some of the case studies examined in this book, this has not always been so with US foreign policy.

The underlying themes of the chapters found in this volume explore some of the key aspects of the debates about democratization being engaged in by foreign policy scholars. The case studies examined, then, are pertinent to the discourse on US democratization efforts. Allowing scholars from around the globe who have experienced different aspects of US democratization efforts to add their voice and perspective to the debates is a significant undertaking. It allows the world to see US foreign policy from the perspective of those on the outside looking in. It is easy to find examples of US scholars or policy-makers providing their perspectives or evaluations of US democratization efforts in other countries, but this book provides those on the receiving end the opportunity to offer their perspectives. The authors have not tried to make definitive pronouncements about topics being debated in foreign policy circles, but rather to add a new dimension to those debates. It is hoped that the insights offered are of value to the debate and encourage new thinking about US democratization efforts around the globe.

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Index

A
Africa
  African Union (AU), 16, 21, 125, 130
  sub-Saharan, 5, 19, 24, 25, 34, 45, 51–68, 70, 95, 96, 98, 99, 125, 198, 199
Africa Command (AFRICOM), 36, 37, 47, 62
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), 63, 95–9, 100
African National Congress (ANC), 41–3
AFRICOM. *See* Africa Command (AFRICOM)
AGOA. *See* African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)
ANC. *See* African National Congress (ANC)
Arab spring, 63, 124, 131
Argentina, 8, 17, 18, 25, 159–73
Atkinson, Carol, 16

B
Balkans, 19, 140–2, 144, 148, 152
Brazil, 8, 17, 18, 20, 159–73
Bush, George H.W. (President), 75, 77, 152
Bush, George W. (President), 20, 21, 96, 142, 178

C
Cameroon, 5, 6, 17, 54, 57, 69–88
Cameroon Peoples' Democratic Movement (CPDM), 72, 73, 77, 80, 82
Carter, Jimmy (President), 161
CENTCOM. *See* Central Command's (CENTCOM)
Central Command's (CENTCOM), 37
Charter of Paris, 141
China, 17–22, 35, 55, 60–5, 130
Christopher, Warren, 79

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Civil society, 43, 47, 56, 58, 79, 80, 82–4, 85, 93, 104, 110–12, 114, 116
Civil war, 43, 55, 106, 127, 130, 172n26
Clinton, Bill (President), 74, 155n16, 169
  administration, 19–20, 27n10, 59, 111, 128, 142–5, 155n16
Clinton, Hillary, 26, 83, 150
Coercion, 15, 132, 160, 199
Cold War, 6, 15, 34–6, 38, 59, 74, 75, 77, 103, 109, 113, 140, 151, 160, 163
  post-Cold War, 2, 6, 19, 34, 36
Colonialism, 126
  post-colonialism, 54
Congress, US, 36, 93, 95, 128, 161, 176, 178–80
Constitutional reform, 41, 180, 186, 187, 192
Corruption, 42, 44, 46, 61, 97, 104, 110–12, 150, 178, 179
CPDM. *See* Cameroon Peoples' Democratic Movement (CPDM)

D
Democracy
  building, 46
  multi-party, 37, 111
  promotion, 6, 8, 15, 33, 35, 37, 47, 48, 82, 84, 100, 103–5, 113, 117n6
Democracy's Third Wave, 69
Democratic assistance, 4, 15, 25, 110, 113
Democratic mission, 7, 26
Democratic Peace Theory/Thesis, 52, 53
Democratic transitions, 43, 111, 159–73
Department of Defense, US, 37
Department of State, US, 162, 179
Development
  economic, 3, 5, 34, 35, 42, 59, 90, 92, 96, 97, 104
  human, 5, 65
  institutional, 8, 38, 51, 112, 114, 116, 187, 191
  political, 8, 104
  social, 58, 116
  underdevelopment,
Dictatorship/s, 2, 39, 40, 47, 51, 54, 64, 65, 104, 106, 108, 111, 161–3

E
Eastern Bloc, 140
Eastern wind, 70–4, 80
Egypt, 18, 21, 25, 34, 37–41, 46–8, 57, 124–6, 133–5
Elections
  irregularities, 45, 78, 80, 82
  monitoring/observation, 45, 79–80, 82, 110
  parliamentary, 39, 41, 69
  presidential, 39, 46, 48, 76–85, 107, 108
  process, 78, 79, 113
Embargo, 134, 145, 146, 153, 154n15
Ethnic cleansing, 145
European Union (EU), 6, 7, 45, 89–92, 94, 100n2, 101n2, 104, 113, 114, 116, 127, 143–5, 151, 152
Exchange programs (US), 16, 192, 193

F
Failing states, 108
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), 142, 143, 146, 152
Fragile states, 100

Free market, 4, 21, 41, 161
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), 6, 21, 89, 91–4, 100n2
FYROM. *See* Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)

G
Ghddafi, Moammar, 135n7
Gligorov, Kiro, 141, 143, 145, 153n2
Greek–Macedonian dispute, 7, 144
Gylfason, Thorvaldur, 38

H
Helsinki Final Act, 141
Human Needs Paradigm, 5
Human rights, 3, 20, 22, 41, 43, 46, 47, 58, 63, 74, 77, 78, 81, 83–5, 90, 95, 97, 104, 107, 108, 112–15, 124, 141, 161, 162, 164, 169, 184, 189, 199
Human security, 3, 5, 20, 22, 41, 81, 97, 112, 141
Huntington, Samuel, 2, 34, 69

