MODERNITY, MEMORY AND IDENTITY IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE

Nostalgia, Loss and Creativity in South-East Europe

Political and Cultural Representations of the Past

Edited by
Catharina Raudvere

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Modernity, Memory and Identity in South-East Europe

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CHAPTER 1

Loss and Creativity: Affect and Effect. Political and Cultural Representations of the Past in South-East Europe

Catharina Raudvere

Is nostalgia always exclusionist? When strong agents assert their own particular vision of the past, is there much space left for competing narratives of belonging? Is it possible to make ironic references to an authoritarian past without sullying the memory of its victims? Svetlana Boym, Esra Özyürek, and other scholars have contested the conventional view of political nostalgia as banal in expression and easily consumed.[1] A number of studies have over the last years shown that an authoritarian (and often traumatic) past still can be a platform for identification, which generates not only historical narratives but also the articulation of emotional bonds and criticism of present conditions. The study of history cultures and the uses of history has taken many directions (Connerton 1989, 2009; Koselleck 2002; Haugbolle 2010; Todorova 2010; Etkind 2013; Sorensen et al. 2015; Raudvere 2017). Where nostalgia was once dismissed as a wistful dream of a never-never land, the academic focus has shifted to how pieces of the past are

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assembled as elements in alternative political thinking and artistic expression. The creative use of the past points to the complexities of the conceptualization of nostalgia, while also entering areas where the humanities meet the worlds of art and commerce.

This book investigates conceptions of loss in South-East Europe and how people's sense of roots and distance has been processed in arenas outside conventional politics. In the wake of the fall of the authoritarian regimes, that set their mark on the region throughout the twentieth century, individuals and groups have had to handle the traumas of the distant and recent past in the areas of politics, community life, and the arts alike.

In studies of South-East Europe, post-Communism is, for good reasons, often the main focus; it may now be the order of the day, but an Ottoman past and the subsequent violent political conflicts have also long determined Greek and Turkish contemporary history, and they hereby constitute the shared principles for everyday politics in the region too. Despite the magnitude of the changes, the region's national narratives, which date from the nineteenth century, still influence official discourses and visions of progress. In this volume, history as a process of events, with consequences for individuals, groups, and whole regions, is not set against history as a construction of narratives in words, images, and music that reclaim the past, ironize over the present, and create affective connections. They are rather two sides of the same coin.

Not all of the chapters deal with creative examples: some concern the harsh realities of forced migration, deportation, and atrocities. In each case, the political realities are analysed in combination with the cultural consequences, concentrating on the relationship between living conditions in South-East Europe today and in the past, a bond that is politically and socially visible on many levels—from states to local communities—and in creative developments in art, literature, and religious practice. Here nostalgia—a longing for that which no longer exists (or perhaps never did) combined with alienation from the contemporary world—is understood in its broadest sense by the authors.

In *The Future of Nostalgia*, Svetlana Boym points to the medical history of nostalgia (once the name of a supposedly curable disorder) and its links to nineteenth-century art and literature, with heroic figures alienated from the contemporaneous world, dreaming of what was beyond their grasp. Boym broke new ground with this study when she bridged highly personal accounts of links to the past with artistic expressions, reminding us that the political potential of nostalgia springs not only from a sense of loss but also from romance and fantasy, though grounded in modern living conditions. 'The nostalgic is never a native, but a displaced person who mediates between the

local and the universal' (Boym 2001, 12). She continues: 'Nostalgia, like progress, is dependent on the modern conception of unrepeatable and irreversible time. The romantic nostalgic insisted on the otherness of his object of nostalgia from his present life and kept it at a safe distance' (13). In this volume, however, we set out to extend Boym's work on literary and artistic tropes with the perspectives offered by historians, anthropologists, political scientists, and regional studies scholars.

Imperial and Authoritarian Pasts

A number of the themes discussed by the contributors are analysed across all of the chapters. Thus a central issue in most is the connection between the modernization of South-East Europe (both the advocates and the critics of the large-scale modernization programmes) and the production of narratives of home and belonging. A variety of expressions of connectedness are discussed in terms of people's relationship to territory or their conceptions of belonging and disruption, of leaving and establishing new homes. The power of place and topography is frequently emphasized in the source material analysed in the volume, while the individual studies identify the producers and consumers of memory cultures and nostalgia. Here, loss is also linked to creativity and represented memory, from the artistic avant-garde to the popular, not to say populist.

For the last two decades, nostalgia and cultural memory have been used to stake out the border zone where politics, culture, art, and history meet. In emphasizing how a sense of loss intertwines with creative momentum in cultural production and history writing, the volume spans many parts of the region as well as various chronologies and levels of society. All of the chapters draw attention to the specific agents—intellectuals, politicians, artists, social activists, and voices in the popular media—who employ (and transgress) various public domains in order to represent the past and formulate visions of the future. Long-term historical perspectives are crucial to this collection, with its focus on lingering networks that span decades, narratives that legitimize inclusion and exclusion, and its effort to view the past as an imaginative tool in the hands of established artists as well as enthusiasts.

The region's geopolitical position at the crossroads of three empires—the Russian, the Habsburg, and above all, the Ottoman—still dominates the recent past of South-East Europe. The imperial past and extended stretches of authoritarian rule in the twentieth century have cast long

shadows over personal and collective memories alike and, significantly, live on in the idea of the Other that evolved in the nineteenth century, helping shape coherent identities from the burgeoning national movements and states. The radical changes in living conditions that characterize modernity (social mobility, urbanization, the legal position of the individual subject, advances in education, and a diversified economy) were driven by political ideologies that did not include the national narratives for which the past was a guarantee of cultural authenticity. Hence, the often authoritarian modernization programmes sooner or later faced backlash in the form of ethno-centric populism. In contrast to the conventional image of Europe, it is necessary to gauge the significance of the Ottoman experience for understanding the political and cultural development of the region. Several of the chapters point to the return of the Ottoman past as a mode of criticize, reflect over or reject modernity.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 brought Europe not only the hope of German reunification and a new beginning but also conflicts of a kind that ran counter to the vision of peace and democracy. The break-up of Yugoslavia, war, ethnic cleansing, and national chauvinism fuelled the idea that the driving forces in the development of South-East Europe were unending hatred and ancient ethnic antagonisms, which only the iron hand of communism had been able to keep in check. At the same time, in the media and in political rhetoric, this gave rise to a perception that the entire region was a special category, its countries trapped in a malignant, unchanging culture, which led many to conclude that for that reason alone it was by definition Europe's backwater, its history an obstacle to all attempts at modernization. Similar perspectives have also affected the general outlook on countries bordering on the former Yugoslavia, such as Greece, Romania, and Turkey, petrifying the outlook on societies and citizens alike in culturalistic boxes.

Modernity's Many Roads

The present volume is an outcome of the activities at the research centre 'The Many Roads in Modernity' at the University of Copenhagen (www.modernity.ku.dk). The research centre was established to study the transformation of South-East Europe and Ottoman heritage from 1870 to the present day, using a comparison of the modern history of the region with its long imperial past as an alternative to the standard models, which are essentially dichotomous: Europe versus the Balkans, the West versus Islam. By examining as much the changes in identity, self-representation, and affiliation as in art, literature, and religious practices since the late nineteenth century, especially in the light of the interaction between external influences and local

and regional practices, and at all levels, from national government to local communities, the results show a more nuanced understanding of the many roads that modernity has taken in South-East Europe.

Each of the research centre's seven individual projects reflects the fact that nineteenth-century national narratives still dominate the official views of the past and visions of progress, despite the major changes of the twentieth century. Each project thus seeks to explore regional and transnational perspectives, past and present. This is particularly important because South-East Europe's modernization processes saw the usually emphasized factors (the Enlightenment, nationalism, mass education, early economic globalization) collide with tenacious local structures. Research at the centre is guided by the premise that the historical development of modernity need not necessarily follow that of Western Europe—there are many other paths in any one country, whether urban or rural, educational, economic, gendered, or generational.

The individual projects at the research centre fall into three chronological units. 'Empire and Nation-States in Post-Ottoman Times, 1870–1950' focuses on the significance of Ottoman heritage for the attempts by elites and minorities to modernize institutions, social practices, and culture in the late Ottoman state and the subsequent nation-states, until war and occupation in the 1940s radically changed conditions for the development of politics and society. The second chronological unit, 'Authoritarian Modernization, 1950–1989', focuses on the challenges of the long-lasting effects of the Second World War—the struggle for statehood and the memory of the years of war and occupation seen in the cracks between the official modernist history and the collective and individual memories of the Ottoman past. There is also a focus on authoritarian forms of government in the region and the impact of external factors, especially the new role as frontline states in the Cold War and direct Soviet influence over internal affairs in some of the states. The third unit, 'Globalization and the Return of the Local since 1989', considers the uses of history and the idealizing of ethnic and religious particularism in an attempt to develop new visions of society, seen in the adaptation of nationalism to span both new global realities and the romantic notion of a nexus of people and territory. It has been crucial to analyse how people handle conflicting ideas about the Ottoman past, which can be linked to convictions about distinctive local character and ideal multicultural empires.

At one of the centre's workshops, the key concepts in all three of the chronological units above were discussed: nostalgia, loss, a sense of

belonging, and notions of connectedness to territory and home. The chapters in this volume emerged from those discussions.

Loss and Creativity

A select group of authors have been invited to present previously unpublished research on the theme of loss and creativity. The resultant chapters are interdisciplinary in approach, free of specific theoretical paradigms, and based on different kinds of material analysed from diverse theoretical angles, although all focus on the political and cultural representations of the past in South-East Europe, and all adopt both contemporary and long-term perspectives.

One of the advantages of this approach is the volume's interdisciplinary character and the dialogue between the chapters, underpinned by historical contextualization. The chapters in this volume bridge the methodological gaps between the humanities and the social sciences and contributes to the sharing of cases between various empirical fields, whether literature, art, history, religion, migration, or urban studies.

Four of the chapters concentrate on the aesthetics of nostalgia. Ger Duijzings' long-term fieldwork in Bucharest in the Palace of Parliament, the former House of the People, points to the interplay between what was literally the concrete destruction of the past through demolition and the transformation of public space. More monumental than most monuments, the building obliterated much of old Bucharest. It echoes with the memories of the Ceauşescu era as it sprawls across former neighbourhoods that were once part of the urban topography. Duijzings discusses the Parliament complex as a microcosm of the strategies used by contemporary citizens and artists to transform a totalitarian edifice without denying its past and pointing to its potential as a shared space.

Both Tanja Zimmermann and Zlatko Jovanovic deal with popular culture in the broadest sense. Zimmermann discusses the transformation of the image of Stalin from the dictator-cum-defender of the Great Patriotic War (a narrative that excluded national and ethnic identities that did not fit the picture of who a defender or traitor was) to the recent 'figure of pathos' disassociated from the historical processes that shaped the Soviet Union. Investigating the interface between political propaganda and commercial advertising, Zimmermann underlines that this pathos has been used as a means to promote not only contemporary ideologies but also commodities. Jovanovic's case of rock music in Bosnia and Herzegovina contests the image of Yugo-nostalgia as a solely regressive phenomenon. Instead, he identifies

references to a Yugoslav past that clearly oppose the current dominance of ethnonationalist discourse, using examples from the Bosnian rock scene that combine political statements and artistic creativity.

Svetlana Boym's identification of nostalgia as a cultural and political phenomenon with a long history, usually connected with nineteenth-century romanticism, informs the chapters that deal with historical material from twentieth-century South-East Europe. In her chapter on nostalgic visions of coexistence found in contemporary Greek historical fiction about the pre-national Ottoman period, Trine Stauning Willert demonstrates how popular novels have deconstructed the conventional national narrative about life under 'Muslim rule'. These realist novels that suggest Ottoman links to personal as well as collective identities in Greece have reached a large number of readers. Though nostalgic in terms of outlook on history, they nevertheless call for complex reflection on the nation's past.

Isa Blumi's chapter discusses the role of Islam as a trope after the fall of the Hoxa regime in Albania. The exceeding brutality of Enver Hoxha's rule was directed largely against individuals and religious institutions. Since the fall of the Hoxa regime, many agents have been involved in the construction of Muslim identities in Albania. Blumi analyses strategies for the inclusion of a specific Albanian past and recent experiences of what it means to be an Albanian Muslim, despite the influence (and pressure) of the international community and of Islamic agents to promote homogeneous identities disconnected from history. Fabio Giomi, in discussing how ethnic and religious diversity was dealt with in interwar Yugoslavia, analyses the conceptualization of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, demonstrating the complexities of the search for a Muslim past and positive modernity that are sometimes in concert, sometimes in conflict. Giomi uses the sources to present a fully fledged picture of Muslim intellectuals and Islamic institutions that set the conditions for how Muslim communities coped with political change over the course of the first part of the twentieth century.

In her chapter on Sarajevo Jews' petitions to the representatives of the German occupying forces during World War II, Francine Friedman makes the case that these letters from a soon-to-vanish community constitute a valuable source for research on the everyday life of a minority in the inter-war period. Throughout history, Sarajevo, so often hailed for the coexistence of its many groups, had its dark side where people lived parallel lives. Friedman charts the fragile position of the Jews and the speed with which conditions could change, with a lasting impact on the structure of an entire city.

Like Friedman, Renée Hirschon focuses on loss, here in a combined historical and anthropological perspective. Hirschon's chapter includes a critical analysis of place and belonging by looking at population movements in South-East Europe in the last fifty years. There is a long history of forced migration in South-East Europe, in the Balkans as well as in Greece and Turkey. People left to rebuild their lives in new places often had few resources other than the memory of their harsh treatment. Hirschon closes the volume by stressing that discussions of personhood and connectedness to physical space and the consequences of disruption, loss, and nostalgia are ultimately about people of flesh and blood where each life is a microcosm of historical and contemporary events.

Inclusion or Exclusion

The volume is framed by Duijzings' and Hirschon's contributions which approach loss, belonging, and living from different viewpoints. Both address vital issues that have shaped the political realities and everyday life of South-East Europe and the academic study of how roots and connectedness are locally conceived: Duijzings with an account of the multilayered meanings of material relics in a confined society, transformed into a creative site for art and performance; Hirschon with her study of the long-term consequences of forced migration for the conceptualization of home and territory, which she broadens into a discussion about Mediterranean twentieth-century history and the present-day refugee crisis.

By adding cases that illuminate the complex relationship between loss and creativity, all the contributions provide perspectives on the initial question about the exclusionist character of nostalgia. The chapters cover a broad range of examples, analysing political processes alongside cultural and ideological production, occasionally more populist than not, although still referring to complex historical events, while other examples are from the art world. All of them, in one way or the other, deal with a kind of disruption where the personal becomes political.

Notes

1. Two interrelated fields of research have dominated cultural memory studies: the two world wars and post-Communist Europe. These themes have also influenced the studies of nostalgia in South-East Europe. Maria Todorova's *Imagining the Balkans* (2009, first pub. 1997) has been key in analysing not only how the Balkans have been exoticized for centuries but also how this has spilt over into politics and the rhetorical use of the past (Duijzings 2000;

Todorova 2010; Zimmerman 2012; Halilovich 2013; Velikonja 2017). Likewise, Esra Özyürek (2006) uses the notion of nostalgia in her study of the conflict zones between ideology and everyday politics in Turkey, a topic that has had a seminal influence on the study of South-East Europe in the past two decades.

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CHAPTER 2

Transforming a Totalitarian Edifice: Artistic and Ethnographic Engagements with the House of the People in Bucharest

Ger Duijzings

This community is a product of the House of the People: it appeared as a result of the demolitions of the 1980s. And now, the authorities have started evicting these people, showing no mercy whatsoever, just like the previous regime did not care about the displacement of 40,000 people and the large stray dog population this caused. Once we visited the House with around 30 neighbourhood kids. They had never been inside, even though they live very close by. They were lively and energetic, splashing water at one another in the toilets and running through the corridors, talking loudly to hear their own voices reverberate in these huge spaces. All of them were stunned by the gigantic carpets, which looked rather impractical to them. They let themselves fall on them, stretching out their bodies to relax and feel the texture. Do not forget that their families take rugs out to sit down on the pavement in front of their houses, while the kids play on the streets. So, obviously they grasp this palace in their own terms. Exploring this further, we discovered that their families took carpets and blankets out after the earthquakes in 1977 and 1990: because of

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these disasters they have learned to use them like this, taking them outdoors to extend or substitute their living spaces…
(Artist Maria Draghici, edited excerpts of a conversation with the author, 4 January 2013)

Bucharest's House of the People, renamed Parliament Palace after the end of socialism, is one of the largest edifices ever built. Begun during the 1980s and finished in the post-socialist period, it has been described as "the most preposterous and violent of Haussmannian surgeries" (Hatherley 2015, 81). After an earthquake destroyed parts of Bucharest in 1977, the Romanian leader Nicolae Ceauşescu decided to erase over one-fifth of Bucharest's old centre to build a new government district, thereby putting his stamp on the capital, as self-aggrandising politicians tend to do (Sudjic 2005). He expelled forty thousand people from their homes and mobilised a work force, including army units, from across the country to construct the new Civic Centre, of which the House of the People was the centrepiece (Danta 1993; Cavalcanti 1997).[1] Apart from building a socialist palace on the vast urban void that emerged, he also carved out a socialist boulevard, longer and wider than the Avenue des Champs-Élysées in Paris, baptised (how else?) as the Boulevard of the Victory of Socialism. Like many other socialist leaders, Nicolae Ceauşescu (and his wife Elena) preferred a combination of ornate Stalinist, socialist realist, national, and postmodern architecture, and with this end in mind several hundred Romanian architects set out to design the project. Dividing the city in two, the new government district destroyed Bucharest's pre-socialist urban fabric through a form of 'spatial cleansing': the creation of large, politically controlled, and sanitised public spaces over which government buildings exert a commanding presence (Herzfeld 2006). This kind of urban intervention could only be carried out by a totalitarian leader: tellingly, Ceauşescu's main source of inspiration was Pyongyang, North Korea's capital.

As Michel Foucault has argued, space is instrumental in the exercise of power through the control of spatial practices and the creation of docile bodies (Rabinow 2003). Socialist urban forms and landscapes provide some of the best examples of this symbiotic relationship between power and architecture, even if they are now merely the remnants, the tangible and visible legacies, of a rejected totalitarian past.[2] One can nevertheless ask to what extent these landscapes have retained their power to regiment everyday life,

as they were initially intended. Has the functionality of a socialist edifice such as the House of the People somehow persisted? Despite the building's conversion and democratisation, are there lingering continuities with the totalitarian past? In this chapter, I will attempt to answer such questions by looking at the post-socialist transformation of the edifice. Following Setha Low, I will look at the social 'construction' of space, that is, "the actual transformation of space—through people's social exchanges, memories, images, and daily use of the material setting" (Low 2009, 24). This process has resulted in the silencing of any form of reflective nostalgia caused by the loss of homes and neighbourhoods; this type of response has been overwritten by a politically hegemonic, restorative nostalgia that defines the building as a great national achievement of the Romanian people (Boym 2001).

In the second part of the chapter I will provide an overview of artistic engagements with the edifice, which have counteracted this trend of idolising the building and forgetting the painful memories it might elicit. I use the work of artists as models for my evolving ethnographic practice, which I describe below, devoted to exploring this building. I have grouped the work of artists into four categories, representing four main artistic strategies: (1) *capture and salvage*, (2) *downsize and play*, (3) *engage and transform*, and (4) *act and perform*. Some artistic work has allowed for the expression of painful memories, representing the reflective nostalgia that Svetlana Boym writes about; but more often, I believe, these works have tried to overcome nostalgia altogether (the national restorative variety, in particular) by attempting to neutralise the building's 'bad karma'. As far as my own engagement is concerned, I am critical of the restorative nostalgia that has affixed itself to the House, and I argue that we should transform the building through forms of public and ethnographic engagement, but we should do so without forgetting that the traumas this edifice has wrought upon segments of the population need platforms for expression. I am trying to do my bit through experimental (and especially performative) forms of ethnographic fieldwork. Even though my fieldwork is unfinished and ongoing, throughout what follows I will refer to it when appropriate.

Socialist Construction and Post-socialist Conversion

> *Buildings constitute substantial investments for any society, and in many societies their usefulness outlives the original builder* (Lawrence and Low 1990, 492).

Fig. 2.1 Punk rocker and other youth in front of the House of the People, 1994, Iosif Király, from the *Indirect* series

Ceaușescu did not see his project to its end. During the December 1989 revolution he and his wife were executed, leaving behind a vast, uninhabited phantom city with many structures still under construction. One can get a sense of the frozen-in-time Civic Centre worksite by watching the footage of Ion Grigorescu's video, *Vitan-Ceaușescu*, shot in 1993 and 1994. In a seemingly post-apocalyptic landscape, the artist crosses a wasteland of concrete shells and cranes, of mud tracks scattered with rubble; a road emerges here and there, with the odd car driving by or some random person walking through this no-man's-land. The Civic Centre envisioned by Ceaușescu, which would include a broad boulevard, or Stalinist 'magistrale', for motorcades and parades in his honour (impressing visitors and foreign guests), remained unrealised. It was still a vast construction site devoid of people, utterly disconnected from the urban life of Bucharest.

Bruce O'Neill (2009) has suggested that Ceaușescu's imposition of such spatial rearrangements was a key element of his autocratic governance, channelling the behaviour of citizens along the lines proposed by Foucault. It would be more accurate to say that it was not the spatial situation per se but rather the *process* of demolition and construction that was at the core

of Ceaușescu's technology of power. Through his incessant interventions and decrees, the *Conducător* (and his wife) closely supervised all demolition and construction activities, including the clearance of sites and the displacement of churches. He erased monuments in broad daylight, transforming Bucharest's inhabitants into shocked, petrified bystanders who could offer little resistance (Petrescu 1999, 194–95). This brutal reshuffling of urban space was the ultimate proof of his power: as long as nobody challenged it, Ceaușescu felt safe. The dictator and his wife's endless trickle of instructions and amendments to the original plans based on their weekly site visits underscores the notion that the process was the main instrument of the autocrat couple's political control, the means whereby power was performed and docility and deference were achieved.

Because of the ruthlessness of these interventions, there is, unsurprisingly, very little (socialist) nostalgia in Romania, as Maria Todorova has argued (2010, 9). The hardships inflicted upon the population have spawned an unsentimental presentism: there is no looking back, and this refusal extends to any debate about the socialist past. The conspicuous continuities between the former communist and the post-communist elites have meant that discussions of the troubled socialist past are avoided, while ordinary people wait, in a state of cryogenic suspension, for better times to come (Popescu-Sandu 2010, 120). References to socialism do pop up, in advertising for example, but they mock the absurdities of everyday life under communism and, unlike in the former Yugoslavia, hardly ever idealise the socialist past (Georgescu 2010; see also the compilation of short films, *Tales from the Golden Age*, 2009). Romanians see no need to grieve for the good old socialist times, as they are still confronted on a daily basis with the overbearing material remnants of communism: socialist concrete all around and, in the middle of the capital, a megalomaniac's edifice that is impossible to ignore. If there is any nostalgia at all, it is for interwar Bucharest, the city that was ruined during socialism. Such feelings are visible in the many books published on pre-socialist Bucharest, and they live on amongst the families that were displaced, whose emotional attachment to their homes and the old neighbourhoods that were erased is poignantly expressed, for example in the work of the artist Ioana Marinescu (Marinescu and Fearns 2006). I will argue, however, that this sort of reflective nostalgia has been silenced, buried beneath the hegemonic, top-down, restorative nostalgia attached to this edifice, which resonates amongst most segments of the Romanian population, particularly those not directly affected by the fate of these areas. The minority's painful feelings of loss and 'longing' have been subsumed within the shadow of the majority's strong sense of national 'belonging'.

Amongst a small but vocal group of local and foreign critics, the House of the People is dismissed as a monstrous, oversized, paranoid, and totalitarian edifice that was erected to instil fear. As one art critic writes, the building is a form of "architectural pornography" in that "it was meant to exhibit the organs of power in colossal erection" (MNAC 2004, 50). Bentham's notion of the panopticon has also been mobilised to characterise the building: it overlooks the city from the top of a hill and is surrounded by an oversized yard functioning as a buffer zone and enclosed by a high protective wall, while numerous windows suggest an omnipresent gaze from above (Salecl 1999, 105). Immediately after the 1989 revolution, discussions about what to do with the House began, similar to debates in other East European capitals addressing edifices such as the Palace of Culture and Science in Warsaw (Murawski 2011b). Some commentators suggested that the building be demolished; others proposed wrapping it in fabric or covering it with dirt, or turning it into a giant casino, a communist Disneyland, or a Dracula theme park. There were interested buyers from abroad (Rupert Murdoch, amongst others), but the authorities, former communists, were unwilling to sell it into foreign hands. In March 1990 they briefly let the public into the building to see what the response would be, and the story goes that visitors praised the building and its lavish decoration as "a great achievement" and "the most beautiful thing ever seen" (MNAC 2004, 162–63). The guestbooks containing such comments were never published and apparently disappeared, but report of these positive remarks was sufficient for the government to resume work on the building site in June 1990 (Granqvist 1999, 91–99). The building's chief architect, Anca Petrescu, with the help of the authorities, may well have manufactured this positive response to justify the building's completion (Müller 2007).

Most of the people I have met in Bucharest, some of whom lived through the 1980s, prefer to pay no heed to the House. Many intensely dislike it, and some refuse to set foot in it. Others possess less categorical views but complain that it is too distant and inaccessible. My selection of informants (intellectuals, students, artists) may be skewed. Perhaps the majority of the population, especially working-class people, have a more positive attitude, for after all they benefitted from the new socialist housing estates in districts, such as Berceni, built for them by Ceauşescu: 'He' gave them their apartments, so surely he was entitled to 'His' House too, they may think. People who arrived after 1989, when one no longer needed a special identification card to live or work in the capital, may have no problems with the building. They had no direct experience of the demolitions, and for them the House may have been a physical marker and orientation point, as well as a source of pride and identification in a city where they had dreamt of living.

Although despised by some, the 'big monster palace' is undeniably popular amongst Romanian and foreign tourists keen to experience architectural shock and awe (Jencks 2005, 18).[3] As Ştefan Ghenciulescu writes, it has become the object of a perverse identity transfer: even if created by a dictator, the House is "beautiful" and was built "through our sacrifice" (2011, 157–58). It is possible to trace this discursive shift—from an emblem of megalomania to a symbol of national achievement—back to precisely March 1990, when, in a series of articles in the former Communist Party newspaper, the building was largely 'nostrified', that is, made ours (Müller 2007, 51–58). Together with the building's chief architect, Anca Petrescu, the authors (all former communists) successfully opposed the attempts by some fervent critics to turn the building into a memorial site commemorating the hardships of the late socialist period. At this very early stage, we see that forms of reflective nostalgia were marginalised and overwritten by restorative nostalgia: it is quite telling that Bucharest still has no museum or monument for those who were displaced and lost their homes.

During the early 1990s, the former communists, now styling themselves social democrats and headed by the future prime minister, Adrian Năstase, campaigned to move the Chamber of Deputies into the building, which was accomplished in 1996 (Müller 2007, 55–56). As part of the building's democratic facelift, all references to Ceauşescu were expunged from official documentation (such as information brochures) about what has been called the Parliament Palace ever since. The guided tours offered to tourists are an example of this deliberate erasure, as I myself have observed: the guides speak of how unique the building is, providing an abundance of astonishing technical details and highlighting—without ever mentioning Ceauşescu—that only Romanians built it, using exclusively Romanian materials. An indestructible reminder of the previous era, it provides a stable anchor for a city and a country that has been changing at a dizzying speed ever since; it is, to adopt Mikhail Yampolsky's words about the Kremlin, "a clot of stagnant time that is so soothing to the human psyche" (1995, 104). Neither Romanian nor foreign visitors seem to care about the building's huge cost or the human suffering it caused.

It may be argued that the building has been domesticated over the last quarter century. Via a process of post-socialist transformation and fragmentation, it has acquired a variety of new functions: it now houses the Romanian Parliament (Senate and Chamber of Deputies); the Constitutional Court; the Legislative Council; the headquarters of the Protection and Guard Service (SPP), a special elite force; an international conference centre; and the National Museum of Contemporary Art (MNAC). Each of these entities has

its own budget and takes care of its own section of the building. Apparently there is no umbrella organisation responsible for general maintenance. At ad hoc meetings the managers and maintenance personnel from these different entities coordinate common action if necessary. Only the SPP keeps the building 'together', maintaining a security ring around its perimeter. More than any other organisation, this elite force has de facto 'ownership' over the building, controlling the flows of people going in and out of it.

The building hosts international summits and gatherings (such as the 2008 North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit), trade fairs and academic conferences, visits from global celebrities, and exclusive parties for members of the local (expatriate) elite, such as annual Viennese Balls and New Year's Parties. The building also regularly provides a backdrop for spectacles, such as fireworks, light shows, car races, rock concerts, yacht shows, and wedding fairs organised on Constitution Square in front of the building. I have attended many of these events. On Friday nights the large square transforms itself into an informal meeting place for revved-up car enthusiasts. Some argue that the building has become more human as a result of this sort of activity (MNAC 2004, 165), but it remains hard to imagine protests in front of such a structure. Only if large numbers are mobilised can protests make anything more than a futile impression, as I observed on 21 September 2013, when thousands of opponents of the Roşia Montana mining project, joined by numerous participants in a Critical Mass cyclists' protest, formed a human chain around the walls of the building's courtyard.

Hence it is questionable whether this 'Parliament Palace' has become a genuine 'House of the People'. It continues to be a centre of authority, "the placement of power inside walls" and "a core protected by a shell", similar to the Kremlin (Yampolsky 1995, 97). The parliament that meets within it is, according to opinion polls, one of Romania's least trusted institutions. The building is 'anti-public', having no direct access from its front façade other than "sloping roads intended solely for cars, guarded by security" (Hatherley 2015, 88). With the SPP guarding the building, it remains a highly securitised, inaccessible, and intimidating fortress; it has never acquired the sort of post-socialist normality of, for instance, Warsaw's Palace of Culture and Science. This palace, an unwanted foreign imposition in the form of a 'gift' from Stalin and the Soviet Union to the Polish people, is now perfectly integrated into the Polish capital, permeating the city's everyday life and social fabric and, in fact, helping Varsovians forget the communist past even as the building itself is a concrete expression of that era (Murawski 2011a). It contains theatres, art galleries, a multiplex cinema, two universities, the seat of the

Fig. 2.2 Panoramic view of the Viennese Ball in the *Sala Unirii* (Union Hall), 2015, Iosif Király, from the *Reconstructions* series

Polish Academy of Sciences, a Congress Hall, the meeting room of the Warsaw City Assembly, municipal offices, a Palace of Youth (with a swimming pool), the offices of private companies, a dance academy, and numerous restaurants, pubs, cafés, and nightclubs (Murawski 2011b, 56).

The House of the People has remained (to use a phrase of the Dutch architect Rem Koolhaas) a fuck-the-context edifice with few channels or social links to the city around it. The building and square in front of it are used for exclusive events with tickets that are prohibitively expensive. During a concert of the American pop icon Lady Gaga in 2012, I observed how families and groups of teenagers tried to catch a glimpse of the stage act (which faced the House) because the square had been sealed off by the Gendarmerie. Elderly people and homeless men and women scavenged the area, while employees of the House watched the concert from the building and its balconies. During these events the palace is patently not of or for the people; it belongs first and foremost to a privileged 'caste' of politicians with close links to the former communist elites and their clientele, and to the members of the special security forces who provide their protection. Employees in the building (including the cleaning ladies and the maintenance personnel) enjoy a beneficial status protected by law (Law no. 7/2006), with excellent employment conditions and job protection, which explains the strong esprit de corps that exists in the building. They share a sense of pride and loyalty, which is heightened at important events such as the NATO summit and strengthened by social gatherings such as Christmas parties organised for the personnel. As one critic (an architect involved in its building) wrote, it may not have been the best decision to move the parliament into this edifice: "This risk is, it may have given elected representatives the idea they have been accorded discretionary powers instead of popular mandate. The lavish construction, waste of public funds and kitsch backdrop, all seem to encourage megalomania in the political class, complete contempt of the

real needs of their electorate and the delusion of belonging to an intangible élite" (Pandele 2009, 42). There are moments, however, when the building's exclusivity and restrictedness show cracks through which the common people can enter: in August 2016, when Rihanna was performing at Constitution Square, I witnessed how some of the Gendarmerie quietly allowed a trickle of people to enter the House's courtyard from a side entrance. From there the fans could cross the courtyard in the dark, walk to the elevated lawn in front, and watch the concert for free from behind the VIP galleries.

Artistic Engagements

The people that especially engage with the building's controversial past are artists (and a handful of critical architects). In this second part of my essay, I will discuss the National Museum of Contemporary Art and the numerous artistic engagements with the House for which MNAC has been an important catalyst. The museum and the artists that have exhibited in it make up a significant share of the few attempts to come to terms with this building and its legacies.[4] The museum has also provided me with a way into the edifice, while the artistic engagements form a key source of inspiration for my ethnographic explorations in and around the House.

The most interesting and unusual post-socialist conversion of the building is indeed the National Museum of Contemporary Art, which, unlike the rest of the building, is easily accessible. Located at the back, it overlooks the wastelands behind the House of the People, where an equally megalomaniacal building, the Cathedral for the Salvation of the Romanian People, is currently being constructed. The museum opened in 2004 under the auspices of Adrian Năstase, who launched and supported the idea of a contemporary art museum in the House of the People during his period as prime minister. MNAC is a modern insert that occupies only around four percent of the building's total space. It has no single direct passage to the other parts of the House except through the basement, which is secured by the SPP. One artist writes:

> "The dominant feature of the National Museum of Contemporary Art is its continuous band of white walls, circumscribing the huge rooms. If you follow the walls you are sure to end up in front of a no-entry zone where access is denied because of security measures. Most of the openings and windows between the rooms are facing the outside, allowing no or limited contact with the other spaces, around and outside them, thus increasing the single-room feeling on each of the floors" (MNAC 2004, 166).

Fig. 2.3 Panoramic view from the roof terrace of the Museum of Contemporary Art at the back of the House of the People, with the Cathedral for the Salvation of the Romanian People (under construction) in the background, 2016, Iosif Király, from the *Reconstructions* series

An interesting aspect of the museum is that on the other side of these white museum walls, in the narrow technical spaces not accessible to visitors, hang dozens of Ceauşescu's encomiastic paintings inherited by the museum, an arrangement that turns the dictator's legacy inside out—or, rather, 'outside in'. At one point I was guided through the various spaces where the paintings hang in thematic groups: Ceauşescu shown as head of state (with sceptre and other royal paraphernalia), posing with his family (depicted in dynastic fashion), meeting groups of children, visiting factories, travelling the Romanian countryside, and so on. Artist and curator Florin Tudor developed the concept for this hidden display when organising a large exhibition of Ceauşescu paintings in 2005, *The painting museum*, also using MNAC's residual spaces to decontaminate the new spaces of the museum.

MNAC can be seen as a space of relative freedom and normality: it suspends the building's role as a symbol of power through not only its exhibitions but also its everyday use as an open and inhabited space. When I did fieldwork in the museum in 2012, one curator's young son played there every afternoon, transforming the museum into a playground and making drawings on the white walls of his mother's office. MNAC organises art workshops for children, for example, and it hosts the annual Rokolectiv Festival for electronic music on its roof terrace, with dance parties continuing into the wee hours. Its public consists of art lovers and artists, students and hipsters, some of whom are surprisingly ignorant of the building's convoluted past (for a more detailed ethnographic description of MNAC's different audiences, see Lazea 2013, 182–87). MNAC also seems to have softened the securitised environment of the rest of the complex, as a

modus vivendi has emerged between the SPP and the museum's employees. Even though guards can be rude at times, imposing unpleasant airport-style bag scans and body checks and causing frequent security incidents for MNAC's employees and visitors, they have become less severe and nervous over the years (on this issue see also Lazea 2013, 188).

Because of its physical integration into Parliament Palace, the museum has caused controversy in art circles. Two well-known artists, Dan and Lia Perjovschi, have boycotted the museum, regarding it as a "cultural Pentagon", that is, a symbol for politicians hijacking contemporary art while leaving the art community out of decision-making processes (Stiles 2010, 176–77). For them, the building continues to signal a lingering democratic deficit in Romanian public life (MNAC 2004, 100). They argue that the museum will always be too close to the powers that be, compromising artists' ability to adopt positions critical of the state and its policies. Despite these controversies, or thanks to them, MNAC has acquired a reputation as "conflict museum" (MNAC 2004, 20–21).[5] The first artistic director of MNAC, Ruxandra Balaci, has argued that the museum's role is radically different from what Ceauşescu had in mind for it: it has become a marker of cultural decontamination, a post-communist dwelling that transforms the fear and frustration attached to it into something more positive, "a space for the exercise of freedom and normality in the most abnormal place of Europe" (MNAC 2004, 40). Balaci has hailed Năstase's decision to locate MNAC in the House of the People as a daring and beneficial move for Romanian contemporary art and the House of the People itself.

In 2004, MNAC organised its first landmark exhibition, *Romanian artists (and not only) love Ceauşescu's Palace?!* Premised on the idea that it is impossible for anybody to remain indifferent to the building, it showcased both the socialist iconography of the House of the People and the work of contemporary artists. Although MNAC cannot erase the building, contemporary art is in its very essence "a prime source for questioning it and putting it under perpetual trial", as one French art critic wrote, impelling artists "to transgression, to derision, to perpetual situationism" (MNAC 2004, 50). Two follow-up events, *Under destruction #1 and #2*, put this orientation into practice by inviting well-known foreign artists to engage with the building. In *The noise of politics*, the Swiss-Italian duo Cristoph Büchel and Gianni Motti interviewed Romanian politicians prior to the 2004 presidential elections and exhibited the audio-visual footage as a cacophony of voices in the basement of the museum. After this event,

the Spanish artist Santiago Sierra carried out a midnight performance in October 2005, *The corridor in the House of the People*, constructing a dark and narrow corridor across different floors of MNAC and populating it with hundreds of begging Romanian women (Sierra and Mircan 2006).

But most relevant for my analysis is the work produced by Romanian artists. Some artists had experienced their own personal traumas related to the demolitions and construction works going on around the Civic Centre. These memories have informed the practice of artists such as Ion Grigorescu and his younger colleagues Călin Dan and Irina Botea, all of whom lived close to the affected area. Another example is Suzana Dan, whose father (a sculptor and son of an 'enemy of the people') was summoned from his home village near Braşov to work on the construction site. For a while, the family did not hear from him and feared he might be dead. Călin Dan (the current director of MNAC) lived in an apartment close to the area: every day he walked to work on a route that traversed the construction site, and over time he witnessed the "random appearance and disappearance of small wooden crosses planted by workers in places where a colleague had died in a work accident" (MNAC 2004, 81). Life at the edge of the site was increasingly disrupted as bulldozers got closer to his neighbourhood (Dan 2010). As a teenager Irina Botea had to walk daily through mud, dust, water, and sometimes snow to go to school because public transportation through the zone had been suspended (MNAC 2004, 128; personal communication).

Capture and Salvage

These direct experiences with the demolitions prompted a first type of artistic engagement, which I have labelled *capture and salvage*. This type of engagement documents the radical changes to the landscape and scars on the urban fabric that resulted from the socialist urban interventions, which were accelerated by the severe earthquake that struck Bucharest in 1977. Artists such as Ion Grigorescu and Teodor Graur filmed and photographed the demolitions in the affected parts of Bucharest and the new socialist neighbourhoods in spite of the regime's strict prohibitions against such recordings. Grigorescu used his own raw and unprocessed visual language and imperfect technical style to show a tortured landscape and document the precariousness of life under socialism (Ghiu and Rus Bojan 2011, 14–20).[6] The artist Iosif Király works in a contemporary setting, capturing memories of lost places in a city where the demolitions have never stopped. His photography (especially his *Reconstructions* series) exposes this con-

tinual destruction as a chronic condition since the interventions of the 1980s. He patches together images of one particular site taken at different moments, providing a subjective rendering of a radically transforming city. That the snapshots are taken from the same vantage point but at different times (of the day, the year, or over the course of years) gives his images the quality not only of spatial coherence but also temporal discontinuity (Király and Oroveanu 2009). The House has provided the occasional background for his images of stray dogs, celebrations, and fireworks (MNAC 2004, 190–93). Dan Mihălţianu's two-channel video, *Divided Bucharest: les enfants de Ceauşescu et de George Soros*, produced for MNAC's 2004 opening exhibition, also falls into this category of showing Bucharest as a socialist and post-socialist city that is shaken and fractured (MNAC 2004, 194–202). Each of the works described under this heading can be understood as examples of Boym's reflective nostalgia.

Downsize and Play

subREAL, the leading Romanian art group of the 1990s (made up of Călin Dan, Dan Mihălţianu, and Iosif Király), was the first proponent of the artistic strategy *downsize and play*. This approach has little to do with nostalgia: it directly targets the despised building, trying to ridicule and neutralise it. The group has gained a reputation for provocative installations and interventions, deconstructing the emerging post-socialist clichés and myths of Romanian national identity (Király 2006, 16). Most relevant is *The castle of the Carpathians (Draculand 7)* (1994), an installation which displayed a replica of the House of the People made of packets of Carpaţi cigarettes (a well-known Romanian brand sold on the black market in other East European countries) with a chair hanging over it, its legs extending into stakes. The installation's name refers to one of Jules Verne's novels and the expression 'the Genius of the Carpathians', which had sometimes been used for Ceauşescu (MNAC 2004, 116, 222–25; Radu 2015, 221; Erić 2015, 31–33). Another example is the work of the duo Euroartist Bucureşti (Teodor Graur and Olimpiu Bandalac) and their playful interventions in front of the building.[7] A later proponent of this strategy is Irina Botea, whose art attempts to neutralise the building by downsizing and consuming it (MNAC 2004, 128). She has produced two videos in which she deploys a travel-size model of the House of the People in pastoral settings, where it interacts with cows, befriends Snow White, and celebrates its anniversary in the company of gnomes and other garden figurines.[8] Botea's strategy has been to make the House of the People

harmless and hence accelerate the depletion of its power.[9] Other artists have produced even more explicitly iconoclastic work in a similar spirit: Vlad Nancă playfully 'sacralised' the building by drawing onto a print of the House of the People cupolas and crosses on its roof, turning it into a tentative Cathedral for the Salvation of the Romanian People (MNAC 2004, 42).[10] As an additional proponent of this strategy I will mention Alexandra Croitoru, whose subtly subversive photographic series *Powerplay* (2004) shows portraits of herself with strong, powerful people, amongst them Adrian Năstase, the prime minister who initiated MNAC.

Engage and Transform

The third major strategy I call *engage and transform;* it focuses on the House of the People's negative impact on vulnerable categories of people. As part of his project *Emotional architecture*, Călin Dan worked with inmates from a high-security prison to produce several related works that potently expose Ceauşescu's legacies, such as the waste of ordinary lives and the injustices his megalomaniacal projects produced and still engender.[11] Dan has also developed the concept for a yet-to-be-realised project, *Negative mountain*, the purpose of which is to systematically gather oral testimonies from people involved in the building of the House (MNAC 2004, 82–83). In 2017, with a team of collaborators he started a pilot under the name *Collective Authorship (Private Histories of Public Architecture)* for which the first architects, sculptors, stonemasons, medics and artists were interviewed, and others were invited to come forward to provide testimonies in the future (see: www.autorulcolectiv.net and https://www.facebook.com/autorulcolectiv/ accessed on 17 December 2017).

A second major proponent of this strategy is the visual artist Maria Draghici and a group of artists and academics gathered around her. Draghici has been the driving force behind an ongoing community art project in the Rahova-Uranus area, an old industrial district close to the House of the People. Spared the demolitions, this self-contained neighbourhood is currently being gentrified. The population now lives under the threat of post-socialist evictions by the real estate mafia who are busy claiming property in this part of the city, signalling a change in the forces behind spatial cleansing. Besides setting up community art projects, the artists assist the inhabitants in organising resistance to these evictions. Working closely with MNAC and inspired by situationist principles, they build on their continuous interactive physical presence and proximity to the local community (Cios 2008, 17). They organised, for example, a visit

to the House by a group of Rahova-Uranus children, enabling them to set foot in the building for the first time (Draghici and Gâdiuţă 2008, 110–15).

Act and Perform

This final artistic strategy, *act and perform*, involves interventions in public spaces, where reflective nostalgia is again surfacing. The first intervention of this kind was subREAL's *East-West Avenue* (1990), installed along the Boulevard of the Victory of Socialism. The group erected improvised metal plates on wooden sticks with handwritten epitaphs for the many workers killed on the building site (MNAC 2004, 221; Radu 2015, 220; Erić 2015, 13–15; Spieker 2015, 61). Mona Vătămanu and Florin Tudor have carried out similar interventions in public spaces, drawing the contours of places lost and buildings demolished during the socialist period (Király 2006, 218).[12] These interventions can be seen as examples of Graham's counter-geographic strategy of exposure, which makes visible what has been hidden (Graham 2010, 351–60). The artists have also produced a two-channel video full of bitter irony, *The palace* (2003–4), which synced two guided tours through the House that offer versions of the official institutional voice of the building, but with little room left for the trauma generated by the building.

Similarly, Mircea Nicolae has undertaken a series of fascinating urban micro-interventions entitled *One hundred*, some of which engage with the House of the People. In intervention number 66, *Plaster moulding* (2008), for example, he removed an ornamental piece from the wall around the building's courtyard and sent it to an art exhibition abroad, describing the complicated process involved in dispatching it. With this small act of dismemberment, he mocks the House's pretentiousness.[13] Gabi Stamate achieves the same effect of ridiculing the House's pompous monumentality in his brief video performance *RO_TO_TI_TA* (2012), which has the artist rolling his body sideways over Constitution Square with a rotating camera fixed on the House, making it tumble as if in a washing machine. Finally, two young artists, Veda Popovici and Arnold Schlachter, have realised provocative interventions inside MNAC itself. When Russian art group Voina visited MNAC in 2012, they (more or less successfully) entered the museum with toy guns, playing the role of 'toy terrorists' protesting the commoditisation of political art. One month later, they performed *The shelter at the House of the People*, transforming MNAC into a shelter for the homeless, that is, into a "real house of the people, where, for a few days, free education, free

health services, free food, political therapy, a bit of everything that now is disappearing" was provided (Popovici 2012). They created a speaker's platform for mock presidential candidates amongst the homeless to speak up in public. As part of the art intervention, Schlachter organised *Paraparada—Aparat Security*, a 'parade' of security personnel protecting the event.

Transforming a Totalitarian Edifice: Ethnographic Engagements

In my own ongoing fieldwork in and around the building, I draw inspiration from the artistic engagements with the House of the People described above.[14] I first ventured inside the building in 2009 to attend an exhibition at MNAC. Since the summer of 2012 I have visited the House on various occasions, MNAC being the easiest way in. My research continues and progresses slowly, and thus my reflections here will be brief. The conceptual key to my work is my approach to the building as an inhabited microcosm—a seemingly inapt but deliberately chosen term for this gigantesque edifice—to which I gain access whenever I manage to enter it in spite of security restrictions. My focus is on what the artist Călin Dan calls emotional architecture, which is "neither a construction of brick and mortar, nor is it a state of mind, or a feeling; it is a dynamic flow of micro-events which occurs constantly, and mostly unnoticed, between people and their habitat, between urbanites and the urban tissue, between citizens and their cities, between architecture and those who live within and around it" (2011, 34–35).

I am particularly interested in the lived experience of this authoritarian building turned democratic. Inspired by Pierre Bourdieu's notion of habitus (1977) and Michel de Certeau's conception of lived space (1984), I look at people's uses and appropriations of this space through embodied practices, such as moving, walking, or, for that matter, posturing, parading, and dancing (as during the Viennese Balls), and cognitive practices, such as naming, narrating, imagining, and remembering, practices urban planners tend not to account for. Hence I try to explore different corners of the building whenever and wherever I am allowed in. As I become more intimate with the building and its users, I hope to ethnographically populate and animate it and to develop a process-oriented and person-based approach "allowing for agency and new possibilities" (Low 2009, 22).

My research shows, for example, that people working here experience certain problems related to the building's 'bigness' which cannot easily be resolved. Amongst the complaints mentioned by MNAC personnel are the

constant security checks and access restrictions and occasional confrontations with members of parliament, security personnel, and other users of the building who are ignorant and intolerant of contemporary art. These ongoing frictions overwrite the traumatic past of the building, which MNAC employees are all too familiar with (see also Lazea 2013, 187–89). Political pressures may occasionally lead to censorship, as I saw in the Constantin Brancuși Hall, an art gallery located at the building's north side (not part of MNAC). In an attempt to prevent angry reactions from politicians and visitors, explicit elements of a young Slovene artist's work were skilfully hidden.

