Dieter Senghaas

Dieter Senghaas
Pioneer of Peace and Development Research

Institute for **Intercultural**
and **International**
Studies

InIIS

Springer

SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice

Volume 6

Series Editor
Hans Günter Brauch

Dieter Senghaas

Dieter Senghaas

Pioneer of Peace and Development Research

Institute for **Intercultural**
and **International**
Studies

InIS

Springer

Dieter Senghaas
INIIS
University of Bremen
Bremen
Germany

Preface

Peace among nations, the wealth of nations, and the music of the great European composers are the major themes in the work of Dieter Senghaas. If someone covers peace, wealth, and music and offers deeply innovative and seminal contributions to each of them, then we can speak of a great intellectual. Dieter Senghaas is one. He belongs to a breed whose members drove intellectual life in Europe for centuries, but are becoming increasingly rare in the twenty-first century.

I got to know Dieter Senghaas when I was a young member of a research group on international regimes in East-West relations in the late 1980s. When we had produced our first results, Volker Rittberger, who directed the research group, invited Dieter Senghaas. To see him acting in this role was a real experience for me. I met an unquestionably famous political scientist with an enormous reputation who was interested in just one thing: the one that we wanted to talk about. He has always remained a role model in terms of intellectual curiosity and constructive criticism for me.

I consider it good fortune that our paths crossed more than once. Only two years after this meeting, the Berlin Wall came down. After months of surprise, the debates on what this meant for peace and politics and for the future of Europe started. We held a number of debates on this, for instance at the Academy in Loccum in meetings organized by Dieter Senghaas' close friend Jörg Calließ. While Dieter Senghaas indicated the opportunities for democracy, the rule of law, and the extension of the European Union, I emphasized the conflicts which would come now into the open after the dominant East-West cleavage lost its importance. I hope that in the end, history will be on his side.

Most importantly, we had spent almost ten years next door to each other at the *Institute of Intercultural and International Studies* (INIIS), University of Bremen, which we co-directed together with Bernhard Peters from the mid 1990s onwards. It would take too long to describe all of the common activities at this time. It suffices to mention two things: first, a colloquium of the Institute that brought together all the perspectives represented in the Institute. The colloquium always was crowded and for many participants, it is still today considered legendary. Dieter Senghaas of course was at the centre of all debates. Second, those ten years were intellectually my most productive time—thanks to this wonderful environment.

After Dieter Senghaas was emerited and I moved to Berlin, we always kept in contact. I am happy to be able to say that it is friendship that connects this eminent scholar and wonderful human being to me.

In my view, one can distinguish five foci or phases in the work of Dieter Senghaas. While there is certainly a lot of work to be mentioned which lies outside these research areas, these five themes can be seen as the major topics in Dieter Senghaas' oeuvre. The phrase 'foci or phases' will indicate that there is on the one hand indeed a certain chronology, but on the other hand phases overlap and some of the themes dealt with in the earlier years have been picked up again later. One can label these phases "Pathologies and Deterrence", "List and Development", "Political Order and Peace", "Macrodevelopments and World Politics", and "Music and Peace".

The roots of Dieter Senghaas' work on "Pathologies and Deterrence" lie in his joint publications with Karl W. Deutsch. On the basis of theories of learning pathologies, Dieter Senghaas formulated a crushing critique of the dominant discourse about deterrence in strategic studies. He showed that deterrence and military efforts at best partially reflected a process of interaction between the executive bodies of the USA and the Soviet Union. It rather reflected two more or less unrelated systems that were producing systemic pathologies leading to armament dynamics. Dieter Senghaas coined the wonderful term "organized peacelessness" to encapsulate this autistic dynamic. These studies received enormous public attention. They were also extremely influential in organizational terms. It is no exaggeration to see these studies as the founding moment of German Peace and Conflict Research, including the creation of specific institutes and foundations in Frankfurt (PRIO), Hamburg (IFSH), and Berlin (Berghof-Foundation).

"List and development" asked about the conditions under which nations and their economies were able to enter a path of self-sustaining growth and development. The starting point of this work was a critique of classical economic approaches to modernization. Dieter Senghaas therefore closely interacted with leading Latin American theorists of dependencia as well as with Samir Amin and helped enormously to make dependencia theory and the theory of peripheral capitalism well known in Europe. The notions of autocentric development and selective dissociation guided his analyses for a limited period of time. In order to move development theory forward, he then engaged in historically enormously rich studies on development paths in Europe, using the work of the nineteenth-century economist Friedrich List (who lived not far away from the little village in Swabia where Dieter Senghaas was born) as a starting point. His masterly "The European Experience" is a classic in development theory and my favourite Senghaas book. It is this part of Dieter Senghaas' work which has probably been cited most often in academic circles.

There are very few leading scholars in International Relations who have made major contributions to both peace and development. Besides Dieter Senghaas, other great minds of this sort were Karl W. Deutsch and Johan Galtung. Dieter Senghaas is unique in bringing these strands of his thinking together in his contributions on the political order of peace. His most recent Suhrkamp book

"Weltordnung in einer zerklüfteten Welt" (World Order in a Fragmented World) is just another proof of this. This book, which I hope will be translated very soon, is a masterly integration of some of Dieter Senghaas' most important concepts and insights. The most famous contribution to this branch is of course his "Civilizational Hexagon", which demonstrates the conditions for both constructive peace and successful development. At the least in the German context, the hexagon, broadly developed in his book "On Perpetual Peace", has become synonymous with Senghaasian thinking.

Especially from the latter half of 1990s onwards, Dieter Senghaas also contributed to the analyses of broader developments in world politics. "Konfliktformationen im internationalen System" (Conflict Formations in International System), "Wohin driftet die Welt?" (Whereabouts is the World Drifting?), and "Friedensprojekt Europa" (Peace Project Europe) are important book publications in this branch. All of them illustrate what the philosophical term "understanding", as opposed to "explaining", can mean. All of them draw a picture of world politics which is deep, sophisticated, and crystal clear. In this area, a fourth Suhrkamp book is my favourite: "The Clash within Civilizations".

Last but not least, Dieter Senghaas' books on peace and music are legendary. They give such a deep insight into the role of peace and war in European music and they show at the same time the change in the meaning of peace even within the history of compositions. Though his critique of deterrence and his work on development theory may have been more influential, these recent contributions are the most enjoyable contributions to his enormous oeuvre.

It is obvious that Dieter Senghaas is a master thinker, a founder of critical peace research and critical development theory, and the best known and most important representative of International Relations research in Germany of his generation and beyond.

Michael Zürn

Contents

Part I
On Dieter Senghaas

Chapter 1
The Author's Biographical Notes

In the first half of the 1960s I studied political science, philosophy and sociology at German and American universities. Among the academics who influenced me most as a student were Iring Fetscher, Ralf Dahrendorf, Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Jürgen Habermas, Anatol Rapoport and especially Karl W. Deutsch. A lasting intellectual impact, though from a distance, came from Samir Amin, in my opinion a most important academic intellectual in the southern hemisphere. These names represent the theoretical and political influences that have characterized my later work: critical assessment of ideologies and critical theory, combined with social science understood as scientific effort based on empirical evidence. These are the foci of the various fields I have worked in since the mid-1960s, reflected in different analytical approaches and determined to a large extent by specific issues.[1]

At the start of my scientific work my interest was in a systematic analysis of international politics and international relations—subjects that were not analysed in the Federal Republic of Germany of the 1960s from the standpoint of a political economy of international society or of the international system. This gap was my starting point for the analysis of international politics as one of the special areas of political science. I entered this research area by reading strategic studies and development studies during my first visit to the USA in 1962/1963, made possible by a Fulbright scholarship. During this time I began to address those research areas that were taught in the USA within political science as international relations, including approaches that were influenced by systems theories. My

---

[1] This text is available (in German) at my institutional website as "Wissenschaftsbiographische Notizen"; at: <http://www.iniis.uni-bremen.de/homepages/senghaas/notizen.php?USER=senghaas&SPRACHE=de>. The author is grateful to Hans Günter Brauch, the editor of this series of books, who translated this text into English and to Mr Mike Headon of Colwyn Bay, Wales, UK who carefully language-edited this translation.

first academic articles then focused on a critical reception of this research area, including systems theory and social cybernetics.[2] I was interested in systematizing these American contributions from the vantage point of a critical assessment of ideologies.

My early own original work was determined by a critical assessment of the military strategic debate in the USA. This was triggered by Henry Kissinger's publications in the late 1950s and early 1960s, especially when I read his book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, which motivated me to apply for a Fulbright scholarship. A side effect of the study of military strategy was my introduction to peace research and conflict resolution, fields that had emerged in the USA in the mid-1950s. In the second half of the 1960s, during a first phase of analysis and bibliographical overview of the international literature on peace research, I wrote several academic and political articles campaigning for the establishment of this new scientific field of peace research in the Federal Republic of Germany.

However, since 1964 my primary research focus was a critical assessment of the military strategic literature published since 1955 and that had had a significant political influence. From this critical work emerged the Ph.D. thesis I submitted during the winter semester of 1966/1967, as well as a more advanced study critically examining deterrence theory and published in 1969. These studies addressed the Clausewitzian problems of the relationship between politics and violence as well as the role and function of the politics of threat in the international politics of those years. In these early studies, I critically examined the strategy of deterrence as an attempt to maintain and restore the conventional understanding of politics and force in international relations in a situation of intensified demonization of political enemies and historically unprecedented destructive potential. In this context I introduced the concept of an organized lack of peace, arguing that such a restoration during the then prevailing conditions (East–West Conflict or Cold War) required a concerted effort by political leadership, economy, military and science (see my book *Abschreckung und Frieden. Studien zur Kritik organisierter Friedlosigkeit* [Deterrence and Peace. Studies in the Criticism of Organized Peacelessness] (1969)).

This laid the groundwork for my subsequent investigations into armaments dynamics, the role of the military-industrial-scientific-bureaucratic complex (MIC) and the study of the function of arms control (see especially *Rüstung und Militarismus*[3] [Armament and Militarism], 1972; *Aufrüstung durch Rüstungskontrolle* [Rearmament through Arms Control], 1972). The theory that the different systems of deterrence operating since the 1960s between East and West could be interpreted as a bipolar autistic structure launched a critical academic and

---

[2] A collection of all my publications since 1963 has been archived in a deposit at the *Archives of Social Democracy* of the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation in Bonn (Germany).

[3] This book was published in Spanish as: *Armamento y Militarismo* (Mexico, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno, 1974).

policy debate. This theory stated that within armament dynamics, the proliferation of doctrines of deterrence and armament potentials could be interpreted as primarily internally determined and far less driven by international processes of action and reaction what was then usually claimed. I called this tendency armament autism.[4]

The autism theory that I had developed in regard to systems of deterrence was also important for me in a different respect: deterrence under the conditions of an extreme situation (credible management of a graduated threat of potential exterminaion) permitted general insights into a structurally determined autistic tendency or into the pathologies of learning in international politics. In such a context, a critical assessment of reality, e.g. reality testing, is far more difficult for politics and science than in domestic fields of politics. Therefore, there is a persistent danger in international politics of falling into an autistic trap. During the East–West conflict this danger was particularly pressing. Even peace research itself did not completely escape it. [For my early work, see Chap. 3 in this book.]

The concept I had offered of a critique of deterrence and the subsequent analysis of armament dynamics and arms control became the starting point of a call for critical peace research. Later, in the late 1960s and early 1970s I developed this proposition as part of a critical analysis of conflict research as then prevailing in the USA, where it was primarily determined by behaviourist and systems-analytical approaches. In this critique, I deliberately focused on the ahistorical aspect, the lack of sensitivity to sociological approaches to systems of rule and the absence of criticism of ideological assumptions in those approaches (today some would say from a deconstructivist perspective). The wide thematic scope and the potential for critical peace research was shown for example in *Aggressivität und kollektive Gewalt* [Aggressiveness and Collective Violence] (1971), and the scope for research into the causes of war was particularly elaborated in *Gewalt—Konflikt—Frieden* [Violence—Conflict—Peace] (1974).

During this period I was also actively involved in the establishment of the Institute for Peace Research, the *Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung* or *Peace Research Institute Frankfurt* (PRIF) as it is known internationally. I, too, worked in an advisory capacity in two research funding organizations for peace and conflict research: the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung* [German Society for Peace and Conflict Research] (DGFK) and the private *Berghof-Stiftung für Konfliktforschung* [Berghof Foundation for Conflict Research] (I still work with the latter). Outside of the Federal Republic of Germany my work was discussed in the framework of the Pugwash Movement, the International Peace Research Association, the International Political Science Association and in meetings of academics from East and West in the *Institut für den Frieden* [Institute for Peace] in Vienna.

---

[4] My reply to the extensive critical assessments of my early studies may be found in the prefaces to the second and third editions of my book on deterrence: *Abschreckung und Frieden* [Deterrence and Peace], Frankfurt a.M. ³1981: 7ff. and 23ff.

The studies mentioned above focused on the analysis of the East–West conflict. But they did not push my earlier interest in a systematic theory of international relations into the background. A study on *Konfliktformationen in der internationalen Gesellschaft* [Conflict Formations in International Society] (1973) rekindled this interest. This marked a shift of focus to the analysis of the world economy and development, and thus to the conflict between North and South. In the early 1970s, my starting point was the study of Latin American theories of *dependencia*, which then provided the only concrete contribution towards an empirical theory of international stratification and its implications for development theory. Out of this intensive study emerged two edited volumes with contributions from the international discussion on *dependencia* (dependent reproduction) and peripheral capitalism (1992/1994) that have significantly influenced the discussion of development theory and policy in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Thereafter my research interests primarily focused on four major themes. First, a curricular project with teachers with which an attempt was made to translate these new insights into teaching materials that could be used in schools. Second, a publication that emerged from a study group I then chaired on the effects of the activities of multinational corporations in the Third World. Third, from the mid-1970s research into development theory became politically more relevant, especially through the debate over a *New International Economic Order* (NIEO). My own contribution to this discussion was a plea for dissociation in *Weltwirtschaftsordnung und Entwicklungspolitik* [World Economy and Development Policy] (1977). In this book I argued that the traditional-style integration of the Third World into the present world international economic order would be unable to solve its fundamental development problems. Rather, I argued that the revival of List's programme of a selective decoupling (dissociation) for a certain period would require a simultaneous focus on autocentric development to allow societies in third-world countries to develop local resources to satisfy the needs of their own population in a coherent way. [See for my work on development policy Chap. 4 in this book.]

This plea—often misunderstood as a plea for autarky—brought about an extensive discussion that went on for several years between supporters of the dominant integration and free trade hypothesis and those who defended the dissociation hypothesis. Retrospectively, it may be noted that the supporters of the dissociation thesis who were motivated by concerns for development policies mostly argued one-dimensionally for a 'decoupling', while my concept that triggered this controversy has always been multidimensional (selective dissociation for a certain time period, autocentric development, and collective self-reliance) (Fig. 1.1).

Fourth, since the mid 1970s I was involved in a research project with a wide empirical scope and with the goal of exploring this concept further for several high-profile examples of extreme dissociative development. In a comparative study four socialist developing countries were analysed: Albania, China, Cuba and North Korea. This project, which I conducted with a group of Ph.D. students from Frankfurt, resulted in several country monographs and a systematic contribution

Fig. 1.1 This photograph was taken by Dr. Jürgen Tremper, a professional photographer and journalist, Bremen and is reprinted here with his permission

to the role of socialism in development policy. In this context I argued that state socialism so far had not resulted in a new mode of production beyond that of highly developed capitalist societies.

Despite the far more wide-reaching social intentions of the actors, socialism has so far been unable to enable delayed development that no longer are likely to occur under capitalist conditions. Both the strengths and the weaknesses of this approach to development policy were equally addressed, likewise the low prospects for success when reforms did not occur after the extensive phase of

development in state socialist systems. Based on these monographic results there was criticism of the increasing discrepancy between a growing complexity of socialist economies and societies on the one hand and the persistent and monolithic character of political order on the other: "Without a self-correction directed towards decentralized guiding structures and political participation the evolving 'real-life socialism' remains a stage of development towards a capitalism that may only be prevented by force" (1982).

The conditions and the processual patterns of delayed development were a subsequent thematic focal point. From theoretical hypotheses about modernization theory, from assumptions of the theory of peripheral capitalism and from general considerations on processes leading towards peripheralization, I turned my interest towards a historical comparative project on the early phase of modern European development during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The key question was the same as in the previous projects. How did a self-reliant autocentric development emerge under the conditions of an international hierarchy that also existed in the early phase of European development as documented in the different levels productivities and competences of societies and economies? With this research project I set the up till then theoretical considerations of development, and especially the dissociation hypothesis, against historical cases. The goal was both the formulation of a historically and comparatively based typology of autocentric development and the possible use of historical insights for topical discussion in development policy on a new international economic order. This research was one of a few other similarly focused efforts, such as the analyses of a "modern world system" (by I. Wallerstein, A.G. Frank, S. Amin, H. Elsenhans et al.), though without necessarily sharing their conclusions. The results were published in the book *Von Europa lernen* [Learning from Europe] (1982), later translated into several other languages (Fig. 1.2).[5]

This study was the result of several years of research. Its special attractiveness was the requirement of a historically genetic, structural and especially comparative analysis. This was followed in the first half of the 1980s by an analysis of the so-called East Asian *newly industrializing countries* (NICs), where the question was whether in this part of the world experiences from the development of Europe were being repeated. Apart from a few special cases, the answer was positive. The results of this development research were co-authored by Ulrich Menzel and published as *Europas Entwicklung und die Dritte Welt. Eine Bestandsaufnahme* [Europe's Development and the Third World. An Assessment] (1986).[6] This book was both an assessment and a systematic evalu-

---

[5] For a Spanish translation: *Aprender de Europa. Consideraciones sobre la historia del desarrollo* (Barcelona-Caracas: Editorial Alfa, 1985).

[6] For a Korean translation: *Yu-Rop eu kyohun kwa tsche sam sae-gyae* (Seoul: Na-Nam Verlag, 1990).

Fig. 1.2 This photograph was taken by Dr. Jürgen Tremper, a professional photographer and journalist, Bremen and is reprinted here with his permission

ation, or more precisely a self-evaluation, of a research project that extended over fifteen years and that was conducted in all phases jointly with Ulrich Menzel.[7]

---

[7] A comprehensive, extremely detailed and superb assessment was offered by Lars Mjöset: "Comparative Typologies of Development Patterns: The Menzel/Senghaas Framework", in: Lars Mjöset (ed.): *Contributions to the Comparative Study of Development. Proceedings from the Vilhelm Aubert Memorial Symposion 1990*, (Oslo: Institute for Social Research, 1992), vol. 2: 96–161; reprinted in: *Comparative Social Research*, vol. 24 (2007): 123–176. See also the comprehensive MA thesis by Hanno Franke: *Der Beitrag von Dieter Senghaas zur entwicklungstheoretischen Diskussion* (Freiburg i. Br.: Institute of Political Science, 1993/94) and more recently a biography by Wolfgang Hein: "Dieter Senghaas—Von Europa lernen: Autozentrierte Entwicklung und Zivilisierung", in: *Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit*, vol. 40 (1999): 172–175.

Given these historically based results concerning development processes—successes, failures and many cases in between—controversial paradigmatic and context-specific orientations could be found with regard to historic and topical constellations. While the analysis of deterrence was based on a single case, the East–West conflict, in development research the multitude of historical and topical material proved to be a 'laboratory' where different development paths could to a certain extent be tested. Coming from a fact-oriented research practice, I have come to understand and practise the comparative method as an ideal method of cognition in the social sciences with the aim of offering numerous differentiations and typologies. I also learnt always to base theoretical and especially empirical results on specific contexts, and this necessarily includes taking into consideration the contextualization of contexts and reflecting on a generalizing theory heavily reliant on the use of typologies.

After a preoccupation with development issues that lasted for several years from the mid-1970s, I returned to a systematic analysis of international relations in the mid-1980s. There were three major areas of research. The first focused on Europe, where I tried to address *Die Zukunft Europas* [The Future of Europe] (1986) in the context of the then global context of the so-called problem of hegemonic crises. The then current political discussion of 'Nachrüstung' (reactive armament) offered an opportunity to critically review—with the goal of self-evaluation—my earlier work on deterrence, armament dynamics and arms control. The results of these considerations may also be found in the last-cited book.

A second main focus dealt with the so-called regional conflicts that were then interpreted primarily as the 'Southern dimension of the East–West conflict'. An extremely stimulating working group at the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* [Foundation for Science and Politics] (then located in Ebenhausen near Munich), where I spent a first year of research from 1986 to 1987, analysed these conflicts by addressing the specific features of each case and making comparisons that often resulted in a reassessment. In this analysis, the East–West conflict was only an additional feature and not a cause of such conflicts.

Relying on my different areas of research since the late 1960s, in the mid-1980s I tried to offer a synthesized assessment of the results of the different research areas of East–West and North–South relations. This addressed the structure and dynamics of development in the international system and resulted in the book *Konfliktformationen im internationalen System* [Conflict Formation in the International System] (1988), published just before the Cold War ended. A year later came the global upheaval that was unprecedented in the post-World War II era. Whether I liked it or not, this book became a document that remains of relevance for a retrospective contemporary analysis of the structure of world politics after 1945 and up to 1989/1990 (Fig. 1.3).

In the final phase of the East–West conflict, I began my work on the Board and Scientific Advisory Committee of the *Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden* [Foundation for Development and Peace] (SEF), founded by Willy Brandt. My personal encounters with Willy Brandt increased my own motivation for issues

Fig. 1.3 This photograph was taken by Thomas Ecke for the © Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden [Development and Peace Foundation] and is reprinted here with his permission. The poster states: "Think in a visionary manner—Create the future. Celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Development and Peace Foundation"

of policies of peace and inspired my research during a period when policymakers who were operating in the old global constellations had difficulties with learning new ways. These encounters were also useful after the global upheaval, when surprisingly (or not) the sciences I had been familiar with behaved like an unwieldy oil tanker that could only with great difficulty change course.

The global upheaval of 1989/1990 led me to a self-critical reassessment of my previous scientific work. This research was obviously contextualized by the dominant global conflict constellation of the post-war period, the East–West conflict. This conflict had influenced both research questions and perspectives not only when the goal was an assessment but also when considerations addressed the tempering or overcoming of the conflict. With the end of the East–West conflict—which became obvious to me on 9 November 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall when I happened to be in Berlin—the prevailing analytical and practical assumptions have become obsolete. A conceptual reassessment became necessary. This took place in three ways.

First I addressed the question of what opportunities there were for a policy of peace for a Europe beyond the constellation of deterrence and the East–West conflict. Two books addressed this question: the outline of a peace plan for Europe, a few weeks after the global upheaval and published in March 1990 as *Europa 2000. Ein*

Friedensplan[8] [Europe 2000. A Peace Plan] (1990), and later a more detailed discussion of the same theme in *Friedensprojekt Europa* [Peace Project Europe] (1992).

Then, in a second step, I turned to an analysis of the whole international system after the global upheaval. A consequence of the upheaval was that several structures of the conflict formations of the post-war era that I had analysed in 1988 had disappeared. This required a reconceptualization of the global scene. As the upheaval was still under way, the title of a book published in 1994 deliberately asked *Wohin driftet die Welt?* [Whereabouts is the World Drifting?]. This analysis reviewed continuities and discontinuities. Development trends that later became more obvious were discussed using the categories of globalization and fragmentation. This publication emerged during a two-year research professorship at the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*, Ebenhausen (1992–1994)—an organization that, like all scholars at that time, was forced to reassess its political and analytical perspectives. This context made my stay in this research institution, which was not affiliated to a university and whose task was primarily policy advice, especially stimulating and useful.

The new global constellation, especially the situation in Europe, made it necessary to think constructively. Unlike the period prior to 1989/1990, the task was no longer to contain a conflict constellation that was to a large extent determined by ideologies and armaments. Rather, after the global upheaval, the possibility of forming a politically open situation was on the agenda. This would require constructive perspectives from academics.

In my own work on contemporary issues a discussion of the concept of peace became a key object of my thinking and research. Even though my initial considerations on this topic pre-dated the global political upheaval by a few years, they were only fully developed after 1989/1990.[9] The goal of a civilizing of the conflict became a key issue of this analysis. I understood peace as a civilizing project and tried to develop the contours of such a perspective. I was quite familiar with this perspective, because Eva Senghaas-Knobloch had to a certain extent introduced it into our life partnership with her early monograph on *Frieden durch Integration und Assoziation* [Peace by Integration and Association] (1969). Unintentionally, based on this a division of focus and labour had emerged, where she addressed associative ("integration") and I addressed dissociative peace strategies ("deterrence") as some feminist perspectives would have expected!

In the early 1990s, my ideas about a constructive concept of peace resulted in my so-called 'civilizational hexagon' (see Fig. 5.1) that enabled me to address the complex architecture of peace from a scientific basis, as well as the complex

---

[8] For a Japanese translation: *Europe 2000* (Tokyo: Sobunsha Verlag, 1992).

[9] For a detailed presentation of this reorientation see my contribution in: Jörg Calließ (ed.): *Wodurch und wie konstituiert sich Frieden? Das zivilisatorische Hexagon auf dem Prüfstand* (Loccum: Evangelische Akademie Loccum, 1997): 21–32.

processes of a policy of constructive peace-building.[10] [See for my work on peace theory Chap. 5 in this book].

With the publication of two tightly focused readers on *Den Frieden denken* [Thinking about Peace] (1995) and *Frieden machen* [Making Peace] (1997), I tried to highlight the constructive peace perspective as a whole. These efforts were facilitated by a demand from political practitioners that due to a new world characterized to a large extent by ethnic conflicts, constructive strategies for conflict resolution were needed. In this way a learning process set in—both in governments and groups in society but also among pacifists who had been critical of armaments—that resulted in a new interest in constructive management of conflicts.

Such a learning process is of importance for peace research in general. If peace is understood as a civilizatory project, it becomes inevitable to focus on coexistence as a perfect example of an institutionalized nonviolent form of conflict management. It thus becomes obvious that criticism of violent conflicts and war—in any respect a legitimate and important area of work and argumentation in peace research—cannot be transferred into a constructive peace concept without newly

---

[10] For a compact discussion of this paradigm see footnote 4 in the previously cited volume, where also my reply to my critics can be found as: "Hexagon-Sünden. Über die Kritik am 'zivilisatorischen Hexagon'", pp. 325–337; further in my book *Zum irdischen Frieden* (2004), Chap. 4, pp. 124–140. See also the comprehensive and fair treatment of my own position in: Peter Imbusch: "Die Konflikttheorie der Zivilisierungstheorie", in: Thorsten Bonacker (ed.): *Sozialwissenschaftliche Konflikttheorien* (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2002), pp. 165–186 and in the portrait of Dieter Senghaas by Thomas König. in: Gisela Riescher (ed.): *Politische Theorie der Gegenwart in Einzeldarstellungen* (Stuttgart: Kröner, 2004): 444–449. For a comprehensive treatment see also: Alfons Siegel: *Ideen zur Friedensgestaltung am Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges und des Ost-West-Konfliktes. Entwicklungen und Konzepte von Matthias Erzberger und Dieter Senghaas* (Münster: agenda Verlag, 2003): 163–418 and passim. See also the articles in: *Leviathan*, 33,4 (2005): "Wissenschaft als Beruf—zwei Vorträge über Dieter Senghaas" (pp. 420–438): Frank Nullmeier: "Ein Professor in Bremen" (pp. 423–427); Michael Zürn: "Frieden umfassend denken" (pp. 428–438); Ulrich Menzel: "Vom ewigen zum irdischen Frieden. Dieter Senghaas wird 65 und kein bisschen leise", in: *Friedensforum*, No. 1–2 (2005), pp. 3–4, and Alfons Siegel: "Kant-Bezüge in Friedenskonzepten von Matthias Erzberger und Dieter Senghaas", in: *Eine Kultur des Friedens denken*, in: *Biberacher Studien*, Vol. 7 (Biberach/Riß: 2006), pp. 43–59 (an extended version was published in: *Zeitschrift für Politik*, 55,3 (2008), pp. 337–361). For a biographical scientific treatment, see Mitsuo Miyata's postscript to the Japanese edition of *Zivilisierung wider Willen* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten Publishers, 2006), pp. 257–272; Hajo Schmidt: "Laudatio auf Dieter Senghaas", in: *Reden in der Villa Ichon 2006–2007*, Vol. XI (Bremen: Villa Ichon, 2007), pp. 21–27. More recent references to the "Civilizational Hexagon" are: Sabine Jaberg: "Frieden als Zivilisierungsprojekt", in: Hans J. Gießmann and Bernhard Rinke (ed.): *Handbuch Frieden* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2011), pp. 86–100; also in several contributions in: Egbert Jahn et al. (ed.): *Die Zukunft des Friedens*, vol. 2: *Die Friedens- und Konfliktforschung aus der Perspektive der jüngeren Generation* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2005), see especially the chapters by Sabine Fischer and Astrid Sahm and by Heidrun Zinecker. For pertinent short contributions and discussions on the 'Civilizational Hexagon' see several contributions to these readers: Jörg Calließ and Christoph Weller (eds.): *Friedenstheorie* (Loccum: Evangelische Akademie Loccum, 2003); Jörg Calließ and Christoph Weller (eds.): *Chancen für den Frieden* (Loccum: Evangelische Akademie Loccum, 2006); Peter Schlotter and Simone Wisotzki (eds.): *Friedens- und Konfliktforschung* (Baden–Baden: Nomos, 2011).

emerging, newly emphasized additional considerations precisely related to making peace possible (in the form of structure and architecture with their own logic). As an example, the results of research into demilitarization may not be conducive to developing a constructive peace concept. Such research (like any research contesting something) is based on the idea of overcoming something: for example, militarism or simply the military, armament potential, prejudices etc. But such research requires systematic considerations as to how and under which conditions unavoidable conflicts, which would obviously also exist in a demilitarized world, could reliably be civilized, without relying on collective force. Such a perspective is at long last not a mere supplement but the decisive issue and fundamental for the overall problem of peace.

It can be empirically proven that research which is in opposition to something hardly ever has a constructive application. The important question is through what and how peace is constituted, and thus the answers remain in general underdeveloped. My own scientific studies when I started to work on the problems of armaments dynamics document the probability of a conceptual narrowing as a consequence of this research against something (in my case, deterrence policy). Obviously both are needed: both a perspective on overcoming certain dangers and of building up a new situation, combining perspectives preferably from the very beginning. While it is not easy for individuals to achieve such a dual orientation, at least one strand of research must try to combine both perspectives and hence become active from the perspective of scientific policy. Starting with reflections on my own approach to these problems, my work of the early 1990s pursued the aim of confronting my own discipline with constructive stimuli to try and meet this demand.

During the 1990s enthno-political conflicts, especially where civil wars escalated, fed the debate on the fundamental conditions for a public order conducive to peace. These types of conflicts often escalate into confrontations about the political and institutional constitution of societies, and so raise constitutional questions. The more basic such confrontations become, as may be easily observed in developing societies with fundamentalist political movements, the more the direction of the development of whole societies may be at stake. Here the more recent cultural debate focuses on the building of public order, considering social norms, institutions and mentalities. To the extent that they are politically relevant they may deal both with the internal constitution of societies and with international society. While quite different from the debate during the East–West conflict, the question of making peaceful coexistence possible has returned to the political agenda against the background of a growing pluralization and politicization of societies and of the world (Fig. 1.4).

Given the increasing politicization of the world a deeper knowledge of cultures and cultural conflicts in the world is needed, as also of intercultural perspectives that will permit bridge-building. My work in the late 1990s addressed questions related to this problem, for example in my book *Zivilisierung wider Willen. Der Konflikt der*

In das Chaos der Wirklichkeit
vermag allein die wissenschaft
Ordnung zu bringen.

FÜR DIETER SENGHAAS, Mitbegründer und seit 32 Jahren Mitherausgeber der Zeitschrift LEVIATHAN, zum Dank für seine unerschöpfliche Phantasie, seine politische Weisheit und seine ordnende Hand im Chaos der akademischen Wirklichkeit und der wissenschaftlichen Zeitschriftenproduktion zum 65.GEBURTSTAG im Jahr 2005 von seiner LEVIATHANMANNSCHAFT

Fig. 1.4 "Into the chaos of reality only science may introduce order". For Dieter Senghaas for his 65th birthday. By the team of the German social science journal *Leviathan*. This photograph was taken by Bodo von Greiff and is reprinted here with his kind permission. The German dedication reads: "For Dieter Senghaas, a co-founder and for 32 years a coeditor of the journal *Leviathan*, as a sign of gratitude for his inexhaustible phantasy, his political wisdom and his orderly hand in the chaos of academic reality and in the production of a scientific journal, for his 65th birthday in 2005 by his *Leviathan* crew"

Kulturen mit sich selbst[11] [Civilizing against their Will. The Conflict of Cultures with Themselves] (1998). Civilizing the methods of conflict management under modern conditions, that is, in pluralizing and politicized societies, will be understood as the result of collective learning processes ranged against the orientation of traditional culture, hence against their own will and consequently in conflict with their own tradition. In divided societies that have become socially mobile, politicized identities and interests are not aimed at coexistence but at hegemonic power aspirations; in such a context, intolerance is more fundamental than tolerance. As this is a modern problem it has not been addressed by the great traditional cultures of the world.

The requirements of modernizing societies are in conflict with the orientations of traditional cultures. Processes of modernization result in profound cultural conflicts in the environments where the processes are taking place. The best example is the Western world itself that has learned to treat coexistence as a guiding

---

[11] For an English translation: *The Clash within Civilizations. Coming to Terms with Cultural Conflicts* (London–New York: Routledge, 2002); for a translation into Arabic by Shawqi Jalal: *As-ssidam dakhil al-hadarat. At-tafahum bisha'n as-ssiraat ath-thaqafia* (Abu Dhabi: Alkalima, 2009—Cairo: Dar Al-Ain 2009).

outlook, after a process of civilizing that lasted long into the previous century. This problem, originally a European one, has in the meantime become a global problem. In addition, if cultures enter into conflict with themselves, they become 'self-reflexive', the international cultural dialogue will then become easier rather than harder. But if the West and cultures outside of Europe are subsumed to have fixed cultural profiles, then this debate will become a sterile ritual. In reality, the great cultures of the world are primarily in conflict with themselves; this was the key message of my book *The Clash within Civilization* (2002).

Those who want democracy in general do not prepare for dictatorship. To prepare for divorce when one enters marriage is as contradictory as poisoning the environment if one wants sustainable development. Yet with regard to peace, such a comparable absurdity has for centuries hardly been noticed. 'Si vis pacem, para bellum' has been the traditional maxim for securing peace that still prevails in many parts of the world: 'If you want peace, prepare for war'. This maxim is the essence of Realpolitik.

However, simple commonsense says that if you want peace, prepare for peace. The correct maxim should therefore be: 'Si vis pacem, para pacem'. One could also say that the measure of peace is peace itself. If this is the case, then this implies a logical requirement to concentrate on 'para pacem', to prepare for peace. This also includes, and not least in importance, the need to reflect on how to deal (in the language of the pacifism of a hundred years ago) with the 'hooligans' of international society. This overall problem is addressed in the book *Zum irdischen Frieden. Erkenntnisse und Vermutungen*[12] [On Earthly Peace. Recognition and Refutations] (2004). In this book I tried to offer a general but differentiated and context-sensitive resume of the many years of my work on modern peace problems. This book is structured in analogy to Kant's philosophical treatise on "Zum ewigen Frieden" [On Eternal Peace] (1795): it contains preliminary and definitive reflections, additions and supplementary material; there is no new interpretation of Kant but rather an empirically based diagnosis of the contemporary world inspired by a differentiated perspective for a policy of peace (Fig. 1.5).[13]

One cannot put into practice what one cannot comprehend. This is my personal justification for the peace research to which I have devoted more and more of my attention and scientific work, initially not without some fortuitousness. This area, in which I have developed gradually, had in many respects a fortunate aspect for me: the nature of the subject required me to steadily expand my horizons. Such fascination also inspired my most recent project on "Annäherung an den Frieden über klassische

---

[12] For an English translation: *On Perpetual Peace: A Timely Assessment* (New York–Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007).

[13] A diachronic analysis, presented in summary form as a journal article, can be found in my contribution "Die Konstitution der Welt—eine Analyse in friedenspolitischer Absicht", in: *Leviathan*, 31,1 (2003): 117–152; see also: Dieter Senghaas: *Weltordnung in einer zerklüfteten Welt. Hat Frieden Zukunft?* (Berlin: Suhrkamp-Verlag, 2012).

Fig. 1.5 This photograph was taken by Thomas Ecke for the © Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden [Development and Peace Foundation] and is reprinted here with his permission

Musik" [Approaching Peace through Classical Music]. Its results were published in spring 2001 in my book *Klänge des Friedens. Ein Hörbericht* [Sounds of Peace. A Listener's Report]. Its content may be summarized as follows. Since time immemorial, composers have been inspired to produce different sounds of peace as they hoped for peace in the face of the brutal reality of war. These inspired productions have been collected and interpreted systematically in this book for the first time. This has resulted in a surprisingly wide scope, ranging from compositions that assume future disaster to works that try to present the richness of peace by musical means. In this so far neglected area, this book offers a guide to how to approach the theme of peace in

Fig. 1.6 This photograph was taken by Thomas Ecke for the © Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden [Development and Peace Foundation] and is reprinted here with his permission

an unconventional way.[14] As well as this book, the CD "Listening Peace" was released in 2003 (2nd edition, 2009). On this CD, important aspects of the thematic area of "war and peace" through examples from classical music can be listened to.

---

[14] This book covers a wide range of different themes, among them the following: Neither night nor storm? Approaches to peace through classical music; The key question: Why do people plan crazy actions?; Periculum in mora: Premonitions; Battle figures in peace and love; War and peace in conflict; Da pacem—then and now; Peace expectations during war; Te Deum and jubilation after victory; Concerti funebri: Why is the city so desolate?; Anti-compositions; Sounding worlds of peace; Retrospective and outlook.

The 38 examples lasting for three hours were selected from pieces by different composers past and present. For each example I offered a commentary. The CD also includes biographies of all composers and background material on the selected pieces.[15] [For my work on music and peace see Chap. 6 in this book] (Fig. 1.6).

A successor to the project "Approaching Peace Through Classical Music" was a book I co-edited entitled *Vom hörbaren Frieden* [On Peace to be Listened To] (2005), in which (besides myself as peace researcher) twenty-one music specialists dealt with specific aspects of this theme (longitudinal and cross-sectional analyses, portraits of compositions and individual composers). This was a unique publication that had no forerunner and no parallel either in general or specifically in the publications of music specialists.

In 2012, I published a monograph on the structure of the contemporary world society and its problem situations in different parts of the world, together with the perspectives on peace policy arising from such a contextual analysis, with the title *Weltordnung in einer zerklüfteten Welt. Hat Frieden Zukunft?* [World Order in a Fragmented World. Does Peace have a Future?]. For a long time, the structure of the world has been characterized by an extreme hierarchy and stratification. Fragmentation and fissures may be observed in many dimensions. For example, in the world's economic system a dramatic gap exists between the "OECD world" and the rest of the world. While the first is intensively integrated and relatively symmetrical, the rest of the world remains highly asymmetrical and is still highly focused on this center of gravity, which is highly coordinated and to a large extent determining global policies; bur it represents only about 16 % of the global population. The fissures within the non-OECD world itself are no less significant: About 10 % of the world population lives within 'states' that have either collapsed (*failed states*) or are threatened by internal decay (*failing states*). Thirty-seven percent of the world lives in two macro-states, China and India, and an additional 37 % in about 140 societies characterized by limited statehood. Programmes of world order and global governance must today face fundamental facts of this kind, otherwise they will remain globally abstract and so analytically dubious and in the final reckoning practically irrelevant. Programmes for world order, if they are to relate to the real world, need to be contextualized in a way adequate to the problem. To analyse such a global challenge is a never ending challenge for peace research.

---

[15] Additonal information may be found at: <http://www.friedenspaedagogik.de/service/publika/f_hoeren.htm>; for orders:<kontakt@friedenspaedagogik.de>or: Institut für Friedenspädagogik Tübingen e.V., Corrensstr. 12, D-72076 Tübingen.

Chapter 2
The Author's Selective Bibliography

2.1 Authored Books in German

Abschreckung und Frieden. Studien zur Kritik organisierter Friedlosigkeit (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1969, 3rd ed., 1981).

*Aggressivität und kollektive Gewalt (*Stuttgart: Verlag Kohlhammer 1971, 2nd ed., 1972).

Rüstung und Militarismus (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1972, 2nd ed., 1982).

Aufrüstung durch Rüstungskontrolle. Über den symbolischen Gebrauch von Politik (Stuttgart: Verlag Kohlhammer, 1972).

Gewalt-Konflikt-Frieden. Essays zur Friedensforschung (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe Verlag, 1974).

Weltwirtschaftsordnung und Entwicklungspolitik. Plädoyer für Dissoziation (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1977, 5th ed., 1987).

Von Europa lernen. Entwicklungsgeschichtliche Betrachtungen (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag 1982).

Die Zukunft Europas. Probleme der Friedensgestaltung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986).

Konfliktformationen im internationalen System (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988).

Europa 2000. Ein Friedensplan (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag 1990, 2nd ed., 1991).

Friedensprojekt Europa (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992, 3rd ed., 1996).

Wohin driftet die Welt? Über die Zukunft friedlicher Koexistenz (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag 1994, 2nd ed. 1996).

Zivilisierung wider Willen. Der Konflikt der Kulturen mit sich selbst (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag 1998, 2nd ed., 1998).

Klänge des Friedens. Ein Hörbericht (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2001).

Zum irdischen Frieden (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2004).

Weltordnung in einer zerklüfteten Welt. Hat Frieden Zukunft? (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2012).