I
ICC. *See* International Criminal Court (ICC)
ICJ. *See* International Court of Justice (ICJ)
ILO. *See* International Labor Organization (ILO)
IMF. *See* International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Interim Agreement, 139, 145–7, 148, 149, 153
International Court of Justice (ICJ), 126, 149
International Criminal Court (ICC), 7, 139, 152
International Labor Organization (ILO), 6, 89, 91–4, 96
International law, 6, 89, 92, 141, 150
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 8, 61, 162, 166, 167
Iraq, 7, 18, 19, 21, 24, 36, 126, 129, 131, 132, 139, 151, 152
Islam
  -ism, 40, 44, 123–5
  -ist, 39, 40, 128, 129

J
Judicial
  reform, 8, 175, 176
  review, 39
  system, 175–8, 180–2, 184, 185, 187, 189–91, 193

L
Labor rights, 6, 90, 92, 93, 95, 98, 100n2
Labor standards, 6, 89–102, 198, 199
Latin America, 2, 8, 159–61, 163, 165–9, 175, 176
Liberal
  -isation, 41, 87n29, 91, 113, 167–9
  -ism, 54–7, 61, 64, 65, 139–56, 170
  norms, 16, 43
  values, 16, 197, 198, 200
Libya, 7, 18, 123–37
Locke, John, 55–7

M
Manifest Destiny, 61, 74
Media, 14, 42, 60, 70–2, 79, 84, 104, 110, 112, 114, 124, 153
Mercosur, 8, 101n2, 168, 169, 171n7
Mexico, 8, 19–22, 175–93, 196n39, 196n40, 198

Military
force, 15, 20, 22, 23, 199
US, 14, 22, 23, 26, 27, 36, 37, 130, 166
US bases, 14, 23, 26, 27
Milosevic, Slobodan, 142, 144
Mitsotakis, Konstantinos, 142
Monroe, James (President), 159, 160, 169, 170n1
doctrine, 159, 160, 169, 170n1
Muslim Brotherhood, 39–41

N
Name issue (Macedonia), 7, 146, 150, 155n20
National Democratic Institute, 6, 78, 79, 87n25
NATO. *See* North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
Neoliberal(ism), 8, 162, 168–70
Nigeria, 17, 18, 20, 24, 34, 37, 39, 43–5, 47, 48, 50n24, 58, 63, 73, 103–16, 117n7, 127, 134
Nimetz proposal, 149
Non-Aligned Movement, 140
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 6, 19, 21, 22, 129, 131, 145, 146, 148–50, 151, 156n31, 163
Nuclear
issues, 8
policy, 8, 170
Nye, Joseph, 15, 62

O
OAS. *See* Organization of American States (OAS)
Obama, Barak (President), 112
administration, 38, 40, 41, 43, 45–8, 98
Ohrid Framework Agreement, 139, 147, 155n25
Oil, 20, 23, 24, 26, 36, 40, 75, 76, 123–35, 145, 146
Organization of American States (OAS), 16, 161, 163

R
Reagan, Ronald (President), 126, 162
Realism/ist, 35, 75, 139–53, 140, 142, 145, 147, 148, 153, 166, 168
Recognition (of states), 109, 128, 129, 140–2, 144, 146, 152, 154n3, 161, 182
Regimes
authoritarian, 38, 109
hybrid, 34
Republic of Macedonia, 7, 139–53, 155n16, 155n20, 198
Roosevelt, Theodore (President), 160, 170
Rule of law, 8, 37, 42, 43, 97, 112–14, 141, 153, 175, 176, 179, 193, 199
Russia, 18–22, 127, 130, 151. *See also* USSR

S
Sanctions, 22, 78, 84, 92, 110, 111, 113, 114, 116, 123, 124, 128, 134
Secretary of State (US), 36, 77, 79, 112, 146, 147, 149, 150, 156n31, 169
Security, 3, 5, 14, 19–22, 36, 37, 40, 41, 44, 47, 48, 56, 61, 70, 74–6, 81, 97, 99, 112, 115, 129, 130, 134, 135, 140, 141, 143, 144, 146, 148, 153, 160, 161, 169, 176–8
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia(SFRY), 140
Soft power, 4–6, 13–27, 59, 70, 199, 200

South Africa, 20, 34, 37, 39, 41–3, 46–8, 116, 126, 127
Sovereignty, 58, 64, 82, 114, 152, 153, 169, 178
Soviet(s)/Soviet Union, 15, 25, 38, 79, 128, 129, 154n3, 166. *See also* USSR
Stability, 3, 7, 20, 35, 40, 41, 59, 105, 108, 112, 140–2, 144, 147, 150, 152, 153, 155n16, 175, 198
State Department, 14–16, 36, 76–8, 81, 84, 141, 149, 156n31, 162, 170, 180
Structural Functional Theory, 5, 53
Study of the United States Institutes (SUSI), 13

T
Taiwan, 17, 19–21
Terrorism, 20, 34, 36, 49n8, 52, 70, 75, 82, 85, 97, 129, 134, 169
Terrorist attacks
  September 11 or 9/11, 70, 82, 85
Trade
  agreements, 6, 21, 89, 91–6, 98, 99, 100n2, 199
  preferential, 96, 98, 101n3
Treaties, 6, 93, 160
Truman, Harry (President), 74

U
United Nations
  Charter, 125, 141
  development program, 109
  General Assembly, 74, 161, 172n24
  Millennium Development Goals, 103, 104
  missions, 7, 16, 144–5; UNPEDEP, 7; UNPROFOR, 7, 144, 152
  Secretary-General, 143, 144
  Security Council, 129, 130, 134, 143, 144, 146, 161
  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 74, 90
US Agency for International Development (USAID), 78, 82, 110, 111, 118n18, 175, 180, 192
USSR, 15, 18, 154n3, 163

W
Warsaw Pact, 140
World Bank, 8, 173n33, 175
World Trade Organization (WTO), 20, 90, 91

Y
Yondo Black, 71