House employees told me that working in this oversized environment may make one feel important and tiny at the same time, causing disorientation, fatigue, and headaches.[15] Offices on the upper levels line long, dark corridors and lack the splendour of ceremonial rooms at the lower levels. Every segment of the building has its own micro-climate, making it hard to adapt to these different milieus for workers who must regularly pass through the building, such as the cleaning personnel. Located on a hill, the colossus catches lots of wind and dust and hence is difficult to keep clean. Maintenance personnel, lacking the special skills needed to do certain dangerous, unusual repair and maintenance jobs, have difficulties operating in such an environment. Finally, the building is like a labyrinth that throws up numerous physical obstacles. There are sealed doors with no keys to open them, walled-off areas and buffer zones, and very few elevators or sets of stairs between the different levels, hindering movement through the building. Even the chief architect, Anca Petrescu (who died in 2013), admitted that she found it hard to navigate the building.[16]

Although the building was constructed to resist a strong earthquake, it was finished in a substandard fashion. On the outside, bits and pieces are falling off the façade. One can spot all sorts of cracks and imperfections: large doors that do not fit properly, inadequate electric wiring that forces employees to run extension cables through rooms and corridors (a funny irony as communism across the Eastern Bloc prided itself on its ability to bring electricity to its societies). The three-kilometre enclosure wall around the building's courtyard looks old, and the cobblestone roads leading up to the House are full of holes. As artist Mircea Nicolae writes: "As we are speaking, the architectural object that was built to embody the worldview of Romanian Communism is slowly disintegrating. Ornaments are falling off the surrounding walls. The building can withstand a nuclear attack, yet it looks unfinished and in a state of decay".[17] The Romanian press has reported that the building is sinking a few centimetres each year.



Fig. 2.4 Collage of details and fragments of the House's interior and exterior, 2012–3, photographs taken by the author

In my ethnographic research, the artistic strategies described here are providing me with models of how to approach the building. I employ these models in a rather loose and conceptual manner. The *capture and salvage* strategy inspires me to collect apocryphal stories about the building which evoke its troubled past (about the ghosts still haunting the building, for example, said to be those of workers and soldiers buried alive during its construction). The *engage and transform* strategy can usefully be applied to the dereliction of the outer shell of the building, the access roads, and the surrounding wall, as well as the dilapidation inside the building. Such evident disregard triggers comments about the indifference of the country's political elite, sparking calls for change and intervention. Some, of course, argue that the House was achievable only in the communist era, when such ambitious projects could be carried out, whereas under democracy corrupt politicians absorb the state's assets, enrich themselves, waste the people's tax money, and, through neglect, destroy the building.

Inspired by the *downsize and play* strategy, I define the House of the People as a microcosm. Rather than focusing on the building's enormity, this strategy describes the everyday processes of human (and non-human) habitation that take place within and around the structure. Apart from the employees who tell me how they have adapted to the building's environment, I also attend to the plants growing out of the building's cracks and fissures and the animals living on or in the building: the stray dogs entering the basement through the complex's tunnels, the predatory birds settling on the top of this artificial mountain who hunt other animals, the pigeons roosting in the lower levels, and the bats hanging from and flying around the building's dark underbelly. I was also told the story of a dead owl found in a chandelier in the plenary hall of the Senate (wisdom apparently has no chance of survival here).

The *act and perform* strategy has made me think of anthropological fieldwork as performance. I have developed plausible roles or truthful alter-egos which form parts of me as a many-sided and composite individual (e.g. Murawski's chameleonic positionality, 2013, 70). Examples of half-actor, half-myself roles are the 'unaware Dutch tourist with Heineken cap' attempting to walk around the building (triggering a corrective intervention by the SPP), the 'expert on the former Yugoslavia interested in trauma and post-traumatic stress syndrome' (accessing the World Psychiatry Association Congress in April 2013), the 'urban activist participating in a cyclists' protest' (helping to create a three-kilometre human

chain around the building), or, for that matter, the 'academic writing a book on Bucharest' (entering the tenth Viennese Ball, appropriately dressed). Maybe the only way to break through the thick walls of this building is to use creative and performative research strategies leaning towards "ethnographic conceptualism" (Ssorin-Chaikov 2013), conducting fieldwork as a form of conceptual art that uses experimentation and provocation as tools. The situations that we create may pay off not only in terms of triggering responses that are revealing ethnographically, but also in nurturing modes of much-needed public engagement with such an edifice. I am in favour of artistic strategies that try to make a new beginning for this traumatic building and aim to overcome both the reflective and restorative forms of nostalgia, providing the former with a proper platform for its expression (which it has sorely missed) while at the same time depleting the latter of the energies that sustain it.

Notes

1. There are very few written testimonies of this process of destruction, demolition, and construction (but see Popa 2012).
2. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss socialist architecture and urban planning at length. The main elements were a centralised decision process based on ideological premises resulting in large-scale, top-down urban interventions, with prominence given to monumental edifices and boulevards to celebrate the achievements of socialism (Wagenaar 2004; Wagenaar and Dings 2004). See Buchli (1999) for how socialist regimes ascribed to architecture transformative powers capable of creating new socialist subjectivities.
3. The building's initial name was House of the Republic (*Casa Republicii*), but during the 1980s it started to be called House of the People (*Casa Poporului*). During the 1990s, its name was changed to Parliament's Palace (*Palatul Parlamentului*), coinciding with the transfer of the Romanian Parliament into the building. In everyday parlance, House of the People is still the most widely used.
4. The only other initiative I can think of is the Bucharest 2000 international design competition organised during the 1990s, which solicited urbanist solutions to heal and reintegrate this traumatised part of the city. Unfortunately, it failed to have any lasting impact.
5. See also The Museum of Conflict conference organised at the Jan van Eyck Academy in Maastricht in 2006 (http://www.museumofconflict.eu/, accessed on 17 December 2017), at which MNAC was the main topic of debate.

6. Most relevant are *The earthquake* (1977), *In my beloved Bucharest* (1977), *The road: new axis of the town* (1993), and *Vitan-Ceaușescu* (1994). For Grigorescu see also Balaci and Radu 2007 and Șerban 2013. For Graur see Király 2006, 236.
7. Examples are *The palace* (1994) and *Ceaușescu's dolphins* (1994), as well as *The Carpathian hero* (1995), an installation with pictures of the artists as heroes, fighters, and athletes, next to images of the House of the People.
8. *Cow session* (2003) and *Batuta lui Oprica* (2003). She has also produced a series of photographs, *Staged photography: Swiss people in front of the House of the People* (2003), and another video, *Enisa and the shadows* (2003), in which she filmed smiling people with no emotional connection to the building against the backdrop of a kitsch wall-drawing of the House, on a stage adorned with red curtains and a few potted plants.
9. The same strategy of radically downsizing the building has been applied in the work of other artists, for example in Suzana Dan's painting titled *Funny C.P.* (2004), which shows a massive pink ice cream cone and small replicas of the palace floating away on clouds (MNAC 2004, 158), or Ștefan Cosma's *Tourist terror target* (2004), which turns tourist snapshots of the palace into slide puzzles (MNAC 2004, 145).
10. See also Dumitru Gorzo's painting *Are jailed sheep zebras?* (2004), which shows the House engulfed in flames as sheep and shepherds in front of it engage in sexual acts (MNAC 2004, 169), Nicolae Comănescu's *Wrongbeach* (2004), which presents a pixilated image of the House (MNAC 2004, 141, 143), or Mircea Cantor's drawing *The milky way* (2013) which depicts a silent march of 365 cows around the House of the People, as the apotheosis, of truly cosmic dimensions, of Romanians' submission to power.
11. The play *Ca(r)ne: this is our city* (2007), the video *Wings for dogs* (2009), and the MNAC exhibition *Anturaju' and other stories* (2010). See also his video *Sample city* (2003), showing Bucharest as a city in upheaval, full of social contradictions.
12. Most relevant is *Văcărești* (2003), in which Tudor draws the contours of a church that was part of a famous monastery destroyed during the demolitions. The intervention is also a critical commentary on the Orthodox Church's plans to build a cathedral next to the House of the People. In the performance and film *Dust* (2006), Tudor gathers soil from the location of a chapel that was displaced and transported, taking it back to its original location, exemplifying the powerful tactile quality that soil and material objects have as symbols of attachment.
13. Intervention number 62, *Demolished church* (2008), is a re-enactment of a performance by Vătămanu and Tudor, in which Nicolae draws the contours of another demolished church using candles; an old map from 1978

was overlaid with a contemporary Google map to identify the church's former location.

14. Fieldwork, carried out intermittently since 2012, has consisted of repeated visits to different parts of the building and participation in an official guided tour, as well as interviews and walks with employees of MNAC and other institutions located in the building. I visit the building as opportunities arise. I would like to thank those who have helped me with my research: Octav Avramescu, Ruxandra Balaci, Irina Botea, Ulf Brunnbauer, Cristina Codarcea, Călin Dan, Suzana Dan, Maria Draghici, Celia Ghyka, Ion Grigorescu, Augustin Ioan, Aurora Király, Iosif Király, Silvia Moraru, Cristina Nitṃu, Mihai Oroveanu, Andrei Pandele, Florin Pavel, Găvrila Pop, Veda Popovici, Gabrielle Popp, Gerhard Reiweger, Arnold Schlachter, Roxandra Trestioreanu, and Raluca Velisar.
15. The building's total floor space is 365,000 square metres, and its volume is 2,550,000 cubic metres, making it, in terms of these dimensions, the second- and third-largest building in the world (Avanu 2011).
16. In an interview to the German newspaper *Die Tageszeitung*, 22 December 2004.
17. http://mircea-nicolae.blogspot.co.uk/2008/03/mulaj-din-gips-66.html. Accessed 17 December 2017.

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CHAPTER 3

Battles of Nostalgic Proportion: The Transformations of Islam-as-Historical-Force in Western Balkan Reconstitutions of the Past

Isa Blumi

Often treated as an analytical monolith, Albanians inhabiting the Balkans in fact face a plethora of challenges today that politically disaggregate as much as unite them. While a number of causal sources for these divides since the collapse of Yugoslavia and Communist Albania await the social scientist's discovery, it may be useful to remind ourselves that, as in many other corners of the world, the conflicts for political and economic ascendancy in the Balkans take many forms and often have deep historical roots. Indeed, such sources of contention, manifested for much of the last century in Albanian communities, are largely responsible for the territorial divisions in the post-Ottoman Balkans. Much like events in the Middle East and their effects on Arabs, Kurds, and Armenians, the manner in which the "Great Powers" organized the break-up of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans imposed forces that profited from separating rather than

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conjoining Albanians in a common national polity (Blumi 2011b). More recent factors surfacing since the 1990s have only added to those divisions within the various Albanian constituencies that are especially important to this volume.

Specifically, it is the dialectical associations shaping Euro-American characterizations of Islam in the larger world that have informed the demonstrable anxieties of exclusion expressed by many Albanian-speaking inhabitants in Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, and Serbia (henceforth the Western Balkans) throughout the twentieth century (Welton and Brisku 2008, 87–110; Ibrahimi 1998; de Rapper 2008; Schwandner-Sievers 2004). Since it has proven to be nearly impossible for policy makers and their favorite scholars working within conventional disciplinary boundaries to frame their analysis of Albanians' violent relations with neighbors in other than religious terms, many of these same Albanians have found it strategically necessary to shed all affiliations with those stereotypes.[1] Finding themselves thus caught in the difficult position of deflecting associations that have seemingly orientated European policies toward the Balkans, since 1990 Albanians have experienced new stridency in the ideological and cultural divisions among themselves. This has manifested in several ways. Most relevant here are the pseudo-scholarly revisionist histories of propped-up "Albanian" nationalist heroes whose battles with "Muslim" expansion on behalf of the rest of Europe explicitly divide Albanians along sectarian lines. Crucially, to lend ideological and historic legitimacy to this revision, sympathetic writers—some actually being "Westerners"—have highlighted how "Europeans" over the last two centuries championed those "Albanians" who consciously allied with Europe's (and Christianity's) struggle with an ontological Islamic other (Bartl 1968).

Some entrepreneurial Albanians today, in search of acceptance into Europe and the West, rely on retroactively distinguishing Albanians living within the Ottoman Empire according to their religious affiliations. Since most Albanians are still variously Muslim, these entrepreneurs have attempted to highlight their country's spiritual fraternity with Europe and downplay what seems like a cumbersome lack of Western qualities by selective nostalgic references to famous European adventurers who became enamored with Europe's most logical Balkan ally. This desperate attempt to have pre-World War I European writers service modern Albanians' pleas for European alliance necessarily relies on repositioning Albanians as Europe's Balkan Christian friends, a frame of engagement that assumes the barbarism of the Ottoman, mostly Turkish, Muslims, the ideal other that scholars of the post-colonial condition have long studied (Blumi 1998).

These historical "pro-Albanian" references, made by authors such as the British poet Lord Byron, the English journalist/government informant Edith Durham, and the Austrian ethnographer Baron Franz Nopcsa, offer succor to those Albanians today desperately seeking European/Western approval (Destani 2011). Trapped by their association with the "Orient" and an endless list of popular tropes, post-1990 Albanians are willing to do almost anything to secure their integration into Europe (Elsie 1999). In part, this overture to Europeans by way of referencing a selective past that necessarily excises Islam from Albanian collective history leads to a number of necessary ideological adjustments and a rewriting of history that warrant analysis here.[2]

The following explores some tactics used by various Albanians traumatized by what they believe is their unwarranted affiliation with Islam. Efforts to rewrite the past as a way to shape these modern identity claims must take on a corrective agenda vis-à-vis the international relations (IR) analysis that has contributed to this discourse of Albanian/Muslim marginality.[3] As such, the following chapter inspects the ideological assumptions of the proponents of this corrective agenda in the Western Balkans, an area still on the margins of European inclusion. I critically question how a selective reading of the past, often framed as nostalgia for cultural as much as political relations between the Balkans and Europe, highlights a prevailing methodological weakness in the study of the Balkans. As such, this critical analysis advocates that scholars adopt another set of tools, first to challenge those identity claims that have always been both contrived and malleable in the Balkans, and then to theorize how assumptions about Europe-as-Modern—Western and Christian—coincide with the manipulative dynamics of identity politics among post-1990 Kosovar Albanians (Doja 2000; Iveković 2002). At the heart of such an analytical turn is to put into context the various references to Islam among Albanians whose ancestors were part of the cultural and strategic reflections of writers in the pre-World War I era, today evoked in nostalgic tones as "proof" of Albanians' indelible links to Europe.

The Albanian Struggle to Remember a European Past

To best make these points and contribute to the larger discussion in this volume, I start with the tactical use of nostalgia within distinctively Albanian discourses about their presumed place in the larger world today.[4] By doing so, I am exploring a prevailing observation among scholars that

key segments of the cultural and political elite in the larger Balkans have sought to disentangle the homeland—critically placed within the larger context of attempts to "re"integrate into Europe—from past associations with the "alien" Ottoman Empire and thus Islam.[5] One of the results of this turn is the documented rise in public hostility toward Islamic institutions, ultimately amounting to populist forms of Islamophobia (Jazexhi 2007a, b). Whereas the relationship between expressions of faith among various Muslim Albanians and the Albanian nation and state(s) attracts wide academic interest, the issue of Islamophobia, although high on the agenda of the local media, is still lacking from the scholarly record (Blumi and Krasniqi 2014).

Paired with this failure to acknowledge Islamophobia in academic and popular discourses is the fact that Albanian elites in Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia are among the most pro-European and pro-American residents of the region.[6] This is naturally reflected in the political orientation of Albanians who have, since American intervention in the region after 1990, been compelled to reinforce an already well-established tradition among Albanians to "balance" their faith with other aspects of daily life. According to a recent survey conducted in Kosovo, 91.5% of people in Kosovo find it necessary to show their "pro-Western" orientation by excluding other cultural and ideological alternatives. This survey, run by the Gani Bobi Center for Social Studies in 2011, suggests that many Albanians believe being Muslim and Albanian could constitute a barrier to full integration into the West. As such, the predominance of secular-minded political elites among Albanians combined with the ever-increasing anti-Islamic discourse seemingly sanctioned by the West have had a noticeable impact on the way non-elite Albanians wish to publicly characterize their relationship to their faith. More Albanians are publically wearing long beards and the veil, and the survey reveals that 40% of people are of the opinion that 'radical Islam' is gaining strength in Kosovo, while 24.3% see it as a threat to Kosovar society and its pro-Western orientation (Center for Humanist Studies 2011).[7]

It is necessary to recall that communities in the Balkans today are faced with the uphill battle of adapting to post-conflict conditions often dictated by hegemonic outside forces, such as the EU, US, International Monetary Fund, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These international forces are crucial to shaping how key players in the daily affairs of Albanians mediate their anxious self-definition as Europeans in order to avoid associations with "terrorists." Thus, a quasi-nostalgic reference to a pre-Islamic past has become a new ideological necessity to gain the

patronage of external actors. In the context of a shrinking pool of resources for Albanians facing expanding dislocation and poverty, how religion transforms with the assumption of/advancement of a collective memory about Islam may prove especially interesting to scholars hoping to understand what mobilizes stakeholders in the Balkans today. Put differently, as community-building agendas form within this complex of domestic and international interests, the aim to monopolize the past, including the constructive or destructive use of revisionist nostalgia—the aspect most relevant to this volume—becomes a factor. This takes distinctive forms among Albanians.

One use of selective nostalgia is evident among Albanian politicians in Kosovo wishing to survive the integration of their homeland into the larger world after the collapse of Yugoslavia. They have learned to work within crude associations synonymous to the Orientalist epistemologies others have effectively critiqued in their scholarship (Puto 2006). Faced with the frustrating consequences of a loose logic that conjoins, for example, being a Muslim with the exclusionary discourse of terrorism, these Albanians (and other self-effacing "non-Europeans") have adopted, consciously or not, distinctive strategies of survival that resort to dissociating themselves (if not Albanians in general) from the so-called Islamic world.[8] Among the strategies has been a nostalgic claim of a past excised of all affiliations to a faith that had established deep cultural roots in the Balkans over half a millennium.[9]

In this respect, mastery over the cultural landscape that commands the loyalties of Albanian Muslims has constituted since the interwar period (1918–1939) a primary administrative goal of the state. Indeed, throughout the modern history of Albania and the former Yugoslavia, where the majority of Albanian Muslims lived, Islam as a set of doctrines of political activism has never played a major role, in large part because of state efforts to marginalize it.[10] According to scholars, this is because Albanians of Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim faith were collectively victimized and that their ethno-national loyalties superseded their religious identities (Duijzings 2000, 153–61).

A partial explanation for this must be the steady flow of nostalgic references in Albanian popular culture. Outspoken advocates for reorientating Albanian history toward Christian Europe (the West) have largely used quasi-fictional representations of the Ottoman past Albanians shared. Be it through the novels written by the once official author of the Enver Hoxha regime, Ismail Kadare,[11] the numerous "histories" and biographies that lionized individuals purportedly motivated by their patriotic (and almost

always hidden Christian) ethos against the "occupying Turks," or, more recently, newspaper columns distributed via the internet, outspoken European-Albanians all target a common, monolithic Islam as the quintessential antithesis of an idealized West (Kadare 2006).[12]

This campaign to excise Islam from the Albanian past has found added urgency since 2001, when America's "war on terrorism" presumably pitted the West against noncompliant Muslims the world over. Discourses on Islam in this context have allowed local commentators, almost all linked to political parties, to funnel their heretofore cautious vitriol against Albanians' Muslim spiritual past through the ready-made ideological lens of the "clash of civilizations," courtesy of Euro-American academia. The resurrected trope, first launched in the early 1990s by Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, has allowed many of these Albanian pundits to assert Islam's incompatibility not only with modern European and Western "values" but even with the democratic ambitions of Albanians in the Balkans. A brief historic contextualization may help to further develop this analysis and service the larger agenda of this volume.

Since the end of World War II, a particular sensibility within intellectual groups in Yugoslavia and Albania has paired Islam (and religion more generally) with a primitive, bygone era. Although attempts were made in both Yugoslavia and Albania to harness religion and a narrowly defined, instrumentalist Islam for social engineering purposes, the overall limits to securing political loyalty to the dominant state was that large constituencies refused to abandon their "traditional" faiths (Blumi 2014). Under the guise of NATO, EU, and US administrative policies during a post-Socialist expansion of the neo-liberal order, community, cooperation, and hostility to materialism and sectarianism were preached in an attempt to separate hitherto strong communities from their "backward" faiths. European Islamophobia became the new wrecking ball, with hyper-economic marginalization the fate for those Albanians refusing to culturally integrate. One of the ideological stimulants for destruction is the fact that Albanians have a confused association with the larger world because of their religious association. The nationalist turn that tries to accommodate this potentially upsetting excision of one's spiritual, cultural, and ethnic identity thus relies on a programmatic, entirely modern utilization of history (treated here as the politics of nostalgia) in order to help redraw the boundaries of acceptable associations. This results in virulent, ahistorical Albanian nationalism, often promoting the worst kind of primordialism in an attempt to dissociate from an Ottoman (Turkish) heritage.

The underlying premise is that associations with the Orient and all things associated with the Ottoman Empire, and by extension Islam, necessarily reflect a bygone era, one in which a foreign Asian power occupied what had been since antiquity "the heart of Europe." Indeed, a linkage between Ottoman occupation and the premise that the peoples of the Balkans were artificially extracted from their otherwise natural historical trajectory as part of Europe informs the relative salience of nostalgic claims to a Christian European heritage made by commentators in the 1990s and 2000s, like Piro Misha, Ibrahim Rugova, and Ismail Kadare, regularly published in the Albanian language.[13] Such claims ultimately seek integrating Albanians-as-Christians into the European Union, a community that excludes Muslim-majority Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania, and Turkey today.[14]

This act of disaggregating some Albanians from an Ottoman heritage was often done in ways that used nostalgia for glorified medieval heroes like Skanderbeg (who had in fact earlier converted to Islam to secure momentary alliance with the expanding Ottoman state) to inform the claim that Albanians acted as Europe's historical guardian from Islam (Dhirma and Qemal 2013; Fishta and Schmidt-Neke 1997; Schmitt 2009). The claim is rather straightforward and prevails in almost all depictions of an Albanian ethos that is said to be by nature hostile to Islam. The prince George Castriot, who became known as Skanderbeg (c. 1405–1467), is unquestioningly posited in these depictions as hostile to the Oriental faith that he himself had embraced, although presumably for entirely political reasons. When the Sultan attempted to punish him and his allies for treachery, Skanderbeg's resistance necessarily took the form of a heroic last stand (for Europe and Christianity as much as for country and self-preservation) that ultimately failed. Despite the fall of Skanderbeg's short-lived fiefdom, Albanians were subsequently implicated in a campaign of continued (nationalistic) defiance.

This was a compelling myth at a time when some Albanians in the nineteenth century began to see greater opportunities outside the direct rule of the Ottoman state. European interests eager to gain a foothold in the wealthy Ottoman lands henceforth cultivated some of these opportunities, as much trying to seduce powerful Ottoman-Albanian regional leaders like Ali Pasha of Tepelena as convince the unimaginative political elite back home of the gains to be had in forging alliances with influential locals in the Western Balkans. Indeed, throughout the nineteenth century, prominent cultural agents of empire as diverse as Benjamin Disraeli (the future Prime Minister of Britain), Martin Cromer, Edward Gibbon, Antonio Vivaldi,

Edmund Spenser, Richard Lovelace, and Christopher Marlowe evoked Skanderbeg, often in terms of his hardened, Balkan, "savage" rebuttal to Ottoman (and thus Islamic) rule. It would be through Skanderbeg, well-known in European lore by the nineteenth century, that the interests of any number of European states could be linked to the region (Blumi 1998, 530). Neatly forgetting the fact that Skanderbeg himself had joined with an expansive coalition of forces in open revolt over regional Christian rivals, the tired juxtaposition of native and foreigner also confuses the complex interactions between prominent land-owning elites, who often subjected their peasants to changing alliances that extended to outward declarations of loyalty to allies' churches, and various Muslim sovereigns (Blumi 2011b, chapter 2).

This drive to rewrite the motivations of past heroes necessitated resurrecting pre-Ottoman associations with Christianity. It also made the geographic, cultural, and productive diversity of Albanians key to subsequent ideological shifts. In Kosovo, the crude appeal since the late 1980s to the Western Catholic Church reflects a tone deafness to the secular "modern" sensibilities of those in power in Europe who entirely reject religion as a guide to their political orientations within the EU. Yet Albanian historic links to Catholicism were the critical association that Kadare or Rugova's breed believed could lift them out of the marginalization in which they found themselves (Brisku 2006). Rather than evoking nostalgic references to an Ottoman intelligentsia, increasingly depicted in recent scholarship as heterogeneous and tolerant, the crudest misappropriations of ignorant racism in the nationalist historiography that asserted Muslims in the Balkans were subordinated to a nationalized "Turkish" regime were the chosen tropes to deny that heritage.

Such methods of excision were popular especially among the Albanian diaspora, ultimately leading to the same kinds of cultism associated with the Communist regimes that arose after World War II. The axis was no longer an object of nostalgia per se but an inaccessible part of antiquity that anachronistically fit all the modern demands of the post-Ottoman, European-dominated world. This method of advocacy, one that mobilizes a revisionist past in the form of nostalgia, has been especially prominent among members of the diaspora scattered around the world by waves of economic and political violence visited upon the Balkans since the middle of the nineteenth century.[15] Paradoxically, much as their countrymen back home have lobbied for the rest of the world to refer to Albanians as

Europeans and consider them a natural affiliate with the West, many in the Albanian diaspora have adopted contradictory positions vis-à-vis their host societies prior to 2001 (Blumi 2011a).

Many Albanians faced overt discrimination when first arriving in Central and Western Europe over the course of the twentieth century, mostly as refugees persecuted by expansionist regimes in Yugoslavia and Greece, leading them to adopt self-isolating strategies for survival. Akin to tactics adopted by other communities of migrants in overtly hostile host societies, Albanian Muslims developed a strident form of nationalism that conjoined their linguistic distinctions with their faith. These migrants intermarried and developed self-education programs that reinforced among their children growing up in these hostile foreign conditions a strong sense of distinction. This hostility to integration meant that diaspora Albanians formed a strong potential constituency that nationalists could tap into when the wars against Serbia required funding and soldiers.

The problem for these communities was that they remained introverted and often discouraged children from integrating with the larger host societies. In the process, their marginalization often resulted in new pathologies for second- and now third-generation Albanians. In the larger context of Islamophobia, Albanian Christians loyal to either the Catholic or Orthodox Churches sought to differentiate themselves from Turks and Muslims, ultimately claiming that their community remained loyal to their European heritage. In order to make this claim, some Albanians adopted a Euro-centric epistemology that serves as the foundation of the complex anti-nostalgic relationship Albanians living in the Western Balkans today have with their past as Muslims (Blumi 2011a).

This context helps us rethink how comparable the experience of Albanian speakers in the diaspora is to other well-studied (and theorized) cases. One could productively attribute these Albanian frustrations with guilt-by-association to the "epidemic" of longing found by Boym and others focusing on more prolific (or perhaps more accessible) Jewish migrants or Slavs. A diasporic intimacy with home conjures security, a state of mind "that does not rely on physically being somewhere as much as mobilizing the sensation of being there," as Boym says. Such imaginary moments surface when consumers of national myths have plenty of free time and still do not know the temptation of nostalgia (Boym 2001, 251). As understood here, nostalgia, a deviation from homesickness, is actually a longing that becomes restorative. Nostalgia allows the memory

of "a people's past" to be transformed into an act that protects them from stigmas. These become reflective nostalgias that are today found everywhere. They serve as imperfect mirror images of home, shaped by often disparate efforts to mold the way migrant communities think of the past by way of newspapers and, more recently, webpages. These images destabilize the once secure narrative of home put forward by the state.

Perhaps paradoxically, the exploitative nature of life in exile described in otherwise competing narratives of the past hints that all authors of nostalgia (and certainly their eager audiences) lack precisely what they idealize their homelands to constitute: a sort of pristine, pre-flight uniformity; a quiet existence that suggests an intimacy with home and neighbor; and a heritage that some critics of the modern world found especially disconcerting. Here I refer first to Hannah Arendt, who was particularly concerned with the tendency to resort to intimate longings at the expense of the necessary cosmopolitan ethos that was the only solution to the visceral racism/apartheid and state-sponsored genocide faced by uprooted peoples in modern Europe (Arendt 1968, 15–16). The interesting—paradoxical—relationship between the nationalistic and the targeted pariah group within the once united national polity is that they both resort to preaching unity as a survival mechanism in a world full of hostile others. Of course, this also leads to self-exclusion and precisely the kind of nativism that shrinks experience, denies empathetic exchange, and ultimately surrenders individual thinking to a group mentality that is easily manipulated by racist epistemologies within the host society.

This hostility to one's own was also observed by Richard Sennett in the US, where nativism is linked to the 'cult of intimacy' related to a doctrine that promises family security but at the expense of civic interaction, sociability, and participation in the public sphere (Sennett 1977, 337–40). Similarly, these Albanian migrant communities are intensely self-isolated even as they profess nostalgic longing for the homeland, which is far more geographically specific than is usually let on by the scholarship. How we make useful sense of this will transform how we ultimately interpret domestic politics in countries with large uprooted populations living in internal or external exile.

Boym (2001, 254) suggests that diasporic intimacy does not promise a comforting recovery of identity through shared nostalgia for the lost home and homeland; in the case of Albanian migrants scattered throughout the world, the opposite is true. Diasporic intimacy can be seen as the

mutual attraction of two immigrants from different parts of the world, or the sense of precarious coziness of a foreign home mediated by, for instance, websites or social clubs (Blumi 2011a). Just as one learns to live with alienation and reconciles oneself to the uncanniness of the surrounding world and to the strangeness of the human touch, there comes surprise, a pang of intimate recognition, a hope that sneaks in through the back door in the midst of the habitual estrangement of everyday life abroad. This reaching out suggests any number of pathologies that force us to interpret the way Albanians use the past as a means to erase the ambiguities their many emotional, political, economic, and spiritual affiliations create.

Arjun Appadurai proposes that globalization, which includes mass immigration and the development of certain forms of electronic media, forces us to reconsider what constitutes the "locale" of such polities mentioned above (Appadurai 1996). It is no longer a specific place to which one lays claim but rather a socially informed context that is easily transported into other settings, including the diaspora. But this framing of the locale may surrender too much to an idealization that is itself mediated by the many factors at work as individuals or groups resort to nostalgic redefinitions of the homeland they miss. There is not a fixed experience from which one is drawing; rather, it is a reconfiguration, a mythology, a redefinition, and, indeed, a fabrication of imagined perfections, purities, and uniformities that fundamentally reflects a local context that informs the powerful longing to escape the xenophobia and intolerance infused in a Muslim's life in Europe (Brown 2006). Reflections on how Albanians rewrite the past in order to become more Western do not suggest a neat importation of something actually experienced as much as an objectification, by way of nostalgia, of complex frustrations, fears, and pathos experienced in the context of exploitation and violent poverty. It is critical to capture these emotionally animated contexts as they create the psychological pretext for elaborations of the nostalgic reference to the homeland that defies simple copying of formal nationalist tropes.

Drawing from what Svetlana Boym calls the "hypochondria of the heart," how Albanians, especially in the diaspora, rethink their place in the world by selectively highlighting a relationship with Europe during the late Ottoman period reflects a collective psychosis best understood as an incurable modern condition (Boym 2001, Part I). In this way, the aesthetic of nostalgia promulgated through history texts produced in the West proves both an attractive window into the ruins of Albanian lives in

exile and a reconstitution of ruined constituencies rediscovering agency in exile, often as migrants facing exploitation and racial discrimination. Another way to understand this is as a way of rethinking the homeland. The Albanian's imagination (or reassertion) of the homeland as an ethos, defined by "tribal" associations and hierarchies that claim respect from Western/European authority, necessarily requires that their associations with Europe are non-Oriental. Rather, they are indigenous, free from the oppression of state authority and the marginality that their association with Islam threatens. The Albanian's references to the past are pedestrian, uneducated appropriations of, first, the nation as imagined from afar, and then, more accurately, of the community out of which the authors of these various expressions of nostalgia for an Albanian past come. Almost uniformly since 2001, these democratic reflections of the community's selective nostalgia for the homeland's past all associate their people's ambitions with the equally contrived, fallacious, and anachronistic "West."

I wish to dedicate space here to a greater methodological point that will aim to remind colleagues who actively use references made by Albanophiles that nostalgia for western patronage does not come without a larger context. While the tropes surrounding Skanderbeg and the parallel manipulation of the "Battle for Kosovo" have attracted ample scholarly attention, another resource which the most virulent Islamophobic Europhiles have tapped into deserves equally critical reassessment.[16] In the following section, I will investigate the construction of idealized Albanian types, especially the mountain men whose association with honorable values made them idealized heroes to many European writers in the crucial period of Ottoman disintegration in the Balkans starting in the 1830s. As Albanian Europhiles eagerly highlight in forms of nostalgic prose, European authors like Edith Durham lionized Albanians, presumably for their valiant and ultimately sacrificial defense of the Christian/Western world against expansionist Islam.[17] Albanian historiography and the intellectuals who aimed to reposition Albanians in the larger European (non-Muslim) story infused romanticism for an ideal Albanian type as assumed by informed European advocates of Albanian independence (Ippen 1892; Nopcsa 1910). These myths, which take the form of nostalgia for an era in which Albanians sat at the center of European strategic thinking, while useful nevertheless distort the larger context in which these policy changes were playing out.

This corrective process hints at attempts to disentangle the way in which we engage each other as human beings. This serves an ethical role

in reshaping our relations with our present while also highlighting the need to recognize the complexity of power relations, or perhaps an "economy of power" as per Foucault. Doing so would help us avoid a reductive interpretation of the ways in which people interacted to fit what we assume were normative practices of signification. Remaining suspicious of the "all-embracing and reifying term," which here extends to a critique of what Edward Said originally called Orientalism, helps us identify the workings of a strategy to rupture the ideological sediments that had built up around the Orientalism term (Foucault et al. 1982, 217).

Revision by Way of a Proposal: Deconstructing the Trope that Binds

It is possible to delineate this strategy by reconsidering the apparent paradox of identifying *a process* that supposedly led to the systemic collapse of the Ottoman/Islamic order. Rather than conceding that it was a process of invariable decline that ultimately inspired new forms of state power, that is, Westernization and modernization, we are best served to consider this narrative as itself vulnerable to theoretical collapse. In this context, learned attitudes of power—the West as exclusive, a monolith associated with development, and the "East" as degenerate and irredeemable—do not necessarily reflect the actual power dynamics at play during the transitional era that saw the rise of the ethno-national state. As argued elsewhere, the myth of "modernity" serves both as a teleology and an obfuscation of relations far more contested. Indeed, expressions of Western superiority as a form of modernity par excellence could actually suggest fear among those making the expressions (Blumi 2012). This fear seems to inspire attempts to frame a pre-World War II era narrative for the purposes of mobilizing forces—ideological and bureaucratic—that could help undermine otherwise autonomous, incorruptible impediments to the ambitions of Western hegemony.[18]

To test the easy assumption about Western ascendancy, and thus undermine the appropriation of Islam as the ideal anti-Western other, we must reassess the context surrounding a nostalgic association of the West with development, progress, and civilization. I do this by drawing on my own research into the Ottoman era, which has challenged the assumption that the Ottoman territories were in need of liberation, an assumption that fails to recognize that these Ottoman territories were targeted by Western

colonialists for reasons far different than inevitable decline. Rather than seeing both an asymmetry of power and its presumed accurate reflection in the way people wrote and spoke about the Ottoman lands, we are better off abandoning the fixations we have toward the very discourse of assumed modernity and returning to the dynamic contexts in which these racist discourses and the Orientalist's cognitive framework emerged.

The place to find such a framework is in the booming media of the pre-World War I era. Much British journalism during the height of the anti-Ottoman (anti-Turkish/Muslim) campaigns was written at a time when the future of the Eastern Mediterranean was an open question. To William Gladstone in the 1870s, his main ally, the journalist W.T. Stead, and others of their Turkophobic ilk, the fact that a number of people's political and economic interests were constantly threatened by rapidly changing events in the East both frightened them and frustrated their agendas.[19] The possibility of political and economic rivals gaining an upper hand often translated into efforts by these opportunistic Islamophobes to reinvent hostile references to the Christian world's ontological other in the media.

The subsequent reterritorialization of the regional economy into "spheres of influence" made the Orient into a tribal, ethnic, racial, and sectarian patchwork that later crumbled into what is today known as one of the Balkans' most enduring characteristics: ethnic violence. At the forefront of this process were policies of intervention administered by a newly empowered international order informed by social scientific objectifications that asserted the modern world (and the civilization Europeans exclusively claimed) would not countenance the ontological other living in such close proximity. The ethnic border, in other words, became by the 1850s a tool in the arsenal of financial interests and their propagandist writers, who began to fill the pages of newspapers and popular travelogues with images of impenetrable tribalism and primordial hatreds.[20]

It is precisely at the point when we integrate the activity of such indigenous conglomerates that questions of how to label the principal actors become crucial. As much as racial, sectarian, tribal, and ethno-national categories have attracted scholarly attention on modern identity politics, the ever-present Orientalism in the literature may offer a set of alternative angles to understanding the transitional era, an angle that involves domestic and international finance as much as it does political alliance and any "natural" affinity for Albanian values. If current writers on Balkan affairs (and Albanian propagandists) fully appreciated this ideological terrain,

perhaps nostalgia, and especially the sources used to purportedly reinforce that nostalgia, could be proven shallow.

Put differently, the most notorious of the authors of the glory years of Albanian "Relindja" (akin to rebirth or renaissance) and the political and economic interests for whom they wrote actually saw themselves (and their larger projects) sitting in a vulnerable place within a larger geopolitical context. In other words, what has been labeled as "Pax Britannica" throughout the middle decades of the nineteenth century actually sat on a precarious perch. The ongoing effects of the rise of Republicanism in Continental Europe, Tsarist Russian expansionism in Central Asia, and the booms and busts that kept global financial capitalists living on edge all constituted annoying uncertainties to the world order.[21]

All these conflicted and contingent interests made political life in the heart of Europe volatile. This dynamic set of contexts invariably shaped how European actors, both as actors within the Ottoman Balkans and independent of them, invested in codifying their relations vis-à-vis Albanians, both as actors within the Ottoman Balkans and independent of them. In this respect, we must remember that the constant engagement with Albanians was influenced by the vociferous rivalry between the Conservative and Liberal Parties in Britain, which were both vying for public favor through the media (Cox 2005). While the offensively racist content of the period's Orientalist literature often speaks for itself, it is regularly forgotten that this form of imperialism was mobilized in these highly contested domestic political contexts in order to help push for certain policies of state as well as to condemn the party in power.[22] To appeal to their base of supporters and remain politically relevant in Britain, advocates for the direct conquest of the Ottoman Empire would constantly fight various "crusades" against "Mr. Turko" (Stead 1894; Mussell 2012, 22).

Maria Todorova, an essential contributor to critically reading the Orientalist literature on the Balkans of this era, is adamant that it was undeniably the "domestic imperatives in great power foreign policy," rather than the proclivities of Oriental violence, that shaped the content of the era's newspapers (Todorova 1997, 101). Indeed, the known rivalry between Gladstone/Stead and their Conservative Party adversary Disraeli was infused with as much vitriol as anything one could find in the anti-Turk media of the time (Aldous 2012).[23] Of course, Gladstone and Stead's stunts in 1876 regarding the campaign against Ottoman policies in Bulgaria did eventually result in securing the Liberal Party a victory in 1880 at Disraeli's expense. In fact, Disraeli was forced to order his attaché

in Istanbul, Walter Baring, to file a report that confirmed some of the earlier press reports highlighted by Gladstone and company (Rodogno 2012, 168). Yet it would be a mistake to think scandals in the Balkans alone brought victory to the Liberals. The demise of the Conservative Party was as much due to the scandals surrounding Disraeli's close associates in South Africa, his occupation of Ottoman Cyprus, his highly dubious takeover of the Suez Canal, and various other gambits to expand British Empire as anything written about events in the Balkans (Hicks 2012; Ković 2010).

Considering this context, a closer (as well as broader and comparative) analysis of the plethora of writings about the Ottoman Balkans and its peoples suggests that a struggle for authorial prominence existed between those who advocated the empire's demise and those who argued against its destruction, a struggle playing out within a larger political conflict for power between distinctive capitalist and bourgeois interests (Malchow 1992). One begins to realize that in the context of an analytical environment in which advocates for one approach to the "Eastern Question" challenged those who saw it differently, the seemingly hegemonic presence of racial colonial epistemologies actually proves far less self-evident.[24] This of course implies, then, that British Orientalism, servicing one group of finance capitalists or Christian crusaders, was not without its dissenters.[25] Indeed, embracing the Ottomans (and Albanian Muslims) as natural rivals to the Russians or the Austro-Hungarians could (and did) serve strategic interests, depending on the mood of the political and economic elite and their relationship with rival European states. With this in mind, present day Albanians stressing the shameful associations with Islam may wish to reconsider.

I wish to take this observation a step further, however, and suggest that we can refocus our study of this era of mass media and the emergence of Islamophobic discourses by reconsidering just how weak a hand the Ottoman Empire had in this century-long card game. Recognizing that the hysteria the Steads of the period hoped to stir up against "Mohammadian Savages" was politically motivated, and thus that anti-Ottomanism was not universally supported, hints that the entire Western project was ideologically precarious well into the early twentieth century. Not only were anti-Ottoman pundits challenged by fellow intellectual and economic elites in the British media, but the greatest proponents of demonizing the generic Turk/Muslim/Asian savage also proved necessarily amenable to change when the politics demanded (Sohrawardy 2010). The case of David Urquhart is perhaps the most relevant.

Initially a philhellene, Urquhart, like many other Russophobes, traveled to the Ottoman-administered Balkans with every intention of "rescuing" the peoples inhabiting what they romantically considered the "birthplace of Western Civilization" (Constantine 1984; Fleming 1999, 7–11). These associations are clearly embraced by those eagerly mobilizing, among other tools, nostalgia to bridge this presumed gap. Likewise, those who reject the West are also susceptible to accepting the founding premise of what men like Urquhart wrote about the Balkans rather than fully disentangling the final product from the conflicted agendas of his target audience and patrons.

While Urquhart's hatred for Russia complemented that of the larger political and economic elite of Britain at the time, it was still an open question to what extent Britain should strive to preserve the Ottoman Empire's territorial integrity in the Balkans as a means to stymie Russia's advance (Cain 2006). To Urquhart (and Lord Byron), initial support for Greek independence in the 1820s at the Ottoman Empire's expense did not contradict their hatred for all things Slavic. Their pro-Greek sentiments changed, however, after these men traveled to the region and actually interacted with those who were administering the Ottoman occupation. This was particularly the case with Ali Pasha, the Albanian bandit turned governor (*ayan*) of what became the most powerful governorate in the early nineteenth century (Blumi 2011b, 45–61). For his part, Lord Byron was fascinated with the rebellious Ali Pasha, who possessed an "exotic fierceness which he [Byron] continued to associate with Islamic Civilization: the combinations of uncompromising religious passion and military virtues which he identified as the qualities of nature" were reason enough for idealizing the "noble savage" found among the Muslim Albanians (Sharafuddin 1994, 227).[26] That Albanian nationalist writers embraced this characterization of Ali Pasha, and stridently excised him from the Ottoman context in which he and his sons acted, proves a larger point about the vacuous operating principles on which Albanian nostalgia sits today.

For his part, Urquhart went even further than Lord Byron, often mobilized by Albanian ideologues as they attempted to dissociate Western admiration of the idealized Albanian from the Ottoman world. In time, as evidenced in his *The Spirit of the East*, Urquhart actually became the Ottoman Empire's greatest champion (Bolsover 1936). Among other things, Urquhart argued that Islam as practiced in the Ottoman Empire was an ideal vehicle to promote and administer reform in the region. He

even went so far as to suggest that the Ottoman Empire was better fit than any Austro-Hungarian, Italian, Greek, or Russian administration to reform those Balkan regions (and the entire Eastern Mediterranean) inhabited by "backward" Eastern Christians. Indeed, it was Russian intrigue and the servility of Greeks, Bulgars, and Serbs to the Eastern Orthodox Church that constituted a far bigger threat to "civilization" (and profits) than the Ottomans (Urquhart 1838, 194–95). This clearly does not sit well with a scholarship that unquestioningly associates Victorian-era literature on the Balkans with both nostalgia for a pre-Ottoman past and explicit hostility to Islam. In Urquhart, Lord Byron's close associate, we have a more complex analysis of conditions on the ground and a relatively dynamic attempt to engage the multiplicity of actors involved in the Balkans, a dynamic that could just as well serve as a point of pride for Albanians today.

Others adopted similar approaches, often using the prevailing stereotypes of the Ottoman, Muslim, and especially Albanian propensity to violence as a totem of their right to act as curators of a world in need of brutal oversight. While on one level this is just another variation of Orientalism as critically read in the scholarship today, it is useful to consider what evocation of these people's ability to follow their leaders, or, in other words, their "nobility," was meant to do for the intended reading audience. I suggest these advocates of greater direct British support of the Ottoman Empire hoped to highlight qualities of Balkan Muslims that were more accessible to the British bourgeois sense of order than those said to belong to the "irredeemable" Eastern Christian, who was widely believed to lack any discipline and even civilization. Throughout Europe, the most widely referenced idealized other in this context was the generic Albanian.

To Théophile Lavallée, the Albanians were entirely savage but also recognized for their capacity as brave fighters, love of independence, and fierce loyalty to tribe and family. These were honorable attributes that could be useful to Westerners seeking to gain a foothold in the region. Looking forward, Lavallée hoped France would tie itself to these people, who could, more than anyone else in the Balkans, bring law and order to the larger region under the proper guidance of France. Again, the appeal was largely one in which the oft-reported Muslim savagery proved a requisite for any future investments French bankers could make in infrastructure, mining, or public works, all risky capitalist ventures in areas that needed law and order (Lavallée 1855, 49–50, 54).[27]

Indeed, in the middle decades of the nineteenth century the possibility for considerable profit encouraged boisterous advocates for policies that

propped up the Ottoman Empire in hopes of returning stability to the Balkans. One noted illustration is the writings of Captain Stanislas Saint Clair and Charles Brophy. Having traveled to the Ottoman Balkans at the height of the Russo-Ottoman war of 1876–1877, they found material that they used to vilify "Turks" as lacking any integrity and filled with lies. Crucially, they would argue that the apparent victims of Ottoman Muslim brutality, the Bulgars and other South Slavs, were in fact all under Russian influence. As a result, they advised readers (and men of influence) not to jump to conclusions about the immediate course of action to take when faced with stories of Bulgarian massacres. As such, the weakness of Gladstone's arguments, which we will turn to shortly, was the fact that the Bulgarians he championed were Slavs and generally seen as less civilized than the otherwise reputable Turk.

It was in face of growing pressure for the Conservative government of Disraeli to act on behalf of these "brutish, obstinate, and uncivilized" Slavs that Brophy and St. Clair countered with their publications. In their book *A Residence in Bulgaria*, they pleaded with the informed policy makers of Disraeli's cabinet to avoid what was "fashionable" at the time (i.e. demonizing the Turk) and adopt a policy of action that, while serving the Ottoman Empire, would also "benefit the true interests of civilization throughout the world" (Saint-Clair and Brophy 1869, 238, 409; Todorova 1997, 101–102). Orientalism thus became a framework that as much essentialized in positive strokes the Ottoman Muslim reformer as reinforced hostility toward the generic Turk. This dual role of Orientalist epistemologies played out in crucial ways for the rest of the century (Nash 2005, 43–74).

As already seen, beyond making positive references to the Ottoman Empire in a sub-genre of Orientalist literature, men like Urquhart also had tremendous influence over British policies. This proved especially true for the Ottoman Balkans, which itself has been a source of Orientalist essentialism ever since (Hammond 2004). The association of the Ottoman Balkans with banditry, kidnapping and, indeed, the first utterances of terrorism, made it a critical arena within which power aspirations and application of codes informed by Orientalist tropes were first possible. In other words, the enduring image of the region being wild and lawless opened up the pretext for interventionist programs at the expense of Ottoman sovereignty. By the turn of the century, Edith Durham and H.N. Brailsford, attending to Balkan affairs as quasi-agents of British interests, in the latter case, as an activist of the British Relief Fund, intervened by publishing

regularly in the press and offering their services to sympathetic consuls in the area.

Indeed, prior to World War I, the most important arena for controlling the narrative of events in the Ottoman Balkans was within the British foreign ministry. In Macedonia, the most volatile Ottoman region, which also attracted the greatest foreign power intrigue, activist consuls like James McGregor had an important role to play in guiding the Orientalist discourse circulating in the larger world toward demonizing the Ottoman Empire. McGregor's affinities to Bulgaria—he spoke Bulgarian—are noted to have been the source of conflict with his superior in the region, Alfred Biliotti, a naturalized British citizen originally from Rhodes who was running the British offices in Salonika. The ongoing struggle between "British Levantines" like Biliotti occupying major roles in the foreign services and those advocating for a more robust, aggressive British role in the affairs of the Balkans opened new channels for entrepreneurs during this period starting in 1897 (Iseminger 1968).

As the Balkans became the primary battleground for the hearts and minds of the larger reading public, the many journalists who flocked to the region found ample support from within these consular offices. Leopold Amery, an occasional reporter for *The Guardian*, for instance, found it to his advantage during his frequent debriefings with various British consuls based in the region to not only "puff up" the cruelty of the Turk but to highlight how inferior they were as soldiers. Much the personality on the ground, like W.T. Stead a generation earlier, Amery was an advocate and muckraker whose campaign took advocate journalism to new heights.