2.2 Co-authored Books in German

Bibliographie zur Friedensforschung, co-edited by G. Scharffenorth and W. Huber (Stuttgart–München: Kösel–Kaiser Verlag, 1970, 2nd ed., 1973).

Frieden in Europa? Zur Koexistenz von Rüstung und Entspannung (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 1973).

Strukturelle Abhängigkeit und Unterentwicklung. Unterrichtsvorschläge (Frankfurt: HSFK-Studie 1–3, 1978).

Strukturelle Abhängigkeit und Unterentwicklung am Beispiel Mozambiques (Bonn: Verlag Wegener, 1980).

Europas Entwicklung und die Dritte Welt. Eine Bestandsaufnahme (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986, 2nd ed., 1991).

Soziale Verteidigung. Konstruktive Konfliktaustragung. Kritik und Gegenkritik (Frankfurt: Verlag Haag + Herchen, 1991; Militärpolitik. Dokumentation, issue 89/81).

2.3 Edited Books in German

Friedensforschung und Gesellschaftskritik (München: Hanser Verlag, 1970; 2nd ed.: Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag 1973).

Zur Pathologie des Rüstungswettlaufs (Freiburg: Rombach Verlag, 1970).

Kritische Friedensforschung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971, 6th ed., 1981).

Imperialismus und strukturelle Gewalt (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1972, 7th ed., 1987).

Peripherer Kapitalismus. Analysen über Abhängigkeit und Unterentwicklung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag 1974, 2nd ed., 1977).

*Kapitalistische Weltökonomie. Kontroversen über ihren Ursprung und ihre Entwicklungsdynami*k (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1979, 2nd ed., 1982).

Sozialismus-Diskussion. Eine Fortsetzung, Focused issue of: *Leviathan*, 9,2, 1981.

Regionalkonflikte in der Dritten Welt. Fremdbestimmung und Autonomie (Baden–Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1989).

Den Frieden denken. Si vis pacem, para pacem, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1995).

Frieden machen (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1997).

Konstruktiver Pazifismus im 21. Jahrhundert (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2006).

2.4 Co-edited Books in German

Texte zur Technokratiediskussion (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1970, 2nd, 1971).

Politikwissenschaft. Eine Einführung in ihre Probleme (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1969, 4th ed., 1973).

Jahrbuch für Friedens-und Konfliktforschung, Vol. 2, (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann Verlag, 1972).

Kann Europa abrüsten? Friedenspolitische Optionen der siebziger Jahre (München: Carl Hanser Verlag 1973).

Probleme des Friedens, der Sicherheit und der Zusammenarbeit (Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag 1975).

Multinationale Konzerne und Dritte Welt (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1976).

Wiedersehen mit China nach zwei Jahren (Saarbrücken: Breitenbach-Verlag, 1981).

Auf dem Wege zu einer Neuen Weltwirtschaftsordnung? Bedingungen und Grenzen für eine eigenständige Entwicklung (Baden–Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1983).

Die Welt nach dem Ost-West-Konflikt. Geschichte und Prognosen (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 1990).

Friedensforschung in Deutschland. Lagebeurteilung und Perspektiven für die neunziger Jahre (Bonn: Arbeitsstelle Friedensforschung, Bonn 1990).

Friedenspolitik. Ethische Grundlagen internationaler Beziehungen (München: Piper Verlag 2003).

Vom hörbaren Frieden (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2005).

Global Governance für Entwicklung und Frieden. Perspektiven nach einem Jahrzehnt (Bonn: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz, 2006).

Sektorale Weltordnungspolitik. Effektiv, gerecht und demokratisch? (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2009).

Den Frieden komponieren? (Mainz: Schott Music, 2010).

2.5   Authored Books in English

The European Experience. A Historical Critique of Development Theory (Leamington Spa–Dover, New Hampshire: Berg Publishers, 1985).

The Clash within Civilizations. Coming to Terms with Cultural Conflicts (London–New York: Routledge, 2002).

On Perpetual Peace: A Timely Assessment (New York–Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007).

2.6   Edited and Co-edited Books and Special Issues of Journals in English

Peace Research in the Federal Republic of Germany, in: *Journal of Peace Research*, 3/1973 (Special Issue).

Overcoming Underdevelopment, in: *Journal of Peace Research*, 4/1975 (special issue).

The Quest for Peace. Transcending Collective Violence and War among Societies, Cultures and States (London: Sage 1987).

2.7 Authored Books in Other Languages

Armamento y Militarismo (Mexico, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno, 1974).

Aprender de Europa. Consideraciones sobre la historia del desarrollo (Barcelona–Caracas: Editorial Alfa, 1985).

Urubba: Durus wa Namadhidsch (Damaskus, 1996).

Gunjika no kózó to heiwa, edited by Yukio Takayanagi,Takehiko Kamo and Susumu Takahashi (Tokio: Chuo University Press, 1986), (Series: Gendai seiji-gaku sosho 7).

Yu-Rop eu kyohun kwa tsche sam sae-gyae (Seoul: Na-Nam Verlag, 1990).

Tata Ekonomi Dunia Dan Politik Pembangunan. Pledoi Untuk Disosiasi (Jakarta: Verlag LP3ES, 1988).

Europa 2000 (jap.), (Tokyo: Sobunsha Verlag, 1992).

Al-imbiriyáliya wa-icadat al-intaj (Damaskus,1986), translated into Arabic by Michel Keilo).

Europa, progetto di pace (Venedig: Marsilio, 1999).

Wenming meibu de chongtu yu shijie zhixu (Peking: Xinhua Publishing House, 2004).

Shobunmei no uchinaru shototsu (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006).

Mung myong nae-Ui'-ungdol (Seoul: Moonji Publishing Co., 2007).

Barkhorde daroune tamaddonha (Teheran: Akhtaran, 2009).

As-ssidam dakhil al-hadarat. At-tafahum bisha'n as-ssiraat ath-thaqafia (Abu Dhabi: Alkalima Verlag 2009–Kairo: Dar Al-Ain 2009), translated into Arabic by Shawqi Jalal.

Part II
Key Texts by the Author

Chapter 3
Towards an Analysis of Threat Policy in International Relations (1974)

Like war, threat policy is assigned to those political practices which characterize in particular international politics.[1] As late as the 1950s this concept could be found in most of the 'classical' introductions to international politics and the theory of international relations. If today threat policy is no longer considered to be a given and an almost fixed component in international politics, and if at least in some scholarly studies it is no longer merely taken for granted as an irrevocable characteristic of politics between states and societies, then this is certainly due in part to the efforts of peace research. For peace research does not merely register the existence of threat policy but rather undertakes a critical, detailed analysis of threat policy from various points of view.[2]

The examination of threat policy has proven to be particularly difficult for peace research, because the subject matter extends itself over various levels of analysis and thus necessitates the expertise of several disciplines. Beyond this, it is becoming increasingly clear that peace research has given new stimulus not only to the general theory of international relations[3] but that the study of threat policy is also of importance for areas of study which have no direct relationship to international relations. One might think here of a multitude of domestic conflicts in which threats and counter-threats play a considerable role.

In the following analysis I will limit myself to threat policy insofar as it is related to relevant conceptions of threat in foreign affairs and international relations, strategies of threat and the phenomena of interaction in international politics. In doing

---

[1] This text was first published with the same title "Towards an Analysis of Threat Policy in International Relations", in: *German Political Studies*, vol. 1 (1974), edited by Klaus von Beyme (London–Beverly Hills: Sage): 59–103. On the analysis of threat policy, see references to the literature in Dieter Senghaas: *Abschreckung und Frieden. Studien zur Kritik organisierter Friedlosigkeit* (Frankfurt: 1969). The following observations represent an attempt to expand and make more precise the questions raised in the above-mentioned book.

[2] Cf. for example the instructive collection of essays by Dean Pruitt and Richard Snyder (eds.): *Theory and Research on the Causes of War* (Englewood Cliffs: 1969).

[3] Compare James Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: 1969).

so, I shall touch upon other fields which cannot directly be assigned to international politics wherever they contain information important for our topic.

3.1   Three Basic Questions in Examining International Relations

Before I take up the analysis of threat policy in general and deterrence policy in particular, I would like to begin by formulating several general observations on the analysis of international politics which shall later prove important for a differentiated examination of threat policy.

I suggest that, no matter what the topic, in the analysis of international politics we should at the outset always pose three basic questions:

Firstly, how great is the proportion of real exchange processes in so-called international or transnational relations between two or more states? Here we look for the currents of transaction across the borders which can—at least in principle—be measured: for example, the flows of goods (import–export, trade, capital movements), the flows of people (immigration-emigration, visitors and tourism, student exchange) and the flow's of information (diplomatic relations, secret services, participation in international organizations, patents, licenses, etc.). For certain analytical purposes it can be useful to divide such exchange processes into public and private which corresponds—if one attaches importance to the differentiation—to international versus transnational relations.[4] We call this type of exchange process actual, realistic or better simply real since these processes are composed of transactions which cross recognizable borders, the single and aggregate movements of which are recorded in the international statistics.[5] Their land of origin can usually be exactly determined and after the transaction is executed they can certainly be found in a second country or finally an nth country.[6]

---

[4] The transaction approach has been practised above all by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues since the fifties. Cf., inter alia, Karl Deutsch: *Nationalism and its Alternatives* (New York: 1969): 93 ff. and passim. For a discussion of this differentiation and its analytical relevance see Karl Kaiser: "Transnationale Politik", in: Ernst-Otto Czempiel (ed.): *Die anachronistische Souveränität* (Cologne-Opladen: 1969): 80–109.

[5] For an analysis, see, inter alia, Steven Brams, "Transaction Flows in the International System", in: *American Political Science Review* (1966), 880–898 (in which the author analyzes the pattern of diplomatic exchange, of trade and the membership of nations in international organizations), including further references to the literature. Concerning the extent of real exchange processes in the international relations of the past 70 years, see Simon Kuznets: *Modern Economic Growth* (New Haven: 1966): 285–358, in which the author treats in particular the changes in trade and capital movement.

[6] To illustrate the order of magnitude of one of the most important exchange processes, world trade: In 1967 in world G.N.P. (in current prices) amounted to 2500 billion dollars; world export (in current prices) c. 178 billion or 7.1 % of the world G.N.P. P; world military expenses amounted at the same time to 182 billion dollars, corresponding to 7.3 % of the world G.N.P. In analyzing this data one must consider that approximately 55 % of world exports flow from highly industrialized nations to highly industrialized nations; the two power blocs alone account for 90 % of the armaments expenses. These data alone suggest the importance of combining the model of transaction in international relations with a model of stratification if the essential characteristics of international politics are to be comprehended. An excellent presentation of the relevance of the transaction approach can be found in Donald Puchala: "International Transactions and Regional Integration", in: *International Organization* (1970): 732–763.

Secondly, we should ask what share friend and enemy images have in international relations, i.e., isolate those psychological processes which influence international relations but which—unlike trade transactions—cannot easily be measured at the borders between states.[7] Such psychological processes are also measurable in theory although there is as yet not a "UNO International Image Yearbook" like for example the existing "UNO International Trade Statistics Yearbook".

The question whether these psychological processes can be considered transactions in the narrow sense of the word or whether they do not rather represent "relations" of their own kind is difficult to answer. The land of origin can definitely be determined; yet their transaction into a second or nth country is not so easy to grasp, and their actual arrival in a reference group beyond the borders is often even more difficult to determine—although these processes are perfectly suitable for detailed analysis.[8] But however one analyses them, these psychological processes in international relations cannot be put on the same level with the real exchange processes.

Thirdly, in the analysis of international relations we must consider the symmetry or asymmetry of such relations. In the last decades most theories and theorems of international relations have barely taken this fundamental differentiation into consideration. Our analytical concepts contain the (usually implicit) assumption of the symmetry of reciprocal relations (a tendency which is probably a vestige of international law in the general analysis of international relations). Yet the political, military, economic and scientific-technological discrepancy between nations is so great today that we can no longer do without the conscious and explicit consideration of symmetrical and/or asymmetrical relations between nations[9] if we do not wish to fail to recognize the decisive political realities of international relations. In dealing with international relations in the future we will have to make clear in which cases we are analyzing "topdog

---

[7] For an analysis of psychological processes see above all J. K. Zawodny (ed.): *Man and International Relations* (San Francisco: 1966), 2 vols.; Herbert Kelman (ed.): *International Behavior* (New York: 1965); Jerome Frank: *Sanity and Survival* (New York: 1968); Ross Slagner: *Psychological Aspects of International Conflicts* (Belmont, California: 1967).

[8] Klaus Faupel recently concisely described this special aspect (not unlike the autism theory to be discussed later) as "one-way bilateral relationship" and "two-way bilateral relationship". See Faupel: "Internationale Politik und Aussenpolitik", in; Ernst-Otto Czempiel (ed.), *op. cit*, footnote 4, 23–47, especially 28–35 and the pertinent literature which is listed in full there. Faupel characterizes all relations which represent a direct sequence of action and response as 'two-way' (as, for example, in negotiations between two states), whereas, as he rightfully emphasizes, most perceptions in the relationships between states are neither in any way symmetrical, nor do they resemble a sequence but are rather decided by determinants which can be ascertained through the analysis of each given actor. This kind of relation is termed "one-way bilateral relationship".

[9] For an example of such a typological approach see Karl Deutsch: "The Probability of International Law", in: Karl Deutsch and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.): *The Relevance of International Law* (Cambridge: 1969): 57–83, especially 70.

topdog", "topdog–underdog", "underdog–topdog" or finally "underdog–underdog" phenomena.[10]

3.2 A Simple Typology of International Relations

It is my thesis that threat policy (as, by the way, other forms of international politics as well) originates from various sources and takes on different courses of development depending upon the given combination of the three dimensions of international relations mentioned above. For the purposes of clarifying this thesis it would appear useful to set up several possible combinations of real exchange processes and psychological processes (in a kind of cross table). I shall differentiate between those real exchange processes which take considerably high proportions, those with a low degree and finally those with a minimal degree of transaction. One could easily operationalize these definitions, for example by setting a uniform threshold value of the share of foreign trade in the G.N.P. or of foreign investment in domestic investments as a whole etc. or by setting a differentiated threshold value according to the size of the nations.[11]

In the same manner the psychological processes should be divided into three degrees of intensity (which can at times coincide with the frequency rate): intensive, weak and no enemy-images and parallel to those no, ambivalent and weak friend-images. The definition of the degree of intensity of friend-images does not precisely correspond inversely to those of enemy-images because in international politics there are, to be sure, intensive enemy-images but no comparatively intensive images of solidarity and loyalty. Loyalty between nations seems at best to be correct rather than particularly fervent.[12]

---

[10] On these concepts and on the theory of international stratification see Johan Galtung: "International Relations and International Conflicts. A Sociological Approach", in: *Transactions of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology*, I (Geneva: 1966): 121–161, and recently by same author, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", in: *Journal of Peace Research* (1969), 167–191.

[11] An early proposal for creating a typology of the degree of such foreign relations can be found in Karl Deutsch, 'The Propensity to International Transactions,' in: Louis Kriesberg (ed.), Social Processes in International Relations (New York: 1968), 246–254 (Table 1). In terms of the foreign trade of a country such as the Federal Republic, the distribution would possibly correspond to the following values: "high" = 1 % or more of one's own export (and perhaps of import as well, in particular in symmetrical relations); "low" = 0.2 to 0.99 % of one's own export; "minimal" to "none" = all values under 0.2 %.

[12] For the literature, see the extensive references in Faupel, *op. cit.*, 42–43.

		Real relations (extent of transaction flows)		
	friend — images	enemy — images	high	low	minimal → none
Intensity	none	intensive	conflict-laden interpenetration	"hostile" coexistence	deterrence
of Psychological Processes	ambivalent	weak	competition	"peaceful" coexistence	"watchful" indifference
	weak	none	cooperation	routine	("empty pairs" in international relations.)

Fig. 3.1 Types of international relations
*This chart assumes the existence of symmetrical relations between states

If we take the special case of relatively equal and symmetrical relations by combining the types of real and psychological relations, each of which is divided into three types, we have in theory nine, in reality eight, types of international relations which differ according to the ratio of real and psychological components. Figure 3.1 illustrates the nine, or rather eight possible combinations. If we were to divide the real exchange relations into symmetrical and asymmetrical, a total of eighteen possible types would already result; if we were also to divide the enemy-friend-images into symmetrical and asymmetrical, we would reach the by no means unrealistic total of 36 types of international relations. Such a division would not, however, be fruitful for the following analysis.

If one regards Fig. 3.1 from the aspect of threat policy two extreme types appear.[13] One type of international relations, cooperation, contains very few elements of threat policy an example would be the relations between the Nordic states), whereas the second extreme type, deterrence, represents threat policy in an exaggerated form (as the deterrence constellation between the USA and the Soviet Union could illustrate). The remaining six types (routine, indifference, two types of coexistence, competition and conflict-laden interpenetration) contain varying degrees of threat policy depending upon the proportion of concrete exchange relations and the intensity of enemy or friend images. The remaining category, 'empty pairs in international politics', represents, to be precise, the lack of relations but embodies nonetheless a large part of the substance of international relations. This

---

[13] As a comparison to my table see Fig. 1 in Karl Deutsch: "Macht und Kommunikation in der internationalen Gesellschaft", in: Wolfgang Zapf (Ed.): *Theorien des sozialen Wandels* (Cologne: 1969), 471–483, especially 473. 1 did not use this figure for this article because the 'deterrence type' of international relations does not appear there.

may seem paradoxical but here, precisely, is an important characteristic of this system to be observed.[14]

If one now examines the various origins, courses of events and forms of expression of threat policy, above all the 'position' that threat policy occupies in the individual types of international relations, the analysis of one of the extreme types, namely deterrence constellations, proves to be particularly instructive. For its analysis does not only lead to findings about deterrence policy in the narrow sense (as I would like to show) but also to insights into some specific characteristics of international politics as a whole. Although for ideological reasons as well as reasons of weapons technology the deterrence system between the super powers today represents what one could almost call an ideal type of an extreme constellation, precisely the analysis of such a structure of relations which is based so thoroughly on threat policy and conflict can provide us with important information and insights about less extreme constellations where the ratio of conflict and cooperation is more balanced. In this sense such an analysis is of general heuristic value.

Moreover, the analysis of today's deterrence policy retains considerable importance as long as both super powers and their allies continue—despite all relaxation of bipolarity—to pursue it with high political priority. In this connection we must consider the following: if today we study deterrence policy, then not primarily in order to once again discuss individual aspects of current political events but rather to comprehend certain forces effective in the long-term which, as deterrence policy continues to be pursued, shape the often rapidly changing political events. Thus today we are concerned with general characteristics of this policy and its consequences in order to establish a realistic picture of them rather than dealing with the details of its modalities. A more comprehensive analysis would of course combine both kinds of analysis: one dealing with the relatively constant characteristics and traits of this policy and the other with the often rapidly changing execution of deterrence policy.

In the following discussion I would like, moreover, to draw attention to a crucial central variable of international politics: the problem of reality testing in

---

[14] In order to provide an insight into the order of magnitude of these 'blanks' the following data are presented: On a world chart of the export relations amongst 106 states which results in n (n−1) = 11,130 possible relationships, in 1964 only 4232 were occupied (the data for previous years are as follows: 1890, 504; 1913, 954; 1928, 2347; 1935, 2082; J954, 4243; 1964, 4232. Even taking into consideration incomplete recording or calculation of the data as well as the growing number of states, the order of magnitude of the existing compared with the non-existent relations does not differ appreciably from these data). For a more detailed discussion, see Karl Deutsch and Richard Chadwick: *Regionalism, Trade and International Community* (in progress). On the 'theoretical' character of international politics see Charles McClelland and Gary Hoggard: "Conflict Patterns in the Interactions among Nations", in: Rosenau (ed.), *op. cit.*, footnote 3: 711–724. McClelland's data from 1966 suggest that—at least as far as the reporting of international politics records it—the ratio of rhetorical interactions to actual interactions (conflict and/or cooperation) is 66: 33. Although such data are difficult to compare, this ratio does provide an insight into the peculiar quality of international politics and the tendency which it promotes to self-presentation.

international relations which has as yet hardly been systematically analyzed. The extent and forms of reality testing in international relations vary not only according to the types of international relations illustrated in Fig. 3.1 (i.e. according to the ratio of real transactions and psychological components) but they provide an analytical key to the understanding of threat policy in its extremes as well as its moderate forms.

We shall begin with the discussion of some elements of an analysis of deterrence policy and of extreme threat policy in general.[15]

3.3 Elements of an Analysis of Deterrence Policy

The first characteristic of deterrence policy which permeates the entire range of problems involved with this policy is expressed in the fundamental paradox that in deterrence policy the overt use of violence and wars are to be prevented precisely through the continuously increasing perfection of the means of war. It is a policy which constantly calculates for the worst possible case—the outbreak of warlike conflicts—and which transforms the preparations for war into a permanent state of being. In this policy war overshadows all aspects of society, for the very anticipation of war in politics and propaganda and the organizational and psychological consequences of such anticipation which are necessary for the credibility of deterrence policy are considered the precondition for its prevention.[16] The attempt to prevent war through deterrence policy leads not only possibly or even with high probability, but necessarily to its extensive preparation.[17] The problematical dividing line between war and peace which has ceased to exist since World War I becomes completely out-moded with the development of deterrence policy since

---

[15] In the following text as well, I shall only refer to the recent, important literature. Bibliographical references can be found in Dieter Senghaas: *Abschreckung und Frieden*, *op. cit.*, 296–316; as well as in Dieter Senghaas (ed.): *Zur Pathologie des Rüstungswettlaufs. Beiträge zur Friedens-und Konfliktforschung* (Freiburg: 1970); and in Dieter Senghaas: *Rüstung und Militarismus* (Frankfurt: 1972). Of continuing relevance is John Raser: "Deterrence Research", in: *Journal of Peace Research* (1966), 297–327; Philip Green: *Deadly Logic. The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence* (Columbus: 1966).

[16] Johan Galtung has recently convincingly illustrated the extent to which not only manifest but also latent violence belongs to the core of peace research in: "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", *op. cit..* footnote 10. See also various articles in Ekkehart Krippendorf (ed.): *Friedensforschung* (Cologne: 1968); and in Dieter Senghaas (ed.): *Friedensforschung und Gesellschaftskritik* (2nd ed.) (Munich: 1973).

[17] The Stockholm Institute of Peace Research, SIPRI, has recently published information as to the extent of these preparations. See Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmaments 1968/69 ff. (Stockholm: 1969 fl). For a discussion of the theoretical relevance of armaments data see Alan Newcomb: "Initiatives and Response in Foreign Policy", in: *Peace Research Reviews* (1969), no. 3, especially 74–75 and 78 where it is asserted that: "In a world in which the intent is usually assumed to be hostile, unless proven otherwise over a period of years, one should be able to measure Threat Perception by measuring Capability".

high gear preparations for war appear as the foundation for the efficiency of this policy. If a policy of peace is followed under the premises of high gear war policy, the development of rigid constellations of hostility can hardly be avoided. This syndrome becomes clearer when one considers the following characteristics of deterrence policy:

Credible deterrence policy is only feasible within the framework of a relatively comprehensive spectrum of violence that is on the basis of a scale of apparatuses of violence which are gradated and differentiated according to intensity. The history of deterrence policy is accompanied by the constant reminder of possible 'catastrophic gaps' in the deterrence doctrines and deterrence apparatuses which if allowed to persist could be exploited by the potential enemy if he only chose, This doctrine of the future catastrophic gaps is based on the imputation of the worst possible intentions on the part of the enemy and at the same time of his best capabilities in developing new military strategies and weapons technologies. For in deterrence policy as it has developed over the last 20 years the unprecedented differentiations in the expectations of political and war-like conflict have not developed accidentally.

The compulsion always to search for new gaps in one's own apparatuses, to seek out possible newer developments on the opponent's side or possible dangers in the next 10 or 20 years cannot be explained by the actual continuous technological developments in the subconventional, conventional and nuclear-strategic weapons arsenals and weapons systems alone.[18] Nor can it be explained by the technological imperative for early preventive planning for possible outbreaks of war-like conflict[19] alone, but to a great extent by the way in which deterrence policy itself becomes effective as a point of orientation for political action. For deterrence policy would by its very definition lose its credibility if it were to concentrate itself on one single sector of the politically imaginable and technically feasible spectrum of conflict—for example solely on conventional weapons potential and not on tactical or strategic, i.e., not on nuclear weapons systems.[20] As late as 1969 the American Defence Minister, Laird, sought to justify the American production of chemical and bacteriological weapons precisely on the grounds of adequate deterrence.[21]

The explanation is simple. If the enemy in a system of partial deterrence does not exploit the level of conflict which has not been covered—for example the level of conventional warfare—he shows himself to be peaceful in those areas in which he is not deterred through weapons apparatuses; thus the credibility of a policy of deterrence which depends upon the existence of a permanently potentially

---

[18] Compare inter alia Nigel Calder: *Unless Peace Comes* (New York: 1968).

[19] That is, the lead-time requirements.

[20] The following works are of lasting significance: Charles Osgood: *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana: 1962); and Erich Fromm: *May Man Prevail?* (New York: 1961).

[21] In the fall of 1969 the American Administration withdrew somewhat from this position.

aggressive opponent is undermined. That is, given the level of development of the weapons potential existing or thinkable today, deterrence policy only seems credible when pursued in a broad spectrum of threatened retaliation. A system of partial deterrence which limits itself by concentrating on the deterrence of one single type of conflict could contribute to undermining the legitimation or destroying the plausibility of deterrence policy as a whole. A fairly comprehensive system of deterrence, on the other hand, guarantees that the enemy always remains fixed in the role of the potential aggressor. In a mutually comprehensive system of deterrence, such as that between the Soviet Union and the United States, each one appears symmetrically to the other as a permanent possible aggressor.

This situation is most clearly expressed in the doctrine of escalation, one version of which differentiates between 44 levels of intensity of international conflict including 20 types of nuclear warfare.[22] This ladder of escalation ranges from diplomatic measures in the traditional style to subversive or propagandist manoeuvres, the various forms of conventional and tactical-nuclear wars to the manifold varieties of thermonuclear-strategic as well as chemical and bacteriological warfare which today are considered possible. Although this myriad of types of warfare and their respective weapons apparatuses—monstrous at all levels—supposedly only serve to deter the potential enemy, we must not overlook that the strategic debate of the last 20 years has lead us—as Herman Kahn, one of the prominent advocates of deterrence has put it—to think the unthinkable: i.e., not only to propagate conventional wars as still rational and practical but also to conceive of certain types of nuclear war as not only thinkable and possible but under certain conditions as rational political acts of violence.[23]

Thus what 20 years ago in view of the first selective use of nuclear weapons was considered unthinkable for future political practice—the definition of these new weapons as instruments of politics—has been torn away from the realm of the unthinkable. The image of nuclear war as the destroyer of all civilization is now considered to be out-moded in the strategic debate. Nuclear wars, like conventional ones, appear as possible means of politics.

It may be that one should not take considerations such as Kahn's and other strategists so seriously and dismiss them rather as hair-brained delusions, above all when one considers the limited realism of such thinking and planning. However, we cannot overlook the fact that the military planning of the USA in the 1950s and 1960s was based on these and similar domestically more effective considerations. At the moment it does not appear as if such fantastic premises will be critically re-examined, and there seems no prospect whatsoever of their revision.

---

[22] Cf. Herman Kahn: *On Escalation* (New York: 1965).

[23] No matter how misguided such a characterization of deterrence policy may appear in the context of "detente", it remains to the point; one need only glance at the literature on armament of the political, economic and military armaments-lobbyists in America to appreciate the extent of continuity. The teachings of the fifties, penned by prominent civilian strategists have been all too deeply understood! For a pragmatic critique of these teachings see Hans Morgenthau: "Four Paradoxies of Nuclear Strategy", in: *American Political Science Review* (1964): 23–35.

Existing in close interconnection with the previously mentioned characteristics of deterrence policy is its characteristic tendency to perceive more possibilities for conflict than are actually probable (overperception), to react to this perception in one's own preparations for possible wars to a disproportionate extent (overreaction) and always conservatively to plan for the worst possible event (overdesign). The pattern of political thought and action is as simple as it is momentous: in political analysis and practice the enemy not only appears to be equipped with technically advanced weapons systems; one attributes him with the will and intent to undertake risks which, were they pursued by one's own political leaders, would be considered madness. From the perspective of such premises one tends not to react to facts but rather to impressions and opinions which thereupon shape reality as if the 'reaction' had initially been too real and not imagined facts. At the end of his term of office McNamara confessed, for example, to the momentousness of this mechanism with all its repercussions. And in the meanwhile many analyses have appeared in connection with the discussion of ABM and MIRV which have again and again pointed out this mechanism.[24]

In this sense deterrence policy is a policy of comprehensive preventive emergency measures for conceivable and possible international contingencies and conflicts. It is nourished by the expectation of the worst of all possible eventualities. And it only survives through a continuing process of renewed legitimatization. It gains its social-psychological justification by propagating in part intensive enemy-images which in turn directly or indirectly determine the spectrum of possible expectations of conflict. The function of anti-imperialism in the Soviet Union finds its mirror-image in the more or less latent or manifest "anticommunism" in the West. On the basis of such enemy-images the intensity of which is variable and can move in waves (when periods of more relaxed enemy-images follow periods of intense enemy-images) any defence measures can potentially be justified.[25] Moreover, the mere existence of such monstrous potential for destruction compels extremely intense enemy-images at least in specific instances. For if one's own threat with the use of such monstrous force is not to appear inhuman and immoral,

---

[24] In this connection, see in particular George Rathjens: "Die Zukunft des strategischen Rüstungswettlaufs. Optionen für die 70er Jahre", in: Dieter Senghaas (ed.), *op. cit.* footnote 15; and George Rathjens and G. B. Kistiakowsky: "The Limitation of Strategic Arms"*, in: Scientific American* (1970), no. 1, 19–29; George Rathjens: "The Dynamics of the Arms Race", *in: Scientific American* (1969), no. 4, 15–25; Abraham Chayes and Jerome Wiesner (eds.): *ABM* (New York : 1969); as well as Pierre Gallois: "De la Dissuasion Naturelle ä l'Insecurité Artificielle", in: *Politique Etrangère* (1969), 548–579; Alain Joxe: "Fin de la Préponderance Stratcgique Americaine", in: *Politique Etrangère* (1969), Part I, 451–470, Part II, 581–614. For an uncritical discussion of the problem, see Brent Scowcroft: "Deterrence and Strategic Superiority", in: *Orbis* (1969), 435–454.

[25] On this subject, see Milton Rosenberg: "Attitude Change and Foreign Policy in the Cold War Era", in: James Rosenau (ed.): *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: 1967), 111–160, as well as the important studies of David Finlay, Ole Holsti and Richard Fagan: *Enemies in Politics* (Chicago: 1967). See also the recent study by Michael Parenti: *The Anticommunist Impulse* (New York: 1969).

the enemy must—if necessary—appear criminal. The potential for total destruc-
tion tends to demand the total enemy if it is not to be totally inhuman. The advo-
cates of deterrence policy tend always to propagate the most frightening
enemy-images at times when the rationality of their policy is being called into
question or when a new possible phase of the arms race is in sight.

Early in the history of deterrence policy political analysts recognized the
importance of the psychological and moral support of this policy in broad sectors
of the population. It soon became clear that the effectiveness of deterrence lies less
in the technical apparatuses than in the readiness to use the ultimate means if nec-
essary. Since deterrence is a psychological strategy, weapons systems are not cred-
ible without the declared will to use them if the case arises. This background
precondition, however, tends to force the psychological militarization of the deter-
rence societies.[26]

Given these conditions, deterrence policy appears to mobilize and simultane-
ously to inhibit societal aggression as a symbiosis of fear and violence. The fear of
violence and willingness to do violence which this policy produces are not annoy-
ing by-products but have functional value within the framework of this policy.
If deterrence policy did not mobilize anxiety, fear, readiness to do violence and
aggressiveness, it would easily lose its plausibility. While requiring societies to be
capable of and ready for action, the consequences of deterrence policy resemble
an education for non-peace or peacelessness. The consequences for the develop-
ment of rigid structures of hostility are obvious.

Yet this consequence is not the only great questionable factor of this policy. Its
characteristic weaknesses form in part the foundations for its continuation; they
can also be explained through other observations. Deterrence policy is supposed to
stabilize the military environment that is to help to prevent the outbreak of actual
acts of violence. It should, moreover, have a stabilizing effect on the political
behaviour of its advocates and its opponents.[27]

Deterrence policy is threat policy. However, long-term stability can never be
attained through threat policy. Every consistently pursued policy of threat contains
elements which undermine stability at each level of reciprocal deterrence which is
reached. For the enemy-images at the base of every policy of deterrence and their
characteristic motivations (fear, mistrust, hostility as well as mobilized and simul-
taneously inhibited aggressiveness) cause the level in weapons systems develop-
ment which has just been reached immediately to seem out-moded and beyond that
guarantee the continued development and growth of such a policy oriented toward
possible expectations of conflict. Moreover, threat policy is subject to elementary
psychological laws. As with any threat, it loses credibility if the threatened

---

[26] The growing critical discussion on armaments in the USA since the spring of 1969 shows
how counterproductive such a militarization can become. In this connection, see my introduction
to: *Zur Pathologie des Rüstungswettlaufs*, *op. cit.*, footnote 15 and the third chapter of Dieter
Senghaas: *Rüstung und Militarismus*, *op. cit.*, footnote 15, chapter 3.

[27] This was one of the strategic theses of the early 1960's.

behaviour is not occasionally practiced in order to reconfirm threat policy as such. In analyzing threat policy in this connection one must also consider the crises and war activities of the super powers in the Third World. Violence which within the framework of the deterrence system only latently pulses in the Northern hemisphere often shows its brutality in the relations of the super powers, especially America, with the Third World.[28] The war in Vietnam, as insane and murderous as it is, represents only one of many possibilities for openly interventionist policy which in turn has positive, strengthening feedback for the growth of deterrence policy, and contributes, although taking place within another frame of reference, to the rationalization of deterrence policy. The uninterrupted, systematically planned and organized innovation of military technology has a strengthening effect on the self-sustaining dynamics (*Eigendynamik*) of threat policy, through its tendency to call into question any 'level of stability' which is reached, even under conditions of political detente.[29]

One recognizes the significance of deterrence policy if one considers how difficult it is to differentiate between purpose and means in this policy. Closely related to this is the specific, stereotyped political intelligence which deterrence policy promotes, an intelligence which conceives of reality from the perspective of threat and influences the continuous restructuring of this reality along the lines of threat policy. The definition of reality in political terms is intertwined in this policy with the means and the strategies which not only produce the definition of what is reality but which reflect this reality as well. In this circular feed-back process between stereotyped perceptions and political practice which support each other reciprocally with a political practice which in essence always confirms only itself (since a negative policy such as deterrence policy does not allow for an unequivocal estimation of its success) we find the core of an enormous pathology of learning[30] which is characteristic of deterrence policy. A relationship with reality which is capable of learning and a practical possibility for estimating the success of a policy are no doubt the basis for every rational policy. The dangerous aspects of deterrence policy are, thus, the reduction of the capacity for an adequate reality-testing and the resulting promotion of political self-deception, delusion and blindness and their possible catastrophic consequences[31] and, moreover, the

---

[28] Compare inter alia Richard Barnet: *Intervention and Revolution. America's Confrontation with Insurgent Movements around the World* (New York: 1968); as well as Gabriel Kolko: *Hintergründe der US-Aussenpolitik* (Frankfurt: 1970). See also Ekkehart Krippendorff: *Die amerikanische Strategie* (Frankfurt: 1970).

[29] Compare Jerome Wiesner and Herbert York: "Keine Verteidigung möglich", in: Krippendorff (ed.), *op. cit.*, footnote 160: 199–216 as well as Herbert York: "Military Technology and National Security", in: *Scientific American* (1969), no. 2: 17–29. York's article is among the best written on this subject.

[30] For a discussion of the concept 'Pathology of Learning,' see Karl W. Deutsch: *The Nerves of Government* (New York: 1966).

[31] On the long-term consequences of the costs of armament, see Bruce Russett: "Who Pays for Defense?", in: *American Political Science Review* (1969): 412–426; as well as chapter 3 of Dieter Senghaas: *Rüstung und Militarismus*, *op. ci*t., footnote 15.

combination of a perception of reality hindered and limited by fictitious expectations of conflict and paranoid enemy-images with a gigantic potential for destruction and a political strategy which manipulates a reservoir of essentially uncritically emotion-oriented collective psychological aggression.

If we know anything about the actual outbreak of aggression, however, it is that the probability of acts of violence always rises when a reduction of the critical assessment of reality gives vent to previously built-up potentials for aggressions, and when a growing self-centredness leads to a loss of self-control and a neglect of more comprehensive relationships to reality. History is full of examples where political elites and peoples deceived themselves intellectually and emotionally to such an extent about themselves and their environment and, like addicts, became prisoners of their own selves so that only catastrophic defeat was able to re-establish an adequately realistic relationship with reality. I will return to these problems later.

The characteristics of deterrence policy as yet mentioned can be summed up in the sociological or psychological concept, autism. In a latent or manifest field of conflict, in particular in international politics, we consider those communications patterns to be autistic or extremely self-centred in which perceptions and images of the environment as they arise in the internal system of an actor overpower the information from the environment which actually corresponds to reality. The more this self-centredness continues to develop, no matter what the reasons, the more blind and deaf an actor becomes towards his environment. He is drawn into a vicious circle which becomes stronger the longer it persists and which makes a correction of this behaviour by the actor himself and thus a correction of his own previous perceptions of the intentions of the so-called enemy increasingly difficult if not increasingly improbable. Aggression stemming from other sources which has accumulated in the actor, for example, those resulting from the manner of education, the conditions of work and the family structure, can then easily be projected onto the supposed enemy. The conflict in an autistic communications system then takes on an intensity which can no longer be explained by the intentions and actual behaviour of the respective opponent in international politics. With growing-self-centredness, the conflicts then become not only more fictitious but also potentially more virulent, and their dynamics become increasingly hard to interpret in terms of the mutual interaction between the opponents; to an increasing extent they can only be understood in terms of the potentially aggressive *Eigendynamik* which, produced in autistic isolation, has developed in a given actor.

Deterrence policy as it has been practised between the two super powers can only be termed autistic. The armaments complexes in East and West are, to be sure, related in a loose fashion, yet their real growth is determined on both sides autonomously by the respective deterrence societies. The case may in fact have been different in the beginning of the history of the Cold War, although this too is questionable. But today we would misconstrue political reality if we were to interpret the deterrence system as a system with a high frequency of interaction between the Soviet Union and the USA. What we can today observe in the deterrence system could rather be termed the Schumpeter-Effect.

In 1919 in a sociological treatise Schumpeter elaborated the thesis that tendencies towards expansion without any object and without any particular utilitarian goal—that is non-rational or purely irrational tendencies towards war and conquest—had played a great role in the history of mankind.[32] It seems paradoxical, he wrote, that countless wars were fought without sufficient grounds not so much from a moral stand point as from the point of view of calculated and rational self-interest. He sought an explanation for this aggression without object in psychological dispositions and social structures which in an early phase of the history of a state were perhaps once necessary to answer an actually existing threat from without but which persisted even after they had lost their significance and their function for self-preservation. Schumpeter's central argument revolved around a theory of social learning: in order to adequately respond to challenge, nations and elites often develop strategies which emphasize effective organization and which later make it difficult for them to turn to new tasks. They continue to prescribe a certain strategy long after it has lost its object and become outmoded. Their armament complexes which have no objective function thus develop dynamics of growth of their own, the direction and speed of which are no longer in any proportion to the original, perhaps real, threat. What Schumpeter observed in 1919 could be seen as the sociological precipitate of the autistic self-centredness of deterrence policy which we have mentioned.

Precisely the recent armaments debate on defensive and offensive systems in East and West has shown to what great extent the respective *Eigendynamik* (despite slogans of coexistence) directs the intensive arms race. They have also demonstrated the pathologies of learning into which deterrence has manoeuvred itself. In this connection we would subsume under pathology of learning those political priorities, strategic orientations, institutional and organizational formations and systems of international relations which, if pursued, lead neither to detente at the international fronts of conflict nor to overcoming old conflicts but rather to hardening and sharpening traditional conflicts and which, moreover, tend to produce new dangerous conflicts with almost systematic regularity. Deterrence policy is pathological in the sense that once begun it revolves in a perpetual circle of self-expanding deterrence policy.

The interconnection of existence of a power elite and an incremental formation of political opinion on the part of those groups participating in deterrence policy is of central importance in understanding the elements of inertia in deterrence policy and the tenacity of the 'Schumpeter-Effect'. This interconnection is particularly valid for the USA where it can be illustrated quite easily. One can assume that similar processes (which differ perhaps in detail) can be observed in the Soviet Union; however, research on this topic is extremely unsatisfactory. The most decisive characteristic of the sociological basis of deterrence policy—and probably of every extensive armament policy—is its pluralist decision-making process, i.e.

---

[32] Joseph Schumpeter: "Zur Soziologie der Imperialismen", in: *Aufsätze zur Soziologie* (Tübingen: 1953): 72–146.

a process based on the cooperation of many groups in which the participants, despite diversity, none the less form a power elite[33] whose coherence is based on the narrow substantive margin of tolerance in basic strategic orientation (for example deterrence policy vs. disarmament policy). The tenacity of deterrence policy simply cannot be explained solely by a 'pattern of conspiracy' in any form whatever but rather by the intermeshed interplay of various influential groups in politics, the economy, the military, in science and in the mass media. In the history of deterrence policy we can clearly observe the manner in which the domestic (sociological) basis of this policy has branched out and expanded through the competitive controversies over its modalities, so that today a larger number of groups would be effected by a change in this policy than in the early years of its history or even 10 years ago (which, by the way, a simple operational test of the existence or nonexistence of an armament complex illustrates). If one wished to mention specific interests involved in the perpetuation of deterrence policy, beyond this general social basis which results automatically through the magnitude of the human and economic resources mobilized through deterrence policy, then they would be the military, the armaments industry and the people dependent upon it in industry, the economy and the mass media, portions of the political establishment and the administration. Above all one must point out that private industry today can no longer muster the costs of research and development in the most advanced areas of technology on their own, that these costs have been socialized while the profits remain in private hands (a situation which recently caused Galbraith to call for the nationalization of this armament industry in a consequent fashion).