In one of his reports, Amery claimed to have saved insurgents in Novi Pazar from likely death by defeating inept Turkish battalions practically on his own.[28] Such claims may be interpreted beyond the obvious bluster; such rhetoric was also meant to assure his audience that the "Englishman," held in such high esteem in those parts, could reasonably expect to lead willing rebellions against the Ottomans. As such, for the British to sit idly by and allow the Russians or Austro-Hungarians to have their way with the Southern Balkans was certainly misguided and perhaps even criminal (Barnes and Nicholson 1980, 26–28). This calculation is invariably lost when Albanian intellectuals today are eager to highlight how political opponents of men like Amery celebrated the Albanians precisely to instill an alternative orientation for British policy makers. The suggestion that something natural existed between Albanians and the West is thus ahistorical and taken out of context.

Other journalists made a career of enflaming public hatred for the Turk at a crucial period when it became apparent that the Ottoman Empire was more valuable broken up than kept together. Most returned to the old story of the Turkish propensity to rape Christian women.[29] These references were useful for inciting the expected outrage among the general public while confirming to more cynical men of power that the Ottoman state was in fact losing control of its armed forces. Indeed, far more convincing than simple crimes by one group of "savages" on another, it was the specter of chaos that likely mobilized a coalition of previously contented investors to decide the empire had to go.

While it would take a world war to finalize what the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 clearly indicated as a shift in Paris and London toward the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, it was the brutality of the war in the Balkans in late 1912 that convinced many that the Orient was entirely irredeemable without direct military occupation. Here then, the interests of financial capital, evangelical Christians, and "the public" ultimately converged to permit the machinations of European capitalism to directly occupy the Ottoman Empire by 1918. Many, like Durham, saw the Albanians (or some Albanian factions) as the critical wedge that would allow the British (or Austrians, Italians, Greeks, Serbs) to succeed at their rivals' expense. What Albanians eager to define these interactions in nostalgic form fail to acknowledge is the precarious, and extremely manipulative, abusive, and ultimately dualistic nature of such associations. One need only consider the experience of Arabs who entrusted their future to T.E. Lawrence during the same era.

Theorizing the Disorientation

This operational logic accounts for the manner in which post-Ottoman societies also adopted much of the framework of Orientalism, a form of the "localizing" discourses that were used within the nation-states of the post-World War I context in order to further delineate where power rested. In Greece, interwar Yugoslavia, post-Ottoman Iraq, Syria, and indeed Turkey itself, the newly emerging ruling elite, often wresting power from clusters of Ottoman-orientated constituencies with still-strong multicultural, universalistic sentiments, relied on Orientalist discourse against the internal other. What has been labeled by others studying these phenomena as "self-Orientalized" agents of post-Ottoman power is a product of fused Euro-American Orientalist practices that, consciously or not, helped

create a national ideal that relied on claims of primordial authenticity and modernity. Partha Chatterjee, for one, notes that the very evocation of modernization in the struggle for cultural and political hegemony meant so-called "Eastern" nationalists actually carried on the Orientalism legacy (Chatterjee 1986, 30–32).

But as Homi Bhabha has argued, this was never an entirely successful campaign because an inherently liminal space existed between those seeking to utilize European civilization to subjugate rivals. The requisite mimicry, in other words, hid the underlying presence of a counterweight to colonial power as it passed from direct rule to rule by proxy (Bhabha 1994, 86). Where I believe we may fruitfully complicate the discussion is in this liminal space that constitutes an arena which was experienced both by Europeans, heretofore deemed the center of the power grid, and the Ottoman object. To date, the way Albanians, both those hostile to their Muslim heritage and those seeking to ideologically orientate it, have studied this liminal space is akin to assuming that the Ottomans (Muslims) advocating reform were simply moving toward the West—a sign of the inevitable Europeanization of certain politically motivated agents of modern history that is either celebrated or decried in Albanian circles today. As Selim Deringil, among others, has said, this had its early manifestations in late Ottoman society by way of key members of society, especially in government, adopting Western mannerisms (Deringil 2003).

But what if this liminal space is also read as an arena for disgruntled Euro-Americans to seek a world that is still present and maybe even resilient? The references to the Ottoman Empire, as excavated from the available sources, seem to reaffirm a power relationship whereby the West is dominant. But for those studying the Balkans, there are tell-tale ambiguities of the late nineteenth century. Unlike Orientalism, which is a discourse about an imputed opposition, the emergent Balkanism is a discourse about an imputed ambiguity clearly evident after the fall of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires. This means that objects or ideas that confuse classifications held dear by the observer may actually provoke the kind of behavior that condemns the classifications. That is to say, whatever is ambiguous, anomalous, or indefinable in the nineteenth century necessarily becomes disorder and danger to some constituencies. The "exasperation before complexity" has long been a fixture of literature that relies on degrading tropes, as tabulated and dissected masterfully by Todorova in respect to the Balkans (Todorova 1997, 62–88).

Indeed, British observers lost in the mire of the Balkans saw the Ottoman lands as full of contradictions whereby different peoples and races lived side-by-side, thus living in a manner exactly opposite of what a reasonable European would expect in such mixed conditions. These anomalies became sources of consternation and anxiety and were invariably characterized as a powder keg that could explode at any moment. And of course, this logic became self-serving, as strategists encouraged organized interests outside the Ottoman lands to invest in methods to excite these natural tensions between different races for their own exploitative purposes.

In time, the heavy influx of weapons, money, and incitement and the cultivation of what I call elsewhere ethnic parvenus, became a self-fulfilling prophecy. With new kinds of opportunities available where no such materialistic possibilities existed before, the Eastern Mediterranean, like much of Africa and Southeast Asia, became a cauldron of ethnic hatreds. The end result was not only fueled by the fire of sensationalist journalism that emerged at the time, but neatly fit into new orientations of possible power shifts as the Ottoman Empire fell vulnerable to pressures from its foreign bankers and invading armies. Here then emerged the new career path for talented writers at the end of the nineteenth century, an important context in which to reconsider their Orientalism. Reporting violence became a genre that linked the romanticism of Orientalism of the past with the new imperialist ambitions to expand empire by proxy. In this crucial intersection of realized influence, the still-evident deficit of Western hegemony, and the capitalists' ambitions of power, left the utility of Orientalist tropes with a new historical trajectory.[30]

Ottoman subjects (Albanians) contradicted as much as reaffirmed these tropes. Indeed, the tension would remain throughout the twentieth century. In this regard, it is reasonable to ask: to what extent would the Orientalist discourse serve as an instrument of power? In fact, does Orientalism reflect any kind of reality by which the Oriental was indeed subordinate to the West? It may be that the reference to the Ottoman as savage, therefore, is also tempered in this liminal zone within which the vagaries of power were navigated by those writing at the time.

Here is where we as observers need to appreciate how confused references to the past distort the strategic calculations of many Albanians today who seek to use nostalgia to refer to a non-Muslim, Western-centric past. Rushing to mobilize nostalgia to highlight Albanians' non-Muslim, European heritage relies on decontextualizing the targeted references to

the past. That there remain a few who object to these tendencies in Albanian circles today, in particular Rexhep Qosja, is a cause of some hope. And yet, what Qosja's lonely struggle also highlights is the dual function of religion in our "modern" world.[31] The primary function in the calculus of power for those "ethnic entrepreneurs" who have been able to win the support of the international community is to manage people who may actually have quite different sets of interests. The constant struggle to gain access to political power (and hence control of the purse strings that allow patriarchs to reward loyalists) distorts domestic realities in Kosovo and Albania. The fact that the international community actually arbitrates this process by dictating when elections take place and has maintained a veto on any political order arising from elections means the struggle for local ascendancy is mediated by the combined interests of the US, the EU, and the United Nations in securing Albanians' political and economic subordination. The end result is a highly unrepresentative political class in Albania, Macedonia, and Kosovo (within all the so-called "ethnic groups") that services the demands of external interests. Their constant defiance of indigenous political hopes and economic needs can, in part, be sheltered by a manipulative use of nostalgia that redirects tensions toward those within the larger community who do not fit in.

Conclusion

Scholars evoking Orientalism sometimes misinterpret the colonial footprint existing in the so-called "Orient" at the time most of Said's Orientalists were writing (painting) their dubious characterizations of the Turks. I suggested in this study that perhaps the most useful way to integrate Said's critical engagement with Western racism is to consider the Orient not as an actual place but as a framework within which people of assumed power engaged the world. Indeed, to Said himself, the Orient is in fact a system of representations rather than a geographic object (Said 1979, 202–203).[32] It is here that his work has most influenced others, often with not entirely satisfying results. In one way, what is so remarkable for this particular set of issues as they involve the actors interesting us in this special volume is that they evoke very much the same lexicon assumed by Said to make up the epistemological core of a purported Orientalist system of representations. This "closed system" does seem to resist modification and be "timeless"; for the last one and a half centuries the discourse has apparently been locked in an ontological vise. In the violent, primitive

Balkans, the inscrutable Turkish, Slavic, and altogether Oriental others are still "not quite European."

The crucial delineation of "difference" is of course entirely fictional, however. It is arbitrary and often renegotiated along an axis that many critical engagements with Orientalism seem to forget: power. This is actually where it is indeed not entirely true that the "once a Turk, always a Turk" calculus interferes with the functions of Orientalist discourse and its resulting objectification of entire peoples. It is rather the question of power that is the animating factor. As a consequence, the systemic nature of the belittling discourse of Orientalism is actually meant to provide reassurance that there is a perceptible boundary between "us and them." As I attempted to demonstrate above, just to whom "us" and "them" refers is fundamentally dependent on context. What is really at play is the capacity to utilize the system of Orientalist codes as a magical device to ensure that the assumed power matrix is sustained. It does not, however, accurately explain where actual power in the nineteenth century lay.

For crucial periods when the Balkans and the Orient more generally were the most coveted prizes in the "Great Game," they were, at least for many with commercial ambitions, out of reach. This Oriental defiance to assumed power may have incited the kinds of vitriol that both belittled and systematically objectified (for science or commerce) the Oriental other. Consider Vesna Goldsworthy's assertion that British fiction set in the Balkans can be read as a way for an otherwise distant British political and economic elite to "secure their stakes [in the East] as surely as European colonists [did]…in America, Australia, or New Zealand" (Goldsworthy 1988, 2–3). A similar explosion of sensationalist travel novels and newspaper articles and journalists traveling among the wild peoples of the East all attest to an inaccessibility that frustrated the conglomerates funding (and profiting from) this literature. Be it a "metaphoric" colonialism or otherwise, the enduring resistance to their power ambitions left various actors entirely dependent on a discourse that could only offer sensationalist depictions of those in need of civilization.

Unfortunately, the corrupting influence of hindsight has convinced many scholars—both conservative and progressive—of the inevitability of the Ottoman Empire's fate. A deeper inspection into the entire nineteenth century, however, suggests the need for more nuance to situate what impacted the interactions between "failed empires" like the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman and ascendant global powers of the first-half of the twentieth century. The underlying conclusion is that modern

imperialism was not yet a refined machine imposing unchallenged dictates upon the rest of the world. This certainly applies to its ideological fundaments and the propaganda that spoke in its terms. Albanians today who are unfamiliar with the precarious nature of Western epistemology miss the chance to embrace an Ottoman ecumenical spirit their ancestors both harnessed and often died protecting.

In their plight as excluded members of Europe, diaspora Albanians reflect on their status as forgotten Europeans as a form of pathos. It is an attempt at remembrance that lacks full acknowledgement of having itself been fraught with tension—otherwise, why the exile in the first place? The assertion that some ideal pristine past shaped the confines of their current plight suggests that they imagine their homelands-as-idealized-past in simpler terms. So their frequent reference to uniformity predictably has both Western-origin racial and ethno-centric underpinnings. Their monochrome existence in their current homes leads them to trust in imagined pasts so utterly pristine and homogeneous that they surely actually never were. And yet, the professions of nostalgia bely a dangerous conservatism that is easily resourced by host societies; this conservatism makes its own particular contribution to recent instabilities back in the Balkan homelands.

Notes

1. In a notorious moment of self-reflection within the larger context of identity politics being forced on the inhabitants of the Balkans, former Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) field commander and current Kosovar politician Ramush Haradinaj said rhetorically, “Nuk e di pse jam musliman …” (“I do not know why I am a Muslim …”). (Lecture given at Columbia University, 23 September 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OHqlaP7Ag5o). This reflection into how such narrow associations to faith determine larger political relations in a post-9/11 Balkans is a process observed throughout the Balkans. For examples see Ghodsee 2009; Banac 2006, 30–43; Öktem 2011 and Poulton 1997, 82–102.
2. In previous work (Blumi 1998) I integrated the concerns expressed by Maria Todorova and others to the operating assumptions scholars analyzing Balkan affairs brought to their study. Furthermore, I suggested there was a sensationalist angle to these tropes about Albanian difference that proved necessary if scholars hoped to publish their work during the 1990s.
3. As done in respect to the early 1990s in Bosnia (Campbell 1998).
4. In particular Boym 2001; Özyürek 2006 and Bonnett 2010.

5. Piro Misha has been one of the most vocal advocates of "returning" Albania to "history" (meaning Europe). This nonethnic Albanian citizen (he is of Vlach origin) has been especially keen on positioning the debates since the end of the Communist era around the region's Christian heritage, thereby freeing Albanians from the "prison" of the past. See his pseudo-guidebook recommending how Albanians should present themselves to the outside world (Misha 1997, 2008).
6. According to data assembled by Gallup Balkan Monitor, Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania show the highest support for American leadership. In 2012, support for the United States (US) among Albanians in Kosovo was 92.2%, in Albania 80.2%, and in Macedonia 55.5%. Likewise, Albanians in the Balkans show a high level of support for European Union (EU) membership. Data from 2011 reveal that support for EU integration among Albanians in Kosovo is 95.4%, in Macedonia 72.3%, and in Albania 87.1%. Source: Gallup Balkan Monitor. Survey data available at <http://www.balkan-monitor.eu/index.php/dashboard>.
7. For discussion on how this plays out in both Macedonia and Kosovo, countries once again in the news as tensions between Slavs and Albanians flair over the distribution of political and cultural rights, see Krasniqi 2011.
8. For an example of how such logic is applied to scholarship that has proven influential in how policies toward the Balkans are developed, see the vapid *The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Islam to Europe and the West* (Deliso 2007).
9. For a rich and thus invaluable survey of that heritage see Norris 1993.
10. As a result, some scholars have reinforced the claim that Albanians (as opposed to Slav Muslims) have a stronger sense of national than religious identity, a trope embraced by Albanian nationalist writers evoking nostalgic references to a European heritage. See Babuna 2002, 2004.
11. The novels of Ismail Kadare, written with the encouragement of the Enver Hoxha regime, evoke an alien, Oriental presence among Albanians who needed heroes willing to use violence to excise it from the homeland. On how his literature is interpreted by the few who have actually studied his novels, see Weitzman 2011; Jing 2013; Gould 2012.
12. Only one scholar, Enis Sulstarova (Sulstarova 2007), has fully understood Kadare's Orientalist agenda. Kadare's novels, if interpreted with this agenda in mind, correspond with his more recent polemic against Albanians, including Kosovar intellectual Rexhep Qosja, who wish to temper these attempts to expunge Islam from Albanian culture. On the debates Kadare's xenophobic, racist, and chauvinist diatribes have inspired, see Ceka 2006.
13. In addition to the previously cited Misha and Kadare, the late Ibrahim Rugova (self-anointed "father" of Kosovo) was particularly keen to prove

Kosovo's Catholic orientations, often at the expense of making the necessary demands of his European interlocutors on behalf of all Kosovars, whom he presumably represented as "President." See for instance, Rugova 1996, 62–83; Rugova et al. 1994.

14. Some intellectuals have pushed back at this crude, opportunistic polemic (Lubonja 2004, 127–35; Qosja 2006).
15. Albanian nostalgia for homeland has grown to near-mythological levels in respect to specific actors, mostly propped up by the Enver Hoxha regime in Albania between 1944 and 1985. This campaign is noted for its strategic use of history to reinforce the regime and, perhaps, a particular sub-group of Albanian speakers who came to dominate the Albanian state with the rise of Hoxha's faction of the Albanian Communist Party during World War II. See Blumi 1997.
16. I am referring to Hysamedin Feraj, *Skice e mendimit politik shqiptar,* calling Skanderbeg a collaborationist (Feraj 1998). In contrast, Kadare has used his reputation as an author to interject hostility toward Albania's Ottoman past, often in mainstream media (Kadare 1992).
17. The sycophantic fascination with this complex, and at times unreliable, agent of British imperialism has left many a scholar and public figure fixated on telling a positive story of Durham's relationship to Albanians at the expense of putting her various projects in their proper early twentieth-century context. The latest efforts to tie Durham to Albanians-as-Europeans makes this problem especially clear (Gowing 2014; Tanner 2014). A similar character has received near worship status among some Albanians hoping to reorientate the region toward the West (Destani 2011).
18. A fundamental concern when engaging nostalgia-as-tool, therefore, is to disentangle the ideological function of Orientalism from the historicist projections of Europe that dominate the scholarship. If we can "decenter" or "provincialize" Europe, not in order to identify parallel processes of modernization but to create a new analytical space to understand the distribution of power in the late Ottoman territories, we can then offer a critical reassessment of the theoretical stakes of Said's claims (Ahmad 1992).
19. The editor of the Darlington daily, *The Northern Echo,* and later co-editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, W.T. Stead became an innovator in advocacy journalism, what by the 1890s evolved into Yellow Journalism in the United States. Upon creating *The Northern Echo* in 1871, he wrote that the paper would give him "a glorious opportunity to attack the devil," or "the Eastern Ogre," by which he meant Ottomans. Seeing that his post as editor offered him "the only throne in Britain" to fight the Ottoman Empire, he became notorious in his attacks on the Disraeli government for its failure to use the state's power to that end. As such, he has been named by

scholars of the era one of the "fugleman of atrocity-mongers," among whom Gladstone remains the best known. See Shannon 1963, 28. For more details of Stead's career, see Robinson 2012.

20. On the so-called "tribal" nature of the ways in which "customary" law was practiced in Northern Albanian contexts, see Durham 1928, 63–97.
21. As argued by scholars of the era's literature, reference to these "dark" corners of the world often disguised considerable internalized fears of actually being overwhelmed by these foreign forces, a kind of "colonialism in reverse" that may equally apply to the way anti-Ottoman discourse worked in the press. See Arata 1990.
22. What W.T. Stead called "Government by Journalism" implied that it was up to the newspaper editor and his solider journalists to push government policy to serve a "higher" calling (Stead 1886, 673). Indeed, it is Stead's campaign in 1876 through numerous editorials in his *Northern Echo,* with his initial foray drawing from the first reports of massacres in Bulgaria (written by Edwin Pears and published in the *Daily News* on 23 June 1876), that best highlights his utilitarian approach to reporting. Within weeks, a scandal exploded in Parliament, with other notorious Turkophobes like Liberal William E. Forster demanding a response from Conservative Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli (Forster 1876a, b, 3).
23. On how Disraeli's specific evocation of Albanians, via an emerging myth about Skanderbeg, entered into this prose, see Elsie 1993. See also Sultana 1976.
24. As others have noted, there is room for being cautious when evoking Orientalism in the context of Europe's relationship with the Ottoman Balkans. Katherine Fleming has noted that not all gestures toward the Ottoman Empire can neatly fit the colonial context within which Said's Orientalism is grafted. To Fleming, "the Balkan instance throws some significant roadblocks in the path of those who would import wholesale a Saidian critique. Quite simply, the territories of the Balkans have had a very different history… The political development of the Balkans, especially as it has been influenced by external powers, has been shaped by factors unlike those at play in the Orient of Orientalism" (Fleming 2000, 1230).
25. Eventually Stead's campaigns against not only Turks but also prostitution in British cities led to his takedown by rivals, who used many of the same sensationalist tactics Stead himself used. By the end of the campaign against Stead, *Lloyd's Weekly Newspaper* had created a scandal wide enough to lead Gladstone's chief apologist to prison. See Walkowitz 1992, 106; Eckley 2007.
26. It was even more complex than mere romanticism, however. Openly flaunting his homoerotic adventures with Ottoman Muslims, Byron described the Albanian men he met during his travels as members of "the

most beautiful race…in the world" and noted that Ali's grandsons were "the prettiest little animals I ever saw" (Marchand 1973, 227–8 cf.; Drucker 2012, 145). See also Bhattacharji 2010.

27. On the extent to which Ali Pasha of Tepelena's investment in building the region's economy served as a model for the European vision of the Balkans as a prime area for investment, see Fleming 1999, 42–48.
28. Weary of such performances, British consul Biliotti, who advocated supporting Ottoman officials facing such open hostility by neighboring states, warned his superiors in London to consider the source of such stories. National Archives of the United Kingdom (NAUK), Foreign Office (FO) 195/2029 no. 45, Biliotti to O'Coner, dated Salonika, 25 January 1898.
29. During the Ilinden Uprising of 1903, with the brutal defeat of insurgents serving as a catalyst for heretofore reluctant interventionists, the journalist Brailsford accompanied accounts of military defeat with references to Turkish ravages of defenseless Christian women. He claimed that "at least 3000 rapes" took place in a few days during the crackdown (Brailsford 1906, 166n).
30. A sort of discursive hardening had thus begun, one that reaches us in the post-colonial era as an historic artifact that is often mistreated anachronistically, assumed to report an imbalance of power that I argue throughout may indeed be inaccurate for most of the nineteenth-century anti-Turk Orientalist rhetoric.
31. For more see Jazexhi 2007a, b.
32. That said, Said can be accused of not remaining entirely loyal to this neat, and persuasive, assertion.

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CHAPTER 4

The Economy of Nostalgia: Communist Pathos Between Politics and Advertisement

Tanja Zimmermann

The Revival of Stalin's and Tito's Images

Over the last decade Russia and Southeast Europe have been experiencing a phenomenon of nostalgia for Communist leaders, even if they were dictators who ruthlessly eliminated their opponents and ordered show trials, mass executions, and gulags. In general, "ostalgic"[1] phenomena and the past's haunting of the present are particularly widespread in countries in which Communist crimes were never prosecuted by law and where the old elites remained in power during the post-Communist period. The inability to officially mourn the victims of repressions on a broad public scale is manifested, as Alexander Etkind observes, in literature and films by the production of spectral figures which return from the past to the present but are detached from their primary context (Etkind 2013: 196ff.). The absence of mourning and of adequate remembrance awakes agents of the past.

On 9 May 2010, the commemoration day of the Soviet victory over the Nazis, public buses called "Victory Buses" bearing portraits of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin appeared on the streets of St. Petersburg.[2] They were

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decorated on the initiative of different social groups—internet bloggers, private transport enterprises, and the old Communist party (KPRF).[3] In 2012 and 2013, several other cities were added. The buses circulated from February till May, or even longer in St. Petersburg and other Russian cities such as Volgograd (previously Stalingrad), Yekaterinburg in the Urals, and Chita in Siberia, their purpose being to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Red Army's victory in the Battle of Stalingrad.[4] Some nationalistic Russian activists even planned to extend the campaign for the fatherland and its strong, victorious leader to the streets of Estonia and Latvia, where large communities of Russian compatriots live beyond the borders of the homeland.[5] Thus, the idea of national strength was inscribed into a means of transportation in order to express imperial memories of glory and power and to signal the extension of the Stalinist period. The picture of Stalin in the idealized style of Socialist Realism, expressing vitality and optimism, was attached to the surfaces and windows of the buses. The Communist dictator, who in his own time was always presented separated from and elevated above the masses, now appeared close to the common people using public transport.

Human-rights activists protested against this form of shifted memory and the exclusion of the dark side of the history in question, especially as the bus route in Yekaterinburg passed by a historical site where victims of Stalinism, among them the Tsar Nicolaus II and his family, had been buried. From the memory sites of the Great Patriotic War, Leningrad and Stalingrad, Stalin *redivivus* moved further eastwards and westwards, to places where other events such as mass executions and gulags should have left traces in historical memory. His movement was no longer limited to the commemoration day; it soon became omnipresent.

In official Russian memory the Soviet leader represents not only the period of industrialization, the rise to global power, and the victory over Nazism and Fascism; the media in Russia also celebrate him as an Orthodox ascetic and saint, as Konstantin Kaminskij observes (Kaminskij 2012: 165ff.; Lutz-Auras 2013: 288ff.). In the documentary-soap *Stalin LIVE* (NTV, 2008) by Grigorij Ljubomirov, the dictator's life is presented according to the hagiographic patterns of religious converts to the Orthodox Church. Stalin's *vita* from childhood until death is constructed as the life of a sinner who lost his faith and became a demonic anti-Christ, but who at the end found his way back to God.

Even stronger manifestations of a Stalin cult are icons depicting the dictator in a non-religious manner in a uniform, but at the same time transfigured by a nimbus or accompanied by traditional saints (Bloomfield

2008; Achmatova 2010; Walsh 2016). Communist and Orthodox iconography have merged together to create a new form of political theology similar to that of the Tsarist period, when the Tsar simultaneously incorporated the highest sacred and profane powers.

After the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 and the iconoclastic destruction of Stalin statues in the countries of the Eastern Bloc, Stalin became a symbol of a former Soviet imperial power. While the gulags represented a part of a shameful history which had to be forgotten, the glorious victory in the patriotic Fatherland's War was integrated into post-Communist memory in Russia. At the same time, Stalin, the generalissimo of the Red Army, was detached from the negative part of history and embedded into its positive pole—as a hero. He is no longer a real historical figure but a pathos formula representing a father of the Russian nation who contributed to the glory of the homeland.

Similarly, in the countries of former Yugoslavia the figure of Josip Tito today stands less for forced collectivization, show trials, and gulags than for the yearning for the Socialist prosperity of the 1960s and 1970s, especially during the decades marked by the "third way" between East and West after the break with Stalin and the foundation of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1956. The Slovenian sociologist Mitja Velikonja explains the phenomenon of "Titostalgia" as a complex product of popular culture which transforms the manipulated memories of the past into a source of utopian longings for a better future (Velikonja 2009: 118). Recent ceremonies on the commemoration day of the Slovenian uprising against Fascism during the Second World War, held on 27 April 2013 and accompanied by a pop-rock concert based on the slogan "For Freedom, for Bread" ("Za svobodo, za kruh"), seem to support his theses.[6] The program included revolutionary melodies of the Paris Commune and international Socialist and Communist workers' hymns as well as popular Partisan and Tito songs. The stadium was adorned with emblems of international Communism, Partisan groups, and former Socialist Yugoslavia. The battle against Fascism as an extreme form of imperialism was held up by the organizers as parallel to resistance to the austerity program imposed by the European Union.[7] Communist emblems and "icons" were thus exploited to protest against recent economic reforms and evoke an anti-European spirit. The Slovenian government used the old Communist slogans and the visual patterns of Yugoslav and international Communism to promote its leftist-liberal politics.

In both cases, the iconic revival of the Communist political leaders is presented as a conversion, similar to the transformation of Saul into Paul.

The antiquated images of the former leaders, following Socialist Realism in style, play an important part in the process of re-evaluation. The pathos of cheerfully laughing people supporting the dictator's five-year plans, as if the death they caused was the result of an ethical principle of benevolence for the future generation, is exploited in present-day pathetical images for other goals.

In memory studies such as Svetlana Boym's *The Future of Nostalgia* (Boym 2001, 2007) and Alexander Etkind's *Warped Mourning* (2013), this change is explained by traumatic experiences and the policy of suppression of memory in the name of persisting totalitarian systems or of new nationalistic concepts of history and identity. The semioticians of the famous Tartu-Moscow school, Juri Lotman and Boris Uspensky, in an article entitled "The role of dualistic models in the dynamics of the Russian culture", claim that the transformation of a sinner into a saint is a typical, constant feature in Russian culture (1977: 1ff.). In Russia, the models of historical change are not arranged according to paradigms of an evolutionary path, for example according to the triple steps of classical Hegelian dialectics leading by way of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis from one historical stage to the next; instead they adhere to a pattern of a dualistic exchange of two opposite, polarized perspectives. The two scholars derive their dualistic model from the imaginary of Orthodox religion, which recognizes only heaven and hell. The possibility of a middle way of purgatory is a notion unknown to the Orthodox Church. According to Lotman's and Uspensky's pessimistic explanation, development inside this dualistic system has no teleological goal which would result in a reconciliation of contrasts and antagonisms, but it occurs as a conversion from one extreme to another: What was on top of the axiological order in an earlier period falls to the bottom in the following one, positive values become negative, the sacred becomes diabolic and *vice versa*. In his later writings, Lotman compares this kind of change to a semiotic "explosion" (Lotman 2010). According to this model, Russian culture is imagined as knowing neither a middle way nor a synthesis but only a total eclipse, a permanent turn upside down. Such a perception implies no continuity but rather a sequence of ruptures, gaps, and abrupt changes of perspective. As similar reversals of ethical values can be observed in countries not belonging to the Orthodox culture, we should be careful of applying Lotman and Uspensky's model exclusively to one religion. Similar changes can also be observed in visual images transfered from pagan antiquity to Christianity.

In visual studies, the dualistic model of conversion resembles that of pathos formulas—emotional-affective mimicry and gestures frozen in solid visual patterns—such as those collected by the German art historian and cultural theorist Aby Warburg in his atlas, *Mnemosyne* (Backer 2013: 2ff.).[8] Such pathos formulas bear the memory of suffering, of emotional tremor or ecstasy; but at the same time they lose the concrete, primary meaning of the original experience. They are less symptoms of the persistence of memory than of its dissolution and its animated afterlife as a spectre between memory and forgetting" (Didi-Huberman 1998: 7ff.). As mobile images detached from their primary context, they can appear in totally new constellations. In pathos formulas persisting over centuries, negative actions and protagonists can convert into positive ones and *vice versa*.

In the following, I would like to call attention to another strategy, similar to nostalgia, which derives not from memory studies but from the sphere of advertisement and marketing. Boym defines nostalgia not only as a "sentiment of loss and displacement", but also as "a romance with one's own phantasy", a "mechanism of seduction and manipulation", which needs a long-distance relationship to look back upon (Boym 2007: 7, 11). These qualities move nostalgia close to the sphere of advertisement by evoking emotions of longing for economic reasons and thereby causing a shift into the field of political propaganda. In the next section we will go back to an early stage of advertisement, to a time when theoreticians in literature and art tried to understand how images of prominent people and their names could influence the emotions of customers and persuade them to buy a product.

Communist Visual Formulas Between Politics and Advertisement

The Russian Avant-Garde, especially the theoreticians of so-called Russian Formalism, drew attention to a close connection between politics and advertising as early as the post-revolutionary period in the Soviet Union. During the New Economic Policy in the middle of the 1920s, when some forms of private economy were permitted, representatives of the Avant-Garde observed how the form, the phrases, and the design of posters became independent of their content and their referents, the products. In an article entitled "Agitation and Advertising" (1923), the leftist futurist,

poet, and propaganda artist Vladimir Mayakovsky recognized that the bourgeois capitalist system possessed powerful means of promoting products. He advised that Soviet Communist propaganda imitate those means for ideological purposes (Mayakovsky 1959: 57ff.; Zimmermann 2007: 197ff.). More important than the product itself was, as Mayakovsky remarked, the name of the product, including the names of prominent people.

> "Advertisement – this is the name of the object. As a good artist makes his mark, an object also makes its name. If people see a famous name on the front page of a newspaper, they stop to buy it. If the same object is offered without a name on the front, hundreds of people would pass by inattentively."[9]

The strategy of transforming a product into a name which would be even more desirable than the product itself was used to animate the vacuous revolutionary slogans. In his essay "Genres of Foodstuff and Semi-Luxury Food" (1928), the Russian Formalist Viktor Trenin observed a new relation between words and objects in advertisements (Trenin 1928: 25ff; Zimmermann 2007: 199ff.). The primary meaning of the words was replaced by their secondary meaning, which no longer had anything in common with the referent. The aesthetic design of advertising, the form and colour of visual images, and the poetically composed phrases would form a product, bestow new characteristics on it, and stimulate the imagination of consumers and the feeling of desire. Thus, advertising and politics were closely connected at the very beginning of Communism as a mass movement in the Soviet Union. In the same way historical personalities like Stalin or Tito can be transformed into advertising images, detached from their original meaning in the post-communist era.

As mentioned above, the Slovenian government organized festivities in 2013 for the commemoration of the Liberation Front (*Osvobodilna Fronta*). It took up the strategy of Avant-Garde Communist advertising and demonstrated how successfully the old revolutionary slogans and emblems still animated the discontented masses. Already in 2006, before Slovenian politicians rediscovered the emblems of the Slovenian anti-Fascist uprising during the Second World War, the Slovenian advertising company Formitas had designed T-shirts with the initials of the Liberation Front, OF, transforming their meaning into Advertising Front (*Oglaševalska Fronta*). Formitas also transformed the symbol of the Slovenian uprising, a three-headed mountain called Triglav, into an eco-



Fig. 4.1 T-shirts with the symbol of the Slovenian Liberation Front (OF) transformed into an economic diagram

nomic diagram with a falling vector calling for action (Fig. 4.1). Their slogan was "It's time for action!" ("Čas je za akcijo!").[10]

This pun demonstrates the facile metamorphosis of the wartime ethos, the appeal of an uprising to liberate the homeland, into a new-age pathos belonging to the realm of commercial advertising. Contemporary economic literature shows how consciously and reflectively the marketing sector analyzes the emotional need of consumers to integrate the past into their individual and collective identity (Kießling 2013). In her doctoral thesis, the German economist Tina Kießling distinguishes not only between a private and a historical collective nostalgia but also between a "material" nostalgia for auratic antique objects, associated with old values, and an "abstract" one for retro-style products, which assume new attributes and no longer have a close connection to the past. This distinction is close to Boym's typology, in which she distinguishes between an individual (private), fragmentary, "reflective" nostalgia and a collective (national), "restorative" nostalgia, which tries to reconstruct and rebuild what has been lost. The former is more temporal, stressing the bittersweet longing itself without any need for location. The latter is more topographical, oriented towards the rebuilding of the lost home (of the nation, understood as a conspiratorial, primordial family clan). The former loves "details" (or, rather, auratic objects of the past as ruins), the latter "symbols" and "rituals" (meaning visual patterns). In advertising, according to

Kießling, nostalgia is connected not with pain and longing but primarily with pleasure because needs may be satisfied by buying retro-products. Thus, nostalgia is constructed like an oxymoron—embodying ambivalent, bittersweet feelings, in which the longing for old times can be satisfied by symbolic aesthetic values. It is a strong emotion in which the gap between past and present can be overcome by the economy of acquisition, and during this process that which has been lost is replaced.

Parody of the Revolutionary Pathos in Politics and Advertisement: Vladimir Milovanović's Documentary-Fiction *The Face of a Revolution* (2012)

In both types of revival of Communist visual formulas, in Russia as well as in Slovenia, we encounter an affirmative recycling of well-known material.[11] In critical fine arts and in film, by contrast, the same patterns are used in an opposite, subversive way. Vladimir Milovanović's film *The Face of a Revolution* (Serbia 2012), half documentary, half fictional grotesque, is dedicated to the Resistance movement (*Otpor*) in Serbia, which overthrew Slobodan Milošević on 5 October 2000. The documentary part of the film tells the story of student Branko Ilić, who was born on 5 October 1981. He was one of the youngest popular leaders of the spontaneous movement, and he was awarded a "Free Your Mind" prize by MTV in Stockholm in 2000.

The documentary starts with interviews with Ilić, today a forgotten man, about what happened to the revolution in Serbia. He expresses his disappointment with the results of the revolution and speaks of how his early fellow combatants have come to occupy high posts in politics and business, or have committed suicide. The film-makers and Ilić's friends try to encourage him to celebrate the anniversary on 5 October 2010, an anniversary which has been forgotten in Serbian society. Via Facebook, he invites Serbian people who feel disappointed with the ex-revolutionaries in the new government to put their trash in front of the Serbian parliament. His slogan is "Trash for trash" ("Đubre đubretu"). However, there is almost no response to his call; he is joined only by some extreme leftist groups, such as the Communist youth (SKOJ).[12] During the small, quiet protest, some policemen write down the names of the protestors without recognizing which of them is Branko Ilić.

Several days later, another event in Belgrade provokes real mass participation, namely the Love Parade on 10 October, which becomes a violent

anti-homosexual manifestation of the nationalist right wing. The commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the revolution of October 2000—which also alludes to all of the other unsuccessful revolutions up to the October Revolution—brings no catharsis for Branko. Deeply disappointed for the second time, he decides to stop giving interviews for the documentary and moves to the countryside, leaving the capital on 17 December 2010 for the small town of Arilje, where he was born. The film presents Ilić as a broken man who lives close to nature, takes pills, and avoids company. The film producer comments that the unfinished documentary resembles the revolution, which also never came to an end.

The fictional part of the film, which complements the unfinished, broken-off documentary, is a grotesque about advertising strategies, using communist images and parols. It unravels specific strategies employed by the post-Communist commercial system, especially its methods of abusing revolutionary slogans and symbols for the purpose of sales promotion. It shows an advertising company working for a big bank that proposes promoting loans for apartments and other services with revolutionary symbols. The company uses retro-Avant-Garde design and dresses their actors like sailors from the battleship Potemkin (Fig. 4.2). There are French, Italian, and Chinese revolutionaries; some of them resemble Robespierre, Louis Antoine de Saint-Just, Che Guevara, Mao Zedong, and other well-known leaders.

Fig. 4.2 Documentary-fiction *The Face of a Revolution* (Serbia 2012), director: Vladimir Milovanović, film-still

Revolution is thus transformed into a trademark, its protagonists into role models of progressive Avant-Gardists. Contrary to their original pathos, formulations from Marx' economical and philosophical manuscript "The Power of Money" (1844) which once criticized capitalism, private property and evoked the spirit of revolution and fraternal bonds are now transformed into commercial slogans, detached from the original ethical appeal to resist its abusive power: "The power of money is the extent of my power! If money is what binds me to society, nature, and people, then is not money the greatest bond of all? It is! That's right!" The director of the advertising company knows how to use nostalgia for Communist times, a nostalgia which lives on in propaganda media from the Tito period, and how to transform it into the label of a "revolutionary offer": "All these years of revolutionary books, partisan films… all this affects the collective unconscious and the psyche. Today everything is psychologized, new-age-ized, or put down to mere aesthetics." The film ends not in a new revolution but in a terrorist act on the part of the producer, who shoots the director of the advertising company and thus becomes the face of a new revolution.

The satirical film thus reveals a close connection between (Communist) revolution and mass media under a post-Communist, neo-liberal system. The nostalgic remembrance of a revolution that failed, when Zoran Đinđić was assassinated, is confronted with cynical ways of misusing slogans from all sorts of movements for new commercial aims. *The Face of a Revolution* displays the face of Branko Ilić as a kind of mascot for short-term political purposes and aims that were later forgotten. Nostalgia is thus not an approach to memory of the past or to an ideal, utopic future, but a creative means of promoting new ideas or products in the present, an activity whose aims are in contrast with the forms used to express it. This strategy, converting an original ethos into a modern form of pathos, is the same in both political propaganda and commercial advertising.

Notes

1. In Germany, the neologism "ostalgic" has been coined out of the term "nostalgic" in order to emphasize this wide spread phenomenon in the East (Ost), in the former Communist countries in Eastern Europe.
2. Stalin-Bus in St. Petersburg sorgt für Skandal. *Focus.* 24 October 2010. http://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/geschichte-stalin-bus-in-st-petersburg-sorgt-fuer-skandal_aid:500479.html; Stalin bus begins driving

through St. Petersburg. *The Telegraph*. 6 May 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/7683577/Stalin-bus-begins-driving-through-St-Petersburg.html. See also Lutz-Auras 2013: 19ff.

3. *Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii*
4. Busse mit Stalin-Porträt empören Menschenrechtler. In: *Ria Novosti*. 25 February 2013. http://de.ria.ru/zeitungen/20130225/265603435.html; "Stalin buses" to mark 70th anniversary of Battle of Stalingrad in Russia. 3 January 2013. http://rt.com/politics/stalin-bus-ww2-stalin-grad-138/; Voswinkel, Johannes: Putin profitiert vom Stalin-Kult. In: *Die Zeit*, 2 February 2013. http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2013-02/russland-stalingrad-gedenken-stalin (Accessed 6 March 2016). See also Lutz-Auras 2013: 19ff.
5. Russische Aktivisten wollen im Baltikum Busse mit Stalin-Bildern starten. In: *Baltische Rundschau*. 1 April 2012.
6. For the festivities of the Slovenian uprising against Fascism led by the Liberation Front (*Osvobodilna Fronta*) see Zimmermann and Jakir 2015: 9ff.
7. A short video of the commemoration is available on YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ifydoT0v3J8&feature=youtu.be.
8. For the use of Aby Warburg's pathos formulas for history and memory studies see Backer 2013.
9. "Реклама—это имя вещи. Как хороший художник создает себе имя, так создает себе имя и вещь. Увидев на обложке журнала знаменитое имя, останавливаются купить. Будь та же вещь без фамилии на обложке, сотни рассеянных просто прошли бы мимо" (Mayakovsky 1959: 23.)
10. http://fmail.domovanje.com/novice/060426-majcke.html (Accessed 6 March 2016). I want to thank Gregor Šergan, who made me aware of the T-shirt.
11. For the affirmative and the subversive use of communist visual formulas see also Zimmermann 2015: 24ff.
12. Savez komunistichke omladine Jugoslavije.

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CHAPTER 5

‘Everything Has Its Place in God’s Imaret’: Nostalgic Visions of Co-existence in Contemporary Greek Historical Fiction

Trine Stauning Willert

Introduction

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, a hundred years after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, its history is more than ever a topic of public attention in Greece. This public concern runs parallel to the revived interest in the Ottoman past in Turkey since the 2002 political paradigm change[1] and has been emphasized in two recent events. The first is the

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unprecedented success of a documentary film, *Smyrna—The Destruction of a Cosmopolitan City,*[2] which was screened in Greek cinemas and museums for more than two years starting in 2011. In the autumn of 2013 it played to full auditoriums as it toured Modern Greek Studies programs in American and Canadian universities. The film was directed by documentarist Maria Iliou, whose father was born in Smyrna, and complements the popular historical bestseller *Paradise Lost: Smyrna 1922—The Destruction of Islam's City of Tolerance*, a book written by Giles Milton (2009), who is also the film's main commentator. The success of this documentary tells us something about the way the tragic circumstances around the simultaneous collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the quasi-imperial aspirations of the Greek state are commemorated today within what could be called the 'paradigm of cosmopolitanism'.[3]

The other event that received attention in the Greek public sphere in the same period is the conversion into a functioning mosque of an Hagia Sophia church in Trabzon, a church which had served as a museum since 1961, as well as plans to use a Byzantine monastery in Istanbul as a mosque.[4] Statements by the Turkish Deputy Prime Minister, Bülent Arinç, to the effect that the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul should re-function as a mosque have been regarded as an insulting provocation in Greece.[5] The Byzantine Hagia Sophia church was converted into an Ottoman mosque in 1453 since 1935 it was turned into a secular museum. Simultaneously, Ottoman monuments in Greece are slowly being restored, in some areas as part of a strategy for attracting Turkish tourists.[6] It can be difficult to grasp the political motives behind decisions to convert or restore religious buildings, but the symbolic signals that such acts convey are certainly very strong, regardless of whether they appear like (imperial) expressions of cultural and religious domination or like invitations to descendants of former conquerors/inhabitants to visit the country.

The cases of the documentary film and religious monuments illustrate Greece's complex relationship with the Ottoman legacy as this is formulated in the Greek public sphere. There is, on the one hand, an accentuation of the thriving cosmopolitan societies that existed in the realm of the Ottoman Empire (albeit waning at the time)—in other words a narrative that challenges the simplistic national narrative about 400 years of darkness and slavery. On the other hand, fears are expressed regarding both Turkish neo-Ottomanism,[7] symbolized in Christian monuments turned into mosques, and general Turkish rapid economic and cultural expansion in South East Europe, including Greece. We thus encounter a simultaneous longing for the cultural and religious co-existence in past imperial

times and a fear of new imperial aggression and domination. These two trends reflect the complexity of remembering and reconstructing the past, especially a past that has been turned into one of the most central myths in the construction of Greek national consciousness, namely the 400 years of slavery of the Greeks under the Turks, known as Turkokratia. Since the 1990s this myth has been scrutinized by historians; and as political relations between Greece and Turkey entered a phase of détente from 1998 onwards this trend has only increased, making Ottoman studies a flourishing new field in Greek historiography (e.g. Exertzoglou 2003, 2010; Kechriotis 2002, 2005; Eldem 2009). The period of ethnocentric opposition between Greece and Turkey was succeeded in the late 1990s by a political and cultural rapprochement between the two countries. In historiography, this rapprochement, which also includes other Balkan nations, is exemplified in the transnational project Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, with the publication *Clio in the Balkans: The Politics of History Education* (Koulouri 2002), and in the development of common history textbooks which mark the beginning of increasing cross-national exchange, at least in academia. This renewed awareness of common traits, pasts, and interests is also based on personal memories; but this time they are experienced through the second and third generations, as the example of Maria Iliou's documentary shows. This new attention to images of successful cultural co-existence and, not least, to successful upper-class Greek society expresses global fascination with cosmopolitanism and multi-culturalism and, perhaps, imperial ideals, but it is certainly also a sign of the obvious longing among Greeks today for international recognition and (self)respect.

This chapter addresses cultural and historical memory from the perspective of literature, more specifically, historical novels dealing with pre-national Ottoman societies. It is well known that the historical novel has returned to the literary scene with considerable force since the 1980s, in Greece as well as worldwide (Beaton 1999, 283–295). Whereas the 'invention' of the modern historical novel was connected with the rise of the nation-state and with national romanticism, its postmodern return was connected with the contestation of homogeneous national narratives (De Groot 2010) and also with the so-called amnesiac condition in late modern societies. From a nation-building perspective, the function of the early historical novel was to raise the reading public's awareness of the imagined national community and its heroes, be they kings and warriors or simple people of high virtue. By contrast, the postmodernist historical novel deconstructed such heroic and virtuous narratives and called on the reader

to reflect on his or her own historical consciousness and conceptions of personal and collective identities (Katsan 2013). Out of this meeting between the traditional homogenizing and the postmodern deconstructionist historical novels, I suggest that a new type of realist historical novel has emerged in Greek literature. This type of novel is well illustrated by titles such as *The Truths of Others* (Themelis 2008), *Imaret* (Kalpouzos 2008), and *So, Are You Greek, Too?* (Christopoulos 2005). The titles indicate that these novels question established versions of truth, take an interest in symbols of the national or religious Other, and question the homogeneity of the national self. Such themes are characteristic of postmodern fiction. However, there are no signs of postmodern metafictional techniques in these novels, which are written in the realist mode, usually with a chronological timeline, and in an easily accessible style and language. In this chapter, I will demonstrate how two such novels attempt to create a new national narrative of religious and cultural co-existence combining the postmodern impetus towards pluralism with the national demand for homogeneity and prevalence of the national self.

Remembering the Ottoman Past in the Greek Literary Tradition

Maria Iliou's above-mentioned documentary highlights the positive features of pre-national Smyrna, and Milton's above-mentioned book speaks of a lost paradise. For the time before the Catastrophe of 1922[8] to be remembered in paradisiac terms is nothing new. In their more or less autobiographical works from the 1940s to the 60s, the celebrated artists and authors Ilias Venezis (1943; 1972) and Fotis Kontoglou (1962) represented the projection of a lost paradise, including cultural and religious co-existence, as did Dido Sotiriou (1962) in her novel *Bloodied Earth*, which was based on the memoirs of a Greek from Asia Minor.[9] These novelists' interest in describing and reviving 'the peaceful life' before 1922 was spurred by their own experience and loss of this life, an experience they shared with more than a million other Christians of the Ottoman Empire, who were forcefully relocated to the kingdom of Greece in 1923 as a consequence of the Lausanne Treaty. The literature written by these authors, enforced or voluntary refugees, has played a huge role in the collective dealing with the deep national trauma of the military defeat to the new Turkish nation-state, the loss of the national dream of Greek rule in Asia Minor and Constantinople, and the population exchange, which

resulted in the incorporation of more than a million refugees into the small, poor, and ideologically divided Greek kingdom.

Through close readings of selected works by these authors, Angela Kastrinaki (1998) has noted that their descriptions of the past turned more ethnocentric over time, so that in newer editions of older works the opposition between Turkish and Greek characters became more accentuated in ethnic and religious terms, thus replacing the original emphasis on individual humaneness with collective national virtues.[10] These literary modifications can be explained by several factors, the most obvious being that of the increased political tension between Greece and Turkey from the 1950s onwards as a result of the Cyprus conflict and the September 1955 riots against the Christian (Greek) minority in Istanbul. As the voices and living memories of 'the peaceful life' changed through willed or involuntary amnesia or died out because of old age, Greek national consciousness was increasingly built up in opposition to the centuries-long enemy, and in schoolbooks and popular history alike the Ottoman Empire and Turkey were depicted as one and the same thing (Millas 2006).

Greek literature dealing with Ottoman society and relations between Greeks and Turks or Christians and Muslims until the 1980s can be seen as having had two functions. On the collective level, literature, through stories of loss, hardship, and heroism, has played a role in the imaginary construction of a homogeneous national community with a clear sense of its enemies. On the individual level, literature has been a means of accounting for personal stories of loss and hardship, where heroism and clear-cut boundaries between good and evil were less pronounced. In these cases, personal relationships between Greeks and Turks or Christians and Muslims were possible, and national stereotypes were nuanced or even contradicted. As noted by Calotychos (2013, 127–30), two celebrated novels, *A Prisoner of War Story* by Stratis Doukas from 1929 and *Bloodied Earth* by Dido Sotiriou from 1962, have male Greek-Christian protagonists who experience relationships of friendship and love with Turkish Muslim characters by pretending to be Muslim. In both cases the relationships are terminated by the Greek protagonists who would, if they remained in the respective relationship, pollute their souls and betray their national identity. For the sake of the imagined national community, they must give up love and personal success.

The generations of authors who personally experienced life before the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the Greek military defeat in 1922 and the catastrophe in Smyrna, and the direct consequences of the Lausanne

Treaty wrote their last works in the 1970s. From the 1980s onwards, a new epoch was inaugurated in Greek literature by authors born after the Second World War who grew up in an apparently culturally homogeneous nation-state, albeit one with sharp and disastrous political cleavages. Some of these authors, for instance Rea Galanaki (b. 1947), contested literature's use of historical narratives in the building of national consciousness, and they questioned, like postmodern literature in general, homogeneous and unambiguous cultural identities, including identities in the Ottoman period. The novels of the late 1980s and 1990s broke new ground by daring to blur the boundaries between Greeks and Turks or Christians and Muslims. Vangelis Calotychos (2013, 123) has recently noted that in fiction of the 1990s, the contact zones between Greeks and Turks are reimagined. Films and popular television programs have also contributed to an extensive remapping of Greece's position in the Balkans after 1989 and its relation to larger postmodern, transnational, and global cultural agendas. This makes Calotychos conclude that a new discourse has emerged, 'a discourse that is sensitive to alterity, even as traditional prejudices remain' (ibid.). The relaxation since 1999 of the traditional tension between Greece and Turkey on the political level was also visible in the cultural sphere, where Greek TV channels in the mid-2000s started screening Turkish soap operas with great success (Tunc 2012).

The intention of applying this new 'alterity-sensitive' discourse is obvious in two historical novels, *Imaret: In the Shadow of the Clock Tower* (Kalpouzos 2008) and *So, Are You Greek, Too?* (Christopoulos 2005). Apart from the sensitivity that these novels display regarding multi-cultural co-existence and the suffering of the Other, they also make use of nostalgia as a literary effect and an emotional force that shapes the narrative.

The concept of nostalgia has lately attracted renewed theoretical and methodological interest in the field of cultural and literary analysis, and therefore the following section will consider how this many-faceted and elastic concept can inform the literary analysis of contemporary Greek historical novels.

Nostalgia in Literature and Popular Culture

Several recent works, for instance *The Future of Nostalgia* by Svetlana Boym (2001), *Ethics and Nostalgia in the Contemporary Novel* by John Su (2005), *A Careful Longing: The Poetics and Problems of Nostalgia* by Aaron Santesso (2006), and *Reclaiming Nostalgia* by Jennifer Ladino (2012),

have sought a rethinking of the concept of nostalgia in popular culture as well as in literature. In particular, these works attempt to go beyond the traditional negative connotations of nostalgia as a daydreaming and regressive or reactionary practice in order to trace the creative potential and the future-oriented and even progressive functions of nostalgic narratives of the past (Ladino 2012, 10).

At the national level, nostalgia often promotes a sense of a shared past as a 'place of sacrifice and glory' by creating a kind of collective belonging that transcends individual memories (Boym 2001, 15). Boym distinguishes between what she calls restorative nostalgia and reflective nostalgia: restorative nostalgia is related to the word *nostos*, the returning home, and reflective nostalgia relates to the *algia*, the pain of longing. Boym links the former to attempts at truthfully reconstructing the lost home and re-living it through a return to the origins. She connects restorative nostalgia mainly to national memory and identity. Therefore, it is relevant to keep this type in mind for the analysis of historical fiction that addresses a national audience and refers to events, spaces, and times that have been inscribed into existing national narratives. How does fiction construct images of the good things in the past that have been lost? What are these images, and how and why are they relevant to a contemporary audience? Historical fiction may thus attempt to restore an (imagined) atmosphere and setting of the past that responds to feelings of loss in the audience, and in this sense literature may have a consoling effect that confirms the readers' image of 'the good old days'.

Reflective nostalgia, however, which is related more to longing as a creative force than to the actual reconstruction of the past, has transformative potential in that it opts to 'explore ways of inhabiting many places at once' (Boym 2001, xviii). Reflective nostalgia can highlight the breach between past and present and inaugurate a search for a different future. The lost homeland can become a vision for the future, even when the longed-for homeland is only an idyllic imaginary picture of a flawed or never-existent place. Consequently, the creative and transformative power of nostalgia, as opposed to its reactionary or even amnesiac or commodified versions, is important to keep in mind.

However, Boym's dichotomist model of a restorative as opposed to a reflective type of nostalgia seems to scorn the restorative type as having no creative or transforming value: restorative nostalgia 'is at the core of recent national and religious revivals; it knows two main plots – the return to origins and the conspiracy' (Boym 2001, xviii). In a very categorical way

Boym distinguishes between 'national memory that is based on a single plot of national identity, and social memory, which consists of collective frameworks that mark but do not define the individual memory' (Boym 2001, xviii). If the first type refers to a hegemonic, state-driven national memory and identity, then alternative nostalgic narratives must, following the logic of the typology, belong to the reflective type of nostalgia. Yet, alternative national narratives are not necessarily 'playful, ironic, inconclusive and fragmentary' (Boym 2001, 50), as Boym's definition of reflective nostalgia prescribes. The novels to be analyzed here belong to a popular realist genre of historical fiction that makes use of nostalgia in a less playful way without, however, adhering to a hegemonic national narrative that seeks to restore a single-plot, 'harmless', and purist version of the past.

Boym's typology was developed with particular regard to the post-Communist experience in urban space and contemporary exilic East European writers and may therefore not provide the appropriate tools for literary texts in other contexts. Instead of working with a *typology* of nostalgia, John Su (2005), in his study of contemporary Anglophone literary texts, points to the ethical dimensions of nostalgia. Like Boym, Su calls for a scholarly rethinking of nostalgia that recognizes it not only as a mode signifying 'inauthentic or commodified experiences inculcated by capitalist or national interests' (Su 2005, 2), but also as a means of facilitating 'an exploration of ethical ideals in the face of disappointing [present] circumstances' (Su 2005, 4). His study shows how many highly acclaimed Anglophone authors 'consciously exploit nostalgia's tendency to interweave imagination, longing, and memory in their efforts to envision resolutions to the social dilemmas of fragmentation and displacement' (Su 2005, 3). Roberta Rubinstein, paraphrased in Su (2005, 7), also argues that 'nostalgia does not necessarily lead to regressive attitudes but can in certain instances enable characters and readers alike to revise their perceptions of the past in two complementary senses', by, on the one hand, 'fixing' or firmly securing the past in the imagination and, on the other, revising, reinterpreting, and reconstructing the past.

Another approach to the concept of nostalgia involves going back to the first coinage of the term by the Alsatian physician Johannes Hofer in 1688, as a description of a physical syndrome observed in soldiers far from home, and to its first uses in literature (poetry), as noted by Goethe, who in 1821 commented that Oliver Goldsmith, in his poem 'The Deserted Village', '(…) resolved to revive an innocent past with sweet melancholy' (cited in Santesso 2006, 11). These two original conceptions of nostalgia

expose the contradictory nature of the concept, which covers painful longing and physical malaise as well as the poetic reconstruction of an idealized version of the past. Thus the nostalgic experience can be painful and distressing in the present, or it can be sweet and comforting as it seeks to soften the hardships of the present or even portray, as Goethe put it, 'everything we loved, esteemed and passionately looked for in the present' (cited in Santesso 2006, 11). This duality will inform my approach to analyzing two contemporary historical novels situated in pre-national Ottoman societies. Both works play on nostalgic visions of the past; but one draws on an idealization of the past as an expression of what is missing in the present, while the other focuses on the consequences of individual and collective experiences of loss and displacement which evoke nostalgia as a potentially transformative force acting on the individual as well as on the collective level.

Co-existence in Two Contemporary Greek Novels

Unlike Maria Iliou's documentary about cosmopolitan Smyrna,[11] which was inspired by Iliou's own family's displacement and her father's nostalgic memories of life before the expulsion, there are no signs in the novels I will examine here, nor in the marketing of them, indicating that the authors were motivated to write their stories by personal or family-related nostalgic narratives. Both novels do, however, to greater or lesser extents refer to the hometowns of the authors, so local 'patriotism', at least in one case, seems to have been a motivating factor. The apparent lack of personal involvement on the part of the author in his or her work distinguishes these contemporary authors from their predecessors, who used literature as a means of coming to terms with the experienced trauma of loss on an individual as well as a collective level. While one can discuss whether these earlier works of literature may be characterized as historical fiction since they refer to events within the authors' own lifetime, as well as whether and to what extent they are autobiographical, the current novels undoubtedly belong to the category of historical fiction. The two novels dealt with here are set in geographical areas that were outside the Greek nation-state in the late Ottoman era (one set in the years 1854–1882 and the other in 1893–1923). The very titles of these novels make it obvious that questions of national identity and religion are focal points in the narratives. Both novels can be characterized as realist chronicles of a specific time and place, with a focus on the daily

lives of the protagonists and the ways in which major historical events influence their lives. It is difficult to identify a main plot in either of these novels. In one case, the narrative evolves around the friendship of two boys from the time they were born till they are forced apart at the age of 27. In the other case, the fates of a series of culturally, linguistically, and religiously mixed couples and their children drive the narrative. Next to these fictive characters, factual historical events are crucial for the narrative to move forward.

The contemporary historical context of the novels, published in 2005 and 2008, is that of global post-9-11 religious polarization and the post-1989 Greek social experience of increasing cultural and religious heterogeneity as a result of a massive influx of immigrants. Because religious symbols and cross-religious contact are crucial in both novels, the following analysis focuses on the use of nostalgia in representations of religious and cultural co-existence as reconstructions of an ideal past where co-existence was a lived experience and, at the same time, as proposals for a different future where co-existence and respect for difference will also be feasible.

Symbols of Co-existence and Time in an Ottoman Town

The novel *Imaret* (2008) by Giannis Kalpouzos (b. 1960) has sold more than 80,000 copies and was awarded the 2009 Readers' Award from the Greek National Book Centre. The novel's narrative revolves around Ottoman Arta in the 1860s and 70s. It is a narrative about the emerging urban middle class and the harmonious religious co-existence between Christians, Jews, and Muslims. Muslim and Christian characters share religious rituals and texts freely without needing to convert. In this sense, the novel recalls the narrative of pre-catastrophe, Belle Époque, and cosmopolitan Smyrna from the documentary by Maria Iliou (Fig. 5.1).

The novel tells the story of the friendship between a Christian boy and a Muslim boy in Ottoman-ruled Arta during a period of relative peace from 1854 to the accession of Thessaly and Arta by the Greek kingdom in 1881. The boys, born on the same day, were breast-fed by the mother of the Muslim boy, and they grew up in a brother-like relationship. Except for the first and last chapters, which are told by a third-person narrator, the chapters are told in the first person alternately by the two main characters,



Fig. 5.1 Front cover of Kalpouzos' novel *Imaret* (2008). The image is from an undated postcard from the archive of Petros S. Mechtidis. It pictures a street in a town characterized by its Ottoman architectural style, with the mosque and minaret in the centre. There is nothing threatening about the presence of the mosque, and the image transmits an atmosphere of good old times with people strolling in the shade of the alley while the tiled roofs are lit by the sun. The colours are harmonious and invite the spectator to step in and discover this alluring past



Fig. 5.2 Map of Arta from the novel *Imaret* (second edition, 2015). The religious institution of the imaret is given a prominent place close to the compass, as if it is showing the way. The city's famous bridge, on the contrary, is placed outside the map and indicated only by a small arrow in the left bottom corner. Apart from the imaret, the map displays six mosques and two synagogues, along with 21 Christian churches. Source: Psichogios Publications.

the Greek-Christian Liontos and the Ottoman-Muslim Necip,[12] from a post-action angle. The voice of the Muslim character is thus given the same amount of space as the Christian character, which appears to be a novelty in Greek fiction.

Another unusual characteristic is that the novel, which provides a detailed historical account of a well-known Greek provincial town, replaces the town's legendary symbol, the Bridge of Arta perpetuated in Greek folk songs, with the town's Ottoman imaret, which was an Islamic institution of charity (Fig. 5.2).[13]

The bridge has been a much-used metaphor in South East European literature, often symbolizing the meeting of different religious, linguistic, and ethnic groups, but it is also seen as a pathway for conquerors and intruders of all sorts. By contrast, Kalpouzos, by choosing the imaret as a new symbol of Arta, indicates that in his novel life in the Ottoman period was characterized not so much by different groups crossing bridges as by the co-existence of different groups in a common space, and in particular a space of tolerance and hospitality. And since the imaret itself does not play any significant role in the story, it seems clear that the author uses it as a symbolic title of his book to illustrate the philosophy it conveys, namely that of religious co-existence and tolerance.

The novel's subtitle, *In the Shadow of the Clock Tower*,[14] indicates yet another important symbol associated with the use of nostalgia. The clock tower refers to the town's Ottoman mechanical clock, which is said to be the oldest in the Ottoman Empire and was created by a pupil of Galileo in 1647. The grandfather of the Muslim narrator is in charge of maintaining the clock, which adheres to the Ottoman conception of time by counting the hours from sunrise to sunset. The clock in the novel demonstrates on the one hand the Ottomans' early acquaintance with Western technology and the grandfather's advanced technical skills and historical knowledge; on the other hand the clock underlines the difference between Ottoman time, which represents the religious organization of society with its cyclical perception of time, and European time, which represents the linear and secular perception of time.[15] The centrality of time in the novel, and the indication of the inevitable transition from Ottoman religious cyclical time to European secular linear time, symbolizes not only the crossing from the world of empires to the world of nations but also the transition from the innocent world of childhood and community to an adulthood marked by separation, loss, and nostalgia.

Mixing of Greek and Ottoman Elements

The Greek national myth has cultivated the idea of categorical difference between the stereotyped images of Greeks and Turks. The Turk has been described in Greek literature as brutal, despotic, violent, and unintelligent, whereas the Greek has been described as civilized, moderate, and brave (Kosmas 2002, 200). In Kalpouzos' novel this myth is challenged by the revelation of a different image of the Ottoman Turks, namely that in Arta the Muslim Ottomans speak Greek and the novel's Ottoman characters are very fond of Greek culture. At the age of seven, the Muslim Ottoman narrator is honoured at a Muslim ritual of Koran-reciting. However, during the celebration of his excellence in Islamic learning, he unveils his deepest wish to his Greek friend: 'One day I will change and I will come to the Greek school!' (45). This wish comes true three years later, when he is accepted into the Greek school after several exams and his grandfather's persuasion of the schoolmaster. The Muslim grandfather, named Ismail,[16] plays a central role in the novel, exemplifying a harmonious Greek-Ottoman co-existence. In particular, he represents a synthesis of the Greek and Ottoman worlds through his education in both traditions and also through a universalistic religious worldview, again expressed through the metaphor of the imaret. His worldview is stated as follows:

> When the Muslims hear me, they become bitter and they criticise me. When the Christians hear me, they do the same. That's because I tell truths. (…)
>
> The earth is an Imaret. The Imaret of God. And we are the poor, the orphans and the travellers of life that it hosts. But we believe that we are its masters. We divide it, saying 'this land is ours, that land is yours' and then we attack each other's lands without recognising that it belongs to no one (111).

With this philosophy of human co-existence across divides, the Muslim grandfather appears as the author's alter ego. Thus, not only is half of the novel narrated by a Muslim boy, the character that expresses the author's message is an Ottoman Muslim. Or so it appears. For in the last chapter of the novel it is revealed by the impersonal narrator that the Ottoman grandfather's grandparents were Greek Christians and that his grandmother had kept her faith while the grandfather had converted (551). Not only is the grandfather's grandmother praised for keeping her Christian faith, she is also described as having had blonde hair and green eyes, something that her great-great-grandchild, the Muslim protagonist's sister,

inherited (178), indicating that she was different from the novel's other Ottoman Turkish characters, who are all described as dark-haired and dark-eyed. Furthermore, this grandmother had maintained in her old days that the Ottomans of Arta were descendants of Christian warlords, the so-called spachides (*sipahis*) Christians, who served the Sultan and had to convert to Islam in the seventeenth century in order to retain their privileges.[17] Consequently, what is apparently represented as the Ottoman-Muslim *Other* in this novel is in the end revealed to be the Greek-Christian *Self*.

Orientalism

This revelation exemplifies the novel's ambiguous attitude about telling the truths of Others. The novel is full of favourable references to the Koran and descriptions of certain Ottomans as enlightened, friendly, and European, for instance in interior decoration (19) and dressing styles (129). Even so, it is also full of stereotypes that inscribe it into an Orientalist tradition, for example in the distinction between the Muslim narrator as dark and the Greek as blond (19, 217). In addition, the Muslim narrator has passionate relationships with a Greek divorced lady and an exotic and erotic Egyptian dancer (219), even after he is married ('He split his life between Khalila and Ghulyia', 550), while the Greek narrator, although he has some pre-marital sexual relationships, remains faithful once he has found his beloved Maria ('In Maria's arms Liontos had found the big and everlasting love and he had no eyes for other women', 550).

Maria is certainly a widespread female Greek and Christian name, and the Maria-cult had intensified among Greek Christians since the time of the Greek War of Independence and the discovery, at the time, of various miraculous icons of the Mother of God.[18] Thus, the author's choice of the name Maria is not unusual; but since several other characters' names bear a symbolic significance, it is reasonable to connect the name of Liontos' future wife to the birth of their common future in the kingdom of Greece and their new life in Athens, just as the Virgin Mary is connected to the birth of the Greek nation through the reinstating of the national holiday of independence on the religious holiday of the Annunciation (Willert 2014, 42). Maria is the bringer of new and holy life. The name of the main character, Liontos, does not have any obvious religious symbolic connotations, but it may refer to the Byzantine Emperor Leontios (695–698 AD) or to the strength and bravery of a lion,[19] while the name of his mother, Agne, means 'pure' and reflects this woman's chastity after her husband's

death, when she resists all suitors. The novel thus upholds the traditional ethnocentric image of Greeks and Christians as pure, brave, and chivalrous, while the Muslim characters that are presented in a positive light are revealed to have Christian 'blood' in them. The Orientalist gaze is not absent from this novel, which, as the cover image suggests, offers an alluring insight into past times, with their exotic and colourful qualities of the foreign and unknown.[20]

The Pain of Others

Despite the novel's ethnocentric perspective and its tendency towards Orientalism, it also clearly expresses sympathy with the national Other, in this case the Muslim protagonist and his family, recognizing the pain he feels when losing his homeland. Recognizing the Others' lost homelands has been brought up in Greek public debate since the late 1990s. The first to address this issue was historian Antonis Liakos, who pointed out in 1998 that 'Often, when we speak about our own lost homelands, we forget the others' lost homelands. (…) If Venizelos had the luck to see his homeland Crete included in the Greek state, for Kemal, Thessaloniki was a lost homeland' (Liakos 1998).

When the Muslim narrator of *Imaret* is forced to leave Arta in 1882, after the Greek takeover of the town, 'his soul is left behind' (544); and as his homeland disappears he realizes that 'All became images of my mind, memory, nostalgia and a lump in the throat' (544). Other Muslim inhabitants' departure is described in ways similar to older accounts of the Greek exodus from Asia Minor: 'Tears, emotional strain, and sobbing marked the departure. They caressed the doors and walls as if they bore a soul within them, full of sorrow they walked through the rooms recalling memories and happy moments of the past, they took a little earth from their yards and embraced the houses with their eyes as if they could take them with them' (Necip, 474).[21] In addition, the injustice of being compelled to leave is voiced by the Muslim character when he is informed that Arta will possibly be annexed by the Greek kingdom:

> Why them and not us? Didn't my family live for so many generations in Arta? Is it not my homeland? (…) I wanted my homeland, my traditions, the town where I was born, my house, and if at some point I were to start my own family, I would walk with my children and my grandchildren in these same streets. And they would walk with their friends, just as I did with Liontos for so many years (361–362).

The author here clearly 'returns' symbolic ownership of the Greek town Arta to a part of its expelled historical inhabitants, the Ottoman Muslims.

Meeting of Religions

The Muslim narrator's brother, Behzat, becomes a follower of the Greek Enlightenment thinker Christodoulos Pamplekas (1733–1793), a native of Arta who, according to the novel's story, was a pantheist and therefore excommunicated from the Orthodox Church (512). Behzat argues that he deliberately follows the example of the Greek Enlightenment thinker because he is a genuine pantheist, whereas the pantheists of the Islamic tradition, like the Sufi masters Mevlana Jalaladin and Bedreddin, who taught that all religious traditions, from East to West, should meet and be like one world, in the end Islamized their followers and therefore remained monotheists (512). Like the Muslim grandfather with his admiration for Greek learning, another Muslim Ottoman character, in line with the Greek-centred focus of the novel, hence appears as an admirer of a Greek philosophical tradition. Yet, despite the novel's clear intention of depicting the superiority of Greek culture, the idea of proximity between Islam and Christianity is often highlighted: 'I knew that many elements were common in the way the two religions related to the Old and New Testament, regardless of how each interpreted them and what their conclusions were' (Liontos, 89). There is a tendency to present the Greek element and the Christian heritage as inherent in the Muslim religious practice; for example, 'the muezzin also made the call for prayer in Greek' (267). Apart from the Muslim protagonist's participation in Greek education, as mentioned above, Muslims are also referred to as sharing the Christian holidays with their Christian neighbours, as expressed here in the words of the Muslim protagonist:

> It was the 15 August feast for the Christians, holiday of the holy mother (Panagía). Meriem Ana for us. Liontos and Aunt Agni would go to church. That day many Muslims used to visit the Christian churches, like on the holiday of Saint John on 24 June. What could be more natural (…) than for me to go with them (Necip, 165).

In general, however, the three religious societies are projected as equally eager to contribute to a harmonious co-existence—'they called for peace in the mosques, for peace in the synagogues, for peace in the

churches'—albeit without much success—'and all around prevailed antagonisms, disputes and all kinds of wars' (267). Instead of demonizing Ottoman and Muslim dominance, the novel recognizes that the authorities in the area never enforced conversions of Christians, and at the same time the Christians' own fidelity towards their faith is underlined: 'Besides, apart from the few marriages between the two races, in our region there was never any violent Islamisation and even fewer were voluntarily converted to the Muhammadan faith over the past two centuries' (Liontos, 178). Overall, religious co-existence and the Muslims' positive contribution to society are emphasized: 'Besides, many Muslim families used to open their houses during Ramadan-nights to friends and neighbours of other religions. Many rich people even offered open meals, where foreigners, poor people and beggars would sit next to each other' (Liontos, 97).

A characteristic of this novel is its resemblance to what has been called folkloristic realism,[22] and it is worth noting that apart from detailed descriptions of social life in the town, children's games, local Greek customs, and so on, Muslim religious practice is also respectfully recounted as a natural element of the tableau.[23] Likewise, without national possessiveness, the shadow theatre tradition of Karagiozis is recognized as originating in a Turkish/Muslim cultural context that plays an important role during Ramadan (Liontos, 97).

Even so, unfavourable elements associated with Islam are also depicted in certain unsympathetic characters, such as Necip's half-brother: 'Dogan and his gang went around town like bullies and provoked the Christians and scorned the Ottoman women who were not properly dressed or didn't behave according to Muslim prescriptions' (Necip, 112).

Such expressions of Muslim fanaticism can be seen as the author's reference to the resurgence of religion in Turkey today. The novel's creation of a contrast between the positive image of the Muslims that are open to Enlightenment ideas and to the Greek intellectual tradition and the negative image of nationalist or fundamentalist uses of Islam resembles the contemporary political situation in the first decade of the twenty-first century, where, on the one hand, Greek-Turkish political relations were developing in a positive direction and, on the other, religious fundamentalism in both countries was on the rise, In Turkey, in particular, the secular ideology of Kemalism was being replaced by the Islamist ideology of the Justice and Development Party, feared by some as being likely to bring about a 'neo-Ottoman' imperialist regime.[24]

Nostalgia

The novel, as its cover reveals, is written in a nostalgic mode. From an adult perspective, the two narrators recall childhood experiences of innocence, excitement, and above all deep friendship. The Muslim narrator expresses his nostalgia for the town of his early childhood in the following terms: 'Like a fairy tale I remember Arta, and above all I remember the smells of spring. (…) We toured the town with Liontos from one end to the other. (…) Every morning whoever got up first would stand at the door waiting for the other' (Necip, 53). These are childhood memories of an innocent time. We do not know how old the protagonists are when they tell their story, but in the Muslim's account there is a reference to an event that happened in 1912, which means that the protagonist must be at least 60 years old at the time of the narration. The composition with two narrators who, from an adult perspective, recount their childhood experiences of shared life in a multi-cultural and multi-religious pre-national setting allows the author to fully develop the sense of loss, both the personal loss of childhood and good times and the collective loss of harmonious co-existence. By generating a collective memory of co-existence and mutual dependence,[25] the author creates an image of a utopia that was destroyed by the irredentist ambitions of the Greek nation-state and by the emerging religious chauvinism and nationalism among the Muslim Ottomans. By letting the novel end with the loss of this world for both protagonists, as the Muslim is forced to leave and the Christian must now assimilate into the Greek nation-state, the author creates an atmosphere of grief and melancholia that does not promise much for the future, especially for the Turkish character, whose narration ends with his arrival in Constantinople:

> …Ghuliya [his wife] clung to me frightened. (…)
>
> 'Where have we arrived, Necip? Where is our town?' she whispered.
>
> 'This is our town,' I answered and to myself I was praying that it was all just a bad dream.
>
> That I would suddenly open my eyes and find myself in Arta, in my house, in my courtyard (Necip, 544).

For the Greek protagonist the story ends on a more optimistic note, with the final chapter told by an impersonal narrator recounting his and his mother's journey to the capital of their new homeland after travelling on three ships named Perseverance, Unity, and Hope (545). But both pro-

tagonists left their hometown of Arta, which, in the words of the impersonal narrator, over the years lost all traces of the Ottoman times except for the ruins of the imaret outside the town. With this reference to the only remnants of the Ottoman period and with the title *Imaret,* the novel can hence be seen as a call to the Greek public to remember this time and look upon it as a period that has coloured the town's identity despite attempts to erase it by the politics of homogenizing nation-building.

The novel is heavily nostalgic, but in giving the Muslim voice such prominence it differs from traditional national narratives of the good old days. Through the example of individual experiences, it recognizes that the Ottoman-Muslim heritage in Greece can also be seen as something positive and emotional. This heritage lives on not only in the memories of the protagonists who tell their story but also in the next generations. The Muslim protagonist, in line with the novel's Orientalist stereotype, has an affair with the Greek protagonist's divorced aunt, who subsequently gives birth to his child without revealing its Muslim father (548). In this sense, the novel's use of the nostalgic mode has a transforming effect for the present of the reader in that it changes his or her emotional attitude towards the Ottoman past. Even if the Muslim characters are revealed at the end of the novel to have Christian ancestry, they are still Muslims, and through their displacement they become Turks; thus their descendants live on in today's Turkey. The novel was published in 2008 at a time when Greek-Turkish relations were probably better than ever and Turkish cultural products, especially TV serials, and tourism to Turkey were at their height. Therefore, the novel's transmission of warm feelings between Christians and Muslims in the Ottoman period was not controversial.[26] Yet the nostalgia of this religious co-existence does have an edge to it, and it belongs to the reflective or transformative nostalgic mode rather than to a simple restorative and soothing nostalgia for the good old days.

Hybridity in the Greek Experience

In the second novel to be treated here, the issue of religious co-existence is accentuated as a widespread phenomenon in many regions of the Ottoman Empire, also towards the end of the Ottoman period, with consequences for the fate and identity of the characters (Fig. 5.3).

The novel *So, Are You Greek, Too?* by Vasilios Christopoulos (b. 1951) was published in 2005. Unlike Kalpouzos' novel, this novel covers large geographic areas and presents a more complex map of mixed cultural identities. The novel narrates the stories of two families, one originating in

Fig. 5.3 Front cover of Christopoulos' novel *So, Are You Greek, Too?* The image is much more demanding than the nostalgic postcard image from Kalpouzos' novel. It pictures a piece of art entitled *Sweet Home* exhibited in 2005 at the 51st Venice Biennale by the Hungarian artist Balázs Kicsiny. The artwork abounds in symbols of anonymity, journey, anchoring, and constraint, illustrating the book's theme of multiple and contested identities, uprooting and new destinations. The book cover conveys an image of faceless modern man carrying the past as a burden and his dilemma between mobility and anchorage.

Monastir with a Vlach or 'Macedonian' background and the other originating in the area of Trebizond with a Greek-Armenian 'Pontian' background.[27] The members of these families are displaced, voluntarily or by

force, several times, and in consequence of these displacements they are brought to Thessaloniki, Smyrna, Northern Kurdistan, and Patras. The novel is divided into three parts, each covering a historical era: (1) 1893–1896, covering the early Macedonian issue, with the foundation of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization and the first persecutions of Armenians; (2) 1908–1923, covering the Young Turk revolution, the persecution of Armenians and Greek Orthodox, the Greek-Turkish war, and the expulsion of Christians from Asia Minor; and (3) 2002, covering the economic growth in Greece and the arrival of Kurdish and other refugees and migrants from Turkey and elsewhere.

The Macedonian family represents trade and commerce, from the old occupation of caravaneering, which is pushed aside by new means of transportation, such as the railroad, to the rising merchants of early-twentieth-century Smyrna. The Pontian family represents agriculture, from milling in Sourmena to stock-farming in the highlands of Kurdistan. The Macedonian narration ends with the destruction of Smyrna in 1923 and the family's expulsion and resettlement in Greek Macedonia. The Pontian storyline continues up to our own time, ending in Patras in 2002. To this storyline is added yet another family, represented by a Greek-Bulgarian woman who grew up in Bulgaria, where her Greek father lived in exile. It is in the meeting of this descendant of a Greek exile and the descendant of a Pontian Greek who converted to Islam and became a Kurd that the novel's use of nostalgia is fully developed.

Cultural Complexity and Criticism of Nationalism

All the novel's characters, presented through an omniscient narrator, have composite linguistic, ethnic, and religious identities; all marriages are cross-cultural and many cross-religious, too, with one of the spouses converting. The cultural complexity is exemplified in the words of an old caravaneer in Macedonia, who questions the possibility of building nations: 'All those who want to belong [to a nation] [...] let them do so. But I speak about all the others who don't want. The local Macedonians who speak the local Macedon [dialect], the Vlach who speak Vlach, the Albanians who speak Albanian, the Jews, the Armenians. And then there are the Sarakatsanoi, the Karagounis, the Gypsies. All those, they don't want, [...]. They just want to be Macedon' (151). This statement could be quite provocative to a Greek reader, given the controversies of the Greek state with the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. This character is himself an Orthodox Christian Greek-speaking Vlach of Albanian origin

who ends up becoming a Serbian citizen. His blurred ethnic and linguistic identity has its counterpart in the last part of the novel, where the author's alter ego, a young Greek-Bulgarian woman in Patras in 2002, is writing a book that 'will undermine the foundations of the nation, the ideology of a permanent national identity. A book that will promote the belief that a national homeland can be any country that provides for your needs' (402). This ideal unveils a vision of a more inclusive and civic definition of national identity than the visions of homogeneity and cultural purity that have been the guiding principles in the development of Greek national identity, as well as of many other European national identities. Early in the novel, in 1893, a French agent says to the Greek-Vlach caravaneer from Monastir that 'we live in the age of nations. If we don't know the nations, we cannot understand our time' (22). By the end of the novel, in 2002, the change of strategy by the Kurdistan's Workers' Party (PKK) is explained by the Kurdish character as a consequence of the changing times.[28] He says: 'The age of nation-states is over. The age of "nationism" is over. "Nationism" is a historical phenomenon of the 19th and 20th century. It is only preserved in backward areas, and where it remains it creates problems' (341).

As mentioned above, the novel displays characters with many different linguistic, religious, and other cultural identities; but Ottoman Turkish characters are absent as autonomous characters. In comparison with *Imaret*, which allocates half of the novel's narrative to an Ottoman-Muslim character, the Ottoman-Muslim friend and business partner of one of the Greek-Christian protagonists in *So, Are You Greek, Too?* plays a much less prominent role. Most of the Muslim or Young Turk characters are Ottoman administrators, local rulers, or undefined bad guys who persecute, imprison, or torture Christian characters. In this sense, the novel does not present a new approach to the perpetual Greek Other. The Kurdish descendant of a Pontian Greek, who is the protagonist in the third part of the novel, has also been persecuted and imprisoned by Turkish authorities. As indicated in the novel's title, *So, Are You Greek, Too?*, the book's intention is not so much to present a new view of the Other, but rather to nuance the image of who can be called a Greek, to question a homogeneous Greek identity, and more generally to discuss—and criticize—how national identities are created at the expense of people's own sense of who they are. This is exemplified in the title of each of the three parts of the novel. In the first, the phrase 'Graecoi, Romioi, Vlachs, Arvanites, you have all become Greeks' refers to attempts to Hellenize the many different ethnic and linguistic groups in order to create a homogeneous

Greek national community. The second title runs 'Not Yunan, not Hellene, me Kurd…', describing the fate of the Christian Greek-Armenian who converts to Islam to be with his beloved Kurdish Muslim girl and escape the work battalions and Ottoman persecution of Christians, and Armenians in particular. The last title resembles the first in that various ethnic groups become Hellenized, but in this case with reference to contemporary groups: 'Albanians, Afghanis, Kurds, you have all become Greeks.' These titles express the novel's message that modern identities are hybrid and there is no such thing as a pure national identity. Each human being has an individual story—some of which are told in the novel—which composes his or her particular individual hybrid identity.

Religious Universalism

Apart from articulating a critique of nationalism, the novel also focuses on religious co-existence. This is symbolized in a religious amulet representing the Mevlana order originating from the Persian poet and mystic Rumi, who taught that the two monotheistic religions have to unite at some point. The amulet therefore bears a Christian inscription on one side and an Arabic inscription on the other (Fig. 5.4).

The descendant of the Pontian family, who has grown up as a Kurd and is a persecuted member of the PKK, brings this double religious amulet with him when he searches for his Greek (Pontian) relatives in the Greek town of Patras. The Greek relatives refuse to recognize him as a relative, partly because they are too occupied with their own suffering in a materialistic, meaningless, and lonely life and partly because their own past as refugees 80 years before is a family taboo. During his stay in Patras, the Kurdish refugee finds comfort in the amulet, which connects him to the Greek-Armenian grandfather who gave it to him. The grandfather converted to Islam to marry his beloved, a Kurdish Muslim girl, and also to get away from the persecution of Armenians and Greek Christians in the Ottoman Empire. With the help of the amulet, which symbolizes the oneness of God, the grandfather realizes that he doesn't have to choose between his ancestral and his new religion but can pray to the Christian God in the mosque.[29]

This kind of religious universalism is also the perspective of a Christian priest in a Kurdish village who is willing to embrace Islam in order to save the villagers. Conversion to him is not a sin if it can save lives, because 'life is the highest value of the Lord'. He represents the view that the problems

of co-existence are not related to religion, but to nationalism: 'We are not in danger because of our faith. We are in danger because of the microbe of nationalism' (277). The old caravaneer from Macedonia, who was the first to be given the double religious amulet, also resorts to religious arguments in order to express his frustration with the idea of nations: 'How did you allow this, Lord? I am sure that the nations were not your work. You hated the nations, it's not possible that you sowed them; they crucified your son.' (323). The idea that Christianity, and a universal understanding of religion, is not in accordance with the division of humanity into nations is also central to a recent development in contemporary Greek Orthodox theological discourse that embraces ecumenism and religious tolerance, thus challenging the traditional perception of Greek Orthodoxy as not only a spiritual resource but also a marker of national identity (Willert 2014).

The double religious amulet plays a final role in the open ending of the novel, when the Kurdish refugee touches the amulet and decides to leave Greece to search for the remaining Greek relatives who returned to their place of origin in Monastir (Bitola in the contemporary Republic of Macedonia). In this way the amulet, as well as the novel, comes full circle, since the novel began in Monastir, where the amulet was given to a Christian Hellenized Vlach originating from Albania who abducted and married a Vlach Slavic-speaking girl whose family had converted to Islam. To complete the picture of religious, cultural, and linguistic plurality, the child born to this couple is the seed of the Ottoman governor who had captured the girl for his harem.

However, the novel *So, Are You Greek, Too?* does not voice a defence of or praise religious worldviews; rather, it expresses cultural co-existence more broadly with a focus on individual stories that may contain much suffering, longing, and genuineness that is overlooked in a materialistic consumer society. The genuineness and humaneness that permeate the Kurdish refugee's story of loss is contrasted with the Greek relatives' insensitivity, materialism, boredom, unhappiness, and unfaithfulness, thus forming the author's critique of the development of Greek society in late modernity.

Nostalgia

The two characters with whom the novel ends, the Greek-Bulgarian Valia and the Pontian-Kurdish Ainout, are both children of refugees and exiles, and both are atheists who believe that nations and homogenization are the

Fig. 5.4 Back cover of *So, Are You Greek, Too?*, with drawings of the fictive double religious amulet. The inscription on the Christian side with the cross says 'In this sign conquer.' The inscription on the Islamic side with the half-moon is difficult to decipher, a fact which could simply indicate that the illustrator is not familiar with Islamic inscriptions, thus underlining the fictive nature of the amulet and the narrative. As a counterpart to the installation art on the front cover, the back cover also displays real-life photographic testimony of the forced journeys and displacements that became the fate of millions of people as a consequence of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the making of modern nations.

causes of human suffering. At the core of suffering is longing and nostalgia for the ancestral homeland, or any homeland, which has been lost to most people in the modern world. This approach to nostalgia corresponds to the core of Boym's argument about reflective nostalgia, which represents an acceptance of longing as a permanent condition of modern life and focuses on the fluctuation between collective and individual narratives, thus avoiding the essentialist and absolutist nostalgic narratives created by restorative nostalgia.

A central passage in the novel is when the Kurdish refugee meets the Greek-Bulgarian woman, the author's alter ego, who works on a book that will subvert 'the ideology of a permanent national identity'. As an anthropologist, she collects stories of exile and displacement. During this meeting, the story of the Kurdish refugee's grandfather is unfolded. In his old age he fell silent and stayed silent for five years, until one day he spoke again; but then he only spoke Greek. During his silence he was 'constantly sad, as if he had fallen into deep melancholy' (417). Valia, the Greek-Bulgarian, asks Ainout, the Kurd, whether he means melancholy or nostalgia and explains that nostalgia is 'the huge sadness caused by the wish to return to the homeland or the remembrance of a bygone and lost happiness' (ibid.), a condition which Ainout recognizes as his grandfather's. It is this emotional experience that drives the grandson to identify with his grandfather's past, to develop a longing and nostalgia in himself for the lost homeland. He learns Greek with the purpose of fulfilling the grandfather's wish to search for the Greek relatives and thereby reconnect with the past. Thus, the Pontian peasant's nostalgia for his Greek background determines the course of life of his Kurdish grandson. This is how nostalgia becomes a driving force in the narrative of the novel *So, Are You Greek, Too?*, a book which, unlike the novel *Imaret*, focuses more on the suffering of longing and displacement than on the restoration of an idealized tableau of childhood and past harmony. Just like *Imaret*, however, it provides suggestions for an interpretation of the past that challenges hegemonic national narratives about Self and Other.

The Transforming Potential of Nostalgia in Historical Fiction

Apart from satisfying a desire for fascinating narratives about the past with a nostalgic twist, these novels also make use of the transforming potential of nostalgia. In *Imaret*, the scenes where the Turkish character realizes that he will lose his homeland forever evoke the Greek reader's sympathy.

Acknowledging the Other's nostalgia is an important step towards reconciliation and recognition of a common past. Even if the Muslim protagonist is in the end revealed to be of distant Greek-Christian descent, he represents the Muslim tradition and will eventually become a Turkish citizen; thus, the Greek reader today will look on him as a Turk. By recognizing this Turk's nostalgia, the novel adds to a rethinking of the national stereotypes of the Greek Other. However, because it ultimately reveals that the Muslim protagonist is actually of Greek descent the novel does not complete the step towards challenging these stereotypes. The message is summed up in the words of the grandfather, 'We are all children in God's imaret' (551)—and since the grandfather has a Greek education and his grandparents were Christians who converted, the reader may conclude that the original source of this statement is Greek and Christian and not Ottoman and Muslim. This interpretation suggests that the novel preserves an ethnocentric national narrative. Nevertheless, this would be a superficial conclusion, because the author has very deliberately incorporated central Ottoman symbols like the imaret and the Ottoman clock tower in the narrative, symbols that are not dismissed as irrelevant or as Greek in their origin. Therefore, the novel does take a step towards rewriting the national narrative about 400 years of slavery under the Ottomans, suggesting that this era also comprises a cultural richness and value that is worth considering for Greeks today.

In *So, Are You Greek, Too?*, the Pontian Greek-Christian grandfather who converted and became a Muslim Kurd passes on his intense nostalgia for the Greek language and culture to his grandson and thus sends him on a journey to discover the lost homeland, not in Pontos but in Greece, where the Pontian relatives settled in 1923.

Both novels end with the change of governance in the homelands of the main characters, who are forced to move as a result. Their relocation causes nostalgia for—or repression of—what is lost; but the religious artefacts, the imaret and the double religious amulet, remain as symbolic bonds to the past. The nostalgic remembrance of religious co-existence and the persistence of cross-religious symbols in the novels may hence function as metaphorical proposals for a fruitful negotiation of religious diversity in contemporary Greek society while at the same time expressing disapproval of the growing intolerance. The ideology, or didactic purpose, behind these novels seems to be an ecumenical, cosmopolitan, or humanistic understanding of cross-cultural co-existence. The novels, directly or indirectly, intend to be open to the Other and to revise the national myths

and narratives about homogeneity, not in a postmodern experimental way but through a historical approach which entails consulting historical sources and scientific historical works.[30]

The two novels highlight problems of Greek society in late modernity, such as amnesia, discrimination, and lack of spirituality. In this sense, the use of nostalgic visions of religious and cultural co-existence becomes what Boym would call reflective nostalgia and I suggest calling *transformative nostalgia*, which reflects the *ethical dimension of nostalgia* that Ladino, Su, and others have proposed. Nostalgia is not just the longing for lost harmony, nor is it merely the passive memory of a lost moment of bliss. It is also an impetus for changing the present and the future. Nostalgia is a means of representing the past in such a way that it can work as an ideal for the future. Older literature focused on the ability of Greek characters to resist assimilation within the religious Other. The heroes were those who remained authentic Greeks. The postmodern magic realist novels of the 1980s and 90s challenged the Greek national myth of categorical difference between the stereotyped images of Greeks and Turks by blurring the boundaries between cultural stereotypes and thus reimagining the contact zones between Greeks and Turks. In the realist historical novels of the 2000s, the heroes are those who show a tolerant attitude towards the Other and who can love and respect them regardless of their faith, like the Greek protagonist in *Imaret,* who gets into a fight with another Greek because the latter insulted his Muslim friend's mother. The Greek protagonist explains his reaction as follows: 'Then I understood how deep in my soul I had ana Safiyé and how offended I felt when I heard the insult. The fact that she was a Muslim didn't bother me at all' (180). Clearly, then, the heroic attitude in the early twenty-first century is not to resist the Other's religion but to embrace it and make it your own, not so much as a framework of religious rituals but rather as a philosophy symbolized by the Sufi tradition of Mevlana preaching the unification of Islam and Christianity, or by the Muslim institution of the imaret that welcomes all human beings in need, regardless of their faith or class.

The novels seek to fulfil a demand on the part of the Greek reading public for nostalgic stories about lost homelands that focus both on the good times of the past and on the pain caused by losing them. At the same time they respond to a call for non-chauvinist attitudes to historical and contemporary Others. The key to such a tolerant attitude is, it is suggested, to be found in a universalistic religious philosophy envisioning the harmonious co-existence of religions. Apart from the visions of religious

co-existence, both novels express a critique of the idea of the homogeneous nation, which is described as a curse by several fictional characters. The novel *So, Are You Greek, Too?,* in particular, indicates a possible change in contemporary societies when nations will no longer be a guiding principle, exemplified by the Greek-Bulgarian woman's book, which will subvert 'the ideology of a permanent national identity', and by the statement of the PKK/KADEK that 'the age of nation states is over'. This statement itself, as a call for the organization's future fight for democracy and human rights, is in essence a nostalgic one. It remains to be seen whether and how the nostalgia for a pre-national era will materialize in new post-national formations.

To sum up, by giving national Others protagonist roles and by pluralizing the national self, these novels attempt to present readers with a picture of life in Ottoman times that is more complex than the simplified image of clear-cut boundaries between opposing ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups. In this way, the authors seem to be able to satisfy the heightened interest in less ethnocentric approaches to the history of the Ottoman Empire and to nation-building. At the same time, though, they keep the national memory of Ottoman dominance and Turkish aggression alive and are thus not deaf to the voices warning against neo-Ottomanism. Reading a book which sympathizes with a Muslim Turkish character from Arta or a Muslim Kurdish refugee in Patras can give the reader the satisfaction of participating in a project of tolerance and open-mindedness. However, since both characters are in fact of Christian Greek descent they can easily be accepted into the national self, and the tolerance demanded from the Greek reader is not that barrier-breaking. On the contrary, the nationalist Turkish brother or the Turkish authorities persecuting Kurds continue to play the role of the bad guys in these new versions of the Greek national narrative. In such a reading of the novels, their nostalgic visions of co-existence become somewhat superficial and suit their apparent intention of being bestsellers with regard to easy consumption and wide circulation. It should not, however, make us blind to the innovation that these novels do after all bring to contemporary Greek literature.

Questions about cultural and religious co-existence are highly topical, as can be seen in the years-long debates about building an official mosque in Athens (and in Copenhagen, for that matter), as well as in the recent news about Christian monasteries and churches being turned into mosques in Turkey, or proposals from representatives of the Turkish government to turn the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul into a functioning mosque again.

Generally speaking, the novels draw attention to religious and cultural co-existence as an alternative narrative that should be considered in the future because history has proven that co-existence based on national criteria is impossible or comes at a heavy price in terms of human suffering. The novels thus inscribe themselves into a new way of talking about religious and national identities, where a universal (ecumenical) religious worldview is proposed as a more viable framework for co-existence than nations. What kind of institutional construction is imagined to be suitable for such co-existence is not clear; but since historiography has for some time, and now in the company of historical fiction, focused on the favourable aspects of multi-cultural and multi-confessional empires, it is certain that this nostalgia for past empires may also express a desire for future empires. Nonetheless, neither of the novels dealt with here entirely relinquishes the idea of a national narrative in which the national characters are predominant, not least because these books address a national audience. Yet they do propose more balanced and multi-faceted narratives than the traditional narrative based on rigid opposition between the national Self and Other(s), and in doing so they become narratives that may strengthen ideals of co-existence at the expense of traditional ethnocentrism and xenophobia.

Notes

1. In 2002 the Justice and Development Party won the national elections with a program that challenged Kemalism and, for the first time in modern Turkey's history, introduced the ideology of Islamism.
2. http://smyrnadocumentary.org/?lang=en&cat=1. Accessed 19 May 2014.
3. In recent years the Ottoman Empire has increasingly attracted the attention of historians, sociologists, and other history-making institutions (documentary films, museums, art, and so on) as a multi-cultural empire and perhaps an exemplary society for developing cosmopolitanism. The cross-disciplinary research network Ottoman Cosmopolitanism (https://ottomancosmopolitanism.wordpress.com/), with the international conference 'Ottoman Pasts, Present Cities: Cosmopolitanism and Transcultural Memories' (Birkbeck College, 26–27 June 2014), can be seen as a prime example of this new 'paradigm'. Other examples of the trend of looking at the Ottoman Empire through the lens of cosmopolitanism are Mazower 2004 and Jasanoff 2005; see also Zubaida 2002 and Hanley 2008 for critical approaches to the phenomenon. This specific geographical and historical attention has developed out of the wider 'paradigm of cosmopolitanism'

related to the various interpretations of the consequences of globalization (e.g. Vertovec and Cohen 2002; Appiah 2006; Beck 2002), but also out of the challenges facing Western societies in dealing with an increasingly diverse ('multi-cultural') population in supposedly homogeneous national communities.

4. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/istanbul-monastery-to-become-mosque.aspx?PageID=238&NID=58526&NewsCatID=341. Accessed 21 May 2014.
5. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/greece-angered-over-turkish-deputy-pms-hagia-sophia-remarks.aspx?PageID=238&NID=58153&NewsCatID=351. Accessed 21 May 2014.
6. http://www.thessalonikiartsandculture.gr/blog/texnopersona/ti-apeginan-ta-eksairetika-othomanika-mnimeia-stin-ellada-argyris-bakirtzis#.U3yD9vl_tIE. Accessed 21 May 2014; http://www.gnomiartas.gr/afierwmata/item/6368-imaret-artas. Accessed 21 May 2014; http://www.peartas.gov.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=431:2013-09-24-11-32-08&catid=36:2011-05-31-05-48-28&Itemid=4. Accessed 21 May 2014.
7. The change in Turkish foreign policy and identity politics since the Justice and Development Party gained power in 2002 has been termed by many observers, especially in Greece, neo-Ottomanism, indicating that Turkey aspires to re-establish its regional influence in the former Ottoman territories. Owing to the party's undisguised Islamic foundation and its cultural policy, intended to rehabilitate the Ottoman era through city planning, architecture, education, and so on, it is also seen as promoting a neo-Ottoman cultural revival. In Greece, the term neo-Ottomanism is often used in the rhetoric associated with the country's traditional rivalry with the large neighbour and enemy par excellence. See for example Karabelias 2009 and Tachopoulos 2012.
8. In Greek historical and political discourse, the 1922 crushing defeat of the Greek army, the subsequent capture of the city of Smyrna by Kemal Atatürk's forces, and the burning down of the Armenian and Greek city quarters, which caused tens of thousands of Christians to flee, goes under the designation the 'Asia Minor Catastrophe'.
9. Sotiriou's novel *Bloodied Earth* consists of three parts. The first is called 'peaceful life', the second 'the Greeks came', and the third 'the catastrophe'. These headlines indicate that the author distinguishes between the Greek-speaking Christians living the 'peaceful life' in Asia Minor and the Greeks from the Greek nation-state who 'came' in the second part and directly or indirectly provoked the catastrophe of the third part.
10. http://smyrnadocumentary.org/?lang=en&cat=2
11. Kastrinaki (1998) shows that in the 1950s, Greek authors like Stratis Doukas, Ilias Venezis, Pantelis Prevelakis, and Nikos Kazantzakis revised

their novels published before the German occupation (1941–1944) so that the reprehensible actions committed by Greeks in the first versions are toned down or removed. From descriptions of Greeks acting individually, there is a change of focus towards Greeks acting as a united community. Good deeds by Turks, on the other hand, are attributed to individual personalities. Thus the Greeks are presented as a homogeneous 'ethnos' with less focus on individual traits. Atrocities committed by Turks are not attributed to individuals but to a collective Turkish nature. Apart from individual exceptions, the Turks are presented as a homogeneous group and as the national enemy of the Greeks. Millas has also analyzed the image of Greeks and Turks in novels from this period and come to the conclusion that 'Turks appear as negative personalities whenever they are portrayed as abstract/historical characters and as potentially positive individuals when presented as concrete/experienced persons' (2006, 47). The same applies to Ottoman rule, which 'is depicted negatively as a historical event, but positively in personal memories' (ibid.).

12. The Greek spelling is Νετζίπ, pronounced 'nedsip'.
13. Imarets were Islamic soup-kitchens often associated with mosques and providing care for elderly or sick people and lodging for travellers. In some cases they were also learning institutions. They were known from the fourteenth century as institutions of Islam, but during the nineteenth century their role as a unifying factor of Ottomanization was enforced by (1) the Tanzimat reforms, (2) new ideas about how to care for the poor, and (3) the increasingly widespread phenomenon of dislocation due to wars and loss of territory (Singer 2012). In Greece today, the best-known (remnants of) Imarets are the Imarets of Arta and Kavala. The Imaret of Kavala has also played a role in recent Greek literary works on cultural and religious co-existence in Ottoman times (Grigoriadis 1998; Axiotis 1999).
14. All translations from Greek original texts were made by the author.
15. On Ottoman clock towers see, for example, Uluengin 2010.
16. The name Ismail brings to mind the first contemporary Greek historical novel that touched upon the issue of national and religious identity in the light of Ottoman history, *Ismail Ferik Pasha—spina nel cuore* (Galanaki 1989). Both Galanaki's Ismail Ferik Pasha and Kalpouzos' grandfather Ismail are Muslims with a Christian background. The first was captured by the Ottoman army as a child and forced to convert; the other is a descendant of Christians who converted to Islam. Yet it is hard to tell whether the intertextual reference is intended. The narrative strategies of the novels couldn't be more dissimilar, but both play on double identities to reflect a

past with more cultural, religious, and linguistic mixing than what has been the case in the age of national homogenization.

17. Σπαχήδες in Greek refers to the Ottoman cavalry corps, *the sipahis* (Greene 2015, 7ff, 82).
18. See among others Mazower 2008 and Stewart 2008.
19. Leontios is also the name of a Christian martyred in 315 AD under the Roman emperor Licinius (265–323).
20. The second novel by this author, *Saints and Demons—In the City* (2010), plays even more on the exoticizing and Orientalizing gaze, as the Rudolf Ernst painting *The Perfume Makers* on the cover indicates (http://www.biblionet.gr/book/162860/%CE%86%CE%B3%CE%B9%CE%BF%CE%B9_%CE%BA%CE%B1%CE%B9_%CE%B4%CE%B1%CE%AF%CE%BC%CE%BF%CE%BD%CE%B5%CF%82_%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%82_%CF%84%CE%B1%CE%BD_%CE%A0%CF%8C%CE%BB%CE%B9%CE%BD).
21. An eyewitness account by a Christian (Greek) woman who was expelled from Cappadocia in 1923 describes the departure in similar terms: 'We saw our houses for the last time, our land, and we cried. (…) We kneeled, crossed ourselves, took a handful of earth (…) and while crying we mounted the animals' (testimony from the Center for Asia Minor Studies, Mourelos 1982, 21).
22. Folkloristic realism, or *ithografia*, emerged as a literary trend in Greek writing from the 1880s as a result, on the one hand, of influences from European realism and naturalism and, on the other, of demands in domestic political and cultural life for a national literature of the people. It has been a recurring feature in Greek literature up through the twentieth century, and now it is being revived by the current trends in historical fiction about the Ottoman period.
23. The novel *Imaret* can be characterized as a chronicle of the town of Arta. As such it continues a tradition in Greek literature that was perhaps initiated with Pantelis Prevelakis' *Chronicle of a Town* (1937), which is a heavily nostalgic depiction of the Cretan town of Rethymnon from 1898 to 1924 and which speaks respectfully of the town's Muslim inhabitants. To some extent it idealizes the cultural co-existence of the time before the enforced expulsion of Cretan Muslims in 1923. Recently, Maro Douka, a highly acclaimed author of historical novels, has also taken up the genre of the town chronicle, in her case of Cretan Chania, but with a narrative twist as the historical town is experienced through the eyes of a contemporary Turkish descendant of the expelled Muslims (*The Innocent and the Guilty*, 2004).
24. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/greece-angered-over-turkish-deputy-pms-hagia-sophia-remarks.aspx?PageID=238&NID=58153&NewsCatID=351. Accessed 21 May 2014.

25. The Greek-Christian protagonist's life depended on the nourishment he could get from the Turkish Muslim protagonist's mother because his own mother couldn't feed him. The successful career of the Turkish protagonist depended on the Greek education he could get by learning from his Greek friend and eventually attending his school.
26. A similar plot is seen in the blockbuster movie *A Touch of Spice* (2003), directed by Tassos Boulmetis, which tells the story of a childhood love between a Greek boy and a Turkish girl in Istanbul in the early 1960s. The relationship abruptly ends with the Greek boy's family's expulsion to Greece; but the nostalgia of that love, both between the two individuals and between the expelled persons and their former home, marks the lives of the protagonists, who finally meet again as adults only to recognize that the common life they had experienced is gone forever, the common language of their childhood having been erased by the homogenizing efforts of nation-states.
27. 'Pontian' refers to Greek Orthodox inhabitants of the Black Sea region.
28. In April 2002, at its eighth congress, the PKK changed its name to KADEK (Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress) and committed to fighting for a democratic solution within the existing state system instead of aiming at the creation of a Kurdish nation-state (Gunes 2012, 140).
29. The crossing of religious boundaries was a more widespread phenomenon in the Ottoman Empire than is usually recognized. From oral testimonies by Greek Asia Minor refugees we know that religious holidays and sacred shrines were often shared by Muslims and Christians, even if these testimonies by Christians of Muslims approaching the Christian religion are meant to indicate the superiority of Christianity (Doumanis 2013, 110–114).
30. Other novels in the same genre appear almost as historiographical studies by providing timelines of the non-fictional historical events, detailed vocabularies, and bibliographic references to primary and secondary historical sources (e.g. Zourgos 2005, 2008; Kakouri 2005).

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CHAPTER 6

"This Is a Country for You": Yugonostalgia and Antinationalism in the Rock-Music Culture of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Zlatko Jovanovic

Introduction

In her work on Yugonostalgia, Zala Volčič has argued that the shared dimensions of the phenomenon across the former Yugoslav republics can best be approached through the realm of cinema and popular music, as they both serve as a form of reflection upon a common Yugoslav past (Volčič 2007, 31). This chapter focuses on the rock-music culture in twenty-first-century Bosnia and Herzegovina.[1] The aim is to explain the relationship between Yugonostalgia and the pronounced antinationalism of this culture. In exploring this relationship, I attempt to go beyond the traditional negative connotations of Yugonostalgia as a daydreaming and regressive phenomenon. My argument is that it is analytically more fruitful to leave behind the understanding of Yugonostalgia as a misty-eyed remembering of an idealized common Yugoslav past and instead approach it as a form of identity politics that seeks to challenge legitimacy claims

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made by present-day nationalist elites. Thus, in dealing with the issue I approach Yugonostalgia as having more to do with the present state of things in the post-Yugoslav societies, and in particular with nationalism, than with Yugoslavia's history. In doing so, I attempt to alter the interpretations of Yugonostalgia that focus on the presumed nostalgic invocation of the lost past and draw attention to the creativity inherent in an ongoing struggle.

In exploring the above, I proceed from Stef Jansen's definition of the concept of "Yugoslavness." In his work on the subject of antinationalism and cosmopolitanism in the post-Yugoslav states, Jansen argues that many of his informants imagined Yugoslavness as a discursive space with a distinct, diverse, open character that was only sometimes openly "Yugoslavist." It is so because Yugoslavness is, as Jansen accentuates, the opposite of nationalist segregation and exclusiveness. As such, Yugoslavness is above all about "open [interethnic] boundaries in a mosaic nationality in a mass" (Jansen 2009, 80). The point here is that the phenomenon of Yugonostalgia should also be approached from this perspective, that is, without reducing it to those expressions which happen to be Yugoslavist.

In the present chapter, I will examine how different references to a common Yugoslav past, and most notably Yugoslav popular culture of the 1980s, are used not so much in order to reconstruct the past as to challenge legitimacy claims currently expressed by nationalist elites. My methodological approach is very much shaped by the theoretical assumption of intertextuality, which stresses that a text can only communicate its meaning when situated in relation to other texts and to the larger issues. In other words, as Theodore Gracyk puts it, a text's meaning "arises" between texts (Gracyk 2001, 56). Basically, this means that there frequently exists a preferred reading of the text, although, as Roy Shuker has argued, this does not necessarily have to be true for the audience as a whole (Shuker 2008, 94). Having said that, I want to underline that this is not a reception analysis focusing exclusively on the audience's reading and decoding of meanings in the songs' text. Rather, my focus is on creativity in the rock-music culture in the specific socio-politico-cultural situation of post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina.[2]

Before turning to concrete expressions of Yugonostalgia in Bosnian-Herzegovinian rock-music culture, however, some general comments on the concept of nostalgia, as well as on research into the phenomenon of Yugonostalgia, need to be made.

Nostalgia

In examining the above arguments, it is analytically productive to begin with a distinction between what Svetlana Boym has called restorative and reflective nostalgia. While the former relates to the Greek word *nostos*, the returning (home), the latter is related to the *algia*, the pain of longing. This means, argues Boym, that restorative nostalgia aims at reconstructing the lost home and past and is often mostly about reproducing old narratives. By contrast, reflective nostalgia is less about reconstructing the past than about transforming the present. In fact, reflective nostalgia is all about highlighting the breach between past and present and potentially inaugurating a search for a different future (Boym 2001, 49–50).

Mitja Velikonja, arguably the leading scholar on the subject of Yugonostalgia in the post-Yugoslav societies, has offered a very similar argument. He argues that the phenomenon of Yugonostalgia is not about idealizing the common Yugoslav past, but rather about "the lost future" that Socialist Yugoslavia promised (Velikonja 2009, 351, 366–397). This means that Yugonostalgia has to do not with what Yugoslavia was but with what it promised to become.

Zala Volčič, another scholar who has worked with the subject, argues that even if the traditional dismissal of Yugonostalgia as inauthentic or historically bankrupt may be accurate, such a dismissal nevertheless misses the real social significance of those "inauthentic" and romanticized cultural formations. Arguing that the imagined community of the former Yugoslavia already blurred this distinction insofar as it was based on the constitutive fiction of a viable supranational sense of unity, Volčič offers a powerful argument that it remained—from its very inception—an unfinished project. It was, in Volčič's view, a project whose unity was predicated not on what it was, but on what it might become. Yugonostalgia is then, arguably, less a longing for a real past than a kind of longing for the desires and fantasies that were once possible (Volčič 2007, 27).

Very much in line with that argument, this chapter is not concerned with verifying claims of (in)authenticity on the part of Yugonostalgic interpretations of the Yugoslav past; instead, it focuses on explaining the social significance of Yugonostalgia in present-day Bosnian-Herzegovinian rock music. In doing so, I want to draw attention to Ina Merkel's work on the East German equivalent of Yugonostalgia, *Ostalgie*. Merkel criticizes the omnipresent understanding of Ostalgie as a nostalgic remembering of

a presumably idealized socialist past of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). She argues that Ostalgie is a form of identity politics that is better understood as a protest against the dominant interpretations of the history of the GDR. These interpretations serve to legitimize the new social order and seek to strip the GDR's socialist past of its subversive potential (Merkel 2008, 324). In other words, Ostalgie seeks to keep the subversive potential of the GDR's past alive.

Approaching Yugonostalgia from this point of departure, I would argue that the popular-cultural phenomenon of Yugonostalgia expressed in Bosnian-Herzegovinian rock music is not at all to be confused with nostalgia proper. It is more about uncovering the subversive potential of Yugoslav history that the dominant post-Yugoslav national discourses are seeking to silence and destroy. And here I want to stress that several of the musicians and songs discussed in the remainder of the chapter are highly popular throughout the formerly Yugoslav lands and do not belong to some tiny subcultural movement with a limited audience. This indicates that we are dealing with a broader phenomenon which is not reducible to popular music and even less so to a particular subgenre of popular music.

"Under the Boot of Nationalism"

One of the pioneers of international research on Yugoslav rock music (Yu-Rock), Sabrina Ramet, has observed that Yugoslav rock music was always political at a certain level. That being the case, she argues, "just like everything else in the country, rock music too was affected by the 'national question'" in the 1980s (Ramet 1996, 146). Other scholars have stressed the antinationalist character of Yu-Rock and approached it as an alternative to the rising nationalism in 1980s Yugoslavia.[3] In the 1990s, during the years of the dissolution of the country, this alternative had to be destroyed in order to attain national homogenization in the newly established post-Yugoslav states.[4] As Ljubica Spaskovska puts it, the later nationalists were undermining Yu-Rock because it generally stood for values they despised, like critical thinking, cosmopolitanism, openness and personal autonomy (Spaskovska 2011, 357).

I have argued elsewhere that the pan-Yugoslav youth culture that emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s with the arrival in Yugoslavia of punk and New Wave bred a sense of community and cohesion among urban youth, a sense which the Yugoslav political system was unable to create (Jovanovic 2013). This said, as Zala Volčič points out, the music

scene of the 1980s celebrated Yugoslav identity while also providing a site for resistance to the prevailing political climate and nurturing the hope for positive social change. The change, when it finally did come, perhaps did not live up to expectations, rendering the hope of the 1980s even more poignant in the new capitalist era (Volčič 2007, 33). In this regard, it is interesting to draw attention to one of the central alternative rock bands in Bosnia and the formerly Yugoslav lands generally. The band is called Letu štuke (Stukas are flying),[5] and it is in a way an incarnation of the general trends in Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav rock music.[6] It was established in Sarajevo in 1986 under the influence of New Wave but ceased to exist in the early and mid-1990s, that is, during the war and the period of marginalization of rock music in the former Yugoslav republics. Re-established after the war in Bosnia, Letu štuke has directed much of their creative energy in the manner Volčič describes, toward expressing their criticism of a present emptied of past hopes (Fig. 6.1).

The example of one of the band's most popular songs, "Minimalism" of 2005, serves to illustrate the point. According to this song,



Fig. 6.1 A screenshot from the video for Letu štuke's "Minimalism," showing the band's frontman with a raised and clenched fist and a star in the background, appearing at the sequence of the song when we are hearing an easily recognizable "Stand up, damned of the Earth" from "The Internationale." A universal salute to express defiance, the raised fist indicates not only the band's stance on social injustice in present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina; in the context of the Socialist past, this symbol of solidarity and resistance also has clear connotations to what Socialist Yugoslavia promised and aimed to become (https://youtu.be/VeNS730nOX8?t=3m33s)

It's minimalism,
it's minimalism.
But primitivism doesn't know
what's minimalism.

It's minimalism,
it's minimalism.
Everyone sees it, but nobody says
what's that boot trampling on us.

The wealthy parents don't mind.
For their kids they'll give everything.
They are selling forests and the hydro plants,
owning half of the state.

That's why their offspring lives merrily.
Don't do anything, but have it all.
Pure cocaine and silk underwear
and someone else's hungry years.

It's not minimalism,
it's not minimalism.
But primitivism doesn't know
what is capitalism.

It's not minimalism,
it's not minimalism.
Everyone sees it, but nobody says
What's that boot trampling on us
... of nationalism[7]

Letu štuke addresses a very important issue concerning the state of things in today's Bosnia and Herzegovina—what locals often ironically call *ethnocleptocracy*. What is at stake here is a naïve equation of democracy with capitalism. The (re-)introduction of capitalism and the multi-party election system in the formerly Communist Yugoslavia did not result in the new-born post-Yugoslav states automatically becoming "truly democratic" societies. Instead, through the transition process (from Communism to capitalism) the nationalist elites secured their own prosperity by grabbing a good part of the profit from the sale of previously state-owned property, while at the same time silencing any criticism of this deed by

pulling out the argument of the protection of national interests. More precisely, any attack on the nationalist elites in Bosnia and Herzegovina is interpreted not as an attack on them alone but on the whole nations, which they presumably represent. Letu štuke is far from the only Bosnian-Herzegovinian band addressing this issue. In fact, as this chapter will show, it is possible to argue that the issue has become almost a mandatory theme for every rock band whose lyrics deal with the politics of nationalism.

The song is interesting on at least one other level relating to nationalism which needs to be stressed here. It offers a description of the cultural preferences and tastes of the nationalist elites, summed up in the lines that also serve as the chorus: "but primitivism doesn't know what's minimalism." In order to understand this description, it needs to be placed in the socio-historical context of nationalism in Yugoslavia and its successor states. As Eric Gordy argues in his work on nationalism in 1990s Serbia, Yu-Rock had an interurban character in the 1980s, with a number of republican and regional centers developing strong local scenes, yet with intensive contacts with one another. However, as a rural- and regional-oriented nationalist elite took the place of an urban-oriented Communist elite, peasants and "urban peasants" colonized the cultural space that used to be dominated by urban rock and roll youth (Gordy 1999, 103–164). I would argue that the same pattern could be observed all across the former Yugoslavia. In the rock-music culture of present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina, the idea that the rural-oriented nationalist elites have since the early 1990s colonized the urban cultural space has become an almost obligatory song theme. By addressing this issue, rock bands position themselves against present-day nationalist elites. Letu štuke does this in their song by contrasting "primitivism" with the aural references to two very popular films from the 1980s, which were both closely associated with the New Wave and post-New Wave generation to which the members of the band also belong.[8] In this way, the band defends the collective Yugoslav past and thereby seeks to protect personal and historical continuity from the nationalist ideologies that completely ignore, destroy or revise common Yugoslav history.

Moreover, scholars working on Yugonostalgia have observed an emancipatory potential on the part of that phenomenon in relation to the *ethnicization* and nationalization of cultural landscapes in post-Yugoslav societies. They point to a strong presence of popular music in narrations, embodiments and interpretations of the Yugoslav past. Thus, in their analysis, they have approached Yugonostalgia from three different perspectives: as a criticism of the actual situation; as a defense of the common Yugoslav past from the dominant nationalist discourses and their

consequences; and as a creative potential in different cultural spheres, most commonly seeking to express itself in an eclectic and satirical way.[9]

In this context, musically eclectic and lyrically satirical Letu štuke offers a criticism of the present by reaching into the common (popular-cultural) past of Yugoslavia. But does that make the band Yugonostalgic? The answer to this question is anything but simple. As already argued, many people in the former Yugoslav republics imagined Yugoslavness as not necessarily being openly Yugoslavist. Seen from this perspective, Yugonostalgia does not need to be pronouncedly Yugoslav-oriented in order to be imagined or experienced as relating to such imagined Yugoslavness. More precisely, given that Yugoslavness was most of all about opposition to nationalist segregation and exclusiveness, any expression of antinationalism and cosmopolitanism in the post-Yugoslav societies can easily be interpreted (both in the process of self-identifying and that of identifying others) as Yugonostalgic. This was also the case with what is arguably the most popular Bosnian rock band at the moment, Dubioza kolektiv,[10] to which I turn in the following section.

"Walter Is Returning, You Are so Gonna Pay Back!"

During the first decade of the twenty-first century, many formerly state-owned companies were sold to private owners in order to make them profitable. However, the new private owners often sold the assets, stopped paying workers and filed for bankruptcy. In early February 2014 peaceful demonstrations against this situation started in the northern city of Tuzla, once a proud giant of Yugoslav heavy industry, and eventually initiated the greatest social unrest that Bosnia and Herzegovina had experienced since the end of the 1992–1995 war. After clashes between police and local protestors occurred in Tuzla, the protests spread to various cities across the country, including the capital, Sarajevo, and the largest city in the Herzegovina region, Mostar. Demanding a change, the public turned most of their anger against the cantonal governments.[11] These governments were widely viewed as symbols of the corruption and nationalism described in the previous section. In the clashes with police, protestors burned and demolished several cantonal governmental buildings across the country. Although these disturbances were obviously of a social character, because they were largely concentrated in areas with a Bosniak ethnic majority, Serb and Croat political leadership (both in Bosnia and in Serbia and Croatia) and several media in the territories of former Yugoslavia soon defined the protests as Bosniak

national protests. Thus, just like everything else in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, the protests were ethnicized (Figs. 6.2, 6.3).

As a reaction to this ethnicization, Dubioza kolektiv—a band best known for its criticism of nationalism and social injustice in Bosnia and Herzegovina and for advocating the legalization of cannabis—offered commentary on the situation. In the commentary (implicitly offering support to the protestors), the band members explained that they did not even identify themselves as Bosniaks, arguing that, in fact, not one of the band's members had chosen to opt nationally as a Bosniak in the population census carried out half a year prior to the protests.

Fig. 6.2 The graffiti on the Tuzla cantonal government building reads, in part, "Stop Nationalism" and "Stop national division of Bosnian-Herzegovinian citizens." The graffiti illustrates the anger and distrust that the protestors of the February 2014 unrest in Tuzla (and elsewhere in Bosnia) felt not only for the cantonal governments but also for the very institution of the canton, which they saw as a symbol of national division in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina (Photo by Sabina Mešić)

Fig. 6.3 Protestors in Tuzla symbolically burning a flag of Tuzla Canton (Photo by Sabina Mešić)

The commentary was circulated on one of the most popular internet portals in Bosnia and Herzegovina, klix.ba, and provoked disparate comments by the portal's readers. In the context of a study of Yugonostalgia, arguably the most interesting comment reads:

> And why they didn't declare themselves as Bosniaks on the census? That's how they harm the survival of their own nation...oh, I have figured it out...they think globally so we are left behind...ha-ha...drugs for all...eh, my Yugo junkies![12]

In this comment, we see a rather common ethno-nationalist discursive strategy of negative Yugo-nostalgization, in which any opposition to the dominant ethno-nationalist discourse is automatically labeled either as an irresponsible betrayal of "national interests" or as an anachronistic way of thinking of the bygone "undemocratic" Socialist era (Mišina 2013, 315). The ultimate aim of dismissing any form of socio-cultural and political alternative as being Yugonostalgic is to make it appear irrelevant. In that way, any criticism is easily silenced and deemed irrelevant, although it may in fact have been highly relevant, especially for those people who did not have strong, or any, ethno-national identity.

In expanding this argument, I will stress that in order to understand the meaning of a particular utterance we need to contextualize it. In other words, we need to remember that actions, utterances and expressions never exist in a vacuum but occur in a particular context, attaining their meaning in that context. In this respect, Dubioza kolektiv claiming not to be Bosniaks should be seen in the context of the heated political debate relating to the 2013 Bosnian population census. The biggest controversy about the census was whether people should also (be allowed to) to opt as Bosnians (or Bosnians and Herzegovinians). Such Bosnian identity was favored by those who were searching for an alternative to the narrow ethno-national identities (as either Bosniaks, Croats or Serbs), and their non-ethnic *Bosnian-ness* made an appearance as an important emergent social force in the ethnically divided Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the particular case of Dubioza kolektiv's response to the media's description of the Bosnian unrest, it is possible to assume that Dubioza kolektiv, by declaring that none of the band's members opted as Bosniak, implicitly suggested that they had, in fact, chosen to opt as Bosnians.[13] It is in this context that the Yugo-nostalgization we see in the quoted comment—the one aiming to declare the emergent social force of the non-ethnic Bosnian-ness as irrelevant—emerged. And in that context, it very much makes sense.

That said, the explanation for why and how it makes sense to "accuse" Dubioza kolektiv of being Yugo(-nostalgic) should not be reduced to this particular discursive strategy used in the struggle to define social and political identities in today's Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dubioza kolektiv or, more precisely, its appropriation of a common Yugoslav (popular-cultural) past bears at least part of the "blame." Probably the best example of this appropriation comes to fruition in the band's 2010 song "Walter."

The name "Walter" refers to one of the most popular films about Yugoslavia's Second World War history. The 1972 film *Walter Defends Sarajevo* was inspired by real events concerning the Sarajevo underground resistance during the war and its leader Vladimir Perić, who was known by the code name "Walter."[14] Even so, for Dubioza kolektiv "Walter" is not about the war at all but about certain moral and ethical themes which were embodied in the film and which very much shaped the aesthetic of living of the Bosnian and Yugoslav citizenry at a specific point in time, most notably the non-national ideal of brotherhood and unity between Yugoslavs of different national and religious affiliations. In developing this argument, it is useful to proceed by describing two scenes from the film in which these

moral and ethical themes, relating to the fraternal solidarity among Yugoslavs, are particularly clearly expressed. The first scene is arguably the film's central scene, in which a Nazi officer invites the parents of some fallen resistance fighters to claim the bodies of their children. Sarajevans of different ethnicities and religions—Muslims, Serbs, Croats and Jews—unanimously step forward, thereby thwarting the German plan to identify and execute anyone who had any connection to the resistance movement. In this act the private loss of the individual parents becomes a public one, which makes the film a story not only about the unsuccessful German attempt to catch Walter, but also about personifying the strength and defiance of the city.

The second important scene is the film's closing scene, in which a retiring colonel and a Gestapo officer discuss the unsuccessful attempts to catch Walter:

Colonel: Impressive! Ever since I came to Sarajevo, I have been trying to trace Walter, but I couldn't find him. And yet, as I am leaving, I have finally found out who he is.
Gestapo: You know who he is?! Tell me his name right away!
Colonel: I will show him to you… Do you see this city? This is Walter![15]

This is pronounced as the camera provides a panoramic view of Sarajevo, implying that Walter is not an individual inhabitant of the city but rather the city itself or, figuratively speaking, all inhabitants of Sarajevo, regardless of their ethno-religious affiliation. Seen from this perspective, Walter could not be more unlike present-day Bosnia and its capital city, both of which are divided along ethno-national lines. In this context, Walter presents a very powerful subversive figure from the Yugoslav past (filmic and real alike) that can be used as a critique of the present and of the dominant ethno-national discourses. In "Walter," Dubioza kolektiv does this quite explicitly, starting with lines addressing the citizens of present-day Sarajevo (and Bosnia):

> You ain't confused, you ain't crazy
> For you this is normal
> A mouth full of fake ideals

This is followed by a description of Bosnian socio-political reality, defined by social injustice and increasing socio-economic inequality, before the band explains its own stance on the situation, announcing what "fake ideals" it is addressing:

This country is not divisible by three
And your nationalism
Is not my patriotism[16]

It is also noteworthy that the chorus is introduced by a well-known sequence from the film, in which a radio-operator's voice states symbolically that it is "five minutes to twelve," which is also the title of the album containing the song.

The video for the song should be mentioned as well. It tells the story of a satirical character, a poor, clumsy old man dressed in a superman-like outfit with a W for "Walter" on it. The old man is cruising the streets of the city in search of food, finding it mostly in the garbage. He fights for crumbs with other even weaker and poorer elderly people rather than turning against the real bad guys, the partying rich played by the members of Dubioza kolektiv themselves. Not much "real" Walter in the video, we can agree. The message, however, is not to be mistaken. It comes to expression in the scene where the old man ends up at the very same spot at which the film's closing scene is set, eating cheap pastry and overlooking the city. The recognizable panoramic view of the city is accompanied by the chorus of the song according to which "Walter is returning, you are so gonna pay back."[17] There is not the slightest doubt that this is addressed to the corrupted and plutocratic ethno-nationalist elites in present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Although satirical and funny, the message—its implicit intertextual overrating of the past of the city as a united Yugoslav city (strong enough to defeat the mighty Germans) serving as an explicit criticism of the consciously underrated present ethnically divided Bosnian city—is indeed rather serious. This conclusion leads me to the question concerning the emancipatory potential of nostalgia in popular music, or more precisely to the question of whether music is only about being entertained and having fun. This discussion is at the center of the next section, a section in which I focus on what is probably the funniest Bosnian-Herzegovinian band of the present time, Mostar's Zoster (from herpes zoster, the Latin name for shingles).

"A Country for You" and "A Country for Us"

One thing is certain: Zoster is an extremely amusing band, on tape and in concert—eclectic, satirical, provocative and yet elusive due to lyrics peppered with puns that make the listener examine the text, trying to decode the messages. This raises the question of to what extent the band's music

(and the music of other bands discussed here) is just for fun. Or, to put it as a more general question: does not all music come from the musician's and audience's desire for entertainment? In line with the general assertion in the field of cultural studies, I would offer an argument that popular music is never "just for fun" but should be approached as an arena for conflict and struggle, for the negotiation of cultural and political identities. This argument is quite similar to the one proposed by Mitja Velikonja in his work on Yugonostalgia in Slovenia. Velikonja argues that every message contains ideological meanings and has political consequences, regardless of whether authors, promoters or the audience are aware of it or not, and whether or not that is the creators' intention (Velikonja 2012, 86).

In the case of Zoster, I would argue that the band is perfectly well aware of the message they are sending. There can hardly be any doubt that the band very consciously chooses to address different aspects of present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina's socio-cultural and political realities—most notably, and like all the other bands discussed in this chapter, those concerning corruption and nationalism. The band's stance on the former comes most clearly into expression in one of their most popular songs, "Who Managed to Get It…" from 2007. Conceived as a World Music song with an African drum rhythm, this song tells the story of four young brothers, petty crooks, who are caught and sentenced to death by hanging for "twelve dollars." All the while, with "the magic, (abracadabra!)," the big money disappears through the "transaction-papers."[18] Every Bosnian and any citizen of other formerly Yugoslav republics would easily recognize and decode the intention behind this message, which alludes to the privatization of the previously state-owned companies mentioned in the previous sections.

In "The Fellow Citizen," another song from the same 2007 record, Zoster addresses the issue of nationalism in Bosnian society and the negative impact that it has on the life of the country's citizenry. I chose the name of this chapter from this song's lyrics, more precisely its line "This is a country for you." The reason for this choice should be clear shortly, after a presentation of the song lyrics and some interpretation. To begin with, I will call attention to a well-known problem in most transition economies, the problem of the younger and better-educated population leaving the country. This is satirically presented in the first verse of "The Fellow Citizen":

> My dear fellow citizens,
> I'm leaving you soon,
> leaving this shitty little town.

Trust me, a young fella like me,
you will not see for a long, long time.
For a long, long time you will not see (someone like me).
Because there is a dreadful brain drain
on our area, and there are none of my buddies left,
and that is why I am leaving too...

While brain drain is common for most transition economies, the following verse leaves the listener in no doubt that it addresses the specific Bosnian-Herzegovinian socio-politico-historical problem:

Going away from Avdo ya-ya-ya-ya-ya
from Anto ya-ya-ya-ya-ya,
and from Jovo...[19]

While the first line is sung in a way that initially makes it sound like "going away from here," it becomes clear in the next line that we are dealing with a pun, referring to Bosnia and Herzegovina's ethnic composition.[20] Thus, in the first line the band's singer announces that he is going away from Bosniaks, as Avdo is a common Bosniak name. Given that Anto is a common Croatian and Jovo a common Serbian name, in the following two lines we learn that he is also going away from Croats and Serbs. This is something easily intelligible for people in the formerly Yugoslav lands. It is helpful to remember here that a text can only communicate its meaning when situated in relation to other texts and to larger issues. The issue at stake here is everyday life in today's Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is organized strictly according to division of the three dominant ethno-national groups.

A slight digression to the two bands discussed in the previous sections will serve to expand this argument before I make the final comment on the song in question here. In the song "Triple Head Monster," Dubioza kolektiv offers their picture of the ethnically divided Bosnia and Herzegovina as a monster-state without unity, divided between three national "heads." In the video for the song, this is presented as all Bosnians wearing paper bags on their heads, with each bag bearing a picture of one of the leaders of the three nationalist parties ruling the country.[21] How this ethnic division affects the Bosnian population comes into expression in the song called "To Mirza." In the song, Dino Šaran of Letu štuke features Edo Maajka, probably the region's most popular rapper. "To Mirza" addresses an imaginary Bosnian emigrant, Mirza, who is longing for his homeland. In an imaginary letter to Mirza, they tell him about economic hardship

and ethnic division that make it not worth returning. The ethnic division is expressed in a line according to which "they are all proud Serbs, proud Croats and Muslims, and they all are hungry and very much broken."[22] It is interesting that in the lines that explain the economic hardship, the song uses the popular referent "from Triglav to the Vardar," meaning, in fact, the territories of former Yugoslavia.[23] We are thus left to decide for ourselves whether the present Bosnia or the past Yugoslavia should be understood as the homeland. This leads me back to the last verse in Zoster's "The Fellow Citizen," which revolves around a similar problem complex:

> This is a country for you…
> This is a country for all of your people…
> This is a house for you...
> This is a house for all of your children...[24]

In this verse, the band evokes the very popular 1987 song "Country" by the Belgrade band Ekatarina Velika. "Country" was written by one of the leading personalities of Yugoslav punk and New Wave, the band's frontman, Milan Mladenović, who would later became the symbol of the antiwar movement in Belgrade and Yugoslavia. As a recent study of Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav popular culture emphasizes, "Country" should be recognized as "one of the biggest patriotic, or better said, peace anthems of Yu-Rock ever" (Perica 2012, 61). The first verse of the song—to which the last verse of "The Fellow Citizen" refers—supports this argument, announcing that:

> This is a country for us.
> This is a country for all of our people.
> This is a house for us.
> This is a house for all of our children.[25]

I have argued elsewhere that Mladenović expressed his Yugoslavism in "Country" without needing to refer directly to Yugoslavia (Jovanovic 2013, 103). For the contemporaneous audience there was no doubt that Ekatarina Velika's country in fact meant Yugoslavia. This country was defined by its interethnic inclusiveness and cosmopolitanism. It was a country very different from the country Zoster is referring to, that is, present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is defined by nationalism and ethnic divisions. However, what is particularly interesting here is Zoster's positioning between these two countries. In its explicit reference to the

common Yugoslav popular-cultural past, the band offers an implicit criticism of ethnicization and nationalization of cultural landscapes in post-Yugoslav Bosnia and Herzegovina. Zoster achieves this by altering "us" and "our" to "you" and "your." Thus, Zoster contrasts "A Country for Us," as the original Ekatarina Velika's 1987 song was commonly known, with "A Country for You," which is what Zoster's song is about. Moreover, it was commonly assumed from the beginning that "A Country for Us" was a song about Yugoslavia—it was recognized as such by all Yugoslavs without any need to use the word "Yugoslavia." Similarly, "A Country for You" is easily recognizable as a reference to today's ethnically divided Bosnia and Herzegovina without any need to refer to it explicitly.

This being said, I can hardly emphasize enough that contrasting the Yugoslavia of the past with the Bosnia and Herzegovina of today should not be understood as an attempt to idealize Yugoslavia or its presumed interethnic harmony. Ekatarina Velika's song was written in the period of rising nationalism in the mid-to-late 1980s. The song's cosmopolitan message about a country for all its people was meant to stand in stark contrast to the exclusivist rhetoric of nationalism that was emerging in mid-1980s Yugoslavia. Thus, Ekatarina Velika's song was about fighting nationalism and its exclusivist rhetoric, and as such it formed an expression of the band's antinationalist and cosmopolitan Yugoslavness. By evoking this particular 1987 song, Zoster reaches for the subversive potential of common Yugoslav (popular-cultural) history in order to fight nationalism and nationalist segregation in Bosnia and Herzegovina here and now.

In conclusion, I want to point out that in this respect, Yugoslavia represents Bosnia and Herzegovina's inverse picture and the "other" of the dominant ethno-nationalist discourses. As Mitja Velikonja argues in his work on Yugonostalgia in the popular music of Slovenia, Yugoslavia constitutes two different "significant others" in the dominant Slovenian national discourses. Yugoslavia is firstly a *spatial other*, territorially different from Slovenia and often equated with the Balkans. Secondly, Yugoslavia is also a *temporal other*, the other from the most recent Slovenian past (Velikonja 2012, 93–94). On this spectrum between spatial and temporal "others," Yugoslavia is more a temporal than a spatial "other" in present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, by announcing its departure from Bosnia and Herzegovina and by allying itself with Ekatarina Velika and thereby indirectly with the Yugoslavness expressed in Ekatarina Velika's song, Zoster offers a critical challenge to the dominant nationalist discourses. The result is that the band allies itself more with

Yugoslavia than with Bosnia. However, this is not a question of retreating into an idealized Yugoslav past, or of restorative nostalgia, but a reflective comment on the present situation in Bosnian society. This discussion about restorative versus reflexive nostalgia is at the center of the next section.

"I Miss My Tito Once Again"

In April 2014, as a comment on the February 2014 unrest, a little-known local Sarajevo band released a video for their cover of the Southern rock anthem "Sweet Home Alabama," renamed "Sweet Home Sarajevo." In its lyrics, this song rejects Bosnia's ethno-national political leadership ("Sarajevo don't need them around anyhow") and criticizes corruption among the Bosnian politicians ("In Bosnia we hate the government, 'cuz they all steal what ain't nailed down"). What is particularly interesting in the context of this chapter is that the song opens with strong references to Yugoslavia and its late president for life, Josip Broz Tito. This is done in a way that contrasts the everyday life of ordinary Sarajevans ("Cheap Drina keep on smoking/ Drinking kafu with my kin/Singing songs about Yugoslavia/I miss my Tito once again")[26] with the political leaders who are referred to by name in the following verses ("I heard Mr. Dodik rant about her/I heard old Čović put her down/Well, good old Bakir ain't much better"). The filmic part of the video uses footage from the unrest, showing clearly that the band's sympathies are with the demonstrators.[27] The logic of telling the story, lyrics and video included, once again fits in with the three approaches to Yugonostalgia described previously in the present chapter. The major difference is that here nostalgia for Yugoslavia is rather explicit. Nevertheless, "singing songs about Yugoslavia" and missing Tito ("once again") is not about "returning" but rather about "longing." This means that we are once again dealing with reflexive nostalgia for the past, a nostalgia that at the same time seeks to provide personal and collective continuity with Yugoslavia and reminds us of the common Yugoslav past in order to articulate a more powerful critique of the present, and possibly to initiate a different and better future.

The same goes for what I will argue is the ultimate Bosnian Yugonostalgia song. This is a song by the Tuzla rapper HZA, alias Jasmin Dervišević. HZA is best known as a part of the Tuzla reggae/hip hop band Disciplinska komisija (The Disciplinary Panel), a band that included some of the most important rappers in the whole region of former Yugoslavia, like the previously mentioned Edo Maajka and Adnan Hamidović Frenkie, whose song "Let's Overthrow Them" became one of the anthems of the protestors during the February 2014 unrest. HZA's song is named symbolically "Dear

Tito" and conceived as a letter to the former president. Although the song deserves to be heard in its entirety, I will here only present the most relevant parts of it. However, before presenting the lyrics, I want to draw attention to HZA's use of "The Pioneer Oath" in the song. The oath—which had to be learned and recited by all first-grade children in Socialist Yugoslavia—serves as a lyrical introduction to the song. The text of the oath is as follows: "Today when I am becoming a pioneer, I swear that I will study industriously, work hard and be a good comrade… That I will love our Self-Managing homeland, the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia. That I will cherish brotherhood and unity and the ideas for which Tito was fighting." (Fig. 6.4)

Fig. 6.4 A screenshot from the video of HZA's "Dear Tito" reading an excerpt from "the Pioneer Oath," saying that "I will cherish brotherhood and unity and the ideas for which Tito was fighting." This text appears at the sequence of the song right after we have heard HZA rapping "I have heard that we have exchanged brotherhood and unity for used ideals and goals in a jar. And where are we now? Just there, where we deserve to be, since we haven't rebelled." This leaves an impression of certain self-blame for not rising up against the destruction of culturally integrated, multi-ethnic, Socialist Yugoslavia. Yet, at the same time it invites for a struggle against ethnic division and nationalism in present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina (Copyrights: Jasmin Dervišević HZA/FmJam https://youtu.be/sB1ke-LdGFI?t=3m18s)

The lyrical introduction is followed by the lyrics, which offer an insightful summary/diagnosis of the contemporary reality in the formerly Yugoslav lands, as seen by the rapper:

> Dear Tito, Yugoslavia no longer exists.
> Imams and priests have fucked us up.
> Hate, the thieves are in authority now.
> They don't name the streets after you any more,
> nothing is like before,
> and the whole of Europe is laughing at us.
> Totally broken, economy and standard [of life]
> and peasants from the mountains, they all come down to the city.
> No jobs, no money, no brotherhood and unity,
> these children will have a crappy childhood.
> Before you even cooled in your grave, they had made their plans
> to split Yugoslavia and Yugoslavs into clans,
> to turn us against each other, to destroy this big country,
> brotherhood and unity to throw into a shadow at any cost.
>
> ... First, they divided Yugoslavia into republics,
> and then they brought sadness to the mothers of the fallen ones
> and pain, they destroyed each other's churches and mosques,
> as though they had not built them together.
>
> ... We didn't know who was a Serb and who was a Muslim.
> Until they clarified it to us, and made the problem.
> And divided us like cattle after so many years,
> and we were like one, we were like family.
> Now everyone is in their own cote and has their own identity,
> eating shit - Balkan mentality.[28]

As wee see here, in addition to the aspects of the socio-cultural and political realities in twenty-first-century post-Yugoslav societies that I have already discussed in this chapter (such as injustice, corruption, economic hardship, nationalism and the colonization by new "peasant" elites of the cultural space that used to be dominated by urban rock and roll youth), in his song HZA introduces at least two other issues important in today's Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first concerns the clericalization of Bosnian society, that is, the increasing religious influence on politics and every other aspect of everyday life in present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina. Second, he contrasts the big and internationally recognized

Yugoslavia with her small successor states which "the whole of Europe is laughing at." That said, I want to emphasize that both of these issues have also been taken up by other bands in their lyrics. For instance, in Dubioza kolektiv's "They Say" the band addresses the passivity of ordinary citizens toward the intrusion of religion into every aspect of social and political life with the chorus "From the Vatican to Iran we act like we only yesterday came down from the trees." The video for the song likewise presents the clerics (Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim) as the real rulers of the country.[29] When it comes to the second issue, it should be remembered that the Yugoslav successor states are today commonly referred to as "banana states." On this issue Zoster has recorded a song called "Banana State" [30]

The point of showing that all the issues raised in HZA's distinctively Yugonostalgic song are also raised in songs sung by the other bands discussed in the chapter—even though these bands are not as explicitly Yugonostalgic—is to put forward a more general comment on Yugonostalgia and its relation to antinationalism in today's Bosnia and Herzegovina. As I argued in the introduction to this chapter by referring to Stef Jansen's work on post-Yugoslav antinationalism, if a person's Yugoslav orientation does not need to be openly Yugoslavist in order to qualify as a case of Yugoslavness, but is defined more by insistence on open interethnic boundaries, antinationalism and cosmopolitanism, then the relationship between Yugonostalgia and antinationalism becomes so blurred (as they necessarily spill into each other) that it does not make sense to insist on separating them analytically from each other.

Conclusion

This chapter promised to explain the relationship between Yugonostalgia and antinationalism in Bosnian-Herzegovinian rock-music culture. In doing so, it has shown that defense of the common Yugoslav past, as seen in the analyzed examples, has sought to protect historical and personal continuity from the dominant ethno-nationalist discourses, which seek to revise and destroy any such continuity. The chapter has also shown that the purpose of defending this past is not to tell the story of how fine everything was before. Rather, it is a matter of reaching for different

subversive elements from this past and turning them into weapons to be used in criticizing the present state of things, most notably the persistent ethnicizing and nationalizing interpretations of socio-economic and cultural realities in the country.

Because of the inherently self-referential character of popular culture, Yugoslav popular culture has often provided bands and musicians with a creative means of defining cultural and political identities—identities different from those offered by the dominant ethno-national discourses—not in bygone Yugoslav history, but in today's Bosnia and Herzegovina. Owing to the pronounced Yugoslav orientation of this popular culture, an antinationalist and cosmopolitan Yugoslavness remains embodied in these struggles. For this reason, it is usually impossible—without violating the intended messages—to make a distinction between the situation where an utterance shows a Yugonostalgic character and the situation where it is "merely" an expression of antinationalism embodied in narratives and interpretations of the Yugoslav past. In other words, any expression of antinationalism in the post-Yugoslav socio-cultural and political space is inevitably caught up in the system of references to the idea(l) of Yugoslavness, which is most of all defined by its imperative of preserving open interethnic boundaries.

Finally, the chapter has shown that the perception of social injustice in Bosnia and Herzegovina is closely associated with the nationalist agency of the political and religious elites. Nationalism is, in other words, perceived as a major obstacle to urgently desired social improvement. In this way, the antinationalism inherent in Bosnian-Herzegovinian rock-music culture has also become inextricably interlaced with the ideas of "the lost future" of social justice that Socialist Yugoslavia promised, a process which has blurred the distinction between Yugonostalgia and antinationalism even further. This nostalgia, as we saw, does not seek to restore Yugoslavia but constitutes a "longing" for those moral and ethical values that used to shape the aesthetics of living of Yugoslav citizenry in the most recent shared Yugoslav past. In relation to these values, the city (and the countryside, as its antithesis) occupies a central position, both as a place and as a trope. And here we see clearly—in the Bosnian example—that the phenomenon of nostalgia is not necessarily about "returning" but often constitutes a reflexive critique of the present state of things in the country's cities: the change in the population structure and, even more importantly, the perceived change in power relations. That change

is experienced as if the rural-oriented nationalist elites have colonized the urban cultural space—a space that used to be dominated by rock-music culture, by interethnic tolerance, and by "the (Yugoslav) dream" about a better future.