These aspects of the political economy of deterrence policy have been discussed in detail elsewhere.[34]

Before attempting to summarize the previously mentioned elements of an analysis of deterrence policy in a model, I would like to investigate the concept of autism and in particular autistic hostility, since in these concepts we can find the analytical key to understanding some of the essential aspects of international relations above all under the conditions of threat policy and of tension, hostility, crises and conflicts.

---

[33] On this subject, see Marc PiJisuk and Thomas Hayden: "Is there a Military-Industrial Complex which Prevents Peace?", in: *Social Issues* (July, 1965): 67–117, as well as John Gurley: "Rüstungsgesellschaft und Friedenswirtschaft", in: Dieter Senghaas (ed.), op. cit., footnote 15, 374–386, Jack Raymond: "Growing Threat of Our Military-Industrial Complex", in: *Harvard Business Review* (May–June, 1968): 652–665; Murray Weidenbaum: "Arms and the American Economy. A Domestic Convergence Hypothesis", in: *American Economic Review* (1968): 428–437; and Adam Yarmolinski: "The Problem of Momentum", in: Chayes and Wiesner (eds.), *op. cit.*, footnote 24, 144–149 (in comparison with chapter 3 of Dieter Senghaas: *Rüstung und Militarismus*, *op. cit.*, footnote 15, chapter 3). For a comprehensive bibliography see Dieter Senghaas: *Aufrüstung durch Rüstungskontrolle* (Stuttgart: 1972): 152–160.

[34] Cf. Richard Barnet: *The Economy of Death* (New York: 1969); Ralph Lapp: *Kultur auf Waffen gebaut* (Cologne: 1969); John K. Galbraith: *How to Control the Military* (New York: 1969); as well as Harry Magdoff: *The Age of Imperialism* (New York: 1969); Fritz Vilmar: *Rüstung und Abrüstung im Spätkapitalismus* (7th ed.) (Hamburg: 1973); as well as my own studies cited in footnotes 1 and 16 (compare chapter 3).

3.4 Autism and Social Reality

Since as far as I can see the concept of autistic hostility and autism in general have not been discussed either in the general theory of international relations or in peace research, and in order to avoid misunderstandings, I would like to describe the gradual introduction of the concept starting in psychological terminology and later moving into social psychology and sociology.[35]

Bleuler, who first introduced the term,[36] understood autistic thinking as a manner of thinking

> which does not take experience into consideration and which waives a control of the results in the light of reality and a logical criticism; that is, thinking, which is thus analogous and to a certain degree identical with thinking in dreams and the thinking of one who is autistically schizophrenic, who is barely concerned with reality, who fulfils his wishes in megalomania, and in paranoia projects his own inability into his surroundings…. This manner of thinking has its own laws which deviate from (realistic) logic; it seeks the fulfilment of its wishes and not the truth: accidental connections between ideas, vague analogies and above all affective needs replace in many cases associations of experience which must be employed in strict, realistically logical thinking. When these associations are called upon it is only in an insufficient, careless manner.

Bleuler did not only observe autistic thinking amongst acutely autistically pathological individuals; he discovered autistic (i.e. more affect-oriented than experience-oriented) thinking in the sciences of his time, above all in medicine. He considered the illusory explanations and the weakly founded or barely foundable instructions for medical therapy to be an expression of a theory without sufficient reference to reality. He considered this manner of thinking to be retreating as science advanced: "As our knowledge grows, the area of autistic thinking amongst healthy human beings will grow smaller of its own accord; our conception of the universe today, of its history and its manifestations is, although in many respects still hypothetical, nonetheless no longer autistic: we draw conclusions from what we observe in a logical manner and are aware which portion of these conclusions only have probability value". In cases where the problems are so complicated and so incalculable that realistic thinking cannot possibly do justice to them, Bleuler saw the danger that, even given the correct formulation of a question, the border between unfounded hypothesis and autistic illusory explanations would disappear.

So much for Bleuler's introduction of the concept into psychology. Although I will later return to some of the aspects of this characterization of autistic thinking, the second step, an attempt, transcending individual psychology, to introduce the concept of autism into the social sciences is of greater importance for us here. Theodore M. Newcomb initiated this attempt in 1947, although his suggestions

---

[35] My own first treatment of the subject can be found in: *Abschreckung und Frieden*, *op. cit.*. footnote 1, 187 ff.

[36] E. Bleuler: *Das autistisch-undisziplinierte Denken in der Medizin und seine Überwindung* (Berlin: 1927), quotations from 1–7.

attracted less attention than they actually deserved.[37] Newcomb was above all interested in the psychological and social conditions under which hostile impulses and motives harden into lasting, indeed, tenacious attitudes. The central thesis of the theorem which he developed and applied to an equal degree to individuals and to groups is as follows: The probability that tenacious attitudes will develop varies according to the extent to which the perceived inter personal relationship remains autistic, i.e., the extent to which isolation is maintained through various forms of communication barriers. Newcomb's ideas are founded on a relatively simple statement of fact: attitudes are, according to him, the outflow of perceptions and evaluations which occur and develop in a specific frame of reference and meaning. Should in the case of developing hostile relations (no matter what the reason) communications break off or be cut off, then a modification of the original frame of reference within which the hostile impulses originated is less probable than if open exchange between the hostile individuals or groups continues to take place. In Newcomb's definition of autistic hostility the essential references to the growing self-centredness of the hostile parties in the development of hostile relations between individuals or groups is an important insight which I shall take up again in the autism model of threat policy using systems analysis.

Newcomb discovered only a few references to 'autism' in the psychological literature before 1947, but rightly believed nonetheless that in many cases the instructions given for psychotherapeutic treatment were implicitly based on the diagnosis of autistic processes, as their emphasis of the necessity in any successful therapy of overcoming communication barriers between the patient and the therapist and the elimination of false images of reality which themselves are to be understood as the result of relationships with reality founded on pathologies of learning as in the case of psychoses and neuroses. What has already been observed for the individual can be observed even more clearly in the case of hostile groups because the cultural and social mechanisms of amplification there help to intensify hostile impulses, and because the group often reinforces a growing self-encapsulation with positive sanctions?

Newcomb differentiated between two forms of communications barriers: first, overt barriers in which case the exchange of information simply ceases or communication declines; second, covert barriers within a communications process in which a particular frame of reference, psychologically charged with specific meanings does not permit the comprehension of the meaning of certain information which is transmitted from the environment. If the meaning of certain information, although transmitted, remains inaccessible to an individual or a group, both are in a way cut off from communication just as much as if no communication existed. From the point of view of the communication processes and the interpretations attached to them, the development of an open, meaningful frame of reference would amount to overcoming narrow-minded, extremely group-specific

---

[37] Theodore Newcomb: "Autistic Hostility in Social Reality", in: *Human Relations* (1947): 69–86.

interpretations and thus the autistic structures of communication. Interpretations would become communicable where they had been inaccessible.

Whereas in individuals autistic hostility often begins with conflicts directed to concrete individuals or social counterparts, group-specific autistic hostility often results without any direct or (at least in the beginning) reality-oriented contact with other groups. The members of a group do not define the relationship to another group which is perceived as the enemy as hostile primarily because of any direct contact but rather their contact has from the start been a contact based on the prejudices about this group, prejudices which are often institutionally grounded as in the case of racial segregation.

After Newcomb, Erich Lindemann again formulated the essence of the conception of autistic hostility[38] calling it a vicious circle in which a group whose purpose and origin is founded in hostile reactions gradually severs the channels of communication with the potential enemy and thus prevents a correction of the original hostile perceptions and a reversal through friendly acts. Hostility which has been built up from other sources is then directed at the enemy, and each attempt to make the enemy no longer appear as the just object of such hostility merely engenders new and stronger hostility. Lindemann's description portrays autism not only as thinking which does not correspond to reality (as in Bleuler's original version), not merely as the severing of communication (as in Newcomb's definition) but includes a scapegoat theory as well which has often been referred to in contributions to the analysis of international politics.

3.5   Deterrence Policy and Autistic Hostility

I have reviewed such earlier work as there is on the discussion of autistic hostility in order to demonstrate the broad realms of experience from which they originated. I believe that one can generalize from the concept of autism and autistic hostility using systems analysis and communications theory and that—thus analytically reformulated and further developed—the concept could serve to throw some light on the structure and *Eigendynamik* of deterrence policy. In the following I would like to sketch my thoughts on this subject with the help of a model analysis. Figure 3.2 serves to illustrate the arguments which will be developed below.[39]

The core of the structure of a deterrence relationship as it has developed over the last two decades between the two super powers is formed by three components:

1. A minimal amount of real exchange relations in the sense of trade, tourism and the like as we mentioned earlier. These relations are of completely

---

[38] Erich Lindemann: "Individual Hostility and Group Integration", in: Zawodny (ed.), *op. cit.*, footnote 7: 62–75. Quotation from 64.

[39] The figure has been borrowed from *Abschreckung und Frieden*, *op. cit.*, footnote 1 and slightly extended.

Fig. 3.2 The autism model of deterrence policy. A and B are the two deterrence societies. On transaction path 1 actual, measurable exchange processes take place such as trade, tourism, etc. On transaction paths *2* and *3* the respective elites transmit those threats which are recognized by the corresponding elites and passed on to the public. The majority of deterrence processes takes place within the respective elites (*4* and *5*). The threats engendered there impress above all the public and circulate around the focal point of the elite. The threats directed at the enemy reflect more back to one's own society (*6* and *7*) than they affect the enemy

secondary importance for the survival of the two super powers involved. In certain sectors, such as strategically important goods, this exchange was obstructed with painful exactitude.[40]

2. A limited amount of threats which are expressed by one given elite and actually perceived by the counterpart elite and passed on by those elites to their own mass public. These threat transaction paths also serve to exchange that information which finally results in a high co-variance of behaviour in areas considered decisive such as military-technological competition, economic rivalry, in behaviour vis-à-vis third parties and in undertakings involving prestige at a global level, etc. Attempts to take steps to match the enemy with its own ideological economical and military weapons often lead to structural assimilation as the basis of effective enemy-oriented policy.

3. The decisive third component of deterrence policy is, however, the preponderance of inner-directed processes over processes oriented to the outside and (as a consequence of deterrence policy) the development of an autistic milieu in

---

[40] Compare with the basic study of Johan Galtung: "East–West interaction Patterns", in: Louis Kriesberg (ed.): op. cit., footnote 11, 272–307 in which Galtung demonstrates that the "top-dogs" have a high frequency of relations in one way or the other: whether positive (as in trade) or negative (as in mutual deterrence).

which this policy in the end reproduces itself. We can observe in this context that the 'enemy-oriented' processes within the given elite and its subordinate mass public are proportionately more real than the seemingly direct 'foreign relations' with the enemy which are often only mediated by self-produced fictitious expectations of conflict and a corresponding threat policy. As soon as the enemy is internalized into one's own decision- and opinion-making process, it is always "present" in one form or another. While expectations of conflict and the rhetoric of threat are directed at the enemy and while at the same time the real exchange relations shrink to a minimum, such projective relations inevitably effect the motivations and actions of the respective elite and its mass public and have a corroborating and strengthening influence on its self-image. Thus the external orientation in a relationship of deterrence is just as real as it is fictitious, since the conflicts which one foresees with this enemy are formulated to a great extent on one's own side of the frontline. Although the deterrence system gives the appearance of extreme interdependence and foreign orientation, it is the expression of incomparable encapsulation and isolation with regard to its essential components.

The interplay of the three components mentioned: minimal real exchange relations, occasional transmission of threats which are actually perceived by the enemy and, above all, a self-encapsulation (which is manifested in projective external relations) of the major antagonists forms the background against which deterrence policy can be considered as a phenomenon of autistic hostility. To be sure after a 20 years history and several phases of deterrence policy it is easier to gain insight into the contribution of this policy in developing autistic hostility and to understand how the system of reciprocal deterrence fixates hostility in an autistic structure than in the beginning, although even then there were many warnings in this direction. However, the stubborn resistance to a revision of this policy today, at first perhaps only an intellectual revision, demonstrates how intense its persuasion was and how effectively it can still delude.

Beyond those characteristics of deterrence policy which we have already mentioned, a series of mechanisms which can be analyzed from a general standpoint are responsible for the development of autistic structures of hostility in deterrence policy. Anatol Rapoport described them in another connection as 'lock-in' effects[41]; David Singer recently discussed the significance of positive feedback processes in international crises and conflicts, processes which lead to an intensification of positions on both sides.[42] Due to the domestically motivated hardening

---

[41] Anatol Rapoport and Albert Chammah: *Prisoner's Dilemma* (Ann Arbor: 1965).

[42] David Singer: "Feedback Processes in International Conflicts", *MHRI-Reprint* (Ann Arbor: 1968). For the basic concept, see Karl Deutsch, *op. cit.*, footnote 30; Raymond Bauer (ed.): *Social Indicators* (Cambridge: 1966), passim; as well as Mogoroh Maruyama: "The Second Cybernetics: Deviation-Amplifying Mutual Causal Systems", in: Walter Buckley (ed.): *Modern Systems Research for the Modern Behavioral Scientist* (Chicago: 1968); compare J. H. Milsum (ed.): *Positive Feedback* (New York: 1968).

of positions involved, in particular those mechanisms which Singer analyzed, contribute to the step by step reduction of the real chances for communication between the antagonists which can be observed at the outset of a conflict; the chances diminish until in the end communication and readiness for compromise are drowned in the swell of mutual propagandistic hostility. Once this point in a conflict spiral is reached—and in the case of deterrence policy this must have occurred relatively early, in the late forties or early fifties—then images of the environment which domestic propaganda have perpetrated begin to out-trump decisively the realistic communication flows with their reliable information from the environment. New information and its evaluation continuously lose the objectivity which is difficult to attain in international politics anyway.[43]

The model of reciprocal deterrence policy illustrated here thus relates more directly to a phase in which the 'lock-in' effect has already begun, in which both antagonists have already 'enclosed' themselves in their position rather than to an early phase in the development of reciprocal deterrence in which the circular process calling upon threat and counter-threat with its characteristic cumulative effect is only beginning.

The new approach developed here—the analysis of deterrence policy as a manifestation of autistic hostility—represents an important correction for the analysis of the arms race between East and West.[44]

Arms race models tend to assume the closely related action-reaction phenomenon between the perceptions and/or the actions of antagonists, as we can observe even in the most recent critical American discussion on armaments (related to ABM and MIRV). This is quite astonishing when one considers that in the last 10 years the self-produced one-sided elements of inertia and the autonomously developed perceptions of threat and their organizational consequences on both sides of the arms race were much more impressive than those which were externally manipulated and dictated from the outside. The unilateral contributions—important in their own right—to the continuation of the present arms race have, within the discussion of ABM and MIRV systems, become evident with ultimate clarity. Yet the debate on counter-force strategy and minimum deterrence strategy begun in the sixties has already caused the predominant political image of the close inter-connection of the actions and reactions of the two opponents to appear obsolete. It would not be surprising if the so-called Richardson processes—leaving aside the aggregative development of budget data—could not be ascertained at all. However, this would mean that the asymmetries in a seemingly balanced, parallel arms race are nevertheless so great that a theory founded on other substantive

---

[43] For a detailed presentation of such processes, see Morton Deutsch: "Conflicts: Productive and Destructive", in: *Journal of Social Issues* (1969), 7–42; Dean Pruitt: "Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action", in: Herbert Kelman (ed.), *op. cit.*, footnote 7, 393–432.

[44] Klaus Jürgen Gantzel: "Rüstungswettläufe und politische Entscheidungsbedingungen", in: Ernst-Otto Czempiel (ed.): *op. cit.,* footnote 8, 110–137. This article contains an excellent summary and continuation of the previous discussion.

Fig. 3.3   Four possible developmental stages of an arms race

assertions tends to prove itself incorrect.[45] General theories of the arms race as they dominate discussions today are now completely open to a new interpretation. However, it remains curious, though politically understandable, that the political conceptions, propagated for political reasons, according to which one's own actions appear as the clear reactions to specific actions of the opposite side have decisively shaped the theoretical discussion.

   If in this connection one turns once again to the previously mentioned ideas of Rapoport and Singer, i.e., to 'lock-in' effects and the effect of positive feedback, then a two-phase model of an arms race would suggest itself: according to this model in the beginning real issues of conflict and differences of interest would most certainly be the decisive driving forces of the mutual debate whereas as the conflict grows and the enemy-images intensify the armament complexes would develop—provided that deadly false decisions could be avoided—into self-expanding organizations. It would then be thoroughly possible for the perpetuation of the armament complexes that intensive enemy-images would only be propagated occasionally and would no longer provide the constant accompaniment to armament policy since the armaments apparatuses would already have consolidated themselves to a large extent. But this assumption needs closer analysis just as much as the succession of stages in the development of armament complexes which is suggested in Fig. 3.3. In this succession, weak or intensive enemy-images would coincide with organizationally less developed or extremely developed armament complexes.

---

[45] Studies along these lines are being undertaken by William Caspary: *Formal Theories of Reaction Processes in International Relations* (American Political Science Association, 1969, unpublished manuscript).

In the first type of armament complex weak enemy-images would come together with a little developed organizational complex; in general there would be no particular tendency to overreaction to perceptions of hostility. In the second type intensive enemy-images would considerably increase the sensitivity to threats and perceptions of threat from the environment; the growth of the initially small armament complex would be increased enormously until finally the second type would merge into the third type, where a growing self-determination of the armament complex would gradually show itself. The fourth and final type would be determined more by the autonomous needs of a given participant of an arms race than by interactive processes between the antagonists.[46] The appearance of highly developed action-reaction processes would still be necessary here to legitimize the excessive apparatuses whereas in reality at this level of development driving forces which can no longer be explained by symmetrical series of actions would have long since determined the dynamics of the arms race.[47]

The autism model in deterrence policy shown here comprising above all the third and fourth phases, clearly illustrates a number of characteristics of this policy which I would like to mention briefly:

1. The autism model analytically includes the structure of the environment in which a pathology of learning engendering expectations of conflict oriented not towards actual and probable conflicts but rather towards conceivable conflicts is made possible. It includes the background conditions which enable the doctrine of 'catastrophic gaps' to become effective and under which the advocates of deterrence policy pursue in practice a policy aiming at a more differentiated spectrum of conflict.

2. The autism model illustrates furthermore the conditions of the loss of contact with reality on the part of those involved which is a constant threat in a deterrence system. It makes clear the weakening of the ability and organizational capacity for an adequate assessment of reality which constantly emanates from the structure of the deterrence system. The circle of impaired political

---

[46] Thus the relevance of bureaucratic and organizational processes automatically grows in the analysis of arms races and international crises. See in this connection the excellent model analyses by Graham Allison: "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis", in: *American Political Science Review* (1969), 689–718. Also compare G. T. Allison: *Essence of Decision Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: 1971). Some references can also be found in Uwe Nerlich: "Abschreckung", in: *Staatslexikon*, Supplementary issue (Freiburg: 1969): 14–23.

[47] Historical material in which we can observe similar sequences can be found inter alia in Eckart Kehr: *Der Primat der Innenpolitik* (2nd ed.) (Berlin: 1970) above all in his discussions of Wilhelminian armaments policy; Robert Butow: *Tojo and the Coming of War* (Stanford: 1961); Masao Maruyama: *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics* (2nd ed.) (London: 1962), in particular Parts 1–5; and on the present situation in America, see General David Shoup: "The New American Militarism", in: *The Atlantic* (April, 1969), 51–56; on the general discussion, see David Singer: "The Outcome of the Arms Race", in: *IPRA Studies in Peace Research, Third Conference* (Assen: 1970), 2: 137–146.

   intelligence and the lack of an adequate assessment of reality thus appear to
   be the cause and the consequence of autistic policies.

3. The autism model clearly illustrates the ominous vicious circles which arise in
   the evaluation of success of this policy. This evaluation amounts to an affirma-
   tion: it affirms the allegedly positive effect of a negative policy, the success of
   which can neither be verified nor disproved, for through a negative policy one
   cannot prove why something has not occurred which was actually expected.
   One can never prove, as Kissinger once argued, that peace was maintained
   because a strategic doctrine is indeed the best possible or whether it only had
   a peripheral impact. In fact one cannot even convincingly prove that the dan-
   ger of an attack existed in reality in the first place.[48]

4. The autism model of deterrence policy demonstrates the relatively easy inter-
   changeability of the axes of deterrence. The more autistic a deterrence system
   is, the easier the fixation of the enemy becomes and the simpler it becomes to
   exchange the concrete enemy.[49] One could, indeed, maintain that the only
   limit to this interchangeability is the small number of nations which could be
   stylized into potential enemies.

5. The deterrence system tolerates detente as well, above all when the arma-
   ments complexes have become more or less independent (for example type IV
   in Fig. 3.3). While maintaining the apparatuses of deterrence the expectations
   of conflict being propagated could then at times decrease in intensity; cooper-
   ations in specific instances could become more frequent; but while such thin
   threads of communication are being spun between the antagonists, without of
   course touching upon the domestic centres of production of deterrence policy,
   the danger of revitalization of domestically produceable expectations of con-
   flict and the reactivation of testimonies of hostility remains great.[50] In this
   sense the autism model of deterrence policy would suggest the thesis that the
   decisive thresholds towards a change of deterrence policy are crossed not so
   much during the thoroughly conceivable negotiations between the two antago-
   nists but more likely through the dismantling of armaments complexes and
   their organizations and apparatuses branching out in politics, economy, the
   military sphere and the science which must be carried out domestically.

---

[48] Henry Kissinger in the introduction to Urs Schwarz: *American Strategy* (New York: 1966):
XII.

[49] This has been clearly proven in American ABM debate since 1968 in which China and the
Soviet Union alternatively took over the role of the enemy varying according to their utility at the
moment. Compare Dieter Senghaas: *Rüstung und Militarismus*, *op. cit.*, footnote 15, Chapter 3.

[50] A good summary on such 'cooperation: can be found in Eberhard Menzel: "Die Bemühungen
um die Abrüstung seit 1945; Misserfolge und Teilerfolge", in: Georg Picht and Heinz Eduard
Tödt (eds.): *Studien zur Friedensforschung* (Stuttgart: 1969), 1: 73–97. Caspary has also ascer-
tained that crises and striking events in international politics have a 'half-life' of some six
months, i.e. after six months the attention directed at a past crisis has decreased by about 50 %.
As quoted in Newcomb, *op. cit.*, footnote 17, 20.

3.6 Autism, Reality-Testing and International Relations

After these comments on deterrence policy 1 shall explore several interconnections between autism, reality-testing and international relations. These interconnections on the one hand are still related to deterrence policy; on the other hand, they suggest a general dimension of international relations. To begin with, we must explain the concept of the reality-testing in detail.

This concept appears occasionally in the context of individual psychology as an analytic variable. Only most recently has it begun to be transplanted in isolated cases into the analysis of international politics. In any case Kenneth Boulding has pointed out the extremely underdeveloped processes for assessing reality in the international system.[51] In his article Boulding imputes that distorted images of the environment lead with a high degree of probability to an endemic pathology of learning. The significance of his observation lies in the assertion that the international system is pathological; i.e., that the pathology of learning is a function of the system as long as the predominant structure of international relations remains unchanged. This susceptibility can, to be sure, be varied, but the chances of overcoming it without consciously pursued structural intervention are, nonetheless, minimal. In a similar, general essay Morton Kaplan described international politics as the source of disfunctional tensions.[52] These tensions, he argues, lead to an imprecise orientation to reality; they could be hindering in reaching certain goals or can indeed only permit such goals to be sought at great cost. Although they are often understood and used by governments as an instrument of politics, they can in the end lead to a break-down of the capacity to assess reality.

It is certainly true that a portion of these and similar ideas have long since been a part of the psychological contributions to the analysis of international politics: yet psychologists have as yet never actually formulated a thorough, systematic basis for the analysis of reality-testing at various social levels, from the individual level to the level of international relations. Thus critics have time and again pointed out that those psychologists who consider the outbreak of international hostility and violence to be the result of the summation of individual psychological processes have not adequately conceptualized the problem of the levels or the unity of analysis. In particular in the 'maximalist' school, individual needs and mechanisms of the individual psyche were brought into direct connection with the actions of more complex societal units, in particular those of states. This kind of criticism has often lead to the formulation of 'minimalist' positions which assume that above all non-psychological factors are amongst the determinants of international violence and the outbreak of hostility.

---

[51] Kenneth Boulding: *Beyond Economics* (Ann Arbor: 1968): 288–302.

[52] Morton Kaplan: *Macropolitics* (Chicago: 1968), 129ff.; and John Burton: *Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules* (Cambridge, England: 1968), passim, and by the same author: *Conflict and Communication* (London: 1969), passim.

An adequate analysis would have to combine in detail the structural and psychological variables which determine the processes of reality-testing at the respective levels of society. Each level could have its own characteristics, and it would be important that these were not mixed.

The preconditions for the adequate reality-testing can be best illustrated in the example of individuals. Here the assumptions of ego psychology are of greatest relevance because they implicitly or explicitly throw light upon the information and control processes at the base of the individual's assessments of reality. One could in general assert that the individual on the average possesses the optimal prerequisites for an adequate assessment: a great capacity to process information of all sorts—information from the environment, from the memory, and information about information. Besides this organizational ability to process information, the individual has a high capacity for self-regulation which enables an adaptation to a changing environment and an internal rearrangement as a consequence of a critical reality-testing. Individuals can to a certain degree shield themselves from specific information without losing their self-control; such 'hardening' is very typical of the structuring of that which we term personality.

Since individuals are always part of larger units (family or groups at work) a large part of their reality-testing takes place through interaction with the immediate surroundings. One can thus by all means imagine individuals who have lost some of the abilities mentioned above for absorbing and processing information and who are, nonetheless, capable of non-pathological interaction with their environment, since interaction itself can serve as a medium of reality-testing. One can even imagine individuals who have maintained their openness to their surroundings yet who have forfeited a part of their capacity for self-control and nevertheless experience a kind of reality testing in their (as a rule) highly structured interaction with their external environment. In both cases the unavoidable confrontation with nature and with societal realities would counteract the diminished capacity to process information and counter-balance a diminished self-control. Such interaction appears initially as the basis and possibly even the substitute for an individual reality-testing. It should, on the other hand, be clear that this relationship is only valid as long as the environment does not itself have a weakening influence on the individual's abilities for reality-testing.

The prerequisite for an adequate reality-testing at the level of social groups can at best be termed ambivalent. Social groups can be self-contained and yet still have a more comprehensive 'horizon' than their individual members. One of their important capacities lies in storing information over periods transcending the life span of individuals; they also have a greater potential for action than individuals. But since groups themselves already make up a considerable portion of societal reality, their reality-testing is less interactive than that of individuals. Yet even large groups are confronted with relevant social realities which they themselves do not represent, not to mention control. Their capacity to adapt to new environments, to come to terms with their internal structural problems and especially with a

changing membership is usually strong enough to protect them from a socially based pathology of learning.[53]

It is difficult to make a general estimate of the precise dimensions of the capacity of reality-testing of entire nations. As in the case of individuals or social groups they vary enormously: in each nation the geographic position, history and societal structure will certainly play a considerable role in shaping the capacity to assess reality; this capacity will also vary according to the size of the nation. Furthermore, there are marked differences between the capacities for reality testing in domestic and foreign policy. In general, nations do not possess sufficient capacities for processing information or for self-control—when measured against their size and might—first, to comprehend their own complex inner-world and finally to comprehend the international environment. The chances for reality-testing and for a successful control of political and societal behaviour in domestic society rest, however, on a more solid base than in international politics. Strategies pursued domestically—as for example, social insurance or economic policies—and their consequences can sooner or later actually be observed and comprehended in their entirety; feed-back processes may be slow but they nonetheless exist, and given conscious planning they can become relatively reliable.[54]

This is only partially true of international politics, and if at all then particularly true of economic relations and least true of the political and military consequences of action. Precisely with regard to the latter where we find circular in contradistinction to interactive processes for reality-testing of unprecedented proportions lies the decisive contrast to domestic policy.

Compared with the extremely complex, dense, 'reality-laden' processes of interaction which take place within nations, what goes on in international relations on the average seems—to exaggerate somewhat—like a sequence of actions in a kind of vacuum. These conditions have consequences for the decision-making processes in international politics which must be discussed in greater detail. Moreover, due to the very selective character of transactions in this framework, exchange processes which actually take place between states function to a much more limited extent as self-regulative, as corrective; they have above all only a limited capacity to compensate for underdeveloped social intelligence and capacity for control. In international politics the social reality which determines the cognitive images of the environment and often the behaviour of the nations usually—above all in cases with balanced relations—coincides with the size of the given domestic society and the determinants of action which this society generates.

---

[53] For a brilliant study of the failure of the collective reality-testing in this connection, see Eugene Genovese: *The Political Economy of Slavery* (New York: 1961); and *The World the Slaveholders Made* (New York; 1969).

[54] Compare Amitai Etzioni: *The Active Society* (New York: 1968), and Frieder Naschold: *Organisation und Demokratie* (3rd ed.) (Stuttgart: 1972).

II \ I	available power potential	intelligence potential	capacity for self-control	consequences for behaviour
Individuals	small	great	great	highly adaptable and flexible
Group	medium-large	medium to great	medium to great	operatively relatively flexible
State: Domestic Policy	medium to great	medium	medium	prone to crisis
State: Foreign Policy	very great	moderate	moderate	prone to deep conflicts
International System	small	little in part great	extremely small	powerless

Fig. 3.4 The assessment of reality at various levels of society. *I* Dimensions of the assessment of reality and of behaviour (the concepts are used in the social-cybernetic sense, compare Karl Deutsch: *The Nerves of Government* (New York, 1966). *II* Social Levels (for an explanation, see Dieter Senghaas (ed): *Kritische Friedensforschung* (Frankfurt, 1971): 322–331

If we now turn to the next higher analytic level, the international system, we find that organizationally anchored capacities for the assessment of reality are only marginally developed, although in isolated sectors they can be extremely comprehensive—as for example the work of international organizations and the products of the statistical departments of the U.N. demonstrate—and in questions of international security, for example, transcend the horizons of the individual nation states. By contrast, the potential for action and control is, if at all, then only insufficiently developed. The assessment of reality at this level, indeed, seems to occupy an auxiliary function for individual nation states rather than represent a part of a system with its own social reality, although this reality has begun to develop and grow (Fig. 3.4).

The guidelines of the processes for reality-testing of nations outlined here correspond with regard to their foreign relations particularly exactly to the realities of the deterrence system and an environment in which threat policy is consistently pursued. Here the attempt to minimize real exchange processes (as in the Dulles era) coincides with postures of threat which tend (for reasons mentioned above) to lead to pathological self-expansion and to the departmentalization and extension of the interest basis of threat policy without meeting with any decisive correction

through a critical reality-testing. The lack of such correction becomes more problematical the greater the might and potential for destruction at the disposal of governments.

What can be seen like an ideal type in the analysis of the deterrence system and of deterrence policy suggests a general tendency in international politics: While in the deterrence system, as a result of the previously discussed structure of autistic hostility, reality-testing is incomparably self-centred and directly determines the cognitive foundations for the dynamics of deterrence, autistic components in the reality-testing and first symptoms of autistically determined behaviour can be observed in abundance in international politics. The basis for this tendency is to be found in the structure of international relations prevalent today; this basis promotes (with certain exceptions, to be sure) the tendency toward self-centredness even in those cases in which nations clearly depend for their survival on interaction with others and in cases in which the real components of international relations are generally less broad, less varied and less densely developed than would be necessary to form a clear and decisive counterweight to projective relations with the outside world.

The six types of international relations lying between the extreme poles, deterrence and cooperation in Fig. 3.1 display in at least five cases a more or less marked tendency to autistically determined perception and corresponding behaviour. Let us assume that these types are not merely artefacts of classification, but that the cases they describe can actually be found in reality (which, indeed, cannot be questioned). We would then (given an equal distribution of types which we shall here assume) be able to observe four to six "autistic" or 'in tendency autistic' cases for every one 'non-autistic case'. If we consider that relations between 'top dogs' need by no means be peaceful (England and Germany in the past, for example), that they indeed usually correspond to the type, conflict-laden interpenetration, if we furthermore consider that relations of dependence even when crucial for survival can lead to resentment or frustration, then this estimate of the pattern of distribution of the types of international politics appears not unrealistic.[55]

3.7 Aggressiveness and Loss of Contact with Reality

These observations now enable a provisional answer to one of the most important questions in international politics which is closely related to the problems we have just discussed: Why does critical reality-testing break down incomparably fast and with much less resistance in the behaviour of nations—above all in processes of escalation—than we can as a rule observe among individuals, social groups and in domestic problem areas? And how are we to evaluate threat policy in the context of

---

[55] With the help of a project these data could most certainly be ascertained. One would not, after all, need to include all of the c. 15,000 presently conceivable relations between all states of the world.

this question? I would like to begin here once again with several references to the ideas of ego-psychology without lapsing into 'individualistic ecological fallacies'.[56]

According to various psychological theories, an adequate reality-testing by the individual is dependent upon the performance of the Ego (or ego achievement) which has—as stated in psychoanalytical theory—to mediate between the demands of the Id and the requirements of external reality. In this process the Ego functions like a cybernetic control centre, the primary goal of which consists usually in the preservation and the unimpaired viability of the individual. An impairment of the performance of the Ego can lead to a loss of self-control and to a general alienation from reality. This is, in turn, imprecisely and inadequately perceived; with the release of affective impulses in the end the weakening of intelligence ability of the Ego escalates. Behaviour then comes to be determined more by blind impulses than by a critical reality-testing. An increase in suggestibility brings with it a release of latent, potentially aggressive impulses.

In the language of cybernetics one could argue that with the impairment of the performance of the Ego, the self-corrective or negative feed-back processes are gradually repelled while positive, self-expanding or amplifying feedback processes increase. As primarily affect-oriented behaviour takes the upper hand—supported by positive feedback mechanisms—the tendency to cognitive regression becomes overwhelming and the ability for self-correction decreases. The close relationship between ego-performance as well as the development and the release of aggression has been dealt with in the framework of group and mass psychology in particular.[57] When individuals in certain groups surrender in part their own autonomy, when knowledge and experience of reality and the evaluation of reality within themselves is substituted by relations with reality which can no longer be directly experienced and are no longer a part and result of one's own independent assessment of reality, suggestibility grows. Emotionality then outweighs critical reason and the individual easily tends towards a libidinous uncritical identification with leaders and social movements. On the basis of this analysis it is not so much a primary, unstoppable drive or impulse inherent to the individual but rather apathy which makes an individual tend to aggression.[58]

As we have previously stated, nations are much less adequately equipped with the capacity to assess reality, although they usually possess unprecedented might and must act within an environment in which small tensions, hostility and potential aggression easily arise. The inherent danger for nations in comprehending their external environment lies not only in their susceptibility to distortions of

---

[56] That is, without thoughtlessly transposing from individuals to collective forms.

[57] Compare Theodor Adorno: "Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda", in: Geza Roheim (ed.): *Psychoanalysis in Social Sciences* (1951), 279–300. Compare also Karl Menninger: *The Vital Balance* (Chicago; 1963), 153 ff., on "ego-impairment and loss of self-control".

[58] In this connection, compare Klaus Horn: "Politische Psychologie", in: Gisela Kress and Dieter Senghaas (eds.): *Politikwissenschaft* (Frankfurt: 1969), 215–268 and the literature cited there.

information and in misperceptions but also precisely in the constant threat that an adequate self-image and self-criticism will be undermined and—related to this—that the capacity for self-control will be weakened.[59] It is relatively easy to understand the tendency of nations towards threat policy and escalating behaviour which often end in acts of violence if one interprets aggressiveness and actual aggression in international politics along the lines we have just outlined: as the result of a cognitive loss of contact with reality towards the outside as well as internally. This occurs when the capacities for reality-testing and for self-control are underdeveloped, whereby the loss of self-control is in turn intensified by the rise of affect-determined behaviour.[60]

This is the basic reason why nations, once set on a collision course, have difficulties in modifying their involvement or renouncing strategies once begun. Seen from the outside such involvement often seems self-assured and calculated step by step; and political propaganda, no less in the past than today, tries again and again to transmit the image of a well-considered strategy, based on a detailed conception, be it a threat or be it escalation, whereas in reality in many such cases states are blindly driven rather than in control of their own actions.[61]

Thus in the case of nations the dangerous aspect of the undermining of the resources of critical intelligence lies (as we shall explain in detail later) not only in the distortion of information from the environment and in the gradual construction of enemy-images and their corresponding attitudes but also in the gradual dissolution of a realistic self-assessment as well as in the problematic consequences of the actions which result from such an assessment. One can thus interpret the tendency to escalation and to violence in international politics as the result of the interplay of a distorted orientation to the environment—orientations being sustained by a limited yet powerful constellation of interests—and running parallel to it, an internal self-delusion with growing political effectiveness which can lead as far as collective self-deception.[62] This double loss of contact with reality in devel-

---

[59] Compare inter alia Franz Alexander: "On the Psychodynamics of Regressive Phenomena in Panic States", in: Roheim (ed.), *op. cit*., footnote 57 (1952), 3 104–110; and Edith Weigert: "Conditions of Organized and Regressive Response to Danger", in: Roheim (ed.), *op. cit.* (1955), 121–126.

[60] Some initial thoughts in this direction can be found in Morris Ginsberg: "The Causes of War", in: *Sociological Review* (1939): 121–143, especially 135.

[61] Shortly after leaving the Pentagon, Defense Minister Clifford, indeed, once said that with regard to Vietnam the Americans had a suspicion which grew into a conviction and ended ultimately in an obsession, in: NBC-Interview, Channel 4, Detroit, June 19, 1969. More recently, see Joseph Gouldner: *Truth is the First Casualty—The Gulf of Tonkin Affair: Illusion and Reality* (Chicago: 1969).

[62] For an example of such a development, see Fritz Stern: *Bethmann-Hollweg und der Krieg. Die Grenzen der Verantwortung* (Tübingen: 1968), and several pertinent statistics in Dieter Senghaas: "Politische und militärische Dimension der gegenwärtigen Friedensproblematik", in: Dieter Senghaas (ed.), *op. cit.*, footnote 16, 20; as well as Karl Deutsch and Dieter Senghaas: "Die brüchige Vernunft von Staaten", in: Dieter Senghaas (ed.): *Kritische Friedensforschung* (Frankfurt: 1971): 105–163.

oping hostilities has as yet to be sufficiently taken into consideration in the analysis of the connection between aggressiveness and the tendency towards violence. The fragility of the political reason of nations manifests itself precisely in the fact that, in the worst case, sufficient critical forces cannot be mobilized against systematic processes of stultification (as represented in a policy of escalation) and that with growing hostility, the environment is seldom a reliable instrument of critical correction. In complex reciprocal relations the irritation, generated when attempts to make the environment controllable and predictable fail, has an intensifying effect on these processes; the resort to actual aggression then often appears to be like a liberating action which frees one of uncertainty and re-establishes 'clarity' in the matter.[63]

What position does consistently pursued threat policy have in this connection? Its problematical significance lies in the fact that it engenders all the possible impulses which decisively strengthen those developmental tendencies which we have outlined here. In leading to the cutting off of free communication and the adequate assessment of reality, in incessantly nourishing the soil of hostility and developing autistic structures, threat policy promotes the exact opposite to what a rational policy which calls to account the structural weaknesses of international politics should take into consideration (I shall return to this point in the conclusion). This policy seems dangerous not only with regard to foreign relations but also to its chronic consequences internally. Beyond the many repercussions in social policies which we have already discussed let us mention here in passing the effect of threat policy on conceivable first steps on the part of individual societal subsystems towards a critical relationship with open communication to the outside world: they are blocked if not thwarted, engendering in the end a cognitive impoverished infrastructure which must then deal with essential questions of security policy which in turn can only be mastered by special, conscious political efforts.[64] Moreover, in the course of the development of a vigorously pursued deterrence policy there is the danger that it will be redundantly caused and finally overdetermined,[65] that is, that its political and strategic military components taken individually—and indeed in combination—most probably promote in one and the same direction the tendency of a state to perception of threat and overreaction which in the end carry over into the development of armament complexes. The conformity in domestic politics which threat policy welcomes for reasons of efficiency then

---

[63] On this subject, see Durbin and Bowlby's discussion in Leon Bramson and George Goethals (eds.): *War* (2nd ed.) (New York: 1968): 100–101, where they interpret violence as a flight from alarming complexity. See also, Karl Deutsch: *The Analysis of International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs: 1968).

[64] The role of self-deception among the Americans in Vietnam has been treated in an on the spot analysis by Robert Jay Lifton: "Deception of War and Peace", in: *History and Human Survival* (New York: 1970): 210–254.

[65] For a discussion of this concept, see Karl Deutsch and Dieter Senghaas: "A Framework for a Theory of War and Peace", in: Albert Lepawsky et al. (eds.): *The Search for World Order, Festschrift for Quincy Wright* (New York: 1972), 23–46.

Fig. 3.5 The irrationalization   Tensions   Decline of goal arranging feed-back processes and
process in conflict spirals   ↓
                                       Hostility   of negative feed-back processes as well as an increase
                                        ↓
                                       Aggression of positive feed-back processes

leads to the erosion of any independent assessment of reality, that is, any that has
not been assimilated into its own political line. What makes processes of escala-
tion and wars which result from threat policy over-determined is not so much the
fact that their outbreak was over-determined from the very beginning but rather
that this outbreak gradually develops into an over-determined pattern of action. To
be precise one would have to speak of the growth of over-determination through
which trends in opinion and behaviour among domestic groups and institutions are
synchronized.

The literature on the psychological analysis of international politics can cer-
tainly be related to our previous observations. This literature emphasizes the usu-
ally highly developed sometimes barely developed tendency of individual
civilizations and cultures towards aggression; special emphasis is placed on the
role of potentially aggressive personality types. The strength of this 30 years old
debate[66] lies in its identification of key variables of individual sources (i.e., indi-
viduals, influence groups, politicians) of possible aggression. These early analyses
have brought important findings to light; but we will have to make more of an
effort in the coming years to develop explanations for the processes of the bun-
dling of single factors to form irrational strategies and the preconditions for behav-
iour which often go against the self-interest of societal aggregates (Fig. 3.5).[67]

I have attempted to demonstrate why the processes for reality-testing in the
relations between states and their environment are problematical and why the
potentially autistic character of international politics and of international relations
(a phenomenon which for individuals and indeed for some social groups appears
quite remote from reality) to varying degrees make international politics the object
of projective relations.[68] I have tried to characterize the conditions of susceptibil-
ity to irrational behaviour inherent in internal societal structure as well as in the
structure of international relations and which in the case of deterrence policy are
amplified to an unprecedented extent.

---

[66] Compare the references to the literature in footnote 7.

[67] In this connection, see the pioneering article by Karl Deutsch: "Mass Communications and
the Loss of Freedom in National Decision-Making: A Possible Research Approach to Interstate
Conflicts", in: J. K. Zawodny (ed.): *op. cit.*, footnote 7, 695–702.

[68] James Rosenau has nicely characterized the structure and components of the opinion-shap-
ing and decision-making processes in foreign policy in their mixture of deficient information
and (in cases of conflict) of psychological intensity. Compare his contribution to the volume he
edited: *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York, 1967): 11–50.

3.8 Decision-Making Processes, Threat Policy and Escalation

The phenomena which we have thus far discussed suggest important consequences for the analysis of political behaviour. Probably the most important part of such an analysis is that which deals with the conflict behaviour of nations. In this connection, a hypothesis which has previously been suggested must be more explicitly formulated: conflicts which were originally 'realistic' tend to be overlayed by 'non-realistic' components in the course of their escalation.[69] By realistic conflict we understand those which bring about the clarification of conflicting goals and which are solvable within given time-spans at least. Such conflicts need by no means be carried out with hostility and aggression. However, as intensity grows, realistic conflicts tend to be transformed into non-realistic ones which then do not so much serve the carrying out of conflict between the opposing parties as rather the release of tensions and aggressive or quasi-aggressive impulses. One could view realistic conflicts as means to attaining goals which one sets oneself and holds as long as it remains reasonable and efficacious; whereas non-realistic conflicts, as in the case of ideological conflicts, engender an involvement which hardly allows for comparable flexibility, since in extreme cases a confrontation which is open to compromise is no longer desired; indeed, aggression must be satisfied. Once certain thresholds are crossed, above all in processes of escalation, realistic conflict turns into non-realistic conflict. The conclusive role which the decision-makers play here must be observed independently.

The sliding escalation of conflicts is accompanied by cognitive distortions and fixation of behaviour in the decision-making process, which have been discussed in detail in peace research in the past years and which I shall only briefly sketch here.[70] Defence mechanisms in the Ego in the individual psyche—repression, negation, projection, displacement—lead to distortions of this kind. But also the succession of experienced frustrations and self-manifesting aggression brings such distortions in its tow. Because in an escalating conflict, the desire to master one's environment grows while the environment at the same time becomes more uncontrollable as it becomes more hostile), decision-makers often tend to play over the cognitive dissonance which they experience by markedly hardening their previous position.[71] If such behaviour precipitates organizationally founded strategies then an entire information apparatus can be molded as far as the search for information, its processing and evaluation are concerned.

---

[69] For a differentiating analysis, see Lewis Coser: *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: 1956).

[70] Charles Hermann: *Crisis in Foreign Policy* (Indianapolis: 1969), in which he compares a simulation analysis with real conflicts. Ralph White: *Nobody Wanted War* (New York: 1968), in particular the literature cited in footnote 43. For a general presentation see Ross Stagner: *Psychological Aspects of International Conflict* (Belmont, California: 1967).

[71] Robert Abelson et al. (eds.): *Theories of Cognitive Consistency* (Chicago: 1969).

A further cause of cognitive distortion is the inability to tolerate ambiguity, insecurity and vagueness (intolerance of ambiguity).[72] A continuing open situation can in a hostile environment easily engender the wish to establish clarity abruptly through massive intervention. Such impatience vis-à-vis incomprehensible, intellectually ambiguous situations is often grounded in cognitively rigid structures of thought and feeling: in the tendency to think in stereotypes, to oversimplify and to be over assured which in this combination lead to a compliance to political propaganda.

The reduction of cognitive complexity in the face of perceived tension, experienced fear, recognized hostility under the pressure of time and under considerable stress is a dimension of cognitive distortion which has been well researched both theoretically and empirically.[73] Given the intensively perceived hostility the pressure for the cognitive simplification of information processes and content is increased by positive group sanctions precisely in questions of patriotism.

Lastly, there are a whole series of pressures towards conformity in small groups which do not lend themselves to raising the level of intelligence of a group; not even the highest decision-making bodies over war and peace are immune to them.[74]

The phenomena we have mentioned can often be found united in so-called 'authoritarian personalities'. The authoritarian personality distinguishes itself precisely through this propensity to dogmatism, through thinking in terms of stereotypes—in friend versus enemy images, through intolerance of ambiguities and the readiness to use violence, in particular military violence in international politics, the tendency to inter-ethnical, non-realistic conflict behaviour and through related attitudes and the mode of behaviour which is derived from them.[75] Moreover, in the close analysis of the 'authoritarian personality' the belief in power and punishment as a means for controlling human behaviour and for solving human and

---

[72] Else Frenkel-Brunswick: "Social Tensions and the Inhibition of Thought", in: *Social Problems* (1954): 75–81.

[73]   Compare in particular Pruitt, op. cit., footnote 43.

[74]   One of the most enlightening studies on this topic: James Thompson: "How Could Vietnam Happen. An Autopsy", in: *The Atlantic* (April, 1968), 47–53, in which the author (himself a member of the government machinery in Washington) interprets the escalation of personal prestige and the exaggerated personal commitments, strengthened by public propaganda among other factors as what caused the kinds of groups of capable, committed men who regularly and repeatedly made mistakes and whose status depended upon their ultimately being proved right. Compare also the report, "The Stupidity of Intelligence", in: *The Washington Monthly* (1969), no. 8, 23–28, in which a member of the American forces tells of the group pressures (for career reasons) which exist in Vietnam to consciously invent and play up 'information on success' even where there was no basis in reality of any kind for such a success. The distortion mechanism we have mentioned has important repercussions in their significance for theories on the outbreak of war. When this is coupled with analyses of the organizational sociology of the decision-making institutions, the image of 'rational' political decision-making groups and individuals should hardly be maintainable.

[75]   David Levinson: "Authoritarian Personality and Foreign Policy" in: Bramson and Goethals (eds.): *op. cit.,* footnote 63: 133–146.

societal conflicts has been recognized in empirical studies for almost 30 years as a dimension which decisively determines the behaviour of humans in questions of war and peace.[76]

It has been demonstrated time and again that compulsion as a basic attitude is constituted of primarily ideological factors like militarism, nationalism, conservatism, religious orthodoxy and political cynicism as well as personality attributes such as extraversion, misanthropy, exaggerated discipline in childhood upbringing and the susceptibility to neuroses. The tendency to threaten with the use of violence and—at the level of manifest behaviour—to actually pursue deterrence policy can undoubtedly be assigned to this dimension. The tendency to punitive and compulsive behaviour frequently permeates the attitudes to domestic and foreign policy, to moral and religious questions with a uniform orientation, giving them coherence and overall meaning. One can observe a similar coherence in the contrasting basic attitude which has been described in the scientific literature as compassion. Internationalism as the ideological factor and empathy (i.e., the capacity and the desire to understand other people and peoples in terms of their own value) as the personality attribute are combined in this basic attitude.

Many critics of the individual-psychological approach to the analysis of the behaviour of decision-makers and opinion-leaders in foreign policy tend to deny or at least belittle the ideological-affective and cognitive personality attributes which we have mentioned and the compulsion toward false perception and wrong decisions. They argue that states are self-contained units and the persons who act in politics are merely playing their parts and orienting themselves toward a rationally defined and well understood self-interest. The weakness of such an argument lies in its failure to take into account the extent to which the environment in which the decision-makers in international politics must act alone harbours a problematical structural prerequisite for pathology of learning. In times of international tension, crises and escalation, the combination of an individual pathology of learning with a heightened degree of fallibility in the international system (concerning the absorption, processing and evaluation of information in its subsystems) can bring about catastrophic consequences. In such a case an interaction between the two factors with a cumulative effect is more likely than the cool, conscious, political rationality which so many theories still postulate.[77] The latter reaction can, of course, occur but the probability is low. Figure 3.6 illustrates some of these interconnections.

The analysis of misperceptions and miscalculations in international crises has lead to observations which are relevant in this connection. Today almost no one disputes that these mistakes stem in part from a process of seeking information

---

[76] See recently in particular William Eckhardt: "Ideology and Personality in Social Attitudes", in: *Peace Research Reviews* (1969), no. 2, as well as Newcomb, *op. cit.*, footnote 17, Part II. On the following, see Eckhardt.

[77] Here also lies the weakness of Robert Jervis's otherwise valuable article: "Hypotheses on Misperception", in: *World Politics* (1968): 454–479, Compare also Robert Jervis: *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: 1970).

Fig. 3.6   Social and psychological channels of aggression and violence

which is based on false, though indeed politically understandable, premises. It is furthermore generally accepted that these mistakes frequently do not stem from a lack of information but rather from the politically motivated false evaluation of the abundance of information at hand.[78] We have at our disposal precise studies (above all on Pearl Harbor and the Cuba crisis) of the latter case which illustrate the difficulties involved in isolating and reading the proper signals amidst the abundance of information.[79]

When decision-makers consciously pursue crisis policy and escalation policy, sober evaluation of the environment decreases as the degree of self-delusion rises; their tendency to absorb arriving information in terms of already existing theories and images of the environment rises, and the equilibrium between the trend toward self-encapsulation on the one hand and realistic orientation to the outside world on the other is shifted in favour of the former.[80]

---

[78] On the problem as a whole, see Harold Wilensky: *Organizational Intelligence* (New York: 1967), which is probably the most important work on the subject and the early article by Benno Wassermann: "The Failure of Intelligence Prediction", in: *Political Studies* (1960): 156–169, as well as the previously mentioned book by Goulden on the Tonkin Incident, *op. cit.*, footnote 61.

[79] Roberta Wohlstetter: "Cuba and Pearl Harbor, Hindsight and Foresight", in: *Foreign Affairs* (1965): 691–707.

[80] For this reason Faupel seems to me to be wrong on this point. He advocates the theses (footnote 8) that the 'two-way' aspect of the relations increases with this actual conflict. Considering all that has been discussed here, this seems precisely to be untrue. It is characteristic of escalation that it increases the 'one-way' aspect of bilateral relations. Under the premises of escalation and hostility, communication comes to mean soliloquy.

The dangerous tendency to consider a minimum of information to be a sufficient basis for self-affirmation increases; the trend towards viewing the opposite side as more hostile and more coordinated, centralized and disciplined in its actions than it actually is likewise accelerated. Precedence is then given to political strategies which in the short term appear sensible (as, for example, increased threat policy and escalation), ignoring the social costs, over long-term calculations which call for greater caution. The assumption (usually tacit) that such threat policy will impress the opponent and that his motivations could thus be changed leads one to ignore the most elementary rules of common-sense in human behaviour such as the recognition that threats without the promise of positive gains and without the reliable prospect of any kind of reward clearly consolidate political motivations and positions on the part of the opponent who feels threatened.[81] The argument continually defended in the discussion of deterrence policy, that through such a policy and its weapons arsenal one can extort concessions from the enemy must be assigned to the realm of political and scientific folklore.[82]

Indeed, central aspects of the theory of decision-making precisely in the doctrine of deterrence are extremely problematical whether one considers the bias for security measures which are plausible in the short-term but have unbelievable negative consequences in the long-term or the assumption of rational self-control, or the disregard of cumulative risks, the assumption that strategies which are politically ruthless and in part consciously irrationally pursued have a chance for success, the imputation of unchanged motivation on the part of the opponent even vis-à-vis ruthless threat policy from one's own side or other aspects.[83]

The doctrines of deterrence have propagated assumptions which at first appear very enticing and plausible but which are suited neither to the period before 1945 nor to the following years; that these doctrines are highly problematical for international politics for the reasons outlined above hardly need be repeated. Not even the assertion that with the development of nuclear weapons the determinants of traditional politics have become obsolete can change this fact of life.

---

[81] Compare Thomas Eliot: "A Criminological Approach to Social Control of International Aggression", in: *American Journal of Sociology* (1952–1953): 513–518.

[82] Compare James Payne: *The American Threat. The Fear of War as an Instrument of Foreign Policy* (Chicago: 1970), a book which offers an exemplary collection of the absurdities of deterrence thinking.

[83] Karl Deutsch, *op. cit.*, footnote 63,126–129; Dieter Senghaas: *Abschreckung und Frieden*, *op. cit.*, footnote 1, 284–286; also compare the studies in Pruitt and Snyder (eds.), footnote 2; in particular also Bruce Russett: "Pearl Harbor: Deterrence Theory or Decision Theory", in: *Journal of Peace Research* (1967): 89–106, as well as Chihiro Hosoya: "Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy. Japanese-US Relations 1938–1941", in: *Journal of Peace Research* (1968): 97–115, as well as Philip Green: *Deadly Logic* (Columbus: 1966): 213–253.

3.9 The Transition from Dissociative to Associative Peace Policy

I have thus far concentrated for reasons I have already mentioned on the analysis of one of the nine posited types of international relations, the system of mutual deterrence, because the potential dangers of international politics take on a particularly momentous form in this type and because these dangers can easily be illustrated in the example of deterrence policy. My commentary on the remaining types can thus be relatively brief and succinct. Whenever the real relations between states deepen, whenever enemy-images do not play a considerable role and wherever sufficient capacity for reliable mutual coordination of action exists, the chances increase that states will approach one another in lasting cooperative or at least aggression-free competitive relations or that they will at least learn to live in peaceful coexistence. Growing interdependence without adequate capacity for coordination is not enough, for—given the structure of international relations—this could quickly lead to conflict-laden interpenetration.[84]

It is in this connection that one must view all those peace programmes and practical strategies which increase the realistic element of international and transnational relations and work to strengthen the capacity to regulate them—above all with the help of more extensive international organizations. This is not the place to discuss these programmes in detail; nor can I treat the directly relevant problems of integration and transnational association here.[85] We can, however, assert the following: the transition from deterrence to cooperation implies a social transformation which would amount to a structural reorganization of inter-state relations—the step from dissociative to associative peace policy.[86] Galtung described the former as the attempt to attain peace through minimalization of contacts and through separation, while he characterized associative peace policy as cooperation and interdependence secured through 'symmetrical' relations as well as relations which overlap and intersect in many respects play a role. The search for ways to enrich and heighten inter-state relations and to increase the probability of a realistic, adequate assessment of reality as attempts to promote structures which suppress autistic hostility is clearly present in these observations. The same is true of the critical variables which have been discussed again and again in the theory of political integration, variables which are supposed to promote integration and contribute to the formation of communities within which wars are no longer conceivable: the agreement on political and societal basic values; the expectation of gaining political or

---

[84] Karl Deutsch, *op. cit.*, footnote 11, passim.

[85] In this connection, see Eva Senghaas-Knobloch: *Frieden durch Integration und Assoziation* (Stuttgart: 1969).

[86] Compare Johan Galtung: "Über die Zukunft des internationalen Systems", in: *Futurum*, 1: 73–116, as well as Galtung: "Theorien des Friedens" in: Dieter Senghaas (ed.), *op. cit*., footnote 62: 235–246; and Johan Galtung (ed.): *Cooperation in Europe* (Assen: 1970).

material 'goods'; the ability to take into consideration the interests of all the states involved, in particular the needs of weaker members (responsiveness); and a mutual predictability of those motives and actions which is determined by an uninterrupted communication between states, above all their elites as well as a widespread enlightened sense of loyalty vis-à-vis new political units.

This concept combines emancipatory steps with organizational innovation. The extent to which these ideas correspond to reality today is an open question which requires empirical analysis. The danger that elites, above all powerful influential groups, will come together at the expense of the people and the dangers that in view of the persistent asymmetries between states processes of integration will help to cement old relationships of dependence and possibly create new ones are not small and require critical analysis. The realities of the nation-state and of international stratification will offer persistent resistance in the long term to comprehensive international cooperation in which the tendency to autistic hostility and to the exploitation of political interests no longer belong to the decisive determinants of international politics.

3.10 Instrumental Threat Policy in Cooperative Systems

But even after the development phase of cooperative systems has been reached, elements of threat policy would still be recognizable.[87] Since the value and function of threat policy in such a framework are entirely different from those in a deterrence system and since cooperative systems in a way represent the second extreme type of international relations in international politics, 1 would like to discuss briefly several characteristics of this kind of threat policy.

Cooperation or cooperative systems in international relations are characterized by relatively pronounced transaction flows in real exchange processes with images of mutual cooperation predominating and with a high positive covariance of gains and actual rewards to be expected. This means that cooperative systems are not solely based on extensive real exchange processes which, given optimal conditions, are of varying nature, so that the cessation of a particular kind of transaction (for example involving a particular kind of goods) does not seriously affect the existing network of reciprocal connections. Neither are cooperative systems only shaped by the psychic tendency toward cooperative self-images and images of the environment and the low probability of escalating perceptions of hostility, but also by an interdependent, to a certain extent symbiotic, way of life. The success and failure of one directly affects the others; the concept of co-variance circumscribes this state of affairs. Co-variance of expectations of success and gains is positive when the success of one does not necessarily imply a disadvantage to the other (were this the case one would speak today of negative co-variance or a zero-sum game of interests).

---

[87] Compare Kenneth Boulding: "Towards a Theory of Peace", in: Roger Fisher (ed.): *International Conflict and Behavioral Sciences* (New York: 1964): 70–87.

In the theory of international relations, patterns of relations which are marked by a high degree of transaction and the existence of a pronounced preference for cooperation with a partner are termed integrated or integrative systems. International integration theory attempts to analytically comprehend the necessary and adequate background conditions for processes of integration and the key variables (as well as their typical relations) of movements toward integration.

It is my thesis that in a cooperative system (as exists today between France and the Federal Republic of Germany, for example) not only conflicts of interests exist but that specific forms of threat policy can also be observed. In such a context threat policy is an instrument or means of pushing through one's own interests within a framework of cooperative international and transnational relations which itself is nonetheless not called into question. In such an environment, threat policy is usually pursued in isolated instances only; it is limited to mutual controversies and employed according to the dictates of political convenience. It acts as a regulating mechanism which appears sensible for the short-term, as a vehicle to promote new cooperative arrangements (as we could very frequently observe in the E.E.C. negotiations of the past years); like many conflicts, it can serve to accelerate processes of mutual adaptation.[88] Under the premises of a framework of cooperative politics which is beyond question, even a surprising ultimatum can promote integration and thus help to overcome inter-state relations in which threat policy as a rule promotes escalation, aggression and war.

Such cooperative systems are a rare phenomenon in international relations. However, they do exist occasionally; and the isolated use of threat policy which is understood and employed as an instrument, as a means to a positive end, is just as frequent as inner societal controversies in the everyday course of domestic politics: in domestic politics, as in inter-state cooperative systems, this form of threat policy is characteristically employed not to transmit a threat to a partner but to push through a substantively different goal with the instrumental help of threat policy. The probability that threat policy will not become an end in itself, that it will not become chronic, makes such a policy instrumental in this context.

The dangers of a threat policy which is employed in order to slow down or halt the development and growth processes of a cooperative system are likewise evident. It can easily turn into an obstructive strategy. Cooperative systems can thus be transformed into that type of international relations which I have termed conflict-laden interpenetration, in which the actual transactions are highly developed and the enemy-images are pronounced (One could cite the German-English relationship before 1914 in this connection). In a cooperative system as I have attempted to sketch it, threat policy is employed only in isolated instances, for short periods and with specific goals as a means of mutual coordination because, as a consequence of the existing real transactions, the positive psychological predisposition and open processes of communication, a dense societal reality between cooperating states exists in which constant interaction leads to a mutual synchronization of goals and

---

88   Compare Coser, *op. cit.*, footnote 68.

operative strategies take place, even without threat policy. As far as the reality-testing, self-control and mutual influences are concerned, the material as well as psychic state of affairs which we have just described forms the foundations for the majority of inter-personal or inner-societal relations which are routinely pursued rather than constantly strategically reconsidered. The fact that we have developed theories of integration and association for inter-state relations suggests the extent to which the material and psychic prerequisites for the formation or the existence of cooperative systems are usually, that is in the majority of all observable cases, lacking in this field of inter-personal, interstate activity. It is no wonder then or rather it is a completely realistic estimation of the situation to note that threat policy is more likely to be associated with escalation, hostility, aggressiveness and aggression, or indeed warlike behaviour in international politics.

3.11 Chronic Versus Instrumental Threat Policy

So far I have attempted to analyze the two extreme types of international relations: deterrence and cooperation. It only remains to be emphasized that in all the remaining types illustrated in Fig. 3.1 the danger is very great that the employment of threat policy not merely in isolated instances but systematically planned and permanently practiced—in the sense of lasting conceptions of threat and threat strategies—will lead to the formation of autistic structures and will activate autistic processes. This is particularly true of the type "conflict-laden interpenetration", as I have already stated. Throughout history it has been the most common type of reciprocal relations amongst the leading states. For these states—on the basis of their size alone—have always traded with one another, have done considerable reciprocal investing and promoted diplomatic exchange and inter-governmental communication. Adequate instruments for the mutual coordination of spheres of interest have seldom developed; conflicts of interest were seldom rationally negotiated and settled. In the majority of cases the danger of sudden turnover or indeed the gradual transition from realistic conflicts to non-realistic conflicts increased. Chronic obsession with the enemy was no rarity in the history of Europe or the world. As with this type of international relations, the other types can much more easily be activated in the direction of intensive enemy-images than towards better coordinated, realistic relations. The costs of such policy have always appeared small and above all in agreement with one's own "interests". However, its long-term consequences can be extremely costly, above all when hostile relations, once established, begin to expand and when the corresponding organizational consequences show themselves following (like arms races). The danger is then indeed great that moves toward those phenomena which I have attempted to analyze in detail will be implemented: the establishment of chronic tendencies towards perceiving threat strategies and the escalation from instrumental to chronic threat policy with its well-known consequences: the militarization of foreign policy and the development of armament complexes.

3.12 Threat Policy in Asymmetrical Structures

In this study I have dealt primarily with threat policy within symmetric structures. This is a decisive limitation which must once again be called to the reader's attention. For the laws of symmetrical structures can only in part be transposed to asymmetrical relationships.

Two essential points should be made in this connection. The fact that in most cases asymmetrical structures (i.e., in terms of power and resources) in international politics and within societies can reproduce themselves without the active employment of threat policy—at least as long as the underdogs do not rebel against the top dogs—is indeed an important characteristic of such systems. Where this is not the case we are confronted with a perfect system of structural violence[89] as it is labelled by peace research today. Yet the more unstable this structure of dependency—or dependent reproduction[90]—becomes, the more important the role of threat strategies becomes which are employed by the top dogs against the underdogs to obstruct movements towards structural change and social forces lighting the prevailing status quo. In such a context, threat policy is the first step towards an overt reactionary policy of pacification which can, and often enough does, end in manifest, direct violence.

On the other hand, in such political and social contexts, threat policy as practiced by the underdogs is an instrument within strategies of polarization which is meant to break up relations of structural violence. It too represents the first step towards such a strategy; indeed, it must be practiced for a relatively long period of time if it is to have any effect whatsoever, for the superiority of the top dogs cannot be broken through isolated campaigns.[91]

This example, although only briefly sketched and presented as a supplement to our discussion of threat policy, shows how important it is that one considers the given context within which a specific policy and strategy are pursued.

3.13 Four Recommendations for the First Steps of a Transformation Strategy

The road from deterrence-based relations to cooperative relations in international politics is long and difficult and in the case of the super powers is additionally complicated by the existence of nuclear and chemical-bacteriological weapons potentials. If it should lead to a 'peaceful coexistence', for the beginning—namely

---

[89] See in this connection Johan Galtung's article which was quoted in footnote 10.

[90] Compare the studies in Dieter Senghaas (ed.): *Imperialismus und strukturelle Gewalt. Analysen über abhängige Reproduktion* (Frankfurt: 1972).

[91] See in particular Lars Dencik: "Plädoyer für eine revolutionäre Konfliktforschung", in: Dieter Senghaas (ed.), *op. cit.*, footnote 10, 247–270.

survival—this would be a gain. My discussion of deterrence policy and international relations implicitly contains several general suggestions for a medium term strategy of change, in particular the following four[92] which I shall like to mention in conclusion:

1. We must point out the importance of overcoming the self-centredness which amplifies itself through threat policy with the help of a process of self-criticism which would become effective in domestic policy and which would precipitate revised political strategies, organizational arrangements (for example in security policy) and work in political education which would consciously draw attention to the dangers of threat policy and deterrence policy and thus contribute to overcoming the regressive structures of consciousness amongst the public which were cultivated in the Cold War. With such a political strategy the susceptibility of a society and a state to pursuing costly, blind strategies could be noticeably reduced.

2. We must imply that such domestic self-correction in international politics must take the form of a consciously pursued under-reaction vis-à-vis states which are hostile or at least not amicably disposed. We would have to pursue unilateral strategies of non-escalation or de-escalation with conscious effort in order to prevent spirals of conflict and to have a moderating effect on possible action-reaction syndromes. The concept of decisive under-reaction or under-response[93] corresponds, though in the opposite direction, to a doctrine of escalation: it attempts to counteract all cognitive and affective-emotional situations into which international politics and, indeed, threat policy can easily lapse.

3. We must increase the realistic components in the relations between antagonists as well as create and gradually extend the chances for a coordination of their actions which is secured institutionally and organizationally. In the concrete case of the present system of deterrence this could lead to a form of conspiracy between the super powers which are evoked so often, if measures towards domestic self-correction (see point 1) are not at the same time introduced on both sides and if comprehensive social change is not promoted.

4. We will need positive feed-back processes between the newly activated political strategies in domestic and international politics. In this framework such positive feed-back processes function to promote the growth and expansion of the fragmentary attempts to develop alternative strategies. They require particular attention, above all in the critical initial phase where failure is a constant threat.

Whether or not these four guidelines will prove to be modest points of departure for a strategy of transformation depends to a great extent on the development

---

[92] On international 'strategies of revolution' and 'rational behavioral strategies' see Roger Fisher: *International Conflict for Beginners* (New York: 1969).

[93] Karl Deutsch, op. cit., footnote 11; and Dean Pruitt: "Stability and Sudden Change in Interpersonal and International Affairs", in: *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (1969), 18–38. Pruitt has explicitly developed the theory of unterretaliation.

of self-awareness and self-confidence of social forces who sustain action and the readiness of a political elite to commit themselves to the creation of a new peace order. As long as the political, military-strategic, economic and social psychological premises of deterrence policy which we have outlined stand unquestioned, I would consider the chances for an alternative peace policy to be rather uncertain.

As far as the relations between the central European countries are concerned—above all between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic—the chances for self-correction appear greater. The reason is simple: under the present conditions of communications and technology, in the short or the long run, structures of autistic hostility can be carried on ad absurdum and can develop to the point of absurdity if the four guidelines for a new policy which I have outlined are not transposed into a whole spectrum of practices in domestic and foreign policy which cannot be described in detail here. Whether this will succeed and whether anything whatsoever will change depends upon the constant efforts and the resoluteness of progressive political groups at all possible levels of society.[94]

---

[94] I emphasize the wide spectrum of societal levels because otherwise the danger of technocratic politics would exist. On these problems see Claus Offe: "Das politische Dilemma der Technokratie", in: Claus Koch and Dieter Senghaas (eds.): *Texte zur Technokratiediskussion* (Frankfurt: 1970): 156–171.

Chapter 4
Friedrich List and the Basic Problems of Development (1989)

The name of Friedrich List is not exactly at the centre of the current discussion of development theory and development policy.[1] Even in the past 40 years, during which development planning has everywhere become the object of national and international politics, the situation has not been different. This limited interest in List's work is rather paradoxical if one considers that he could be called the great–great grandfather of today's development theorists, development policymakers, and development planners. This apparent underestimation of the man, which is mainly a reflection of a lack of knowledge, and only occasionally an expression of intentional polemics, repeats a tragic element that characterized extensive periods of his life.

Throughout his lifetime List (1789–1846) set himself tasks with which, today more than ever, development planners are attempting to cope in private and public institutions of development aid. On his own initiative or in response to tasks entrusted to him, he formulated memoranda and petitions—which today would be termed development projects—primarily aimed at far-reaching administrative reform, promotion of industry and trade, and improvement of the infrastructure. Transport planning, particularly railway construction, became one of his favourite occupations.

And like contemporary development planners, List was a tireless traveller. His life was characterized by a ceaseless restlessness. Nowhere was he really at home; and wherever he might have felt at home, for instance in Württemberg, he made too many enemies. In his time, to be sure, unlike today, the profession of development planner and leader of development projects was not a lucrative one, whether

---

in the administration or 'in the field'. Only since the fifties and sixties of the 20th century has the planning, execution and administration of development projects become a large-scale and generally very remunerative means of job creation. In List's time, as his life reveals, 'development work' was extremely risky.

List early on worked out his concept of development. His pronounced ability to solve practical problems of development was of more use to him in the process than lengthy studies in an ivory tower. The fact that he nevertheless eventually published an academically noteworthy work on basic questions of political economy demonstrates his analytical ability to discuss problems of development thoroughly and systematically. His 1841 book *Das nationale System der politischen Ökonomie* (The National System of Political Economy) may be termed a classical treatise on the basic problems of modern development—even if most development experts today in politics, the administration, higher learning and planning know nothing of its substance or, at the very most, are only able to recall its arguments about protective tariffs (e.g., infant industry protection).[2]

When examined carefully, however, List's contribution to understanding the problems of development is incredibly up to date. It is therefore still well worthwhile examining his work.[3]

Authors become classical when they impart a way of looking at problems that permits a new interpretation of social reality. What is the Listian perspective?

4.1 Delayed Development as a Problem

The starting point of List's reflections is the problem of delayed or catch-up development. It arises when a gap in know-how and organizational capacities exists between economies carrying on frequent exchange with each other, or where such a gulf forms as a consequence of unequally spreading technological and organizational innovations. A less productive economy is then confronted by a more productive one. Between them there develops a capability or competence gap. As the exchange relationship proceeds, it produces competition for pre-eminence between, in List's terms, the 'more advanced' economy and the 'less advanced' one. The vanguard society or leading economy is then in a position to sell the goods, which it turns out with its greater productivity, more cheaply in national and international markets. If no protective measures are in place, the goods turned out with lesser productivity will lose out to the competition. Moreover, if the competence gap is particularly great, any efforts aimed at reversing the situation will often be discouraged from the outset. The propensity for performance and innovation on the part of the stragglers then threatens to fizzle out completely, since

---

[2] List's main book was published in 1841 (List 1959).

[3] List's writings, speeches and letters are available in a ten-volume edition (List 1927–1935). An instructive biography was published by Henderson (1983).

the competent leading economy can use its superiority to good advantage in every respect: in the areas of production processes and products as well as in its capacity for continuous innovation. Such an economy can and always does know better. Competition for pre-eminence is thus a comprehensive phenomenon; it is not only demonstrated in the competitive pressure of cheap goods.

Societies subject to a competence gap are easily pushed aside. They are marginalized or peripheralized. If they succumb to the pressure of peripheralization, then they either undergo a disintegration of their traditional lifestyles, that is, social regression, in which case they are simply overwhelmed; or they are converted into appendages or outposts of the more highly developed society. As the history of the peripheries demonstrates, superior military force not infrequently facilitated the process.

In the latter case, seen from the perspective of the leading economy, there arise 'exclave economies' in the form of monocultures or plantation economies. These are hybrid creatures that cannot achieve a balanced and broadly effective development of the available forces of production. It is true that, in times of high demand for agricultural products and unprocessed raw materials, the more advanced society will trigger substantial growth in the corresponding sectors of the less advanced economy. But the result is nothing more than a short-lived period of apparent prosperity. The peripheries still remain dualistically divided between an outwardly directed pole of growth and a relatively stagnant residual economy. If the demand for agricultural goods and raw materials should recede in consequence of conjunctural and/or structural changes taking place in the vanguard economy, then not only will the outwardly-stimulated growth in the enclave collapse, but the meagre consequences of this growth will also be exhausted in the rest of the economy. The affected society is then thrown back onto the traditional subsistence economy which, however, is certainly no longer intact.

Dozens of examples from the history of the peripheries in and outside Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have underscored the correctness of List's diagnosis.[4]

However, one might conceive of a quite different reaction to a forming competence gap: the pressure toward peripheralization can be seen as a challenge that can be met by forcible measures. The straggler then views the gap between it and the vanguard as an opportunity. Imitation, suitable protectionist precautions, and purposive development projects are supposed to reduce or even eliminate the vanguard's head-start in development. The motto is then: catch up or indeed overtake! If this were the case, it would be an active and innovative answer to the pressure toward peripheralization, quite different from the case of passive regression or one-sided orientation by the lower economy to the needs of the vanguard economy. Of course the prerequisite for such a constructive reaction is that the gap not be too great and that some of the intra-societal preconditions for a successful catching-up process be present.[5]

---

[4] A synoptic analysis from a Listian perspective is found in Senghaas (1985, 1988).

[5] Case studies in this respect are found in Menzel (1988).

In List's time, England had attained a singular leading position in the world economy. List's ideas and plans were oriented towards the subordinate nations' prospects for development. It was his view that only the large and populous states in the moderate climatic zones were capable of development. They were among the 'nations with a calling'. Conversely, small, sparsely populated states as well as states in the 'hot zones' ought to specialize in the provision of foodstuffs and of agricultural and mineral raw materials, and to profit somehow or other in the process. Oddly enough, it never occurred to List to apply his diagnosis to these states as well.

This point of view is the basis of a not inconsiderable prejudice on List's part. It may well have led to a failure to recognize the relevance of his ideas to development processes outside the small number of "nations with a calling". After 150 years of numerous processes of development and faulty development, we are of course cleverer and know that this narrowing of vision was not in the least justified and that List's ideas are of general interest. The fact that only a small number of societies, basically the advanced industrialized societies of the West today, were able to elude regression or actual peripheralization only appears to vindicate his assumption that only a few countries are 'called'.

List's first contribution to the *problematique* of modern development thus lies in his analysis of competence gaps and the pressure toward peripheralization—a *problematique* that since his time has grown many times more virulent. His second contribution is related to the question of the conditions under which, and the ways in which, catch-up development is possible in the face of pressures toward peripheralization. How does one elude peripheralization? The answer to this question is contained in List's reflections on development programmes.

4.2 List's Development Programmes

List discussed the problem of catch-up development in relation to states that had entered into a phase of transition from the feudal-aristocratic order to industrial society. His account clearly shows that he saw that the development prospects of individual societies with a calling were dependent on the scope and scale of the defeudalization process taking place within them. According to him, successful development required the appropriate social and public conditions: in place of feudal despotism there must be a far-sighted and efficiently operating administration, including a strong monarchy to attend to the cohesion of a nation in the process of development; instead of a nobility luxuriating in its privileges there must be a business world oriented to profit and material prosperity; bondage would be replaced by a free peasantry; he considered a well-fed and well-paid worker would be the foundation of increasing labour productivity; he contrasted the prosperous effects of freely-creating science and the arts with the consequences of traditional fanaticism as revealed in religious wars and the Inquisition; he saw an intellectually and socially mobile society as the counterpart to the stratified societies of the *ancien regime*.

Defeudalization thus amounted to the mobilization of forces which in traditional societies had lain fallow. Wherever this process was inhibited, only half-way launched, or interrupted, blockages to development necessarily arose. Freedom and freedom of movement were thus for List important prerequisites to the process of development. A stable national framework was here just as important as the rule of law and the extension of self-government. So were a free entrepreneurial spirit among all strata of the population, a public administration able to plan with prudence and far-sightedness, a wide-branching transport system (roads, railways, canals), and a highly differentiated education system.

List's reflections on the underlying conditions for successful development or blockages to development anticipated a discussion of considerable significance, particularly in the fifties and sixties of the 20th century. What distinguishes his reflections from the later discussion is their configurative orientation. List never formulated individual development-promoting or development-inhibiting factors as separate entities but saw development as a broad set of interactions among them. Economistic thinking, in particular, was foreign to him. His thought revealed an empirically substantiated line of argumentation oriented toward statements of probability. This is also the backdrop for occasionally contra-factual reflections with which List argumentatively tried out the possibilities of alternative paths to development.

If List did accord a certain priority to anything, it was his high esteem for nonmaterial intellectual forces as opposed to material goods. In 'invisible capital', that is, in the stimulation and promotion of intellectual activity and inventive spirit, of knowledge and skills, in short, of competence, he saw a source of energy and strength which would be very difficult to replace by natural resources.

In his own time, List had observed too many positive and negative development processes to believe that development was an automatic process guided by a hidden hand. For him, state intervention at the appropriate time and in the appropriate amount was the indispensable precondition for successful development. State intervention for him had two main thrusts. First, he felt, it was a matter of facilitating domestic policy measures, particularly far-reaching constitutional and administrative reforms as well as measures to expand the infrastructure. And second, he considered incremental protectionist measures against the harmful effects of the vanguard economy to be essential. Both sets of measures were equally important for him, although only his plea for the protection of aspiring branches of industry—the infant-industry argument—is still remembered today.

Yet he made even this plea in much more cautious terms than is generally believed today.

List was by no means in favour of protective tariffs under all circumstances. He considered them to be especially harmful in agricultural economies still at a low level of development. But in developed societies too, the production of agricultural goods and raw materials ought not to be protected in principle. In the former case, where the forces of production were poorly developed, protectionist measures would prevent the necessary initial stimulation of the productive forces. In the latter case, where the forces of production were advanced, the protection of

agricultural products would raise the cost of living, thus giving rise to a negative effect on the overall economy.

The protective tariff was conceived as a flanking instrument of external or foreign economic policy and was intended to increase prospects for the survival of young industries in already developing societies. But even in this case List's proposal was differentiated: to be protected were the young industries that produced for mass consumption because they were of central importance to the opening up of their own domestic markets. Not to be protected was the production of precious and extremely valuable luxury consumer goods. As well, the importation of foreign machines and know-how should be liberally dealt with at an early phase of the development process. Nations with a calling, he felt, were capable of utilizing the equipment and technologies of the advanced economies to their own advantage and to accelerate catch-up development. In all probability the then less accentuated technology gap between England and nations with a calling behind that leading economy was the basis for this relatively optimistic evaluation of technology transfer.

List was entirely aware of the disadvantages of the flanking protectionist measures that he recommended, for instance the higher prices for goods that would quite possibly be worse in quality than those hitherto imported. Also, account had to be taken of the political conflict between agriculturalists oriented to free trade and domestic industrialists interested in protectionist measures; for such a conflict could result in political turbulence detrimental to development.

However, these disadvantages were for List of minor importance and only of temporary significance because, in his view, industrialization would lead to the formation and strengthening of internal or domestic competition and higher domestic demand for agricultural goods from the local agrarian economy. Agriculturalists, industrialists and consumers would thus be the joint long-term beneficiaries of the protectionist measures essential in the transition period.

In accordance with List's argument, then, short-term disadvantages are the price for the crucial long-term advantage, namely the comprehensive development of a society's forces of production. Once these are fully developed, the protectionist measures must be radically terminated, since a nation is then capable of exposing itself to free trade without danger of peripheralization and indeed carving out a free trade position for itself with some prospect of success.

Protectionist measures were no panacea for List. Depending on level of development, they might be beneficial or obstructive. He expressly warned against precipitate haste and excessive—as well as too meagre—tariff rates. He considered as particularly harmful protectionist measures that owed their existence only to powerful lobbied interests rather than being in accordance with a coherent development strategy. In the critical early phase of catch-up development it was essential to find the right mixture—specific to each branch and sector—of openness toward the outside and protectionism. List was therefore an advocate of a qualified mixed strategy of selective integration into the world market and selective decoupling, and he saw the ratio of the mixture as dependent on the mobilized productive forces' capacity for selfmaintenance and/or competition. To find the correct way

was the task of superordinate state policy. The trick was to place neither too many nor too few demands on one's own economy. Of course it is easier to formulate such a maxim than it is to translate it into practice.

The goal of these facilitating and flanking protectionist measures was the formation of a well-proportioned structure consisting of agriculture, industry and services. The route to this goal could only be traversed step-by-step and rash actions were considered to be harmful. Like Adam Smith, List was concerned with the expansion and deepening of the division of labour, but List's attention was even more directed toward the "confederation of the productive forces", that is, the merging and linking of the differentiating sectors of the economy.

Since impulses toward development rarely arise uniformly and can only be instigated point-by-point, unbalanced growth cannot be avoided. List was enough of a realist to discern this state of affairs. But he was more in favour of balanced rather than unbalanced growth. Hypertrophied sectors of the economy, as found in monoculture and plantation economies, had to be prevented. His normative orientation toward balanced growth, especially between agriculture and industry, may well have prevented him from formulating a theory of crises arising from the typical disproportionalities of the development process. On this point Marx was more far-seeing than List.