Notes

1. Rock music is here understood as a meta-genre within a broader musical soundscape and is not reduced to any narrow subculture within this meta-genre.
2. Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina refers to Bosnia and Herzegovina after 1995. In the period between 1992 and 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced an incredibly violent conflict with ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, including genocide. The Dayton Peace Agreement signed in December 1995 officially ended the war, but has at the same time de facto sanctioned the territorial division of Bosnia across ethnic lines. This division persists to this day.
3. See for instance Pogačar 2005, 4.
4. On this issue, for Serbia see Gordy 1999, 103–164; for Slovenia see Stankovič 2001; and for Croatia see Baker 2010, 11–88.
5. Letu štuke is the first half of the chorus of the song "Letu štuke, letu avioni" (grammatically incorrect form for "Stukas are flying, airplanes are flying") from the popular 1960s Yugoslav war film *Kozara*. *Štuka* (pl. *štuke*) is a transliteration referring to the German dive bomber Junker Ju 87, popularly known as Stuka from **Stu**rz**ka**mpfflugzeug ("dive bomber").
6. In his recent argument on the development of civic identity in relation to rock culture in the post-conflict Balkans, Dalibor Mišina distinguishes three phases in the development of this culture: the rise of Yugoslav rock culture starting with the arrival of punk and New Wave in the mid-to-late 1970s; its fall in the early 1990s with the rise of ethno-nationalism in the formerly Yugoslav lands; and finally a "reloading" of (post-Yugoslav) rock culture around 2000 with the rise of hip hop as a leading politically informed (re) incarnation of Yugoslav rock-music culture (Mišina 2013, 304–325).
7. Letu štuke, "Minimalizam," *Letu štuke* (2005).
8. These are Slobodan Šijan's *The Marathon Family* from 1982 and Dušan Kovačević and Božidar Nikolić's *Balkan Spy* from 1984.
9. Both Zala Volčič and Mitja Velikonja have emphasized this emancipatory potential in their different works referred to in this chapter.
10. The word *dubioza* in the band's name, although literally best translated as "dubiousness," refers to the common slang in Bosnia and other post-Yugoslav societies "biti/pasti u *dubiozu*" (be/fall into *deep troubles*). Thus,

Dubioza kolektiv translates best as "In the Deep Trouble Collective" (or, to be true to the slang, "The Deep Shit Crew").

11. Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided into two entities, the Federation and the Serb Republic; Brčko, an autonomous district, does not belong to either of them. The Federation, which is predominantly Bosniak and Croat, is further divided into ten mostly ethnically defined cantons.
12. http://www.klix.ba/magazin/muzika/dubioza-kolektiv-osniva-paralelni-bend/140214087
13. This argument is also supported by the lyrics of one of the band's songs, "They Say," which is discussed in the last section of the chapter.
14. On Vladimir Perić see Donia 2006, 195.
15. Hajrudin Krvavac, *Valter brani Sarajevo* (Bosna film, 1972).
16. Dubioza kolektiv, "Walter," *5 do 12* (2010).
17. https://youtu.be/BDZ3jUB0C1M
18. Zoster, "Ko je jamio…," *Festival budala* (2007).
19. Zoster, "Sugrađanin," *Festival budala* (2007).
20. In the Serbo-Croatian languages "going away from here" is spelled *odavde,* while "going away from Avdo" is spelled *od Avde*.
21. Dubioza kolektiv, "Triple Head Monster," *Dubnamite* (2006); video: https://youtu.be/ct9HmjFll08
22. Edo Maajka (feat. Dino Šaran), "Za Mirzu," *Stigo ćumur* (2006).
23. "From Triglav to the Vardar," or in a reverse order "from the Vardar to Triglav," was and still is a common reference to Yugoslavia as an entity demarcated on the basis of its historic-geographical territory and not ethnicity, as the Vardar is a river in Macedonia and Triglav is the highest peak of the Julian Alps in Slovenia. This reference was easily recognizable by every Yugoslav because the phrase "From the Vardar...to Triglav" was also used in the 1970s folk song "Yugoslavia!" In fact, it is not an exaggeration to claim that "Yugoslavia!," which was commonly called "From the Vardar to Triglav," was Yugoslavia's unofficial national anthem, most probably preferred by the majority of the Yugoslav population to the more ethnically defined "Hey Slavs." Starting with the verse "From the Vardar to Triglav," the song was very much in the spirit of the ideological axiom of "brotherhood and unity," stressing unity among Yugoslavs across national, religious and linguistic boundaries.
24. Zoster, "Sugrađanin," *Festival budala* (2007).
25. Ekatarina Velika, "Zemlja," *Ljubav* (Belgrade: PGP RTB, 1987).
26. "Drina" refers to a local cigarette brand and "kafa" (acc "kafu") is the local word for "coffee."
27. Broken House Band, "Sweet Home Sarajevo" http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OSEujupHIFg
28. HZA, "Dragi Tito," *Opušten ko leksaurin* (2007).

29. Dubioza kolektiv, "Kažu," *Apsurdistan* (2013); video: https://youtu.be/FZZJeMKJV3M
30. Zoster, "Banana State," *Ojužilo* (2005).

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CHAPTER 7

Domesticating Kemalism: Conflicting Muslim Narratives About Turkey in Interwar Yugoslavia

Fabio Giomi

In 1936, a book intriguingly titled *The Orient in the West: Contemporary Cultural and Social Problems of the Muslim Yugoslavs* was published in Belgrade, the capital of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Mulalić 1936). The author of this almost five-hundred-page, finely bound volume was Mustafa Mulalić (1896–1983), a Muslim from Livno, a small town in Western Bosnia. Before becoming notorious as one of the rare Muslim supporters of the Chetnik movement during the Second World War,[1] and consequently being condemned to oblivion by Socialist historiography, Mulalić was a typical representative of post-Ottoman, Bosnian Muslim cultural entrepreneurship. He received his primary and secondary education in Bosnian schools while the province was part of the Habsburg Empire.

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After 1918, he participated in the Yugoslav public space through writing, volunteering in associations, and even becoming a member of Parliament in 1931 and 1935 (Nametak 2004, 311–312). His voluminous book belongs to a genre that was clearly successful among Muslim educated notables of his time. It denounced the social and cultural "backwardness" (*zaostalost*, in the Serbo-Croatian language) that allegedly affected Yugoslav Muslims, as well as Muslims in general, in the interwar period, identifying the causes of this state of things in a low literacy rate and economic marginality, but also in "fatalism" and "bigotry" (Mulalić 1936, 115–131). Further, it proposed a set of reforms that would allow Muslims, along Darwinian lines, to "adapt to" (*prilagoditi*) and "survive" (*opstati*) in the current circumstances, such as reforming the Islamic community, increasing the number of children in secondary schools and universities, and abandoning practices such as the wearing of the female veil and the male fez. Most importantly, Muslims should stop identifying themselves in purely confessional terms, and they should adopt a clear national identification, as "civilized peoples" around the word already did. Like the rest of the Muslim educated notables, Mulalić seemed to have internalized the basic assumptions of the Western Orientalist discourse that divided the world into a hierarchical binary: a civilized West and an Orient not capable of serious progress.[2]

The last chapter of Mulalić's book focused on a topic that apparently does not have much to do with Yugoslav Muslims: titled "Kemalism" (*kemalizam*), this part provided the reader with an enthusiastic "historical review of the cultural progress of Turkey"[3] since its establishment in 1923. Attention towards this post-Ottoman country, and towards its charismatic leader Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938), was by no means exclusive to Mulalić. Muslims in Yugoslavia, as in many other areas of the world, have shown vivid interest in this country and its specific path towards social, political, and cultural transformation.[4] The special place that Kemalist Turkey held in the Yugoslav Muslims' imaginary is well exemplified by Mulalić's terminological choice: while Yugoslav Muslims, given their condition as a numerical minority in a European state, were called "The Orient in the West" (*Orijent na Zapadu*) in the text, Turkey, because of the impressive efforts at reform implemented by its political leadership, was referred to as "The West in the Orient" (*Zapad na Orijentu*) (Mulalić 1936, 440). Of course, this specular terminology on Mulalić's part did not understate the important asymmetries existing between these two civilizational enclaves. After 1923, Turks obtained and consolidated their own nation-state, while

Muslims in Yugoslavia lived as a numerical minority in a mostly Christian state. Despite their differences, however, both entities seemed to have the power to destabilize a world forged on rigid dichotomies, that is, West versus Orient, Europe versus Asia, civilization versus backwardness.

Mulalić was not the only Muslim cultural entrepreneur to give Turkey a special place in his political imaginary: even a rapid overview of the main Muslim journals of the interwar period shows how this Middle Eastern country became the most evoked, celebrated, and contested foreign political reference among Yugoslav Muslims. Taking as a corpus several kinds of printed sources, such as journal articles, books, and pamphlets in the Serbo-Croatian language, this chapter explores Yugoslav Muslims' view of Turkey in the interwar period.[5] More precisely, the chapter attempts to show how imagining Turkey was a truly transnational venture—that is to say, conflicting discourses on Turkey and its inhabitants were fashioned through interactions among people, goods, and ideas largely happening across, and beyond, state borders. Secondly, the chapter shows how shaping and reshaping discourses on Turkey were affected by shifts in power relations at multiple levels, in particular inside the Muslim community, at the Yugoslav level, and at the international level. Thirdly, the chapter highlights how Muslim notables produced representations of Kemalist Turkey that were essentially designed for local political circumstances, both at Yugoslav-state and Muslim-communal levels. Trans/international and local at the same time, the act of imagining Turkey thus became a practice of reflection on several thorny issues affecting Muslim individual and collective trajectories, and of expressing anxieties and expectations concerning the place of Muslims in a post-Ottoman world.

The chapter is structured in four parts, plus a Conclusion. Section "An Embarrassing Lineage" addresses the discourses elaborated by Muslims of Yugoslavia on the Ottoman Empire/Turkey in the aftermath of the First World War, more precisely in the period from 1918 to the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Two subsequent sections address the rise of a "Kemalophile" discourse in the Yugoslav public space, cautiously developed in the second half of the 1920s and significantly expanded in the 1930s. The sections focus on the development of this discourse among Yugoslav non-Muslim writers in general (section "Yugoslavia Goes Kemalist") and more particularly among Muslims (section "Forging an Islamic Kemalism"). Section "Inventing Kemalistan" deals with the development, starting from the end of the Twenties, of an anti-Kemalist narrative developed by Islamic religious officials.

An Embarrassing Lineage

The first Yugoslav state, initially baptized the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, was established in 1918 around the Serbian royal dynasty of the Karađorđevićs. The new kingdom included the previously independent kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, as well as several territories formerly subject to the Habsburg Empire, such as Dalmatia, Croatia-Slavonia, Slovenia, Vojvodina, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Like other states that saw the light in the post-World War One world designed at the Paris Peace Conference, Yugoslavia was organized on the national principle. The official national theory adopted by the authorities in Belgrade, and broadcast throughout the 1920s, was rather peculiar in the Balkan space: Yugoslavia was the state of the South Slavs, a unique people divided into "three tribes" (*troplemeni narod*), or alternatively carrying "three names" (*troimeni narod*), the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. These tribes, oppressed for centuries by two anti-national empires, namely the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires, and unified by the same ancient Slavic past, were finally ready to share the same future (Djokić 2007). Building a unified Yugoslav nation was thus explicitly a work in progress. At the moment of the creation of the state, the problem of how to overcome the differences between the ethnic and religious components of the evolving Yugoslav society went substantially unaddressed by the political leadership (Dimić 1996, 213–246).

The confessional mosaic of the first Yugoslav state was rather complex. The two dominant religious groups were the Orthodox and the Catholic ones; the Orthodox mostly identified themselves as Serbs, while the Catholic population mostly regarded themselves as Croats and Slovenes. In Yugoslavia, Muslims represented a numerical minority of less than 10%, mostly inhabiting the southern areas of the country, nowadays Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia; their presence on Bosnian soil was unanimously considered as the result of the centuries-long Ottoman rule over the region.[6] The position of these Slavic Muslims was ambiguous. To the extent that they were Serbo-Croatian-speaking, they were in one sense generally considered, and considered themselves, South Slavs. At the same time, the Treaty of Trianon (1920) gave the legal status of "minority of race, language and religion" to all Muslims in the country. In addition, the treaty assigned international protection to a set of communal institutions, such as religious schools (*mekteb* and *medresa*), sharia courts, and pious endowments (*vakuf*) (Popovic 1986). The position of Slavic Muslims in the new state

was thus a kind of paradox: as a Slavic-speaking population, they were considered (and considered themselves) legitimate members of the national body; as Muslims, they were considered (and considered themselves) an internationally protected minority.

In the aftermath of the First World War, Muslim notables explored different strategies of political reorganization. In 1919, the majority of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Muslim notables—landowners and religious officials, but also a growing rank of urban white-collar workers—gathered around the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (*Jugoslovenska Muslimanska Organizacija*, JMO), a newly established party that was able to collect the vast majority of votes of Slavic-speaking Muslims in the interwar period. In continuity with the political experiences of the pre-First World War period, the party was a confessional one: it presented itself as a defender of Muslims' interests and promoted the visibility of Islam in the public space. Despite the first national adjective in its name, the JMO refused to adopt a clear national identification: its members defined themselves as "Croats" or "Yugoslav" in different circumstances and periods, or simply refused any national identification.[7]

At the same time, a minority of Muslim notables characterized by secondary or university education and strong national sentiment refused to organize along confessional lines, an option that was seen as irremediably backward and linked to the imperial past. For this reason, these men involved themselves mostly in the activities of existing parties, which had non-Muslim leaderships and promoted Serbian and Yugoslav national ideas, such as the Radical Party and the Democratic Party. Having regularly experienced electoral defeats inflicted by the JMO in general elections, these men found shelter in the main Muslim cultural association, *Zeal* (*Gajret*), established in 1903, whose primary goal was to support Muslim pupils' secondary and higher education. In the interwar period, *Gajret* assigned growing importance to the "awakening" of national consciousness among Muslims of the country, in both a Serbian and Yugoslav sense.[8] A few years later, in 1924, other Muslim educated notables closer to the JMO gathered in a competing association, *Popular Hope* (*Narodna Uzdanica*); in opposition to the rival *Gajret*, this second Muslim cultural association tried to promote the Croatian national idea among Muslims, with very limited results (Kemura 2002). At any rate, the establishment of this second cultural association confirmed a long-lasting feature of the political life of Muslims in Yugoslavia: the split between the intellectuals who gave nationalization a key role in their integration into

Yugoslav society, and the majority of Muslim notables who employed a communitarian strategy for influencing state decision-making.[9]

In this phase of reorganization of the political field, newspapers in Yugoslavia paid very limited attention to the military and political transformation in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Mostly focused on the debate around the constitutional structure of the first Yugoslav state, and on the threats to its territorial integrity that came from neighbouring states, journals assigned limited importance to the Turkish National Movement's fight against the Allies taking place on three fronts. Journals published in Serbia in particular seem to have been reticent, or at least non-sympathetic, in the face of the renovated capability of the Ottomans to cope successfully with European powers on the battlefield and to finally reverse the humiliating conditions of the Treaty of Sèvres (Teodosijević 1998, 10). Journals published in Croatia expressed some sympathy towards Mustafa Kemal, but only rarely and only as an opponent to the Italian claims on the Eastern Mediterranean.[10] Such a lack of sympathy is far from astonishing: even setting aside the long-lasting anti-Ottoman feeling that had developed in Serbia, especially in the nineteenth century, Serbs had found themselves twice opposing the Ottomans on the battlefield in the previous decade, namely in the Fist Balkan War and during the Great War. The unexpected successes of a part of the Ottoman troops were, after all, the successes of a former military enemy.

How did Bosnian Muslims position themselves to face the rise of Mustafa Kemal as victorious commander? Scholarship has shown how his military victories brought him a new wave of sympathy from all over the Muslim world. The entry of the Turkish army into Izmir in September 1922 was accompanied by rallies and meetings in Palestine, Damas, Tunis, and also among the Muslims of India, Yemen, and Addis-Ababa.[11] After at least a century of defeats, the Ottoman Empire was seen by Muslim populations as "the last Muslim independent state, able to cope with the European Imperialism" (Georgeon 1987, 4–5) in a period in which nearly all of the global Muslim population lived in colonial situations. Some sources highlighted a palpable feeling of sympathy among the Muslim notables in Bosnia. As observed a few years later by Maksim Svara, a non-Muslim journalist from Sarajevo and a close observer of his Muslim fellow citizens, in the period between 1919 and 1923 "there was not a single Muslim on earth that, with the greatest enthusiasm, did not follow the efforts of a small and battered Turkish people to obtain political freedom". As stated few lines later by the same author, "Gazi Mustafa Kemal-paša,

military genius and initiator of a super-human effort, became a positive figure to every Muslim, and from each segment of the Muslim world he received signs of love, respect, and solidarity, and in many cases even valid help. Even our Muslims spoke with admiration of this great man, not because they tied their success to any political hope, but out of pure confessional solidarity [*čista vjerska solidarnost*]" (Svara 1931a, 6–7). However, the enthusiasm noticed by Svara for the military accomplishments of Mustafa Kemal, and for the Turkish National Movement in general, seem to have remained mostly in the realm of informal conversations, occupying a very limited space in the Muslim press. How should such a public silence be explained?

The response to this question likely comes from the specificities of the Muslim position inside the architecture of the forming Yugoslav political arena. In the first years of activity, the JMO, as the main Muslim party, was often in opposition to the most important Serbian parties, and for this reason it was regularly attacked in the press and in parliamentary debates. Interestingly enough, references to Turkey were constantly used by the JMO's competitors in order to question Muslim loyalty to the new state. When JMO deputies entered the Constituent Assembly in 1920, they were addressed by their Serbian colleagues as "supporters of Lenin and Kemal Paša" (Purivatra 1977, 83), a mode of address which stressed their supposed allegiance to foreign powers. In 1923, when the JMO was allied with the Croatian opposition, the Serbian newspaper *Serbian Word* (*Srpska riječ*) did not hesitate to designate the Muslim delegates in Parliament as "Pan-Islamist and Kemalist", and so on (Purivatra 1977, 141, 269). Such accusations in the newspapers were accompanied by numerous anti-Muslim episodes of violence across the country, episodes that caused around 2000 deaths between just 1919 and 1922 (Imamović 2006, 275–276). Although observers occasionally mentioned Muslim demonstrations of sympathy towards a Muslim armed movement reacting to decades of military humiliations, this manifestation of sympathy was scarcely visible in the newspapers: the risk of being accused of, and persecuted for, anti-Yugoslav feelings probably represented the most effective deterrent. Looking for their place in the Yugoslav social fabric and facing anti-Muslim violence resulting from accusations of being alien and non-loyal, JMO partisans preferred to avoid publicly expressing sympathy towards a foreign national movement.

Mustafa Kemal's recent military success was even less welcome among Muslim cultural notables, especially among the ones gathered around

Gajret. Although Edhem Miralem, a Muslim political activist and writer with a pro-Croatian orientation, expressed as early as November 1923 a vivid enthusiasm for "honest, brave and patriotic Kemal-Pasha at the helm of the Turkish people [who] freed his country from the foreign enemy […] and thus performed an extraordinary feat and gained eternal glory" (Miralem 1923, 3), these kinds of laudatory statements remained few. Given the importance they assigned to the national awakening of the Muslim population in Yugoslavia, meaning the assimilation of the Muslim population in the Serbian and Yugoslav nations, *Gajret* activists, in particular, displayed explicit hostility towards the Ottomans in their writings. Such hostility was at the same time generally anti-imperial and specifically anti-Ottoman. It was general because it regarded all the empires that had ruled the Yugoslav space over the last couple of centuries—Byzantine, Ottoman, and Habsburg—as different manifestations of the same oppressive force against autochthonous Slavic nations (Tanović 1920, 57–58). In the context of this anti-imperial attitude, the most frequently attacked countries were, tellingly, "sick Austria and Turkey" (*bolesne Turska i Austrija*) (Ćorivić 1919, 3–4), the ones that had most directly and most recently shared their rule of the region. At the same time, the Ottoman Empire was the object of particular hostility: journals that were ideologically close to the association, without necessarily being a house organ of the same association, it was regularly described as the bastion of "conservatism" and the supporter of the most reactionary elements of the local Muslim society, meaning the religious officials (*ilmija*) and landowning families (*begovat*) (Velja 1919, 73–74). with their arguments circulating largerly in Western and Serbian public discourse (Hentsch 1987, 196–208), these journals regularly represented the Ottoman Empire as a decrepit state impossible to reform. Turning to popular Darwinist rhetorical repertoires, some nationalist Muslims depicted the Ottomans as unfit to survive in the "national selection" (*nacionalna selekcija*) and thus condemned to rapid extinction.[12] In such a dichotomous representation, the opposition between national, and thus progressive, forces and a-national, and thus conservative, forces was regularly used to mirror *Gajret*'s competition with the JMO with regard to elections to the Constituent Assembly.

Placing the "sick" and "oppressive" Ottomans at a distance was not the only purpose of *Gajret* activists. As fervent nationalists, they also felt the need to popularize the Serbian national narrative among Muslims. For this purpose, *Gajret* activists published texts celebrating the heroism and sacrifice of Serbian warriors in the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, and even more in the First World War. For instance, between 1924 and 1925 the *Gajret*

official journal published a feuilleton eloquently titled "Serbian Epopee",[13] an anonymous text published in Belgrade in 1915 and celebrating, as the subtitle says, Serbian "heroes and martyrs" against the Ottomans.[14] Indeed, *Gajret* activists turned out to be even more ambitious: they tried to inscribe Muslims into the Serbian national narrative as praiseworthy characters. The main obstacle to this ambitious intellectual project came from the established doxa of the Serbian national narrative, which was not only anti-Ottoman but also vividly anti-Muslim. As a vast body of historiography has shown, in the Serbian hegemonic national narrative the Slavs that converted to Islam during the Ottoman period did so for personal advantage, in order to maintain or acquire rights to land, to build a successful career in the Ottoman administration, to pay less taxes, and so on. For such material reasons, they did not hesitate to cooperate with the oppressor and renounce the Christian faith. Slavic Muslims thus played the role of internal enemies who did not hesitate to betray the nation and turn their backs on their fathers' religion (Hajdarpasić 2015). How, then, was it possible to transform traitors into national heroes?

In the first half of the 1920s, two Muslim cultural entrepreneurs tried to resolve this narrative impasse. The first was Šukrija Kurtović, a Muslim originally from Sarajevo, who was a voluntary official in the Serbian army in Odessa during the First World War (Kemura 1986, 76). Close to the Democratic Party, he became one of the leading figures of *Gajret* in the aftermath of the First World War. In a text published in 1919 in the journal *Future* (*Budućnost*), Kurtović stated that Slavs who converted to Islam did not betray the nation; on the contrary, they saved it. According to Kurtović,

> the Muslim part of our people, that has played an important social and political role in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has also played its own role in our national [*narodni*] history, and it is clear that it is only thanks to the service [*zasluga*] of our ancestors that Bosnia remained pure from a national point of view, and did not experience the same fate as Thrace and Macedonia from a national point of view since the invasion of the Turks. (Kurtović 1919, 1–2)

Kurtović's theory—his view had little to do with historical reality—had the explicit aim of inscribing the conversion to Islam of local Slavs into the Serbian national narrative. According to him, in converting to Islam Slavs prevented the Ottoman Empire from implanting Turkish (and thus alien) people from Anatolia in the area mostly inhabited by Slavs. Here,

conversion to Islam, usually considered a betrayal of "Serbianhood", was turned into a service to the national cause.

A contemporary of Kurović's, *Gajret* activist Hasan Rebac, further developed this argument. The two men's biographical and political trajectories were similar in some respects. After having completed his studies in Belgrade, Vienna, and Paris, Rebac volunteered in the Serbian army during the First World War. Thanks to his political connections to Nikola Pašić, he obtained a position as a civil servant in the Ministry of Cults and then in the Ministry of Justice. In 1921 he married Anica Savić (1892–1953), a prominent Serbian writer and translator and daughter of the editor of *Letopis Matice Srpske*, a periodical considered one of the most prestigious Serbian cultural institutions.[15] In 1920, in the pages of the feminist journal *Female Movement* (*Ženski Pokret*), Rebac gave a gender dimension to Kurtović's thesis (Rebac 1920, 13–16).[16] He argued that despite their conversion to Islam, Slavic Muslims, and in particular Muslim women, "have always remained our children and never ceased thinking of their people and their country" (Rebac 1920, 14). Their loyalty to their national origins was mainly evidenced by their language. Despite their conversion to Islam—referred to as "the Turkish faith" (*turska vera*)—Slavic Muslims remained "Serbian sons" (*srpski sinovi*). According to Rebac, if the national identity was kept alive among the Muslims of Bosnia, the credit belonged "to their mothers, to Serbian women of Muslim faith [*srpkinje muslimanske vere*]". Within the privacy of their homes, these women had kept Serbian customs alive through songs and poetry. In Rebac's words,

> Our Muslim women never learned nor had any desire to learn foreign languages, and were generally given in marriage only to members of their own people. Even today, there are Yugoslav women of Muslim faith who have spent twenty years among Turks in Turkey with their children, and who do not know a word in the Turkish language. (Rebac 1920, 14)

Ottoman confessional and gender segregation thus became the tool for maintaining Slavic national qualities, making the integration of Muslims in the Ottoman state a superficial matter. To support his argument, Rebac adduced the story of the encounter between a Serbian pope and an Ottoman "governor" (*vali*), a Muslim of Herzegovinian origins, in the first half of the nineteenth century at the latter's home in Prizren. After a friendly conversation, the master of the house honours the presence of his guest by reading a poem of the Serbian national epic tradition.

> When the *vali* started to read a poem from the third book of Vuk [Stefanović Karadžić, the father of modern Serbian language and literature], his mother, an old Herzegovinian woman, listened in delight with tears in her eyes, interrupted her son and continued to recite the verses of the poem by heart, as she had learned it from her mother. (Rebac 1920, 14)

To sum up, in the aftermath of the First World War, eager to show their non-Muslim fellow citizens the legitimacy of their presence in the Yugoslav space, and to participate in the construction of a Yugoslav society, Muslim notables of every political orientation publicly downplayed their proximity to the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish National Movement, and its recognized leader Mustafa Kemal. Both JMO supporters and the Muslim progressive opposition wanted to avoid being associated with a foreign political power and to show to their non-Muslim fellow citizens their loyalty to the newly established Yugoslav state. If the former chose silence, the latter attacked the Ottoman Empire as a reality condemned to death by history, substantially ignoring the importance of military victories gained by Mustafa Kemal. In order to inscribe themselves into Serbian national history, *Gajret* supporters tried as well to invent a new historical narrative in which Slavs who converted to Islam were transformed from traitors to heroes, and from picklocks of the Ottomans into a bastion against the Turkification of the Yugoslav space.

Yugoslavia Goes Kemalist

A rapid sequence of events happening at the core of the Ottoman space in the period from 1922 to 1924 progressively created the circumstances for a substantial shift in these representations. The abolition of the two most important Ottoman institutions—the Sultanate (1 November 1922) and the Caliphate (3 March 1924)—and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey (29 October 1923) were meant to put Mustafa Kemal and his political entourage in the global spotlight. As stated by François Georgeon, in the Muslim world, as elsewhere, after 1924 Mustafa Kemal progressively stopped being celebrated as *Gazi*, the victorious fighter for Islam against Christian powers, and progressively became the enlightened father of the Turkish nation (Georgeon 1987, 17–25). Such a shift in the perception of Turkey and its political leader happened slowly in the Yugoslav press, however. Non-Muslim journals offered extensive coverage of the political and diplomatic events taking place in the Eastern

Mediterranean region, occasionally expressing sympathy towards Mustafa Kemal's audaciousness and aspiration to transform what remained of the Ottoman territories into a modern, Western-like state. However, a wait-and-see attitude seemed to prevail in non-Muslim Yugoslav newspapers until the end of the Twenties.[17]

The demise of the Ottoman Empire and its centuries-old institutions had a powerful impact on the Muslim population of Yugoslavia, which, even if separated by the Ottoman Empire in 1878, still had very strong cultural, political, and emotional ties with that part of the Muslim world. In Bosnia, as in the majority of the Muslim world, it was in particular the suppression of the Caliphate that provoked the strongest indignation and surprise (Georgeon 1987, 17). This is easy to understand if we consider that Muslims in this part of Europe had, since the Congress of Berlin, lived as a de facto religious minority in a Christian state. For Bosnian Muslim notables, even after the Habsburg annexation of the province in 1908, the Caliphate still gave formal approval for the appointment of the Bosnian "chief of the scholars" (*reis ul-ulema*), thus guaranteeing, albeit symbolically, the connection between Bosnian Muslims and rest of the *umma*, the global community of believers.[18] As noted by Svara, with the 1924 and following sets of reforms, the image of Mustafa Kemal among Bosnian Muslims was essentially fractured: for many Muslim notables "respect turned into disappointment, and even in real opposition. In this way in Muslim newspapers, Kemal becomes a *dönme* [a term that in the Ottoman Empire meant a crypto-Jew who publically professed Islam] or a freemason" (Svara 1931a, 7).

Nevertheless, the 1922–1924 institutional changes did not provoke only diffidence and consternation. There were Muslim intellectuals in Yugoslavia who started to look to the Kemalist experience with different eyes. In 1926, Šemsudin Sarajlić (1887–1960), a well-known Muslim writer from Sarajevo, published *New Turkey* (*Nova Turska*) (Sarajlić 1926), probably the first Yugoslav book entirely devoted to the newly established Turkish state. Already active before the First World War as a journalist and translator, Sarajlić had been educated in Habsburg Bosnia and in Istanbul, thereby acquiring familiarity with issues and themes circulating in both Habsburg and Ottoman cultural spaces. Such a specific, trans-imperial education gave him access to very different kinds of sources: as stated in the Introduction of his book, Sarajlić used both German sources—in particular Walter Lierau's book from 1923, *New Turkey (Die neue Türkei)* (Lierau 1923) and an older book by Ewald Banse from 1915 called *Turkey (Die Türkei)*

(Banse 1915)—as well as "several more updated sources, both Turkish and European" (Sarajlić 1926, 2).

As was the case with almost all of the authors who spilled ink on this topic in the interwar period, Sarajlić's perception of the Turkish republic was overwhelmingly positive. The book focused not only on Mustafa Kemal, described as an excellent military leader and an outstanding statist and diplomat, but also on Turkish policies in the domains of economy, agriculture, and education. The rise of the new leader, like the set of reforms in these vital domains of the life of the state, allowed Sarajlić to mobilize the notion of a "new Turkey" in opposition to the old one, that is, the Ottoman Empire. Interestingly, Sarajlić's book seemed to assign a marginal place to the contested measure of the abolition of the Caliphate, which was evoked only en passant and in rather neutral terms, and also to the place of nationalism in the formation of the new state. This last point is prima facie hard to understand, given the usual reliability of this author. Such a downgrading of nationalism was probably linked to Sarajlić's personal militancy as a member of a non-nationalist force and his opposition to Muslim nationalist organizations, in particular *Gajret*. His militancy in the JMO could have pushed him to downplay the importance of nationalism in the fabric of the new Turkish state. In any case, Sarajlić's "a-national Turkey" was to remain an exception.

In the Yugoslav public space, the most attentive observers, commentators, and supporters of the newly established Turkish state since the mid-1920s appeared to be Muslim nationalist notables, calling themselves "progressives" (*naprednjaci*). Thanks to the efforts of this circle, in approximately half a decade the Turks ceased to be a symbol of decadence and backwardness and became its opposite—a young nation heading for progress and international recognition. The fortune of the new Turkey became more and more visible in the Muslim press throughout the Twenties, reaching its acme at the end of the decade. For instance, in 1928 Dževad Sulejmanpašić, a Muslim journalist and fervent nationalist from Sarajevo, could celebrate the Republic of Turkey in the press as "the best example for us all".[19] The same thing happened in the pages of the *Gajret* journal, where several activists celebrated Turkish commitment in the field of education, the use of religious endowments to meet the real needs of the general population, the determined policy to eradicate traditional customs such as the wearing of the hijab and the fez, juridical reforms, and the new social position awarded to women. Osman Nuri Hadžić (1869–1937), a well-established Muslim writer educated in

Sarajevo, Vienna, and Zagreb, stressed that "the reforms of Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha are so vast, courageous, and wise, embracing all sectors of spiritual and cultural life, that they have utterly destroyed even the memory of the Old Sick Man of the Bosphorus" (Hadžić 1930, 73). In these lines Mustafa Kemal is no longer the *Gazi*, the victorious Muslim military leader against the Christian powers; he is the enlightened and reformist statesman, the engine of an ambitious project of national rebirth.

Despite the differences in the ideas they expressed, all the Muslim pro-Kemalist notables quoted here seem to have had a fundamental sociological trait in common; they were all part of the Muslim intelligentsia, as the Muslim men who had received secular education were called. By the end of the Twenties, sympathies for the Kemalist regime timidly surpassed the narrow limits of this circle with the involvement of a minority of the Islamic religious officials (*ilmija*). In a growing number of articles published in the Muslim progressive press, figures from the religious hierarchy publicly expressed curiosity, and sometimes even sympathy, towards the policies implemented by Ankara's governments. The review that rapidly became the polestar for these individuals was *New Blossom* (*Novi Behar*), published in Sarajevo beginning in 1928. The review, which openly referred to Islamic modernist ideas, devoted numerous articles to Kemalist reforms, in particular the reform of the alphabet and the improvement of the position of women, and more broadly to the modernization of Turkish society and to Mustafa Kemal himself, the man who "showed the world that Muslims also exist, and that they too are willing and able to live independently" (Mešić 1932–33, 94–95). This was a sign that not only secular Muslims but also people with a religious background could feel and express sympathy with Kemalist policies.

In the 1920s, as we have seen, Yugoslav "Kemalophilia" was generally a Muslim phenomenon among men with higher, mostly secular, education. In the 1930s, however, this phenomenon became interconfessional and Yugoslav. This process was influenced by changes in the relations between Belgrade and Ankara. In 1925, the Yugoslav and Turkish governments established diplomatic relations for the first time (Todorović 1973, 263). Their relationship improved slowly during the second half of the 1920s, a development which accelerated considerably in the 1930s. The inauguration in 1930 of an imposing Yugoslav Embassy in the Serbo-Byzantine style in the Çankaya quarter in Ankara made visible the new era of closer international relations between the two countries (Kadijević 2012, 97–106). The launch in the early Thirties of a series of Balkan

conferences involving representatives from the countries of South-Eastern Europe, aimed at improving relations among them, fostered a rapprochement between Belgrade and Ankara. The conferences, held annually between 1930 and 1933, were at least partly successful in their attempt "to promote Balkan cooperation in economic, social, intellectual and political intercourse" (Stavrianos 1944, 230–231), and they led to closer collaboration between the two governments. In February 1934, this cooperative climate produced the signing of the Balkan Pact, an agreement through which Yugoslavia, Turkey, Romania, and Greece committed themselves to the maintaining of the post-World War One geopolitical status quo (Barlas 1999). Among the fruits of this new era of international cooperation was, for instance, the trip made by King Alexander of Yugoslavia to Turkey in October 1933, an event which was extensively covered by Yugoslav media and which initiated the idea of friendship between Alexander and Mustafa Kemal. Yugoslav journals in particular stressed the amicability between the two men, a friendliness made possible by their common military past; their efforts to promote international appeasement, national unity, and the integrity of the state; and, more generally, by their authoritarian and paternalist roles. In an international landscape characterized by the rise of bellicose figures such as Mussolini and Hitler, these two men at the heads of their respective states were described as men of peace, paternally anxious to preserve their subjects from the risk of another war.[20] Yugoslav-Turkish entente produced practical fruits as well, in particular in the domain of scientific collaboration. Starting in 1937, Yugoslav Turkologues and Turkish Slavists were regularly part of a student exchange between the two countries, and from 1939 onwards the Yugoslav government gave scholarships to Turkish students to study in their country.[21]

In this new international climate, several books and hundreds of articles flourished in the Yugoslav space. In 1931 and 1932, in Skopje and Sarajevo respectively, journalists Stevan Simić and Maksim Svara published two books entirely devoted to Mustafa Kemal (Simić 1932; Svara 1931b). The enthusiasm for the Turkish political leader shown by these authors was boundless. According to Simić, Kemal was "the best reformer of all time" (Simić 1932), and according to Svara, his political success was "grandiose, unprecedented from every point of view" (Svara 1931b, 8). Both authors resorted, as Svara says, to "Western sources" (*zapadne izvore*) written by European scholars in French, German, and English, because "there is already an enormous bibliography on this topic in the European languages"

(Svara 1931b, 4). At the same time, Svara admitted to having used translations from Turkish sources (*istočne izvore*) made by Muslim friends from Bosnia. Among the many aspects celebrated in these texts by non-Muslim Yugoslav authors was the issue of gender relations, or, as it was expressed by contemporary authors, "the Muslim woman question" (*muslimansko žensko pitanje*). This was the case with Ana Delijanić Mirit, a journalist and painter from a family of Russian émigrés. In 1934, the year when Turkish women received the right to vote in general elections, Mirit was in Istanbul as a correspondent for the Serbian journal *The Sunday Illustrated* (*Ilustrativni list nedelja*), and in her texts she supported the Kemalist top-to-bottom reforms of women's rights (Teodosijević 1998, 10–17). The circulation of international best sellers written and published outside the Yugoslav space also contributed to the growth and circulation of information on this topic. In particular, the world-famous 1932 work by Harold Courtney Armstrong (1891–1943), *Grey Wolf: Mustafa Kemal, an Intimate Study of the Dictator*, was translated into Serbo-Croatian and reprinted at least twice before the Second World War. As this contribution will show, it was widely read (and criticized) in the interwar period.[22] Books and articles by local authors quickly joined the circulation of international best sellers.

"Kemalophilia" increased in the Yugoslav space with the death of Mustafa Kemal in 1938. In the ensuing months, hundreds of articles were published celebrating Atatürk, the "Turk-father", and condolences from Yugoslav political leaders were published. In Croatia, even Catholic journals devoted a great deal of space to the death of the Turkish political leader, showing deep respect for him and underlining the importance of his legacy (Vlašić 2016).[23] Muslims were, of course, very active in this context. Two Bosnian Muslim writers and political activists, the pro-Serbian Edhem Bulbulović and the pro-Croatian Munir Šahinović Ekremov, published books on Turkey and the Turks. Bulbulović's book was purchased for the student dormitory libraries of the Muslim cultural association *Narodna Uzdanica* as a valuable educational tool for Muslim youth.[24] Here again, we see how Turkey, as shaped by its political leader, was considered by progressive Muslim notables to be one model, or even the best model, for the new generations of Muslims in Yugoslavia.

Muslim authors were of course not alone in this last wave of "Kemalophilia" in interwar Yugoslavia. The journalist Miodrag Mihajlović-Svetovski and the diplomat Zoran Tomić published two more books on the same topic in Belgrade (Mihajlović-Svetovski 1938; Tomic 1939). Whether focusing on the man (Mustafa Kemal) or on the country (Turkey),

these books have in common that they celebrated the policies implemented by the Turkish government in the fields of education, state administration, economic policy, and social customs, assigning the role of primary source of political transformation to Mustafa Kemal. Non-Muslim authors, especially Serbian ones, also openly admired the Turkish state for its military and economic successes and for the stress on national unity in the official rhetoric. The latter point was relevant for people living in Yugoslavia, a country with a dramatic lack of national unity and no ability to institute radical reforms in many strategic fields. In 1939 the *Glavni Prosvjetni Sabor*, the institution in charge of education in the Yugoslav state, decided that Tomić's book on Mustafa Kemal should be distributed to every school library in the country (Teodosijević 1998, 12).

Forging an Islamic Kemalism

Did the Muslim pro-Kemalist discourse elaborated from the late 1920s have any specificity? The authors who wrote enthusiastically on the Republic of Turkey in interwar Yugoslavia expressed a kaleidoscope of positions that cannot be reduced to a single narrative. Nevertheless, a close exploration of this textual output allows us to see a major difference between texts written by non-Muslim and Muslim authors. The former, partly inspired by the circulation of best sellers such as Armstrong's *Grey Wolf* book, tended to qualify the Kemalist experience as an eminently anti-Islamic one. Tomić, for instance, did not hesitate to describe Turkish reforms as "reforms of an anti-religious character" (Tomić 1939, 168), and the majority of other non-Muslim authors of the period expressed similar views. By contrast, as this section will show, Muslim authors tended to challenge this idea and stress the compatibility between Kemalist reforms and Islam, seeing an eminently Islamic political leader in Mustafa Kemal.

The reasons that concurred in the development of such a peculiar interpretation of Kemalist politics can probably be found in the dynamics inside the Muslim community in Bosnia and Yugoslavia during the late 1920s. At that time, Muslim cultural entrepreneurs gathered around the cultural association *Gajret* tried to establish a stronger alliance with progressive Islamic religious officials, in particular some "judges of sharia law" (*kadija*) and "scholars" (*ulema*) who were influenced by the ideas of Islamic modernism. The design of bridging the gap between Muslim progressive

notables of secular and religious backgrounds was stimulated by the presence at the head of the Islamic community in Bosnia-Herzegovina of Mehmed Džemaludin Čaušević (1870–1938). Born in Western Bosnia, he studied first at the prestigious Faculty of Law (*mekteb-i hukuk*) in Istanbul and then in Cairo, where he came across the ideas of one of the greatest Islamic reformers of his time, Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905). Once back in Bosnia, he played a role in in several Islamic institutions as well as in the establishing of cultural associations, including *Gajret* itself, and literary journals (Karić and Demirović 2002). Both secular and religious reformers denounced the conservatism of the "turbaned people" (*ahmedijaši*, a derogatory term for the conservative *ulema*) and the ignorance of the rural local imams (*hodža*). The alliance between these two circles of Muslim notables should have been sealed with the organization in September 1928 of a two-day congress of Muslim intellectuals in Sarajevo, a celebration of the twenty-five-year anniversary of *Gajret*, to be chaired by Čaušević himself. The congress had an ambitious agenda: to gather secular and religious notables and to propose a set of reforms affecting Muslim social life, both in the community (reform of the pious endowments and Islamic schools, codification of sharia law, etc.) and in Yugoslav society (reinforcing schooling, strengthening the economic role of Muslims, spreading national awareness, etc.) (Kemura 1980, 312–337). In one of the public meetings in preparation for the conference, in late 1927, Čaušević stated publicly that he had recently visited Turkey and that he came away with "the best impressions", particularly with regard to the reform of pious endowments, the campaign against the fez, and the discouraging of the female veil.[25] Such an endorsement for Kemalist Turkey, coming from the highest religious official of the Islamic community of Bosnia-Herzegovina—an endorsement that, as we will see in the next section, elicited harsh reactions among the ranks of the *ilmija*—widely galvanized secular progressives. For these two circles of Muslim notables, an Islamic, or Islam-compatible, Kemalism thus became the basis for building a common front incorporating different reformist projects inside the Muslim community of Yugoslavia.

In order to strengthen such a political alliance, progressive Muslim notables in Yugoslavia engineered a representation of Kemalism that was synonymous, or at least compatible, with Islamic modernism. To stress this point, many Muslim authors resorted in their articles to what can be called a "double-argumentation strategy": each reform that was implemented in Turkey and subsequently held up as a model for Muslims in

Yugoslavia was legitimized by two parallel lines of reasoning, one "secular", nourished with social Darwinism, and one "religious", developed with the vocabulary and tools of Islamic exegesis. Such a double-argumentation strategy was commonly used, for instance, by the pro-Kemalist authors publishing in *Gajret* and in *Reform* (*Reforma*), a short-lived journal published in Sarajevo, which defined itself as the "organ of progressive Muslims". In this way, Muslim notables legitimized the Kemalist experience through an Islamic perspective: as practitioners resorted to modernist Koranic exegesis, which permitted the "erasing" of "all that is not in accordance with the spirit of the times" (Spahić 1928, 1), Kemalist reforms were thus qualified as "completely in harmony with Islamic principles […] It is evident that [according to Islam] it is permitted to reform the human spirit, even at the cost of the enforced destruction of 1,000 useless mosques and *harem*s" (Spahić 1928, 1).

Such an idea of compatibility between the policies of Islam and the Republic of Turkey also appeared in the aforementioned book by Edhem Bulbulović, a Muslim writer and political activist from Sarajevo who had been educated in Istanbul, Salonika, and Zagreb. A fervent pro-Serbian nationalist, Bulbulović was, in the aftermath of the First World War, elected to the Constituent Assembly in the ranks of the Communists, but he later abandoned all forms of political activism after the ban of the party in December 1920. His book, titled *The Turks and the Development of the Turkish State* (*Turci i razvitak turske države*), was published in 1939 and represented the successful experience of the Turkish nation-state as both a Turkish and a Muslim success. As Bulbulović stated in the Introduction to his volume,

> contemporary Turkey is the forerunner of Muslim renaissance [*muslimanska renesansa*]; and, given the speed at which their country is able to achieve cultural development and economic progress, Turks, thanks to their national awareness and Islamic conscience [*nacionalna svijest i islamska savjest*], can conjugate Socialist collectivism and nationalist individualism, looking at the same time to the East and to the West of Europe. (Bulbulović 1939, 12)

In Bulbulović's words, Turkey was thus able to reach and surpass the different political projects developing in interwar Europe ("the East and the West of Europe"), including liberal democracy, right-wing authoritarianism, and Communism, thanks to the fertile synthesis between Islamic and Turkish conscience. In order to strengthen his argument, Bulbulović

inscribed the story of the Republic of Turkey into the long-term history both of the Turkic peoples and of the Muslim world.

Muslim authors of Yugoslavia also tended to read the reforms implemented by the entourage of Mustafa Kemal as being in continuity with the Islamic and Ottoman past, rather than seeing them as amounting to an abrupt break preceded by a uniform dark past. A noteworthy example of such an effort to inscribe Kemalist reforms into the long-term history of Islamic and Ottoman civilization is represented by the aforementioned Mustafa Mulalić. In his 1936 book *Orijent na Zapadu*, he not only resorted to the strategy of double argumentation but also interpreted one of the most contested reforms of the Kemalist era, the ban of the fez, as follows (Fig. 7.1):

> Mohammed did not know about the fez; he wore a turban such as this one. His caliphs wore turbans of the same kind. In Alhambra, where the Islamic culture reached its peak, there were no fezes either; intricately wrapped turbans were worn. It was not the Turkish sultans who brought the fez to us. Murat at the Kosovo Polje wore a cupola-like headgear, and Mehmed Fatih conquered Constantinople and Bosnia wearing a *čalma*, such as this one. […] Suleiman the Magnificent reached Vienna wearing this wonder of a wonder of a headgear, and our Sokolović also did not wear a fez, but they became the strongest of pillars of Islam. Janissaries wore *kamilavkas* and hats […]. Gradaščević […] shed blood while wearing a turban. It was only Mahmud who discovered the fez among the Greeks – the closest Europeans – which, after the shedding of rivers of blood, was worn by Rizvanbegović and all state officials; however, when after the occupation [of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878] the hat appeared, the fez was worn by the common folks as well. Again, when a turban was wrapped around the fez, it became the scarlet symbol of Islam. Meanwhile, things changed with time; first the *šubara* and bare heads appeared, then, only a little later, hats, until finally top hats began to shine.

This caption is associated with an Islamic and Ottoman timeline of male headgear, running from the prophet Mohammed to the 1930s. In his text and pictures, Mulalić mentioned several main characters of Islamic history (Mohammed, the first caliphs) and of Ottoman history (Mehmed the Conqueror, Suleiman the Magnificent, etc.), as well as important Bosnian Muslim political and military leaders (Sokolović, Gradaščević, etc.). Such a genealogical overview was intended to demonstrate how Kemalist reforms in the domain of dress were nothing more than the latest episode



Fig. 7.1 From Muhammed's turban to the top hat: an Islamic-Ottoman genealogy of Kemalist reforms (Source Mulalić 1936, 210)

in a long history of transformation, a history which started with Mohammed himself.

Mulalić's book is also interesting for the way in which it described Mustafa Kemal, who was presented as the very source of reform. In the book, Kemal was read simultaneously in two different ways. Firstly, Mulalić described him as belonging to a global landscape of reform populated by several "great men" who, in different times and contexts, radically transformed the lives of their fellow citizens/subjects. In one of the many pictures enriching his book, titled "Three great reformers," Mulalić traced a sort of pantheon, from the Russian Tsar Peter the Great of the Romanovs (1672–1725) to the Japanese Emperor Mutsuhito (1852–1912) and finally to Mustafa Kemal (Fig. 7.2).

However, Mustafa Kemal's belonging to such a global sphere of great men did not prevent him from being firmly considered an Islamic reformer by Mulalić. Kemalist Turkey, its ideology and its leader, were evoked in the text as the "classic example" (*klasičan primer*) (Mulalić 1936, 439) for every Muslim population in the world during that period. In stressing this point, the author did not hesitate to attack the Armstrong understanding of Mustafa Kemal as an anti-religious leader. According to the author, "analyzing the state of present-day Turkey, we do not want to see a movement against Islam in Kemalism, and nor, by contrast with Armstrong's tendentious suggestion, do we wish to regard the man who guides that movement, the great Islamic reformer Gazi Kemal [*veliki islamski reformator Gazi Kemal*], as a non-believer" (Mulalić 1936, 439). Here again, Mulalić seemed to agree with Bulbulović's views on the exemplary character of the Turkish Republic and its leader for Muslims all around the world, that "as a cultural reformer, Gazi Kemal goes beyond the narrow limits of Turkish nationalism for us Yugoslav Muslims. If we cannot speak in the name of others and say that he belongs to Islam as a whole, he is surely a positive example for all Islamic people, and above all for us Yugoslavs as friends and advisors" (Mulalić 1936, 439).