List's development scenario followed an intrinsically logical series of steps. He advocated a concept of import-substituting industrialization which would expand and deepen in stages. For him it was important that the creation of industrial wealth, including the spread effects that went with it, be gradually shifted into the domestic realm. This first step in the early development of a society producing and exporting agricultural goods and raw materials and importing manufactured goods was to be followed by a second involving the national production of simple types of finished goods. A third stage of development was concerned with fostering domestic machine building. In this way an economy would arise that would become capable by stages of manufacturing and processing its own and others' agricultural goods and raw materials and which, beyond this, would increasingly be in a position to produce the equipment necessary for this. If at some later stage, technology- and manufacture-intensive products became internationally competitive, then what was an agrarian country would become once and for all an industrial society ready for free trade.

In List we do not find any timetables relating to these stages, nor to the overall process of development. In fact, for most OECD countries it took almost 80–100 years, although for many Newly Industrializing Countries nowadays it seems to be taking place much more rapidly.

In List's view such a development process extending over decades would require a functional agricultural economy from the outset. Its tasks would be of a multiple nature. First, it would be essential that a growing urban population be fed by a progressively shrinking number of people actively employed in agriculture. Then industry would have to be supplied with agrarian raw materials. There would also be no way for agriculture, during the early phase of industrialization, to avoid paying for industrialization and the erection of an infrastructure through

open or hidden resource-transfers. Second, however, the agricultural sector was also an important market for industrial goods for everyday needs and for agricultural equipment. Despite the substantial demands and burdens placed on the agricultural sector, therefore, it must be allowed to maintain a solvent demand if the overall dynamics of economic development were to be sustained. These reflections clearly reveal how futile it is to attempt to achieve successful industrialization in the absence of a prosperous agriculture.

For List it was obvious that agriculture occupied a strategic position in the process of development. Yet those who formulated the development programmes of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries more or less forgot this self-evident fact. It took the many development debacles of recent decades to restore this elementary insight.

List's reflections on development programming cumulate in the thesis that the production of the forces of production is more important than the production of values. That is to say, whatever serves the broadly effective opening up of a national production potential must be seen as more valuable than the production of cheap goods that only seems to be efficient according to short-term business calculations. The constitutive elements of a national economy thus comprise more than the sum of the profitability calculations of individual businesses. The costs of the learning process, which are both indispensable and incalculable in the short term, cannot be avoided.

These considerations for List pointed to the difference between cosmopolitan and political economy. It was worthwhile to argue in cosmopolitan terms, that is in relation to world-wide allocational efficiency, once one's national production potential had been extensively tapped. Only under these conditions did the calculations of business, the national economy and the international economy converge. However, so long as the national forces of production still lay fallow, remained only partially developed and moreover were subject to pressures toward peripheralization, one had to argue and plan on the basis of the imperatives of the national economy. On this central point List differed fundamentally from the 'English School', i.e., from the classical theories of Adam Smith and his successors.

4.3 Experiences in the History of Development

List reached his conclusions on the strength of a comparative analysis of historical experiences and, in particular, his own perceptions. The chequered history of Venice, Spain, Portugal, the Hanseatic League, Holland and England provided evidence for his theses; so did his own experiences of development policy in various parts of Germany, France, the U.S.A. and Hungary. Yet only in the roughly 150 years since his time have the basic development problems that he formulated gained world-wide significance, particularly since the decolonization drive of the 1950s and 1960s.

Can any noteworthy lessons be drawn from the great plethora of historical and current experiences of development processes?[6] Do they confirm or refute the Listian perspective?

List's high evaluation of a broad-scale mobilization of a country's agricultural potential has been underlined by both positive and negative experiences. Within and outside Europe, countries that successfully improved their performance in the agricultural sector prior to or during the process of industrialization certainly have enjoyed substantial successes in the process of development. By contrast, countries that did not undergo institutional agrarian reform and agro-technological modernization remained incapable of releasing their development potential; in general they came up against substantial bottlenecks.

It is irksome that nineteenth-century development planners, who believed they were building upon List, read into him a one-sided strategy of industrialization under the banner of protectionism but overlooked or disregarded his recommendations respecting the necessary development of agriculture. In East and South-East Europe in particular, this faulty interpretation was in vogue. Unfortunately, the same experience, whether building upon List or not, repeated itself in most Third World countries. In all these cases the development process remained fragile, or in List's terminology 'one-armed' or 'crippled'.

With these clear figurative concepts List characterized a state of society which recent development theory describes as inner cleavage or 'structural heterogeneity'.[7] What development processes taking place under these banners lack is a proportionate and broadly effective linkage between agriculture, industry and trade. Oriented to the limited markets of small-scale demand, industrialization in such societies leads primarily to withdrawal effects to the disadvantage of agriculture and the advantage of urban agglomerations (urban bias). The deepening political, socio-economic and cultural cleavage that thereby takes place becomes the scene of a number of mounting social catastrophes: the collapse of agriculture's capacity for self-sufficiency, flight from the land and impoverishment in the countryside, excessive urbanization, unemployment and underemployment, and uncontrollable population growth. In the history of the peripheries within Europe (in East, South-East and South Europe as well as Ireland) these phenomena were no different than those in the contemporary Third World.

Experience teaches that homogeneous domestic markets can only be achieved by means of a Listian development programme: by the mobilization of dormant resources in all sectors of society, particularly those in agriculture, by means of the necessary institutional reforms and technological innovations as well as purposive protective measures on the part of the state. Any attempts at industrialization in the absence of prior or accompanying reforms have generally failed, as List's perspective would lead us to expect.

---

[6] A comprehensive discussion is found in Menzel/Senghaas (1986). See also the interesting article by Janos (1989).

[7] On this concept see Senghaas (1977).

The recent development discussion was relatively late in discovering so-called 'non-material capital' or human capital, that is, those intellectual resources that List recognized as the foundation of agricultural, industrial, commercial and administrative competences. Countries that remained behind in the literacy level of their population and in the construction of such institutions of higher education as trade schools, adult-education schools, technical colleges and universities, not only were less inventive than societies with a more differentiated educational provision but also impeded social mobility in their society. This caused intellectual resources to lie fallow. In this respect one might compare the Scandinavian development with that of many South and South-East European areas, or the development of the educationally-intent 'Four Little Tigers of East Asia' (Korea, Taiwan, Hongkong and Singapore) with other parts of the Third World.

What List did not see, although it does not contradict his theory, is the possibility of compensating for a shortage of natural resources with a disproportionate mobilization of intellectual capital. In this way, countries poor in resources, even small ones, can achieve a high degree of specialization in the niches of the international economy.

By and large, List's reflections on the strategic development position of a branching-out infrastructure have turned out to be correct. In periods of a growing division of labour and growing linkages between individual branches and sectors of the economy which necessarily result, an efficient infrastructure becomes an indispensable medium in the mediation of economic activities. Since infrastructure is a public good, it cannot be expected that individual enterprises will make the investments necessary for the development of a national economy. Infrastructure thus becomes a public task, and those countries that have correctly perceived this state of affairs have done well by their national processes of development.

As far as foreign economic policy measures are concerned, the history of development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries teaches us that free trade was the exception, while varying degrees of protection were the rule. As in List's time, so later too, free trade was the doctrine of the dominant leading national economies in the international economy.

List was right in predicting that protectionist measures would only be helpful to the development process if the corresponding internal conditions were present. Where these conditions were absent, protectionism led to naught. This link is demonstrated in the history of many peripheries where isolation from the outside world came about in the absence of purposive structural reforms and development-policy measures within. One not infrequently hears that most of the world's developing countries did not attain their development goals in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, despite considerable protectionist measures, and for this reason protectionism and state intervention must be rejected. Yet this argument is not convincing because unabridged conceptions of development attribute only a relative importance to foreign economic policy, an importance which, however, is ultimately dependent on a country's internal development efforts.

The cases of successful catch-up development, particularly the kind pursued in a mixed strategy of partial integration into the world market and selective

decoupling (Scandinavia, Oceania, North America), demonstrate the importance, as List stressed, of national self-determination and national disposition over indigenous material and non-material resources. Political sovereignty is thus an asset of development that ought not to be underestimated.

In the title of his principal work, List underscored the *national* dimension of political economy. He could not have predicted how powerful a historical force nationalism would be. Not only in those countries in which, given the corresponding political measures, he saw an opportunity for successful catchup development, did nationalism become a motive force, but also at the peripheries within and outside Europe, where the demand for political independence, economic modernization and cultural identity everywhere arose. The surge of nationalism developed notably among those populations who in List's time were characterized as 'peoples without history', namely in East and South-East Europe. The world-wide relevance of his diagnosis and the dozens of attempts to launch national development programmes would no doubt have surprised List more than anyone, had he lived beyond his times.[8]

The emphasis on national frameworks of development processes distinguished List's basic perspective from both the classical political economy of England or 'cosmopolitan school' and classical Marxism. The former was directed toward an internationally calculated allocation of scarce resources; its horizon was thus humanity rather than the nation. In reality, however, the national framework of development processes has turned out to be indicative of their success or failure. Classical Marxism condemned the nation and nationalism as an expression of bourgeois ideology and replaced it with the world-wide, unbounded and supranational solidarity of the proletarian class. Yet Marxism everywhere, in the course of time, became national Marxism. This turn to the nation was already evident in Marx's later commentaries on the Irish question and Russian industrialization. It was expressly formulated in the Austro-Marxism of the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, and it eventually became self-evident in all later variants of actually existing socialism. In his early polemics directed at List, Marx was fundamentally wrong! List was right to emphasize the national context of the processes of catch-up development.[9]

The relevance of List's reflections is also shown in relation to the experience of development processes in societies under actually existing socialism. Each and every one of the observed areas there singled out for emphasis would be subject to List's justified critique, and not surprisingly, a Listian-type critique has since been expressed in the self-criticism articulated within these societies.

When an autocratic or totalitarian state eliminates society's spheres of freedom, as was the case in the Stalinist Model, then, according to the Listian perspective, one of the most important resources for development, namely the free

---

[8] On this set of problems see the classical study by Karl W. Deutsch (1966).

[9] On the relation between List's paradigm and Marxism see the excellent study by Szporluk (1988).

development of individuals and groups, is eradicated. In the long run, agriculture cannot be drained without negative consequences to the overall economy. The overemphasis on heavy industrialization leads to production that bypasses the obvious everyday needs of the consumers. This results in the collapse of performance incentives and in apathy. Neglecting the service sector and viewing it, through ideological blinkers, as 'unproductive' necessarily hinders both the division of labour and the 'confederation of the forces of production'. Total isolation from the outside world, that is, a policy of autarchy, deprives a society of its stimuli for innovation. In existing socialism this produces some particularly negative effects because, contrary to List's programmes, in countries where trade is conducted by the state domestic competition is also eliminated as a potential source of innovation. Furthermore, existing socialism also demonstrates that growth is a necessary but not in itself a sufficient condition of development. As in other parts of the world, it depends rather on what is growing, how rapidly and under what conditions of distribution.

What is lacking in actually existing socialism, according to List's perspective, is obvious: the emancipation of society from the state and party monopoly, particularly the transition from a kind of despotism to enlightened absolutism and finally to democracy; the creation of spheres of political freedom as the starting point of self-mobilizing dormant forces and—essential to these—the opportunity for political participation and self-governance; agricultural reform that takes account of the worldwide experience of the high productivity of self-managing and cooperatively linked operations of medium size; the raising of labour productivity in all sectors of the economy by means of shifting growth priorities from basic and heavy industries to consumer industries while promoting technologically advanced machine-building; the expansion of the infrastructure as well as the high regard for, and fostering of, the service sector; a growing opening to the wider world by intensifying the exchange of people, goods, technology and capital. *Glasnost* and *perestroika* were thus long overdue.[10] And probably existing socialism today suffers more from chronically insufficient demands than from excessive demands placed on it by the predominant Western economies.

4.4 Conclusions

At the beginning of this paper, it was emphasized how little heed has been paid to List in the development policy discussion of recent decades. The recollection of important ideas in his work, and the comparison of such ideas with important historical and current development experiences, should show clearly that a broad reception of his ideas is long overdue. It is not a matter of exposing all the facets of List's work to the current development discussion.

---

[10] As one example of recent publications see the comprehensive study by Segbers (1989). .

This would be the task of historians and exegesist whose goal is to trace an author's works in all its ramifications. Much would already be gained if List's outstanding major work *Das nationale System der politischen Ökonomie* (National System of Political Economy) were obligatory reading for all those in politics, administration, higher learning and industry who have anything to do with development policy. Many mistakes could have been avoided if it had not taken until List's two hundredth birthday and even later on to recall his ideas; this could have been done much sooner, when in the postwar era the die was cast for national and international development policy. List's diagnosis and development programme are well worth recollecting, if only for the reason that they gave voice to the correct reasons for the positive and negative developmental experiences of the past 150 years.

References

Deutsch, Karl W., 1966: *Nationalism and Social Communication. An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (Cambridge: MIT Press).

Henderson, William (1983): *Friedrich List* (London: Frank Cass).

Janos, Andrew C. (1989): "The Politics of Backwardness in Continental Europe, 1780–1945", in: *World Politics*, 41,3: 325–358.

List, Friedrich, 1927–1935: *Schriften, Reden, Briefe*. Ed. by E.V. Beckerath et. al., 10 vols., (Berlin: Verlag Hobbing).

List, Friedrich, 1959: *Das nationale System der Politischen Ökonomie* (Tübingen: Verlag Mohr-Siebeck); English, translation: *National System of Political Economy* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1856).

Menzel, Ulrich, 1988: *Auswege aus der Abhängigkeit. Die entwicklungspolitische Aktualität Europas* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag).

Menzel, Ulrich; Senghaas, Dieter, 1986: *Europas Entwicklung und die Dritte Welt. Eine Bestandsaufnahme* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag).

Segbers, Klaus, 1989: *Der sowjetische Systemwandel* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag).

Senghaas, Dieter, 1977: *Weltwirtschaftsordnung und Entwicklungspolitik. Plädoyer für Dissoziation* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag).

Senghaas, Dieter, 1985: *The European Experience. A Historical Critique of Development Theory* (Leamington Spa–Dover, New Hampshire: Berg Publishers).

Senghaas, Dieter, 1988: "European Development and the Third World. An Assessment", in: *Review*, 11,1: 3–54.

Szporluk, Roman, 1988: *Communism and Nationalism. Karl Marx versus Friedrich List* (New York–Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Chapter 5
Developing the Definitions of Perpetual Peace ('para pacem'): Through What and How is Peace Constituted Today? (2004/2007)

5.1 The Doctrine of 'Causative Pacifism'

Through what and how is peace constituted today?[1] This elementary question was put at the centre of pacifist programme study by Alfred H. Fried, one of Germany's leading pacifists during the first two decades of the twentieth century. The slogan was 'causative pacifism': "He who wishes to eliminate an effect must first eliminate its cause. And he who wishes to see a new desired effect instead of another must replace that cause by one that can produce the desired effect."[2] This sounds methodologically abstract, but was meant quite literally. If war is the consequence of an 'international anarchy' still prevailing in relations between states, then this anarchy has to be eliminated in order to eliminate its consequence, war. Anarchy must therefore be replaced by a 'social order', as a result of which conflicts can be reliably managed without force, so that, in the political meaning of the concept, peace is established.

The doctrine of so-called 'causative pacifism' is therefore based on the attempt to reflect systematically on premises and conditions that render peace possible and probable. In an analytical respect the doctrine of 'causative pacifism' was therefore comparable to today's efforts towards a contemporary peace theory.[3]

'Causative pacifism', whether or not this specific term was used by individual authors, was therefore both a fundamental scholarly and a practical issue in the classic discussion of pacifism. It is part of the tragedy of the past century that this perspective lost attention in the pacifist trends and eventually became a

---

[1] This text was translated by Ewald Osers from the German book: *Zum irdischen Frieden. Erkenntnisse und Vermutungen* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2004) and published as: *On Perpetual Peace: A Timely Assessment* (New York—Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007); 15–53. Permission to republish this text was granted on by Berghahn Books.

[2] Alfred H. Fried, Probleme der Friedenstechnik, Leipzig (1918): 10.

[3] Ernst-Otto Czempiel: *Friedensstrategien* (Opladen, 1998); *ibid.*: *Kluge Macht. Außenpolitik für das 21. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1999); Dieter Senghaas (ed.): *Den Frieden denken* (Frankfurt/M., 1995, with a comprehensive bibliography).

non-theme. In that twentieth century of tyranny, wars, genocide and the mutual threat of annihilation within the framework of the deterrence system anti-militarism—quite understandably and comprehensibly—became a predominant orientation of pacifism, governing thinking and action. However, a gap was left behind, an 'empty hole' (Vlasta Jalusic). Antimilitarism aims at liquidating structures and mentalities causing aggression, violence and war. In contrast, 'causative pacifism' aims at erecting durable peace-promoting structures and mentalities. For this reason 'causative pacifism' and comparable orientations can be described as pacifism aiming at the construction and architecture of peace, i.e. a 'constructive pacifism'.

The classic doctrine of 'causative pacifism'—thus explicitly formulated by Alfred Fried in 1918—aimed at the establishment of a 'new world order'.[4] This intention was not based on any eschatological idea, but on a peace-technical, manageable one, 'imbued with a purposeful spirit of peace'. This new world order was seen as the result of an ongoing process of 'state socialisation' leading to a 'social contract between states'. This would, formulated in present-day terminology, lead not to the liquidation of conflicts, but to conflict transformation, "to the transformation of an inter-state relationship that would lend to conflicts a character ensuring that it becomes removed from violent resolution and becomes entirely suitable for judicial treatment".[5] Such conflict transformation, 'the transformation of the character of the conflict', therefore means precisely what is described in the present-day peace-theory discussion as 'civilisation of the conflict'.

However, whereas in the classic doctrine of 'causative pacifism' a civilised management of conflicts on the internal scene was regarded as more or less successfully accomplished—here, with regard to Europe, a successful 'socialisation' had taken place according to the assessment of the situation at the time—today this premise can no longer be assumed as a matter of course. A glance at the world shows that, at least at this moment, scarcely any wars between states are being fought (even though the world of states has by no means been 'socialised' yet); on the other hand we observe a break-up of states and a multitude of militant internal conflicts within states, above all civil wars of the most diverse character.[6] In consequence, the rendering possible of internal peace—and not just the 'new world order'—once more becomes an important analytical and practical orientation of constructive reflection on peace. A contemporary theory of peace must therefore relate to both planes, the internal and the international.

---

[4] Fried, *Probleme der Friedenstechnik*, op. cit.: 42.

[5] *Ibid.*: 12.

[6] Klaus-Jürgen Gantzel and Torsten Schwinghammer: *Die Kriege nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg 1945–1992. Daten und Tendenzen* (Münster, 1995); Mary Kaldor: *Neue und alte Kriege* (Frankfurt/M., 2000); Herfried Münkler: *Die neuen Kriege* (Reinbek b. Hamburg, 2002). For an analysis of background conditions see the fundamental study by Günther Bächler: *Violence through Environmental Discrimination* (Dordrecht, 1999).

5.2 Pluralisation and Politicisation of Traditional Societies

The need for a cause-of-peace research to re-examine also the conditions of internal peace arises from the far-reaching transformations that affected the Western world at an earlier date and the extra-Western world mainly in the twentieth century and presently. When the idea of 'causative pacifism' was formulated at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, the world, including the major part of today's industrialised countries, was largely organised on a peasant basis. The past 100 years (1900–2000)—a matter rarely considered—will go down in history as the century of the deruralisation of the world and its consequences. Today, unlike at the beginning of the twentieth century, most people no longer live under subsistence conditions and its typical mutual dependence of people within a small-scale radius. Instead they live in territory-wide economies with increasingly broad-spectrum economic relations. Developing countries are no exception, even though marked gradations continue to exist in this respect, for instance between East Asia and Black Africa.

In contrast to peasant communities in the traditional village frame, this new socio-economic milieu has brought to people an enormous broadening of horizons and range of activity. The urbanisation that goes hand in hand with the structural change moreover intensifies communication and for the first time in world history makes the mass of the population capable of political organisation. A simultaneous literacy drive on a mass basis produces a large-scale mobilisation of intelligence, i.e. intellectual emancipation and a revolution in skills: the human competence level rises dramatically. A conversion is taking place: 'from ignorance to awareness, to connection with the world', as a nun working in India's poverty districts once accurately put it (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 6 January 1999). It is here that, unlike in traditional society, the opportunity for social upward mobility is based. Worldwide media, moreover, make life expectations and lifestyles comparable. It is possible that the globalisation of such demonstration effects is today more effective than a mere globalisation of economies.

In this way traditional societies become politicisable and in fact politicised societies. In them traditional identities become questionable. 'Truths' can no longer be simply defined, ideas of justice are multiplied, as also are interests. What makes a 'good society' becomes a problem in the face of the plurality of offers of system-political projects and definitions. The 'tranquillitas ordinis', the 'tranquillity of order', once written about, in the milieu of traditional societies, by Augustine and many other European and, chiefly also, extra-European authors, is no longer to be apprehended. There arise, viewed in terms of their structure, social constructs prone to producing conflicts or even violence, constructs that can no longer be reduced to a common denominator, except forcibly by dictatorship or despotism. These, however, are doomed to failure sooner or later under the socio-economic and sociocultural conditions shown: the fact is that sociocultural, socio-economic and hence also political plurality are insuperable, just as the politicisation of

identities, truths, ideas of justice and interests is irreversible. The consequence of all this is the demand for political participation, audible from every corner of the world.[7]

The 'modern social conflict' resulting from politicised difference thus becomes a problem of the whole society with considerable external consequences: if social, socio-economic and cultural conflicts present themselves as political, and if political conflicts present themselves as social, economic and cultural, we are faced with fundamental politicisation. As a result, many societies today are acutely confronted with the question of coexistence in spite of fundamental politicisation. The questionable alternative to coexistence, in the extreme case, is civil war—something we are taught anew by what we see around us every day.

5.3 The Civilisatory Hexagon or the Need to Civilise the Modern Social Conflict

But how, in such a situation, does one avoid civil war? The above-outlined reconstruction of the world occurred first as a consequence of agrarian and industrial revolution about the middle of the eighteenth century and, above all, in the nineteenth century in the Western part of Europe. Not surprisingly the just outlined set of problems—coexistence in spite of fundamental politicisation—first became acute here and that is why some results of the tackling of that set of problems can best be observed here.[8]

Above all, six conditions of a civilised, i.e. durably non-violent, management of indispensable conflicts need emphasising ('civilisatory hexagon').

First: To start with, there is the legitimate state *monopoly of power*, i.e. the safeguarding of the rule-of law community -this is of fundamental importance for any modern peace system. Only a 'disarming of citizens', the deprivatisation of force, compels them to settle their identity and interest conflicts by argument and not by force. Only thus are the parties to potential conflict compelled to resort to argument and hence to a policy of deliberation in the public space. The significance of this state of affairs becomes dramatically obvious wherever the power monopoly collapses and a rearming of citizens takes place, i.e. when feuds and warlords rise again in new garb, as may be observed at many militant war centres in the world today.

Second, the power monopoly requires control by the *rule of law* unless it is to become simply an expression of arbitrariness. Without such control, which is at the core of the modern constitutional state, the monopoly of power would remain

---

[7] See Karl W. Deutsch: *Tides Among Nations* (New York, 1979); Ralf Dahrendorf: *Der moderne soziale Konflikt* (Stuttgart, 1992).

[8] The following reflections continue observations on the history of modern European development, as documented in Dieter Senghaas: *The European Experience. A Historical Critique of Development Theory* (Leamington Spa/Dover, NH 1985).

legally uncircumscribed, in fact nothing other than dictatorship, the rule of the stronger, the rule of force. Rule of law lays down the rules of the process of political opinion formation and will formation, as well as of decision making and of the legal enforcement of legal requirements as defined. Along side general principles, such as those laid down in catalogues of fundamental rights, these constitutionally fixed rules of the game are of basic importance just because in politicised societies there is usually no agreement on substantive issues.

Political systems based on the rule of law ensure that the monopoly of power is fenced in; only thus does it become legitimate. With this first step it loses its original character of being simply an instance of predominance achieved by force, ultimately by military or warlike means.

These ring-fenced, controlling, legitimated principles transforming the monopoly of power include, among other things, the protection of fundamental freedoms, the guarantee of human rights by law, the equality of citizens before the law. As one of the principal points they guarantee the separation of powers, free elections and the right to political participation, the constitutionally delimited action of governments, the subjection of government and administration to the law, the principle of transparency, administrative justice, especially the instruction on legal means in the findings of judges, the independence of the judiciary and the public prosecutor's office, the unambiguity of the rules laid down for criminal proceedings, the right to legal assistance in the event of criminal prosecution, the right to public and fair legal proceedings, the right to defence, criminal prosecution only on the basis of legally defined circumstances, the presumption of innocence until judicial proof of guilt.[9]

Orders based on the rule of law are also distinguished in the social sphere by a multitude of institutionalised forms of conflict articulation, conflict management, conflict regulation and conflict resolution. Conflicts of any kind, whether conflicts of interest or of identity, are regarded from the outset as 'normal' and legitimate; in intact rule-of-law conditions conflicts of interest are more frequent than conflicts of identity and, as a rule, are more easily manageable than the latter.[10]

Political systems thus conceived allow for the emergence of soft and incomplete problem solutions for a time; they are subject to a trial-and- error process. A rule-of-law system could therefore be interpreted, with regard to conflict management, as an institutionalised permanent learning process about the handling of conflicts that are of significance to the public. Its product is lawfully arrived-at (legal) authoritative decisions, valid for a time, which fail to become the starting points of serious conflicts, in the extreme case of civil wars, if they are accepted as legitimate from procedural and substantive points of view and are perceived as, in principle, capable of revision.

---

[9] See "Dokumente des Treffens der Konferenz über die Menschliche Dimension der KSZE in Kopenhagen vom 29.06.1990", which, after the world-political upheaval of 1989/90, summed up the fundamental principles of the rule of law as it was achieved or developed in European constitutional history; published in Dieter Senghaas: *Friedensprojekt Europa* (Frankfurt/M., 1992): 191–210.

[10] See John Burton: *Conflict. Resolution and Prevention* (London, 1990).

Concerning the relation between monopoly of force and rule of law the following should, in terms of logic, be stated: Without the previous constitution of the monopoly of force, a democratic rule of law is not even conceivable. The state based on the rule of law, where fully developed, itself becomes the quintessence of control of the monopoly of power. The monopoly of power is legitimised. Although therefore only a rule-of-law circumscribed, moreover democratically based (see below) monopoly of power is conducive to a civilising of the modern social conflict, the separation performed in the civilisatory hexagon between monopoly of power and its control is conceptually meaningful, if not downright obligatory, because in the historical process, as a rule, power conditions initially produce only a crude monopolisation of power before, in usually prolonged disputes, i.e. in the conflict history of societies, control bodies and control modalities are established and eventually acknowledged as legitimate (constitutionalisation process).

Third, another essential condition of internal peace consists in *affect control*, which stems from multiple interdependences. Deprivatisation of force ('the disarming of the citizens') and its socialisation into a multitude of institutionalised conflict regulations imply a control of affects. Such self-control is significantly supported by the development of large-scale networks (in Elias's sense of 'long chains of acting') because these, as can be observed mainly in division-of-labour economies, require a considerable measure of calculability and, in consequence, bring with them reliability of expectation.[11] Modern societies are differentiated in many directions: people in them are multiple 'role players' with a range of loyalties. The demand for multiple roles, as taught by conflict theory and by everyday experience, leads to conflict fractionalisation and to a moderation in conflict attitudes, to a taming of affects, because without these coexistence would not be thinkable in complex milieux such as presented by modernising or modern societies.

Affect control—the result of sublimation of affects—means self-control or self-restraint resulting in differentiated societies from diverse sets of action. It is the basis not only of the inhibition of aggression and renunciation of force, but, developing from these, of tolerance and readiness for compromise. Neither is conceivable without preceding self-discipline. With it the autonomy striving of individuals and groups, which characterises all modern societies, finds an indispensable corrective.

Fourth, there is a need, on the other hand, for *democratic participation*. Because where people cannot involve themselves in public affairs, whether due to legal or other discrimination, 'judicial unrest' (S. Freud) arises, in the worst case a build-up of conflicts, which in politicisable societies can become a focus of violence. Democracy as the basis of institutionally regulated development of the law is therefore not a luxury hut a necessary condition of peaceful conflict management.[12]

---

[11] See Norbert Elias: *Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation* (Frankfurt/M., 1976), vol. 2.

[12] Sigmund Freud perceptively (in his famous answer to Albert Einstein's question) in: Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud: "Warum Krieg", in: *Briefwechsel* (Zürich, 1996): 43ff.; see also Dieter Senghaas: *Aggressivität und kollektive Gewalt* (Stuttgart, 1972, 2nd ed.): 53ff.

Societies in which large-scale interdependence textures develop become socially mobile societies. In them, as pointed out above, a fundamental transformation process takes place that can be outlined by the following keywords: deruralisation or proletarianisation, devillagisation or urbanisation, as well as, for mobile societies fundamentally, a literacy drive. Such a transformation process leads to the emergence of entirely new social strata that, according to their place in society and depending on their potential upward or threatening downward mobility, articulate and defend specific interests and develop their own identity profiles. For the past few decades, as a result of progressive democratisation, gender-specific role assignations, as well as the patriarchal relations underlying them, are being questioned.

In politicisable communities interests must be capable of articulation on a broad front and capable of integration in the ongoing political process. The more open and flexible the democratic rule-of-law institutional structure, the more resilient to stress it will be in the event of persistent or possibly increasing political demands.

Generally speaking, subordination relations on the basis of gender, race, class or other characteristics are no longer tolerated by those concerned in advanced, socially mobile societies. In democratic rule-of-law states with a high politicisation potential such discrimination undermines political stability.

Fifth, such conflict management in politicised societies, however, is durable only if there are continuous *efforts for social justice*. Socially mobilised societies with a widening participation are societies characterised by a high degree of lobbyist organisation by many (albeit not always all) interests and hence by a large measure of potential or actual politicisation. In them, social justice, in the double meaning of the concept—i.e. justice of opportunity and justice of distribution—inevitably becomes a persistent virulent problem.

In societies with a considerable politicisation potential an active policy of justice of opportunity and distribution, supplemented by justice of basic needs (safeguarding of basic requirements) is indispensable because only then does the mass of the population feel protected with fairness. The material enrichment or buttressing of the rule of law, especially in the sense of fair participation in welfare, is therefore not a political orientation that can, but need not, be pursued by such societies according to their inclination; instead it is a constituent condition of the viability of rule-of-law systems and hence of the internal peace of societies.

Societies based on the rule of law are therefore well advised never to let the issue of social justice come to rest, especially when the economies on which they are based—as a rule capitalist market economies—in their systemic nature tend to produce inequality rather than equality. Unless this dynamic towards inequality is continually counteracted, explosive social rifts develop in such societies. Unless continuous efforts are made to achieve fairness of distribution, the disadvantaged will question the credibility of the rule of law because the rules of its game are no longer perceived to be fair. In contrast, serious efforts for social justice and fairness are conducive to a constructive conflict management; they lend legitimacy to public institutions, a legitimacy feeding on direct everyday experience.

Sixth, if in the public space there are fair opportunities for the articulation of identities and for the reconciliation of diverse interests it can be assumed that such an arrangement of conflict management is reliably internalised and that compromise-oriented conflict situations, including the toleration necessary for them, become a self-evident orientation of political action. The monopoly of power and the rule of law and democracy—in short, the democratic state based on the rule of law—become anchored in the political culture. Moreover, *the culture of constructive conflict management* becomes the emotional basis of the community. Material performances ('social justice') prove to be an important bridge between the structure of institutions and their positive emotional safeguards ('public attitude'). To use a concept of Ralf Dahrendorf, appropriate 'ligatures' come into being, i.e. political and cultural ties or socio-cultural in-depth ties, definable as the "subjective inside of the norms that guarantee social structures".[13]

The development of geographically bounded dense interdependence textures is, as a rule, translated not only into a unified juridical area, into a unified economic area (characterised by a common currency), but also—mostly overlooked—into a corresponding 'emotional area'. This is a late product of prolonged modernisation processes and is reflected in 'national identity' or also 'regional identity'.[14] On its basis develops the ability to think and act empathetically with regard to a far greater number of people than those close to one.

The political culture of constructive conflict management does not stand at the beginning of the evolution of modern coexistence. Instead it is a late product in the historical process. And, like the other five components, it is not foreshadowed in European (read: Western European) culture. On the contrary, the evolution of every single component is more of a reluctant process. Viewed historically, disarmament as a rule was the outcome of victory and defeat in elimination struggles: the stronger was victorious over the weaker, a superior instance above subordinate. Rule of law had its origin in historically contested compromise arrangements wrested from the conflicting parties, arrangements that, naturally enough, were not loved and initially understood as concessions in fragile power situations. As for affect control, self-determined existence in concretely over seeable small-scale connections was invariably preferred to integration in self-dynamic (as we say nowadays, sell-referential) functional systems. Since Sigmund Freud, if not longer, we have known that affect control is determined by the imperatives of the reality principle and not the pleasure principle, with both principles being inexorably in conflict with one another.

Moreover, the struggle for the extension of participation always encountered hard defensive fronts, as, in a world of system-conditioned inequality, did the dispute about justice and fairness in distribution. Political participation and just

---

[13] Thus defined by Ralf Dahrendorf, in: *Auf der Suche nach einer neuen Ordnung* (Munich, 2003): 45; see also Christian Graf von Krockow: "Die Tugenden der Friedensfähigkeit", in: Senghaas (ed.): *Den Frieden denken*, pp. 419–441.

[14] See Karl W. Deutsch: *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, 1966, 2nd ed.), as well as *idem*: *Tides Among Nations*.

distribution had to be wrested from the status-quo powers. Eventually a culture of constructive conflict management only came about under the fortunate conditions that the above-listed building blocks of civility, each in turn, became historical reality, moreover reinforcing one another and ultimately anchoring themselves emotionally. Only under such extreme preconditions did a civilisation of conflict and hence the basically non-violent settlement of conflicts become probable in a milieu of fundamental politicisation.

The process itself can therefore be understood only as the historical result of numerous conflicts that took place in the European context in line with the above-mentioned sequence of six stages. Besides, this historical state of affairs is reflected also in the history of modern political thought. Synoptically reconstructed it presents itself as follows. In the modern peace discussion Hobbes emphasised the pacifying effect of the state's crude power monopoly in view of acute and threatening civil wars. Kant's contribution was focused on the rule-of-law circumscription of that power monopoly ('republican order'), as well as on the confederative networking of states in a 'peace league'. Liberal thought in numerous variations supplemented the civilising effect of division of labour, of free exchange of goods, and (albeit over a long period and with considerable limitation) of democratisation. Socialist tradition laid great emphasis on fair distribution and social equity. Later the psychological (especially the psychoanalytical) argument was focused on self-awareness, strength of ego, affect control and empathy. Feminist thinking, wherever it was capable of a positive turn, accentuated many of these aspects. In retrospect these diverse thinking traditions, one building upon another, reveal the configurative complexity of the civilisation project—its constitutional, institutional, material and emotional dimensions.

What has arisen is a construct of conflict management—here called the '*civilisatory hexagon*'—which has constitutional, institutional and material dimensions, but is also marked by specific mentalities and generally—this has to be emphatically stated—represents a civilisatory artefact (see Fig. 5.1).

It can be plausibly argued that circumstances, which, in emancipated mass societies, characterise fundamental politicisation, such as the demand for absoluteness, fixation on a particidar interest, emphasis on a special identity, possessive individualism, lobbyist inclinations, etc., are immediate, in a sense 'natural',

Fig. 5.1 The 'civilisatory hexagon'

whereas tolerance, sensitivity to rules, moderation, separation of powers, readiness for compromise, the sense for more than one's own interest (empathy) are, in a sense, 'artificial', i.e. the result of laborious collective learning processes. All these extensive civilisatory achievements were attained, especially in Europe, against its own old- European class-society tradition, in struggle and in conflict with that past. Thus the democratic rule-of-law state is not the result of culture-genetic pre-moulding. Instead it is the expression of an innovation, or of a sum of innovations, moreover, in the framework of two and a half millennia of European history, a very recent development.[15]

The above-mentioned six components of the civilisatory hexagon should be seen configuratively, not monothematically or in terms of a one- dimensional and narrow-minded theory, but as the premises and conditions for lastingly civilised conflict management. Monothematic thinking concentrates on one of the six named points of the hexagon, in order to illuminate it positively or critically (including fundamental critique). The complexity of the configuration is lost in this process. All six components are important, as also their feedbacks, because these provide support for the individual components and reciprocal reassurance, causing relative stability configuratively or through redundancy.

If this configuration is inadequate, stability cannot be expected either. Without a secure power monopoly there is no rule of law or violence-free democratic participation; without fair distribution there is no guarantee of endurance for a rule of law that is perceived to be fair and legitimate and, in consequence, no reliably ring-fenced power monopoly and no conflict culture. Without democratic participation and fairness of distribution there is no civic mentality, there are no 'ligatures'.

If one views the civilisatory hexagon from its components and their feedbacks, it presents itself as a fragile construct that, as it is built up from its corner points, is also always threatened with collapse from their direction. The force monopoly can flip over into a police state; rule of law and democratic processes can turn out to be just a facade and thus lose legitimacy; overwhelming, no longer transparent, interdependences can lead to identity loss and, in consequence, to a renewed liberation of affects; unfair distribution is one of the politically most sensitive dangers. When such and other negative conditions bundle together, even constructive conflict culture stands no chance. The sequence of steps of 'Lebanonization'—exemplified by Lebanon, once the often-quoted as the 'Switzerland of the Middle East', and its collapse in a 15 year-long civil war-offers a representative scenario: perceived and politically increasingly virulent inequality of opportunity and of distribution as a starting point, delegitimation of constitutional formulas of coexistence, collapse of conflict culture, reprivatisation of force, as well as disrespect for and collapse of the rule of law, arming of the conflicting parties, breakdown of traditional interdependent action patterns, including the economy, release of

---

[15] See Dieter Senghaas: *The Clash within Civilisations. Coming to Terms with Cultural Conflicts* (London—New York, 2002).

parochially determined ethnopolitically motivated affects, civil war and unleashing of affects—until the eventual exhaustion of those involved and the intervention of an external hegemony (Syria).[16]

The civilisatory hexagon, in view of its collapse-threatened points, is therefore an enterprise that has to be secured time and time again. Successful opposition to the threats therefore requires persistent efforts in all the areas designated by the six corner points. Configurative thinking is necessary not only in the analytical but also in the practical respect.

5.4   Historical and Topical Experience ('Hexagon Variations')

In the civilisatory hexagon historical experience from modern history of certain parts of Europe—the region of democratic constitutional states—is conspicuously bundled together. Viewed historically, the monopoly of power was the first to take shape since the end of the Middle Ages in Europe—the result of prolonged elimination struggles (as a rule of feuds and wars) for hegemony. Along with the emergence of the power monopoly the conflicts for the control of this power monopoly began immediately. In the long run these resulted in the institutionalisation of the rule of law. Differentiation and interlinking of modern societies with an increasingly large-scale territorial economy and increasingly dense and close communication structures took place with a time lag. The struggle for democratic participation, imaginable only on the basis of societies that have become socially mobile, went hand in hand with arguments about social justice, especially fairness of distribution. Parallel to this a political conflict culture of liberal character developed step by step.[17]

The variations in the developmental process within this basic pattern were certainly remarkable. Thus England had a long struggle for the rule of law behind it at a time when the power monopoly in the large-area countries of the European continent still maintained its absolutist and autocratic position. Generally the struggle for democratic participation depended on the scale and the speed of the

---

[16] As Rainer Tetzlaff has argued, especially with an eye to black Africa, there arises a "Hexagon of Decivilisation as a result of state disintegration". See his essay "Staats- und Zivilisationsverfall. Wird Afrika anschlußfähig an die globalisierte Welt?", in: Hans Küng and Dieter Senghaas (eds): *Friedenspolitik. Ethische Grundlagen internationaler Beziehungen* (Munich, 2003): 1–383. The hexagon of decivilisation has the following components: (1) fragmentation/privatisation of force; (2) rule of force, lawlessness; (3) overexploitation economy and self-help/affect explosion; (4) dictatorship, will imposition, enslavement; (5) self-granting of privileges/social polarisation; (6) war and terrorism/exclusion of enemy groups.

[17] See Wolfgang Reinhard: *Geschichte der Staatsgewalt. Eine vergleichende Verfassungsgeschichte Europas von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich, 1999); Paolo Prodi: *Eine Geschichte der Gerechtigkeit. Vom Recht Gottes zum modernen Rechtsstaat* (Munich, 2003).

transformation of traditional societies into modern ones. Where the labour force potential was, or became, small the political struggle for social justice was facilitated. This was the case, for instance, in the European settler colonies (especially in New Zealand, Australia and Canada); moreover they were not burdened with the heritage of European feudalism, which is why the development of the civilisatory hexagon, albeit starting late, proceeded especially fast and with regard to all six components. Experience on similar lines was also shared by the Scandinavian countries, where, long before the rest of the European continent, a completion and rounding off of the civilisatory hexagon took place. A certain 'maturity' of the civilisatory hexagon is observed only in the democratically and market-economy oriented constitutional states of the West (OECD states) after 1950, without however the above-mentioned break-up danger being eliminated in principle.

Although Eurocentrally rooted, the civilisatory hexagon is not anchored in any original 'cultural genes' of Europe. Its first outlines appeared 500 years ago; 100 years ago it began to differentiate in a few individual instances; as recently as in the twentieth century there were dramatic regressions and it remains to be seen whether the relatively positive experiences in the OECD sphere during the past 50 years can be seamlessly extended into the future. Just as no certain origin can be established in Europe, so there is no guarantee of endurance for the civilisatory hexagon in Europe or in the Western world generally. And since this construct represents a sum of politically institutional innovations, it would be a mistake to assume that innovations beyond the forms of the hexagon known today would be improbable over future centuries, let alone millennia.

Maybe such innovations will come about in other regions and cultural spheres of the globe, such as, during the next few decades, in the East Asian or South-East Asian area. Here one could speak of an emerging hexagonal development process, especially in Korea and Taiwan, but as a trend in all reasonably successful developing countries of East and South- East Asia. The sequence observed in these cases may be described as follows. The starting points were dictatorial development regimes in the form of military dictatorships, which, in the time after 1950 enjoyed a generally uncircumscribed power monopoly. By the customary economic criteria the development policy pursued by them was exceedingly successful—especially in comparison with the results of development policy in other Third World continents. The consequence of successful development policy manifests itself in a dramatically swift transformation of traditional into modern societies, which, viewed in terms of social statistics, increasingly approach the OECD average.[18] This transformation, as always in history, led to struggles for political recognition, i.e. efforts by new social strata for political participation. As a result, democratisation appeared on the agenda of those societies. One of its aims was the enforcement of rule-of-law principles, in particular a constitutional control of the power monopoly. Since a dramatic growth of the economy has meanwhile

---

[18] This approach can be readily measured by indices. See Ulrich Menzel and Dieter Senghaas: *Europas Entwicklung und die Dritte Welt. Eine Bestandsaufnahme* (Frankfurt/M., 1986), chapter 6.

exhausted the manpower potential and since the conflicting groups of modernising society are organising (creation of 'strategic groups'), the dispute about social justice will become further exacerbated.[19] An interesting question will be whether, in a cultural sphere previously disinclined to conflict (such as the Confucian-Buddhist), a political culture can establish itself that will gradually develop a positive attitude to conflicts and conflict management.

What we observe in the Far East is the scenario of a hexagon unfolding in specific sequence ('emergent hexagon'): crude power monopoly, efficient economy, democratic participation, rule of law, fair distribution, conflict culture. As always in history, this is ultimately a wrestling for new forms of coexistence, basically therefore for constitutional issues, the answers to all of which may be historically inspired, but are by no means predetermined. There is therefore always scope for politically institutional innovation.

The East Asian experience of an emerging civilisatory hexagon stands in clear contrast to the failure of the real-socialist experiment. In the political, social, economic and cultural respect real socialism was based on power monopoly—the monopoly claim of the Communist Party. Although real socialism vigorously promoted the transformation of traditional into modern societies, especially industrialisation, urbanisation and literacy, it was unable to meet the growing complexity of society, economy and culture through correspondingly increasingly complex political control instruments and, eventually, step by step, to abolish the monopoly claim of the single party and to open up to democratisation based on pluralism. Instead of acceptance of a scenario of an emergent hexagon there was enforcement of a crude power monopoly with more or less undisguised repression. Thus real-socialism manoeuvred itself into a civilisatory blind alley. The planned economy typical of it, despite considerable and increasing capital expenditure, performed less and less efficiently, which meant that for the mass of the population the ideologically promised fairness of distribution was replaced by increasingly widespread shortages. Rule of law remained unknown; self-organisation of social conflict parties ('civil society') was frowned upon. When social movements eventually forced a change, the initial result of democratisation was not infrequently chaos—a process entirely comprehensible in the light of the civilisatory hexagon. Ethnicisation—the lowest common denominator of politics—often became the pseudo-biological vanishing point of political movements. In the light of the civilisatory hexagon the reconstruction programme following the political turn (1989–92) had dramatic dimensions. The power monopoly was often contested by civil war; the rule of law, until then unknown, had to be gradually established, democratic pluralist politics had to be rehearsed. This actually required a political conflict culture, which had a poor chance unless the reconstruction of efficient economies helped to defuse the social problem. Tasks of this kind and this scope arose therefore abruptly ('dilemma of simultaneity') and

---

[19] See Hans-Dieter Evers and Tilman Schiel: *Strategische Gruppen. Vergleichende Studien zu Staat, Bürokratie und Klassenbildung in der Dritten Welt* (Berlin, 1988); Günter Schubert et al. (eds): *Demokratie und konfliktfähige Gruppen in Entwicklungsländern* (Münster, 1993).

continue to present themselves in all six dimensions of the hexagon at the same time. This has no parallel in history. It is not therefore surprising if all societies affected are struggling with these facts and that many of them cannot as yet see the light at the end of the tunnel (although the image of 'the tunnel at the end of the light' may be exaggerated).[20]

The emerging hexagon in the Far East points to growing—albeit not yet secured—opportunities for civilised conflict management in the political sphere; the real-socialist 'anti-hexagon' focused only on the power monopoly points to the violence-proneness of such a construct, given a socially mobile politicisable society. Other experience shows that in the large Latin American societies, which, in their history, have already known limited periods with democratic experience (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico) the opportunities still exist for an emerging civilisatory hexagon, for instance in the less populated countries (such as Chile and Uruguay). At least it is worth noting that Latin America at present does not belong to the worrying conflict sources in the world—quite unlike large parts of black Africa, where political institutions, economic potentials and infrastructures are, in many places, falling apart or are being wrecked, even though, on the other hand, certain individual democratisation processes can be observed, albeit with an as yet entirely open result. With regard to civilised conflict management Latin America (though perhaps only on the surface) may give rise to optimism, whereas black Africa gives rise to profound pessimism. In other parts of the world, especially in the Arabic-Islamic sphere, existing institutions of conflict settlement, such as the post-colonial secular state (where existing), find themselves, in the face of an expanding and deepening developmental crisis, under the political fire of fundamentalist Islamic forces. Unfortunately trends in that direction can be observed also in an ethnopolitically divided India ('Hindustan'), where more than a billion people will have no choice but to preserve the secular state as an institutional platform for more or less civilised conflict management or, replacing it, find (or invent) a new platform that would fence in ethnic conflicts—but what platform could that he other than the secular state?

Whether China, the world's existing more than one-billion society, will grow into an area-wide emerging civilisatory hexagon is a particularly suspenseful question. The scale of the task is unprecedented: efforts to fit into the civilisatory hexagon in the sense of conflict-prone collective learning processes have so far taken place successfully in small countries, such as Scandinavia, or in settler colonies, and most recently in Taiwan. But how can one visualise such a process in a vast country with, at present, more than 1.3 billion inhabitants? Can such a process, given our experience, even be expected? The answer is open, but there is one noteworthy state of affairs: as in the rest of East Asia, the forces in China that have an interest in the development of one or another variant of the democratic rule-of-law

---

[20] A formulation by Claus Offe: *Der Tunnel am Ende des Lichts. Erkundungen der politischen Transformation im Neuen Osten* (Frankfurt/M., 1994). For an analysis of real socialism, largely in agreement with the one here presented, see Wolfgang Engler: *Die zivilisatorische Lücke. Versuch über den Staatssozialismus* (Frankfurt/M., 1992).

state are being strengthened by a dynamically unfolding economic basis, whereas the material power base of the status- quo forces, trapped in an ageing centralised planned economy, tend to shrink. Unlike the reformist forces in the eastern half of Europe, which at zero hour (1989–92) had no new economic basis at their disposal, the reformers in China will be able, in the impending inevitable political conflict about the direction of future development, to throw their own economically founded political weights on to the scales. Here is a clear difference from the development in the eastern half of Europe, especially Russia, following the world-political about-turn.

5.5 The Worldwide Civilisation Problems from a General Perspective

What Europe had to learn laboriously and painfully, by trial and error, by direct and roundabout roads and sometimes wrong roads—tolerance as a solution of a pluralisation initially perceived as a threat to the status quo—is a process that will have to be repeated in other parts of the world, if not in detail then certainly in principle: the non-postponable mastering of coexistence problems in the face of a spreading fundamental politicisation, as the consequence of the above-mentioned transformation of traditional into socially mobile societies, is increasingly on the agenda there. However, just as once in Europe, no provision is made in any of the various extra- European regions for these modern problems in their traditional political culture. Their self-comprehension, too, was largely 'cosmocentrally' oriented. In it—especially in the manifestation of high mythology—the cosmos, society and people were understood as a unit from an integral perspective. This was envisaged as a well-ordered and well-constructed hierarchy. Its architecture was viewed statically. Besides, the roles and role play of the actors were prescribed. Cyclicity determined historical self- comprehension, which in reality was not historical in the modern sense, because the cycle—in analogy to the processes in the annual cycle of nature or to events in the political sphere (rise, flowering and decay of imperial structures or empires)—kept returning to the same starting point. The idea of a plurality of truths was, on the whole, unimaginable.

If on such premises especially the institutions of community and governance appear as an organic entity, the conflicts are, as a rule, regarded as dysfunctional. They are, as in ancient China, understood as the 'great unrest under the sky', that is as the starting point of the danger of chaos or as an expression of an already existing chaos. Counteracting thinking is then seen as a contribution to the overcoming of just that chaos, as a chaos control strategy designed to restore the 'cosmic order'.[21] However, for the requirements of mastering the modern coexistence

---

[21] On the ideologies of high mythology see Ernst Topitsch: *Vom Ursprung und Ende der Metaphysik* (Vienna, 1958).

problems, such orientations are no longer helpful. That is why, also in the rest of the world, new perspectives of conflict management suited to our time, and hence new formulas and forms of internal peace will have to emerge under the compulsion of circumstances.

Unlike the endogenous Western development, the collective learning processes in the extra-European world are massively co-determined by earlier developments within the West: these, being earlier, define the history-making international context that shares in shaping local events. In this process, just as once in Europe in its relations with hexagonal pioneering societies (like Britain, France and Scandinavia) or with latecomers (e.g. Germany), four prototype forms of reaction can generally be observed in the extra-European world today:

Modernistic-imitative is a reaction that accepts the challenge of the West as well as its experiences and 'solutions offered', viewing the West therefore as a model and fighting against the weight of its own tradition, including its own traditional political culture. In the first half of the past century such orientations were found in many places, above all in China; they remained unsuccessful at their time. Today, however, they are strikingly successful, e.g. in two of the four threshold countries in East Asia—Korea and Taiwan. There, as demonstrated above, newly industrialising countries (NICs) become 'newly democratising countries', whose political culture, despite all local colour, will in the foreseeable future be barely distinguishable from that of western countries.

Where modernisation upheavals occur and coexistence problems become acute, the preservers also appear: traditionalists, also reactionaries, generally conservatives. They endeavour to turn back the wheel of history or at least to halt modernisation. This type of reaction can be observed wherever in the world Western modern ideas clash with traditional ones. Gandhi could be quoted here as a soft-minded example, because his tradition-based philosophy of life was village-oriented, anti-commercial and egalitarian. It envisaged small units and therefore favoured a direct democracy based on consensus in an area of manageable size, i.e. not representative democracy to which, in populous societies, there is no alternative anyway. Today comparable ideas, albeit controversially discussed, are still found, mainly in black Africa.

Where upheavals occur half-modernists also appear on the scene. They pounce on western know-how, but try to keep all other ideological influences away. Japan has successfully pursued such a project since the middle of the nineteenth century, whereas the real socialism of the twentieth century remained unsuccessful. The so-called 'Singapore school' became prominent during the last three decades of the past century for such an orientation of half-modernism, and Islamic fundamentalism is pursuing it to this day. Yet the political problems of an increasingly complex pluralising society, be it in Singapore, in China, in the vast sphere of Islamic societies or elsewhere, are not resolved by such a system-political programme or even brought nearer to a solution—least of all where attempts are made to proceed with theocratic recipes of Islamic provenance. These reveal astonishing parallels with historical antecedents, but also prove the hopelessness of a 'theocratic counter-revolution' against modernism, such as was observed, for instance, in

Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century as a reaction to the French Revolution. Pluralism was, and is, considered in this anti-modernist programme as an amoral community-disturbing idea, as an expression of the decay of values and culture, as the quintessence of moral blindness ('jahiliyya'); unrestricted religiously motivated rule was, and is, considered right for our time.[22]

However: even in the extra-European world *innovations* will ultimately be necessary where modern and traditional ideas clash and irreversible upheavals follow. Just as they were unpredictable in the European zone, so they cannot be predicted in the extra-European world. Internal European experience will be repeated: As soon as traditional political order and culture are confronted with modernisation thrusts, when societies undergo a structural and hence mental upheaval, these systems and cultures get into conflict with themselves with merciless inevitability, experiencing a 'clash within civilisation'. From this stem the necessary collective learning processes—and also problematical wrong developments.

That the innovations of modernism in the European western sphere have totally exhausted themselves with regard to the mastering of coexistence problems—this is the assumption underlying Francis Fukuyama's thesis of the '*end of history*'—does not seem likely. On the contrary, four fifths of humanity will, over the next few decades and as a rule reluctantly, have to experiment with the discovery of new appropriate answers to the problems of social mobilisation and fundamental politicisation. It is unlikely that these answers, which will ultimately have to prove effective, will be invented in abstract form at the drawing board.

More likely, also in this respect, is a repetition of European experience: that which eventually proves its worth as a viable arrangement of coexistence, i.e. of internal peace, will have come about as an unintended consequence of profound political conflicts.

Extra-European society will not therefore be spared Europe's difficult, painful and conflict-abundant experiences on the road to the democratic rule-of-law state, its institutions and its ethos. The process is comparable to that in Europe, even though its final outcome could be different, especially if genuine innovations are actually implemented. In this case, however, the result would reflect not the deep dimension of traditional political culture, but something new—against one's own tradition.

Pluralisation as a perceived threat, institutionally protected and emotionally anchored tolerance as a solution: this, viewed worldwide, is one of mankind's great challenges for the twenty-first century, no less weighty than the intensifying worldwide environmental problems. A glance back at the twentieth century reveals the explosive nature of these problems. In that century the 'alternatives' to tolerance were rehearsed in many areas: marginalisation, ghettoisation, apartheid, expulsion, 'ethnic cleansing', genocide and, above all, civil wars in many variants.[23] Unlike the 'causative pacifism' at the beginning of the twentieth century, the search

---

[22] See Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit: *Occidentalism. The West in the Eyes of its Enemies* (New York, 2004).

[23] See Gunnar Heinsohn: *Lexikon der Völkermorde* (Reinbek b. Hamburg, 1998); Mihran Dahag and Kristin Platt (eds): *Genozid und Moderne*, vol. 1 (Opladen, 1998).

for system- political normative, institutional, material and mental conditions of coexistence *within* societies, therefore, in view of the irreversibility of pluralisation, remains high on the agenda. *Internal peace* is not therefore a marginal problem, but has become an acute existential core problem—more than ever before, seen worldwide. For even in the last corner of the earth the matter-of-course nature of traditional orders is crumbling away, which is why indispensable orientation conflicts are inevitable in a mixture of power disputes and system-politically motivated culture conflicts. The exacerbated conflicts in Iran since the 1980s are a good example.

5.6   Shaping of a World Order Policy

5.6.1   Constructive Conflict Management on the International Plane

The civilisatory hexagon was initially explained with an eye only to the civilisatory requirements of politics within societies. In such individual hexagonally organised societies an increasingly coherent sequence of actions arises in consequence. Can these reflections be transferied to the plane beyond individual societies? What would civilisation of politics mean on the international plane?

A transfer of the civilisatory hexagon from the intra-state intra-society plane to the international plane would have to understand the world either as a sum of hexagonal societies or even as a single hexagonally structured civilian world society. Its emerging development, viewed in the abstract might be imagined as follows: first, the emergence of increasingly dense transnational inter-societal interconnections within the traditional world of states, from which, initially in regional link-ups and later beyond these, a transnational 'societal world' and 'economic world' would develop; gradual relativisation of the world of states and step-by-step development of a world society, principally through globalising system relations in the dimensions of worldwide economy, transport, information and communication; next, the development of corresponding, in the final effect common, normative and judicial horizons, as well as of corresponding overarching institutions, of accepted rules and political control mechanisms that would contribute to a civilised management of conflicts and to the cultural development and stabilisation of a civilian world society. If such a world society were also to tend to become a homogeneous community of values, then today's world of states would eventually be transformed into a world community with the individual states playing an important, albeit ultimately subsidiary, role and function in such a worldwide network of actions. Within such an overall construct—the civilian world society—the realisation of a large-area civilisatory hexagon would now become imaginable on the highest possible, i.e. worldwide, plane: the development of a power monopoly, acknowledged as legitimate (however institutionally shaped in detail), control of this power monopoly in a manner analogous to

the rule of law on the state plane, worldwide interdependence links and resulting disciplinary constraints with the result of affect control; democratisation at least in the sense of appropriate possibilities of representation of essential collectives and groupings; economic equalisation to achieve social justice on a worldwide plane; as well as internationalised conflict culture, mainly in the sense of tolerance as the fundamental contents of a world ethos.

There is nothing to prevent us from indulging in an abstract mental experiment (like the one just rehearsed) and imposing the civilisatory hexagon in its separate components and as an entity upon such a future world, regardless of whether we regard such development as desirable or reprehensible. As for desirability, we might, in this context, recall Kant's scepticism as articulated in *Zum ewigen Frieden* (1795). He championed the thesis that mutually independent neighbouring states may justify a state of war (unless a federative unification of them prevents the outbreak of hostilities), but that, according to reason, a federative unification of such independent states is preferable to an amalgamation into a power overarching all individual states and transforming itself into a world state. His reasoning was: 'because the laws, with the enlarged size of the government, lose more and more of their weight and a soulless despotism, having exterminated the germs of good, ultimately descends into anarchy'.

And, although the dissimilarity of languages and religions bears within itself the tendency towards mutual hatred and towards a pretext for war, this very dissimilarity was being utilised 'by nature' to prevent nations from intermingling and to keep them apart. Growing culture and the gradual rapprochement of people to common principles and to consensus with regard to peace would engender rivalry and eventually an equilibrium that would be more peace-promoting than 'despotism'.

In the language of the newer theory: the abstract extrapolation of the civilisatory hexagon from the individual civilian society to the world as a whole would aim at the creation of an 'amalgamated security community', i.e. a new federal state on a supranational plane. Kant's critique of this is oriented positively towards this or that variant of a 'pluralist security community' (K.W. Deutsch), i.e. towards imaginable variants of a confederation.[24] Also imaginable are models of political constitutional shape between federal state and state federation, such as the 'league of states', which was the label given to the European Union in a judgment of the German Constitutional Court. A 'league of states', accordingly, would be less integrated than a federal state, but far more integrated than a mere state federation, a 'confederation'.

What is possible, what is probable and what, moreover, is sensible does not, of course, primarily depend on such abstract extrapolations, but on the reality of the world and foreseeable trends of development. To start with, this reality does not present itself as a single homogeneous and coherent pattern of actions, but as a fissured and hence heterogeneous system of relations.[25] And the likelihood of the

---

[24] See Chapter 5 of the book, from which this text was taken (see footnote 1 above).

[25] See Dieter Senghaas: "Die Konstitution der Welt. Eine Analyse in friedenspohtischer Absicht", in: *Leviathan*, 31, 1 (2003): 117–152.

world as a whole gradually, and in the foreseeable future, becoming homogeneous over large areas and achieving worldwide effective systemic, moreover institutional and mental, coherence continues to be slight.

If this is difficult to accomplish within societies, and if even there it should, under optimal conditions, be seen only as a fragile construct without any guarantee of endurance (which is why, as demonstrated, continuous efforts for internal peace remain necessary even with a fairly stable starting situation), then this is, not extrapolated in the abstract, but concretely analysed relating to the existing reality, a much more difficult task on the international plane: namely, to achieve and safeguard international coexistence with world order politics.

Hence first the question: what systematic reflections result, with regard to the existing reality, from the preceding reflections on the civilisatory hexagon concerning the transformation of the character of international conflicts? What would have to be done in the real existing world in order to 'formally institute peace' (Kant) also on this plane and hence to establish a 'social order' beyond individual states in the sense of the above-quoted causative or constructive pacifism?

First, the equivalent of the disarming of the citizens within the state would be a 'disarmament of states'. Potentially or actually armed states—as defined by the 'anarchy of the world of states' situation—live under the conditions of the so-called security dilemma which, in the event of appropriate conflicts of interests, goes along with the threat, or the use, of force. 'Peace' under the premises of the security dilemma, as Alfred Fried has pointed out, initially means only armistice. However,

> such peace would… only be a latent war, its time limit given by a mutual outbidding of means of force, by the fear of one state of a sudden attack by the other, a peace that could be maintained only by the sacrifice of all the productive forces of the states, forces that should serve the enhancement of a happy life of the nations, for the longest possible extension of a period between a recently finished and the next war, a period misnamed peace. Just as a person cannot be regarded as in good health if, for a predetermined time, he is free from an acute attack, so the world of states is not pacified by a transformation of an acute state of war into a latent one that one knows is bound to retransform itself into acute war.[26]

If, however, the security dilemma were to be replaced by reliable expectation, predictability and hence assured behaviour, what institutional provisions would be necessary for achieving such a state of affairs? What would be the functional equivalent of the intra-state rule of law and its power of enforcement, i.e. to the intra-state monopoly of legitimate power? A negative answer is easy: a stable monopoly of legitimate power on the international plane could not be simply the result of victory and defeat in an international elimination struggle, or the result of a hegemony order based solely on power. Least of all is such a monopoly imaginable in a deterrence or equilibrium system of the powers—or in an arrangement between military alliances (whether oriented regionally or worldwide). The justification of the last-named systems, which have characterised the history

---

[26] Fried: *Probleme der Friedenstechnik*, p. 29.

of international relations to date, explicitly contradicts the idea of a legitimate monopoly of power. Moreover, none of these arrangements are durable. A hegemony-based order is always prone to erosion: systems of equilibrium or deterrence usually find that the ground on which they believe they rest securely is pulled from under their feet by uncontrolled and uncontrollable processes. On an international plane and in a persistent heterogeneous environment a monopoly of legitimate power, given the continued existence of separate states, is imaginable only within a system of collective security as conceived, albeit only in embryonic shape, in the Charter of the United Nations since 1945. This system is based in principle on a prohibition of power—not to be confused with the monopoly of force—which is why international law can only claim to be an international law of peace since 1945. The only exception from the prohibition of force is time-limited individual or collective self-defence until the instruments of the collective security system are set in motion, i.e. effective help is provided for the victim of force, i.e. the attacked state, with its defence against the aggressor. This state of affairs was conceived in analogy to one that exists also within rule-of-law political systems: in acute emergencies individuals are entitled to self-defence until the lawfully competent state bodies come to their aid.

In theory the system of collective security as enshrined in the UN Charter is conceived entirely logically. That its instruments have not been fully implemented is not the fault of the concept (of collective security), but of the states that continue to refuse to fully implement such a system—with the result that it is not properly effective. What does its logic consist of? For the event of conflicts of interests that are apt to lead to force or have indeed led to force, it has provisions for peaceful conflict settlement, negotiation, investigation, mediation, arrangement, adjudication, judicial decision and other peaceful means of its own choice. In the event of a failure of such efforts, and if aggression has taken place, there is a gradation of measures: assessment of aggression having taken place, peaceful sanctions in the sense of an economic embargo, evaluation of the efficacy or inefficacy of such peaceful sanctions, possibility of military sanctions for which a whole range of provisions exists (so far unrealised special agreements between the Security Council and the UN members obliged to assist; holding of air forces in readiness; drawing up of plans for the application of force of arms by the Security Council with the support of the general staff committee; execution of the resolution of the Security Council according to its judgment by all or some members of the UN; possibility of authorisation of one or more members, i.e. authorisation of appropriate actions).

Whatever differences there are in detail, the ban on the use of force, laid down in international law since 1945 on the international plane is based, just as in the intra-state sphere, on two elementary premises: the individual (here the state, there the individual or group of individuals) is prohibited in principle from resorting to force except in the event of self- defence. There is no kind of exception. Besides, since even a ban on the use of force in principle is no guarantee that force will not be resorted to, the second premise really consists in the duty, under the law, to come to the assistance of the victim of aggression—the conceptually

logical counterpart to the prohibition of force. If such assistance, though urgently required, does not take place on the international plane, or only rarely, or only for opportunist reasons, this means that the community of nations in reality lags behind what it has itself explicitly and without any reservation undertaken to do. Today's international world is therefore, in respect of a security guarantee, a rule-of-law community in the formal sense, whereas in political reality it usually acts as if judicial anarchy prevailed. This means that relevant decisions (e.g. in the Security Council) are taken arbitrarily as a contingent result of political bargaining processes and not always or cogently in the light of the situations viewed and assessed from judicial points of view. As a rule, therefore, we still see à la carte decisions motivated by power politics or interest politics instead of decisions resulting from the assessment of a situation in the light of judicial demands.

The fundamental problem of the collective security system as it exists today in international law in accordance with the UN Charter is that it is practised as a power figure that is manipulated by opportunist considerations in all possible directions instead of a mandatory instance of law. If political actions were at the level of an international law with its own value, the weighting would have to be exactly the other way about. The legal character of the decisions to be taken in the UN, especially in the Security Council, would have to be the primary consideration, with aspects of political opportunism holding second place. The fact that this is not so indicates that the much-invoked 'community of nations' at top level still sees itself as a power-politically defined 'world of states' and not, especially with regard to very elementary police-type international order-restoring functions, as a legal federation. However, there will be no world peace order until this emphasis is changed in line with the fundamental demands of the existing international law of peace.

Secondly, the question about a rule-of-law-analogous control of enforcement measures arises also outside the individual state. This is the problem of the rule of law on the international plane. Who is it, on this level, that actually controls the executor of sanctions against a threat to peace or a breach of peace: who today controls the Security Council?

This problem is of fundamental significance for the development of a world peace system. If we look at the present system of collective security, as laid down in the UN Charter, the question immediately arises of what controlling body those affected by the resolutions of the Security Council can turn to in the event of feeling violated in their own rights. In the intra- societal sphere there are a multitude of legal procedures and judicial levels serving the protection of the individual. Only in combination with such protective and control measures does the intra-state monopoly of power become one of the pillars of the state based on the rule of law and thus the backbone of a genuine rule-of-law community. Hardly any comparable development is to be observed on the international plane and hardly anything has so far been institutionalised in an analogous manner if we disregard a few regulatory fundamental principles, such as the principle of proportionality of means. However, an international legal system that is to attain legitimacy is not thinkable without control by a decision-making sanctions-imposing authority.

While the role of the 'world public' should not be underestimated, what would be truly relevant is appropriate institutionalised legal authorities,[27] i.e. independent fact finding in order to establish whether or to what degree a threat to peace or an actual breach of peace exists, furthermore an independent body that examines the facts found, assesses them in the light of international law and arrives at a legally justified judgment; next an authority that puts into effect appropriate sanctions in the light of that judgment; and finally an authority to which the sanction-imposed state, if it feels wronged, can complain against the procedure of the community of nations. The more intra-state outbreaks of violence, i.e. civil wars, are interpreted by the world security council as 'threats to peace' and hence as a legitimate field of activity of UN agencies,[28] the more an interpretation of legitimate intervention that is more than casuistic becomes necessary.[29] There is an urgent need, also in this respect, of differentiated judicial institutions that would actually establish the rule of law and hence a legitimacy of peace enforcement or law enforcement measures appropriate to our time; as a result they would overcome the quasi-absolutist character of the present state of the Security Council. Only then would it be possible to speak correctly of the existence of a monopoly of legitimate force also at the international level within the framework of a differentiated peace-constitutional law.

On the international plane no institutionally differentiated power monopoly, one to be qualified as legitimate, analogous to the rule of law, as yet exists. What does exist is a general prohibition of force—no less (what a progress in international law!) but also no more. On the basis of the UN Charter the Security Council is authorised by international law to take decisions regarded as mandatory. There is an 'authorisation monopoly for the use of force' (L. Brock). Admittedly these decisions are à la carte: they can, but do not have to, orient themselves along existing international law. Orientation points can also be single-state or coalition-determined interests, power-opportunist situation assessments, decisionist manifestations of will, etc. The dictum of Louis XIV 'L'état [le droit] c'est moi' might be legitimately varied by the members of the Security Council on the basis of the UN Charter to 'Le droit international c'est nous'—in point of fact a scandalous state of affairs that should be overcome, as a matter of urgency, by means of

---

[27] See Richard Falk et al. (eds): *The Constitutional Foundations of World Peace* (Albany, 1993); and explicitly Michael Zürn and Bernhard Zangl: "Weltpolizei oder Weltinterventionsgericht? Zur Zivilisierung der Konfliktbearbeitung", in: *Internationale Politik*, 54, 8: 17–24; Dieter Senghaas: "Recht auf Nothilfe", in: Reinhard Merkel (ed.): *Der Kosovo-Krieg und das Völkerrecht* (Frankfurt/M., 2000): 99–1 14.

[28] See Heike Gading: *Der Schutz grundlegender Menschenrechte durch militärische Maßnahmen des Sicherheitsrates—das Ende staatlicher Souveränität?* (Berlin, 1996); Martin Lailach: *Die Wahrung des Weltfriedens und der internationalen Sicherheit als Aufgabe des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen* (Berlin, 1998).

[29] A suggestion for such casuistry is found in Dieter Senghaas: *Wohin driftet die Welt? Über die Zukunft friedlicher Koexistenz* (Frankfurt/M., 1994), chapter 6.

rule-of-law-analogous international provisions.[30] The urgency of reforms was emphatically revealed by the Iraq crisis in the winter of 2002/03.

Third, let us examine the other components of the hexagon, the interdependences and their consequences. As long as eight decades ago the above-quoted Alfred Fried (and many others similarly) formulated this observation:

> As a result of the revolution in transport and production technology a powerful tendency is observed towards a division of labour and systematic collaboration of nations, even in the remotest countries. This created reciprocal dependence between different states, both in material and moral respects. Nearly all activities today transgress the frame of the individual state. A community of civilised humanity has begun to develop before our eyes. That community strives for an organisation in which people's actions would be adapted to the trend and the purpose of the new technology-influenced living conditions.[31]

Fried's observation is not incorrect, but it requires considerable differentiation; this is of major importance for the problems here discussed.[32] The point is that the interdependences in the world are very disparately located: symmetrically, asymmetrically or confrontationally. Symmetrical interdependences, as found, for instance, in the West European region, are based upon system-politically relatively homogeneous states (here, hexagonal rule-of-law states of the Western type). These structures are in turn characterised by comparable highly productive and efficient economic profiles, resulting in dense material networking of the type of substitutive division of labour, which in turn is embedded in correspondingly dense institutional networks at government level, at social level and at non-governmental level. The measure of self-regulation is relatively high. Explicit conflict-settlement mechanisms exist in the event of conflicts. This structure of relationships moreover gives rise to a constraint towards durable coordination at government level and increasingly also between social groups, as well as between governments and transnationally operating non-governmental organisations.

Needless to say, nothing similar is observed with regard to asymmetrical interdependences, as those existing between developed regions and little developed, misdeveloped or underdeveloped regions. Inequality, possibly (though not inevitably) with a growing tendency, is built into asymmetrical interdependence. The contents aspect of the exchange structure resembles, in the worst case, colonial relations: technology, machines and finished products are exchanged for raw materials. In the event of such an exchange the result is the structural enrichment of one side and a relative, often even absolute, structural impoverishment of the other. Such a competence gradient is usually safeguarded by dominance. Moreover, it is inherently unstable, erosion-prone and, for obvious reasons, prone not only to conflict but to violence.

---

[30] International lawyers, usually focused on the political character of the Security Council, have mostly not been too inventive with regard to appropriate reform; mostly they put forward a critique of proposals viewed as utopian or illusionist. See, however, Mohammed Bedjaoui: *The New World Order and the Security Council. Testing the Legality of its Acts* (The Hague, 1995); Bernd Martenczuk: *Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrates* (Berlin, 1996).

[31] Fried: *Probleme der Friedenstechnik*: 46–47.

[32] See chapter 8 of the book from which this ext was taken.

In the event of confrontational interdependence (such as existed in the East–West conflict and can today be observed in many regional conflict situations, for instance between India and Pakistan or in the Middle East) there is always a danger of a clash of the agents, just because they are, through specific incompatibilities of interests, fixed directly upon each other, giving rise therefore to an interdependence *ex negativo*). This interdependence expresses itself in rearmament and counter-rearmament, i.e. in a rearmament dynamism or progressive military phases. If the conflict management concerned collapses, this means the threat of war or actual war.

The above-mentioned three-way differentiation is, in view of the very disparate action patterns observed in the world, not only of heuristic value, but is also important for political practice. Symmetrical interdependence is the only one with built-in self-stabilisation and self-enlargement mechanisms. Confrontational interdependence, on the other hand, tends to give rise to vicious circles. Asymmetrical interdependence in most cases runs counter to elementary demands of fair distribution and fairness and cannot therefore be stabilised. Wherever one of these three starting situations is given, practical action and policies are quite differently focused: symmetrical interdependence invites deepening; confrontational interdependence, on the other hand, given its inherent vicious circle, calls for considerable efforts to deconstruct it; asymmetrical interdependence requires, at least, restructuring. The action perspectives present in the two last-mentioned instances ultimately aim at symmetrisation. Symmetrical interdependence thus becomes a normative yardstick in analysis and practice. This justifies itself by the fact that the prospect of civilisation of international politics is enhanced by it. To achieve worldwide symmetry is probably an unrealistic goal. But it can sometimes be realised in a regional or sub-regional context. That is why as many world-order-building bricks as possible should be brought together at these levels.

With regard to affect control the implications of the above-listed differentiations are more or less clear. Confrontational interdependence allows affects to become exacerbated; special efforts are therefore needed to moderate them ('détente policy'). With asymmetrical interdependence a time-limited moderation of affects for overcoming power and welfare gradients gives the disadvantaged side a chance of avoiding discrimination ('empowerment'). Symmetrical interdependence sets restrictive conditions to affects. Affects are fenced round and cushioned; if they were mobilised this would have counterproductive and damaging consequences all round. Functional differentiation here—and only here—at the interstate and international level results in the same consequences as in the above discussed intra-societal sphere.

The outstanding characteristic of the world is therefore a totally diverse position of the forms of interdependences, which defines the situation of the world in the overall view and in detail. Its characteristic is not homogeneity, but heterogeneity. This creates, looking at the world as a whole, a tendency towards major analytical and also considerable peace- policy problems.

Fourth, what might democratic participation on the international plane mean? Who—other than the states that are doing so already anyway—would have to organise on the international plane, and how, in order to avoid a violence-engendering

accumulation of conflicts? Alongside the states, how about interest groups (such as multinational firms, employees' organisations, professional associations, etc.) or cultural and religious communities of every kind and size—or the much-quoted and rarely concretely defined 'civilian society'—along with Greenpeace, Amnesty International and Transparency International, who else? And what would a representative democratic constitution at a world level look like? What would 'citizens' participation' mean here?

Meanwhile on the international plane a consensus is developing (albeit still largely theoretical) that the authorities and institutions maintained and staffed by individual states are in urgent need, beyond the state level, of an institutionally buttressed feedback with the institutions of the individual civic societies in order to make participation possible, create transparency, enhance the effectiveness of decisions and their implementation and, beyond that, mobilise legitimacy. The problems concern the EU and, more especially, the international organisations all the way to the United Nations.

Ideas on this are of the most diverse nature.[33] Thus, for example, there is some discussion, at UN level, of establishing, as a supplement to the Security Council and the General Assembly (the representative body of the states), an 'Assembly of Nations' as a deliberate opposition and counterpoise to the etatistic ponderousness of the United Nations. Capable of development are also arrangements such as have meanwhile arisen at the great world conferences of the United Nations: non-governmental organisations are there given their own platform parallel to the official event or even, most recently, closely linked with it. Also imaginable is a more far-reaching involvement of all relevant forces in the consultation on specific problem areas, analogously to the 'commitology' of the EU and the practice existing since the 1920s in the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and institutionally anchored, whereby representatives of the state, capital and labour (most recently also non-governmental organisations) cooperate with one another within the same international organisation.

Fifth, if the thesis that the so-called social and economic worlds each have a weight of their own and, as a rule, do not follow the action logic of the state, then their agents will, over time, demand participation in consultations and decisions concerning matters affecting them beyond the individual state. The corresponding procedures in the EU sphere are important here as examples. There is sufficient cause for such considerations in the dramatic extent of inequality and unfairness of distribution on the international plane and in the conflict matter latent in it or often already manifest. Only in some parts of the world is inequality diminishing, for instance between the old industrial centres and the 'new industrial countries' mainly of East Asia and South-East Asia. Elsewhere we observe a deepening of inequalities and hence an accumulation of conflict matter. Even though a worldwide and simultaneous eruption of this conflict build-up is not to be expected, such conflicts might nevertheless

---

[33] See Daniele Archibugi and David Held (eds): *Cosmopolitan Democracy. An Agenda for a New World Order* (Cambridge, 1995); David Held: *Democracy and the Global Order. From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge, 1995).

become virulent in local or regional contexts, resulting in worldwide consequences. At any rate, historical and topical experience points in precisely that direction.

That much may be assumed. If the problems of fair distribution remain unmanaged, political stability cannot be expected on the international plane, any more than within societies and states. Chances of civilising the conflict remain slight. Formulated positively: on the international plane, too, serious efforts for fair distribution are needed, or at least efforts to mitigate gross neediness. Only thus can the accumulation of no longer controllable political explosive matter, resulting from privilege and discrimination, be avoided.[34]

Sixth, power to impose sanctions against a threat to peace or a breach of peace, existing formally but used à la carte, or even abused, lacking or inadequate rule-of-law-analogous institutions and control mechanisms, structural heterogeneity concerning interdependences, inadequate or only embryonic forms of participation, gross inequality—can a culture of constructive conflict management even exist at a world level in view of all these circumstances? The obvious answer is no. The surprising thing is that in spite of all controversial debates, now also about supposedly worldwide 'cultural conflicts', the point of reference for such disputes is, as a matter of course, universal values (human rights of the first or second generation) which act as a yardstick even where they are rejected. Perhaps the experience from the internal areas of hexagonal societies will repeat itself also on the international plane. There, too, constructive conflict culture was not the result of appropriate programmes, but the unintentional consequence of power-political situations, from which mutual tolerance of the contenders inevitably became a reluctant orientation, and only in the course of time became a kind of society-absorbed routine behaviour.[35]

Hence peace, also at the international level, is to be thought of no differently from peace within societies—only with a multidimensional configurative structure with constitutional, institutional, material and emotional components. To quote Fried's fundamental reflections once more: whoever wishes to see one consequence (peace) rather than another (war), must replace the one cause (anarchy) by another ('new world order') that can produce the desired result. Peace, i.e. the enduring civilisation of the conflict, cannot be instituted in a simpler way, not even conceptually. In consequence, peace has to be understood as a non-violent process, aimed at the prevention of the use of violence. By means of agreements and compromises such conditions for the coexistence of societal groups, or of states and nations, should be created as would, firstly, not endanger their existence and, secondly, not gravely violate the sense of justice or the vital interests of individuals or groups that, having exhausted all peaceful arbitration procedures, they believe they have to resort to force.[36]

---

[34] See Norbert Brieskorn (ed.): *Globale Solidarität* (Stuttgart, 1997).

[35] See Norberto Bobbio: *Das Zeitalter der Menschenrechte. Ist Toleranz durchsetzbar?* (Berlin, 1998); Michael Walzer: *Über Toleranz. Von der Zivilisierung der Differenz* (Hamburg, 1998).

[36] This definition of peace is elucidated and deduced in Dieter and Eva Senghaas: "Si vis pacem, para pacem. Überlegungen zu einem zeitgemäßen Friedenskonzept", in: *Leviathan*, 20, 2 (1992): 230–251 (reprinted in: Berthold Meyer (ed.): *Eine Welt oder Chaos?* (Frankfurt/M.: 1996): 245–275.

Such a successful undertaking requires an astonishing amount of preconditions even on a minor scale, i.e. within societies and states; unfavourable circumstances often enough result, in the worst case, in civil wars replacing internal peace. Is therefore, viewed practically, a world peace order realisable at all on the international plane?

5.6.2 Global Governance as a Model of a World Order Policy

Indications that there is a chance of realising a world peace order are found not necessarily on the world plane itself, but in relevant subsystems of the world, such as, at present, exist mainly in the European zone. The Western half of Europe, today's EU Europe, has, since the end of the Second World War, been spared, if not civil-war-like disputes (as in Northern Ireland, the Basque country and Corsica), then at least major wars. More importantly, no one here expects the threat, let alone the use, of military force in spite of continuing conflicts of interests. However, the absence of such expectation in daily life—no one nowadays regards war as an instrument of policy—is, according to a classic definition, an expression (if not the actual constituent condition) of 'stable peace',[37]

If one asks how this situation has arisen in the western half of Europe, the following explanation offers itself. All Western European states, viewed from a civilisation-theory viewpoint, became 'hexagonal societies' after 1950. In terms of constitutional politics they are democratic rule-of-law states, in terms of economics they are market-economy units with a comparable profile, closely intertwined with one another by symmetrical interdependence. Admittedly, equalising justice between them is only in its beginnings (e.g. the EU Regional Fund). Moreover, the institutional interlinking is so marked that the principal agents are under continuous coordination constraint and must willy-nilly orient their various selfish interests towards common positions. Since there are no reciprocal military dangers, it has become unnecessary to create a regional system of collective security. For defence against external dangers there is a defensive alliance going beyond its own region, NATO, as well as an (albeit only symbolical) regional security system in the shape of a Western European Union (WEU) having transformed itself into the EU. At an all-European level there exists, in embryonic shape, a security arrangement containing several (further developable) instruments for peaceful conflict settlement, the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Thus the outlines emerge in western Europe of a geographically enlargeable regional peace order. This is the result of a protracted process of political community-formation, the finality of which, as proved by the continuing public discussion, is still undecided. A whole series of circumstances has contributed to this community emergence: the agreement of all major players on basie political values, the expectation of positive benefit

---

[37] Kenneth Boulding: *Stable Peace* (Austin, 1978).

and the intensification of frontier-crossing communication and economic-exchange processes, readiness to deal with the needs of the weaker ('responsiveness'), accentuated growth and the expectation of mutual advantage, increased ability to solve problems, the existence of core areas functioning as political 'draught horses', variable or flexible roles adopted in the course of time by individual countries, the enlargement of elites as a result of the opportunity for social upward mobility, the evolution of new lifestyles, above all the increasing predictability of motivations and behaviour (expectation stability), etc.[38]

These factors have contributed to institutionally safeguarded collective learning processes; these have progressed to a point where a drifting apart of this part of Europe has become improbable and almost unimaginable. What is often diagnosed as a shortcoming, namely, that Western Europe has not yet become a true community of memories, communication and experience, is not a serious shortcoming so long as there are no indications that, as used to be the custom in European history, these clashing interests will once more be settled by military means. Anyway, EU Europe is slowly moving towards becoming just such a community.