Another Muslim author from Yugoslavia who developed the relationship between Islam and Kemalism was Munir Šahinović Ekremov (1910–1945), a Muslim writer educated in Croatia and Switzerland, close to the Muslim pro-Croat cultural association *Narodna Uzdanica* and well known as a journalist and writer. After having written on Turkey for at least a decade, Šahinović systematized his reflections in the book *Turkey, Today and Tomorrow*, published in Sarajevo in 1939 (Šahinović 1939). As Mulalić had done before him, he did not hesitate to qualify Mustafa Kemal

Fig. 7.2 "Great men" of a global reform landscape (Source: Mulalić 1936, 337.)

as an "Islamic reformer" (*islamski reformator*) and describe "Ankara's [political] recipe" (*ankarska recepta*) as being "in the path of truthful Islam" (*put istinskog islama*). In his book, the author started from the merits of Kemalist experience: "Turkey is the first Islamic country to choose a new life path, to erase the pseudo-Islamic chains and prejudices, and to liberate itself, for the first time, from the tutelage of enslaving Europe" (Šahinović 1939, 7). Here again we see what made Turkey interesting in the eyes of Bosnian Muslim progressives: its status as a *Muslim* country able to cope victoriously with the West. According to Šahinović, in this way Turkey "became the example for every Islamic people desiring to create its own state, life, and future. It is thus understandable that we, Muslims of Croatian origin [*muslimani hrvatskog porijekla*], should feel interest in and sympathy for New Turkey" (Šahinović 1939, 7).

As stated by Šahinović, "not even reforms implemented by Ankara's regime in the domain of Turkish Islam can be said not to belong to real Islam. Ankara's government is not godless but Islamic" (Šahinović 1939, 169). In his book, Šahinović explicitly contested Western sources on Kemalist Turkey, sources according to which the regime was anti-religious. The main object of attack was, again, Armstrong's book, which had a vast circulation in Yugoslavia and which claimed that the "new regime has open anti-Islamic tendencies" (Šahinović 1939, 9). Šahinović's ambitious aim was that of correcting the Western perception of the Kemalist regime and "demonstrating the bond between the present-day, republican-secularist Turkish regime [*republikansko-laicistički režim turskog*] and Islam as the faith of the entire Turkish people" (Šahinović 1939, 9). In doing this, he addressed the notion of laicism (*laiklik*). The concept entered into the official six-harrows formula of Kemalism at the beginning of the 1930s. On this topic, the author offered an original interpretation, distinguishing the official Kemalist discourse, the propaganda of its enemies, and the practice on the ground:

> According to the official laicist theory, faith does not matter to the Turk. He can choose to profess any faith, or none. But the practice is completely different. All Turks are Muslims. […] Even the most fervent Kemalist will react badly if you say to him that he is not a Muslim. The rare cases where a Muslim woman converts to Christianity after marriage to a European are considered a disgrace to the Turkish nation. […] The theory of laicism in public life remained just a theory. The actual practice is the complete negation of that theory. Despite Kemal's projects, Islam remained the state

> religion of Turkey. […] Laicist theories […] remained dead letters written on paper. And they stayed there. They were never transformed into practice. And they never will be. (Šahinović 1939, 56–57)

This author did not limit himself to unmasking anti-Kemalist propaganda about the alleged anti-religious character of Turkish reforms. He also stressed how the laicist principle, which theoretically represented one of the very pillars of the Kemalist regime, was purely fictive: the Turkish nation was compactly Muslim, and Islam, albeit implicitly, was still the religion of the Turkish nation.

This perception of Kemalist reforms is visible on the book's cover as well. The image chosen by the author—obtained by combining images from *La Turquie kemaliste*, the journal established in 1934 by the regime to promote Kemalism abroad—included a map of Anatolia with the new capital, Ankara; modern housing; machines of industrialization; and, in the centre, disciplined and unveiled women gymnasts, all of it a compelling metaphor for the complete reform of Turkish society. Interestingly, the author included two mosques in this collage so that Islam thus remained a visible element in the architecture of "New Turkey" (Fig. 7.3)

In the Conclusion of his book, Šahinović qualified Kemalist Turkey as being in transition between East and West: "Turkey is not yet a modern European state, but it is on its way to becoming one" (Šahinović 1939, 191). Such a civilizational migration, from the East to the West, is difficult but necessary because—as highlighted by the author—"if Islamic peoples really want to free themselves from Europe, they themselves have to become Europe" (Šahinović 1939, 192). As the opener of the path, Turkey had to be the leader of such a civilizational mutation, coinciding with the emancipation of Muslim peoples from European tutelage. In keeping with this argument, Šahinović assigned to Ankara "an additional mission, besides the national mission":

> I would call such a mission *Pan-Islamist* in its modern meaning. Ankara woke up the Islamic East, Ankara offered it the chance and the example for a new way. Ankara has the duty, whether it wants to or not, to wake up the Islamic peoples with its example. And Islamic people are already listening to it: Turkey is already the guide for the Islamic world. (Šahinović 1939, 192)

In Šahinović's discourse, Turkey was not just an example, or the best example, to be followed by all Muslim peoples. Going a step further than his Muslim progressive fellows, he demanded that Turkey assume the role



Fig. 7.3 Front cover of Munir Šahinović Ekremov, *Turska danas i sjutra* (Sarajevo: Muslimanska svijest, 1939).

of guide of the Muslim peoples, to lead them "through a council of Islamic states, through a confederation, or through a new Caliphate" (Šahinović 1939, 192). He thus suggested the creation of a sort of post-Ottoman, or even Muslim, commonwealth under Ankara's tutelage, in order to bring Muslim people along the path of progress and political emancipation. In a period in which Muslim populations were oppressed by colonial powers almost everywhere, opposing Kemalist Turkey would mean condemning Muslim societies to eternal misery. As Šahinović warned, "Every Muslim that rises against the Turkey of Kemal today rises against Islam itself, against its future. A new Islam needs new Muslims. New Islam is represented by present-day Turkey, and this will be even truer in the near future. We are the last ones who will understand it" (Šahinović 1939, 192).

Inventing Kemalistan

The efforts of progressive cultural entrepreneurs to bridge the gap between themselves and a segment of the religious officials did not always provoke enthusiasm. On the contrary, the majority of religious officials in Bosnia and Yugoslavia reacted strongly against Čaušević's modernist statements from 1927, especially against those that expressed an indulgent attitude towards Kemalist reforms. In the following months, reputed Muslim scholars from Bosnia and beyond, sometimes supported by local branches of the Islamic community, publicly distanced themselves from Čaušević's modernist statements, proclaiming that Islam was "in peril" in Bosnia. In particular, it was the indulgence, and even sympathy, of the Bosnian religious leaders towards Kemalist Turkey, and the choice of that country as a positive model for the Muslims in Yugoslavia, that provoked the harshest criticism. In 1928, for instance, the mufti of Mostar accused Čaušević of establishing a "fifth Kemalist *mezheb*" (Karabeg 1928, 17), a de facto new juridical school incompatible with all accepted interpretations of Islam. In July 1928, despite the enthusiastic support that they received from progressive Muslim notables, Čaušević's progressive statements were officially condemned by the Islamic community with an official "declaration" (*takrir*), which constituted a severe setback to the dissemination of Islamic modernist ideas in the country (Bougarel 2013, 109–157).

The polemics around Čaušević's declarations, a controversy that involved Muslim notables for a good part of 1928, made a new agent visible in the Yugoslav public sphere: the conservative Muslim religious official. Some of those who were conspicuous in attacking Čaušević

decided a few months later to establish the journal *Wisdom* (*Hikjmet*) in the Bosnian town of Tuzla with the explicit purpose "of showing […] the wisdom and the favorable features of Islamic precepts and institutions" (Posavina 1347 [1929], 3). The journal was led by Mufti Ibrahim Hakki Čokić (1871?–1948), who had been educated in a local *medresa* and in the Sarajevo School for Sharia Judges. Čokić had completed his education in the Arabic language and literature at the University of Vienna, before becoming a teacher of the same subjects in the high school of Tuzla. In seven years of activities (1929–1936), *Hikjmet* became the polestar for those conservative Muslim religious officials in Yugoslavia who openly rejected the Islamic modernist interpretation of the Islamic sources.[26]

Printed in the Serbo-Croatian language, its title written in Ottoman Turkish in Arab script, *Hikjmet*'s main goal was to challenge the monopoly of the Muslim progressives in the public sphere as well as their self-proclaimed right to propose "adaptations" to post-Ottoman circumstances. More precisely, religious officials who gathered around *Hikjmet* openly contested the idea that it was possible to reform the social practices of Muslims outside the boundaries of sharia in order to adapt them to the supposed needs of modern times. Only people with a solid religious training, using Islamic exegesis, had the right to propose gradual change in the life of Muslim populations. Mindful of the significant credit given to Kemalist reforms by influential Muslim notables in Bosnia, the *Hikjmet* group assigned the greatest importance to demonstrating the illegitimacy from an Islamic point of view of the policies implemented by Ankara. In order to do this, the journal was not limited to publishing original texts by local *ulema*, but it regularly translated journal articles (more often excerpts from them) written by Mustafa Kemal's political opponents in Bulgaria and, especially, Egypt into the Serbo-Croatian language. Journals such as *El-Fethi*, *El-Mukatam*, and *Intibah* represented a very important set of source materials in the establishment of a Muslim anti-Kemalist narrative in Yugoslavia (Jahić 2004, 175). The criticism directed against the policies implemented in Turkey was accompanied by, and intertwined with, criticism against both secular and religious notables in Bosnia and Yugoslavia who regarded Kemalist reforms favourably, "because among us, too, there are so many Kemalist *ašik* [from Ottoman Turkish 'lovers', meaning 'enthusiast partisans' here]".[27] Criticism against a foreign country's policies thus went hand-in-hand with criticism against political opponents in Bosnia and Yugoslavia.

Anti-Kemalist statements filled the pages of *Hikjmet*. In 1929, a five-episode text explored and criticized thirteen individual reforms implemented by Mustafa Kemal since the establishment of the republic, focusing in particular on the 1924 suppression of the Caliphate, the replacement of the Ottoman civil code (*mecelle*) with codes inspired by Western Europe, the shutting down of religious schools, the centralization of the *vakuf* administration, the prohibition against the use of the male fez, and the discouraging of the wearing of the female veil.[28] The point at the core of *Hikjmet*'s criticism was one of the theoretical pillars of the new Kemalist political order, the laicism. In order to strengthen criticism against this political idea, the journal editorial board published several texts by Shakib Arslan (1869–1946). According to the Druse politician and intellectual, Mustafa Kemal's ambition to build Turkey on the "separation between religion and politics" (Arslan 1351 [1933a], 324–330)[29] represented a total break with the Ottoman Empire and placed his political actions beyond any possible Islamic legitimacy. In *Hikjmet* semantics, the political action of the new republic was not only "a-religious" (*bezvjerski*) but also explicitly "anti-Islamic" (*protuislamski*), while the very core of the Kemalist political design was considered incompatible with religion. As vigorously stated by one of the journal's editors in an article series from 1933 on "satanic Kemalism" (*satanski kemalizam*), "it is completely clear that such a struggle [a Kemalist one] is not national at all, but openly anti-Islamic".[30] The difference between their perception of Kemalist policies and the benevolent views of Čaušević and secular intellectuals could not have been more radical.

Another feature that suffused the entire intellectual output by the men of *Hikjmet* was their mourning over the end of the Ottoman Empire as a religious, political, and cultural space. As was pointed out above, the abolition of the Sultanate, and later of the Caliphate, left Bosnian religious officials—living in a de facto minority condition since the 1878 Congress of Berlin—orphans in relation to what they had considered their own centre. According to *Hikjmet*'s contributors, Mustafa Kemal was responsible for erasing from the map Istanbul, the city that was "the center of the spiritual culture of Islam",[31] transforming it into a peripheral city in a non-Islamic state. The same text continued, "the Kemalist entourage had annihilated all that held the attention of almost 400 million Muslims and replaced it with Ankara, which is only able to attract the attention of the Turks".[32] The destruction of an empire and the establishment of a nation-state was thus not considered a modernizing but a provincializing process: this part

of the world, once representing the centre of one of the bigger and longer-lasting empires in human history, was replaced by a smaller nation-state, a state among many others. Idiosyncratic attitudes and disappointment with the new Turkish deal caused many contributors to forge, with open mockery, the neologism *Kemalistan*, "the state of Kemal",[33] thereby stressing Turkey's narrowness and dependence on the will of a single man.

For *Hikjmet*'s contributors, was it necessary to consider the newly established Republic of Turkey a fully Western country? Or, despite being led by an allegedly anti-Islamic clique, could Turkey still somehow be considered a segment of the vast Muslim world? For the collaborators of the journal, the placing of Turkey in either of these opposing fields remained a difficult matter. Proof of that difficulty comes from the very structure of *Hikjmet*'s individual issues. The concluding column was devoted to news "from the Islamic world" (*iz islamskog svjeta*), containing news from Muslim societies all over the world. The news presented in this section concerned not only the regions where Muslims represented the majority of the population but also regions where Muslims were a minority, including Europe. Interestingly enough, for news concerning the Republic of Turkey—all of it presented in unfavourable terms, of course—the editorial board created a separate section, named "from the Turkish world" (*iz turskog svjeta*). This was a sign that the post-1923 political trajectory of the Turks was seen to diverge from that of their fellow Muslims, putting them in a "separate space" which was no longer truly Muslim but not completely outside the sphere of interest of Muslim readers.

The loss of the Ottoman space, and in particular the loss of Istanbul, saddled the conservative religious officials with the difficult task of replacing them with new references. In such a changing scenario, the desired surrogate Ottoman centre was found in the Arab peninsula, and more precisely in Ibn-Saud (1876–1953), King of Nejd and Hejaz. In the 1930s, *Hikjmet* contributors published many enthusiastic texts focused on the rise of the statesman, who, openly inspired by the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, became King of Saudi Arabia in 1932. In *Hikjmet*'s pages, this Muslim and Arab political leader was clearly fashioned as an anti-Kemalist, and his newly recognized kingdom was presented as an anti-Turkey. According to the editors of the Bosnian journal, Ibn-Saud's main human and political qualities came together in his determination "not to distance himself from the Qur'an, the *hadit*s and Islamic sciences" (Jahić 2004). Unlike Mustafa Kemal, King Ibn-Saud was a successful

political leader who did not succumb to the sirens of Western modernity. As stated by another *Hikjmet* contributor,

> The Wahhabi [Ibn-Saud] is not "modern" [*moderan*], and will not become modern. And this is a good thing. Maybe he will hence suppress the "freedom" of individuals to do whatever they want, but he will then free the entire people from the evils that emanate from "modernity", evils that constitute a colossal oppression both of "moderns" and of the modernized. (Chameran 1348 [1929b], 143)

The success of this political leader was interpreted as a sign that it was possible to have a powerful and victorious Muslim state while refusing the Western formula of separation between religion and politics. In addition, that success seemed to imply that it was possible to live in modern times, to survive and even to thrive in them, even to win, without introducing the adaptations promoted by Muslim progressives—in Bosnia and all over the world—at that time.

Conclusion

Closely identified with Mustafa Kemal, the man who was considered its designer, the Republic of Turkey played a crucial role in the imagination of Muslims in interwar Yugoslavia. Notables of every political orientation and educational background devoted a great deal of energy to understanding, supporting, or contesting Kemalist Turkey. The reason for such a special relationship was eminently post-Ottoman in nature: despite the efforts of Mustafa Kemal's entourage to deny any link with the pre-1923 world, "New Turkey" was resolutely perceived as the most direct heir of "Old Turkey", the Ottoman Empire. Somehow, Ankara and Mustafa Kemal thus became the surrogates of Istanbul and the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph and continued to be fundamental political, religious, and cultural references for the Muslims living there. Such a reiterated act of "imagining Turkey" turned out to be an eminently transnational venture: looking closely at the texts produced by Muslim cultural entrepreneurs, it appears that the different narratives were produced through complex circulations of peoples, translations of texts, collages of pictures, often happening across state and imperial borders. In tracking the production of the different narratives about Turkey, it is possible to embrace broader spaces of circulation encompassing both the post-Ottoman space—the Balkans and the Middle East—and the wider sphere of Western Europe.

Nevertheless, the post-Ottoman dimension does not explain everything. After 1923, and especially after the Turkish government launched an impressive set of reforms aiming to deeply transform Turkish society, Kemalist Turkey became the living evidence that the West/Orient dichotomy, which put the Muslims of Yugoslavia in the uncomfortable position of backwardness and inferiority, could finally be blurred. For Muslim progressives, the Kemalist success story was the best historical proof that being Muslim *and* modern was possible at last, and that even Muslim people could be determiners of their own history, fully national subjects no longer trapped in the gauntlet of Western colonization. On the other hand, Muslim conservatives radically refused this path and started to look well beyond Ankara, to Saudi Arabia, in order to find a successful Islamic political model that refused, as Šahinović said, "to become Europe".

Despite their differences, Muslim progressive and conservative notables seem nevertheless to have shared as a common feature the difficulty in locating Turkey. Was Turkey "the West in the East"; a "Turkish world" separate from the rest of the "Islamic word"; a nation halfway between two civilizational poles, no longer Eastern but not yet Western? This trouble was echoed in Muslims' difficulty in locating themselves in the newly established Yugoslav framework and tracing their own political trajectory in a post-Ottoman world.

Notes

1. The Chetnik movement was a Serbian anti-Axis and anti-Communist movement led by Draža Mihailović that was active in the Yugoslav space during the Second World War. They engaged in resistance activities for limited periods and, in order to contrast with Communist partisans, in tactical or selective collaboration with the occupying forces for almost all of the war.
2. On the Muslim intellectual debates in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia, see, in particular, Karčić 1990, 1999; Karić 2004.
3. These words complete the title of the same chapter. See Mulalić 1936, 431.
4. On the fortunes of Kemalism in the Muslim world, see the seminal work of François Georgeon, "Kémalisme et monde musulman: quelques points de repère" (Georgeon 1987, 1–39). As shown by recent scholarship, the interest towards Kemalist Turkey transcended the borders of the Muslim world. For an overview of the German fascination for the Turkish model in the Thirties, see Ihrig 2014.

5. The article does not take account of any sources that might exist written in the Turkish and Albanian languages by the Muslims of Yugoslavia.
6. On different theories about the Islamization of South-Eastern Europe since the nineteenth century, see Clayer and Bougarel 2013.
7. On the first ten years of activities of the JMO, see Purivatra 1977. On the activities of JMO leadership in the Thirties and during the Second World War, see Hasanbegović 2012.
8. On the association *Gajret*, see in particular Kemura 1986.
9. For an overview of Bosnian Muslim political life, see Filandra 1998. On Bosnian Muslims and the national issue, see Bougarel 2003, 100–114.
10. Anđelko Vlašić, "The perception of Turkey in Croatian press, 1923–1945", https://bib.irb.hr/datoteka/711296.The_perception_of_Turkey_in_Croatian_press_1923–1945.doc. (Consulted in May 2016).
11. "Ripercussione delle vittorie kemaliste nei paesi di lingua araba", *Oriente Moderno*, II (1922–23), 290–291.
12. V. P. "Nacionalna selekcija", *Budućnost*, 5 (1919), 57–8.
13. For the first episode of the series, see "Srpska epopeja", *Gajret* 9 (1924), 151–9.
14. The feuilleton is probably taken from Georges A. Ghentchitch, *L'Epopée serbe. Héros et martyrs* (Ghentchitch 1915, 12–13).
15. For a biography of Hasan Rebac, see Kemura 1986, 160–161.
16. The same ideas were also expressed a few years later in Rebac 1925.
17. Vlašić, "The perception of Turkey".
18. However, the delusion for the abolition of this institution did not inspire Muslim notables to involve themselves in the 1924 convention in Mecca for the restoration of the Caliphate, launched four months after the abolition. Bosnian Muslim religious and political leaders attended two of the five most significant Pan-Islamic conventions held during the period between the two World Wars, in Jerusalem in 1931 and in Geneva in 1935. They had wanted to attend the congress in Cairo in 1926 but were prevented by Yugoslav authorities. On this topic see Karičić 2007, 114–21.
19. Privremeni ekzekutivni odbor "Reforme", "Naša prva riječ", *Reforma* 1 (1928), 1.
20. On the interest of Yugoslav journals in the personal link between Mustafa Kemal and King Alexander, see Teodosijević 1998, 17.
21. Arhiv Jugoslavije, 66/451/710—Minister of Education to Minister of Foreign Affairs (10 June 1939).
22. Harold Courtney Armstrong, *Kemal paša, Sivi vuk* (Belgrade: Narodna kultura, n.d.).
23. Vlašić, "The perception of Turkey in Croatian Press".
24. Historijski Arhiv Sarajevo, 96/1939, *Narodna Uzdanica*'s Central Committee to Edhem Bulbulović (6 March 1939).
25. "Važne izjave Reis-ul-uleme", *Jugoslavenski list*, 10 December 1927.

26. On the experience of *Hikjmet*, see Jahić 2004. On the role of *Hikjmet* in the life of the Bosnian/Yugoslav Islamic community, see Jahić 2010.
27. Chameran 1348 [1929b], 143
28. Chameran 1348 [1929a], 116–119
29. On the same topic, see also Arslan 1351 [1933b], 312–314.
30. Chameran 1351 [1933], 285–288
31. Chameran 1352 [1934b], 191
32. Chameran 1352 [1934b], 192
33. Chameran 1352 [1934a], 127

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CHAPTER 8

Writing for Survival: Letters of Sarajevo Jews Before Their Liquidation During World War II

Francine Friedman

Introduction

Throughout the many centuries of their sojourn in Bosnia and Herzegovina under various empires and regimes, the Bosnian Jews had been fully integrated into all facets of life throughout the area—socially, politically, economically, and culturally. There was a long and peaceful intermingling of the Jewish community with the Bosnian Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian communities, whose leaderships showed a mutual acceptance and respect for the habits and rituals of the different religious groups. However, the events of the mid-twentieth century forever destroyed that characterization.

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Bosnian Jewry on the Eve of World War II

When the Sephardic (Judeo-Hispanic) Jews were expelled from the Iberian Peninsula at the end of the fifteenth century, many were attracted to the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman elites invited Jews to the land and gave them opportunities to participate in every facet of the empire's socioeconomic, political, and cultural activity. The Sephardic population entered the region at the invitation of the Ottoman Sultan Bayazit II (r. 1481–1512). They brought with them their international financial and commercial contacts and their medical knowledge, as well as their abilities to repair and manufacture weapons and engage in other useful crafts. Soon the Jewish population was so substantial that Sarajevo was sometimes referred to as "little Jerusalem" ("Yerushalayim chico" in Judeo-Spanish) (Schwartz 2005, 28).

Economic opportunities beckoned from larger cities like Istanbul, but the hinterlands such as Bosnia and Serbia were also promising for the refugees. The first official records of a Jewish presence in Sarajevo, which became the capital city of the Bosnian pašaluk[1] in the early 1460s, go back to 1565, although there is evidence of a Jewish presence much earlier.[2]

Conflict between religious groups was rare in Ottoman Bosnia. The history of the area is replete with many examples of close, personal relations, called komšiluk (neighborliness). Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the few lands in the world about which it can be said that its Jewish population dwelled for four centuries in relative peace, living more or less harmoniously with their Serbian Orthodox, Croatian Roman Catholic, and Muslim muslim[3] neighbors, until the Holocaust shattered that tranquility.

When Austrian troops occupied Bosnia in 1878, the Jewish population was estimated at 3428—all Sephardim (Kreso 2006, 40). However, by 1910 Bosnia's Jewish population had grown significantly, to 11,866, with the entry of a large number of Ashkenazic Jews from various parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Ashkenazic Jews[4] came en masse into the Bosnian region with the Habsburg occupation troops as professionals and civil servants. The Jews, always regime-supportive, were treated as equal citizens under Austria-Hungary, receiving the same civil rights as the inhabitants from the other religious groups.

The end of World War I in 1918 saw a totally new entity, a state for the South Slavs, emerge from the wreckage of the collapse of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires. The creation of this Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Yugoslavia after 1929) also brought together under

one Jewish administration the two distinct Jewish communities of Sephardim and Ashkenazim. Until right before World War II, these two communities maintained a polite but distant relationship. Yugoslavia's Jews, equal in status with other religious groups, retained a large amount of communal freedom, and their religious and cultural activities were unhindered by the state. For example, as the next sentence also has it. Instead substitute In those communities where a minority formed more than ten percent of the population, the Jewish community occasionally received certain exemptions. For example, some of the most important of the Sarajevo Jewish community's religious holidays became legal holidays.

Serbian and Croatian neighbors also influenced Bosnia's experiences, in particular because Bosnia's population was always a multiethnic patchwork. The jostling for influence within Bosnia of the Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims inevitably drew the attention, and often the involvement, of Serbia and Croatia (whether as dependent units of a larger entity or, after 1991, as independent states themselves). This should be a footnote, not in the text, as the text is mostly about history, not contemporary politics. I would place this sentence at the beginning of footnote 5.[5]

When World War II entered Bosnia and Herzegovina, everything historically positive about the Jewish population's situation changed. In fact, interwar Yugoslavia is one of the few countries in Eastern Europe that may be remembered for its fair treatment of its Jewish minority. However, Bosnia's Jews, Serbs, and Roma suffered under the native Croatian fascists, the Ustaše,[6] one of the worst experiences of World War II in terms of brutality and number of lives lost as a percentage of the population.

On 10 April 1941, the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was proclaimed, and on 16 April Ante Pavelić, who had come from Rome to Croatia on 15 April, assumed the title of Poglavnik (Leader). The NDH lasted until 8 May 1945, when Partisan forces under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito entered Zagreb, the capital of both the NDH and Croatia proper.

The NDH was an amalgam of two regions of occupied Yugoslavia: Croatia and the (involuntarily) incorporated Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been part of both the Drinska and Vrbas Banovinas, the administrative districts of the former Yugoslav Kingdom between 1929 and 1941. In 1941, the NDH population consisted of around six million people, which included approximately three million Croats, two million Serbs, more than one-half million Bosnian Muslims, 140,000 Volksdeutsche, 70,000 Hungarians, more than 35,000 Jews, and 150,000 members of other ethnic groups (Ramet 2006b, 115).

Almost immediately upon their declaration of the NDH, the Ustaše, began to set up the machinery of a repressive, totalitarian state in Croatia, assisted by their Nazi sponsors. Initially, the Croatian populace welcomed the NDH administration as an antidote to what they perceived as the chauvinism, corruption, administrative hegemonism, and exploitation they had experienced under the Serbian-dominated government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. It did not take long, however, for the population to learn how brutal the new administration would be. Consequently, many people joined the Partisans, particularly in 1942.

In the meantime, however, certain measures were taken by the ruling authorities to exert their power over the population of the NDH. The first item of business was to determine which of the inhabitants of the newly constituted state were "friends" and which were "enemies." The enemies list consisted of Serbs, Roma (Gypsies), and Jews, as well as individuals who were not supportive of the new regime and its ideology. Among the measures taken to determine who belonged on that list, employees of public and private enterprises and of governmental agencies were identified according to their religion/nationality. Those who were identified as Orthodox (Serbian or Montenegrin) or Jewish were immediately dismissed from their jobs. We find in the archives, for example, a list of dismissed clerks and employees of the Technical Department for the Kotar (district) authority in Sarajevo and the Institute for Meteorology in Sarajevo. They are mostly Serb and Montenegrin or Jewish.[7] Even reports dealing with problems or observations of situations would regularly identify personnel by their religion/national group. Those who were identified as Orthodox (Serbian or Montenegrin) or Jewish were immediately dismissed from their jobs.

Once ensconced in power, the Ustaše began to deal harshly with those whom they considered their enemies. Although few of the individuals belonging to categories denoted as enemies of the regime were safe once the fascists came to power, this chapter focuses on just one of those groups, the Jews.[8] While some who feared for their lives under the Ustaše were able to escape from the NDH entirely or to the relatively safer areas of Croatia that were under Italian rule, most of the endangered people considered enemies by their political masters were forced to remain under Ustaše control. Although there were Jews living throughout Bosnia at this time, the majority were centered in Sarajevo. Therefore, we will look closely at the situation of those members of the Jewish community in Sarajevo who were unable to escape the Ustaše regime.

Shortly after Ustaše rule was instituted, the anti-Jewish decrees came thick and fast. Within two months of the creation of the NDH, the Jews were destitute; within eleven months, most of them were dead—brutalized in concentration camps or other killing fields throughout the NDH (Table 8.1).

But what happened in the interim? What was life like for Jews in the NDH during the interregnum between the establishment of the Ustaše state and transportation to the concentration camps? Until now, such information has been sketchy at best, although some memoirs describe the horrors witnessed by individuals in their places of incarceration.[9] Preserved letters written by Sarajevo Jews that detail their living conditions, however, shed light on their situation. This chapter analyzes some of the letters written by Bosnian Jews during this time. The letters show their struggles for survival under increasingly desperate conditions and illuminate for us a little of what life was like for them as they moved inexorably from increasingly constrained lives to their ultimate transferal to concentration camps, and thence to their deaths.

Jewish Life in Sarajevo under the NDH

When the German 16th Motorized Division of the 46th Motorized Corps marched into Sarajevo on 15 April 1941, there were more than 10,000 Jews in Sarajevo. On 16 April, the Nazis, accompanied by a mob composed of a large percentage of Muslims,[10] set fire to the Il Kal Grandi Sephardic synagogue, opened in 1931 on Ul. Kralja Petra (King Peter Street) and considered the largest and prettiest synagogue in the Balkans. They also burned the adjacent community offices containing a rich library and a small museum.

Immediately upon entering Sarajevo, the occupiers arrested several members of the administrations of each of the two Jewish communities. Some of the remaining Jewish authorities escaped from the city; the rest of the elites were more or less paralyzed, and the work of the community stopped (Levi-Dale 1969, 90). Those individuals who could attempted to escape from Sarajevo before they were trapped, but most Sarajevo Jews were poor and without the wherewithal to leave (Levi-Dale 1969, 90).

The NDH passed a series of decrees denying Jews civil rights, freedom of movement, the ability to change residence, the ability to earn a livelihood, the right to freely visit stores, and to protect their

Table 8.1 Jews in Yugoslavia (in thousands)

	Bosnia and Herzegovina	*Croatia*	*Macedonia*	*Slovenia*	*Serbia*	*Banat*	*Srijem*	*Bačka*	*Kosovo*	*Total*
Census 1931	11.1	20.2	7.5	0.8	9.2	3.7	1.1	13.2	0.4	68.4
Expect. 1948	11.8	21.4	8.2	0.9	9.7	4.1	1.2	14.1	0.5	71.9
Census 1948	0.8	1.8	0.3	0.1	1.7	0.7	0.2	1.3	–	6.8
Demog.ic Loss	11	19.6	7.9	0.8	8	3.4	1	12.8	0.5	65
Emigrants	1	3.7	0.4	0.1	1.2	0.2	–	1.3	0.1	8
Real loss	10	15.9	7.5	0.7	6.8	3.2	1	11.5	0.4	57
Died abroad	1.1	6.0	7.4	0.7	–	–	–	8.4	0.4	24
Died in Yugoslavia	8.9	9.9	0.1	–	6.8	3.2	1	3.1	–	33

Source: Žerjavić (1997, 132)

possessions from plunder. On 17 April, Jewish citizenship and protection under the law were revoked. On 27 April, Jews were forbidden to display or wear Croatian symbols or the fez; they were also no longer allowed to visit public places.

On 30 April came the enactment of the Statute on Racial Membership and the Statute for the Protection of the Purity of Aryan Blood and the Honor of the Croatian People, which defined who was Aryan and prohibited marriage between Aryans and non-Aryans.[11] However, because some of the government's leaders had wives of Jewish origin, the Poglavnik, Ante Pavelić, arrogated to himself the right to declare certain persons "Honorary Aryans" (Hilberg 1985). Therefore, the Croatian Ustaše did not always follow the Nazi practice of voiding all mixed marriages.[12] Nevertheless, these statutes attempted to legally justify the persecution of Jews as subversives against the NDH.

As of 7 May, Jews were forbidden to own radios and telephones. On 11 May, a series of decrees forbidding free passage throughout Sarajevo for Serbs and Jews was passed. Ustaše policies against Jews accelerated with exaction of payments to the authorities. Upon the creation of the NDH, members of Bosnia's Jewish population, as well as Serbs, emigrants, and other designated enemies, were ordered to register their movable and immovable property on forms that asked for personal and family facts and information about savings, stocks, property ownership, business balance sheets, and so on (Gašić 2006, 1). On 18 May, Jews were forced to identify their stores to the authorities as Jewish (židovska radnja). After the registration process was established, the NDH then created the post of povjerenik (commissioner or trustee) to administer the commercial properties taken from the Jews and Serbs. Jewish property, bank accounts, life insurance, and apartments were easily plundered thereafter.[13] Thus, economic ruination and psychological abuse preceded the final extermination of the Jews.

On 23 May, Jews were ordered to wear yellow arm bands. Finally, Jews were forced to purchase (for 5000 dinars) an identification tag (at first two yellow strips to be worn on the sleeve, and then a yellow tin disk). On 4 June, a decree prohibited Jews from participating in any Croatian social, sporting, or cultural clubs or organizations.[14] Contracts with and obligations to Jews were voided.

Each of the two organized Jewish communities (Ashkenazic and Sephardic) was assigned a povjerenik by the NDH. The povjerenik was

responsible for passing on to the state the "religion surtax," which the Jews were forced to pay to their religious communities even under fascist rule. He was also responsible for the care of community members who remained in residence in Sarajevo, as well as those who were engaged in forced labor in the nearby internment and labor camps. For example, the Jewish community was responsible for providing food for internees, most of whom were members of the Jewish community.[15] Both male and female Jews who were sent to labor camps had to be fed and doctored by the Jewish community without reimbursement.

The povjerenik for the Sephardic community (Jevrejska sefardska općina u Sarajevu) was Judge Srećko Bujas. The povjerenik for the Ashkenazic community (Jevreska vjeroispovijedna općina Aškenaskog obreda u Sarajevu) was the district judge, Branko Milaković. All decisions connected with Jewish life and work were routed through the povjerenik, making him the connection between the Jews and the authorities on matters of property (both real estate and financial). Thus, based on (usually written) communications to him by individuals, the povjerenik for the particular Jewish community made representation to the authorities on behalf of Jews deprived of their businesses, savings, and other movable and immovable property. The povjerenik presented the situations of his constituents to the Sarajevo branch of the Ministry of National Management—Section for Reconstruction of the Economy, and the Ministry transmitted answers to the questions put by the povjerenik. The povjerenik for the Jewish community, understanding the situations of the Jews, suggested how the Ministry should satisfy the needs of the Jews, who were suffering from NDH depredations. Almost without exception, however, the Ministry's response to these suggestions was to deny the request of the povjerenik, which was based on the information given by the petitioner. (Sometimes, the povjerenik himself reduced the petitioner's request before transmitting it to the Ministry.)

We can get an idea of the straits in which Jewish individuals in Sarajevo found themselves as a result of NDH policies from letters written to the povjerenici describing problems, making requests for support, and complaining about difficulties suffered because of the loss of control over their homes, businesses, and lives. The following gives a glimpse of some of the problems faced by different Sarajevo Jewish citizens before their transportation from the city for liquidation.

Petitions to the Trustees (*povjerenici*) of the Jewish Communities

Lea Salom wrote a letter on 18 September 1941 to the State Directorate for Reconstruction via the povjerenik of the Sephardic community to request a monthly maintenance allowance. Her letter describes the reason for the request: Her husband, David Salom, a bookkeeper, had become a prisoner of war in Germany at Stalag VII A (#87774). He had served gallantly in the military and had been nominated by his military commander for the highest recognition. Mr. Salom owned one-fourth of a house, the gross income of which amounted to Kn 8000 per month (net Kn 4500).[16] Mrs. Salom wrote that she had two children and an elderly mother to support. Because of her husband's absence and, even more, because of the conditions imposed on Jews by the NDH, Mrs. Salom found herself without the means to support herself or her dependents. According to NDH resolution #1413/41 of 25 August 1941, a monthly allowance of Kn 1200 could be requested. However, Mrs. Salom said in the letter that it should be obvious to the authorities that her numerous responsibilities could not be supported even minimally with the amount decreed by law; therefore, she was requesting that she be granted a monthly income of Kn 4500, equal to the amount of income she should be receiving from her husband's share of the house.[17] The response to this request was not appended to the document. However, in light of the pattern of responses to other requests to the authorities, as outlined below, it is unlikely that Lea Salom's request received a favorable response (Fig. 8.1).

In a letter dated 11 June 1941, Avram Majer Altarac of Sarajevo requested of the authorities a monthly maintenance of 5000 dinars in order to continue to support the basic needs of his wife, himself, his son, his deceased brother's 75-year-old widow, and his other deceased brother's 60-year-old widow, as well as his widowed sister. He also was assisting his son in supporting an estranged wife and their children. Altarac asked to be able to use some of the revenues from his shop, where he was an iron-monger. The povjerenik of the Sephardic Jewish community appended to his letter a recommendation that the authorities honor this request fully. But on 2 August 1941, the authorities granted Mr. Altarac a monthly allowance of only 2000 dinars.[18]

The official appointment of a povjerenik for each Jewish business created much hardship in the Jewish community, as the former (Jewish)



Sarajevo 6 lipnja 1941.

12/VI/44
Hev. 67-R

P.n.

Ustaškom povjereništvu
Sarajevo

Moj muž Mikael Levi nalazi se u zarobljeništvu, a bio je uposlen kao trg. pomoćnik kod firme Sinovi Menahema Alkalaja.- Povjereništvo koje je postavljeno kod pomenute firme nije mi izplatilo plaću za moga muža, tako da sam ja sa dvoje sitne djece ostala bez ikakovih preostava za život.- Nikakovih drugih prihoda nemam, niti rodbine koja bi me mogla potpomagati, a radi sitne djece ne mogu niti da se uposlim, nego sam uzdržana samo na plaću muža.-

Molim stoga Sl. paslov, da bi dozvolilo da mi povjereništvo gore pomenute firme neai izplaćivalo plaću moga muža.- Razumijem da je moj muž kod pomenute firme uposlen neprekidnih 19 godina.-

U nadi povoljnog rješenja, zahvaljujem unapred i b. štuje

Sa odličnim poštovanjem:

Lunči Levi, Sarajevo
Dr. Ante Pavelića ul 18.

POVJERENIK
za
Jevrejsku sefardsku općinu u Sarajevu
Srećko Bujas, sudac

ODOBRAVA SE ISPLATA
1500 Din
mjesečno

Pošto su gornji navodi potpuno tačni, preporučujem da se izda nalog firmi Sinovi Menahema Alkalaja da se udovolji traženju moliteljice.

POVJERENIK
za
Jevrejsku sefardsku općinu u Sarajevu

Fig. 8.1 Several thousand letters from Sarajevan Jews are now kept at the Sarajevo Historical Archive (Photo: Velid Jerlagić, Historical Archive of Sarajevo)

owners were no longer permitted to control their own businesses or even to garner profits from them for living expenses without official approval. Even Jews who had converted to Islam sometimes fell under the law against Jews owning businesses. Especially interesting in this regard is the example of Salamon (Sabit) A. Kabiljo, who wrote a letter on 12 November 1941 to the State Directorate for Reconstruction complaining that the authorities had appointed a povjerenik who was unqualified to run his specialized business, which treated and sold high-quality hides treated with aniline dye to produce a delicate, soft leather. Kabiljo provided a certificate testifying that in 1929 he had accepted Islam, which, he believed, exempted him from persecution according to the Nuremburg Laws.[19] Therefore, he requested that the povjerenik be removed.

A povjerenik appointed to oversee a Jewish business was not necessarily (or usually) assigned to a business for his expertise. Sometimes the povjerenik was a former employee of the Jewish boss who took over the management (and the profits). Other times, a povjerenik was assigned who had no knowledge of the business whatsoever. This was the case in Kabiljo's store. To add insult to injury, the povjerenik assigned to Kabiljo's business was a Hungarian citizen, not even a citizen of the NDH, while Kabiljo was the holder of a silver medal for bravery during World War I. The owner provided testimony from a physician that he was ill and incapable of engaging in any other work than that for which he was trained. The deprivation of his business had denied him the ability to provide the necessities of life for himself and his family of four. He requested, therefore, that he be allowed to manage his own business again. His request for the removal of the povjerenik from his business was denied on the basis of the non-resolution of the question of the recognition of the Aryan laws.[20]

Moric I. Gaon, a haberdasher in Sarajevo, included in his letter of 20 July 1941 a list of his assets and debts. The sum total of his assets was "insubstantial," according to Gaon, but a povjerenik had been appointed to oversee his business nevertheless. Gaon asked the povjerenik of the Sephardic Jewish community to intercede to have the povjerenik of his business dismissed. Gaon protested that he could not afford a povjerenik because his assets were small, he owned no other property, and he had no other income but the modest living from his business. On the other hand, his expenses were large: His wife had been ill for many years and had to seek treatment as far away as Vienna, although with little relief. Gaon also

supported his 90-year-old parents and his married sister, as well as her children and her husband, who had been fired from his job, presumably because he was Jewish. He therefore "humbly" asked the authorities to free him of the additional burden of a povjerenik, which, with the overhead of his store, promised that "those expenses in a short time will devour this little store." On 31 July 1941, the Ministarstvo Narodnog Gospodarstva (Ministry of National Management) answered this request in the negative, saying simply that Gaon's request "could not be satisfied" (Fig. 8.2).[21]

Other owners of modest stores also begged the authorities to expel the povjerenici from their businesses. For example, on 22 July 1941 Moric H. Kabiljo wrote to the authorities that the income from his fish store was so small that in order to support himself and his two children he had had



Fig. 8.2 The petitions from Sarajevo Jews to the Trustees (povjerenici) of the Jewish communities in fascist-occupied Sarajevo contain requests for financial support after their livelihoods and property were stolen from them by the occupying authorities. Thus, these letters constitute a valuable resource, not only for wartime history, but about the everyday life of the Jewish people under fascist occupation shortly before they were murdered (Photo: Velid Jerlagić, Historical Archive of Sarajevo)

to depend on credit. The subsequent appointment of a povjerenik took the little that the Kabiljo store earned, leaving the family literally with no means of support. The petition to dismiss the povjerenik from Kabiljo's store was denied on 29 July 1941.[22]

A similar situation was reported by Minka Altarac in her letter of 31 June 1941. She wrote that the povjerenik assigned to her dairy had not yet paid her anything for monthly maintenance. He was supposed to have given her something for her living expenses because the dairy was her only source of income. The authorities answered her letter on 2 August 1941, stating that she was approved to receive a maintenance sum—from the povjerenik of her business, but no help was provided to ensure that the povjerenik would comply.[23]

Some Jewish property owners were willing to continue to work at their businesses, albeit in positions subservient to the povjerenici, in order to secure a monthly maintenance and to preserve their businesses. For example, Moric S. Kabiljo wrote to the authorities on 4 June 1941 that he had transferred to the two povjerenici assigned to his business, Slavko Bravadžić and Alfred Rodinis, all his debts, ready goods, and all the business of the property. He confirmed that he owned no other real estate and had no other income sources. Therefore, he had no means of supporting himself and his family other than whatever the authorities would give him. He requested a monthly sum of 4000 dinars. In addition, he promised that he would continue to work in the business with as much vigor as he had before the povjerenici came and would make sure that all was done for the satisfaction of the customer and the profitability of the firm. The povjerenik of the Sephardic Jewish community seconded his request for the sum, saying it seemed reasonable. The authorities responded on 26 August 1941 that he could receive Kn 2000 (much less than he had requested), to be paid to him by the povjerenici of his store.[24]

There were others who lost their stores, their only source of income, to povjerenici who took most of the profits. Thus, the former (Jewish) owners were forced to ask the authorities for a monthly sum for maintenance. This was the case for Luna Montiljo, who had received an inconsequential sum for maintenance from the povjerenik assigned to her business. She was left without the wherewithal to pay for the rent for her family of four. Following the request that she filed with the povjerenik of the Sephardic community on 22 July 1941, she was granted a modest sum for maintenance by the authorities.[25]

There were also occasions when a povjerenik bankrupted the store under his or her control. For example, the firm of C.D. Gaon of Zagreb

notified the authorities in Sarajevo on 17 July 1941 that Estika Gaon's embroidery firm in Sarajevo owed them a large sum of money, which, despite repeated requests and warnings, had not been repaid. The Zagreb firm inquired whether the Sarajevo firm was under the management of a povjerenik to whom it could apply for relief. On 23 July 1941, the authorities replied to the Zagreb firm that the povjerenik, Miss Slavica Heruc, had been dismissed as the firm was now bankrupt, and therefore the debt had to be paid by Estika Gaon herself.[26]

Jewish owners of businesses occasionally wrote to the authorities to complain about theft by the povjerenici and to warn of possible bankruptcy as a result. For example, on 17 July 1941 Salamon Levi, owner of Gumija, a workshop for the repair of rubber, wrote to accuse the two povjerenici assigned to his business of theft. In this letter, he stated that they withdrew money from the shop's account allegedly for the purchase of goods for the shop. However, the money was in fact used to pay their own personal bills. Levi warned the authorities that his firm could not sustain such theft.[27]

We also occasionally find a case where the assigned povjerenik sent a written response to accusations by the Jewish owners of the business. On 4 June 1941, Albert E. Kajon, owner of the firm H. Kajon and Son, wrote to the authorities requesting a monthly maintenance sum of 10,000 dinars to support his family of three and a housekeeper, as well as his married daughter and her husband, who had lost his job and could no longer support his family. His request was sent to the authorities through the povjerenik of the Sephardic Jewish community. That officer recommended that Kajon receive a sum of 4000 dinar. Attached to his report to the authorities was a statement by the povjerenici of the firm. They accused Kajon of not being entirely forthcoming in his information. For example, his son, Elias, was in captivity in Italy and thus was not in the household and should not be counted in the financial reckoning. They acknowledged that the son-in-law had lost his residence in the bombardment of the city, but they could not be certain that he had no other movable or immovable property. Finally, they accused the owner of bias in the salaries he gave to his employees. For example, the married Croatian bookkeeper with two children continued to have a very small salary, while the Jewish assistants in the store received more generous salaries. Therefore, the povjerenici recommended that the authorities grant only a small maintenance sum to the Kajon family. On 2 August 1941, the authorities followed the suggestion of the povjerenici

and sent a letter granting the Kajon family a 2000-dinar monthly sum for maintenance.[28]

Contrast this with the positive recommendation of a povjerenik to the authorities on behalf of the former (Jewish) owner of a firm. Ovadija Finci was the owner of a wholesale firm, which was given into the management of a povjerenik, Arifbeg Pašić. When Mr. Finci requested a maintenance sum for his family, his povjerenik wrote a very warm letter to the authorities stating that Finci regularly came to the store and worked conscientiously and diligently. Therefore, the povjerenik strongly recommended that the authorities grant Mr. Finci a monthly maintenance of 5000 dinars, a suggestion seconded by the povjerenik of the Sephardic Jewish community. On 3 August 1941, the authorities wrote a letter granting to Mr. Finci a monthly maintenance sum of 3000 dinars.[29]

Occasionally, a povjerenik would serve as a character witness for the owner of the store that he now controlled. For example, Dr. Jakob Levi, co-owner of a store called Leda, requested that the authorities grant him monthly maintenance from the store's assets. He appended to his application a note written by Husim Njanović, the povjerenik of his store, which stated that Levi was "necessary for the organization for better production, on which he actively works." Nevertheless, on 28 August 1941, the authorities sent a letter that reduced the recommendation of the povjerenik of the Sephardic Jewish community from the requested Kn 3000 to Kn 2000.[30]

Jewish landlords had to ask permission of the authorities through the povjerenik to collect rent from their tenants. For example, the letter of Rifka Montiljo, sent to the povjerenik of the Sephardic Jewish community on 21 April 1941, set out the housewife's list of assets (which consisted only of the rent for rooms in her home). She claimed that she paid her yearly and excise taxes and that the rent was her family's only means of maintenance. Her husband, a craftsman, no longer earned a living as his enterprise was under the management of a povjerenik. The rent alone maintained the family of six, which included four minor children. Her request to continue to collect the rent from her tenants was granted on 24 July 1941.[31]

A similar request from Rifka Papo was forwarded by the povjerenik. The housewife collected rent from four tenants, which was what supported her, her husband, Moise, who had been invalided in World War I, and her two minor children. A sickly woman who had endured three operations, the rooms that she leased to tenants were her only source of

income. Her request to continue to collect rent from her tenants was approved in a letter on 24 July 1941.[32]

Dr. Samuel Pinto wrote to the authorities on 3 June 1941 from the hospital, where he was recuperating from an operation. His illness required that he be bedridden for several months, followed by a further operation. He owned several homes from which he collected rent, but he was no longer able to collect rent due to the laws passed by the state. He owed a large sum of money to the state mortgage facility, which he was unable to pay under the circumstances, much less the sums incurred for his long illness. His office had been destroyed during the bombardment of Sarajevo, so he had no source of income. Therefore, he requested a monthly maintenance from the authorities. Dr. Pinto attached to his letter an affirmation by his surgeon that he was indeed ill and hospitalized and a statement from the state mortgage facility confirming the debt. The Chamber of Lawyers in Sarajevo sent a letter to the authorities that asserted that Dr. Pinto's office had been bombed, that he had thus lost his main source of income, and that he was in the hospital and unable to provide for his own sustenance or for his sister and two nieces if he could not use the rent from his houses. The povjerenik for the Sephardic Jewish community also strongly urged the authorities to urgently attend to this matter. On 24 July 1941, Dr. Pinto's request to collect the rents from his houses for his own maintenance was denied.[33]