A comparable situation cannot as yet be observed in other parts of the world—in that respect not even in East Asia, where, especially in the case of Korea and Taiwan, new hexagonal societies are developing, although their reciprocal frontier-transcending networking, especially with Japan (and China) still exhibits considerable shortcomings, mainly a lack of substitutive division of labour—not to mention joint overarching institutions of cooperation and policy coordination.

What lesson can be learnt for a world peace order from the exceptional western European experience? The most promising road towards a world peace order will consist in regional systems evolving in many regions of the world, within which there is no threat or use of military force; this expectation would then have to be economically, socially and emotionally rooted and institutionally safeguarded. Such a peace order on a regional basis is durable only if the above-mentioned components work together as infrastructure and superstructure and if that 'social order' comes about which Alfred Fried has quite rightly described as the cause of the effect aimed at in causative pacifism, i.e. the cause of enduring peace beyond the individual state. This guiding perspective applies to Europe as a whole,[39] and also to other regions of the world.

Proceeding from such regional systems of lasting peace a world peace order would not be difficult to envisage: simply as the sum total of such regional arrangements—not as a world state (in the usual sense of the concept), perhaps as a federalist construct, certainly as a quasi- confederative arrangement of regions, which would all be anxious jointly to tackle the region-transcending, i.e. superior, world problems that even in peace-policy-protectcd regional relationships cannot

---

[38] See Chapter 5 of the book from which this text was taken.

[39] This guiding perspective for Europe as a whole is developed in a differentiated manner in Senghaas: *Friedensprojekt Europa*.

be adequately managed. Global governance would probably be the appropriate concept, i.e. a world order policy based upon multiple solid individual-state and regional foundations.[40]

5.6.3 EU Europe as an Exceptional Case of an Emerging Multi-Level Hexagon

EU Europe represents an outstanding case of an advanced political community formation with interesting practical and hence also conceptual implications for hexagonal-peace-theory reflections that, at some future time, might be relevant elsewhere in the world. As has been shown, the civilisatory hexagon evolved in a historical process in a single-state or national constellation. Building upon this and politically deliberately, the integration process in EU Europe has meanwhile developed to a point that has to be described as a post-national constellation.[41] This is the gradual result of political decisions that have led—and in a further integration process will continue to lead—to a derestriction of until now territorially restricted national states, hexagonally constituted in their internal structure. This process may also be described as 'denationalisation'.[42] The new frontier- transcending action patterns and transaction intensifications, especially with regard to an economy in course of transnationalisation (domestic market) and to increased mobility of all possible factors across hitherto fixed and guarded single-state frontiers (people, capital, harmful chemicals, drugs, criminality, etc.) give rise to incongruence between until now national-state- limited, mostly specific political, administrative and juridical regulation mechanisms on the one side and the new denationalised spheres of activity on the other.

It is improbable that, relating to the new spheres of activity, a new, spatially extended but structurally totally identical 'postnational hexagon' will simply replace the many former national hexagons. It is more probable that a 'multi-level hexagon' will develop, a graduated structure with a tendency to react to the denationalisation process and hence innovatively processing the new post-national

---

[40] A complex conceptualisation is found in Otfried Höffe: *Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung* (Munich 2002, 2nd ed.); Dirk Messner and Franz Nuscheler: "Global Governance. Herausforderung an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert", in: Dieter Senghaas (ed.): *Frieden machen* (Frankfurt/M., 1997): 337–361; Paul Kennedy: Dirk Messner and Franz Nuscheler (eds.): *Global Trends and Global Governance* (London, 2002); critically Ulrich Brand et al.: *Global Governance. Alternative zur neoliberalen Globalisierung?* (Münster, 2000).

[41] Thus explicitly Jürgen Habermas: *Die postnationale Konstellation* (Frankfurt/M., 1998), chapter 4.

[42] Michael Zürn: *Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates. Globalisierung und Denationalisierung als Chance*, (Frankfurt/M., 1998).

constellation.[43] Such a development suggests that the attainments until now gathered in the civilisatory hexagon of the national constellation are newly reproducing themselves, or will have to be produced, across several levels in a post national constellation, which is why the multi-level hexagon will be characterised by a number of remarkable specific features.

The following can be observed in detail: the monopoly of power does not, in line with traditional logic of verticality and hierarchy, have to be at the top of the new construct: it can remain, as now, anchored in the national framework. This is possible and probable because European integration is the outcome of far-reaching consensually negotiated political endeavours, because a great measure of voluntary rule observance can be presumed to exist, and in fact exists, without a supernational sanctioning body, so that the EU itself does not have to figure as the quintessence of a classic etatist power monopoly. Moreover, in spite of an evolving governance beyond the nation state, rule-of-law control remains unchanged at the level of the individual states. This, however, is complemented at the EU level by an institution like the European Court of Justice, whose increasing (largely self-created) weight is not to be missed. Admittedly, the democratic legitimation of will formation and decisions on regulations at the transnational level is generally still regarded as having shortcomings. However, this state of affairs is corrigible by the development of transnational parliamentary authorities, the well advanced evolution of associations at EU level and by a political public that is transnationally articulating itself beyond narrow party-political and lobbyist interests. With regard to public control the critical role of civic groupings operating in frontier-transcending networks, both nationally and transnationally, is of major and growing importance. In view of a politically driven frontier-disregarding economy, amounting to an interdependence step, and in view of inadequately developed social- political regulation authorities at the transnational level there is a danger of that much-quoted downward spiral (race to the bottom) of social standards becoming a threat to the transnational European multi-level system and hence also to national political systems. But it is unlikely that, in a denationalised sphere like the EU, the social question that used to be answered by national welfare-state measures would simply evaporate and become a non-problem. On the contrary: in the new context these problems will acquire a political virulence that will eventually make their management, also at supra-state level, inevitable. This point in particular makes it necessary to think configuratively. The problems give rise to action imperatives that cannot fail to have

---

[43] Michael Zürn: "Vom Nationalstaat lernen. Das zivilisatorische Hexagon in der Weltinnenpolitik", in: Ulrich Menzel (ed.): *Vom Ewigen Frieden und vom Wohlstand der Nationen* (Frankfurt/M., 2000): 19–44. Also of interest in this context are the imperatives of a 'catch-up civilisation' of Europe, articulated by Emanuel Richter, who visualised a 'republican Europe'. See this author's: *Das republikanische Europa. Aspekte einer nachholenden Zivilisierung* (Opladen, 1999). Christine Landfried's reflections on the utilisation of the rich experience of difference in Europe fora policy creation at European level can also be assigned to the concept of a multi-level hexagon. See that author's: *Das politische Europa. Differenz als Potential der Europäischen Union* (Baden–Baden, 2002).

consequences for political awareness and for an appropriate political strategy. Thus a redistributive policy, albeit as a rule not yet imaginable today, will become reality also on the transnational-regional plane, even though it may be assumed that central endeavours towards social justice will continue to have their centres of gravity in the various national frameworks.

This means that in a graduated regional multi-level hexagon à la EU there will be stratifications between the separate levels, which, as a rule, will give rise to hexagonal building blocks of varying complexity, different from those familiar from national constellations. The process would be repeated elsewhere in the world, provided preconditions comparable to those in the EU were to develop there.

5.6.4 Players in a New World Order

These efforts for a world peace policy are therefore concerned, as viewed prophetically by 'causative pacifism', with the architecture and internal life of a world peace order: from the lower level of the pacified individual state (what a premise!) via its integration in loosely or variegated integrated regional associations or, as the case may be, emerging multi-level hexagons (again what a premise!) all the way to the top level, where international organisations and international regulations (international regimes) create durable institutional, also juridically conceived, framework conditions for a civilised handling of the conflicts that are inevitable in diverse conflict areas.[44] To counteract violent conflict settlement at all levels, indeed to overcome it in principle—that used to be the idea of visionaries; today these efforts must become the task of pragmatic Realpolitik.

But from whom can we expect such a world-order-oriented Realpolitik—i.e. a policy giving rise to a 'new world order' (a hexagonally inspired 'global governance')? Pacifists with a constructive programme used to believe that a new world order would result from the circumspect behaviour of crucial statesmen, i.e. from wise diplomacy guided by internationalist cosmopolitan norms and backed by international organisations. They had no problems with the state per se since they knew about the qualitative differences between states and were familiar with the concept of the 'rowdy state'[45]—which in the international community meant those players that chronically rejected international order (today they are called 'rogue states'). Thus their thinking, in line with conditions at the time, was state-centred, even though they regarded the civilisation of the international world and societal movements, such as bourgeois, feminist or socialist-motivated pacifism and their transnational or international links, as useful. Anarchist thinking was entirely alien to them. Admittedly, there are still states of diverse character; it would be irresponsible to underestimate this fact because from it can be derived

---

[44] The diverse plans are discussed in Senghaas (ed.): *Frieden machen*.

[45] Thus Alfred H. Fried, explicitly, in *Friedenskatechismus*, published in 1894, reprinted in excerpt in Wolfgang Benz (ed.): *Pazifismus in Deutschland* (Frankfurt/M., 1988): 73.

indications for civilisation chances. Meanwhile, however, deepened and widened interdependences in the world, at least in the OECD sphere, are relativising the importance of state and statehood; they allow not only the players of the economic and cultural world, but also those of the social world, to become co-agents in international politics. Along with the long observed economisation of current foreign policy we can today observe an emergent socialisation of foreign relations with already marked repercussions on foreign policy. The media, interest groups, political parties, foundations, professional associations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other societal groupings are increasingly interlinking across national frontiers; some of these already have considerable weight. The old question, "Is foreign policy *foreign* policy?", thus extended and reformulated, acquires new topicality.[46] The answer can only be in the negative: in advanced societies of the type of the OECD world, foreign policy is a continuation of a self-internationalising domestic policy.

Moreover, in dealing with disasters and emergencies, more especially in the management of ethnopolitical conflicts, non-governmental organisations are downright indispensable in today's world. Here a new field of varied autonomous activities, or activities conducted in cooperation with state authorities, is opening for socially engaged citizens; all of these make diverse demands on personal presence and competence.[47] What we have in mind is activating assistance to politically and socially disadvantaged groups ('empowerment'), escort services for endangered persons, support for refugees and appropriate help and after-care ('postconflict peace building'), reporting in the event of threatening conflicts and emerging escalations ('early warning'), observation of demonstrations, organisation of dialogues between hostile groups, assistance with mediation efforts, lawcourt observation, physical presence in areas of potential or actual tension, observation of elections, advice to official missions such as the UN or OSCE or EU. Such activities cannot, in the long run, be staged off the cuff; along with the necessary commitment they require situation-pertinent training, i.e. problem-specific and action-area- specific civilian peace service, indeed a specialised peace service, in which civic commitment can competently fulfil itself. Here a vast field of activity opens for societal agents and hence for constructive pacifism.[48]

---

[46] See Ekkehart Krippendorf: "Ist Außenpolitik Außenpolitik?", in: *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, vol. 3 (1963): 243–266; Thomas Risse (ed.): *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In. Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions* (Cambridge, 1995).

[47] See Jörg Calließ (ed.): *Barfuß auf diplomatischem Parkett. Die Nichtregierungsorganisationen in der Weltpolitik* (Loccum, 1998); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink: *Activists Beyond Borders. Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, 1998); Norbert Ropers: "Konfliktbearbeitung in der Weltbürgerinnengesellschaft. Friedensförderung durch Nichtregierungsorganisationen", in Ulrich Menzel (ed.): *Vom Ewigen Frieden*: 70–101; rather critically Elmar Altvater et al. (eds): V*ernetzt und verstrickt Nichtregierungsorganisationen als gesellschaftliche Produktivkraft* (Munster, 1999, 2nd ed.).

[48] See Christine Merkel (ed.): *Friedenspolitik der Zivilgesellschaft* (Munster, 1998).

The necessary conceptualisation of such services grows with demand, which reflects an objective need, and especially with first experiences. These experiences, especially if made in crisis situations and aggravated conflicts, show the extent to which societal and state activities are often dependent on each other, even though they operate at different levels and have different addressees. Even police and military security measures may, in certain circumstances, prove indispensable in order to make civic-society activities possible in an environment of conflicts that have become warlike. Dogmatically motivated fears of contact have proved counterproductive, while common learning processes ('multi-track activities' in the framework of 'security-governance' structures) have proved promising.[49]

Specialised peace services are helpful in the building of peace structures, as is peace-oriented diplomacy. Durable peace, however, will ultimately be found only where the local conflict parties eventually agree on universally accepted constitutional patterns and organise their activities accordingly.[50] This applies to separate societies as much as it does on the international plane. The difficulty of achieving such agreement on new rules of coexistence in the public sphere, even in the middle of Europe, is demonstrated over the past few decades by the sluggish process, driven by state and societal forces and marked by continuous relapses, of finding a constitution in Northern Ireland.[51]

5.7 Conclusion

The accents for 'thinking peace' and 'making peace' were at one time correctly set by 'causative pacifism'. Its constructive programme, so far largely disregarded, was to be an inspiration for congenial efforts suitable for our time. Its guiding idea in this can be that the yardstick of peace is peace itself. This is the legacy of an idea from the beginning of the past century—an idea whose time has now come, an idea that, after a terrible century and despite identifiable obstacles, needs to be revived.

Si vis pacem, para pacem: the *para pacem maxim* contained in this guiding perspective contains, at the individual state level, the regional level and the international level, several cognitive, constitution-political, institutional, material and emotional premises. It refers to the requirement of consensus-capable and legitimated coexistence formulas and appropriate institutions (constitution); it regards the material premises of constructive conflict management as a sensitive point

---

[49] The security governance' concept is fundamentally argued in Elke Krahmann: *Multilevel Networks in European Foreign Policy* (Aldershot, 2002). For experience reports on peace consolidation see Mir A. Ferdowsi and Volker Matthies (eds): *Den Frieden gewinnen. Zur Konsolidierung von Friedensprozessen in Nachkriegsgesellschaften* (Bonn, 2003).

[50] See John Paul Lederach: *Building Peace. Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Tokyo, 1994).

[51] For a comprehensive presentation of the problem see Ulrich Schneckener: *Auswege aus dem Bürgerkrieg* (Frankfurt/M., 2002).

of crucial importance for socially mobile and politicisable societies. Emotional reinsurance—'ligatures'—is gained by such a maxim through the orientation of action along life preservation or life enhancement, with transparency and perceived fairness being important criteria of legitimacy. This clearly reflects the process character of peace as a civilisatory project: if, confronted with the requirements of mainly newly organised, newly of-age actors, the traditional internal or international political framework conditions prove incapable of adaptation, then—paradoxically (or perhaps not)—force, with inexorable logic, becomes a substitute for communication and, ultimately, a final resort perceived as having no alternative. Against this background we can understand why such starting situations will, more or less rapidly, slide into political upheaval situations, sometimes into civil wars or revolutions, and indeed into wars between states. Learning and adaptation capacity are therefore important categories for the civilisatory project 'peace'. And the demand for measures providing for 'peaceful change', though usually raised in the peace discussion by international lawyers, is of general and fundamental importance for a civilisatory or peace concept for our time.

Peaceful change in the conditions of a worldwide evident social mobilisation and politicisation, as well as a continually developing societal and economic world with inevitable conflicts about the direction of evolution of individual societies and the world as a whole, i.e. of system-politically relevant power-determined cultural conflicts, requires readiness to learn and adapt on the part of all actors at all levels. This, in particular, cannot be enforced by crude power potentials; it can come about only as a result of reciprocal persuasion efforts in the framework of materially and institutionally receptive transparent communication forums open to participation.[52] Since at the level beyond the individual state the actors cannot usually be compelled to base their actions on guidelines they do not themselves accept, there exists no alternative to persuasion endeavours through communication, i.e. through dialogues and discourses, through arguments and counter-arguments. Where suitable fora evolve in the shape of networks of private, public or mixed character, there politically relevant communication communities can develop, communities that learn to find common rules and consequently to accept the communicatively arisen power as binding. Such a result of collective learning, however, can be envisaged only if those concerned have a fair opportunity of participation, if the communication process itself is largely transparent and if fairness can be mutually expected.[53] As a result of discursive creation of plausible causes for a successful community creation we may then also expect those processes of rule-of-law creation, and ultimately of a

---

[52] The state of affairs emerges from a fascinating observation by Karl W. Deutsch, one of the most important peace researchers of the second half of the twentieth century. He defined power 'as the ability to afford not to learn'; quoted from: *The Nerves of Government. Models of Political Communication and Control* (New York, 1966, 2nd ed.): 111.

[53] On this set of problems see the fundamental article by Rainer Schmalz-Bruns: "Deliberative" Supranationalismus. Demokratisches Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates", in: *Zeitschrift für internationale Beziehungen*, 6, 2 (1999): 185–244.

reliable rule-of-law creation in international relations, in which the 'causative pacifism' referred to at the beginning has always been the quintessence of a 'new world order', i.e. of lasting peace.

As a final conclusion—though seemingly apodictically, but here and now well founded in these reflections on the defining conditions for peace—we are able to formulate this statement: The constituent conditions for a viable enduring peace are known.

Chapter 6
Sounds of Peace: On Peace Fantasies and Peace Offerings in Classical Music (2005)

The reality of war and the hope of peace have always inspired composers to write opuses to which the same prefatory motto could be applied that Ludwig van Beethoven wrote for his Missa Solemnis (1819–1823), one of the most impressive masterpieces of musical petitions for peace: "From the heart, may it go to the heart". The motto suggests the possibility of an affinity between the composer and the listener. Understood thus, compositions can be seen as offerings; the listener acts as a receiver, a sounding board. Mediating between the two is a 'musical event'—a symphony, an opera, chamber music, lieder, and so on.

However, such explicit offerings not only arise through composers and their wish to arouse a certain mood in their listeners through their work, since everybody has their own particular thoughts and feelings, which they associate with war and peace, and especially with the notion of peace and hope of peace. Each individual, or personal notion of peace is profoundly influenced and shaped by that person's everyday consciousness—their associations and emotions, which one might call subjective 'peace fantasies'. These fantasies are projected into different compositions while listening to them—regardless of whether it was the intention of the composer or not to evoke specific fantasies. This, too, is a 'musical event', albeit very different from the type described above. It is not primarily the thematic offering of the composer that in this case comes to the fore, but the fantasies of people who simply love and enjoy music and who experience particular pieces as emotional points of reference relating to their individual projections of peace. Both types of musical event, peace fantasies and composers' contributions, are the subject of discussion below.[1]

Let us first examine some examples of such peace fantasies and their musical equivalents:

---

[1] This chapter was originally written in German and has been translated by Vicki May. See Senghaas (2001; for a more extensive discussion, parts of which have been reproduced here with the kind permission of Suhrkamp (Frankfurt am Main). It was first published in English with this title, in: M.I. Franklin (Ed.): *Resounding International Relations On Music, Culture, and Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005): 199–221.

Many people associate peace with the idea of a well-ordered political and social community. Peace is, then, clearly understood to be more than merely the absence of violence and war, and more than just security. One form of order is expressed in the rule of law, which, as we all know, at least in today's societies, is inconceivable without the perpetual pursuit of social justice. Terms that suggest themselves in this connection would be, for example, a trustworthy political structure and design, with a transparent architecture; peace, that is, as a mirror of recognizable and highly valued 'order'.

As an example, if one listens to a *concerto grosso* from Corelli, Muffat, Bach, Händel, or other Baroque composers, one might sense or identify this characteristically ordered music as an expression of such a peace fantasy. Perhaps Hermann Hesse was inspired by such a "fantasy of orders" when he discussed the late works of Béla Bartók and detected exactly the opposite of the order he had localized in Händel's compositions: "Chaos in place of Cosmos, confusion in place of order, scattered clouds of aural sensation in place of clarity and shape, fortuitous proportions and a renunciation of architecture in place of structure and controlled development" (Hesse 1976: 217).

Whether or not Hesse's judgment of Bartók is really justified is not a matter for our concern here. The positive catchwords that he used, however, are the same ones that characterize a peace fantasy associated with order, and the music corresponding to it. For Hesse, Händel's music was explicitly "symmetry, architecture, tamed hilarity, crystal- clear and logical" (217). And Tan Dun recently remarked, on looking back at his first encounter with Bach—shortly after escaping the chaos of the Maoist Cultural Revolution: "From the very first moment I had the impression that one could visualize Bach's music. The structure, the forms, the order. It is aural architecture" (Dun 2000: 31).

The parallels hinted at here between this kind of peace fantasy and baroque music are by no means unfounded, as is clear from the literature on this subject from the Baroque period and before. In one such essay, dated 1653, Johann Andreas Herbst wrote in the language of the time:

> Und wie die Anarmonia und Uneinigkeit eine Ursache des Untergans in allen Dingen ist, also wird dagegen durch die harmonium alles erhalten, kraft welcher auch alles bestehet, ja das, was gefallen, wieder aufgerichtet und durch seine Harmonium und Einigkeit auf festem Fuß bleibt. … und zum Harmonischen Ebenbild Gottes wieder erneuert werden kann (cited in Müller 2001: 35).[2]

In the words of an observer today, the "regular and well-ordered pattern of a composition is thus (as understood at that time] both a reflection of orderly circumstances in peace, and also a means of achieving such order by exerting its influence on people" (Hanheide 1992: 81).

---

[2] This is roughly translated as; "And just as disharmony and strife are a cause of the downfall of all things, in contrast, all is preserved by harmony, as by its virtue everything also exists, yet even that which has fallen, is set up again and given a firm footing through harmony and unity… and can be restored as a harmonious image of God.".

Let us look at a second peace fantasy. In contrast to the notion just discussed, there are also 'Asian', or so-called universist, and above all Taoist associations. These see a symbiotic unity between the cosmos, nature, society and humans, but also between the cosmos and the system of rule in the here and now. Above all, in this cosmology there are smooth transitions between all that exists: between up and down, and back and forth in time, so that such categories are understood without precise limits or breaks; that is, without polarization or dichotomization. 'Peace' here means finding one's place and nestling oneself into the cosmic order as a whole, but above all not disturbing the cosmic order, which is in itself peaceful.

Which compositions, might one say, correspond to such notions? It must be music with flowing transitions, a wide range of sound; with a continuous, steady and gentle flow of sound. It must be music without a perceptive signature—iridescent, opalescent, finely woven, with a colorfully changing and shifting harmony, without theme or motif, without melody or meter—a music that sparkles, glitters, and flows. Such flowing music can be found in both traditional and contemporary modern East Asian compositions (such as the works of Isang Yun, Toru Takemitsu, Takashi Yoshimatsu, Toshio Hosokawa et al.),[3] but also in the music of modern Western composers, as, for example, in György Ligeti's classic work, *Atmosphères* (1961), that inspired so many other composers to similar compositions based on broad expanses of sound.

A different association with 'peace' again is that of peacefulness, elation, happiness and bliss. For after all, 'ugly' peace is unimaginable. This kind of peace fantasy finds its reference in 'heavenly or divine music', in the 'most beautiful passages' of compositions. People from all over the world very often associate the music of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart with such notions of peace, and many have expressed this feeling eloquently in varying ways. George Bernard Shaw, for example, says of Mozart that his music is the only music that would not seem out of place in the mouth of God. The well-known protestant theologian Karl Barth—and he really ought to know—imagines that when angels play music in praise of God, they play Bach. When they are amongst themselves, they play Mozart, but God still likes to listen in. The catholic theologian Hans Küng perceives "traces of transcendency" in Mozart's music, and the composer Hans Werner Henze sees in it "pure spiritual exaltation, the force of gravity overcome". And Georg Lukacs once said in a conversation with George Steiner: "There is not a single note in Mozart that could be exploited for inhumane or reactionary political purposes." Quite recently, Ekkehart Krippendorff, the political scientist, described Mozart's music as "dialogical" right down to the finest structure and smallest element. "To use a term coined by Jürgen Habermas with reference to public communication in future, democratic, ideally utopian societies, that however have only actually been realized in Mozart's music— a 'domination-free dialogue' is taking place here" (see Senghaas 2001: 13–14).

---

[3] As one paradigmatic example see Isang Yun: Loyang (1962) and the excellent and enjoyable interpretation by Oesch (1997).

Beauty and happiness: that is clearly the notion of peace, here associated with Mozart's music, irrespective of the fact that, as the American composer Elliott Carter once noted, Mozart's music is "happy and sad at the same time, tragic in the most comical moments, Minor in Major, passionate and objective, a mixture of contrasting emotions". The musicologist Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht, among others, obviously agrees with this: "Mozart's music portrays life itself. It dances and sings, asks questions and gives answers, it falls to pieces and renews itself, it is happy and sad, gloomy and bright, tragic, liberated, mournful and comforting…" And conductor Nikolaus Harnoncourt agrees: "Mozart's music contains all the richness of life from the deepest pain to the purest joy. It endures the bitterest conflicts, often without offering a solution. It is often shockingly direct in the way it holds a mirror in front of us. This music is much more than beautiful, it is awe-inspiring in the old-fashioned sense of the word: majestic, discerning, omniscient" (cited in Senghaas 2001: 14–15).

Again, it is irrelevant here whether the peace fantasy projected into Mozart's music—with its delightful, cheerful harmonies—is founded in the compositions or whether the composer, musicologist, or conductor and their own observations are closer to the pulse of Mozart's compositions. Musical fantasies of peace have their own significance, and as a rule they are never totally wrong.

Another notion of peace and its musical expression brings us back to reality. This kind of music expresses the dialectic between the perfect dream world and the adversities of real existence, between peaceful tranquility and pounding, hammering, unbearable peacelessness, between the depths of terrifying despair, and then deliverance. Similar in spirit are compositions in which beauty, peacefulness, and happiness, conveyed through the dialogical play of the melodies, cannot be trusted; where there is an audible tension between the adversities of the real world and an emphatically desired alternative world, possibly leading to inescapable tragedy because the yearning for an untroubled, peaceful coexistence is foiled again and again by harsh reality. Many great symphonies of the past 200 years are experienced as an expression of this kind of peace fantasy, characterized by extreme tension, fragility and disruption or even antagonism, but then again also by some kind of "reconciliation" which relieves the listener from all the extremes heard. Particularly impressive in this respect, to name but two of many examples, are Anton Bruckners last (unfinished) *Symphony No. 9*, which as a whole, but especially in the second movement—*scherzo*—lends itself to such an interpretation, but also Dmitri Shostakovich's *Symphony No. 8* (1943). All of Gustav Mahler's symphonies could be referred to here, of course.

Peace thus presents itself to listeners in keeping with their own subjective projections, with which, on the basis of their everyday consciousness and with only their own sensual perceptions to rely on, they 'naively' encounter compositions or actually even seek them as congenial expressions of their own emotions. It must be reiterated, however, that the compositions themselves need not necessarily bear any programmatic reference to the theme of peace at all. As a rule, it is through the act of listening to such compositions (without any theoretical knowledge or ability to put their listening experience into words) that the listener's preconceived expectations are met simply by stimulating their senses on the same emotional wavelength.

This is only one approach to the sensual world of music and its relevance to the issue of peace. A completely different approach is through the offerings of composers who expressly deal with the issue of peace in certain compositions and attempt, as it were, to find an answer to the question raised in the Messiah by Händel, inspired by the Old Testament: "Why do the nations so furiously rage together, and why do the people imagine a vain thing?" While this is not meant as an academic question, and the Psalmist is not posing the central question with which research into the causes of wars is concerned, one would be justified in interpreting Händel's musical arrangement of the Psalmist's question as the musical motto of any reflections on peace.

A brief survey shows that there is a wide range of compositions that explicitly deal with the subject of peace. There are only a few compositions in which presentiments of impending war manifest themselves. Of course, war itself is often the subject of compositions—in an untroubled sense, in earlier works often with militarist intentions, but today especially in deliberately thought-provoking works. Petitions for peace were often expressed in compositions, and also thanks for regained peace, and in earlier compositions above all thanks for battles won. The twentieth century was dominated by compositions characterized by mournfulness, with war depicted as despicable and inhuman. Martial music is now only understood in terms of music written for military bands. During really existing socialism, politically instrumentalized composers quite often had to bow to party-political intentions, often producing trite musical declarations in favor of peace. Another impressive category of twentieth-century music is that of anti-compositions, that is, antimilitarist music, which also proliferated in the seventeenth century in the period around the 30 years' War. A positive, constructive or affirmative representation of peace is something composers seem to have difficulties with—and the past is no different from the present in this respect. There have been endeavors, however, with and without vocal accompaniment.

There is, thus, a relatively wide range of offerings by composers attempting to approach the theme of peace in classical music.[4] Here are—again—but a few topically arranged examples to illustrate this.

6.1 Premonitions

The premiere of Anton Webern's *Six Pieces for Orchestra*, op. 6 (191 1/1928), in 1913 in Vienna, was surrounded by scandal—in that city a not uncommon occurrence in the early twentieth century. (In actual fact, the loud protests—abuses, slapped cheeks, and fisticuffs— were directed more specifically at Alban Berg's *Altenberg Lieder*, op. 4(1912)). Webern had violated the romantic ideal of sound

---

[4] Senghaas (2001) systematically covers some 250 compositions. The examples given here should be considered only paradigmatically. The order of appearance is the same, however.

by minimizing the sound pattern, provoking the audience with his aphoristic style; that sound pattern is characterized not by sweeping symphonic gestures, but by succinct movements. And there are no repetitions. It was enough, Webern believed, to say something once, and once only. What probably remained concealed to the concert-goer at the time, however, was Webern's premonition of war, which began the following year and ravaged Europe for many years. In an environment of blissful, carefree ignorance, of late romanticism and blithe waltzing, Webern's music carries a sense of foreboding, especially in the longest movement of this, otherwise extremely short, composition, the Funeral March (*Marcia Funebre*). The distant rumbling of canon can be heard, the subdued sound of marching, and here and there the groaning of the brass instruments—the funeral procession advances, as one can tell by the rhythm. Finally the sinister crescendo of the percussion, leading to catastrophe, perceptible through an extreme outburst, a grand tutti that is inconsistent with the chamber-music character of the entire piece. The catastrophe allows no crowning finale; there remain only remnants of sound.

At that very time, in September 1914, Alban Berg was just finishing his *3 Pieces for Orchestra op. 6*. Here, too, catastrophe is anticipated. In the third orchestral piece (*March*), the persistent forcefulness and momentum of the music, its rhythms and crisscrossing dynamics have such a powerful effect that the march is no longer really perceptible. It is utterly engulfed by the musical interpretation of a vision of uncontrollable devastation. As the music progresses, several attempts at appeasement are persistently suppressed, and there develops an atmosphere of doom. In the 1860s the poet Tolstoy once succinctly described the inexorable precipitation into war from a similar perspective in his critique of Clausewitz's notion of the rational, calculable character of war within historical processes.

Berg, in philosophical terms a Tolstoyan, finishes his *3 Pieces for Orchestra* as Tolstoy would have ended it—with a big bang, a Mahlerian hammer blow. Ten years earlier, Gustav Mahler had concluded his *Symphony No. 6-Tragic* (1903–1905), a symphony characterized by rigorous march rhythms, with three such hammer blows. Berg enlarges on the expansive, tragic gesture unfolded in Mahler, developing a solid, merciless, implacable texture, a distressing experience for the listener, only made bearable by the brevity of the composition.

In Béla Bartók's *Divertimento for Strings* (1939), finished a fortnight before World War II began, one can also sense a premonition of what was to come. The first movement is dominated by the airiness of dance melodies, but dissonances indicate that this idyll is not likely to last. The middle movement (molto adagio) is filled with lamentation, evoking quite different associations than idyllic peace: hardship, fear, devastation—*periculum in mora*—an utterly menacing situation! This ominous vision, an impending world catastrophe, is counterpointed by Bartók in a bright, sprightly final movement: "The worst danger can be averted…" Contrary to this suggestion, disaster took its course.

"You can tell when a war starts, but when does the prewar start? if there are rules about that, we should pass them on," Christa Wolf advises in her story *Cassandra* (1983). Webern's, Berg's, and Bartók's compositions—if one might exaggerate somewhat—are early warnings of catastrophe, compositional anticipations. Music

figures here as a sensory device for early warning, "a reminder of the future" (Hector Berlioz), although very probably not in each case intended as such.

6.2 War

War should be depicted m a martial-like way. During World War I, Gustav Holst composed *The Planets* (1914–1917). This seven-part composition begins with "Mars: The Bringer of War" (this piece was actually completed before the war began!). The atmosphere is gloomy, the mechanical rhythms pounding and monotonous. The pitch, while still monotonous, rises, the martial mood intensifies, progressing breathlessly in 5/4 time. Although there are lighter intervals, airy and more cheerful, they are only momentary, and the hammering rhythm returns, more relentless than before. There is a clash of harmonies, and with the final thunderous onrush the world is audibly torn asunder.

All is not lost, however, as after Mars comes "Venus; The Bringer of Peace". The coarseness of the first part gives way to graceful, more refined music. The degeneracy and wearisomeness of war stands in striking contrast to the sweetness and plentitude of peace, as if Holst wanted to present a compositional illustration of the distinction between 'negentropic' and 'entropic' structures as discussed in contemporary peace theory (Senghaas 2004: 143–161). 'Negentropy' denotes the forced dichotomization of reality in good and bad, black and white—conceptually and in practice an orderly structure such as, for example, the deterrence system during the Cold War. 'Entropy', by contrast, is a form of self-regulation through diverse, multilevel structures within a complex environment (as can be observed today, for example, in the multifaceted relations between both the German and French elites and their civil societies).

Mars versus Venus, Venus versus Mars—here is an obvious locus for some feminist music commentators who—not without reason— identify aggression, violence and belligerence as male and conciliation, mediation and peace as female attributes. Gustav Holst makes this contrast strikingly clear.[5]

This type of composition is, of course, worlds apart from the battle music of early modern times. With a pedantry bordering on obsession, particularly in the numerous instrumental pieces, the turmoil of battle is depicted in specific stages: at dawn, the reveille, the marshalling of the enemy troops (distinguishable by different national musical citations), the advance of the troops, the actual battle, the groaning of the wounded, interspersed with rallying fanfares of trumpets and trombones, victory or defeat, retreat, mourning for the fallen soldiers and their burial, dances and victory celebrations, and so on. It required a genius such as Beethoven to actually bring this type of composition, that was quite popular in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, to a culmination in the early

---

[5] On Venus and Mars as a topical orientation in music see Hagemann (1998).

nineteenth century. Remarkably, *Wellington's Victory or the Battle of Vittoria* was actually Beethoven's most frequently performed composition during his lifetime. The piece celebrates the victory of the British, Portuguese, and Spanish troops at Victoria, in Spain, against the French army in the early summer of 1813.

Wellington's Victory was, as noted, a composition of great acclaim during Beethoven's lifetime. Nevertheless, it also provoked considerable disputes, as did battle music as a particular form of program music as a whole. In the long term, and up until quite recently, this composition actually endured the fate that E.T.A. Hoffmann, in his famous critique on Beethoven's 5th Symphony 3 years before *Wellington's Victory*, had expressly invoked on all musical depictions of battles. According to Hoffmann, such "ridiculous aberrations," as he called them, should "be punished with complete oblivion" (Hoffmann 1988: 23). Alfred Einstein passed a very similar judgment 150 years later when, he remarked that *Wellington's Victory* marked the lowest point of Beethoven's creativity (Einstein 1957: 77). This may well be, but Wellington's Victory is without a doubt a highlight in modern battle music, far more sophisticated than all previous works of that genre.

Inevitably, opinions and prejudices made in the past are reflected in such compositions—as in Franz Liszt's *Battle of the Huns* (1857), for instance, in which Goodness (Christianity, symbolized by the army of the Romans and West Goths) clashes with the Evil (represented by the Huns as the embodiment of barbarism). There is no question that Christianity will prevail; here it is signaled by Old Gregorian choral music, first introduced, surprisingly, only by a hesitant organ. Ultimately, after some lyrical sections, which lead us away from the turmoil of battle, Goodness triumphs in a symbiosis of orchestra and organ, very much in accordance with Liszt's belief that "the light of Christ destroys the darkness of heathenism".

Written a few years before Liszt's *Battle of the Huns*, Felix Mendelssohn Bartholdys *Elijah* (1846) also deals with the theme of Good versus Evil; here it is the confrontation between monotheism and the Baal cult. Set in the dynastic context of the Old Testament, *Elijah* tells the story of a "clash of civilizations"—a clash between different religions. Yahweh versus Baal—the invisible, one and only God versus the sensual god of fertility and rain. As always in such oratorios, the outcome of the conflict is easy to foresee. Centuries before Liszt and Mendelssohn Bartholdy, Mateo Flecha (senior) composed a musical interpretation of a clash between heavenly armies and the armies of Lucifer in *La Guerra* (included in the collection *Las Ensaladas* from the first half of the sixteenth century). In this piece, the vanguard are the warriors from the Old Testament, the battle is fought by the captain with his strongest men, and the Church forms the rearguard! Then comes the command: "Bring the artillery of pious thoughts, the observation of the Commandments. Give them their weapons. The trenches are good. Put it there, the heavy artillery… Light it…" Here, of course, as with Liszt later on, Goodness prevails.

A showdown between the angels and Lucifer, a "cosmic w ar" is also the subplot of George Frederick Händel's early oratorio *La Resurrezione* (1705). At the gates of Hell, an angel demands that Christ be let into vanquish Death. Lucifer summons the powers of Hell to battle, but, in the course of the story, which takes place after Easter, he is forced to retreat back into Hell. A few years later,

in Johann Sebastian Bach's Cantata *Es erhub sich ein Streit* (There arose a fight) (BWV 19, 1726), again a cosmic battle is put to music in a splendid opening chorus: "There arose a fight,/The raging serpent, the infernal dragon/Charges against Heaven with furious vengeance./But Michael triumphs,/And the host that surround him/Overthrows the cruelty of Satan."

The story of the Jewish heroine Judith has often been put to music, offering an additional exotic savor, but ultimately dealing with the same power struggle, for example in Antonio Vivaldi's spiritual "war oratorio," *Juditha Triumphans* (1716). The Republic of Venice had been at war with the Ottoman Empire since 1714. The year 1716 marked a turning point, and Venice prevailed on land and at sea. In the oratorio it is Judith's charm and cunning that triumph, but also her determination to commit murder, which, remarkably, she brutally carries out directly after an aria in praise of peace (*vivat in pace, et pax regnet sincera*). Holofernes, commander of the Assyrians, has drunk too much wine and fallen asleep at the table, and is beheaded by Judith with a sword, so that in Bethulia, now liberated, the torch of love may be lit! Contemporary audiences knew that Judith symbolized Venice, Bethulia was the Church and Holofernes stood for the Turks. Vivaldi knew how to present community affairs—here, Venice's fate—in impassioned and powerful tones, as becomes apparent in the vivid portrayal of the horrors of war in the opening chorus.

Early modern composers were, however, not only very fond of portraying military battles, "cosmic wars" and "clashes of civilizations", but also in compositional interpretations of "love wars." The war of love (guerra d'amore), as depicted for example in the compositions of Claudio Monteverdi or Biagio Marini, is an analogy of war, a role game. In Marini, the loved one is a fortress with a heart of stone, at first invincible, even unapproachable; the lover is filled with a yearning desire to conquer: "*Guerra e il mio stato*" which one could translate as "I am m a state of war." Just as the soldier never gives up the struggle, the lover never rests until he has reached his goal.

In *Il Combattimento di Tancredi e Clorinda* (The Combat of Tancredi and (Clorinda) (1624) in particular, Monteverdi uses his newly developed, *stile concitato* (agitated style), as he termed it, to depict the fateful, tragic duel between two lovers who do not recognize each other, as both are wearing coats of armor, which ends in the death of the girl. The assumed airs and inner emotional states are expressed in racing tremolos; the combat between the two lovers, working themselves into an increasingly autistic frenzy, is depicted in sharp pizzicato: "Indignation fuels their vengeful fury,/vengeful fury fuels more indignation,/ whence to their fierce exchange, their frenzy,/comes a new stimulus to inflict more wounds."—The tragedy takes its course; the lovers recognize each other, but too late; Clorinda dies, though filled with happiness: "*S'apre il ciel, io vado in pace*" (heaven opens; I go in peace).

The love-war theme takes a completely different turn in the numerous musical interpretations of Romeo and Juliet (Berlioz, Bellini, Gounod, Prokofiev et al.). Here the lovers are tragic figures because they must bear the suffering brought on by narrow-minded power conflicts between the Montagues and the Capulets, two aristocratic families of Verona. In Peter Tchaikovsky's *Overture Fantasia:*

Romeo and Juliet (1880), the virtuosity with which the violent confrontations—again, scenes of combat—come alive is particularly impressive. However, the war depicted in the Romeo and Juliet story is no longer a "love-war" comparable to many early modern compositions, but a real war (albeit on a small scale within an aristocratic republic), and the lovers are simply the victims of that power struggle, which they cannot influence themselves.

Symphonic interpretations of the theme to love and war do not end there, however. An additional variation is the story of Penthesilea, as composed, for instance, by Hugo Wolf in his *Penthesilea: Symphonic Poem for Large Orchestra* (1883–1885/1903). Inspired by Heinrich von Kleist's tragedy of the same name, Wolf composed a symphony in three movements, the first movement relating in restrained martial- like tones the departure of the Amazons for Troy, led by their queen, Penthesilea. The second movement is a lyrical and picturesque depiction of Penthesiliea's dream of the Festival of the Roses. The actual drama of the piece takes place in the third movement, entitled: "Battles, Passions, Madness, Destruction". Penthesilea versus Achilles, Achilles versus Penthesilea: in this fateful duel, claims to power and passionate declarations of love, calculation and blindness interweave and mingle. Love, hate, and frenzy ultimately escalate to a tragic finale, a late, terrible awakening. The music that portrays the battles is tempestuous and martial-like. The composition is scored for a fourfold brass section and additional percussion. The fervor of battle and love, driving the two to madness, only interspersed fleetingly by short lyrical passages, ends audibly in self-destruction.

Composers frequently adored such subjects as battles and wars of love because they were able to use their compositional virtuosity to the full, and also, apparently, because audiences were responsive to such performances. Numerous interpretations of such compositions for the piano testify to this, providing musical enjoyment in the parlor at home, at the same time of course running the risk of glorifying conflict, war and the turmoil of battle.

6.3 Da Pacem: The Petition For Peace

The relentless beat of the kettle drum, symbolizing the marching of troops, the clash of military apparatus, can also be symbolic of other things, such as fear of the impending war, resistance, or protest—in other words, an antiwar attitude, out of which a plea for peace might arise. An impressive testimony to this is found in Haydn's "*Agnus Dei*" of the *Missa in Tempore Belli* (also known as the *Paukenmesse*), written in 1796—a time beset by war. The French troops had gained one victory after another. Historians write of Bonaparte's "glorious campaign": French troops were already in Styria and threatening to advance. In the "*Agnus Dei*", the distant enemy can be heard approaching through the kettle drum solo. An official imperial order had prohibited any talk of peace as long as the French army was still on Austrian territory. Haydn,

however, made use of the mass liturgy not only to address the subject of peace, but, using compositional means, explicitly to demand it. The imploring "*Miserere Nobis*" is embedded in the relentless rhythm of the kettle drum solo; the "*Dona Nobis Pacem*", backed by powerful fanfares, sounds like "We want peace, we demand peace!"

In Beethoven's *Missa Solemnis* (1819–1823), Haydn's message was given an insistence that has not been—and probably could not be—repeated since Beethoven. In the "*Agnus De*i" of Beethoven's mass, the dramatic struggle for peace and against war deals with the antagonism between war and peace in a way that is unique in the history of music. In this "*Agnus Dei*" too, the military, bellicose atmosphere ultimately recedes. The impression arises that the determination to make peace, and peace itself, have prevailed. It is not, however, an easy kind of peace, not casual and certainly not declamatory. In the composition it is the final outcome of an incomparably dramatic confrontation and extreme tension. Ultimately, peace here is inconceivable without the preceding outcry of fear (*timidamente*) and a glimpse of the depths of despair in the face of disaster.

Peace remains fragile, as clearly demonstrated in this work: The mass does not finish with a triumphal fanfare of victorious trumpets and drums, with no apotheosis, as was often the case on ceremonious occasions before and after Beethoven (and occasionally still is). No, despite the restoration of peace, the mass still ultimately conveys an impression of uncertainty, transience, and the danger of war breaking out anew. One is reminded here, right at the end of the *Missa Solemnis*, of Thomas Hobbes, the realist observer of turbulent times, who wrote in chapter 16 of *Leviathan* (1651): "The nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary". And in the next sentence he writes: "All other time is PEACE". Beethoven finishes with "no assurance to the contrary"—without the certainty of enduring peace, known and discussed in his lifetime as "*paix perpetuelle*", or, as we know from Kant (and others), "eternal peace".

Contemporary composers have also endeavored to give similar musical expression to the antagonism between war and peace. Arthur Honegger's *Symphony No. 3* and Antal Doráti's *Symphony No. 2—Querela Pacis* are two such examples. The petition for peace ("Da Pacem") is incidentally a compositional topic that has repeatedly been taken up by composers right through the history of music since the late Middle Ages. Galina, Ustwolskaja, Heinz Holliger, Bernd Alois Zimmermann, Leonard Bernstein, Katherine Hoover, Violeta Dinescu are among the most recent composers with works on that topic.[6]

---

[6] See Gaima Ustwolskaja: *Composition 1. Dona Nobis Pacem* (1970–1971); Heinz Holliger: *Dona Nobis Pacem* (1968-1969); Bernd Alois Zimmermann: *Requiem für einen jungen Dichter* (1967–1969); Leonard Bernstein: *Mass* (1971); Katherine Hoover: *Quintet Da Pacem* (1988); Violeta Dinescu: *Dona Nobis Pacem* (1987).

6.4 Anticipations of Peace

Similar in content to the petition for peace is music composed in the midst of war that expresses the anticipation of peace. As the German Wehrmacht marched into France in 1940, for example, André Jolivet wrote a *Messe pour le Jour de la Paix*. This mass begins with a depressive "*Hallelujah*" offering no glimmer of hope—which is understandable in the light of events. Hesitantly, though, in the course of the mass, the bleak mood brightens. Finally, the "*Hallelujah*" is repeated, this time quite euphorically, implying that despite all current indications to the contrary, it is possible to hope! Ralph Vaughan Williams's *Symphony No. 5* again, composed in 1943 in the midst of war, is regarded as the highest token of trust that despite all the devastation and chaos, peace will ultimately prevail. Similar sentiments are also attributed to the performances of Sergey Prokofiev's *Symphony No. 5* (1944–1945). The composer conceived his symphony as a document of victory over evil powers. After long years of war, and during the war itself, this symphony was to offer a glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel.

6.5 Compositions of Thanks

In earlier times, the final conclusion of peace was celebrated with music, especially in the case of victory. It was a time for songs of thanksgiving, for "*Te Deum*" compositions, praising God in celebration of armed victory. George Frederick Handel became memorable to his contemporaries and all succeeding generations for such compositions, notably his popular *Music for the Royal Fireworks*, written at the conclusion of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen) in 1749. Marc-Antoine Charpentier's *Te Deum* (1692) was a jubilant response to a French victory (*joyeux et très guerrier*). Today, the orchestral prelude to this composition is played at the beginning of every Eurovision TV program and has thus been given eternal fame—without any remembrance of battles won, but still played today with drums and fanfares, the bygone instruments of war.

6.6 Laments

Broadly speaking, no serious triumphal music to celebrate victorious battles was written in the twentieth century. War is now rather regarded to be a tragedy for civilization, society, and humanity. The compositions deal with death, mourning, and lament, bringing back to mind the seventeenth-century compositions written at the time of the 30 years War; expressing the suffering of that atrocious, long-drawn out conflict.

   Protest, mourning, the overcoming of pain, desperation, and anger—these are the catchwords with which Karl Amadeus Hartmann's compositions are

chiefly associated. It would be too arbitrary to single out particular compositions of his, as his whole oeuvre is leveled against dictatorship, violence and war, but his *Concerto Funèbre* for Solo Violin and String Orchestra (1939) is particularly impressive. Other composers were inspired by places where acts of extreme barbarism took place. Guernica, Lidice, Auschwitz, Hiroshima, but also Nanking—a city in which in Winter 1937–1938 Japanese troops massacred 300,000 Chinese to set an example—a genocide that remained forgotten and unrecorded until only recently, and is now also documented in a composition by Bright Sheng: N*anking! Nanking! Threnody for Orchestra and Pipa* (2000).

But let us return to the theme of lament: "1 am not concerned with Poetry. My subject is War, and the pity of War. The Poetry is in the pity…. All a poet can do today is warn." These are the words of Wilfred Owen, whose poems, along with texts from the Requiem Mass, were worked into the *War Requiem* by Benjamin Britten (1962). To make the composer's intention quite clear, they are on the title page of the War Requiem, which was first performed on the occasion of the reconsecration of Coventry Cathedral that had been destroyed during World War II. (The previous day had seen the premiere of Michael Tippett's *King Priam. Opera in Three Acts*, an antiwar piece about the senselessness, brutality and destruction of war.) Owen's texts, written as "*Missa Pro Defunctis*" on the battlefields of the Great War, figure in the *War Requiem* as if in protest at the declarations of the mass liturgy. Although the conventional Latin mass is a religious ceremony to mourn the dead, Owen's cycle, interspersing the Latin mass, brings across the perspective of the trenches, and of soldiers living in permanent anticipation of their deaths and frequently dying pitifully, as Owen himself did in World War I.

One particularly moving composition is Arnold Schoenbergs *A Survivor from Warsaw*, op. 46 (1947). With his use of recitatives, his blunt, realistic portrayal of a massacre—an act of the utmost human contempt and brutality—but also of the resistance arising out of the horrors of the carnage, and the final chorus, "Hear, O Israel: the Lord is our God, the Lord is One", this short piece, with its extreme dissonances crying out the truth, arouses utter dismay in the listener without the slightest chance to escape.

Compositions of this kind deal with existential abysses the representation of which had hitherto been deemed impossible, or in some cases not even permissible, as Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht once put it. After World War II, however, many composers felt it an obligation to represent the unrepresentable, despite the risk of aestheticism and consequently the musical fictionalization of the barbarism that actually took place.

6.7 Anti-Compositions

A century as scarred with violence, oppression, destitution, prejudices, demonization, nationalism, and racism as the last one, must inevitably provoke resistance and protest, also, of course, in terms of music, in the form of antimilitarist compositions. It could be said of such compositions that the more subtle they were,

the greater effect they had. As in Gustav Mahler's *Revelge*, for instance, a reveille [in Lieder to poems from *Des Knaben Wunderhorn* (The Youth's Magic Horn)], in which a wounded soldier, left dying by his comrades, beats the drum once more and, together with other fallen comrades in a ghostly army beats the enemy and returns to the night quarters: "In the morning the skeletons stand there,/in rank and file like tombstones./The drummer stands in front,/so that she can see him." Kurt Weill and Hanns Eisler must also be mentioned in the context of antiwar compositions. Their compositions of resistance and protest are, understandably, characterized by agitatorial messages. The decisive question here is not whether political agitation is legitimate or not, but whether the artists succeed in conveying these messages aesthetically and convincingly.

"The darkness declares the glory of light"—this motto of Michael Tippett could be the underlying meaning of many anti-compositions that shed light on darkness and evil and still end, not in a depressive, despairing mood, but full of hope, and sometimes even confident of victory: *per aspera ad astra*!

Music that expresses opposition to violence, militarism, armament, repression and tyranny, destitution, racism, and soul-destroying dogmas that promise salvation, is a negative expression of peace, that is, it defines peace in terms to the absence of whatever it is that recognizably and unquestionably averts peace. It is music with an anti-attitude. Anti-compositions and music of the type just described ultimately prompt the question whether a bridge to peace can also be found in music that prevents the above-mentioned antagonisms, mentalities, and modes of behavior right from the outset. How does peace reveal itself in classical music—positively, constructively, or even affirmatively? The answer to this question—that of the expression of peace in the narrower, but proper sense of the term—must ultimately be sought in the compositions.

6.8 Peace

The compositional problem of how to depict peace is often overcome with the aid of literary means, especially passages from the Bible and poetry, as, for instance, in Arnold Schoenberg's composition *Friede auf Erden* (Peace on Earth) for a mixed a capella choir (1911), inspired by a poem by Conrad Ferdinand Meyer. The poem begins with the biblical promise of peace; it continues with a lament over the futility of that promise, and ends with the hope, and even the demand, that this promise at last be fulfilled.

In the 1920s, Anton Webern had said of the piece: "It is our duty to pass on that which must be above all else—the spiritual. If everything falls apart, we shall all sing *Friede auf Erden* by Schoenberg", in the stubborn belief that, as it says in this poem, "Yet, there is faith, eternally,/That not each weak and feeble creature/To impudent, shameless murder/Will fall prey:/Something like justice/lives and works in murder and atrocity,/To erect a kingdom/That strives for peace on Earth." Significantly, Arnold Schoenberg wrote in 1923, on the occasion of the

preparation of the piece for a new performance, that his hope had been an illusion, for when he composed it (in 1911!), he had thought pure harmony among humans to be possible. Since then he had had to learn, however "… that peace on earth is only possible if this harmony is closely guarded, in other words: it may not be left unaccompanied" (Schoenberg 1958: 99). It is worthy of note in this connection that Schoenberg is probably the only composer who actually ever presented a concrete proposal for securing peace (1917). The plan followed the pacifist program of several contemporary specialists in international law, whose contributions were published in the pacifist journal *Die Friedenswarte*. Schoenberg advocated a mandatory international arbitral jurisdiction, including an "army of guardians," an "international guard," thereby developing remarkably ingenious notions on the organization of such peacekeeping and peace-enforcement troops (Schoenberg 1917). Their duty would be to punish blatant breaches of international law and norms by "rowdy states" (the latter term was originally coined by Alfred Fried, a well- known German international lawyer and pacifist, in 1894).

Writing peace compositions without lyrics is undoubtedly a risky enterprise that can easily fail. The third movement in Handel's *Fireworks Music*, entitled "*La Paix*", extremely lightweight, certainly in comparison to the first movement, which is played with the full force of "military" instruments (trumpets and kettle drums) that are out of place in "*La Paix*"! In Gustav Holst's *The Planets*, as already mentioned, *Mars: The Bringer of War* is followed in the second movement by *Venus: The Bringer of Peace*, a sweeping, uplifting and pleasing melody, in stark contrast to the first, hammering, warlike movement. In *Ein Heldenleben* (A Hero's Life) (1898), by Richard Strauss, the hero progresses from the turbulent, martialistic movement, "*Des Helden Walstatt*" ("*The Hero's Battlefield*") to "*Des Helden Friedenswerke*" ("*The Hero's Works of Peace*"). The tumult of battle and the exertions of the works of peace finally culminate in "*Des Helden Weltflucht und Vollendung*" ("*The Hero's Retreat from the World and Fulfillment*"), a poetic, lyrical movement, with enchanting sounds, in parts even sentimental, only occasionally interspersed in the course of the narrative by short dissonances.

Such music evokes, usually toward the end at least, the kingdom of the blessed, the elysian fields, just as many decades before, particularly in the Baroque period, but also later, composers used pastoral music to create an image of peace as a countryside idyll. Händel's "*La Paix*" also belongs to the pastoral genre, which is, of course best known through Johann Sebastian Bach's *Christmas Oratorio* (the *Hirtenmusik*—the "pastoral music"—at the beginning of the cantata for Boxing Day), but also the Christmas music of A. Corelli, J.D. Heinichen, P. Locatelli, F. Manfredini, C. Saint-Saens, D. Scarlatti, and Händel's Messiah (*Pifa-Sinfonia Pastorale*). In Bach's *Hunting Cantata* (1713), pastoral music is combined with what could be called a political statement when Pales, the Roman god of flocks and shepherds, sings: "*Schafe können sicher weiden, wo ein guter Hirte wacht, wo Regenten wohl regieren, kann man Ruh und Friede spüren und was Länder glücklich macht*". (Sheep may safely graze/Watched over by a good shepherd./ Where rulers rule well/Calm and peace may be felt/And all that makes nations happy.) In Jean- Baptiste Lully's and Jean-Philippe Rameau's ballet-operas, as in

other Baroque operas, the virtues of peaceful rustic life are often extolled; such passages, with their murmuring brooks, gentle hills, lush pastures, and constantly enamored youth, have a soothing, affirmative effect.

Pastoral music was finally immortalized by Ludwig van Beethoven's *Symphony No. 6—Pastoral* (1808), which imparts an atmosphere of Arcadian peace. Pastoral, arcadian worlds were later given a marked musical expression by Hector Berlioz in the third movement ("*Scène aux Champs*") of his *Symphonie Fantastique* (1830), and by Gustav Mahler in the first movement of his *Symphony No. 1* (1889) as well as in his *Symphony No. 4* (1900), particularly in the third movement. Peace, or rather peacefulness, throughout the whole of Mahler's extremely dramatic symphonic oeuvre, is audibly an alternative to the shattered world of reality, portrayed impressively in this oeuvre, too.

Music can, however, be used to promote peace in a very different way, for example, when composers consciously combine different national musical styles, as was once the explicit intention of Georg Muffat, to bring about peace. As he explained in his first anthology of concertos in mixed style, *Florilegium* (1695), he wanted to mingle the French with the German and Italian style, to foment not war, but "the harmonization desired by their peoples." Although it was expected of the Hungarian Béla Bartók to compose patriotic, even nationalist, that is, pro-Magyar compositions for the newly founded Hungarian state, his fondest wish was in fact to encourage the fraternization of the nations despite war and strife. "I try to serve this idea—as far as I am able in my music; for this reason I will not turn my back on any influence, be it of Slovakian, Rumanian, Arab or any other source" (Bartók 1931, cited in Helm 1965: 36). All these different cultural and national influences, and especially folk music, are present in his *Dance Suite* (1923). Contemporary composers have also recently begun to seek "intercultural dialogue" and a corresponding semantics, as demonstrated by the Swiss Klaus Huber in his *Lamentationes de Fine Vicesimi Saeculi* (1992–1993), written after the second Gulf War as an explicit bridge-building exercise between the West and the Islamic world of the Near East.

The contribution of religiously founded or spiritual music is of particular relevance to composers' treatment of the theme of peace. The Roman Catholic mass, in particular the "*dona nobis pacem*" in the "*Agnus Dei*" was mostly appreciated not only in terms of its liturgical value, but also from time to time as evidence of peaceful political intentions. Johann Sebastian Bach's handling of the peace theme in his *Mass in B Minor* (1733–1748) is an exceptional case. Here the orchestral and choral flow of praise to God in "*Gloria*" is positively interrupted, even brought to a halt, by an almost endless repetition of "*et in terra pax*"—something that cannot be found in many other mass composition (with the exception of Vivaldi's *Gloria*, RV 588 and RV 589). It is as if Bach wanted to insist, against the dissent of the clergy or the listeners: "Yes! There is an order of peace in *this* world, too…"—albeit *hominibus bonae voluntatis*: peace to those of good will. And if such people bring about peace, then they, especially in religiously motivated music, are the blessed: "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God" (C. Franck, A. Pärt et al.).

Ultimately, peace demands a positive message, and a corresponding aesthetic. In the twentieth century, Olivier Messiaen's work is almost unique in its understanding of this. "Joy", the French composer once wrote, "is much more difficult to express than pain. Look at contemporary music—nobody expresses joy. There are terrible, sad, sorrowful, black, gray, somber things, but there is neither joy nor light" (Messiaen, in Schlee and Kämper 1998: 171). Messiaen didn't want to simply reproduce the gloomy side of life—the existence of which he by no means denies—by writing gloomy music. His ideal was "color music" (*musique colorée*), which evoked in him (and, he hoped, also in the listeners) the same effect as the stained-glass and rose window's of mediaeval cathedrals illuminated by the sun. By listening to the sounds of colors, color music leads us to understand things beyond simple comprehension; "it dazzles us" ("*elle nous apporte l'éblouissement*"). Working against the spirit and the noise of the age in an anti-lyrical environment, Messiaen sought to use tone colors, rhythms, and lyricisms—his "church-window music"—and the multicolored sounds of songbirds (Messiaen was also an ornithologist!) to demonstrate that the beauty of creation still manifests itself today. Messiaen was no Romantic, however; his music is unsentimental. It entices us into a not-quite-everyday world: by no means a mystic world, as one might expect, but one which can by all means be puzzled out rationally—a sonorous world of joy and peacefulness.

Messiaen's explanatory preface to an homage to Mozart entitled *Un Sourire* (1989–1991), written in commemoration of the two hundredth anniversary of Mozart's death in 1991, could also apply to Messiaen's own work: "Despite pain, suffering, hunger, coldness, lack of understanding, and his approaching death, Mozart always smiled. His music smiled, too. So I have taken the liberty, in all humility, to entitle my homage *A Smile*."[7] 'The resulting creation was, in defiance of all the miseries of life (*les ténèbres*), a new "rainbow of sounds," by a composer who seemed to be a messenger from another world.

6.9 Concluding Observation

Earlier, I quoted E.TA. Hoffmann, who, in his critique of Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony* exclaimed that all recent battle pieces were ridiculous aberrations and should be condemned to oblivion. This was his verdict not only of battle music, but also of every kind of "Programm-Musik" (program music). Although the term came later and had a slightly different meaning, this was surely at the same time a petition for "*absolute Musik*". "If one can speak of music as an independent form of art," wrote Hoffmann in 1810, "then it should only be instrumental music in which all interference by other arts are despised and, thus, absent" (Hoffmann 1988: 23).

---

[7] Quoted from the accompanying Deutsche Grammophon booklet, 1995, CD 445947-2.

Valued music, and music of lasting value according to this powerful aesthetic theory, could only be "absolute music", the epitome of pure, subject-free instrumental music, detached from lyrics, program, drama and action. Or it could, as was formulated after 1945 in reaction to the political instrumentalization of some music during the first half of the twentieth century, only be "autonomous music"—music free of function, service or purpose, in particular of societal and political functions that penetrate into the intrinsic nature of music and exploit it. It could only be art for art's sake.

This aesthetics of music, which singles out absolute or autonomous music as the only music to be taken seriously, did not go undisputed in the nineteenth, or even in the twentieth century, but despite the odd outstanding controversy it has remained the predominant theory, at least in Continental Europe, and particularly in Germany. Its inherent bias against program music of any kind has—as one might surmise—hindered not only the historical, but also a systematic approach to compositions dealing with themes explicitly related to issues of war and peace.

Just one banal observation testifies to this: 150 years after Eduard Hanslick's book, *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen* (The Beautiful In Music), was first published in 1854 as a brilliant vindication of absolute music as the only music to be taken seriously, it is still (and quite rightly so) a bestseller, now in its twenty-first German edition and available in paperback. But in the new edition of one of the few excellent, world-leading musicological handbooks, published in early winter of 2000, *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, with 29,000 articles in 29 volumes (!), while there is no separate entry on peace music at all, there is, of course, one on battle music. The case is very much the same with recently published handbooks in German and other languages.[8]

In view of this situation in musicology—with the exception of occasional contributions on particular works of topical interest (on the reissue or new performance of a work, for instance)—it should come as no surprise that even in peace and conflict research, the musicological approach to the issue of peace has remained a nonsubject. This situation in peace research, and in the neighboring disciplines of music history and musicology, should nevertheless prompt scholars to approach the central theme of this contribution as a worthwhile topic, shedding light on the peace prohlematique from quite an unusual perspective.[9]

---

[8] The excellent documentation of war-related music by Arnold (1993) also testifies to this observation.

[9] A collective effort by 20 musicologists in this direction is now available in Lück and Senghaas (2005). All compositions referred to in this chapter are presently available on CD in at least one version. There are, depending on the fame of the composer and/or the composition, many interpretations. An excellent catalogue (usually with short comments or descriptions added) is <www.jpc.de> or <www.gramophone.co.uk->. Of particular use is also Gramophone Classical Good CD Guide, published yearly in the U.K.

References

Arnold, Ben, 1993: *Music and War. A research and Information Guide* (London–New York: Garland Reference Library of the Humanities, vol. 1581).

Dun, R., 2000: "Interview", in: *Die Zeit*, 20 July: 31.

Einstein, Albert, 1957: *Von Schütz bis Hindemith* (Stuttgart: Pan).

Hagemann, K., 1998: "Venus und Mars. Reflexionen zu einer Geschlechtergeschichte von Krieg und Militär", in: Hagemann, K.; Pröve, R. (Eds.): *Landsknechte, Soldatenfrauen und Nationalkrieger. Militär, Krieg und Geschlechterordnung im historischen Wandel* (Frankfurt–New York: Campus): 13–48.

Hanheide, S., 1992: "Musik und Pazifismus", in: *Magazin der Universität Osnabrück* (Osnabrück: University of Osnabrück, December): 80–83.

Helm, E., 1965: *Béla Bartók* (Hamburg: Rowohlt).

Hesse, H., 1976: *Musik* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp).

Hoffmann, E.T.A., 1988: *Schriften zur Musik* (Berlin [Ost]: Aufbau).

Lück, H.; Senghaas, D. (Eds.), 2005: *Vom hörbaren Frieden* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp).

Müller, H., 2001: "Die Imagination von musikalischer Einheit und Ordnung", in: Mautz, S.; Breitweg, J. (Eds.): *Festschrift für Siegfried Schmalzriedt* (Frankfurt/Main: Lang): 27–48.

Oesch, H., 1997: "Musik aus dem Geiste des Tao", in: Heister, H.; Sparrer, H.-W.; Walter-Wolfgang, W. (Eds.): *Der Komponist Isung Yun* (München: Edition Text + kritik): 11–27.

Schlee, T.D.; Kämper, D. (Eds.), 1998: *Olivier Messiaen. Über Leben und Werk des französischen Komponisten* (Köln: Wienand).

Schoenberg, A., 1917: "Friedenssicherung", reprinted in: *Beiträge zurMusikwissenschaft*, no.3, 1977: 202–205.

Schoenberg, A., 1958: *Briefe* [ed. by Erwin Stein] (Mainz: Schott).

Senghaas, D., 2001: *Klänge des Friedens* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp).

Senghaas, 2004: *Zum irdischen Frieden* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp).

Chapter 7
Enhancing Human Rights: A Contribution to Viable Peace

7.1 Introduction

On 10 December 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in Resolution 217 (III) of the United Nations General Assembly. The prior history of this declaration had already been marked by considerable controversy. Essentially, there was a clash between the liberal and the real-socialist understanding of human rights; and the concern of several Islamic states, mainly with regard to reservations on Article 18 of the Declaration, which embodied the right of every person to freedom of conscience and religion, including the freedom "to change [one's] religion or belief".

These controversies continued during the next 18 years, when the U.N. Commission on Human Rights elaborated internationally legally binding agreements. In 1966, these were adopted in the form of two human-rights conventions: the *Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* and the *Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*. As the two decades following 1948 were marked, in terms of international politics, by the struggle for decolonisation, and hence for the right to self-determination for peoples and to independent economic, social, and cultural development, corresponding demands found their way into the documents mentioned. Both covenants begin in identical fashion with the affirmation that: "All peoples have the right of self-determination". Like many other statements in the covenants, this first sentence in itself highlights the fact that human rights have not only an individualistic but also a collective rights dimension. Looking at the two *Covenants* together and taking into consideration the concern for the ecological problématique as having been articulated since the early 1970s, there is a tremendous conceptual and political overlap of the human rights debate and movement as well as the concern for human security.

7.2 The Emergence of the Concept of Human Rights and Human Security

Taking into consideration the early controversies, which continued beyond 1966, the functional status of human rights in political and social processes, within societies and at the international level, can presently be resumed as follows: Reference to human rights, particularly, of course, civil and political rights, is aimed at averting arbitrary action by the state. Corresponding rights serve to safeguard individual autonomy and, ultimately, the inviolability of "human dignity". This scheme of argumentation, of course, presupposes the existence of a legal community, because the possibility of arbitrary action by private persons against other private persons is deemed to be eliminated by virtue of the existence of a state monopoly on the use of force and of the "rule of law".

However, a legitimate state monopoly on the use of force and the rule of law are only an embodiment and expression of a decent legal community if law has come into being by democratic means, and if there are constitutionally stipulated measures for furthermore developing existing law in the light of new political, social, economic, cultural, and (by implication) legal requirements. Hence, the realisation of human rights—a process that must constantly start anew, though it necessarily remains controversial—is thus dependent on the existence of a democratic constitutional state based on the separation of powers and a broadly based political participation. It follows that the struggle for human rights is always also a struggle for the institutionalisation of modern democracy, and, despite identical premises (separation of powers, principle of openness, freedom of assembly, etc.), that democracy takes very different institutional forms.

As well as offering protection against arbitrary action by the state and also promoting the constitutionally regulated elaboration of law, reference to human rights currently primarily serves to identify and overcome all types of discrimination. In this respect, the discourse about human rights has become an anti-discrimination discourse—a trend which, incidentally, is fully in line with the 1948 declaration and the two 1966 *Covenants*. This does not just involve political discrimination *per se*, but also the social, economic, and cultural disadvantage that underlies such discrimination. The aim of such discourse is to overcome an institutionally entrenched order that systematically produces inequalities and thus goes against equality of opportunity at the most basic level. In concrete situations of chronic disadvantage, reference to human rights and by implication to human security thus becomes a lever to protest and, in some cases, to liberation. Article 27 of the *Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, for example, states that: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language".

Provisions such as these have often been criticised for their 'collectivist' stance. But such criticism is flimsy, for, as history shows, collective discrimination such as that which occurs in the case of minorities cannot generally be eliminated by

individual measures alone. In fact, it is precisely in such cases that group-based legal provisions and collective measures are needed to ensure that the requirements of Article 2 of the *Declaration* focused on the individual are satisfied: "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."

Protection of the individual can be fixed by law, as can the prohibition of discrimination. Discrimination can, additionally, be overcome through appropriate constitutional regulations (such as the safeguarding of minority rights) and also through general measures of support. Over and above these important and fundamental reference points, human rights in general and the concern for human security imply a social order in which there are specific measures to ensure that human dignity is given some kind of look-in politically, legally, economically, socially, and culturally. The basic human rights documents, thus, leave no room for doubt as to the fact that they are underpinned by the notion of a "society in correspondence with the dignity of human beings". Much—some would say too much—is already contained in the 1948 *Declaration:* the freedom to marry, for example, and the protection of the family; social security and the right to work and to equal wages; even "the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay" (Art. 24). Finally, there are provisions on cultural freedom, in that Art. 27 states that: "Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits."

These kinds of general statements naturally need to be given concrete shape. The fact that there are a host of conflicting opinions as to what constitutes a "society in correspondence with the dignity of human beings", ensuring human security, is not a drawback; it turns out to be almost an elixir of life for the idea of human rights. The widening and deepening of the idea of human rights—from the rights guaranteeing protection of the individual and non-discrimination, through to the positive notions for shaping a society, including an international order worthy of human rights—would never have come about if there had ever been one single self-consistent blueprint for human rights. The longer the discourse about human rights continues, and the more international it becomes, the more human rights will take concrete shape over the controversies it arouses. This trend is definitely to be welcomed, and it accounts for the conceptual bridge between the historically prior concept of human rights and the concept of human security as it is understood today.

7.3 Human Rights as the Result of a Cultural Revolution

In the West, and also beyond it—though in this case with anti-Western feeling—human rights have been interpreted as a typical outgrowth of European culture. This self-perception and external interpretation are essentially correct, given that

human rights, as currently understood, are a product of European developments. But what do "European culture" and "European development" mean here? If one assumes European culture began with Greek antiquity, then it would now be about 2,500 years old. But it is only in the last 250 years that the idea of human rights has played a determining role in the development of European culture. The political struggle to get human rights enforced is confined to this period as well. And since it was a struggle in the true sense, the thesis that human rights had to be enforced *in opposition to Europe's own tradition*, as it had been shaped over the preceding centuries, is not a groundless one. What we nowadays associate with human rights in the narrow or broad sense was therefore clearly not something implanted into Europe's original 'cultural genes'. The overwhelming part of European history, including its cultural history, does not attest any particular sympathy for those things which human rights currently represent. And it is also quite wrong to imply that European history, by virtue of its internal logic, had inexorably to lead to the triumph of the idea of human rights.

The history of human rights in itself proves that this is not so. The human rights' declarations of the late eighteenth century refer to humankind, but in reality this term only ever included a section of it: for a long time, it did not mean anyone who did not have education or property; it did not mean women, or children, let alone coloured people or slaves. All of them were excluded without scruple; and philosophy and political theory sometimes offered extravagant justifications for this kind of exclusion—justifications that one should also recall as a genuine expression of European cultural heritage! And what began in exclusionary fashion became inclusive not because there is some internal logic leading from exclusion to inclusion, but because, with the passage of time and as a consequence of social mobilisation from traditional to a modernizing society, those who were excluded were no longer willing to remain so, and instead called for equal rights—until finally the idea triumphed that where human rights are cited, this embraces *all* people, regardless of the concrete and cultural shape they take.

Hence, what we nowadays regard as self-evident, and what is claimed, with a reference to the Christian notion of man's being created in the image of God, to have always been regarded as self-evident in European history, had no determining influence whatever for 90 % of that history. The early European social and political system was autocratic and status-based, corporatist-and-collectivist; one seeks in vain across many centuries for the 'autonomous individual' as found in modern human rights documents. And until well into the nineteenth century, despite the revolutions at the end of the eighteenth, many European societies continued to be characterised by status-based social stratification and legal divisions, with individual rights and duties varyingly defined according to gender, status, and later on to class.

The *abstract individual* of Article 1 of the 1948 Declaration ("All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights")—in other words the individual irrespective of gender, age, colour, and so on—did not exist at all socially, legally, and thus culturally for most of European history. The idea of such an individual only emerged in the context of social conditions that were becoming intolerable because of class privilege and class exploitation, of conspicuous wealth side by

side with poverty, and also because of the new, mostly bourgeois classes, who found the traditional order, the *ancien régime*, incompatible with their own aspirations. It was this constellation that generated the explosive cultural and political energy against Europe's own tradition which finally got the human-rights idea going—a process which was deepened by social movements of different orientation.

Of course, every far-reaching idea has isolated intellectual precursors. But it was only in a relatively late phase of European development that it was possible to emancipate the status-based individual, who possessed only an unequal, status-determined freedom and dignity, and make of him or her a human being *per se*. It was only then—and, as already stated, in complete contrast to Europe's long history—that all people came to be regarded as free and equal *in principle.*

The idea of human rights thus represents a profound turning point in European history as well, indeed a cultural revolution. This was much more profound than is implied in those arguments that portray human rights—their embodiment in constitutional provisions and social policy—as an expression of "timeless European culture", or indeed as the end-product of European cultural traits present from time immemorial. By way of a counter to this, one should remember: Human rights were not given to Europe in the cradle, with the idea that one just had to sit and wait until Europe at some point reached maturity. On the contrary, they were the result of public agitation on a mass basis—the work of subversives in spirit and deed and of social revolutionary movements, led first by the bourgeoisie and then by the workers' movement. Women and marginal groups then followed.

This, then, is the true history of the idea of human rights and its translation into a social and political system that we nowadays view as "typically European/ Western". This order only stabilised after 1945, and only after this did it—and the political culture underlying it—become a foregone conclusion. *Prior to this, every Western society had waged a battle, each in its own particular way, against its own tradition.*

In Germany in particular, there should be no trouble recalling this fact, given that, until the middle of the last century, prominent intellectual currents and political movements existed here that expressly opposed the hard-won achievements of a political culture that we nowadays see as 'Western'. Thus, Thomas Mann, far from acting as an eccentric, was actually being quite representative of what now seems an anachronistic intellectual current in Germany when, in 1918, writing of the contrast between Germany and the West, he stated that democracy was "alien and noxious" to the German nature: "I confess and I am of the profound conviction that the German people will never bring itself to love political democracy, and that the much-decried 'authoritarian state' (Obrigkeitsstaat) is, and will remain, the form of government that best suits, best befits, and is essentially desired by, the German people." And this then already world-renowned German writer (a Nobel prize winner) goes on to say: "Anyone who sought to make Germany simply into a bourgeois democracy in the Roman-cum-Western sense and spirit would rob it of what is best and most complex about it, of its problematical features, in which its nationality truly consists. He would be seeking to make it monotonous, unambiguous,

unsubtle, and un-German and would thus be an anti-nationalist, insisting that Germany should become a nation in a sense and spirit alien to it" (Mann 1918, p. 46). This was written nearly 95 years ago—by one of the most respected champions of "the German spirit", and it reads like many present statements from some intellectuals of the non-Western world (Buruma and Margalit 2004).

7.4 History Repeats Itself Indeed

A realistic view of European development—one that is aware of Europe's human rights struggle against its own tradition—is also important for understanding the human rights problematic outside Europe and the West, because tensions familiar from early European history are being played out afresh there. All extra-European societies currently find themselves in a state of profound upheaval. On top of this, they are undergoing internal pluralisation. As a consequence, traditions are breaking away and reorientation is becoming overdue. Internal cultural conflicts are arising which are ultimately about the future of the social and political system. The human rights problematic acquires, as ever, particular political explosiveness in this context.

The lines of conflict are relatively clearly drawn up: some want to imitate Europe, others want to revitalise the old traditions. Others again believe they can combine modern technologies with old values. Not surprisingly, the European battle-lines in argumentation observable in the late eighteenth century and the nineteenth century are also being replicated: Individual human rights are seen as a threat to traditional values, to the particular country's own culture and tradition, and, most importantly, to current standards of decency. In contrast, the champions of human rights in the non-Western world are no longer prepared to bow to autocratic or despotic regimes, economic exploitation, or social and cultural discrimination.

It is serious abuse that once again gets human rights onto the agenda in each particular place all over the world, and this means that outside Europe too, traditional orders and cultures are coming into conflict with themselves. In East Asia, South-East Asia, and South Asia, and in the broad Islamic sphere of influence, cultures of corporatist-collectivist, patriarchal, or paternalistic bent are being called into question as a result of social mobilisation leading to pluralisation. This is an actual repetition of one of the crucial and recent experiences of Europe.

This process is not a smooth one, and it does not even follow a straight course. It gives rise to recalcitrant fundamentalist movements to which human rights for the most part are anathema. At the same time, however, there is a spread of political movements that have made it their aim to make human rights, the rule of law, and self-sustaining democracy a political reality. Of course, the prospects for human rights and democracy are greater in societies where development has been relatively successful than in societies that find themselves in a chronic development-crisis with no immediate prospect of a solution. This is the difference—to cite a concrete example—between Taiwan and Egypt.

7.5 Conclusion

Until well into the present century, anti-Western 'German values' were still being championed in Germany. Until recently, 'socialist values' were being played off against bourgeois ones in the real-socialist system. 'Islamic values' are currently being propagated in Islamic societies. And the autocrats of Asia, along with the fundamentalist writers of the Arab-Islamic region, are arguing in just the same way as Thomas Mann did 90 years ago with respect to Germany. In the case of these latter, the Islamist argumentation also displays an astonishing degree of congruence with the Catholic-inspired 'theocratic counter-revolution', so-called, which, during the first half of the nineteenth century, vehemently opposed both the humanistic view of history, culture, and mankind propounded by the French Revolution, and, of course, any form of liberalism and individualism.

The worldwide cultural conflict scenario, of which the human rights discourse is currently a core element, is thus very familiar. Its real setting is located in individual societies with their specific cultural cleavages. In these societies, a 'clash *within* civilizations' is being fought out. In contrast, the 'clash of civilizations' as predicted by Huntington, is a chimera (Senghaas 2002). This state of affairs has a remarkable side effect: the international dialogue is becoming easier, because the encounter is no longer between internally harmonious, rather monolithic or homogenous cultures, but between cultures that have come into conflict with themselves.

Whether the idea of human rights will ultimately triumph in many different places in the world, and whether this idea will be translated into political orders congenial to human rights—these are open questions. But just as was once the case in Europe, the answers outside Europe too will not depend on age-old pre-programmed cultural characteristics that supposedly help or hinder such transition. The decisive factor will be the political power-constellations within development processes, which will either succeed or fail—or, more frequently, will be caught in the crosscurrent between success and failure. It is here, and not in cultural legacies, that the uncertain future fate of human rights lies.

Since there has been an overlap between human rights issues and the concern for human security, there is a high probability that neither the concepts of human rights and human security nor the political movements, respectively, will counteract each other. It is rather to be assumed that with respect to both intellectual and political activities there will be a kind of mutually reinforcing feedback.

References

Buruma, Ian; Margalit, Avishai, 2004: *Occidentalism. The West in the Eyes of its Enemies* (New York: The Penguin Press).

Mann, Thomas, 1918: *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen* (Berlin: S. Fischer).

Senghaas, Dieter, 2002: *The Clash within Civilizations. Coming to terms with cultural conflicts* (London–New York: Routledge).

About the Author

Dieter Senghaas (Germany)
Dr. phil. (Political Science, University of Frankfurt, FRG), Professor of Peace, Conflict and Development Research, Institute of Intercultural and International Studies (INIIS), University of Bremen, Bremen, FRG. Publications include: The European Experience. A Historical Critique of Development Theory (Leamington Spa, Dover: Berg Publishers 1985), The Clash within Civilizations. Coming to terms with cultural conflicts (London/New York: Routledge 2002), Klänge des Friedens. Ein Hörbericht [Sounds of peace: A Listener's Report] (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 2001), On Perpetual Peace. A Timely Assessment (New York– Oxford: Berghahn Books 2007), Coeditor of Vom hörbaren Frieden [On Peace to be Listened To] (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 2005), Weltordnung in einer zerklüfteten Welt [World Order in a Fragmented World] (Berlin: Suhrkamp 2012).

Address: Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Dieter Senghaas, Universitaet Bremen, Institut fuer Interkulturelle und Internationale Studien, PF 33 04 40, D-28334 Bremen, Germany.

Website: <http://www.iniis.uni-bremen.de/homepages/senghaas/index.php>.

About the Book

Dieter Senghaas, professor emeritus of international relations, University of Bremen, is one of the most innovative contemporary German social scientists with major contributions on peace and development research and on music and peace. He was awarded many prizes: International Peace Research Award (1987), Göttingen Peace Prize (1999), Culture and Peace Prize of the Villa Ichon in Bremen (2006) and Leopold-Kohr Prize of the Austrian Ministry of Science and Research (2010). This book offers a global audience five key texts of D. Senghaas (1974–2009): Towards an Analysis of Threat Policy in International Relations; Friedrich List and the Basic Problems of Development; Developing the Definitions of Perpetual Peace ('para pacem'): Through What and How is Peace Constituted Today?; Sounds of Peace: On Peace Fantasies and Peace Offerings in Classical Music; Enhancing Human Rights—A Contribution to Viable Peace.