Despite the desperate conditions faced by Sarajevo's Jewish residents, some citizens attempted to continue to meet their financial obligations. For example, Haim Romano, in a letter dated 21 July 1941, he requested that the povjerenik forward his petition that he be permitted to collect rent from his tenants so he could maintain his family, including his wife, who had been bedridden for 18 years with sciatica. The rent would also be used to continue to pay off his debt of 35,000 dinars to the City Savings Bank. Fired from his job as a representative of a Zagreb firm, presumably because he was Jewish, the rent was his only income. In support of his claim, Romano included a statement from the credit department of the bank and a statement from the doctor about his wife's illness attesting to the truth of his statement. The request was subsequently approved.[34]

Another similar letter, which requested the privilege of continuing to personally collect rent (instead of by the state) to be used for family maintenance, listed the official obligations that remained to these beleaguered property owners even though civil rights for Jews had been removed. In a

letter to the authorities dated 22 July 1941, Mento Gaon listed the income from his house, minus the cost for water and chimney sweep. Then he mentioned that from the net total of his rent, he also paid state and local (opština) taxes. His request to continue to collect his rent for his own use and forgo having to deposit the rent with the police bureau was approved by the authorities on 24 July 1941.[35] Similarly, Moric Montiljo, an unemployed upholsterer, requested of the authorities in a letter dated 12 June 1941 that he be permitted to continue to collect his modest rent so he would be able to pay his tax and opština commitments. His request also was granted.[36]

On 18 July 1941, Salamon Levi wrote to request that the authorities allow him a certain sum so he could pay a debt to the firm owned by Bencion Eskenazi. The authorities responded on 29 July 1941 that the povjerenik of the Eskenazi firm could expect that the debt would be paid in one month.[37]

Other people, in the midst of their desperation, also did not forget obligations to others. Thus, we find a letter from Ada Papo of Banja Luka, which requested that the rent from ownership of half of a house in Sarajevo be paid not to her but to her maternal aunt. The aunt, who lived in Sarajevo, dwelled with her husband and daughter in great poverty. Ada Papo wished to alleviate that poverty by directing to them her portion of the rent due. The request was granted by the authorities (Fig. 8.3).[38]

Similarly, Josef L. and Suzana Pesah requested on 17 July 1941 that they be permitted to utilize the rent they collected from their homes to reimburse their (non-Jewish) maid, Anastazija Kučicki, for three months' salary in arrears, as well as for the current month. Since they were forced to turn in all income to the police station, they had to request that the same be given back to them. They pointed out that much of the money they had previously collected as rent, presumably before the establishment of the office of the povjerenik, had been spent on repair of damage to their property due to the bombardment of Sarajevo and for the quarterly state taxes. On 25 July 1941, the authorities approved the granting of the unpaid salary to the maid.[39]

Three siblings, Sida Finci, Klara Alkalaj, and Hani Danon, wrote a letter on 1 July 1941 requesting that the rent from their jointly owned property be applied to the maintenance of their "weak-minded" brother, Salamon Baruh, through his guardian, Mr. Salamon I. Danon. Their brother, who had no personal income, lived in his own house, the taxes and surtaxes of which they wished to continue to pay from the rent they earned from their



Fig. 8.3 The petitions from Sarajevo's Jews illustrate the daily difficulties they faced in navigating the constraints generated by the anti-Semitic regulations, even as the concentration camps were being prepared for them (Photo: Velid Jerlagić, Historical Archive of Sarajevo)

own property. They also wanted to continue to pay for the food, medicines, and other personal needs of their brother. Appended to their request was an affirmation of the situation by the guardian. On 31 August 1941, the authorities approved the use of the rent from the sisters' house for the continued support of their brother.[40]

Occasionally, Jewish building owners enlisted the authorities to assist in the collection of outstanding debts or rent. In one example from 25 June 1941, Haim and Rafo M. Kabiljo wrote to the authorities complaining that the tenant of a house they owned was in arrears with his rent. The tenant, Slavko Zirojević, was ordered by the authorities to pay the rent or bear the legal consequences.[41]

Some people who had been fired from their jobs and had no income requested a remission in rent until their situation improved. For example, Rafael Alkalaj, a metalworker, was unemployed and had no ability to pay for the room he rented in the home of Rafael Salom. His letter to the povjerenik requested a remission of rent with the promise that "as soon as I am able I will pay the same most readily." Attached to the letter was the written testimony of the povjerenik of the Sephardic Jewish community that confirmed the veracity of Alkalaj's letter and the povjerenik's recommendation of a favorable decision. The answer from the authorities on 31 July 1941 was that Alkalaj had to pay two months' rent.[42]

Jewish residents of Sarajevo needed special permission to access money they had previously deposited in a bank account. For example, on 22 July 1941 Avram E. Altarac, an unemployed cabinet-maker, applied to the authorities for the right to withdraw from his own bank account an amount that would enable him to support his family modestly. The authorities permitted him to withdraw a small amount from his bank on a weekly basis.[43]

While the Jews of Sarajevo were struggling to get through the days of deprivation, non-Jews in the city were preparing to take over their property or to profit in other ways from their misfortunes. So, for example, there is a letter by Josefina Miloš, a Sarajevo widow, who wrote to the authorities requesting that a property formerly occupied by either Serbs or Jews (she did not seem to be sure which) be deeded to her to be turned into a café. This request, forwarded on 22 July 1941, was approved by the authorities on 31 July 1941.[44]

In a letter dated 22 July 1941 the povjerenik placed in the store of Oto Špiler requested permission of the authorities to raid Špiler's bank accounts

in order to continue to supply the store he now controlled. His request was granted on 29 July 1941.[45] When Mr. Antun Jakovac, a merchant, complained in a letter to the authorities on 19 July 1941 that Mr. Julius Adler had owed him a debt for a long time, the authorities wrote to Adler on 30 July 1941, warning him to pay the debt immediately.[46]

Conclusion

On 26 June 1941, a special statute on the creation of concentration camps was enacted. In part, the statute blamed the Jews collectively for "disseminating lies which disturb public peace and order … for which they must be dealt with accordingly. In addition to corrective punitive measures, sites for concentrated internment will be prepared for them under the clear sky."[47] The imprisoned would include even those who had converted to Catholicism or Islam in the late 1930s or early 1940s. Mixed couples were dealt with on a case-by-case basis[48] because of Pavelić's self-appointed privilege of designating certain Jews "Honorary Aryans." These usually included those Jews deemed vital to the economy, health care, infrastructure, or those married to Ustaše (Hilberg 1992, 77).[49]

Most of the Jews who survived the increasingly desperate situation of membership in the "enemies" group in the NDH were sent to their deaths at one of the 26 NDH concentration camps located in Drnje, Stara Gradiška, Jadovno, Slano, Metajna (on the island of Pag), Kerestinec, Lepoglava, Jastrebarsko (for children), Tenje, Djakovo, Loborgrad, among others (Ramet 2006a, 402). Many of the Bosnian Jews perished in the Ustaše Jasenovac camp, which operated from August 1941 until April 1945.[50]

Not knowing their eventual fate, the Jews of Sarajevo who found themselves under Ustaše rule were forced to deal with a predatory regime and often greedy fellow citizens with whom they had previously lived without dissension. The letters cited above show some of the problems encountered by the Jews of Sarajevo, who were forced to navigate blindly in the difficult conditions placed on them by the Ustaše. The letters described here show that they never found relief during the time they remained in Sarajevo; they were given minimal sustenance by the authorities, who looted their businesses and savings and starved them while the concentration camps were being prepared.

Notes

1. An Ottoman administrative unit governed by a paša.
2. For archeological evidence suggesting that Jews were present in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the early years of the Common Era, see Kaplan 1964, 66–70.
3. In Yugoslavia, nationality and religion usually coincided. That is, Serbs followed Serbian Orthodoxy; Croats, Roman Catholicism; Bosnian Muslims, Islam; and so forth. Muslim with a capital "M" denotes ethnicity, while a small initial "m" denotes religious identification. For more on this designation, see Friedman 1996, 163.
4. Jews who came from Eastern and Western Europe outside of the Iberian Peninsula.
5. Even now, however, Bosnia's multiethnic population and the nationally dependent structure of its government, as well as the policies of Serbia, Croatia, and even the international community, continue to influence its situation, not least in the current perceptions of the Holocaust. At the same time, however, Bosnia's experiences have differed from its neighbors as a result of historical vagaries, its ethnic composition, and the consequences of its contemporary politics and governmental structure.
6. The Ustaše, also known as the Hrvatski Revolucionarni Pokret (Croatian Revolutionary Movement), was a fascist movement that had engaged in terrorist activity before World War II and was implicated in the assassination of Yugoslav King Alexander in 1934 in Marseilles. It ruled, under the protection of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, in part of Yugoslavia after that country was occupied by the Axis powers.
7. Arhiv Bosne i Hercegovine. "Spisak: otpuštenih činovnika i službenika Tehničkog odjela, Tehničkog Odeljka pri Kotarskom poglavarstvu u Sarajevu i Zavodu za meterologiju u Sarajevu," Zagreb: Nezavisna država Hrvatska. Povjereništvo Sarajevo Tehnički odjel. (9 May 1941). V-Broj: 203/41. [DSCN6516]
8. Bosnia's pluralistic and tolerant history is described in Friedman 1996.
9. See, for example, Gaon 2001.
10. See Jelinek 1990, 288, and report by Srećko Bujas, AbiH, Zemaljska komisija za utvrdjivanje ratnih zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača za Bosnia and Herzegovina, box 3.
11. *Narodne novine* (30 April 1941).
12. Jewish marriages were no longer publicly performed; rabbis, without witnesses, secretly performed the ceremonies (American Jewish Committee 1982, 3).
13. Narcisa Lengel-Krizman estimates that the total loss of property for Jews in the NDH may have been twenty billion dinars (1939). (The dinar was the monetary unit of interwar Yugoslavia.) (Lengel-Krizman 1990, 4, note 5).

14. *Narodne novine* (4 June 1941).
15. The two trustees for Sarajevo appear to have tried to assist the Sarajevo Jewish community, even to the extreme of offering to purchase exit visas and passage permits to the Italian zones in return for donation of Jewish possessions to the NDH. The Ustaše refused this offer. In a letter from Zionist Organization leader Richard Lichtheim in Geneva to I. Lauterbuch in Jerusalem, the utter destitution of the Jewish community in the NDH was described. Zionist Archives, Jerusalem S26/1399.
16. The kuna was the monetary unit of the NDH.
17. Istorijski Arhiv, Sarajevo, "Fond: Državno-ravnateljstvo za gospodarstvenu obnovu - podružnica Sarajevo 1941.-1942.god." #2130.
18. *Ibid*., #852/41.
19. Nuremburg Laws discriminated against Jewish people according to a pseudo-scientific distinction of parentage.
20. *Ibid*., #1664.
21. *Ibid*., # 796/41.
22. *Ibid*., #713/41.
23. *Ibid*., #849/41.
24. *Ibid*., #1483/41.
25. *Ibid*., #642/41.
26. *Ibid*., #568/41.
27. *Ibid*., #98.
28. *Ibid*., #847/41.
29. *Ibid*., #840/41.
30. *Ibid*., #1507.
31. *Ibid*., #235/K/41.
32. *Ibid*., #276/K.
33. *Ibid*., #248/41.
34. *Ibid*., #291K.
35. *Ibid*., #141K.
36. *Ibid*., #219-K/41.
37. *Ibid*., #712/41.
38. *Ibid*., #447/K.
39. *Ibid*., #287/0.
40. *Ibid*., #457-K/41.
41. *Ibid*., #208/41.
42. *Ibid*., #280/K.
43. *Ibid*., #658/41.
44. *Ibid*., #658/41.
45. *Ibid*., #789/41.
46. *Ibid*., #769/41.
47. *Hrvatski narod* (29 June 1941).

48. *Ibid*., 5.
49. Some of these special cases were not transported to concentration camps, and others who had been were returned from the camps. With this policy Pavelić initially resisted Hitler's demands that all Jews be killed; however, in 1943 he yielded to Hitler's demands and offered financial compensation (Jelić-Butić 1977, 174).
50. Some historians claim that 80,000 to 90,000 people perished at Jasenovac (Ramet 2006a, 402). See also Matković and Mirošević 2003, 159; Deak 2002, 42. The Jasenovac collection and work camp was part of a system of five special camps (Krapje, Bročice, Ciglana, Kožara, Stara Gradiška). Special women's camps, such as Loborgrad, Tenje, and Djakovo, were also established (Kreso 2006, 82).

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CHAPTER 9

Enduring Bonds of Place: Personhood and the Loss of Home

Renée Hirschon

The Wider Context: Types of Forced Migration

In this chapter, I seek to examine not only the regional problems of population disruption in South-Eastern Europe, but also to set our concerns in an overall perspective, namely that of global migration, a major characteristic of the last 50 years.

It has been glibly said that this is the 'age of migration' (Castles and Miller 2009), but actually humankind has been migratory through the millennia of prehistory, departing initially from Africa and eventually colonizing all parts of the world. The unique characteristic of our times is the scale of population movements and mass mobility. We should be aware that this contemporary mobility is not always of a benign kind, a fact which has become painfully evident lately. The most recent figures in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Global Trends Report noted that worldwide displacement was at the highest level ever recorded. The number of forcibly displaced peaked at the end of 2014 (the latest figures available at the time of writing in January 2016), rising from 37.5 million in 2004 to 51.2 million in 2013 and to a

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staggering 59.5 million in 2014 (UNHCR 2015a). People in ever-increasing numbers are being forced to move because of development schemes (15 million per year) or out of fear for their lives because of persecution, oppression and deadly conflict (45 million). This makes an overall total of 60 million persons losing their homes in the last year of published data (Fig. 9.1).

A large proportion of those seeking refuge enter Europe via Lesvos, a small Greek island separated from Turkey by the narrow Mytilene Strait (7–10 kms wide). In 2015 Lesvos received 500,018 refugees, with as many as 3500 arrivals per day (UNHCR 2015b). Unbelievably, as of January 2016 the island accounted for more than 50 per cent of all refugees and migrants arriving in Europe by sea, despite increasingly hazardous wintry conditions (UNHCR 2015c). The number has doubled to over 3000 per day since August 2015. Overall more than a million persons fled to Greece in 2015. The number quadrupled from 216,054 in 2014. Of this figure, 84 per cent have come from the world's top 10 refugee-producing countries, as designated by the UNHCR. This is evidence that most of the people arriving in Europe are fleeing war and persecution and are in danger of their lives (UNHCR 2015d).[1]

With the mass flight of refuges from Africa and the Middle East, migration, especially into and within the European Union (EU), has become



Fig. 9.1 Annual displacement of refugees 2004–2014 (Source: UNHCR)

the primary political issue in international discourse. A rising tide of xenophobia has also become evident in many countries of the developed world. Nowadays, invidious distinctions are made by populist politicians using terms such as 'economic migrants' and 'bogus refugees', and the popular media tend increasingly to inaccurately refer to all refugees as 'illegal immigrants', revealing a defensive and increasingly hostile attitude.[2] Challenges to the original UNHCR Convention on Refugees have been raised and are manifested in different reactions to the masses of asylum seekers in EU countries. In the case of the UNHCR convention, a clear obligation for protection under international law is being increasingly manipulated by political interests aided by the media. This has prompted migration experts to propose new solutions for the protection of asylum seekers and to the issue of first location registration.[3]

With the erection of fences at frontiers and the *de facto* abolition of the Schengen Agreement (underway at the time of writing), an attitude of 'Fortress Europe' is unravelling the treaties which bind member states in the EU. Acting as separate states, each country is prioritizing its own political self-interest. These are blatant contraventions of international legal agreements, and with the increasing security risks posed by millions of displaced people, there are now serious challenges to the established conventions which have governed immigration over the past 70 years, a situation that casts doubt on the integrity and even the continuing feasibility of the EU.

These reactions might be explicable as the consequence of austerity policies, the pressures of economic decline, and the ongoing recession which have beset parts of Europe. Despite their economic problems, however, Europeans cannot ignore the horrific drowning of people crammed into boats capsizing off the coasts of Greece, Italy and Spain. Yet these refugees, mainly from the Middle East and Africa, who are seeking to save their lives are becoming increasingly unwelcome in Europe.

The UNHCR Global Trends Report (already cited) notes that '… globally, one in every 122 humans is now either a refugee, internally displaced, or seeking asylum' (June 2015). Significantly, it notes that only 126,800 refugees were able to return to their home countries in 2014, the lowest number in 31 years. Consequently, we are witnessing the uprooting of a huge number of people from their homelands without the prospect of return, a fact which will have long-term effects on destination countries as well as on the individuals who require resettlement.

Thus, the topic of nostalgia, which is my focus, is not asynchronic and it certainly entails consideration of the wider picture. It also needs to be

related to the overall context of modernity, and indeed of post-modernity. My chapter also reveals aspects of the creative response to displacement taking a particular ethnographic approach.

The challenges posed by time-space convergence have led some writers to suggest that places are being *re-placed* by networks of social relations. For example, Castells talks of the 'network society' (Castell and Miller 2009; Castells 2010). Thus, our triumphant technological mastery over the constraints of physical space allows us to collapse geographical location into immediate communication. However, the effects and extent of changes wrought by globalising technology are proving to be evermore problematic and not without cost. My approach emphasizes the concept of personhood in its material relation to physical space. In my view, space and place are intimately bound up with the person, a human subject involved in a social and cultural milieu and recognized by others as a person. This nexus of elements lies behind the phenomenon of yearning for home and long-term nostalgia.

Modernization Projects and Migration

A longstanding debate exists over the question of the terms used to designate modes of human mobility and whether such categorizations offer any heuristic value. Is there, for instance, a significant distinction between voluntary and involuntary migration, between refugees and internally displaced persons, between those persons displaced by force and economic migrants?[4] Furthermore, there is a category of ambitious persons who migrate in order to better their education, skills, remuneration and careers. These 'aspirational' migrants have a different trajectory than others who have been displaced; indeed they might constitute a sub-category of the 'economic migrant'.

The plight of the islanders of the Pacific in the face of observable climatic change was highlighted at the Paris Climate Conference (Goldenberg 2015). For these islanders the prospect of being forcibly displaced and becoming 'climate refugees' is no longer hypothetical. A measurable rise in sea levels is affecting life on the low-lying islands, and the sea is already invading their settlements. Global processes of modernization that have produced threats to the planet's ecosystem are affecting these and other low-lying regions (e.g. Bangladesh's Ganges River delta) with dire immediacy (McAdam 2012).

It would be helpful to consider the different categories of displacement, including those related to modernization, recognized by international law. The case of development schemes illustrates the necessity of

contextualizing the topic of this book in terms of modernity. Boym's (2001) influential work points out the connection—as well as the disjunction—between *modernity* as perceived in European arts, literature, and philosophy, and *modernization* as a project to which the world is increasingly subjected.

Modernization programmes incorporate at their heart the development of infrastructure for the purpose of economic gain. In the name of modernization and of greater economic wellbeing, development agencies disrupt local people's ways of life, appropriate their land, and interrupt relationships within their communities and with their ancestral territory. Dam and highway construction, railways, urban rehabilitation—all are central to this process. People are forced to leave their homes when development plans flood the land for dam construction, chop up landscapes for highways, bulldoze established communities, or replace poor neighbourhoods—so-called urban blight areas—with tower blocks that produce further social problems. People who have to leave their homes in these circumstances, even in the case of slum clearance, usually feel a deep sense of coercion.

Development-induced displacement (DID) is an established branch of migration studies in which there is a considerable body of literature and a separate disciplinary status. Surprisingly, its most striking finding is that the disruptive effects of forced resettlement due to development are no less profound than those resulting from the physical violence accompanying situations of deadly conflict, warfare or political persecution.

An early concern in social anthropology was the plight of people who were forced to move from their homes for purposes of economic development. In the 1940s Elizabeth Colson lived with the Tonga people of Northern Rhodesia, now Zambia, on the Zambezi River, conducting a classic anthropological study (Colson 1962). This provided the baseline for what later became the first long-term analysis of the social effects of development projects (Colson 1971).

Colson's research reveals the breakdown of community among the Tonga after resettlement in the Zambezi River region resulting from construction of the Kariba Dam. People's lives were radically disrupted even though their displacement took place in an orderly fashion and with proper provisions for resettlement. Nonetheless, it involved coercion. The extraordinary finding has been replicated in other parts of the world where large-scale development projects entailed population relocation (e.g. Chile and China). For example, Jing describes the resettlement experience following dam construction on China's Yellow

River (1999, 331, 333–335). He notes how villagers were still in mourning some 30 years after their displacement. Even the younger generation born after the flooding could point to sites, now deep under the waters of the reservoir, where their parents had lived and worked and where their ancestral shrines were located (Colson 2003, 19). Colson, comparing on the situations in both countries, notes:

> Gwembe Tonga still speak of themselves as "People of the River" some forty years after their river disappeared into Kariba Lake, and they make claims for special treatment based on their knowledge that they were moved even though the majority now were born in their new areas. They too can be precise about what lies below the water, and as dry land re-emerged when Kariba Lake fell during the droughts of the 1980s they reclaimed fields which, they said, had been cultivated by dead kin. (Colson 2003, 19–20)

Subsequently, Scudder and Colson (1982) developed a model for anticipating the stages of adjustment following resettlement, which has provided a benchmark for forced migration studies. Their finding that development-induced displacement even under peaceful conditions causes long-term and irreversible social disruption has been validated in many other cases all over the world and provoked serious revision in the policies of the World Bank, the entity underwriting many of these projects. However, Cernea's more benign policies (2000) have been subjected to a series of unfortunate reversals. Formerly World Bank policy emphasised careful planning of resettlement schemes but this has been abandoned as a priority (Cernea and Ferris 2014).

In order to explain the puzzling pattern to explain the puzzling pattern of disorganization following planned resettlement which Cernea calls 'social disarticulation' (Cernea 1994), Downing proposed the concept of 'social geometry' (Downing 1996). He defines this as 'infinite intersections of socially constructed spaces, socially constructed times, and socially constructed personages' (1996, 33). This concept provides particularly insights into the experience of forced displacement. The disruption of daily routines of space and time when people are forcibly moved from their familiar environments results in disorientation which affects individuals, families and the community as a whole.

This volume dedicated to *Nostalgia, Loss and Creativity in South-East Europe: Political and Cultural Representations of the Past* must necessarily consider processes which result in population displacement through modernization, as well as those that result from violent persecution. In strictly

legal terms a case can be made for distinguishing internally displaced persons (IDPs) from refugees since they remain in their country of origin and do not cross international borders.[5] However, in my view the essence of the problem is the same for all forcibly displaced peoples, whether they are displaced due to conflict or to development projects. In essence they suffer the effects of loss of home, which, as I aim to show, has a long-term trajectory.

Nostalgia Examined

The etymology of the English word *nostalgia* derives from ancient patterns of migration in early antiquity, and its original meaning is well revealed in its Greek roots (*nostos* = returning home, *algos* = ache, pain = homesickness). The word reflects the deep emotional bonds associated with place and the disruption and suffering experienced when separated from that place. Papadopoulos sums it up: 'Nostalgia is the hurt, the pain, the sickness, the suffering that a person experiences in wanting to go home' (Papadopoulos 2002, 15). This view contrasts with current English usage. For example, the *New Oxford Dictionary of English* provides a rather superficial and trivializing characterization, defining nostalgia as 'wistful affection' or 'sentimental longing'.

My approach takes a different emphasis. I wish to treat the question of nostalgia from a grounded and material perspective, as a dimension intrinsic to the development process in human life. In my view, which is based on ethnographic sources and anthropological concepts, nostalgia is grounded in actual experience and is an existentially embedded phenomenon.

This contrasts with the way nostalgia has been treated in some other fields. Boym's elegant and imaginative discourse (2001) examines its currency in literature, philosophy, social theory and the arts. The notion represented there encompasses various emotional dispositions which refer to time (Benjamin), to alienation (Marx, Sartre) and to nihilism (Nietzsche). In Boym's treatment, the cognitive level seems to override the actuality of physical location. She herself notes a 'seemingly ineffable homesickness' in humankind and typologizes two kinds of nostalgia, 'restorative' and 'reflexive,' as ways of 'giving shape and meaning to longing' (Boym 2001, 41).

In Boym's approach longing seems to be a kind of disembodied state of mind. Memory and its embellishment, through superimposed notions of time, are glorified because of a fantasy which flourishes through absence. In her evocative discourse Boym posits links with nationalist sentiments and with the romanticism of the past: 'Nostalgia is an ache of *temporal* distance and displacement' (Boym 2001, 44) (my emphasis).

In my view, however, it is obvious that to understand the phenomenon of nostalgia we need to view it holistically and empirically. I hold that nostalgia is not simply constituted in a set of enhanced memories, a romanticism for the past, with many and varied manifestations (contra Boym 2001, 19–32). It is not just a state of mind. Rather, it necessarily entails physical movement; at a very minimum it entails loss of place. However, it is equally clear that *dis-location* has to do with more than geographical transfer, such as moving house or growing up and leaving home. The continuous harking back to lost homelands which is noted in many studies of locality and belonging has not been explained satisfactorily. Use of the description 'long-term nostalgia' is, in my view, an inadequate labelling.

I suggest that the nostalgia produced by forced displacement is more fundamental because it entails the disruption of the self, of the matrix of identity, of the social fabric to which one belongs, and thus of the whole person. My interpretation rests on the assumption that forced displacement of any kind disrupts the whole person. The key to my argument is that personhood and place are indissolubly bound up together in most societies. I am pursuing an understanding which is not confined to literate, urban or bourgeois cultural groups. Consequently, our conceptual framework for understanding must be wide enough to encompass the varied expressions of the relationship between person and place in different societies. This is particularly important under current circumstances where natural disasters and climate change are contributing to widespread displacement (McAdam 2012).

It is vital to emphasize that in many parts of the world the notions of the human subject and of place are inextricably linked and integrated conceptually. They differ greatly in content from those which characterize the world of modernity—the capitalist industrial world which tends towards fragmentation, where power and wealth reside, and where international conventions and the development of human rights regimes are formulated. The ways in which the relationship between personhood and place is formed have varied expressions in different cultures. Despite the great inroads made everywhere by the global economy, and despite the claims of the transnationalists that we have entered an era of deterritorialization, these culturally specific notions regarding spatial relations are still salient (see below).

My conviction that place and the person are intricately linked should be examined empirically, so we will be referring to a range of illustrative examples from various societies.

Displacement and Adjustment

The starting point for my interest in the long-term significance of place was the vivid descriptions and recollections of a lost homeland among refugees who had been subjected to exile from their homes over 50 years before. It alerted me to the organic link between memory, place and identity which was a central cultural feature of the Asia Minor people I lived with in the 1970s, five decades after their expulsion from Turkey (then the Ottoman Empire) to Greece. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne was a unique compulsory exchange of populations, affecting on the one hand the Muslims of Greece, who were forcibly expelled to Turkey, and on the other the Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire, who were expelled to Greece. This was not repatriation but a removal of religious minorities resulting from the post-World War I determination to create homogeneous nation-states; in effect, this was not 'ethnic cleansing' but 'religious cleansing' (see Hirschon 2003).

In 1972, I conducted in-depth ethnographic fieldwork in Kokkinia, now Nikaia, a poor urban locality of Piraeus with, at the time, a population of 86,000 in the Athens-Pireaus metropolis of over 4 million. I soon noticed that the people I was living with proclaimed a separate identity and consistently referred to themselves as 'prosfyges' ('refugees') or 'Mikrasiates' ('Asia Minorites').[6] Their separate sense of identity was vibrant, even some 50 years after their arrival, and, significantly, it was manifested not only by the original refugees but also by their children and grandchildren, the second and third generations (see examples in Hirschon 1998, 22–26). A major basis for distinguishing their identity from local Greeks was their origin in the Ottoman Empire, that vast and highly diverse, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural society where they had lived in recognized communities, with a close knowledge of the lifestyles of others (Hirschon 2006). Despite the marginal and deprived conditions in Kokkinia (Hirschon 1998, 39–55), social life among the Mikrasiates was integrated and had a markedly sophisticated and cosmopolitan quality (Hirschon 1998, 1–14).

Mechanisms for Adjustment: Means of Adaptation

As I shared in their daily lives for over a year, it became clear that these inhabitants of Kokkinia had a distinct identity derived from a deep sense of the value of their way of life. As noted in other studies of communities of displaced persons, they held a strong conviction of their cultural superiority

(Hirschon 1998, 12–14; for example, see also Capo Zmegac 2007, 95ff; Dikomitis 2009). Asia Minor people took pride in their cuisine, their religiosity, their housekeeping skills, even their knowledge of other people's customs. The first generation prided themselves on being cosmopolitans and frequently made disparaging remarks about the underdevelopment of the Greek state and about local Greeks, whom they called 'peasants' and saw as unmannered, uncouth and narrow-minded (Hirschon 1998, 30–35).

Mikrasiates had achieved a coherent and integrated way of life in their new environment through creatively responding to the disruption of their previous lives. They did this as a subconscious response through adopting various adaptive mechanisms (Hirschon 1998). One of these was the exercise of memory. Their reminiscences revealed the contrasts between the life they were forced to abandon and life in a very different society, which demanded the difficult processes of adaptation and adjustment. They also expressed a profound sense of loss about their previous way of life, the familiar fabric of society, and for their homes and the landscape of the Ottoman social world.

In my attempt to understand the adjustment process involved in transcending the disruption caused by their expulsion and their efforts to reconstitute their society, I discerned various means of promoting continuity.

a) One of these was a *continual narrative process*. The frequent and vivid references to life in their homeland (*'stin patrida'*) and the many tales and accounts of the experiences of the older people vividly recreated the familiar world they had left behind. I began to realize that life in Kokkinia was a world of many layers, of the past in the present, and of time and overlapping landscapes. The local physical environment became imbued with images of past and distant places and events, co-existent and co-incident. These reminiscences became part of the inherited memory for succeeding generations, who imbibed a sense of differentiation from others.

'Memory', writes Walter Benjamin in his essay 'The Storyteller', 'creates the chain of tradition which passes a happening on from generation to generation' (Benjamin 2016). Boym, too, uses Benjamin's notion of memory, of past, present and future as superimposed times. Her reflective notion of nostalgia 'explores ways of inhabiting many places at once and imagining different time zones' (Boym 2001, xvii). Much like Proust's unpredictable excursions where words and sensations mingle, the stories and objects presented in the continual narrative process displace the subject to other times and places through memory.

In my experiences with Mikrasiates, it was their memories expressed in continual narratives which created a bridge between the disrupted past and their present lives. Even now I note how often this heritage is invoked when young people with Asia Minor connections talk about their grandparents. This is by no means a unique process, having been observed in other cases.[7]

The difference I want to highlight contra Boym is that in the displaced communities presented here, nostalgia is a painful, existential crisis which does not simply 'thrive in algia, the longing itself, and delay the homecoming—wistfully, ironically, desperately' (Boym 2001, xvii). It is my opinion that Boym overlooks the central importance which *home as place* plays in the formation of the person, beacuse nostalgia is triggered by stories and material embodiments of memory, especially among subjects of forced displacement.

b) Another mechanism of promoting continuity was that of *recreating a familiar topography* or landscape. This took place through the naming of streets; the attributing of characteristics based on regional stereotypes from the homeland; the constructing of landmarks, such as churches, dedicated to the saints of the towns they had left. Kokkinia became an 'imagined geography', where elements of the place of origin were attached as characteristics to the different neighbourhoods of the locality. Since the housing patterns were not uniform throughout the area, landmarks were chosen, particularly churches, that provided a physically distinguishable template on which regional stereotypes could be impressed (Hirschon 1998, 22–26). Indeed, among relocated groups, street naming is a noted as a common reaction to the disruption of their spatial co-ordinates (one of the variables in the social geometry matrix proposed by Downing 1996).

c) A most important element of promoting continuity was the role played by *material embodiments* of memory. In the 1960s, before the dedication of the Church of the Evangelistria in Kokkinia/Nikaia, stones were brought from the Turkish town of Iznik (Nicaea) to be built into the final stage of construction. Indeed, religion and its accompanying ritual was a major part of the template on which Mikrasiates could rebuild the shattered past. This is not surprising: it is a consequence of the Ottoman *millet* system in which a person's identity was defined by religious affiliation rather than by ethnicity or language. Thus the role of religion and its practice was a dominant element in the identity of these displaced people. In the early stage of the population exchange, foreign reports noted that the refugees' first action was to create a church of some kind to house their icons, which were among the most important items salvaged in their flight

to safety or in the subsequent population expulsion (Greek Refugee Settlement Commission 1926).

One exemplary figure was Filio Haidemenou, born in Vourla/Urla near Izmir in 1899. Her life was marked by the terrible moment when she fled the flames engulfing her home town, 'beloved Vourla'. Then aged 23, she vowed that she would never forget it and would one day create a memorial to the place. Many years passed, and it was only in 1990 at the age of 91 when she finally fulfilled her promise by initiating a campaign to establish a monument and museum to the Asia Minor heritage in Nea Philadelphia, an original refugee settlement where she had lived.

Before the dedication of the monument, Filio returned to Vourla, which she had already visited four times since the 1970s. The purpose of this last visit, she explained, was to bring back stones and earth to be placed in the monument 'so that it's really *Mikrasiatiko'* (*… na fero petres kai choma ap'eki, yia na einai Mikrasiatiko*). In the ruins of the Greek school building, the Anaxagoreon, where she had studied as a child, she picked out some marble pieces and some earth. The incident reveals the deeply grounded nature of identity in the Orthodox Christian communities of the Ottoman Empire. It also reveals a concern with authenticity, a feature which characterizes the importance of markers of identity to distinguish the displaced from the culture of the host society.

Many similar illustrative examples can be seen in the remarkable book by Kemal Yalcin (1998), a Turkish writer, who describes his encounters with those expelled from their homeland in Kapadokya/Cappadocia in the 1920s. The mixed communities of Cappadocia were disrupted not by military conflict but, ironically, by the violence of an international political agreement. In his quest to find a certain family, Yalcin interviewed many families who had been moved to Greece. Their previous neighbours had entrusted the dowry goods of a daughter to Yalcin's grandfather for safekeeping many decades earlier, but the trunk had not been claimed. Yalcin made two separate trips to Greece, and his book contains moving accounts of his contacts with those expelled in the 1920s and their descendants, whom he interviewed all over Greece.

One of those interviewed was Eleftheria Staboulis, a high school teacher whose father, Lazaros, was originally from Kayseri. Lazaros frequently narrated stories about his life in Kayseri to his children and had always wanted to go back. Finally, he asked his daughter to visit his hometown since he was no longer fit to travel to Turkey. Lazaros gave her the names and addresses of neighbours and told her: 'Go and find our home. Bring me a

bag of soil from our garden and a bottle of water from our fountain if it is still there. Before I die, I wish to drink the water from our spring and kiss our soil.'[8]

Eleftheria undertook the journey to Kayseri and found their family house. Deeply moved, she filled a bag of soil and a bottle of water and took it back to her father. She told Yalcin that Lazaros filled his pillowcase with the earth she had brought him, and he slept on that pillow of soil until the day he died.

A common theme revealed in these accounts is the strong bond with the physical place of origin and its association with home. Yalcin's interviews manifest an important aspect of the culture of these people, namely, the deep integration of the material, symbolic and spiritual worlds. In this way of thinking these domains are not separate but are co-incident and interpenetrating. It is worth noting here the importance of the elements of earth and water. A central feature of Orthodox Christianity (Ware 1993, 274–296) is that the sacred interpenetration into daily social life has many and varied manifestations (see Hirschon 1998, 134–140, 235–245; Hirschon 2009; also cf Prodromou 1998 and especially du Boulay 2009 after Prodromou).[9]

Here I want to shift the focus to the relationship that every human being has with his or her environment. At a very early stage of life the surrounding world begins to be perceived as ordered, starting from infancy when the individual and social personality is formed. This takes place through processes of physical and psychological development, through socialization and enculturation, which continues even in later stages of life. Indeed, it can be argued that the significance of place and home changes throughout the life cycle of any individual. A phase in early adulthood is marked by the ease of mobility and adventure, while older people, in contrast, tend to hark back to their place of origin, thinking of it as home even many years after settlement in another place or country. Consequently, the relationship between persons and places should be conceptualized as an ongoing and dynamic process, not as a static one (cf. Korac 2009).[10]

The Significance of the House as Home

Cultural variation is a characteristic of human creativity and imagination. Thus the notion of 'home' displays a great variety of forms when viewed globally. The differences may be striking, as we shall see, but the universal dimension is that all human beings have a notion of belonging which encompasses the physical environment and together with the social world.

However, we should note a contrast. As Sandel, an influential Harvard political philosopher, has pointed out, 'The most fateful change that unfolded in the last three decades was not an increase in greed. It was the expansion of markets, and of market values, into spheres of life where they don't belong' (Sandel 2012). This alerts us to the idea that in developed western countries commodification has penetrated many aspects of life, and the urban dwelling place achieves a monetary value as a major economic asset. However, anthropological studies in many other societies reveal that the house has powerful social, symbolic and ritual significance. From the Amazon region to the Pacific archipelagos, the house is variously seen as a 'microcosm', 'an organic whole', and is even conceived of as an animate being. Carsten and Hugh-Jones, who have worked in these regions of 'house societies', point out:

> Houses are far from being merely static material structures. They have animate qualities; they are endowed with spirits or souls, and are imaged in terms of the human body… Houses and their inhabitants are part of one process of living… The life-essence of people, houses and other entities emphasizes the unity of their animate qualities. (Carsten and Hugh-Jones 1995, 37)

Similarly, among the South Indian Tamil, the house itself is seen as an animate member of the village community:

> A house is more than a dwelling-place…(it) is conceived, born, grows up, lives and interacts very much like human beings do… Both the house and the inhabitants are constituted of similar substances, which they share and exchange…. (Daniel 1984, 161)

Other people's perceptions of their relationship with the environment challenge the taken-for-granted notions of those of us who live in the urbanized and capitalist west. However, noticeably similar perceptions are also found in some European societies. Ethnographers of the Basque region, for example, have described the corporate quality of the house and property, its role in conferring identity on its members, and the continuity which such property represents.[11] Tim Jenkins has described in detail the significance of the house in south-west France. Continuity is maintained through the generations as the undivided property is passed on to a single elected heir. He notes that 'the house, although a humanly constituted category, has an extraordinary power over the humans who constitute it'

(2010, 52). Here it is the house which confers identity, and not the people. 'Property is a moral fact … it has a life and force… It is also the key to local life…it organizes the neighbourhood through customary rights and duties with respect to shared labour and common land, and local politics' (Jenkins 2010, 8).

In other parts of Europe, too, the house was not a commodity but a socially embedded entity. In traditional Balkan society, for example, the Zadruga involved property ownership by a corporate kinship group whose identity was in the concept of trangenerational continuity manifested in the house and its saint's festival, the *slava*.[12]

Does Territory Matter?

It is clear from these few examples that place and the notion of home have a rich and varied significance in many societies, and that an image of rootedness permeates the worldview of many peoples. This is particularly true among those who practice agriculture. For the Canaque of the Melanesian islands, for example, the tree planted the day a child is born, in the hole where they bury the umbilical cord, may indeed have a reality similar to the reality of the child's life…The tree confers social and civil authenticity on a man' (Leenhardt 1979, 19).

The Luund people in rural south-west Congo reveal the powerful consociation of beliefs, practices, embodiment and physical environment. For them, it is the *miyoomb* trees which 'are associated with ancestors and elders, and are seen as living shrines' (de Boeck 1998, 25). Important in their worldview is the linking of ancestor beliefs and the role of the elders as living repositories of knowledge and memory. 'Landscape and memory converge through the intermediary of the tree and, by extension, the bodies of elders' (de Boeck 1998, 47). Notably, it is connection with the rituals owed to deceased ancestors that is another common motif permeating many accounts of such societies, an aspect that clearly underlines the importance of graves and burial grounds. Abandoning these places exacerbates the pain of displacement among peoples whose social and personal obligations include memorials to deceased family members in their homeland.

The idea of rootedness and of the potency of place was eloquently expressed to me by Victor, a Sierra Leonean refugee in Oxford:

> The land is the source of life to us; it is more than just the productivity, it has sacred and symbolic points. Its meaning is not only physical, it is emotional

> and spiritual. A kola nut symbolizes life. When a child is born, the umbilical cord is buried together with a kola nut seed. The *migurlu* tree that grows there is the tree of that child and each one knows his or her tree.

When Victor got news from his home town that a development scheme involving resettlement was being drawn up that would engulf his locality, he realized that his *migurlu,* his kola nut tree, would be destroyed. He expressed the fear that his identity was being threatened and would be lost.

Trees and roots are the reference points for many indigenous people, whether or not the word 'rooted' is used. However, a debate has arisen among those who study migration, some of whom claim that the global world has created a new condition where territory does not matter. Indeed, they maintain that we live in a 'deterritorialized world'. Malkki's influential attack (1992) has been followed by others (such as Turton 1996; Allen 1996; Okely 1983) who question or reject 'rootedness' as a western ethnocentric concept (Turton 1996, 97).

Those who have studied herders, nomads and gypsies may have been insufficiently aware of the bonds to the territories within which these mobile people move. They argue that the common approach to displacement reflects the 'sedentarist' nature of our own society and is not applicable universally. However, their view disregards the empirical evidence that many people in the non-western world also have just such a sedentarist view. Even if man is 'a wandering species', as Bruce Chatwin suggests (1987), it is worth considering the view of the phenomenological geographer Edward Relph, who notes that 'mobility or nomadism do not preclude an attachment to place' (1976, 29).

Rootedness does not necessarily entail the exclusive ownership of a fixed patch of earth. My argument is that we should not confuse property relations with affective relationships. Attachment to place is primarily a relationship with the proximate physical environment; significantly, this includes the community of people who live there. People everywhere are related to people, place and landscape, and this spatial context and the integrally related social fabric cannot be ignored; their parameters and configurations interact with those of the culturally embedded person.

I am among those who hold that locality is still a salient feature in everyday life, and I argue against the transnationalist critique which asserts that we have entered a new age of deterritorialization. I see that approach as an expression of members of an educated, affluent minority who articulate their special position in the modernity of the global village. It is

possible that they have not themselves experienced the disruption of forced displacement, and their approach is informed by a limited grasp of the cultural differences alluded to in this chapter. Kibreab (1999) rightly asserts that the empirical evidence should not be ignored, whether or not the word 'rooted' is used.[13] The transnationalist critique does not account for the many societies where bonds with home and place of origin are indigenously expressed in symbolic referents in the plant world, as attested in numerous ethnographies.

Personhood and Place

> Places are fusions of human and natural order and are the significant centres of our immediate experiences of the world… They are important sources of individual and communal identity. (Relph 1976, 141)

My view that physical space—or place—matters is based on the insights provided from philosophy, architecture, developmental psychology, and particularly phenomenological geography. The essence of these writings emphasizes the meaningful attributes of the physical world. Space is imbued with meaning through relationships and social activities, through symbolism and spiritual qualities, and thereby becomes Place. This process is integrally related to the development of the person, and thus to the notion of personhood.

My explanation of attachment to place combines elements of these different disciplines. The power of place arises out of the aesthetic of childhood experience that becomes part of one's subliminal responses. I have a notion that each of us develops an inner topography, a familiar landscape comprising sounds, smells, colours, light. Within childhood experience, these developing perceptions provide an aesthetic framework in which the personality emerges, setting co-ordinates of space, seasonal time and shape. The quality of light and colours, shadows, contours and elevations, a sense of the sky, vegetation, pre-dawn smells—all of this sets up a kind of inner landscape geography, a close connection with the physical world.

Who has not experienced the sudden lift of recognition evoked through a smell, the scent of flowers, the quality of light and shade, the sensation of sand or rocks or grass beneath the feet? Evocation of any of the senses produces a transformed immediacy, a kind of primordial response of feeling 'at home'. In this 'gut response', time and memory are cancelled out through the immediacy of reliving.

Boym's category of reflective nostalgia likewise 'explores ways of inhabiting many places at once and imagining different time zones' (Boym 2001, xvii). Referring to Marcel Proust's notions of remembrance as 'unpredictable excursions in syncretic perception' (Boym 2001, xviii), which he explored in *In Search of Lost Time*, Boym unfortunately neglects the strong materiality of his description (the *madeleine* moment). Thus she comes to the regrettable conclusion that it is the 'memorable literary fugue, then, that matters, not the return home' (Boym 2001, 50).

I maintain that for all of us, even the wanderers, nostalgia has as its primary point of place reference the childhood environment from which all other places take their measure. Throughout life other places may achieve significance, but I suggest that there is an internal landscape geography moulded through one's early spatial experiences that affects one's sensory responses—visual, olfactory, tactile, auditory—and which will create a preference for, and certainly a sense of ease with, certain kinds of spatial environment. In my view, therefore, space and place are intimately bound up with the person, a human subject involved in a social and cultural milieu and recognized by others as a person.

Thus, personhood is necessarily relational, social, and involved in exchange and interaction. It is therefore also located in space, for these are not abstract ideas but the very stuff of life. The human existential condition involves the material world and thus is embedded in the dimensions of space and time. Personhood is a composite notion and is essentially relational; it subsumes the many different identities which anyone may have depending on different contexts.

This situation was the case for most of human existence until recently with the invention of the internet in the 1970s. For most of humankind's existence all social interactions *took place* (note the idiom) in a definable real space. But electronic technology has created new modes of relationship through the speed of transmitting messages and images which collapses three- and four-dimensional reality into uni-dimensionality. Associated with this technological advance is the notion of deterritorialization, but its proponents, representing a particular class, underestimate the existential reality of space-time for most people, whether in traditional societies or not.

Conclusion: Towards Expanding Our Understanding

As we have seen, mass population displacement, most likely of an irreversible kind, is increasing. The causes of forced displacement are many and various, and in the contemporary world enormous challenges are posed for human beings all over the planet. These problems will not be resolved rapidly or easily. It is my view that dislocation of any kind disrupts the very basis of personhood through removing the structures and content of the known and familiar world. Downing's concept of social geometry makes sense of the disorientation experienced by people who are forcibly removed from their homes, even when communities are reconstituted in planned developments. It is this radical disjunction of people from their place of origin, their home, together with the notion of personhood which helps account for the pervasive phenomenon of persistent long-term nostalgia and yearning for home. Far from being whimsical romanticism, I argue that long-term attachment to place is grounded in the human life cycle; though subject to a great variety of expressions, it nonetheless reflects a universal human nexus of belonging.

Taking an anthropological viewpoint is not easy: it is challenging to grasp a different worldview, another 'moral order', partly because it is invisible to us or seems irrational. It is also very difficult because it involves becoming critically aware of our own culturally embedded assumptions. At the present time of crisis, with mass population displacements (whether through conflict, development schemes, climate change or for economic reasons), it is necessary to abandon the pervasive hegemony of western thought. In order to react appropriately to these contemporary demographic upheavals, we need to exercise empathy and imagine ourselves into the perceptions of people whose thinking about their place on this planet is rather different from our own. We are called upon to enter imaginatively into the degree of disruption experienced by individuals removed from the place where these relationships are the essence of being.

My aim in this chapter is to broaden the scope for understanding the cultural variety in responses to displacement, and it attempts to account for the enduring and pervasive longing for home which is such a significant factor in the experience of displacement. I hope that this effort might improve our ability to deal compassionately and adequately with those who face long-term exile from their homes.

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Notes

1. Among the UNHCR's 'Top 10 Source Countries' of refugees are Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Myanmar, Iraq, Colombia and Central African Republic. See UNHCR 2015a.
2. Massive population displacement from Africa and the Middle East has recently taken on the scale of a major humanitarian crisis, posing threats to the very existence of the EU itself, which, through the Schengen Agreement, includes open borders among its founding principles.
3. Betts 2015 suggests that the changing conditions of population displacement require new categories—for example, 'survival migrants'—as well as new ways of treatment.
4. Zetter 1991, 2007 has examined the issue of 'labelling' and its effects on displaced people's ability to reconstitute their lives.
5. Barutciski 1998 emphasizes the importance of this distinction and the need for different legal regimes to deal with IDPs and refugees.
6. Strictly speaking, they were not refugees because, under the terms of the Treaty, they had been granted full citizenship rights in their new country.
7. See, for example, Dikomitis 2009, 64ff; Halilovich 2013.
8. For a fuller description of the significance of such activity, see Hirschon 2014, 24–26.
9. du Boulay's masterful volume (2009) contains the fullest interpretation of the interwoven and many-layered meanings of fundamental elements. Her chapters on earth and on water enlighten our understanding of their deep significance in a Greek Orthodox village. See also Kain Hart 1991 on the Orthodox ritual calendar, and Dikomitis 2009 on village rituals and return pilgrimages to expropriated Greek Cypriot villages.
10. Korac 2009, in her admirable comparative study of Yugoslavian refugees in Rome and Amsterdam, is among those who problematize the question of 'home' and how it is constructed.
11. For examples in Basque society, see Douglass 1969; Ott 1993.
12. See, for example, Baric 1967; Rheubottom 1976.
13. See also the responses to Kibreab by Turton, Stepputat and Warner, and Kibreab's rejoinder in Kibreab 1999.

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